

## Letters of Support

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Berry Daniel K Col 311 HSW/YAM

**To:** 'Alan'

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 10, 2003 6:07 PM

**Subject:** Seldon Laboratories Briefing to the Air Force - Follow-up

Mr. Cummings:

On behalf of the 311<sup>th</sup> Human Systems Program Office (311<sup>th</sup> HSW/YA), USAF and the Aeromedical and Medical Information System Division (311<sup>th</sup> HSW/YAM) here at Brooks City Base, San Antonio, Texas I would like to personally thank you for visiting our Systems Program Office on June 6, 2003 and for your very informative briefing on recent technology developments at Seldon Technologies.

Your work in carbon "nanomesh" as a basic building block for a system for water and air filtration is very innovative and unique. Many carbon nanotube based applications are in the concept stage of development. Your innovation of the "nanomesh" shows great promise for a more advanced water filtration system and air filtration systems for future USAF warfighter applications. Potable water recovery and air filtration systems are core technologies that are greatly needed for our Air Force Special Operations Forces. Additionally, providing sterile water to reconstitute lyophilized blood volume expanders is a critical Air Force Medical Service need.

Your technology may satisfy several capabilities needed by the Air Force, such as, the Air Force Medical Service Requirements for Potable Water Capabilities "(1)Eliminate biological pathogens in medical water supply. Exemplified by such pathogens such as: Giardia muris cyst, Escherichia coli, Legionella pneumophila, Vibrio Cholerae, Hepatitis virus analog (F@), Bacillus subtilus spore, Cryptosporidium parvum oocyst, Anthrax, Smallpox "(2) "No power required for operation" (3) "Lightweight" (4) "Single Operator Use" (5) "Operates under austere conditions," and the CAF-MAF-AETC/ 319-93-I-A ORD describes Survival Kit Components needed: "Water purification to increase capability, and reduce size and weight, an Osmosis Demineralizer , a Pocket Water Purifier ("Straw"), and Desalting Kit." The Draft Pararescue Operational Requirements Document Paragraph 4.6 states "current plasma and fluid replacement options are bulky and weigh too much for practical use in the tactical field setting. PJ's need dehydrated blood, colloid, and electrolyte replacement options that allow reconstitution in the field setting by adding filtered water" and the Draft Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Equipment & Training Systems Interim Capabilities Document (ICD) states in Paragraph 3,"... Safely moving patients who are stabilized, critical or enclosed in protective gear...while isolating or containing CBRN hazards" (Air Filtration). Also in the ICD for the Ground Contingency Medical Support System (GCMSS). Paragraph e. 1 "to rapidly

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11-L-0559/OSD/18177

## Letters of Support (contd.)

generate and field specific FDA approved vaccines for operationally relevant pathogens and an Air filtration system in field or mobile operating room (OR) to decrease infections."

I would strongly encourage you to visit the Air Force's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program in the Department of Defense's solicitation website at <<http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir>> for USAF related research opportunities and submit proposals to the Air Force under the research areas of creating potable water from non-potable sources, and providing sterile water to be used to reconstitute lyophilized blood volume expanders to support emergency treatment of warfighter casualties.

Regards,

Dan

Col Daniel K. Berry  
Chief, Aeromedical and Medical Information System Division  
311 HSW/YAM  
7980 Lindbergh Landing  
Brooks AFB, TX 78235-5119

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: "TREVINO, ROBERT C. (JSC-EC5) (NASA)" (b)(6)

To: "'Cummings, Alan G.'" (b)(6)

Cc: "'Cooper, Christopher'"

Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 6:10 PM

Subject: Thank You for Informative Briefing

Mr. Cummings:

On behalf of the Advanced Life Support Systems Group, the Advanced Thermal Control Group, and the Advanced Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Systems Group here at the NASA Johnson Space Center, I would like to personally thank you for visiting our center on June 5, 2003 and for your very informative briefing on recent technology developments at Seldon Technologies.

Your work in carbon nanotube based "nanomesh" as a basic building block for a system for water filtration is quite innovative and unique. Most carbon nanotube based applications are in the concept stage of

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

11-L-0559/OSD/18178

## Letters of Support (contd.)

development. Your innovation of the "nanomesh" shows great promise for a higher Technology Readiness Level (TRL) for a water filtration system and possibly thermal control and CO2 removal systems for future human space flight applications.

Regenerable water recovery and air filtration systems are core technologies that are greatly needed for future human space flight, especially beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

I would strongly encourage you to visit NASA's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program and the NASA Research Announcement (NRA) Program websites for space related research opportunities and submit proposals to NASA under the research areas of water recovery, CO2 and trace gasremoval, thermal control, and EVA.

Regards,  
Robert C. Trevino, P.E.


Robert C. Trevino, P.E.  
EVA Systems Engineer  
NASA Johnson Space Center, Mail Stop: EC5  
2101 NASA Rd 1  
Houston, Texas 77058-3696

Phone: (b)(6)  
FAX :  
E-mail:

Seldon Laboratories, LLC.

08  
7/21

July 8, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: McCormack's Trip to Iran

Attached is a report on a recent trip to Iran by Richard McCormack that you might find interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/26/03 McCormack ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
070803-9

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*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20734 /03





## CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL - 8 2003

HONORARY CHAIRMAN  
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RONALD W. REAGAN

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

June 26, 2003

Dear Don;

A lot of water has gone over the dam since our trip together to China.


As it happens, I just returned from a ten day visit to Iran where our group had extensive meeting with the President, Foreign Minister; key Ayatolas in Qom and elsewhere in their system, and with leaders in Isfahan, Sherraz, and other sites around the country.

Before making this trip, Bill Schneider and some of our old crew met in Moscow for discussions with the Russians. Iran came up in some of my side conversations. Later, I headed an American delegation to a major foreign policy conference in Austria, where I had a chance to talk at length with my old friend, Adeshir Zahedi and key representatives from the British intelligence and diplomatic services.

The attached report summarizes the key conclusions from this visit and related discussions. I felt you might find it worth scanning.

With deep thanks for all you are doing for America;

Sincerely;

  
Richard McCormack

cc: C&amp;D

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:**

June 19, 2003

**CONTACT:** Susan Gibbs

301-853-4516

**Cardinal McCarrick Speaks About Recent Trip to Iran with Abrahamic Delegation  
of Americans** 7672

Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick, Archbishop of Washington, issued the statement below upon returning to the United States on June 18 from a trip to Iran. The Cardinal was part of a delegation of Muslims, Jews and Christians from the United States who visited Iran between June 10-18 in an effort to develop a religiously based dialogue with the people of that country.

Delegation members from The Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law included Marshall J. Breger, Professor of Law; Robert A. Destro, Professor of Law; and Dr. Ahmad Iravani, Adjunct Lecturer in Law. Other delegates from Washington, DC included Charles Black, Esq., BKSJ & Associates; Doug Coe, International Friends; Dr. Douglas M. Johnston, Jr., President, International Center for Religion and Diplomacy; and Ambassador Richard T. McCormack, Counselor, Center for the Study of the Presidency. Imam Feisal Abdul al-Rauf, Founder, Asma Society, North Bergen, NJ and Rabbi Jack Bemporad, Director, Center for Interreligious Understanding, Secaucus, NJ also were part of the delegation.

**Cardinal McCarrick's statement:**

"On behalf of our Abrahamic Delegation of American Muslims, Jews and Christians, I sincerely thank Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi for inviting the delegation to visit Iran, for his and his staff's warm and most generous hospitality and for their tireless efforts in ensuring the success of our trip. I also thank Mohammed Reza Khatami, First Deputy of the Majlis and Mohammad Mohammadi Iraqi, Director of the Organization of Cultural and Islamic Relations.

"Our delegation visited Iran in an effort to improve and expand communication between the peoples of Iran and the United States. Its members believe that our Abrahamic religious heritage is the common ground upon which the dialogue of cultures can take place.

"In keeping with that goal, we had valuable meetings with President Mohammad Khatami, Speaker Mahdi Karrubi, Chief Justice Hashemi Shahroodi and many key Iranian religious, academic, cultural and political leaders.

"We visited the holy city of Qom, its shrines and academic institutions, including Mofid University. In Qom, Isfahan and Shiraz, we met with various Ayatollahs and academic figures to learn more about the Shiite Islamic perspective on a wide variety of issues. We were received everywhere with great warmth and hospitality; many of those with whom we visited expressed their hopes for fuller and deeper communication between our two countries. We plan to encourage such communication.

"We thank all of those who showed us kindness and hospitality, and look forward to future visits to and from Iran."

Sensitive: For Internal Use Only By the U.S. Government

Center for the Study of the Presidency

Ambassador, Richard T. McCormack  
Counselor  
1020 19<sup>th</sup> Street NW, Suite 250  
Washington, DC 20036

(b)(6)

June 23, 2003

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A VISIT TO IRAN June 8-18, 2003

Richard T. McCormack

Summary

There is a growing consensus in large parts of the diverse Iranian political and economic establishment that a course correction in policy by the government is overdue. But broad subsequent changes in the overall situation in Iran seem more likely to be more evolutionary than revolutionary. The demonstrations in Iranian cities, modest in scope thus far, are an accurate reflection of disaffection by younger people toward certain aspects of the educational system as well as broader unhappiness over excessive clerical influence.

The repressive apparatus of the State, however, is fully in place, and many important observers who want change in Iran, including Adeshir Zehedi, the highly able and well informed former foreign minister to the Shah, and key parts of the British intelligence services, are convinced that too much open encouragement of the reformers and demonstrators by well intentioned foreign governments will be used effectively by opponents of reform, to portray the opposition as tools in the hands of foreigners. Kim Roosevelt's famous CIA financed rent-a-mob helped drive the nationalist Iranian leader, Mohammed Mosedeigh, from power in 1953. Newsreel footage of these mobs was prominently featured on Iranian television during our visit, along with reminders of the less happy aspects of the Shah's subsequent rule, including the torture chambers of the Savak secret police.

In dealing with problematic regimes, such as that of Iran, sticks are often an essential tool of statecraft for those hoping to thwart policies such as attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. But a policy composed mainly of sticks runs the risk of encouraging key parts of the current Iranian establishment and many ordinary Iranians to rally around the embattled government to prevent a possible rerun of the events of 1953. This threat may encourage the regime under attack to deploy its repressive apparatus even more ruthlessly to contain opposition, thus delaying the positive evolutionary changes that Iran's own interests would otherwise encourage.

Years of harsh isolation only solidified the regime in Sudan. The appointment of former Senator Jack Danforth as special emissary to Sudan, however, achieved meaningful

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5. Roosevelt told me personally in the mid 1970s that his success in Iran proved to be a disaster to his later career, when he was sent again and again to problematic regimes with suitcases full of cash, but was never again able to accomplish missions of this kind. Similarly, we made many, many efforts to destabilize the government of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, using everything we could imagine to throw against his regime. In the end, we had to send the American Army to do the job. On a smaller scale, the same was true of Panama during the time of the corrupt ruler, Noriega. If we allow our relations with Iran to worsen and worsen, tensions will mount, the regime seems likely to intensify its repression, people will be asked to choose between their government and the foreign threats, and some spark, perhaps over suspected support of unrest in Iraq, could trigger another regional conflict involving U.S. armed forces.
6. Iran is surrounded by 15 countries, including Russia and the region now called Pakistan, both of whom are nuclear armed, and with whom Iran has fought wars and power struggles in the past. Until recently, its hated enemy, Saddam Hussein, lurked in the west, licking his wounds from invasion-triggered wars that cost Iran and Iraq half a million casualties each. Iran's support of the Palestinians raises fear in some minds of Israeli nuclear retaliation under some possible circumstances. It seems very probable to me that years ago, the Iranians began efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program - although as a private citizen I have no direct evidence to back this suspicion.
7. Some Russian leaders say privately that they will press Iran to clean up any suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, but they insist that it must be seen to be an internationally supported and supervised inspection system. This accounted, they say, for the mixed signals that came from the Russian Government after Blair reported Putin's concurrence prior to a bill of particulars from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Uncertainties after the Iraq war make it unlikely that a unilateral accusation backed by classified information and sources will alone suffice to produce broad support for more than diplomatic measures against Iran at this point. Still, the international environment facing Iran is different now than was the case a year ago. One enemy gone in Afghanistan - Saddam Hussein is no longer ruling Baghdad - and the American army is on Iran's border. With measured diplomacy we should be able to make progress combating any covert nuclear weapons' program in Iran.
8. Iran's support of the Palestinians is another matter. Not only does the Palestinian issue serve as a useful distraction from domestic problems, but to many, it is a religious obligation, deeply felt by many of the Islamic leaders to support what they refer to as "Muslims living under tyranny". That is why it is so important that the President's road map to peace be successful. Calming the tensions emanating from this conflict would also immensely help America's relationship with the rest of the global Islamic community.
9. Nuclear technology to build weapons of mass destruction now exists in the Islamic world with the large and growing Pakistani program. Some scientists engaged in this program in Pakistan are potential sources of information and nuclear materials to others. Israel's growing military sales relationship with India is potentially adding to ill will toward Israel, and potentially encouraging more radical parts of Pakistan's establishment to consider active anti-Israeli efforts. Should the present government of Pakistan fall and be replaced by a more militant regime, covert cooperation with Israel's enemies could intensify on many fronts, including the nuclear one. Iran's nuclear program could be one beneficiary, absent an improvement in relations among countries in the region.

10. Members of the foreign diplomatic community in Teheran are inclined to discount active cooperation between the Iranian Government and al Qaeda, except for corrupt elements sharing the profits from the drug smuggling that comes from Afghanistan through Iran, to other places, and which is reported to be partly the means by which al Qaeda finances itself. Thousands of Iranian soldiers have been killed in efforts to curb the drug smuggling along Iran's long, sparsely settled border with Afghanistan. It is said by some that full disclosure of the information obtained by interrogation of al Qaeda suspects will come when it is fully clear that the United States will not support terrorism against Iran's government by exile groups. If my memory serves me correctly, President Reagan agreed not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs in the Algiers Agreement settling certain bilateral issues after the Embassy captives were released. But that was a long time ago, and my memory may not be correct on this point.

11. One hears complaints from Iranian leaders about radio programs broadcast from Los Angeles based Iranian émigrés, which, they say, call for a mass uprising against the regime. Many Iranians assume these broadcasts are U.S. policy. Someone might monitor these broadcasts carefully for a few weeks to determine what exactly they are transmitting. Years ago, similar broadcasts in 1956 urged the Hungarians to revolt. When they did, Eisenhower did not believe that the risk of a nuclear war was worth running, and the rebellion which we encouraged failed utterly, with thousands of human tragedies. The same was true of the Shiite rebellion in Iraq in 1991, when another set of risks were weighed. It is sometimes easier to destabilize a situation than to restabilize it in our interest after the event. We need to approach the political situation in Iran with great care and deliberation. Facts, not wishful thinking, need to be our guide.

12. I have spent most of my life in the foreign policy arena, beginning with the Vietnam conflict in 1967. I have learned that there are some situations that only a resolute posture by the American Government and President can constructively confront. President Reagan proved this during his first administration, when he set the stage for his later constructive engagement with Soviet leaders. Without offering an olive branch to the Soviet Government late in his period in office, and without a similar posture by his successor, reactionary elements in the Soviet Union could have turned the collapse of the empire into a blood bath, in desperate efforts to save the Soviet Union.

Iran faces a similar situation in some ways. 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30, and unemployment is massive throughout the country. The place desperately needs privatization, foreign investment, foreign technology on a large scale, and full integration into the global economy. However, the personal representative of the Japanese prime minister visited Teheran during my visit and remarked that he was surprised to find that Iran seemed on the surface to be a normal country. Other veterans of third world countries have made similar observations after recent visits to Iran.

There is obviously a lot of intellectual ferment going on now in Iran. The most sophisticated of the Shiite clergy realize that they cannot run the economy efficiently and that change is urgently needed. But there seems to be a bizarre alliance between the most benighted of the clergy and some of the more cynical figures who are personally profiting from the status quo. Both are using current American political rhetoric, including Senator Brownback's recent proposed bill to finance destabilization efforts in Iran as justification for hard line measures to protect the regime from a rerun of 1953.



Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Zahedi, begged me to return to Washington, and ask my friends to cool off the rhetoric on Iran in the Senate and elsewhere, which he says is playing into the hands of the hard line element. He is very much in contact with the current scene in Iran through well placed friends. He could be contacted directly for additional details on his views by appropriate U.S. officials.


An approach by the U.S. Government, which includes a direct, sustained, high level dialogue seems more likely to serve our interests than a purely confrontational approach. There is a role for the "good cop" as well as the "bad cop" in this situation. This also would lessen the risk that Iran's intelligence service might respond to any future suspected U.S. efforts to destabilize the regime by launching a covert campaign to complicate our already difficult situation in Iraq.

The British are developing small scale, bilateral programs of cooperation as part of a bridge building operation. Most other countries are actively trading with Iran, making our economic sanctions less meaningful and effective.

I recommend that the President appoint a high level individual of Senator Danforth's stature to mount an effort similar to his earlier missions to Sudan to explore ways and means by which Iran and the United States might improve the quality and effectiveness of our dialogue. The dialogue needs to be conducted at a sufficiently high level so that the inevitable snags in the process can be directly appealed to the highest political level in Iran as well as in the United States.

More constructive public diplomacy could also improve the prospect for evolutionary change in Iran. In this context, some of the more neuralgic issues might find mitigations. People will listen to well intentioned friends far more attentively than they do to purely confrontational enemies. By contrast, Iran's establishment seems likely to rally around its current leadership to confront any real or imagined foreign efforts to replicate the events of 1953.

July 8, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Susan Molinari

Someone recommended Susan Molinari for Public Affairs. She is married to Bill Paxon. Why don't you think about that and see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070603-12

.....


*Please respond by* 7/11/03

U20735 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18187



July 8, 2003

TO: Michael Wynne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Seldon Laboratories

Please take a look at the attached material from Seldon Laboratories, and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Seldon Laboratories Info

DHR:dh  
070803-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/13

Response attached.  
v/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
7/25

U20736 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18188

UNCLASSIFIED

As of July 25, 2003 1330 PM

**RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ON SELDON LABORATORIES**

From: Mr. Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  
Technology, and Logistics, (b)(6) *for RUMS*

- Seldon Laboratories, LLC, is a new company, setting up laboratory facilities in Windsor, Vermont. Seldon plans to focus initially on the production and use of carbon nanotubes (extremely small diameter carbon fibers) bonded with metals for water filtration and purification.
- Dr. Lewis Slotter in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology has met with Seldon principals, obtained technical and marketing background, and provided advice on nanotechnology programs and contacts in DoD.
- We have no evidence that Seldon has a unique product, technical approach, or fabrication capability. Seldon does appear to be in position to competitively bid on Small Business Innovation Research provided that it can produce or procure sufficient carbon nanotube product. Seldon is also currently working on a water purification proposal for the Office of Naval Research.


Prepared by: Charles J. Holland/DUSD(S&T)/(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/18189

July 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Help w/Education

There is a fellow named Don Agresto, who used to be president of St. John's College, who is interested in helping with education in Iraq. I know him. He is a very able person.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070903-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20737 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18190

July 9  
July 6, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Baghdad

Attached is an article on Baghdad and Frank Lloyd Wright's interest in it. I found it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

Ringle, Ken. "The Genie in an Architect's Lamp," *Washington Post*, June 29, 2003.

DHR:dh  
070603-1 (ts computer).doc

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*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20738 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18191

washingtonpost.com

## The Genie in an Architect's Lamp

Frank Lloyd Wright's '57 Plan for Baghdad May Be Key to Its Future

By Ken Ringle  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Sunday, June 29, 2003; Page N01

Many stories in recent weeks have told us that the United States fights an uphill battle for public support in Iraq, partly because of a persistent belief on "the Arab street" that the West is intent on erasing Islamic culture. How can the United States convince Iraqis that it's not true?

Two Middle Eastern specialists at the Library of Congress say the answer lies in little-known plans by the celebrated American architect Frank Lloyd Wright for rebuilding Baghdad into a glittering capital of Islamic culture like the one that once dazzled the world.

Why not call on Iraqis to embrace Wright's grand vision, the scholars ask: a dazzling new, high-tech Baghdad deliberately rooted in its fabled past?

It is impossible to overemphasize the power of such a vision to unite Iraq's religious factions and tribes, says Mary Jane Deeb, who has lectured on Arab history and culture from Sweden to Morocco as well as in her native Beirut.

Even the most illiterate Iraqi child -- "or, indeed, any Arab child," she says -- has heard of the Baghdad of Scheherazade, Sinbad and "The Arabian Nights." They all know that when Europe was wallowing in feudal darkness, "Baghdad was a triumph of civilization -- a place of tolerance and philosophy, of poetry and music and great architecture and science. Why should it not be that sort of city again?"

Mina Marefat, Rockefeller Fellow in Islamic Studies at the Library of Congress's Kluge Center, agrees.

The significance of the Frank Lloyd Wright drawings, she says, is that they show such profound respect for the very cultural heritage to which the West is supposed to be hostile.

"Iraqis think we want to kill their culture," she says. "Yet when America's greatest architect drew a plan for Baghdad" in 1957, "where did he turn for inspiration? Not to American or European 'modernism,' which was so fashionable at the time, but to Arab and Persian architecture, which had shaped the famous Baghdad of the 8th and 9th century."

That realization might help inspire Iraqis to lift their sights beyond the immediate squabbles and resentments of occupation, she says. "Wright's vision for Baghdad need not be the only vision," she says. "Other architects, Iraqi architects, could be called on to submit designs. The key factor is to focus on the ingredients that made Baghdad great long ago" and challenge Iraqis to make their greatest traditions live again in a reborn city.

Marefat is hoping to arrange an exhibit of Wright's Baghdad drawings both at the Library of

Congress and in Baghdad. She is also hoping to interest some filmmaker in making a documentary about Wright's Baghdad project.

Wright's plans for Baghdad remain a little-known last act in the long career of the flamboyant architect. He was 93 when he traveled to Iraq in May 1957 to take up a commission for an opera house that would "help modernize" the capital city of what was then a kingdom ruled by King Faisal II. Dissatisfied with the site selected for the opera house, Wright lobbied for and received permission to build it instead on an island in the Tigris River. He then expanded his proposal to include a civic auditorium, a landscaped park with monuments, fountains and waterfalls, a parking deck in the shape of a three-story ziggurat, museums for both ancient and modern art, a botanical garden and zoo, a casino, a bazaar, an amphitheater and an entire university complex. He also designed a new post office in the old city of Baghdad.

"We've got a great opportunity there," he wrote, "... to demonstrate that we're not destructive but constructive, where the original forces that built the civilizations of the world are concerned. ... We are not there to slap them in the face but to do honor to them."

In a chapter she authored on "Wright's Baghdad" in the book "Frank Lloyd Wright: Europe and Beyond," Marefat wrote that Wright's proposed Baghdad civic center "was intended to reinforce a cultural identity rooted in a rich historic past. To this end he mined both Islamic and pre-Islamic imagery, relying as much on myth and memory as on historical context. His circular plan was in fact reminiscent of al-Mansur's city" and featured "domed shapes and lofty spires" of Islamic memory plus ziggurats and terraces "alluding to the ancient Assyrian and Mesopotamian heritage" of Iraq.

Mindful of such modern urban challenges as traffic flow and communications towers, she added, "what Wright prepared in Baghdad was a rare mixture of respect for the past and for the technology of the future. ... But the city he evoked was [the] city of memory ... of imagination," the Baghdad of Scheherazade and Sinbad -- powerful enough to endure for centuries even when the real city was long destroyed."

However much Arab storytellers have embroidered it over the years with magic lanterns and flying carpets, Deeb and Marefat point out, the fabulous Baghdad of the Middle Ages was more than just an Islamic Camelot: It really did exist.

It was built between 762 and 766 by 10,000 slaves laboring under the orders of the Abbassid al-Mansur, the second of the 37th caliphs of that dynasty. Mansur thought himself an architect. He envisioned a perfectly circular walled city roughly a mile and a half in diameter, its sections radiating out from a central palace and mosque like the sections of an orange. To double-check the geometry of his design before construction, Arab chronicles say, he had his workers outline the path of Baghdad's intended wall with a shallow trench, fill it with a mixture of cottonseed and oil and set it afire while he watched from a nearby height.

That Baghdad was destroyed in 1258 by invading Mongols who burned its mosque and minarets and libraries and looted its splendors, and went on killing for 40 days. Arabs have been mourning its loss ever since.

"There is no way to exaggerate the hold the myth of Baghdad has on the Arab imagination,"

Deeb says, "Arabs know their civilization was great once. They don't understand why that greatness passed away. The fundamentalist Mullahs tell them it is because they have been corrupted by infidel teachings from the West" -- never mind that Baghdad was sacked not from the West, but from the East.

The more likely explanation for the decline, she says, is that the greatest thinkers of the Arab world were killed by the Mongols. The surviving Muslims, much like Catholic Spain in the same era, turned against rationality and scientific inquiry, considering them subversive of religious orthodoxy and faith. That attitude in Spain inspired the infamous Inquisition, expulsion of the Jews and a long twilight of bloodshed and intolerance. In the Arab world it led to increasing Islamic factionalism and tribal enmity and a long decline in the face of the technologically superior West.

Nowadays, Deeb says, young Arabs are being asked to choose between a faith-based Islamic fundamentalism with ties to their cultural past and a high-tech Western culture that they're told exploits them to marginality.

"They look around and see nothing that echoes this great past they've heard about. The prospect of a Baghdad rebuilt to mirror that greatness could be a profoundly inspiring and healing vision," she says. "One vital not just for Iraqis: one in which all Arabs could feel they share."

Wright had grown up with the "Arabian Nights" tales and was so fond of them he adorned his own children's playhouse in Oak Park, Ill., with a mural depicting "The Fisherman and the Genii," Marefat writes. But his involvement in Baghdad was anything but fantasy.

Iraq had come into being as a nation in 1924, its boundaries conforming not to any resemblance of its past kingdoms but to the negotiated wishes of the great European powers in the wake of World War I. The British, who with the aid of Lawrence of Arabia had evicted the Turks during the Great War from their long dominion over Arab lands, installed Faisal I of the Hashemite family as Iraq's king. They continued to influence Iraqi affairs even after World War II when the country nationalized its mushrooming oil production, making vast sums available for public development projects.

In 1950 Iraq created a Development Board to chart a path for using the oil money to move the still primitive desert country into the modern age. For the first five years the board targeted the country's infrastructure: roads, flood control, sewerage, hospitals, schools and the like.

By 1957 the basics had been taken care of and the board was ready to move on to more ambitious public works. With Iraqi architects scarce at the time, leading architects from the West were invited to submit proposals for specific projects.

Among those who did were Germany's Walter Gropius, France's Le Corbusier and Italy's Gio Ponti. Wright was enlisted almost as an afterthought.

"The irony," says Marefat, "is that Wright was the only one giving a thought to Iraq's cultural heritage in his designs, and his weren't built. The others created 'modern' architecture of the era that had little or no relation to Iraq or its history."



Those designs, she said, influenced the design of buildings in the years since, "so that today Baghdad looks like any Western city . . . maybe Los Angeles. The chance to reshape it with a distinctive character was lost."

It is the chance to recover that character, she says, that continues to fuel her fascination with Wright's vision.

"Americans -- and I am one myself -- are not very good at grasping the importance of traditional culture in a country like Iraq," she says. "We tend to think that because our political and economic system makes life good for us, it will solve problems for others if we just transport it. But Iraqis must feel they are holding onto the culture that makes them Iraqis as they adapt their society to the post-Saddam era. They are a proud people. We should help them express that cultural pride in a constructive way. It would solve so many of their present problems. And ours, too."

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July 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Army

I want to work with the Army. I think the way to do it is to start meeting every week or two with the new Secretary and the new Chief of Staff of the Army, once they are confirmed. I would like Jack Keane to be in each meeting while he is still here.

I want to start getting my head into what they are doing and see that the Army gets better connected to the Building.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-40

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*7/17*  
*Sec Def -*  
*Will do. In fact,*  
*Les Brownlee has*  
*asked if he and*  
*Keane can start coming*  
*and I said yes.*


U20742 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18196

Larry Di Rita

*J. R. Rite*

July 10, 2003

TO: (b)(6)  
CC:    
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Backup

You have to fix your system so that you are connected to (b)(6) and when she is not here, you are able to do the things she normally does. The foreign travel sheets that she gives me every time I am meeting with a foreign leader in this country or another country are not what you gave me. You might want to get briefed on how it is done and then see if you can do it.

The same thing is true on connecting with the driver and connecting with Joyce. You are going to want to find out how she does it, so that the system works.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-24

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20743 /03

DR FOREIGN TRAVEL 1999

*fitz*

2/2 - 2/5/99 SWITZERLAND (Zurich) - ABB AB Board Meeting and dinner, meeting with Goran Lindahl; ABB AB press conference.

2/5 - 2/7 GERMANY (Munich) - Munich Conference on Security Policy

3/7 - 3/10 SWITZERLAND (Montreaux) - ABB AB TMF Conference; Amylin board call.

3/10 - 3/12 ITALY (Palermo) Vacation.

3/12 - 3/14 TUNISIA (Tunis) Vacation.

3/14 - 3/15 FRANCE (Paris) Vacation.

3/15 - 3/16 RUSSIA (Moscow) - American Foreign Policy Council meetings with members of the Russian Duma, press conference.

3/16 ENGLAND (London) - Fuel stopped in London en route from Moscow; went into town for lunch.

3/26 - 3/27 PANAMA (Panama City) Vacation to go through Port of Canal.

5/20 - 5/21 SWEDEN (Vasteras) - ABB AB Board meeting with dinner.

8/4 BELGIUM (Brussels) - Meet with Ambassador Andre de Staercke.

8/4-8/6 SWITZERLAND (Zurich) - ABB Board meeting.

8/6-8/9 FRANCE (Nice) - Meet with Stevy Davignon (Gilead Board member).

10/1-10/6 PERU (Lima, Cuzco) ABB meetings.

10/6-10/7 BRAZIL (Sao Paulo) - ABB Board meetings. *OCT. 1999*

10/10-10/14 CHINA (Beijing) - American Foreign Policy Council visit.

10/14-10/18 RUSSIA (Moscow) - RAND U.S.-Russia Business Forum.

12/2-12/3 SWITZERLAND (Zurich) - ABB Board meeting.

12/3-12/4 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Sarajevo). Lunch with Ambassador Tom Miller, tour of Sarajevo. Dinner at Ambassador's Residence. Briefing at SFOR HQ, Ilidza. Guests include: Ambassador and Mrs. Miller (hosts),

**Foreign Contacts Report**

Date(s)		Contact	Country	Title	Event
From	To				
10/6/99		Fernando Henrique Cardoso	Brazil	President	ABB meetings
10/6/99		Mario Covas	Brazil	Governor of Sao Paulo	ABB meetings

mso\excel\files\reports\foreign contacts report

Sorted in Ascending Date Order  
1

11-L-0559/OSD/18199

July 10, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Ruth Wedgwood

DONE

I would like a phone call with Ruth Wedgwood sometime today or tomorrow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-23

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

U20744 /03

July 10, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO ASG

*DONE*  
*BY DR*

Please give me the material on the at NATO Assistant Secretary General job—the precise pay, whether or not there is a house, servants, expense account and the like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-11

.....

Please respond by 7/16/03


U20745 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18201



July 10, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Paper Into and Out of the Office

I want to sit down and find out how all the paper is handled around here—how it comes in to me, who sees it, what goes out of here, what stamps get put on it, what assumptions are made, who presumes what, etc.

Let's get a briefing for me this week or next that lays out this process. I am going to have to fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-22


.....  
Please respond by

7/18/03

  
T  
7/13  
Fast.

U20746 103

10  
July 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Wrestling Invitation

This invitation to the "Wrestling Legends" arrived at home. Please have someone check it out and see what it looks like. It might be something I would want to do. I think Hastert is going to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Invitation for 9/13/03

DHR:dh  
070903-3

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20747 /03

USA Wrestling

Invites

Donald Rumsfeld

To

"An Evening With Legends"

A Dinner held in conjunction with the  
2003 World Championships of  
Freestyle Wrestling

There to be honored with a  
FILA Lifetime Achievement Award

September 13, 2003

The Foyer at Madison Square Garden

USA Wrestling Development

6155 Lehman Drive

Colorado Springs, CO 80918 USA

(b)(6)

10  
July 8, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photo of Garner w/POTUS

7/18  
Larry Di Rita  
Did we ever get the photograph I asked for of Jay Garner with the President, so we could give it to Jay?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-33

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

7/19

SecDef-

I am told  
President will  
sign it Tuesday,  
7/22 Same  
as Bremer photo  
and Bremer certificate.  
Cabinet Affairs will  
provide.  
Schulte

U20748 103  
11-L-0559/OSD/18205

10  
July 8, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memos on Iraq

Your memos are coming in to me, and I am reading them and getting folks here working on them.

I am not responding to each one directly, but if you don't get responses from one of us in a reasonable period of time, do let me know.

You are doing a good job, my friend! Keep at it.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
070803-29

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20750 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18206

10  
July 8, 2003

TO: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memos

Attached are the two memos you wanted copies of.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/25/03 SecDef memos 062403-14, 062403-15

DHR:dh  
070803-28

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20751 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18207

CC PP.  
June 25, 2003

SUBJECT: Meeting on 4/29/03 with Admiral Keating

The Army is not good with air.

The Marines operated alone.

The Patriot blue-on-blue was a training matter.

DHR:dh  
062403-14

11-L-0559/OSD/18208



**June 25, 2003**

**SUBJECT: Meeting on 4/29/03 with Whitcomb**

**Lessons:**

- Need for joint training. DoD needs a national joint training center.
- Common acquisition for the Services.
- Get young officers who experienced this war and promote them.
- The Army doesn't train with the Air Force.

DHR:dh  
062403-15

11-L-0559/OSD/18209

July 8, 2003

EF-6073

7/21  
Answer From FEITH  
TO STATE

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Borders

Why don't we get Jordan and Saudi Arabia to help guard their borders with Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-27

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

7/13/03

→ Lufi  
Status report for SD  
from us + J5. Shd  
give him something  
on 7/14 or 7/15 at  
latest.

DJR

Distro To DS, JA, FW, PH, Lufi

Date Northrup Eng office  
6/16

Time 1630 14 Jul 03

07-10-03 16:57 19

U20753 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18210



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL  
AFFAIRS (MARC GROSSMAN)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *X/DF 7/2/03*

SUBJECT: Demarche on Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Border Control

As you know, hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq continue to cross Iraq's borders and may be responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. service members. I believe it would be useful to approach Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to urge them to increase security on their borders.

Attached are draft demarches. Please let me know if we can assist further.

Attachment:

a/s

## Proposed Demarche to the Kingdom of Jordan

1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Embassy Jordan see paragraph 3.
2. BACKGROUND: The USG is concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of security on Iraq's borders to engage in activities contrary to our interests. In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers. The Coalition, working with appropriate Iraqi entities, is establishing a plan to improve Iraq's control of its own borders. At this time, however, we are unable to provide the necessary Coalition or Iraqi forces required to patrol effectively all of Iraq's borders with neighboring states. We would like to ask our regional partners to step up their efforts to patrol their borders with Iraq.
3. US Embassy Jordan is instructed to deliver talking points as soon as possible.
4. TALKING POINTS
  - We appreciate your continued support for coalition activities to stabilize Iraq. In this regard, we would like to ask for your assistance in increasing security along your border with Iraq.
  - We remain concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of border security to engage in activities contrary to our shared interests.
  - In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers there.
  - Coalition and Iraq forces are unable to patrol Iraq's 181 km border with Jordan effectively at this time.
  - While there is a plan in place to increase border security, it will take some time for a border security force to be fully operational. In any event, it is critical to have better security on the Jordanian side of the border.
  - We would ask that you immediately take appropriate additional steps to improve security and control over goods and people at the border.

- We welcome any measures you can take that would prevent border smuggling, the flow of “old regime” fighters, or any other activity which threatens Jordanian, Coalition and/or Iraqi interests.
- In appropriate channels, we would be pleased to coordinate actions and establish appropriate information sharing, and we welcome your assessment of the flow of people and goods across your border.
- Enhanced security along the border with Iraq is of mutual interest to our governments and supports our shared objectives in Iraq.
- We are also raising this issue with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to request their additional assistance.
- (If needed) Strong support from our regional allies on this issue will allow coalition forces to focus resources on Iraq’s borders with its other neighbors.

## Proposed Demarche to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Embassy Riyadh see paragraph 3.
2. BACKGROUND: The USG is concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of security on Iraq's borders to engage in activities contrary to our interests. In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers. The Coalition, working with appropriate Iraqi entities, is establishing a plan to improve Iraq's control of its own borders. At this time, however, we are unable to provide the necessary Coalition or Iraqi forces required to patrol effectively all of Iraq's borders with neighboring states. We would like to ask our regional partners to step up their efforts to patrol their borders with Iraq.
3. US Embassy Riyadh is instructed to deliver talking points as soon as possible.
4. TALKING POINTS
  - We appreciate your continued support for coalition activities to stabilize Iraq. In this regard, we would like to ask for your assistance in increasing security along your border with Iraq.
  - We remain concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of border security to engage in activities contrary to our shared interests.
  - In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers there.
  - Coalition and Iraqi forces are unable to patrol Iraq's 814 km border with Saudi Arabia effectively at this time.
  - While there is a plan in place to increase border security, it will take some time for a border security force to be fully operational. In any event, it is critical to have better security on the Saudi Arabian side of the border.
  - We are also raising this issue with Jordan and Kuwait to explore mechanisms to tighten control and security of common borders with Iraq.
  - We would ask that you immediately take appropriate steps to improve security and control over goods and people at the border.

- We welcome any measures you can take that would prevent border smuggling, the flow of “old regime” fighters, terrorists or any other activity which threatens Saudi Arabia, the Coalition and/or Iraqi interests.
- In appropriate channels, we would be pleased to coordinate actions and establish appropriate information sharing, and we welcome your assessment of the flow of people and goods across your border.

## Proposed Demarche to the State of Kuwait

REFTELS: KUWAIT 3040; KUWAIT 3039

1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Embassy Kuwait see paragraph 3.

2. BACKGROUND: The USG is concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of security on Iraq's border to engage in activities contrary to our shared interests. In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers. The Coalition, working with appropriate Iraqi entities, is establishing a plan to improve Iraq's control of its own borders. At this time, however, we are unable to provide the necessary Coalition or Iraqi forces required to patrol effectively all of Iraq's borders with neighboring states. We would like to ask our regional partners to step up their efforts to patrol their borders with Iraq. OSD and State are attempting to coordinate a time/place for a meeting between the Kuwaitis and the CPA border planning team.

3. US Embassy Kuwait is instructed to deliver para 4 points as soon as possible.

### 4. TALKING POINTS

- We appreciate the suggestions the Foreign Ministry and the council of Ministers' Security Decision Follow-up Committee recently made regarding the improvement of security at the border.
- We also appreciate your continued support for coalition activities to stabilize Iraq. In this regard, we would like to ask for your assistance in increasing security along your border with Iraq.
- We remain concerned that terrorists, former regime elements, criminals and smugglers are taking advantage of the lack of border security to engage in activities contrary to our shared interests.
- In particular, we are concerned that hostile elements not indigenous to Iraq are filtering across Iraq's borders and may have been responsible for some of the recent attacks on U.S. soldiers there.
- Coalition and Iraqi forces are unable to patrol Iraq's 240 km border with Kuwait effectively at this time.
- While there is a plan in place to increase border security, it will take some time for a border security force to be fully operational. In any event, it is critical to have good security on the Kuwaiti side of the border.



- We are also raising this issue with Jordan and Saudi Arabia to explore mechanisms to tighten control and security of common borders with Iraq.
- In response to your requests to coordinate our efforts, we would like to propose a meeting between our CPA border planning team and officials from Kuwait with responsibility for border security.
- We welcome any measures you can take that would prevent border smuggling, the flow of “old regime” fighters, terrorists or any other activity which threatens Kuwait, the Coalition and/or Iraqi interests.
- In appropriate channels, we would be pleased to coordinate actions and establish appropriate information sharing, and we welcome your assessment of the flow of people and goods across your border.

July 8<sup>10</sup>, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Finding Saddam

*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/18*  
Please find out if anything has been done this tribe. See the attached. Let me know what we have found out. I gave that information to folks weeks ago, after my last trip to region.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/2/03 SecDef memo [050103-23]

DHR:dh  
070803-26

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03  
*SIR-*

*I have given this task to Adm Jacoby with instruction to canvass both DIA and CIA and to consider what foreign services might know.*

*SC.*  
*7/12/03*

U20755 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18218

*7/14*

7

May 2, 2003 7:44 AM

SUBJECT: Saddam Hussein

In meeting with Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia, he said that the Hukrah tribe may be hiding Saddam Hussein in the desert. They run herds of sheep and goats out there.

DHR dh  
050103-23

11-L-0559/OSD/18219

C 8/7

12  
July 8, 2003

TO: ADM Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Training

Shouldn't the Army train more with the Air Force?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-23

✓ 8/7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDER  
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200  
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488IN REPLY REFER TO:  
6 August 2003

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Joint Training

1. Yes, Sir, they should; they are and they will for the USJFCOM Army component. This is part of the plan.
2. Joint National Training Capability will help make this a reality.

Very respectfully,

E. F. GIAMBASTIANI  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

U20756 /03

11-L-0559<sup>2</sup>/OSD/18220

July 8, 2003

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Common Acquisition

Should there be common acquisition for the Services?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-24

Please respond by 7/25/03

✓ 8/4

7/18

RESPONSE ATTACHED

VIR

Forwarded  
v/r  
CDR VOSSEN  
7/31

U20757 /03

✓  
814  
July 16, 2003

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge



Subject: Common Acquisition

You asked me whether there should be "common acquisition for the Services?" I assume what you meant was whether there should be a central DoD organization that would acquire systems for all the Services. France, Germany, Italy and the UK have such an arrangement.

I do not think such an arrangement would work for the U.S. The Defense acquisition budget is just too large to permit one organization to manage it. However, we do try to provide "common" planning for the larger, highly visible defense acquisition programs.

