#19

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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has not been sufficient, particularly with the continual rise of the use of heroin and other narcotics in our own country and it is now on the rise once again. We did have some slowdown during the time when we had the Turks stop their poppy growing and then, of course, it came from Colombia and Mexico and elsewhere. I would hope that you would look forward to a more extended narcotics assistance program to those countries and stop the danger at its source rather then wait until it reaches us at home.

Mr. MAW. There is a great deal to be said for the extension of that program, and as you know it has been the subject of a great deal of debate in the last year.

Let me ask Assistant Secretary Sober to amplify on the Middle East situation.

Mr. SOBER. Mr. Burke, we also take this to be a very serious problem. Naturally we have concentrated our efforts in those particular countries in the world where we have seen a special need to cooperate in trying to control the situation. We have, for example, in a number of countries specialists in drug abuse enforcement who are attached to our Embassies and who work with the governments. Sometimes we cooperate with the governments in helping them to establish a nucleus of enforcement people and increase their capability. This may involve AID programs. We also work with and through the United Nations which also has a narcotics control program and some of our money has been going to the United Nations work.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have you here, Secretary Maw.

In your statement you refer in a number of places to the need to revitalize our links with allies who share our institutions, values, and interest. That is on page 2.

Then on page 3 you say security assistance is a tangible means for demonstrating the cooperation expected of us by those nations which share our values and goals.

On page 4 you speak of human rights.

When you get to page 6 you talk about formulating each annual country program, and all of those considerations seem to drop out and you talk only about our security interests. I take it that the question of shared values really is mostly rhetoric and has no application to the real world that we engage in when we actually decide country programs.

Mr. MAW. Well, Mr. Fraser, I don't think it is entirely rhetoric. We give serious consideration to human rights problems from the American point of view and from the point of view of our foreign policy interests. It is very difficult sometimes to reconcile our wishes and desires in terms of the conduct of our friends and it is sometimes very difficult to balance, as you know, the effect that one act may have in producing within another country the result we desire.

We have two or three situations where we do give substantial security assistance and yet we cannot condone the conduct of the Government with respect to human rights in the country in question. All

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factors are taken into account, they are difficult to weigh, and I must say exceedingly hard to put a security assistance dollar value on human rights or a change therein one way or the other in any given country.

HUMAN RIGHTS: SINGLING OUT SPECIFIC COUNTRIES

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, could you give me a single instance in which this weighing of human rights or shared values or the lack of them has altered a decision on security assistance or modified the decision? Can you give me a single instance?

Mr. MAW. I have to answer you, Mr. Fraser, by saying that is one of the factors that has gone in and is weighed in all cases. You cannot quantify one factor as against another.

Mr. FRASER. Can you point to any country where you can tell us that weighing in the question of shared values or lack of it or human rights——

Mr. MAW. I would like not to point the finger at particular countries but I think you appreciate that we might feel much more strongly about helping countries if their human rights were more compatible with our own ideas.

Mr. FRASER. Well, you don't have very much money to work with.

Mr. MAW. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. There are some countries that you might do more for if they had some shared values with us?

Mr. MAW. I prefer not to get into the position of having to point a finger at any particular countries. The facts are available, but how much you evaluate or how much more you would give if they had one or two points down the scale of attention to human rights is impossible to state. Human rights factors are taken into account in all of our relationships. We do what we can to advance the cause of human rights, perhaps not as successfully as we would like. We do, I think, have some effect and have some impact in those countries.

SOUTH KOREA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. FRASER. As you are aware, I have been interested in the course of events in Korea. It is hard to find any shared values between us and the government presently in power. Has the Department given any weight in the case of Korea to the obvious loss of political rights of the Korean people?

Mr. MAW. Well, as you know, Secretary Kissinger appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee a few days ago pointed out that we are extremely unhappy with recent events in South Korea. We have clearly and firmly made our views known to the Korean Government both publicly and otherwise. We have told them about the adverse impact of their actions within the United States and other parts of the world, and there is no doubt of our strong concern about the issue.

