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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 JUL 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: NSDD-71; US Policy Toward Latin America in the Wake  
of the Falklands Crisis ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ The Department of Defense chaired an interagency group to develop a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by country, and to propose a strategy to increase US military influence in the Latin American region as requested by NSDD-71.

~~(S)~~ The attached study, "Military Objectives and Requirements in Latin America," was developed by the interagency group and coordinated with State and the CIA to respond to the NSDD-71 tasking.

John H. Stanford  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
a/s

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Date: APR 17 2018

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### Military Objectives and Requirements in Latin America

(S) The primary US objective of assuring the security of the United States, the North American continent, the contiguous Caribbean Basin, and its approaches is currently based upon the assumption of a secure, cooperative southern flank. A strategy to increase US military influence in the Western Hemisphere is necessary to achieve this fundamental objective, to foster the development of active bilateral/multilateral cooperation for a coalition defense of strategic lines of communication in and through the hemisphere, and to further the US national interests and objectives cited in NSDD 71. To develop this strategy and a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, a by-country threat evaluation from both US and host country perspectives and an assessment of how the individual country could assist US global strategy were accomplished.

### Threat to US Strategic Interests

(S) US military strategy has traditionally viewed the southern flank as an economy of force area, relying on cooperative, non-hostile relations to help maintain US security in the region. In a major conflict, US force planning currently assumes (1) no Latin American force contribution outside this hemisphere; (2) US forces will be committed to other regions; (3) the Latin American nations will grant US access to critical material, provide logistic support as well as staging and operating bases; (4) the Latin American nations will deny logistic support, bases, and port facilities to nations that are presently or potentially hostile to US interests. The validity of these assumptions is being challenged by (1) a well-armed Cuba astride key Caribbean lines of communication; (2) an enhanced Soviet and Cuban capability to project military power, to coerce friendly nations in the region, and to penetrate or destabilize regional governments; and (3) the increased threat and activity of radical left terrorists/insurgents capable of destabilizing friendly governments.

### Latin American Threat Perception

(S) The Latin American perspective of the hemispheric threat is, on the whole, somewhat at variance with that of the US. The Latins perceive threats to their security as internal and regional, not global. Traditional East-West conflict dimensions tend to be less important than intra-regional tensions. Most Latin American governments are concerned by the threat posed by internal elements influenced and/or promoted by the Soviet Union or its surrogates, primarily Cuba. This perception of the threat, coupled with the difficult economic problems confronting the Latin Americans and the low percentage of GNP that they historically have spent for defense needs, militate against efforts to develop a universal strategy regarding defense requirements applicable to individual Latin American governments. However, several of the major South American countries are developing an awareness of the indirect threat Soviet global capabilities pose to their security and national interests.

### Strategy Requirements

(S) To be effective, any strategy developed to increase US military influence in the region must be programmatic, sustained and long-term. The US is now described as an "unreliable security partner" by many of the South American

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countries. Bilateral, and particularly military-to-military, relations with the US are viewed by many Latin American leaders from a national security perspective. The large investment and long term nature of force modernization plans creates for the Latin governments an uncomfortable situation wherein their national security is dependent upon a logistics and training base controlled by another government. In the recent past, the selective and punitive use of the military instrument for political reasons by the US in its relations with the South American countries has been viewed as directly affecting their national security interests, as intervention in internal affairs of the State, and/or as an affront to their national honor. In many cases, withdrawal of US military personnel and restrictions on, or the cut-off of, sales of spare parts and support for equipment purchased from the US have been counterproductive to short and long term US interests, objectives, and goals. For the US, the military instrument has been used recently to pursue other than security interests and has not been dependent upon the Latin American countries' perceived needs or US strategic requirements, but upon other factors (e.g., force structure balances, possible border disputes, status of human rights, movement toward democratic government). Consequently, overcoming the suspicion of and resistance to the US as a security partner within the region necessitates a strategy which:

- Uses each of the three major methods to increase US access and influence.
  - Major equipment sales: long-term influence through logistics supply, training, and possible interoperability (FMS, MAP).
  - Technology transfer: long-term influence through cooperative efforts, tie to US systems (coproduction/coticensing agreements).
  - Presence: short mid-term influence through training (technical and professional), consultations/conferences, exchanges, security assistance organizations (combined exercises, IMET, ship visits, personnel exchange programs, staffing).
- Is responsive to host country requirements and modernization efforts within the context of the US worldwide arms transfer policy.
  - Priority should be given to those requests/actions which increase interoperability in areas of US strategic interest (e.g., ASW patrol aircraft, air defense).
  - The long term, sustained nature of security requirements must be paramount.
- Seeks the active cooperation of key countries in regional territorial and air defense, security of lines of communication (LOCs), and facilitates air and ocean movement.
  - Would require emphasis on converging interests across the entire spectrum of relations.
  - Long-term effort toward developing the required coalition warfare capability.
  - Recognize that any evaluation of regional balances of power should include more than military force structure comparisons.
  - US would necessarily support greater force capability in specific, prioritized countries than in lower priority countries.

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- Consider non-military initiatives (e.g., economic assistance, OAS, bilateral relations) to strengthen friendly governments to offset their lack of military capability.
- Should support bilateral approach to complement a revised general approach to the region.
- Eliminate over-generalized approach to strategic countries.
- Continue and expand multilateral fora leading to cooperative efforts and development of coalition warfare capability.

### Strategy

While general conceptual approaches can be developed to increase US military influence in Latin America, individual supplemental strategies will be required for specific countries, particularly those which are of greater strategic interest to the US. The initial approaches by the USG in the region will be limited by the short term scarcity of resources. A concerted interagency effort will be required to increase FMS credits (non-budgetary loan guarantees) and IMET levels available to major South American countries and to train the personnel required. Continued emphasis on MAP grant must be maintained to meet US strategic objectives in the countries with severe economic problems, particularly in the Caribbean Basin.

General Concept: During the initial phase (0-5 years), interagency emphasis should be placed on working with the Latin American countries to increase US military presence and improve the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Coordination with Congress will be required to amend/revise current legislation which imposes limitations on US foreign policy efforts to develop a cooperative relationship between the US and friendly South American governments (e.g., budgetary actions, Glenn-Symington, specific country restrictions, arms transfer legislation).

- Increase MAP grant levels for specific countries based upon economic conditions, current threat, and host country security requirements.
- Long range strategic requirements will continue to dictate the need for MAP grant to develop cooperation and stability required.
- MAP grant should also be directed for national development (usually a collateral mission of Latin America armed forces).
- Increase FMS credit levels to support US strategic requirements in the region.
- Provide FMS credit for major equipment the country wishes to purchase which would benefit US security interests directly (e.g., ASW equipment to Brazil). Legal and Congressional restraints currently place limits on USG capabilities.
- Interoperability potential increased.
- Increase IMET funding levels.
- Selective country increases/additions to promote US training.
- Technical training for general skills and support of specific US equipment through military schools and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).

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- Professional Military Education (PME) to impart US ideals, tactics, and doctrine.
  - Engineering support, civic action, and medical training to increase capabilities to contribute to infrastructure development.
- Junior and middle grade officers should be targeted.
  - Currently, groups are not tied to US in many countries (lack of US equipment, training).
  - Emphasis on lower and intermediate level schools.
- Expand personnel exchange programs (PEP).
  - Conclude agreements with all major countries for all services.
  - For less strategically important countries, develop representative programs on a more limited scale.
  - PEP restrictions on Services must be addressed and resolved to develop meaningful positions in US (e.g., access to classified material, equipment, flying aircraft not in parent country inventory).
- Eliminate "specialized" arms transfer policies for Latin America in accordance with NSDD-5 guidelines, recognizing that some current legal and Congressional restraints may require modification.
  - Increase responsiveness to requests for data.
  - Greater recognition and awareness of increased technology levels of particular countries and equipment currently in region.
  - Favor systems which improve interoperability and further US strategic interests.
  - Conduct interagency review of Munitions Control List (MCL) to simplify its use and reduce the number of items.
    - Remove items associated with ground and flight safety items.
    - Consider removing from the MCL those items which are distinctly non-lethal (e.g., transport aircraft, jeeps, air defense radar).
    - Recognize the civilian use of many items of military equipment (used either by military forces or civilian firms -- road construction, air transport, air traffic control, civic action, national development).
  - Certification for Argentina and Chile\*; restrict selective punitive use of security assistance program to an exceptional use basis only.
- Increase information flow and interaction.
  - Review such possibilities as [REDACTED] exchange agreements and General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA).
  - Continue current periodic conferences of Chiefs of the Services and support functions.
  - [REDACTED]
  - Provide capabilities for reciprocal small unit and training/education exchanges.