These are called Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs, and are managed and directed by the Defense Acquisition Executive, or USD(AT&L). While the day-to-day management and contracting is performed by a designated Service, the decision making is done by USD(AT&L) using the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The F/A-22, Joint Strike Fighter, DD-X, Chemical Weapon Demilitarization and Future Combat System are typical of ACAT I programs. Other lower level acquisition programs are designated by AT&L to be managed by the Services, but their progress is reported to USD(AT&L) on a quarterly basis. Problems surfaced by these progress reports can and do trigger a special review by the USD(AT&L).

Action: None. Information only

11-L-0559/OSD/18222

10  
July 8, 2003

OB  
7/21

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Vision for Iraq

I just looked over this Coalition Provisional Authority "A Vision for Iraq" paper Jerry Bremer sent in. It is a good start.

I have not read it carefully. I am going to wait to see a later draft. The only thing I would suggest is that it not start out negative, as it seems to do on page 5. The first sentence says, "... will not be judged by the success of the military campaign ..." It seems to me it is not a good idea to start that way.

After you get an edited version, please let me see it, and then we will send our suggestions back.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/4/03 CPA Vision for Iraq

DHR:dh  
070803-20

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

U20758 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18223

**Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD**

**From:** Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Friday, July 04, 2003 10:42 PM  
**To:** Kingston, Amy, LCDR, OSD; SecDef Cables ESO  
**Subject:** FW: CPA Planning Document

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**JUL - 8 2003**

Hi Jaymie:

Jerry asked me to send this to you. Trust you had a Happy Fourth of July. All the best,  
 Clayton

Jaymie

Happy Fourth! Hope this does not find you at work.

Would you please forward this memo and attachment to the Secretary. Many thanks

LPB

Mr. Secretary:

I have felt it important to produce a planning document to outline our strategy in Iraq. This will serve to give all our CPA folks a sense of how their part fits into the whole. It also gives me the basis for having the staff produce some clear metrics so that we can track how we are doing against targets, something I have not had time to organize until now. That will be the next step. We have given this paper to Rick Sanchez with a request that he design a campaign to fall in on this campaign. Once done, this should assure that all USG personnel here, whether civilian or military, have a clear picture of our overall strategy and be able to see what they can do to advance our team.

As the document notes, this will be a dynamic process. I am sure we will make changes as we move along. But the overall outline of what we need to accomplish in the coming months is clear-better security, better essential services, the beginning of political and economic transformation.

I would of course welcome any comments you might have.

I wish you a very happy Fourth of July!

Jerry

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A-75-2

11-L-0559/OSD/18224



SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL - 8 2003

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
Baghdad, Iraq**

**A Vision for Iraq**

July 4, 2003

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  - E. Governance and Sovereignty
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## Introduction

Now that Saddam Hussein's regime has been removed, the opportunity exists for the Iraqi people to create the conditions for a stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in close partnership with the Iraqi Interim Administration, the United Nations, and the international community, has a key role to play in the next stage of rebuilding Iraq so that it is once again able to take its rightful place as a proud member of the international community.

The aim of this document is to describe the CPA's role in this historic process. It outlines both the way ahead and the approach I wish to take so that everyone in the organization is clear on their role in the process. While the CPA will have a dominant role in the first stages of the transformation of Iraq, we should all understand that shortly we will have a significant partner in the Governance Council (GC) of the Interim Administration. That council will represent the voice of the Iraqi people to the Iraqi people, to the CPA, and to the world. Together the CPA and the GC will forge a partnership that will guide the nation forward in its transformation.

This document is designed to direct the work of the CPA and the CJTF-7 in a flexible manner that recognizes the need to retain the support of the Iraqi people in all that we do, knowing that without their support we will fail. It is also aimed at the international community whose political and financial backing will be essential if our overall objectives are to be achieved. The plan also recognizes the need for further planning in coordination with the GC as the process of rebuilding Iraq evolves. While full economic recovery will take years, the economic reform program provides a vision of a future of freedom and prosperity towards which we and the GC will work in the short term.

At the heart of the plan, I provide my vision, and my views of our mission and desired end-state for Iraq. I hope every member of CPA will be familiar with these and work to fulfill them. The plan describes the six core elements that will need to be woven together to rebuild Iraq. From these core elements flow a series of key tasks, milestones and targets. Nonetheless, we should consider this plan as a living document, suitable to a dynamic reality that will require innovation, flexibility, and revision.

The plan describes a critical path within the various core elements that directs the CPA's priorities in the short, medium and long-term. From this, we can review what we have achieved and where we need to readjust as necessary. Finally, the plan will assist us and the Governance Council to allocate our resources and those of Iraq. It will also assist in attracting critical resources and capabilities from the international community.

On a personal note, let me thank each and every one of you for the truly extraordinary work you have done here in recent months, and for the personal sacrifices that you have made. I look forward with great optimism to working with you to achieve our objectives in the period ahead.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator  
Coalition Provisional Authority

## Background

### Operating Environment

Ultimately the Coalition's achievements in Iraq will be judged not by the success of the military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein's regime but rather by the foundations that the Coalition lays for Iraq's future.

The environment is complex. We must conduct military combat and security operations to establish the peace while expanding political, reconstruction and economic activities to help rebuild Iraq. This requires an integrated civil-military approach that will include the Governance Council. Our approach has to combine flexibility with a clear sense of strategic purpose.

### Opportunities and Challenges/Critical Paths

There is wide approval, within Iraq and the region, for the removal of Saddam Hussein. This provides a unique opportunity for the Iraqi people to create the conditions for a stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq with our help. The vast majority of Iraqis want us to succeed, knowing that our success is their success. At the same time, expectations are high and this window of opportunity will not be indefinite. So we must strike a careful balance between the measured consideration of a wide range of options in consultation with the Iraqi people and the need to make continual and tangible progress. This process will be facilitated once the Interim Administration is established.

Our first priority is to create a secure and safe environment, without which there can be little progress on other goals. We will likely face the potential for instability for some time. At the extreme, the threat comes from residual pockets of fanatics, terrorists and externally-supported elements seeking to undermine the CPA's authority. Reprisal killings and organized crime are also present. Externally supported terrorists are present in Iraq and pose a serious danger to coalition personnel. In the short run this will make it difficult for Iraq. We will need a coordinated approach to security sector reform, including the integration of the military, police, judicial and penal systems, and border control.

We will need to work hard to establish democratic rule. Iraq is vulnerable to internal strife as the country transitions from an institutionalized dictatorship to an open society and ultimately to democratic elections for a representative government. Establishing the Interim Administration is a high priority in order to give voice to the Iraqi people and the real sense that they have authority over their future.

As we work with the Iraqis to transform their country into a democracy, we will need to nurture the environment for a *responsible civil society*. This is why de-Ba'athification is a high priority. Without eradicating the structures of the Ba'ath Party and its instruments of terror, true civil society can not emerge. We will need to work closely with the Iraqi Interim Administration on the next stage in de-Ba'athification and on the work to

establish the conditions for a vibrant civil society including the desirability of some process of reconciliation.

The creation of *transparent government financial management practices* will require a significant effort in a country where secrecy, use of public resources for private use and indiscriminate punishment were the standard practices. We will work with Iraqis and Iraqi institutions to build new budgeting, banking and accounting practices. The new practices need to be pervasive, not only at the national government, ministry and municipal levels but also in civil society organizations and in the private sector. Modern information systems technology can be an important part of this institution-building process.

Finally, *economic regeneration* is the key driver in the overall process of rebuilding Iraq and will provide the most tangible evidence of progress made by the CPA and the Interim Administration. Iraq's assets -- its physical resources and its skilled, energetic people -- create opportunities for Iraq as a nation. The potential benefits to the Iraqi people are huge. Our priority will be to encourage rapid transition to an economy guided by free market principles. These have been shown, in case after case, to offer the quickest way to create efficient and job-creating economic activity. We must also make the case for the role of foreign investment in the development of Iraq. At the same time, it will be essential to put in place an adequate social safety net to protect those disadvantaged by rapid change.

Training programs will be essential for *Iraqi political-economic leadership, prosperity and growth, and a free market economy*. The conventional practice of learning on-the-job takes years. But time is a luxury in the Iraq recovery program.

#### **The Path to Transformation; End State or Next State**

Expectations are a serious matter. Iraqis, legislators, press, taxpayers, home offices, think tanks and international citizens all develop expectations of the future. Planning processes can provide information on plans, increase cooperation among the many entities that contribute directly or indirectly to executing plans, and encourage contributions in critical areas from those who wish to invest.

Setting realistic, interim targets toward an end state can help set reasonable expectations. If a post-conflict reconstruction program will take years to achieve, then it may be helpful to identify the "Next State" which can be achieved over a shorter time period en route to an End State. Planning can focus efforts on achieving important milestones along the way to an End State.

A matrix of corresponding measures of progress in each "core element" will be created for each stage. The objectives listed for each "core element" will be used as a guide to develop the priority measures in each. Special attention will be paid to the "transformation" objectives as the most critical path is likely to be centered in this area.

## **The CPA Vision**

After decades of a ruthless dictatorship, the Iraqi people can at last control their destiny and establish the conditions for a free and stable future. With the international community, the CPA will help the Iraqi people achieve the President's and Prime Minister's vision for Iraq – a free Iraq governed by a representative government chosen through democratic elections. At the core of this new Iraq is the development of a democratic, accountable, and self-governing civil society respectful of human rights and freedom of expression. The future prosperity of Iraq's citizens depends on the use of Iraqi resources to foster the development and establishment of a market-based economy for and by them. Furthermore, our goal is an Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors, once again able to play a responsible role in the international community. The Coalition is firmly committed to the future of Iraq. The CPA succeeds when Iraq succeeds. Hence we will stay as long as necessary, and not a day longer. But we will not leave until we have succeeded in carrying out the President's and Prime Minister's vision. Our foundation of authority is firmly embedded in international law and in accord with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483.

## **The Mission**

The CPA will work with the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim Administration to establish the conditions for a free, sovereign, democratically-elected representative government. We want to work with Iraqis to establish an Iraq that uses its resources for the benefit of its people. It should be an Iraq that is stable, united, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors and able to take its rightful place as a responsible member of the region and the international community. This Iraq must be free of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists.

## **The End-State**

The ultimate goal is a durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that: provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.

## CPA Planning Assumptions

### ➤ General:

- International law and UNSCR 1483 provide the necessary mandate for CPA to achieve its mission.
- The international community and the UN will be positively engaged in helping the CPA achieve its mission. Their relationships with the CPA may change over time.
- The Coalition will stay as long as necessary and leave as soon as its job is done.
- The Coalition will work closely with the Interim Iraqi Administration to establish the process for success for a future Iraq and will do so cooperatively in each of the following areas.

### ➤ Security:

- An atmosphere of security is the 'sine qua non' of all Coalition and Iraqi efforts to rebuild Iraq.
- The Coalition and International Community will provide sufficient forces to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment. But the major burden will continue to fall on American and British forces for the foreseeable future.
- The international community will assist in building Iraqi capacity to manage their own security, but here too we will be the key players.
- Continuing, well-organized security threats (crime, extremists, terrorists) and the potential of external subversion will challenge Coalition progress.
- The transformation of the economy from a highly protected and controlled command economy to a market system will be painful for many, and even if successful in economic terms, will produce fresh security problems.
- Resources (money, people, equipment) needed for the new military, police and security services will be limited and will require a substantial Coalition commitment.
- Iraqi police will be trained rapidly and soon begin to contribute importantly to establishing security and law and order. A full police force trained to respect human rights and proficient in community policing methods necessary to gain community support in law enforcement will take considerably longer.
- Selected Iraqi military will participate constructively in the security sector.
- The effects of this effort will allow Iraq to provide adequate protection for its citizens both internally and externally without posing a threat to its neighbors. Timely accomplishment of this will require a conscious, planned effort.

- Oversight mechanisms to maintain accountability of the security, police, justice, and custodial sectors will be a long-term requirement which must be built into Iraqi democratic institutions.

➤ **Essential Services and Civil Society:**

- Reconstruction efforts to restore essential public services must be pursued aggressively to improve the quality of life and to enable progress in other sectors.
- An Iraqi capacity to manage any new humanitarian emergencies, with some international assistance, will evolve.
- Free market economic transition will increase unemployment in the short run. Early development of a social safety net is essential.
- Iraqi people will be encouraged to support and remain engaged in the process of reform and to promote an active role for women in society.
- The policy of Deba'athification and the evolving guidelines for its implementation will remain a priority for achieving the CPA mission.

➤ **Economy:**

- Full transition to an open market economy is beyond the scope of the Coalition mission. But we can set the Iraqi economy on the path for sustainable growth and establish strong momentum toward an open market economy.
- There will be continued economic and financial resources from Iraq, the UN, the international community and the United States to accomplish the CPA mission.
- If the Iraqi people are to remain engaged it will be essential to create jobs quickly.
- It will be essential to engage the private sector, both domestic and international, in reconstruction. Exiled Iraqis will return to help develop Iraq.

➤ **Preparing for Democracy:**

- Most Iraqis have little experience with participative democracy.
- Little Iraqi experience exists to manage a free market economy.
- There are few democratic institutions (responsible political parties, independent representative organizations, public interest groups or electoral bodies or systems) upon which to build. These will require substantial assistance.
- It will be necessary to instill an understanding of democratic principles, what they do and do not mean, and a grasp of the responsibilities that go with freedom.
- Educational institutions at all levels will require extensive curriculum reform to support a democratic system and a free market economy.



- It will be important to nurture the growth of vigorous and responsible civil society organizations to hold governments accountable at all levels of society.
- Extensive and accelerated education, training, and focused experience activities will be essential to support a rapid transformation in politics and economics.

➤ **Governance and Sovereignty:**

- The Iraqi people will accept the legitimacy of the Coalition and the Interim Administration.
- The election of an accountable and representative government will be based upon a Constitution born of a popular participative process.
- The Iraqi people will embrace and remain committed to electoral reform.
- The Iraqi people will support a united national government structure.
- Neighboring states will ultimately:
  - Accept the CPA as a legitimate authority until the creation of a sovereign Iraqi government.
  - Recognize the new Iraq as a legitimate sovereign state.
  - Support the emerging Iraqi governance structure as a legitimate part of the regional community.
- Efforts by Iraq's neighbors to disrupt the CPA mission will not succeed.

➤ **Information:**

- A coherent and coordinated information campaign will be an essential pre-requisite for integrating the various strands of the CPA and ultimately achieving its mission.
- CPA will successfully overcome the perception -- internally within Iraq and externally within much of the international community -- that the Coalition prosecuted the war for Western gain of Iraq's natural resources.
- CPA will establish an accepted, effective and transparent information exchange with the Iraqi people.

## Core Foundations and Sub-Objectives


- *Security...address all aspects of the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The objective is to create an Iraqi capacity to manage and resolve any and all potential conflict situations in both the civil and military sectors.*
  - Create a safe and secure environment by CPA/CJTF-7.
  - Create Iraqi capacity to maintain structural stability.
  - Develop Iraqi security forces effective in protecting the society and the constitutional order while respecting human rights.
  - Develop Iraqi military formation/training; with full oversight mechanisms to ensure civilian control of the military.
  - Assist Iraq in developing a constructive security relationship with its friends in the region and with the Coalition.
  - Transform the police/guards to be accountable to the community, while practicing effective security.
  - Reform the criminal justice system, penal code, prisons.
  - Reform the intelligence service and oversight mechanisms.
  - Establish anti-corruption measures in all security organizations.
  - Eliminate the threat and use of violence as a means to secure political goals.
- *Essential Services and Civil Society... restore essential services to acceptable standards, repair infrastructure necessary to return to normal, and begin to create a vigorous and responsible civil society which participates in improving a social and physical infrastructure that benefits the population.*
  - As a top priority, urgently restore physical and social infrastructure and public utilities including:
    - Water, power and health infrastructure.
    - Outbreaks of water-borne and other diseases.
    - Health education.
    - Vaccination of children.
    - Local resources to support the communities.
    - Reform and restore education, including school infrastructure repairs, curriculum reform, and training of teachers.
  - Provide knowledgeable contribution to public expenditure management and civil service reform.
  - Encourage participation of responsible NGOs.
  - Develop effective women's organizations.
  - Develop trade unions.
  - Develop an independent judiciary.
  - Develop and regulate a free and professional print and broadcast media.
  - Develop professional associations.

- Help create law enforcement and corrections system respectful of human rights.
  - Encourage impartial, open and accountable governmental institutions.
  - As requested by the Iraqis, contribute to providing advice on a fair constitution and body of law.
  - Help establish mechanisms for monitoring human rights.
- *Economy ... initiate processes leading to robust economic policy reform and effective free market economy management, including a focus on regulatory change, training and routing out corruption.*
    - Encourage the growth of small and medium-sized private enterprises.
    - Effectively manage the transition, as quickly as possible, from value-destroying public enterprises to value-creating private ones.
    - Encourage foreign and domestic investment as essential to fundamental economic transformation.
    - Reform the management of agriculture and other resources for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
    - Ensure that the legal system facilitates property ownership by domestic and foreign investors, privatization, contract management, taxation, trade, and other measures essential to the creation of a free market.
    - Restructure the banking system and find ways to introduce competition, technology, service and quality that will move towards the international standard.
    - Strengthen the Central Bank, make it independent, and assure that Iraq has sound and stable currency to sustain growth.
    - Put in place a national budget system to allow Iraq to muster its resources effectively for economic growth.
    - Encourage initiatives to diversify the economy.
    - Develop open market trade policy priorities for a level playing field with regional trade partners.
    - Encourage the private sector to lead in reconstruction.
    - Develop accelerated training programs for business managers, management best practices, and business ethics.
    - Assure that all CPA contractors place the maximum possible work with Iraqi firms to promote jobs for Iraqis.
    - Restore Iraq's oil production initially to its former productivity and as soon feasible to levels beyond that for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
    - Examine, with the Interim Administration, the feasibility and desirability of an oil trust fund designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
  - *The Path to Transformation ... empower the Iraqi people to learn to manage a free market democracy.*
    - Design accelerated training programs in the complexities of democratic government and a free market economy.

- Engage Iraqi leaders early and often in programs on the workings of democratic institutions, organizing political parties and the fundamental principles of democratic society.
- Work with Iraqi leaders early and often to address reconstruction.
- *Governance and Sovereignty...transform governance to a participative democratic system which balances local and national governance, builds a new constitutional process, and transfers responsibility for governance to the Iraqi people.*
  - Immediately establish a Governance Council to give Iraqis substantial responsibility for running the government.
  - Encourage the Iraqis to write as quickly as possible a modern constitution embodying democratic and individual rights and the rule of law. Seek ratification of the constitution immediately thereafter. Hold free and open elections for a sovereign Iraqi government, at which point the coalition relinquishes sovereignty.
  - Transfer responsibility for De-Baathification to an Iraqi De-Baathification Council.
  - Encourage a process of reconciliation among the Iraqi people.
  - Nurture civil society actors to progressively marginalize spoilers.
  - Build effective administration and political bodies at the local, governorate and national levels.
  - Strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights.
  - Create a governmental system responsive to a healthy and responsible civil society.
  - Develop transparency and accountability in all governmental institutions.
  - Set conditions for an Iraq "deserving" of economic assistance.
  - Develop beneficial regional economic relationships.
- *Information ...provide a disciplined application of coordinated messages to inform local, regional and other international audiences of CPA actions and intentions on behalf of the Iraqi people. It should install for Iraqis the mechanisms to share thoughts and ideas necessary to reach decisions based on a common understanding.*
  - Develop a coherent and coordinated Information Campaign addressed to the principal Iraqi, regional, and international audiences, in order to:
    - Communicate the CPA's intent and program of action.
    - Explain the increasing role of the Iraqi people as players in setting the conditions for a new Iraq.
  - Establish and maintain the support of the significant majority of the Iraqi people for a new Iraq.

10  
July 8, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Police in Iraq

Jerry Bremer recommends that we speed up training of police and get additional international police in order to stand up a force to protect critical infrastructure.

Prime Minister Blair said he agreed and would get some help.

We need to get a list of requirements and a plan.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
070803-22

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20759 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18237

July 11<sup>th</sup>, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Central Idea

I continue to think that we want to have a single thing that we want people to remember in each speech or statement. I think you should have it on the cover paper, telling me what that is, so that as I edit it, I can strengthen it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070903-7

.....


Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20760 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18238

July 11, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Speeches

Watch the speech of Tom Franks at the Change of Command Ceremony in Tampa.

He repeated a few things, and his speech had real punch. Let's think of doing that in future speeches for me. Not testimony, not press briefings, but speeches with punch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070903-9

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20761 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18239

11  
July 8, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Responsibility in Liberia

We have to make sure we keep our eye on who is in charge in Liberia, whether it is State or Defense, meaning the Ambassador or the head of the Joint Task Force.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
070303-5 (ts computer).doc

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20762 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18240



11  
July 9, 2003

EF-6089  
031009.23

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bob Zoellick

Here is a note from Bob Zoellick. Should he get Andy Hoehn's brief on Theater Security Cooperation?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/30/03 Zoellick ltr to SecDef re: Free Trade Agreements

DHR:dh  
070903-14

.....  
Please respond by 7/11/03

7/11/03  
→ SD  
I'll call him  
and say you  
suggested he  
get the Hoehn  
briefing.  
Doug Feith

U20763 /03

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SECDEF HAS SEEN

June 30, 2003

JUL - 9 2003

Note for: Don Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

From: Bob Zoellick *BZ*  
U.S. Trade Representative

Re: Free Trade Agreements

Thanks for your note of June 18. I appreciate your encouragement on our FTA negotiations.

Of the countries on your list:

- We passed the FTA with Jordan in 2001. I met with King Abdullah just last week at the Davos meeting he hosted. I was encouraged to see how Jordan is employing the FTA to help drive his economic and political reform process.
- We hope to complete the FTA negotiations with Morocco by the end of the year, for submission to Congress in 2004.
- Then we will start with Bahrain. I visited Bahrain on my way to Jordan to help pave the way for the negotiations. The King is pleased -- and I am impressed with their reform effort.
- Qatar, like Bahrain, is part of the President's MEFTA initiative. Qatar is not as far along in its ability to undertake an FTA with us, but I would be delighted if they were. (Our FTAs cover a host of topics -- including IPR, services, government procurement, competition policy, and transparency -- so a country must be prepared for serious commitments.)

You did not mention Australia, but I would think that FTA negotiation would be of interest to DoD, too. We will face some real challenges with Congress on Australia, because many of our Aggies do not want the competition. At a later point, we might discuss getting some DoD help with Members of Congress; I think we can carry some votes by stressing the strategic partnership.

A final thought: If you wish, I would be pleased to come over some time to brief the Joint Chiefs and some of your senior officials on our trade strategy and agenda. As you know from your experience, the Congressional trade committees are extremely sensitive about our using FTAs for "foreign policy" reasons -- but I would, of course, welcome any suggestions.

cc: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and Director, National Economic Council

11-L-0559/OSD/18242

July 11, 2003

03  
7/21

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan's Ambassador

Please see me about the Afghan ambassador who wants to get his U.S. citizenship back.

Marty Hoffmann tells me there is a way to do it on the basis that he was mistaken as to whether or not he could get his citizenship back when he gave it up to become Afghanistan's ambassador to the U.S. Marty feels if you talk to Taft about it, it could get accomplished.

Please talk to Marty Hoffmann and get his ideas on how to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-10

.....  
Please respond by


*7/18/03*

U20764 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18243



July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Policy Shop

Here is the OSD Policy organization chart. Please tell Pete Aldridge that Policy is just too big. There must be things we should move out of there or reduce.

Thanks.


Attach.  
Policy Org Chart

DHR:dh  
071403-46

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20765 /03

July <sup>14</sup>~~9~~, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Here is a note from Bob Dole.

Please look into this situation and get back to Senator Dole pretty quickly.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/27/03 Sen. Dole letter to SecDef w/attached e-mail  
SecDef ltr to Sen. Dole

DHR:dh  
070903-13

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20766 /03

**OFFICE OF SENATOR BOB DOLE  
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET**

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**JUL 10 2003**

**DATE:** June 27, 2003

**TO:** The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

**FAX NUMBER:** (b)(6)

**FROM:** Bob Dole

**COMMENTS:** Letter is being mailed also.

**NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 4**

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Phone (202) 654-4848

Fax (202) 654-4850

Senator Bob Dole  
601 Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
North Building, 10<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Washington, DC 20004-2601

BOB DOLE  
601 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
NORTH BUILDING, 10TH FLOOR  
WASHINGTON, DC 20002

June 27, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 10 2003


Dear Don,

Could you have (b)(6) matter reviewed.  
I cannot believe dependents are treated as she describes  
it.

I've never requested anything from D.O.D. but I am  
very sympathetic to her expressed concerns.

I would appreciate a report if you determine a review  
is appropriate.

God Bless America,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Bob Dole", written over a horizontal line.

BOB DOLE

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E880, The Pentagon  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

11-L-0559/OSD/18247

**Rucker, Marion**

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 24, 2003 5:05 PM  
**To:** Rucker, Marion  
**Subject:** Re: Senator Dole

Marion Rucker,

I apologize for taking so long to get back to you. The second attached letter will explain why I have been delayed.

(b)(6)

The Honorable Senator Bob Dole  
Alston & Bird LLP  
Attn: Marion Rucker  
601 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington DC 20004

Dear Senator Dole,

I wrote to you because you are a supporter of the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS). I am trying to find someone that can help me get someone in the Army to sit down face to face with me and resolve matters after death of my husband- (b)(6). I have been told that this is the worst casualty case in the history of the Army. I am asking the Army to correct the wrongs that have been done, especially for the sake of my children. I am looking for someone to stop the stonewalling and act in the best interests of my children and I. (My son met you at Arlington National Cemetery. He is the little boy that helped present the TAPS wreath.)

Our tragedy has been every bit as traumatic for us as any other military tragedy. Unfortunately we have not received what other surviving spouses and children have received. So every year my daughter cries. Unlike the other children at the youth gathering, she said she and her brother are the only ones there that have had no funeral, no flag, no medals and no grave to go. I have no official documents even though Army officials assured me they would provide the documents to me. These are all things I have repeatedly requested from the Army.

My children and I have suffered over \$44,000 in property loss and damage. We were refused all information prior to the packing of our property. Then initially the Army refused to process any of the claim; and later only part of the claim was considered. The damage to our property was tremendous. Every piece of furniture had damage. Whole dish packs arrived with everything in the box smashed into nothing but shards of glass. Furniture couldn't even be put together because ever piece of hardware was missing. Our church sent a carpenter to our house to put the children's beds back together so they would not have to sleep on the floor. Every tool we owned (and my husband did wood working) vanished and the cradle my husband had made for our children's first bed was demolished. Boxes of books arrived moldy, etc... Army officials have trivialized the claim, suggesting that \$7860 is sufficient compensation for over \$44,000 in damages.

Army official ordered my husband to change his SGLI, so my children and I did not receive any life insurance proceeds. We are not getting survivor benefits based on my husband's highest rank; nor have we received compensation for his final month of active duty, for which LTC (b)(6) said my husband was not paid. I have been told that DFAS is using rescinded orders for the basis of all financial computations.

I was told before my husband died that a casualty officer would be pre-positioned since my husband was deemed to be in imminent death status. However, when my husband died I had to go drive over 250 miles to Fort Meyer (at that time my children and I were in Pennsylvania). I said my husband has died now what do I do? Instead of helping me, (b)(6) (DA-Casualty) wanted to argue with me about my husband's rank. He told me a casualty officer would be to my home the next week. After waiting that week, I called him however (b)(6) told me

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11-L-0559/OSD/18248



that (b)(6) would not be taking my calls. So no casualty officer was assigned. I keep asking questions, but I am not getting responsive answers from anyone in the Army. And the one officer that was helping me, was ordered not to bring up my name. I am trying to figure out what is going on; how to rebuild life for my children and I; and help my children come to terms with this tragedy.

(b)(6) another TAPS survivor said it took her 9 years to get a Senator to listen and then for someone in the Army to be assigned to help her. Within 3 weeks that officer had all issues resolved for her. My children and I pray that it will not take 9 years for someone to help us review these matters and fix the wrongs that have been done.

With warm regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

June 19, 2003

The Honorable John Warner  
United States Senate  
225 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington DC 20510-4601

Dear Senator Warner,

I previously wrote to you regarding the abusive acts by Army personnel and problems I have had accessing Fort Meyer. (b)(6) told me on May 19, 2003 that I would have no further problems accessing with Army personnel, Fort Meyers and Fort McNair.

Monday, June 16, 2003, my children and I went to Fort Meyer to purchase food at the commissary. Because my children and I do not have benefit of life insurance proceeds, I am forced to drive an old unreliable car or rent a vehicle. Monday I was driving a rental vehicle from Enterprise. Over the past two years I have done this many times in order to go to the commissary, and take care of other needs. Since I had done this so many times I had my military identification card, driver's license and rental agreement at hand when I arrived at the gate.

This morning though things did not go as usual. When I got to the Wright gate I showed the person at the gate my identification. He asked why my vehicle did not have DOD stickers. I told him it was a rental. He then told me to pull to the right. I did and immediately my car was surrounded. I opened all the doors. My children and I got out. We were surrounded by military police with automatic weapons. My young children were terrified, especially given the prior abuse by this same group of military police. Because of the prior abuse I feared this was about to be a repeat of the prior abuse. I tried to ask repeatedly what was going on, for a list of names of those military personnel involved and for an officer in charge. I explained that because of prior abuse by MPs from Fort Meyer that I was terrified. My questions were not answered. And in fact I was lied to. After asking over 6 times for a list of names and the immediate assistance of an officer in charge (OIC), I was laughed at by a female sergeant with the last name of (b)(6). She indicated that she was in charge and proceeded to allege that I was disrespect. I told her that I was not disrespectful and asked how she thought I was. I said again because of the prior abuse and present heavy handed behavior I needed the names of those involved. She acknowledged that I was not disrespect, but refused to provide names or call for an OIC. She repeated that she was the OIC. I again asked for an officer. I obtained a piece of paper from my car and wrote down names. After my identification was returned, my children and I got back into our car and left Fort Meyer.

We went to the office of General Jackson at Fort McNair. My identification was all that was requested to enter Fort McNair. There I spoke with Colonel (b)(6) about the above. He said I probably just subject to a random search. He also said that they did not know who I was. However, there was nothing random about the trauma my children and I were subjected to the fear my young children expressed seeing (b)(6) stand there with her hand always on her gun. And they did know who I was! They had possession of both my Virginia driver's license and military issued (from Fort Meyer) identification card. Colonel (b)(6) called Colonel (b)(6), then referred

6/26/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18249

me to Fort McNair military police.

Instead I spoke with Major (b)(6) I told him I feared all Army MPS given the history of abusive treatment. We discussed the above and matters as per previous communications. He said the litigation issues were being discussed with my attorney. I told him I feared this was a continuation of the prior abuse by Fort Meyer MPs. He acknowledged that my name had been on a list at the gates to Fort Meyer and Fort McNair as person to be denied access, but it had been removed. I asked how I was supposed to know whether an old list was still around...

I also specifically mentioned that my husband's medical retirement had been reviewed and according to 2 experts, it was done incorrectly. I asked when I was going to get help. I told him that my husband's death was as much a tragedy to our family as the deaths on September 11th, 2001. Yet our family has not been treated like the families of those killed in the Pentagon. I asked him when that was going to change. He didn't know. I told him there was so much confusion when the paperwork was done and many Army Posts involved. I also told him the retirement was done while my husband was at Walter Reed. He then acknowledged that local Army JAG officers should have been involved. So again I asked why aren't they willing to sit face-to-face with me and go over the documents? He said he would be willing to call OCAR and Army Casualty for me. I would also like to know when I receive written apologies for the prior abuse and for the current situation. The history of heavy handed behavior by military police at Fort Meyer needs to stop. I am simply the widow of (b)(6) and the mother of his children. I also have a cardiac history. My children and I do not need any further trauma. We should not have to be traumatized when attempting to purchase groceries. We should not have to fear people that wear the same uniform that my husband wore so proudly. [There is more to this, but I have tried to be concise and I am still very upset!] I am anticipating the assistance of General Jackson and his staff with this matter.

With regards,

(b)(6)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Bob Dole  
601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Bob,

I got your note regarding (b)(6) I asked Les  
Brownlee to look into the matter and get back to you directly.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of Defense, is written over the word "Sincerely,". The signature is composed of a large, sweeping loop at the top, followed by a vertical line that curves into a horizontal stroke at the bottom.

July <sup>14</sup> 9, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee

CC: Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Trip Report

Thanks for providing me a report from your trip to Iraq.

It is helpful. I have sent a copy to General Myers and Doug Feith.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/1/03 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Trip Report

DHR:dh  
070903-12

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20768 /03

7:12 1230



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

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2003 JUL -1 PM 5:10

INFO MEMO



1 July 2003, 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

SUBJECT: Trip Report: CENTCOM AOR, 23-29 June 2003

JUL 10 2003

- I visited the CENTCOM AOR from 23 June – 29 June 2003. I met with senior leaders to include Ambassador Bremer, LTG McKiernan, LTG Sanchez, Walt Slocumb, the Division commanders in Iraq, MG (P) Vines, Ambassador Finn, and Defense Minister Khan. I was impressed with both the magnitude of the efforts and with the skill and dedication of the American soldiers executing missions that run the full spectrum of military operations, usually within the same units, and often within the same day. We are all proud of the job our young soldiers are doing under difficult and challenging conditions.
- Below are some key observations concerning Iraq:
  - U.S. military presence in Iraq is critical to the overall effort to establish a viable government. American military forces represent the only law enforcement in most of the country. We must take a hard look at the long-term force requirements to stabilize Iraq. Ambassador Bremer mentioned several times that the U.S. must maintain a sufficient force to establish a strong and visible presence. He indicated that while coalition forces can provide some relief, significant U.S. combat capability will be required.
  - Baghdad remains the center of gravity. There are nearly 30,000 U.S. military within the city. The efforts to establish security and provide basic services are critical and ongoing.
  - We must work to improve the living conditions of our soldiers in Iraq. The heat and the inadequate facilities affect individual soldier effectiveness and may have a long-term impact on the time required to accomplish our objectives. I am working with the Army Staff in coordination with Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Combined Joint Task Force 7 to identify assets, such as Force Provider and other smaller, more versatile troop shelters, to improve living conditions. Ambassador Bremer fully supports this effort.

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ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXEDAC 188-0372	

11-L-0559/OSD/18253



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- Ambassador Bremer and his staff were pleased with the support provided by the Army as Executive Agent for several different functions for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Ambassador Bremer and LTG Sanchez are working well together.
- There is an enormous amount of ammunition within Iraq that must be confiscated, safeguarded and destroyed. The effort to confiscate, consolidate and destroy this ammunition will take at least six months.
- Funding for Restoration of Iraqi Oil (RIO). There are some issues with current funding stream for the RIO efforts. I am working with USD(C) to resolve.
- (FOUO) Two key groups pose the greatest threat to stability in Iraq -- the remaining Baathist activists and some Shi'a elements. Walt Slocum suggests that the Baathists are engaged in an effort to terrorize and demoralize coalition troops by steadily inflicting casualties. Their intent is to weaken U.S. resolve through fear and frustration. Walt suggests that, meanwhile, the Shi'a are seeking to undermine the coalition by supplanting the CPA as the provider of basic services.
- Afghanistan:
  - The effort to provide follow-up support to the Afghan Transitional Authority is weak. There is an urgent need for a concerted effort (U.S. or international) to strengthen the central government in a range of activities including recruiting and training an effective police force, fiscal and financial management, and infrastructure development.
  - Funding the Counter-narcotics (CN) and Counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. I will work with USD(P) to determine the desirability of legislation similar to that which currently provides authority in Colombia, to link the CN and CT efforts in Afghanistan. The DEA representative indicated that funding of significant terrorist activity within Afghanistan is through the narcotics trade. Significantly degrading or severing the linkage would enable further progress in Afghanistan.
- Bottom Line: In both Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers and civilians are performing well under tough conditions. They will continue to warrant our attention and support in the difficult, complex phases of these campaigns.

Prepared By: LTC John K. Wood, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

July 14, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Anniversary of All-Volunteer Force

Thanks for your note on the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the all-volunteer force.

I was one of the original sponsors in Congress of the all-volunteer force back in the 1960s. I testified before both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the subject. I wasn't aware that the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary was coming up.

DHR:dh  
071003-3

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U20769 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18255

119  
0930



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUL -7 PM 3:47

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 10 2003

INFO MEMO

July 2, 2003, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu Jul 03*

SUBJECT: 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force July 1, 2003 Events

- July 1, 2003 marked the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that for three decades has provided the Nation a military that is cost efficient and combat effective. The President issued a Proclamation for the AVF anniversary.
- As you know, we planned a series of events to commemorate the occasion. On July 1, 2003, there were 66 separate events – enlistment ceremonies at all 65 Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) across the Nation, and a White House reenlistment ceremony. The AVF commemorative coin was unveiled at these events. The events were very successful.
- Enlistment Ceremonies: 10 enlistees per ceremony; General/Flag officer guest speaker; Federal/State/local dignitaries (or representatives) attended.
- White House Reenlistment Ceremony: 30 reenlistees, representing all 5 Services (Active and Reserve Component); President gave speech; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff administered oath; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Chiefs, and Senior Noncommissioned Officers (or representatives) attended.
- Media coverage of the events was outstanding. White House reenlistment ceremony was covered live by CNN, MSNBC, and Fox, as well as covered by other media. The majority of MEPS ceremonies were covered by local media. Initial indications are at least 41 stories nationwide covered the events.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Major Heidi Schwenn, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/8
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/9
MA BUCCI	5/7
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/8

U10556 / 03



11-L-0559/OSD/18256



7/15  
0800

14  
July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita  
7/18

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Woodward

Tommy Franks is going to talk to Woodward. You should work with him on what he does and how he does it. He also agreed that it is important for Woodward to see Gary Luck.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-18

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

7/19  
Scheduled for Aug 6.  
in Tampa. D. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita  
7/18

U20770 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.R.  
SUBJECT: Dinner for Gen. Franks

Here are the people who came to this dinner. Senator Ted Stevens never made it, but Catherine did.

Please ask somebody who is supposed to pay for this. I am happy to do it, and if I do, it is business deductible, but let me know before we decide.

Thanks.

Attach.

Guest List for 10 July Dinner in honor of Gen. Franks

DHR:dh  
071103-2

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/03

U20771 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18258

Accepts: 15  
Regrets: 4  
Yet to Respond: 0

**Guest List for Dinner  
in honor of  
General Tommy Franks  
Thursday, July 10, 2003**

**ACCEPTS**

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and Mrs. Rumsfeld

The Honorable Dick Cheney, The Vice President,  
and Mrs. Cheney (Dick/Lynne)

General Tommy Franks, USA, Central Command  
and Mrs. Franks (Tommy/Cathy)

~~Ms. Marcy Rumsfeld~~ ? 

~~Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK)~~  
and Mrs. Stevens (Ted/Catherine)

General Peter J. Schoomaker, United States Army, Retired  
and Mrs. Schoomaker (Cindy)

The Honorable Frank Carlucci  
and Mrs. Carlucci (Frank/Marcia)

The Honorable James Schlesinger and Ms. Molly Hemphill

**REGRETS**

General Jay Garner, United States Army, Retired and Mrs. Garner (Jay/TBD)

Senator Daniel K. Inouye, (D-HI) and Mrs. Inouye (Dan/Margaret)

5:17 PM-7/9/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18259

14  
July 11, 2003

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Princeton Reunion

Here is the material on the Princeton reunion. Joyce and I will be going. We will probably go in on Friday afternoon and leave on Sunday morning. I have forgotten where (b)(6) said we were staying.

Someone ought to fill out this form for me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/16/03 Princeton University Class of 1954 50<sup>th</sup> Reunion materials

DHR:dh  
071003-41

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

U20772 /03



Princeton University  
Class of 1954

2003 JUL 10 11:13:46

50th REUNION  
May 27-30, 2004

June 16, 2003

50th Reunion

Co-Chairmen

(b)(6)

Committee

Attendance

(b)(6)

Beverages

(b)(6)

Costumes

(b)(6)

Entertainment

(b)(6)

Faculty-Alumni Forums

(b)(6)

Food

(b)(6)

Headquarters

(b)(6)

Housing

(b)(6)

Memorial Service

(b)(6)

P-rade

(b)(6)

Reunion Treasurer

(b)(6)

Webmaster

(b)(6)

Dear Classmates and Associates

Lectures, Faculty-Alumni Forums, Tours, Receptions, Golf, Tennis, Dinners, Dancing, Renewing Old Friendships, Concerts, P-Rade, Fireworks etc, etc, etc. All of this and more is why reunions are increasingly popular, now attracting over 18,000 back "to the best old place of all".

It is the reason for this special mailing, which concerns lodging. A place to rest those weary bones is essential to enjoying what promises to be a special Memorial Day and 50th Reunion weekend, May 27-May 30, 2004. Competition for housing is robust and we want '54 to have quality multiple choices.

(b)(6) is again doing his usual outstanding job overseeing our accommodations ranging from Merrill Lynch and the Hyatt to on campus rooms. We urge you to review the enclosed lodging information carefully and act promptly to secure your venue of choice.

Other registration info will follow shortly.

(b)(6)



Princeton University • Class of 1954

50th REUNION

May 27-30, 2004

**Lodging Information**

**Merrill Lynch Conference Center accommodations (best value - Most fun)**

We have booked 130 rooms, these accommodations are on a first-come, first served basis. Merrill Lynch does not accept guests under the age of 18. Rooms are outfitted with one or two queen beds. Minimum stay is for three nights ( a limited number of two night reservations might be made available). The reservation deadline is March 29, 2004.

Cost per night for one person in a room is \$179 per night.

Cost per night for two persons in a room is \$199 per night.

Buffet breakfasts are included in the rates.

Book accommodations through (b)(6) Use the **Lodging Reservation Form** to specify your requirements and calculate the payment. Credit card information is required on the form. First come, first served!

**Campus accommodations**

There will be 190 beds in dormitory rooms in or near Class Headquarters. These beds are available for the 4 day/ 3 night weekend at a total cost of \$75 per bed, the fee is the same whether the bed is used one, two, or all three nights. A deposit of \$100 per bed for keys, bed linens, and towels will be required at sign in, refunded when items are returned.