At the same time we have a major interest in preventing a Communist attack across the 38th parallel. It is a concern, of course, shared by the South Koreans and others of our friends and allies. Our military assistance in Korea is intended to avoid having a Communist regime in Seoul. Avoidance of an invasion across the 38th parallel is

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and then they go back and take an important part in their own governments. I would like to see the program increased.

Mrs. MEYNER. But why, when we are trying to phase out grant military assistance—and this is grant military assistance—would this not be phased out, too?

You say they learn about our way of life. It seems to me they learn from us how to kill each other. I think they would be better off if we took them on a tour of Disney World, they would learn more about our way of life.

Mr. MAW. Well, that is perhaps a bit of a callous approach. Most of these people are administrative. The facts of life are that in many countries of the world the military are the conservative forces helping maintain stability in their country. In many cases, they actually provide full civil administration, so that to train those people in our ways seems to me to be a very desirable objective and one where we can't really lose.

MILITARY TRAINING AND LATIN AMERICA

Mrs. MEYNER. On page 10 you refer specifically to Latin America and you say:

> Although in modest amounts, this aims at perpetuating the benefits of person-to-person contact between middle level officers in the United States and recipient country armed services; some of these officers may be expected to assume important future roles in their governments.

Well, that is exactly what concerns me. Isn't it possible that we may be contributing by doing this to the decline of democracy in Latin America? Don't some of these people go back and overthrow their governments? Look at what is happening in Argentina. Look at what did happen in Chile. This is what concerns me about this program. At least if they are going to have it, shouldn't they pay for it?

Mr. MAW. Well, to answer your first question first, I don't know that the people trained in the United States are the ones that go back and try to overthrow governments. That would make an interesting study. I would think the training here would be one that would lend to stability rather than instability. I would prefer to have the military training in this country rather than in Eastern Europe, for example.

Now as to your second question—whether they should pay for it themselves—in some cases they do. By and large we may lose the influence of scholarship. The experience has been by those who are close to this program over the years that this does establish a good point of contact and a good relationship. If you bring them in and tell them to pay for it, they may not come. Where they are able to do so, we require payment. We are doing that for various countries now.

Mrs. MEYNER. Just one final question, Mr. Secretary. You said that you felt that this program should be increased and not decreased. If anything, you do not in the foreseeable future see the grant part of it.

Mr. MAW. That is right.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalen.

GRANT MAP AID TO SOUTH KOREA

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I notice for Korea you propose a little more than $8 million in military assistance. In view of the minimal size of this

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amounts used for credits will be repaid to the U.S. Treasury with interest by the governments to which it is made available. Do you have available a list of that repayment history; in other words, how successful have we been in obtaining payments on these loans?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Completely. There has never been a default ever.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is that correct? And with all nations to which we have extended the credit?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Could that history be supplied for the record?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. It will be made a permanent part of the record.

[The information subsequently supplied follows:]

Repayments of principal and interests on foreign military sales credits, through December 31, 1975

Foreign country:	Amount
Argentina	$53, 431, 108. 56
Australia	108, 467, 695. 59
Austria	16, 991, 687. 51
Belgium	8, 030, 185. 20
Bolivia	272, 446. 99
Brazil	92, 275, 252. 18
Chile	25, 524, 901. 86
China (Taipei)	141, 602, 635. 38
Ecuador	752, 729. 56
El Salvador	100, 000. 00
France	80, 354, 790. 58
Greece	30, 711, 937. 35
Guatemala	3, 722, 235. 77
Indonesia	506, 904. 86
India	11, 955, 737. 04
Iran	422, 940, 772. 33
Israel	422, 216, 543. 83
Italy	291, 856. 88
Japan	34, 771, 614. 00
Jordan	37, 481, 777. 42
Korea (Seoul)	15, 305, 468. 82
Lebanon	742, 986. 73
Liberia	1, 554, 305. 69
Malaysia	23, 724, 921. 73
Mali	51, 914. 16
Morocco	39, 753, 817. 66
Mexico	3, 697, 943. 32
NATO projects	51, 736. 00
NAMSO	16, 376, 555. 46
NAMFI	6, 681, 300. 00
Netherlands	2, 200, 000. 00
Nigeria	306, 894. 61
New Zealand	1, 492, 339. 93
Paraguay	328, 351. 29
Peru	4, 299, 256. 54
Philippines	514, 960. 73
Pakistan	7, 215, 154. 98
Spain	2, 300, 000. 00
Saudi Arabia	169, 042, 492. 56
Sri Lanka	361, 923. 25
Turkey	11, 233, 569. 91
Tunisia	4, 026, 785. 07
Uruguay	1, 084, 989. 05
Venezuela	100, 527, 176. 32

