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SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 22 2017

27 JAN 1975

In reply refer to:
I-780/75

#84

MEMORANDUM FOR Under Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C)
Assistant to the Secretary (AE)
Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency

SUBJECT: Report to the President

Attached is a memorandum received from Ambassador Hoffacker on 22 January 1975 (Tab A). It requests comment/concurrence on an accompanying draft report to the President on the activities of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

Your comments/concurrence on the draft response to Ambassador Hoffacker (Tab B) by 1000 hours, 29 January 1975, would be appreciated. Telephone replies directly to Major Naftzinger (extension 76645) of my office are acceptable.

*signed by
Ellsworth*

Attachments 2
a/s

cc: Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Director, Joint Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA)
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Distribution: Xerox Cy with attachment to each addressee
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Chron

Prepared by: Maj J.E. Naftzinger, USA
OASD(ISA)PD/NAC, X76645/eg
24 Jan 75
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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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
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27 Jan 1975



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

TAB A

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS January 20, 1975

Date: DEC 22 2017

To: Members of and Participants in the Working
Group/Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

From: Lewis Hoffacker, Chairman of the Working Group/
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism *LH*

Subject: Report to the President

You will recall that the Presidential mandate setting up our Committee and Working Group specified that there would be periodic progress reports. The last report was made when my predecessor departed, June 27, 1973.

I propose submitting the attached sequel to Secretary Kissinger as soon as possible. May I therefore have your comments within the next week? Please pass them by phone or in writing to John Gatch or myself by Wednesday, January 29.

Since the report is for the President, it must be kept brief. Moreover, I have noted in the report that the President can expect to receive more detailed accounts of your programs through the normal department and agency channels. What I have tried to do is to hit the high points and to leave the detail for individual agency reporting. But please bring to my attention any big programs or emphases which I may have overlooked.

Attachment:

Draft Memorandum for the President

S/CCT:LHoffacker:ijg

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Combatting Terrorism.

In his September 25, 1972, memorandum establishing the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, President Nixon requested periodic progress reports. There follows a resume of the work of the Committee since the latest report on June 27, 1973.

The Committee itself has been convened only at its installation. There has been no compelling reason to convene it further since its 10 statutory Cabinet-level members are kept fully informed by its dynamic Working Group, which is in close contact as issues arise and incidents occur. The Working Group now includes as participants 10 additional agencies which cooperate in seeking "the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad," to use the language of the original mandate.

For working purposes, we consider terrorism as violent attacks by politically motivated or mentally disturbed individuals or groups against innocent bystanders who fall under our protective responsibility. We are concerned primarily with protection of Americans at home and abroad and with foreign officials and dependents in this country. But since this is a global problem requiring international remedies, we as a government assume an international leadership role in pursuit of multilateral remedies. At the same time, the Committee watches violence in this country through the eyes of the FBI, the Department of Transportation,

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and other domestic agencies and is particularly alert to any domestic cases with international terrorist potential.

Individual departments and agencies continue to manage programs dealing with terrorism under their respective mandates. Therefore this paper will concentrate on the essentially coordinating role of the Cabinet Committee/Working Group, which ensures that these programs are fully dovetailed and that government-wide resources focusing on this problem are used to best advantage.

The emphasis remains on prevention and on diplomacy, but the Cabinet Committee/Working Group is also prepared to cope with emergencies. I am convinced that this bureaucratic innovation has, over the past two and a half years, reduced the risk to our people and is well worth continuing.

A. Continuing Programs at Home

You will have received reports through the traditional channels on the performance of individual departments in the counter-terrorism field. The following essentially domestic programs are however worth highlighting:

-- The Department of Transportation/FAA, in cooperation with other agencies, refine the counter-terrorism controls in effect at airports and on airliners, which along with the bilateral agreement with Cuba have effectively discouraged domestic hijacking.

-- The Department of State has created a new position of Security Coordinator, who will ensure that protection of

foreign officials and installations is optimum. He will work closely with the Secret Service, the Executive Protective Service, and the Department of State as they provide supplemental protection to that which is furnished by local authorities.