Please book campus accommodations through (b)(6) using the **Lodging Reservation Form**. Payment and deposits will be made at the registration desk.

First come, first served.

**I'd rather do it myself**

The facilities listed on the next sheet should be contacted, by you, as early as possible. If using one of these hotels, list it on the **Lodging Reservation Form**, so that you will receive bus passes.

If you are living nearby, or are staying with friends, or have any other arrangements, please check the "independent" block, so we know that a reservation form was not lost in the mail.



## **Hotels, Motels and Inns**

The facilities listed below should be contacted, **by you**, as early as possible. Rates may change in 2004. These hotels are located on or near Route 1 between Raymond Road and I295, and have shuttle bus service to the campus.

<u>Hotel</u>	<u>2 beds</u>	<u>King</u>	<u>MI. to P.U.</u>	<u>Telephone</u>
--------------	---------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------

### **Route 1 - North of Princeton**

<b>Doral Forrestal</b> 100 College Rd. E.	\$249	\$249	5	609-452-7800 800-222-1131
<b>Holiday Inn</b> 100 Independence Way	\$209	\$209	5	609-520-1200 800-HOLIDAY
<b>Marriot Courtyard</b> 3815 Route 1	\$189	\$189	2	609-716-9100 800-228-9290
<b>Marriot Residence Inn</b> 4225 Route 1	\$269	\$269	6	732-329-9600 800-331-3131
<b>Radison Hotel</b> 4355 Route 1	\$219	\$219	5	609-452-2400 800-333-3333
<b>Summerfield Suites</b> 4375 Route 1	\$279	\$279	5	609-951-0009 800-833-4353
<b>Weston Hotel</b> 201 Village Road	\$269	\$269	4	609-452-7900 888-627-7036

### **Route 1 - South of Princeton**

<b>Amerisuites at Marketfair</b> 3565 Route 1	\$279	\$279	2	609-720-0200 800-833-1516
<b>Hyatt Regency</b> 102 Carnegie Center	\$320	\$295	1.5	609-987-1234 800-233-1234
<b>McIntosh Inn</b> 3270 Route 1	\$159	\$159	4	609-896-3700 800-444-2775
<b>Palmer Inn</b> 3499 Route 1	\$189	\$189	3	609-452-2500 800-688-0500
<b>Red Roof Inn</b> 3203 Route 1	\$99	\$99	4	609-896-3388 800-THEROOF

Also, **Bed and Breakfast of Princeton**, 609-924-3186, might be your choice.





Princeton University • Class of 1954

50th REUNION

May 27-30, 2004

**Lodging Reservation Form**

Name \_\_\_\_\_

(please print)

e-mail address \_\_\_\_\_

☐

**Merrill Lynch Conference Center** is my choice.

Including me, there will be \_\_\_\_\_ person(s) staying at the Merrill Lynch Conference Center

I/we expect to arrive (circle 1) Wednesday Thursday

Friday

Saturday

I/we expect to depart (circle 1)

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

\_\_\_\_\_ Smoking \_\_\_\_\_ Nonsmoking \_\_\_\_\_ 1 bed \_\_\_\_\_ 2 beds \_\_\_\_\_ Handicapped

One person per room \$179 per night (x 3 nights = \$537) = \_\_\_\_\_

Two persons per room \$199 per night (x 3 nights = \$597) = \_\_\_\_\_

Tax will be added.

**Note:** Credit card (no personal checks) for accommodations will be processed on 3/31/04 or at expiration date of the credit card, whichever is earlier.

Charge to \_\_\_\_\_ Visa \_\_\_\_\_ Master Card \_\_\_\_\_ American Express

Card Number \_\_\_\_\_ Expiration Date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

☐

**Campus accommodations** are my choice.

Including myself, there will be \_\_\_\_\_ person(s) staying on campus. I will need \_\_\_\_\_ beds for the weekend.

I/we expect to arrive (circle 1) Thursday

Friday

Saturday

I/we expect to depart (circle 1)

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

Number of beds x \$75 = \_\_\_\_\_

(\$100 per bed deposit for key, linens and towels will be refunded when these items are returned.)

☐

**I prefer to make my own reservations.**

I will stay at \_\_\_\_\_ from the enclosed list. (Important to fill in this blank, so bus passes will be put into your registration package.)

☐

I have other **Independent** sources for the weekend.

Mail this form to

(b)(6)


Or e-mail info to:

(b)(6)



July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Guests for Coffee

Please make sure we get (b)(6) and (b)(6)'s over to have a cup of coffee someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-34

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

7/15 ✓  
It's scheduled on July 29<sup>th</sup>.  
D, hte

Larry Di Rita

7/15

U20773 /03

July <sup>14</sup>~~10~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>  
SUBJECT: Nominations

Please make sure I get the updated lists of military and civilian, so I can call Senator Warner and know what to say.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-31

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/14/03

U20774 /03

July <sup>14</sup>~~10~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>  
SUBJECT: Lance Smith

Please don't forget to set me up to see Lance Smith. Also, please set up a phone call for me with Jim Roche to talk about Lance Smith, and whether or not he is a comer. The slot at CENTCOM is critically important for future advancement.

Thanks.


DHR dh  
071003-30

.....

*Please respond by* 7/18/03

U20775 /03

July 10<sup>14</sup>, 2003

TO: ADM Clark  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Deputy CENTCOM

Vern—Why didn't you nominate anyone for Deputy at CENTCOM? I was surprised.

DHR:dh  
071003-29

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

✓  
7/17  
CNO RESPONSE ATTACHED

✓  
JLR

U20776 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18268



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

INFO MEMO

July 16, 2003, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Deputy, Central Command Nomination

- In your memorandum of July 14, 2003 (TAB A), you asked why Navy did not nominate anyone for Deputy, Central Command.
- Frankly we were told that CENTCOM wanted an Air Force Officer for the Deputy job and therefore we did not submit a nomination. Navy has two strong candidates for the position who I would be pleased to nominate.
  - VADM Timothy J. Keating, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command/ Commander, FIFTH Fleet.
  - RADM James A. Robb, Director, Plans and Policy, J5, U.S. Central Command.

COORDINATION: NONE

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

Prepared By: Bob Erskine, N00F, (b)(6)

Sir,

7/17

PER CNO - LT GEN DELONG


PASSED TO VCNO THAT  
THE AIR FORCE WOULD  
FILL THE DEPUTY SPOT  
AT CENTCOM.

VIR  
CNR SETTELE

cc: SECNAV (Acting)  
by whom? -

11-L-0559/OSD/18269

July <sup>14</sup>~~10~~, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Wedgwood piece

This piece by Ruth Wedgwood is excellent. You ought to make sure people get it, like the other people on the "wise men's" group, etc.

Thanks.

Attach.

Wedgwood, Ruth. "Justice Will Be Done at Guantanamo," *London Financial Times*, July 10, 2003.

DHR:dh  
071003-28

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20777 /03

London Financial Times  
July 10, 2003

## Justice Will Be Done At Guantanamo

By Ruth Wedgwood

To the operatives of al-Qaeda, war against the west is not a metaphor. On September 11 2001, the group tried to decapitate the US government: using aircraft as missiles, it hit the Pentagon and sought to strike the White House or Congress. It toppled the World Trade Center towers in New York, terrorising the city and nearly killing 30,000 commercial workers. Only rapid evacuation limited the death toll to 2,800.

Al-Qaeda acted as a saboteur military force. America's right to return fire against its declared enemy was recognised by Congress, Nato and the United Nations Security Council. US forces took to the field under the laws of war, and captured and routed Taliban and al-Qaeda combatants. Under the usual protocols of armed conflict, captured fighters can be interned as enemy combatants until hostilities are over.

Some have challenged America's right to do this, pointing out that this is a war that may never have a definitive end. And indeed, a different stage has now begun. The Pentagon announced on July 3 that six of the captured combatants currently residing at Guantanamo Bay may be prosecuted for war crimes in an initial round of trials. Some may plead guilty in plea bargains that impose limited prison terms in return for co-operation in exposing al-Qaeda's operations. Others may be tried on charges such as training with al-Qaeda or recruiting other terror network members. Two of the group are apparently British citizens and another is Australian.

From the chatter of certain British ministers, one might think this was a great surprise. In fact, the US has been consulting with the British government for months on the question of how to make the trials work well. Some complaints are manifestly ill-founded.

The use of military tribunals is preferred under the Geneva Conventions even for prisoners who are lawful combatants. The rationale is that military fact-finders will understand and share the interest in a protective law of war. So, too, the Geneva treaties allow criminal proof involving sensitive operational information to be presented behind closed doors. The rules of evidence under Geneva also permit the consideration of any relevant evidence.

The procedural rules for the Guantanamo war crimes trials were debated for 18 months in the light of the Geneva principles and the particular problems presented by al-Qaeda's "learning organisation", which has proved adept at exploiting disclosures of US intelligence methods. The basic framework was settled only after Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, sought the advice of bipartisan wise men (people who might once have been called elder statesmen). These included Lloyd Cutler (White House counsel to President Bill Clinton), Bernard Meltzer (a Nuremberg prosecutor and University of Chicago law professor) and William Webster (a judge, and chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under President Jimmy Carter and of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Ronald Reagan).

There was a hubbub, to be sure, when the White House issued a preliminary order on enemy prisoners in November 2001. But the subsequent rules were written with a sensibility that takes full account of modern standards of international humanitarian and human rights law. They have been published for scrutiny by all-comers at the Department of Defence website. ([www.dod.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf))

The rules respect the common law's presumption of innocence in favour of the defendant, burden of proof on the government, right to cross-examination of witnesses, right to call defence witnesses, mandated disclosure of any exculpatory evidence and requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. A defendant is given his choice of military counsel and can engage any civilian counsel who qualifies for security clearance. Any finding of guilt must be rendered by a two-thirds vote. All convictions will be reviewed by an independent appellate panel - with one or more civilian members endowed with authority to reverse judgments for serious errors of law. Members of the press are entitled to witness the full trial proceedings, except when classified or sensitive information is presented.

In ordinary civilian trials, there is no significant cost to sharing everything the government knows. But this does not hold against the background of al-Qaeda's stated ambition of mounting new attacks. In partial concession, the tribunal rules provide that discrete pieces of evidence may be presented in closed court and, indeed, may need to be examined by the military defence counsel rather than the defendant.


This is not ideal and there may be good reasons for delaying some trials until the operational backbone of al-Qaeda is broken. But the call for timely trials must make its peace with the equal right of civilians to be guarded against al-Qaeda's violence. As Winston Churchill aptly noted in October 1940: "I do not relish laying bare to the enemy all our internal resources."

There will surely be practical adjustments to the procedure as problems are encountered. Working through these will depend on the good-faith efforts of military judges, zealous defence counsel and fair-minded prosecutors. The president's order for military tribunals has one guiding principle: to provide a full and fair trial for any accused, while upholding the laws of war.

*The writer is a professor of international law at Johns Hopkins, and was one of the advisers to the Department of Defence on implementing rules for the military tribunals.*



July 14, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Senator Collins

We may need the VP to call Susan Collins at the right moment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-27

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20778 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18273

14  
July 10, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please make sure a date is set for the Policy Board promptly. It hasn't met for too long of a time. Let's get going on it.

Someone has to get with Tillie to teach her how to do it and get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-25

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

7/10  
I gave her some tentative  
dates later this month  
(28-29 July).  
J. Felt

U20779 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

Have David Chu and you taken a look at this response from Gen. Myers on pulling things together?

Thanks.

Attach.

7/3/03 CJCS action memo re: Pulling Together Elements [U10516/03]

DHR:dh  
071403-16

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

7/29

SecDef -

Dr Chu's and my edits to the  
CJCS memo are at the YELLOW T.  
(highlighted)

- The CJCS original memo is at the  
RED TAB

- If you concur we will forward  
to LTG Blum - it is good guidance

11-L-0559/OSD/18275

U207804/03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a Bureau jointly administered under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, I want you to develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.

Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's homeland defense needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization and demobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.



11-L-0559/OSD/18276

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.

Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me in the next 30 days with a proposal on how to proceed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal line extending from the "D" and "R".

Copy to:  
SecArmy  
SecAF  
CJCS

11/7/03  
Snowflake

C 7/10  
#1

G.L.  
Chw

May 31, 2003 1:53 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
cc: David Chw  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

7/9  
SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

As I understand it, you are going to come back to me with some proposals as to how we pull together all the Guard, Reserve, military and civilian elements in DoD and some proposed guidance for General Blum.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
053103-18

.....  
Please respond by 6/16/03

7/9  
Response  
Attached

11-L-0559/OSD/18278



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

GENERAL  
SECRETARY

2003 JUL -7 AM 7:30

ACTION MEMO

CH-1057-03  
3 July 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/3*

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

- You requested proposed guidance for Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), to aid him in pulling together the Guard and Reserve and military and civilian elements in the Department of Defense as he transforms the NGB

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter to CNGB at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General John A. Bradley, USAF; ACJCS-RM; (b)(6)

*Mr. Secretary —  
Chief, National Guard Bureau  
agrees with his testimony. I  
think this is a good letter and  
that you should sign it. ASD  
Hall concurs as well. VB  
(OSD Reserve Affairs) Dick*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/9
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/10
MA BUCCI	5/10/03
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4 7/7

U10516 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/18279



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a joint Bureau under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the several states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force, and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.

Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's HLS needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.




11-L-0559/OSD/18280



Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me with your thoughts in the next 30 days.



Copy to:  
SecArmy  
SecAF  
CJCS

TAB C


USMC	Colonel Bultermeier	June 27, 2003
USA	Colonel LaCrosse	June 27, 2003
USN	Commander Kreitz	June 25, 2003
USAF	Colonel Ball	June 27, 2003
USGC	Mr. Terriberry	June 27, 2003
NGB	Dr. Spencer	June 26, 2003

Tab C

EF-6119

July 14, 2003

1-03/009739

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Utility Districts in Iraq

Please read this Duncan Hunter paper on the creation of utility districts. If you think it is good, please send it along to Jerry.

Water districts in the west are very important. It is kind of an interesting idea. They may already have them out there.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hunter, Duncan. "Proposal for Creation of Utility Districts in Iraq Communities" (undated)

DHR:dh  
071403-15

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

EC ISA  
NESA

JUL 15 2003

U20781 /03

20-1050-1000000

11-L-0559/OSD/18283



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

NOTE FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 4/3/03

Secretary Rumsfeld suggested I pass along this idea to you. It comes from Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. It may be helpful to you.

If you plan to develop something along these lines, you may want to drop a line to Chairman Hunter.

## **PROPOSAL FOR CREATION OF UTILITY DISTRICTS IN IRAQ COMMUNITIES**

### **DISCUSSION –**

Discussions with Ambassador Bremer, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and military leaders illuminated the challenge of establishing basic infrastructure in Iraq (water, power, etc.) and at the same time cultivating political leadership that can provide sustained stability.

Both challenges could be met by establishing utility districts in each community in Iraq. The districts could provide a vehicle for partnered U.S.-Iraqi projects which will attract talented Iraqi citizens with technical expertise and the desire to accomplish practical community oriented projects. This pool of Iraqi "utility leaders" could become a farm team for greater local and national political positions.

At the same time, the utility districts could accomplish basic, necessary tasks of providing water and electricity at a community level. Such an accomplishment would certainly assist the U.S. strategic goal of standing up the Iraqi economy and turning the populous to the exercise of free enterprise.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

Establish a water district in every Iraqi community/city. The local military commander in consultation with the community leadership should appoint an Iraqi managing engineer and an American counterpart. Iraqi membership for a 30 person advisory board should then be established, drawing on Iraqis who are community minded and well educated. This advisory board should then elect a 5-person board of directors.

The organization should be attended by a representative of the local U.S. military commander, in addition to the "engineering co-director." This representative should be empowered to commit and expend funds on projects of the utility district.

### **PROPOSED OPERATION**

The utility advisory board, with input from the community, should recommend specific water projects (for example running an 8 inch pipeline to a particular neighborhood, etc.) The board should then vote on the project and upon approval send it with direction for action to the managing engineer and his American counterpart. These two engineers should then draw up execution plans along with material and labor lists.

Materials should be purchased from a local vendor. In most instances, the local vendor will be unable to supply some or all of the materials. In these cases, the vendor should be

allowed to order the materials through a large American jobber or wholesaler like Home Depot with an outlet in Kuwait. The local Iraqi vendor should be allowed a 10 percent mark-up on such materials.

The Iraqi managing engineer and his U.S. counterpart should hire labor and rent equipment from the local community. If equipment is unavailable, such items should be rented from a U.S. equipment company with a Kuwait/Iraq outlet.

Upon the procurement of the necessary equipment and the hiring of work crews, the managing engineer and his American counterpart should commence the project. The American commander should ensure that he or his authorized designee is prepared to disburse funds on a timely basis for materiel, equipment and labor.

### SUMMARY

The establishment and operation of utility districts such as the example described above will accomplish multiple goals:

- 1) Provide a forum for goal-oriented, community-minded Iraqi citizens to participate in a real governmental exercise which benefits their community in a tangible way (water, electricity, etc.);
- 2) Create real jobs;
- 3) Emplace the infrastructure foundation for economic recovery;
- 4) Improve the health and well being of Iraqi citizens;
- 5) Establish the building blocks for a new Iraqi society based on a representative government.

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ASD(PA)

I got a call from David Kennerly. He recommends we take a look at Cathy O'Hearn. She is in New York. She produces on MSNBC or CNBC for Tina Brown. She is very smart and capable, she anticipates and she should have a good rapport with us. She used to be with CBS and ABC.

Let's take a look at her. Kennerly is going to send her background sheet.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-14

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

→ Sec Def

7/15

→ Made Contact. Will  
advise.

*Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita

7/15

U20782 /03

## KATHERINE O'HEARN

Kathy O'Hearn has one of the most diverse resumes in television news with experience that truly spans the broadcasting spectrum. She was one of the first women to carry a camera in the field for CBS News, and rose to the top executive ranks where she directed worldwide network television news coverage.

Shelby Coffey, former managing editor of the Los Angeles Times and former vice-president of ABC News has said, "Kathy O'Hearn's management skills, and her wide breadth of knowledge about television production and news gathering are simply unparalleled in this industry."

Regarded as a tough but compassionate manager, O'Hearn is known for inspiring her troops while keeping everyone focused on the end result. She has produced award-winning television news under great pressure, and has faced and overcome almost every difficulty imaginable during the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, the Gulf War, Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, floods, fires, earthquakes, riots, political conventions, and elections. She is known for coolness under fire, and for bringing people together as a team in every tough situation.

As ABC News bureau chief in Los Angeles she directed reporting of the L.A. riots, the Northridge earthquake, the Malibu fires, and the OJ Simpson trial. During the first Gulf War she was ABC's bureau chief in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, coordinating press pool coverage with the United States military.

O'Hearn also helmed CNN's morning coverage in the aftermath of 9/11, and created, launched and produced the new CNN morning show, *"American Morning with Paula Zahn."*

Even though she was a vice president at CNN, and not responsible for day-to-day news, O'Hearn stepped into the control room on 9/11, rolled up her sleeves, and coordinated the ensuing months of CNN's morning coverage in the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, an



important and critically-acclaimed component of its Emmy award-winning coverage.

She was executive vice president of CNN Business News and CNNfn. In that capacity, she was in charge of programming on CNNfn, and the production and creative development of CNN Business News, including the network's flagship program, *Moneyline*. O'Hearn was the executive in charge when the show was successfully re-launched as *Lou Dobbs Moneyline* in May 2001.

O'Hearn joined CNN in June of 2000 after a 17-year career at ABC News. She served as executive producer of *World News Tonight Saturday*, *World News Tonight Sunday*, and *Good Morning America Sunday*.

Earlier ABC posts include that of Los Angeles bureau chief, where O'Hearn supervised news coverage for the western United States. She was also Dhahran bureau chief during the Gulf War, and senior producer of *World News This Morning*.

Before joining ABC News, and after her years of experience in the field as a cameraperson, O'Hearn was an assignment editor for the CBS News bureau in Washington, D.C. She began her broadcasting career at CBS News in 1976.

The awards for her work include five Emmy awards, three Edward R. Murrow awards, a 2000 National Headliner Award for Best Newscast, an Overseas Press Club Award in 1999, and a Peabody Award in 1999.

This year O'Hearn launched the new CNBC talk show, *Topic A with Tina Brown*. O'Hearn and Brown created *Topic A*, and O'Hearn is the executive producer.

O'Hearn holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in broadcast journalism from the University of Maryland.

## O'HEARN OVERVIEW:

- Senior Exec. Producer & Creator, CNN's *American Morning* (2001-2002), coordinated CNN morning coverage in aftermath of 9/11.
- Executive Producer & Creator, *Topic A with Tina Brown*, CNBC
- Executive Vice-President, CNN Business News & CNNfn (2000-2001). Oversaw daily programming on CNNfn, a 24-hour business news channel, and production & creative development of seven CNN business shows where she supervised a staff of 200.
- Executive Producer, *World News Tonight Saturday/Sunday* (1996-2000). Established weekend version of WNT as groundbreaking and award-winning, with one of the most diverse staffs at ABC. In just under four years, while under O'Hearn's creative leadership, *Weekend News* won 8 awards and much acclaim ("...O'Hearn, the executive producer who has made weekend editions of "World News" must-see TV among news junkies." *Hollywood Reporter* March 2000)
- Executive Producer, *Good Morning America/Sunday* (1997-1999). Re-launched GMA Sunday, while exec. producing Weekend News.
- LA Bureau Chief, ABC News -- coordinating coverage of 14 western states, Alaska & Hawaii, supervising 45 reporters, producers & technical staff. Broke stories for ABC while covering such news events as the Rodney King Trial (1993), LA Riots (1993), Malibu Fires, Northridge Earthquake (1994), OJ Simpson Trial (1994-95)
- Producer in Charge of coordination on major events: 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Attack on Pearl Harbor (1991), APEC Summit/Seattle (1993), NH Primary (1988), Gulf War (1990-91), Sydney, Australia's Celebration of the Millennium (ABC 2000)
- International Stories Covered: Tokyo G7 Economic Summit (1979), Cancun North-South Summit (1981), Bonn G7 Summit & Reagan's visit to Bitburg (1985), Gorbachev-Castro meeting in Havana (1989), Paris G7 Economic Summit & Bush in Eastern Europe (Warsaw & Budapest - 1989), Gulf War from Saudi Arabia (ABC Bureau Chief in Dhahran 1990-91), START-2 Treaty Signing in Moscow (January 1993), APEC Meeting in Seattle (1993), Hong Kong Handover (1997), Millennium Celebration at Sydney, (2000).

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Strategic Communicators Outreach Group

I looked at this list.

1. I think it is a good idea to invite them in.
2. See the ones I crossed off.
3. Why don't we get some additional names, like Mary Matalin and Torie Clarke and some others.

Let's get creative!

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/11/03 Di Rita Outreach Group List

DHR:dh  
071403-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20783 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18291

Strategic Communicators Outreach Group

Mr. Haley Barbour  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Barbour Griffith & Rogers  
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20004  
Telephone: (b)(6)  
Fax: [REDACTED]  
Email: [REDACTED]

Dr. William J. Bennett  
Co-Director  
Empower America  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 900  
Washington, DC 20006-5805  
Telephone: (b)(6)  
Fax: [REDACTED]  
Email: [REDACTED]

Mr. Thomas Hale Boggs Jr.  
Chairman  
Patton Boggs LLP  
2550 M Street, NW Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20037  
Telephone: (b)(6)  
Fax: [REDACTED]  
Email: [REDACTED]

7/11

Sec. Def -

I'm thinking of  
assembling these folks  
and picking their  
brains on better  
communicating our  
Iraq activities.

Does that sound  
useful? I'd  
want you to join for  
a short period.

J. R. R. R.  
Larry Di Rocco  
7/11

- ① OK
- ② See that I  
wrote all  
names for me to
- ③ Get some  
names for review.  
Add many more  
Tori, Amber  
other?

Mr. Rich Bond  
Chairman  
Bond & Associates

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax:

Email:

Mr. Joseph A. Califano Jr.  
President and Chairman  
The National Center on Addiction &  
Substance Abuse

Columbia University  
633 Third Avenue, 19<sup>th</sup> Floor  
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Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax:

Email:

Mr. David Carmen  
President and Chief Executive Officer  
The Carmen Group  
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 800 West  
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Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax:

Email:

Mr. Jim Cicconi  
General Council and Executive Vice President for  
Law and Government Affairs

AT&T  
1120 20<sup>th</sup> Street, NW, Suite 1100  
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Telephone: (b)(6)

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Email:

Mr. Mike Deaver  
Vice Chairman  
Edelman Worldwide  
International Square  
1875 I Street, NW, Suite 900  
Washington, DC 20006

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Fax:

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Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
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2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 500  
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Email:

Dr. Ed Fuelner  
President of the Heritage Foundation  
Heritage Foundation  
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Fax:

Email:

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Alexandria, Virginia 22314

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Fax:

Email:

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Email:

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Managing Share Holder  
Winstead & Sechrest  
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Foley & Lardner Law Firm  
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Email:

Mr. Greg Mueller  
President  
Creative Response Concepts  
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Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Worldwide  
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The Honorable L. William Paxon  
Senior Advisor  
Aiken, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, Feld LLP  
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Telephone: (b)(6)

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Email:

~~Mr. John Podesta  
Visiting Professor  
Georgetown University Law Center  
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Washington, DC 20001~~

~~Telephone: (b)(6)~~

~~Fax:~~

~~Email:~~

Mr. Jody Powell  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Powell Tate  
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Washington, DC 20005

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Fax:

Email:



Mr. Scott Reed  
Chairman  
Chesapeake Enterprises  
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Washington, DC 20006  
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Fax:  
Email:

[Redacted contact information]

Mr. Rick Shelby  
Executive Vice President of Public Affairs  
American Gas Association  
400 North Capitol Street, NW, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor  
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Ms. Deborah Steelman  
Vice President Corporate Affairs  
Eli Lilly and Company  
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Telephone: (b)(6)  
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[Redacted contact information]

Ms. Shelia Tate  
Senior Partner  
Powell Tate  
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[Redacted contact information]

Mr. Ben Wattenberg  
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The Honorable Vin Weber  
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Mr. Lawrence O'Donnell

Telephone: (b)(6)

Ms. Cynthia Hudson  
Principal  
August Consulting  
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Alexandria, Virginia 22314

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Mr. Marlin Fitzwater

(b)(6)

Mr. Robert L. Dilenschneider  
Chairman and Founder  
The Dilenschneider Group  
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Mr. Robert E. Cuthriell  
Senior Consultant  
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655 National Press Building  
Washington, DC 20045

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Fax:

Email:

New Additions:

Ms. Marilyn Ware  
Chairman Emeritus  
American Water Works, Incorporated  
125 Lancaster Avenue  
Strasburg, Pennsylvania 17579

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax:

Email: (b)(6)

Mr. Lewis Manilow

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax:

Email:

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quoting Troop Numbers

I said that neither Paul nor I ever said we were going to go down to 50,000 troops. Can you please double check and make sure that is true? I am confident it is true for me, but check on Paul.

Also, please see if we can find out where they got that number. I vaguely remember someone on the Joint Staff speculating about it, and I laughed and said, "Take it out of there. There is no way in the world you can know what we are going to end up with."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-11

7/19  
→ PA/Rhynedance -  
Have we found any thing  
press-wise?  
*D. Rita*  
Larry Di Rita  
7/18

Please respond by 7/18/03

Exec Sec - Check for  
Briefs/  
Slides,  
etc

OMB/?  
Memos?  
Larry Di Rita  
7/18

U20784 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18300

July 14, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quoting POTUS

Please see me about the fact that we put the quote from the President's State of the Union message into my press briefing statement.

In the future, we basically might want to avoid quoting the President on specifics and instead quote the President on macro issues, which I think is probably the better thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-10

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/18/03

U20785 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18301

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Items

Why can't I get an answer back as to whether or not we have ever gotten the President to sign a photograph to Jay Garner, why can't I get a report back as to whether or not there is a signed photograph of the President to Jerry Bremer, and why can't I get a report back as to whether or not there has ever been a certificate for Jerry Bremer as a Presidential Envoy?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-8

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

*7/14*  
~~Because you have an  
inadequate special assistant!  
(with)~~

Larry Di Rita  
*7/17*

U20786 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Corrections

I wonder if I should correct my testimony and my answer to Senator Pryor.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-5

.....

Please respond by 7/18/03

U20787 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18303

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article and Illustration

*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/21*

Here is an article from a paper. I have never seen which paper this came from, but your folks can find out who Philip Terzian is and get the article. I would like to read the article. I would also like to get the illustration. Would you see if you could do that?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Article by Philip Terzian; Illustration: Taylor Jones

DHR:dh  
071403-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/18/03

*7/21*  
*Ser Def -*  
*The article is attached.*  
*No illustration yet.*

*7/18*  
*[Signature]*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/18*

*[Signature]*  
Larry Di Rita  
*7/21*

U20788 /03



# Won over or run

By PHILIP TERZIAN

WASHINGTON

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ILLUSTRATION BY TAYLOR JONES

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## Philip Terzian: General Rumsfeld's war

06/25/2003

WASHINGTON

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Donald Rumsfeld has now achieved Vince Lombardi/George S. Patton status in our national life.

He personifies muscular, can-do, bull-in-the-china-shop America. The sight of Rumsfeld extolling soldiers in camouflage gear, or biting off the heads of the Pentagon press corps, endears him to Americans watching at home. That he is the least popular U.S. cabinet member in Europe, and the most likely to berate the Belgians or French or whomever in public, has done him no harm. Already his management system and P.R. techniques are being packaged and sold as advice for executives. A calendar containing Rumsfeld quotations, or an inspirational plaque sold in airline magazines, cannot be far off.

This is not just an unusual turn of events for a Princeton-educated politician/businessman in his 71st year; it is an amazing transformation. Just two years ago, he was the "Rip van Rummy" of Maureen Dowd's sneering columns in *The New York Times*: a dinosaur from the Nixon-Ford epoch flailing about in the high-tech, freshly sensitized corridors of the Pentagon. Before Sept. 11, 2001, he was widely expected to be the first cabinet member to go, a mildly embarrassing error by George W. Bush. Since 9/11, of course, he has been reinvented as the indispensable civilian warrior.

It would be difficult to disguise the fact that Rumsfeld seems acutely aware of his reputation. His routine press briefings at the Defense Department -- which, from a news standpoint, are not always necessary -- are as much an exercise in force projection as an effort to keep the media informed. His reluctance to impart useful knowledge, and his discursive answers to direct questions, combined with a curious appetite for browbeating favored victims, give the briefings the flavor of theater.

One measure of their cult status is the recent publication of *Pieces of Intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. Rumsfeld*, a thin volume in which author Hart Seely has arranged some of Rumsfeld's more prolix responses in poetic form. It's a one-joke exercise that palls fairly quickly, but some of the unintentional free verse is hilarious. I am reliably informed that Rumsfeld, when advised about the book at a cocktail party, reacted not with amusement or inquisitiveness, but with irritation. Ironical humor, sad to say, is not the defense secretary's strong suit.

The larger irony, however, is that Rumsfeld, for all his cocksure manner and chest-thumping confidence, is not admired quite as fervently inside the Pentagon as out. The Army, for example, is reportedly disturbed by his efforts to "transform" the culture of the armed forces and the way the nation's military business is conducted. Simply stated, Rumsfeld has sought to streamline the composition of the Army by fashioning a smaller, less musclebound, more mobile fighting force. He is not the first civilian leader to exalt guerrilla tactics and special forces over tanks and heavy artillery -- the Kennedy brothers were similarly inclined -- but he is the first to push the concept as far as he has.

This difference of opinion manifested itself most dramatically in the battle within the Pentagon about the number of American soldiers required to conquer Iraq. Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, argued for many more troops than were ultimately deployed, and has warned about the costs of relying too heavily on "special operations," multiple missions, or ignoring the manpower needs of occupation: "Beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division army," he has said. Feelings grew so bitter on the subject that Rumsfeld announced Shinseki's retirement a full year before it came due,

and not a soul from Rumsfeld's office (including Rumsfeld) was invited to attend Shinseki's retirement ceremony -- an unprecedented snub.

The secretary has, in effect, returned the favor: He passed over all the eligible generals and lieutenant generals to bring Gen. Peter Schoomaker -- a special-operations enthusiast -- out of retirement to succeed Shinseki.

To be sure, alienating the top brass is not necessarily evidence of poor judgment. And to our great advantage in World War II, Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall was appointed chief of staff in 1939 over dozens of senior officers. Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a lean, mean fighting machine may well be validated by events. Yet there is evidence that General Shinseki's concerns are not misplaced. The pacification of Afghanistan has proved more onerous than expected, and U.S. soldiers are being shot regularly in Iraq. Beyond that, there is the continuing struggle against al-Qaida, the potential for further engagement in the Middle East and, of course, NATO, Korea, Bosnia, Colombia, etc.

The problem is that the defense secretary's brand of self-assurance -- salutary, even inspiring, in wartime -- is less palatable on other occasions. It's a thin line that separates confidence from presumption, or success from arrogance, and the verdict is a long way from delivery on Donald Rumsfeld.


Philip Terzian, The Journal's associate editor, writes a column from Washington.

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Online at: [http://www.projo.com/opinion/columnists/content/projo\\_20030625\\_25clterz.5dfc9.html](http://www.projo.com/opinion/columnists/content/projo_20030625_25clterz.5dfc9.html)

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if some of your people can get this cartoon.

Thanks.

Attach.

Cartoon: © 2001 Peters—*Dayton Daily News*

DHR:dh  
071403-2

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Please respond by 8/15/03

U20789 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18308



Hope


IWC

Hope  
we will  
Don't  
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say hi

OB  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Keeper of the Flame

I am not going to be able to go to the Keeper of the Flame event Frank Gaffney is hosting.

They are giving the award to Paul. We ought to get a superb letter from me to Paul that has some humor in it and that praises Paul, Doug Feith and the team we have put together. Please get a draft now, so I can look at it and get comfortable with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-1

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20791 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18310

July <sup>14</sup>~~11~~, 2003



TO: Gen. Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: German Deaths in Afghanistan

How many Germans have been killed by enemy action in Afghanistan, and how many have died as a result of non-hostile activities?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071103-6

.....

Please respond by 7/15/03

<sup>7/17</sup>  
RESPONSE ATTACHED

U20792 /03

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD**

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**From:** Reynes COL Joseph Jr (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 15, 2003 10:32 PM  
**To:** 'Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD'  
**Subject:** German Deaths in Afghanistan

Steve,

Secretary Rumsfeld sent Gen Abizaid an e-mail asking "How many Germans have been killed by enemy action in Afghanistan, and how many have died as a result of non-hostile activities?" Unfortunately I was not able to get the information in front of the Boss yet. However, we have coordinated the following information with our German coalition Senior National Representative.

German Casualties as members of the ISAF:

5 KIA

11 KIA non hostile action

I will have an approved CENTCOM position later tonight or early tomorrow morning.

Thanks

Joe Reynes

Li (- C)

Mr. FYI. - If it changes, I will get  
it to you  
COL B



July 11, 2003

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 71

SUBJECT: Signing Ceremonies

Anytime there are Members of Congress for a ceremony of the size we had today, please ask me if I think the Members ought to be brought up for the signing. As you noticed, they expected that, and I am glad I thought of it. They would have been unhappy if we had not invited them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071103-5

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U20793 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18313

July 14, 2003

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Metrics

I looked at these metrics, but I don't see any actual data. This just looks like theory. Are we tracking things weekly and monthly? If so, I want to know what the things we are tracking are and what the data is.

What is the status of all this?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/14/03 SecDef memo to Durnan [0514030-25] re: Metrics

5/30/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Question about metrics from Gus Pagonis Visit on May 14<sup>th</sup>


DHR:dh  
071403-30

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20794 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Army Culture and Transformation

Andy—

The paper by Gen. Paul Gorman was excellent. I do thank you for sending it to me. Please keep things coming like that.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
071403-28

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20795 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18315

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Congressional Relations

I would like to have Senator George Allen down for lunch someday, possibly Senator Chambliss.

Please give me a note. I think I ought to call Trent Lott and see if he would like us to give him a briefing. I notice he is new on the intel committee.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-24

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20796 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/18316

08  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore  
LTG Craddock  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

I think we ought to set up a public affairs and a congressional relations approach for the 9/11 Commission. That is to say, we have to assign someone to the 9/11 Commission to do what legislative liaison does for the Congress.

We have to sensitize Steve Cambone, so we don't get any more bad press as not being cooperative. We have to get a public affairs strategy.

I am concerned we are not handling this well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-23

.....

*Please respond by* 8/1/03

U20797 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18317

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senators McConnell and Santorum

I want to have Mitch McConnell down for lunch someday, and Rick Santorum  
down for lunch someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-22

.....

*Please respond by* 8/1/03

U20798 /03

03  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Slocombe Presentation

Attached is an interesting paper Walt Slocombe sent me that he presented on October 31, 2002.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/31/02 Slocombe outline for GCSP Forum: "Confronting the Axis of Evil: Perspectives on the Use of Force on Iraq"

DHR:dh  
071403-21

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_ 

U20799 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18319

② By Wally Slocombe

Outline for GCSP Forum  
Confronting the Axis of Evil: Perspectives on the Use of Force on Iraq  
Geneva, 31 Oct 02

Honor to have opportunity to participate in this forum to present the US perspective.

Speaking as private citizen, broadly, but not. I hope uncritically supportive of USG position, 11/5

Central problem that I campaign to develop chem., them ever more effectively a

These program are un international law, and in part resolutions. Their continuati against SH and his WMD pr mandates to "declare, destroy the infrastructure for its deve

To let these programs ; for blackmail and coercion in tolerable for the national secu Asia, or the US.

- or for the credibility : community, to let those progr to use them for blackmail and

A military campaign, if be carried out with the support countries that realize that, if a mortal threat to their vital inte

If SH refuses one last opportunity to disarm under UN supervision, there is reason to hope that the UN - acting through the Security Council - will formally authorize military action. If it does not, it will gravely undermine the UN as a serious institution for international security. If in the end, the UN fails to act, the US and other nations will be fully justified in

DOC# 181878 v1 - 10/29/2002


Sir -

This was sent by  
Mr. Slocombe - he

used the attached in

Geneva last week with a

rep. of the Arab League.



Copy sent to D. Rita

111



leading an international coalition to invade Iraq, oust the Saddam regime, and lay the basis for Iraq to emerge as a decent country for its people to live in and a force for stability and progress in the region.

It is important to emphasize that the sole reason the US is considering US of military force is SH's WMD programs. That success in that effort would mean regime change that would lift from the Iraqi people the burden of one of the world's most repressive regimes and eliminate the threat of an ambitious dictator's aggression in an unstable region that contains much of the world's energy resources would be welcome side-effects, but they are not the reason for use of force.

Evidence that SH is building WMD is clear:

Evidence is detailed in the IISS dossier, the reports of the UK government, and US intelligence – and up to 1998 by UNSCOM and IAEA.

Used CW extensively in 80s and retains capability to produce more, plenty of evidence from UNSCOM and defectors as well as unilateral intelligence that the effort continues

Had weaponized anthrax in 91, also retains production capability. Again the evidence is overwhelming that the program continues

Crash program for nuclear weapons in 91, much closer than we (or IAEA) thought. Retained scientists and technicians, Efforts to acquire technology for NW programs

Extensive development work on longer range missiles, UAVs

Concealment and deception in UNSCOM era – consistent pattern of lying, only to be found out by UNSCOM or defectors, new sets of lies/obstruction.

To believe Iraq is not working as hard and fast as possible on WMD requires belief that after a decade plus of effort and concealment that was found by UNSCOM in 1998, he has stopped since.

Instead the evidence is clear that he has continued and accelerated those programs.

Happily those programs are not yet fully complete, especially in respect of nuclear weapons and means for long range delivery—but they are comprehensive, deeply concealed, and clearly aimed at building a massive capability as soon as possible.

The principal danger from these weapons is their potential role as part of Saddam's ambition to dominate the entire region, that they will induce SH to believe that he can pursue his vision of Iraq as the hegemon of the region by coercion and aggression against his weaker neighbors. Iraq's conventional forces, though far weaker than in 1990, as still more than a match for all its neighbors except probably Iran and Turkey, and freed from sanctions, they would become still more powerful. The obstacle to SH regional aggression is realization that an attack on one of Iraq's weaker neighbors would mean massive intervention by others, including the United States. He hopes that he could use his WMD as a shield against serious resistance in the region and, especially, against the US and others intervening to help defend them – as the international coalition did in 1990 and 1991 when he attacked Kuwait.

There is also a troubling potential link between Iraq's WMD programs and the terrorist threat. We saw during the last year in the anthrax letter attacks, on a very small scale, the insidious potential of even very small amounts of biological weapons to disrupt a society. One does not need to believe that Iraq had any direct role in the 9/11 attacks – and there is no real evidence at this point that it did – to recognize to the regime has been deeply involved in terrorism in the past, and that WMD in its hand create a new dimension to the terrorism problem. That dimension is the potential of such weapons in the warehouses of Iraq being used not just to backstop regional aggression but to supply terrorists – both for their own operations and to provide Iraq a means of long range and effective delivery that would otherwise be lacking.

The danger of the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery has rightly been recognized since the end of the Cold War and indeed even before that as central to the long term security of the world community. Iraq is by no means the only WMD threat – but it is the most acute. It presents a frightening combination of:

- Programs that are extensive and well advanced –
- Defiance over a long term and in a variety of ways of clear international obligations – and in particular of treaty commitments and unambiguous UN decisions – this is a challenge to the very concept of the UN as a central institution for international security.
- A regime with an established record of use of illegal weapons and of regional aggression – and of unlimited ambition to dominate the region and repeatedly self-proclaimed willingness to use any means at its disposal for its aims.

