

June 16, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: October Ministerial in Colorado

We ought to think through who we might want to have a chance to meet the NATO ministers of defense when they are at Colorado Springs, such as other combatant commanders. Any thoughts on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-38

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20111 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17777

June 16, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting

I am dissatisfied with the reports I am receiving from CPA and CENTCOM on Iraq and Afghanistan. The President and the NSC are probably also unfulfilled.

We are not telling the NSC when major efforts are being mounted. We don't have good metrics. We don't have a useful format. We don't have a rhythm or a system.

I would like to put together a team of people to develop a proper format.

Thanks.

DHR:dl
061603-40

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U20112 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17778

June 16, 2003

OS
6/23

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cycle Time

I want you to connect Pete Aldridge with Fran Harvey now, and have him get interested in what Pete is doing. I think he could be very valuable on cycle time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-45

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20113 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: Immediate Office
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tom Foley

*Andrew
Casper*
DONE

Condi Rice is going to send me a background sheet on Tom Foley. Please physically hand it to me in a file that says what it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-48

.....
Please respond by _____

U20114 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: NSC and PC

*ADVANCE
COPY 5/21/03*

Apparently there is an NSC on Wednesday, and they want Bremer to brief the President.

There is a PC on Tuesday, but I have forgotten what they said it is about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-32

.....
Please respond by 6/17/03

OBE

U20115 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Saddam

I think you ought not to say you think Saddam Hussein is alive. I think we ought to say we don't know, which is the truth. Second, we ought to say we do know one thing for sure—he is not running Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-33

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U20116 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17782

June 16, 2003

Done


TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Call with Bremer

Let's make sure we reschedule my phone call with Bremer that never got done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-31

.....
Please respond by 6/16/03



Done

U20117 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *7*
SUBJECT: Okinawa

*Done - LTG C
TO SENT
TO DRAFT PIP 31*

Colin Powell tells me there is a rape case in Okinawa again. We sure better get on top of it. Colin thinks it could be as bad as the last one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-30

.....
Please respond by 6/17/03

O BLS

U20118 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17784

June 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Answers for Woodward

Please have someone try to figure out the answers to some of these questions.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/27/03 Woodward list of questions

DHR:dh
061603-26

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20119 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Bob Woodward (27 May 2003)

JUN 16 2003

ANC

Questions / Statements:

- 1) **In spring of 2002, POTUS issued order to the CIA – a corollary effort to the military planning. The agency’s personnel were incorporated for the first time – not left dangling out there alone. Is that accurate?**
- 2) The early plans discussed at high levels were beyond (much more than) Desert Badger Plus and Desert Badger Plus Plus, right?
- 3) Early Franks plan was beyond standard linear and chronological, right?
- 4) Is there a way to get some concrete examples ... or some kind of calendars without dates (timelines) that help translate from the matrix concept to something that is more linear?
- 5) Requested help with documents that would be helpful in clarifying for readers. (Perhaps from Jan./Feb. time frame.)
- 6) When did plan/discussions get to the point where there were distinct phases? When were these meetings and who was present?
- 7) **What was SecDef’s immediate reaction to Franks’ first plan?**
- 8) Who on his staff may have helped him? Did he bring anyone along with him to these key, senior planning meetings?
- 9) When was this meeting in the SecDef’s office?
- 10) **What was your reaction to the President’s Axis of Evil speech?**
- 11) POTUS says the West Point speech (“preemption speech”) is the most significant. Says we must be both Wilson and T. Roosevelt.
- 12) When was the “Preparatory Tasks” directive signed by POTUS (several hundred million in construction and preparatory work) – the directive that SecDef asked POTUS to sign? (end of July?)
- 13) Was that a big deal?
- 14) (Description of document.) The blue bars were the “critical enablers”?

- 15) **When did POTUS decide to go to war?**
- 16) When was the earliest we could have gone to war?
- 17) A point (mid- to late-February) at which point the broad outline of the plan was calling for what? (5 days for air bridge, 11 days for force flow, etc.)
- 18) Scooter Libby made a major case study presentation. It was very dramatic a started with conclusions, then proceeded to WMD concealment?
- 19) Either Powell or POTUS used a lot of that material over time?
- 20) What were the 10 most interesting, courageous, unexpected and unpublicized missions undertaken by SOF units (at the battalion level and below)?
- 21) POTUS is trusting of the (Woodward article and book) process.
- 22) In execution of war-related decision making, POTUS was very gutsy.
- 23) Offered to let DSD, KSK read transcript of his two POTUS interviews.
- 24) "I did an inadequate job of telling the story of the war plan." Needed more time to flesh it out and crosscheck some key aspects.
- 25) **Is Saddam Hussein still alive?**
- 26) It is now White House policy to tell the story of the war.
- 27) **I've known SecDef for a long time. "Whatever has happened there, I have to accept my responsibility for it."**
- 28) Any advice on whom else I should also be speaking with and what to look for?
- 29) I have intentionally not approached other DoD officials – uniformed or civilian – out of deference to SecDef. Thought I should speak with him first.
- 30) **Tell me more what else I should do or how I can assure SecDef. I would be happy to just sit down with him for an initial conversation about the process and what I'm looking to achieve with the series and the book.**

June 16, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Turbulence in Managers

Please look at the turbulence in these managers. What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/03 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Program Stability

DHR:dh
061603-25

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20121 ' /03

→ INFO ONLY

March 19, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 20 2003

Larry Di Rita
3/19

(Handwritten initials)
D
D
LW

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Myers

From: Pete Aldridge *(Signature)*

Subject: Program Stability

This is why we have a hard time maintaining program stability. In the life of a typical DoD program, lasting an average of 11 years, we have the following*:

- 4 Program Managers
- 5 Program Executive Officers
- 8 Service Acquisition Executives
- 8 Defense Acquisition Executives
- 5 Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 7 Secretaries of Defense, and
- 3 Presidents

The tenure of Program Managers is not the only problem.

* Source: Dave Walker, GAO



June 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointees and General Officer Nominations

Larry, I need a complete list of all the vacancies we have in the civilian side and what the exact status is of these nominations. The status would be: we are searching; we have sent it to the White House and it is awaiting FBI or clearance by the President; or it has been sent to the Senate but is waiting for the Senate committee to consider, has cleared the committee or is waiting for the floor action.

Please establish a grid to give me every week, so I know what is going on and I can help push these things along. We simply have to get our arms around this.

John, I also want a similar list for the senior four-star military.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-12

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

FBI 11/2003

*- "Military" response attached.
- will add confirmation hearing date for 4-stars once scheduled.*

U20149 103 *C* 6/17

11-L-0559/OSD/17790

3 & 4 STAR NOMINATIONS

17 June 2003

NOMINATIONS IN THE PENTAGON

Joint Dep Cdr, CENTCOM (TBD - **Release for Noms (RFN) sent out 11 Jun**)
 Joint Cdr, RC South/Cdr, US Naval Forces Europe (TBD - **Navy specific RFN released**)
 Army Vice Chief of Staff, Army (TBD)
 Army Dep CofS, G-1 (TBD)
 Army DCG/CofS, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army (**Ward**)
 Navy Cdr, SIXTH Fleet & Cdr, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (**Ulrich**)
 Navy DCNO for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8 (**Dawson**)
 Navy Cdr, SECOND Fleet and Cdr Striking Fleet Atlantic (**Roughead**)
 Navy Chief of Naval Reserve (**Cotton**)
 Navy Superintendent, Naval Academy (**Rempt**) (On hold)
 AF Cdr, Fifteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command (**Welser**) (Upgrade to O-9) (On hold)
 AF Asst Vice Chief of Staff, HQ AF (**Hopper**)
 AF The Inspector General (**Polk**)
 AF Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Cmd (**Brown**)

NOMINATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE FOR POTUS SIGNATURE

	<u>To WH</u>
Joint Cdr, SOCOM (Brown)	5 June
Joint Deputy Cdr, SOCOM (Olson)	10 June
Joint CJCS 2-year term reappointment (Myers)	10 June
Joint Cdr, CENTCOM (Abizaid)	10 June
Joint VCJCS 2-year term reappointment (Pace)	10 June
Joint Deputy USD for Intelligence (Boykin)	6 June
Joint Director, J-6 Joint Staff (Shea)	17 June
Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 (Christianson)	4 June
Army DCG/CofS, FORSCOM (McNeill)	5 June
AF Dep CoS for Personnel, HQ AF (Brady)	13 June
AF Vice Cdr, Pacific Air Forces (Renuart)	13 June
AF Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command (Johnson)	12 June
USMC CG, III MEF (Blackman)	4 June

NOMINATIONS AT SENATE AWAITING CONFIRMATION

	<u>To Senate</u>
Joint President, NDU (Dunn)	6 Jun
Joint Supreme Allied Cdr for Transformation (ADM G)	22 May
Army CSA (Schoomaker)	16 Jun
Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (Alexander)	6 May
Army CG, Fifth Army (Clark) (On hold by SASC Chairman)	11 Mar
Army CG, United States Army Combined Arms Center (Wallace)	3 Jun
Navy VCNO (Mullen)	22 May
Navy Cdr, Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet; Cdr, Submarine Allied Cmd, Atlantic (Donald)	11 Apr
Navy Cdr, LANTFLT/Cdr Fleet Forces Command (Fallon)	28 Apr
AF Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration (Hobbins)	12 Jun
AF Cdr, Twelfth Air Force; United States SOCOM Air Forces, Air Combat Cmd (Schmidt)	12 Jun
AF Cdr, 9th Air Force; Air Combat Command and Cdr, CENTCOM Air Forces (Buchanan)	12 Jun
AF Cdr, United States Air Forces Europe, Ramstein Air Base (Foglesong)	20 May
AF Cdr, Air Force Materiel Command (Martin)	20 May
AF Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (Moseley)	20 May
AF Vice Cdr, AF Space Command (Leaf)	20 May
USMC Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Ops (Huly)	22 May
USMC Cdr, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; CG, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (Gregson)	14 May

VOTED OUT OF COMMITTEE 22 MAY 03

AF Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy (**Rosa**)

11-L-0559/OSD/17791

June 16, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: Mary Claire Murphy
(b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Dinner Event for Gen. Franks

Please find out when Tom Franks is going to be in Washington the week of July 7 and if Cathy Franks is going to be here, too. Please find out if they are available for dinner—our first choice is July 10, the second choice July 8—and let me know, so we can figure out who Joyce would like to have for dinner. Also let me know if he happens to be in town on July 11.

Mary Claire, please draft up a tentative list of the Rumsfelds, the Franks, Tim Russert, Fred Hiatt (with a possible alternative of Bill Safire), Gen. Myers, Gen. Keane (with a possible alternative of Schoomaker), Vice President Cheney, with a possible of President Bush, and Senator Dick Stevens (with a possible alternative of Senator Inouye).

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-2

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U20151 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Clocks in SVTC Room

*Amirhose
Capt SCANT*

In the SVTC room I was in today, please have them take Riyadh and Tokyo off the clocks and put Baghdad and North Korea on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-34

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

DONE

18 Jun
SPB

U20152 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

CC: (b)(6)
Cathy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Long Range Calendar

I would like to have the monthly calendar I keep in here go through January 20, 2005. At the present time, it stops in April 2004.

Someone should look out and get as much as possible into that calendar through the end of the current term, so we can look at it as a whole.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-35

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U20153 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Secretary Martinez

I would like to have Mel Martinez, the Secretary of HUD, over for lunch someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-1

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20154 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hoon

Please get back to me with a proposal as to what I say to Hoon with respect to Karadzic and ~~Milosevic~~ *Mladic*, as Paddy Ashdown requested. Then tell me how I communicate it to the FBI, CIA, Department of State, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-9

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U20155 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned w/Ashdown

I think we ought to figure out a way to do lessons learned with Paddy Ashdown.

Let's get the UK and the US to put together a team of people to do it. We may be able to develop a model for peacekeeping.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-12

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20157 /03

OB
6/23

June 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: LTG Craddock
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paddy Ashdown

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT
TO CRADDOCK*

I have asked General John Craddock to connect you with Paddy Ashdown, the fellow who is doing peacekeeping in Bosnia.

Ashdown is absolutely first-rate. He has learned some lessons that we do not need to relearn in Iraq. He is in the U.S. this week, and then I believe he is going to the UK and Greece.

I would very much like to have you connect with him somewhere. General Craddock will work on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-14

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

U20158 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mark Ellis

Would you please get Mark Ellis in and interview him and see if you think we could use him for something. Norm Augustine is a good man, and he says this fellow is first-rate.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/9/03 Augustine Letter

DHR:dh
061703-17

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

6/19
Jim O'Beirne -

Please get him in and you/I should meet w/ him. Top.

U20159 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/17799

Larry
Larry Di Rita
6/20

JUN 10 '03 08:08AM EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Lockheed Martin Corporation
6801 Rockledge Drive Bethesda, MD 20817
(b)(6)

2003 JUN 11 PM 4:30



Norman R. Augustine
Chairman of the Executive Committee

June 9, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon—3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Via Facsimile: (b)(6)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am attaching the resume of a former student of mine at Princeton who is seeking a position as an executive assistant or researcher in your office. The letter speaks for itself . . . but I can attest that he is an extraordinarily capable individual. Should you be in need of any such support, he would be well worth your consideration.

With all best regards.

Sincerely,

Norman R. Augustine

/pw

Attachment

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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FILE	

U09027 /03

Mark Ellis

(b)(6)

June 5, 2003

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

I am very interested in public policy and in particular, issues of national security. Having interned at the CIA, the US Embassy in Ireland, and on Capital Hill for the House Subcommittee on National Security and International Affairs during my summers at Princeton, I am very interested in pursuing an executive assistant position within President Bush's administration. I am friends with Mr. Augustine and he suggested I contact you to explore executive assistant or research analyst opportunities with your office.

In my academic, government and work experiences, I have sought opportunities to further develop my analytical skills and understanding of issues pertaining to national security. I graduated *summa cum laude* from Princeton University where I majored in political psychology, a self-created major focusing on global leaders and their leadership styles in resolving conflict. I also pursued a Masters in Management Studies from Cambridge University focusing on economic theory and innovation through acquisitions and graduated with first class honors with distinction.

At Disney, I have had the opportunity to hone my strategic thinking and analytical skills in our corporate strategic planning group where I work closely with senior corporate executives to devise and implement long-term strategies and develop new businesses. My experiences with the CIA, the US Embassy in Ireland, and the House Subcommittee have afforded me the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the legislative process and assist senior government officials in their day to day responsibilities.

I am anxious to pursue an executive assistant or research analyst opportunity. Enclosed is a copy of my resume. I will be traveling to Washington, DC the second week of June and would be interested to meet with you if you have the time. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Mark Ellis
(sent electronically)

11-L-0559/OSD/17801

(b)(6)

MARK E. ELLIS

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE

- United States Embassy, Dublin, Ireland** Summer 1998
Intern, Political & Economic Office, Top Secret Clearance
 Analyzed diplomatic and security issues surrounding the Northern Ireland peace process and drafted speaking points for the Deputy Chief of Mission; assessed the political and economic issues affecting US businesses in the Republic of Ireland and authored reports for the State and Commerce Departments on Irish industries highlighting economic development and business opportunities; provided contextual summaries of situations involving US businesses who were in need of diplomatic assistance; briefed U.S. tourist groups on the political, economic, and business climate in Ireland
- Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia** Summer 1997
Intern, Inspector General's Office, Top Secret Clearance
 As part of an internal strategic planning group, assessed the effectiveness of intra-Agency operations in responding to global crisis situations; devised a strategy that allowed the Agency to maintain its preparedness and ability to respond to issues of National Security on a reduced Congressional budget after conducting interviews with employees from various divisions of the Agency and conducting several collaborative brain-storming sessions with members from other government agencies and private sector companies; presented findings to senior Agency officials; assisted in preparing biographical, political, and psychological profiles of world leaders for U.S. officials who were preparing to meet with these leaders
- US House of Representatives, Washington, DC** Summer 1996
Intern, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, & Criminal Justice
 Researched issues for Congressmen who were preparing for committee hearings; issues ranged from the US drug prevention strategy and the FBI's handling of the David Karesh stand-off to the FBI File-gate controversy and the INS immigration process; drafted reports and press releases on various topics

WORK EXPERIENCE

- The Walt Disney Company, Burbank, California** July 2000 to Present
Senior Analyst, Corporate Strategic Planning
 Work closely with senior corporate and operating executives to devise and implement long-term strategies and develop new businesses. Focus primarily on the company's internet, broadband, wireless and interactive gaming initiatives. Compose business plans, analyze markets, profile competitors and model financials for proposed ventures and acquisitions.
- Targeted and analyzed new opportunities, mapped competitive landscape, and identified strategic partnerships to build domestic and international wireless content distribution business
 - Developed strategy and financial model to facilitate the rollout of a multi-studio digital cinema projector initiative. Met with financial institutions to negotiate financial terms. Quantified print-cost savings and ancillary streams of revenue
 - Performed intrinsic valuation analyses of acquisition targets in the search engine, on-line auction, and interactive gaming spaces and presented recommendations to senior management
 - Developed and assisted with implementation of entry strategy of online business in China by identifying potential partners, developing business plan, and negotiating term sheet and contract
 - Conducted five-year strategic and financial planning process with the Walt Disney Internet Group and prepared business valuation which was presented to senior management and board of directors
 - Determined market value for internally developed 4D construction-modeling software. Recommended optimal sale strategy after negotiating with VCs and companies in the software development industry
 - Formulated turn-around strategy for the Internet Group. Assessed strategic and financial value for ESPN.com and ABCNews.com of forming strategic alliances with Internet portals. Assisted in the sale of Internet portal assets
- Johnson & Johnson, Warren, New Jersey** Summer 1999
Analyst, Global Product Management Group, Cordis Endovascular
 Conducted product positioning research for several endovascular medical devices and assisted with product launches; constructed financial model to forecast price elasticity and presented pricing strategy recommendation to senior management; conducted market research for next generation products to assist development process; identified and analyzed business opportunity for e-commerce of medical devices

EDUCATION

Cambridge University, St. John's College, Masters, Management Studies, *1st Class Honors with distinction* July 2000
Dissertation: *Impact of Acquisitions on Innovation: Remedy, Not Poison Pill*
Finalist, *Cambridge University Marketers Prize* for outstanding contribution to the field of Marketing;
Student Representative - Judge Institute Advisory Board; Cambridge Overseas Trust Award; Entrepreneurs Club

Princeton University, B.A., Political Psychology Independent Major, Music Performance Minor, *summa cum laude* June 1999
Thesis: *Allen and John Foster Dulles and US Foreign Policy: An Advising Constellation of the Eisenhower Administration*
President and principal trumpeter, University Orchestra; Residential Advisor; Debate team; Member of the Student Government
Judicial Committee; Treasurer, Forbes Residential College - Budget: \$50,000; Chair, Adult & Elderly service projects - Student
Volunteer Council; Prosecution lawyer, Mock Trial Team - State Champions '97

INTERESTS: Triathlons, trumpet playing, traveling, international affairs, snow boarding, screenwriting



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Lockheed Martin
6801 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20817

Reed

Dear Norm,

Thank you for recommending Mark Ellis for a position in the Department. I will move his resume around for consideration.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely "Reed", written in black ink.

June 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Codel Letter

I want to make sure the letter to the Congressional leadership on Congressional delegation trips to Iraq and Afghanistan goes to the big eight as well: Warner, Levin, Hunter, Skelton, Lewis, Murtha, Stevens and Inouye.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-18

.....
Please respond by 6/19/03

U20160 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rewards System

My impression is the rewards system is still not working, and it has been a long time waiting to get fixed. It clearly is an interagency issue. I wonder if you could get some folks to try to figure it all out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-25

U20161 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17806

June 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foley Background Sheet

Please make sure you get the background sheet on Tom Foley sent out to Bremer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-29

.....
Please respond by 6/19/03

6/17
SecDef
Done
Den Stokes
Will fill you in
DHR

U20162 /03

June 17, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Strategy for Iraq

Why don't you come up with a strategy to win in Iraq, so we can look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-24

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20163 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17808

June 17, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Quote


Attached is a quote from Kipling. It is not bad.

Thanks.

Attach.
Kipling Quote

DHR:dh
061703-11



Please respond by _____ 

U20164 /03

June 17, 2003

SUBJECT: Kipling Quote

Rudyard Kipling said, "We need to win the savage war of peace."

DHR:dh
061703-10

11-L-0559/OSD/17810

June 17, 2003

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Larry Di Rite
4/24

Please see if you can get this cartoon from *The New Yorker*.

Thanks.

Attach.
The New Yorker, June 16 & 23, 2003, p. 16.

DHR:dh
061703-21

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

6/23

(me)

→ Ricco -
Anything other than
original? Lay-out version
or something? Just curious.
S. Rata

Larry Di Rite
4/24

U20165 /03

THE
NEW YORKER
4 TIMES SQUARE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036-7441



June 23, 2003

Major Ricco Player

(b)(6)

Dear Major Player,

The original of James Stevenson's drawing for The New Yorker issue of June 16, 2003 ("I wish Donald Rumsfeld had a hobby."), is available for \$3000. It's done in pen and ink and wash on drawing paper measuring 11 by 14 inches. The artist will hand-letter the caption on the art.

For an extra \$100, we'll archivally frame the art for you: acid-free matting, ultraviolet Plexiglas and a plain black wood frame.

We take credit cards, and we pay for shipping by Fed Ex.


Let me know if you need further information. Thanks for getting in touch with us.

Best,

Anne Hall
Cartoon Art Consultant
The Cartoon Bank
A division of The New Yorker

(b)(6)

The Provocative National Bestseller



ANN PACKER

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**NEW IN
PAPERBACK**

CONTRIBUTORS

This summer's fiction issue features work by three fiction writers who have not yet published a book.

Heather Clay ("Original Beauty," p. 78) is completing her first novel. This is her first published story.

Lara Vapnyar ("Love Lessons, Mondays, 9 A.M.," p. 133) has a collection of short stories, "There Are Jews in My House," coming out in December. She came to the United States from Russia in 1994.

Daniel Alarcón ("City of Clowns," p. 156) is a student at the Iowa Writers' Workshop. He was born in Lima, Peru, and returned there on a Fulbright scholarship in 2001. This is his first published story.

David Sedaris ("Our Perfect Summer," p. 96) is the author of "Me Talk Pretty One Day."

Jonathan Franzen ("Caught," p. 104) has published a new book of essays, "How to Be Alone." His novel "The Corrections" is out in paperback.

Roger Angell (Verse, p. 166) is a fiction editor at the magazine. His books include "A Pitcher's Story: Innings with David Cone" and, most recently, "Game Time: A Baseball Companion."

Jhumpa Lahiri ("Gogol," p. 170) is the author of "Interpreter of Maladies," a collection of short stories. Her novel "The Namesake" will be published in the fall.

Cynthia Ozick (A Critic at Large, p. 188) is completing a novel, "Lights and Watchtowers."

Spencer Reece (Poem, p. 202) will publish his first collection of poems next year. ♦



"I wish Donald Rumsfeld had a hobby."

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June 17, 2003


TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Magazine Cover

Please get the cover of *National Review* that had President Bush, Colin Powell, Rumsfeld, Condi, and J.D. Crouch on it. I want to send it to Nick Burns. He never saw it.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-27

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03



U20170 /03



June 16th
Issue

U-Th 9-5¹⁵

(b)(6)

June 18, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: COCOM Conference Participants

Should we be inviting the people we have selected to be CINC's, like Brown, Schoomaker and Abizaid to this dinner at our house and to the CINC Conference. Are they coming?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-7

.....
Please respond by 6/17/03

U20171 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17816

June 18, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Japan

I talked to Howard Baker last night on the phone. He said you did a terrific job in Japan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-9

.....
Please respond by _____

U20173 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17817

June 18, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: India-Pak Paper

That piece on India and Pakistan is first-rate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-10

.....
Please respond by _____

U20174 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17818

June 18, 2003


TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lengthening Tours

We have to figure out a way to lengthen tours—Eikenberry, for example. Please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-16

.....
Please respond by


7/11/03



U20175 /03

June 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Keane
ADM Clark
Gen. Jumper
Gen. Hagee

CC: Gen. Myers
Powell Moore
PETE GELAN

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Pending Legislation

I understand you have agreed to contact members of the Senate Armed Services Committee no later than Friday, June 27 (prior to the July 4 recess), to discuss the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), Range Readiness Preservation Initiative (RRPI) and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation with them. This is very important, and I appreciate your readiness to do this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-3

.....

Please respond by _____

U20176 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Return from Retirement

Please have someone get me the retired people who have been brought back from other services besides the Army. I have this one paper on the Army, but there are other precedents of people who were brought back from retirement. I ought to have it in my head.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-22

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20177 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ~~Intelligence Officers~~

Here is an interesting idea from (b)(6) a fellow I have known for years who is a junior intel officer. Why don't you think about it and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/18/03 (b)(6) e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
061903-25

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20178 /03

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

(b)(6)

Wednesday, June 18, 2003 1:29 PM

(b)(6)

Please pass to SECDEF

Dear Mr. Secretary

In January, you asked me to pass along any ideas I may have while I was in Afghanistan. Well, I came up with one:

The Armed Services need to consider creating a "joint" course for junior intelligence officers (O-3s with 2 years time in grade). The idea: O-3s from all services spend a month at Ft. Huachuca, then Goodfellow AFB, then Navy and Marine Intelligence Training Center in Virginia Beach and learn how each service gathers and utilizes intelligence to support their service-specific operations. Granted, at Goodfellow AFB, I was "taught" about the Army, Navy and Marines, but it was very basic and it was a USAF member who did it. Additionally, the information was not focused on how the services use Intelligence.

If the joint structure is the future of the United States Armed Forces, then more and more officers need exposure to the different services earlier on in their careers. Unfortunately, in the current structure, officers do not get joint educational exposure until much later in their career. And it's only for a very select few. This junior officer course is a way for the Intelligence Community to get out in front.

I'd be interested to know your thoughts on the idea.

With great respect,

(b)(6)

June 19, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vaccinations

Are you thinking through the question as to whether or not we ought to continue with the smallpox and/or anthrax vaccinations?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-26

.....
Please respond by

07/11/03

CR

U20179 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DLA-TRANSCOM Issue

We have to have a meeting to close on this DLA-TRANSCOM issue. Let's get it set up this week with the right people.

Please see me and propose who you think it ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-27

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U20180 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{DR}

SUBJECT: Crawford Meeting

Condi says we are going to have the Crawford meeting for DoD on August 8. We need to work up the program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-28

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

CLOSED
20 JUNE
Round Table
TEN
8/9

U20181 /03

June 19, 2003

C7/31

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jay Garner

7/31
Larry Di Rita

On your project on what is going on in transformation in OSD, you might want to include Jay Garner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-15

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

✓
8/11

7/18
RESPONSE ATTACHED
v/r

Forwarded
v/r
CDR Nosenzo
7/31

U20182 /03

July 16, 2003

✓
8/1

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Jay Garner

You asked if we might use Jay Garner on our "joint needs" process study for DoD. The answer is yes.

I have an Advisory Committee using both external and internal people who have an interest and expertise in this area. They meet periodically to review our status. We will ask him to join our Advisory Committee.

11-L-0559/OSD/17828

June 19, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Laser

Jay Garner tells me there is a ground-based laser that can shoot down artillery shells. I would like to get briefed on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-14

.....
SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by 7/11/03

JUL - 8 2003

U20183 /03



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE **SECDEF HAS SEEN**

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JUL - 8 2003

INFO MEMO

July 3, 2003, 02:45PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics)

MW 7/7

SUBJECT: Laser

- You asked about a ground-based laser that can shoot down artillery shells. We do have one such laser, a prototype called the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).
- THEL was a joint U.S. Army/Israel Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration, based on a deuterium-fluoride laser, begun in 1996 and completed in 2002.
 - THEL has shot down Katyusha rockets and 152mm artillery rounds.
 - Primary objective was to develop a laser-based system to intercept and destroy small Katyusha type rockets.
 - Original concept was a system that would be permanently installed along the northern Israeli border.
 - Operational THEL hardware is installed on a concrete slab at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
 - System is transportable, but not mobile – would require several weeks to tear down, move, and reassemble.
- Follow-on Army program with Israel is designing a Mobile THEL (called MTHEL) for integrated air defense.
 - An MTHEL prototype is scheduled to be completed by FY 2007.
- Briefing available upon request.

COORDINATION: ASAALT, PEO ASMD

Prepared By: LtCol Mark Arbogast, OUSD(AT&L) DS/MW,

(b)(6)

8:33 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 9, 2003
SUBJECT: **ESDI**

Europe

Please send me that side letter on ESDI that you mentioned on the phone yesterday and today.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.15

9 Dec 03

U202150030



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1416-03
11 December 2003

12/11
326

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/12/10*

SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

- **Question.** Is there some way we can get people who are heading up the PRTs to do it for a year instead of six months?
- **Answer.** PRT commanders are primarily selected from civil affairs (CA) units because of their stability operation skill sets (mediation, negotiation, reconstruction) and the large pool of qualified officers available within the CA unit structure. The majority of CA troops reside in the Reserve Forces. To get PRT commanders who are Reservists on the ground for 1 year requires a 16-month mobilization. Current authorities (10 USC 12302) allow for 24-month mobilization periods. Active duty PRT commanders are already covered by the Army's recently instituted 1 year on the ground policy.
- **Analysis**
 - US PRT commanders who are Reservists currently spend approximately 9 to 10 months on the ground in Afghanistan. They are mobilized with a unit for 1 year, but use about 2 to 3 months of that time for mobilization and demobilization activities. A 16-month mobilization would ensure Reservists have enough mobilization time for 1 year on the ground in Afghanistan.
 - Active duty commanders are already required to stay in Afghanistan for a year.
 - By comparison, New Zealand PRT commanders have command for 1 year, while British PRT commanders in Mazar-e-Sharif stay for 6 months.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve Reserve Service members commanding PRTs be mobilized for a sufficient period, approximately 16 months, to provide Reservists 1-year assignments in Afghanistan and adequate training/demobilization time. If approved, my staff will work with USCENTCOM to implement this policy.

Approve *RBM* Disapprove _____ Other _____
DEC 11 2003

COORDINATION:

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X NIS
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 12/11
MA BUCER	12/11
EXECSEC MARRIO	12/11

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11 Dec 03

U20223-03

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	COL Keen	21 November 2003
USSOCOM	COL Colon	21 November 2003
NG/RM	COL Hershey	22 November 2003
US Army	COL Wright	8 December 2003

10:59 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: October 2, 2003
 SUBJECT: *PRTs*

Is there some way we can get people who are heading up the PRTs to do it for a year instead of six months?

*^
 (Provincial Reconstruction Team)*

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 100203.35

Please respond by: _____ *16*

*✓
 12/12*

*Sir,
 Response attached.
 V/CDR Nosyn
 12/11*

U20233•03•

58
10:59 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 2, 2003
SUBJECT: *PRTs*

326

Is there some way we can get people who are heading up the PRTs to do it for a year instead of six months?

*^
(Provincial Reconstruction Team)*

Thanks.

DHR/azn
100203.35

Please respond by: _____ *10/16*

*✓
12/12*

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosey
12/11*

U20233.03

200203



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9998

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2003 DEC -1 PM 11: 48

✓
12/12

ACTION MEMO

CH-1416-03
11 December 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 12/10*

SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

- **Question.** Is there some way we can get people who are heading up the PRTs to do it for a year instead of six months?
- **Answer.** PRT commanders are primarily selected from civil affairs (CA) units because of their stability operation skill sets (mediation, negotiation, reconstruction) and the large pool of qualified officers available within the CA unit structure. The majority of CA troops reside in the Reserve Forces. To get PRT commanders who are Reservists on the ground for 1 year requires a 16-month mobilization. Current authorities (10 USC 12302) allow for 24-month mobilization periods. Active duty PRT commanders are already covered by the Army's recently instituted 1 year on the ground policy.
- **Analysis**
 - US PRT commanders who are Reservists currently spend approximately 9 to 10 months on the ground in Afghanistan. They are mobilized with a unit for 1 year, but use about 2 to 3 months of that time for mobilization and demobilization activities. A 16-month mobilization would ensure Reservists have enough mobilization time for 1 year on the ground in Afghanistan.
 - Active duty commanders are already required to stay in Afghanistan for a year.
 - By comparison, New Zealand PRT commanders have command for 1 year, while British PRT commanders in Mazar-e-Sharif stay for 6 months.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve Reserve Service members commanding PRTs be mobilized for a sufficient period, approximately 16 months, to provide Reservists 1-year assignments in Afghanistan and adequate training/demobilization time. If approved, my staff will work with USCENTCOM to implement this policy.

Approve *RM* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION:

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HKS
BR MA CRADDOCK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12/11
MA BUCCI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12/11
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12/11



U20223-03

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	COL Keen	21 November 2003
USSOCOM	COL Colon	21 November 2003
NG/RM	COL Hershey	22 November 2003
US Army	COL Wright	8 December 2003



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8099

087 11 12 11 10 20

INFO MEMO

CM-1419-03
12 December 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 12/11

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Credit

- **Question.** "I just read your memo on Joint Duty Credit. You have stated the problem. What is the solution? Do you have someone thinking it through and fashioning some suggestions?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** A statute change is required to award joint credit to functional component commanders and other members performing similar temporary joint duties. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff are collaborating with RAND Corporation to examine the Joint Officer Management (JOM) system and develop a strategic approach. The study will provide the impetus for legislative change.
- **Analysis.** The JOM report will identify the education and experience officers require to conduct joint operations successfully. Additional information is attached (TAB B). The review will also aid in developing criteria to evaluate and subsequently modify the current list of joint credit positions. Strategic plan completion is scheduled for Feb 04. The second phase (to analyze which of the nearly 10,000 positions should or should not receive joint duty credit) will be completed in Nov 04. This phase of the study is estimated at \$600K, and the additional cost to accelerate its timeline would not yield significant benefits (RAND estimates earliest possible completion date Oct 04).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director J-1;

(b)(6)

Snowflake

TAB A

November 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Credit

I just read your memo on joint duty credit. You have stated the problem. What is the solution?

It seems to me we simply have to do a complete review and re-categorization of jobs and possibly seek a change in the law, so that we can do it appropriately.

Do you have someone thinking it through and fashioning some suggestions? If not, please let me know and we will figure out how to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/30/03 CICS memo to SecDef re: Joint Duty Credit for CFLCC, CFACC and CFMCC [U18063/03]

DHR:dh
110303-10

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1309-03

30 October 2003

11/3

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *10/29*

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Credit for Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)

- In response to your question during a Joint Officer Management brief on 3 October regarding joint duty credit for the CFLCC, CFACC and CFMCC in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the following is provided.
- LTG McKiernan (CFLCC), Lt Gen Moseley (CFACC) and VADM Keating (CFMCC) did not receive joint credit as functional component commanders for OIF. However, VADM Keating did receive joint credit for his assignment as Commander, US Navy Forces USCENTCOM, which is a Joint Duty Assignment List position.
- Current law specifies three methods for officers to obtain joint duty credit:
 - Serve the required time (36 months/24 months or minimum of 10 months in a Joint Duty Assignment List position).
 - Serve a minimum of 90 days in an approved JTF HQ position.
 - Receive a waiver after you determine that the service completed by the officer (regardless of length of time) is considered a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.
- The only method of obtaining joint credit for the OIF functional component commanders is for you to use the waiver authority. This provision awards full (vice cumulative) joint credit. This is an example of why we are working to modify the joint officer management portion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

COORDINATION: TAB

Attachment:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SH MA CRADDOCK	<i>C 10/31</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/23/12</i>
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

U18063 03

TAB

COORDINATION SHEET

Agency	Name	Date
OSD(P&R)	Ms. Sheila Earl	10 Oct 03

Joint Officer Management (JOM) Strategic Approach



- **USD (P&R) and Joint Staff working with RAND to develop strategic approach to shape JOM to meet future joint requirements**
- **The strategic approach will**
 - **Establish clear goals for officer development in joint matters:**
 - **Determine what current and future joint missions will look like**
 - **Identify type and quantity of officers needed to perform joint missions**
 - **Identify joint organizations' requirements**
 - **Identify education, training, and experience joint officers require**
- **Following the RAND study, the Department of Defense will determine the strategic vision for JOM**
 - **Strategic vision will**
 - **Provide impetus for policy/legislative change**
 - **Base JOM system on joint requirements versus requirements in law**
 - **Provide mechanism to meet joint organization personnel requirements**
 - **Outline actions to prepare future senior Joint and Service leaders**

11/21/2003

¹
Tab B

Joint Duty Assignment List Review



- **After completing the strategic approach, RAND will conduct a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) review**
 - Review each position currently providing joint credit
 - Ensure positions on the JDAL provide officers with significant joint experience/competencies
- **Strategic approach will provide the foundation for establishing the criteria to define joint duty assignment positions**
 - Create objective factors to validate JDAL positions and use these factors to recommend removal of marginally joint positions
 - Criteria will also validate adding positions to JDAL

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USD(P&R)

Copy provided

21 November 2003

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/17844

TAB A

November 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Credit

I just read your memo on joint duty credit. You have stated the problem. What is the solution?

211

It seems to me we simply have to do a complete review and re-categorization of jobs and possibly seek a change in the law, so that we can do it appropriately.

Do you have someone thinking it through and fashioning some suggestions? If not, please let me know and we will figure out how to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/30/03 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Joint Duty Credit for CFLCC, CFACC and CFMCC [U18063/03]

DHR:dh
110303-10

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

3 NOV 03

Tab A

U20270 /03

June 19, 2003

DONE

*Call. it
& told Marc*

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Acknowledgements

Let's make sure you have the right acknowledgements in the front part of my BENS speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-10

.....