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[The material, subsequently submitted, is classified and therefore retained in committee files.]

Mr. WHALEN. That one episode, of course, could distort——

General FISH. It accounts for a large portion of it, as does our program. There is no question that the reequipping of the two sides in the Israeli-Arab conflict in the aftermath of the 1973 war, does account for a large portion of the figures in the total.

Mr. WHALEN. What are the projections for the future as far as Russia is concerned with these four countries? We know what has happened with Egypt. How about India?

General FISH. In the words Mr. Ellsworth said yesterday, I guess we are all very poor at forecasting the future, and particularly poor when it is the Soviet Union. One of the features of making the comparisons is that we have perfect knowledge of our own programs and only limited knowledge of theirs, and certainly as to what they intend to do in the future, that is the most sketchy of all.

Mr. WHALEN. Do they have an equivalent to a U.S. Congress that makes your perfect knowledge less than perfect?

Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FMS

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, on page 11 you quote from section 1, chapter 1, of the Foreign Military Sales Act, and cite certain extracts from section 1. You have left out certain other parts, though. Also included in section 1 is a statement which I will now read:

> It is further the sense of Congress that sales and guarantees under sections 21, 22, 23 and 24 shall not be approved where they would have the effect of arming military dictatorships who are denying the growth of fundamental rights and social progress to their own people.

Are you familiar with that provision?

General FISH. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Can you give me a single instance in which you have applied it?

General FISH. Sir, I think it would be best to defer that question to the State Department because, as you know, Mr. Fraser, we do operate totally under the policy of the State Department, as to whether there will be a program, the size of the program and they make those decisions. We administer the program.

Mr. FRASER. General, whether you administer and they make the policy, you are familiar with the program, aren't you?

General FISH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Give me a case of a single country where that provision has been applied.

General FISH. Sir, I don't recall any particular—that would not necessarily mean there has been no examples.

Mr. FRASER. You don't know of any?

General FISH. I don't know of any.

Mr. FRASER. How long have you held your present responsibility?

General FISH. A little over a year and a half, some 20 months.

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CHILE: FMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. FRASER. You know of no single case of your own knowledge where that provision has been applied?

General FISH. All right. If you press me, it certainly has been applied—the terminology goes to the fundamental question of human rights, which I know certainly we have withheld from Chile for instance. Sales have not gone forward to Chile.

Mr. FRASER. Did Congress enact a ban on sales to Chile?

General FISH. Yes; it expired on June 30, 1975.

Mr. FRASER. So, tell me of a single case where you have applied this provision?

General FISH. In the case of Chile.

Mr. FRASER. Chile was a separate provision. This tied your hands?

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN FORMAN, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS), OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. FORMAN. I was just commenting to General Fish, Mr. Fraser, that it is a little difficult for us to answer your question because this is one of a number of restrictions and policy guidelines which are either mandatory or precatory which have been enacted by Congress and the State Department, in making its decision, takes that and a whole host of other things into consideration in making its decision and in transmitting its decision to us, and we aren't able to pinpoint—when the State Department says don't sell a particular weapon or postpone a sale or a grant of a particular weapon or training to a particular country, whether the basis of that decision was this particular provision or another provision or a group of provisions or these plus some general foreign policy decisions.

Certainly there have been instances where we have refrained from making sales or postponed sales based on guidance from the State Department, but we are not in a position to testify as to what was the predominant underlying reason for that decision.

