

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#78  
-2 JUN 1982

SECRETARY *6*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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PRIORITY/ROUTINE  
P R 022113Z JUN 82

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3290  
BT

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS

Date: 15 NOV 2017 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 17 -M- 2081

+ 5 USC 552

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SANTIAGO 3272

FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER FROM AMBASSADOR THEBERGE

~~SECRET~~ (THEBERGE, J.D.) OR-M

TAGS: OVIP, PEPR, CI

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER'S REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: NOV 15 2017

REF: SANTIAGO 3269 (022049Z JUN 82)

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS NOTED IN REFTEL, FOREIGN MINISTER RENE ROJAS IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH SECRETARY HAIG AT 1515 HOURS JUNE 15 IN THE DEPARTMENT. HE ALSO WANTS TO MEET WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MEYER, AND OTHER RELEVANT DOD OFFICIALS ON OR ABOUT SAME DATE.

3. LTC JULIO CANESSA ROBERT, VICE CINC OF THE CHILEAN ARMY, WILL ACCOMPANY ROJAS. GENERAL MEYER IS PLANNING A TRIP TO CHILE AND BRAZIL IN THE JANUARY 6-20, 1983 PERIOD. THIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WILL PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR GENERALS CANESSA AND MEYER TO MEET AND EXCHANGE VIEWS PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S CHILEAN VISIT. WHILE THE VICE CINC IS SECOND IN COMMAND (THE PRESIDENT IS THE COMMANDER), HE IS IN EFFECT IN CHARGE. ASIDE FROM THE PRESIDENT, HE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL OFFICER IN THE ARMY.

4. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT A MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAS ALREADY BEEN REQUESTED BY THE CHILEAN EMBASSY. WE URGE THAT THE SECRETARY AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AGREE TO RECEIVE FOREIGN MINISTER ROJAS AND VICE CINC CANESSA ON OR ABOUT JUNE 15. THEY SHOULD PROBABLY BE SCHEDULED TO SEE MG WILLIAM DE CAMP, MG JOHN SIEGLE AND OTHERS YOU DEEM IMPORTANT. PLEASE ADVISE US OF SCHEDULED MEETINGS ASAP.

5. WE ARE PLANNING TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR THE ROJAS/CANESSA MEETINGS AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PART IN YOUR MEETING AS WELL AS OTHERS IN DOD. THEBERGE  
BT

ACTION SECDEF: (1)  
INFO SECDEF (9)

(M)

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-20066

MCN=82153/04606

TDR=82153/2140Z

TAD=82153/2142Z

CDSN=MAK260

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DSD  
Chile

(2 Jun 82)

SECRETARY	
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4 MAY 82

Security Relationship

Objective: To state Administration position on resuming a security relationship with Chile and briefly highlight steps taken.

(U) Developing a complete security relationship with Chile depends upon Presidential certification to remove the Kennedy Amendment restrictions.

(S) The Kennedy Amendment restriction dates from 1976. In 1980, 1980, in response to Letelier/Moffitt, the US withdrew its Military Group and excluded Chile from the UNITAS exercise. Chile has been able to buy planes and tanks from France, armored cars from Brazil, tanks and patrol boats from Israel, submarines from Germany, and surface ships from Britain, but its purchases come nowhere near matching those of Argentina. In addition, the Chilean domestic arms industry is much less developed.

(C) The US has resumed UNITAS and high level military visits. The first US/Chile joint staff talks were held in March in Washington. We have budgeted \$50,000 for IMET in FY83, dependent on certification. If we are able to go forward with certification the Chileans have an urgent need for spare parts and, probably, would also seek new arms purchases (more F-5s or an equivalent).

Points for Discussion: (U)

- The Reagan Administration wants to achieve full normalization of relations, including restoring a normal military-to-military relationship with Chile (strategic reasons).

-- US and Chilean foreign policies coincide on many points and we appreciate the support the Chilean Government frequently provides on important hemispheric and global issues.

- We hope to be able to make the certification required by legislation repealing the Kennedy Amendment, but a final decision has not been made. Frankly, the Letelier-Moffitt certification requirements are proving to be difficult ("appropriate steps" by "all legal means in Chile and the US" to bring to justice).

- If we are able to resume arms sales and IMET, they will of course be subject to the normal criteria, including the need to avoid contributing to arms races and to take into account human rights factors.

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Date: NOV 15 2017

CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, IA REGION  
DECLASSIFY ON: 9 April 1988

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 15 2017

Beagle Channel

Objective: To reinforce US position on Beagle Channel dispute, indicating our desire for peaceful resolution.

(S) This Chilean-Argentine issue is probably the focal point of Chilean concerns and, consequently, directly impacts on all bilateral issues with the US. The Chileans have the better legal case (as shown in 1977 arbitration), but the Argentines are unwilling and, at least for the foreseeable future, politically unable to accept it. Until there is a solution, the GOA appears determined to maintain its claimed rights by air and sea incursions. At some point, the Chileans may react with force even though Argentina has a significant military advantage.

