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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Counterintelligence Memorandum

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Date: MAY 01 2018

## THE TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)

MARCH 1977

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 02 May 2018 Authority: EO 13526 <sup>+5 U.S.C. §</sup> 552


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DIACIM 1-77

28 February 1977

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
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SPECIAL SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRECAUTIONS



. DIA FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (3); 10 U.S.C. § 424 .


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PREFACE

(U) Information in this document is based on intelligence reporting available to DIA through 12 February 1977.

(U) As utilized in this study, the terms "terrorism," "international terrorism," "terrorist organization," and "nuclear weapon," are bound by definitional parameters. These are:

a. Terrorism: The use of force, violence, or threats thereof by a terrorist organization or its members to attain political goals through fear, intimidation, or coercion.

b. Terrorist Organization: An anarchist, nihilist, or politically-oriented, insurgent-type group which uses terrorism as a mode of operation, usually in an urban vice rural environment.

c. International Terrorism: Calculated acts of terrorism inflicted against foreigners or occurring extranationally which are usually designed to attract worldwide publicity and focus attention to the existence, cause, and demands of a terrorist organization.

d. Nuclear Weapon: A weapon or device intended to produce a nuclear yield.


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
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
B. (S) [REDACTED] TERRORISM AND MASS DESTRUCTION INCIDENTS

(S) [REDACTED] Much discussion continues to be waged - especially in the public media - over the possibility of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons are usually defined as radiological, biological, or chemical. Similarly, there is continued debate over the possibility of terrorists fabricating a nuclear weapon or device for use in an operation; attacking a nuclear power plant; or attacking a nuclear weapon storage site. No information has been received during the last six months to cause any significant change to previously made judgments on these possibilities. Briefly stated these judgments are:

- Radiological or Biological Devices: Some terrorist organizations must be presumed to have the capability to construct a conventional explosive device to which a radioactive or biological substance in some form can be added. The main constraint in either of these endeavors lies not with the capability of some terrorist groups to construct an explosive device, but rather with their ability to acquire suitable radioactive materials or biological substances.

- Chemical Devices: Many of the world's terrorist organizations could acquire the capability to manufacture at least a crude chemical weapon should they so desire.

- Nuclear Devices: None of the individual steps involved in fabricating a nuclear device are beyond the capabilities of a sophisticated, well-funded group; however, the probability of successfully completing all of the steps required is considered to be fairly low.<sup>2</sup>



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(S) While the possibility of terrorists fabricating and utilizing weapons of mass destruction as described above, is considered to be fairly low for a number of reasons, the possible terrorist threat to nuclear power plants is more ambiguous. Generally speaking, terrorist organizations are adept at judging the maximum levels of violence which they can inflict without incurring complete public rejection for their causes. Often times in the past, such groups also conduct operations which are specifically designed to incur public feelings of sympathy or at the least apathy toward their activities. Representative examples would include the on-going campaign by the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) in some cities in West Germany to print and distribute fake tickets to the local citizenry for their use on transportation systems. From the terrorists point of view, such a campaign is not only "good public relations" - it is also a subtle form of seduction. Another illustrative example could be the ability of Greek extremist groups to foment violent incidents against U.S. personnel and facilities in Greece by playing on public frustrations over the outcome of the Cyprus situation and other internal political developments for which the U.S. is a handy whipping boy.

(S) In the specific case of nuclear power plants, there is widespread and international public concern regarding their feasibility, long-range usefulness, and security. In some instances, public protests about these facilities have turned violent. In other instances, individual(s) acting clandestinely have demonstrated their feelings about nuclear power plants with bombs. Five such incidents occurred during the last six months in Western Europe:

- On 28 November 1976, 50 pounds of explosives were discovered near the Ringhals nuclear plant on Sweden's west coast. A local newspaper received a letter from the unknown perpetrators stating that this was the last warning - next time the plant will be leveled.

- On 30 October 1976, 1000-5000 demonstrators battled police at the Brokdorf, FRG nuclear power plant site resulting in 52 arrests. On 13 November 1976, a crowd of protestors officially estimated at 25,000 persons confronted 2000 police at the Brokdorf site. After a day-long protest the crowd was dispersing when a small number of militants confronted the police who in turn reacted against the entire column of marchers. After the melee was finished, 51 demonstrators and 79 police required hospitalization. Police later attributed the violence to extreme left militants from the Communist League of West Germany (KBW), the Communist Party of Germany-Marxist/Leninist (KPD/MC), and the Group of International Marxists (GIM).

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- On the night of 13 November, five bombs exploded in a uranium mine near Limoges, France causing an estimated \$10 million damage and closure of the mine. The mine was a major French source of uranium. A previously unheard of "group" calling itself "Opposition Commando Using Explosives Against the Self-Destruction of the Universe" (COPU) claimed responsibility. On 14 November, the offices of a French atomic research firm in Paris were destroyed by a bomb blast. Responsibility for the bombing was not claimed. Previous incidents of violence at nuclear power related facilities in France occurred in May 1975 and August 1975.

( ) As indicated above, the significance of these acts lies not so much on the tactics involved (although that information is required for security countermeasures purposes), but rather with the fact that their accomplishment would have some measure of public support; or be viewed as responsive to public concerns; or at the least not be completely condemned by the public at large. When that situation or stage is reached, similar targets and further acts against them can be perceived as "legitimate", and the potential threat that a terrorist group might include such a target in its future operations increases. In summary, although no known terrorist group has been known to have targeted a nuclear power facility in the past, the incentives to include such a target in the future must be viewed as increasing.

C. ( ) THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DOD PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

( ) Based on investigations of incidents which have occurred at, near, or on U.S. nuclear weapon storage sites or military bases containing such sites, and on information available from intelligence sources, there is no evidence available which indicates that any known terrorist organization has in the past or intends in the future to target such sites. Further, there is no information to indicate that incidents which have occurred at these sites - to include harassment, vandalism, curiosity seeking, foreign intelligence observation, and occasional acts of low-level violence - can be attributed to known terrorist organizations. Based on all information currently available, we believe that an attempt by a known terrorist group to steal a nuclear weapon from a U.S. nuclear weapon storage site within the next six to eight months is highly doubtful.

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



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THREE DOD CONTRACT PERSONNEL ASSASSINATED  
ON 28 AUGUST 1976 BY AN IRANTAN TERRORIST GROUP.



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(S) [REDACTED] There is a real and demonstrated threat, however, to other DoD personnel and facilities. Nuclear weapon storage sites can generally be considered "well defended" installations if they meet the security criteria established by appropriate DoD regulations. Other DoD facilities overseas and their associated personnel however do not have the types of in-depth security protection associated with nuclear facilities. Indeed, the very nature of these non-nuclear DoD facilities all but precludes anything other than passive defensive measures from being employed, and it is these DoD facilities and their associated personnel which have been included as targets by terrorists in the past. Generally speaking, these non-nuclear DoD facilities and associated personnel are publically accessible by design or by the nature of their missions and duties, and they have not been or cannot be provided with other than minimal security. Representative examples of the types of DoD facilities and personnel most likely to become targets of terrorist organizations are demonstrated by the following incidents and serious threats which occurred during the last six months:

- The German terrorist group "Revolutionary Cells" (RZ) claimed responsibility for the 1 December 1976 bombing of the Rhein Main AFB Officers Club and the 4 January 1977 bombing of a fuel storage tank at Giessen Army Depot.

- In October 1976, two U.S. Embassy personnel in a Latin American country (one of whom was a U.S. military attache) were targeted for assassination or kidnapping. Due to effective counteraction, the terrorist group cancelled the operation.

- The Iranian Peoples Strugglers (IPS) claimed responsibility for the 28 August 1976 assassinations of three DoD civilian contract personnel in Iran. Other assassinations have been conducted by the IPS in the past against personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy and the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran.

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[REDACTED]

- In August 1976, a raid was conducted in Buenos Aires on a safehouse belonging to the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP). Discovered were lists of names and addresses of U.S. MILGP members. During interrogation, one captured suspect admitted that at least one U.S. military member was to be the target of an ERP assassination operation.

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II. (S) [REDACTED] ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES  
AND PROJECTION OF LIKELY TRENDS

(U) This Section provides an update of information on those terrorist organizations whose activities cause them to fall within the scope of this study. It is designed to present an overview of terrorist activities in certain nations of interest with emphasis on identification of trends and projection of future terrorist activities.

A. (S) [REDACTED] LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL  
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(S) [REDACTED] The sole Latin American organization which possesses the personnel, support apparatus, logistical base, and international terrorist contacts that would be required to successfully facilitate an attack on a U.S. nuclear weapons storage site is the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). Established initially in November 1972, the JCR was formally announced as an organization on 13 February 1974, in Argentina. Member groups of the JCR currently consist of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Uruguayan Tupamaros, Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Paraguayan National Liberation Front (FREPALINA). When formally established in 1974, the JCR announced it would act as a central operational command to coordinate guerrilla actions, logistical support, and financing on a continental level. Subsequent events determined that the JCR principally served as a funnel for financial support among member groups with ERP providing the leadership and drive within the JCR. The JCR has not engaged in any known unilaterally originated terrorist activity, although member groups have continued to do so.

(S) [REDACTED] DIACIM-2-76 provided information concerning activities of the JCR during the first half of calendar year 1976. A late entry to DIACIM-2-76 noted the death of Mario Roberto Santucho, leader of the ERP who was killed in a firefight with security forces in Argentina on 19 July 1976. The ERP was primarily responsible for formation of the JCR between 1972 and 1974, and reportedly managed and helped finance JCR activities from 1974-1976. Since Santucho's death, the ERP, and consequently the JCR, has been seriously weakened by counter-

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terrorist operations initiated by Argentinian security forces during the second half of 1976. <sup>4</sup>

(b) [REDACTED] Of particular import to the subject of this study, it is noted that the JCR has members among the Latin American exile communities in Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and France. During early 1976, it was reported that the JCR was holding meetings in Paris and on 9-10 May 1976, Le Monde contained an article entitled: "Latin America Fights in Argentina," which was signed by the JCR. The existence of JCR representatives in Europe allows for the establishment of safe houses, post office boxes, and liaison with political or other terrorist organizations in the European area. This potential logistical support base for future international terrorist operations by JCR member groups deserves continued monitoring. Evidence exists that the JCR in Europe has been inactive during the past six months. Although the reasons for this inactivity are not clear, it can be speculated that the successful counterterrorist operations in Argentina against the JCR have robbed the JCR of its most important organizational asset - its leadership cadre. There are, however, sufficient numbers of exiles remaining to quickly increase JCR European activity with proper motivation, leadership and support. To that end, the only activity by the JCR during the past six months has been efforts to relocate and provide assistance to Latin American exiles.