There are many instruments in the fight against proliferation. They include:

- Direct inducements and assistance – as in the large scale assistance that the US and other countries provide to Russia and other former Soviet states for destroying and safeguarding their nuclear and other WMD potential. And it includes, in the case of North Korea, actually paying directly for stopping dangerous programs.
- Economic sanctions designed (as should be the case in NK) to raise the cost of continuing WMD programs to unacceptable levels and create an incentive for compliance. The sanctions against Iraq were designed for that purpose, but they have eroded badly – partly because of Iraq's mendacious claim that they – and not Iraqi actions – have been responsible for the suffering of ordinary Iraqis and partly because individual nations have seen advantages to themselves in cooperation with SH sanctions-busting efforts. [In fact, the claims of deaths due to sanctions are demographically impossible, and in Kurdish areas where food has been distributed fairly, mortality has gone down since 1991.]
- Hope for – and steps to foster – political changes that may make possession of WMD no longer a national priority – as in the cases of South Africa, Argentina, and some others – or at least offer hope that possession will not be so great a danger. That hope is perhaps the greatest distinction between Iran and

Iraq in this respect. [It is the judgment that this Iraq regime will never truly renounce WMD that makes the US – since 1998 – conclude that only regime change will really deal with the problem. But Pres. Bush has been clear: Regime change is a means to an end, not an end in itself. However desirable regime change is on various grounds, if SH will genuinely disarm, the US will stay its hand.]

- Fostering restraint in regional conflict –as was done with at least temporary success in the case of Pakistan and India this year.
- Continued deterrence by making clear the immense costs to the attacker of any use of WMD. [Of course, deterrence remains a key to restraining SH, like other adventurers, but serious evidence that he ignores serious threats, not just to his population, but even to his regime. Moreover, the use of WMD for blackmail to backstop regional aggression is not entirely subject of classic deterrence – as we learned repeatedly during the Cold War.]
- Work on direct defenses, both passive and active, to reduce the incentives to acquire, much less use, WMD, and limit the damage if they are used.
- International cooperation on controlling export – legal or illegal – of essential components of a WMD program.
- And finally, international monitoring and supervision of compliance with non-proliferation standards, whether generally, as in the case of NPT parties (who include North Korea and Iraq) and specific measures, notably those applicable to (and accepted by) Iraq as among the conditions of the 1991 suspension of hostilities. [This is, of course, the prime means the UN chose after the Gulf War – and the means that has been consistently defied by SH.]

The issue of use of force is the issue of what to do if all these other means fail – as so far they have in the case of Iraq. The Iraq case is distinct from all the other “axis of evil” – countries with both a record of support of international terrorism and active WMD programs.

In the coming few months the US and the world will have to face up to the question of what we will do about this problem.

Unless SH takes up the final UN offer to disarm, the world has to recognize that the only options it has left are either to eliminate SH WMD programs by military force now, when they are relatively immature – or deal with them later when they have reached full flower

War is a terribly difficult choice – but there is no question as a matter of law, practice, and strategy alike that states are fully justified in using force to forestall a deadly threat.

International law does not require that victims absorb the aggressor's first blow – it is lawful to act with force against a threat that is imminent.

“Imminence” has to be judged in a real world context: In past, attack required visible and extended mobilization; now WMD can be developed and deployed in secrecy (as Iraq is doing) and used w/o meaningful warning

If we wait until SH capability is fully developed and he is in fact about to use it, it will be too late.

This is not a matter that the US imagines it can do or decide alone.

As a matter of principle, the US, like every other nation, must in the end do what it judges necessary and right for its self-defense – but, as a practical matter --

This is an international problem – not just, or even primarily, a US one

There should be open, candid consultation on this common – and very difficult – issue. And the administration's delay in that consultation -- the occasional “go it alone” rhetoric of the some of its supporters – is fair ground for criticism.

However, for the last two months at least, and before making any decisions on use of force, the administration has genuinely pursued such consultation.

The US administration, the US Congress, and the US people all know how important it is that others – both in the region and far distant from it – be part of whatever is done, which means that others must be part of the deliberation and of the decision on what to do.

In that process of consultation and exhaustion of all alternatives to force, the US has accepted the view of many in the international community – and in the US as well – that there should be one last effort through the United Nations at requiring Iraq finally to fulfill its 1991 commitment to end its WMD programs completely and permanently.

Making and carrying out that commitment was a condition of the cease fire at the end of the Gulf War – and it is a commitment that the UN – both UNSCOM and the Security Council -- has repeatedly found Iraq to have defied and violated.

The issue is whether Iraq is now finally ready to end its programs and demonstrate that ending to the world, without obstruction or delay.

The resolution the US is proposing is a demanding one – requiring measures that can determine whether disarmament is real. But to be effective, the standard must be an exacting one. What is required is disarmament, not inspections. This is not a children's game in which Iraq hides and the UN inspectors seek. The function of the inspections is not to discover whether Iraq has really disarmed by clever detective work – though that may be necessary -- but to confirm that it has done so. The burden is on Iraq to show that it has disarmed, not on the UN or the US or anyone else to prove that it has not. For these reasons, complete declarations, unrestricted access to documents, facilities, and people, and cooperation with national intelligence and other sources to provide information, and personal security and freedom of action for the UN monitors are every bit as important as rigorous, absolutely unrestricted inspections.

The burden is on Iraq to demonstrate that it has lived up to its promises to disarm, not on UN inspectors to prove non-compliance.

Given its past record, the chances that Iraq will comply are slight.

But whatever chance there is depends on SH realizing that he and his regime have to choose between complying with the UN demands and losing power – and the only way he will believe he faces that choice is if he knows that defiance will mean military defeat and the end of his regime.

There may be reasonable ground for difference over one resolution or two, over what exact form of UN-speak to use in describing the consequences. That is what is being worked on in NY today.

But it is clear that unless Saddam believes that he will face military action, he won't comply – and he is most likely to believe it if he knows that the US will have strong international –and formal UN – support in building a coalition for military action if he does not comply. And the reality that the US is prepared to rally an ad hoc coalition under US leadership if the UN fails to act contributes to the chance that he will make the right choice.

If this means of achieving disarmament fails (or is rejected by Iraq), the world, and not just the US, must face up to the stark choice we would all then confront – between letting Saddam's programs reach completion and taking military action promptly to stop them and to replace the regime that has insisted on their continuation.

The choice for war should not be taken lightly. It is right and just to say that resort to force should be a last resort –

- because of legitimate concerns about pre-emptive war and regime change as war aims, -- but these are extraordinary circumstances
- because of the costs – certainly in money, probably in lives– that war would entail – but these costs are less than we would face together from inaction and
- because of the risks and uncertainties both in Iraq and elsewhere that would accompany victory – but these problems also pale in comparison with those of inaction. The US recognizes that military success must be followed up by massive and sustained efforts to secure the peace. To that end, the US is committed to join with the international community to devote the necessary resources to the post-war

effort to bring Iraq back into the community of nations, and, indeed to help the Iraq people build a state based on law, democracy, and justice for its diverse population. And it is also committed to support progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict, based on the creation of a Palestinian state genuinely prepared to live permanently in peace with Israel – ending both terrorism and rejectionism on the one hand, and occupation and oppression on the other..

War is never an easy option. But the only other choice would be to stand aside and let an already dangerous potential mature into a formidable weapon for aggression and even terror. That is not an attractive course. I – and I think most Americans – would say it is not an acceptable course –that the very real disadvantages of the choice of military force are greatly outweighed by the disadvantages of letting Saddam perfect his WMD capability – whether that takes a year, two years or ten years.

The American people have no desire for war. The American people, who will inevitably bear most of the financial costs and whose sons and daughters will bear the bulk of the combat risks, know that even more than citizen of other nations. Opinion polls in the US show that the view of the general public is remarkably similar in the US and in Europe – recognition that SH is a grave threat, that the UN-confirmed disarmament alternative should be tried –and that war should come only with strong international support.

The best resolution is for SH to accept the UN mandates genuinely, completely, and permanently to disarm and cease to be a threat to his neighbors and world peace.

But if that does not happen, military force is fully justified, legally, morally, and strategically.

The US has vast military power, and will prevail in any conflict with Iraq, but

We want, and indeed we need, any military operation to have the support and participation of others – not just to share in the direct burdens and risks, but to confirm our own judgment that we need to deal with the problem while there is still time.



Shortly – probably by the end of this year –we will all – Americans, Europeans, the UN, the Gulf states, the entire world – have faced an exacting test of our values, our courage, our solidarity – and our ability to face reality. I am confident we will pass that test together. I shudder to think of the consequences if we fail.

July 14, 2003

OB  
7/21

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lanzilotta's Paper

Please take a look at this note from Larry Lanzilotta. I think it is excellent.

Why don't we have a meeting with the appropriate people, including Pete Aldridge, and have him make a presentation. We can go over his proposals and get some work started on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated Lanzilotta memo to USD(C)

DHR:dh  
071403-19

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Please respond by 8 / 1 / 03

U20800 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18330

Set 186  
Jenny

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

SUBJECT: The Future

P. 10  
Jenny

Here are some quick thoughts.

Work in management reform is endless. Our problem is we are in a target rich environment and need to avoid taking on too many tasks to work on at one time. I do believe what Adm Owens told the SecDef, "transformation is accomplished through the budget," and I believe we need to build on the direction we are going already with the financial management improvement plan. Following that same direction, below are some areas ripe for work:

a. **PPBS Reform.** Cannot be accomplished without major OSD(C) input and direction. This reform takes three parts -- some of which only we can do.

(1) Policy -- an example is changing the termination liability policy will save billions in TOA.

(2) Process -- More of which Secretary of the Navy is working on, but the Combined Program/Budget Review and the new Summer Issue cycle are major steps forward.

(3) Administration -- Simplification of regs, budget exhibits, and procedures - a lot has to be done and it has to be done at the OSD(C) level.

FYDP improvement plan is another excellent example of progress being made - moving to one database and one data call for both budget and POM. We should not let this effort stop because of the split between PA&E and Comptroller.

b. **Move from process analysis to functional analysis.** IBM is looking at our processes. We should move our emphasis from process orientation to functional orientation, for example -- logistics to supply chain. This would have greater impact on how we provide financial services. No separate personnel and pay systems one personnel/pay system. Does DFAS have to do pay at all? Can a provider do not only retired pay but retired and vendor pay. DFAS should start now to decide what capability we need for 2010. Deciding this during a BRAC is way too late.

c. **Reengineer Process.** SecDef recently asked you if it is true we pay \$8 pay for each claim processed. Defense Travel System serves as an excellent example of taking a service and doing an end-to-end reengineer to avoid cost and duplications.

d. **Metrics.** Right now we have seven efforts going on independently. We need to have a strategic plan and move to performance based budgeting -- maybe as part of the PPBS reform effort.

V. 5

- (1) OMB Reviews
- (2) OMB Budget Integration
- (3) President's Management Scorecard
- (4) President's Management Agenda Initiative
- (5) GRPRA
- (6) Dashboard/Instrument Metrics
- (7) Metrics each level down

e. **Freedom to Manage.** Need to get rid of this name, but the idea is the same. Put together a package of reform issues that can be submitted in FY 04. Start now, put it through as a package, then when the SecDef gets asked as to what he needs from Congress we will have a comprehensive package.

We need to reorganize to support this type of aggressive effort. I don't think it is good to call them the DMRD team, but making management reform a permanent part of Comptroller seems to make sense.


I will stop here.



Lawrence J. Lanzillotta

08  
7/21

July 9, 2003

TO: General Myers  
CC: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Poland

I am told the Polish are a little concerned that they don't have air or artillery where they are going to be in Iraq.

We want to make sure they are not left with the impression that they are forbidden from having those capabilities, and we ought to try to find a cooperative solution to work with them.

Please tell me what you propose.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
070803-43

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20801 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18333

July 14, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meeting with Andy Card

Please let me know after you meet with Andy Card, and show me what you plan to talk to him about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-42

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/18/03

U20802 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Speech on Afghanistan

What is the status of this proposal for a speech on Afghanistan?

Thanks.

Attach.

9/25/02 SecDef memo 092502.08c

10/8/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Major Policy Speech on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
071403-38

Please respond by

7/25/03

7/18



→ We wrote one, did not deliver in entirety, used portions of it for other speeches, especially the Intrepid foundation event in January.

*L. Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita

U20803 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18335

SEP 26

NESH  
EF2934  
02/014208c/10/17  
✓

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: September 25, 2002

SUBJECT:

Someone should do a major speech on Afghanistan, explaining where they were, what happened, where they are now and indicating that it is up to the Afghan people, the people in the country, the Afghan people outside the country, and to the people who care about Afghanistan and the Afghan people that they not be returned to the misery they were in before the Taliban were thrown out. It should lay out a forward look as to what needs to be done, how the government has to function, how people have to support the government, how people have to deliver on their promises, how the government has to be wise and earn the support of the people so that they will reject Taliban influence and reject Al Qaeda influence.

We need a good conceptual speech that describes where the responsibility is (and moves the blame if it fails away from the U.S.), namely on the Afghan people and on the international community.

We need to get some markers laid down.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092502 08c

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

10/5

10/15

SecDef -

This outline is a good start. May be a good speech for Nov-Dec timeframe to recognize one-year after Taliban started falling. For you? SecState?

D. Rumsfeld

Larry Di Rite

11-L-0559/OSD/18336

09-25-02 18:17 IN

10/16





INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

OCT -7

EF 2934/LH



EF 2934

I-02/44466 014208

USDP AJ 10/11/02

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

*PMc* 08 OCT 2002

SUBJECT: Major Policy Speech on Afghanistan (U)

- You asked about someone doing a major speech on Afghanistan, and proposed some issues that might be included in it (next under).
- I have given some thoughts in outline form to Mark Thiessen, who I understand is already working on such a speech.
- Bill Luti's staff will collaborate with him as appropriate.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:

Next under Speech snowflake

Tab A Coordination

PDASD/ISA (Peter C.W. Flory)

*copy provided*

Prepared by M. D. Walsh, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DASD/NESA *WJ Luty* 07 OCT 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/18337

## **AFGHANISTAN SPEECH OUTLINE**

### **I. WHERE WERE THEY A YEAR AGO?**

- Afghanistan as political/diplomatic “failed state”.
  - Taliban regime in power.
  - UBL/Al-Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan.
  - Regime isolated, not recognized by majority of world community; sanctioned by UN.
  - Islamic militancy breeding ground.
- Economic/Financial
  - Collapsed economy sector; no trade relations with U.S. and West.
  - Revenue through drug production and cross-border smuggling.
  - Financial support from UBL/overseas Wahhabi elements.
  - Struggling commercial activity in major cities.
- Humanitarian
  - Nationwide famine; growing IDP and refugee populations.
  - Zero to limited NGO/IO aid distribution.
  - U.S. biggest Humanitarian Assistance donor for UN efforts in Afghanistan.
  - Harassment/extortion/killing of international aid workers.
- Social
  - Extensive human rights abuses, including persecution of ethnic and religious minorities.
  - Harsh application of Sharia law; collapse of judicial system.
  - Women’s rights denied.
  - No social mobility; unemployment.
  - Lack of education for women and girls.

## **II. WHAT HAPPENED?**

- U.S. traced responsibility for September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on UBL/Al-Qaeda network, being harbored by Taliban regime.
  - U.S. sought extradition of UBL; when refused, we acted.
  - Struck with vigor, surprise, and purpose on October 7<sup>th</sup>.
  - Month later, Taliban regime collapsed, Al-Qaeda on the run.
  - U.S. concurrently worked to support introduction of new Afghan government.
- Conference in November produced the Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- Agreement outlined structure of interim and future permanent Afghan governments.

## **III. WHERE THEY ARE NOW?**

- Interim government established in Kabul late December 2001, received near-immediate worldwide recognition, seat in UN.
  - Began organizing itself and planning for Emergency Loya Jirga to choose transitional government.
  - Loya Jirga held in June 2002, chose Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA).
  - ATA will establish Afghan government institutions, consolidate private sector re-construction efforts.
- People of Afghanistan taking responsibility for bringing their country back to life through building, commerce, trade, travel, education, health care.
- Simultaneously, they are seeking to reconcile old wounds and new challenges:
  - Nationwide security, law and order,
  - Residual ethnic tensions, regional "warlordism,"
  - Opposition to Karzai government, external interference.

## **IV. WHERE THEY ARE GOING?**

- Bonn Agreement establishes roadmap to permanent government in Afghanistan by 2004.
  - ATA to continue work on establishing bureaucratic and administrative framework of future permanent government.

- Next steps include establishing Constitutional Commission to work on new national constitution, based on constitution of 1963.
- Constitutional Loya Jirga (to be completed by December 2003) to ratify new "broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative" constitution.
- Once constitution adopted, general elections to be held so that new, permanent government assumes power by June 2004.

## **V. WHAT IS THE WAY AHEAD?**


- What needs to be done?
  - Establish the writ of the ATA across Afghanistan.
  - Implement nationwide reconstruction.
  - Field trained Afghan security forces: army, border guards, police.
- Who can help?
  - U.S. pressing UN and international donors to speed up provision of reconstruction assistance.
  - U.S. providing significant assistance on our own through USAID and DOD (reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, support for training army respectively.)
  - Afghans have capacity to meet challenges they face but need the tools to be successful.
- An opportunity and a risk.
  - Rapidity with which Taliban/Al-Qaeda regime fell reflects their shallow roots in Afghan soil.
  - Afghanistan's liberation is an affirmation of the impulse to freedom felt by the mass of Afghans after so many years of war and upheaval.
  - Afghanistan's struggle to re-build itself is clear, unambiguous rejection of Talibanism, terrorism, and oppression of Al-Qaeda.
  - Opportunity is at hand to strengthen Afghanistan and ensure it never reverts to terrorist safe haven again.
  - Will not be automatic – nothing is assured without sustained engagement by not just U.S. and Afghan people, but international community as well.
  - Challenge over the next period is to ensure the opportunity and dispel the risk.

Coordination Page

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	Ms Torie Clarke	Copy provided
SECDEF Speechwriter	Mr Mark Thiessen	Copy provided
Office of Stability Operations (SO/LIC)	Dr Joe Collins	Copy provided
Joint Staff (J5)	Col Oscar Anderson, USA	Copy provided

08  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: LaPorte Memo

What is the status on this memo from LaPorte?

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/16/03 LaPorte memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
071403-39

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20804 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18342

Mr. Secretary,

Per your request, I am listing the critical information needed to successfully execute our operations plans. This first cut constitutes an information baseline that applies to all our current and projected plans. We need better information about the North Korean leadership and how they make decisions; details about the North Korean initiatives, information operations initiatives, and regime goals weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and ability to s Specifically, we need information on the following topics:

*SecDef -*

*Revised memo from Gen Laporte on his WMD-planning information needs - "bullet" format.*

**North Korean Leadership**

- Understand how it works and who are the key players
- Understand how they make, influence, and disseminate information that motivates those decisions
- Identify key leaders who may be sympathetic to regime change and understand how we can approach and support them
- Increase our knowledge of their leadership system, its communications network and its internal security apparatus
- Understand North Korea's vulnerabilities during periods of increased internal instability

*C 2/19 71*

**North Korean Economy**

- Identify source and location of Kim, Jong Il's personal assets - particularly if we want to pursue economic leverage
- Understand the economy, foreign aid and Kim, Jong Il's reward system and how it keeps the Kim regime in power with economic incentives
- Understand how the regime obtains and uses its resources
- Understand North Korea's diplomatic efforts to develop international support and

obtain aid

### **Military Perspective**

- Develop information about North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, proliferation activities, asymmetric capabilities, and ability to sustain its force in war
- Identify which underground facilities are active and what they contain
- Decipher North Korea's new frequency hopping radio and penetrate their fiber optic network
- Decipher North Korea's fledgling cell phone and computer infrastructure

### **Information Operations**

- Develop themes to focus on maintaining North Korea's visibility as an international threat to global stability
- Develop theme to counter North Korea bi-lateral confrontation -- they can only be overwhelmed through comprehensive, international compliance pressure
- Develop theme to internationalize North Korea's human rights record
- Develop theme that links economic aid and reform with the need for verified compliance of international agreements and their pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction

As I have mentioned to you before, I feel confident in our ability to provide indications and warning of a North Korean conventional attack. However, substantive information needed to help us shape policy, prevent or respond to a crisis, requires clearer fidelity. I believe you are offering an effective method to better focus our overall intelligence efforts on filling the information gaps that currently plague us.

Very Respectfully,

Leon LaPorte

11-L-0559/OSD/18344



C 2/18

No Classification in Message Body

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

**From:** LAPORTE, Leon J. GEN (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, February 16, 2003 6:52 AM  
**To:** John. Craddock (E-mail)  
**Cc:** 'Fargotb0 (E-mail); Richard. Myers (E-mail); PETER. PACE (E-mail); George. Casey (E-mail); Stephen. Cambone (E-mail); Douglas\_Feith (E-mail); Stephanie. Sherline (E-mail); (b)(6) pentagon.smil.mil'  
**Subject:** SECDEF REQUEST

Mr. Secretary,

Per your request, I am listing the critical information needed to successfully execute our operations plans. This first cut constitutes an information baseline that applies to all our current and projected plans. We need better information about the North Korean leadership and how they make decisions; details about the North Korean economic situation, diplomatic initiatives and regime goals; and better fidelity on their weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and ability to sustain combat operations.

We need to better understand the North Korean leadership, how it works, who are the key players, how they make or influence decisions, how they disseminate those decisions, and what motivates those decisions. We need to identify key leaders who may be sympathetic to regime change and understand how we can support them. We know this is a hard problem set, but we must increase our knowledge of their leadership system, it's communications network and its internal security apparatus if we hope to take proactive steps to shape North Korean regime change. We need to understand North Korea's vulnerabilities during periods of increased internal instability.

We need to better understand the North Korean economy and the source and location of Kim, Jong Il's personal assets - particularly if we want to pursue economic leverage. Although many analysts state that their economy is failed, the economy, foreign aid and Kim, Jong Il's reward system remain strong enough to keep the Kim regime in power. We must better understand how the regime obtains and uses its resources. We must better understand North Korea's diplomatic efforts to develop international support and obtain aid. North Korea is not the totally isolated state that many believe. It has a complex and deliberate engagement program with nation states throughout Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

From a military perspective, we must develop information about North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, proliferation activities, asymmetric capabilities, and ability to sustain its force in war. We also need to identify which underground facilities are active and what they contain. We need to decipher North Korea's new frequency hopping radio and penetrate their fiber optic network as well as their fledgling cell phone and computer infrastructure. Greater fidelity on these topics will enable us to more rapidly recognize, dissuade or defeat North Korean actions.

Our Information Operations themes need to focus on maintaining North Korea's visibility as an international threat to global stability and whose actions are undermining the international communities non-proliferation mechanisms. North Korea is a master at bi-lateral confrontation. They need to be overwhelmed through comprehensive, international compliance pressure. North Korea's human rights record needs to also be internationalized. Linkage of economic aid and reform, the need for verified compliance of international agreements and their pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction need to be themes in our Information Operations campaign.

As I have mentioned to you before, I feel confident in our ability to

No Classification in Message Body  
11-L-0559/OSD/18345

**No Classification in Message Body**

• provide indications and warning of a North Korean conventional attack. However, substantive information needed to help us shape policy, prevent or respond to a crisis, requires clear fidelity. I believe you are offering an effective method to better focus our overall intelligence efforts on filling the information gaps that currently plague us.

Very Respectfully,  
Leon LaPorte

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DPB

I think I need an appointment with Tillie Fowler, Chris Williams, Doug Feith and you to talk about the Defense Policy Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-37

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

*7/19*  
(b)(6)

*This should be in a folder for his mtg on Monday 7/22.*

*DR*

Larry Di Rita

*7/22*

11-L-0559/OSD/18347 **U20805 /03**

April 30, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD  
UNDER SECRETARY FEITH

FROM: Chris Williams *CAW*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board *help  
T.H.*

*TO SD  
DSD*  
Jaymie Durnan  
*JD*

I respectfully submit the following suggestions regarding the operation of the Defense Policy Board for your consideration.

- The Board's activities are only useful if they serve your needs. Therefore, I recommend that there be a tighter lash-up between the Board chairman and each of you. The Board should only "strap on" those issues that you deem most important and appropriate, and of the highest interest and concern. *mib.  
w/ L.H.*

To accomplish this, there will need to be close coordination and communication between the Board chairman and each of you. Regular meetings (every 4-6 weeks) with each of you to review on-going work and to plan for future activities would help facilitate such coordination and communication.

- The Board should provide analysis, review, and recommendations on a continuing basis. In this regard, I recommend that you consider establishing one or more "subpanels" or "task forces" to augment the regularly scheduled "plenary" meetings of entire Board membership (every 2-3 months). For example, you might wish to consider establishing subpanels of the Board to look at "long-term Asian security challenges" or "defense reform". Such subpanels should meet regularly (every 2-4 weeks) to discuss and debate the issue(s) they've been tasked to assess; their findings and recommendations could be briefed to each of you on an as-requested basis or at the regularly scheduled Board plenary meetings. *7*

Given the pool of talent resident on the Board, I believe it could be used more extensively and on a wider range of topics than can be covered in the existing set-piece, formal 2-day meeting format. And I'm certain that Board members would respond favorably and willingly to the opportunity to provide additional inputs to each of you, in response to your guidance and direction.


- Finally, I believe there can be greater coordination and "cross fertilization" between the Policy Board and the Science Board. In my judgment, there should be Policy Board members on most, if not all, Science Board summer study projects or task forces, and vice versa. Currently, only one or two Policy Board members are invited to participate in Science Board activities, and vice versa. I view this as a missed opportunity. *7*

11-L-0559/OSD/18348

A good example, in my opinion, is the current Science Board review of "Lessons Learned" from Operation Iraqi Freedom, being ably led by Jim McCarthy. Many of the important lessons to be drawn from this conflict will involve the confluence of policy and technology, and the intersection of military strategy and plans and diplomacy. The addition of a few Policy Board members on Jim McCarthy's group just might enhance the product. ?

I hope you find these suggestions helpful. As always, I stand ready to assist you in any way you deem appropriate. Best regards.

July 14, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Kipling Quote

A good quote from Kipling talks about "the savage war of peace." That certainly is appropriate in this environment. I am told another quote is Winston Churchill talking about "the sinews of peace" and the need to stitch them back together.

I found each of these in Paddy Ashdown's paper, which is attached.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/19/03 Ashdown speech to International Rescue Committee

DHR:db  
071403-33

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20806 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18350



**Embargo: 1800 hrs BST, 19 June 2003**

**SPEECH BY THE RT HON PADDY ASHDOWN, HIGH  
REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA, TO THE  
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, LONDON, 19 JUNE  
2003**

*'Broken communities, shattered lives: winning the savage war of peace'*

**Introduction**

Last week, my wife Jane and I spent a night with a displaced Bosnian family in their home near Visegrad.

It's a breathtakingly beautiful spot, high in the mountains, with the Drina river tumbling through the valley a couple of thousand feet below.

Together with our hosts for the night – the Setkic family - we sat sipping tea, watching the sun go down, barely noticing the clouds gathering menacingly on the horizon. The Setkics live in a now decrepit UNHCR tent.

Within a few minutes, we were in the middle of one of the most severe hail storms I have seen.

The hail stones went straight through the canvas of the tent, punching holes in it as though it had been strafed by machine gun fire. We were in for a damp night.

Ahmed and Sibisa Setkic, in their mid-seventies, are refugees from Sarajevo, two of the 2 million refugees and internally displaced spawned by the Bosnian war. For Ahmed, this is the third time his house has been burned down. The first was in 1941 by the Germans. The second was 1944 by the Ustase; and then in 1992, by the Serbian paramilitary warlord, Arkan. He was the worst. He left nothing behind him alive - neither woman, nor child nor animal.

Nevertheless, two years ago Ahmed moved back, cleared his land, planted meagre crops, cleaned his house and started patiently scraping together the

resources to rebuild it. And they are still at it, eight years after hostilities ceased.

Ahmed and Sibisa's plight, like that their country, no longer features on our television screens or on the agenda of key international meetings.

The world's attention has moved on.

First there was Kosovo, then East Timor, then September the 11<sup>th</sup>, then Afghanistan and now Iraq.

But in Bosnia, the slow, unglamorous business of winning what Kipling called "the savage war of peace" continues, day in day out, year in year out; and with each step, so does the parallel task of strengthening not just the security of Bosnia, but of the region, and the wider world. ✓

The problems faced by the Setkic family in that valley on the other side of Europe demonstrate the gargantuan scale of this task; the time it takes to complete; the need for a steady and enduring application of will and resources; the vital role of the international community

They also offer a small example to politicians and policy makers around the world of what foreign policy means at the basic human level. A reminder of why, as we embark on yet another exercise in building peace after war – this time in the Middle East – we must learn the lessons of the past, and learn them quickly.

I will want to return in a moment to some of the lessons we might be able to draw from Bosnia for Iraq, and for other similar missions that inevitably will follow. But before I do so, let me say a word about how we are doing in Bosnia itself.

### **Progress in Bosnia**

There are plenty of sceptics about.

They look at the difficulties Bosnia still faces, from getting its highly complex government structures to function, to the formidable economic challenges, to the rise of organised crime, and they conclude that it is all



hopeless. We have given it our best shot, they argue, and nothing has changed.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Observing progress in Bosnia is a bit like watching grass grow. You have to go away and come back at decent intervals to notice it.

But, after years of heavy-duty international engagement, the country is in far, far better shape than it was when the Dayton agreement was signed. And when one considers the trauma of that war, it is frankly little short of miraculous how much has been achieved.

The worst is behind us in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With a few exceptions the issues we deal with now are not those of conflict, but increasingly the reassuringly familiar challenges of transition, which Hungary and Poland and the other new European democracies have already overcome.

We have to finish the task of course. But if we do so, and I am confident that we shall, we will have demonstrated in Bosnia that it is possible to create a durable peace, even out of the rubble of a vicious ethnic war.

Eight years ago, Bosnia lay torn shattered and near fatally wounded by a four-year war in which a quarter of a million of its four million population lay dead, as Milosevic and Tudjman bartered over its territory. Today Tudjman is dead, Milosevic is in The Hague, and their countries are focused, not on territorial expansion, but on European integration.

At the end of the war, Bosnia had three armies and over 400,000 men under arms; today there are only 16,000 soldiers left, and, by the end of this year, they will be brought under a single system of command and control.

Then, Bosnia had three secret services. By the end of this year, it will only have one.

Even after the Peace Agreement was signed, it would have been unthinkable to travel freely all over the country. Now that is taken for granted.

By the time the fighting stopped, most of the housing stock was heavily damaged. Today the bulk of it has been repaired, and all the utilities are functioning.

Eight years ago, Bosnia was in economic turmoil with no universally accepted currency. We now have a central bank, a stable currency and one of the lowest inflation rates in the Balkans.

And, perhaps the greatest achievement of all, a million of those burned, raped and brutalised from their homes have now returned. We have made a reality, in Bosnia, of a fundamental human right that elsewhere, tragically, only existed on paper– the right of refugees to return home.

We have set a standard and established a precedent. War will never be the same again. Some good has come out of evil.

So progress has been made.

If you come to Sarajevo, as thousands now do each winter for the skiing and each summer for the International Jazz and Film Festivals, you will see some bullet scarred houses to be sure. But you will also see teeming cafes and restaurants, modern homes, and all the accompanying paraphernalia of domestic European life, from garden centres to DIY stores. It's all a far cry from the days when I used to be smuggled through the tunnel and whisked down 'sniper's alley' in an armoured personnel carrier amid the thump of artillery fire, and the crack of rifle shots.

Slowly but surely, Bosnia is becoming a 'normal' country.

It may take time to do, but we are stitching back together what Winston Churchill called the 'sinews of peace'. ✓

Which is why a family like the Setkics are right to hope that they will succeed and their children will, eventually, be able return to the family home.

To be sure, Bosnia still faces huge problems – problems that appear all the more complex and intractable when viewed through the distorting lens of a three-way ethnic prism.

We have more to do, particularly to establish the rule of law and to transform the economy, which is why, when I arrived in Bosnia a year ago, I said my priorities were Justice and Jobs.

But again, out of the glare of the world's media, a lot of hard work is beginning to pay off.

After six years of intensive work, the UN has completed the Herculean task of downsizing, training and certifying the police. The new European Union Police Mission will now see the process through to completion.

We are reforming the judiciary and restructuring the court system.

Together, International and Bosnian lawyers have written new, modern criminal and civil codes that will make it easier to convict the guilty and protect the innocent.

We have beefed up our international criminal intelligence and investigation capacity to assist the police in going after the high level criminals.

And we have created a Special Chamber in the new State Court, staffed with international as well as Bosnian judges and prosecutors, to take on organised crime.

Just last month, this new Chamber took on its first case – the biggest human trafficking trial in Bosnia's history.

On the economic front, we are doing away with the existing indirect tax system, so loved by the criminal and the corrupt, in which different administrations collect different taxes, at different rates. With the help of the European Commission, we will soon have one modern, transparent tax administration to deal with Customs, Excise and a single system of VAT.

And we are tackling the big, structural, supply side reforms that all transition countries have had to tackle, from labour market reform to privatisation, from bankruptcy courts to public administration reform.

## Lessons for elsewhere?

What we have seen in the last few years in Bosnia, and in the Balkans as a whole, is that it really is possible to turn things around. But it requires a marathon effort over many years.

Until recently, of course, so-called 'nation-building' was derided in some quarters as naïve and expensive international 'social work' - Hackney Council on a global scale. The reality is quite the opposite. 'Nation-building' was always a misnomer - we can't build nations, in the sense that the international community can't impose the emotional ties and patriotism that nationhood implies: those develop naturally or not at all. But we can - and we must - help failed states build governing structures that work, because if we don't, those failed states easily turn into warring states or terrorist havens. Changing regimes is not enough; we have to leave behind something better than came before. The teams now re-building Iraq, or Afghanistan, are as much part of the war on terrorism as the B52s or the carrier battle groups.

We have become good - very good - at winning the short, sharp, hi-tech wars of the last two decades. We can now do it almost by numbers.

But we are far less good at the hard, patient, resource-consuming task of building the peace that follows.

Perhaps there are signs that this time the coalition's swift victory in Iraq has started to change that.

The day after Baghdad fell, the telephones in Sarajevo were ringing hot.

My office lost count of the number of calls wanting to know what pointers Bosnia could offer for the task ahead in Iraq.

It turned out that regime change, to misquote Winston Churchill, was not the end, not even the beginning of the end of the matter in Iraq. It was merely the end of the beginning. It was plain that the next stage would, in its own way, be every bit as challenging and sometimes as dangerous: and so it is proving.

So what can our experience in Bosnia and elsewhere offer for Iraq, and for any future missions of that type?

I acknowledge, of course, that the two countries are very different.

We need to be as wary of trying to build the last peace as we should be of fighting the last war. Every situation is different.

Iraq is over ten times bigger than Bosnia. There the war lasted less than 4 weeks; in Bosnia it lasted 4 years.

In Bosnia, nearly all the houses were damaged and much of the infrastructure destroyed. In Iraq, the level of damage has been, proportionately, far less.

Four years of war in Bosnia spawned thousands of war criminals, many of whom are still at large today. Twenty-five years of the Baath party regime will have inflicted a different kind of trauma on the Iraqi people, which will have to be addressed in a different but equally resolute way.

And perhaps most importantly of all, Bosnia, rich in natural beauty, has never been rich in natural resources. Iraq on the other hand is sitting on the second largest oil reserves in the world. The financing of its reconstruction is secure in the long-term, and does not depend exclusively on international charity.

So the differences are great.

But some ingredients are common and some broad lessons worth considering.

### **Principles for peace-making**

There are, I would suggest, seven broad principles – the seven pillars of peace making - that apply more or less universally.

The first principle is the importance of having a good plan and sticking to it. This plan needs to be drawn up, not as an after-thought, but well in advance, as an integral part of the planning for the military campaign. Because the switch from war fighting to peace-building can happen, literally, overnight.

Indeed in Iraq we have seen how the two can proceed almost simultaneously – how troops can be engaged in high intensity conflict one moment, then policing the next, then supervising humanitarian hand-outs and then, at a moment's notice, switch back to war fighting all in a matter of hours. It's very tough for them. These are new skills most soldiers are neither trained for nor used to. But they are skills soldiers are now going to have to learn, for in the early, crucial days in the savage war of peace, until the police arrive and the administrators roll in, everything depends on them.

In Bosnia, we had no such plan for civil reconstruction when the war ended. Indeed it is only in the last few months that we have finally drawn up a Mission Implementation Plan, setting out clearly what we are trying to achieve, how and by when.

It is easy in the chaotic aftermath of conflict to get buffeted from pillar to post, and to lose sight of the key strategic goals. We need to get as good at planning the post war period as we are at planning the war itself.

The second principle is the over-riding priority, as we have discovered in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and now Iraq, of establishing the rule of law - and doing so as quickly as possible. The first hours are crucial.

Crime and corruption follow swiftly in the footsteps of war, like a dark shadow. They seep into the space that wars leave almost as the last firing stops. If the rule of law is not established very swiftly, it will not be long before crime and corruption infect the body politic, contaminate its organs, choke off its resources and threaten its chances of recovery.

This, above all was the mistake we made in Bosnia. We oversaw some major failures at the outset, as the Sarajevo suburbs were forcibly cleared by Serb paramilitaries under the eyes of NATO peace-keepers.

We failed to quell the reprisal attacks on Serbs in the early weeks of NATO's presence in Kosovo, which has had a profound effect on the mission ever since.

And we are plainly encountering similar difficulties in Iraq, despite the heroic efforts of the troops on the ground.

It is much more important to establish the rule of law quickly than to establish democracy quickly. Because without the former, the latter is soon undermined.

In Bosnia, we got these priorities the wrong way round. Perhaps it was because we wanted to get out quickly and we thought elections would help us hand over power and go.

So we insisted on six elections in six years, with the turn-out falling at each one; but in that time we have barely been able to put six major criminals behind bars.

Now we are starting to win this battle for the rule of law in Bosnia. But it is tough, because we are fighting an entrenched enemy that reaches into every corner of politics, government and the state. And it is much tougher than it would have been if we had made the rule of law our number one task in the first year, rather than in the sixth.

The third lesson is that it is vital to go in hard from the start. On the military side, that means establishing your credibility straight away. The more robustly a peacekeeping force deals with any initial challenges to its authority, the fewer challenges there will be in the future. It means having enough troops at the outset, and scaling down as things improve. We had 60,000 in Bosnia at the start. Now there are 12,000, and next year there will be fewer.

On the civilian side, going in hard means starting off with the powers needed to get the job done, rather than having to acquire them later.

In Bosnia my predecessor, the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, famously arrived in Sarajevo with a briefcase full of cash, a handful of staff and that was about it. He had to beg, borrow and steal to get his mission off the ground. He worked wonders; but it was not until after he left that the international community invested his successor with the tough – some would say Draconian – executive powers that the High Representative in Bosnia now possesses.

These include the power to impose legislation and remove officials and politicians obstructing the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Before this, international officials were in the absurd position of having to negotiate

even the most minor issues with all three parties to the conflict, often with the very people who had been both the master-minds of the conflict and its profiteers.

It is better to start off with strong powers, the sooner to relinquish them, than to start with weak powers and to have, too late, to strengthen them.

The fourth principle is that it is vital to start as quickly as possible on the major structural reforms – from putting in place a customs service or reliable tax base, to reforming the police and the civil service, to restructuring and screening the judiciary, to transforming the armed forces. Long-term success always depends on these fundamental reforms: the sooner they are embarked upon, the sooner they will be completed.

It is also vital – and this is my fifth principle – that the international community organises itself in theatre in a manner that can work and take decisions. You can't re-build war torn communities by committee, nor by remote control from several thousand miles away. It has to be done by the people on the ground, and they have to be empowered – and trusted – to drive the process forward.

This may mean – as in Bosnia – more frequent use of coalitions of the willing. I happen to believe that we have stumbled in BiH on an ad hoc arrangement that works well. I report to a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council – essentially the key countries involved in implementing the Dayton Agreement.

The Office of the High Representative was established at Dayton as an ad hoc institution charged with supervising civilian implementation of the peace agreement. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force – SFOR – has responsibility for military and security implementation.

I report twice a year, to the UN Security Council, through the UN Secretary General, but am not formally accountable to them.

The OHR was created outside the UN family as a matter of political expediency, but this arrangement has over time displayed certain advantages.

- It brings with it flexibility in operating, reporting and funding.



- It allows greater freedom of manoeuvre than is accorded to our sister organisation, UNMIK in Kosovo, which is directly accountable to UN structures and has frequently, in the past, been subject to micro management on a five thousand mile screw driver from New York
- The powers accorded to the High Representative – more sweeping than might have been accorded to a UN Head of Mission – have proved indispensable in maintaining the effectiveness of this temporary post.

These features have enabled successive High Representatives to respond quickly and decisively to a broad range of situations that have arisen in the course of peace implementation.

The sixth principle is the importance of an exceptionally close relationship between the military and civilian aspects of peace implementation. Civilians depend on the military if they are to succeed, and the military depend on the civilians: both need each others' skills. Civilian administrators need to know they can count on military support as and when they need it. They need to be able to take on extremists, confident that the military will be there to back them up. And they need the military's help, in everything from mine clearance to ensuring a safe and secure environment for tasks ranging from exhumations to refugee return. This is an area where we have made immense progress in recent years: the military are now much better attuned to the needs of the civilian administrators. The experience British and American troops have had on the streets of Banja Luka and Brcko, in everything from patrolling, to small -scale economic goodwill projects, are being put to good use in Baghdad and Basra.

The final lesson is perhaps the most important.

Indeed it ought not to be a surprise to us at all, since it proved the case after the World War II with the Marshall Plan, and it has proved the case in every major conflict since.

The fact is that building things up takes much longer than knocking them down.

That is true – literally true – of buildings, of homes, of bridges, of power stations.

But it is even more true of institutions – of professional police forces, of independent judiciaries, of courts, of civil services, of legislatures and executives, of free and responsible broadcasters and newspapers, of an active civil society.

Installing the software of a free and open society is a slow business. It cannot be done – as we initially claimed in Bosnia – in a year or so. So we should avoid setting deadlines, and settle in for the long haul. Peace-keeping needs to be measured not in months but decades. In Bosnia, after almost a decade, we are nearing success: but it has taken a huge commitment.

The last American Commander of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia, who became a close and much admired friend, used to have a wonderful Texan word for it.

