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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 28 DEC 2017 Authority: EO 13526

25 FEB 1975

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____

In reply refer to:

Declassify in Part: _____

1-21126/75

Reason: _____

MDR: 17 -M- 2061

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ELLSWORTH

SUBJECT: Visit of the Commander General, Argentina Navy -
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Admiral Emilio Eduardo MASSERA, Commander General of the Argentine Navy, is visiting the U.S. as the guest of Admiral Holloway during the period 23 to 28 February 1975. We have arranged for Admiral Massera to pay a courtesy call in your office 0930 to 1000 hours on 26 February. Attachment A is a listing of those who will accompany Admiral Massera to your office. Appropriate background material, summarized as follows, is provided in additional attachments.

1. Biographic Information - Admiral Massera has commanded the Argentine Navy since December 1973. His appointment by President Juan Domingo Peron forced the retirement of eight flag officers senior to him. He is highly respected by his Service, enjoys the most influential position with President Maria Estela Peron of the three Service Commanders, and is very well disposed toward the U.S. He has served in the U.S. as advisor to the Inter-American Defense Board and as a student at the Inter-American Defense College. His English is rated fair. (Bio at Attachment B).

2. Itinerary - Admiral Massera's schedule includes visits to the Norfolk Military Complex, the U.S.S. Leahy, Washington Navy Yard, the Pentagon, Arlington National Cemetery, and the United Nations. (Detailed itinerary at Attachment C).

3. MAP Grant Training - You will recall that MAP grant training for Argentina was suspended because of the involvement of Argentine flag vessels in trade with Cuba. We recently coordinated on a State paper designed to obtain a Presidential Determination to lift the sanctions. That paper is now stalled at State pending investigation of the possible involvement of Panamanian flag vessels in Cuba trade. It may become necessary to include Panama in the waiver request. At the present time, the suspension of MAP training for Argentina is still in effect. Such training as Argentina is receiving from the U.S. is via FMS cash and credit. No relief on grant training can be offered at this time. (Point Paper at Attachment D).

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333 Argentina

25 FEB 1975

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~~AS TWO YEAR ANNIVERSARY, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~

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4. Foreign Military Sales - Through a combination of more liberalized U.S. arms transfer policies and increased availability of FMS credit, Argentina is turning more to the United States for military hardware. Current requests and status are summarized at Attachment E.

5. R&D Cooperation - Over the past two years, concerted efforts on the part of Defense to establish formal programs of R&D cooperation between the U.S. and Argentine armed forces have failed to achieve the desired results. Our proposal for concluding a formal agreement for the mutual exchange of scientific and technical data, Defense-to-Defense, has been in staffing at State since June 1974. In the interim, the primary exchange has been the accomodation of visits to the U.S. by representatives of Argentina's Defense research and development complex. No substantive improvement to this matter can be offered to Admiral Massera at this time.

6. U.S. Military Group Manning - Because of increased terrorist activity in Argentina, manning in the Military Group was temporarily reduced from 29 to 20 in July 1974. DoD is on record as opposing any further reductions. At this time, any effort to reinstate positions temporarily vacated would be counterproductive.

In spite of problems on grant training and the lack of progress on R&D cooperation, U.S./Argentine military-to-military relationships are excellent at this time.

(SIGNED)

GEORGE M. WALLACE
Major General, USA
Director
Inter-American Region

Attachments
a/s

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25 February 1975

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-307-75
17 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: US Military Presence in Argentina (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ I have reviewed once again the question of US military presence in Argentina, including the recent tragic events in that country and the 13 March letter to you from Acting Secretary Ingersoll. In light of all the facts, my conclusion remains that reduction of US military strength below present levels is unjustified and would render the Group incapable of adequately performing its mission.
2. ~~(S)~~ After reviewing the reasons set forth by the Department of State, both in past efforts to reduce our posture and in Mr. Ingersoll's latest letter, I still find no compelling rationale for a further reduction of US military presence in Argentina.
3. ~~(S)~~ Many of Mr. Ingersoll's conclusions are based upon facts that may well pertain to other parts of our mission in Buenos Aires, but have limited, if any, application to the military. It has not been our interpretation of the messages coming from Argentina that the military have been singled out as being in a "high risk category." Our reading of the reports would indicate the reverse. The Defense Intelligence Agency, on assessments made from reports from the Attache Office in Buenos Aires, concurs in this assessment.
4. ~~(S)~~ The fact remains that the military is frequently called upon to accept high risk assignments as a necessary aspect of military service. For the United States military to retreat in the face of a terrorist threat would, in my opinion, cause a more serious breach in our military-to-military relations with the Argentines than the disservice done to the Ambassador by one department not reducing its complement proportionately. I continue to question whether the proper response, particularly the response by the US Armed Forces to a terrorist threat, is "to diminish the number of targets. . . ." Likewise, I cannot accept the conjecture that should a kidnapping or assassination of a US military officer or enlisted man in Argentina occur,

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
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it would evolve even greater diplomatic and political complications than a terrorist act against a US civilian because of the possible implications of a US military involvement in Argentina."

5. ~~(S)~~ Finally, while the technique of reducing the number of exposed targets may be useful as a countermeasure to an indiscriminate area threat, such as represented by a rocket attack, this measure is inappropriate for the type of threat posed in Argentina - the kidnapping of specifically targeted individuals.

6. ~~(S)~~ In summary, I recommend strongly that we not reduce the current military presence in Argentina.


GEORGE S. BROWN, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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