Please respond by 6/17/03

U20307 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Photos/Letter for Jay Garner

Please get a copy of the photos from the White House of the President with Jay Garner, and let's get the President to sign a nice inscription.

Also, please get a letter from the President thanking Jay for his work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-12

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20312 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Remarks for Franks CoC

*Sent to
Marc via
e-mail*

We want to get going on the Franks change of command remarks. I want them to be very good. My thinking is a brief statement about the fact that no one wants to be engaged in a war, but people do recognize there are times we must. When that is the case, the kinds of qualities one looks for in those you will be working with in such a critical endeavor are several.

It is something above all a respect for the fact that it is the last resort, not the first.

Please see me, and I will give you some thoughts.

Thanks.

DJR:dh
061903-2

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U20313 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17848

June 19, 2003

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mail in Iraq

Here is a note from David Chu on mail in Iraq. You need to be sure this information gets to John Warner, Ike Skelton and everyone in Congress who is undoubtedly hearing from Service member constituents.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/12/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Mail in Iraq [U09245/03]

DHR:dh
061903.1

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20315 /03

011
1300



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2003 JUN 16 AM 8:20

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

SECDEF HAS SEEN June 12, 2003, 3:00 p.m.

JUN 19 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 13 June 03

SUBJECT: Mail in Iraq

- We are receiving a number of complaints from service members and families that the mail was not flowing efficiently to and from military units in Iraq. Additionally, the Early Bird has included several articles over the past weeks reporting on mail delays in Iraq. I checked on the military mail service into and out of Iraq and found that there have been problems, but the Army, as Executive Agent for military mail, has implemented the necessary fixes.
- The problems that generated the complaints we were hearing are caused by several factors. As you know, units were moving often early in the conflict and the mail was being held in theater until a stable location could be identified. We found that on some occasions the military postal offices were not advised when a unit moved resulting in mail sent forward only to be returned to Kuwait. Now that the unit locations are more stable, these problems have been resolved.
- There have been no problems getting mail out of the United States to the theater, but intra-theater movement was slow because convoys had to be escorted by combat units. Now that the supply routes are open and more secure, and now that Baghdad International Airport is open to routine logistical flights, moving mail into Iraq has significantly improved. The United States Postal Service has been helpful in providing some heavy-duty mail handling machines in theater.
- The military postal officials note that, because of the heavy use of e-mail and phones, a high percentage of the mail is packages vice letter mail. The weight and cube of the packages present additional challenges for the military mail handlers.
- I believe that the mail complaints we are hearing reflect an earlier time in the conflict and that the military postal system has responded to the causes in an appropriate manner.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD (P&R),

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/17
SR MA CRADDOCK	6/18
MA BUCCI	5/18
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/16

U09245 03



June 19, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

Cc: Cathy
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Powell Moore in Round Table

Powell Moore should probably attend Round Table whenever Congress is in session, so he would not attend during the July break or August recess.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-23

.....

Please respond by _____

U20316 /03

June 19, 2003

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this cartoon from the *Washington Times* for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/18/03 *Washington Times*, p. A15.


DHR:dh
061903-3

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20318 /03

against former President Bush, retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice President Richard Cheney, for alleged war crimes against civilians when they bombed a Baghdad bunker during the first Gulf war; and against both Israeli Prime Minister

Sharon and Yasser Arafat. Last year, the United Nations Security Council reluctantly deigned to grant the United States a one-year grace period from the risk of having U.S. soldiers on overseas peacekeeping missions arrested for prosecution by the ICC. Our so-called allies were worried they would have to take over the costs of peacekeeping in Bosnia if U.S. troops pulled out.



Donald Rumsfeld

The Bush administration has been trying to cajole separate nations into signing promises that they won't arrest Americans stationed on their territory. So far, 38 such agreements have been signed, but that doesn't include most of the major governments. The one-year exemption granted by the U.N. last year just expired, and the U.N. Security Council reluctantly approved a one-year extension.

France, Germany and Syria abstained, 17 countries spoke out against us, and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan undiplomatically sneered at the U.S. exemption.

Our so-called European allies, whom American blood and treasure have again and again protected against military aggression and economic ruin, deserve a prize for impertinence. We should nip in the bud the heady hopes of the pompous bureaucrats in the Hague and Brussels, who were not elected by anybody yet dream they can exercise global judicial power.

U.S. officials don't need to pussy-foot around with the niceties of diplomatic language. They should say: "Bug off. America already enjoys the rule of law that best protects human rights, our Bill of Rights is not up for negotiation with foreigners, and we will not subject our citizens to rules or judges in foreign countries."

Fortunately, we have moved on from the era of President Clinton, who told the United Nations in 1997 that he wanted to put the United States into a "web of institutions" to set "the international ground rules for the 21st century." We now have a president who will stand up for American sovereignty.

Phyllis Schlafly is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Phyllis Schlafly is a nationally syndicated columnist.

democrats to gain seniority and power at the expense of their Northern liberal colleagues.

Second was Democratic control of state legislatures, which gerrymandered House seats in order to keep Southern seats in Democratic hands long after Republicans had gained substantial strength there. For decades, Republican representation in the House was much less than the percentage of votes cast for Republicans in all House races.

Third was money. Because Democrats controlled Congress, businesses had no choice but to contribute heavily to them even though the party is fundamentally hostile to the business community. Businesses figured that contributions would at least buy them access so they could minimize the damage of Democratic policies on their in-

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PAUL GREENBERG

R.I.P. for Atticus Finch

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Atticus Finch dead at 87? The news had to come someday, but you knew it would be a shock when it did.

Some actors become lodestars in the generation that grew up with them — role models, stars in our Walter Mitty daydreams, assurances we can rise to the occasion, challenges to our character. And not just because of the characters they played, but because of who the actors were themselves.

Some mysterious alchemy takes place between actor and role that merges forever an Atticus Finch and a Gregory Peck. And the result leaves the imprint of "To Kill a Mockingbird" on a whole generation in a way no number of high school readings could.

It's the combined power of the visual, the character and the actor that does it. "I found it easy to climb into his suit and shoes," Mr. Peck said of Mr. Finch. "I felt that I knew him." Knew him? He was Atticus Finch.

Gregory Peck was born to play the character that the American Film Institute has just told us is the top American movie hero of all time: a country lawyer, father, gentleman, marksman, Southerner of course, and mainly a personification of decency in a time when that simple,

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Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld properly and publicly lowered the boom on uppity Belgium last week. He said the United States will provide no funds for the new NATO headquarters unless Belgium repeals this law.

Brussels has been host to NATO since 1967. NATO (which long since completed its genuine mission of keeping Soviet troops out of Western Europe) is now kept on life support in order to continue channeling U.S. taxpayer funds to Europe.

NATO is planning to pretend it has a reason for existence by building a \$352.4 million futuristic headquarters in Belgium. U.S. taxpayers are expected to pony up a least 22 percent of the cost.

In Brussels last week, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "If the civilian and military leaders of member states cannot come to Belgium without fear of harassment by Belgian courts enforcing spurious charges by political prosecutors, then it calls into question Belgium's attitude about its responsibilities as a host nation."

Mr. Rumsfeld said the Belgian law "has turned its legal system into a platform for divisive politicized lawsuits against her NATO allies." He added that it doesn't make sense

June 20, 2003

OS
7/1

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Belgian Issue

We might want to have somebody brief NATO at the Colorado Springs meeting on the Belgian legal situation and the problem of law and why it doesn't work for the United States to go in there if these things are going to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, we could have a paper on it.

It might even be better to have it done by Nick Burns in Belgium with the PermReps.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-11

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

U20319 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17854

June 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Codel

Porter Goss and Jane Harman want to go to Baghdad July 7 to 11. They are having trouble with Powell Moore. I told her I would fix it. I want them both to be able to go and anyone else they want to take with them.

Please see me about how we do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-7

.....
Please respond by 6/23/03

U20320 /03

SGT 6/20
June 18, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraq Info

I asked George Tenet today to give me a piece of paper that shows me everyone in Iraq who the Agency is dealing with or giving money to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061803-24

.....
Please respond by _____

U20321 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17856

HOT

June 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Please call (b)(6) and have her come in and have a cup of coffee with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-13

*Very soon
To name
of Sandra at my
house*

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

*6/20
Monday 11:00*

U20322 /03

June 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Central Idea

I think when I am making remarks, whether it is a press briefing, a short speech, a farewell, an award or a major speech, I ought to have in my mind the one thing I want the listeners to go away with. It need not be fresh and original each time, either.

When I go up there, I ought to have that idea very clear, and it almost ought to be on a separate card so that I know. The speech needs to wrap around it some.

Why don't you think about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-15

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20323 /03

June 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Kagan Article

Here is an article by Kagan you ought to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
Kagan, Robert. "A Plot to Deceive?" *Washington Post*, June 8, 2003, p. B07.

DHR:dh
062003-16

.....
Please respond by _____

U20324 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17859

washingtonpost.com

 **PRINT ARTICLE ONLY**

A Plot to Deceive?

By Robert Kagan

Sunday, June 8, 2003; Page B07

There is something surreal about the charges flying that President Bush lied when he claimed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Yesterday The Post continued the barrage, reporting that Defense Intelligence Agency analysts claimed last September merely that Iraq "probably" possessed "chemical agent in chemical munitions" and "probably" possessed "bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent and VX," a deadly nerve agent.

This kind of "discrepancy" qualifies as front-page news these days. Why? Not because the Bush administration may have -- repeat, may have -- exaggerated the extent of knowledge about what Hussein had in his WMD arsenal. No, the critics' real aim is to prove that, as a New York Times reporter recently put it, "the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq may mean that there never were any in the first place."

The absurdity of this charge is mind-boggling. Yes, neither the CIA nor the U.N. inspectors have ever known exactly how many weapons Hussein had or how many he was building. But that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the ability to produce more? That has never been in doubt.

Start with this: The Iraqi government in the 1990s admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced 8,500 liters of anthrax and a few tons of VX. Where are they? U.N. inspectors have been trying to answer that question for years. Because Hussein refused to come clean, the logical presumption was that he had hidden them. As my colleague, nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione, put it bluntly in a report last year: "Iraq has chemical and biological weapons." The only thing not known was where they were and how far the Iraqi weapons programs had advanced since the inspectors left in 1998.

Go back and take a look at the report Hans Blix delivered to the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 27. On the question of Iraq's stocks of anthrax, Blix reported "no convincing evidence" that they were ever destroyed. But there was "strong evidence" that Iraq produced more anthrax than it had admitted "and that at least some of this was retained." Blix also reported that Iraq possessed 650 kilograms of "bacterial growth media," enough "to produce . . . 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax." Cirincione concluded that "it is likely that Iraq retains stockpiles of anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin."

On the question of VX, Blix reported that his inspections team had information that conflicted with Iraqi accounts. The Iraqis claimed that they had produced VX only as part of a pilot program but that the quality was poor and the agent was never "weaponized." But according to Blix, the inspections team discovered Iraqi documents that showed the quality of the VX to be better than declared. The team also uncovered "indications that the agent" had been

11-L-0559/OSD/17860

"weaponized." According to Cirincione's August 2002 report, "it is widely believed that significant quantities of chemical agents and precursors remain stored in secret depots" and that there were also "thousands of possible chemical munitions still unaccounted for." Blix reported there were 6,500 "chemical bombs" that Iraq admitted producing but whose whereabouts were unknown. Blix's team calculated the amount of chemical agent in those bombs at 1,000 tons. As Blix reported to the Security Council, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for."

Today, of course, they and many other known weapons are still unaccounted for. Does it follow, therefore, that they never existed? Or does it make more sense to conclude that the weapons were there and that either we'll find them or we'll find out what happened to them?

The answer depends on how broad and pervasive you like your conspiracies to be. Because if Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are lying, they're not alone. They're part of a vast conspiratorial network of liars that includes U.N. weapons inspectors and reputable arms control experts both inside and outside government, both Republicans and Democrats.

Maybe former CIA director John Deutch was lying when he testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Sept. 19, 1996, that "we believe that [Hussein] retains an undetermined quantity of chemical and biological agents that he would certainly have the ability to deliver against adversaries by aircraft or artillery or by Scud missile systems."

Maybe former defense secretary William Cohen was lying in April when he said, "I am absolutely convinced that there are weapons. . . . I saw evidence back in 1998 when we would see the inspectors being barred from gaining entry into a warehouse for three hours with trucks rolling up and then moving those trucks out."

Maybe the German intelligence service was lying when it reported in 2001 that Hussein might be three years away from being able to build three nuclear weapons and that by 2005 Iraq would have a missile with sufficient range to reach Europe.

Maybe French President Jacques Chirac was lying when he declared in February that there were probably weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that "we have to find and destroy them."

Maybe Al Gore was lying when he declared last September, based on what he learned as vice president, that Hussein had "stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country."

Finally, there's former president Bill Clinton. In a February 1998 speech, Clinton described Iraq's "offensive biological warfare capability, notably 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs." Clinton accurately reported the view of U.N. weapons inspectors "that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons." That was as unequivocal and unqualified a statement as any made by George W. Bush.

Clinton went on to insist, in words now poignant, that the world had to address the "kind of threat Iraq poses . . . a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or

provide them to terrorists . . . who travel the world among us unnoticed." I think Bush said that, too.

So if you like a good conspiracy, this one's a doozy. And the best thing about it is that if all these people are lying, there's only one person who ever told the truth: Saddam Hussein. And now we can't find him either.

The writer, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

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June 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony

I have agreed to testify with Franks before the Senate Armed Services Committee the week after the recess. I have asked Marc Thiessen to get started on testimony.

I also should take a moment in the testimony to talk about a couple of the items in the House/Senate conference, or at least be prepared to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-17

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

U20325 /03

June 20, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Australian Ministerial

Are you going to try to sort through with State the possibility of doing the Australian meeting in Guam sometime in that September 14 to 20 period, when I am trying to go to Japan and Korea?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062003-12

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20326 /03

June 21, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: WMD

Here is a very good answer on WMD by Jay Garner.

Thanks.

Attach.
Page from transcript of June 18 press avail w/Jay Garner

DHR:dh
062103-9

.....

Please respond by _____

U20327 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17865

matter. I do know that the intelligence has been what it has been for a decade and more, and it has gotten richer every year -- fuller, more robust. It is intelligence that the U.S. had, that the U.K. had. It is intelligence that was not disputed in the U.N. If you'll recall, the issue wasn't whether or not the intelligence was correct by the other countries, the only issue was whether it was appropriate to wait a bit longer to allow inspections to work.

What you have to appreciate is that they learned to live in an inspections environment in that country; that is to say to be able to still function and have inspectors there in the country. And they had a very long period to hide, or do whatever it is they wanted to do with those capabilities.

My personal view is that their intelligence has been, I'm sure, imperfect, but good. In other words, I think the intelligence was correct in general, and that you always will find out precisely what it was once you get on the ground and have a chance to talk to people and explore it, and I think that will happen.

Jay, what do you think about this? You've seen what's been going on.

Garner: Well, he used them pretty robustly 20 years ago against the Iranians. He used them very robustly against the Kurds. In fact, when I was in the north last time, a Kurdish child gave me a picture she had painted of Kurds who were dead, having been gassed by Saddam Hussein.

As our troops went forward to Baghdad, I think you found that his army was well provided with chemical and biological equipment, which indicates to me that he had that and probably intended to use it, if he had been able to. He had 12 years to hide it; he was very skillful at doing that.

But to me, that's not the issue. I mean, if you had been with me three weeks ago in the killing fields near Babylon, I stood there with the governor of Babel and watched them unearth bodies. And there were over -- probably nearly 4,000 in that one particular grave. And many of them were no longer than this - children. And thousands of people killed; many of them, buried alive. That, in itself -- just that one thing in itself -- was enough to go in there and remove that dictator. And if you had been with me three weeks ago, you'd believe the same thing today.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could I ask my other clarification?

Rumsfeld: Why don't we move around a little bit and -- yes?

Q: To follow up on your opening comments about this small area of resistance, we've seen reports out of Iraq about non-Iraqis, or at least some evidence --

Rumsfeld: (Off mike) -- That's valid. The people we're scooping up, in many cases, are not Iraqis.

Q: Well, can you talk a little bit about that? You know, there's some concern that the longer this lasts, that Iraq could become a recruiting tool for Muslim militants in that part of the world, kind of along the lines, although not as big, as Afghanistan in the eighties. Are you

June 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Video of BENS Dinner

Please check to see if there was a tape of my remarks to the BENS dinner and my Q&As. I would like to have it if there was, or a transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062103-8

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20328 /03

FYI - BUCCI

June 21, 2003

MAINARDI
(b)(6)

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Crawford Plan

It looks like the Deputy is planning to be gone on August 8, the day the President wants me to go down to Crawford. Let's talk to Paul and see if he is really going to be out of town on that date. Joyce is not going to go to Taos that weekend, so I will just fly down that morning and come back that evening, although I do think I should probably stop and do some other military function

Also, why does it say "hold for dinner with GJ," whoever that is, on my calendar for August 8? I need to know what the dinner is about and what time the meeting in Crawford is.

Thanks.

DHR:ah
062103-13

.....

Please respond by _____

U20329 /03

Long Range Calendar - Secretary of Defense - as of 06/21/03

AUGUST 2003

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1	2 <i>POTUS to Crawford til 9/1</i>
3 <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	4 <i>POTUS @ Crawford Senate Recess Begins</i>	5 <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	6 <i>POTUS @ Crawford DSD TDY</i>	7 <i>POTUS @ Crawford DSD TDY</i>	8 <i>POTUS @ Crawford SD to Crawford; then Hold DSD TDY (Hold-dinner w/GJ)</i>	9 <i>POTUS @ Crawford DSD TDY SD Hold</i>
10 (b)(6) birthday DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford SD to DC</i>	11 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	12 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	13 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	14 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	15 DSD TDY <i>(Hold-dinner w/GH) POTUS @ Crawford</i>	16 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>
17 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	18 DSD TDY <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	19 DSD back in office <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	20 <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	21 <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	22 SD/JR Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	23 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>
24 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	25 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	26 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	27 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	28 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>	29 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford Senate Recess Ends</i>	30 <i>POTUS @ Crawford Hold</i>
31 Hold <i>POTUS @ Crawford</i>						

AUGUST 2003

June 19, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

CC: (b)(6)
Cathy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: August Calendar

Please put on my calendar that the President is going to be operating out of Crawford from August 2 to September 1. He wants me to come down with some folks and do a DoD briefing for him August 6, 7 or 8. Please put that on the calendar, and we will work out the dates.

(b)(6) please find out when Joyce is going to be in Taos. She may go down for the whole month, but my calendar doesn't seem to indicate that. If she does, then I may go brief the President August 8 and then go to Taos, or brief him the afternoon of August 7 and go to Taos that night. Either way, I would stay over the weekend and return to Washington August 10.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-19

.....

Please respond by 6/25/03

Sir- Per Joyce, she has no plans to go to Taos unless you go. If you brief POTUS on Aug 8th, & go to Taos afterwards, she will go, too.

11-L-0559/OSD/17870

(b)(6)

June 17, 2003

Note to 6/17

(b)(6)

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Dinners w/Jumpers and Hagees
"GJ" "GH"

On July 23, please see if the Jumpers or the Hagees can have dinner on August 8, and give them a choice between Italian or sushi. Then invite the other one for August 15. Don't do it now—it is way too early to invite them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061703-5



Please respond by _____

June 23, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Joint Intelligence

I would like some ideas from you as to how we can get the intelligence business joint. I am deeply concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-44

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20330 /03

June 23, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Constabulatory Corps

I would like to move forward on having us sponsor a constabulatory corps of some sort where the people would be from other countries and we would help with the training, equipping, the headquarters and possibly command and control.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-35

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

U20331 /03

June 23, 2003

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Nussle

Why don't you have Dov Zakheim fashion this memo as a response to Nussle, and then get it up to Nussle.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/11/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Telling our Story on Stewardship of Taxpayer Money [U09131/03]

DHR:dh
062303-30

.....
Please respond by

6/27/03

↑

U20332 /03

6/12
17875



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2003 JUN 12 AM 10:01
SECDEF HAS FILE

JUN 23 2003

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

June 11, 2003, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Telling our Story on Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

- This is in reply to your recent memoranda (Tab A) on saving money and getting our story out about being good stewards of taxpayer money. Attached are examples of DoD actions supporting good stewardship. I will continue to develop these and related materials to help us get this story out.
- Telling our story on stewardship of taxpayer money is not only money savings initiatives, but also our management initiatives.
- We have had some success on specific issues with both the Hill and the press, e.g., transformation legislation, 2-year budgeting, management initiatives, and Personnel Security Investigations transferred to OPM.
- The appropriations bills are currently going through mark-up, and the authorization bills through conference. It is important that we continue to demonstrate our commitment to management improvements.
- I have already been working the Hill on our business architecture by using briefings and lunches to keep key staffers informed.
- I will work with Powell, Ken, and Torie to develop a more detailed plan of action.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Robert Shue

(b)(6)

BPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/12

DoD Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

1. Adopt and support the right strategy

- 2001 QDR blueprint to transform U.S. defense to reflect 21st century realities.
- NPR recommended New Triad geared to realities of post-Cold War.
- Missile defense: new direction and way of budgeting (consolidate various \$ pots)
- Near-term requirements balanced with long-term transformation.

2. Acquire the right military capabilities

- Over \$80 billion shifted from old to new plans for FY 2004-09 – for early termination of acquisition programs and other efficiencies.
- Increased investments in transformation goals, Science & Technology.
- New ways to fulfill military missions, e.g. unmanned vehicles.
- Better focus on new threats: SSGN conversion, increased SOF.
- Skip ahead to better technologies/systems: CVN-21, DD-21 to DDX.

3. Change how U.S. military fights

- Joint operational concepts: interoperability, info superiority, intelligence, precision, speed, range, mobility, survivability, lighter logistics burden.
- New Unified Command Plan, greater roles for SOCOM and JFCOM.

4. Put people first

- Military compensation: Both added dollars and better distribution of funds through targeted pay raises for people who are hardest to retain.
- Privatization leverages budgets to yield quality housing faster: over 92,000 units.

5. Achieve passage of Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act

- National Security Personnel System; better military personnel management.
- Transformed acquisition process, range preservation initiative.
- DoD reorganization, greater flexibility for appropriated funding, fewer reports.

6. Improve defense acquisition

- Spiral development and other initiatives speed fielding of new systems.
- Realistic funding: FY 2002-03 requests added \$8 billion to key programs.
- Rationalizing long-term program, most notably tactical aircraft.

7. Streamline and upgrade DoD facilities

- President's and Congress's support for new 2005 BRAC round remains critical to achieve more streamlined, cost-effective facilities infrastructure.
- Once fully implemented. BRAC 2005 will save about \$8 billion per year.
- Facilities recapitalization: FY 2002-03 PB added about \$2 billion per year.

8. Overhaul internal DoD programming/budgeting

- Balanced scorecard and performance metrics to guide budget decisions and improve programs.
- New process: combined program/budget review, 2-year cycle, execution review.

9. Modernize business management systems

- The Department's 2,000 business systems are being transformed by eliminating some of them and overhauling the rest. The Business Enterprise Architecture is guiding the transformation. It will standardize and integrate systems, enabling them to generate timely and accurate business information for DoD leaders.

10. Advance other management improvements

- Senior leadership is in charge through Senior Executive Council, Business Initiative Council (BIC), and Defense Business Board, and use of the Management Initiative Decision (MID) process. Below are highlights of MIDs.
- Competitive Sourcing (MID 907): Directs studies of 226,000 DoD positions to determine which public or private organization can best provide the functions of those positions. Once the results of the studies are implemented, savings for FY 2006-2009 would likely exceed \$300 million.
- Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) (MID 908): DoD is seeking statutory authority to transfer the PSI function to the Office of Personnel Management, which would make it the central provider of these services for the federal government. This would eliminate redundancy and other inefficiencies, and is projected to save \$160 million.
- Defense Agencies (MID 909): Examples of proposals include:
 - For the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA): Divest its Document Automation and Production Service, finance various logistics studies from within available resources, and demolish obsolete fuel facilities.
 - For Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA): Conduct pilot test for outsourcing its audit workload.
- BIC Initiatives (MID 902): Examples include:
 - Cell phone economies: Achieve savings by pooling and bundling unused cell phone minutes by organization, installation, or regional level. This initiative now has been broadened to encourage users to obtain flexible cell phone plans that are tailored to their needs and most cost effective.
 - Alternatives for outsourcing. This advances the use of several efficient means for outsourcing non-core DoD functions to the private sector. Such means include direct service contracts and the commercial cost comparison option permitted by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. One example: One DoD organization outsourced its desktop computer services by defining them as a new requirement, then negotiating with the private sector for the efficient providing of those services.
 - Web-based processing. For DoD contracts, convert from paper-based to web-enabled process. This would speed up processing, make payments more timely and thus reduce penalties against DoD, and save operating costs.

May 22, 2003 8:01 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
 CC: Torie Clarke
 Powell Moore
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Getting the Story Out

Larry Di Rita
6/8

Congressman Nussle of the Budget Committee said yesterday that he thought we were being attentive to taxpayers' money, but he really thought there ought to be a way we could show the taxpayers that we were being attentive.

Should we begin to think of how we can say we have saved money on different things and what we are trying to do? I think that is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:db
 052203-11

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

Please respond by 6/6/03

JUN 23 2003

6/17

See Zakheim note, attached

Larry Di Rita
6/18

6/19

SENT 5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Savings

Where are the lists that show we are saving money in different things around here and that we are respectful of the taxpayers' dollars?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-7

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

June 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Award for Mrs. Franks

I probably should give an award to Cathy Franks when I go down to Tampa for the Change of Command.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-32



Please respond by 6/27/03

Sir, 6/25
Work on OUTSTANDING
PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD IS IN
PROGRESS - IT WILL BE READY
FOR PRESENTATION PRIOR TO
THE 7th. SAME AWARD
WENT TO GEN JONES' &
GEN SHELTON'S WIVES. *v/r*
CDR SERPLE

U20333 /03

Select a continent or country (North & Central America) ▾

Decorations and Medals of the United States

Page updated: Feb 11, 2003



Civilian Decorations of the Department of Defense



Distinguished Civilian Service Award (1954)



Distinguished Public Service Award



Secretary of Defense Medal for Valor



Mentorship Civilian Service Award (1955)



Outstanding Public Service Award



Exceptional Civilian Service Award



Exceptional Public Service Award



Secretary of Defense Defense of Freedom Medal (2001)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Awards




Distinguished Civilian Service Award




Distinguished Public Service Award



Mentorship Civilian Service Award



Outstanding Public Service Award



Civilian Service Commendation Award



Civilian Service Achievement Award

Department of the Army Awards

11:04 AM

TO: David Chu
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 29, 2003
 SUBJECT: **DACOWITS**

334 Dacowitz

I received the DACOWITS material. Please let me know who recommended each of these people.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
11/30/03 04

Attach: Action Memo Re: Selection of FY 04 Defense Advisory Cmte.

Please respond by: 12/4

29 Nov 03

U203440031

INFO MEMO

December 10, 2003, 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 12 Dec 03

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Nominees

334 DACOWITS

- You asked who recommended each DACOWITS nominee and alternate. The following is a prioritized list of the nominees and alternates and the people that nominated them:

- Margaret Hoffman – Sec Def
- Lisa De Pasquale – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Martha Kleider – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Adam Mersereau – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Lisa Gutierrez – White House Liaison Office Staff
- Joy Silverman – White House Liaison Office Staff

- Margaret Hoffman was recently appointed on October 30, 2003.

COORDINATION: White House Liaison Office

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Denise Dailey, DACOWITS,

(b)(6)

10 DEC 03

U20345.031

INFO MEMO

December 10, 2003, 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 10 Dec 03

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Nominees

334 DACOWITS

- You asked who recommended each DACOWITS nominee and alternate. The following is a prioritized list of the nominees and alternates and the people that nominated them:

- Margaret Hoffman – Sec Def
- Lisa De Pasquale – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Martha Kleider – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Adam Mersereau – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
- Lisa Gutierrez – White House Liaison Office Staff
- Joy Silverman – White House Liaison Office Staff

- Margaret Hoffman was recently appointed on October 30, 2003.

COORDINATION: White House Liaison Office

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Denise Dailey, DACOWITS,

(b)(6)

10 Dec 03

U20345-031

SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO DACOWITS

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 12/14

SUBJECT: Dacowits



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2003 NOV 19 PM 5:49

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

October 31, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 18 Nov 03

SUBJECT: Selection of FY04 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) Members

- DACOWITS currently has 13 members (12 + 1 Chair). Under the current charter, the Committee can have up to 15 members. Two current members asked to leave the Committee after this first year: Ms. Julie Hamre and Mrs. Constance Horner. Our recommendation is to select more than two members this year, preferably four, to achieve a total of 14 members and one Chair. These four people will form the new core group as of 1 Oct 06 when the normal term for the FY03 members is complete.
- To complete the nomination process for FY04, we would like to solicit your desired characteristics for members of the Committee. The Committee deals with military women's workforce issues and those issues that military families encounter in supporting a Service member's career. Your insight and observations as to what talents would best serve the Committee's mission would be very valuable.
- You indicated Margaret Hoffman was an ideal candidate; we have enclosed a copy of her letter of selection at TAB A. In coordination with the White House Liaison Office, we recommend three additional nominees: Lisa de Pasquale, Martha Kleder, and Adam Mersereau. We have found that in addition to knowledge of women's issues and a military background, expertise in writing and research is very helpful to the Committee. Members visit installations, read current studies about the military, and receive technical briefings on military topics. They process a large amount of data in order to make sound recommendations to the DoD in their annual report. The individuals listed above have a broad experience with the military and are published writers for various magazines.

Call Chu

*see proposal
w/ recorded with
see Lita Gontars*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	11/20



U19107 / 03

- The membership will reflect experience in the military, as a military family member, or with women's or family-related workforce issues, and a strong analytical background.
- The prioritized list of recommended nominees and alternates follows:
 1. Margaret Hoffman
 2. Lisa De Pasquale
 3. Martha Kleder
 4. Adam Mersereau
 5. Lisa Gutierrez
 6. Joy Silverman
- TAB B is a prioritized matrix of information on the four DACOWITS nominees and the two alternates.
- TAB C provides the applications, resumes, and/or biographies of the nominees and alternates.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the appointment of #1-4 as members of DACOWITS and #5-6 as alternates.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LCDR Shannon E. M. Thaeler, USN, (b)(6)

12/1/03

11:04 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 29, 2003

SUBJECT: DACOWITS

I received the DACOWITS material. Please let me know who recommended each of these people.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113003 04

Attach: Action Memo Re: Selection of FY 04 Defense Advisory Cmte.

Please respond by: _____ *12/1/03*

U20344039

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: November 26, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Appointment of Bing West

020 CPA

Don,

Attached is a memo that Bing West and Jim Thomas have prepared that I would urge you to send to Bremer and Abizaid to encourage the appointment of Bing West as the guy in Baghdad in charge of making sure that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is stood up properly and properly resourced.

I think this memo is drafted with considerable diplomatic skill, but you can expect some push-back. I think you're going to have to press them hard and insistently if we're going to get this job done on the schedule that it needs to happen.

Paul W.

To PW.

- 1) See edits*
- 2) Have Myers or Pace personally edit the memo -*
- 3) Wash it by Abizaid -*
- Show me the final draft -*

DK

26 Nov 03

U20371-03

November 26, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Regional Security and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

encouraging
It is gratifying to see the speed with which you are moving to set up the Civil Defense Corps. I note that CENTCOM's training plan aligns the CDC closely with our soldiers, at least for several months. The key is to instill in the Government of Iraq (GOI) forces an offensive, winning spirit. The former regime loyalists ~~can and~~ *will eventually* ~~may~~ be eliminated by the GOI, not by US troops *alone*.

force
The objective is to transition to GOI forces *being* in control, with coalition forces providing support. Security does not mean a cessation of violence; a practical measure of security is the self-confidence of Iraqi police to walk in small (e.g., four-man) groups anywhere. In some locales, the new GOI battalions will be needed as backup. In many other areas, the new Civil Defense Corps will be the ~~main~~ *basis*, with enough firepower and self-confidence to supplement the police.

To insure we are all pulling together to make the new CDC ~~unit~~ *work*, I would like the CPA to have an adviser for regional security, charged with three tasks:

there to be
1. Develop ~~and implement~~ *a* concept of operations for the CDC that addresses unit deployments, against what threat, in what numbers, for what missions, measures of training and of performance, dollar costs, logistics sustainability, chain of command and coordination. Insure that CDC deployments take into account the deployments and missions of other Iraqi forces, namely the Army, Facilities Protection, Border and Police.

- The CONOPS should also take into account the missions of US units deployed in the same area, and the training and operational relationships with the CDC. The priority is the Sunni Triangle. Develop a simple but reliable measuring system for security.

2. Manage the modest CDC budget and recommend adjustments if necessary. In dollar terms, the CDC looks cost-effective, but delivering quickly will be a challenge.

3. Establish intelligence /operations regional coordinating centers, to be used by US agencies, US military, and Iraqi police, military and militia. These may be at a town or district level.

We are on the right track. The establishment of regional security networks -- police operating under the umbrella of military or CDC units - provides the proper mechanism for the responsible transition of security missions from coalition to Iraqi forces.

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: November 26, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Appointment of Bing West

Don,

Attached is a memo that Bing West and Jim Thomas have prepared that I would urge you to send to Bremer and Abizaid to encourage the appointment of Bing West as the guy in Baghdad in charge of making sure that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is stood up properly and properly resourced.

I think this memo is drafted with considerable diplomatic skill, but you can expect some push-back. I think you're going to have to press them hard and insistently if we're going to get this job done on the schedule that it needs to happen.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul W.", with a stylized, cursive script.

November 26, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Regional Security and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

It is gratifying to see the speed with which you are moving to set up the Civil Defense Corps. I note that CENTCOM's training plan aligns the CDC closely with our soldiers, at least for several months. The key is to instill in the Government of Iraq (GOI) forces an offensive, winning spirit. The former regime loyalists can and must be eliminated by the GOI, not by US troops.

The objective is to transition to GOI forces being in control, with coalition forces providing support. Security does not mean a cessation of violence; a practical measure of security is the self-confidence of Iraqi police to walk in small (e.g., four-man) groups anywhere. In some locales, the new GOI battalions will be needed as backup. In many other areas, the new Civil Defense Corps will be the linchpin, with enough firepower and self-confidence to supplement the police.

To insure we are all pulling together to make the new CDC entity works, I would like the CPA to have an adviser for regional security, charged with three tasks:

1. Develop and implement a concept of operations for the CDC that addresses unit deployments, against what threat, in what numbers, for what missions, measures of training and of performance, dollar costs, logistics sustainability, chain of command and coordination. Insure that CDC deployments take into account the deployments and missions of other Iraqi forces, namely the Army, Facilities Protection, Border and Police.

- The CONOPS should also take into account the missions of US units deployed in the same area, and the training and operational relationships with the CDC. The priority is the Sunni Triangle. Develop a simple but reliable measuring system for security.

2. Manage the modest CDC budget and recommend adjustments if necessary. In dollar terms, the CDC looks cost-effective, but delivering quickly will be a challenge.

11-L-0559/OSD/17893

3. Establish intelligence /operations regional coordinating centers, to be used by US agencies, US military, and Iraqi police, military and militia. These may be at a town or district level.

We are on the right track. The establishment of regional security networks – police operating under the umbrella of military or CDC units - provides the proper mechanism for the responsible transition of security missions from coalition to Iraqi forces.

November 26, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Regional Security and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

It is gratifying to see the speed with which you are moving to set up the Civil Defense Corps. I note that CENTCOM's training plan aligns the CDC closely with our soldiers, at least for several months. The key is to instill in the Government of Iraq (GOI) forces an offensive, winning spirit. The former regime loyalists can and must be eliminated by the GOI, not by US troops.

The objective is to transition to GOI forces being in control, with coalition forces providing support. Security does not mean a cessation of violence; a practical measure of security is the self-confidence of Iraqi police to walk in small (e.g., four-man) groups anywhere. In some locales, the new GOI battalions will be needed as backup. In many other areas, the new Civil Defense Corps will be the linchpin, with enough firepower and self-confidence to supplement the police.

To insure we are all pulling together to make the new CDC entity works, I would like the CPA to have an adviser for regional security, charged with three tasks:

11-L-0559/OSD/17895

1. Develop and implement an concept of operations for the CDC that addresses unit deployments, against what threat, in what numbers, for what missions, measures of training and of performance, dollar costs, logistics sustainability, chain of command and coordination. Insure that CDC deployments take into account the deployments and missions of other Iraqi forces, namely the Army, Facilities Protection, Border and Police.

- The CONOPS should also take into account the missions of US units deployed in the same area, and the training and operational relationships with the CDC. The priority is the Sunni Triangle. Develop a simple but reliable measuring system for security.

2. Manage the modest CDC budget and recommend adjustments if necessary. In dollar terms, the CDC looks cost-effective, but delivering quickly will be a challenge.

3. Establish intelligence /operations regional coordinating centers, to be used by US agencies, US military, and Iraqi police, military and militia. These may be at a town or district level.

