

Latin America has been Castro's first and lasting interest and therefore has provided the clearest image of the Cuban leader's revolutionary fluctuations over the past two decades--the early quixotic forays, the retrenchment after Guevara's death in 1967, and the emphasis on diplomatic relations during the early 1970s.

In 1977, the level of Cuban support to Latin American revolutionaries was at a low; the impetus seriously to reappraise strategy toward the area did not arise until 1979, when the Sandinista threat to Somoza became substantive. The Sandinista example spurred Castro to promote actively the development of strong, viable revolutionary vanguard movements in Central and South America beginning in 1979. That summer he told several high-level Latin American visitors that Nicaragua proved that armed struggle was the only path to revolution. Cuban officials also warned Communist Party leaders in Central America that they would lose Cuba's support if their parties did not actively promote armed insurrection. On 26 July 1980 Castro made this point publicly and in stronger terms than he had used for years. He said that "the experience of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no formula other than revolutionary struggle."

Castro's personal involvement with Central American Communist party leaders and revolutionary movements has been more intense over the past five months than in any similar period in recent years. His optimism over trends in El Salvador in early 1980 was tempered by the failure of the rebels to achieve a quick victory. But rather than losing heart, he has pressed even harder for a revolutionary triumph. He seems convinced that if Salvadoran rebels are to succeed this year, they must do so before the new administration in Washington has established itself and developed a Salvadoran policy that is accepted as reasonable by moderate Latin American governments.

At the same time, Castro has been trying to light a fire under the Guatemalan guerrillas and to convince Honduran leftists that they must give high priority to preparations for eventually launching their own revolution. In his fervor to promote revolution, he appears to be offering the Guatemalan guerrillas more arms than they can presently use, and to be pushing the Hondurans toward a revolution they still are far too weak and disorganized to wage successfully. This seemingly undue haste does not result from Havana's ignorance of the leftists' capabilities and weaknesses; it is more attributable to impatience, a desire to maintain the revolutionary momentum, and an interest in diverting US attention away from Cuba itself. The Castro regime's traditional paranoia, fed by the deterioration in relations with the US after 1978, increased markedly following the November elections in the US.

There is also growing evidence of increased Cuban support for guerrilla movements in South America albeit at a lower level than Central America. Training of Chilean and Argentine guerrillas appears to have increased substantially beginning in early 1979 followed by a number of attempts--mostly unsuccessful in Argentina--to reinfiltate guerrillas. Terrorist activity has revived in Chile and renewed infiltration attempts are likely. Meanwhile, the MIR and Montoneros most likely will maintain a high international profile supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and possibly involving themselves in guerrilla operations elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Havana's involvement with the M-19 in Colombia is growing. It is suspected of having played a role in the occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in March 1980 and reportedly received a large number of guerrillas for training in Cuba late last year. Revolutionaries from

Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil were believed to be receiving political and military training in Cuba or with the PLO in Lebanon as recently as last year. Small numbers of guerrillas from each of these countries reportedly have been or will be reinfiltrated to develop new guerrilla cadre. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, Havana's support for subversive movements is minimal.

Continued Involvement in Africa

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Havana continues to expand its influence and presence in Africa despite some occasional setbacks. Large numbers of Cuban troops are likely to remain in both Ethiopia and Angola so long as a significant external threat exists. Small Cuban military detachments are in a number of other African countries; Havana believes this type of support pays off politically. For example, some 150 Cuban counterinsurgency experts reportedly arrived in Mozambique last month to assist the Machel government deal with a growing insurgency.

Castro's successes in Africa are largely attributable to his ability to anticipate the needs of developing countries and to respond quickly with assistance. Cuba's serious economic problems have not prevented many Sub-Saharan countries from viewing it as an attractive development model. Havana's entree is also aided by its support for liberation movements in the region, and by its longstanding opposition to colonialism and apartheid.

Having established diplomatic relations with seven African states during the past two years, Havana now has ties with 37 out of the 46 Sub-Saharan countries. In addition to assessing local conditions, this diplomatic network identifies and cultivates groups sympathetic to the

Castro regime--whether they are part of or opposed to the ruling government. Moreover, Havana hopes to buttress its claims to be nonaligned by establishing diplomatic relations with countries of differing ideologies.

Following the one-week visit to Havana last fall of Paulo Muwanga, chairman of Uganda's ruling Military Commission, Cuba and Uganda signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Cuba sent 20 health and agricultural specialists to Uganda and granted 200 scholarships to Ugandan students for study on the Isle of Youth, where thousands of African and Latin American children already are enrolled in work-study programs. Although Muwanga's visit also sparked rumors of the imminent arrival of Cuban troops, none are yet known to have arrived. The expected reduction or removal of Tanzanian forces following the recent Ugandan elections, however, could result in the introduction of some Cuban military advisers.