‘What we need here’, he used to tell me ‘ is sticktoitiveness’.

That’s exactly what we need – in Kosovo, in East Timor, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq: the political will, the unity of purpose, and the sheer stamina as an international community to see the job through to lasting success.

That means staying on, and sticking at it, long after the CNN effect has passed.

Television has become very good at prodding governments to intervene; but it is less good at staying around to make sure they finish the job.

### **Bosnia and the EU**

We have not yet finished that job in Bosnia, although we are making, as I have described, steady headway.

But finish we must.

It is often said that if we withdraw too soon, we put our whole investment at risk. And that is true in so far as it goes.

But what we really need in Bosnia is not a withdrawal strategy; it is a transition strategy. And that is, perhaps, the eighth principle. If peace-

building is to succeed, to take root, to become irreversible, it needs a political destination. For Iraq, that may be a democratic and prosperous state in a peaceful and secure Middle East. For Bosnia, it is Europe.

Bosnia, like the rest of the Balkans, is part of Europe.

What happens in that part of our continent has a direct effect in other parts of our continent.

We are in the same geographical and political boat.

So the political choice facing Europe is clear: either we export stability to the Balkan region or, as we have seen already, the Balkans will export instability to the rest of Europe.

It is as simple – and as stark – as that.

That is why, in Bosnia, and in the rest of the Balkans, the role of the European Union is of such cardinal importance.

The prospect of membership of the Union is perhaps the most powerful force available to us for projecting stability.

We have seen across Central and Eastern Europe what a transformation that prospect can bring about.

It was not inevitable, when the Soviet Empire collapsed, that its aftermath would largely be free of conflict and bloodshed.

That – with the tragic exception of the Balkans – the process was largely peaceful is due in large part to the twin stabilising influences of NATO and the European Union.

The Union has stood like a magnetic pole, towards which the ex-Communist countries from Estonia to Slovakia were able to set their compasses and steer a steady course of reform.

Today, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are on the very threshold of membership.

The Western Balkans are now embarking on the same journey, towards the same destination. But they do so with the advantage of having had the route charted and the dangers marked by others who have gone before.

Tomorrow, I will travel to Thessaloniki for the European Summit. That meeting, organised by the Greek Presidency, will bring together the leaders of the Western Balkan countries with their EU counterparts.

It is an important occasion, because it will offer a chance to the EU to demonstrate conclusively to the Balkan countries that it wants them to join the Union once they have met the necessary standards – no ifs, no buts.

I hope that that message will go out loudly and clearly from Thessaloniki. Because it has not always been heard – or indeed said – as clearly in the past as it might have been.

I recognise the domestic political pressures some EU governments are under on the whole question of enlargement. But Europe bears a special responsibility in the Balkans – for its past, and now for its future.

We cannot change the Balkans' history.

But we can – and we must – help to determine the region's future.

That will require leadership. It will require continued financial commitments on a substantial scale. It will mean maintaining political interest, especially as new and exciting priorities crowd the international agenda.

It will mean making sure the European Union is equipped to take decisions in real time, on issues that ultimately have a direct bearing on its own security. It will mean mobilising all the leverage at the Union's disposal, from the Stabilisation and Association process, to visa bans against those supporting indicted war criminals, to trade policy, to budgetary assistance.

We are using all these instruments much more proactively than in the past, in large part due to the tireless efforts of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, who have done more than anybody else to make the EU an effective reality in the Balkans.

But there is still room for improvement.

The process they have started has to be completed. It still takes too long for a plethora of committees in Brussels to take decisions with the speed required by people in the field. There is still too much arcane institutional theology in place of bold and decisive action. There is still too much institutional rivalry, and not enough sense of operating as a single integrated team. This all hinders, sometimes severely, but always frustratingly, the EU's ability to bring its – potentially immense – political clout to bear, even in the Balkans where there is, unlike in Iraq, a genuinely common European policy, and one that is largely shared on the other side of the Atlantic.

A final thought.

Why are we seemingly endlessly condemned to re-inventing the wheel when it comes to peace keeping? If, as I suspect, peace making is going to be a key element in the exercise of power in the modern world, is there not a case for creating some formal training facility for the world's politicians, diplomats and soldiers, which could also act as a repository of best practice and tribal wisdom in the field? Increasingly, we are finding that these are transferable skills. Just look at the CVs of the people being called on to serve in the civilian administration in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan. They crop up again and again, with good reason.

## **Conclusion**

The challenge for us now in Bosnia is keep up the pace. To finish what we have started.

We, the international community, have made our mistakes there.

Nevertheless, we have stuck at it. And this, coupled with the courage and extraordinary qualities of the decent people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has meant that, despite it all, we are in reach of a time when Bosnia can begin to make its own way in the world as a normal and stable country.

It would, however, be a tragedy to add to Bosnia's tragedies if the painful lessons we have learned there over the last seven years were to be ignored as we struggle with similar problems elsewhere.

For Ahmed and Sibisa Setkic, in their patched up tent on a Balkan mountainside, I believe we are at last beginning to win the savage war of peace in their small country.

I can do no better than hope that we can win that war with fewer errors and greater effectiveness for the tens of thousands of others like them elsewhere in the world.

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

What did v

notas as mentioned here under

Tab J?

Thanks.

Attach.

2/8/03 Cambo

1/13/03 SecDe

1/7/03 USMC

DHR:dh  
071403-48

.....  
Please response

*7/18*  
*Exec Sec.*  
*Check w/*  
*Bob Ferrell*  
*to make sure I'm*  
*right in my note*  
*(it's a PIR issue)*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/18*

*7/19*  
*We kept it ~~at~~ 4 for*  
*the USMC, 6 for the*  
*others.*

U20807 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18367

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USMC Issues

What did we ever do on Congressional fellowship quotas as mentioned here under Tab J?

Thanks.

Attach.

2/8/03 Cambone memo to SecDef  
1/13/03 SecDef memo to Cambone  
1/7/03 USMC Issues

DHR:dh  
071403-48

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

*7/13*  
*We kept it ~~at~~ 4 for*  
*the USMC, 6 for the*  
*others.*



3:36 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: January 13, 2003  
SUBJECT: USMC Issues

Here's a memo that the Commandant gave me on his outcall.

Would you look at it, read it, draft memos from me to whoever I ought to draft memos to, based on this and get things moving.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
011303.28

*Attach: USMC Issues 1/7/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*30 72*


*2/20*

*Sec Def -  
No action by  
you required. Cambone  
status memo attached.  
You may want to mention  
to General Hoge that  
we are working on the items.*

11-L-0559/OSD/18369

*D. R. L.*


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone 

SUBJECT: Gen. Jones Outcall Memo

Following are actions I have taken, or are being taken by others, in response to Gen. Jones' outcall memo of 7 January 2003 (attached).

TAB A: FY 03 Supplemental

- Dov Zackhiem continues to work this with OMB. 

TAB B: FY 2004 Budget End-game

- I raised LPD-17 as a bill payer for Navy. Secretary England would not allow bills to be paid from any source.

➤ The FY 2003 budget had one LPD-17 in FY 07; I proposed a return to that schedule.

➤ Navy and Marines cried foul, because we haven't finished the forcible entry study.

- The fix to "late major decisions" is that we will work from here out as if the FY 05 budget is the baseline.

➤ Dov is working to formalize process beyond FY 05.

TAB C: Joint Advanced Rotorcraft Office

- The program review has initiated a study of non-fixed wing aircraft to replace or supplement current capabilities, including V-22. The proposed office may be a recommendation.

TAB D: Seabasing

- Navy will have more data for FY 05. We allocated substantial reserve funds in FY 07-09 to this concept.

EF-6132 07/31

July 14, 2003

I-03/009790

TO: J.D. Crouch

CC: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: National Security Space Operations

J.D. -

Please pass attachment  
to Steve Cambone  
when you are done w/ it  
J.D.

(b)(6)

Please take a look at these papers. I think they are from Lowell Wood and maybe Kanneman [?]. Tell me if you think there are things in them we ought to be doing that we are not doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The 'Brass Tacks' of Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century National Security Operations in Space," University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  
"National Security Space Operations"

DHR:dh  
071403-50Please respond by 8/8/03

JUL 22 2003

Six-

The papers are from Lowell Wood.

J.D.'s effort w/ Kadish to describe a missile  
defense space program respond to Cowall's initiative.

J.D. aims to be ready to take his proposals  
to Crawford on 8 August - should you approve of them.

SC

7/22

Forwarded  
7/31  
v/r CDR NOSU20

11-L-0559/OSD/18371

U20808 /03

7/22

EF-6132

July 14, 2003

I-03/009790

TO: J.D. Crouch

CC: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: National Security Space Operations

*J.D. - Please pass attachment to Steve Cambone when you are done w/ it. J.D.*

(b)(6)

Please take a look at these papers. I think they are from Lowell Wood and maybe Kanneman [?]. Tell me if you think there are things in them we ought to be doing that we are not doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The 'Brass Tacks' of Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century National Security Operations in Space," University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  
"National Security Space Operations"

DHR:dh  
071403-50

.....  
Please respond by 8/9/03

AUG 28 2003

*Mr. Secretary:*

*I am continuing work on this. Wood has some interesting ideas, some we are already working on. All of them raise space weaponization issues. I will come back to you shortly with a more complete response.*

01-13-03 14:32 11

*Sir,  
Forwarded 8/29  
vr/CDR Nozenzo*

11-L-0559/OSD/18372

J.D. Crouch

*8/29/03*

EF-6132 ✓ 9/25

July 14, 2003

I-03/009790

C 4/25

Snowflake

TO: J.D. Crouch  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

TR

J.D. - Please pass attachment to Steve Cambone when you are done w/ it. There

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: National Security Space Operations

Please take a look at these papers. I think they are from Lowell Wood and maybe Kanneman [?]. Tell me if you think there are things in them we ought to be doing that we are not doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The 'Brass Tacks' of Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century National Security Operations in Space," University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  
"National Security Space Operations"

DHR:dh  
071403-50

.....  
Please respond by 8/9/03

Sir,  
Response attached. I have supporting documentation from the coordinating offices available if desired.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
9/25

11-15-12 11:13 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/18373

## INFO MEMO

USDP *copy made 11/24/03*

I:03/009790-ES

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (J.D. Crouch, II) SEP 24 2003

SUBJECT: Lawrence Livermore Papers on National Security Space Operations

- You asked if there was anything in the *National Security Space Operations* and *Brass Tacks* papers from Lawrence Livermore (Dr. Lowell Wood) "we ought to be doing that we are not doing?" DoD is pursuing all of the capabilities in the Livermore proposal, but not at the speed and cost they propose.
- What is Livermore proposing?
  - To design, develop, and launch 120 30-pound micro-class satellites that can each perform:
    - multispectral surveillance of the earth and space;
    - boost phase intercepts of missiles and reentry vehicles;
    - spacecraft intercept, inspection, and grappling;
    - spacecraft escort/protection functions or spacecraft destruction.
  - To develop and implement the command, control, and communications lash-ups required to tie the system together.
  - To field this initial operational capability (40 satellites) within 18 months of program start at a total program cost slightly above \$3B.
- What is DoD pursuing?
  - DoD is pursuing everything in the Livermore proposal except for the concept of putting so many complex capabilities on a single 30-pound micro-class satellite.

Prepared by: Col (S) Trottier/OASD(NII) Space Policy (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

- In lieu of its full program, Livermore can assist in developing some technologies mentioned in its proposal, including:
  - miniaturization and packaging of multispectral sensors, communications equipment, satellite health/status systems, and antennas.
  - smaller, superhigh-efficiency thrusters optimized for power and on-board fuel conservation
  - intra-satellite constellation command, control, and communications.
- The Livermore program would provide an all-in-one space control and surveillance capability. However, it would do so on a schedule that would demand a large investment and a streamlined acquisition process.
  - Funding this proposal now could also precipitate a debate on space weaponization.
- I recommend my office continue to engage with Livermore to mine the best ideas from proposal and that we look at adjustments we might want to make in the 05 budget late next year.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**COORDINATION:**

OASD(NII) Space Programs

DoD Executive Agent for Space

Missile Defense Agency

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
11-L-0559/OSD/18376



July 14, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Time in Posts

I am convinced that one of the big problems we have in the Department and the world is the short periods of time that Foreign Service officers, military people and civilian leadership in the government serve in their posts.

Why don't we put together a study group to think through those things and see what we might do about it.

Please have Larry Di Rita set a meeting and get three or four of the right people. We can talk about it, and then get you started on it so you can come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-52

.....  
Please respond by

*8/8/03*

U20809 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18377

July 14, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Eritrea

Please get the memorandum of conversation I had or the reporting cable on the meeting I had with the President of Eritrea, and tell me what you think we ought to do to support them. I would like to show some interest in that country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-54

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20810 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18378

03  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Accomplishments, Initiatives and Priorities

I would like to update these three papers.

### Accomplishments

- It should be changed to 30 months.
- Add Iraq under "the war on terrorism," and we should add other relevant items.
- Please put together a small group with Cambone, Feith and Wolfowitz, and get back to me within a week with a revised draft.

### Initiatives

- It seems to me that "new unified command plan" and "new strategic direction" can now be moved over onto accomplishments.
- Change 24 months to 30.
- I think "new strategic relationships" can probably be moved over.
- On "quality of life improvements," I would put down the need for longer tours.
- Where it says "improving DoD processes," I would say, "modernizing."
- I would take out "dramatic," and before we put in output metrics, I would like to see what they are. I cannot find anyone who has any metrics, and if we cannot find them and be happy with them, then I think we ought to put them on the priority list. We probably ought to do that anyway.

U20811 /03

## Priorities

- Let's make it for the next 18 months.
- I think we should mention under "successfully pursue the global war on terrorism" the developing refined post-war approaches and peacekeeping capabilities.
- Bullet #2: I would move the fourth dash up to make it the third dash, I would say "lowest appropriate levels," not "lowest levels," and I would add the word "combined" with joint.
- Bullet #4: I think we need to refocus and strengthen intel capabilities for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Bullet #5: Another dash might be, "to put in place experienced joint warfighters in top posts."
- Bullet #6: I would say, "implement" the revised security assistance approach and under the second dash, I would say, "continue to refashion."
- Bullet #10, I think we ought to say "reorganize DoD and the USG to deal with post-war responsibilities."

Let's get those three things re-done, get a team of people working on them, have a meeting and then give me a revised draft for all three.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/21/03 Accomplishments and Initiatives, 9/17/02 Priorities

DHR:dh  
071403-55

.....

Please respond by 1/25/03

DRAFT

<sup>30</sup>  
**The First 24 Months—Highlights**  
**Accomplishments**

- War on Terrorism—Removed Taliban
  - Risk Taking
  - Innovative
  - Transformational Mindset Change
- Improved Readiness
  - Funding Increases
  - Combat Capability Strengthened
  - Global Posture Adjusted
  - Rapid operational response
- Quadrennial Defense Review
  - New Defense Strategy
  - New Force Sizing Construct
  - New risk balancing focus
- Nuclear Posture Review
  - New Triad
  - Offensive Reductions
- Restructured Missile Defense
  - Refocused R&D Program
  - ABM Treaty Withdrawal
  - Fielding Operational Testing
- Space Commission Recommendations Implemented
- Realistic budgeting/cost estimates
- Key Program Decisions
  - Crusader to FCS/Precision
  - B-1 Modernization
  - Acceleration of UAVs/UCAVs
  - SBIRS Restructuring
  - DD-21 to DD-X
  - SSBN to SSGN
  - Navy “Area-Wide” Restructuring
  - “Ship Swaps”
  - Laser Comms and C4ISR Funding
  - Stryker Brigade Combat Capability

1/21/03

DRAFT

<sup>30</sup>  
**The First 24 Months—Highlights**  
**Initiatives**

- To Do*
- New Unified Command Plan
    - Northern Command
    - JFCOM—Focus on Transformation
    - New Space/Strat Command
    - NATO command structure review
  - New Strategic Direction
    - DoD role in new political military strategy
    - Defense Planning Guidance
    - Contingency Planning Guidance Improving Speed/Relevance of Plans
    - Reserve Component Roles
  - New Strategic Relationships
    - ~~Russia~~, Poland, NATO
    - South Asia and Central Asia/Caucasus
    - Missions determining Coalitions
    - Security Cooperation Planning *to be*
  - Quality of Life Improvements
    - Targeted Pay Raises
    - Housing programs/Privatization
    - Personnel policy Reviews
  - New Focus on stewardship of taxpayer dollars
    - Improved Readiness Standards
    - Acceleration of Acquisition, Spiral Development Technique
    - Navy/Marine TAC Air Consolidation
    - HQs Realignment/Staff reductions *(11.1%)*
    - BRAC
    - Adjust footprint for future *see*
  - *Modernizing* Improving DoD Processes
    - Program/Budget Process consolidation
    - 2-Year cycle inside DoD (no FY'05 build)
    - ~~Dramatic~~ streamlining of Acquisition Regs
    - Operational Availability Work
    - Joint Concepts of Operation Work
    - Output Metrics
      - Built around Balanced Risk and President's Management Agenda
  - Fiscal management initiatives
  - Joint training initiative
  - Stand-up of USD(I) and ASD (Homeland Defense)
- slowly*

1/21/03

*Long term*  
11-L-0559/OSD/18382

18  
Proposed Top Ten Priorities for Next 6-12 Months

1. Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism *more to do with Iraq*
2. Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities
  - Joint CONOPS to integrate air, land, sea, and ISR assets
  - Translate Joint CONOPS into acquisition strategy
  - Bring Jointness to the lowest level *Appropriate*
  - Strengthen joint exercises and joint training *Combined*
3. Transform the Joint Force
  - Lighter, more agile, easily deployable military units
  - Military culture that rewards innovation and risk-taking
4. Optimize Intelligence Capabilities *for 21st Century*
5. Improve Force Manning
  - Develop 21<sup>st</sup> century human resource approach
  - Longer tours, revised career paths, improved language capabilities, etc.
  - *Place only experienced home warfighters in top posts*
6. New Concepts of Global Engagement
  - Revised Security Assurance and Cooperation and Overseas Presence/Basing *Save bank*
  - Fashion new relationships worldwide, update alliances, build coalition of unequal partners, refocus security cooperation and fashion a more relevant footprint *Center to*
7. Counter the Proliferation of WMD
8. Homeland Security
  - Define clearly and organize the Department's role in Homeland Security
9. Streamline DoD Processes
  - Shorten PPBS and acquisition cycle time
  - Financial Management Reform
  - Shorten all DoD processes by 50%
10. Improve Interagency Process, Focus and Integration
  - Rationalize NSC and Homeland Security Council
  - Reduce time to respond and create a surge capability
  - *Reason on DoD the USA & deal with post war responsibility*

✓  
July 14, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POM Process

*9*  
*LAITY DI FINE*  
*7/27*  
What is the status on the decision to make the POM process a biennial event? Are we sticking with it?

Thanks.

DffR:dh  
071403-57

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

*7/27*  
*Response attached*

U20812 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18384


*7/25 TEN*



**INFO MEMO**

July 25, 2003, 10:00AM

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Dov S. Zakheim** 

**SUBJECT: FY 2005 Program and Budget Execution Review**

- We are implementing the biennial Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and budget.
- The upcoming FY 2005 Program and Budget Execution Review will initiate the revised Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process outlined in Management Improvement Decision (MID) 913 (Implementation of a 2-Year Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process). The review will be conducted as the "off-year" of a biennial process.
- In accordance with the guidance contained in MID 913, the Components will only submit changes to the FY 2004 President's Budget baseline, rather than full-up program and budget submissions.
- The Program Review will concentrate on issues greater than \$250 million.
- The Budget Review will concentrate on executability issues and on the evaluation of program performance.
- The Deputy Secretary issued the guidance for the structure of the upcoming FY 2005 review on May 21, 2003.

**COORDINATION:** Attached

Attachment:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/18385

## **COORDINATION SHEET**

PA&E  
Director

Ken Krieg

July 24, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18386

C 7/31

July 14, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
Ken Krieg

CC: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fiscal and Planning Guidance

How do we align fiscal and planning guidance and involve the Services in the strategic objectives of each department?

How do we give the Services an unambiguous statement of OSD priorities, objectives and constraints and do it as early as possible in the budget cycle, so that we can get the entire Department of Defense working towards common objectives?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-58

Forwarded  
7/31  
J/r  
CPR  
Dosenzo

(Aldridge response attached)

Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 8/1

JUL 22 2003

Sir:

For FY05, the DPG issued earlier this year remains in force.

We are already beginning to build the FY06-11 budget/program guidance. Ken Krieg is leading the effort to build the DPG for FY06-11 & publish it early in CY04 (February).

SC (Cambone response)

11-L-0559/OSD/18987 020813 103

7123

Larry Di Rita  
1/31

✓  
July 14, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
Ken Krieg

CC: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fiscal and Planning Guidance

*Larry D. ... 9/2*  
How do we align fiscal and planning guidance and involve the Services in the strategic objectives of each department?

How do we give the Services an unambiguous statement of OSD priorities, objectives and constraints and do it as early as possible in the budget cycle, so that we can get the entire Department of Defense working towards common objectives?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-58

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*8/30*  
*Sec Def -*


*09/3*  
The work Pete Aldridge is doing in his study group will affect this question directly. Pete is preparing to brief the SLRG in September on some recommendations his group has. A memo on the issue is attached. DLR

11-L-0559/QSD/18388

✓  
8/1

July 16, 2003

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Fiscal and Planning Guidance

You copied me on a note to Cambone and Krieg regarding "how do we align fiscal and planning guidance and involve the Services in the strategic objectives of each department."

This is EXACTLY what we are trying to do in the "Joint Defense Capabilities Study" that you have asked me to do. You may recall in the status briefing I gave you on June 19, that we are trying to create a process by which the "joint needs" of the Department are defined up front, and the Services participate in defining how we satisfy these needs.

Our current proposed process permits you to issue "Strategic Planning Guidance" that would define "what the DoD wants to do" by describing the joint capability needs of DoD. After extensive analysis, with Service, OSD and Joint Staff participation, you would issue the "Joint Programming Guidance." This would be a fiscally realistic document that would describe "how" we want to meet the joint needs of the DoD, and would be the input to the Service POMs. The Service POMs would then be integrated and joint from the beginning, and avoid you trying to make them "joint" at the end of the process.

We will get on your calendar to give you another status report and describe some organizational options to make this process work.

Action: None required. Information only.

11-L-0559/OSD/18389



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

POLICY

August 15, 2003

TO: The Secretary

FROM: Ryan Henry and Ken Krieg

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Fiscal and Planning Guidance

Last week at roundtable you asked Steve Cambone about the subject snowflake (attached next under). Steve mentioned that I am working the issue with Ken Krieg. I would like to share Ken's and my thinking on the way ahead for fiscal and planning guidance:

Aligning Fiscal and Planning Guidance

- There are significant innovations already underway to align planning guidance with fiscal reality. The 2004 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) was the first to contain guidance on where DoD Components should take risk (i.e. stop doing things) as well as reduce risk.
- In DPG 06, we will refine this risk guidance further to fine-tune the description of priorities and focus on particular offsets that best align the program to the Strategy.
- Also in DPG 06, we aim to provide rough cost estimates for the proposed guidance and for all the major issue alternatives proposed for your consideration. This will provide a fiscal reality check on the amount of turbulence and offsets required to fund risk reductions in priority areas. It will do so without violating the fundamental tenet of a strategy-driven (vice fiscally-driven) guidance document.
- Finally, we are working to introduce a new innovation in DPG 06 that will further assist in aligning the fiscal and strategy pictures for the mid-term. We intend to provide a set of common mid-term planning assumptions, including fiscal assumptions, that Components will use in building their POMs. By providing these assumptions about the fiscal environment in which their programs are to be executed, we will be enhancing Components' ability to balance among and within the QDR risk areas in accordance with your priorities.

Early Statement of OSD Priorities, Objectives, and Constraints

- The decision this past year to move to a biennial cycle gives the Department significantly more time to focus on planning. This breathing space allowed us to

focus on the Post-War Defense assessment, for example. It also allowed your scarce joint analysis resources to work on ways to better support capabilities based planning, including much more comprehensive, in-depth planning pictures for the near-, mid-, and far-term.

- The extra year therefore has a direct positive effect on our ability to provide DoD Components with the Defense Planning Guidance in a timely manner. Taken together with the strategy and fiscal innovations raised above, the various reforms already underway put us on a rapid path to providing early, unambiguous, fiscally-informed, strategy-driven, and prioritized guidance to all DoD elements.
- Accordingly, we hope to release DPG 06 in the December 2003 timeframe, as opposed to the March-May timeframe which has been the norm in recent years.


cc: Pete Aldridge

Attachment: as stated

8/21  
18392

August 21, 2003

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Joint Defense Capabilities Study

A Senior Level Review Group (SLRG) is being scheduled in September to review the status of the "joint needs" study you asked me to conduct. I will do the briefing. As you may recall, I briefed you on the status last month.

I wanted to give you a preview of what I plan to say at the SLRG:

--we have designed a process which can identify the "joint needs" of the Department and do so in a manner that programs are "born joint". The process will place more emphasis on good up-front planning and should eliminate the year-end "train wreck".

--to implement the process we need to split the Defense Planning Guidance into two parts: 1) a Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) where you would identify the strategy and needs of the DoD and any analytical efforts required to identify future needs, and 2) a Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), coming later, where you would direct the Services what to program in their budgets based on appropriate analytical efforts.

--we need to identify "joint capability categories" that form the basis for performing the analysis that will determine the "joint needs" of DoD. We need to accelerate the efforts to define what we mean by "capability" and to establish the joint capability categories.

--our current organizational structure will not permit us to implement this new process in the most efficient manner. Organizational options will be the next phase of the study.

--in order to affect the preparation of the FY06 President's Budget and the FY06 FYDP we must start this new process now.

--actions on your part will be to: 1) accept the general thrust of the new process; 2) direct the preparation of the SPG to be completed in December 2003; 3) direct the accelerated development of the "capability categories"; and, 4) agree to the identification of the top "joint capability analyses" that will form the input for the preparation of the JPG in March 2004.

You might expect some push-back from parts of the OSD staff on this because it is a change from the current process. However, the study team, with representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services, are all unanimous that this new "joint process" is the right way to go. Dick Myers, whom I also briefed, seems to agree.

Action: None for now. Guidance from you after the SLRG meeting would be helpful.


11-L-0559/OSD/18392



July 14, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: A Sobering Assessment

Attached is a memo from Newt Gingrich, "A Sobering Assessment," which I found interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/8/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: A Sobering Assessment

DHR:dh  
071403-62

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20814 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18393

Copy to Di Rita  
Craddock

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, June 08, 2003 6:20 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil;  
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** stephen.cambone@OSD.mil  
**Subject:** a sobering assessment-newt  
 for secdef,depsecdef  
 from newt 6/08/03

a sobering assessment

the following is from a government official who has studied the Middle East for years and is worth thinking about:

I am worried by the direction we are taking. I have a number of reasons for this concern:

1. We see 9-11 as a transformative event, for our own character and for the rules of international affairs. We see the downing of the Taliban and Saddam as proof that we define these new rules. The change is permanent. But that is not how others see it, not only in the Middle East, but in Europe as well. They see 9-11 as a shock, to which we responded immediately by striking the Taliban and committing ourselves to hitting Iraq. At the moment we did so, which I place roughly in December 2001, the world was open to the idea that we are defining a fundamentally new era. But the long hiatus between the first talk of Iraq – which was taken deadly seriously – and the actual war was seen not as deliberation, but as nervous or confused hesitation. Over the intervening 16 months, that hesitation was increasingly understood as a function of internal division within the US and especially its government, as a dawning fear of prolonged involvement in the region and its costs, and as the slow reemergence of the pre-9-11 character of the US – namely Iraq was perhaps going to be done as the last act of "getting it fully out of our system" rather than the next act in transforming the rules of international politics. So, even before we shot the first shot in Iraq, everyone in the region was already looking beyond Iraq as the real test: to Iran, North Korea and Syria.

6/9/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18394

Regardless of how serious we in fact are with respect to these, the perception is now that Iraq was the last act, and that we were a big oaf stung by a bee and then forgot, rather than a real tiger reawakened.

2. They see confirmation in numerous foreign policy initiatives of the idea that Iraq was the last act:

- a. -hesitation to threaten force to confront North Korea
- b. -sudden backing away of the challenge to Syria, even though it was clear that they behaved with seriously hostile intent during and before the war.
- C. - evincing a confused policy toward Iran and its clearly, publicly stated strategy of destroying us in Iraq. They are not impressed by our reaction to their strategic challenge to us, which they understand as a mixture of warning and engagement.

3. We underestimate our immediate opponents. While we prepared for Iraq, so too did Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the EU. Many were in Iraq for a year – even I would suspect with Iraq' acquiescence – before we came in. I suspect a lot of WMD and its infrastructure left Iraq before the war even began. Unless we turn to Chalabi decisively to take the Iraqi people's natural inclinations to side with us into our strategic tool to dismantle these well-established networks of control within Iraq, then we will be defeated bloodily.

4. Our opponents also see evidence of our returning to pre-9-11 character, namely our vulnerability to manipulation rather than a sober strategic mindset appropriate to the region. As evidence, they see:

- a. -our eagerness to put the conflict with Germany and France behind us and say nothing that indicates we see the EU and the UN Sec Gen as a challenging force.
- B. -that we listened to the Arab elites and returned to attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict as a precondition for securing our interests and establishing our presence in the region. Over the last year, we had focused the region on the idea that we were engaged in a broad struggle to challenge the region's tyrannies and transform the politics of the region. Syria, Iran, Libya, and even Saudi Arabia and Egypt all understood that these terms of debate were one within which they could not win and the US could not lose. These regimes are already despised by their peoples, and by placing ourselves on the side of freedom, we simply could not


lose. But the Middle East has a long literature and history of 3000 years in how the weak and defeated can win: by changing the debate. The story repeats itself -- Queen Esther with King Ahashweros and Sheherazad with King Shahriyar -- and remains a key anecdote in the way generation after generation of Middle Eastern weak defeat their strong, omnipotent adversary. The peace process is a bid by the weak, defeated Arab and Iranian leaderships to change the terms of debate. We can't win and they can't lose. We have fallen into their trap, and it endangers our war on terror and everything else we seek strategically and politically in the region. I cannot but be gravely frightened: our regional strategic position will not survive another entanglement in the morass of the peace process.

3. Finally, in the mid-1990s, the success of an effort such as Ahmad's to oust Saddam would have been sufficient to unlock an uncontrollable regional dynamic. Syria, Iran and Libya were in serious trouble and had not prepared themselves to respond yet. As a result, they had no options against us. But our strategic drift in the region in the mid-1990s -- which included the peace process, our failure to solidify the Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian alliance, establishing a strong Iraqi government under Chalabi, failure to grasp the emerging Saudi/Wahhabi threat and the emergence of strategic convergence of our main adversaries through the creation of a broad terror network which was and continues to be matched by the emergence of a broad WMD acquisition and development network -- has by now left us in such a weak position that Iraq alone could not have unleashed such a dynamic unless it were done fast after Afghanistan, or followed now by another serious challenge to Iran, Syria or North Korea. Unless we deal with these two networks as one, and the regimes that form their core as mortal enemies with which there is no coexistence, then we are facing a meltdown globally in 5-0 years that makes 9-11 itself pale. Instead, we are doing many of the same mistakes we did in the 1990s, as if the pre-9-11 establishment has finally triumphed over the shock of 9-11 and gotten back on its feet. And again, that is how it's understood in the region: that we have returned to pre-9-11 patterns

I write all this with extreme trepidation. This administration has done immensely important things, and we have placed ourselves in a moment of opportunity. I thank our lucky stars

that Bush is President. But if we go in the direction we have started in the last month, then we will be devastated in the region and ejected from it like Britain was a half-century ago. We have not won yet in Iraq, and we cannot do so only within the confines of Iraq. We are in a broad regional, strategic twilight struggle, and trying to move to other issues, such as the peace process, is like trying to move on to resolve the Sudeten problem after only having retaken Sicily in World War II. We have to win the war first, and we can only win it in Tehran, Damascus, Tripoli and Pyongyang.

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meet w/Dolan

I want to see Tony Dolan sometime this week and talk about the Congressional hearing and Meet the Press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-66

.....

*Please respond by* 7/18/03

U20815 /03

July 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Input from Torie

Please ask Torie to check out Katherine O'Hearn and Eileen O'Connor. Send her the background sheets, and see if she can do some checking around and let us know what she thinks.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
071403-64

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/18/03

U20816 /03

DB  
7/21

July 14, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Anthrax

Here is a note from Newt Gingrich quoting an article from *Financial Times*.

Please take a look at it, and tell me if you could dig in and find out what the facts are. If that is true that he did indicate they had anthrax as late as March 19, 2003, that is quite a story.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/3/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Financial Times

DHR:dh  
071403-63

.....  
Please respond by

8/1/03

U20817 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18400



5:41 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 17, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Tony Blair Speech**

I thought Tony Blair's speech was absolutely superb! That is quite a performance he put on.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071703.03

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*7/25/03*

U20818 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18401

July 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kori Schake

Please see me about Kori Schake. She worked for Frank Miller at the White House. Conceivably she could do Mira's job if Mira leaves.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-5

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/25/03

U20819 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18402

July 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reuben Jeffrey

What should we do with Reuben Jeffrey? I think he is a talented guy, and I wouldn't want to have him slip away from us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-6

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

*See Def 7/19*

*We're thinking of him to full-time run the Bremer "Washington office" out of here. He wants to do it, Bremer wants him. Steve H. has some concerns about it, but he has another candidate we also want to*

**U20820 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/18403 *line.*

*D. R. L.*

July 17, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Liberia Paper

*ADVANCE  
COPY SENT*

We have to get that Liberia paper turned around.

You weren't in the meeting, but Feith was. The more I dug into it, the more it was clear to me I didn't agree with it. Finally, in the NSC meeting with the President I just said we are not going to go forward with this because it hasn't been scrubbed properly, and it isn't ready for prime time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-7

.....

Please respond by 7/21/03

*complete  
TEN  
B11*

U20821 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18404

July 17, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator McCain

*Advance  
copy sent*  
*DONE*

I need to see the questions that McCain asked me in the hearing, so that I am ready to talk about them at breakfast. Please get the transcript, look at it and give it to me tonight without fail.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
071703-9

.....  
Please respond by 7/17/03

*Breakfast 7/18  
CNX*

U20822 /03

July 17, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: VCSA Appointment

Is the Vice Chief of Staff an appointment for four years, or just any period I want?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-11

.....

Please respond by 7/21/03

U20823 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18406

**TITLE 10 > Subtitle B > PART I > CHAPTER 305 > Sec. 3034.**[Prev](#) | [Next](#)**Sec. 3034. - Vice Chief of Staff****(a)**

There is a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the general officers of the Army.

**(b)**

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, while so serving, has the grade of general without vacating his permanent grade.

**(c)**

The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties with respect to the Department of the Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him. Orders issued by the Vice Chief of Staff in performing such duties have the same effect as those issued by the Chief of Staff.

**(d)**

When there is a vacancy in the office of Chief of Staff or during the absence or disability of the Chief of Staff -

**(1)**

the Vice Chief of Staff shall perform the duties of the Chief of Staff until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases; or

**(2)**

if there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice Chief of Staff or the Vice Chief of Staff is absent or disabled, unless the President directs otherwise, the most senior officer of the Army in the Army Staff who is not absent or disabled and who is not restricted in performance of duty shall perform the duties of the Chief of Staff until a successor to the Chief of Staff or the Vice Chief of Staff is appointed or until the absence or disability of the Chief of Staff or Vice Chief of Staff ceases, whichever occurs first

Search this title:

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**TITLE 10 > Subtitle B > PART I > CHAPTER 305 > Sec. 3033.**[Prev](#) | [Next](#)**Sec. 3033. - Chief of Staff****(a)****(1)**

There is a Chief of Staff of the Army, appointed for a period of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the general officers of the Army. He serves at the pleasure of the President. In time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress, he may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

**(2)**

The President may appoint an officer as Chief of Staff only if -

**(A)**

the officer has had significant experience in joint duty assignments; and

**(B)**

such experience includes at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) as a general officer.

**(3)**

The President may waive paragraph (2) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

**(b)**

The Chief of Staff, while so serving, has the grade of general without vacating his permanent grade.

**(c)**

Except as otherwise prescribed by law and subject to section 3013(f) of this title, the Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary.

Search this title:

Search Title 10

[Notes](#)[Updates](#)[Parallel authorities](#)[\(CFR\)](#)[Topical references](#)



DONE

July 17, 2003

ADVANCE  
C2M GIVEN

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Redeployment and Rotation of Forces

Saturday I want to get the redeployment and rotation of forces thing solved one way or another, even if it takes all day. Let's start at 8:30 a.m.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-2

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U20825 /03

7/17  
1800

July 17, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: List for Press Avail

ADVANCE  
UNCLASSIFIED

I want to pull together for the press briefing tomorrow a list of all the good things that have happened out there in Iraq—the schools that have been opened, the hospitals that have been opened, the police put on the street, the patrols that have been made, and the like—to balance it against what has been lost.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071703-13

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

7/18

7/19  
Don

- Chris Willcox / Don Meyers

~~Let's start~~

Please Compile a stack on what I already available here / CPT.

Attachat

- D.

7/17

Don't we have a product that has all this info closer than 1st 2 pages?

11-L-0559/OSD/18410

Larry Di Rita

7/17  
U20826 /03

Larry Di Rita  
7/17

## **GOOD THINGS HAPPENING IN IRAQ**

30,000 Iraqi Police Force (IPF) officers have reported back to work and police will now be paid almost double what they were under Saddam.

The Basra River Service (river police) are up and running (since 19 June), using former members of the Iraqi Armed Forces. So far 500 men are trained and put to work.

All refineries are working. Production ramping up. Oil revenues will be paid to the Iraqi Development Fund, held by the Central bank of Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Coalition started a Free Fuel Push, distributing approximately 5,000 gallons of fuel to hundreds of Iraqi citizens in Al Fallujah.

24 of 28 hospitals are operational and 15 health clinics are open and stocked with appropriate drugs. We have facilitated an immunization program, with over 3,000 immunizations to date.

In Baghdad, the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade delivered medical supplies to the new Baghdad Public Health Clinic #1 in the Karadah municipality. The supplies meet the immediate needs of the clinic to conduct operations.

Public education; 98 percent of all schools have been reopened. We have established multiple projects to improve the schools' infrastructure, to include painting, refurbishing, and purchasing of new desks and several other materials. Teachers' pay has been quadrupled compared to that under Saddam.

There is a flourishing free press, with well over 100 newspapers that have sprung up across Iraq since liberation.

Basra Central Bank reopened on 21 June, allowing payments to be made to 80,000 local pensioners.

By mid June over 8,281 tons of Iraqi ammunition had been consolidated out of Baghdad, with 9 of 23 sites remaining to be cleared. Much of this Iraqi ammunition had been stored by the former regime near or in schools, mosques and hospitals.

In the last six weeks, the Coalition has spent almost a billion dollars on several thousand projects in Iraq, such as irrigation and construction. For example, on the irrigation scheme, we have already hired 3,000 workers, and they have cleared over 350 kilometers of irrigation channels. By the end of the month, we expect to have 50,000 men and women at work on over 5,000 kilometers of irrigation channels.

The Umm Qasr port is now functioning at a much higher capacity than it has for years and Iraq's borders are open to trade and people. We expect to open the airports soon to scheduled traffic for the first time in 12 years. Just yesterday we invited applications from air carriers to operate to and from Iraq.

All Baghdad post offices are operating. Postal services to Kuwait have resumed--first time in 12 years.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment working in partnership with the World Food Program provided food. Units of the 3rd ACR delivered a total of 23,000 meals to six area hospitals.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment continued to issue Humanitarian Daily Rations from the World Food Bank Organization to area hospitals feeding the sick, wounded, women and children. The Regiment also delivered food to the people of the Al Anbar Province, Trebil and Ar Ramadi. The 3rd ACR engineers collected in the area of operation, 111 truckloads of trash and debris for a total of 1,588 truckloads to date.

In Fallujah, the 3rd Infantry Division's engineers worked on improvements to Al Fallujah Hospital's electrical and water chlorination systems.

Sunday's humanitarian missions included delivery of fuel and thousands of gallons of water, along with well repairs and removal of ordnance.

Troops from the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division began repairing windows, doors and repainting the Al Mothana Youth center in Mosul. It was previously occupied and damaged by Saddam Fedeyeen but has now been returned to the Mosul community and will soon feature an Olympic Parks and an Arts and Crafts facility.

In Fallujah, the 490th Civil Affairs Battalion distributed 3,000 gallons of potable water to residents due to the 40 water main breaks. Engineers are making repairs to these main breaks to restore water distribution to the area. In Mosul, the 4th Infantry Division completed repairs to two wells in Yzedi towns. These towns had never had their own water source.

Third Infantry Division Support Command assisted in the restoration of clean water to the towns of Al Janabai and Al Qaqaa providing water to more than 2,200 families. They also aided in plumbing repairs and construction of new fences at an elementary school and middle school.

Third Infantry Division engineers continued to clear unexploded ordnance. A total of 56 sites throughout the country, consisting of more than 4,200 pieces of ordnance have been destroyed to date. In Baghdad, the 1st Armored Division delivered 1,200 gallons of diesel and performed preventive maintenance on a generator at Al-Najat orphanage.

In Baghdad, the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade delivered medical supplies to the new Baghdad Public Health Clinic #1 in the Karadah municipality. The supplies meet the immediate needs of the clinic to conduct operations.

In Fallujah, the 3rd Infantry Division's engineers worked on improvements to Al Fallujah Hospital's electrical and water chlorination systems.

The 418th Civil Affairs Battalion completed the Tikrit Women's College project. The unit provided the college with paper, light bulbs, ceiling fans, a refrigerator, two safes, several calculators and school supplies.

The 1st Armored Division humanitarian activities included meeting with artist and vendors to discuss the opening of the Baghdad Zawra Park Zoo. The division's major ongoing projects include monitoring fuel distribution, solid waste collection, salary payments, medical supply distribution, food distribution and coordinating supplies for the upcoming student exams.