We are on the right track. The establishment of regional security networks – police operating under the umbrella of military or CDC units - provides the proper mechanism for the responsible transition of security missions from coalition to Iraqi forces.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET
2003 DEC 15 PM 6:02
CM-1423-03
15 December 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F&R} VR/RSK 03

SUBJECT: Chairman Duncan Hunter

- **Question.** Duncan Hunter was in today and mentioned hidden cameras in Baltimore's high crime areas. He recommended it to Seal Team 6 Iraq. Would you have someone look into that? Additionally, somebody ought to talk to his staff, find out what it's about, and look at it in an orderly way (TAB A).
- **Answer.** Congressman Hunter was interested in how quickly NS Microwave could provide a demonstration of its surveillance capabilities. He envisioned employing the system to monitor some of the most dangerous roads in Iraq, specifically those where improvised explosive devices (IEDs) incidents have occurred and resulted in US soldier casualties.
- On 21 November, a congressional delegation, led by Chairman Hunter along with Mr. Peter Geren, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and CAPT John Costello, USN, Joint Staff, received a demonstration and capabilities briefing in Baltimore, Maryland. The technology proved its ability to integrate and network multiple surveillance sensors over a wide area and in challenging terrain, which could be potentially beneficial for use in Iraq. However, further analysis is required.
- The Joint Staff in collaboration with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' emerging technologies working group will continue to evaluate the utility of this capability in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and will provide an assessment and recommendation no later than January 2004.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: MG Joe F. Peterson, USA; Vice Director, J-3 ;

(b)(6)

U20408 /03

TAB A

2:34 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT: **Chairman Duncan Hunter**

Duncan Hunter was in today and mentioned hidden cameras in Baltimore's high crime areas. He recommended it to Seal Team 6 Iraq. Would you have someone look into that?

Somebody ought to talk to his staff, find out what it's about, and look at it in an orderly way.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.16

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17898

TAB B

COORDINATION

OSD (AT & L)	Dr. Charles Perkins	10 December 2003
Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense	Mr. Peter Geren	4 December 2003
Deputy CG for Systems of Systems Integration RDT&E	BGen Charles Cartwright	4 December 2003



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

Ray Dubois DEC 16 2003

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

- In an October 27th snowflake you expressed concern (Tab D) about the currency of DoD Directives.
- Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to conduct a review of all Directives under their purview to determine if they should be canceled, revised or continued in effect (Tab C).
- Of the 653 Directives presently in effect, the PSAs identified 50 for cancellation, 334 for revision and 269 as being current. At Tab B is a summary of the PSAs' reviews.
- Listings for all of the Directives and the PSA annotation for each are at Tab A.
- The suspense date for completion of this project is April 5, 2004. Communications and Directives staff will track closely the progress of each Directive and provide me with periodic reports. The coordination process, historically the primary impediment to finalizing revised Directives, will also be accelerated.

COORDINATION: None

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Counsel
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. H.D. Neeley, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



ACTION MEMO

December 15, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES

FROM: L. Edward Curry, Director, Communications and Directives

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives


- In an October 27th snowflake SecDef (White Tab B) expressed concern about the currency of DoD Directives.
- Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were tasked to review all Directives under their purview for currency and determine whether to cancel, revise or continue them in effect (White Tab C).
- The PSAs were further tasked to accomplish intended revisions within 90 days of the review and cancellations within 45 days of the review. We will provide you with monthly reports on the progress of those actions.
- Of the 653 Directives presently in effect, the PSAs identified 50 for cancellation, 334 for revision and 269 as being current.
- At White Tab A is an Info Memo to Secretary Rumsfeld transmitting the results and outlining our plan for insuring that revisions and cancellations identified by the PSAs are accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the Info Memo at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. H.D. Neeley,





11-L-0559/OSD/17902

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1000.3	SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	4/17/1979			X	
U	1010.7	DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING BY DOD PERSONNEL	11/20/1985			X	
U	1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/26/1978		X		
U	2000.8	COOPERATIVE LOGISTIC SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS	2/12/1981		X		
U	2000.9	INTERNATIONAL CO-PRODUCTION PROJECTS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	1/23/1974		X		
U	2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	6/24/1992		X		
U	2010.6	STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	3/5/1980	X			
U	2010.8	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR NATO LOGISTICS	11/12/1986		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17903

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	2010.9	ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS	4/28/2003	X			
U	2060.1	IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS	1/9/2001	X			
U	3005.7	EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS, ALLOCATIONS, PRIORITIES, AND PERMITS FOR DOD USE OF DOMESTIC CIVIL TRANSPORTATION	5/30/1985		X		
U	3100.3	COOPERATION WITH ALLIES IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT	8/17/1967	X			
U	3100.4	HARMONIZATION OF QUALITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES	9/27/1963	X			
U	3100.5	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFSHORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/16/1987		X		
C	3100.6	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY LOGISTIC PROGRAMS (U)	8/10/1978	X			
C	3100.7	UNITED STATES-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) LOGISTIC PLANNING (U)	6/24/1980	X			
U	3110.6	WAR RESERVE MATERIEL POLICY	11/9/2000	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17904

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
S	3145.2	CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY (U)	7/23/1987		X		
U	3150.1	JOINT DOD-DOE NUCLEAR WEAPON LIFE-CYCLE ACTIVITIES	8/26/2002		X		
U	3150.2	DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM	12/23/1996		X		
U	3150.3	NUCLEAR FORCE SECURITY AND SURVIVABILITY (S2)	8/16/1994		X		
U	3150.5	DOD RESPONSE TO IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE (IND) INCIDENTS	3/24/1987		X		
S	3150.7	CONTROLLING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)	6/20/1994		X		
U	3150.8	DOD RESPONSE TO RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS	6/13/1996		X		
U	3200.11	MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE (MRTFB)	5/1/2002	X			
U	3200.12	DOD SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (STI) PROGRAM (STIP)	2/11/1998			X	
U	3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981		X		
U	3202.1	USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH FACILITIES BY ACADEMIC INVESTIGATORS	1/4/1972		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17905

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		
U	3210.1	ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT OF BASIC RESEARCH BY THE DOD	4/3/1970			X	
U	3210.6	DEFENSE GRANT AND AGREEMENT REGULATORY SYSTEM (DGARS)	2/27/1995		X		
U	3216.1	USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS IN DOD PROGRAMS	4/17/1995	X			
U	3216.2	PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS AND ADHERENCE TO ETHICAL STANDARDS IN DOD-SUPPORTED RESEARCH	3/25/2002	X			
U	3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		
U	3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE): ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1989		X		
U	3235.2	DOD FOOD AND NUTRITION RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, AND ENGINEERING PROGRAM	4/20/1983		X		
U	4001.1	INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT	9/4/1986	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17906

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		
U	4120.11	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		
U	4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	5/2/1985		X		
U	4140.1	MATERIEL MANAGEMENT POLICY	12/8/1995	X			
U	4140.25	DOD MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR ENERGY COMMODITIES AND RELATED SERVICES	8/25/2003	X			
U	4140.57	DOD REPLENISHMENT PARTS PURCHASE OR BORROW PROGRAM	4/13/1987	X			
U	4151.18	MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY MATERIEL	8/12/1992		X		
U	4165.50	HOMEOWNERS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (HAP)	6/26/1991		X		
U	4165.6	REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION, MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL	9/1/1987		X		
U	4165.61	INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION OF DOD FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES	7/19/1988		X		
U	4165.63	DOD HOUSING	7/20/1989		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17907

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4165.66	REVITALIZING BASE CLOSURE COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE	2/12/1996	X			
U	4200.15	MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (MANTECH) PROGRAM	9/19/2002	X			
U	4205.1	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SMALL BUSINESS AND SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION PROGRAMS	9/11/1996		X		
U	4205.2	ACQUIRING AND MANAGING CONTRACTED ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE SERVICES (CAAS)	2/10/1992			X	
U	4270.33	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDICAL FACILITY ACQUISITION AND MAINTENANCE BOARD	1/8/1980	X			
U	4270.34	HOST NATION-FUNDED CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS	10/19/1982		X		
U	4270.36	DOD EMERGENCY, CONTINGENCY, AND OTHER UNPROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS	5/17/1997		X		
U	4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3/2/1982		X		
U	4275.5	ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	10/6/1980			X	
U	4400.1	DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT PROGRAMS	10/12/2001	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17908

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4500.34	DOD PERSONAL PROPERTY SHIPMENT AND STORAGE PROGRAM	5/20/1994		X		
U	4500.36	MANAGEMENT, ACQUISITION, AND USE OF MOTOR VEHICLES	4/10/1985		X		
U	4500.37	MANAGEMENT OF THE DOD INTERMODAL CONTAINER SYSTEM	4/2/1987		X		
U	4500.43	OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRLIFT (OSA)	10/28/1996	X			
U	4500.53	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION QUALITY AND SAFETY REVIEW PROGRAM	12/12/2000	X			
U	4500.56	DOD POLICY ON THE USE OF GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT AND AIR TRAVEL	4/19/1999		X		
U	4500.9	TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT	12/29/1993		X		
U	4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995		X		
U	4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		
U	4540.1	USE OF AIRSPACE BY U.S. MILITARY SEAS	1/13/1981	X			
U	4540.5	LOGISTIC TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	2/4/1998	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17909

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION ON DOD LANDS	9/28/1983		X		
U	4700.4	NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM	1/24/1989			X	
U	4705.1	MANAGEMENT OF LAND-BASED WATER RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS	7/9/1992	X			
U	4710.1	ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC RESOURCES MANAGEMENT	6/21/1984			X	
U	4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		
U	4715.11	ENVIRONMENTAL AND EXPLOSIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE AND INACTIVE RANGES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES	8/17/1999		X		
U	4715.12	ENVIRONMENTAL AND EXPLOSIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE AND INACTIVE RANGES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES	8/17/1999		X		
U	5000.1	THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM	5/12/2003	X			
U	5000.35	DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS (DAR) MANAGEMENT	5/27/1997		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17910

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		
U	5000.59	DOD MODELING AND SIMULATION (M&S) MANAGEMENT	1/20/1998	X			
U	5000.60	DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENTS	4/25/1996	X			
U	5010.33	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DESIGN AWARDS PROGRAM	9/9/1980			X	
U	5010.41	JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION (JT&E) PROGRAM	2/23/1998	X			
U	5030.14	DISCLOSURE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS	7/24/1981		X		
U	5030.41	OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTINGENCY PROGRAM	9/26/1978			X	
U	5030.49	DOD CUSTOMS INSPECTION PROGRAM	1/6/1984		X		
U	5030.57	SPECIAL WARNINGS TO MARINERS	5/3/1977			X	
U	5030.8	OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR SHIP REPAIR AND CONVERSION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	9/24/1976			X	

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17911

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5030.9	COORDINATION OF SHIPBUILDING, CONVERSION AND REPAIR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	1/19/1972			X	
U	5100.27	DELINEATION OF INTERNATIONAL LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES	12/29/1964		X		
U	5100.53	U.S. PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN NATO GROUPS RELATING TO THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT	7/29/1967	X			
U	5105.33	ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE	11/25/1987	X			
U	5126.46	DEFENSE ENERGY INFORMATION SYSTEM (DEIS)	12/2/1987	X			
U	5126.9	EXEMPTION UNDER TITLE II, FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATION SERVICES ACT--TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC	6/18/1979		X		
U	5128.32	DEFENSE DEPOT MAINTENANCE COUNCIL	3/10/1994	X			
U	5129.22	DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD	6/26/1978		X		
U	5129.46	ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES	6/12/1969		X		
U	5129.47	CENTER FOR COUNTERMEASURES	4/23/2002	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17912

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5134.11	DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (DARO)	4/5/1995			X	
U	5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992			X	
U	5158.4	UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND	1/8/1993		X		
U	5160.5	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE	5/1/1985	X			
U	5160.63	DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO TAKE CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS	6/3/1986	X			
U	5160.65	SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (SMCA)	3/8/1995			X	
U	5230.24	DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTS ON TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS	3/18/1987		X		
U	5230.25	WITHOLDING OF UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DATA FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE	8/18/1995			X	
U	5410.12	ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE TO DEFENSE-IMPACTED COMMUNITIES	12/22/1987		X		
U	5535.3	DOD DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (T2) PROGRAM	5/21/1999		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17913

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	6050.15	PREVENTION OF OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	6/14/1985			X	
U	6050.16	DOD POLICY FOR ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS	9/20/1991			X	
U	6050.4	MARINE SANITATION DEVICES FOR VESSELS OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	3/16/1982			X	
U	6050.7	ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS	3/31/1979		X		
U	6055.9	DOD EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD (DDESB) AND DOD COMPONENT EXPLOSIVES SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES	7/29/1996		X		
U	6230.1	SAFE DRINKING WATER	4/24/1978			X	

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/17914

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1010.1	MILITARY PERSONNEL DRUG ABUSE TESTING PROGRAM	1/11/1999		X		
U	1010.4	DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE BY DOD PERSONNEL	1/11/1999		X		
U	1010.9	DOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES DRUG ABUSE TESTING PROGRAM	1/20/1992		X		
U	1025.2	NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM	5/13/1994		X		
U	1300.7	TRAINING AND EDUCATION TO SUPPORT THE CODE OF CONDUCT (CoC)	12/8/2000	X			
U	1315.17	SERVICE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) PROGRAMS	2/22/1997		X		
U	1322.23	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FELLOWS PROGRAM	9/2/1995		X		
U	2000.11	PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM AND TEMPORARY REFUGE	5/17/1973		X		
U	2000.12	DOD ANTITERRORISM (AT) PROGRAM	8/18/2003	X			
U	2000.13	CIVIL AFFAIRS	6/27/1994		X		
U	2000.6	CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN ANTARCTICA	6/3/1980		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17915

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	8/15/1985		X		
U	2010.12	AVIATION LEADERSHIP PROGRAM (ALP)	9/23/1994	X			
U	2030.8	TRADE SECURITY CONTROLS ON DOD EXCESS AND SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY	11/17/1997		X		
U	2035.1	DEFENSE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH CANADA	11/4/1980		X		
U	2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7/5/1985		X		
U	2040.3	END USE CERTIFICATES (EUCS)	11/14/1991		X		
U	2055.3	MANNING OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL	3/11/1985		X		
U	2060.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	7/9/1996		X		
U	2100.3	UNITED STATES POLICY RELATIVE TO COMMITMENTS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS UNDER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS	8/8/1972		X		
U	2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17916

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		
U	2310.1	DOD PROGRAM FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE: DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/18/1994		X		
U	2310.2	PERSONNEL RECOVERY	12/22/2000		X		
U	3000.3	POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS	7/9/1996	X			
U	3020.26	CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) POLICY AND PLANNING	5/26/1995		X		
U	3020.36	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	3/12/1993		X		
U	3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	1/15/1993		X		
U	3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)	2/4/1994		X		
U	3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	2/18/1997		X		
U	3200.13	CENTER FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES	9/3/1997		X		
U	3224.4	SINGLE MANAGER RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT SERVICE MILITARY DIVING TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING (MDT&T)	7/18/1996	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17917

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	3305.6	SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY	1/4/1993		X		
C	4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		
U	4500.54	OFFICIAL TEMPORARY DUTY TRAVEL ABROAD	5/1/1991	X			
C	5030.43	SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISES (U)	10/14/1977		X		
C	5030.44	MILITARY OPERATIONS IN OR NEAR POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AREAS (U)	6/29/1973		X		
U	5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	7/15/1974		X		
U	5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	4/13/1972		X		
U	5100.46	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12/4/1975		X		
U	5100.55	UNITED STATES SECURITY AUTHORITY FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS	4/21/1982		X		
U	5105.47	U.S. DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE (USDR) IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES	1/20/1992		X		
U	5120.49	DOD INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER COORDINATING COMMITTEE	3/14/1990		X		
U	5132.10	SECURITY ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FIELD TEAMS (TAFTS)	7/19/1974		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17918

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5132.12	CONSOLIDATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICES (DAOS) AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS (SAOS)	10/8/1991	X			
U	5132.3	DOD POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE	11/16/1994		X		
U	5158.5	JOINT DEPLOYMENT PROCESS OWNER	11/12/2001		X		
U	5160.62	SINGLE MANAGER RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING (EODT&T)	12/15/1995	X			
U	5200.34	GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES	11/25/1992		X		
U	5200.38	ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES	1/29/1996		X		
S	5210.36	PROVISION OF DOD SENSITIVE SUPPORT TO DOD COMPONENTS AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (U)	7/30/1987		X		
U	5210.60	SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM FOR U.S. CITIZENS EMPLOYED DIRECTLY BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)	1/30/1990		X		
U	5230.11	DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	6/16/1992		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17919

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	8/12/1998		X		
C	5230.23	INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE POLICY (U)	11/18/1983		X		
U	5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	3/1/1985		X		
U	6205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE	11/26/1993		X		
U	7230.8	LEASES AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF DOD EQUIPMENT	2/16/1995	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/17920

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1000.20	DETERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND DISCHARGE: CIVILIAN OR CONTRACTUAL PERSONNEL	9/11/1989	X			
U	1000.22	UNIFORMED SERVICES' IDENTIFICATION (ID) CARDS	10/8/1997		X		
U	1005.10	TABLE OF HONORS FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	7/24/1981	X			
U	1005.6	DISPLAY OF THE NATIONAL FLAG AT HALF-STAFF	1/13/2003	X			
U	1005.8	ORDER OF PRECEDENCE OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN IN FORMATIONS	10/31/1977	X			
U	1010.10	HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE/INJURY PREVENTION	8/22/2003	X			
U	1015.11	LODGING RESOURCE POLICY	12/9/1996	X			
U	1015.14	ESTABLISHMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND CONTROL OF NONAPPROPRIATED FUND INSTRUMENTALITIES AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF SUPPORTING RESOURCES	7/16/2003	X			
U	1015.2	MILITARY MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION (MWR)	6/14/1995	X			
U	1015.5	DOD STUDENT MEAL PROGRAM	7/24/1991		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17921

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1015.8	DOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION (MWR) ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTING NONAPPROPRIATED FUND INSTRUMENTALITIES (NAFIS)	10/22/1985		X		
U	1020.1	NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES ASSISTED OR CONDUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	11/16/1994	X			
U	1025.1	DOD CIVILIAN RIFLE AND PISTOL MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM	1/31/1984			X	
U	1030.1	VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE	11/23/1994	X			
U	1035.1	TELEWORK POLICY FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	9/9/2002	X			
U	1100.18	WARTIME MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING	10/23/1986			X	
U	1100.20	SUPPORT AND SERVICES FOR ELIGIBLE ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	1/30/1997		X		
U	1100.4	GUIDANCE FOR MANPOWER PROGRAMS	8/20/1954		X		
U	1100.6	NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE	12/7/1983		X		
U	1100.9	MILITARY-CIVILIAN STAFFING OF MANAGEMENT POSITIONS IN THE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	9/8/1971			X	

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17922

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1125.3	VENDING FACILITY PROGRAM FOR THE BLIND ON FEDERAL PROPERTY	8/22/1991		X		
U	1145.1	QUALITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY MANPOWER	1/22/1986	X			
U	1145.2	UNITED STATES MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING COMMAND	2/25/1986		X		
U	1200.16	CONTRACTED CIVILIAN-ACQUIRED TRAINING (CCAT) FOR RESERVE COMPONENTS	5/30/1990		X		
U	1200.7	SCREENING THE READY RESERVE	11/18/1999	X			
U	1205.17	OFFICIAL NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL DATA	11/16/1994		X		
U	1205.18	FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS) TO THE RESERVE COMPONENTS	5/25/2000	X			
U	1205.20	RESERVE COMPONENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS	1/8/1996		X		
U	1205.5	TRANSFER OF MEMBERS BETWEEN RESERVE AND REGULAR COMPONENTS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES	4/10/1995		X		
U	1215.13	RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBER PARTICIPATION POLICY	7/8/1998	X			
U	1215.15	RESERVE OFFICERS FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROGRAM	9/8/1987		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17923

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1215.6	UNIFORM RESERVE, TRAINING AND RETIREMENT CATEGORIES	3/14/1997		X		
U	1215.8	SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) PROGRAMS	3/25/1994		X		
U	1225.6	EQUIPPING THE RESERVE FORCES	11/2/1992	X			
U	1225.7	RESERVE COMPONENT FACILITIES PROGRAMS AND UNIT STATIONING	6/6/2001	X			
U	1235.10	ACTIVATION, MOBILIZATION, AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE READY RESERVE	7/1/1995		X		
U	1235.11	MANAGEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES (IMAS)	5/6/1996	X			
U	1235.13	MANAGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) AND THE INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD (ING)	11/19/1997		X		
U	1235.9	MANAGEMENT OF THE STANDBY RESERVE	2/10/1998	X			
	1241.1	RESERVE COMPONENTS INCAPACITATION BENEFITS	12/3/1992		X		
U	1250.1	NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE (NCESGR)	8/17/1999		X		
U	1300.13	ENLISTED CREW MEMBER FLYING DUTY	7/14/1979	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17924

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1300.15	MILITARY FUNERAL SUPPORT	1/11/2001	X			
U	1300.17	ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES	10/17/1988	X			
U	1300.19	DOD JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT PROGRAM	9/9/1997	X			
U	1300.22	MORTUARY AFFAIRS POLICY	2/3/2000	X			
U	1300.4	INTER-SERVICE TRANSFER OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	11/15/1996	X			
U	1300.6	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS	9/11/1975	X			
U	1304.12	DOD MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCESSION TESTING PROGRAM	6/22/1993		X		
U	1304.19	APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES	9/18/1993		X		
U	1304.20	ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	12/19/1984		X		
U	1304.21	ENLISTMENT AND REENLISTMENT BONUSES FOR ACTIVE MEMBERS	1/20/1998		X		
U	1304.23	ACQUISITION AND USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION BY THE MILITARY SERVICES	11/16/1994		X		
U	1304.24	USE OF DIRECTORY INFORMATION ON SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS FOR MILITARY RECRUITING PURPOSES	4/20/1984			X	

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17925

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1304.26	QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION	3/4/1994		X		
U	1308.1	DOD PHYSICAL FITNESS AND BODY FAT PROGRAM	7/20/1995		X		
U	1308.2	JOINT DOD COMMITTEE ON FITNESS	1/25/1985			X	
U	1310.1	RANK AND SENIORITY OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	4/29/1996		X		
U	1310.2	APPOINTING COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	2/7/2001	X			
U	1312.3	SERVICE CREDIT FOR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	10/21/1996	X			
U	1315.15	SPECIAL SEPARATION POLICIES FOR SURVIVORSHIP	9/26/1988	X			
U	1315.7	MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS	5/7/1997		X		
U	1315.9	UTILIZATION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL ON PERSONAL STAFFS OF GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS	9/2/1983	X			
U	1320.10	DISCHARGE OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS NOT QUALIFIED FOR PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT OR LIEUTENANT (JUNIOR GRADE)	7/9/1996	X			
U	1320.11	SPECIAL SELECTION BOARDS	5/6/1996		X		
U	1320.12	COMMISSIONED OFFICER PROMOTION PROGRAM	10/30/1996		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17926

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1320.8	CONTINUATION OF REGULAR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ON THE RESERVE ACTIVE STATUS LIST	10/21/1996	X			
U	1322.10	POLICIES ON GRADUATE EDUCATION FOR MILITARY OFFICERS	8/31/1990		X		
U	1322.12	FUNDED LEGAL EDUCATION	9/23/1975		X		
U	1322.16	MONTGOMERY GI BILL (MGIB) PROGRAM	5/11/1994 Updated 6/18/2002	X			
U	1322.18	MILITARY TRAINING	12/28/1993		X		
U	1322.22	SERVICE ACADEMIES	8/24/1994		X		
U	1322.6	FELLOWSHIPS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND GRANTS FOR DOD PERSONNEL	4/19/1998	X			
U	1322.8	VOLUNTARY EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL	1/6/1997	X			
U	1325.2	DESERTION AND UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	1/31/1990	X			
U	1325.4	CONFINEMENT OF MILITARY PRISONERS AND ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES	8/17/2001	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17927

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1325.6	GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING DISSIDENT AND PROTEST ACTIVITIES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES	10/1/1996	X			
U	1327.5	LEAVE AND LIBERTY	9/10/1997		X		
U	1330.12	UNITED SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, INC. (USO)	11/1/2000	X			
U	1330.16	UNITED SEAMAN'S SERVICE (USS)	7/18/1984	X			
U	1330.17	MILITARY COMMISSARIES	3/13/1987		X		
U	1330.4	PARTICIPATION IN ARMED FORCES, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ACTIVITIES	3/9/1987		X		
U	1330.5	AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS	12/20/1991	X			
U	1330.9	ARMED SERVICES EXCHANGE POLICY	11/27/2002	X			
U	1332.14	ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS	3/4/1994	X			
U	1332.16	DROPPING RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE ROLLS OF THE ARMED FORCES	3/24/1970	X			
U	1332.17	RETIRED SERVICEMAN'S FAMILY PROTECTION PLAN	1/21/1975	X			
U	1332.18	SEPARATION OR RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	11/4/1996	X			
U	1332.20	MINIMUM SERVICE IN GRADE FOR NON-DISABILITY (VOLUNTARY) RETIREMENT	2/26/1982	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1332.23	SERVICE ACADEMY DISENROLLMENT	2/19/1988	X			
U	1332.27	SURVIVOR ANNUITY PROGRAMS FOR THE UNIFORMED SERVICES	6/26/2003	X			
U	1332.28	DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD (DRB) PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS	4/14/1983	X			
U	1332.30	SEPARATION OF REGULAR AND RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	3/14/1997	X			
U	1332.31	ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF CHAPLAINS UPON LOSS OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS	10/16/1981			X	
U	1332.32	SELECTIVE EARLY RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS ON AN ACTIVE DUTY LIST AND THE RESERVE ACTIVE STATUS LIST AND SELECTIVE EARLY REMOVAL OF OFFICERS FROM THE RESERVE ACTIVE STATUS LIST	9/30/1996	X			
U	1332.35	TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL	12/9/1993	X			
U	1334.1	WEARING OF THE UNIFORM	8/11/1969	X			
U	1334.2	FROCKING OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	2/12/2002		X		
U	1338.4	MORTGAGE INSURANCE FOR SERVICE MEMBERS TO AID IN CONSTRUCTION OR PURCHASE OF HOMES	9/2/1986	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17929

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1338.5	ARMED FORCES CLOTHING MONETARY ALLOWANCE POLICY	3/9/1998	X			
U	1340.14	SPECIAL PAY FOR AVIATION CAREER OFFICERS EXTENDING PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY	2/26/1985	X			
U	1340.4	PROFICIENCY FLYING PROGRAMS	11/20/1972		X		
U	1341.1	DEFENSE ENROLLMENT ELIGIBILITY REPORTING SYSTEM (DEERS)	5/21/1999		X		
U	1341.6	VETERAN'S EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM	3/28/1985	X			
U	1342.13	ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EDUCATION OF MINOR DEPENDENTS IN OVERSEAS AREAS	7/29/1992		X		
U	1342.16	PROVISION OF FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR ELIGIBLE DEPENDENT CHILDREN PURSUANT TO SECTION 6, PUBLIC LAW 81-874, AS AMENDED	8/5/1994		X		
U	1342.17	FAMILY POLICY	12/30/1988	X			
U	1344.10	POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON ACTIVE DUTY	2/17/2000	X			
U	1344.3	PATERNITY CLAIMS AND ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING MEMBERS AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES	11/16/1994	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1344.7	PERSONAL COMMERCIAL SOLICITATION ON DOD INSTALLATIONS	5/2/1991	X			
U	1344.8	INTERMENT ALLOWANCE FOR DECEASED ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL	9/25/1978	X			
U	1344.9	INDEBTEDNESS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL	10/27/1994	X			
U	1348.19	AWARD OF TROPHIES AND SIMILAR DEVICES IN RECOGNITION OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS	5/12/1989	X			
U	1350.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (MEO) PROGRAM	5/7/1997	X			
U	1350.4	LEGAL ASSISTANCE MATTERS	6/13/2001	X			
U	1352.1	MANAGEMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF REGULAR AND RESERVE RETIRED MILITARY MEMBERS	3/2/1990		X		
U	1354.1	DOD POLICY ON ORGANIZATIONS THAT SEEK TO REPRESENT OR ORGANIZE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN NEGOTIATION OR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING	11/25/1980	X			
U	1400.13	SALARIES AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO TEACHERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE DOD OVERSEAS DEPENDENTS' SCHOOLS SYSTEM	11/16/1994		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17931

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1400.16	INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT	11/16/1994		X		
U	1400.20	DOD PROGRAM FOR STABILITY OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT	6/16/1981		X		
U	1400.24	CIVILIAN MOBILITY PROGRAM	10/20/1989		X		
U	1400.25	DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANUAL SYSTEM	11/25/1996	X			
U	1400.28	CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS	9/11/1981	X			
U	1400.31	DOD CIVILIAN WORK FORCE CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION	4/28/1995	X			
U	1400.33	EMPLOYMENT AND VOLUNTEER WORK OF SPOUSES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL	2/10/1988	X			
U	1400.34	DOD CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIPMS)	11/16/1994		X		
U	1400.5	DOD POICY FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL	3/21/1983		X		
U	1400.6	DOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN OVERSEAS AREAS	2/15/1980	X			
U	1402.1	EMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES	11/16/1994	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1402.4	ENTRY AGE FOR SELECTED FIREFIGHTER AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER POSITIONS	12/29/1988	X			
U	1403.1	SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AND EQUIVALENT-LEVEL POSITIONS AND PERSONNEL	10/18/1982	X			
U	1404.10	EMERGENCY-ESSENTIAL (E-E) DOD U.S. CITIZEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES	4/10/1992	X			
U	1418.5	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE (BAS) POLICY	10/6/2003	X			
U	1430.13	TRAINING SIMULATORS AND DEVICES	8/22/1986		X		
U	1430.14	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (ELDP)	9/12/2003	X			
U	1430.16	DEFENSE LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (DLAMP)	4/11/1997		X		
U	1430.2	CIVILIAN CAREER MANAGEMENT	11/16/1994		X		
U	1430.4	CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE TRAINING	11/16/1994		X		
U	1440.1	DOD CIVILIAN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) PROGRAM	4/17/1992	X			
U	2000.15	SUPPORT TO SPECIAL EVENTS	11/21/1994	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	2000.17	UNITED STATES POLICY ON THE COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) FORCES	2/4/1998	X			
U	3025.14	PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD (SHORT TITLE: NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS)	7/13/1992	X			
U	3025.16	MILITARY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LIAISON OFFICER (EPLO) PROGRAM	12/18/2000		X		
U	3200.15	SUSTAINMENT OF RANGES AND OPERATING AREAS (OPAREAs)	1/10/2003	X			
U	4105.67	NONAPPROPRIATED FUND (NAF) PROCUREMENT POLICY	7/30/2002	X			
U	4140.58	NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT REPORT (NGRER)	10/21/1993	X			
U	5010.16	DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM	12/14/1973		X		
U	5010.31	DOD PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM	4/27/1979	X			
U	5030.56	DOD CONSUMER AFFAIRS PROGRAM	8/12/1982	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5120.14	DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES (DACOWITS)	7/15/1997		X		
U	5120.2	RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD	8/12/1985	X			
U	5120.39	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WAGE FIXING AUTHORITY APPROPRIATED FUND COMPENSATION	11/16/1994		X		
U	5120.42	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WAGE FIXING AUTHORITY NONAPPROPRIATED FUND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS	11/16/1994		X		
U	5120.8	ARMED FORCES CHAPLAINS BOARD CHARTER	3/20/1995	X			
U	5124.3	ARMED FORCES TAX COUNCIL	12/1/1988		X		
U	5124.6	QUALITY OF LIFE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	9/11/1998	X			
U	5154.25	DOD MEDICAL EXAMINATION REVIEW BOARD	6/11/1981	X			
U	5154.29	DOD PAY AND ALLOWANCES POLICY AND PROCEDURES	3/9/1993	X			
U	5154.6	ARMED SERVICES MEDICAL REGULATING	4/29/1993		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17935

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5160.24	DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT	4/4/1957	X			
U	5160.41	DEFENSE LANGUAGE PROGRAM (DLP)	4/7/1988		X		
U	5160.58	RECRUITING FACILITIES	3/21/1986		X		
U	5500.11	NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS	8/15/1972	X			
U	5500.14	NATURALIZATION OF ALIENS SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF ALIEN SPOUSES AND/OR ALIEN ADOPTED CHILDREN OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ORDERED OVERSEAS	5/7/1997	X			
U	5525.4	ENFORCEMENT OF STATE TRAFFIC LAWS ON DOD INSTALLATIONS	10/31/1986		X		
U	5525.5	DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS	12/20/1989		X		
U	5525.8	SERVICE BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON STATE AND LOCAL JURIES	6/13/1988	X			
U	6000.12	HEALTH SERVICES OPERATIONS AND READINESS	1/20/1998	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17936

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	6000.14	PATIENT BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (MHS)	3/17/1999	X			
U	6000.8	FUNDING AND ADMINISTRATION OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS	11/3/1999	X			
U	6010.22	NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM (NDMS)	1/21/2003	X			
U	6010.4	DEPENDENTS' MEDICAL CARE	4/25/1962		X		
U	6010.7	ADMISSION POLICIES FOR THE UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)	11/12/1997	X			
U	6025.13	CLINICAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (CQMP) IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM (MHSS)	7/20/1995		X		
U	6025.14	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK (NPDB)	11/1/1990		X		
U	6025.18	PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION IN DOD HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS	12/19/2002	X			
U	6040.37	CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) RECORDS	7/9/1996		X		
U	6070.1	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDICARE ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND	7/17/2002	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17937

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	6130.3	PHYSICAL STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT, ENLISTMENT, AND INDUCTION	12/15/2000	X			
U	6200.2	USE OF INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS FOR FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION	8/1/2000	X			
U	6200.3	EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS N MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	5/12/2003	X			
U	6400.1	FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM (FAP)	6/23/1992		X		
U	6400.4	DOD VETERINARY SERVICES PROGRAM	8/22/2003	X			
U	6420.1	ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (AFMIC)	9/30/1996		X		
U	6465.3	ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION	3/16/1995		X		
U	6485.1	HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS-1 (HIV - 1)	8/10/1992		X		
U	6490.1	MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES	10/1/1997	X			
U	6490.2	JOINT MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE	8/30/1997		X		
U	6490.5	COMBAT STRESS CONTROL (CSC) PROGRAMS	2/23/1999	X			
U	7060.3	INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM -- NONAPPROPRIATED FUND ACTIVITIES	1/25/1984		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17938

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	7700.20	COMMISSARY SURCHARGE, NONAPPROPRIATED FUND (NAF), AND PRIVATELY FINANCED CONSTRUCTION POLICY	7/16/2003	X			
U	7730.47	DEFENSE INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (DIBRS)	10/15/1996	X			
U	7730.65	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM (DRRS)	6/3/2002		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/17939

Proponent Responsibility: USD(C)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1000.11	FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON DOD INSTALLATIONS	6/9/2000	X			
U	1332.34	VOLUNTARY STATE TAX WITHHOLDING FROM RETIRED PAY	10/14/1991			X	
U	1340.16	FORMER SPOUSE PAYMENTS FROM RETIRED PAY	9/20/1997	X			
U	1340.17	ALLOTMENTS FOR CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT	10/14/1991	X			
U	1341.3	SERVICEMEN'S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE	11/29/1991		X		
U	2140.2	RECOUPMENT OF NONRECURRING COSTS (NCS) ON SALES OF U.S. ITEMS	1/13/1993	X			
U	5010.38	MANAGEMENT CONTROL (MC) PROGRAM	8/26/1996	X			
U	5545.2	DOD POLICY FOR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS	7/22/1996	X			
U	7000.15	DOD ACCOUNTABLE OFFICIALS AND CERTIFYING OFFICERS	7/8/1998		X		
U	7045.14	PLANNING, PROGRAMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)	7/28/1990	X			
U	7060.1	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRANSACTIONS ENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS	6/16/1969		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(C)

11-L-0559/OSD/17940

Proponent Responsibility: USD(C)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	7200.1	ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF APPROPRIATIONS	5/4/1995	X			
U	7280.4	COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S (CINC'S) INITIATIVE FUND (CIF)	10/26/1993		X		
U	7360.5	POLICIES GOVERNING USE AND DISPOSITION OF CURRENCY AND COINS UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS	11/29/1991		X		
U	7650.1	GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AND COMPTROLLER GENERAL ACCESS TO RECORDS	9/11/1997	X			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(C)

11-L-0559/OSD/17941

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1341.8	PAYMENT OF DEATH GRATUITY TO SURVIVORS OF CERTAIN DOD PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTELLIGENCE DUTIES	3/31/1986		X		
U	1400.35	DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM (DCIPS)	3/18/2002	X			
U	1400.36	INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICER (ICO) PROGRAMS	3/5/2002	X			
S	3115.6	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TRAINING (U)	1/7/1967			X	
S	3115.7	SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) (U)	10/9/1973		X		
U	3115.8	COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON NON-U.S. PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AT REQUEST OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (LEAs)	9/7/1999		X		
U	3305.1	JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE (JMIC)	1/14/1998	X			
U	3305.2	DOD GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TRAINING	7/20/1984		X		
U	3305.7	JOINT RESERVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (JRIP)	2/29/2000		X		
C	3320.3	FOREIGN AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT SECURITY PROGRAM (U)	2/4/1985	X			
C	3325.1	FOREIGN MATERIEL PROGRAM (U)	2/19/1998		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17942

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
S	3325.2	TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TASKING AUTHORITY (U)	6/18/1987		X		
S	3600.1	INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) (U)	12/9/1996		X		
C	4515.9	USE OF DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM AIRCRAFT (U)	5/25/1984		X		
U	5010.10	INTELLIGENCE CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	11/16/1994		X		
U	5030.59	NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY (NIMA) LIMITED DISTRIBUTION IMAGERY OR GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND DATA	5/13/2003		X		
S	5100.19	IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (U)	3/19/1959		X		
S	5100.43	DEFENSE SPECIAL MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS CENTER (DEFENSE/SMAC) (U)	9/19/2002		X		
U	5100.47	NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC SCHOOL	4/30/1965		X		
U	5100.76	PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEW BOARD	1/21/1983		X		
U	5100.78	UNITED STATES PORT SECURITY PROGRAM	8/25/1986	X			
U	5100.85	INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS BOARD (ISB)	6/27/1995			X	
S	5105.29	HUMAN RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) ACTIVITIES (U)	7/9/1987		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17943