<sup>4</sup> For example, during the same month that Santucho was killed, security forces discovered and destroyed an ERP printing plant; numerous ERP cadre were killed or captured; and an ERP library was discovered and literature confiscated. Within this library was found a listing of names and addressees for all ERP collaborators in Argentina. Subsequently, security forces have engaged in additional neutralization operations and have reportedly wiped out most of the ERP organization. Those ERP cadre remaining in Argentina have allegedly joined forces with the Montoneros.

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(S) [REDACTED] In terms of support, one of the most significant developments relative to the JCR to occur within the past few months has been the accumulation of increasing evidence that Cuba has been providing financial and training support to the JCR. During a JCR meeting in Argentina in March 1976, a Cuban (NFI) was reportedly introduced as the person who would be coordinating future logistical support for JCR elements in South America. Captured leaders of member groups of the JCR have reported that the Cubans have provided financial support - in one instance, \$75,000 to the Chilean MIR in June-July 1976. There is also a reported school within Cuba for political and military training of Latin American leftists. Upon completion of the Cuban school, insurgents are infiltrated back into their home country and engage in subversive activity, which may include terrorist activity.

(S) [REDACTED] In sum, the JCR continues to be a Latin American organization of unique properties. It is composed of terrorist groups from five different countries with transnational connections. However, significant police and security activity within Argentina has appeared to neutralize the JCR during the past six months. New leadership is now required and additional support from the Cubans will likely be needed before the JCR can reach the same peak of influence it had in February 1976, just prior to the first Argentine police raid on a JCR meeting site. The JCR is not currently considered a threat to the security of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe, or to other storage sites worldwide.

B. (S) [REDACTED] AFRICAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (U)

Currently those indigenous terrorist, or insurgent movements which employ terrorist techniques, located in Sub-Saharan Africa pose no threat to the security of U.S. nuclear weapons. Those major terrorist groups north of the Sahara are addressed in the Middle East Section (see Section II.E.) of this memorandum.

C. (S) [REDACTED] FAR EAST TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (U)

(U) [REDACTED] Far Eastern terrorist groups, or insurgent organizations which utilize international terrorist activities, have not yet evidenced any intention to target U.S. nuclear weapons. There do exist, however, some major terrorist or insurgent groups in the Far East which either have targeted DoD personnel and non-nuclear installations in the area or possess the operational capability to do so.


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2. (S) [REDACTED] JAPAN (U)

(S) [REDACTED] As noted in DIACIM-2-76, those Japanese organizations most likely to engage in violent acts or terrorist type operations against U.S. personnel or facilities in Japan are the ultra-radical, leftist, student groups. These radical student groups do not pose a threat to DoD personnel or installations located outside of Japan.

(S) [REDACTED] In Japan during the past six months, violent attacks by radical student groups were minimal but were characterized by the use of new and ingenious operational techniques. The Japanese National Police Agency had expected ultra-leftist violence to surge during the October-November time frame as a result of the 50th anniversary of Hirohito's enthronement. Police had noted that clashes between radical factions had been far less frequent and that their guerilla squads were growing restive. Underground propaganda was calling for renewed violence and the major target common to all ultra-leftists was the Emperor. These small groups were planning a series of violent activities starting on 21 October - "International War Day" - and culminating with the 10 November celebration of the ascension of Hirohito. Numerous Japanese federal buildings were mentioned as targets as was the U.S. Embassy. This threat was the only example of a specific threat against a U.S. Governmental asset during the reporting period.

(S) [REDACTED] Early October reporting indicated that radical elements planned an all out offensive during the October-November time frame. However, as usual, the Japanese police were well prepared for the radical threat. Radical elements never garnered the support necessary to create the turmoil they envisioned. There were, however, a few examples of interesting new techniques utilized by radical Japanese elements to include:

. . . 12 October. Unidentified individuals planned to hurl flame bombs into the Imperial Palace grounds using a baseball pitching machine mounted in a truck. Police captured the truck before any damage was done. Individuals escaped.

. . . 14 October. A burning unmanned vehicle crashed into the east gate of the Japan Defense Agency. Police determined that plastic bags containing about nine gallons of gasoline had been ignited in the front seat of the vehicle before it was aimed down-hill on a one-way street which led to the gate.

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. . . . 2 November. An unidentified individual attempted to pour gasoline into the moat surrounding the Imperial Palace and then ignite it in a display of "anti-imperial household sentiments." Individual escaped.

(S) In a more significant vein, Fathi Abdul-Hamid arrived in December as the first Director of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Tokyo. Reportedly, Tokyo PLO personnel will be granted unrestricted travel permits and will be free to make contact with any persons or organizations. Opening of this office and unrestricted travel will afford access to a number of persons and groups in Japan sympathetic to the PLO to include the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the East Asia Anti-Japan Armed Front (EAAJAF). All three organizations have been ominously quiet during the last six months. Japanese security agencies believe that the PLO representative warrants close surveillance to determine whether he will attempt to act as a intermediary for pro-Palestinian/JRA groups in Japan.

(S) In summary, those violent incidents directed against DoD personnel or installations in Japan usually emanate from violence-prone leftist student factions, and usually occur incident to demonstrations or protests by these groups over sensitive political issues involving U.S. and Japan. As such, these student groups must be presumed to represent a continuing potential threat to DoD personnel and installations in Japan. Japanese terrorist groups active in Japan have not heretofore posed a threat to U.S. Forces and installations. While there is no current indication that they are likely to pose such a threat in the immediate future, their apparent efforts to reorganize and regroup - together with the ongoing efforts by the remnants of the exiled Japanese Red Army (JRA) to effect some reconciliation with indigenous based terrorist organizations and radical groups - are situations which should be carefully monitored in the near term.