\*State/ARA believes certification for Argentina and Chile should be on an "as soon as feasible" basis.

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- Establish liaison positions on appropriate US staffs on a limited scale.
- Expand scope of responsibilities [REDACTED] offices with appropriate, required manning increases.
  - Expand ability to provide instruction in host country training institutions.
  - Expand scope of duties to include providing general force modernization planning assistance when requested.
  - Increase contact with host country units.
  - Avoid total withdrawal of security assistance offices for short term political gains.
- Services should increase reservoir of personnel with capability and prerequisites to respond rapidly to changing politico-military situations.
  - Increasing influence will require additional personnel with appropriate background and language capabilities (Army - Foreign Area Specialist; AF - Area Specialist Program; Navy - Political/Military Specialist; USMC - Foreign Area Officer Specialty).
  - Training and manpower requirements may create short-term disruption.
- Pursue coproduction/collensing possibilities with major South American countries.
  - Technology transfer, properly developed, could increase interoperability, strengthen relations, improve convergence of interests.
  - Currently being investigated with Brazil.
  - Some corporation to corporation or host government agreements are already in being and could form one base for expansion.

(S) The effort by all US agencies to increase USG influence during this five year period will determine the ability of the Latin American and US armed forces to interoperate effectively during a contingency, natural disaster, or major conflict in the future. With a cooperative interagency approach, US military influence can be expected to increase and assist in obtaining the US objectives listed in NSDD-71. A concerted effort by the NSC, State, and DOD will be required to eliminate/reduce the growing legislative restrictions on the Executive Branch's ability to develop and implement a coherent foreign policy which employs all the instruments of national power, to include the military.

(S) Prioritized Strategic Listings: As stated in NSDD-71, the current priority region for the United States is the Caribbean Basin (including Central America) with our second priority being to restore and reassert United States influence in South America.

Sub-regional long-term, strategic priorities are:

- |     |                              |
|-----|------------------------------|
| I   | Caribbean Basin              |
| II  | Eastern Coast, South America |
| III | Western Coast, South America |

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The individual country prioritized listing\* was developed by considering such criteria as location, resources, force structure and support capabilities, and industrial base. It is not designed to reflect the current priority for resources due to present threat or internal stability, but reflects the overall long term, strategic importance of the particular country to US national interests and objectives.\*\*

I	Mexico Brazil
II	Venezuela Panama Colombia
III	Guatemala Honduras El Salvador Costa Rica
IV	Argentina Chile Peru
V	Bahamas Jamaica Dominican Republic Haiti Trinidad and Tobago Eastern Caribbean
VI	Ecuador Uruguay Belize
VII	Bolivia Paraguay
VIII	Suriname Guyana

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(S) Brief individual country studies highlighting US strategic interests, military objectives, and US perception of force requirements are attached. All the specifics discussed in the General Concept may not apply to any given country; however, it provides an approach with options which can be selectively tailored for a specific country to increase US military influence and to enhance the security of the US southern flank.

\* Although strategically important, Cuba and Nicaragua and Grenada are not listed because of their international alignment and efforts to subvert friendly governments.

\*\*State has some differences both with the priority rankings and the methodology. State believes that there should be fewer sub-divisions and that more weight should be given to short/mid-term factors.

The JCS believe the Latin American region should be prioritized by strategic sensing with four divisions: Vital Interest -- direct, clear and major impact

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on attainment of basic national security objectives, risk escalation to general war; Significant Interest -- less important impact than those of vital interest, commit conventional military forces; Important Interest -- indirect impact on basic national security objectives, commit limited forces excluding ground forces other than advisory personnel; Of Interest -- indirect and less important impact than those of important interest, provide logistic and advisory support only. The JCS prioritize by sub-region and within the sub-region according to the above strategic sensings; they have not developed a strategic, prioritized list for the Latin American region as a single entity. The JCS agree with the sub-regional priority listing cited on page 5.

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