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
C	5105.32	DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM (U)	3/23/1973		X		
S	5105.61	DOD COVER AND COVER SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (U)	5/3/1997		X		
U	5160.54	CRITICAL ASSET ASSURANCE PROGRAM (CAAP)	1/20/1998	X			
U	5200.1	DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM	12/13/1996	X			
S	5200.17	SECURITY, USE AND DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) (U)	2/5/1965		X		
U	5200.2	DoD PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM	4/9/1999		X		
U	5200.26	DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM	6/12/1979		X		
U	5200.30	GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN PERMANENTLY VALUABLE DOD RECORDS	3/21/1983			X	
U	5200.31	SINGLE MANAGER FOR DOD MILITARY WORKING DOG PROGRAM	9/7/1983		X		
U	5200.32	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES (SCM) AND POLYGRAPH EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROGRAM SUPPORT	2/26/1996			X	
U	5200.33	DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (DCS)	6/24/2002		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17944

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5200.37	CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) OPERATIONS	12/18/1992			X	
U	5200.39	SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ACQUISITION PROGRAM PROTECTION	9/10/1997		X		
U	5200.8	SECURITY OF DOD INSTALLATIONS AND RESOURCES	4/25/1991		X		
S	5205.1	ACQUISITION AND REPORTING OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY	1/31/1983		X		
U	5205.10	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TREATY INSPECTION READINESS PROGRAM (DTIRP)	12/5/2000	X			
U	5205.2	DOD OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) PROGRAM	11/29/1999		X		
O	5205.7	SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP) POLICY	9/3/1997		X		
U	5205.9	JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (JMIP)	4/7/1995		X		
U	5210.2	ACCESS TO AND DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED DATA	11/16/1994		X		
U	5210.41	SECURITY POLICY FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS	9/23/1988		X		
U	5210.42	NUCLEAR WEAPON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP)	1/8/2001		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17945

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5210.45	PERSONNEL SECURITY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY	5/9/1964		X		
U	5210.48	DOD POLYGRAPH PROGRAM	12/24/1984		X		
U	5210.50	UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC	2/27/1992		X		
U	5210.56	USE OF DEADLY FORCE AND THE CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY DOD PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY DUTIES	1/24/2002		X		
U	5210.63	SECURITY OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS	4/6/1990		X		
U	5210.64	ALTERNATE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER PROTECTION PROGRAM	11/16/1994		X		
U	5210.65	CHEMICAL AGENT SECURITY PROGRAM	10/15/1986		X		
U	5210.70	DOD CRYPTOLOGIC TRAINING	11/3/1980		X		
U	5210.83	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION (DOD UCNI)	11/16/1994	X			
U	5220.22	DOD INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM	12/8/1980		X		
U	5240.1	DOD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES	4/25/1988		X		
U	5240.12	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) INTELLIGENCE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (ICAS)	1/11/1999		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17946

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5240.2	DOD COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)	5/22/1997		X		
U	8520.1	PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)	12/20/2001		X		

Proponent Responsibility: USD(I)

11-L-0559/OSD/17947

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	2010.7	POLICY ON RATIONALIZATION OF NATO AND NATO MEMBER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES	7/6/1981		X		
U	3100.10	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		
C	3100.9	SPACE SYSTEMS POLICY (U)	3/28/1977			X	
U	3222.3	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY PROGRAM (EMCP)	8/20/1990		X		
C	3222.5	ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SIGINT SITES (U)	4/22/1987	X			
U	3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1988		X		
U	3405.1	COMPUTER PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE POLICY	4/2/1987			X	
U	4630.5	INTEROPERABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) AND NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (NSS)	1/11/2002	X			
U	4640.1	TELEPHONE MONITORING AND RECORDING	11/16/1994			X	
U	4640.13	MANAGEMENT OF BASE AND LONG-HAUL TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES	12/5/1991	X			
U	4640.3	UNOFFICIAL TELEPHONE SERVICE AT DOD ACTIVITIES	8/20/1979		X		

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

11-L-0559/OSD/17948

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4640.5	DEFENSE METROPOLITAN AREA TELEPHONE SYSTEMS	5/2/1986	X			
U	4640.6	COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY TELEPHONE MONITORING AND RECORDING	6/26/1981		X		
U	4640.9	AUTOMATIC VOICE NETWORK ACCESS	2/8/1985	X			
U	4650.1	MANAGEMENT AND USE OF THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM	6/24/1987		X		
U	4650.2	MILITARY AFFILIATE RADIO SYSTEM (MARS)	1/26/1998	X			
U	4650.5	POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING	6/2/2003	X			
U	4660.3	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS	4/29/1996		X		
U	5015.2	DOD RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM	3/6/2000	X			
U	5030.19	DOD RESPONSIBILITIES ON FEDERAL AVIATION AND NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM MATTERS	6/15/1997	X			
C	5030.58	CONSOLIDATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTERS INVOLVING DEFENSE SPECIAL SECURITY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AND GENERAL SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS (U)	5/23/1978			X	
U	5100.30	WORLD-WIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS)	5/16/1974		X		

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

11-L-0559/OSD/17949

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5100.35	MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS BOARD (MCEB)	3/10/1998		X		
U	5100.41	EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS)	5/1/1991			X	
S	5100.44	MASTER PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM (U)	5/6/1977		X		
U	5100.79	WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ENGINEER	11/21/1975			X	
O	5160.13	DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO PROCURE CRYPTOLOGIC MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT	3/20/1956			X	
S	5200.16	OBJECTIVES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MEASURES USED IN NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS (U)	9/22/1970		X		
C	5200.19	CONTROL OF COMPROMISING EMANATIONS (U)	5/16/1995		X		
C	5200.5	COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) (U)	4/21/1990		X		
U	5205.8	ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION	2/20/1991		X		
S	5210.81	UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)	6/18/1991		X		

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

11-L-0559/OSD/17950

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5215.1	COMPUTER SECURITY EVALUATION CENTER	11/16/1994			X	
U	7950.1	AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING RESOURCES MANAGEMENT	9/29/1980			X	
U	8000.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD INFORMATION RESOURCES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	3/20/2002	X			
U	8100.1	GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID (GIG) OVERARCHING POLICY	9/19/2002	X			
U	8190.1	DOD LOGISTICS USE OF ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE (EDI) STANDARDS	5/5/2000	X			
U	8190.2	THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) ELECTRONIC BUSINESS/ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EB/EC) PROGRAM	6/23/2000	X			
U	8190.3	SMART CARD TECHNOLOGY	8/31/2002	X			
U	8220.1	SINGLE AGENCY MANAGER (SAM) FOR PENTAGON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES (ITS)	3/1/1995	X			
U	8320.1	DOD DATA ADMINISTRATION	9/26/1991	X			
U	8500.1	INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA)	10/24/2002	X			
O	8530.1	COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND)	1/8/2001	X			
U	8910.1	MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS	6/11/1993	X			

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(NII)

11-L-0559/OSD/17951

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(PA)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5040.2	VISUAL INFORMATION (VI)	5/10/1999		X		
U	5040.3	DOD JOINT VISUAL INFORMATION SERVICES	12/5/1985	X			
U	5040.4	JOINT COMBAT CAMERA (COMCAM) PROGRAM	8/13/2002	X			
U	5040.5	ALTERATION OF OFFICIAL DOD IMAGERY	8/29/1995	X			
U	5120.20	ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE (AFRTS)	5/13/1996		X		
U	5122.11	STARS AND STRIPES (S&S) NEWSPAPERS AND BUSINESS OPERATIONS	9/3/1996		X		
U	5122.8	USE OF MILITARY CARRIERS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PURPOSES	12/13/1963	X			
U	5230.16	NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) GUIDANCE	12/20/1993	X			
U	5400.13	JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS	1/9/1996	X			
U	5410.1	RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ACCIDENTAL CASUALTIES INVOLVING MILITARY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT	9/27/1973	X			
U	5410.14	COOPERATION WITH U.S. NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AT THE SCENE OF MILITARY ACCIDENTS OCCURRING OUTSIDE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	4/3/1970	X			

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(PA)

11-L-0559/OSD/17952

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(PA)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5410.18	PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNITY RELATIONS POLICY	11/20/2001	X			
U	5535.7	LICENSE AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES	11/1/1985	X			
U	5160.48	DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND VISUAL INFORMATION (PA&VI) EDUCATION AND TRAINING (E&T)	1/6/1997		X		

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(PA)

11-L-0559/OSD/17953

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(LA)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	4515.12	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR TRAVEL OF MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE CONGRESS	12/12/1964		X		
U	5400.4	PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS	1/30/1978		X		
U	5410.10	COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE OF ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS, CLOSURES OF INSTALLATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF CONTRACT OPERATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES	7/22/1968		X		

Proponent Responsibility: ASD(LA)

11-L-0559/OSD/17954

Proponent Responsibility: DPA&E

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	8260.1	DATA COLLECTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND MANAGEMENT	12/6/2002	X			
U	5000.4	OSD COST ANALYSIS IMPROVEMENT GROUP (CAIG)	11/16/1994		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DPA&E

11-L-0559/OSD/17955

Proponent Responsibility: IG, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1401.3	REPRISAL PROTECTION FOR NONAPPROPRIATED FUND INSTRUMENTALITY EMPLOYEES/APPLICANTS	10/16/2001		X		
U	5200.27	ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	1/7/1980		X		
U	5505.1	DOD CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION STANDARDS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	4/17/2000	X			
U	5505.6	INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	7/12/1991	X			
U	5505.9	INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ELECTRONIC, AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT	4/20/1995		X		
U	7050.1	DEFENSE HOTLINE PROGRAM	1/4/1999	X			
U	7050.4	AWARDS FOR COST SAVINGS RESULTING FROM THE DISCLOSURE OF FRAUD, WASTE, OR MISMANAGEMENT	9/7/1984		X		
U	7050.5	COORDINATION OF REMEDIES FOR FRAUD AND CORRUPTION RELATED TO PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES	6/7/1989		X		
U	7050.6	MILITARY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION	6/23/2000		X		

Proponent Responsibility: IG, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17956

Proponent Responsibility: IG, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	7600.10	AUDITS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, AND OTHER NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS	5/20/1991		X		
U	7600.2	AUDIT POLICIES	2/2/1991		X		
U	7640.2	POLICY FOR FOLLOWUP ON CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT	8/16/1995	X			
U	7650.2	GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REVIEWS AND REPORTS	7/13/2000	X			
U	7650.3	FOLLOWUP ON GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL, AND INTERNAL AUDIT REPORTS	2/14/1992		X		

Proponent Responsibility: IG, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17957

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1340.20	SETTLING PERSONNEL AND GENERAL CLAIMS AND PROCESSING ADVANCE DECISION REQUESTS	7/14/2003	X			
U	1340.22	WAIVER OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES	7/10/2003	X			
U	1442.2	PERSONNEL ACTIONS INVOLVING CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS	10/11/1968		X		
U	2000.3	INTERNATIONAL INTERCHANGE OF PATENT RIGHTS AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION	5/31/1961		X		
U	3020.4	ORDER OF SUCCESSION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13000 AND THE FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998	5/2/2001		X		
U	5000.62	IMPACT OF MERGERS OR ACQUISITIONS OF MAJOR DOD SUPPLIERS ON DOD PROGRAMS	10/21/1996	X			
U	5100.64	DOD FOREIGN TAX RELIEF PROGRAM	6/12/1979		X		
U	5100.77	DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM	12/9/1998		X		
U	5100.9	DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 10621	9/22/1955		X		
U	5120.18	DOD CONCESSIONS COMMITTEE	1/13/1999	X			
U	5145.3	SURVEILLANCE OF DOD SECURITY PROGRAMS	3/13/1967	X			

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17958

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5145.5	ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR)	4/22/1996	X			
U	5160.59	DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11390, JANUARY 22, 1968	1/22/1987	X			
U	5160.64	FEDERAL LEGAL INFORMATION THROUGH ELECTRONICS (FLITE) AND THE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES RETRIEVAL AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM (DEARAS)	8/12/1991		X		
U	5220.6	DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE REVIEW PROGRAM	4/20/1999	X			
U	5405.2	RELEASE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION IN LITIGATION AND TESTIMONY BY DOD PERSONNEL AS WITNESSES	7/23/1985	X			
U	5500.1	PREPARATION AND PROCESSING OF LEGISLATION, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROCLAMATIONS, AND REPORTS AND COMMENTS THEREON	5/21/1964	X			
U	5500.17	ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE (JSC) ON MILITARY JUSTICE	5/3/2003	X			
U	5500.19	COOPERATION WITH THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD	11/16/1994		X		
U	5500.7	STANDARDS OF CONDUCT	11/18/1994	X			

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17959

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5505.5	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM FRAUD CIVIL REMEDIES ACT	8/30/1988		X		
U	5510.3	AUTHORITY TO CONVENE GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL	8/11/1983		X		
U	5515.10	SETTLEMENT AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS UNDER THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS ACT OF 1964	7/6/1965		X		
U	5515.3	SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS UNDER 10 U.S.C. 2733 AND 2734, AS AMENDED	5/26/1966		X		
U	5515.6	PROCESSING TORT, CONTRACT AND COMPENSATION CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OPERATIONS IN NONAPPROPRIATED FUND ACTIVITIES	11/3/1956		X		
U	5515.8	SINGLE-SERVICE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING OF CLAIMS	6/9/1990		X		
U	5515.9	SETTLEMENT OF TORT CLAIMS	9/28/1990	X			
U	5525.1	STATUS OF FORCES POLICIES AND INFORMATION	7/2/1997	X			
U	5525.3	JURISDICTION OF SERVICE COURTS OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES	8/18/1966		X		

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17960

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5525.7	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN CRIMES	1/22/1985	X			
U	5525.9	COMPLIANCE OF DOD MEMBERS, EMPLOYEES, AND FAMILY MEMBERS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITH COURT ORDERS	8/17/1990		X		
U	5530.1	ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE OF PROCESS	8/22/1983	X			
U	5530.3	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS	2/18/1991	X			
U	5535.2	DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS-INVENTIONS AND PATENTS	10/16/1980	X			
U	5535.4	COPYRIGHTED SOUND AND VIDEO RECORDINGS	11/16/1994	X			
U	6000.6	MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES	11/16/1994	X			

Proponent Responsibility: GC, DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/17961

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1000.21	DOD PASSPORT AND PASSPORT AGENT SERVICES	7/9/1992		X		
U	1005.13	GIFTS AND DECORATIONS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS	12/6/2002	X			
U	1342.20	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY (DODEA)	10/13/1992		X		
U	1342.21	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECTION 8 SCHOOLS	10/13/1992			X	
U	1342.6	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPENDENTS SCHOOLS (DODDS)	8/5/1994			X	
U	3030.1	OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT (OEA)	11/28/2000		X		
U	3150.6	UNITED STATES NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM SUPPORT STAFF	1/19/2001	X			
U	4640.7	DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (DTS) IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR)	10/7/1993		X		
U	5000.24	PENTAGON EXECUTIVE DINING FACILITIES (EDFs)	5/3/1997	X			
U	5000.57	DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY	10/22/1991		X		
U	5010.35	DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (DRMI)	2/7/2003	X			
U	5030.54	FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BOARDS	4/14/1989		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17962

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5100.1	FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS	8/1/2002	X			
U	5100.20	NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE	6/24/1991		X		
U	5100.23	ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY	11/1/1985			X	
U	5100.3	SUPPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF COMBATANT AND SUBORDINATE JOINT COMMANDS	3/23/2000		X		
U	5100.73	MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES	6/5/2001		X		
U	5100.87	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY (DoDHRA)	6/29/1998		X		
U	5101.1	DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT	5/9/2003	X			
U	5101.2	DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE	7/22/2003	X			
U	5105.18	DOD COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM	2/8/1999	X			
U	5105.19	DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA)	6/25/1991		X		
U	5105.2	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	3/2/2001	X			
U	5105.20	DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND EUROPE	5/2/2001	X			
U	5105.21	DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)	2/18/1997		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17963

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5105.22	DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA)	12/6/1988		X		
U	5105.3	ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL	3/1/1989		X		
U	5105.36	DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY (DCAA)	2/28/2002	X			
U	5105.4	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM	2/10/2003	X			
U	5105.42	DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE (DSS)	5/13/1999	X			
U	5105.45	UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)	3/9/2000	X			
U	5105.53	DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT	11/23/1998		X		
U	5105.55	DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY (DECA)	11/9/1990		X		
U	5105.59	THE SECRETARY'S BOARD ON INVESTIGATIONS	9/25/1995			X	
U	5105.60	NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY (NIMA)	10/11/1996		X		
U	5105.62	DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)	9/30/1998		X		
U	5105.64	DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)	9/27/2000	X			
U	5105.65	DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY (DSCA)	9/23/2003	X			
U	5105.66	SENIOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (SEC)	7/10/2001	X			

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17964

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5105.67	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY (DoD CIFA)	2/19/2002	X			
U	5105.68	PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY	5/3/2002	X			
U	5106.1	INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	1/4/2001	X			
U	5106.4	INSPECTORS GENERAL (IGs) OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS	5/21/1993		X		
U	5107.1	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CIVIL SUPPORT (ATSD(CS))	1/5/2001			X	
U	5107.2	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) FOR GULF WAR ILLNESS, MEDICAL READINESS, AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS	5/16/2001			X	
U	5110.10	DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION OFFICE (DPMO)	7/16/1993		X		
U	5110.4	WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES (WHS)	10/19/2001		X		
U	5111.1	UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P))	12/8/1999		X		
U	5111.10	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC))	3/22/1995		X		
U	5111.11	DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT	8/22/2001	X			

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17965

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5111.12	WESTERN HEMISPHERE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION	6/17/2002	X			
U	5111.3	PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (PDUSD(P))	12/8/1999		X		
U	5111.7	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ASD(ISA))	10/19/1999		X		
U	5111.8	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY AND THREAT REDUCTION (ASD(S&TR))	2/3/2000			X	
U	5118.3	UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (USD(C))/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	1/6/1997		X		
U	5118.5	DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE	12/13/1991		X		
U	5122.10	AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE (AFIS)	11/21/2000		X		
U	5122.5	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ASD(PA))	9/27/2000		X		
U	5124.2	UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R))	10/31/1994		X		
U	5124.7	OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR FOR EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT	9/27/1999		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17966

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5124.8	PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (PDUSD(P&R))	7/16/2003	X			
U	5125.1	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS (ASD(RA))	3/2/1994		X		
U	5134.1	UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L))	4/21/2000		X		
U	5134.10	DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)	7/16/2001	X			
U	5134.12	DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS (DUSD(L&MR))	5/25/2000	X			
U	5134.13	DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY (DUSD(A&T))	5/25/2000		X		
U	5134.3	DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (DDR&E)	8/31/1994	X Revised 11/3/2003			
U	5134.4	DIRECTOR OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION	3/17/1989		X		
U	5134.8	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ATSD(NCB))	3/11/1996		X		
U	5134.9	BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (BMDO)	6/14/1994		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17967

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5136.1	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS (ASD(HA))	5/27/1994		X		
U	5136.12	TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVIITY (TMA)	5/31/2001	X			
U	5137.1	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (ASD(C3I))	2/12/1992			X	
U	5141.1	DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION (PA&E)	3/18/1999		X		
U	5141.2	DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (DOT&E)	5/25/2000		X		
U	5142.1	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)	6/14/2000	X			
U	5145.1	GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	5/2/2001	X			
U	5145.4	DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY	12/15/1989		X		
U	5148.11	ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT	7/1/1994		X		
U	5149.2	SENIOR READINESS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (SROC)	7/23/2002	X			
U	5154.24	ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY (AFIP)	10/3/2001	X			
U	5158.1	ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	5/1/1985		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17968

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5160.55	DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE	8/22/1988		X		
U	5330.3	DEFENSE AUTOMATED PRINTING SERVICE (DAPS)	6/25/1997		X		
U	5335.2	DEFENSE SUPPLY SERVICE - WASHINGTON (DSS - W)	4/21/1993		X		
U	7060.6	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES (ICASS)	8/25/1999		X		

Proponent Responsibility: DA&M

11-L-0559/OSD/17969

Proponent Responsibility: WHS

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	1000.17	DETAIL OF DOD PERSONNEL TO DUTY OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	11/24/1998	X			
U	1000.4	FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FVAP)	6/3/2002	X			
U	1100.12	AUTHORITY FOR ESTABLISHING SPECIAL COMMAND POSITIONS	9/3/1991	X			
U	1344.13	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT (NVRA)	11/16/1994	X			
U	1402.3	ADMINISTRATION OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE PROGRAM IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DEFENSE AGENCIES	8/16/1984		X		
U	4515.14	WASHINGTON LOCAL COMMUTING AREA	5/12/1989	X			
U	5025.1	DOD DIRECTIVES SYSTEM	7/27/2000		X		
U	5025.12	STANDARDIZATION OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMINOLOGY	8/23/1989		X		
U	5035.1	COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN (CFC) FUND-RAISING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	5/7/1999	X			
U	5035.6	PURCHASE OF UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS BY DOD PERSONNEL	2/9/1979		X		

Proponent Responsibility: WHS

11-L-0559/OSD/17970

Proponent Responsibility: WHS

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS
U	5230.9	CLEARANCE OF DOD INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE	7/15/1999	X			
U	5400.11	DOD PRIVACY PROGRAM	12/13/1999		X		
U	5400.12	OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS	4/15/1983		X		
U	5400.7	DOD FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) PROGRAM	6/17/2002	X			
U	7250.13	OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (ORFs)	9/10/2002	X			

Proponent Responsibility: WHS

11-L-0559/OSD/17971



11-L-0559/OSD/17972

DOD DIRECTIVES FOR EACH OSD COMPONENT

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES</u>	<u>INTENDED DISPOSITION</u>		
		<u>CURRENT</u>	<u>REVISE</u>	<u>CANCEL</u>
USD(AT&L)	114	35	58	21
USD(P)	58	9	49	
USD(P&R)	193	112	75	6
USD(C)	15	9	5	1
DPA&E	2	1	1	
USD(I)	59	9	45	5
ASD(NII)	44	19	16	9
ASD(PA)	14	10	4	
ASD(LA)	3		3	
IG, DOD	14	5	9	
GC, DOD	36	20	16	
DA&M	86	31	47	8
WHS	15	9	6	
TOTALS:	653	269	334	50



11-L-0559/OSD/17974



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration
& Management

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency,"
dated December 30, 2002.

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to certify the currency of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five years old. Since that effort was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and has directed that they be reviewed and recertified for currency. He is concerned that the DoD Directives should reflect recent actions taken within the Department to respond to world events and the realignment of functions.

Because the Secretary has asked for a current listing of all directives, a timely review and certification of each directive (see attached list) is required by the responsible Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Your response is requested by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate whether the listed directives are current, need revision or should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of your input, this information will be provided to the Secretary.

For directives no longer current, proposed revisions should be processed through the DoD Directives System for signature by the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days. Requests to cancel a directive should be processed within 45 days. The support and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure that these suspenses are met.

In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic review process for maintaining the currency of DoD Directives, the mandatory review period for directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," will be reduced from five years to two years. This change is effective immediately and will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/17975

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at (b)(6)


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

Attachment:
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/17977

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/17978

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102463-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/17980

C



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration
& Management

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency,"
dated December 30, 2002.

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Because the Secretary has asked for a current listing of all directives, a timely review and certification of each directive (see attached list) is required by the responsible Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Your response is requested by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate whether the listed directives are current, need revision or should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of your input, this information will be provided to the Secretary.


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In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic review process for maintaining the currency of DoD Directives, the mandatory review period for directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," will be reduced from five years to two years. This change is effective immediately and will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/17982



Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at (b)(6)


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

Attachment:
As stated



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



INFO MEMO

December 16, 2003 12:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

SUBJECT: Pentagon 9/11 Memorial Funding

- In the attached snowflakes, you asked for information on the Pentagon Memorial and where we stand with respect to funding of the Memorial. The Background Paper at Tab A briefly recaps the project. Below is a specific update on the funding status.
- The contract award cost of the actual design and construction of the winning design is \$11.6 million. Preliminary work is underway but full construction of the Memorial cannot begin until sufficient money is available to fund the various phases of the contract.
- Specifically, we need \$1.5 million as soon as possible, but no later than April 2004, to proceed with the next phase of the contract. The contractor has indicated that cost impacts can be minimized by receiving full funding no later than May 2004. The contractor remains flexible and timeframes remain negotiable.
- To date, DoD has received a total of \$368,000 in private donations, including the Pentagon employee's fundraiser that you approved in August.
- In addition, the families of 9/11 victims established a private non-profit Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.) to raise up to \$20 million to donate to DoD to pay for construction and maintenance of the Memorial.
- PMF, Inc. hired a professional fundraiser in October, and has also been raising funds in conjunction with the CFC campaign. To date, PMF, Inc. has raised approximately \$100,000 through these efforts and hopes to raise the substantial funding necessary to fully fund the contract next year.
- Should you and Mrs. Rumsfeld desire to make another contribution toward construction of the Memorial, your check can be made payable to the United States Treasury – Pentagon Memorial. It can either be forwarded to the WHS Budget Office, or if you prefer, I would be happy to deliver it for you.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/USD/17984

11204767/03

10:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 13, 2003

SUBJECT: **Pentagon Memorial**

I asked for some information on where we currently stand on the Memorial. Joyce and I may want to make another gift before year ends so we need to know soon.

Thanks.

DHR/am
121303.19

Please respond by: _____

12/17/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17985

8:28 AM

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 9, 2003
SUBJECT: **9/11 Memorial**

Please get me information on the 9/11 Memorial; what it is, who is going to pay for it, what's been raised, what needs to be raised, where it is likely to come from.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.14

Please respond by: _____

~~12/5~~ 12/12

11-L-0559/OSD/17986

December 16, 2003

Background Paper

SUBJECT: 9/11 Pentagon Memorial

- In December 2001, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to establish a Memorial at the Pentagon Reservation dedicated to the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack.
- Congress authorized DoD to use necessary amounts in the Pentagon Reservation Revolving Fund to plan, construct and maintain the Memorial. Congress also specifically authorized DoD to accept private contributions for establishment of this Memorial. DoD and the families have agreed that the actual construction costs of the Memorial are to be funded with private donations.
- After a world-wide design competition, the "Memorial Park" concept design was selected in March 2003, by a DoD design jury including former Secretaries Brown and Laird and surviving family members.
- A private foundation, Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.) was established in May 2003 to raise private donations to give to DoD for establishment of the Memorial. In October 2003, PMF, Inc. hired professional fundraiser Linda Webster.
- A design-build contract for this Memorial was awarded in August 2003 to Centrex-Lee, LLC in the amount of \$11.6 million. In addition, site preparation, planning and maintenance for the Memorial bring the total estimated cost to nearly \$20 million.
- Preliminary work is underway but full construction cannot begin until sufficient funds are provided to fund phases of the contract. To execute as originally envisioned, \$1.5 million is needed as soon as possible to finish design and begin construction. The contractor has indicated that cost impacts can be minimized by receiving full funding no later than May 2004. The contractor remains flexible and timeframes remain negotiable.
- As you directed on October 16, 2003, we have worked with former Secretaries Brown and Laird, and on December 5, 2003, letters bearing their signature were sent to former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries making them aware of the opportunity to donate.
- The full contract for construction of the Memorial will proceed upon receipt of sufficient funding.

Prepared by: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17987

10:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 13, 2003

SUBJECT: **Pentagon Memorial**

I asked for some information on where we currently stand on the Memorial. Joyce and I may want to make another gift before year ends so we need to know soon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
121303.19

Please respond by: _____

12/17/03

DDO.Y

13 Dec 03

8:28 AM

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 9, 2003
SUBJECT: 9/11 Memorial

Please get me information on the 9/11 Memorial; what it is, who is going to pay for it, what's been raised, what needs to be raised, where it is likely to come from.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.14

Please respond by:

12/15 12/12

ODD.Y

9 Dec 03

6/23 Done
D. White
Army Dir
6/24 June 23, 2003 6/26

452H

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Helicopters

Sharon - Do get me
a phone # for
Brit Hume. Tax.
D. White

Why are there so many helicopters with white tops that fly up and down the Potomac? Brit Hume asked me the question.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-34

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

24 June 2003

Sir,

HMX Airlift Support (the Marine VIP helos that display the white top used primarily to support White House & senior cabinet level missions), is headquartered in Quantico, VA, however, they have a forward staging area in Anacostia where all D.C. trips originate from. Therefore, they travel the Potomac frequently to rotate aircraft between the forward staging area and Quantico for maintenance & repairs and to ensure even usage among the fleet. They travel the Potomac route because they create less noise pollution for residential areas by staying over the river as much as possible.

V/R

Rick Kisling

Henry -
Call Brit Hume that
and give him
Answers -

23 JUN 03

U20502 103

June 23, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Estimates

Before I go up to testify the second week in July, we have to get some ways to answer: "How long are they going to be in Iraq, and how much is it going to cost?"

Let's get some folks working on it now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-37

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

U20504 /03

23 JUN 03

June 23, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA.*
SUBJECT: Casualties

The President raised the fact that X number of people are killed or wounded in Iraq every month, some by enemy action, some by accidents and so forth.

He asked how many people are in the military on active duty. I said 1.4 million. He asked in an average month, how many of the military people are killed or wounded in non-hostile activities.

I wonder if we could pull that together so I can show him soon. He said it is a way to put it in perspective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-40

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

Sir, 7/1
ANSWER TO THIS MEMO
ATTACHED. MORE
COMPREHENSIVE INFO
ATTACHED AT RED TAB.
(PROVIDED EARLIER TO S.D.
AT 0700 ON 7/1) *4/2*
COE

03JUN03

U20506 /03

June 30, 2003

Numbers of Non-Hostile Deaths or Injuries

Non-Hostile Deaths include all accidents (training and other), deaths due to illness, suicides and homicides.

Non-Hostile Injuries include all injuries from all sources during a deployment (Disease Non-Battle Injury Database).

Year - Month	<u>Non-Hostile Deaths</u>	<u>Non-Hostile Injuries</u>
2002 - May	86	3240
June	90	2566
July	98	1608
Aug	98	2110
Sep	75	2236
Oct	90	2043
Nov	61	1574
Dec	71	1851
2003 - Jan	64	1987
Feb	63	4739
Mar	87	10126
Apr	75	7738
May	80	9063
Monthly Average	80	3914

Sir,

7/1

- NON-HOSTILE DEATHS DO
NOT INCLUDE IRAQ INFO.

- NON-HOSTILE INJURIES IS
DEPLOYED TROOPS ONLY - THIS
DATA DOES INCLUDE IRAQ
INFO. ONLY INFO AVAILABLE
AT THIS TIME

11-L-0559/OSD/17993

June 30, 2003

Ratios of OIF Deaths to Worldwide Non-Hostile Deaths

Year - Month	Worldwide Non-Hostile Deaths Less OIF (1)	OIF Hostile/Non-Hostile Deaths	Worldwide Non-Hostile Deaths/100K Less OIF (2)	OIF Hostile/Non-Hostile/100k Deaths (2)	Ratio of OIF Deaths to Worldwide Deaths
2002 - Average	76				
2003 - Jan	64				
Feb	59				
Mar	72	29/19	6.54	19.05	2.91
Apr	57	82/38	5.19	41.38	7.97
May	53	10/31	4.82	14.14	2.93
JUNE		9/12			
Monthly Avg.	63.5		5.52		

(1) Worldwide non-hostile deaths include all accidents (training and other), deaths due to illness, suicides and homicides.

(2) Ratios per 100,000 troops

Worldwide injury data is not available at this time, a new database is in work to collect this info.

JUNE kio - 15
NON

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: Ries, Maj Michael R. (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 9:18 AM
To: Cables (E-mail)
Subject: FW: KIA WIA info JUN 03 IRAQ

RS,
Major Michael Ries
DCINC AXO
USCENTCOM
DSN: (b)(6)
Comm: (b)(6)
STU III: (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ries, Maj Michael R.
> Sent: July 09, 2003 09:13
> To: Settele, James, CDR, OSD
> Cc: Cerjan, LTC Robert P.; Zadlo, Col Cheryl L
> Subject: KIA WIA info JUN 03 IRAQ

>

	US	UK	TOTAL
> Total Dead		21	6 27
> KIA	9	6	15
> non hostile		12	0 12
>			
> Total Wounded	174	9	183
> WIA	139	8	147
> non hostile		35	1 36

>

> RS,
> Major Michael Ries
> DCINC AXO
> USCENTCOM
> DSN: (b)(6)
> Comm: (b)(6)
> STU III: (b)(6)

June 23, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cambone Read In

Please tell David Addington that I would like Steve Cambone briefed on the program David works on with me.

If I need to talk to somebody about it, have him tell me who I have to talk to, and I will get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-43

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

*I got an
OK from
George Tenet -
today -*

U20507 /03

June 23, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Intelligence

LARRY DI PUA
7/18

I would like some ideas from you as to how we can get the intelligence business joint. I am deeply concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-44

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

Sir-

I am working with The Services to assess how well / the extent to which they address "joint" intelligence in the context of their "Title 10" activities. The answer is "not much."

My objective is to develop guidance that leads to "joint intelligence doctrine" to complement the joint operational doctrine Adm G is preparing at USJFCOM.

You know how painful creating anything joint can be. I'll stay with it. Its important.

11-L-0559/OSD/17997 *U20508* *103* *8c* *7/12/03*

June 23, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Remarks for Change of Command

In preparing the remarks for Tom Franks's change of command ceremony, one of the things to focus on is the fact that he is a truly joint warfighter.

Thanks.



DHR:dh
062303-5

.....

Please respond by _____

U20509 /03

June 23, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cost Estimates

Here is a paper on historical examples of cost estimates that is very interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/7/03 paper "Historical Examples"

DHR:dh
062303-8

.....
Please respond by _____

U20510 /03

SECRET HAS BEEN

JUN 23 2003

M T DF
MAR 07 2003

Historical Examples

Purpose

- Key point: There are wide variations between estimates and actual costs for contingency operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Estimates change constantly as more information is gathered and "ground truth" is discovered.
- This paper provides some historical examples of recent contingencies and compares estimates for post-conflict reconstruction with refined estimates once ground assessments were completed and actual expenditures tracked.
- The estimates cited below come from respectable sources such as the World Bank, Congressional Research Service, or the General Accounting Office, who could be expected to make reasoned estimates, as opposed to wild guesses not based in reality or on plausible assumptions.
- **Bottom line:** Initial estimates have ranged from 25% to 626% of final costs for the cases listed below. A key lesson learned over the past decade concerning post-conflict reconstruction and predicting costs is that it takes some time after the dust has settled (e.g., two months) to do a comprehensive assessment on the ground to derive reasonable costs.

Panama

- Estimates for post-intervention funding ran close to \$2 billion.
- In January 1990 President George H.W. Bush requested \$1.028 billion in emergency credits, loan guarantees and grant aid for Panama. By January 1992, only \$619 million had been disbursed with indications that the remaining funds would likely not be needed.
- GAO economists estimated that economic recovery from the Noriega years had already begun prior to the arrival of significant aid.
 - GDP growth under Noriega in Panama averaged 0.4% a year from 1981 to 1991.
 - Panama has grown at an average 3.5% a year since the U.S. removed Noriega from power.

Bosnia

- Under President Clinton, military and civilian operations in Bosnia through fiscal year 1997 were initially estimated to cost \$3.2 billion.
- In a May 1997 report, the GAO noted that the actual cost for U.S. participation had risen to \$7.7 billion – more than double the original estimate.

- The increase covered the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Bosnia through June 1998. President Clinton subsequently decided to extend the U.S. troop presence beyond the 1998 deadline.
- The incremental costs associated with U.S. presence in Bosnia from 1995 through 2002 has totaled more than \$12.7 billion.
- As an indication of varying estimates prior to completion of thorough assessments, the World Bank initially placed the cost of repairing the damage to Bosnia at between \$20 and \$30 billion, whereas the government of Bosnia placed it at \$50-70 billion. Aid and loans to Bosnia over the past seven years has averaged around \$2.3 billion a year.

Kosovo

- In late spring, 1999 the World Bank initially estimated that post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo would require \$2.3 billion in external financing over a five year period.
- By July, the World Bank had significantly lowered the estimate for rebuilding Kosovo to \$1.23 billion, citing less damage than expected as the driving factor.
 - **Note:** These figures do not take into account immediate humanitarian aid and macroeconomic aid (e.g., balance of payments support).
- In April 1999, the European Union gave an estimate of at least \$3 billion for reconstruction. By late June, this estimate had grown to \$3.8 billion over a three-year period.
- The European Commission estimated the bill for reconstruction could go as high as \$7 billion.
- Then Secretary of Defense Cohen estimated in June 1999 that U.S. peacekeeping in Kosovo would cost \$1.5-2.0 billion a year. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments put the figure at \$2-3.5 billion.
 - The actual incremental costs incurred by DoD in Kosovo were \$3.1 billion in FY99 (including incremental costs associated with the conflict), \$1.8 billion in FY00, nearly \$1.4 billion in FY01, and just over \$1 billion in FY02. U.S. troop presence in Kosovo has fallen from 7,000 in 1999 to approximately 3,000 today (out of a total of 27,000 in the multinational force).