#### JAPANESE RED ARMY

(S) Since the August 1975 Kuala Lumpur Operation, the Japanese Red Army (JRA) has apparently been beset with personnel and organizational problems. Never large in terms of numbers from the start, the JRA for much of the time after August 1975 had a number of its activists as permanent "house guests" in Libya. As a result of the arrest of two of these JRA members in September 1976 in Jordan, it is reasonable to conclude that the remaining personnel are no longer in Libya, but their exact location has not been confirmed. Current reporting

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indicates the JRA has moved its headquarters from Beirut to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and there have commenced planning for future unspecified terrorist operations. Other JRA personnel have been reliably reported to be in Iraq. Both locations are likely in view of JRA ties with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and PFLP ties with both the PDRY and Iraq.

(S) [REDACTED] Paralleling their personnel problems, the JRA has been reported for the past year or so to be reexamining its structure in the Middle East and Western Europe and attempting to rebuild its communal ties with indigenous Japanese radical organizations. The results of these efforts to date, while noteworthy, must be judged as mixed. There has been no reporting to date indicating a groundswell of support for the JRA in Japan, and the leader of its European support group was recently arrested and deported to Japan.

(S) [REDACTED] In spite of the problems identified above, it is likely that the JRA will again become active in the foreseeable future - most likely to avenge the capture and recent (October 1976) extradition of Junzo Okuidaira to Japan and the death of Toshio Hidaka in Jordan, as well as the December 1976 arrest and deportation of Toshio Omura from Canada to Japan. It should be emphasized that at this time, however, no information has been developed indicating specific JRA targets. Such reporting which is presently available should be viewed as speculative.

3. (S) [REDACTED] PHILIPPINES (U)

(S) [REDACTED] The two insurgent organizations currently operating in the Philippines are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the New People's Army (NPA). The MNLF continues to operate primarily in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao areas and as such poses little threat to DoD personnel. The most recent operation carried out by the MNLF was the late May 1976 hijacking of a Philippine Airlines flight from Davao. In early August, the MNLF leadership issued orders that no Americans were to be kidnapped or otherwise harassed in Mindanao. A spokesman for the organization indicated that hijacking, kidnapping and other international terrorist acts were against organization policy as being counter-productive.

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(S) [REDACTED] The NPA in need of weapons, appears to have increased its activity in the area around Clark Air Force Base. AFOSI has reported that the NPA is considering an attack on the armory at Camp O'Donnell ostensibly to obtain needed weapons. While the NPA has in the past primarily had the inclination to avoid direct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities, it is possible that their urgent need for armaments could cause them to reassess their philosophy toward U.S. installations. Additionally, it is possible that U.S. personnel could be caught in some type of NPA operation without actually being specifically targeted. With the exception of the reference to Camp O'Donnell, no information is available to indicate any specific NPA targeting of other U.S. facilities. Increased NPA operational activity against indigenous targets commenced in November 1976. Should the raid against Camp O'Donnell or any other U.S. installation in the Philippines take place, it would add a new dimension to the terrorist threat against U.S. personnel and facilities there.

D. (S) [REDACTED] WEST EUROPEAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

1. (S) [REDACTED] UNITED KINGDOM (U)

(S) [REDACTED] The latter half of CY 1976 saw an erosion in the capabilities of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Great Britain, while significant PIRA terrorist acts continued to occur in Ulster and Eire. Intelligence sources attributed the erosion of PIRA capabilities in Great Britain during the latter half of 1976 to three main factors: the inability of the PIRA's hierarchy to adopt an agreed upon operational strategy (to include political stratagems) for Great Britain; personnel and organizational problems at the highest PIRA levels due to deaths or capture of some of the PIRA leadership; and finally, to effective police actions in Great Britain which included raids on PIRA safehouses, weapons caches, and arrests of PIRA members during December 1975 and CY 1976.

(S) [REDACTED] While experiencing organizational and personnel difficulties in Britain during this period, the PIRA continued to broaden its base in Northern Ireland (many PIRA terrorists arrested and convicted last year were from the middle-class and many were university graduates), and continued to conduct terrorist acts directed against a wide variety of targets in Ulster and Eire. One of the more widely publicized of these terrorist acts was the 21 July 1976 assassination of the British Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland (Evart-Biggs), who died when his car was destroyed by a land mine detonated by an electrical charge. In Ulster,

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the PIRA is continuing its terrorist campaign against the British military (3 British Army personnel killed since 1 January 1977), the police and commercial establishments. Most ominous is the recent PIRA announcement that the families of members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are considered to be "legitimate targets" in reprisal for alleged RUC police torture tactics. If such a strategy is adopted by the PIRA, it would most likely bring immediate sectarian retaliation by various Protestant extremist groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force.

(S) [REDACTED] Other information available about PIRA indicates that at least some effort was spent during the latter half of CY 1976 in training. Of particular significance - specifically in terms of the internationalization of terrorism - is the fact that this training occurred in foreign nations and was accomplished through the intercession of West European groups with whom the PIRA maintains contact. One such session occurred in July 1976 in the FRG when PIRA members attended a training session sponsored by the West German/Ireland Solidarity Committee (WISK).<sup>5</sup> In another instance, at least one reported member of the PIRA received terrorist training in July 1976 by Palestinian terrorist cadre in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). This training session was arranged by the Dutch terrorist group - "Red Help" - for its members. The PIRA trainee (a long time PIRA contact for the Dutch Red Help) had previously been a prominent speaker for the PIRA on a WISK arranged tour of 20 West German cities during 1975.