-- The FBI is the primary source of intelligence on domestic violence and assumes primary responsibility should an act of terrorism occur involving foreign officials and installations and requiring a Federal response.

-- The Department of Justice monitors Public Law 92-539 which specifies Federal criminal offenses for various acts against foreign officials, thus supplementing legal protection customarily provided under local jurisdictions.

-- Visa, immigration, and customs procedures remain tight. A deeper screening of visa applicants of Arab origin has shown some useful results. Japanese applicants have been given special attention following the seizure of hostages in the French Embassy in Holland by Japanese Red Army terrorists.

-- The FBI, the Secret Service, and the Department of State are training negotiators and other professionals for use in hostage situations.

-- All Departments concerned, including the Washington Metropolitan Police Department (which cooperates with the Working Group), are agreed on guidelines to be used in domestic incidents with international ramifications. The Philippine Embassy incident of November saw an effective

initiation of these guidelines, which have been refined since then.

-- The AEC and Defense have tightened safeguards designed to forestall terrorist seizure of nuclear materials on the civilian and military sides respectively.

-- The Postal Service operates a well-tested surveillance for letter bombs and has developed good international connections.

B. International Efforts

We seek wherever possible to inspire the broadest multi-lateral consensus in responding firmly to international terrorists. Ideally, if governments will agree on arrest or extradition of such offenders, terrorists will find that the price for their crimes will be intolerable and they will desist. Unfortunately most countries do not show the firmness or political will which the US manifests in standing up to terrorist threats and in too many cases find reasons to permit the terrorist to get away and to strike another day. Nevertheless, there are hopeful signs -- such as new firmness of Mexico, Santo Domingo, Algeria, and even the PLO in some cases of international terrorism -- which gives us hope that common sense will eventually prevail and international terrorists will be restrained in the process. In any event, it is important that the US continue to set the best example and to show the right sort of leadership internationally in the face of this continuing challenge. Some areas of activity which we support:

-- Under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), three international conventions have been adopted calling for arrest or extradition or aerial saboteurs.

.. Regrettably two joint conferences in Rome in the summer of 1973 were unable to agree on sanctions against countries which violated this principle. The ICAO Council in Montreal, however, continues its quiet and good work in improving airport and airline technical security.

-- While we failed in 1972 to achieve agreement at the UN on a convention to outlaw the export of violence from one country to another, the General Assembly in December, 1973, agreed on the principle of arrest or extradition of terrorists who struck at diplomats. The climate at the 1974 General Assembly was such that no profitable initiative in the terrorism field was feasible. We are therefore obliged to await a change in that climate before attempting new initiatives there.

-- Our delegates to INTERPOL over the years have achieved what was possible in that essentially police and judicial organization to track down terrorists.

-- Members of the Cabinet Committee/Working Group cooperate with the International Association of Chiefs of Police in a wide variety of counter-terrorist matters.

-- NATO has been hesitant to engage in counter-terrorism, largely because of divergences over Middle East policies, but the US has taken initiatives regularly to attempt to overcome this unrealistic reluctance.

-- The Department of State engages in steady bilateral diplomacy to supplement multilateral affects to convince governments that they should stand together or they will hang separately. State also makes demarches to a wide variety of governments in cases where leniency toward terrorists can only foster new terrorism. We have, e.g., been firm with the Sudanese and Egyptians in the matter of the terrorists who killed our Ambassador and his Deputy in Khartoum in March, 1973.

-- CIA plays an important role in collecting and analyzing intelligence abroad and in maintaining appropriate liaison with friendly foreign services in this field. CIA and NSA are indispensable, as is FBI domestically, in intelligence support of task force operations.

-- The Department of Transportation/FAA have offered a variety of technical assistance to foreign governments to help improve their airport and airline security. The FAA school at Oklahoma City is but one opportunity for foreigners in this program.

-- AID's Office of Public Safety has accomplished a great deal of good over the years in the counter-terrorism field with its programs abroad and in this country for foreign police administrators. This Office was abolished by the last Congress.