June 23, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

I have read your memo of June 13 on rebalancing forces. I like most of it.

Please coordinate that with Dick Myers, the Services and anyone else who is appropriate, and then develop an action plan and get back to me.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency.


Thanks.

Attach.

6/13/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Rebalancing Forces [U09353/03]

DHR:dh
062303-12

.....
Please respond by


8/1/03

U20512 /03



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

200 JUN 17 AM 10:09

INFO MEMO SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 23 2003
June 13, 2003, 11:00am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 13 June 03

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces--SNOWFLAKE

- In your June 9, 2003, memorandum, you asked "to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve."
- As detailed in the "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense," there are multiple solutions to address your concerns about Active/Reserve force mix. These include:
 - Move AC/RC capabilities within/between war plans and theaters of operation. - ?
 - Enhance volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual reservists, and units, who can be used without involuntary mobilizations. +
 - Expand the use of reachback to reduce the need for deployed forces. +
 - Streamline the mobilization process to improve responsiveness. +
 - Rebalance capabilities between and within the AC and RC. +
- The issue has been at the forefront of our ongoing discussions with the Services and is the topic of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) on June 19, 2003. Attached are the last two slides from that brief, constituting the proposed action items that will be the basis for discussion on the way ahead. The list you requested would be compiled from the Program Change Proposals due August 1st.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Alan LaBeouf, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA O'NEILL	11/6/20
MA	
EXT. PARROTT	6/17

AC/RC Force Mix Considerations

OSD/RA Brief to SROC
25 June, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18004

THE WAY AHEAD

- Reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation by replacing early deploying RC with later deploying AC where appropriate. +
- Expand the use of volunteer RC units and individuals through application of concepts such as the Variable Pool of Reserves. +
- Program for RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater. +
- Program RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation. 4

THE WAY AHEAD (Cont.)

- Implement innovative management techniques such as those described in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* to include new management programs and auxiliaries for specialized skills difficult to access, train and retain, and designing and testing new RC affiliation programs. †
- Determine the role and contribution of the RC to Homeland Defense and Assistance to Civil Authorities. †
- Conduct a review of the most recent mobilization lessons learned and recommend an improved mobilization system. Identify legislation, policy, or procedural changes needed to enable the new system. ††
- Reprogram force imbalances that result in repeated, frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors, or mitigating shortfalls through technology. †

REFER TO THE HANDOUT PROVIDED FOR ASSIGNMENTS AND DUE DATES

6/9/03
1306

SENT 6/9
June 5, 2003

Active
Plan

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: ~~Rebalancing Forces~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN 23 2003

Larry Di Rita
4/20

I want to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve.

The goal would be to make sure we have people who can do every needed skill on active duty, so that every time we want to do anything we don't have to activate Reserves.

We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-10

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

June 23, 2003

6/24

TO: LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Baghdad Itinerary

*COPY PASSED
TO TRIP GUYS FOR
TRICKLE FILE 1/2*

The next time I go to Baghdad, I want to go to one of the mass graves and one of the prisons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-14

.....

Please respond by _____

U20513 /03

June 23, 2003

OB
7/1

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Award for Stenbit

I should have presented a medal to John Stenbit. Did I do it? If not, let's get him in here and have a little ceremony and do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-15

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

U205146/03

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN SECDEF HAS STEEL



INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

JUN 23 2003

June 12, 2003 3:55 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF ACTION ___

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Global Information Grid - Bandwidth Expansion Program

*LARRY EN EN
6/18*

This morning I approved the purchase of the fiber optic paths, the laser equipment needed to light them up, and the electronics needed to create the network that will connect over 100 fixed bases around the world with very-high bandwidth capability.

- This program is the first to achieve this milestone of the several which are required to complete the vision of moving to a network-centric information system for DoD and related intelligence activities.
- The laser satellite program provides the extension from this fixed network to forces anywhere. It faces a busy summer of activity with coordination of the documents that describe the system sufficiently to issue contracts to define the system later this year. We will move to first launch at the beginning the next decade.
- Many people have worked very hard to get to this point in the program, and we are definitely moving toward a new "transformational" communications system for DoD. To reinforce this momentum, I recently issued a policy statement that will impact almost every software and communications system in the Department.
- The policy requires systems purchased from FY04 onwards to be capable of operating with the emerging commercial Internet standard, "Internet Protocol Version 6." By requiring the capability to be built in now, we will fully transition DoD to this new standard by 2008 and allow the end-to-end network to generate across the department. Choosing a transition date now allows the Future Combat Systems in the Army, for example, to count on the rest of DoD's being supportive of FCS information needs without worrying about how to interface with other systems. A related press release is attached.

Attachment:

As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/17
SR MA CRADDOCK	6/18
MA BUCCI	6/18
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/13

U09190 / 03



NEWS RELEASE

**OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE**

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

June 13, 2003

No. 413-03
(703)697-5131(media)
(703)428-0711(public/industry)

NEXT-GENERATION INTERNET PROTOCOL TO ENABLE NET-CENTRIC OPERATIONS

Implementation of the next-generation Internet protocol that will bring the Department of Defense closer to its goal of net-centric warfare and operations was announced today by John P. Stenbit, assistant secretary of defense for networks and information and DoD chief information officer.

The new Internet protocol, known as IPv6, will facilitate integration of the essential elements of DoD's Global Information Grid -- its sensors, weapons, platforms, information and people. Secretary Stenbit is directing the DoD-wide transition.

The current version of the Internet's operating system, IPv4, has been in use by DoD for almost 30 years. Its fundamental limitations, along with the world-wide explosion of Internet use, inhibit net-centric operations. IPv6 is designed to overcome those limitations by expanding available IP address space, improving end-to-end security, facilitating mobile communications, enhancing quality of service and easing system management burdens.

"Enterprise-wide deployment of IPv6 will keep the warfighter secure and connected in a fast-moving battlespace," Secretary Stenbit said. "Achievement of net-centric operations and warfare depends on effectively implementing the transition."

Secretary Stenbit signed a policy memorandum on June 9 that outlines a strategy to ensure an integrated, timely and effective transition. A key element of the transition minimizes future transition costs by requiring that, starting in October 2003, all network capabilities purchased by DoD be both IPv6-capable and interoperable with the department's extensive IPv4 installed base.

-END-

INTERNET AVAILABILITY: This document is available on DefenseLINK, a World Wide Web Server on the Internet, at: <http://www.defenselink.mil>

11-L-0559/OSD/18011

EF-5835

June 23, 2003

TO: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: CPG Meetings

I would like to have Steve Cambone and Ken Krieg involved in contingency planning meetings.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
062303-17



Please respond by _____

MR SECRETARY -

1) I HAVE REVIEWED BOTH STEVE AND KEN ON YOUR CPG PLANS.

2) I HAVE ALSO ASKED YOUR STAFF TO ENSURE BOTH ARE INVITED TO FUTURE CPG MEETINGS WITH YOU.

Very Respectfully,
RANTZBERG

U20515 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18012

11/21/03

6/25

June 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Confirmation Hearings

When you go up for your confirmation hearings, you are very likely going to get asked about the WMD and the management of intel. I suppose that is true of Abizaid as well. He saw all the intel. Someone better give him a heads up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-18

.....

Please respond by _____

U20516 /03

June 23, 2003

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Review

Your Defense Strategy Paper 2003 dated 12 June is excellent. I agree with you that it could emphasize the points you mention in your cover note.

One thought is, while you are working on that, to go ahead and send this draft out. Why don't you talk to Andy Hoehn and come up with a list of folks to send it to. Certainly, the members of the Senior Level Review Group are appropriate.

One other thought would be to have a separate piece of paper that suggests specific actions to be taken from it, such as the recommendation on page 20 and others.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-20

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20517 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18014

1/3.
1200



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 23 2003

June 13, 2003

Handwritten signatures and initials:
Dante
Kenny
Eric
Tom
p. 201

C6116

LARRY D. BROWN
4/10

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *AM*

SUBJECT: Revision/Update of Defense Strategy Review Paper (9 March 2001)

Attached is a draft/update of the early Defense Strategy Review paper you sent to me a few weeks ago. It needs further work, but it attempts to make the argument for preferential investment in a carefully selected set of warfare areas clearer and more persuasive.

After you have read it, lets talk about how you wish me to proceed, who else to send it to, etc.

I think it needs more on:

- The high level of uncertainty we face in planning.
- Rationale for capabilities/advantages based portfolio approach vice threat based approach.
- Hedging against future emergence of strong, antagonistic China.

EF-5834

June 23, 2003

TO: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Andy Marshall

I would like Andy Marshall to come to the next big contingency planning meeting, when we are talking about countries. Maybe you ought to brief him on our last meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-21

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

MR SECRETARY -

I WILL BRIEF ANDY MARSHALL ON OUR CPG PLANS PRIOR TO OUR NEXT CPG MEETING WITH YOU (HOPEFULLY LATER THIS WEEK WHEN WE BRIEF YOU ON THE SERIA CONCEPT).

2) I'VE SPOKEN TO YOUR STAFF ABOUT INCLUDING ANDY IN ALL FUTURE CPG MEETINGS WITH YOU.

*Very Respectfully
Donald Rumsfeld*

JUN 24 6:54 AM

U20518 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18016

6/25

June 23, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Families

There is an article in the *Washington Times* today about Saxby Chambliss that raises some questions I would like you to look into and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

Chambliss, Saxby and Alexander, Lamar. "Military Parents," *Washington Times*, June 23, 2003, p. 23.

DHR:dh
062303-4

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

U20519 /03

LARRY DI RITA
7/8

7/10
0800

SECRET
DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

June 30, 2003, 2:46PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 11 July 03

SUBJECT: Families - Snowflake

- The June 23 Washington Times Op-Ed piece by Senators Chambliss and Alexander came in anticipation of a combined hearing of the subcommittees they chair: (Personnel/SASC; and Children and Families/Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions)
- Thus far, they have also held field hearings in Warner-Robins AFB, GA, Ft Campbell, KY, and Groton, CT. Another field hearing is planned for Omaha, NE in September.
- Senator Alexander has a long-standing interest in family issues. By teaming with Senator Chambliss and Armed Services, he can leverage that.
- Mildly negative slant of Op-Ed is inconsistent with actual state of family support—although there is always room for improvement. Specific issues raised are analyzed at Tab A.
- To keep abreast of these issues, we convene quarterly a Quality of Life council with the military departments and other interested parties, including the Combatant Commands. We invite the Combatant Commanders to appear personally on a rotating basis to raise the matters that need our collective attention. At the most recent meeting, for example, Generals Hill and Holland briefed, and General Franks gave us his perspectives at an earlier meeting. (We would be pleased to have you or the Deputy Secretary address a future meeting if you would like.)

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENT:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/14

PREPARED BY: John Molino, DUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

*M.
7/11/03*



Issues Raised by Senators Alexander and Chambliss

1. **Respite Child Care:** We used some of the emergency supplemental money to provide this care at bases heavily affected by mobilization/deployment. This is over and above the regular budgeted amount and was necessary to add services at no or little cost to patrons (\$13M to date).
2. **Shifting Funds to Areas of Need (Groton):** The issue is more than flexibility and spending dollars. A Navy process exists that creates the most efficient organization. Unfortunately, changing the configuration of child development center rooms can require construction, and more equipment and staffing for infants. Further, it is not economical to reconfigure rooms as the population changes from year to year.
3. **Excess Demand for Child Care (Ft. Campbell example):** A real problem. Military departments have been reluctant to program funds to close the gap despite our urging. Our efforts to establish in-home care, in addition to stand-alone child development centers, has only been modestly successful. We are therefore developing a child care funding wedge to begin addressing child care shortages. This is an important economic issue for families.
4. **Stability for High School:** Waiver processes to meet this need exist in all Services, but Army instituted a formal program 12/2000: 99 percent of requests approved to date. Air Force considering a similar effort. Unfortunately, military needs must come first.
5. **Telephone lines:** Common complaint. Not always possible to provide US-style service in a deployed situation, despite the best efforts of all concerned. However, we are making steady progress. By the end of July, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service will establish six call centers to support areas in Iraq with large troop densities and there are 907 phones in country dedicated to morale calls for the troops. (A "good old days" note: Only a generation ago—Vietnam—such connectivity was unknown.)
6. **Slow mail:** Valid complaint. Army is Executive Agent. Part of cause is stark nature of infrastructure in Afghanistan, rapid movement of units in Iraq. We are working urgently with Army, the Executive Agent, to resolve this issue.
7. **Inappropriate Notification of Casualties:** From the beginning of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, embedded media was asked to wait 72 hours before reporting names, and generally complied. There is no difference during war.

published a best practice guide to aid Commanders and school districts. In addition to the efforts of the individual Services, I will engage the Departments of Education in the states where our involvement may be needed.

9. Connecticut Child Care Certification. One of the few states that will not accept our certification. I will request assistance from the Governor and Navy will begin discussion with the state licensing authority.
10. In-state tuition: Presently 38 states offer some degree of in-state tuition benefit to Service members or their family members. I have sent letters to all the Governors stating the importance of in-state tuition. In addition, the Army has sent letters to senior military leaders in ten States providing state-specific information on current policies and identifying key personnel who have influence over states' educational policy.
11. Housing Allowance as Income: Privatized housing changed legal status of housing allowances. But, effective May 13, 2002, housing allowance for military personnel living in privatized housing ceased to be counted as income for child nutrition programs; and this year Social Security Administration directed it be excluded in SSI benefit calculations.

Military Parents

Putting our children first

By Saxby Chambliss and Lamar Alexander

During the 1991 Gulf War, Col. Ted Purdom's 101st Airborne brigade fought alongside a nursing unit commanded by his wife, Lt. Col. Jean Purdom. Their sons, ages 9 and 11, stayed with their grandmother in Tennessee while their parents served in Iraq.

Today in Iraq, Maj. Lee Medley commands a Chinook helicopter unit. He has been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq for 15 of the 17 months since his youngest daughter was born. During the 21 days he was home at Ft. Campbell, Ky., he spent most of the time training for his next deployment.

Half the men and women in today's United States military are parents raising children. They volunteer for service — and for marriage. But a reduced force structure and more frequent and longer deployments are putting stresses on those marriages and children.

Family readiness affects military readiness. That is why two Senate subcommittees which we chair have been holding field hearings at Ft. Campbell, Warner Robins Air Force Base and Groton Naval Base to put the spotlight on military parents raising children. We will report what we have learned and continue those hearings in Washington next Tuesday.

Our hearings have presented a picture of fewer warriors, more missions, longer deployments, frequent moves, more marriages, more spouses working and more children. We are also finding that while our military is ahead of many segments of society in making it easier for parents raising children, there are many areas that deserve attention.

For example, nationally accredited child care is an area in which the services excel. At the same time, busy military parents need more child care options, especially "respite care" — a few hours off.

Ft. Campbell has 65 spouses that are certified to care for four to six children in its family home care network. But there is a demand for 230 such homes. And if the Groton submarine base commander had more flexibility in spending dollars, he might shift dollars from preschool programs — where there are vacancies — to infant care, where there is a waiting list.

The Pentagon should be able to make some changes to help families fairly easily. There would be wide support for offering more families of 11th or 12th-grade children the opportunity not to move until the child has graduated. (When he finished testifying at the Ft. Campbell hearing, Col. Kim Summers and his wife drove nine hours to Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas to his new assignment. It was his 22nd move in more than 25 years of service.)

Communications can be improved. Spouses at Warner Robins told how their husbands waited for hours to use phones, only to experience poor quality and frequent disconnections. Letters and care packages took weeks to reach troops. Tragedies were sometimes reported on network television before the Department of Defense had sufficient time to confirm victims and notify families.

More difficult to do but even more helpful would be to persuade states to make reciprocity agreements aimed at making it easier for military parents who move:

- *A high-school junior who learns Georgia history at Ft. Stewart might also be required to meet the Tennessee history requirement when a parent is transferred to Ft. Campbell;
- *Spouses who want to provide child care as part of a family home network must wait six months to become certified when transferred to Groton, Connecticut;
- *Other states might follow Georgia's example of allowing in-state tuition to continue at Georgia universities, even though the parent is transferred during the student's academic career.

Finally, it was also disturbing to learn that in some cases housing allowances are now counted as part of a military family's income, making the family ineligible for child-care vouchers and Women, Infants and Children's (WIC) grants — even though previous housing was treated as "in-kind" and not as part of their income.

As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld takes a hard look at force structure, at length of deployments and frequency of moves, he should keep in mind the families at home as well as the fighting men and women who are deployed. Maj. Medley's wife, Gricell, put it this way, "We want to allow our soldiers to be good soldiers, but they also want the opportunity to be good fathers and husbands." Help for military parents will mean a high re-enlistment rate, a saving of taxpayer dollars and a happier and more effective fighting force.

Sen. Saxby Chambliss is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee. Sen. Lamar Alexander is chairman of the Senate's Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Subcommittee on Children and Families.

COORDINATION

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 7-2-03

June 23, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Award for Lord Robertson

When Robertson steps down at the end of the year, let's tickle a note for October to present him with some sort of a DoD award.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-3

.....
Please respond by 10/1/03

U20520 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18024

June 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Formers and Commissions

I want to get the former secretaries of defense in sometime and give them a briefing on Iraq, what is going on, and just have lunch with them, a private meeting. Let's try to do it in the next three or four weeks, before the end of July.

Also, I think it would be nice maybe to bring in the folks from the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and the Space Commission at the same time and do the same thing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-38

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20521 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18025

June 23, 2003

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

COPIES SENT
TO MCM &

(b)(6)

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dinner Event for Gen. Franks

Joyce and I want to have the dinner for Tom Franks on Thursday, July 10, at 6:30 p.m. at our house. Marcy would also be included in the dinner.

Besides the Rumsfelds and the Franks, please invite the following people immediately: Senator Ted Stevens and his wife, Senator Dan Inouye and his wife (I don't know if Senator Inouye has a wife, so we ought to check), General Schoomaker and his wife—if she happens to be in town, which I doubt, but he should be told that it is not a command performance or anything like that—Vice President and Mrs. Cheney, and General and Mrs. Garner. Then, as we get regrets, we can add other people. On my list at the moment are: Frank Carlucci and Jim Schlesinger.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-26

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

U20522 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Africa

Please tell Andy Hoehn to talk to somebody to slow down on talking about possible bases in Africa that I keep reading about. I have not approved anything like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062403-1

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

U20523 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Supreme Court Decision

I take it the Supreme Court decision is not going to affect how DoD does its education selection. Is that right?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062403-3

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

U20524 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: German MoD

MoD Struck of Germany told me he is going to be in the U.S. on July 9 for the convention celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Harley Davidson. He just wanted me to be aware of it. He is not asking for anything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062403-6

.....

Please respond by _____

U20525 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Danish Special Forces

The Danish MoD said he wanted their Special Forces people to have an officer in the U.S. Special Forces Command and the Northern Command. Do you know anything about that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062403-7

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20527 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: de Graffenreid

Should we transfer de Graffenreid to you? If so, let's talk about it and figure out how we get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062403-8

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

U20528 /03

June 24, 2003

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: E-mail to Kilberg

ADVANCE
COPY SENT

Please send the following e-mail to Bobbie Kilberg:

Bobbie—

I received your e-mail. I am sorry I simply cannot do it. Would you like me to see if Paul Wolfowitz could? Do let me know.

Best regards,

DHR:dh
062403-12

.....
Please respond by 6/25/03

U20529 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18032

Don for you

1-2

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: "Bobbie Kilberg" (b)(6)
 To: (b)(6)
 Sent: Monday, June 23, 2003 4:59 PM

Joyce: I would appreciate your giving the below e-mail to Don. Thanks. Bobbie

Don:

We have known each other for almost 34 years and this is the first time I have brought you a speaking request or asked you to consider something that is important to me. I thought it was about time I exercised the prerogative that comes with ties that go back more than 1/2 my lifetime ☺.

I am aware that you want to improve the access of DOD to the innovative and cutting-edge technologies of the young entrepreneurial technology companies. As President of the Northern Virginia Technology Council (NVTC), the membership and trade association for the technology community in Northern Virginia, I can help you with that goal. NVTC has about 1500 member companies and 69% of our technology members are small companies of 10 employees or less. They are innovative and creative by definition or they would not still be alive in this economic downturn. Our membership includes companies from all sectors of the technology industry including information technology, software, Internet, ISPs, telecommunications, biotech, bioinformatics, biometrics and aerospace.

I have noticed that you are accepting some speaking engagements in this region and I would like to invite you to be NVTC's Fall Banquet speaker. Our audience of 1,000 will be composed of a significant number of young entrepreneurs as well as CXOs from the large and mid-size federal contractors. Since you just spoke to the largest federal contractors at the Business Executives for National Security Gala,, this would be a wonderful opportunity to expand your message to include a much broader range of companies in the technology arena. Though our event is normally in October, we would be pleased to hold it on any date from late September to mid-December that would be feasible for you. As a Northern Virginia organization, we stay in Virginia for our major events and our usual venue is the McLean Hilton. Our 2003 Spring Banquet speaker was Secretary Ridge, our 2002 Fall Banquet speaker was Virginia Governor Warner, and our 2001 Spring Banquet speaker was the Vice President. Thus, you would be in good company. But, most importantly, you would be reaching a target audience for DOD.

Please seriously consider this invitation. I can be reached at my office at (b)(6) ext. (b)(6) or on my cell at (b)(6) and on e-mail at (b)(6). Thank you very much. Bobbie

6/23/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18033

June 25, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DATT

LARRY DI RITE
7/8

Please find out what this phrase means that I have circled on this memo:
"CENTCOM has stated critical operational requirements".

Thanks.

Attach.
6/23/03 DIA memo to SecDef re: Defense Attaché/Army Attaché Update for Kabul, Afghanistan

DHR:dh
062503-3



Please respond by 7/8/03

Sec Def
As we discussed.
82
JUL 11 2003 ✓

U20530 /03



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO

U-1919/DR

June 23, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:  L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: ~~(U)~~ Defense Attaché/Army Attaché Update for Kabul, Afghanistan

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Sir, we informed you in February 03 that COL Teddy R. Seel, USA, would report as the Defense Attache (DATT) in Kabul, Afghanistan, in September 03. CENTCOM has stated critical operational requirements for COL Seel to remain in Iraq. I have approved COL Elmer G. White, III to replace COL Seel, (Army nomination and CENTCOM approval) as the next DATT and Army Attaché (ARMA) to Afghanistan.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Colonel White is scheduled to assume the duties as the DATT no later than September 2003. He:
 - served as the assistant ARMA to USDAO Moscow.
 - served as Commander, Military Coordination Center, Zahko, Iraq.
 - served as the Chief of Staff, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
 - served as Team Chief, On-Site Inspection Activity, Rhein Main, GE.
 - attended the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
 - has an MA from Georgetown in Soviet Studies.
 - commanded an Air Defense Artillery Battalion with the 4th ID.
- COL White will receive attaché refresher training and Afghan Persian language training before he reports.

cc: DEPSECDEF, USD(P), ASD(C3I), CJCS, VCJCS, ACJCS, DJS, J5, J3, J2

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11-L-0559/OSD/18035



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO

U-1951/DR

28 June 2003

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *L. E. Jacoby* L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: ~~(U)~~ Response to SECDEF Query Re: DAO Kabul Assignment

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Sir, this responds to the SECDEF question concerning the nature of the "critical operational requirement" that caused CENTCOM to divert COL Teddy Seel from his programmed assignment as Defense Attaché (DATT) Kabul.

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ COL Seel was assigned as the Deputy Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in Cairo when chosen to become DATT Kabul. However, CENTCOM determined that due to impending operations in Iraq, COL Seel's fluency in Arabic would be required in Iraq. He was assigned to northern Iraq as the CENTCOM liaison officer to the Iraqi National Congress. He served in that capacity until his assignment in Iraq was curtailed and he returned to OMC Cairo (b)(6)
(b)(6) My original memo incorrectly stated that he was diverted to remain in Iraq.

PREPARED BY: Mr. Nicky Cook, DHO-3, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/18036

June 27, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 28 2003

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita
Gen. Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Transparency on Funds

We need to get Dov Zakheim to brief us on what kind of transparency we are going to have on all the funds of Iraq, the U.S. and anyone else that are being spent in Iraq. I need a report and a format.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062703-5

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

6/27

Sec Def - Will do. For
~~W/B~~ the oil money in
particular, we (DoD) are
developing options for
Bremer for an accounting
service, either governmental
or private. Secondly, the
UN Resolution called for an
international monitoring board,
~~that~~ which Treasury is organizing
from World Bank, etc. to provide
further scrutiny.

22 Jun 03

U20590 /03

11-L-0559/QSD/18037

Larry Di Rita 6/26

SENT 6/27
June 25, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lobbying

If we need to bust Clark loose, I would be happy to talk to John Warner about it,
or I would be happy to take Steve Herbits and go up and see Ted Kennedy if
necessary.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062503-15



Please respond by 6/27/03

25 Jun 03

U20591 /03

SENT 6/27
June 25, 2003

OB
7/1

337 WH

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fargo Brief to POTUS

We are going to have to think through how we take the Fargo brief to the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062503-11

.....
Please respond by _____

25 Jun 03

U20592 /03

SENT 6/27
June 25, 2003

000.71 SP

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marshall Billingslea

I should see Marshall Billingslea sometime this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062503-14



Please respond by 7/1/03

25 Jun 03

U20593 /03

June 30, 2003

230.02

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hiring

What do you think about hiring a Hispanic for personnel services to get some Hispanics in the Department?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-42



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20594 /03

June 30, 2003

200.1

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Keane
ADM Clark
Gen. Jumper
Gen. Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Lost Days

Paul O'Neill tells me that the Department of Defense uniformed personnel have five lost days per every hundred. He said Alcoa loses .15. He moved Treasury from 2.5 down to 1.2. He said DoD numbers are inexcusably high.

The only way it will get fixed is if the senior leadership is personally involved and we set tough goals for military and civilians.

DHR:dh
063003-51

30 Jun 03

U20595 /03

June 30, 2003

313

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Phone Logs

In record keeping, when I leave am I going to end up with a complete set of these telephone log sheets on a disc? I didn't recall hearing that.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cables phone log

DHR:dh
06J003-15

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

30 JUN 03

U20596 /03

Sample Phone Log

6/30

6/30/03 2:30 AM

Secretary of Defense Cables Telephone Log for Secretary Rumsfeld

Date/Time	Name	Type Call	Status/Duration	SecDef Location
27 Jun / 0738	Secretary Powell	Secure	Complete, 7 minutes	Office
27 Jun / 0745	CENTCOM/CPA Conference Call	Secure	Complete, 24 minutes	Office
27 Jun / 1530	Vice President Cheney	Secure	Incomplete, direct dial from VP office. SecDef was with ROK MOD at time of call. SecDef made two direct calls to VP office at 1612 and 1639 27 Jun 03	SD Dining Room
28 Jun / 1641	Mr. Hadley	Secure	Complete	Residence
29 Jun / 0908	GEN Pace	Secure	Complete	Residence
29 Jun / 1015	GEN Pace	Secure	Complete	Residence
29 Jun / 1255	Ambassador Bremer	Secure	Complete	Residence
29 Jun / 1936	Mr. Rodman	Non-Secure	Complete	Residence
29 Jun / 2115	Mr. Hadley	Secure	Complete	Residence

June 30, 2003

020 DOD

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Dictionary

Please get me a copy of the DoD dictionary. I didn't even know there was such a thing. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-88



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20597 /03

SENT 6/30
June 26, 2003




TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

337

Let's make sure that Pete Schoomaker sees it the next time there is a briefing on lessons learned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062603-4



Please respond by 7/11/03

26 Jun 03

U20598 /03

SENT 6/20
June 26, 2003

334

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tom Murphy

Please see what you can do about that Tom Murphy Save the Children problem with AID that George Shultz raised with you.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062603-3



Please respond by 7/11/03

26 Jun 03

U20599 /03

June 30, 2003

413.51

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JFCOM Memo

What should I do with this memo from ADM Giambastiani?

Thanks.

Attach.

JFCOM memo to SecDef re: Multinational Limited Objective Experiment on Information Sharing, 31 March 2003 [U05614/03]

DHR:dh
06/30/03-40



Please respond by 7/18/03



30 Jun 03



41-
4300

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

SECDEF HAS SEEN ✓

JUN 30 2003
IN REPLY REFER TO
J00
31 Mar 03

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Multinational Limited Objective Experiment on Information Sharing

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to update you on our recently completed Multinational Limited Objective Experiment. The second of four planned annual multinational experiments, it focused on information sharing (CENTCOM's top priority for coalition warfighting) and the development of a coalition operational net assessment capability. Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada participated in this globally distributed experiment. Unique to this experiment and employed for the first time, retired flag or general officers led each country's participants. Additionally, NATO participated under the auspices of Allied Command Atlantic. Although our detailed data analysis is not yet complete, several emerging insights are evident:

a. Information sharing among coalition partners is essential even in pre-crisis situations. This builds trust and confidence within the coalition and develops the collective understanding necessary to make proper decisions. Current policy - not technology - constrains our ability to create this condition. Notably, while the other participating nations withhold information by exception; the U.S. releases information by exception. Our policy on foreign disclosure may require re-examination to fully exploit the potential of coalition warfare. The National Security Agency is heavily engaged in assisting.

b. All participants have found our system of systems analysis of the adversary, ourselves, and the operational environment to be very powerful. Building on the Operational Net Assessment concept from Millennium Challenge 02, we are expanding the concept to comprehensively assess the operational environment. While the technology requires continued development and our disclosure policies hamper achievement of a full multinational capability, all participants support aggressive pursuit of a multinational operational net assessment capability.

c. Development of a useable distributed information environment requires pre-crisis groundwork or the ad hoc nature of coalitions will hamper speed of planning and action. Many participants recommended that we examine how Interpol has established their collaborative network to see if there is a military analogue that we could develop.

d. The Senior Mentors noted the need for a political framework to enable a productive multinational operational net assessment process, while cautioning that the pursuit of consensus may undermine exploitation of unique national insights. To no one's surprise, they noted that "knowledge" was the key to decision making and comprises much more than information or intelligence. Finally, they viewed face-to-face contact prior to or during the early stages of the operational net assessment process as essential to building confidence and trust within the coalition.

11-L-0559/OSD/18049

U05614 / 03

2. I have been following this experiment closely. I am encouraged by the initial insights. Building on them, we plan to aggressively pursue multinational experimentation and continue to expand the participant pool.

Handwritten signature of E. P. Giambastiani, consisting of the letters 'V/R' above a stylized signature.

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

June 30, 2003

Iraq

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anderson Paper

I read this paper on Iraq by Anderson. You ought to move ahead and get people aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated memo by DepSecDef to SecDef w/attachments

DHR:dh
063003-39

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20601 /03

POSITION PAPER

Subj: DEALING WITH A BAATHIST PROTO-INSURGENCY IN IRAQ

1. **BACKGROUND.** In March, I predicted that the Baath Party's most probable post-war course of action would be to morph themselves into a popular insurgent movement and attempt to wage a guerilla war against coalition forces. In recent days, there have been a series of well-organized attacks on US in central Iraq that resemble the classic nascent first stage of the three stages of insurgency. If this is the case, we should apply classic counterinsurgency doctrine early and energetically.
2. **DISCUSSION**
 - a. The first phase of a classic insurgent strategy is to conduct low level hit and run attacks, build political cadres and sanctuaries in areas where disaffection is greatest, and seek sanctuaries in third nations.
 - b. The classic successful response to this first phase has been to remove the potential causes of popular dissatisfaction, eradicate the insurgent cadres before they mature, insert government alternatives to the insurgent.
 - c. Ambassador Bremmer appears to have grasped the first principle and the administration has made it clear that it will tolerate no third nation sanctuaries. The devil in counter-insurgency remains in the details.
 - d. The nexus of the problem appears to be in Fallujah, a predominately Sunni city, where Baathist loyalties remain strong although sections of Baghdad remain problematical.
 - e. Another problem is the assignment of Army mechanized infantry in a potential insurgent zone. This is not a criticism of mechanized infantry that has performed magnificently in conventional combat. But mechanized infantry has two strikes against it in counterinsurgent warfare, particularly in urban areas: (1) there aren't enough dismounted infantry for counter-insurgent area control operations. (2) They aren't prepared by training or temperament for such operations. None have gone through the Fort Polk urban rotations that stress the "three block war".
 - f. There is not a local Iraqi alternative to the Baath hardliners in most locales. Such mechanisms must be created.
 - g. The most obvious message being sent by Baathist hardliners is that, "you are not better off today than you were three months ago". This is the only popular message they have. In the long run, it will be discredited, but the Iraqi's need a clear message that there is light at the end of the tunnel, and they must see definite glimmers along the way.
 - h. The Baathists cannot be allowed to merge in a temporary alliance with Shiia radicals in a National Liberation Front. The Israelis allowed natural enemies in Lebanon to band together due to political ineptitude. We cannot repeat this mistake.
 - i. We must avoid making the mistake of assuming the Baath loyalists will always be inept. Freed of the suffocating day- to- day supervision of a

corrupt government and party leadership, the younger cadres can be expected to learn from experience and adapt. It is likely that they will eventually challenge the senior leadership. We must stamp them out before they get to that point.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Secretary Bremmer must develop a road map to reconstruction with milestones. It must be widely publicized with milestones met celebrated and milestones missed honestly admitted. This will go a long way toward taking away the potential causes of dissatisfaction among the majority of the population that can be expected to be the swing vote in any insurgency or revolutionary situation.
- b. We need to engage the IOs, NGOs, and PVOs in a constructive manner in national recovery. They are a pain in the neck to deal with, but they are reasonably cost effective, and that cost does not come out of the DOD budget.
- c. A Marine Corps Task Force should be dispatched to get a handle on Fallujah. They specialize in "tough love" and the three- block war. The Marines won't like it, but they will do what they are told. The citizens of Fallujah won't like it, but they'll be glad to have the Army back when the Marines get done with them.
- d. Mobile Training teams proficient in counter-insurgent operations should be dispatched to get the mechanized infantry up to speed on counter-insurgent operations, and they should be replaced as quickly as possible with light infantry that have been through the Fort Polk rotation.
- e. Groups of anti-Baath Iraqi "young Turks" should be recruited and trained to provide armed anti-Baath cadres for villages and urban neighborhoods. If properly trained in military skills and democratic values by special ops teams, they could provide the cadre for effective long-term local leadership and an antibody against insurgent infection.
- f. An effective means of interagency coordination is needed at the national and regional level. IOs, NGOs, and PVOs should be included in the reconstruction effort to ensure against duplication of effort. Not all will participate in a cooperative effort, but those who do will be value added in the long run.

Most respectfully,
Gary Anderson

Source: [News & Business > News > News Group File, All \(i\)](#)

Terms: [editorial and gary anderson and date\(geq \(3/1/03\) and leq \(5/6/03\)\) \(Edit Search\)](#)

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April 02, 2003, Wednesday, Final Edition

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BYLINE: Gary Anderson

BODY:

Many observers of the war with Iraq are focused on the looming battle for Baghdad in anticipation that it will be the culminating event of the conflict, and it may in the end be so from an American perspective. But in the view of the Iraqi leadership, it may be only the end of a first stage in a greater Iraqi plan.

George Patton said that the only way to truly get to know an enemy is to fight him. We have been fighting for nearly two weeks now, and some patterns have been emerging that indicate the Iraqi game plan may differ from the American worldview. A conflict with Iraq has been war-gamed countless time, in many venues in the past 12 years. The potential Iraqi use of asymmetric "dirty tricks" has been a feature of virtually every game I have been associated with. These tactical actions should have come as no surprise to anyone. The question is how to turn asymmetric tactics into a coherent strategy. The assumption that Saddam Hussein is looking at the Battle of Baghdad as a glorious last stand is totally inconsistent with his character. There is likely a greater game afoot, and it is becoming clearer.

Let's look at what we know. Hussein is an admirer of Ho Chi Minh. He has also studied the American debacles in Lebanon and Somalia. He and his staff have had 12 years to think about how to fight. What follows is how I think he has thought about it.

Begin with a desired strategic end state. I believe that he views the war as an opportunity not only to defeat the Americans but also to hijack leadership of the anti-Western wing of the Arab and Muslim world from Islamic fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden. To do that against overwhelming American and British conventional military superiority, Hussein must develop a three-pronged strategic approach.

Phase I assumes eventual defeat in a conventional war. If defeat is inevitable, he must make the most of it. Anwar Sadat of Egypt reclaimed a measure of Arab pride in 1973 in a war that, while lost tactically and operationally, was fought with enough skill to regain an Arab sense of honor and pride lost in 1967. The next precept is to make the conventional phase last as long as possible and be as bloody as possible for the American-British coalition. The

11-L-0559/OSD/18054

final sub-phase will be to attempt to turn Baghdad into an Arab Alamo and make "Remember Baghdad" a battle cry, not just for future generations but also for the rest of this war. At this point Hussein would go into hiding or exile, portraying himself as having led a glorious struggle against imperialism and vowing to continue. If he uses chemical weapons, I am wrong. There will be no sanctuary.

The second phase would be a protracted guerrilla war against the "occupation," which the American-British coalition bills as liberation. It is now obvious that the Baath Party has seeded the urban and semi-urban population centers of the country with cadres designed to lead such a guerrilla movement; this is not a last-minute act of desperation or an afterthought. Americans have overrun facilities that have been in place for some time. The war would be waged as an attritional struggle against the occupying forces and any Iraqi interim government. Attempts at free elections would be subverted and portrayed as a sham. The strategic objective of this phase would be to have the Americans and British tire of the effort and turn it over to the United Nations.

Phase III would then be to amass enough semi-conventional power to overwhelm the U.N. and interim government mechanisms. In other words, the concept would be to stage a combination of "Black Hawk Down" and the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive that crushed South Vietnam. A success here would transform Hussein from a regional pariah into a darling of the Arab world. This is a high-risk strategy, but Saddam Hussein is a high-risk kind of guy.