(C) Events occurring in late January and early February 1977, would seem to indicate that the PIRA has taken steps to solve the deficiencies previously noted which hampered PIRA operations in England during the latter half of CY 1976. Recent statements made to public media representatives by PIRA leaders indicate the PIRA leadership has reached

<sup>5</sup> According to intelligence reports, little actual "training" was accomplished during this session; rather, most of the time was spent discussing political problems and the necessity for increasing future cooperation. WISK is a prominent "new left" organization with demonstrated ties to Marxist-Leninist parties and anarchist groups such as the 2 June Movement in the FRG.

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agreement on an expanded operational strategy for both Ulster and Britain, and has reintroduced at least one active service unit into Britain to carry out that strategy there. According to PIRA statements, this strategy involves an intense bombing campaign directed at British military and economic targets to include British industrialists in both Ulster and Britain. More ominously, the PIRA leadership has also announced that "civilians" in Britain - specifically in London - are open to PIRA "acts of war." The bombings in London's West End on 29 January 1977 and in Liverpool on 2 February 1977, and the murder of the British manager of a large industrial complex in Ulster on 2 February 1977, were cited by the PIRA spokesman as examples of the intensified PIRA terrorist campaign to be conducted in the coming months.

(S) With specific regard to the threat to DoD from future PIRA terrorist activities, there is no indication that PIRA intends to include DoD personnel or installations in the United Kingdom as primary targets in its continuing terrorist campaign. DIA believes that PIRA will most likely continue to conduct the majority of its terrorist acts in Ulster with British military, local police, commercial establishments, and leading industrialists as the main PIRA targets. A resumption of PIRA terrorist campaign in Great Britain is also likely as demonstrated by the 29 January bombings in London. Such a campaign will most likely consist of bombings directed against traditionally "soft" targets such as public buildings, commercial establishments, or tourist sites. Because of the large numbers of U.S. tourists in Great Britain and DoD personnel stationed in or visiting Great Britain, U.S. personnel could well become innocent victims in the PIRA campaign against British civilians. PIRA targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Great Britain is not anticipated and is considered to be a highly unlikely possibility.




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


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


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OSD E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6)




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(U) Again, the most dramatic terrorist incidents specifically directed against DoD personnel or installations in Western Europe during

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the past six months occurred in the FRG. As reported in DIACIM-2-76, the West German terrorist group "Revolutionary Cells" (RZ) claimed responsibility for the 1 June 1976 bombing of the U.S. Army V Corps headquarters and Officers Club building in Frankfurt in which 18 persons were injured and extensive damage was caused. On 2 June 1976, a firebombing of two trucks occurred at Lindsay Air Station, FRG. Responsibility for the 2 June firebombing was claimed by the "International Anti-Imperialist Section-FRG", and later by a group calling itself "Commando Friends of 2 June." On 1 December 1976, the detonation of an explosive device followed by fierce fire extensively damaged the Rhein Main Air Force Base Officers Club. Finally on 4 January 1977, an explosion caused by a bomb occurred at a fuel storage tank located at the Giessen Army Depot. Responsibility for the Rhein Main and Giessen incidents was claimed by the RZ.

(S) As reported in DIACIM-2-76, the current West German terrorist milieu is primarily composed of Baader Meinhof Gang/Red Army Faction (BMG/RAF) successor "organizations". These "organizations" -- and the RZ is representative of them -- can be best described as loose confederations of individuals who share similar views and who occasionally come together for terrorist operational purposes. Usually only after a terrorist operation occurs and the perpetrators are apprehended can they be traced back to an identifiable organization of some type. Many of these individuals began as members of the BMG/RAF or came from "sympathizer" groups such as Red Relief, Committees Against Torture of Political Prisoners, and ad hoc collectives such as Black Cross, Black Relief and others. In essence, the current terrorist milieu is highly fragmented and operates with extreme clandestinity.

(S) [REDACTED] Heretofore, little was known about the RZ, its personnel, or organizational structure. However, since the 30 November 1976 arrests of two individuals believed to be members of the RZ leadership cadre (Roland Mayer and the lawyer Siegfried Haag), a clearer picture of the RZ is beginning to emerge. When arrested Haag and Mayer had in their possession:

- forged passports (Austrian, Peruvian and Uruguyan) which, because of certain forging characteristics, indicate links with the former PFLP support cell in Paris that was headed by "Carlos";

- keys for apartments and coded notes indicative of apartments and support bases used by Haag/Mayer associated members for refuge and storage of funds, arms and explosives, and counterfeit identification documents;

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DIA FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424



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DETONATION OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND FIRE  
DESTROY RHEIN MAIN AFB OFFICERS CLUB ON 1 DECEMBER 1976.



DIA FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 4124

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- considerable amounts of money - some of which is known to have originated from bank robberies in Cologne and Hamburg;

- other information indicating that at least 11 individuals were part of the Haag/Mayer group. Some of these have been arrested and others are currently being sought;

- cryptic notes and documents indicating that the Haag group was planning a hostage taking operation designed to secure the release of imprisoned German terrorists.

