snowflake

INFO
B 4/2
0900

January 31, 2002 1:41 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Canada to GTMO

I have told Condi that the Canadians can send someone down to GTMO.

I think we ought to let coalition people go down if they want to, not for consular reasons but just to see what is going on and get briefed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013102-7

Please respond by 02/06/02

38316

31 Jan 02

U13235 /02

snowflake

RETION
to 02
0905

January 31, 2002 1:41 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ICRC Report

Your memo indicates that the final report of the ICRC will be given to the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland.

If that is the case, we have to make sure that we know when that is, we get a copy of it, the U.S. Mission knows how to handle it and not make it public, and we have an understanding as to who is going to get to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013102-6

080

Please respond by 02/08/02

31 Jan 02

U13236 /02

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

October 22, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Interoperability & Connectivity

As the battlefield becomes increasingly complex, the transformation of our nation's military is dependent upon joint operations with assured interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. One of the keys to achieving this capability is the acquisition of a joint command and control "system of systems" net-centric capability.

We are not structured to facilitate the "organizing, training and equipping" of joint capabilities. To address this problem, I am directing that the Joint Staff and JFCOM co-lead the development of a plan, in conjunction with AT&L, C3I, the Services, and SOCOM, with options to address this issue. The plan should address organizational and other (e.g., process/policy, such as requirements generation) considerations, associated timelines, and recommended options.

Options should include, but not be limited to, (a) creation of an agency which would address, fund and implement aspects of battle management command and control (BMC2) interoperability and connectivity; and (b) allocation of money directly to all Combatant Commanders to buy "joint" BMC2 systems; and (c) authority and allocation of money directly to JFCOM to buy "joint" BMC2 systems to support combatant commanders.

I would like this plan to be briefed to me within 25 days, along with a proposed set of specific actions to implement the recommended option. The OSD point of contact for this is Mr. Michael Wynne, PDUSD(AT&L).

311 CCC

22 OCT 02

cc:
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)
COMMANDER, US JOINT FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

U13244-02

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SECDEF HAS SEEN 2002

ACTION MEMO

2002

August 29, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Pete Aldridge, USD(AT&L) Paul Wolfowitz for ECA.

SUBJECT: Interoperability & Connectivity

- You asked me to draft a directive letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead the development of a plan to address joint operations with assured interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. (see June 20 snowflake, attached.)
- One of the keys to achieving this capability is the acquisition of a joint command and control "system of systems" net-centric capability.
- The letter directs the Chairman to consider options to achieve this capability, to include: (1) creation of an agency which would address, fund and implement aspects of battle management command and control (BMC2) interoperability and connectivity; and (2) allocation of money directly to the JFCOM/Combatant Commanders to buy "joint" BMC2 systems.
- Letter requests that the plan be briefed to you within 90 days along with a proposed set of specific actions to implement the recommended option.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign letter

COORDINATION: Done-Attached

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Michael Wynne, (b)(6)

9/10
SECDEF - Recommend you sign, to get it going. Have discussed with Cambone. He thinks JFCOM is a better study lead than Joint Staff. I raised that with Aldridge. He agrees JFCOM will play a big role, but thinks JOINT STAFF needs to lead.
DiRita

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/10
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	9/16
MA BUCCI	9/16
EXECSEC WHITMORE	9/20

11-L-0559/OSD/10843

U13244 02

U13244/02

ADM G 10/8
CORRECTIONS

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Interoperability & Connectivity

As the battlefield becomes increasingly complex, the transformation of our nation's military is dependent upon joint operations with assured interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. One of the keys to achieving this capability is the acquisition of a joint command and control "system of systems" net-centric capability.

We are not structured to facilitate the "organizing, training and equipping" of joint capabilities. To address this problem, I am directing that the Joint Staff and JFCOM co-lead the development of a plan, in conjunction with AT&L, C3I, the Services, ~~JFCOM~~ and SOCOM, with options to address this issue. The plan should address organizational and other (e.g., process/policy, such as requirements generation) considerations, associated timelines, and recommended options.

Options should include, but not be limited to, (a) creation of an agency, ~~reporting to the Joint Staff,~~ which would address, fund and implement aspects of battle management command and control (BMC2) interoperability and connectivity; and (b) allocation of money directly to ~~the JFCOM/~~Combatant Commanders to buy "joint" BMC2 systems; and 3) all authority + allocation of money directly to JFCOM to buy "joint" BMC2 systems to support combatant Commanders.