-- Businessmen with overseas interests have been in mild panic in such areas as Latin America, where they are often terrorists' targets. State's Coordinator for Combatting

Terrorism has made a special effort to share with such Americans techniques, intelligence, and counsel which can reduce the risk to these individuals.

-- Following the murder of our diplomats in the Sudan, Congress was asked for special funds for additional personnel and materials to better security at our diplomatic and consular posts. \$19.6 million was appropriated and has been disbursed to the most needy posts.

C. Policy and Tactics

Our principal desire is to deter a terrorist from striking by placing legal, physical, or other barriers before him. Should he strike, we seek to apprehend him and ensure that he pays a sufficiently high penalty to discourage other potential terrorists.

In a hostage situation, our primary objective is to secure the safe return of the hostages. Collaterally we seek to apprehend the terrorist(s). This is easier said than done since in some instances we may be obliged to acquiesce to the terrorist's freedom in return for the safety of the hostages. In order to facilitate the decision-making in such instances, the Cabinet Committee/Working Group have included in their operational guidelines probable demands of terrorists at home and abroad, various options with pros and cons, and certain recommended actions. The thorny problems of monetary ransom (the US has not paid ransom for release of its personnel), release of prisoners, and amnesty for terrorists are reviewed in those guidelines in the interest

of facilitating the excruciating, and often life-and-death, decisions which must be made in hostage situations.

On the management side, all departments and agencies have improved their task force and other procedures for emergency actions connected with kidnappings, hijackings, and other terrorist actions. These procedures are kept under continuing review and constitute yet another deterrent to terrorists. By prompt and effective management of hostage situations, we hopefully can overcome terrorists by one device or another.

Handling of publicity is an important element in any counter terrorism program. In a rescue operation, the task force commander sees to it that the media receive such information which does not jeopardize his operation or further endanger the fragile security of the hostages. In the longer run, the various agencies in their public relations roles attempt to place the terrorist in his proper context -- terrorists are not heroes but rather criminals who strike at innocent bystanders, political passion no matter how deeply held cannot be justification for killing innocents, and governments have a continuing and overriding obligation to safeguard the most fundamental right of all -- the right of life.

D. Continuing Concerns

I regret to report that the outlook is not bright for an early termination of representative incidents such as are listed in the attachment. Our primary concerns:

-- Terrorist groups and individuals of different nationalities are working more closely together, are moving farther and farther afield, including toward North America, and are generally amply financed by ransoms collected or by governments which for one reason or other are sympathetic toward certain terrorist groups.

--- As progress is made toward a political settlement in the Middle East, there remain so-called rejectionists who wish to sabotage that progress and to kill Arabs and others seeking a settlement. These rejectionists often receive encouragement if not support from Iraq and Libya.

-- While the PLO and its more moderate supporters have disavowed foreign terrorist operations except for Israel or Israelis, this does not preclude continuing raids in Israel, which in turn triggers sharp Israeli reaction in kind and further cycles of violence, particularly across the Israel-Lebanon frontier.

-- Terrorists benefit from improved technology, including communications and weaponry. We have attempted to restrain the Soviets and the Syrians from making a portable surface-to-air missile (SA-7) available to Fedayeen groups who might allow this weapon to be diverted to use against civilian airliners as was the case in Rome in the winter of 1973.

-- In Latin America, where kidnapping is endemic, there have been epidemics of this extremism from time to time. Argentina gives us particular concern as our people are periodically targetted in the terrorist process. The recent kidnapping in Managua of members of the Nicaraguan establishment causes us to fear repetition of that atrocity even in countries where security is considered to be good.

-- Our vigilance has spared the US many of the atrocities which we see committed abroad, but international terrorist threats continue to aim at the US. The bombs in Manhattan during Mrs. Golda Meir's 1973 visit, the letter bomb at the British Embassy in August, 1973, and the murder of an Israeli Military Attache in July, 1973, were all believed to be of foreign origin and are dramatic reminders that international terrorists have already arrived. Moreover the Patty Hearst case and others contained an international potential and illustrated the possibility of domestic and foreign terrorist groups' collaborating operationally.

-- Last but not least, there seems to be no shortage of political, economic, and social frustrations to spawn terrorists on all continents.