(S) [REDACTED] The significance of the Haag/Mayer arrests must be viewed from three perspectives:

a. Primarily, the arrests and incarcerations rob the RZ of some of its principal cadre members. The identification of other members and pursuit of investigative leads developed from the arrests should cause significant internal disruptions for the RZ as its members seek to relocate.

b. Second, the information gained from the arrests and subsequent investigations serves to refocus attention on the current intermingled relationships of the members of the German terrorist organizations (RZ, Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction Successor Groups, and 2 June Movement), as well as the relations of these groups and individuals with non-German terrorist organizations. Regarding the former, Haag, as the defense counsel for Andreas Baader, played an important role in transmitting operational instructions from the prisoners to their RAF confederates and in orchestrating internationally the public expressions of support for the terrorists. On another level, Haag also participated in the planning of terrorist operations (notably the attack on the West German Embassy in Stockholm in April 1975 by the Socialist Patients Collective (SPK), and provided support for that operation in terms of providing weapons stolen by a Swiss terrorist group to the group that conducted the Stockholm operation. For that offense he was indicted in March 1976 and subsequently went underground. All of his movements between March 1976 and 30 November 1976 are not yet known; however, he and seven other German terrorists (to include some members of the 2 JM and BMG/RAF who were released from jail in exchange for Peter Lorenz) were reliably reported to be in attendance at a PFLP-run terrorist training camp in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) during the summer of 1976. In that regard it is interesting to note the ever-expanding relationship between Palestinian and German terrorists which, since January 1975, has included participation by German

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nationals in PFLP terrorist operations. <sup>6</sup>

c. Finally, the Haag/Mayer arrests should be viewed in terms of their impact on future terrorist activities by West German terrorist groups. As demonstrated by the 4 January 1977 bombing at Giessen Army Depot, the RZ still must be considered capable of conducting similar attacks against such targets. Given the RZ's documented anti-U.S. military animus, a continuation of such targeting - mainly against publicly accessible or undefended U.S. military installations - should be considered likely in the future.

(S) [REDACTED] Beyond that, other conclusions about possible RZ operations are highly speculative. However, it should be noted that Haag's arrest adds another individual to the growing list of German terrorist cadre who are now behind bars, and whose continued imprisonment is a cause celebre within international terrorist circles. So far, at least three terrorist operations involving hostage taking have been perpetrated to secure the release of these imprisoned terrorists. Two of them (the Stockholm incident by the SPK and the hijacking of the Air France plane in Athens by a mixed German/Palestinian terrorist team) have been dismal failures. Only the 2 JM kidnapping of Peter Lorenz was successful and resulted in the release of five imprisoned terrorists. How much of an added incentive will be caused by the arrests of Haag and his associates is problematical at this time. What is more certain is that only a dramatic operation involving mass hostage-taking or some other terrorist act with the potential for dramatic and serious consequences could provide the inducement for the FRG authorities to consider the release of these convicted felons. To that end, commercial airliners and diplomatic facilities offer the most likely type of terrorist target. Not coincidentally, how to "skyjack" and take over Embassies are courses of instruction offered by Palestinian terrorists at some of the facilities where German terrorists were reported to have been trained.

(S) [REDACTED] With specific regard to U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in the FRG, DIA has no information indicating that they will be targeted. We believe that such sites would only be considered if security at them was reduced to the point where a raid would appear to be openly invited.

<sup>6</sup> Mixed German/Palestinian terrorist teams conducted the January 1975 attack at Orly Airport; the December 1975 attack on the OPEC ministers in Vienna, Austria; and, the 29 July 1976 hijacking of the Air France airliner in Athens, Greece, which ended at Entebbe.

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
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
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


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


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OSD E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6)\*Section 6.2(a); CIA E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)




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
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


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
MAJOR PALESTINIAN TERRORIST LEADERS




Sabri al-Banna  
(Black June Organization) - Iraqi  
backed and controlled.



Salah Khalaf  
(Black September Organization) -  
International terrorist arm of  
Fatah.



George Habbash  
(PFLP)



Wadi Haddad  
(Former Chief/Foreign Operations  
Committee-PFLP; Presently  
operating under Iraqi control.)



Ilich Ramirez Sanchez "Carlos"  
(PFLP Associated - Presently  
operates under Libyan control)

Not Pictured:

Ahmad Jabril - PFLP/General Command

Abu al-Abbas - PFLP/General Command


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
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Sabri al-Banna (center left), organizer of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Paris in September 1973, and Muhammad Da'ud Awadh (Abu Da'ud) (center right), whose release from imprisonment was one of the terrorists' demands, flanking former Premier Chou En-Lai in the People's Republic of China in April 1972.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the more dramatic developments in international terrorism during the last six months has been the revival, under a new name, of another Iraqi-sponsored terrorist organization. Led by an ex-Fatah member, Sabri al Banna (Abu Nidal) - and using the name "Black June Organization" (BJO) in commemoration of the June 1976 Syrian intervention in Lebanon - the BJO conducted terrorist raids against hotels in Damascus and Amman, and attacked Syrian embassies in Rome and Islamabad. Its most recent recorded terrorist act was the 1 December 1976 attempted assassination of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abu al-Halim Khaddam. The Abu Nidal organization had been dormant (in terms of the conduct of international terrorist activities) since the hijacking of a British airlines plane in Dubai in November 1974. Prior to that hijacking, Abu Nidal's group had been responsible for the seizure of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris in September 1973 in an effort to force the release of Palestinian terrorists then being detained in Jordan to include Nidal's close friend - Mohammad Da'ud Awadh (Abu Da'ud) - whose rearrest in Paris in January 1977 caused an international stir.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Members of Abu Nidal's group carried out the seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Paris in September 1973 under the name "Punishment Organization". The November 1974 hijacking of the British airliner was carried out by members of Abu Nidal's group under the name "Martyr Abu Mahmoud Squad".

