

~~SECRET~~

#21

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

Argentina

1. Total Security Assistance (\$ thousands)

<u>MAP</u>	<u>Military Training</u>	<u>FMS Credit</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Cost of Mission</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Contributed Currency by Host</u>
-	920	34,000	34,920	1,634	36,554	-

2. External Threat (US Assessment)

None.

3. Independent External Threat Estimate (Argentine Assessment)

Brazil, because of its size, the size of its military forces, its strong industrial base, and its rapid economic development, is viewed as a vague potential threat in the distant future.

4. Last Time Engaged in Active Military Hostilities

Argentina has not engaged in active military hostilities during this century. In 1962 Argentina contributed some military aircraft to the Cuban blockade; they also dispatched two destroyers, but the blockade ended before they arrived on station.

5. Aggressor Country

Not applicable.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

5 U.S.C. § 552 +

Date: 28 DEC 2017 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: Deny in Full: _____

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: _____

MDR: 17 -M- 2049

6. Internal Threat (US Assessment)

Continuing terrorism and guerrilla warfare that has plagued the country since 1968, became intensive in 1974-1975, and has tied down a regimental-size force in counter guerrilla operations in Tucuman Province since February 1975. The main insurgent groups are the Montoneros (an organization with several thousand hard-core members that is an offshoot of the Peronist movement and has extensive contacts in the parent organization) and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP - a Marxist-Leninist group with several hundred hard core members, much more active than the Montoneros and with considerable international support)

7. Independent Internal Threat Estimate (Argentine Assessment)

Same as US assessment.

8. Other Reasons for Providing Assistance

As the second largest country in South America, and because of its relatively advanced culture and economy, Argentina has important influence in regional affairs. Together with Chile, Argentina geographically dominates the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

strategic ocean routes between the South Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Security assistance to Argentina contributes to that country's modest modernization efforts [specifically to improve its counterinsurgency capability, strengthens the US position as the predominant influence on the Argentine military, and reduces the likelihood of the incursion of third powers with interests inimical to those of the US.]

9. Reasons for Requesting the Specific Amount of Assistance

Argentina has received no grant materiel assistance since FY68. The grant training funds requested are to provide basic technical training essential to the operation and maintenance of equipment obtained from the US, to sustain the pro-US orientation of the Argentine armed forces, and to contribute to their increased professionalism. The level of FMS credit requested for Argentina for FY76 is to support their program of armed forces modernization, particularly their counterinsurgency capability. The projected FY76 security assistance requirements for Argentina include helicopters and transport aircraft to improve its airmobile capability as a means to respond to internal security threats. Specialized equipment such as infra-red sensors and improved communications items are projected to improve their counterinsurgency capability. [In addition, since the armed forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations, equipment will be purchased to replace attrition losses.]

10. Amount of Assistance Requested by Country

[Argentina specifically requested \$39 million FMS credits in FY75, \$9 million more than they received. In FY76 they have requested an FMS credit program of about \$50 million and a Foreign Military Training program of about \$1.1 million.]

11. Objections from Neighboring Countries

None.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

~~SECRET~~

1. Total Security Assistance (\$ thousands)

<u>MAP</u>	<u>Military Training</u>	<u>FMS Credit</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Cost of Mission</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Contributed Currency by Host</u>
2,200	720	6,000	8,920	1,549	10,469	-

2. External Threat (US Assessment)

None.

3. Independent External Threat Estimate (Bolivian Assessment)

[Bolivia is concerned that its territorial integrity could be infringed in the event of a war between Peru and Chile.]

4. Last Time Engaged in Active Military Hostilities

1932-1935, fought against Paraguay in the Chaco War. [Poorly defined boundaries and Bolivian desire for an outlet to the Atlantic led to increasing intemperance on both sides, border clashes, and finally war. Bolivia was soundly defeated.]

5. Aggressor Country

[Neither country could be clearly identified as the aggressor.]

6. Internal Threat (US Assessment)

[Possible insurgency by sizeable labor elements over some future labor problem. Large elements of the miners, urban labor, and campesinos have revolted at various times in recent Bolivian history. There is no current guerrilla threat; the National Liberation Army, a Castroist guerrilla group that claims to continue Che Guevara's guerrilla force of 1966-67 and has made a few raids since that time, has not been active in Bolivia since at least 1972, but has members in exile in Argentina and has the support of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) through common membership in the so-called Revolutionary Coordination Junta.]

7. Independent Internal Threat Estimate (Bolivian Assessment)

Same as US assessment.

8. Other Reasons for Providing Assistance

Bolivia is at the center of the continent, bordering five other countries in South America. By bolstering Bolivia's capability to maintain internal security, US interests in maintaining hemispheric stability and security are served.]

~~SECRET~~

9. Reasons for Requesting the Specific Amount of Assistance

The bulk of grant materiel funds requested are for the basic equippage of key internal security units. Foreign military sales credits proposed will support the acquisition of transport and utility aircraft and trucks for increased mobility. Foreign military training will provide basic technical courses required for the operation and maintenance of equipment of US manufacture, as well as courses intended to increase the professionalism of Bolivian armed forces.

10. Amount of Assistance Requested by Country

No specific amount of assistance has been requested by Bolivia [however, they desire, through grant, the equipment for five internal security units.]

11. Objections from Neighboring Countries

[Recalling their protracted war with Bolivia during the 1930s, Paraguay takes exception to any security assistance provided to Bolivia by the US]

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

~~SECRET~~

Uruguay

1. Total Security Assistance (\$ thousands)

<u>MAP</u>	<u>Military Training</u>	<u>FMS Credit</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Cost of Mission</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Contributed Currency by Host</u>
600	520	2,500	3,620	761	4,381	-

2. External Threat (US Assessment)

None.

3. Independent External Threat Estimate (Uruguay's Assessment)

Same as US assessment.

4. Last Time Engaged in Active Military Hostilities

Uruguay has not engaged in active military hostilities during this century.

5. Aggressor Country

Not applicable.

6. Internal Threat (US Assessment)

Possible resumption of terrorism by the Tupamaros, a radical terrorist group. Terrorism was a serious threat during 1968-73, but has been eliminated by the security forces. Cuba supported the Tupamaros. Cuban support of the Tupamaros is believed at present to be confined to propaganda. Many Tupamaros are in exile in Argentina, where they have gained the active support of Argentina's People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), both organizations being combined in the Joint Revolutionary Junta.

7. Independent Internal Threat Estimate (Uruguayan Assessment)

Possible resumption of terrorism by the Tupamaros. Terrorism was a serious threat during 1968-73, but has been eliminated by the security forces. Cuba supported the Tupamaros, and Uruguay believes that Cuban support continues and is the major reason that the threat remains serious. Many Tupamaros are in exile in Argentina, where they have gained the active support of Argentina's People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), both organizations being combined in the Joint Revolutionary Junta.

8. Other Reasons for Providing Assistance

Security assistance to Uruguay serves to enhance military-to-military relations, sustain the traditional pro-US stance of that country and assist Uruguay in modernization of the armed forces and in maintaining an adequate counterinsurgency capability.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9. Reasons for Requesting the Specific Amount of Assistance

The security assistance program assists Uruguay in maintaining a credible counterinsurgency capability by providing for acquisition of river patrol boats for surveillance and mobility, vehicles for mobility and weapons for standardization of inventory.

10. Amount of Assistance Requested by Country

No specific amount of assistance has been requested by Uruguay.

11. Objections from Neighboring Countries

None.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

~~SECRET~~