Mr. FRASER. Your answer does not help me very much. This is a rather explicit provision. It calls for a waiver by the President and a report to the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Presumably it has a fairly specific application. Is it fair then to conclude, however, that whatever the reasons are, you can't tell me of a single country where this provision has been enforced?

General FISH. Because we are not necessarily knowledgeable on the reasons, as Mr. Forman has pointed out.

DOD RECOMMENDATIONS ON KOREA

Mr. FRASER. General, let me go to this question. Do you make recommendations to the State Department as to the size of programs?

General FISH. Yes; but we consider such things as the military requirement. We operate within our own area of expertise, which has to do with the requirement of the forces, consideration of the threat and——

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Mr. FRASER. Just the military issues?

General FISH. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Now, you don't accept responsibility for carrying out the provision I just read because yours is just a military concern, right?

General FISH. As far as making recommendations, sir, to the State Department, we make the recommendations in the area that I indicated, correct.

Mr. FRASER. Now, with respect to Korea, how much did you recommend for fiscal 1977?

General FISH. Some $275 million in credits is my recollection, but let me get the exact reference here.

Mr. FRASER. You are going to read it out of the program book?

General FISH. Yes; that is what we are requesting that is in the program book.

Mr. FRASER. And that is what you recommended?

General FISH. Yes; that is right. My recollection is this figure was—yes indeed, I can remember the dialog we had, and the main dialog on Korea was a question of how much should be credit and how much should be grant assistance. The total was never in contention. This is consistent with the Defense Department recommendation.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, so far as you can tell then the recommendations made purely on military grounds are the recommendations we now have in front of us?

General FISH. Yes, sir, not purely military grounds because there are other considerations. The way we do this——

Mr. FRASER. But you only take into account military considerations in your recommendations?

General FISH. We make our recommendations as part of an overall consultative process which includes working groups of the security assistance program review committee and then the actual security assistance program review committee which is chaired by the State Department.

I sit on it. We discuss not only the military problems, but human rights, the economic ability, all of the provisions and considerations that are in the act are actively under consideration. I think the tenor of your question is as if we independently make an assessment and say "here it is." That is not the way it works. It is a consultative process.

Mr. FRASER. So, then, you are in on a consultative process that, therefore, must take into account all of these provisions, is that right?

General FISH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Do you want to change your testimony, then, from before where you said so far as you people are concerned you only take into account the military questions?

General FISH. What I am saying is that my main area of expertise and my main contribution in those discussions is from the military standpoint. The group as a whole takes on the responsibility to review the human rights aspect. We depend upon Treasury and others to review the economic aspects.

Mr. FRASER. But this is done in a consultative process, is that right?

General FISH. That is correct.

Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FRASER. Can I have 1 more minute?

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDS FOR KOREA

Mr. FRASER. In those consultations, can you tell me whether or not human rights questions affected the amount of money for Korea?

General FISH. Sir, I know that the human rights question was raised, was discussed, and it was obvious that the human rights situation was an important element in our policy consideration.

Mr. FRASER. Does that account for the increase in the amount this year over last year, then? Have you taken that into account?

General FISH. I cannot testify that we tried to put a dollar increment in the way that the Congressman is questioning. It is an overall assessment.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, the increment in the military assistance for this year you are not alleging was a reward for what South Korea is doing on human rights?

General FISH. Sir, it is primarily total assessment of all the considerations that are in the act, including the requirements to meet the threat in the area, in total regard for our national interest, and with due consideration of the congressional constraint on human rights.

Mr. FRASER. We can play that record again. I think somebody there should start paying attention to the law. If you won't, somebody ought to, and this is the reason I think this whole program is going to keep losing support.

Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Lagomarsino.

MILITARY TRAINING FOR LEBANON

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. General Fish, on page 3, about three-fourths of the way down, you say, "Lebanon's modest assistance program includes $300,000 in training funds and $5 million in credit sales." Who do we train and who do we give the credit sales to in Lebanon at this point?

General FISH. Obviously, the congressional presentation document was prepared prior to the unsettled turn of events of recent days, and we believe, as Mr. Ellsworth testified yesterday, it is prudent to have this program in within the overall authorization and appropriation.