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(S) [REDACTED] The BJO is reliably reported to be planning the conduct of future international terrorist operations to include attacks on hotels, assassinations of prominent Arabic personalities, and airplane hijackings. Some reporting indicates these terrorist operations may be carried out in cooperation with the PFLP (Haddad Faction), or in coordination with other PFLP-sponsored acts of terrorism. The seriousness with which these threats must be taken is underscored by the BJO's already demonstrated capabilities, and by two apparently aborted "Rejectionist" operations which have recently occurred. On two occasions (30 December 1976 and 9 January 1977), Palestinian nationals have been arrested at Beirut airport while attempting to board aircraft bound for Athens, Greece. In both cases, the individuals were carrying weapons and explosives in their suitcases. In the 9 January 1977 incident, the suitcases and one handbag contained weapons, explosives, grenades, and ammunition. One individual came to the attention of Beirut airport security officials when it was noted that his ticket was for Beirut-Athens-Sofia, Bulgaria - but the individual insisted on checking his bags to Athens only. Speculation about these incidents being related to a "Rejectionist" terrorist operation is increased by the continuing intervention on the part of the Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon with the Lebanese authorities to secure the release of at least one of the individuals arrested.

(S) [REDACTED] In addition to terrorist operations conducted by the BJO, the Iraqi and Libyan-backed PFLP (Haddad Faction) was also active and was responsible for three major terrorist incidents since June 1976 - none of which could be considered as a major success. First, the 29 June hijacking in Athens ended in disaster at Entebbe on 4 July. Then second, the 11 August attack on passengers waiting to board an El Al aircraft at Yesilkoy Airport, Istanbul, Turkey in which four persons (including one U.S. national) were killed and 17 injured ended with two terrorists sentenced to life imprisonment by Turkish court. Finally, the 4 September 1976 hijacking of a KLM airliner in Nice, France ended with the terrorists surrendering in exchange for their freedom. The 4 September hijacking was the last reported PFLP (Haddad Faction) terrorist action - but probably not for want of trying. Mentioned above were the apparently aborted terrorist operations in December 1976 and January 1977 due to the arrest of two Palestinians who were carrying weapons to Athens airport. Additionally, two members of a Dutch terrorist group, "Red Help" - who had been trained at a PFLP camp in the PDRY during the summer of 1976 - were arrested by Israeli and Indian security authorities respectively in late September 1976. During interrogation, one of them admitted that they were surveilling airports at the request of the PFLP in order to obtain information on airport security

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procedures in preparation for a hijacking of an Air France airliner in the name of the PFLP.

As indicated in the foregoing, the "Rejectionist" Front of the Palestinian movement is reliably reported to be planning future international terrorist activities in the coming months. To a large extent, the ability of these terrorist groups to conduct such activities is directly dependent on the continued support (in terms of sanctuary, financial backing, provisions of facilities for training, operational support, et al) provided to them by their principal Nation State backers - Libya and Iraq. Such extensive support to the "Rejectionist" groups as provided by these two nations (to also include use of the diplomatic pouch for transport of weapons and communications and assistance by Libyan and Iraqi diplomatic facilities abroad) has been evidenced that the term "support" to Palestinian international terrorism does not begin to sufficiently describe the relationships. Rather, the relationships should more properly be described for what they truly represent - the employment of limited violence over a protracted time period by one state against another or others for political purposes. In short, the relationships between Libya and Iraq and some of the terrorist factions within the "Rejectionist" Front - specifically the BJO; the PFLP (Haddad Faction); and the "Carlos Group" - is such that, the latter are used as instruments of surrogate warfare by the former.<sup>10</sup> This development is significant for two mutually dependent reasons:

- unless it is recognized for what it truly is, and unless effective action is taken by the targeted nations to stop it at the source - the incentives for a continuation of international terrorist violence will remain constant or increase;

- as acts of terrorist violence are successfully accomplished, they serve as an incentive to other dissident groups to adopt the tactic. Similarly, it could be asked whether other nation states - especially those of the Third World - might not come to appreciate the possible benefits of sponsoring similar activities, thus multiplying the cycle of international terrorist violence.

<sup>10</sup> For an excellent appraisal of the concept of surrogate warfare through the utilization of terrorist groups; advantages to the sponsoring state; and implications for warfare in the last quarter of the 20th Century, see High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level Violence, by Brian Michael Jenkins, January 1975, Paper #P-5339, the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

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(S) [REDACTED] Finally from a more immediate perspective, the Palestinian terrorists associated with the "Rejection Front" and the principal nations which support them (Iraq and Libya) are the key factors in international terrorism within the other nations in Western Europe, the Middle East, and to some extent, the Far East. As demonstrated throughout this report, the Palestinians, Iraq and Libya are the ones that other groups turn to for support - principally in the form of training, sanctuary, weaponry, and occasionally, finances. The extent that this support can be stopped or curtailed - either by effective action by host country security services, or by decreasing the incentives for these groups and states to provide such support - will in the long run, affect the number of terrorist groups operating and hopefully, the level of their activities.

F. (S) [REDACTED] U.S. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(S) [REDACTED] No information has been reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicating that any known terrorist group - foreign or domestic - has planned or is planning to conduct terrorist operations against DoD facilities in the U.S. to include nuclear weapon storage sites.

