



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

#59

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

[Handwritten signature]

2 April 1982

ARGENTINIA

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Argentinian Invasion of Falkland Islands (U) --
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

~~(S)~~ The following points are in addition to the information in today's NID and on the attached memo:

1. I talked to Walt Stoessel to make sure we are in synchronization with what State and the White House are doing. As you probably have learned now, the President got in touch with Argentine President Galtieri yesterday trying to dissuade the Argentinians and consideration was also given to sending the Vice President. But apparently these initiatives were unsuccessful.

2. Tom Hayward who was on a tour to Latin America was told yesterday that there was going to be a landing, and therefore decided to leave Buenos Aires for Brazil. It is obviously the right decision that the CNO should not be visiting Argentina at this time.

3. I am concerned that this Argentinian action will make it more difficult for us to work with the Argentinians on Central American issues and to overcome Congressional opposition to IMET funding for Argentina. Also, there could be a spillover from the undoubtedly strong negative British reaction toward the Argentinians to the pervasive West European hostility toward our Central American policy. The left in Europe will be quick to make connection between Argentina and the governments that we happen to support in Central America. I feel, therefore, that we in DoD and the Services ought to use all our influence to reinforce the Administration's effort to dampen down this conflict.

4. We have to consider further steps, in particular whether to go ahead with General Allen's visit April 12 and your stop in Argentina last week of April.

Office of the Secretary of Defense *SV.S.C. § 552*
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: *28 DEC 2017* Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____ Fred *[Signature]* Ikle

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: _____

MDR: *17* -M- *2065*

Attachments
a/s

~~DECLASSIFY ON 2 APRIL 1982~~

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APR 2 1982
DEP SEC HAS SEEN

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

2 APR 82



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

2 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Preliminary Thoughts on DoD Role in Reaction to
Falklands Incident

~~(S)~~ 1. We should let State get out in front on the issue, because it's not going to end with both parties happy with the interlocutor. We at Defense (at least in ISA) have a peculiar interest in not irritating Argentina. In South America, finally, it is the military-to-military relationship that matters--not State to Foreign Ministries.

~~(S)~~ 2. We have some pressure points short of a Carlucci statement, or trip cancellation.

a. Admiral Hayward left Argentina ahead of schedule.

~~(S)~~ b. The Kirkpatrick dinner is being looked at by State // right now.

c. General Allen is slated to go to CONJEFAMER (this year in Argentina) on April 12, leaving here on the 10th.

We have the means for a graduated approach to the issue and we should use them, cautiously.

~~(S)~~ 3. The argument for a strong U.S. response to Argentina is that if we do it correctly (and we consult privately with Argentina about what we're doing and why), then we may strengthen our hand with Congress on Humphrey-Kennedy and benefit Argentina in the end.

~~(S)~~ One argument the other way is that we will get accused of trying to play policeman in the Western Hemisphere. Another is we will likely have no effect (a result of the Carter Administration proving to Argentina they can survive with U.S. disapproval), and the impression of U.S. impotence in its own backyard will be reinforced.


NOEL C. KOCH

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

~~Classified by PDASD/ISA~~
~~Declassify on 2 Apr 1998~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/02/82 13:55 CRT 8 L PAGE 1
FLASH -- ~~SECRET~~ -- GENSER MESSAGE -- 2055 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM CNO//BRAVO 005//, SSN 5 AT 02 1330Z APR82
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:
MARR NADN CCF2 ADM1 WEUL AIRR TMCH NSAR
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:
A015(1), B013(1), C014(1), D017(1),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
C9, DC9, USSR, RECCE, SOVMER, STAG AR, ARGENTINA,
FLASH CRITIC MESSAGE, GENSER TASKING TIPOFF,

DICTIONARY: C9, PROFILE:
72 138 202 244 316 408 606 688 823
NMIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
125-032566

CDSN = NSS366 MCN = 82092/02139 TOR = 820921354

EZ01:
ZTTSZYUW RUESBAA 0005 0921345-SSSS--RUEKDIC.

ZNY ~~SSSSSS~~

EZ02:
Z 0 021330Z APR 82 ZFF-6
FM CNO//BRAVO 005//
TO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC FLASH
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC/AT-7 IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/ADMIN CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

EZ03:
EZ04:
SUBJ: ARGENTINA SITUATION
EZ05:

ADM HAYWARD SENDS
1. ~~(C) (U)~~ ADM HAYWARD WAS RECEIVED BY ADM ANAYA, CINCARRCNAV AND
NAVAL MEMBER RULING JUNTA, AT 0825L THIS AM IN ARGNV HDQTRS BLDG
HERE IN BUENOS AIRES.
2. ~~(C) (U)~~ ADM ANAYA EXPLAINED SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:
A. AT 10 PM LOCAL LAST EVENING (1 APR) 70 ARGENTINE MARINES
(REFERRED TO AS COMMANDOS) LANDED SOUTH OF PORT STANLEY, MALVINAS
ISLAND (FALKLANDS).
B. AT 4 AM THIS MORNING THE GOVT RADIO STATION ON THE ISLAND
WAS SECURED.
C. AT 6 AM A BATTALION OF MARINES LANDED BY AMPHIBIOUS MEANS
NEAR PORT STANLEY (A BATT NORMALLY IS ABOUT 350). NAVATT ESTIMATES
WITH LST CABO SAN ANTONIO AND AVAILABLE LVTP-7 AMPHIBIOUS
VEHICLES ARG MARINE FORCE ASHORE COULD TOTAL MAX OF 300.
3. ~~(C) (U)~~ NO ADDITIONAL INFO WAS PROVIDED ON ACTION IN
MALVINAS BY ADM ANAYA. ADM EXPRESSED APOLOGIES THAT THIS
ACTION CAME DURING MY VISIT. HE ATTEMPTED TO LINK ARG ACTION
WITH THEIR ROLE IN COUNTERING THE PERCEIVED THREAT OF "SOVIETS"
IN THE REGION, REFERRING TO THEIR COUNT OF AN ESTIMATED 60
SOVIET FISHING TRAWLERS IN THE VICINITY OF THESE ISLANDS.
4. ~~(C) (U)~~ I INFORMED ADM ANAYA THAT REMAINDER OF MY VISIT WAS
CANCELLED AND THAT PLANS WERE INITIATED TO LEAVE FOR RIO DE
JANEIRO THIS AFTERNOON.
REVW ON 2 PARIL 2002

BT
EZ06:

ACTION TERM SVC(*) J3(*) (M)
INFO CJCS:(*) CJCS(*) NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) SJCS(*)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(*) OSD:ADMIN(*) USDP(**) NMIC(1)
AT-7(*) DB-3E(*) DB-5D(*) DIA(*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

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EZ07:

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

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a/s

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 28 2017

Fred L. Ikle

DECLASSIFIED ON 2 APRIL 1982

~~SECRET~~

APR 2 1982

DEP SEC HAS SEEN

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SEC DEF
HAS SEEN

APR 5 1982

2 April 1982

ARGENTINA

(2 APR 82)