Of course, we would not go forward blindly to provide it unless it would be in our national interest. We would hope that the authorization and appropriation would allow and permit a program to assist in the security of Lebanon if and when things settle down.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Would it be accurate to say that if the present circumstance, whatever it is, continued, we would not provide these funds?

General FISH. I could not imagine us providing that in the unsettled conditions that exist there now.

FMS CREDITS TO ZAIRE

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. On the next page, page 4, you talk about the sum of $28 million in FMS credits to help Zaire modernize its forces and increase stability in the area. I am sure there will be concern on the part of some Members of Congress that some of that money might finds its way into Angola for, I quess, what at this time would be guerrilla activities.

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I wish the members of this committee would invite other Members in Congress to participation in seminars, programs, and so forth, so that our knowledge can be broadened in this regard. Unfortunately, it is not.

THE SITUATION IN PERU

Mr. DERWINSKI. I wish that you had enough time to spend a few days in Peru as well. Because part of the problem, as I see it, is the tendency in certain circles—you know we are overcritical of Chile, yet Chile is not unique as Latin American governments come and go these days.

For example, I happened to have been in Lima, Peru, a few days before a junta took over there in 1968, and some of the parliamentarians I knew at that time haven't been heard from since. There doesn't seem to be any interest expressed in any circles I know of about them.

Yet, I will watch with great interest—as to what happens in Argentina and what interest there is in the institutions there that were abolished just this past week.

I would hope that this kind of thing you gentlemen did, which I consider basically practical and consistent with, the importance of the U.S. Congress, that we do not just concentrate on one or two popular whipping boys. I would like to see my friend Mr. Diggs take three or four Congressmen to Luwanda and Burundi when the Watusis and Hutus are killing each other and defend the human rights there in addition to Rhodesia and South Africa, which is a more popular thing.

I am concerned about human rights, but not selectively.

Mr. MILLER. I agree with your statement. I hope that is something we stand for. It is not limited to just Chile, but that we examine all our efforts in support of various countries in regard to the basic human rights and what is happening in those countries.

I think that is absolutely clear, if you look at the voting records of the three of us, where we have those issues, we have tried to raise the consciousness in Congress. We have been there, and I think it is important that that be made clear in the record.

Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Harrington.

VIEW OF U.S. EMBASSY IN CHILE

Mr. HARRINGTON. You people testified prior to my coming in about the meeting you alluded to with Popper and others in the State Department. Could you pursue the theme about the so-called special relationship that exists in sectors of the world like Chile and Korea and what you sense the prevailing attitude was on behalf of the Embassy personnel?

Mr. MOFFETT. It was the first Embassy I dealt with as a Member of Congress, so I don't have a basis of comparison. Perhaps George can elaborate a little more on that.

I regard them as a mirror of the policy of our Secretary of State and Department of State. I think it needs to be said that the Ambassador probably goes farther than our policy might indicate generally in the area of human rights, and we should give him credit for that. But, at the same time, I found some disturbing things in the Embassy.

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gation to see restored, there and in other countries, is the process of civil law.

Then I think the supreme court, the judicial system in that country can operate to replace this legal foundation. There are indications that they want to do this.

We heard great discussions in this country over the last 2½ years about being a country of laws, a government of men. What they have is a government of four personalities and not of civil law. That is what has happened in Argentina, and Peru, and I think we have an obligation to help restore civil law and then they will take their own course.

Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Our next witness is Dr. Larry P. McDonald, a Member of Congress from Georgia.

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY P. McDONALD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Chairman MORGAN. You may proceed, sir.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to update the statement regarding security assistance to Chile and Peru, which I made before this committee on November 10, 1975.

With me is Ken MacKenzie, a member of my staff who accompanied me on a trip to Chile last July. We visited with numerous Chileans, both inside and outside of their government, and have recently received a report from Dr. Susan Huck, a member of my staff who spent 10 days in Chile last month. Thus, we have firsthand knowledge of the situation in Chile and have kept abreast of recent developments.