(S) [REDACTED] Within the past few months reports have been circulating indicating that unnamed Mexican terrorist groups were planning cross-border operations into the U.S. southwest for the purpose of acquiring weapons by attacking conventional weapons sites at U.S. military installations. In all cases to date, these reports have been proven to be without foundation, and it is the belief of DIA that the likelihood of such a cross border attack/raid by Mexican terrorist organizations such as the 23rd of September Communist League is extremely remote. Alternately, however, neither that group nor any other would be adverse to purchasing/bartering for weapons which might be stolen from such installations by criminal elements operating in the U.S. or elsewhere.

(S) Finally, one U.S. based terrorist organization has claimed responsibility for the conduct of significant acts of international terrorism in the U.S. and abroad. This group, which claims to coordinate the terrorist activities of five Cuban exile groups, was responsible for bombings of Cuban facilities in Latin America and Western Europe to include the sabotage of a Cubana airliner in October 1976 in which 73

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people perished. To date, this organization has not directly attacked any DoD facilities; however, its terrorist campaign against airliners and at international airports and bombings of public buildings abroad and in the U.S. - to include the bombing of one building housing various U.S. Federal offices - demonstrates the international scope of its terrorist activities and causes it to be considered at least a potential threat to DoD personnel.

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APPENDIX

SUBJECT: Major Terrorist Organizations

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
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
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Japanese Red Army (JRA)	Libya	15-25	Leftist/Anarchist	Close ties to PFLP. Engaged in Lod Airport massacre and other international incidents. Ties to North Korea and groups in Japan. Inactive since August 1975.
Irish Republican Army-Provisional Wing (IRA-Provos)	N. Ireland/U.K.	1,300	Catholic/Separatist/Socialist	Engages in urban terrorism in N. Ireland and Britain. Some monetary support received from sympathetic groups in U.S. Has contacts in Libya and with some West European terrorist groups.
Montoneros	Argentina	1,000	Marxist/Peronist	Urban guerilla operations. Kidnappings, assassinations, robberies, bombings and sabotage. Kidnapped and killed U.S. Consul John Egan.
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Philippines	10,000	Moslem/Separatist	Engaged in insurrection. Has conducted kidnappings of foreign nationals and air hijackings. Receives Libyan support.
Movement of National Liberation/Tupamaros (MLN/Tupamaros)	Uruguay	200	Leftist	Kidnappings, assassinations and guerilla activity. Weakened due to numerous arrests during 1974-75. Most members in exile. Member of JCR.

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Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	Chile	2,200	Marxist/Leninist	Robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations. Isolated cells in Chile but most members are in exile in Argentina and Western Europe. Member of JCR.
National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia	150	Leftist	Cuban ties. Conducted kidnappings for ransom after Cuba reduced monetary support in 1970. Guerilla warfare.
New People's Army (NPA)	Philippines	1,200	Marxist-Leninist/Maoist	Rural guerilla activities, extortion, and assassinations. Responsible for April 1974 murder of three U.S. Naval officers near Subic Bay.
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Argentina	Unknown	Marxist/Leninist	Urban/rural guerilla warfare. Robberies, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and sabotage. Anti-U.S. Activities significantly reduced in 1976 due to effective government counterterrorist action. Creator of JCR.

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Peoples  
Sacrifice  
Guerillas  
(PSG)

Iran

200

Marxist

Assassinations conducted by  
PSG in March 1975 of SAVAK  
agent. Has ties with exiled  
leadership of Tudeh Party.  
Conducts joint operations  
with PS.

People's  
Strugglers  
(PS)

Iran

200

Islamic/  
Marxist

Conducts bombings and assas-  
sinations. Primary targets  
are Iranian security forces  
and U.S. officials to include  
U.S. Military) personnel.  
Most recent act was August  
1976 assassination of 3  
DoD contractor personnel.  
PS is noted for technical  
proficiency. Make own weapons,  
special ammunition, and so-  
phisticated explosive devices.  
Has ties with Palestinian groups.

Popular Demo-  
cratic Front  
for the  
Liberation  
of Palestine  
(PDFLP)

Lebanon

300

Marxist/  
Leninist

Engages in occasional terrorist  
acts against Israel. Has con-  
tacts with USSR. Member of  
PLO moderate faction.

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Revolutionary  
Armed Forces of  
Colombia  
(FARC)

Colombia

Unknown

Leftist

Guerilla arm of pro-Soviet  
Colombian Communist Party.  
Kidnappings, bombings, and  
guerilla warfare.

Revolutionary  
Coordinating  
Junta (JCR)

Argentina

Unknown

Leftist/  
Marxist

A transnational alliance and  
guerilla coordinating body  
formed in 1974. Made up of  
ERP, Tupamaros, Bolivian ELN,  
and MIR. Contacts maintained  
with other guerilla and ter-  
rorist groups throughout  
Latin America. Meetings held  
in Europe and Argentina.  
Leaders exchange information  
and provide mutual support.  
Supported by Cuba.

Sa'iqā

Syria

3,000

Controlled  
by Syria

Sa'iqā international ter-  
rorism directed against  
Israel and Soviet Jewish  
immigrants transiting  
Europe.

Sandinist  
National  
Liberation  
Front (FSLN)

Nicaragua

150

Leftist

Kidnappings, assassinations,  
and guerilla attacks. The  
Revolutionary Student Front  
(FER) in Nicaragua supports  
the FSLN and provides mem-  
bers for urban cells.

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
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


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


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