I ~~ask that~~ would like to this plan be briefed to me within ~~90~~ 25 days, along with a proposed set of specific actions to implement the recommended option. The OSD point of contact for this is Mr. Michael Wynne, PDUSD(AT&L).

cc:
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)
COMMANDER, US JOINT FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

11-L-0559/OSD/10844

SPD 10/9

United States Joint Forces Command

MEMORANDUM Date 10/8/1915

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command

To: LTGEN CRADDOCK

John –
Here is the markup I recommend.
I'm working closely with Mike Wynne so he as the OSD POC is fine.
Ready to execute.
J

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 16 2002

ACTION MEMO

August 29, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Pete Aldridge, USD(AT&L) Paul Wolfowitz for PA

SUBJECT: Interoperability & Connectivity

- You asked me to draft a directive letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead the development of a plan to address joint operations with assured interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. (see June 20 snowflake, attached.)
- One of the keys to achieving this capability is the acquisition of a joint command and control "system of systems" net-centric capability.
- The letter directs the Chairman to consider options to achieve this capability, to include: (1) creation of an agency which would address, fund and implement aspects of battle management command and control (BMC2) interoperability and connectivity; and (2) allocation of money directly to the JFCOM/Combatant Commanders to buy "joint" BMC2 systems.
- Letter requests that the plan be briefed to you within 90 days along with a proposed set of specific actions to implement the recommended option.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign letter

COORDINATION: Done-Attached

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Michael Wynne, (b)(6)

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SECDEF - Recommend you sign, to get it going. Have discussed with Gambone. He thinks JFCOM is a better study lead than JOINT STAFF. I raised that with Aldridge. He agrees JFCOM will play a big role, but thinks JOINT STAFF needs to lead.
DiRita

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/10
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	9/16
MA BUCCI	9/16
EXECSEC WHITMORE	9/20

113744/02

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

have
See me
D

Ask Ed G
why he thinks
Still to lead.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Interoperability & Connectivity

As the battlefield becomes increasingly complex, the transformation of our nation's military is dependent upon joint operations with assured interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. One of the keys to achieving this capability is the acquisition of a joint command and control "system of systems" net-centric capability.

We are not structured to facilitate the "organizing, training and equipping" of joint capabilities. To address this problem, I am directing that the Joint Staff lead the development of a plan, in conjunction with AT&L, C3I, the Services, JFCOM and SOCOM, with options to address this issue. The plan should address organizational and other (e.g., process/policy, such as requirements generation) considerations, associated timelines, and recommended options.

Absolutely not

Options should include, but not be limited to, (a) creation of an agency, ~~reporting to the Joint Staff~~, which would address, fund and implement aspects of battle management command and control (BMC2) interoperability and connectivity; and (b) allocation of money directly to the JFCOM/Combatant Commanders to buy "joint" BMC2 systems.

would like

I ~~ask that~~ this plan be briefed to me within ~~90~~ 25 days, along with a proposed set of specific actions to implement the recommended option. The point of contact for this is Mr. Michael Wynne, PDUSD(AT&L).

Ed Gordon

cc:
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)
COMMANDER, US JOINT FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

July 22, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
John Stenbit
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 16 2002

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Interoperability and Connectivity

You asked for my thoughts on how we can accomplish "interoperability and connectivity" and had some specific questions. Unfortunately, there is no short answer to your questions.

1. "Have we defined what those words mean..."? *Interoperability* is defined by Joint Publication (JP)-01, as "ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together." In plain English, it is the ability to conduct seamless joint and combined operations, requires system of systems integration and depends on connectivity. *Connectivity* is defined by JP3-18 as the "ability to exchange information by electronic means."

2. "Have we defined how deep it must be if we are going to have joint operations? We have several initiatives that require joint interoperability and connectivity down to the tactical level. In the basic area of connectivity, we are acquiring equipment like the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) which incorporates adaptable software that will permit a single radio to communicate with a variety of legacy and future users, and the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) that allows communications and data exchange with a variety of airborne and ground elements, including these of our major allies.

We are working on improving the interoperability of our legacy forces. We have told the Services that legacy forces that are not fully interoperable by 2008 are candidates for phase out. We do not need to improve every system, but there are some which are critical to "joint and coalition warfare."

3. "My impression is that each of the Services is still trying to get its own situational awareness based on its approach." While this is true to a degree, there are several joint interoperability initiatives to ensure shared situational awareness among the Services, down to the tactical level. These include the Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP), a multi-Service effort which includes both blue and red force situational awareness, the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), and the Single Integrated Ground Picture (SIGP), also multi-Service efforts. Additionally, there are several related joint

11-L-0559/OSD/10848

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators (ACTDs) aimed at providing secure connectivity and information assurance for the Combatant Commanders.

4. "JROC supposedly is doing this." The JROC approved improvements to the Global Command and Control System/Common Operating Picture (GCCS/COP) which provides top level situational awareness, as well as, the AT&L-initiated FIOP effort, and the SIAP initiative. The SIGP effort was recently initiated by AT&L with Army leadership and will be reviewed by the JROC. Additionally, the JROC has been working in conjunction with AT&L to develop a recommendation on an Executive Agent for DoD for all Blue Force tracking. However, appropriate resources and management for such joint initiatives have been inadequate as Services have been focusing on their respective priorities.