As you know, we are presently supplying arms to Peru, but denying such assistance to Chile. In fact, we are threatening to impose a total embargo, cutting off even cash and private sales to the Pinochet government.

Because of the Soviet and Cuban influence in Peru and because of Peru's overwhelming superiority over Chile in military power, I think this is an extremely unfortunate policy which threatens not only the security of Chile, but of all Latin America and, ultimately, the United States.

Chile has been targeted to become a Soviet satellite for some time now. The initial strategy, after it was concluded in the 1960's that Chile was not yet ready for a revolution, was to support a democratic road to socialism under Allende. When this failed, the Soviets apparently adopted a new strategy with two main thrusts: Arming Peru for a possible direct military attack, coupled with continued subversion and propaganda against the present Government of Chile.

WEAPONS ACQUISITION BY PERU

Peru began an ambitious and costly weapons acquisition program immediately after the present Government was established in the 1968 military coup, acquiring $1 billion worth of military equipment during the years from 1969 to 1973.

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June 5—Decree 567: Designates the members of the Special Commission.

September 11—Decree-Law 1.181: Establishes the stages of the State of Siege and reduces the present stage to that of "Internal Security," which is the antepenultimate degree of stringency. (ANNEX PAG. 35)

December 23 and 30—Release of 210 detained persons. Currently there remain only 677 detained.

1976

January 28—Decree 187, published in the *Diario Oficial* on January 29, 1976: Establishes the Rights and Guarantees of those detained in accordance with the State of Internal Security. Orders medical examinations of those detained, at the time of their detention, during their detention, and upon their release. Authorizes the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice to visit detention centers without prior notice, and to initiate legal action in the case that an inappropriate situation is observed.

February 25—Decree 146, of February 10, published in the *Diario Oficial*, February 25. Establishes three detention centers: Puchuncaví, Tres Alamos and Cuatro Alamos.

February 26—The Ministry of Justice sends an official note to the Ministry of Health directing the National Health Service and the Legal-Medical Institute to designate physicians to ascertain the condition of those detained, in compliance with Decree 187.

March 3—The President of the Supreme Court, José María Eyzaguirre, makes a surprise visit to the Tres Alamos Detention Center in Santiago. He remains there six hours, meeting privately with several detained persons.

March 5—The Minister of Justice, Miguel Schweitzer, makes a surprise visit to the Cuatro Alamos Detention Center in Santiago, accompanied by the Sub-Secretary of the Ministry, Mario Duvauchelle, by the Director of the National Health Service, Dr. René Merino, and by the Director of the Legal-Medical Institute, Dr. Alfredo Vargas. He submits his report to the President of the Republic.

March 8—The President of the Supreme Court, José María Eyzaguirre, makes a second surprise visit to the Tres Alamos Detention Center. The detained persons present their requests to him through their representatives. He remains six hours.

U.S. AID: CHILE AND PERU

Chairman MORGAN. What you are really saying is, if we are going to put the whip on Chile, we also ought to put the whip on Peru?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have not had that policy. However, Peru, as I pointed out, is the only country in the Western Hemisphere outside Cuba that is receiving Soviet military assistance. We are giving military assistance also to that same country, which has an authoritarian left wing government.

Our Peace Corps was kicked out of Peru because they were termed CIA agents. We have a Peace Corps in Chile, and we seem to have a policy of hurting those who want to be our friends and helping those who make it clear they are allying themselves with our global enemies.

Chairman MORGAN. Doctor, do you have any evidence to support the statement just reported by Mr. Derwinski that there are violations of human rights in Peru also?

Mr. McDONALD. Certainly Soviet tanks were used in one of the, I think, consumer protests and dealing also with the police matters in Lima. I did not spend any appreciable time in Peru except merely on the trip back from Chile.

However, I think it is well known that there are problems in South American governments in transition stages, that human rights have sometimes not been observed, but that has also been the case in our own Government.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Derwinski.

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ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. McDonald, you made a reference to the economic policies of the Government of Chile. You described it, if I remember correctly, as basically a free enterprise. They are taking steps, I understand, to try to combat inflation, which was an inherited problem.