My reason for writing this is not to postulate a gloom-and-doom scenario but to suggest that we be prepared to react to an enemy game plan that may be different from our own. This plan is not devoid of significant dangers from an Iraqi perspective. First, it would be hard for Baath Party operatives to make the transition from the role of Sheriff of Nottingham to that of Robin Hood. But it would not be impossible.

Such a transition is not unprecedented. Vlad the Impaler, a noted tyrant, became a Romanian folk hero in the face of a Turkish invasion. If Dracula could make the transition, it's not inconceivable that Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party leadership could do the same. But that transition is not yet complete. The Baath cadres can be rooted out and hunted down early if we make doing so a priority. We know how to fight a guerrilla war, but we need to act quickly before these cadres become indigenous to the local terrain. We need to ship copies of the old Marine Corps Small Wars Manual to the battlefield if we have not already done so.

In Iraq we are fighting an adaptive and asymmetric foe. To paraphrase actor George Hamilton in one of his most memorable roles (in "Zorro, the Gay Blade"), "There is no shame in fighting an asymmetric war; the only shame is fighting one badly."

The writer is a retired Marine Corps colonel who served in Somalia and Lebanon.

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11-L-0559/OSD/18055

June 30, 2003

Inag

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Schlesinger and Pickering

You should have someone draft a response to Schlesinger and Pickering, and then let me see it before it goes under your signature.

Thanks.

Attach. ^{6/23} COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LETTER SCHLESINGER NOTES
~~5/29/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Army Personnel and Pay Systems [U08307703]~~

DHR:dh
063003-38

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20602 /03

FOR: SECDEF FROM: ABE SHULSKY

6/24
1530
c 6/24

USDP had Abe Shulsky do a quick review of the CFR paper. (SD gave a copy to USDP for his review at this morning's roundtable.) Below are Abe's comments. - PAPER IS ATTACHED.

Subject: RE: Letter from Council on Foreign Relations

No major issues.

Most critical point is as follows:

"The lack of a clear vision and strategy to shape Iraq's political landscape has had negative implications of the success of U.S.-led postwar efforts. Several changes in approach have undermined U.S. credibility and created uncertainty among Iraqis about U.S. intentions." (p.4)

AT
RED
TAB

Answer should be that Bremer has made clear what his intentions are, and he is now in the process of laying out for the Iraqis what powers the Interim Administration would have. This problem, such as it is, is in the past.

Abe

7/11/04

June 30, 2003

334 NSC

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NSC Schedule

I think the NSC on Tuesday is going to be at 7:30 a.m.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-35



Please respond by _____

30 Jun 03

U20603 /03

June 30, 2003

230.02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: James Carafano

I was watching Fox on Sunday, and they had a fellow on by the name of James Carafano from Heritage who said everything right. He was logical, and he presented well.

I wonder if he is someone we ought to look at. He could conceivably do something in public affairs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-24



Please respond by 7/8/03

30 Jun 03

U20604 /03

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our staff



Dr. James Jay Carafano
Senior Research Fellow, Defense and
Homeland Security, [Davis Institute](#)

[E-mail James Carafano](#)

areas of expertise:

Homeland Security, Defense, Military
affairs, Post-conflict operations, and
Counterterrorism

OF ADDITIONAL

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summary:

Carafano joins Heritage after serving as a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington policy institute dedicated to defense issues.

Before that, he served 25 years in the Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During his service, Carafano served in Europe, Korea and the United States and was a special assistant to the Army chief of staff, the service's highest-ranking officer. Before retiring, he was executive editor of the Joint Force Quarterly, the Defense Department's principal war fighting journal.

Carafano also taught military history courses at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and the Army's Center of Military History. He continues as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College.

He is the author of two books: *Waltzing Into the Cold War*, published in 2002 by Texas A & M University; and *After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout*, a Military Book Club selection published in 2000 by the Lynne Rienner publishing company of Boulder, Colo.

Carafano is also the author of the forthcoming report, *Threats to the Homeland: A Post 9/11 Diagnostic Assessment*, to be published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. In addition, he is currently serving as a member of the National Research Council's Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Defense.

June 30, 2003

235

TO: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Recognition of 3rd ID

When the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd ID comes back, we might want to think about doing something. They have been there the longest.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-16

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20605 /03

June 30, 2003

334

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Historians

The DCI told me that both he and State have a panel of historians who assist them.
Do you think we ought to get a similar panel?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-46

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

30 Jun 03

U20607 /03

June 30, 2003

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quote

Do you have any record of me using the word "imminent threat" out of Iraq? I don't recall ever doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-47



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20608 /03

June 30, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update to Initiatives etc.

020 DDD

Please have someone do a redo on our initiatives, accomplishments and priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-48



Please respond by 7/18/03

30 Jun 03

U20609 /03

June 30, 2003

032

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Testimony

I need the testimony for my July 9 SASC hearing with Franks. It is an hour open session and an hour closed. I need testimony for both.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-49



Please respond by _____

30 Jun 03

U20610 /03

June 30, 2003

000,7 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Avail

I think we ought to schedule a press briefing with Franks and me while he is in town, and have that be my only press conference of that week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-50



Please respond by 7/3/03

30 Jun 03

U20611 /03

June 30, 2003

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mass Graves

Please find out what the status is of this proposal that Newt Gingrich came up with that I sent to Torie.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/16/03 ASD(PA) memo re: Documenting and Disseminating Information on Mass Graves

DHR:dh
063003-60

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

→ 7/15 Sec Def ✓

We are doing what Newt suggested. I'll let him

know.

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita
7/16

30 Jun 03

U20612 /03



"Nobody likes war. It's not a pretty thing. It's only compared to mass graves and the kind of terror that Saddam Hussein was putting forward that you can say it's the lesser of two evils." Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, CNN Interview, May 31, 2003

Decades of Death

For more than 20 years, Saddam Hussein's regime killed, tortured, raped and terrorized the Iraqi people and his neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of his actions - the vast majority of them Muslims. U.S.-led coalition forces are now beginning to reveal evidence of the Iraqi dictator's crimes against humanity. Mass graves display the horror of his reign.

On May 29, Human Rights Watch reported that a survivor who escaped after he was left for dead in a mass grave in March 1991 linked the thousands of victims unearthed earlier in the month to systematic mass killings by Iraqi Special Republican Guards and Ba'ath Party officials. Farmers living near the sites also witnessed the killings and confirmed the survivor's account.

The group released a 14-page report, "The Mass Graves of al-Mahawil: The Truth Uncovered," providing the first independent documentation of how the Iraqi government suppressed the Shi'a uprising after the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

A History of Barbarism

According to an April 4 White House fact sheet, Saddam had approximately 40 of his own relatives murdered.

The regime used allegations of prostitution used to intimidate opponents of the regime, to justify the barbaric beheading of women.

Documented chemical attacks by the regime, from 1983 to 1988, resulted in some 30,000 Iraqi and Iranian deaths.

Human Rights Watch estimates that Saddam's 1987-1988 campaign of terror against the Kurds killed at least 50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 Kurds.

The Iraqi regime used chemical agents to include mustard gas and nerve agents in attacks against at least 40 Kurdish villages

U.S. Marines Locate Grisly Reminder of Hussein's Regime

AL HILLAH, Iraq (May 5, 2003) — Decaying human bones and tattered clothes litter a dirt pit that was once used as a trash dump near the town of Al-Hillah.

Marines with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, found the site but are quick to point out that its existence was no secret.

"It has been there since 1991," said an intelligence specialist staff sergeant with 1st Battalion. "This site was not a secret in this town, everybody knew where it was." *Story*



Refugees International reports that the "Oppressive government policies have led to the internal displacement of 900,000 Iraqis, primarily Kurds who have fled to the north to escape Saddam Hussein's Arabization campaigns (which involve forcing Kurds to renounce their Kurdish identity or lose their property) and Marsh Arabs, who fled the government's campaign to dry up the southern marshes for agricultural use. More than 200,000 Iraqis continue to live as refugees in Iran."

The U.S. Committee for Refugees, in 2002, estimated that nearly 100,000 Kurds, Assyrians and Turkomans had previously been expelled, by the regime, from the "central-government-controlled Kirkuk and surrounding districts in the oil-rich region bordering the Kurdish controlled north."

Malnutrition & Starvation

"Over the past five years, 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died of malnutrition and disease, preventively, but died because of the nature of the regime under which they are living." (Prime Minister Tony Blair, March 27, 2003)

Under the oil-for-food program, the international community sought to make available to the Iraqi people adequate supplies of food and medicine, but the regime blocked sufficient access for international workers to ensure proper distribution of these supplies.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces have discovered military warehouses filled with food supplies

11-L-0559/OSD/18068

between 1987-1988. The largest was the attack on Halabja which resulted in approximately 5,000 deaths. Two thousand Kurdish villages were destroyed during the campaign of terror.

"In the last few days, I've seen the shocking and haunting pictures of mass graves which contain some of the thousands and thousands of Iraqis he murdered. I have heard from dozens of Iraqi citizens about their gratitude that the coalition has freed them from this horror. Saddam Hussein was a truly evil man who repressed, tortured and murdered his people. He didn't go a day too soon."

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III
Baghdad, Iraq, May 15, 2003

Iraq's 13 million Shi'a Muslims, the majority of Iraq's population of approximately 22 million, face severe restrictions on their religious practice, including a ban on communal Friday prayer, and restriction on funeral processions.

According to Human Rights Watch, "senior Arab diplomats told the London-based Arabic daily newspaper al-Hayat in October [1991] that Iraqi leaders were privately acknowledging that 250,000 people were killed during the uprisings, with most of the casualties in the south."

Related Links

- [**Chemical Weapons Used in Halabja**](#)
- [**Saddam's Brutality Against the Iraqi People**](#)
- [**Repression of the Shi'a**](#)
- [**Iraqi Crimes Against Humanity**](#)
- [**The Flight of Iraqi Women**](#)
- [**Just Who Is Saddam Hussein?**](#)
- [**Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents**](#)
- [**Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons**](#)
- [**U.S. State Dept. on Iraq**](#)

meant for the Iraqi people that had been diverted by Iraqi military forces.

The Iraqi regime repeatedly refused visits by human rights monitors. From 1992 until 2002, Saddam prevented the UN Special Rapporteur from visiting Iraq. The U.N. Special Rapporteur's September 2001, report criticized the regime for "the sheer number of executions," the number of "extrajudicial executions on political grounds," and "the absence of a due process of the law."

Executions

Saddam Hussein's regime carried out frequent summary executions, including:

- 4,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in 1984
- 3,000 prisoners at the Mahjar prison from 1993-1998
- 2,500 prisoners were executed between 1997-1999 in a "prison cleansing campaign"
- 122 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/March 2000
- 23 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in October 2001
- At least 130 Iraqi women were beheaded between June 2000 and April 2001

"In the Arab world it was actually not a surprise that thousands of mass graves turned up. I think the Arab people understand that this man was responsible for killing more Muslims than I think any other single individual and there is an opportunity now to build a much better Arab society and to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Arabs are capable of democracy."
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz
CNN interview, May 31, 2003

<http://defendamerica.mil/specials/june2003/atrocities.html>

cc: Durnan
Craddock
D. Rite

2:30

(b)(6)

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, June 02, 2003 11:15 AM

JUN - 2 2003

To: libby@ovp.eop.gov; cheneyel@state.gov; eedelman@ovp.eop.gov; jhannah@ovp.eop.gov;
Samantha_F._Ravich@ovp.eop.gov; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; wilkinjr@centcom.mil;
DBartlet@who.eop.gov; tucker_a._eskew@who.eop.gov

Cc: jbolten@who.eop.gov; cdemuth@aei.org; Peter_H._Wehner@who.eop.gov; dpletka@aei.org

Subject: a website on mass cemeteries

as a step toward winning the argument about whether or not the Iraq war was the right thing to do, the government should create a website commemorating the number of cemeteries and mass executions, tortures etc which are now coming to light

there is one report that as many as 300,000 bodies may ultimately be discovered. this could have a devastating impact if it was organized and presented in the right way so the American left and Europeans could not hide from it
newt

June 30, 2003

381

TO: LTG Craddock

CC: Steve Cambone
 Ken Krieg
 Larry Di Rita
 Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Portfolio Approaches to Defense Strategy

We ought to think about whether we want to schedule a SLRG on this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.
 1/30/03 Marshall memo re: Summer Study Report

DHR:dh
 063003-62



Please respond by 7/25/03

30 JUN 03

U20613 /03



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

(D)

(L)

January 30, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 30 2003

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Summer Study Report

Attached is a paper on the possible use of portfolio approaches to Defense strategy. One of my 2002 Summer Studies dealt with this topic; something of major interest to me. The original strategy paper I wrote for you in early 2001 proposed a portfolio of advantages strategy as a way of exploiting our strengths and coping with the uncertainties of the future.

I have highlighted the first five pages of the paper. This will give you a good idea of major messages that come out of the study. The most striking thing to me was how resistant the people in the study group (mostly drawn from DoD) were to looking at strategy as (1) constructing a portfolio (especially that top-level managers approach to strategy might in any way be different than at lower levels), and (2) pursuing advantage rather than focusing entirely on reacting to threats. We are the biggest player in the game; our strategy ought to reflect this. There is a reluctance to act on this and thus to remain focused on threats.

(D)

The plan is to organize a few seminars to discuss the use of portfolio approaches, using this paper as a read-ahead.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>AWM</i>

Portfolio Approaches to Defense Strategy¹
(OSD Net Assessment Report: Newport Study Group July 2002)

Introduction

Annually OSD (Net Assessment) has sponsored short studies of complex strategic issues at the Naval War College. In the summer of this year one of those subjects was the potential applicability of a private sector strategic thinking process called portfolio analysis to the development of defense strategy. Addressing that subject meant examining three major topics:

- Developing examples of portfolios for the DoD that might reflect a different view of strategy.
- Analyzing how a portfolio approach to defense strategy might be incorporated into the existing defense planning process.
- Recommending a program to implement such an innovation, if the decision was made to adopt it as a vehicle for defense planning.

This paper provides an overview of the portfolio method, the results of the Newport discussions, and examples of types of portfolios that might be applicable in defense strategy (the first topic). The objective of the paper is to provide a background for individuals in the DoD to discuss the portfolio method and address the second and third topics: integrating the method into the existing strategy and planning processes, and developing a program to implement the use of portfolio analysis.

Overview ---- Current Strategic Setting

At present the United States holds a pre-eminent position in military power that may last for several decades. It should be able, therefore, to use this period to develop and implement strategies that exploit and extend that advantage. This could include reshaping military capabilities in a manner that helps shape peacetime relations and emerging competitions with other nations, that deters or puts opponents at a disadvantage prior to conflict, and that leads to U.S. forces dominating such opponents in the event of conflict. Perhaps no nation has ever had such reach and capability, and strategies should focus on extending that advantage for the long term.

However, greater uncertainty exists today than during the Cold War about the next generation of major competitors and the manner in which they will challenge U.S. national security. Broad geopolitical trends can be identified (e.g., the growing importance of Asia and the PacRim), but many specifics of confrontation and conflict cannot (e.g., which nations will challenge the U.S. and when). Technologies may also lead to the appearance of new types of warfare (e.g., space warfare, non-lethal combat, and information warfare), or to substantial changes in the manner in which certain types

¹ This paper was prepared by George "Chip" Pickett, chairman of the OSD(NA) working group studying the application of the portfolio method. Comments and questions can be directed to him at (b)(6) (email: (b)(6))

of fighting occur (e.g., the increased use of precision fires). The pace of the emergence of these new forms of war, however, is similarly unclear.

A major counterbalance to this uncertainty is that this existing substantial U.S. leadership provides opportunities for strategic behavior that might not otherwise exist. Because the U.S. is not in a close worldwide military competition with another country (or set of countries), it has the current advantage of very large gaps between it and potential competitors. That presents it with strategic flexibility that it would not have if it were locked in a neck and neck competition. For example, it can use the current period to develop new approaches to conflict, to test new force capabilities on a broader scale, and to accept near term risks in order to develop future capabilities.

Today's strategic position, therefore, may require a different strategic thought process than in the past several decades, a strategic thought process that focuses on using that advantage to increase the gap between the U.S. and other nations and position it for the future. This is a strategy of "seeking advantage", not of "countering threats". This in turn raises the question of whether there are new ways to think strategically about the future, ways that are more pertinent to strategy setting than the methods used in the period of the Cold War.

Description of the Portfolio Method

One approach to strategy in this situation may be to apply a framework drawn from the portfolio method found in private industry. This strategic thought process originated in 1950s as a method to manage stock portfolios, and has been applied since the 1960s to the management of very large, diversified multi-business enterprises. Its value lies in two major attributes: (a) an ability to focus the power of the entire institution while subelements optimize their individual strategies, and (b) an ability to balance risks and opportunities at a broad level.

In large diversified enterprises, the portfolio method enables managers to look at individual businesses (or sub-organizations) from a different perspective. Top managers can set aside delving into the intricate and complex strategies of individual businesses and focus on the mix of those businesses and changes in that mix. For example, by thinking of these businesses in the aggregate, top managers can examine, establish strategy and manage such factors as:

- Positioning the firm, for its collective power, and applying that collective power to influence competitors, allies and customers.
- Determining the overall goals for the enterprise that may then lead to creating new units, or altering the role of existing ones.
- Identifying common needs (e.g., in skilled personnel, technologies, and facilities) and using the overall firm's scale to meet those more effectively.
- Picking high risk and high payoff opportunities that would be beyond the resources and strategic interests of individual units.

- Identifying units that eventually will become more or less critical to long term success (e.g., because of changes in competitive environments, or underlying technologies), and then guiding the strategic direction of those units.
- Identifying and developing subtle cross linkages between units to enhance their power.
- Managing overall risk among businesses so that, for example, a technology risk that undermines one unit does not similarly undermine another, and resources from one unit can be applied to assist another in such situations.
- Allocating overall corporate resources (technology investment, key skilled personnel, facilities, etc.) across businesses for strategic purposes.

At the level of the individual business unit (or sub-organization) managers continue to develop, implement and manage strategy tailored to the unique demands of their individual businesses. One of the advantages of the portfolio method is that it recognizes that fundamental differences can exist between various business units in a large organization (e.g., in the rates of change in underlying technology, the characteristics of products, the underlying investment requirements, the practices of competitors, and the rates of growth.) While manager at the unit level focus on the demands of their businesses (e.g., "how will this business succeed in its market against the products of companies X, Y and Z?"), managers at the top of the corporation can focus on the overall long term business of the company (e.g., "how will this mix of businesses affect the future of the firm?")

Potential Applicability of the Portfolio Method to Defense Strategy

DoD is a large diversified organization with a complex mix of operations, many having both strong independent roles and requirements while being part of an interdependent set of relationships. The combination of individual and collective strengths provides the overall national security impact of the Department. In that context, the portfolio method could provide a method of assessment and strategy setting that would assist the top levels of the Department. For example:

- It could provide top management with a way to think about the activities of the Department at an aggregate level. DoD top leadership could have a different perspective on military power from (for example) the military services. While the individual services and joint commands develop specific capabilities, top management might select specific areas to pursue for the long term that might not be routinely selected in their current strategy activities, and which could substantially reshape the overall military capability of the U.S. This could be at a broad level (e.g., new missions such as missile defense), or at a more specific level of technologies, systems or forces (e.g., robotics).
- It could enable top management to focus on existing and emerging capabilities from a different strategic viewpoint and make appropriate strategic decisions about the pace and direction of those capabilities. For example, some force capabilities are well within the competence of DoD and their future potential value is predictable (e.g.,

DoD has decades of experience in long range strike and undersea warfare). Other capabilities are not as well developed or their future value is far more uncertain (e.g., DoD may just be entering a period of extensive and ever changing uses of information warfare.) A portfolio approach can enable top managers to balance current competencies and new competencies, and make appropriate resource commitments for the future without surrendering the past.

- It could assist top management in selecting a set of specific and narrowly focused investments, the success of just a few would greatly enhance U.S. political military leadership. By focusing on broad long term goals, the portfolio method could enable top management to make high level "bets" on the future sources of success and to free up resources to make those bets. DoD top management could pursue several such investments in parallel, realizing that some will succeed and others will fail, but that the collective impact will be major leaps forward in defense capabilities.

In general, the portfolio approach provides a means for DoD top management to use a different framework for strategic thinking from that used lower down in the department. Top DoD management can focus on an activity from a different perspective (e.g., are combat divisions important entities to perceptions of power?), while lower levels of the department focus on the specifics (e.g., what is the right number of divisions? How should a division be organized? What are the operational concepts that they should employ or support?) Even now the results of the DoD's current strategy and planning activities is to create a portfolio of capabilities; the difference is that this is now a by-product of the analysis and not one of its major goals.

Summary of Results of Newport Study of Portfolio Methods

At Newport, government representatives, commercial management consultants, and members of private defense analysis groups attempted to define the portfolio method as it might be applied in DoD, and attempted to create example of such portfolios. From this experience and from post-Newport assessments of the effort, the following are key findings:

- Developing sample portfolios proved far more difficult analytically than envisioned, even after identification of the attributes or criteria for portfolios. There are both problems in understanding the underlying concepts of a portfolio, and problems in creating ideas for what should be included in a portfolio. This is not a problem of bureaucratic resistance, but one of understanding the concept itself.
- Within DoD, frameworks for strategic analysis appear to be oriented almost entirely on threats and on forecasts of possible military conflicts. This focus is so strong as to impede the use of other strategic frameworks, such as those focused on establishing peacetime competitive advantages. Such other frameworks are applied in the DoD on an isolated basis, but the dominance of frameworks, processes and measures based on threats and conflicts tend to exclude the use of such strategic approaches more broadly.

- Consequently, DoD strategy as currently developed may be fundamentally defensive and reactive in nature. The strategy setting process starts almost from the beginning with a forecasted threat (or set of threats). In doing so it sets a theme of responding to opponents. If this is the case, its potential implication is that progress in U.S. capability is subtly tied to opponents who are already far behind. This constrains consideration of powerful strategic options. It also may create situations in which the participants in setting strategy do not focus on important strategic questions (e.g., what initiatives could be taken to alter the setting in which the U.S. and other nations compete or to place other nations in inferior long term positions?)
- DoD strategy setting processes appear to create the situation in which the strategic frameworks used by senior leadership is expected to be nearly identical to that used by lower levels. For example, if war planning were to use a framework of "threat to strategy to task" at the joint or individual unit level, then "threat to strategy to task" should, in the DoD process, be used by the SecDef for creating strategy for the entire department. By contrast, as the portfolio method suggests, top level leaders often use strategic frameworks very different from their subordinate organizations. DoD personnel also appear on occasion to view strategy as very tightly integrated (i.e., any change in one part has a direct impact on another part). This is not found in companies and is probably over emphasized.
- In the long term, to develop the application of portfolios broadly in DoD will take several years. Research will be required (a) to develop the taxonomy and method of analysis; (b) to determine how to insert it within current strategy and planning processes; (c) to educate managers and staffs in how to use the method; and, (d) to accomplish insertion. This will require a range of efforts, including demonstration projects, conceptual thinking by the DoD's school system, and tapping non-DoD experts in the methodology.
- In the near term, if top level DoD management wants to develop portfolios, it will require an independent effort. The intellectual and process obstacles are too significant for rapid and widespread introduction of the method. A small effort under OSD sponsorship would be needed to develop portfolios for the SecDef, if this framework is to be applied even in a limited manner in the near term.

As a result of these observations from Newport, this paper was prepared in order to engage additional participants in the department in the discussion of the portfolio method and its potential application.

Examples of Portfolios

The following are examples of approaches to portfolios that are drawn from discussions and recommendations at the Newport session and from other sources. Three classes of portfolios are discussed:

- Portfolios of general advantage
- Portfolios of specific advantage
- Portfolios of revolutionary change and risk management

Portfolios of General Advantage

Portfolios of general advantage contain actions that would enable the U.S., on a broad basis, to sustain dominance in military capabilities and defense strategy over opponents. These portfolios build upon current U.S. leadership, and expand already existing gaps by actions across the entire department. In addition to improved warfighting, their objective is to increase, in opponents, their sense of uncertainty and lack of control in the military competition with the U.S. That is accomplished both by making major advances in specific areas and by presenting opponents with a complex military force under constant rates of change, so that the exact type of U.S. force that would be encountered is always unpredictable.

Portfolios of general advantage can take several forms:

- They can focus on the “front end” of defense capability, those forces seen as the most visible aspect of U.S. military capability. Various portfolios could be constructed around, for example, missions (e.g., precision strike), areas of dominance (e.g., space capabilities), trends in warfare (e.g., urban combat), or top level national security goals (e.g., peacekeeping). The objectives of such portfolios could be to limit, for the very long term, the capacity of any nation to initiate hostilities far from its own borders, to restrict such nations to local aggression, and thus to create opportunities for U.S. led alliances to muster worldwide counters.
- They can focus on the “back end” of defense capability, the underlying infrastructure of practices and processes that lead to strong military capabilities. For example, the U.S. leadership in undersea warfare, long range strike, etc. is underpinned by such defense wide strengths as the selection and training of personnel, the ability to develop new operational concepts of warfare, the capacity to develop very complex weapon systems and networks, and the ability to conduct realistic training in global operations. These are the subtler and less visible bases for long term military leadership.

Examples of such a portfolio include:

<p>Portfolio of general advantage: Limit Strategic Behavior of Potential Opponents</p>

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retain blue water worldwide naval dominance to discourage others from attempting to match U.S. seapower capabilities or project power by sea and keep, for the long term, major crises away from U.S. shores. |
|---|

- Establish missile defense to lower the risk that nations, restricted from long range strike by other means, can consider missile attack as a method.
- Sustain dominance in long range aviation and local air superiority to undermine "distance" from U.S. forces as a perceived advantage by other nations.
- Sustain leadership in long range delivery, application and sustainment of multi-divisional land forces in order to make potential opponents see that the U.S. can take the ground war to them.
- Invest in space to sustain capabilities that are too costly for others to replicate and yet are seen as essential to successful major aggression.
- Link the above areas to each other in order to create interrelated capabilities that opponents cannot match without first developing each individual area.

Portfolio of general advantage: Shape Warfighting Practices for Enduring Leadership

- Master first engagement competence.
- Establish effects based warfighting.
- Achieve instantaneous massing of dispersed forces.
- Achieve precision effects.
- Sustain large forces at a distance with minimum logistics tail.
- Provide rapid power projection from a distance into denied areas.
- Develop very fast counter-strike capabilities.
- Provide fast "speed to kill" at the individual weapon and force levels.

Portfolio of general advantage: Sustain Excellence in Underlying DoD Practices

- Focus on development and training of skills in joint and combined operations of large units.
- Develop new concepts of military operations.
- Expand experimentation.
- Emphasize simulation for training realism from individual soldier to large unit operations.

Portfolio of general advantage: Develop National Sources of Competitive Advantage

- Develop capability to access industrial skills and capabilities in non-defense industries.
- Develop the engineering disciplines in special areas of

- lasting advantage, such as system engineering.
- Preserve competition in key future warfighting technologies and systems.
- Identify key technologies and skills to be restricted from foreign access.
- Pursue substitution of capital for labor.
- Develop strategies for outsourcing industrial capabilities to long term allies and friends.

Portfolios of Specific Advantage

Portfolios of specific advantage do not deal with the full range of the department's activities but focus on a subset of capabilities in which the U.S. wants to preferentially invest. Defense resources may not be sufficient for increasing the gap of leadership broadly across the DoD. The objective of these portfolios is to pick specific areas in which the U.S. can achieve unambiguous and expanding leadership, and in which that leadership would have a substantial impact on potential opponents.

Such portfolios might be of the following forms:

- They might consist of a narrow set of activities in which the U.S. could clearly dominate the military environment and perceptions of military power. This could involve specific areas such as space warfare, control of the seas, and long range power projection; investments in new concepts of military operations; or, investments in a class of technologies or systems.
- They might consist of a set of activities that are specifically targeted against general classes of potential opponents. This could include emerging major powers, regional powers, opponents in the PacRim, or terrorists. Such types of portfolios could present opponents with significant new U.S. advantages that would discourage them from entering into a peacetime military competition, or influence their own investments in military forces over the long term.

Examples of activities that might be included in portfolios of this type are:

- | |
|--|
| <p>Portfolio of specific advantage: Sustain Sea Power Dominance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop technology and operational concepts for sea operations at great depths. • Develop capabilities to operate covertly within opponents territorial waters prior to official opening of hostilities. • Develop forces able to track, trail and target any ship in any location in peacetime. • Integrate sensors, C2 and operational forces for long range strike from the sea. • Invest in deep underwater technologies for surveillance, inspection, destruction, disarming, and retrieving. |
|--|

Portfolio of specific advantage: Establish Dominance in Networked Forces

- Develop increased joint force capabilities, including joint operations at the level of squads, individual aircraft and individual ships.
- Develop combined operations doctrine and competence (through exercises).
- Develop systems and system implementation strategies to network foreign military forces into U.S. C4ISR processes in peacetime, crisis and conflict.

Portfolios of Revolutionary Change and Risk Management

Revolutionary and risk management portfolios are even more narrowly focused than the preceding ones. These may be formulated because defense resources are too limited for a broader approach, or because the Secretary wants to focus the department on a very select set of activities. Two types can be identified:

- Portfolios could be designed to invest in a series of high risk/high payoff initiatives, anyone of which would have major impact on U.S. military capabilities. Several initiatives would be pursued in parallel because some will succeed and others will fail. Because probabilities of success are low, the payoff from each initiative should be very high. Moreover, the initiatives should be diversified so that, should one not succeed, the factors leading to its failure will not similarly affect other initiatives.
- Portfolios can be constructed that are more defensive in nature and create hedges against long term trends in military conflict. In this application the portfolio resembles insurance, a set of activities that protect against major long term trends in the nature of combat and confrontation between the U.S. and opponents. This portfolio approach, more than any other, comes closest to a threat form of analysis.

Examples of such portfolios are:

Portfolio of High Risk/High Payoffs in Shaping Combat Environments

- Creation of "keep out zones" in air, space and sea, where other forces cannot operate.
- Control cities and large populations with small units.
- Passive large scale shutdown of opposing forces in conflict at long range.
- Creation of the ability to fight precisely in cluttered environments.

- Development of capabilities to target and disable under ground targets.

Portfolio of High Risk/High Payoffs in Technologies

- Broad programs in robotics for military applications.
- Establish multi-sensor networks using bi-statics, time sharing, etc among sensors to create 24/7 coverage.
- Pursuit of developments in nano-technology.
- Development of technologies that enable "plug and play" integration among disparate systems.
- Development of technologies for operating at great depths in the ocean.

Portfolio of Hedges

- Develop counters to opponents employing "anti-access" strategies and forces.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Defenses against chemical and biological weapons.
- Establishment of domestic security capabilities to detect, identify and counter threats within U.S. borders.

Conclusions and Questions for Consideration

The portfolio method appears to offer a different way to think about strategy formulation for the DoD in this period of both great uncertainty and great advantage. The initial work accomplished at the Naval War College provides some ideas, as well as raising questions about the form of such a portfolio and about how such a method could be employed within the current DoD strategy and planning processes.

To further develop work on this potential method of thinking, it is intended that various individuals within the Department would read and consider the issues raised in the preceding pages. These individuals would then meet in several working groups to discuss the issues, and to address the following questions:

In general:

- To what extent does the U.S. current leadership position require a different framework of thinking, such as the portfolio method?

- To what extent should top level DoD managers apply strategic frameworks of thought different from those used by the military services and joint commands?

As to types of portfolios:

- What types of portfolios would be of the most use to the Secretary of Defense in the near term?
- What portfolios would be particularly given the long term trends in U.S. national security environment (e.g., such as the forecasted rise in importance of Asia, or the increased presence of terrorism)?
- What might be portfolios that would create leap-ahead capabilities in periods of resource constraints (i.e., portfolios of revolutionary change)?

As to implementing portfolios:

- What types of projects should be initiated within the DoD to further develop the portfolio method and test its applicability to defense planning? For example, what tasks might be assigned to the military services and joint commands to develop ideas for portfolio planning?
- What types of research activities could be established to investigate the concept, to develop the terminology, and to develop methods and measures to evaluate portfolios? For example, should there be a long term research program within various think tanks?
- How might portfolio thinking be incorporated into the DoD's existing PPB and related strategy setting activities?
- What steps should be taken to build support for implementing this form of strategic thinking? What steps could be taken to gain acceptance for the method within the department?

June 30, 2003

335

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 3rd ID

You ought to think through this 3rd Brigade of the 3rd ID issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-74



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 JUN 03

U20615 /03



June 30, 2003

060 WH

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: POTUS Photo for Garner

Did we ever get the photos of the President with Jay Garner? I want to send one to Jay and possibly get the President to sign it.

Let's send this one to Jay as well.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef photo w/Garner

DHR:dh
063003-83



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20616 /03

Sent 6/30
June 27, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow-Up

Please let me see the "to do" list that flows out of my breakfast with Duncan Hunter and my meeting with the Big Four.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062703-9

Please respond by

7/8/03

K

27 Jun 03

U20617 /03

FD Copy ✓
EF-59133

June 30, 2003

352

TO: Gen. Keane
CC: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Army War College Peacekeeping Institute

I notice here that it says the War College Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, is going to be closed. I wonder if that makes any sense, given our interest in peacekeeping.

Would you and Doug Feith please look into it and let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

Thompson, Mark. "The Price of Peacekeeping? Too High." *Time*, July 7, 2003, p. 18.

DHR:dh
063003-1

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

Andy Hoehn spoke with LTG Cody on the Army Staff. The Army will maintain the Peacekeeping Institute capability at Carlisle, which is under TRADOC, though likely under a different name.

7/10
} RESPONSE
= 30 Jun 03
v/e

Douglas Feith

U20618 /03



June 30, 2003

G3: Action

TO: Gen. Keane
CC: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Army War College Peacekeeping Institute

I notice here that it says the War College Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, is going to be closed. I wonder if that makes any sense, given our interest in peacekeeping.

Would you and Doug Feith please look into it and let me know.

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Attach.

Thompson, Mark. "The Price of Peacekeeping? Too High." *Time*, July 7, 2003, p. 18.

DHR:dh
063003-1

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

Response Attached.

11-L-0559/OSD/18088

Time
July 7, 2003
Pg. 18

Notebook

The Price Of Peacekeeping? Too High

Is Donald Rumsfeld afraid to give peace a chance? Academically, at least, it appears the answer is yes. The Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle, Pa., the only government entity dedicated to the task, will close by summer's end, even while the military struggles to keep the peace in Iraq. Army officials say the closure, endorsed by Rumsfeld, is a money-saving measure, though the institute's \$1 million annual budget represents only .00025% of the military's annual \$400 billion outlay.

"Closing the Peacekeeping Institute reflects the Army's priorities, but we're in danger of losing Iraq because we haven't figured out how to do postwar missions," says Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. diplomat now lecturing military officers at the National Defense University. "We should be strengthening the peacekeeping component of our military, not diminishing it."

Alas, any "lessons learned" during the Peacekeeping Institute's 10-year life are not readily available to the public. That's because its website shut down May 1--the same day President Bush declared, from the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, that "major combat operations" in Iraq were over.

By Mark Thompson



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

INFO MEMO

July 8, 2003, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GEN John K. Keane, Acting Chief of Staff, Army *JK* 11 JUL 2003

SUBJECT: Army War College Peacekeeping Institute

- The decision to close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College was based on recommendations of the recently conducted Realignment Task Force.
- Based upon subsequent world events, closing of the Institute has been put on hold. We are in the process of reviewing the Institute's mission with a probable outcome that it will be retained at the War College, with an updated charter and structure in keeping with our current policies and focus.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Holly Guzowski, (b)(6)

June 30, 2003

337

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prep for Next Week w/POTUS

When I meet with the President next week, I want to talk about the French nuclear program, and I will need a short briefing from J.D. Crouch on how to do that.

I also want to talk about Liberia and my guidelines.

I want to talk about anything else that others think I need to do. Are there loose ends we need to consider now and get people working on, so when I get back we will be ready to do it thoughtfully?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003.3



Please respond by 7/3/03

30 Jun 03

U20619 /03

Snowflake

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

June 30, 2003

350.001 SD

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Speeches

Let's echo the themes the President is pushing here. Here is a draft of his speech. It is not final, but when he makes it on Tuesday, we ought to look at it and try to echo it.

Also attached is a memo from Jerry Bremer that explains what is going on in Iraq that might be helpful for you.

When I speak next, which I guess is at Frank's change of command, that might be a place to include some of that.

Thanks.

Attach.
Draft POTUS Speech
Bremer memo

Very close hold on Rumsfeld speech. D.

DHR:dh
063003-9

.....
Please respond by _____

30 Jun 03

U20620 /03

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/T8092

June 30, 2003

210 Marines (3+4)

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Hagee Issue

Please make sure you are ready to deal with the Hagee frocking issue from a PR standpoint when that is public.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-10



Please respond by 7/3/03

30 Jun 03

U20621 /03

June 30, 2003

Middle East

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Misinformation

Larry Di Rita
7/18

Please take a look at this memo from Torie Clarke on misinformation in Iran and tell me where you think that stands.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/6/03 Clarke memo

DHR:dh
063003-12

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

7/18
Response Attached

Larry Di Rita

30 Jun 03

U20622 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18094

Handwritten signature

June 6, 2003

TO: SecDef
FROM: Torie Clarke
SUBJECT: Misinformation on Iran (and related)

Background

There are several reasons for recent negative and often inaccurate media coverage.

