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DIADIN 2603-75
14 OCTOBER 1975

#4-28



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 12 APR 2018 Authority: EO 13526
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Date: APR 12 2018

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Supplemental Doc. 1

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This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

ARGENTINA

THE PRESIDENT'S FUTURE.

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~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Mrs. Peron's latest decision to resume the Presidency is increasing speculation in Argentina that the military will prevent her from doing so. Consequently, her planned resumption of office on 17 October is still uncertain.

~~(S/NOFORN/WHINTEL)~~ We don't believe the armed forces will take any action against the President because of the unfavorable political and public reaction that would ensue. Nevertheless, most of the military leaders do not want Mrs. Peron to continue in office. The army commander and the majority of his senior officers prefer that the President take extended leave or resign rather than be ousted, contending that she lacks the ability and physical stamina needed to correct the country's pressing political, economic, and internal-security problems.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Several courses of action appear to be open. Military and anti-Peronist forces could permit Mrs. Peron to resume the Presidency on a figurehead basis with the Ministers of Economy and Interior actually running the government. This approach would save the armed forces the negative reaction they would encounter from loyal Peronists should she be ousted by them. At the same time, it would tend to mollify those who oppose her altogether. On the other hand, military leaders could convince Mrs. Peron that she should remain on leave or resign, thus leaving the government in the hands of interim President Italo Luder.

~~(S/NOFORN/WHINTEL)~~ On balance, the first alternative appears more likely because the military's principal complaints -- alleged government tolerance of and inaction against terrorism -- have been satisfied somewhat. Establishment of the National Defense and Internal Security Councils on 6 October to deal

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with subversion seems to have placated some officers who have advocated action against the Peron leadership. Furthermore, the armed Forces now have the authority they have long wanted to press the struggle against terrorism, handled in the past mainly by federal police. ~~(NSA 2 Declassify upon notification)~~
~~(originator)~~

SOURCES: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Emb Buenos Aires 6813 10 Oct 75 (S) and
3076 10 Oct 75 (S)

DIA FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424
CIA E.O. 13526 Section 3.5(c)

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PREPARED BY:
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