B. Priority Areas of Concentrated Effort

Appreciating as we do the importance of preventing terrorism as opposed to an after-the-event response, all agencies and departments have concentrated on improving their intelligence and their standard operating procedures for dealing with this phenomenon. More specifically:

-- Research is given high priority. State and Defense have hired the RAND Corporation to prepare a Confidential study to advise on the optimum management of hostage situations. Four or five agencies, including LEAA, are collaborating in a study to determine where municipal and international law may permit additional legal deterrents against terrorists. We are examining the possible utility of independent research to ensure that all possible gaps are being filled with counter-measures against terrorists who may wish to employ nuclear or biological-chemical weapons. The AEC has hired a consultant agency to help refine their safeguard procedures. Defense has engaged a firm of consultants to analyze the political dynamics of Palestinian terrorist movements.

-- Justice continues to monitor Federal and other legal protection of foreign officials to ensure that prosecution is vigorous and that terrorists are deterred by efficient law enforcement in pending cases.

-- We remain gravely concerned over the gaps in the security screen surrounding foreign officials and installations in this country and have presented various recommendations to the White House calling for increased resources to supplement the traditional local protection accorded our foreign guests. Of particular concern is New York City, where it is imperative that we do something more and soon to supplement the good work the New York City Police, who have done

remarkably well in such situations as the Arafat visit.

Other communities also deserve limited support.

-- On the Hill, we continue to press for implementing legislation on the UN Convention for the Protection of Diplomats as well as for/^asimilar convention adopted in the OAS.

-- The Treasury and Transportation Departments, with State participation, are attempting to devise a joint program which would mechanically examine both incoming and outgoing hold baggage.

-- FAA is considering regulations which would impose on foreign airlines serving this country the same restrictions on security of hand baggage and persons boarding their incoming and outgoing aircraft as prevail with domestic US airlines.

-- State is preparing a major revision of its task force procedures for dealing with overseas kidnappings of official and unofficial Americans.

The challenge of international terrorism is still great and we have no choice but to meet it. Some countries lack the political will to face up to it and choose instead to transfer the problem to the international community. We set the opposite example -- firmness with terrorists while at the same time compassion for the hostages, a responsive system which removes legitimate grievances, collaboration with other nations to find the broadest international consensus to counter the continuing threat, and improvement of management and other techniques to outwit or to overcome the terrorist.

The Cabinet Committee/Working Group is unique among governments as a mechanism for coping with terrorism. There is no danger that the Committee/Group will rest on its several laurels. On the contrary, its membership is the first to admit that there remains much we can and should do to cope with this continuing problem. This report outlines the course which is charted for so doing.

Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman of the Cabinet
Committee

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Attachment:

Representative Incidents, July, 1973, to the Present

REPRESENTATIVE INCIDENTS, JULY, 1973, TO PRESENT

(Perpetrators in Parentheses)

ABROAD

July 20-24, 1973 - Hijacking of a JAL airliner out of Amsterdam.

(PFLP and Japanese Red Army)

September 5, 1973 - Terrorists caught with Russian-made SAM's at Rome airport. (3 Arabs subsequently freed)

September 5, 1973 - Seizure of 13 hostages in the Saudi Arabia Embassy, Paris. (Probably Iraqi-based terrorists)

October 18-19, 1973 - Killing of an American and others in attack on Bank of America office in Beirut. (Shibbu gang)

November 25, 1973 - Hijacking of KLM plane out of Beirut.

(Arab National Youth Organization)

December 6, 1973 - Seizure of EXXON executive Samuelson in Argentina; he was released over 3 months later after payment of high ransom. (Leftist guerrillas ERP)

December 17, 1973 - Massacre of 31 Americans and others in a Pan Am plane at Rome airport. (Arab "rejectionists")

December 29, 1973 - Apprehension of an American, a Moroccan and a Palestinian at London airport with arms apparently intended for terrorist purposes.