Havana expects to open an embassy in the Seychelles shortly. A small number of Seychellois students already are attending school in Cuba, and Victoria has agreed to accept a few Cuban doctors. Responding to domestic pressure, President Rene thus far has refused to accept Cuban armed forces personnel.

In recent months, Cuba has attempted to shore up relations with some of its established African allies by playing host to a number of high-ranking delegations and by signing several protocols increasing bilateral cooperation. The foreign ministers of Madagascar (Malagasy Republic), Benin, and Sierra Leone recently visited Cuba, as did members of Ethiopia's Central Committee and of the Cuba-Cape Verde Intergovernmental Committee. In August, Burundi signed a protocol for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, and two months later Guinea-Bissau signed a similar agreement. The accession of Joao Bernardo Vieira

to the presidency in Guinea-Bissau may lead to even closer ties; as Minister of Defense in 1978, Vieira received advance military training in Cuba.

Cuban military and economic assistance, however, has not kept some African countries, such as Sierra Leone and Guinea, from drifting away. Sierra Leone, a longtime aid recipient, early last year expressed dissatisfaction over the costs of maintaining a mission in Havana and threatened to close its embassy there. The desire of Guinea's Sekou Toure to play a greater role in the nonaligned movement and his seeming turn toward the West have created other problems. Toure, for example, has campaigned aggressively to get the nonaligned movement to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a move that Havana has had to resist. Cuba recently turned down a request for science and engineering teachers, but did send some road construction crews and 35 instructors for the Guinean fishing school. Although Toure has moderated his Western tilt, his drive for influence in the NAM could generate further frictions with Havana.

Gabon, never a close ally of the Castro regime, broke relations last August, partly because Cuban diplomats were in contact with Gabonese students. Libreville also views the sizeable Cuban presence in Angola as potentially threatening. Havana is concerned that Libreville's move could provoke other African leaders to charge Cuba with meddling in their diplomatic affairs or encourage them to protect the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia.

The Cubans also suffered a minor setback in Sudan recently, when one of their diplomats arrived unexpectedly in Khartoum with the announced intention of opening an embassy. The Sudanese suspected that the "diplomat"--who had been forced to leave his post in Mexico City in 1972 after

a shooting incident--was actually an intelligence operative. They declared him persona non grata, and he left shortly thereafter.

Political Action Activities

The Castro regime uses cultural and informational exchanges and contacts to introduce and expand its influence abroad. These activities are part of a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism designed to promote Cuban policies and undercut US influence worldwide. The mechanism is extremely complex and involves elements of the party, the government, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, front groups, and the regime's subversion apparatus, yet it is still flexible enough to make allowances for national and regional differences as well as for class distinctions in each country.

The main goals of these efforts are:

1. -- To raise the political consciousness of the masses through propaganda.
2. -- To create political structures through which the masses can be motivated and mobilized to support--wittingly or unwittingly--Cuban policy goals.
3. -- To train revolutionary cadres to provide leadership.

Moreover, cultural exchanges and contacts provide the Cubans with a channel through which they can identify cooperative intellectuals who can be useful in propaganda operations; activists in labor unions, youth groups, and women's and farmers' organizations who might profit from training and indoctrination in special schools in Cuba; and potential agents for intelligence collection and operations.

Radio Broadcasts

Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits over 355 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. This service uses eight transmitters located near Bauta, outside Havana; since May 1979 it has also been relayed on several shortwave frequencies from transmitter sites in the USSR.

Cuba also has mediumwave Spanish-language and English-language broadcasts to the Caribbean nightly over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba.

Prensa Latina

As the press agency of the Cuban Government, Prensa Latina combines news gathering and intelligence collection with propaganda dissemination and intelligence operations.

Prensa Latina has 36 field offices around the world and numerous stringers. In addition to its press transmissions to subscribers in all parts of the world, Prensa Latina disseminates a number of publications and places material in a variety of other foreign publications.

Front Groups

Havana sees its role in the Third World largely as that of an organizer and then a catalyst of revolution with the successful completion of the former being a prerequisite for the success of the latter. The Cubans either join existing groups and try to influence them from within or, where formal structures are lacking, establish new organizations. To counter the influence of the Interamerican Press Association, for example, they formed the Federation of Latin American Journalists,

ber 1977, Cuban labor officials were instrumental in organizing the First Caribbean Trade Union Conference which was attended by some 40 regional labor delegations.

Sports Competition and Cultural Events

Cuba places considerable importance on fielding large and usually formidable sports teams for virtually all regional games where they can arrange an invitation. The Castro regime not only sends impressive delegations to cultural events elsewhere in the region, it also plays host where appropriate. Havana was the site of the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in the summer of 1978, and entertained delegations from some 140 countries or political entities.

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