(S) The Chileans want us to bring pressure on the Argentines to accept the Pope's proposal of December 1980. We do not have that kind of influence and, in fact, we think US pressure would be more likely to have the opposite effect on Argentine opinion and decision makers. About the most we can do is urge restraint on both sides (directed primarily at Argentina) and that they stick with the Papal mediation (directed mainly at Chile, which is tempted to go back to the World Court for a strictly legal ruling).

(S) The impact of the Argentine-UK dispute over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands on the Beagle Channel mediation is unknown at this time.

Points of Discussion: (U)

- We recognize the cooperation the Chilean Government has given to the Pope in trying to find a solution to the southern zone dispute with Argentina.

- Unfortunately, we have seen no indication the Argentine Government is willing or able to agree to the Pope's proposal of December 1980. (For specific points see TAB E-1)

- We continue to believe that the Papal mediation offers the best, perhaps only, hope of mutually acceptable solution; but that of course is a decision your government must make (i.e., whether to make resort to the World Court).

- We have urged the Argentine Government, in the interest of hemispheric peace and security, to do its utmost to achieve a prompt and satisfactory solution through the mediation.

- We hope that your government will continue to do the same.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 13 April 1998

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Biographic Sketch  
Fernando ZEGERS Santa Cruz

Served as Director General of Foreign Policy in the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs since July 1981. He is responsible for formulating and executing Chilean foreign policy directives relating to bilateral and multi-lateral issues. He entered the Chilean Foreign Service in 1963 and served as his country's UN representative in New York (1969-71) and Geneva (1975-78), and was recently Ambassador to Brazil (1978-81) and has headed all Chilean delegations to meetings of the Third Law of the Sea Conference.

Zegers' present position in the Foreign Ministry is somewhat akin to our Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. He is also one of Chile's foremost experts on Law of the Sea matters.

Zegers is not active in domestic politics in Chile. He is known for his willingness to negotiate. He speaks fluent accented English and some French. The Director General is described as intelligent, capable, self-confident, easy to talk with. He is accredited with the title of Ambassador.

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20 Apr 82

APR 20 1982  
POSSIBLE ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION  
DEP SEC HAS SEEN

- (U) Objective: To provide information on possible discussion topics at 20 April Chilean luncheon in honor of DepSecDef.

TOPICS:

(U) Visit to Chile:

- The US government is serious in its resolve to increase hemisphere security.
- The Administration desires to normalize relationships with Chile, including rebuilding a security assistance relationship.

FYI: Chileans may express interest in your spending an additional day in Chile.

(U) Presidential Certification: Due to Argentina-UK dispute, certification for either country is stalled.

- Possible legal problem with Chile (Letelier-Moffitt) may necessitate splitting Argentine and Chilean certifications.
- Certification issue is under review by USG (State and Justice) due to Letelier-Moffitt case, unknown when decision will be made.

(U) Argentina-UK Dispute: Chileans, maintaining neutrality, are worried about impact on Beagle Channel.

- Chilean forces, while reinforcing South, have avoided any provocative actions.
- Privately many Chileans hope Argentines will be defeated because a victory for them would set a bad precedent for other border disputes in Latin America.
- US role seen as crucial (Chile realizes delicate US balancing position).
- US is attempting to adhere to bilateral agreements with both countries and avoiding favoring one over the other.

(U) Beagle Channel: Focal point of Chilean concerns.

- Still being mediated by Pope.
- Argentina has not accepted Pope's proposal; Chile has.
- Argentine-UK dispute impacts on issue.
- US supports Papal mediation efforts to peacefully resolve Beagle Channel issues.

CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, IA REGION  
DECLASSIFY ON: 19 April 1988

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CHILE

20 APR 82

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(S) Security Relationship: Ambassador may surface resumption of USMILGP in Chile.

- Pulled out due to Letelier-Moffitt case.
- Unless certification goes forward, no real need for a military assistance unit in Chile.
- Resumption of USMILGP is dependent upon Presidential Certification and reinitiation of security assistance. Administration has proposed \$50K in IMET for FY83, subject to certification.

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Date: NOV 15 2017

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## TOAST

Mr. Ambassador, distinguished guests:

Thank you for your kind words and for the honor of this occasion. I am now doubly enthusiastic over my visit to Chile next week after experiencing your wonderful hospitality today.

My trip to Chile and other South American nations represents, Mr. Ambassador, a concrete expression of this Administration's determination to strengthen ties with our neighbors in the Hemisphere. This is especially relevant for the Department of Defense, since military relations, which had in many places been allowed to deteriorate, are essential to preserving the security with which this Hemisphere has long been blessed.

The Administration has clearly and consistently expressed its intention to restore normal relations with Chile. There are, as you know, still obstacles, but these and the others we have faced in recent years, are small beside the long and close friendship that unites our nations.

I ask you, therefore, to join me in a toast to this friendship between Chile and the United States, in the confidence that it will endure and flourish.

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