In As Sulaymaniyah, the Coalition completed a project to purchase \$1,500 of medical supplies for the municipality of Bayinjan. The supplies will last for four months in the Bayinjan Clinic.

In Al Fallujah, the Coalition delivered basic school supplies to area schools and distributed 3,000 gallons of potable water to the city. Engineers are making repairs to these main breaks to restore water distribution to the area. In Mosul, the 4th Infantry Division completed repairs to two wells in Yzedi towns. These towns never had their own water source.

As a part of Operation Desert Scorpion, the Coalition delivered one and one-half field ambulances worth

of medical supplies to the medical warehouse in Ar Ramadi for distribution among local hospitals.

Third Armored Cavalry Regiment removed 100 truckloads of trash and debris from Al Fallujah.

The Coalition met with Al Zahara neighborhood council in Baghdad and developed a garbage clean-up program to help clean the area of debris and trash.

USAID Daily Iraq Update #84  
July 10, 2003

Headlines

Abuse Prevention Unit (APU): The APU is coordinating with a local human rights organization in Baghdad to publicize the message that saboteurs are destroying Iraq's future.

Airport: The Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) remains on schedule to open on July 15.

Education: USAID private sector partner Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) is finalizing thirty grants to refurbish the school system in the southern region.

Through a USAID grant to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) project, an advisory committee comprising 30 Iraqis representing different ethnic, religious, and regional groups in Iraq, is working with three international consultants to revise and edit math and science textbooks for school grades 1-12. The committee will review all 47 math and science textbooks by August.

Infrastructure: USAID private sector partner Bechtel has submitted recommendations for 37 major projects in seven sectors (ports, airports, power, water, communications, surface transportation, and buildings) for review by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regional heads in advance of final submission to CPA in Baghdad.

Local Governance: USAID partner Cooperative Housing Foundation's (CHF) will assist youth leaders and athletes in Al Hillah to renovate the Al Hillah Youth Sports Club and build a computer learning and training center. Also in Al Hillah, the new community association has decided to work with a women's association to clean up the commercial district.

Public Distribution System (PDS): July's PDS distribution to food agents continues. Beneficiaries will begin picking up rations in the coming days.

Umm Qasr Port: Two Iraqi subcontractors to USAID private sector partner Bechtel began work at the perimeter wall of the Umm Qasr port. There were no reports of security breaches in the 24 hours since the work began.

**Correction to Iraq Daily Update #83**

- Yesterday's Iraq Daily Update reported, "USAID has awarded an additional \$45 million to private sector partner Bechtel to rebuild the communications infrastructure in Iraq, bringing Bechtel's total USAID funding to \$193 million." To clarify, the provision of this \$45 million constitutes an amendment to Bechtel's existing contract; USAID has not awarded an additional contract to Bechtel. The additional \$45 million will be used to conduct emergency repairs to Iraq's existing communications infrastructure.

**Sectors**

**Abuse Prevention Unit (APU)**

- The APU is coordinating with a local human rights organization in Baghdad to publicize the message that saboteurs are destroying Iraq's future. Iraqis reportedly say that one solution to widespread insecurity is to spread this message through a massive publicity campaign that will target the younger generation of Iraqis. The campaign will mobilize Iraqis to speak out and stop sabotage to Coalition efforts; reassure people that they can report injustice in the form of police brutality, corruption, or thievery; and remind Iraqis that the future of Iraq is in their hands. The APU will work with student artists to develop simple slogans superimposed on artistic, culturally meaningful designs for the campaign. The human rights organization will recruit teams of students, both male and female, to distribute approximately 5,000 posters in every neighborhood in Baghdad in an effort to reach the five million plus inhabitants.

**Food**

- The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN World Food Program (WFP) are now conducting a joint Food Crop Supply and Food Aid Needs Assessment to improve the understanding of the food security status and situation of the Iraqi population.
- WFP will also conduct a Food Security Baseline Assessment, which will take the results of the WFP/FAO joint assessment a step further to examine the current and future food security situation and status of the Iraqi population, focusing on two major questions:
  - In terms of individual's food security status, how important is the present Public Distribution System (PDS) ration?
  - In terms of future food security, how important and in what form will a continued PDS ration be needed?

- WFP continues to increase the number of shipments in the Umm Qasr port. This move to increase the use of the Iraqi port is essential to reducing transportation costs and creating more employment for locally based workers in the Iraqi transport industry.

During the month of June, nearly 760,000 metric tons of food items were dispatched into Iraq. ~~This represents an unprecedented performance that not only meets the food requirements for the Iraqi population for 1.5 months, but also surpasses all previous accomplishments by WFP logistics operations.~~ In order to achieve the dispatch of 760,000 metric tons, WFP sustained the rate of 1,000 metric tons dispatched per hour for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, during the entire month.

- According to the DART, the Ration Registration Center (RRC) Manager in Ad Diwaniyah, Al Qadisiyah Governorate confirmed that everyone who applies for a ration card before the end of July's registration deadline will receive one, whether they possess an identification card or not. The RRC manager confirmed that he would clarify the policy with all individuals working at the private assistance desks.
- July distribution of food commodities and wheat flour to food agents has begun in Wasit Governorate. As of July 7, 24 percent of food agents had picked up the food commodities. The governorate currently has a 3,700 metric ton shortfall of wheat flour for the July distribution. WFP has sent an alert regarding the shortfall and expects that wheat flour shipments through the Jordanian corridor will arrive prior to the end of the July distribution period. PDS in Wasit Governorate serves more than 440,000 beneficiaries.

#### **Local Purchase**

- WFP continues to assist the Ministry of Trade (MOT) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with the procurement of 1.2 million metric tons of the local wheat harvest. Independent superintendents contracted by WFP have begun verifying the quantity and quality of the wheat received by the MOT. Approximately 173,000 metric tons of wheat has been procured thus far.
- The US Military Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) reported that smutty (fungus infested) wheat has been a major problem in Wasit Governorate with only 20 percent of the local wheat brought in passing inspection tests. The MOT three-tiered plan that provides a sliding scale payment for wheat with higher levels of smut has assisted a large number of farmers to recover some income for the damaged crops. The Al Kut grain board, one of two in the governorate, has received over 48,000 metric tons of smutty wheat. Farmers in Wasit Governorate reportedly did not plant the rice crop this year



due to lack of adequate electricity supply to provide for sufficient irrigation. The DART learned from the Al Kut silo manager that the rice crop had not been planted since 1999 due to chronic power shortages that prevented proper irrigation.

- CMOC reported on a potential problem developing in Wasit Governorate, the second largest corn-producing governorate in Iraq. In order for the farmers to have a successful corn crop this year, the fields must be planted in the coming weeks; however, farmers are reluctant to begin planting without assurance that there will be sufficient electricity supply to run the pumping stations to provide adequate irrigation. CMOC estimates that at least 25 percent of the corn crop will be lost if more electricity is not supplied to the governorate. In addition, first generation hybrid seeds are not being provided to the farmers this year, so they may resort to using third generation seed saved from previous harvests, the results of which will be a much lower yield. Estimates are that third generation seeds yield 40 percent less than first generation seeds. Fertilizer is also in short supply and may be more expensive than the average farmer can afford.
- CMOC also reported that farmers throughout Wasit Governorate are feeling desperate because the inputs they received from the government in the past have been discontinued, and the direction that they are accustomed to receiving from the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) is no longer given. Farmers are being told that they must make these decisions for themselves and assume risks that they have not had to assume previously, and during a period of significant uncertainty.

**Public Distribution System (PDS)**

- WFP and the Ministry of Trade (MOT) have successfully completed the first nationwide food ration distribution, through the PDS. During the month of June, WFP and the MOT distributed more than 400,000 metric tons of wheat flour, rice, oil, pulses, infant formula, sugar, tea, soap, and detergents to approximately 26 million people throughout Iraq.

**Infrastructure**

- On July 8, USAID private sector partner Bechtel briefed CPA Officials on its Iraq infrastructure reconstruction assessment and implementation recommendations. Approximately \$177 million of the \$680 million contract has already been committed through job orders. Bechtel assessed approximately \$16 billion worth of needs in the Iraqi infrastructure, and has recommended 37 projects in seven sectors (ports, airports, power, water, communications, surface transportation, and buildings). Bechtel is soliciting comments and questions from the regions and Ministries this week for inclusion in a recommendation to CPA for the week of July 14.

**Airports**

- USAID private sector partner Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) recently consulted with Skylink representatives in Al Basrah regarding the opening of the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and the Al Basrah Airport. The BIAP is scheduled to open on July 15. Skylink is currently working on a preparedness plan for the Al Basrah Airport.

**Customs**

- A customs assistance team from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, is establishing basic training facilities in the passenger terminal at Umm Qasr, and computer equipment should be installed shortly. Training of the first 20 Iraqi Customs and Immigration Inspectors will begin on Saturday and will last 6 days. The first group of trained inspectors will be available to begin on-the-job training when the first passenger ferry arrives on July 19.
- The first 125 Customs Police uniforms have been issued, with priority given to front line officers who are currently operational or will become so in the next week. The first sets of uniforms were issued to officers at Umm Qasr Port, Safwan Border Crossing, and Abu Filous Port.
- British 4th Regiment Royal Military Police are working on a project to renovate the Safwan customs facilities using UK Quick Impact funds. In the interim, the Iraqi Customs Police will work out of the Safwan Police station. Once buses can be acquired to transport Civil Customs Inspectors from Umm Qasr to Safwan the Customs Police presence will be augmented by an Inspection facility.

**Communications**

- USAID private sector partner Bechtel will undertake repairs to Iraq's emergency communications infrastructure with a \$45 million increase to the Bechtel contract. Bechtel's scope of work includes procuring and installing a satellite gateway to restore approximately 50 percent of Baghdad's international phone service, purchasing and installing four out of 33 damaged switching exchanges that will make 120,000 phone lines operational by mid-October, and repairing and reconstituting the main north-south fiber optic backbone that will telephonically reconnect approximately 70 percent of Iraq.

**Education**

- As part of the Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and the Stabilization of Education Program (RISE), USAID private sector partner Creative Associates International Inc.'s (CAII) grants management team is now in Iraq and is establishing project offices in Al Basrah, Al Hillah, Baghdad, and Mosul. Thirty grants to refurbish and revitalize the school system at the community level for the southern region are under review. CAII offices have been established in Baghdad and Al Basrah

and are in the process of being established in Mosul and Al Hillah.

- Preparation of salary payment documentation for 70,000 teachers in Baghdad and 4,000 Ministry of Education (MOE) employees will be completed today at the Ministry of Finance (MOF). It is expected that the salaries will be paid beginning on July 12.
- Through a USAID-supported UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) project, an advisory committee comprising 30 Iraqis representing different ethnic, religious, and regional groups in Iraq, are working with three international consultants to revise and edit math and science textbooks for school grades 1-12. The committee will review all 47 math and science textbooks by August. UNESCO's initial assessments indicate that there is a need for 19 million math and science books for grades 1-12. Approximately 5.3 million books, beginning with grades 6, 9, and 12, are scheduled to be delivered by October 1. UNESCO reported that additional books are expected to be distributed by the end of the year. According to USAID's review parameters, the initial review provides that edits in math and science textbooks will primarily remove Saddam Hussein's pictures and speeches, religious prayers, and pictures that promoted religious rituals. The latter are found mainly in elementary school books, and religious material is found in both primary and secondary school books. UNESCO review supervisors also noted that advisory committee members are hesitant to make more extensive changes until an in-depth curriculum reform process has taken place in Iraq. Thus far, the committee has reviewed 21 books and printing is scheduled to begin the week of July 14.

#### **Local Governance**

- USAID private sector partner Research Triangle Institute (RTI) personnel, in collaboration with Iraqi Reconstruction and Development (IRDC) representatives, recently conducted site visits for possible meeting locations for the Baghdad neighborhood Interim Citizens Advisory Councils. In Baghdad, RTI worked with local and international women's groups to explore opportunities for current and future assistance and collaboration.
- USAID partner Cooperative Housing Foundation's (CHF) Babil Governorate Immediate Results Team (IRT) recently reported that youth leaders and athletes from five neighborhoods in Al Hillah elected an eight-member community association which, in turn, selected their first community project, the renovation of the Al Hillah Youth Sports Club and the addition of a Computer Learning and Training Center for the club.

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- In the Bab Al Mashhad neighborhood of Al Hillah, the Business Men's Association recently elected an eight-member community association. In a notably positive development, the newly elected association resolved to join a previously elected women's association, and together worked toward the cleaning and paving of the main commercial district. The community project is scheduled to begin implementation tomorrow.

**Media**

- USAID recently reviewed and edited the proposed template of standard media information submitted by International Relief and Development (IRD), an implementor of USAID's Community Action Program (CAP). As the IRD does not have its own website, the proposed template will provide background information to address basic questions the media may have on the implementation, goals, and expectations of the IRD's CAP program.

**Umm Qasr Port**

- On July 9, two Iraqi subcontractors to USAID private sector partner Bechtel began work at the perimeter wall of the Umm Qasr port. There were no reports of security breaches in the 24 hours since the work began. Salvage operations are progressing slowly. The Turkish contractor continues working to remove the Korean dredger in pieces.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

- The DART recently completed an initial overall analysis of IDPs in northern Iraq, a product of assessments and interviews conducted in four northern governorates during late June and early July. The DART met with government and non-government officials and visited a number of IDP sites in Dahuk, Arbil, As Sulaymaniyah, and At Tamim Governorates. Among the findings are that the most effective support to date has been sanitation and medical treatment and that additional assistance is needed in the water, electricity, and food sectors.
- As of July 7, 40 IDP families from At Tamim and Diyala Governorates (352 individuals) had been registered at the Wasit Governorate RRC. Returning from Iran, 333 refugee families (2941 individuals) have also been registered. The RRC in Wasit Governorate was looted and burned after the war and is in need of major repairs. RRC employees are still doing the majority of their work from their homes due to the poor condition of the RRC building. USAID/OTI is exploring the possibility of renovating the RRC building.

**Security**

- Security in Wasit Governorate continues to be problematic with armed robberies of civilian houses and public buildings and car hijackings. Explosions at former Ba'ath party members houses are also an almost nightly occurrence. WFP is

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reportedly operating at the Phase 4 security level in Al Kut city and Phase 5 outside of the city, limiting operations and precludes any monitoring by WFP staff of the PDS outside of the city center.

- International agencies have been advised to take extreme caution on the road to the BIAP and the surrounding area following a sudden rise in the number of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents in the western suburbs of the city.

Field Activities

- As of July 10, there are a total of 27 DART members in the region, of which 21 are in Iraq.
- As of July 10, there are a total of 26 USAID Mission personnel in the region. In addition, there are more than 280 personnel in Iraq working for USAID's private sector partners.

## PRESS RELEASE

## COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

DATE: 12 July 2003

PR No. 00017

### TEXT AMBASSADOR BREMER'S WEEKLY TV ADDRESS 12 JULY 2003

Masaa al Khair. I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Last week was a good week for Iraq.

- The Baghdad City Advisory Council held its first meeting, and I was honored to attend. Across the country, new Councils have been formed to represent the views of citizens in the management of their towns and cities. Democracy is on the move in Iraq.
- We finalized the state budget for 2003, a budget of over 9 trillion dinars, which includes huge increases in spending across the board, especially on public services. For example, the Ministry of Health will spend in the second half of this year 35 times more on health than it did in the second half of last year under Saddam Hussein.
- We announced new banknotes for Iraq, to deal with all the problems of the existing notes: poor quality or old banknotes, not enough denominations, and two separate currencies in one recently-unified country. These new notes, which will be ready on October 15, will make you rightly proud of your currency again.
- I visited Najaf and announced a number of new development initiatives for that region. Across the whole of Iraq, there is an enormous amount of development and reconstruction work underway, to repair some of the damage done by Saddam's regime, and to invest in your future. To date, the coalition has carried out almost 2000 reconstruction projects across the country, to help make life better for all Iraqis.
- We arrested more remnants of the last regime, include 2 of Saddam Hussein's inner circle: Mizbar Kkudr al-Hadi and Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad. Both were members of the inner circle of bad men responsible for repressing you, the Iraqi people. We now have in custody 34, about two-thirds, of Saddam Hussein's top cohorts.

And we will find the rest in the weeks ahead, including – if they are still alive – Saddam Hussein and his sons. If you have information on any of these people, then please give it to any coalition official – military or civilian.

You will be helping to complete the process of change in this country. You will be helping to bring these

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
PRESS OFFICE

Naheed.mehta@ota.gsi.gov.uk  
11-L-0559/OSD/18422

Page 1 of 2

Formation of  
Tribunal  
(in hands of  
Iraqis)

Payment of Iraq soldiers  
st. today 715

## COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

people to justice. You will receive a financial reward. And we will ensure your safety.

There are a very few Iraqis left who are attacking change and progress in this country. These vicious men target the services you need, like electricity and water. They target, as we work together to transform this country. But rest assured that we are targeting them aggressively. Together, we will defeat them, to ensure that your new freedoms are safe, and that the momentous changes in Iraq in the last few weeks are never reversed. The coalition came as liberators. We have made all Iraqis free, and we will protect and entrench these freedoms.

This week, the new Governing Council will be formed. This will be a momentous step for Iraq:

- The launch of the Governing Council will mean that Iraqis play a more central role in running their country. The Governing Council will be involved in all the significant decisions which the Iraqi Government and the Coalition need to take in the months ahead. The Council will name the new Ministers to lead Iraq's Ministries. And its members will be able to represent Iraq internationally. It will determine the budget for next year.
- The formation of the Governing Council will also mark the start of the process leading to full, free and fair democratic elections in Iraq.
- The Governing Council will bring together, for the first time in Iraq's history, a balanced representative group of political leaders from across this country. It will represent the diversity of Iraq: whether you are Shi'a or Sunni, Arab or Kurd, Baghdadi or Basrawi, man or woman, you will see yourself represented in this council. But, more importantly, the Council as a whole will represent all Iraqis. I look forward to the Council taking decisions on the basis of what is right for all Iraqis.
- One of the Governing Council's first jobs will be to help launch the constitutional process: the process by which you, the Iraqi people, write your new constitution. It will be a constitution to cement your freedoms, and to enable these democratic elections to take place. The constitution will be written by Iraqis and for Iraqis. It will not be written by the Coalition. Once the constitution is written, you, the Iraqi people, will have an opportunity to approve it. Then you will elect a sovereign Iraqi government. And the Coalition's job will be done.

The Governing Council will be an interim body. A body to ensure that all Iraqis' views and needs are properly represented in this interim period. It will be a huge step forward in all the ways I have just described. But the Council is the first step on an important journey for all Iraqis. The end-goal is full, free and fair elections: real democracy and real accountability for the first time in Iraq's political history. That will mark a truly momentous moment for Iraq, when this country can once again lead this region by example, and by its modernity.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
PRESS OFFICE

Naheed.mehra@cdc.gsi.gov.uk

11-L-0559/OSD/18423

Page 2 of 2

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 17, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Report to Congress**

✓  
5:26 PM  
*In reply refer to:*  
**EF-6205**  
**I-03/010058**  
**NESA**

I just looked at this Report to Congress. I notice it doesn't mention the Iraqi Survey Group on the organization page.

It also doesn't mention the governing council or the city council that Iraq has. I wonder why.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071703.02

*Attach: Report to Congress/90 Day Update Report on US Strategy for Relief and Reconstruction in Iraq.*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

7/25/03

*Sir,  
Received late Friday.  
✓R  
CDR Nosenzo  
7/28*

**U20827 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/18424



USDP  
EF-0205  
I-03/010058

**INFO MEMO**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Iraq Reconstruction

You asked why the 90 Day Update Report to Congress on US Strategy for Relief and Reconstruction in Iraq doesn't mention the Iraq Survey Group or the recently formed Governing Council.

- The Report addresses reconstruction activities, as the legislation that requires it prescribes. It intentionally doesn't address military operations, including the Iraq Survey Group.
- The Report doesn't mention the Governing Council because the GC was formed after the report was written. The next report will clearly need to contain more information on governance activities than we've included previously.

*11/11/04 ISA + 0121111*  
*DAI General*  
*8/1/04*  
*6/1/04*

**Report to Congress  
Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental  
Appropriations Act, 2003  
(Public Law 108-11)**

**90 DAY UPDATE REPORT ON  
UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR  
RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ**

Section 1506 (b) of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003,  
(117 STAT. 580) provides:

**(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS-** Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act,  
and every 90 days thereafter until September 30, 2004, the President shall submit to the  
Committees on Appropriations a report that contains:

(1) A list of significant United States Government-funded activities related to  
reconstruction in Iraq that, during the 90-day period ending 15 days prior to the date the  
report is submitted to the Committees on Appropriations--

(A) were initiated; or

(B) were completed.

(2) A list of the significant activities related to reconstruction in Iraq that the President  
anticipates initiating during the 90-day period beginning on the date the report is  
submitted to the Committees on Appropriations, including:

(A) Cost estimates for carrying out the proposed activities.

(B) The source of the funds that will be used to pay such costs.

(3) Updated strategies, if changes are proposed regarding matters included in the reports  
required under subsection (a).

(4) An updated list of the financial pledges and contributions made by foreign  
governments or international organizations to fund activities related to humanitarian,  
governance, and reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

The report that follows has four sections that correspond to the four specified categories listed in  
section 1506(b).

July 18, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Message

*Advance copy  
provided*

I am going to go to Leavenworth next week, and I may also do a press briefing.

I was inspired by Tony Blair's presentation. It is a shame that the country seems not to have been inspired, or at least the press in Washington seems not to have been impressed. They immediately reverted back to the weeds.

I think our job is to try to keep lifting people's heads up and seeing if we can't help get the country and the world to take a deep breath, step back, clear our eyes, lift our heads, look out at the horizon and concentrate on the important things.

Specifically, the global war on terrorism is going to be a long war, but we can't know how long it will be.

We will continue to have to deal with Afghanistan and Iraq, and people will be killed. This is hard stuff. We are in a war.

We do have a choice. The choice is either we do our job, a job that no other country on earth at this time in history is doing or will do, or could do. We cannot fail to meet those responsibilities, tuck in our head and pretend that what happens in the world doesn't matter to us. It does.

We need to take a tougher and somewhat somber tone. We have active opponents who are at war against us. They are killing our people. Our choice is either to keep working to find them, capture them or kill them in Afghanistan, in Iraq and

U20828 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18427

in the other parts of the globe. For if we fail to do so, we will end up having to deal with them here in the United States.

We should make no excuses for how long it will last or for not knowing how long it is going to take. We should make no excuses for how hard it is and will be. We should make no excuses for the fact that things are going to go wrong. This is a very real, hard war.

People have to either sign up for the war or announce that they want to cut and run. Pretending that there is some sort of an easy, safe, warm, comfortable middle ground won't work. It doesn't exist.

Why don't you go to work on a speech or statement. Take some of the concepts from the Blair speech. We might think about taking some of the things people are saying and knocking them down. This business that there is no plan—there is a plan. We had a plan for a lot of things that didn't go wrong—had plans for the oil fields burning, for dams being broken, bridges blown up after a massacre, refugee problem, for a humanitarian crisis that did exist. We had plans for their use of weapons of mass destruction against us, for firing SCUDs into their neighbors. We had plans for all those things, and most of the bad things didn't happen.

We also have plans for the things we are working on. We have plans for the recovery of their oil production so they can have the resources to help reconstruct their country. We have plans for security. It includes coalition forces, some X countries participating now and more to come—Iraqi policemen, Iraqi militia, Iraqi army.

We had plans to deal with the humanitarian crisis, to see that food and water came in, and it has. We had plans to put them on a path towards an evolution of their political system to a representative system.

The point here, Marc, is I want to take the political, economic and the security areas, and list 4, 5 or 6 things we have done—get the schools open, and they are open; plans to get the hospitals working, and they are working. List the numbers.


If you and Tony and others want to come up and talk about this, let's set it up soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-42

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Talk to Gen. Abizaid

You have to talk to Gen. Abizaid and suggest that he systematically read what you and I say, so he knows and we won't have things like this "guerrilla war" problem again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-1

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/25/03

U20829 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18430

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Secretary Principi to Afghanistan and Iraq

Tony Principi would like to go to Afghanistan and Iraq. If he did, he would be able to come back and talk to the veterans in a very helpful way. He is going to have to be responsible for those folks when they get back.

Let's get an arrangement so it works out that he can go both places, maybe with a Congressional delegation or maybe with someone like Wolfowitz, the Chairman or whoever is going out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-5


.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20830 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18431

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Brief Cabinet

I think we should invite the Cabinet in to give them a briefing on Iraq and Afghanistan, an update.

A lot of them have people from their departments out there now who are sending back e-mails, and the Cabinet secretaries need some perspective and context.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-6


.....  
*Please respond by* 8/8/03

U20831 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18432



July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Brad Berkstrom

I want to talk to Brad Berkstrom sometime, who was mentioned in the meeting with Mike Wynne. He sounds to me like he is promotable.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
071803-7

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/1/03

U20832 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18433

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: No Call w/Bremer

I haven't talked to Jerry Bremer all week. That is not good. We have to get a hold of the calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-8

.....

*Please respond by*                     

U20835 /03

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Franks and Woodward

I want a report back after Gen. Franks talks to Bob Woodward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

*Mr. Di Rita -  
The Woodward /  
Gen. Franks mtg  
is scheduled for  
Aug. 6 (in Tampa).  
Sharon  
7/8*

U20836 103 Done 8/5

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Gen. Keane

Jack Keane gave some very eloquent remarks about his visit to Baghdad. I think he might be someone to take down and brief the press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-16

.....  
*Please respond by 7/25/03*

U20837 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18436

July 18, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld }  
SUBJECT: Gen. Keane's Charts

Please get from Gen. Keane the charts he used in the Combatant Commanders' Conference on joint warfighting, with all the backups.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-18

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

✓  
814

U20838 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18437

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Woodward's Book

I think Woodward should talk to Jack Keane, Vern Clark and John Jumper about his book. Please add those folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-20

.....

*Please respond by* 7/15/03


U20839 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18438

July 18, 2003

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Linking Our Congressional Relations w/Combatant Commanders

At the Combatant Commanders' Conference, I listened to the Combatant Commanders. They are constantly interacting with the Congress. We need to get them wired into our Congressional relations activities, so they know all the issues we are worried about on a continuing basis—certainly with respect to the conference that is currently going on, but also year in and year out, day in and day out.

These are talented people who are up there. If they weigh in on training ranges, environmental issues and the personnel system, it will make a big impact, but I don't think we are linking them.

Powell, please come up with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-21


.....

*Please respond by* 8/1/03

U20840 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18439

July 18, 2003


TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: DCI Lunch

What happened to my lunch with George Tenet today? Whose decision was it to cancel it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-22

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

  
Sir,  
The lunch is normally every other week. It is on for next week.  
It was never on for today.

V/K. CCB

U20841 /03



July 18, 2003


TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DCI Lunch

What happened to my lunch with George Tenet today? Whose decision was it to cancel it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-22

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_




Larry Di Rita

7/19

7/18

Sac Def -

We did not have it on for this week. It is next week. We do it bi-weekly (Tenet cancelled last week).



Larry Di Rita

7/18

11-L-0559/OSD/18441

July <sup>18</sup>~~16~~, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Questions from Congress

Whenever I get asked questions that we have to get back to the Congress on, I would like to see the answers to the questions, but I am not seeing them.

Please arrange to see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071503-3

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20842 /03

*Done 8/5*

11-L-0559/OSD/18442

July 18, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Troop Numbers

George Stephanopolous claims you said we were going to have only 50,000 or 60,000 troops in Iraq. Did you or anyone ever say that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071503-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20845 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18443

July 18, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Finding

Does George Tenet need a new finding for post-war Iraq?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071503-12


.....

*Please respond by* 7/25/03

U20844 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18444

July 18, 2003

TO: Ambassador Nick Burns  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Magazine Cover

Here is the *National Review* magazine cover I was referring to. It turns out you were not on the cover, to my surprise. I apologize for the confusion.

Regards,

Attach.  
June 16, 2003 *National Review*

DHR:dh  
071303-14

U20845 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18445

P. JOHNSON  
ON  
MUGGERIDGE

Byron York: Is Bush a Liar?

# NATIONAL REVIEW

## NEOCONSERVATIVES



Ramesh Ponnuru  
ON BUSH'S  
MISUNDERSTOOD  
FOREIGN POLICY

18  
July 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rebuttal

Don't you think we ought to send a letter to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* for this article? It is just wrong on so many counts.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Waiting for Plan B," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 15, 2003.

DHR:dh  
071603-3

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

*7/19*  
→ Bryan Whitman -  
Please draft a  
response that uses the  
basic text on this point.  
Use the text of Feith's  
discussion with Doyle  
McManus, where he  
addressed this head on.  
I'll consider signing.  
*D. R.*

U20846 /03

Larry Di Rita  
11-L-0559/OSD/18447 *7/18*

British, apparently pressed for its inclusion in spite of the CIA's doubts. If so, that would represent one of several instances in which administration statements on Iraq were stretched to reflect the most aggressive interpretation of the intelligence.

Yet that does not mean the decision for war was based on false information. The Africa nugget, after all, formed a small part of the president's argument -- and like other questionable parts of the administration's case, it was widely disputed before the war. The heart of the argument -- that Iraq had repeatedly defied disarmament orders from the United Nations -- was endorsed in December by all 15 members of the U.N. Security Council, and remains indisputable. Similarly, the conclusion that Saddam Hussein had retained chemical and biological weapons was one shared by the Clinton administration as well as every major Western intelligence service. That conclusion is now being challenged, but it hasn't yet been disproved; nor has it been established that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the recent unearthing of designs and machinery for producing bomb-grade material in a scientist's garden seems more suggestive than the discrediting of the report on Niger.

The excessive heat generated by this secondary issue reflects the troubling but, for the moment, unresolvable uncertainty about why Iraq's WMD have not been found. Mounting anxiety in Congress and among the public about how the postwar occupation is going feeds this surrogate debate as well. It is vital that a debate go forward, and that the Bush administration be prepared to respond to it constructively. If intelligence assessments were wrong, Congress must probe why they were, and whether political pressures had any influence.

But first it is necessary to determine the facts. Despite what some of the rhetoric from both sides might suggest, that job has not yet been done.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
July 15, 2003

#### 47. Waiting for Plan B

A BILLION DOLLARS a week. A soldier a day. An excuse a day, a scapegoat a day, a "clarification" a day, a doubt a day.

A day at a time, the costs of American involvement in Iraq continue to mount.

Two weeks ago, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld denied that U.S. troops there were facing an organized guerrilla war. On Sunday, he changed his tune. He said on ABC's "This Week": "It's pretty clear that in a city or an area, there is coordination. We don't have any good evidence that it's nationwide, or even a large region, but it's possible."

It's also possible, he said, that the number of U.S. troops Iraq will have to increase from the current level of 146,000. That tune has changed since last Wednesday, when he said he didn't think more troops would be necessary. He also acknowledged that the Pentagon's estimated cost for keeping all those troops there had doubled, from \$2 billion a month to nearly \$4 billion a month. And that doesn't include the cost of rebuilding the country.

Also last Wednesday, Mr. Rumsfeld spun the administration away from its claims that Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were the prime cause for going to war.

"The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder," Mr. Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our experience on Sept. 11."

So the scorecard now shows Mr. Rumsfeld wrong on the cause, wrong on the nature of the opposition, possibly wrong on troop levels and wrong on costs. We can only hope he was wrong about one other thing he said Sunday on CBS's "Meet the Press": "Are more people going to be killed? I'm afraid that's true."

It becomes ever more apparent that the Bush administration was -- as a former senior White House official told *The Philadelphia Inquirer* -- "staggeringly negligent" in its postwar planning. The *Inquirer* reported that the administration was convinced that Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops with open arms. The one and only postwar plan was to install Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, as Saddam's successor, and then get out of Dodge. When that plan failed, "It was time for Plan B," the *Inquirer* reported, "but there was no Plan B."

Mr. Chalabi was also the source of much of the administration's intelligence on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, which have yet to be found. His critics say he may also have been the source of the now-discredited British intelligence report that Saddam was trying to buy uranium from the African nation of Niger. Mr. Chalabi has denied working with British intelligence.

Because President George W. Bush cited the British report as a *casus belli* in the State of the Union speech in January, it has gotten a lot of attention in the last week. The White House admitted July 8 that the claim was probably not true, and Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet stepped forward to take one for the club.

On Sunday, both Mr. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice defended -- weakly -- Mr. Bush's words as "technically correct," since all he did was attribute the claim to the

British. And President Bill Clinton never had sex with that woman.

On Monday, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said the uproar over the issue was "a bunch of bull." In a way, he has a point. The uranium claim appears to be the smallest part of a very large problem -- the administration, based on information provided by an opportunistic Iraqi politician about whom its own state department and intelligence agency had serious doubts -- sold the Congress and the people of the United States on committing troops and treasure to a country it now has no idea what to do with.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the ranking Democratic on the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that Congress should help investigate the intelligence that led us into war. "There's a lot to look into," he said.

He got that right.

New York Times  
July 16, 2003

#### 48. Nuclear Doubts In The House

Thanks to an unexpected vote by a House appropriations subcommittee, the Bush administration's ill-considered plan to study the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons has been at least temporarily stalled. These warheads, less powerful than those built during the cold war, would be designed to penetrate hardened underground command centers or weapons sites or for possible use in regional conflicts. The plan threatens to blur the line between nuclear and conventional arms. Instead of looking for new uses for nuclear weapons, the administration should be directing its research toward creating advanced conventional bombs capable of the same missions.

Last week the subcommittee, led by David Hobson, an Ohio Republican,

11-L-0559/OSD/18448





PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

11 August 2003

Editor  
*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*  
900 North Tucker Boulevard  
St. Louis, MO 63101-1099

To the Editor:

The assertion in your editorial on July 15, 2003, "Waiting For Plan B," that the Bush administration was negligent in its postwar planning was simplistic and wrong.

In fact, we planned for a wide variety of contingences, many of which did not arise. There is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq. There is no refugee crisis. There is no health crisis. There has been no environmental catastrophe, either from oil well fires or from dam breaks.

Once on the ground, however, we did find an infrastructure neglected for many years by a regime more intent in siphoning off Iraq's wealth to build palaces and pursue weapons of mass destruction than taking care of its own people. The infrastructure was in considerably worse condition than many anticipated. An element of the plans for both hostility and post-hostility phases has been the ability to respond flexibly to the circumstances we find, which in some cases have been different from those we anticipated.

Life is better for the Iraqi people today than under Saddam's tyranny. Essential services -- water, electricity, health care -- are being restored after decades of neglect, security is improving every day. The Iraqi Governing Council is working towards a government that will, for the first time, truly represent the interests of all Iraqis. Having removed a threat to America and the world, we continue to capture the criminals who committed such monstrous crimes against the people of Iraq.

Sincerely,

Bryan G. Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs (Media Operations)



11-L-0559/OSD/18449

July <sup>18</sup>~~16~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Road System

I would like Ray DuBois to come up and explain what is going on with the road system around the Pentagon. I just don't get it.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
071603-5

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20847 /03

July 18<sup>18</sup>, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Chronology and Chart

ADVANCE  
COPY SENT

Please call Tom Franks and see if he can get me the chronology and the Gary Luck chart. He talked to me about both of them and said he wanted me to have them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071603-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03


U20848 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18451

DoA  
SMA  
8/11

July 16, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: TRANSCOM Info

Please get Gen. Handy to give me a copy of his lessons learned at TRANSCOM. Also, if he has quantification of what they did, what they moved over, what they brought back, what it cost, how well it went, how poorly it went—I need some of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071603-11

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03


U20849 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18452

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Colorado Springs

When I go to Colorado Springs I want to break off and go to Eberhart's headquarters, get a briefing on what he is doing and meet some of his people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071603-19

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

7/18  
Dick M'Graw-  
fy 1.

Larry Di Rita

7/18

Done  
TEN  
8/11

U20850 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18453

July 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Brad Berkston

John Handy said Brad Berkston is a fellow he thinks is terrific and who could go in for Diane Morales.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071603-20

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20851 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18454

July 18, 2003

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Senator Levin's Question

Did we ever answer Levin's question as to the 320,000 people who were military people doing civilian jobs. I would like to see the answer, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071503-2

Please respond by

7/26/03

U20852 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18455

8/8 TEN



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

July 23, 2003 11:03 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake--Senator Levin's Question

- You asked about our response to Senator Levin (TAB A).
- TAB B is our answer. The 320,000 estimate that was briefed to you by Arnold Punaro was extracted from a 1997 QDR study guided by the ASD(FMP). It was based on a review of military occupational specialties.
- Shortly after that study was completed, the Department began collecting personnel data for the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) inventory that relates to A-76 reviews. These data provide more depth, telling how many people are doing seemingly non-military essential jobs, but also why they are doing them. The latest inventory substantiates that there are over 380,000 jobs being done by active military that appear to be civilian in nature. However, the Services have designated approximately 332,000 of these as "exempt" from civilianization. We are now debating with the Services regarding the merits of the "exempted" population.
- On July 11, members of my staff briefed SASC minority staff on the origin of 320,000 and the ongoing review of the 332,000. The initial feedback was they expected to see exactly which 320,000 jobs would be converted—stating they were under the impression that those jobs had already been identified. We pointed out that no determination has yet been made. The staffers asked for additional data on the functions being reviewed. We have heard nothing further, but anticipate that any future hearings related to the conversions will include questions on details on the conversions (how many, what jobs and when).

ATTACHMENT(S):

As stated

PREPARED BY: A. Gallant, OUSD(P&R)PI, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	8/1



11-L-0559/OSD/18456

U12716 /03



Senator Levin. My question, though, is does the inventory you referred to total 320,000?

**Response:** The 320,000 military jobs that could be converted to DoD civilian or private sector were first identified in a 1997 study for Deputy Secretary Hamre that was conducted under the auspices of the Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. The study was a review of "Headquarters and Cross-Service Occupational Specialties." It concluded that there were approximately 320,900 military in occupational specialties that were "commercial" in nature. Those occupations are attached. They ranged from General Administration to Recruiting/Counseling, Weather and Information Technology. While these data accurately depicted what military personnel were doing, there was no supporting "requirements" information that illustrated why they were doing it. Subsequent to that 1997 study, the Department began compiling the annual Inventory of Commercial and Inherently Governmental Activities (commonly referred to as the IGCA Inventory). This inventory is based on a set of criteria that categorize military authorizations into: 1) inherently governmental, 2) commercial but exempt from private sector performance, and 3) subject to review for divestiture or private sector performance. The criteria used for this inventory is very explicit, and gives greater visibility into the reasons military manpower is being used in fields other than combat operations.

The latest IGCA inventory (Fiscal Year 2002) is currently being analyzed for accuracy, but initial indications are that there are over 330,000 Active military in commercial activities that DoD Components have identified as exempt from DoD civilian or private sector performance. This group is now under scrutiny by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for possible conversion to either DoD civilian or private sector performance. This evaluation is part of a larger review of the entire workforce that was initiated last year in support of the President's Management Agenda for competitive sourcing. The larger review will eventually cover the entire range of functions performed in support activities in the Department's infrastructure, and will eventually be expanded to address manpower in the operating forces. In addition to the 330,000, three of the Services have identified nearly 50,000 Active military in activities that could be converted to DoD civilian, private sector performance or to the Ready Reserve. However, while we explore, encourage and debate conversion of additional military manpower, we also must consider the changing worldwide military stationing strategies and potential transformation of our force structure, which will affect the outcome. That outcome may also be constrained by federal law, treaty, International Agreement, or other similar requirement.

**MILITARY MANPOWER IN SPECIALTIES  
THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED NON-MILITARY ESSENTIAL**  
Task Force on Defense Reform Report, June 1997

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>All Services</u>
<b>Officers</b>				
Adjutant General/Information Management	596	1,465		2,061
Aerospace Engrg/Maintenance			542	542
Civil Engineer		1,571	1,174	2,745
Communications/Data Automation	641	4,655		5,296
Comptroller	170	1,066		1,236
Contracting	370			370
Foreign Area Officer	570			570
Manpower		261		261
Morale, Welfare & Recreation		333		333
Nuclear Research & Operations	90			90
Oceanography			322	322
Operations Support, Plans & Training	841	1,109		1,950
Operations Research	212			212
Ordnance	200			200
Personnel	236	1,131		1,367
Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs	51			51
Public Affairs	133	375	184	692
Quartermaster/Supply/Transportation/Logistics	717	1,114	3,211	5,042
Research, Development & Acquisition	955	2,545	825	4,325
Security Police		1,013		1,013
Special Duty		1,366		1,366
Weather		709		709
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,782</b>	<b>18,713</b>	<b>6,258</b>	<b>30,753</b>
<b>Enlisted</b>				
Administration				39,769
Auditing & Accounting				3,117
Computer Operations & Analysis				13,539
Construction Equipment				4,457
Electricians				3,645
Electronic Instruments				14,428
Fire Fighting				5,579
Food Service				17,672
Information & Education				3,580
Law Enforcement				26,811
Mechanical & Electrical				2,957
Medical Admin & Logistics				8,172
Motor Vehicle Operators				14,052
Personnel				26,751
Recruiting & Counseling				6,088
Security Guards				17,044
Supply				56,707
Transportation				9,603
Utilities				10,390
Warehousing & Eqpt Handling				5,851
<b>Subtotal</b>				<b>290,212</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>				<b>320,965</b>



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# Briefing for the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff

**July 2003**



# TOPICS

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- Review of 320,000 Active military for conversion to civilian or private sector performance
- Funding for the conversions
- Operation Iraqi Freedom contractor support



# BACKGROUND

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- 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  
Study on Management Headquarters
- 1998 Defense Reform Initiative Directive  
(DRID) 20 Inventory
- 1999 Inherently Governmental and  
Commercial Activities (IGCA) Inventory
- 2002 Briefing to Secretary of Defense
- 2003 Hearings and Speeches



## BACKGROUND – 1997 QDR

---

Secretary Pang guided a special study of *Headquarters and Cross-Service Occupational Specialties*

- Data indicated approximately 320,900 Active military in occupational specialties that were “commercial” in nature
- Data accurately portrayed military personnel occupations – but not the reason the jobs were being performed

Inventory of Commercial and Inherently Governmental Activities (IGCA Inventory) identifies:

- Type of work performed
- Rationale for activities considered military or civilian essential versus private sector performance



# 1997 PANG REPORT-SPECIALTIES

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>All Services</u>
<u>Officers</u>				
Adjutant General/Information Management	596	1,465		2,061
Aerospace Engrg/Maintenance			542	542
Civil Engineer		1,571	1,174	2,745
Communications/Data Automation	641	4,655		5,296
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Foreign Area Officer	570			570
Manpower		261		261
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Nuclear Research & Operations	90			90
Oceanography			322	322
Operations Support, Plans & Training	841	1,109		1,950
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Personnel	236	1,131		1,367
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Security Police		1,013		1,013
Special Duty		1,366		1,366
Weather		709		709
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,782</b>	<b>18,713</b>	<b>6,258</b>	<b>30,753</b>



# 1997 PANG REPORT-SPECIALTIES

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## Enlisted

Administration	39,769
Auditing & Accounting	3,117
Computer Operations & Analysis	13,539
Construction Equipment	4,457
Electricians	3,645
Electronic Instruments	14,428
Fire Fighting	5,579
Food Service	17,672
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Motor Vehicle Operators	14,052
Personnel	26,751
Recruiting & Counseling	6,088
Security Guards	17,044
Supply	56,707
Transportation	9,603
Utilities	10,390
Warehousing & Eqpt Handling	5,851
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>290,212</b>

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<b>Grand total</b>	<b>320,965</b>
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18  
July 16, 2003brief for  
SD

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Tour Credit

After having heard from a number of generals and admirals regarding what they believe to be joint duty, but that receives no joint credit, hearing the same from the Service Chiefs during my meeting with them last month, and after my recurring updates from David Chu, I am convinced we need to fix the joint tour credit problem.