January 31, 1974 - Seizure of a ferry after attack on an oil refinery in Singapore harbor and subsequent seizure of the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. (PFLP and Japanese Red Army)

February 3, 1974 - Seizure of a Greek ship in Karachi harbor. (Muslim International guerrillas)

March 4, 1974 - Hijacking of a British Airways plane out of Beirut. (Arab National Youth Organization)

March 22, 1974 - Disappearance of US Vice Consul John Patterson in Hermosillo and his subsequent murder. (Bobby Keesee, US citizen, is standing trial in San Diego for this murder)

April 12, 1974 - Kidnapping of USIA officer Alfred Laun in Cordoba, Argentina. (Argentine terrorist organization ERP)

May 8, 1974 - Bombing of USIS office in Beirut. (Shibbu group)

August 14, 1974 - Explosion of a bomb at the US pavilion at the Damascus International Fair. (Arab Communist Organization)

September 8, 1974 - Crash of TWA plane in the Aegean as a result of an explosion in the baggage compartment.

September 11, 1974 - Hostages associated with Tenneco were released after detention for months in Ethiopia. (Eritrean Liberation Front terrorists)

September 13, 1974 - Detention of the French Ambassador and others in the French Embassy in The Hague. (Japanese Red Army)

September 27, 1974 - Kidnapping of USIA official Barbara Hutchison and others in Santo Domingo. (Dissident Dominican Republic group)

October 11, 1974 - Bomb explosion at Beirut office of the First National Bank of Chicago. (Arab Communist Organization)

November 10, 1974 - Bomb explosion at the UN Information Center Bookstore, Los Angeles. (Possibly Jewish Defense League)

November 14, 1974 - Molotov cocktail attack on American Embassy Tokyo. (Marxist Youth League)

November 21, 1974 - Holding of American and other hostages on board a British Airways plane in Tunis.

December 28, 1974 - Detention of American and other hostages in Managua. (Anti-government Sandinistas)

January 13 and 19, 1975 - Two attacks at Orly airport with 10 hostages held in the second one. (Anti-PLO group Mohammed Bandia Commandoes)

DOMESTIC

July 1, 1973 - Murder of an Israeli Military Attache in Bethesda. (Probable Arab terrorist connection)

July 11, 1973 - Splattering of paint on newly opened Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. (Jewish Defense League)

August 27, 1973 - Letter bomb in the British Embassy maiming A British employee. (Probably IRA)

February 22, 1974 - Aborted hijacking of Delta plane at Friendship airport. (A loner who was killed in the incident)

May 22, 1974 - Delivery of an explosive device to the Peruvian Embassy, Washington.

July 23, 1974 - Pipe bomb explosion at the French Military Mission, Washington.

November 8, 1974 - Holding of the Philippine Ambassador and his aide by a terrorist. (Napoleon Lechoco, who is standing trial)

November 9, 1974 - Bomb in Pan American Union building, Washington. (Probably anti-Castro elements)

December 5, 1974 - Threat to kidnap the daughter of the Dutch Ambassador to the UN. (Estranged husband of the Ambassador's maid)

December 6, 1974 - Assault on a receptionist at the Soviet UN Mission. (New York resident)

December 14 and 16, 1974 - Latest in a series of explosions in Miami against two cruise lines serving the Bahamas.

(Anti-Castro FLNC)

December 25, 1974 - Gate crasher at the White House. (Possibly mentally disturbed Washington resident)

January 13, 1975 - Invasion of the Indian Mission to the UN.

January 19, 1975 - Firing into the Ukrainian Mission to the UN. (Possibly Jewish Defense League)

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TAB B

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS HOFFACKER, CHAIRMAN OF THE WORKING
GROUP/CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

SUBJECT: Report to the President

I concur in your draft memorandum for the President, and recommend
the following additions:

Line 9, page 3 after the words "...Federal response." add the
sentence: "Pursuant to an agreement with the Attorney General, the
Department of Defense is providing assistance to the FBI in the form
of equipment loans and training support."

Third paragraph, line 2, page 1 insert "or threats" between "attacks"
and "by."

Dwayne S. Anderson
Deputy Director
Negotiations and Arms Control

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Assistant Secretary of Defense (C)
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Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency

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Robert Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Attachments 2
a/s

cc: Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Director, Joint Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA)
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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