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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

#128

18 April 1982

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Argentina

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Relationship Between Argentina's Three Junta Members

The triumvirate is composed of President and Army Commander in Chief Leopoldo Galtieri--a junta member since December 1979, Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Jorge Anaya--a member since September 1981, and Air Force Commander General Basilio Lami Dozo--who joined the junta in December, 1981.

1. President Galtieri is the dominant member of the junta and has set the overall tone for aggressive foreign and domestic policies since his takeover as President in December of 1981. This is in keeping with his own strong nationalistic sentiments, his conviction that Argentina should play a larger role on the world stage, and his belief that firm policies are necessary to correct some of the problems caused by the vacillation of his predecessor, President Viola. Galtieri's dominance flows not only from his personal assertiveness and decisiveness, but from the fact that the Army is the most powerful service.

2. Despite Galtieri's drive, both of his fellow junta members are capable of playing important roles. This is especially true of Navy Chief Anaya--by dint of his personality and the Navy's central position in Argentina's territorial disputes with the UK and Chile. In addition, neither Anaya nor Lami Dozo are "yes" men, although the Air Force Commander is clearly the least influential member of the junta.

3. Anaya is a no nonsense, very capable officer who is extremely nationalistic--indeed, the Navy as a whole is the most nationalistic of the services. In that sense, Anaya probably feels more strongly about the Falklands than does Galtieri and it is likely the Navy leader has been out in front of Galtieri on the issue. Prior to the March incident on South Georgia that ultimately led to the Falklands invasion, Anaya was reportedly pushing for some Argentine action in the area in order to break the stalemated diplomatic negotiations with the UK. There is no direct evidence that the Argentines manufactured the original incident at South Georgia but at the least they quickly seized on a tactical opportunity to confront the British militarily. Anaya's role has also been central because the Navy was the focal point of the long held contingency plans for the Falklands invasion.

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4. Anaya is sophisticated and, because of his background, almost certainly has considerable say in shaping certain international policies. For example, Anaya probably shares significant responsibility for Argentina's more aggressive attitude toward the Chileans in the Beagle Channel dispute following Galtieri's takeover. He has served as Naval Attache to the UK and has had responsibility for other tasks related to international affairs. He also has resented the US role in halting the sale of modern equipment and spare parts to Argentina.

5. Galtieri is, in several respects, politically close to Anaya. Both are strong nationalists and they were classmates at military school. Anaya also supported Galtieri's ouster of President Viola last year. Further, the Navy was the first to offer public support to Galtieri in his bid to retain his active duty command of the Army past his mandatory retirement date later this year.

6. Air Force Commander Lami Dozo has a reputation for greater flexibility and pragmatism than either Galtieri or Anaya, but his voice has been the least influential of the three by far. This is partly because of the aggressive personalities of his two fellow junta members and his own penchant for a lower key approach to problems. It also reflects the fact that the Air Force is the smallest of the services--only half the size of the Navy. Lami Dozo is also the least senior junta member.

7. The Air Force Commander is both intelligent and frank, however. He has both trained in and toured the US and believes he has a good understanding of the complexities of this country. Although open with US officials, he may not be as pro-US as some of his fellow Air Force officers. Since the invasion, Lami Dozo has stated that in the absence of a diplomatic settlement, he supports whatever military action is necessary to defend Argentina.

8. Thus, although Galtieri is senior to his junta partners and dominates by virtue of his position and personality, his contemporaries are both relatively sophisticated and not hesitant to speak out. Because Galtieri was still in the process of solidifying his position at the time of the invasion, he may be more beholden to both than would have been the case later in the year. In addition Galtieri has taken an enormous risk with his Falklands invasion, and his potential vulnerability vis-a-vis other senior Army Commanders may make him more dependent on support from Anaya and Lami Dozo. And on the issue of nationalism, at least, Anaya is a more forceful proponent than even the strongly nationalistic President. This reinforces Galtieri's natural tendencies. Even if Galtieri were totally

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dominant, however, it is doubtful that he would compromise at this juncture on the basic question of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands.

9. Argentina's Foreign Minister seems unlikely to have an important role in formulating his country's position. He was out of step with the junta early in the crisis and, so far as is known, is not an important voice in junta policy deliberations. His tendency toward compromise was overridden early on when the junta determined the Falklands issue was a military rather than a diplomatic problem.

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. §552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 28 DEC 2017 Authority: EO 13526

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MDR: 17 -M- 2015

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