- We transitioned quickly from pumping huge volumes of information to large numbers of media during the war, to sporadic contact with fewer media.
- The quality and nature of media covering our issues changed also, from Pentagon veterans to rookies and intel/foreign correspondents.
- Some media feel obliged to be "tougher" on the military because of the primarily positive coverage during the war.

Strategy:

- Fill the information vacuum with more frequent regular and ad hoc briefings on Iraq and related issues.
- Aggressively refute and correct misinformation and widely disseminate corrections.

Following are actions underway and planned to deal with misinformation on Iran, Iraq and related topics:

Underway:

- More frequent briefings at Pentagon and in Iraq that give status reports and process information. CentCom and CPA in Iraq give daily briefings; key officials brief on select topics (e.g. Carroll on oil; McKiernan on security). Average of seven per week.

- Aggressive courting of Arab media; average of three senior DOD officials doing interviews with select Arab media per week; one senior official doing Arab media roundtable each week.
- Frequent letters to the editor and meetings with media regarding errors and misperceptions caused by irresponsible coverage. Examples: Vanity Fair and Wolfowitz; CNN and DIA report on Iraqi WMD. In most cases, we do get reasonable corrections.
- On the record refutations of gross inaccuracies (e.g. Feith briefing on DOD intel cell and plans for Iranian regime overthrow).

Planned:

- Reconstituted rapid response cell at CentCom (Iraq) and OSD Press Operations to improve prevention and speed of corrections.

Attachment: Examples of letters to the editors and results. All included in Early Bird.

July 18, 2003/Di Rita

MEMO TO SECDEF: Response to your note, attached

Assessment. We are about where we were when Torie wrote on June 6. Our media activities are more frequent and regular, but the background noise has gotten louder as attacks on U.S. troops have become more frequent and regular.

The problem is not an information vacuum, as Torie put it. There is a lot of information, and our challenge is to focus the media attention on stories other than the attacks on coalition forces.

One way we have focused attention is by going on the offense militarily, which allows us to assert that some of our casualties are from offensive operations.

Briefings. Bremer and Sanchez brief two or three times a week from Iraq. Typically, you and the Chairman are out once a week.

We are also highlighting ministry and regional activities, including providing those stories via teleconference to U.S. media audiences.

Also, the increased congressional visits to Iraq are helping generate a more positive image.

Personnel. We have:

- Hired a senior communicator to augment Bremer's operation.
- Hired a senior technical specialist with expertise in post-hostility communications policy (FCC-type regulatory schemes, etc.) This will permit establishment of standards and licensing requirements that can help Jerry shut down harmful media outlets.
- Hired eight professional public affairs civilians, who will join the senior communicator in Baghdad. They have expertise in press and outreach.
- Established a cell within OSD/PA with press and legislative representation that does nothing but organize and push Iraq stories, in close coordination with CPA/Baghdad and the administration in D.C.
- Established the rapid response cell with Tony Dolan, although that has yet to take shape or bear fruit.

June 30, 2003

2000.6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Award for Crouch

Do you think we ought to give an award to J.D. Crouch now, given the fact that he just accomplished that NATO command structure effort?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-13



Please respond by 7/11/03

30 Jun 03

U20623 /03

May 31, 2002 11:58 AM

452T

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter

The President would like a one-pager on the Joint Strike Fighter (one and a half at the most).

Please get it to me in English, so he can understand it and will know what countries are participating and to what extent.

Ed Giambastiani, please be in charge of getting this accomplished for me.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
053102-38

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

4 Jun

mfr-

This has already been answered. SD provided edits which were incorporated and returned to SD office about a week ago

31 May 03

J. Chiron

U20625 /03

May 24, 2002 10:52 AM

380.01

TO: John Stenbit
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

BRIEFING IS
SCHEDULED FOR
18 JUNE .

The May 17 memo you sent concerning the security clearance process is not good enough for me.

I would like you to get somebody sharp to screw his head into it, come up with a proposal as to how we get the Department of Defense vastly more efficient and with a smaller total backlog and improve skills to get them done properly.

I want a briefing scheduled sometime in the next three weeks to fill me in on what the actual situation is and what you propose to do to get it fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/17/02 ASD(C3I) info memo to SecDef re: Status of Efforts to Improve Security Clearance Process [U08554/02]

DHR:dh
052402-12

.....
Please respond by 06/18/02

24 May 03

U20627 /03

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

MAY 23 PM 2:18

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

MAY 24 2002

May 17, 2002 11:32 AM



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

FOR: LARRY DI RITA, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3D)

5/17/02

SUBJECT: Status of Efforts to Improve Security Clearance Process

The following is provided in response to your last inquiry:

- "Is 'excess backlog' different from 'normal' backlog?"
- On September 30, 2000, the Defense Security Service (DSS) carried over a pending, in-house, investigative workload of some 493,000 cases into FY01. In the prior response, the 343,000 cases referred to as the "excess backlog" represented the number of pending cases at DSS that was in "excess" of the target 150,000 steady state goal;
- At the same time, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had a pending investigative workload of approximately 30,000 DoD cases.
- At present, DSS has a pending investigative workload of about 149,000 cases, slightly below the "steady state" of about three months work under the working capital fund. More than half of these cases are more than one year old. OPM presently has a pending investigative workload of about 244,000 cases for a combined pending DoD workload at both locations of 393,000 cases;
- Timeline for completion of new investigations also has improved, with the principal concern being DSS's backlog of very old, difficult cases. These are targeted for completion over the next several months.
- In sum, the total pending investigative workload at DSS and OPM on Sept 30, 2000, was 523,000, and is now down to 393,000. The "excess backlog" for DSS has been eliminated, and since a steady state target for OPM was never defined, there never was an excess backlog for them.
- From FY01 through FY02, DSS and OPM will have conducted approximately 1.75M cases at a cost of approximately \$860M.

25/24

5/30

5/23

Calvin M - JUNE 18TH
Schedule a 15 minute
briefing for SecDef within next 7/23
for work. D.H. 408554 102

Prepared by: Pete Nelson

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/1810
5123



102
512



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

May 7, 2002 12:26 PM

SECRET HAS SEEN

MAY 24 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Status of efforts to improve security clearance process

In reply to your inquiry about the backlog on security clearances:

- The excess backlog, in October 2000, was as high as 343,000 cases. As of April 2002, we have eliminated the excess backlog at the Defense Security Service (DSS). However, the current pending caseload includes a larger number of very old and complex cases than normal. These cases will be closed out on a prioritized basis over the next several months.
- The Defense Security Service ran a pilot to show that they can complete new investigations at the correct pace.
- We are now in a transition period, where new cases are being handled on a last in first out basis. This will prevent us from slipping behind on the new cases.

ASD (C3I) 5/9

COORDINATION: None

John - Is "excess backlog" different from "normal" backlog?

This sounds pretty finely worded. Please advise.

Prepared by: Bill Leonard, C3I,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/18102

J. Stenbit
U07945 102



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

December 16, 2003, 6:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Positive Developments about the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)

- ~~(U)~~ During the summer, you expressed concern about the DFI running low or out of money by the end of 2003. (TAB A) I committed to working with Policy, CPA and the other agencies to address these concerns. Since then, the situation has improved markedly and the DFI now has a balance of \$5.2 billion in its account. (TAB B)
- ~~(U)~~ The situation has improved for two principal reasons:
 - ~~(U)~~ **Oil-for-Food.** The CPA budget projected that it would receive transfers to the DFI of \$1.35 billion in FY 03, \$600 million in FY 04, and \$280 million in FY 05 for a total of \$2.2 billion from Oil-for-Food contracts that were unobligated. To date, \$3 billion has been transferred and we expect additional transfers of over \$4 billion during the next year for a total of over \$7 billion. The situation improved because the UN agreed to transfer the funds earlier and made more funds available than anticipated as letters of credit expired.
 - ~~(SBU)~~ **Frozen Assets.** In October, the CPA budget projected recovering about \$300 million in frozen assets. Since then, a Treasury-led interagency team recovered about \$540 million in frozen assets that were transferred to the DFI. According to the Treasury Department, Kuwait will deposit \$85 million and Jordan at least \$150 million in the DFI during the coming year. Lebanon may also deposit about \$400 million in the DFI. An inter-agency team is also pushing Syria and several European countries to turn over their frozen assets. This progress has been achieved despite internal pressures on countries to hold those funds pending the resolution of claims by their nationals on those assets.

COORDINATION: TAB C.

Attachments: As stated

cc: U/S Feith and CPA Director Jeffrey

Prepared By: Tom Parker (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18103

U20628 / 03

TAB

A

July 8¹⁰, 2003

TO: Dev Zakheim
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funding for Iraq

It strikes me that for reconstruction in Iraq we are going to have to start developing numbers for a supplemental appropriation. I would think getting oil revenues up is critically important, and investing in that project would be critical.

Also, I am concerned we are going to be spending all the Iraqi assets we have been able to gather up and run out of that, without having gotten additional funding in place from the international community.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070803-23

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

*Sir,
Tasked to
David N.
5: July 16
MRF*

*David/Cameron
Dr. 2 would
like this as
joint effort
of PB
court*

*Mary,
Dr. Zakheim would
like you to work
this w/ David.
Thanks
AF*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

July 18, 2003, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Funding for Iraq

The concerns you raise in your note (Tab A) are valid. Increasing Iraqi oil revenues is critical to Iraq's financial situation, which will be precarious by the end of this calendar year without international assistance.

According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the effort to restore the Iraqi oil industry is projected to cost about \$1.3 billion. Included in this total are the cost of repairing the industry from sabotage (\$800 million), the cost of buying outside fuel (\$300 million), and the investment in improving the production capability (\$200 million).

Congress appropriated only \$489.3 million for fire fighting, repair of damages to oil facilities and related infrastructure, and preservation of a petroleum distribution capability, and further provided for funds in the Defense Cooperation Account (\$13.2 million) to be used for these purposes. Absent additional legislative authority or supplemental funding, CPA will be required to fund remaining oil facility and production related efforts from seized or vested assets or from the Development Fund for Iraq (currently capitalized at approximately \$1.1 billion).

However, the funding for Iraq will be very tight by the end of this calendar year. Starting in July with \$5.4 billion in assets, the Ministry of Finance expects to have only \$1.1 billion left by December 31, 2003. However, should oil revenues be below the \$3.5 billion projection, as now seems likely, their balance may be closer to zero. *or at zero*

11-L-0559/OSD/18106

LL11794-03

We are pursuing two major opportunities for international assistance:

Frozen Assets: According to Treasury, a total of \$2.5 billion in Iraqi assets has been frozen by foreign countries. Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 (2003), these are to be transferred to the DFI for the benefit of the people of Iraq. There is an interagency team lead by Treasury which is identifying the institutions holding these frozen assets and is working with the appropriate governments to get these funds transferred. Treasury lawyers believe we may shortly receive \$300 million for the DFI account (\$200 million in frozen Iraqi assets from UK banks and another \$100 million from Japanese banks). I believe we can also recover significant assets from Lebanon, which desires access to our prime contractors in Iraq, and may be willing to be more cooperative on assets in exchange for this access.

Donor's Conference: In addition, there will be an international donors' conference in October to raise funds to support Iraq's 2004 budget requirements. The CPA is working with the World Bank and United Nations Development Program teams to identify needs and projects for the international community to support. I chair the interagency group that is working this donor effort and I participate in the international effort to plan this conference. Representatives from CPA are included in both of these forums.

Ultimately, as I indicated in my memo to you of July 9, I believe we must be prepared to fund Iraq's reconstruction needs by ourselves. But we will continue to press the international community, and are focusing on both of the key areas—frozen assets and the conference—noted above.

I will continue to update you on the efforts to liberate frozen Iraqi assets and on the preparations for the international donor's conference.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: David Norquist, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18107

TAB

B

STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR IRAQ (DFI) ACCOUNT
12/10/2003

INITIAL UN DEPOSIT	\$1,000,000,000.00
OIL PROCEEDS	\$2,902,012,923.19
UN OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM	\$2,192,364,573.89
UNSCR 1483/REPATRIATED FUNDS	\$540,418,962.75
UN WORLD FOOD PROGRAM WHEAT PURCHASE REIMBURSEMENT	\$120,000,000.00
TOTAL DEPOSITS DFI - NY	\$6,754,796,459.83
INVESTMENT INCOME	\$6,470,885.69
SPECIFIC DONATIONS	\$20,000.00
TOTAL PAYMENTS DFI - NY	\$653,311,906.33
TOTAL TRANSFERS TO DFI - BAGHDAD	\$1,050,400,000.00
TOTAL BALANCE DFI - NY	\$5,057,575,439.19
TOTAL DEPOSITS DFI - BAGHDAD	\$1,050,400,000.00
TOTAL COLLECTIONS DFI - BAGHDAD	\$9,114,670.00
TOTAL PAYMENTS DFI - BAGHDAD	\$902,695,788.00
TOTAL BALANCE DFI - BAGHDAD	\$156,818,882.00
TOTAL DFI BALANCE*	\$5,214,394,321.19

TAB

C

COORDINATION SHEET

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENT FUND IN IRAQ

Treasury Department Juan Zarate December, 12, 20003
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Violent
Crime

State Robin Raphel December 15, 2003
Coordinator of Iraq Reconstruction

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

COORDINATION SHEET

SUBJECT: Update on Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)

	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>
for USD(Policy)	<u><i>J. G. [unclear] w/ [unclear]</i></u>	<u>11 Dec 03</u>
CPA	<u><i>[Signature]</i></u> w/ edits	<u>12/11/03</u>

For pick-up and/or questions, please contact: Tom Parker

(b)(6)

July 8¹⁰, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Funding for Iraq

It strikes me that for reconstruction in Iraq we are going to have to start developing numbers for a supplemental appropriation. I would think getting oil revenues up is critically important, and investing in that project would be critical.

Also, I am concerned we are going to be spending all the Iraqi assets we have been able to gather up and run out of that, without having gotten additional funding in place from the international community.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070803-23

*Sir,
Tasked to
David N.
5: July 16
WRJH*

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

*David/Cameron
Dr. 2 would
like this as
joint effort
of PB
can't*

*Mary,
Dr. Zakheim would
like you to write
this at David's
Thanks
JH*

10JUL03

U20629 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 17 2003

The Honorable Leszek Miller
Prime Minister
Republic of Poland
Al. Ujazdowskie 1/3
00-583 Warsaw
Poland

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I read the attached Agence France Press report on statements it contends you made in Warsaw. If in fact you said these things, I have no idea what you could have seen or heard that could have led you to that conclusion. The situation is quite the opposite. The United States has reduced its forces from about 150,000 on May 1 to 123,000 today.

In addition, we have spent a great deal of effort and money increasing the Iraqi security forces from zero on May 1 to 160,000 today. Our intent is to have the Coalition military in Iraq turn over to the Iraqis increasingly more responsibility for their own security.

I was surprised to read that you may have the opposite impression.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Poland

17 Dec 03

U20645 /03



UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT_ID: OW42479935
 DOCST: ACTIVE
 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
 VENDOR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
 FUENAME: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
 ORIGDATE: 200311161416
 PUBLISHR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
 PUBNO: e0377
 DOR: 20031116
 TOR: 091842
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 TITLE: Polish PM criticizes Rumsfeld on Iraq
 TOPLINES:

WARSAW, Nov 16 (AFP) - Prime Minister Leszek Miller of Poland, a loyal US ally in Iraq, criticized Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday, saying that the US defense secretary was hell-bent on a military solution
 TEXT:

Polish PM criticizes Rumsfeld on Iraq

WARSAW, Nov 16 (AFP) - Prime Minister Leszek Miller of Poland, a loyal US ally in Iraq, criticized Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday, saying that the US defense secretary was hell-bent on a military solution for Iraq that Miller argued would fail.

"I've had the impression for some time now that this US politician is an advocate of systematically increasing the military presence in Iraq," Miller told public radio Trojka.

"I don't think that this is the right approach. This conflict must be resolved through political means," he said.

"Sending in more troops will not do much good. We must quickly act to ensure that Iraqis themselves take responsibility for their country and for the security of their citizens, that a new constitution is adopted as soon as possible so that a new Iraqi government can take over," said Miller.

Poland was a key ally of the United States in the war that toppled Saddam Hussein seven months ago.

It now heads a multinational force of some 9,000 troops patrolling a large swathe of central and southern Iraq. It has 2,350 soldiers in the oil-rich country, the fourth largest military contingent after the United States, Britain and Italy.

Poland buried its first soldier killed in Iraq earlier this month but leaders vowed that the contingent would stay on.

mrm/cml/jah
 Iraq-Poland-US
 AFP 161416 GMT 11 03

11-L-0559/OSD/18115

UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

ACTION MEMO

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

USDP _____

I-03/015988

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense for EURASIA
(Performing the Duties of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense For
International Security Policy)

SUBJECT: Polish PM Criticism 

- Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller in a recent radio interview criticized you.
 - PM Miller claimed that you are an advocate of increasing military presence in Iraq.
 - The PM argued the conflict must be resolved through political means.
- Although the PM criticized you, Agence France Presse (AFP) reporting has sensationalized his remarks.
- While in Iraq, 10-11 November, Prime Minister Miller underscored that the worst possible outcome is to replace one dictatorship with another.
 - The PM called for a political solution by transferring more authority to the Iraqis.
- The letter at TAB A is a draft response to the Prime Minister.
- RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at TAB A.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: COL Peter Podbielski
ISP/EUR, (b)(6)

11-L-055970SD/18116



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Leszek Miller
Prime Minister
Republic of Poland
Al. Ujazdowskie 1/3
00-583 Warsaw
Poland

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I understand that in one of your recent radio interviews that you said I am advocating an increase in the Coalition military presence in Iraq.

The situation is quite the opposite. We intend to reduce the Coalition military presence in Iraq, and to turn over to the Iraqis greater responsibility for their security. Our plans are to reduce the American force levels in Iraq to 105,000 by next May from about 130,000 now.

It is important that we are clear and accurate about Coalition objectives and plans in Iraq. I trust this clarifies the matter.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/18117

Coordinating Page

Director, Europe

CAPT Jay Wilkins

GW 11/26/05

P/DASD for Europe and NATO

Jim Townsend

JM

DASD/NATO-EUR

IAN RIZCZINSKI

IAR 11/21

3:25 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 18, 2003
RE: **Polish MoD**

EF-7585
03/015988

Here's a strange indication of the Polish PM criticizing me on Iraq because I am recommending more U.S. troops. We had better get a letter from me to him explaining how inaccurate it is and asking him to give us any references they have that suggest I have ever said anything like that.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
111803.05

Please respond by: _____ *11/30*

19-11-03 13:43 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/18119



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



12/17

C&D

Please control

F. S&D (ALSO S&D)
BCC'S

THANKS R. M

The Honorable Leszek Miller
Prime Minister
Republic of Poland
Al. Ujazdowskie 1/3
00-583 Warsaw
Poland

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I read the attached Agence France Press report on statements it contends you made in Warsaw. If in fact you said these things, I have no idea what you could have seen or heard that could have led you to that conclusion. The situation is quite the opposite. The United States has reduced its forces from about 150,000 on May 1 to 123,000 today.

In addition, we have spent a great deal of effort and money increasing the Iraqi security forces from zero on May 1 to 160,000 today. Our intent is to have the Coalition military in Iraq turn over to the Iraqis increasingly more responsibility for their own security.

I was surprised to read that you may have the opposite impression.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Gen. Dick Myers
BCC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Enclosure



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 17 2003

President Pervez Musharraf
Chief Executive's Office
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear Mr. President,

I was relieved to hear that you escaped an apparent assassination attempt on the evening of December 14th. I also am pleased to hear that no one was killed or injured in the attack.

The United States appreciates your courageous stand on fighting extremism and finds common cause with you and your government in renewing our joint efforts against these threats.

Let me take this opportunity to convey my best wishes for your continued good health, and for peace and prosperity for Pakistan and its people in the New Year.

Sincerely,

PAKISTAN

17 Dec 03

U20655 /03



11-L-0559/OSD/18121

LARRY: I-03/017024
Som?
SD approved letter
J.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(Douglas J. Feith, 697-7200)

SUBJECT: Personal Support Letters for President Musharraf

Attached for your consideration are three options for a letter of support to Pakistani President Musharraf after the apparent assassination attempt of December 14th.

Next under is a personal letter for your signature.

SOM/DJ
SBUT
12/16

Attached at Tab A is an optional letter you could forward to President Bush, recommending his signature and transmission to President Musharraf. We could send this letter in conjunction with yours, or in lieu of it.

Whichever option is approved, ISA will send the text out as an electronic message in advance of the hard copy.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the personal letter next under and return to ISA for transmission as a message, and forward the memo at Tab A to President Bush for his signature on the enclosed letter.

SECDEF DECISION
CONCUR
NON-CONCUR:
Other:
COORDINATION: Tab B
Attachments: a/s

12/17
12/15
SOM
Larry Di Rita
12/17
As discussed
Di Rita
Recommend the POTW version

Prepared by M. D. Walsh, ISA/NESA (b)(6)
DUSD(NESA) _____ PDASD/ISA _____ ASD/ISA _____

3:25 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 18, 2003
RE: **Polish MoD**

*EF-7585
03/015988*

Here's a strange indication of the Polish PM criticizing me on Iraq because I am recommending more U.S. troops. We had better get a letter from me to him explaining how inaccurate it is and asking him to give us any references they have that suggest I have ever said anything like that.

Poland

Thanks.

DHR/azn
111803.05

Please respond by: _____ *11/30*

18 Nov 03

19-11-03 13:43 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/18123

1120680 *11/03*

9:41 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: July 1, 2003
 SUBJECT: *Time Magazine*

Attached is an article on Carlisle, PA. Do you know anything about this being shut down?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.04

Attach: "The Price of Peacekeeping? Too High," Time, 7/7/03

Please respond by: 7/15

7/8 -

→ Bryan Whitman ✓
 Please attach a
 copy of the letter
 Les Brownlee signed
 B. White

U20708 /03

7/11

July 10, 2003

7/15



← SecDef -
This is what
Les sent to Time.

Editor, Time Magazine
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, NY 10020

D. Little
Larry Di Rita

Editor,

Your article ("The Price of Peacekeeping? Too High", June 30) incorrectly singles out Secretary Rumsfeld as the force behind closing the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute.

In fact, the decision to close the Peacekeeping Institute was made by Army leadership as part of a much larger initiative to transform the Army's major commands and agencies to improve efficiency in acquisition, operations, training and resource management. Although Secretary Rumsfeld gave us his full support for the entire initiative, its details were developed and agreed upon by the Army.

The national security environment has significantly changed since 1993 when the Peacekeeping Institute was established. Today the Army is committed to stability operations, which include peacekeeping, in critical areas around the world. We appreciate the broader context our soldiers must operate in and intend to provide them with a refocused institute to support their efforts.

We are presently reviewing the mission and resources that a new institute requires. We intend to announce its mission in the near future.

Sincerely,

Les Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army



playing on the Jeep's stereo, and he was singing about the "turnpike from Stockbridge to Boston." In the dusk, I thought about how Johnson was a smart and likable guy and about how the soldiers were good, decent people and about how whatever bad we were doing at this new American gulag we must be doing out of fear.

Later, as we passed by two housing subdivisions, Tierra K and West Iguana, I also thought of the ending of "Cast Away," in which Tom Hanks, off the island at last, returns home to the suburbs. Moviegoers will remember what happened there: his fiancée, hearing no news of him for years, wrote him off as dead and married somebody else. He has survived, but his life is destroyed. Being incommunicado so long, as prisoners all over the world can tell you, is a sort of death.

Ted Conover is the author, most recently, of "Newjack: Guarding Sing Sing."

Washington Post
June 28, 2003
Pg. 7

28. For The Record

The Senate confirmed Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid to replace Gen. Tommy R. Franks as head of U.S. Central Command, a position that includes responsibility for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Abizaid is now the number two official at Central Command. Franks announced last month he would retire this summer.

Time
July 7, 2003
Pg. 18

Notebook

29. The Price Of Peacekeeping? Too High

Is Donald Rumsfeld afraid to give peace a chance? Academically, at least, it appears the answer is yes. The Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle, Pa., the only

government entity dedicated to the task, will close by summer's end, even while the military struggles to keep the peace in Iraq. Army officials say the closure, endorsed by Rumsfeld, is a money-saving measure, though the institute's \$1 million annual budget represents only .00025% of the military's annual \$400 billion outlay.

"Closing the Peacekeeping Institute reflects the Army's priorities, but we're in danger of losing Iraq because we haven't figured out how to do postwar missions," says Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. diplomat now lecturing military officers at the National Defense University. "We should be strengthening the peacekeeping component of our military, not diminishing it."

Alas, any "lessons learned" during the Peacekeeping Institute's 10-year life are not readily available to the public. That's because its website shut down May 1--the same day President Bush declared, from the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, that "major combat operations" in Iraq were over.

By Mark Thompson

Washington Post
June 29, 2003
Pg. 9

30. Navy Plans To Increase Carrier Readiness

By Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writer

As Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld moves to increase the global presence of U.S. military forces to fight the war on terrorism, the Navy has developed a new fleet readiness plan designed to double the number of aircraft carriers available for missions around the world.

Instead of maintaining single carriers in the Pacific Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, the Navy could have six carriers

ready by the end of the year to respond to terrorist emergencies or other military contingencies worldwide, Navy officials said.

Aircraft carriers are the Pentagon's surest means of projecting air power to distant corners of the globe, as demonstrated two years ago during the war on terrorism in land-locked Afghanistan, when Navy fighters flew attack missions almost 700 miles inland.

"With the war on terrorism, we're going to have to be prepared to go a lot of places we've not gone before," one Navy official said. "Essentially, now our [carrier] deployments are to three places."

To realign the nation's global force structure, Rumsfeld is working to create a network of smaller, semi-permanent bases in more distant locations that U.S. forces can use to counter emerging terrorist threats.

Rumsfeld's plan is predicated upon the belief that U.S. forces must be able to respond much more quickly to strike terrorists and rogue states that have weapons of mass destruction before they can attack the United States. With respect to ground forces, he is pushing the Army to think about creating smaller units that can be deployed much more quickly by air and sea.

The Navy's new fleet readiness plan is its response to the same impetus and should enable Navy commanders to be much more flexible and unpredictable in the way they employ the nation's 300-ship fleet, Navy officials said.

"The Navy is migrating away from the static deployment patterns of the Cold War in order to be more flexible and responsive to unpredictable threats," said Loren B. Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute who works as a consultant to the Navy and various defense contractors. "The new approach is part of a

broad effort to be more forward-deployed, more numerous in the number of formations and more precise in the range of responses."

The Navy's fleet management system is anything but agile. Beyond the two carriers it maintains on a full-time basis in the Pacific and the Persian Gulf and the third carrier it keeps on station in the Mediterranean for at least six months a year, the Navy has just one or two carriers in the United States ready to go to sea in an emergency.

Upon returning from deployments, carriers in the United States are put through a slow and predictable maintenance and training cycle that is scheduled to take 18 months before they are ready to deploy for six-month missions.

"The only people who know our ships' schedules better than the Chinese government are the ladies who work down at the Navy Exchange," one Navy official said.

The new system is designed to speed up the 18-month reconstitution process by speeding up maintenance cycles, changing personnel procedures and modifying training rotations so that carriers could be ready to sail after nine months.

The officials said this new readiness system does not necessarily mean that Rumsfeld and officials on the National Security Council will scrap the long-standing forward presence policy of maintaining carriers in the Pacific, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

But the new system will give them the ability to modify the policy and, instead of permanently basing one carrier per theater, "surge" two or three carriers to a theater at different, less predictable intervals.

"I think we'd be sending a different type of message," one Navy official said, "to a

10:11 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: July 1, 2003
SUBJECT:

*OB
9.20*

You may want to think through what Intel we ought to be wanting to get so that we can focus our research on biological weapons more precisely.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.06

Please respond by: _____ *7/15*

U20709 /03

10:58 AM

DB
7/21

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: July 1, 2003
SUBJECT:

Here are a couple of memos; my meeting with Inouye and my meeting with Stevens alone. Would you please assign out the responsibilities that I incurred in those two meetings to get David Chu and other people up to brief and then give me a report on who has been assigned to do what.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.09

*Attach: Inouye memo of 6/24
Stevens memo of 6/24*

Please respond by: _____ 7/15

U20710 /03

TO: Steven Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: July 1, 2003
SUBJECT:

Here are some thoughts from Jerry Bremer on the speech the President is thinking about for Tuesday. Here also is his response on Najaf.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.14

Attach: Bremer email of 6/30/03 to SecDef

U20711 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18129

Settele, James, CDR, OSD

Subject: FW: Message for SecDef

-----Original Message-----

From: Bremer, Paul

Sent: Monday, June 30, 2003 2:21 AM

To: Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD

Cc: Norwood, Scott

Subject: Message for SecDef

Jaymie

This responds to the phone call from SecDef to me Sunday afternoon. Please pass to him before today's phone call, with note that I would be happy to discuss further with him at the end of today's call.

Mr. Secretary:

June 30 2003

Here are some possible points for the President's presentation. I also have notes below on the fast-moving situation in Najaf.

Points for the President:

The threats to Americans in Iraq come from several sources:

1. Elements of the former regime(Baathists, Fedayeen Saddam, Intelligence agencies). These groups focus their attacks on three targets: coalition forces; infrastructure; employees of the Coalition, including recently Iraqis. To date, these elements do not appear to be subject to central command and control. But there are signs of coordination among them. They do not pose a strategic threat to American interests in Iraq. But they do exacerbate tensions particularly because of the fragile nature of Iraqi's infrastructure due to consistent underinvestment the past 35 years.

2. Iranian subversion- Elements of the Tehran government are actively arming, training and directing militia in Iraq. To date, these armed forces have not been directly involved in attacks on the Coalition. But they pose a longer term threat to law and order

in Iraq.

3. Terrorists- Coalition forces have captured or killed subversives from outside Iraq(Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen). There are clear indications that Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group associated with Al Qaeda, is again operating inside Iraq and actively surveilling Coalition targets.

Our response to the Threat:

- 1. We will locate and neutralize these saboteurs and enemies of the Iraqi people. Neither the Iraqi people nor our enemies should be in any doubt that we will prevail.**
- 2. We will not be deterred from carrying out our strategy of reform and reconstruction in Iraq. We will move forward on our three priorities-establishing a sense of security and law throughout the country; stimulating sustainable economic activity; and moving to establish an interim Iraqi Administration in July.**
- 3. We will be patient and resolute in implementing our strategy. It will take time to reform a society which has been subjected to political tyranny and economic mismanagement for almost 4 decades. We will not be thrown off track by occasional bumps in the road.**

Update on Najaf

My political folks reported to me this morning that they find persuasive the evidence that the Acting Governor of Najaf has committed crimes. I have therefore ordered his arrest today. We will replace him immediately with the Deputy Governor and then move to follow a selection procedure which has the best chance of producing another Acting Governor conducive to our interests

(and not subservient to Iran).

Jerry

1:25 PM

TO: Gen. Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: July 1, 2003
SUBJECT: **POTUS Meeting**

At the meeting with the President, it came up that it might be a good idea to refresh him on where we stand on missile defense when we meet with him in August or before.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.15

Please respond by: _____

7/15

U20712 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18133

7:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.
DATE: July 1, 2003

SUBJECT:

Have someone draft a letter from me to *People Magazine* commenting on the series in their July 7 2003 issue on "Today's Military".

Thanks.

DHR/azn
070103.02

Please respond by: _____ 7/9 _____ 7/14

7/14 -
SecDef -

That was an advertisement. It was in other mags, too (Attached).

BW -
Please take forac. Thx.
G. R.

D. Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
7/15

U20715 /03

1530
↑

July 3, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Nat Troy, Jr.

I met with Nat Troy, Jr. (age 30). I know his parents in Taos. His background sheet is attached. He is interested in doing something either in government or with a corporation.

As I recall, Bremer is looking for two or three hundred people. I don't know if they are looking for anyone with Troy's background, but he is ready to go. He could go out as a gopher to be available to do whatever needs to be done that reasonably fits his background and skills. He got good grades in school, has lived in foreign countries, and has language skills in Persian and Russian, which might be helpful.

Why don't you take a look at what Jerry is looking for and see if Troy might fit. He is available immediately. He could come to Washington for an interview if he had to, or you could interview him by phone or VTC. since he is here in Taos and we have the equipment.

7/8

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

To: Tim O'Berne -

Could he fit one of the billets Jerry is seeking?

Attach.
Nat Troy letter and résumé

D. Rita

DHR:dh
070303-2 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

Larry Di Rita

7/9

U20714 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18135

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Nat Troy, Jr

(b)(6)

SECRET

JUN 25 2003

June 17, 2003

Dear Donald,

At my dad's suggestion, I am writing to you and enclosing my resume in hopes that you can offer me some guidance.

To be brief, I just received my MBA from Rice University in Houston. Previously, I studied and worked in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and most recently Iran. I am fluent in Russian and Persian, with some proficiency (mainly conversational) in French and Spanish and the Turkic languages. My interest in Central Asian and Middle Eastern history and culture developed early on in high school in Taos and has persisted through out my education and professional life, with the goal of eventually working in those regions. I am applying to Halliburton and other international companies for positions that could utilize my language, knowledge of certain cultures, and my MBA. I think I could well serve a Western company operating in Central Asia, Persian-speaking areas of Iraq or Afghanistan, or eventually Iran, but I do not know how to get my foot in the door. I would greatly appreciate your advice and guidance, while fully understanding that you are pretty busy right now and may not need a distraction.

In any event, I will be in Taos over the Fourth and hope to see you then. If that doesn't happen, any communication will be helpful.

Sincerely,

Nat Troy, Jr.
enclosure

NATHANIEL R. TROY JR.

(b)(6)

education
2001 - 2003

RICE UNIVERSITY, JONES GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
Master of Business Administration, May 2003. Founder and Vice Chairperson of International Management Club. Certificate of completion for Energy Derivatives Workshop.

HOUSTON, TX

2001

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PERSIAN LANGUAGE STUDIES
Received a certificate of completion for advanced Persian language. Studied modern Persian literature.

TEHRAN, IRAN

1993 - 1996

INDIANA UNIVERSITY
Bachelor of Arts degree. Graduated with honors. Member of Association of Young Historians of Kyrghyzstan.

BLOOMINGTON, IN**experience**
summer 2002**EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF UNITED STATES (Ex-Im)**

Business Development Program Assistant. Conducted due diligence on companies applying for Ex-Im programs.

- Processed applications and drafted writeups on companies seeking Ex-Im support. Recommended and secured short-term export credit insurance policy for small Houston manufacturer.
 - Conducted financial statement, risk and credit management analysis.
 - Assessed political risk of countries and calculated Ex-Im exposure fees.

spring 2002

HALIBURTON COMPANY

Action Learning Project (ALP). Consulted Economics Group on financial modeling processes.

- Analyzed and provided recommendations on group's financial modeling practices.
- Developed methodology for documenting oil and gas models.
- Created prototype oil and gas screening model.
- Developed monitoring and tracking solutions for financial models.

HOUSTON, TX

1998 - 2000

TESM, INC.

American Partner. Consulted Kazakh pharmaceutical distribution company.

ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN

- Played key role in developing relationships between TESH and Alcom Pharmaceuticals, INC. and TESH and Johnson & Johnson.
- TESH continues to work with the two companies on supplying Kazakh market with American pharmaceutical products.
 - Assisted in opening a representative office for Alcon Pharmaceuticals, INC. in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
 - Secured Kazakhstan's first exclusivity agreement with Alcon Pharmaceuticals, INC.
 - Translated and revised business plan, marketing proposals and annual reports.
 - Developed a plan to expand American product line in Kazakh market.

1996 - 1998

KAZAKH INTERNATIONAL BANK

Advisor to the Board. Presented project proposals to American companies. Consulted on energy projects.

ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN

- Advised Davies Associates, INC. on implementation of independent power project (IPP) in Aktiubinsk (northern province of Kazakhstan). Obtained Letter of Intent from Prime Minister.
- Negotiated and secured an Exclusive Right to Sell Fee Agreement from Kazakh National Gas Company on behalf of an American mergers and acquisitions company, M. Kaulkin & Associates, INC.
- Organized and managed a gas pipeline project task force on behalf of the bank and Kazakh National Gas Company.
 - Acted as an intermediary between the bank and Kazakh National Gas Company and American investors.
 - Translated, evaluated and presented the bank's project proposals to American investors.
 - Conducted due diligence on gas trunk pipeline construction and rehabilitation projects for Kazakh National Gas Company.

personal

Lived and studied in Kyrghyzstan, France, England and Iran. Study Persian and Central Asian history and cultures. Published article on ethnic origins of Kyrghyz in Kyrghyz academic journal. Member of Iranian Trade Association (ITA). Fluent in Russian and Persian. Literate and conversant in French, Spanish and Uzbek. Enjoy traveling, studying languages, alpine skiing and horseback riding. Proficient in Excel, SPSS and Minitab.

July 4, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Program Stability

Please read this response from General Myers on program stability and draft an appropriate memo for me to sign.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/2/03 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Program Stability [U10325/03]

DHR db
070403-2 (ts computer) doc

Please respond by

7/18/03

U20715 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

2003 JUL -2 AM 10:56

CM-1049-03
2 July 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/1*

SUBJECT: Program Stability

- In response to your question regarding program management, tour lengths for Program Executive Officers (PEOs) (usually O-7, O-8, SES 3 or SES 4) are statutorily required to be not less than 3 years. PEOs are responsible for multiple programs and extending their tour lengths will not necessarily provide stability to the specific programs.
- As a step toward improving program stability, I recommend focusing on Program and Deputy Managers, usually O-6, O-5, GS-14 or above. Program and Deputy Managers are responsible for individual programs and thus have a greater effect on the outcome of the particular program.
- 10 USC 1734, stipulates that "a program manager and a deputy program manager of a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) be assigned to the position at least until completion of the major milestone that occurs closest in time to the date on which the person has served in the position for four years."
- The statute allows the Service Secretaries to waive the minimum assignment period. Statistics show that of the MDAP Program Managers who have been reassigned over the past 4 years only 31 percent met the minimum assignment period without waiver.