I would like you, working with David, to show me what the law says joint duty is. I have been told Title 10 sets it out.

Next, I would like to see your recommendations—coordinated with the Services, combatant commanders, and whomever else has a piece of this—of what jobs should be given joint credit and those that we should not be giving joint credit. I do not believe we should be constrained by Title 10 on this effort. Please tell me what is right and if it doesn't fit the statute, we will work to change the law.

I would like to see a lay down on this by the first week of August.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071403-45

.....


Please respond by 8/1/03

U20855 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18465

8:52 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 19, 2003

SUBJECT:

I agree with you completely on getting off the yellowcake story.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071903.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

U20854 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18466

9:51 AM

TO: John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 19, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Let's go ahead and get the information on the number of general officers and flag officers per 10,000 people in each of the services.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071903.05

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*7/30/03*

*SIR,*

*7/22/2003  
1540*

*F/403 PER 10K BY SERVICE FOLLOW:*

ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
6.22	5.76	4.59	7.49	6.22

*(excludes CADETS & MIDSHIPMEN)*

*vr/  
Nbsunzo*

**U20855 /03**

**Department of Defense**  
**Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade**  
**May 30, 2003**

Rank/Grade - All	Services				Total
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Services
GENERAL - ADMIRAL	9	9	4	13	35
LT GENERAL - VICE ADMIRAL	41	29	15	39	124
MAJ GENERAL - REAR ADMIRAL (U)	105	69	22	84	280
BRIG GENERAL - REAR ADMIRAL (L)	150	110	40	139	439
COLONEL - CAPTAIN	3,714	3,474	635	3,833	11,656
LIEUTENANT COL - COMMANDER	8,844	6,995	1,793	10,696	28,328
MAJOR - LT COMMANDER	14,282	10,387	3,495	16,100	44,264
CAPTAIN - LIEUTENANT	23,392	16,535	5,181	20,928	66,036
1st LIEUTENANT - LIEUTENANT (JG)	8,998	9,124	3,410	10,908	32,440
2nd LIEUTENANT - ENSIGN	8,217	7,274	2,017	10,021	27,529
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-5	413		104		517
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-4	1,539	338	209		2,086
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-3	3,516	415	505		4,436
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-2	4,478	971	755		6,204
WARRANT OFFICER W-1	2,133		454		2,587
<b>TOTAL OFFICER</b>	<b>79,831</b>	<b>55,730</b>	<b>18,639</b>	<b>72,761</b>	<b>226,961</b>
E-9	3,313	3,187	1,428	2,896	10,824
E-8	10,958	6,826	3,524	5,696	27,004
E-7	37,118	23,943	8,518	30,609	100,188
E-6	57,177	53,552	15,037	45,645	171,411
E-5	74,189	74,519	25,579	74,520	248,807
E-4	115,280	67,307	31,599	50,948	265,134
E-3	61,328	61,119	43,844	58,458	224,749
E-2	32,598	20,598	19,843	12,090	85,129
E-1	18,543	9,995	8,521	13,379	50,438
<b>TOTAL ENLISTED</b>	<b>410,504</b>	<b>321,046</b>	<b>157,893</b>	<b>294,241</b>	<b>1,183,684</b>
CADETS-MIDSHIPMEN	3,027	3,163	0	2,964	9,154
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>493,362</b>	<b>379,939</b>	<b>176,532</b>	<b>369,966</b>	<b>1,419,799</b>

- C/M

490,335  
376,776

↑

326  
367,002

141,045

11-L-0559/OSD/18468  
126,437

ARMY  
305/490335

NAVY  
217/37,676

MARINE  
81/17,653

USAF  
275/36,700

TOTAL  
878  
141,045

ARMY  
6,220

NAVY  
6,759

MARINE  
4,588

USAF  
7,493

OVERALL  
6,224

878

18,308

9:52 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 19, 2003

SUBJECT:

See me about all the interns we have, how many we have, who has them, what we do with them. I want to think about increasing.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071903.06

*Please respond by:* 7/25/03


U20856 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18469

*Done 8/5*

10:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 19, 2003

SUBJECT: **Outreach**

I want to talk to you about business Round Table and the Chamber of Commerce  
and how we could do outreach.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071903.07

*Please respond by:* 7/25/03

U20857 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18470

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 19, 2003

SUBJECT: **Muhammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan**

10:01 AM

EF-62560

03/010244-ES

C7/31

I think you should write a letter to Muhammad bin Zayid, thanking him for all his help over the past 2.5 years. He really was helpful with Tom Franks.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071903.11

Please respond by:

7/25/03

USDP  
Rodman has for  
action. Suspense

7/24/03

7/24/03

Copy of response.

v/r

CDR Nosenzo

7/31

✓ 7/31

Col Pivarski

675-5136

Distro To SS, Finc, J, M, S, H

Date 24 Jul 03

Time 1000

11-L-0559/OSD/18471

U20858 /03



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

JUL 31 2003

His Highness  
Lieutenant General Sheikh Muhammed bin Zayid al Nahyan  
Chief of Staff of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces  
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Your Highness:


You and your country have provided extraordinary support to coalition efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism. Tommy Franks, just before his retirement, spoke to me so warmly of the help you provided that I wanted to convey gratitude personally on behalf of myself and the Department of Defense.

Afghanistan is no longer a haven for international terrorists and is progressing toward a secure and independent future. Iraq is no longer threatening its neighbors and oppressing its citizens, and soon, we hope, will be an independent, prosperous and self-respecting member of the community of the free states in the world. The region's future looks brighter, and the UAE has been instrumental in improving the outlook.

We trust you will extend to General Abizaid the same good advice, assistance and friendship you gave to General Franks.

With best wishes, I am

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith



11-L-0559/OSD/18472



July 19, 2002 9:53 AM

SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops

Vern Clark promised to get back to me with a memo on what OSD ought to do to get a joint Con Ops plan, so we don't get eaten to death by special interests—some way, for example, to eliminate this problem while all four Services think they have to be first deployers. It is nonsense. Some elements ought to be C3, and everyone knows it.

DHR:dh  
071902-27

T 7/28

U20859 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18473

July 21, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guards at Leavenworth

I am told we may have a battalion of troops guarding the prisoners at Fort Leavenworth. Why don't we use contract employees for that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-49

.....


Please respond by 8/8/03

U20878 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18474

July <sup>21</sup>~~18~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Staying Clued In

I had no idea it was Dave Trachtenberg's last day. I think I should say goodbye and thank you to someone like that. People need to keep me clued in on things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-43

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U2088U /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18475

Done 8/5

21  
July 18, 2003 ✓

TO: Service Chiefs  
Service Secretaries

CC: Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nominations by Services

I noticed recently that one or two of the Services did not offer nominations for a key AOR post. When I inquired as to why, I was told that the post had indicated that they wanted a particular Service to fill the post. As a result, other Services did not bother to nominate.

Please understand that it is not for the post to decide what Services we want nominations from. When we put out a call for nominations, we expect all Services to submit nominations, regardless of what they may hear on the grapevine as to a preference someone may have. It is not for others to limit the nature of our consideration.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-28


.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20882 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18476

21  
July 18, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Liberia

I think we ought to schedule a meeting on Liberia for Saturday after we do the redeployment issues.

Please tell Gen. Myers, and let's plan on having them have the package ready.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-25


.....  
*Please respond by* 7/19/03

U20885 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18477

July <sup>21</sup>18, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Accomplishments

Should the accomplishments of the Navy in making carriers more available by their management of the process go on the accomplishments list, a group on the organization page?

It also doesn't mention the governing council or the city councils that Iraq has. I wonder why.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-27


.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

✓  
7/22

11-L-0559/OSD/18478

U20884 /03

July <sup>21</sup>18, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Space Efforts

Please tell me how you think we ought to look into our ability to counter enemy counter-space efforts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-34

.....


*Please respond by* 8/8/03

U20885 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18479

21  
July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Nominations

Please make sure that when we go out for nominations, we don't have people tell them we don't want nominations from certain Services.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071803-37

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20886 /03



July <sup>21</sup>18, 2003

TO: Jim Schlesinger  
CC: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: World Radio Conference

John Stenbit tells me we did all right at the World Radio Conference. You may want to get a brief from him.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
071803-39


*SENT*

U20887 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18481

July 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: August 16 Event

We can go ahead and get started on planning this party for August 16 at our house at 6:30 p.m. Call it an indoor/outdoor summer barbecue—casual.

Attached is the list. Spouses are included. Please let Joyce know how many people accept.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/03 Guest list for August 16

DHR:dh  
072203-1

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20888 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18482

July 22, 2003

SUBJECT: August 16 Event

Indoor/outdoor summer barbecue---casual---at 6:30 p.m. Spouses are included. We want to end up with 70 or 80 people. The names we have in mind at the present time are the following:

- |                       |                                       |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Pete Aldridge      | 23. Jim Haynes                        |
| 2. Michael Barone     | 24. Rich Haver                        |
| 3. Fred Barnes        | 25. Jim Hoagland                      |
| 4. Josh Bolton        | 26. Brit Hume                         |
| 5. Frances Bremer     | 27. Ron James                         |
| 6. Steve Cambone      | 28. Ruben Jeffreys                    |
| 7. Andy Card          | 29. Tina Jonas                        |
| 8. Margaret Carlson   | 30. Charles Krauthammer               |
| 9. Gen. Cartwright    | 31. Larry Lanzilotta                  |
| 10. LTG George Casey  | 32. Scooter Libby                     |
| 11. David Chu         | 33. John McWethy                      |
| 12. Torie Clarke      | 34. Mira Ricardel                     |
| 13. LTG John Craddock | 35. Tom Ridge                         |
| 14. J.D. Crouch       | 36. Cokie Roberts                     |
| 15. Cong. Tom Davis   | 37. Jim Roche                         |
| 16. Dan Dell'Orto     | 38. Peter Rodman                      |
| 17. Larry Di Rita     | 39. Tim Russert                       |
| 18. Ray DuBois        | 40. Tom Shanker                       |
| 19. Gordon England    | 41. Sen. John Warner                  |
| 20. Doug Feith        | 42. George Will                       |
| 21. LTG Jay Garner    | 43. Mike Wynne                        |
| 22. Steve Hadley      | 44. Person we select to replace Torie |

DHR:dh  
072103-31

11-L-0559/OSD/18483

23  
July 21, 2003 W

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
cc: PETER RODMAN  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld PR  
SUBJECT: Colombia Trip

Please get Chris Williams involved in my Colombia visit. Here is a memo from him on the subject.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/10/03 Williams' memo on Colombia Trip

DHR:dh  
072103-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/2/03

EF-6264

I-03/010297

USDCopy provided  
LA 7/30/03MEMO FOR SECDEF

From: ASD/ISA Peter Rodman (b)(6)

29 JUL 2003

DASD/WHA Pardo-Maurer has spoken to Chris Williams about his interest in the Colombia trip and will get together with him in the next few days. We're pleased to be able to incorporate well-informed "outsider" views in our trip preparations.

U20894 103

27/18



July 10, 2003

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams

SUBJECT: Colombia

CWS

(b)(6)

I understand you may be considering an invitation to visit Colombia sometime this Fall. The significant US military and intelligence investments and relationships in Colombia; the FARC's holding of US hostages; the linkage between narcotics trafficking and terrorists; Colombia's support for the war in Iraq; International Criminal Court issues; the Colombian government's success, through Plan Colombia, of dramatically reducing coca cultivation – these and other reasons compel senior US decision makers to continue to follow developments in that important country.

For what it's worth, sir, I recommend you do undertake such a visit. Such a visit would help demonstrate the continued US commitment to and interest in Colombia, give you a "first hand" assessment of the progress to date in our mutual efforts to defeat the narco-terrorists, and allow you to congratulate and support the brave Americans (civilians and military personnel alike) who are serving in that war-torn country.

I have followed US policy toward Colombia for several years, and helped push through the original "Plan Colombia" legislation and funding, back when I worked for Senate Majority Leader Lott. I would be happy to assist you and your staff in the preparation for such a visit, if you believe that would be beneficial.

Thank you again for the kind note, and best regards.

cc: Peter Rodman

11-L-0559/OSD/18485

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
cc: PETER RODMAN  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Colombia Trip

Please get Chris Williams involved in my Colombia visit. Here is a memo from him on the subject.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/10/03 Williams' memo on Colombia Trip

DHR:dh  
072103-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/2/03

✓ 7/24

C9/3  
✓

<sup>23</sup>  
July 24, 2003

TO: Bill Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsteld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rich Haver

I think we ought to stick Rich Haver on the Defense Science Board, maybe effective August 1, when he is scheduled to chop out. He is first-rate, as you know

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-48

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/cnr Nosenzo  
9/3

U20895 /03



DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

INFO MEMO

August 28, 2003, 1436

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

THRU: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Membership - Haver

- In response to your snowflake, we have added Rich Haver to the membership of the Defense Science Board, effective 28 July 2003.
- Rich attended the recent Summer Study session in Irvine as his first Defense Science Board activity.
- In addition, we added Pete Aldridge to the Board as a Senior Fellow.


COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Brenda Leckey/DSB/(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18488



July <sup>23</sup> 21, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: More on Information

I am told that the mortar attacks took place at 9:40 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time. I wasn't told until close to 12 p.m. That is hard for me to believe that that is the way this process works. I have asked John Craddock to do a timeline as to when the Pentagon was notified and what happened each step along the way, so we can figure out how we get this messed up system fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-42

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

Done/OBE  
7/31 TEN

U20896 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18489

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Troops in Liberia

I think people ought to stop saying how many Marines and troops we have in Liberia. Maybe people will get frightened and think we have more than we have. Why do we keep announcing the numbers?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-41

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/25/03

U20897 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18490

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information

I would like a proposal as to how to keep me informed. I need to be told immediately when something important is happening in the world, like when mortar rounds hit the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia.

Please arrange new wiring, so somebody is dedicated to and has the obligation of getting information to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-40

.....


Please respond by 7/25/03

U20898 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18491

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response

Should we get a letter to the people who wrote this letter to the *New York Times*  
and thank them for their thoughtful comments?


Thanks.

Attach.  
*New York Times* letter to the editor, July 20, 2003.

DHR:dh  
072103-34

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

✓ 7/24

Tom, 7/24  
LTGS PASSED TO  
ZERO GAMBLE FOR  
SMOOTH-FOLLOWUP  
W/2 DAYS 

OK  
DR 

U20897 /03

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

24 JULY 2004

FROM: LTG CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LETTERS TO NY TIMES

PER SNOWFLAKE ATTACHED, YOU ASKED IF YOU SHOULD WRITE AND THANK TWO SOLDIERS WHO WROTE TO THE NY TIMES ABOUT THEIR SERVICE IN IRAQ.

I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD. DRAFTS FOLLOW:

*DEAR STAFF SERGEANT GRIMES,*

*GOOD FOR YOU! THE LETTER CORPORAL ALLEN AND YOU WROTE TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES WAS ABSOLUTELY SUPERB AND PUT A SMILE ON MY FACE!*

*YOU ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK – THE VAST MAJORITY OF ALL SERVICEMEMBERS SERVING IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM DO SO QUIETLY AND COMPETENTLY. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOUR GREAT WORK IS MAKING A POSITIVE DIFFERENCE FOR IRAQ AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE.*

*MY THANKS FOR YOUR INSPIRING WORDS AND YOUR DEDICATED SERVICE.*

*ALL THE BEST  
RUMSFELD*

11-L-0559/OSD/18493

*DEAR CORPORAL ALLEN,*

*I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE SUPERB LETTER YOU AND STAFF SERGEANT  
GRIMES WROTE TO THE NEW YORK TIMES – WELL DONE!*

*YOUR MESSAGE IS POWERFUL. INDEED, THE VAST MAJORITY OF SOLDIERS  
AND MARINES ARE DOING THEIR DUTY, PROFESSIONALLY, WITHOUT  
FANFARE, DAY IN AND DAY OUT. YOUR OUTSTANDING EFFORTS ARE MAKING  
A BETTER FUTURE A REALITY FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE.*

*THANK YOU FOR YOUR GREAT WORDS AND FOR YOUR DEDICATED SERVICE.*

*ALL THE BEST  
RUMSFELD*

New York Times  
July 20, 2003

## **Soldiers' Complaint**

To the Editor:

Re "U.S. Commander in Iraq Says Yearlong Tours Are Option to Combat 'Guerrilla' War" (front page, July 17):

As soldiers serving with the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq, we're frustrated every time we open a newspaper and read articles about the extended deployments of troops overseas and soldiers complaining because they cannot go home.

Nobody forces a soldier into enlisting in the military. It's a voluntary contract that each soldier signs.

Do we miss our families back in the States? Yes. Are we going to sit around and write letters to Congress asking if we can go home? No.

The majority of us are professionals who will do what it takes to complete the mission, whether it is a wartime or a peacekeeping operation. For every soldier you read about who writes a letter to his Congressional representative imploring the government to bring us home, there are many more who are proud to be performing their duties.

It is a disservice to those who sacrificed their lives to sit around and complain about being here too long.

**(Staff Sgt.) Clay Grimes and (Cpl.) Jesse Allen, Mosul, Iraq, July 18, 2003**

**Editor's Note:** The article referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, July 17, 2003.

**Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD**

---

**From:** Gamble, Zeno K, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 31, 2003 7:18 AM  
**To:** Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Snow Flake Follow Up

CDR Nosenzo,

I've prepared those two letters in final format and sent into SecDef for signature.  
As soon as the letters are signed and mailed, I will let you know immediately.

I keep copies of all outgoing personal correspondence here in case you ever need something.

Thanks for the follow-up!

V/r

-Zeno.

--

Secretary of Defense Writing Team  
(b)(6) The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 30, 2003 2:16 PM  
**To:** Gamble, Zeno K, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Snow Flake Follow Up

Mr. Gamble,

I am trying to follow up on a snowflake from 23 July. The Secretary asked for letters to two soldiers who had written the NY Times (Sgt Grimes and Crpl Allen). A draft was submitted and we are still waiting for smooth follow up. Can you help me please?

Thanks,


Tom Nosenzo

CDR Thomas E. Nosenzo, USN  
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(b)(6)



23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Brother of Sec. Martinez

Please see if Mel Martinez's brother is someone who ought to go to Baghdad or if he is someone we might want to look at for the Pentagon. He was just rejected for the OAS.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-32

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

8/11

Tom O'Brien -

please get a  
resume ; let's discuss.




Larry Di Rita

8/11

U20900 /03

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Personnel Issues

Here is some material on a friend of mine's DACOWITS visit to Yuma. It might be helpful to you.

Regards,

Attach.

Notes from Dacowits visit to Yuma, AZ July 11, 12

DHR:dh  
072103-28

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/15/03

U20901 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18498

Notes from Dacowits visit to Yuma, AZ July 11, 12

These are observations that I am sure that will show no new information.

Colonel James J. Cooney, CO was extraordinary in his treatment to us as was his second in command, Lt. Col William Turner.

In the tour of the flight line via car, I asked to see a harrier up close so Col. Cooney arranged a visit with a pilot to go over the plane carefully - in 120 degree heat!

Compared with the visit I made to Fort Sam, this CO, Col Cooney, was deeply committed to the quality of life on and off base for his marines and interested in the issues we addressed in our focus groups - retention, deployment and women's health care.

We interviewed enlisted only : (except officer wives)

E-1-E-3 Female Pfc-LCpl

E-4-E-5 Male Cpl-Sgt

E-6-E-9 Female SSgt-GySgt-MSgt-SgtMaj

E-6-E-9 Male SSgt-Gyst-MGySgt- SgtMaj

Officer Family members - female

## Issues

1. Want pay related to hours of work - with increased work because of numbers deployed
2. Equipment - trucks, helicopters - 30 years and older - I thought it was interesting to hear it from the marines working on the equipment rather than the CO. They are convinced it is cheaper to buy new and worried about repairs all the time.  
( I know money is always the concern in every issue)
3. Barracks - a major problem and an old one (like living in a prison cell) yet barracks must be 90% full  
Marines get married JUST to live off base and not in barracks and marriages do not last  
Some marines leave the service just not to live in barracks

CO said new barracks are a mess after a year in spite of Friday inspections. No one is responsible like the "old days" and these young men and women coming in don't care about property - costs \$60,000 to \$75,00 each year to repair broken furniture and equipment. CO thinks the barracks and their care should be contracted to private sector. "We're fighters not cleaners"

4. Deployment issues are always the same but at this base it was clear all services are available to families- financial (power of attorney - wills, etc.) and info. on all other issues. The problem is getting the marines and their families to USE what is available. It was suggested that when you arrive at a new base -deployment issues be part of the introduction training for families and marines - some even thought it could be mandatory that a marine bring his spouse in but that couldn't work because it would reflect on the marine's record if spouse didn't show.  
Child Care - always a complaint - long lists to get into child care - off base is extra cost and must be licensed and varies by community. Would like drop-in child care where there are large deployments so remaining spouse can get errands, Dr. appointments done.
5. Marines have to pay for food by the month and miss many meals by work schedule and hard to get reimbursed by chits. Suggestion was made for a swap card like they use in colleges.
6. The male E-6 to E-9 were toughest on the female marines (discussion did not include deployment) but on base. Pregnancy (and female physical problems) in work situations - time off because "didn't feel good" or in warehouse couldn't do job later in pregnancy. They were very vocal and then the Sgt. major spoke at length about the progress that had been made over his time in the marines and tried to put on a positive spin.
7. Col Cooney considers Yuma a soft target - minutes from Mexico

and the huge fuel tank is on the Mexican side of the base. He thinks one person could destroy the tank and cause havoc - not on terms of lives but chaos at the most important Marine aircraft base.

MZR

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jim Vaught

Please prepare an answer for me to Jim Vaught.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated memo from Jim Vaught

DHR:dh  
072103-24

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20902 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18502

DoA SMA  
8/16

*Fax For LTG Craddock - Please pass to your boss  
With info to Dick Cody. Thanks*

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT

(b)(6)

*information*

Memorandum for Secretary Rumsfeld:

Congratulations on your continuing quest to stabilize the situation in liberated Iraq.

Call it what you will, the irregulars rascals who are killing our soldiers will be eliminated as their Bathe Party supporters dry up. Stay with your plan. John Abizaid will get the job done and done well. Rangers will lead the way!

*Corps-level logistics unit*

FYI: On July 16, while eating lunch at Fort Bragg with soldiers at 1<sup>st</sup> COSCOM, (which I created in 1972), I was told that 1<sup>st</sup> COSCOM expects their ability to perform their anticipated Mission during the period September to December 2003 will be reduced by the release of reservist who are now serving in COSCOM.

For your consideration:

Expedite the removal of Support Command soldiers and logistics support civilians from Korea and assign them to Fort's Bragg, Hood and elsewhere where they are most needed to keep the Army's logistics system operating at the pace needed to sustain our global missions. The remaining Soldiers in logistics will be even more overstretched i

Sincerely,

*Jim Vaught*  
Jim Vaught

*LTG (ret) Vaught has been retired for about 25 years - but is still very active! He is an old Korea hand and a long-time Special Ops warrior. Believe he is close to Schoemaker and Paul Steiner*

11-L-0559/OSD/18503

*7/19*

*Fax For LTG Craddock - Please pass to your boss  
With info to Dick Cody. Thanks*

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT  
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

*For your information*

(b)(6)

Memorandum for Secretary Rumsfeld:

Congratulations on your continuing quest to stabilize the situation in liberated Iraq.

Call it what you will, the irregulars rascals who are killing our soldiers will be eliminated as their Bathe Party supporters dry up. Stay with your plan. John Abizaid will get the job done and done well. Rangers will lead the way!


*Corps-level logistics unit*

FYI: On July 16, while eating lunch at Fort Bragg with soldiers at 1<sup>st</sup> COSCOM, (which I created in 1972), I was told that 1<sup>st</sup> COSCOM expects their ability to perform their anticipated Mission during the period September to December 2003 will be reduced by the release of reservist who are now serving in COSCOM.

For your consideration:

Expedite the removal of Support Command soldiers and logistics support civilians from Korea and assign them to Fort's Bragg, Hood and elsewhere where they are most needed to keep the Army's logistics system operating at the pace needed to sustain our global missions. The remaining Soldiers in logistics will be even more overstretched if prompt action is not taken.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Vaught

11-L-0559/OSD/18504



23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Alert Level

I would like a report back soon on the alert level for the Pentagon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-22

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

*Done/OBE  
TEN  
7/31*

U20905 /03

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Backfill

Why don't we go ahead and try to get some backfill in Bosnia and Kosovo, and take some of our troops out of there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-21

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/8/03

U20904 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18506

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keane w/Press

We should get Jack Keane to go meet with the press this week and talk about force rotation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-18

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20905 /03

23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Media Issue

*Larry Di Rita*  
*8/14*

On CNN about 1:40 p.m. Eastern time on Wolf Blitzer's show on Sunday, there was a retired CIA agent named Frank Anderson, who announced to the world that Rumsfeld helps his friend Carlucci at Carlyle. Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-16

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

*8/13*  
*Sec Def -*  
*Anderson actually defends*  
*you. See Tab.*

*D. L. H.*

*Larry Di Rita*

*8/14*

General Counsel of the Department of Defense  
August 13, 2003

TALKING POINTS

Subject: Snowflake Regarding Mention of the Secretary on CNN Late Edition

- The Secretary asked you to see him about the mention of him by Frank Anderson on CNN's Late Edition on July 20.
- Wolf Blitzer had two guests for the segment in question – both former CIA analysts. They were: Robert Baer, author of "Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude," and Frank Anderson.
- The focus of the segment was our government's relationship with Saudi Arabia (the subject of Baer's book). Baer's premise is that we have been protecting Saudi Arabia for so many years that we are now ignoring their culpability in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
- Frank Anderson mentioned the Secretary while criticizing Baer for the things he says in his book about the Secretary and the President.
  - He said he profoundly disagreed with Baer because Baer paints a picture of corruption in the US based on information from sources that he does not identify and that, in fact, have served him poorly.
  - Anderson says the most troubling allegations are those about the President accepting bribes and about the Secretary assisting Frank Carlucci out of friendship. There is no further elaboration of any assistance supposedly provided to Mr. Carlucci.
  - Baer defends his failure to identify sources as required by CIA reviewers, and the discussion moves elsewhere.
- We will obtain a copy of the book and review it for additional information.

Prepared by: COL Charvat, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18509

BLITZER: Welcome back to LATE EDITION.

Since the September 11th attacks, suspicions have been raised about Saudi Arabia's role in the war on terrorism. And there have been calls for the United States to reassess its long-time relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Joining us now to talk about this, two guests. Here in Washington, Robert Baer. He's the author of the new book, "Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold its Soul for Saudi Crude." And in New York, with a very different perspective, Frank Anderson. He's a former CIA chief for Near East and South Asia.

Welcome to LATE EDITION to both of you. I know both of you strongly disagree.

Bob, let me begin with you. The thrust of your book is that Saudi Arabia should accept at least some of the blame for 9/11.

ROBERT BAER, AUTHOR: I think it should accept the blame, because those 15 hijackers were recruited inside Saudi Arabia. We have to know how this came about. There were clerics that did this, that filtered these people that got on those airplanes.

Also, at every turn in the network, in Germany, there was a Saudi involved, in Tatex (ph) Company. With Darkenzali (ph), another suspect in 9/11, there was a Saudi involved.

And then we find out today that one of the Saudis in San Diego had been going to the Saudi consulate and then meeting with two of the hijackers. The same hijackers he met in a restaurant, set them up in an apartment.

There are a lot of unanswered questions, and we are not getting the same cooperation out of Saudi Arabia as we are, let's say, Pakistan.

BLITZER: Frank, like Bob, you worked in the CIA for many years. You worked basically on the same issues. At one point you were Bob's boss over at the CIA. But you come out very differently. Why?

FRANK ANDERSON, FORMER CIA CHIEF FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: Well, Bob's book gives us a view of the United States and of Saudi Arabia with which I profoundly disagree. He paints a picture of corruption in the United States and of dysfunction in Saudi Arabia that are based on sources that he doesn't identify, and in fact that have served him poorly.

The Washington side of his story is, in many ways, the one that I find more troubling, because it makes some very troubling allegations about the president of the United States accepting bribes, about the secretary of defense assisting Frank Carlucci (ph) and the Carlisle Group out of friendship. It says things about Saudi Arabia that would involve access that, frankly, the United States government has never had.

BLITZER: All right.

ANDERSON: And Bob's sources have served him badly, and they've given him some bad facts.

BLITZER: Let's let Bob respond to that.

Bad facts? The serious allegation against you and your book.

BAER: Well, here's the problem I had. I had to clear this book with the CIA. Every single word...

BLITZER: You were a case officer?

BAER: I was a case officer. I signed a contract. What I learned inside the CIA has to be sent to the CIA, has to be taken out, or the sources can't be identified. I have no choice over that. So I couldn't use footnotes.

A lot of the information, if Frank will look at it, about disputes inside the royal family come from after he left the CIA, which I think was 1994. I'm quite certain of those sources. I'll stand by them right until the end. They're the best I've ever seen in my entire career.

The stuff on Frank Carlucci -- and I, what I talk about in Washington is chumminess. It's...

BLITZER: But basically you make the allegation that almost everybody in a position of power is on the Saudi payroll one way or another.

BAER: No, no, I think that's unfair. That's taken out of context.

What I say is there is a deference to Saudi Arabia because Saudi Arabia has been a longtime ally. It is an enormous support for our defense industry. It has been enormous support for our oil industry.

But while we were showing deference to Saudi Arabia, these clerics were recruiting suicide bombers. And what I'm trying to do in my book is explain why and how we correct it.

BLITZER: Let me put up on the screen an excerpt from the book, "Sleeping with the Devil."

"There's hardly a former assistant secretary of state for the Near East, CIA director, White House staffer or member of Congress who hasn't ended up on the Saudi payroll in one way or another, or so it sometimes seems. With this kind of money waiting out there, of course, Washington's bureaucrats don't have the backbone to take on Saudi Arabia."

That's a big thrust of your book.

BAER: I stand by that. Why else are we not looking into the Saudi connections to September 11th? Why is it that Syria is still on the terrorism list, Iran, yet all the terrorist attacks have been inside Saudi Arabia, have involved Saudis. We still don't have answers on 9/11.

What I'm trying to do in my book is answer these questions the best I can. And I answer them in the absence of testimony from the leaders of this country.

BLITZER: Let's let Frank respond to that.

Frank, so many people on the Saudi payroll. First of all, what about you? Are you on the Saudi payroll?

ANDERSON: No, I am not. I have never received a penny from the Saudis. My business, I have a number of American businesses, and for that matter, at times the U.S. government, that pay me for information and understanding about the Middle East. And if I don't get along with the Saudis, I'm not going to be able to talk to them, and I would probably then have less of an ability to make a living. But I am certainly not on their payroll.

BLITZER: Well, what about the argument that he makes, that so many others in Washington are one way or another, directly or indirectly, on the payroll. You've been around Washington, the U.S. government, for a long time. Do you accept that?


ANDERSON: I absolutely don't. Let me give you just one example. And let's go back to the Carlucci (ph) and Don Rumsfeld thing. In order to make the case of that chumminess, Bob says that Don Rumsfeld -- pardon me for the familiarity -- that Secretary Rumsfeld had fought to keep alive the Crusader Howitzer program. And you, Wolf, as a defense expert know how clearly Rumsfeld was on the other side.

His facts on Saudi Arabia. He treats us to page after page after page of information on, you know, the inner workings of the Saudi government from sources, who when he lists the members of the family can't get sons and brothers straight. He lists...

BLITZER: Well, let me ask Bob to respond to that.



23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Senators Chambliss and Alexander

Please make sure David Chu talks to Senators Chambliss and Alexander and gives them the straight story regarding military family concerns.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/23/03 SecDef memo  
6/30/03 USD(P&R) memo [U11097/03]

DHR:dh  
072103-14

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20907 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18513

Snowflake

June 23, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Families

There is an article in the *Washington Times* today about Saxby Chambliss that raises some questions I would like you to look into and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

Chambliss, Saxby and Alexander, Lamar. "Military Parents," *Washington Times*, June 23, 2003, p. 23.

DHR:dh  
062303-4

.....

Please respond by 7/11/03

✓  
RESPONSE ATTACHED

11-L-0559/OSD/18514

7/15  
0800

LEONARD J. ...  
7/15/03

✓



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

June 30, 2003, 2:46PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu 11 July 03*

SUBJECT: Families - Snowflake

- The June 23 Washington Times Op-Ed piece by Senators Chambliss and Alexander came in anticipation of a combined hearing of the subcommittees they chair: (Personnel/SASC; and Children and Families/Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions)
- Thus far, they have also held field hearings in Warner-Robins AFB, GA, Ft Campbell, KY, and Groton, CT. Another field hearing is planned for Omaha, NE in September.
- Senator Alexander has a long-standing interest in family issues. By teaming with Senator Chambliss and Armed Services, he can leverage that.
- Mildly negative slant of Op-Ed is inconsistent with actual state of family support—although there is always room for improvement. Specific issues raised are analyzed at Tab A.
- To keep abreast of these issues, we convene quarterly a Quality of Life council with the military departments and other interested parties, including the Combatant Commands. We invite the Combatant Commanders to appear personally on a rotating basis to raise the matters that need our collective attention. At the most recent meeting, for example, Generals Hill and Holland briefed, and General Franks gave us his perspectives at an earlier meeting. (We would be pleased to have you or the Deputy Secretary address a future meeting if you would like.)

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENT:  
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/18
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/14

PREPARED BY: John Molino, DUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

*7/11/03*



11-L-0559/OSD/18515

U11097 /03

## Issues Raised by Senators Alexander and Chambliss

1. **Respite Child Care:** We used some of the emergency supplemental money to provide this care at bases heavily affected by mobilization/deployment. This is over and above the regular budgeted amount and was necessary to add services at no or little cost to patrons (\$13M to date).
2. **Shifting Funds to Areas of Need (Groton):** The issue is more than flexibility and spending dollars. A Navy process exists that creates the most efficient organization. Unfortunately, changing the configuration of child development center rooms can require construction, and more equipment and staffing for infants. Further, it is not economical to reconfigure rooms as the population changes from year to year.
3. **Excess Demand for Child Care (Ft. Campbell example):** A real problem. Military departments have been reluctant to program funds to close the gap despite our urging. Our efforts to establish in-home care, in addition to stand-alone child development centers, has only been modestly successful. We are therefore developing a child care funding wedge to begin addressing child care shortages. This is an important economic issue for families.
4. **Stability for High School:** Waiver processes to meet this need exist in all Services, but Army instituted a formal program 12/2000: 99 percent of requests approved to date. Air Force considering a similar effort. Unfortunately, military needs must come first.
5. **Telephone lines:** Common complaint. Not always possible to provide US-style service in a deployed situation, despite the best efforts of all concerned. However, we are making steady progress. By the end of July, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service will establish six call centers to support areas in Iraq with large troop densities and there are 907 phones in country dedicated to morale calls for the troops. (A "good old days" note: Only a generation ago—Vietnam—such connectivity was unknown.)
6. **Slow mail:** Valid complaint. Army is Executive Agent. Part of cause is stark nature of infrastructure in Afghanistan, rapid movement of units in Iraq. We are working urgently with Army, the Executive Agent, to resolve this issue.
7. **Inappropriate Notification of Casualties:** From the beginning of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, embedded media was asked to wait 72 hours before reporting names, and generally complied. There is no difference during war.

published a best practice guide to aid Commanders and school districts. In addition to the efforts of the individual Services, I will engage the Departments of Education in the states where our involvement may be needed.

9. Connecticut Child Care Certification. One of the few states that will not accept our certification. I will request assistance from the Governor and Navy will begin discussion with the state licensing authority.
10. In-state tuition: Presently 38 states offer some degree of in-state tuition benefit to Service members or their family members. I have sent letters to all the Governors stating the importance of in-state tuition. In addition, the Army has sent letters to senior military leaders in ten States providing state-specific information on current policies and identifying key personnel who have influence over states' educational policy.
11. Housing Allowance as Income: Privatized housing changed legal status of housing allowances. But, effective May 13, 2002, housing allowance for military personnel living in privatized housing ceased to be counted as income for child nutrition programs; and this year Social Security Administration directed it be excluded in SSI benefit calculations.

## Military Parents

### *Putting our children first*

By Saxby Chambliss and Lamar Alexander

During the 1991 Gulf War, Col. Ted Purdom's 101st Airborne brigade fought alongside a nursing unit commanded by his wife, Lt. Col. Jean Purdom. Their sons, ages 9 and 11, stayed with their grandmother in Tennessee while their parents served in Iraq.

Today in Iraq, Maj. Lee Medley commands a Chinook helicopter unit. He has been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq for 15 of the 17 months since his youngest daughter was born. During the 21 days he was home at Ft. Campbell, Ky., he spent most of the time training for his next deployment.

Half the men and women in today's United States military are parents raising children. They volunteer for service — and for marriage. But a reduced force structure and more frequent and longer deployments are putting stresses on those marriages and children.

Family readiness affects military readiness. That is why two Senate subcommittees which we chair have been holding field hearings at Ft. Campbell, Warner Robins Air Force Base and Groton Naval Base to put the spotlight on military parents raising children. We will report what we have learned and continue those hearings in Washington next Tuesday.

Our hearings have presented a picture of fewer warriors, more missions, longer deployments, frequent moves, more marriages, more spouses working and more children. We are also finding that while our military is ahead of many segments of society in making it easier for parents raising children, there are many areas that deserve attention.

For example, nationally accredited child care is an area in which the services excel. At the same time, busy military parents need more child care options, especially "respite care" — a few hours off.

Ft. Campbell has 65 spouses that are certified to care for four to six children in its family home care network. But there is a demand for 230 such homes. And if the Groton submarine base commander had more flexibility in spending dollars, he might shift dollars from preschool programs — where there are vacancies — to infant care, where there is a waiting list.

The Pentagon should be able to make some changes to help families fairly easily. There would be wide support for offering more families of 11th or 12th-grade children the opportunity not to move until the child has graduated. (When he finished testifying at the Ft. Campbell hearing, Col. Kim Summers and his wife drove nine hours to Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas to his new assignment. It was his 22nd move in more than 25 years of service.)

Communications can be improved. Spouses at Warner Robins told how their husbands waited for hours to use phones, only to experience poor quality and frequent disconnections. Letters and care packages took weeks to reach troops. Tragedies were sometimes reported on network television before the Department of Defense had sufficient time to confirm victims and notify families.

More difficult to do but even more helpful would be to persuade states to make reciprocity agreements aimed at making it easier for military parents who move:

- \*A high-school junior who learns Georgia history at Ft. Stewart might also be required to meet the Tennessee history requirement when a parent is transferred to Ft. Campbell;

- \*Spouses who want to provide child care as part of a family home network must wait six months to become certified when transferred to Groton, Connecticut;

- \*Other states might follow Georgia's example of allowing in-state tuition to continue at Georgia universities, even though the parent is transferred during the student's academic career.

Finally, it was also disturbing to learn that in some cases housing allowances are now counted as part of a military family's income, making the family ineligible for child-care vouchers and Women, Infants and Children's (WIC) grants — even though previous housing was treated as "in-kind" and not as part of their income.

As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld takes a hard look at force structure, at length of deployments and frequency of moves, he should keep in mind the families at home as well as the fighting men and women who are deployed. Maj. Medley's wife, Gricell, put it this way, "We want to allow our soldiers to be good soldiers, but they also want the opportunity to be good fathers and husbands." Help for military parents will mean a high re-enlistment rate, a saving of taxpayer dollars and a happier and more effective fighting force.

*Sen. Saxby Chambliss is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee. Sen. Lamar Alexander is chairman of the Senate's Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Subcommittee on Children and Families.*

**COORDINATION**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 7-2-03

11-L-0559/OSD/18520



23  
July 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bremer Town Hall

What do you think about having Bremer do a town hall that is taped and sent all around the world through the military channel, and let the press cover it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072103-13

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20908 /03

DoA SMA  
8/11

11-L-0559/OSD/18521

July <sup>23</sup>21, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention

Attached is David Chu's report. It looks to me like we have the highest retention and the highest recruiting we have had in a while. We clearly don't have a problem at the moment. That's not to say we won't get a problem, but at the moment we don't seem to have one.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/3/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Iraqi Freedom [U10703/03]

DHR:dh  
072103-7

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20909 /03

U20909 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18522

CBSD  
10/8/12

5/1/03

⇒ MPP

April 29, 2003 1:59 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since the Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Your report of April 11 [U06866-03] doesn't say compared to what. I need to see trends or comparisons.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
042903-3

.....

