

DIA E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6) + FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 JUL 1982

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11-19

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 25 2018

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SNF-96/DR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Armed Forces

1. (U) [REDACTED]

2. (S) [REDACTED] was disappointed at having been excluded from multinational support efforts now underway to assist friendly governments of Central America. Colombia hopes the situation does not constitute a change of US strategy and [REDACTED] ascribed the situation as perhaps due to a lack of aggressive action by the Embassy here in Washington. The Colombians are willing and able to assist.

[REDACTED] He also appeared to be looking toward the US for some type of guidance concerning possible Colombian actions in support of anti-Sandinista activities.

3. (SNF) [REDACTED] the small Central American states, except for Nicaragua, view Colombia as a big brother. In keeping with this idea, an intelligence conference is held annually with representation from Guatemala (originators of the concept), Colombia, El Salvador and Honduras. This year's conference, held in Bogota in March 1982 identified the three principal threats to Central America as:

a. (e) Nicaragua - because of its obvious support for insurgents throughout the region.

b. (SNF) Mexico - because of its vocal support for the government of Nicaragua and in light of five documented cases of support to Guatemalan guerrillas.

c. (SNF) Costa Rica - because of its inability to protect itself and on account of the wide range of subversive activity conducted on Costa Rican soil. Because of the esteem with which these small friendly nations view Colombia, and taking into account the latter's democratic government, [REDACTED] theorized that a visit to Bogota by President Reagan would solidify the image of US support.

COLOMBIA

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4. (S) In commenting on the situation in Central America, [REDACTED] opined that the US must reinforce friendly states and publicize success more aggressively. He pointed out that Jamaica recently voted out of office an avowed Marxist regime but that the US has not seized the opportunity. Similarly in Honduras there exists an elected government in a poor, agricultural nation seeking to defend itself from outside aggression. Yet we permit it to be lumped with El Salvador and Guatemala as a regional problem. Both Jamaica and Honduras should be held up as models. [REDACTED] stressed the need for the US to increase funding of the Caribbean Basin initiative. In answer to my question on a good US response to any deployment of MIG's to Nicaragua, [REDACTED] responded, "What would the Soviets do if the Afghan fighters suddenly acquired jets?" [REDACTED] went on to say he sees no possibility of a military settlement in Central America.

5. (S) [REDACTED] official message from the Argentine J-2, BG Alfredo Sotera. Sotera wished the policy makers in DoD to understand the following regarding Argentina's position following the Falklands' crisis.

- Argentina remains friendly to the US and understands why the US had to support the UK. Argentina sees the US as its "older brother" and is interested in rebuilding relations that existed prior to the crisis.

- Argentina entertained no thought of seeking Soviet or other Communist military aid. The country remains staunchly anti-Communist and will continue its active support of stability in Central America.

- The UK should agree to release Argentine prisoners without humiliating Argentina.

- The US must extend a hand of conciliation by lifting economic sanctions.

As you are aware, the last two points were met by US and UK action on 12 and 13 July. [REDACTED] amplified Sotera's official message by commenting that Argentina needs time to recover and assistance to make the structure work. The alternative to a military junta is anarchy.

6. (S) With regard to Panama, the recent shift in Panamanian policy since the death of Gen Omar Torrijos has moved the Government of Panama from the Left to the Center under the leadership of the new National Guard Commander, BG Ruben Paredes. Despite this fact, however, infiltration from Panama into Colombia continues although without apparent official Panamanian sponsorship. [REDACTED] expressed satisfaction with the attitude and performance of Paredes. The General was described as not a "typical Panamanian" but an honest

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
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simple man of a more democratic bent than his predecessor, BG Omar Torrijos. Paredes has been personally assisting Colombia in dealing with the Colombian terrorist group, M-19. He refuses to rely upon his staff in dealing with this sensitive topic and is especially not disposed to rely upon his G-2, Col Manuel Noriega (who is widely regarded as a power seeking, leftist opportunist). [REDACTED] did admit that Paredes would like to become President of Panama.

  
JAMES A. WILLIAMS  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Director

cc: ISA (Mr. Sanchez)  
CJCS

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APR 25 2010

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

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+5 USC § 552

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