COORDINATION:

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria Cribbs, USAF; DJ-1; (b)(6)

*Mr Secretary -
I recommend a memo from
you to the Service Secretaries
asking them to ensure Program
Managers spend
4 years in the job
with few exceptions.*

VR Oich

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/3
MA BUCCI	7/3
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/3

U10325-103
A48-3

June 2, 2003 9:27 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Program Stability

Do you have any thoughts on how we can improve the stability in our program management? There is not much we can do about Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but we ought to be able to figure out something for the rest of them.

One thought would be to simply mandate longer tours.

What do you think?

CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED 7/3

Thanks.

✓R

Attach.
3/19/03 Aldridge Memo re: Program Stability

DHR:dh
060203-18

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

03 JUN 04 AM 7:49

1948-2

7/10 1530

6002



July 5, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bremer Announcement of Rewards for Justice Program

Larry Di Rita
7/8

Things like this Bremer announcement should be circulated to the Interagency, so everyone knows what is going on.

7/10/03
DONE

Thanks.

Attach.
July 3, 2003 Bremer remarks and press release re: Rewards for Justice Program, Press Guidance

V/R

DHR:dh
070503-4 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

DC Trans - to Jul
LTR to SECDEF STARTING

U20727 /03

07-07-03 12:51

11-L-0559/OSD/18141

07/5

Text of Announcement:

July 3, 2003 Remarks by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

Rewards for Justice Program
July 3, 2003

Today the United States is including Iraq in a program called Rewards for Justice that will offer ordinary people in Iraq and around the world an opportunity to contribute to the battle against terrorism.

We believe that ordinary citizens in Iraq or elsewhere may have information that can help bring Saddam Hussein and his sons to justice. To encourage citizens to come forth and provide such information, the United States government is offering to pay up to twenty five million dollars for information leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and up to fifteen million dollars for information leading to the capture of each of his sons, Uday and Qusay.

There is substantial evidence that Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, in their positions of despotic authority at the head of the former Iraqi regime, provided significant support to international terrorist groups that have directed violence against the United States.

Assuming they are still alive, Saddam Hussein and his sons remain capable of carrying out, or providing significant assistance to other individuals or groups who would carry out, acts of violence against the United States.

This U.S. Department of State program called Rewards for Justice has already saved many lives, has prevented acts of terrorism and has resulted in the conviction of terrorists in several countries. For example, Ramzi Yousef, the terrorist who bombed the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, was captured in Pakistan because of information provided through the Rewards for Justice program. He has been convicted and is serving a life sentence.

No one can hide from everyone. We hope that the Rewards for Justice program, now active in Iraq, will provide support to the efforts of freedom-loving Iraqis to bring to justice Saddam Hussein and his sons, who together are responsible for the murder of many innocent people.

AT/24

(b)(6)

July 3, 2003
Press release

**U.S. Announces Counter Terrorism Rewards Program
Targeting Saddam Hussein and his sons.**

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, announced today rewards for the capture of Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay. Under the program, the U.S. Government will offer monetary rewards of up to \$25 million for information leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and up to \$15 million for each of his sons.

Saddam Hussein and his sons, in their positions of despotic authority at the head of the former Iraqi regime, provided significant support to international terrorist organizations that have directed violence against the United States. This includes, but is not limited to, providing safehaven, transit points and operational bases for designated foreign terrorist organizations such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Palestine Liberation Front. Hussein and his sons have cooperated openly with KANAS. Saddam Hussein also was behind the 1992 assassination attempt against former President Bush.

Assuming they are still alive, Saddam Hussein and his sons remain capable of carrying out, or providing significant assistance to other individuals or groups who would carry out, acts of violence against the United States. They were responsible for the development of weapons of mass destruction while in power in Iraq. Since Iraq's WMD inventory has not yet been accounted for, there is a significant risk that Hussein or his sons, if still in possession of such weapons, would use them, or provide them to others who would use them, for terrorists acts. There is also a high probability that Hussein and his sons continue to have access to funds and other assets that they could use, or provide to others to use, to support terrorist attacks against American interests.

The counter terrorism campaign is known as the "Rewards for Justice Program" and is administered by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

People with information should contact the Office of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority or any U.S. military commander here in Iraq, the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, write to our post office box address, send us an e-mail (mailrewardsforjustice.net), or call 1-800-877-3927.

All responses will be kept strictly confidential. Individuals providing information may be eligible for a reward, protection of their identities, and relocation with their families.

The Rewards for Justice Program has been effective. In the past nine years, the United States has paid over \$9.75 million to 24 people who provided credible information that put terrorists behind bars or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide.

For additional information on the Rewards for Justice Program, visit the Department of State website: <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net>.

A 17-3

7/3

Press Guidance
July 2, 2003

Rewards for Saddam Hussein and Sons

Q: Is there a reward offer for Saddam Hussein?

Answer

- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS OFFERING A REWARD OF UP TO \$25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.
- REWARDS OF UP TO \$15 MILLION DOLLARS EACH ARE OFFERED FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO THE CAPTURE OF HIS SONS UDAY HUSSEIN AND QUSAY HUSSEIN.
- THESE REWARDS ARE BEING OFFERED AS PART OF THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
- UNDER THIS PROGRAM, A REWARD OF UP TO \$25 MILLION DOLLARS HAS ALSO BEEN OFFERED FOR USAMA BIN LADEN.
- ANYONE WITH INFORMATION MAY CONTACT THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY OR ANY U.S. MILITARY COMMANDER HERE IN IRAQ, ANY U.S. EMBASSY OR CONSULATE, OR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE..

Q: Will you offer protection to people who provide information?

- INDIVIDUALS PROVIDING INFORMATION MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR A REWARD, PROTECTION OF THEIR IDENTITIES, AND RELOCATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

A23(7)

Q: Can you provide some general information about the Rewards program?

- THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM IS ADMINISTERED BY THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY. UNDER THIS PROGRAM, THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY OFFER REWARDS OF UP TO \$5 MILLION FOR INFORMATION THAT PREVENTS OR FAVORABLY RESOLVES ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE, OR LEADS TO THE ARREST OR CONVICTION OF TERRORISTS ATTEMPTING, COMMITTING, CONSPIRING TO COMMIT, OR AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMMISSION OF SUCH ACTS.
- THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, WHICH BECAME LAW ON OCTOBER 26, AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO OFFER OR PAY A REWARD GREATER THAN \$5 MILLION IF HE DETERMINES THAT A GREATER AMOUNT IS NECESSARY TO COMBAT TERRORISM OR TO DEFEND THE NATION AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS.
- THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE TOOL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN THE PAST EIGHT YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS PAID MORE THAN \$9.75 MILLION TO 24 PEOPLE WHO HAVE PROVIDED CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT PUT TERRORISTS BEHIND BARS OR PREVENTED ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WORLDWIDE.

A23(2)

3

Q: By offering a reward, aren't you encouraging bounty hunters?

Answer

- THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO OFFER REWARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION, NOT FOR THE HAND OVER OF INDIVIDUALS.
- WE STRONGLY DISCOURAGE BOUNTY HUNTERS FROM PURSUING THE PHYSICAL APPREHENSION OF TERRORISTS.
- PEOPLE WITH INFORMATION SHOULD CONTACT THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY OR ANY U.S. MILITARY COMMANDER HERE IN IRAQ, THE NEAREST U.S. EMBASSY OR CONSULATE, WRITE TO OUR POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESS, SEND US AN E-MAIL (mail@rewardsforjustice.net), OR CALL 1-800-877-3927.

Q: How is the size of a reward determined?

- A PERSON IS NOMINATED FOR A REWARD FROM A U.S. GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATING AGENCY.
- AN INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE EVALUATES THE INFORMATION PROVIDED AND RECOMMENDS WHETHER A REWARD SHOULD BE PAID, AND IF SO, ITS AMOUNT.
- THE RECOMMENDATION ON THE SIZE OF THE REWARD PAYMENT IS BASED ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, THE RISK FACED BY THE INFORMANT, AND THE DEGREE OF THE INFORMANT'S COOPERATION IN AN INVESTIGATION OR TRIAL.

A23(4)

4

- IF THE SECRETARY APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION, HE THEN CONSULTS WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. IF THERE IS FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST CONCUR ON THE PAYMENT OF THE REWARD.

Q: Which agencies sit on the interagency committee?

- STATE DEPARTMENT (CHAIR)
- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
- OTHER AGENCIES, DEPENDING UPON THE PARTICULAR CASE

(Note: For example, if the case involved civil aviation, we would invite the FAA to participate.)

Q: Are there any exclusionary provisions for eligibility that would keep persons with unsavory backgrounds from getting a reward?

- WE CLOSELY EXAMINE THE BACKGROUNDS OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS NOMINATED FOR REWARDS PAYMENTS.

(Note: Under the U.S. law that governs the program, Federal, State, and local government and foreign government employees are not eligible for a reward if they provide information while in the performance of their official duties. There are no other statutory exclusions for reward payments.)

Q: How much have you paid?

A03(5)

5

Answer:

- MORE THAN \$9.75 MILLION HAS BEEN PAID TO 24 PEOPLE UNDER THIS PROGRAM.

Q: Can you give us some specific details of reward payments?

- THE LARGEST PAYMENT TO DATE WAS \$2 MILLION.
- A KEY ASPECT OF THIS PROGRAM IS THAT RESPONSES TO OUR REWARDS CAMPAIGNS ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
- IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON SPECIFIC REWARDS PAYMENTS OR CASES IN WHICH WE HAVE PAID A REWARD.
- HOWEVER, THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY SUCCESSFUL OVER THE YEARS. OUR ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE CAPTURE OF TERRORIST RAMZI YOUSEF.

Q: How can we be sure that you've actually paid rewards if you won't give us specifics?

- WE PROVIDE A CLASSIFIED REPORT TO THE CONGRESS EACH TIME A REWARD IS PAID UNDER THIS PROGRAM.

Q: Where does the reward money come from?

- THE REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM IS FUNDED BY FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS.
- THE FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE UNTIL EXPENDED (NO-YEAR ACCOUNT).

A-23(w)

Additional Contact Information

- IN ADDITION TO CONTACTING THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY OR ANY U.S. MILITARY COMMANDER IN IRAQ, PEOPLE WITH INFORMATION ON PAST OR PLANNED ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MAY CONTACT THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY VIA ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING AVENUES:
 - INTERNET: www.rewardsforjustice.net
 - E-MAIL: mail@rewardsforjustice.net
 - TELEPHONE: 1-800-877-3927
 - MAIL: Rewards for Justice
Washington, DC 20522-0303 USA
- IN ADDITION, PEOPLE LOCATED OVERSEAS MAY CONTACT THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AT THE NEAREST U.S. EMBASSY OR CONSULATE.

A23(7)

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF* 7/10/03

SUBJECT: Rewards for Justice Program

- You requested we circulate Amb Bremer's guidance announcing the Rewards for Justice program with the inter-agency.
- At the Deputies Committee Meeting on 10 Jul, I distributed the package to all.

for
DUSD(SP-NESA) WJ *9.10.03*

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

July 8, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on Iraq

John Hamre, the Deputy Secretary of Defense who served in the last administration, is now running the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army conducted a two-year study on post-conflict reconstruction. Their study was generic, but I requested that they visit Iraq and apply the knowledge they gained in their study to Iraq. The attached is a preliminary report on their recent visit to Iraq.

While it is critical in some important respects, I feel they did an excellent job, and it struck me that it would be worth your time to read it.

Needless to say, we will be acting on many of their recommendations.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

July 3, 2003 John Hamre memo and report re: "Preliminary Observations Based on My Recent Visit to Baghdad"

DHR:dh
070803-3

U20729 103

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/18151

~~Close Hold~~

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: 202/775-3227
Fax: 202/463-7224

FAX COVER SHEET -

DATE: July 3, 2003

TO: Lauren Haber

FAX: (b)(6)

PHONE:

FROM: John Hamre

NUMBER OF PAGES: 10 (including cover page)


MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO TO UNDERSECRETARY FEITH VIA LAUREN HABER

Lauren,

Attached is Dr. Hamre's Memo to Amb. Brommer and Undersecretary Feith. Dr. Hamre asked me to inform you that besides the copy sent to Amb Brommer, these are the only two copies of this document that exist. He has instructed me to destroy this copy on my end as soon as it is sent. Please contact me at the number listed below when you receive this. Thanks.

Sincerely,



Francis J. DuFrayne
Administrative Assistant
Office of the President
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

(b)(6)

~~Close Hold~~

11-L-0559/OSD/18152

~~Close Hold~~

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

From: John Hamre

Subject: Preliminary observations based on my recent visit to Baghdad

At your invitation, my colleagues and I visited the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. My colleagues remain in Iraq. I am taking this opportunity to relay provisional observations based on our extensive conversations in Baghdad. My colleagues are continuing their interviews in outlying cities, thanks to the support of the CPA. When they return, we will prepare a final report and submit it to you.

Before I begin, let me thank the CPA for the superb support we received during our stay. Administrator Bremer invited me into his morning conference meetings and instructed all senior representatives to support our visit. We were given unfettered access to individuals and offices. During my four days, I personally interviewed over 80 individuals.

This preliminary report is intended only for your use. I have attached a second report that contains the points that I would make publicly, if you authorize me to offer public remarks. As we indicated at the time you invited us to make the trip, we consider ourselves as informal consultants to you. We will make no public report unless you authorize it.

Key Findings

We cannot fail in our mission to rebuild a free and democratic Iraq. But our success is not guaranteed. The CPA under Ambassador Bremer is making astounding progress. But the security situation is difficult and getting more so.

The CPA is confronting a much more difficult problem than a traditional post-conflict reconstruction challenge. Iraq is also a completely failed economy. The CPA is confronting the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989.

The active sabotage of Saddam loyalists is amplified by the fragile infrastructure of Iraq. A well-placed attack can create consequences felt throughout the city or even the country.

The CPA faces three inter-related problems that have to be solved together—security, electricity and petroleum production. These three are inextricably tied. The

~~Close Hold~~

11-L-0559/OSD/18153

lack of security is permitting Saddam loyalists and criminal elements to plunder both the electric system and the petroleum industry. Interrupted electric service undermines public confidence in the competence of the CPA, and interrupts petroleum production, undercutting the revenue base that will be required to rebuild Iraq. In short, if the security situation is not fixed, the entire rebuilding process will fail. The electric grid and the petroleum industry are already failure-prone. So the danger posed by active hostile elements is amplified.

The CPA is making astounding progress, but it lacks the forces, the money and the flexibility to do the job. The next 6 months are crucial.

Security Forces. There are not enough composite security forces to stop the plundering and sabotage of the country. America cannot solve this problem. Ultimately, Iraqis have to take responsibility for stopping the plundering and the sabotage. But they are not likely to have the competence to do that in the near term. Therefore, security must be the central focus of American efforts. (See "Security Forces" below.)

Money. The CPA is budgeting to the resources available, which is currently \$5.9 billion. I was impressed to see a solid, if somewhat rudimentary, budgeting process in place. But those resources are inadequate for the challenges at hand, and there are serious inefficiencies imposed by the restrictions imposed on the CPA. (See "Money" below.)

Flexibility. The CPA is badly handicapped by a "business as usual" approach to the mechanics of government, such as getting permission to spend money or enter into contracts. You cannot underestimate the difficulties this is posing to the CPA and the reconstruction efforts. (See "Flexibility" below.)

We appreciate the enormous difficulty of creating a viable long-term political governance process for Iraq. We believe the process outlined by Ambassador Bremer is sound. The Iraqis are not at all ready for a complex process like that required to draft a constitution and elect a government. But the demand for quickly getting Iraqis invested in the political transformation of Iraq places a high priority on the governance council. While security is the pre-eminent challenge facing the CPA, governance can't lag because it becomes the key to getting Iraqis invested in rebuilding their own country, including long-term security. (See "Governance Issues" below.)

The CPA is building democracy from the top down, while JTF7 is building democracy from the bottom up. These are not sufficiently coordinated. While relations between Administrator Bremer and JTF Commander Sanchez are excellent, there is significant friction at lower levels. Co-locating JTF7 with the CPA is an excellent step, but there are a few additional steps that should be taken. (See "Civilian-Military Relations" below.)

Finally, the energy and enthusiasm in the CPA is remarkable. The sense of mission, dedication and destiny among the CPA staff is great. As I said, the progress has been nothing short of remarkable. But there are areas that could be improved (see "Administrative Improvements" below.)

Security Forces

When Saddam loyalists choose to attack U.S. forces, they lose. So they are developing other tactics. They continue to take opportunistic shots at military forces. But it now appears they are organizing their attacks against critical infrastructure and civilians. We have adequate forces to engage the enemy if they engage us. But the country lacks the security forces to protect critical infrastructure and critical civilian support elements.

I think it would be a mistake just to throw in U.S. military forces, though somewhat more capability is probably needed. We need a much more comprehensive solution. There are four broad categories of security resources:

- **Iraqi Forces.** I saw the new Iraqi MP forces, and I am told that they are well received in Iraqi neighborhoods. You are half-way to your goal of recruiting 60,000. Iraq probably needs many more than that given the continuing plundering and sabotage against fixed targets, but that requires more money to resource a larger force than you currently have. Walt Slocombe has a good plan for the new Iraqi army. But this is 18-24 months off and doesn't address your near-term security woes. There are indications that the working relationship between the Iraqi police force and U.S. military forces needs attention.
- **Coalition Contributions.** This will help, but on a confidential, off the record basis, no one there felt it would help much. Indeed, the main worry I heard was that the Saddam loyalists are likely to attack coalition military forces early to test their will and sow dissention internationally. Several in the military felt we would have to divert some of our forces for force protection for the new coalition forces. It is still very valuable to cite coalition contributions, but their actual military capabilities are being questioned.
- **Contract Security Forces.** I think you could rapidly expand security by permitting contracted security forces at point locations. I was told that this is proceeding on an uneven basis. U.S. military authorities understandably don't want to see private militias throughout the country. But this can be normalized if there is a policy on standardized uniforms and identification. This is your fastest way to expand security for low-risk installations.
- **U.S. Military.** Frankly, I was worried to see the fatigue in our forces. They are very tired. The enthusiasm one sees in the CPA personnel is contrasted with the fatigue I saw in the military. You need to seriously address rotation

policy and R&R policy quickly, but I didn't get into this adequately to offer any suggestions.

I understand your reticence to add more forces to the theater. There are political elements in Washington who want to jump on that to score political points. If I am asked about this, I will say that I think we need to sustain our present force levels, and that we need to put first priority on expanding Iraqi forces, coalition contributions and contract forces for fixed low-risk installations. But I honestly believe we need to bring in more forces. You don't have enough forces to undertake patrols today and support the high-value missions that the CPA needs to undertake, plus defend fixed installations. For the next six months the most reliable source of augmented security will be US forces. The next 6-9 months are crucial.

I think you can make the case that you don't need more "victory forces" (VFOR), but the victory phase and the stabilization phase have overlapped because of the continuing activities of Saddam loyalists. I would argue that while you sustain the VFOR force during mop-up operations, you could bring in the "stabilization force" (SFOR) now for areas in the north and south that are ready for it while you concentrate your VFOR forces for the central hot zone.

Again, I will avoid saying any of this publicly, but I ask you to seriously consider finding additional troops to help over the next 6-9 months.

Money

I was surprised to find a budget process in place. It is rudimentary, but it is an incredible accomplishment this early in such a complex environment. The budget, however, is a cash-flow analysis, and major elements are not included. (For example, your electricity ministry is going to recommend an investment of \$1.5 billion/year for four years just for power generation, and an additional \$500 million/year for transmission upgrades. None of that is included in your budget.) The petroleum revenue assumptions are relatively conservative, but that is wise given the continuing attacks on the infrastructure. Frankly, if the security problems persist for the next 6-9 months, those revenue numbers will look optimistic.

Privately most of your advisers believe you will run out of money in 9-12 months. You need to look into this now, because you still have time to get the numbers right while the Congress is working on the FY04 appropriations. If you wait until next year, it will be harder to get a supplemental next spring/summer when the election season is underway, so I would try to get it appropriated this fall.

Flexibility

I was astounded to hear the constraints your lower level folks live with to get money and contracts. It is taking up to 10 days for OMB to approve fund requests after you approve them. They are asking for a level of detail which, frankly, I think is indefensible. The greatest constraint you have is on so-called "vested" funds. This is sufficiently debilitating to be worth taking to the President. I would especially establish the precedent now, since OMB is likely to hound your folks even more on any appropriated funds, and you will need more appropriated funds next year. So I would take this opportunity to get OMB off your back now when the White House knows that we have problems in Iraq and need to give the CPA Administrator all the flexibility he needs.

Another area of limitation is in the area of contracts. I heard more complaints about contracting than anything. Ambassador Bremer told me that there is now an Army contracting office in theater. Maybe this has not yet been felt by lower-level CPA offices yet, but contracting has been a significant problem to date. I spoke with company representatives who indicated that their headquarters were planning to pull them out of theater if contracts were not let soon. Right now each of your ministries is doing its own thing. This amplifies the chance for error in addition to the obvious inefficiencies it presents. You will have better control and responsiveness with in-theater capabilities. I would check to see how well this is working and whether the Army contracting office is meeting your needs.

For both of these, you are living with the mechanics of government that proceed under a "business as usual" approach. This isn't adequate for the urgency of the situation.

Governance Issues

As I said above, our team has studied many models for the governance question that is always at the heart of any post-conflict reconstruction challenge. We think your formula for putting first priority on creating a near-term governance council with a follow on constitutional process as right for the circumstances.

While our team will have more to say on this, one thing we would recommend with our governance council is that you find a way to get provincial representatives to participate as observers. I know that you are already having great challenges to recruit the governance council, but after you get that set, we think getting regional representatives early will help with the top-down, bottom up disconnect noted below.

I suspect that this will be an area where we will have more to say when the team returns.

Civilian-Military Relations

It was a very good decision to co-locate JTF-7 with CPA. Administrator Bremer and LTG Sanchez clearly have a good working relationship. But there are still

considerable tensions. Many are the lingering problems created when ORHA was first set up and effectively subordinated to Centcom land forces at Camp Doha. But that is getting better.

The real problem is that the reality of post-conflict reconstruction on the ground is different from the policy formulation at the top. CPA is too far removed from the challenges on the ground to be able to address all those questions when they come up, and the military feels it understands the problems better than CPA civilians.

I believe Ambassador Bremer has sent in a request to get CPA civilians assigned to the field, effectively as political advisers (POLADs). But I understand that this request is hung up on wrangling over personnel levels. The disconnect between field and headquarters is real, and serious. It is diverting too much of precious management time and talent sorting out problems after the fact. A modest investment in POLADs in the field would help CPA make more reasoned policy decisions, and help the military understand the reason for and direction of CPA policy choices.

Administrative Improvements

You have recruited a remarkable group of individuals as senior advisers. But as one of them said to me "we are like an all-star baseball game—great players but not really a team."

The daily staff meetings are a major contribution to team development. And the new budget process, while always contentious, will be valuable in helping the individuals understand the "whole" and not just their piece of the whole.

I understand that Ambassador Bremer has initiated a plan to secure military assistants for the senior advisers, at least for your power ministries. Everyone who works in the Pentagon knows how crucial the military assistants are. They amplify the effectiveness of the principle by undertaking triage on the array of problems that confront the principle. Ambassador Bremer has an executive secretariat, but adding military assistants would do wonders for improving the efficiency of the CPA leadership. Military assistants would also be very helpful as points of contact for the JTF7. This is an urgent requirement, in my view, and I hope that you can direct the military departments to quickly meet the CPA Administrator's request for military assistants.

Conclusion

These are my preliminary observations. When the rest of my team returns, we will prepare a more thoughtful report for you. They are especially concentrating on the complex governance challenges.

I have already received a request from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify concerning my observations from the trip. I have attached the key points I would propose to make in a public setting.

PUBLIC TALKING POINTS CONCERNING VISIT TO IRAQ

- CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army conducted a 2 year study on post-conflict reconstruction. The study was "generic", but we applied it to Iraq in the publication "A Wiser Peace" which was published in January.
- Based on the study, Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer invited us to Iraq to provide assistance to the CPA as it assesses ongoing operations.
- I spent five days in theater, and my colleagues will spend a total of 11 days. These talking points reflect only my preliminary observations and could be changed after I consult with the full team.
- Ambassador Bremer and the CPA provided superb support for our visit. We were given unfettered access to individuals and offices. I personally interviewed over 80 individuals.

Key Findings

- We cannot fail in our mission to rebuild a free and democratic Iraq. But our success is not guaranteed.
- The CPA under Ambassador Bremer is making astounding progress. But the security situation is difficult and getting more so.
- The CPA is confronting a much more difficult problem than a traditional post-conflict reconstruction challenge. Iraq is also a completely failed economy. The CPA is confronting the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989.
- The active sabotage of Saddam loyalists is amplified by the fragile infrastructure of Iraq. A well-placed attack can create consequences felt throughout the city or even the country.
- The CPA faces three inter-related problems that have to be solved together—security, electricity and petroleum production. These three are inextricably tied. The lack of security is permitting Saddam loyalists and criminal elements to plunder both the electric system and the petroleum industry. Interrupted electric service undermines public confidence in the competence of the CPA, and interrupts petroleum production, undercutting the revenue base that will be required to rebuild Iraq. In short, if the security situation is not fixed, the entire rebuilding process will fail. The electric grid and the petroleum industry are already failure-prone. So the danger posed by active hostile elements is amplified.

- The CPA is making astounding progress, but it lacks sufficient forces, money and flexibility to do the job. The next 6 months are crucial.
- Security Forces. There are not enough composite security forces to stop the plundering and sabotage of the country. America cannot solve this problem. Ultimately, Iraqis have to take responsibility for stopping the plundering and the sabotage. We have four ways we can expand security forces.
 - Iraqi indigenous forces. There has been good progress in recruiting indigenous police forces, but we need to expand even the goal. This will require more funds than are available to the CPA, however.
 - Coalition contributions. These are welcome, but require considerable coordination and augmentation which will be another mission for our US forces.
 - Contract security forces. The fastest and easiest way to expand security capabilities would be to let U.S. contractors hire site security guards for low-risk facilities. I understand why the U.S. military does not want to see private militias in Iraq where there is already a complex security environment. But these forces can be made uniform in appearance and rules of engagement to minimize the security worries for our forces.
 - U.S. Forces. We need to sustain our current force structure, but we need to urgently address the fatigue I saw in our forces.
- Money. The CPA is budgeting to the resources available, which is currently \$5.9 billion. I was impressed to see a solid, if somewhat rudimentary, budgeting process in place. But those resources are inadequate for the challenges at hand. I believe the CPA needs supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal year 2004, and this needs to be appropriated this fall.
- The CPA is badly handicapped by a "business as usual" approach to the mechanics of government, such as getting permission to spend money or enter into contracts. We need to adopt procedures that are realistic for the challenging environment facing Administrator Bremer and his team.
- Creating a viable long-term political governance process for Iraq is crucial. Iraqi society is too traumatized and fractious to undertake a complex process like that required to draft a constitution and elect a government. Administrator Bremer has established a process to create a near-term governance council while the foundations for a follow-on constitutional process are being set. We think this is the right approach. The governance process cannot lag, however, since that is crucial for getting Iraqis to take ownership for their own country, including providing security.

- The CPA is building democracy from the top down, while JTF7 is building democracy from the bottom up. Both are essential, though at present these efforts are not sufficiently coordinated. Administrator Bremer is aware of this problem and has taken concrete steps to fix it.
- The energy and enthusiasm in the CPA is remarkable. The sense of mission, dedication and destiny among the CPA staff is great. The progress has been nothing short of remarkable. At the same time the fatigue in our troops is worrying. This must be addressed.
- We cannot fail in our mission to build a free and democratic Iraq. But success is not guaranteed. This is going to be a very difficult process and it will take years. The length of time required to accomplish our goals is inversely related to the resources we put to the task now. If we skimp on money and manpower, we are likely to be in Iraq longer.

July 8, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Senator McCain

I would like to have John McCain down for lunch someday, just to visit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070803-2

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

U20730 /03

7/8/03

July 8, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: LTG Craddock
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hamre Report

I think you and Jerry Bremer need to come up with some proposals as to what we ought to do based on the Hamre report. Then set a meeting, and we will get going.

Thanks.

DHR dh
070803-4

.....

Please respond by 7/14/03

7/14

FEITH RESPONSE
ATTACHED

vir

Larry Di Rita
7/18 →

7/19
Sec Def - ✓

Also, we're asking
Hamre to hold further briefings,
including press
Di Rita

U20731 /03



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 7/11/03*

SUBJECT: Hamre Iraq Report

As you know, John Hamre provided us an interim report on his trip to Iraq. I am meeting with him next Tuesday, July 15, to get his final report.

Based on Hamre's recommendations, we will come up with proposals on what to do next through the CAPCOM meetings that I chair with General Pace and LTG Sharp. We will keep you updated.

July 8, 2003

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Seldon Laboratories

Please take a look at this material from Seldon Laboratories, and tell me what you think I ought to do with it.

Thanks so much.

Attach.
Seldon Laboratories Info

DHR:dh
070803-5

.....
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20732TM/03

Department of Defense Briefing Summary

Upcoming Briefing (August 4, 2003):

Lt. Gen. Richard V. Reynolds
Commander
Aeronautical Systems Center
Air Force Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Maj. Gen. Paul D. Nielsen
Commander
Air Force Research Laboratory
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Past Briefings:

Michael G. Knollman
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Advanced Systems & Concepts
(March 11, 2003)

Timothy McClees
Special Assistant to Deputy Director
Defense Research and Engineering
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(March 11, 2003)

Theodore K. Barna, PhD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Advanced Systems and Concepts
(March 12, 2003)

Dr. Brendan B. Godfrey
Executive Director
311th Human Systems Wing
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
(June 5, 2003)

Col. (Dr.) Daniel K. Berry
Chief, Aeromedical/Medical Information
Systems Division
Human Systems Program Office
311th Human Systems Wing
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
(June 5, 2003)

Elton M. Hudgins, Jr.
Chief, Technology Programs
Human Systems Program Office
311th Human Systems Wing
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
(April 10, 2003)

Marty Watson, RN
USAF Force Protection Battlelab
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
(April 10, 2003)

*Colonel Walter Price
Wright Patterson AFB
Dayton Ohio*

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

11-L-0559/OSD/18166

NanoMesh Applications

- **Water Treatment**

- Disinfection
 - Shreds microorganisms (shear force)
 - Attracts microorganisms (van der Waals force)
 - Denatures microorganisms (conductivity)
- Desalination
 - Improves capacitive desalination
 - Improves reverse osmosis
- Contaminant Removal
 - Charged membrane attracts oppositely charged contaminants (e.g., arsenic)
 - Absorption

- **Black Body Absorption**

- Takes in radiation of any optical wavelength and reradiates that energy in a black body distribution
- Initial tests show that light from a laser does not reflect off NanoMesh
- Prevents targeting from laser-directed weapons
- Material will not have to be replaced after every flight
- Eliminates radar signature

- **Air Decontamination**

- Kills and/or absorbs airborne biological and chemical contaminants

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

11-L-0559/OSD/18167

NanoMesh Applications (Contd.)

- **Thermal Management**

- Night vision cloaking
 - Efficiently transfers heat from body to cold trap
 - Minimizes body's distinctive heat signature
- Electronics
 - Dissipates heat more quickly from sensitive processing equipment
- Aircraft countermeasure
 - When applied at engine exhaust it can alter heat signatures


- **Ballistic Cloth**

- Extends the unique properties of nanotubes to a material (strong, light, and conductive)


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11-L-0559/OSD/18168

Evidence of effectiveness for water disinfection



Photograph showing natural bacterial growth in unfiltered river water



Photograph showing no bacterial growth in river water treated with Seldon's Device

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.



Dartmouth Medical School

Department of Microbiology

Vail Building
Hanover, NH 03755-3842
Tel: (603) 650-1613
Fax: (603) 650-1318

June 24, 2003

To: Seldon Laboratories, LLC

From: Nicholas Jacobs, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Microbiology
Dartmouth Medical School

Re: Bacterial analysis of raw river water after filtration by nanotube filters.

Summary

Two preliminary experiments were conducted. One indicated that nanotubes, when present on a filtration device, could cause a significant decrease in the bacterial counts in raw river water containing 500 to 1000 bacteria per ml. The decrease was at least 40 fold and more likely at least 120 fold. Since no bacteria were detected when small samples of filtrate were tested, it is possible that this filtration may have the capacity for completely removing all bacteria from water samples. (See results in full report for details)

The second experiment raised the interesting possibility that nanotubes may not only remove bacteria by physical filtration, but may also achieve some degree of killing or damage of bacterial cells that come in contact with nanotubes when passing through the filter. This latter interpretation, although of potentially great importance, is very tentative and will require further studies for confirmation.

This report does not describe the design or filtering characteristics of these filters. This study was supported by an award to Dartmouth (Professor Petrenko, Thayer School) from Seldon Laboratories.

11-L-0559/OSD/18170

Table 1. Membranes on Manufactured Grids:
Multiple Walled (MWNT) or Single Walled (SWNT)

Sample	Volume Sampled	Bacterial count (48 hours)
Raw water	0.1 ml	42 colonies
MWNT filtrate	0.1 ml	0 colonies
MWNT filtrate	0.3 ml	0 colonies *
SWNT filtrate	0.1 ml	23 colonies

* Plates were counted and photographed at 48 hours.

During this photography, this culture plate (MWNT, 0.3 ml) was opened and handled extensively. After reincubation for 3 additional days, 7 colonies were observed. However, these were colony types typical of bacteria from the human skin, and not typical of the bacteria found in the raw water. N. J. concluded that these 7 colonies were skin contaminants introduced at 48 hours during photography. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the 0.1 ml sample of MWNT filtrate which was not handled at 48 hours, showed no colonies at 5 days.


[Signature]

Table 2. Scintard 365 Filters of Medium and Fine Porosity with and without Nanotubes

Sample	Volume sampled	Bacterial count (48 hours)
Raw water	0.3 ml	290 (large, mature colonies)
medium without nanotubes	0.3 ml	140 (" " ")
fine, without nanotubes	0.3 ml	36 (" " ")
medium with nanotubes	0.3 ml	18 (small, immature colonies)
fine, with nanotubes	0.3 ml	16 (" " ")

* Note: When plates were incubated for 5 days, the colony counts did not increase. In addition, the colonies from raw water and the filters without nanotubes did not increase in size and maturity after 5 days, indicating full growth at 48 hours. However, the small, immature colonies on the filters with nanotubes (16 or 18 small colonies) grew into 16 or 18 large mature colonies of the type seen in the raw water and the filters without nanotube samples. This observation suggested to N. Jacobs that the nanotubes, in addition to causing a decrease in bacterial numbers might possibly have caused bacteria which did pass through the filter to exhibit the phenomenon of "delayed growth". This occurs when bacteria are damaged by treatment, and a period of growth and repair is needed before growth resumes. However, the interpretation of this observation is

Well Dispersed NanoMesh (Magnification = 10,000x)



Properties of Carbon Nanotubes

- Conductive – 7,000 – 10,000 times the conductivity of copper
- Strong – 100 times the tensile strength of steel
- Lightweight – 1/10th the weight of steel


NanoMesh

- Multiple layers of carbon nanotubes fused together with metal bonds

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

11-L-0559/OSD/18173

Seldon's Metal Fused NanoMesh (Magnification = 20,000x)



2 μ m 20.00k 3/ 6/ 3 SEMF 20000 X
SEM image showing gold acting as a solder to form strong attachments between nanotubes in order to produce an ultra-strong, lightweight material

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

11-L-0559/OSD/18174

U. S. Government Funding Status

Pending Funding Proposals:

Proposal	Contact
Defense Appropriation	Laurie Schultz Heim Sen. James Jeffords (b)(6)
	Daniel Ginsberg Sen. Patrick Leahy (b)(6)
	Col. Daniel K. Berry 311 th Human Systems Wing U.S. Air Force (b)(6)
Nanomechanical Individual Water Purifier	Major Craig Penrose Office of Naval Research (b)(6)
Potable Water Straw	Thomas H. Aldrich Norwich University Center for the Study of Counter-Terrorism and CyberCrime (b)(6)
Disinfection Unit for Municipal Water Treatment	EPA SBIR

Rejected Funding Proposals:

Proposal	Contact
Nanomechanical Water Purification Unit	TSWG Broad Area Announcement J. Renee Hodge Contracting Officer Stated reasons for rejection: Budget constraints & timeframe
Bacillus Anthracis Spore Destruction Emulsion	TSWG Broad Area Announcement Julia S. Vincenti Contracting Officer Stated reasons for rejection: Budget constraints & timeframe

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U. S. Government Funding Status (contd.)

Rejected Funding Proposals (contd.):

Field Intravenous Fluid Reconstitution System based on Nanomechanical Sterilization	USAF Broad Area Announcement Bill Kaufman Contracting Officer Stated reasons for rejection: High risk & high cost
Nanomechanical Water Sterilization Component for Field Intravenous Fluid Reconstitution System	USAF Broad Area Announcement Bill Kaufman Contracting Officer Stated reasons for rejection: High risk & high cost

Funding Proposals to be submitted:

Proposal	Contact
Water Production for Tactical Systems (SBIR)	Jay Dusenbury, PhD US Army TACOM (b)(6)
On-The-Move Individual Water Purification (SBIR)	Alex Papadopoulos U.S. Marine Corps (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/18176