Please respond by 5/5

✓

7/11

CHU RESPONSE ATTACHED

cc: DSD

11-L-0559/OSD/18523



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 JUL -3 PM 6:29

INFO MEMO

July 3, 2003, 12:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

(Signature and date)

*David S. C. Chu 7 July 03*

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Iraqi Freedom

- You asked about recruiting and retention since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and I responded (P&R). You requested trend data (P&R). This responds.
- Retention is strong with overall retention the highest in six years. Even amidst Stop Loss, troops may reenlist — and they are doing so in numbers sufficient to meet retention goals of the Services. Pocket skill shortages continue, but are not as severe as over the past six years. Table 1 shows the percentage of the enlisted force retained over the fiscal year, as a fraction of those who started the year.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Total Continue	82%	85%	85%	85%	85%	85%	86%	87%

\* FY 2003 to Date

Table 1 - Retention - DoD Components (Active)

- Recruiting news also is good. Annual goals were missed in FY 1999-2000, but were met in FY 2001-02, and have been exceeded for FY 2003 to date. See Table 2.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Recruit HS Grad	96%	90%	91%	93%	94%	94%	96%	96%
Top Half Aptitude	71%	66%	66%	66%	63%	69%	69%	71%
Recruiting Goal Met	102%	100%	100%	96%	97%	100%	100%	102%

\* FY 2003 to Date

Table 2 - Recruiting - DoD Components (Active)

- The proportion of high school graduates among recruits matches its high point over the past six years, and the representation of top-half aptitude recruits (math and verbal aptitude, which correlates strongly to job performance) is at its highest level in six years.
- The numbers look good, but factors today operate in our favor: unemployment levels conducive to recruiting and retention; strong patriotism; and atypically strong compensation for many (e.g., tax free income in combat zones). As these change, solid pay raises will help guard against any quick downward shifts.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Gina Grosso, (b)(6)


SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/10
MA CRADDOCK	6/11
EXECSEC	7/9

11-L-0559/OSD/18524

U10703 / 03

July 23, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Korean Letter

I talked to Condi and Colin about the Korean letter, and told them they ought not to let the President do anything that weakens the ground under us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072303-17

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20910 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18525

492

July 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Informant

We have to make sure the fellow who turned in Uday and Qusay stays alive and that he gets a reward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072303-7

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

Done/OBE  
TEN /7/31

U20912 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18526

July 23, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Hunter's Staff

Please get me a report on what happened with the meeting John Young has been having with Duncan Hunter's staff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072303-10

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

U20915 /03

*CBDD  
JEN 8/12*

11-L-0559/OSD/18527

UNOFFICIAL

July 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Copy of POTUS Speech

Please immediately get me a copy of the speech the President just gave over at the White House, where Bremer, Myers and I were with him.

Thanks.

DHR:jh  
072303-11

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*Done  
8/5*

U20914 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18528





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For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
July 23, 2003

## President Bush Discusses Progress in Iraq

Remarks by the President with the Secretary of Defense and the Presidential Envoy to Iraq  
The Rose Garden


10:16 A.M. EDT



VIDEO Multimedia

President's Remarks

 view

 listen

**THE PRESIDENT:** It is my pleasure to welcome Ambassador Paul Bremer back to the White House. I'm also pleased to be joined by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Thank you all for coming.

Ambassador Bremer is doing a fine job in an essential cause. The nations in our coalition are determined to help the Iraqi people recover from years of tyranny. And we are determined to help build a free, and sovereign, and democratic nation.

The coalition provisional authority, led by Ambassador Bremer, has a comprehensive strategy to move Iraq toward a future that is secure and prosperous. We are carrying out that strategy for the good of Iraq, for the peace of the region, and for the security of the United States and our friends.



Saddam Hussein's regime spent more than three decades oppressing Iraq's people, attacking Iraq's neighbors, and threatening the world's peace. The regime tortured at home, promoted terror abroad, and armed in secret. Now, with the regime of Saddam Hussein gone forever, a few remaining holdouts are trying to prevent the advance of order and freedom. They are targeting our success in rebuilding Iraq, they're killing new police graduates, they're shooting at people that are guarding the universities and power plants and oil facilities.

These killers are the enemies of Iraq's people. They operate mainly in a few areas of the country. And wherever they operate, they are being hunted, and they will be defeated. Our military forces are on the offensive. They're working with the newly free Iraqi people to destroy the remnants of the old regime and their terrorist allies.

Yesterday, in the city of Mosul, the careers of two of the regime's chief henchmen came to an end. Saddam Hussein's sons were responsible for torture, maiming and murder of countless Iraqis. Now, more than ever, all Iraqis can know that the former regime is gone and will not be coming back.

As our work continues, we know that our coalition forces are serving under difficult circumstances. Our nation will give those who wear its uniform all the tools and support they need to complete their mission. We are eternally grateful for the bravery of our troops, for their sacrifice and for the sacrifices of their families. The families of our servicemen and women can take comfort in knowing that their sons and daughters and moms and dads are serving a cause that is noble and just and vital to the security of the United States.

A free, democratic, peaceful Iraq will not threaten America or our friends with illegal weapons. A free Iraq will not be a training ground for terrorists, or a funnel of money to terrorists, or provide weapons to terrorists who would willing use them to strike our country or our allies. A free Iraq will not destabilize the Middle East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful example to the entire region and lead other nations to choose freedom. And as the pursuits of freedom replace hatred and resentment and terror in the Middle East, the American people will be more secure.

America has assumed great responsibilities for Iraq's future. Yet, we do not bear these responsibilities alone. Nineteen nations are providing more than 13,000 troops to help stabilize Iraq. And additional forces will soon arise -- arrive. More than two dozen nations have pledged funds that will go directly towards relief and reconstruction

efforts. Every day we are renovating schools for the new school year. We're restoring the damaged water, electrical and communication systems. And when we introduce a new Iraqi currency later this year, it will be the first time in 12 years that the whole country is using the same currency.

Our greatest ally in the vital work of stabilizing and rebuilding a democratic and prosperous Iraq is the Iraqi people, themselves. Our goal is to turn over authority to Iraqis as quickly as possible. Coalition authorities are training Iraqi police forces to help patrol Iraqi cities and villages. Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid are working to establish as quickly as possible a new Iraqi civilian defense force to help protect supply convoys and power plants and ammunition depots. Offices have been established in major Iraqi cities to recruit soldiers for a new Iraqi army that will defend the people of Iraq, instead of terrorizing them.

Most importantly, 10 days ago, Iraqis formed a new governing council. The council represents all of Iraq's diverse groups, and it has given responsible positions to religious authorities and to women. The council is naming ministers to establish control over Iraq's ministries, and the council is drawing up a new budget. The process of drafting a constitution will soon be underway, and this will prepare the way for elections.

Yesterday, in New York, members of Iraq's governing council participated in a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. They heard a report from U.N. Secretary General Annan, which welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi governing council as a broadly representative Iraqi partner with whom the U.N. and the international community can engage to build Iraq's future.

Now that we have reached this important milestone, I urge the nations of the world to contribute -- militarily and financially -- towards fulfilling Security Council Resolution 1483's vision of a free and secure Iraq. The U.N. report also urges a swift return to full Iraqi sovereignty. And this morning, Ambassador Bremer briefed me on our strategy to accelerate progress toward this goal. He outlined a comprehensive plan for action for bringing greater security, essential services, economic development and democracy to the Iraqi people.

The plan sets out ambitious timetables and clear benchmarks to measure progress and practical methods for achieving results. Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment. America and our partners kept our promise to remove the dictator and the threat he posed, not only to the Iraqi people, but to the world.

We also keep our promise to destroy every remnant of that regime and to help the people of Iraq to govern themselves in freedom. In the 83 days since I announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq, we have made progress, steady progress, in restoring hope in a nation beaten down by decades of tyranny.

Ambassador Bremer is showing great skill and resourcefulness, and is demonstrating fine leadership and the great values of our country. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for what you're doing for America, I appreciate you.

END

10:25 A.M. EDT

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**Return to this article at:**


<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030723-1.html>

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**Joint Publication 1-02**




**Department of Defense  
Dictionary of  
Military and Associated Terms**



**12 April 2001**

**(As Amended Through  
5 June 2003)**



Get All Ref Get Dis

**instrument flight** — (\*) Flight in which the path and attitude of the aircraft are controlled solely by reference to instruments.

**instrument landing system** — (\*) A system of radio navigation intended to assist aircraft in landing which provides lateral and vertical guidance, which may include indications of distance from the optimum point of landing. Also called **ILS**.

**instrument meteorological conditions** — Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling; less than minimums specified for visual meteorological conditions. Also called **IMC**. See also **visual meteorological conditions**. (JP 3-04.1)

**in support** — (\*) An expression used to denote the task of providing artillery supporting fire to a formation or unit. Liaison and observation are not normally provided. See also **at priority call**; **direct support**.

**in support of** — Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control.

**insurgency** — (\*) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.


**insurgent** — Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership. See also **antiterrorism**; **counterinsurgency**; **insurgency**. (JP 3-07.2)

**Integrated Consumable Item Support** — A decision support system that takes time-phased force and deployment data (i.e., Department of Defense deployment plans) and calculates the ability of the Defense Logistics Agency, the warehousing unit of the Department of Defense, to support those plans. Integrated Consumable Item Support can calculate for the planned deployment supply/demand curves for over two million individual items stocked by the Defense Logistics Agency in support of deployment. Integrated Consumable Item Support allows planners to identify critical end items and anticipated shortfalls in the Defense Logistics Agency inventories. Integrated Consumable Item Support provides materiel readiness information for Defense Logistics Agency managed items to Defense Logistics Agency management, to all Services, and to the Joint Staff, to be used as a piece of the larger wartime logistic picture, which ultimately is used to assess total readiness and sustainability for deliberately planned contingencies. The goals and objectives of Integrated Consumable Item Support are to know the "war stoppers," know the weapons systems affected, and know when the Defense Logistics Agency will run out of stock. Also called **ICIS**. (JP 4-03)

**integrated fire control system** — A system that performs the functions of target acquisition, tracking, data computation, and engagement control, primarily using electronic means and assisted by electromechanical devices.

\* =  
approved for  
both DoD  
and NATO

July 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Positive Results in Iraq

I would like someone assigned to produce at least a weekly release for me to put out or for us to release that shows in detail all the good things that have been happening in Iraq—from a political standpoint, an economic standpoint and a security standpoint—all the arrests, everything.

Let's get a draft of the first one and show it to me by Friday, so we can polish the format and get it ready to go out next week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072303-1

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20916 /03

Done 8/6

11-L-0559/OSD/18536

July 24, 2003

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Low-Intensity Conflict

Please see if you can find the definition of low-intensity conflict in this dictionary.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-49

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

To: SecDef

Sir,

✓ 8/7

We no longer use Low Intensity Conflict as a category. SecDef is still using it in its name because it was established as that in the law. The old spectrum of conflict can be:

Peace → Low Intensity Conflict → High Intensity Conflict

LIC = Peace keeping, humanitarian interventions, NEOs, etc. (Colombia, Bosnia, etc)

MIC = full conventional war (CIT)

HIC = All out war, including nuclear

None of these terms are now in use.

U20917 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18537 v/r COL B 7/24 4:29pm

7:07 AM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>1)</sup>

DATE: July 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Here's a definition of "Low-Intensity conflict" to add to <sup>the other definition.</sup> your cluster.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.01

*Attach: Definition 7/24/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

July 24, 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Definition

Sir:

Definition of "Low-Intensity conflict" from FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 1-1:

*Low Intensity Conflict is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among nations. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged over a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.*

As mentioned earlier, this is a manual that is no longer used.

V/R, COL B

11-L-0559/OSD/18539



11:23 AM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
Paul Bremer  
cc: ~~Thesen~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

The President has requested several times, and Dick Myers and I agree, that there is a need for a daily briefing in Iraq. Whether you need one for the Coalition Provisional Authority and one for CENTCOM separately, or whether you just need one of the two every day, six days a week, I don't know.

Please come back with a proposal as to what you two propose. We simply have to feed the appetite that exists with the kinds of things we believe need to be put forward. It certainly doesn't need to be the two of you doing the briefings, but it does need to be a competent, "Vince Brooks" type briefer, such as we have used here with Stan McCrystal and Rosa.

We are getting unfairly pounded. There's good information that needs to be put out. We've got to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.012

Please respond by: 2.3.03

*Done*  
*8/5*

U20918 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18540

7:10 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9

DATE: July 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Find out the name of Colin McMillan's wife and son, and draft an appropriate letter for my signature.

I will want to call them. Give me the phone number. — Done

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.02

Please respond by: 7/28/03

U20919 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18541

7:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*  
DATE: July 25, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Funding for Iraq**

I read Zakheim's memo. What are we supposed to do? What action item ought to come out of it?

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.11

*Attach: Zakheim Memo Re: Funding for Iraq 7/18/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8/3/03*

*CBSD  
TB  
8/12*

**U20920 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/18542

July 8<sup>10</sup>, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Funding for Iraq

*Lamy Di Riba*  
*7/22*

It strikes me that for reconstruction in Iraq we are going to have to start developing numbers for a supplemental appropriation. I would think getting oil revenues up is critically important, and investing in that project would be critical.

Also, I am concerned we are going to be spending all the Iraqi assets we have been able to gather up and run out of that, without having gotten additional funding in place from the international community.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070803-23

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

*Sig,*  
*Handed to*  
*David N.*  
*5 July 16*  
*on JH*

*David Cameron*  
*7/22/03*  
*10:00 AM*  
*10/18/03*  
*10:00 AM*

*May*  
*Don Zakheim*  
*Take you to work*  
*at him at David*  
*Thatcher*  
*7/16*




COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

7003 JUL 21 AM 6:2



## INFO MEMO

July 18, 2003, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

**SUBJECT: Funding for Iraq**

The concerns you raise in your note (Tab 1A) are valid. Increasing Iraqi oil revenues is critical to Iraq's financial situation, which will be precarious by the end of this calendar year without international assistance.

According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the effort to restore the Iraqi oil industry is projected to cost about \$1.3 billion. Included in this total are the cost of repairing the industry from sabotage (\$800 million), the cost of buying outside fuel (\$300 million), and the investment in improving the production capability (\$200 million).

Congress appropriated only \$489.3 million for fire fighting, repair of damages to oil facilities and related infrastructure, and preservation of a petroleum distribution capability, and further provided for funds in the Defense Cooperation Account (\$13.2 million) to be used for these purposes. Absent additional legislative authority or supplemental funding, CPA will be required to fund remaining oil facility and production related efforts from seized or vested assets or from the Development Fund for Iraq (currently capitalized at approximately \$1.1 billion).

However, the funding for Iraq will be very tight by the end of this calendar year. Starting in July with \$5.4 billion in assets, the Ministry of Finance expects to have only \$1.1 billion left by December 31, 2003. However, should oil revenues be below the \$3.5 billion projection, as now seems likely, their balance may be closer to zero.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 1173
MA RUCCI	
057-9/OSD/	8544
EXECUT. MARRONI	7/21

U11794 03

We are pursuing two major opportunities for international assistance:

Frozen Assets: According to Treasury, a total of \$2.5 billion in Iraqi assets has been frozen by foreign countries. Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 (2003), these are to be transferred to the DFI for the benefit of the people of Iraq. There is an interagency team lead by Treasury which is identifying the institutions holding these frozen assets and is working with the appropriate governments to get these funds transferred. Treasury lawyers believe we may shortly receive \$300 million for the DFI account (\$200 million in frozen Iraqi assets from UK banks and another \$100 million from Japanese banks). I believe we can also recover significant assets from Lebanon, which desires access to our prime contractors in Iraq, and may be willing to be more cooperative on assets in exchange for this access.

Donor's Conference: In addition, there will be an international donors' conference in October to raise funds to support Iraq's 2004 budget requirements. The CPA is working with the World Bank and United Nations Development Program teams to identify needs and projects for the international community to support. I chair the interagency group that is working this donor effort and I participate in the international effort to plan this conference. Representatives from CPA are included in both of these forums.


Ultimately, as I indicated in my memo to you of July 9, I believe we must be prepared to fund Iraq's reconstruction needs by ourselves. But we will continue to press the international community, and are focusing on both of the key areas—frozen assets and the conference—noted above.

I will continue to update you on the efforts to liberate frozen Iraqi assets and on the preparations for the international donor's conference.

COORDINATION:

Prepared by: David Norquist, (b)(6)

7:32 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: July 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Are we going to go ahead and get a letter to every one of the members of the House and Senate from me, signed by me, with an attachment, showing what's going on in Iraq?

I think it is a good idea. You will recall that was posed to us.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.08

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

8/3/03

U20921 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18546

7:23 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>1</sup>

DATE: July 25, 2003

SUBJECT: NATO

You should figure out how NATO could conceivably be involved in helping the Turks and give them some political cover.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.06

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_


8/2/03

U20922 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18547



7:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: July 25, 2003  
SUBJECT: Colin McMillan

You need to let the White House know that the Colin McMillan nomination should not go forward.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.04

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

7/28/03

U20925 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18548

1:52 PM

Call

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: July 28, 2003  
SUBJECT:

When I went down to that press briefing last week, they said that it was the first time that I'd been there in more than a month.

Is that true? Show me the dates I've briefed in the briefing room.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.19

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

✓ 8/5

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
8/1

11-L-0559/OSD/18549

U20924 /03

August 1, 2003/Di Rita

✓  
8/5

MEMO TO SECDEF

The actual assertion was at your press conference on July 24<sup>th</sup>, in which the CBS producer said that you had not been down there since June 30.

The dates you have been down there over the past couple of months are:

July 24<sup>th</sup>  
June 30<sup>th</sup>  
June 24<sup>th</sup>  
June 18<sup>th</sup>  
May 20<sup>th</sup>

I have heard no grumblings about you not being accessible or in the studio enough.

During the period from June 30<sup>th</sup> to July 24<sup>th</sup>, it is important to recall:

**Week of June 30:** In studio, but then gone from July 2 to July 7

**Week of July 7:** You testified to the Senate July 9<sup>th</sup>, offering ample press coverage

**Week of July 14:** We had General Abizaid in the studio on July 16, a special opportunity for our press corps. On that basis, we cancelled your tentatively scheduled July 18<sup>th</sup> press briefing.

**Week of July 21:** We had the DepSec in the studio reporting on his trip, again an opportunity our press corps does not often have.

We are also giving them other high-level special opportunities, such as simulcast press briefings from Baghdad with Odierno, Sanchez, and, next week (tentatively) Bremer.

2:15 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

Could we use the 9/11 Commission Report to get our personnel system reformed?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.18

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8/6/03*

*Done 8/5*

U20925 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18551

TO: *Marin Strymecki*  
Merin Strymecki

(b)(6)

*In reply refer to:*

2:04 PM

*EF-6392*  
*I-03/010769*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

What's happened to the crops in Afghanistan this year? What have they produced besides illegal drugs?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.15

Please respond by:

8/8

*✓ 8/18*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*vr/CDR Nosenzo*  
*8/14*

11-08-03 1:55

U20927 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18552



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

AUG 12 2003

USDP

I-03/010769

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

12 AUG 2003

SUBJECT: Afghan Crops (U)

- You asked about the status of crops in Afghanistan. Data on Afghanistan's agricultural production is scarce, but the best indicator is the production of wheat (bread is a key staple in Afghan diets).
- In 2002, wheat production increased 60-80 percent over 2001 yields to an estimated total of 3.6 millions of metric tons (mmt).
  - The increase resulted from an end to five years of drought in many parts of the country, as well as distribution in some localities of improved seeds.
- In 2003, wheat production is expected to exceed 4.0 mmt, perhaps reaching 4.2 mmt.
  - If production reaches 4.2 mmt, this may be a surplus over domestic needs.
- Afghanistan, traditionally an exporter of fruits and vegetables, has increased production of these commodities, though data on scale of production are not yet reliable.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mani Sirmeeji, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

USD(NESA)

PDASD/ISA Tdy

1:38 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

I've got to see my answer to Ted Kennedy on the numbers of troops. We've got to get the information from Jim Jones as to how many of the NATO non-US troops are deployable.

Second, I need to get an answer to Pryor as to when I knew that the information might be wrong.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.12

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 8 | 6 | 03

*Done 8/5*

U20928 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18554

1:55 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 28, 2003  
SUBJECT:

I think I've got to figure out what I should do on this problem with the Academies involving sexual assaults. I haven't gotten satisfaction yet. I don't fully understand it and I don't know how widespread it is, but it is serious and it worries me. Any ideas?

Thanks.

DHR/vzn  
072803.11

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8/6/03*

U20929 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18555



12:45 PM

C8/1

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

What do we have planned for the Pentagon to do in connection with Bob Hope?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.07

Please respond by:

8/3/03

7/30

✓  
8/14

~~Sec Def~~ - I asked  
for some recommendations  
from some people and will  
give some ideas. What I  
have gotten thus far include  
re-naming the USO Corridor  
here in the Building and  
naming the Boundary Channel  
Drive "Bob Hope Way". There  
will be other suggestions coming  
and we'll put some thoughts to-  
gether for you. *Di Rita*

U20930 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18556

8/1 TEN

1:57 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 28, 2003  
SUBJECT:

I would like to know how much money is allocated to each of the AOR Combatant Commanders, and what they do with it and who decides it, and when's it done.

Thanks.

DJR/azn  
082803.04

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

8/5/03

✓ 8/14

8/5

Sir,  
Response attached.  
Coordinated w/ JB.

v/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
8/5

Refer to  
SF 081403-8

U20931 103

*see id*  
8/1/03 0800 11-L-0559/OSD/18557

12:34 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

These myths are not bad.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082803.03  
*1*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

U20932 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18558

## Myths and Facts about the Coalition in Iraq

**Myth:** Iraqi clerics and protestors opposing the U.S. reflect the widespread resentment among Iraqis toward the Coalition's presence in their country.

**Fact:** With Saddam Hussein's removal, Iraqis are now free to speak their minds, voice dissent and protest openly -- acts that would have earned jail sentences and torture just months ago. While thousands may protest, more than 25 million people are liberated from the rule of Saddam Hussein, and most Iraqis are helping the U.S. and Coalition rebuild their country. Thousands have become new Iraqi army service members, civil defense militiamen, policemen and electrical workers. In increasing numbers, they are also helping Coalition forces locate and capture former regime members and their weapons.

**Myth:** Why doesn't the U.S. acknowledge the need for international help in securing and rebuilding Iraq? And why do American troops outnumber those from other Coalition members?

**Facts:** The Coalition force in Iraq is an international force. There are 19 countries on the ground and 37 countries that have pledged almost \$3 billion in reconstruction assistance to the Iraqis. The U.S. has the majority of forces in Iraq because it is the world's great power right now, and with great power comes great responsibility. The U.S. has the fundamental responsibility for winning the peace in Iraq and will continue to commit the forces necessary to get the job done.

**Myth:** Recent reports say that the U.S. doesn't have adequate troop strength in Iraq.

**Fact:** There are currently 148,000 U.S. service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops are serving in Iraq. Not only did elements of this force defeat Saddam's army in a number of weeks, they are now helping with internal security and reconstruction.

*Even the  
Iraqi  
troops*

Rather than looking at numbers, it's helpful to look at results. The force in Iraq continues to be effective at applying pressure to the remnants of the former Iraqi regime. U.S. troops are conducting operations against enemy dead-enders. Recent operations -- including Soda Mountain, Sidewinder, Desert Scorpion and Ivy Serpent -- have included 190 raids resulting in the capture of 1100 detainees, the seizure of 4,500 mortar rounds, 1600 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition and thousands of other weapons and military equipment. In addition, more than 8,000 tons of Iraqi ordnance have been secured or destroyed since the end of major combat operations.

**Myth:** The Coalition has yet to find evidence of WMD in Iraq. Evidence of Saddam's WMD ambitions will probably never be found.

**Fact:** There is currently a large team of 1,500 people who have begun operations in Iraq to uncover WMD evidence. It will take time and patience to uncover weapons that Saddam and his regime have had years to hide. Iraq is a large country that developed complex methods of denial and deception tactics to mislead the international community and U.N. inspectors about the nature of their weapons programs. But there has never been any doubt -- among U.S. officials or the United Nations, which passed 17 resolutions calling for accountability with regard to Saddam's weapons -- that the former Iraqi regime had an aggressive WMD program.

**Myth:** A CSIS report released July 17 was highly critical of the U.S. effort in Iraq, and made a number of recommendations that should be implemented immediately.

**Fact:** The CSIS was fair in characterizing the immensity of the challenge facing the Coalition Provisional Authority in rebuilding a country suffering from the effects of 35 years of oppression and neglect. It also said the upcoming months were crucial, and that full reconstruction would take a number of years. For the most part, CPA leaders agree with this assessment. First, the U.S. is already implementing many of the CSIS recommendations, such as working hard to provide security, electricity, running water, sanitation and food. It is widely understood that rebuilding Iraq is a long-term process. It's clear that given the size of the task, the Coalition will be in Iraq going to be there for a while, possibly a number of years.

The CSIS report was also positive with regard to U.S. efforts. An excerpt:

"Eleven days in Iraq left indelible images in our minds...fathers escorting young girls to school; young men waiting in long lines everywhere jobs are announced; young kids flashing the thumbs-up sign; retained Iraqi police officers directing traffic; 19 year-old American soldiers...chatting on street corners with Iraqi children; the pride and professionalism of Iraqi members of newly established town councils; [and]...the sincere efforts of civilians to forge ahead...

"As we traveled throughout the country, it was impossible not be impressed by the character and drive of the coalition forces, the dedication and enthusiasm of the CPA, the weary endurance of the Iraqi people, and the enormity of the opportunities, challenges, and risks before them all [Page 9, [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org)]."

**Myth:** Saddam's remaining supporters are launching coordinated attacks across Iraq.  
**Fact:** Eighty-five percent of the attacks against the coalition since June 1<sup>st</sup> have been in a small area between Baghdad and Tikrit. This is the area of Saddam's traditional tribal and political support, where remnants of the old regime regrouping in squad-level attacks against our soldiers. But they present no strategic threat to the Coalition, and there is no evidence of command-and-control coordination of these attacks.

**Myth:** The U.S. is getting drawn into a drawn-out guerrilla war in Iraq.  
**Fact:** The Saddam hold-outs are not guerrillas, they are dead-enders, and they don't have the support of the Iraqi people. Additionally, they are no match for the Coalition forces in Iraq who number more than 140,000 and are conducting on-going and effective operations against Hussein regime criminals. Their attacks have not held up progress in Iraq.

1:56 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

Here is info on (b)(6). He runs these hotels on the shore. We may want to stay in one of them. Either "The Avenue" or possibly talk to him about where to stay next time.

His name is (b)(6) and the phone number is (b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

U20935 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18561

4:13 PM

TO: Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*DATE: July 28, 2003 *C3/*

SUBJECT:

*(B)*

Why didn't the *Nashville* leave when the *Iwo Jima* and the *Carter Hall* did? Why is it taking six days longer to get there?

Thanks.

*Briefed to SecDef already  
L.C.*

DHR/azn  
072803.30

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*8/5/03*

U20934 /03

4:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

This week I want a meeting with Marc Thiessen, (b)(6) with those file categories, and Larry Di Rita.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.29

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *8/5/03*

U20935 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18563



TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

You are in charge of saying that the reward gets paid for the capture of Uday and Qusai.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Larry Di Rita is working on a public affairs strategy. Challenge is balancing need for publicity with need to protect the life of informant.*

XTRA - Ken FYI

↑

3:18 PM

*Sir,  
Copy for you.  
V/R  
Nose*

*8/4*

*1020  
7/21*

*7/31/03*

*→ See Def -  
Done.*

*TW*

*✓  
8/4*

U20937 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

C 8/7  
✓  
8/9

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Daily Update to Congress

I want to set up for the Congress a daily e-mail or fax that sends in hard facts for them, so they can have talking points to talk to the media and respond to questions. They need facts about what is happening in Iraq—security, political evolution, economic progress, etc. If we cannot do it every day, we ought to do it at least three times a week.

They need it. They want it. I promised it.

*] They get it. Have been for a few weeks.*

Please get back to me with a proposal as to who is going to do it, how it is going to be done and when it is going to start.

Thanks.

*We have a joint PA/LA team that focuses exclusively on the H/I/I/Iraq*

DHR:dh  
072403-16

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*D. Rumsfeld*

Larry Di Rita  
8/7

U20938 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18565

*Sir,  
Forwarded  
for  
Cdr. Wessinger  
8/7*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
8/9

August 5, 2003 12:10 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake # 072403-16 regarding Daily Update to Congress

- Legislative and Public Affairs have developed a coordinated outreach plan to inform Congress about Iraq. The plan includes daily faxes and e-mails to the Congress as well as weekly briefings.
- The plan is a continuation of OSD-LA's faxes that have been sent on a regular basis to the Hill since October 2001.
- A detailed outline of the plan, called OPERATION ENDURING RECESS, is attached as well as samples of the daily and weekly faxes to the Hill.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake
2. Outreach Plan
3. Daily Iraq Update (2 examples)
4. Weekly Iraq Progress Report

11-L-0559/OSD/18566

## Update From the Field

### Security Initiatives

#### Iraqi Police

- Over 34,000 Iraqi police rehired nationally; 9,600 in Baghdad (not all are actively policing yet).
- CPA finalizing accelerated national police recruiting and training plan

#### Facility Protection Force

- Ministries / municipalities responsible for training and equipping guard forces to protect their facilities and property. The Ministry of the Interior will establish protection force standards.
- Currently over 1000 personnel guarding 87 critical sites in Baghdad.

#### Iraqi Civil Defense Force (Militia)

- Plan to form eight battalions with about 850 Iraqi militiamen each in the next 45 days; possible additional eight battalions to follow.
- Iraqi forces will initially protect supply convoys and fixed points (ammo dumps, power plants, etc.)

#### International Stabilization Force

- Progress continues toward three multinational divisions.
- Seeking international constabulary contributions.

#### New Iraqi Army

- Coalition Military Advisor and the Training Team are standing up.
- Three divisions (40K) personnel envisioned within 2 years (30 battalion sized units); initial 12K to be ready this year.
- Three recruitment centers open in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah.
  - Fourth center in Irbil to follow
  - All males between 18-40 are eligible
  - Members of the former regime security organizations, intelligence organizations, Special Republican Guards, Baath Party security and militia organizations, and top-level Baathists are not eligible.
  - Enlistees receive \$60 / month during training.

## Key Points

**International support continues to grow. Each week more countries contribute military support.**

- More than 45 nations have offered military support.
  - 19 countries have military capabilities on the ground in Iraq. They are currently contributing 13,000 troops.
  - 17 countries are working out deployment details for their forces.
  - 11 other countries are in various stages of discussions for potential contributions.
- A UK led multi-national division is on track to assume full operational control of its sector this week.
- A Poland -led multinational division is on track to assume full operational control of its sector on September 3<sup>rd</sup>.
  - As the Poland - led division come in place, it will replace the Marine Expeditionary Force.

### Important Transcripts and Links

**Today's Iraq: Talking points on Governance, Security, Mass Graves, International Participation and Quality of Life in Iraq** [www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil)

**Update on Iraq's 55 Most Wanted:**

<http://www.defendamerica.mil/iraq/iraqi55/index.html>

**Secretary Rumsfeld Stakeout at the Senate: 7/30/03**

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030730-secdef0482.html>

**Briefing on the Status of Telecommunication Services in Iraq 8/1/03**

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030801-0483.html>

**For Press Secretary or MLA Inquiries on Iraq:  
Call Legislative Affairs (703) 697-6210**

**Or Refer To:**

**[www.cpa-iraq.org](http://www.cpa-iraq.org) or [www.Defendamerica.mil](http://www.Defendamerica.mil)  
To be added to this electronic mailing list, e-mail**

(b)(6)



## Update From the Field

### Security Update

- Saddam supporters continue sporadic hit-and-run attacks; persistent sabotage and looting still complicate recovery efforts.
- Coalition forces have conducted broad sweeps and quick reaction combat missions, registering significant success in eliminating Saddam's sons on 22 July.
  - Efforts continue to add at least 30K Coalition military forces in Iraq in the next several months.
  - 36 of 55 "most wanted" killed or captured.
- 148,000 US service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops are serving in Iraq.
- More than 8,200 tons of ammunition has been seized throughout Iraq—much of which was stored by the Hussein regime in hospitals, schools and mosques.

### Operation Soda Mountain (ended July 17):

- 141 Raids by US forces
- 611 individuals captured including 62 former regime leaders
- 4,297 mortar rounds, 1,346 rocket-propelled grenades and 635 other weapons captured.

### Operation Sidewinder (ended July 7):

- 282 individuals detained
- 96 AK-47 rifles, 3 heavy machine guns, 217 rocket propelled grenades, 33 grenades, 200 60 mm-mortar rounds, other military equipment, documents, weapons and ammunition.

### Operation Desert Scorpion (Ongoing):

- 6 raids
- 29 detainees
- \$8 million worth of Iraqi dinar, and a large sum of British pounds, sterling and Euro.

### Operation Ivy Serpent (Ongoing):

- 27 raids
- 226 detainees
- 800 82-mm mortar rounds
- 50 AK-47s
- 26 rocket-propelled grenades and 3 hand grenades
- 6 detainees are former regime leaders.

## Key Points

The United States and its Coalition partners are continuing a major offensive against the remnants of Saddam's regime. The deaths of Saddam's sons and the success the forces have realized capturing former Ba'athist officials are helping to build trust with the Iraqi people, who are coming forward to volunteer information about former regime officials.

- The Coalition's aggressive patrols and search and attack missions are paying off. Captured regime members are providing information.
  - Three Key figures, including a bodyguard, were captured near Tikrit. The 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division also netted documents in the raids
  - Saddam remains a critical target for the Coalition. Troops continue to focus on their mission to kill or capture him. There is a \$25 million reward.
- The demise of Uday and Qusay Hussein is important to make Iraqis feel more secure that the Ba'athist tyranny will never return.
- Iraqis suffered under Saddam's regime for 35 years, and their fear of the regime is still pervasive. As more regime remnants are captured and killed, the fear of the Iraqi people will subside.
- The Iraqi people are providing vital assistance and information to bring members of the former regime to justice.
- In the days following Uday and Qusay's death, Iraqis came forward about dead-enders and weapons caches.

## Important Transcripts

DoD News Briefing – Mr. Di Rita and Lt. Gen. Schwartz: 7/29/03

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030729-0465.html>

For Press Secretary or MLA Inquiries on Iraq:  
Call Legislative Affairs (703) 697-6210

Or Refer To:

[www.cpa-iraq.org](http://www.cpa-iraq.org) or [www.Defendamerica.mil](http://www.Defendamerica.mil)  
To be added to this electronic mailing list, e-mail

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18568





### Coalition Provisional Authority's Goal

*"A unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security."*

- L. Paul Bremer, Administrator

### Security

Coalition security activities in a recent 24-hour period: 29 raids with 241 arrests, including Saddam bodyguard. 1,096 day patrols, 889 night patrols. 122 day and 139 night joint Coalition and Iraqi police patrols. Over 34K Iraqi police rehired nationally, 9600 rehired in Baghdad. Over 1000 Facility Protection Force personnel guarding 87 critical sites in Baghdad.

### Quality of Life

There is no food or health crisis. 3K tons of medical supplies distributed in the last 60 days. All of Iraq's hospitals and 95% of health clinics are open.

Much of Iraq is at or near pre-war power levels. 26 July Energy Conference brought together power officials from all over Iraq. At the conference a interim predictable minimum service schedule of 3 hours on and 3 hours off was developed throughout Iraq. Essential services like hospitals, water plants, and sewage treatment plants to receive power 24 hours a day. Currently generating 3249MW nationally (74% of pre-war levels).

Much of Iraq is at pre-war water levels.

Daily gasoline supply (including imports) this month fluctuated from 46% to 113% of pre-war production.

### Economic Revitalization

Ambassador Bremer announced the establishment of the Trade Bank of Iraq. It's mission is to facilitate and support the reconstruction of Iraq through trade finance activities related to exports from and imports to Iraq.

CPA has approved a \$77M contract for economic governance assistance.

Crude exports from the South continue. 2.1 million barrels of stored crude departed 7/29 by tanker. The Iraq-Turkey pipeline has been repaired and is ready for exports. Crude production currently exceeding 1 million BPD. Security, sabotage, electricity outages still serious concerns.

### Self Government

The Governing Council has established leadership structure. The 9-person leadership committee reflects the country's ethnic and religious diversity. The leadership committee has a rotating presidency. The council is made up of 5 Shia and 4 Sunni muslims, eight are from Saddam opposition groups. Many head large political organizations with significant constituencies.

All major cities have city councils. 85% of towns have town councils

### International Contributions

International offers of assistance for Iraq total \$2.3B, which includes 1B from the Iraqi Oil-for-Food funding. \$2.0B toward March UN Flash Appeal of \$2.8B. 23 June additional UN appeal for \$259M, total UN appeal now 2.459B. 30 separate countries have made pledges or contributions within the UN appeal and additional countries have made pledges or contributions outside of the appeal.

Over 45 nations have offered military support. 19 countries have military capabilities on the ground in Iraq. 17 countries are working deployment details for their forces. 11 others are in various stages of discussions for potential contributions. The UK-led multi-national division is on track to assume full operational control of its sector on 01 Aug 03. Polish-led multi-national division on track to assume full operational control of its sector on 03 Sept. 03.

Prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

For more complete weekly briefings please e-mail

(b)(6)

July 31, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18569

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Boeing and Cong. Hunter

Here is a note Boeing gave Duncan Hunter that runs to the issue we just talked about.

Please have somebody take a look at it and tell me what they think of it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/22/03 Boeing ltr (de Leon) to Cong. Hunter



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS  
Powell A. Moore

DIIR:jh  
072403-17

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*To Mike Wynne*  
*CR 8/18*  
*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/r*  
*CDR Nosenzo* ✓ *8/18*  
*8/17*

U20939 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18570



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
**FOUO**  
**INFO MEMO**

✓ 8/18

August 15, 2003 5:15 PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM:** Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

**SUBJECT:** Boeing and Congressman Hunter  
Response to Snowflake 072403-17

- By memorandum dated 29 July 02 (Tab A), you requested information on a letter from Boeing to Chairman Hunter as it relates to the Domestic Preference provisions.
- Although not explicitly stated in the letter, Boeing's willingness to make any accommodations regarding specialty metals is tied to trying to garner support for the Air Force's 767 Tanker Lease.
- DoD has not been a party to any discussions or agreements regarding alternate language on the Domestic Preference provisions of HR 1588.
- Boeing has declined to give us a copy of the attachments to the letter that contain detailed language.
- There have always been significant differences between DoD and the HASC on specialty metals language. It is unlikely that the language referred to in the letter would be acceptable for general usage.

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, 614-9115 & Daniel C. Nielsen, OUSD AT&L (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18571



Rudy F. de Leon  
Senior Vice President  
Washington, DC Operations

The Boeing Company  
1200 Wilson Blvd MC RS-00  
Arlington, VA 22209

✓  
7/24

July 22, 2003

The Honorable Duncan Hunter  
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2265 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have enjoyed the opportunity to catch up with you several times in the past month and want to thank you for always taking the time out of your busy schedule to meet. As a result of a good faith dialog on the issue of applicability of the specialty metals provisions of the Berry Amendment to commercial items that dates back to March, prior to the House Armed Services Committee markup of the FY04 defense authorization bill, I believe we have reached a conceptual agreement on this narrow issue. The agreement is reflected in a new subsection (i) and implementation procedures included in the attached discussion draft dated July 21, 2003.

The discussion draft describes a more streamlined specialty metals commercial item exemption than in the current House bill. The approach is based on an equivalency methodology to be developed by the DoD in conjunction with industry. This approach intends to strike a balance between the industrial base concerns of domestic specialty metals suppliers and commercial companies using marketplace processes.

During our discussions, I have not consulted with the Senate, the Department of Defense, or other companies, but I believe this is a workable solution to a highly challenging and important issue.

I have also worked with your staff on the House bill provision (Sec. 826) regarding machine tools as you requested. I believe that the revised approach addresses many of our concerns related to Sec. 826 in the House bill.

There is great value in further study that will provide a more solid basis for evaluating the needs of all interested parties in looking at these complex industrial base questions. The conceptual path forward for commercial items in the attached is one that may still benefit from further refinement in order to achieve the intended balance noted above.

The public attention generated by these issues, and the time that you have devoted to them, underscores their importance. As always, I look forward to working with you in the future on a wide range of issues of mutual interest. Please do not hesitate to call me on this, or on other issues, if I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,





29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statistics

Please have someone give me a list of all the people who are killed on the highways every year in the United States and all the people who were killed after V-E day, after V-J day, after the Korean armistice.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-18

.....

Please respond by 8/8/03

U20940 /03

# Peacekeeping Has Been Bloody

<u>Mission</u>	<u>American Deaths</u>	
Korea (Since Armistice)	1,500 ( 72 Hostile )	
Panama (After Just Cause)	93 ( 1 Hostile )	
Balkans (UN/NATO Peacekeeping)	30	
Iraq* (After End of Major Combat)	19 ( 19 Hostile )	20 July 37 ( 37 Hostile )

Data Provided by Congressional Research Service

\* Deaths as a result of hostile action through June 20, 2003

111-0559/OSD/18574

Information to Come:

Post VE Day: Hostile/Non Hostile

Post VS Day: Hostile/Non-Hostile

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Numbers from Gen. Jones

I have to get the details from Jim Jones as to what percentage of the 2-plus million NATO people (non-U.S.), what the exact number is, and the number of people who are deployable. He told me three percent, but he wanted to check it.

Please get the answer from him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-19

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20941 /03

Done 8/5

11-L-0559/OSD/18575

498

July <sup>29</sup> 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Multiple on Rotation Forces

What do you propose we do to analyze the issue of why we seem to need from three-to-one to five-to-one multiple based on rotation forces. I have trouble understanding why the differences between the Services and why the difference between three and five.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-21

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 9/30  
C 9/30

Sir,  
Response attached.  
Copy to DepSec.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
9.30

11 JUL 20 AM 7:59

11-L-0559/OSD/18576

U20942 /03