Would you address yourself at all to the economic situation as you analyzed it?

Mr. McDONALD. Under the former regime, under Allende, the economic policy had become a total disaster with a runaway inflation approaching 1,000 percent at the time of the regime's turnover. They had additional problems of simply being unable to feed themselves.

It has become under the present regime a small importer and under Allende had to move to massive imports to feed the people. Rationing and bare shelves became commonplace. In going through the stores and seeing the stores today, there is an abundance of food.

This is no longer the problem that was formerly there.

The move toward a free enterprise economy is not going to be an easy one because the problem is not one that began with Allende, but you are dealing with a country that had for over 50 years moved toward a welfare concept. In the thirties they had a Marxist regime, which had a relatively short life.

There is concern among the people in Chile that there is an inbred feeling from one generation to another of waiting for the Government to solve the problems for them. There will be great difficulty in trying to regain an appreciation for individual initiative and a work ethic rather than Government as the ultimate problem solver for human needs.

HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORTS IN CHILE

Mr. DERWINSKI. You attach an appendix which covers a number of steps taken to ease the internal conditions. As I read this, there are three incidents you refer to as surprise visits by authorities to various detention and prison camps.

I gather, you are making the point that the justice and court authorities are now given greater flexibility in what they are able to do both as to conditions and perhaps shorter prison sentences for people presently detained.

Is that the thrust of your information?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, that is correct. During this period of the state of seige, which is a legally allowed process that many governments in South America have as an alternative, as a form of government that may be used under extreme circumstances, that steps are being directly taken as shown by that particular appendix item to try to insure an increased degree of basic rights to those who are detained.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

SPONSORSHIP OF MISSION TO CHILE

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we have expressed our commendations to others who have taken an interest in human rights, I also want to commend Dr. McDonald

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as oppressive; that is, "a monumental internal security problem at the time of takeover of this regime."

Mr. McDonald. Yes, there were approximately 15,000 revolutionaries that were brought in from outside. Massive stores of armaments had been brought in, violating the laws of Chile when they were brought in. President Allende personally intervened so they could be brought in and shipped to his residence.

To date, only about 40 to 50 percent of the illegal armaments shipped in have been recovered. The rest are still buried or in hiding someplace in the country.

The 15,000 revolutionaries are in addition to the Communist Party apparatus of Chile. The basic Communist apparatus in Chile is intact. This has not been appreciably disturbed.

Many of the revolutionaries fled the country. Not being native Chileans, many of them were picked up. A few are still being detained. Less than 700 are the total number of people being detained as of September. There was an unbelievable internal security problem, and it is one, everything considered, they handled I suppose relatively well.

That is not to say there were not excesses. There will always be excesses on both sides when you have a civil war of brother against brother or native against native.

We should not be unmindful of the fact, however, during our Revolutionary War, which we fought about 200 years ago, that those loyal to the king had to pack up, lost their homes, lost their civil rights, they fled to an offshore island, to the Bahamas and what have you.

There were serious civil rights violations throughout the Revolutionary War. We sometimes expect a country to immediately blossom forth into a constitutional republic. Yet, it was a number of years after the Revolutionary War before we got around to our Constitution.

We should take into account the problems other nations might be faced with, but we sometimes demand a Simon pure government approach that we have been unable to reach ourselves.

BETTER SECURITY: MORE HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. Buchanan. Is it your opinion the government would have a better record toward protection of human rights as this internal security problem lessens?

Mr. McDonald. Absolutely. As the internal security lessens, a normal way of life I think will be achieved. But, speaking to patience, on the side with no one else involved, I was impressed with the fact there was a general relief throughout the country that the situation had been depoliticalized. This is not to say they want this forever, but we in this country have no understanding of what they were sliding into as a subculture in that country.

You had athletic teams of one political party versus athletic teams of another political party stretching all the way down to grammar school. The classroom would be divided along political lines, and the society was subdivided. We don't have much appreciation for that in this country—so and so's father may be a Democrat and the mother a Republican, but we won't take it beyond the political season. But they have it during the entire year.

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