The fundamental problem I see needing resolution is that there is no Title 10 responsibility for the acquisition of "joint" systems. The Military Departments have their Title 10 responsibility for the "organize, train and equip" of the equipment and support systems associated with their individual missions (tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.) If we want to develop and acquire a "joint" command and control system to integrate capabilities, there is no organization responsible or accountable. That is the problem you detected.

We have tried to fix this, in some ways, by assigning an Executive Agent responsibility to a single Service (e.g. "space" to the Air Force). This doesn't work very well because a given Service does not like to "pay" for a capability used by another Service for free. We can continue to accept this deficiency, or we can establish an organization to exercise Title 10 responsibility for "joint" systems, in this critical area, and provide that organization the resources to carry it out.

5. Recommendation. Direct the development of a plan to resolve this problem. One option would be to allocate money directly to the combatant CINCs to buy "joint' systems. Another option might call for the creation of a Battle Management and Command and Control Agency, reporting to the Joint Staff, which would address, fund and implement interoperability and connectivity.

The development of such a plan, with specific organizational options should be led by Lt. Gen. Cartwright (J-8) and include members from ASD(C3I) and AT&L, as well as the Military Departments and JFCOM. We should also have members from SOCOM, who do acquire some of their own unique "joint" equipment.

Action: Draft Directive Letter DR See me_____.

11-L-0559/OSD/10849

snowflake

June 20, 2002 12:10 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Interoperability and Connectivity

Have we defined what those words mean and how deep it must be if we are going to have joint operations? My impression is that each of the Services is still trying to get its own situational awareness based on its approach.

JROC supposedly is doing this. I wonder if we should tell Joint Forces Command to see that it gets done, and if it isn't done, we should get reports on it.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-19

Please respond by 07/19/02

snowflake

June 20, 2002 12:10 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsf

SUBJECT: Interoperabilit

9/10

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

USD (AT&L)

Have we defined what those ... we are going to have joint operations? My ... s still trying to get its own situational awa

JROC supposedly is doing thi ... s Command to see that it gets done, and if

Pete -
Would JFCOM or C3I be better than Joint Staff?
Dick

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-19

9/10

Please respond by 07/1

11-L-0559/OSD/10851

U13244

snowflake

June 20, 2002 12:10 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Interoperability and Connectivity

322

Have we defined what those words mean and how deep it must be if we are going to have joint operations? My impression is that each of the Services is still trying to get its own situational awareness based on its approach.

JROC supposedly is doing this. I wonder if we should tell Joint Forces Command to see that it gets done, and if it isn't done, we should get reports on it.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 23 2002

DHR:dh
062002-19

Please respond by 07/19/02

7/22

Aldridge response attached

V/R
Ed

20JUN02

11-L-0559/OSD/10852 U13245 /02

July 22, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
John Stenbit
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Interoperability and Connectivity

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11-L-0559/OSD/10853

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators (ACTDs) aimed at providing secure connectivity and information assurance for the Combatant Commanders.

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Action: Draft Directive Letter_____ See me_____.

11-L-0559/OSD/10854

snowflake

7/26 0930

July 25, 2002 12:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Congressional Breakfast

We should have invited three times the number of people we did to that breakfast this morning and had twice the number of people there. If we are going to invest an hour, we ought to have a bigger crowd than that.

Second, we had more people from DoD there than there were Members of Congress by about two to one. We should cut down on that number of people and increase the number of Members.

Next, Powell, you have to keep an absolute list of every human being who has received the WMD briefing and heard the concept. I want to see it, and I want to end up making sure that we have either briefed every Member of the Senate and every Member of the House or we have invited each of the ones who have not been briefed at least three times.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072502-8

8/9 Powell Moore - Are you doing this? Larry

Please respond by 08/09/02

snowflake

8:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

I want to make darn sure we don't lose that undersecretary for intel because we haven't done the work. Are people up there working their tails off to get that done? If I need to call Graham or somebody, let me know. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080902.01

Please respond by: 8/15

8/9

Secdef -

- Graham is travelling. We will connect you with him soon.

- We are working the issue. That's how it got in the Senate bill and passed. We are not taking it for granted. It is not over until it's over, and we know that. DiRita

U13313 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10856

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Sharon

Darlene -

Make sure this goes to Powell with my note on it.

Larry

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, 697-6210

SUBJECT: Response to Snow Flake 072502-8 regarding WMD Briefings

- Last week we briefed House Members on WMD on three separate occasions for a total number of 50 Members.
  - **July 24,** Committee Room Briefing: **House Armed Services Committee Members:** 60 invited, 33 attended.
  - **July 25,** Breakfast: **Rank and file Members**: 27 invited, 13 accepted, 8 attended. The House was in session until 2:30 a.m. on Thursday, which resulted in several Members dropping out at the last minute. This also accounted for the imbalance in the DoD to Member ratio.
  - **July 26: Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee Members:** 15 invited, 9 attended.

- We also offered this briefing to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but they were unable to schedule.

- Attached is the list of House Members invited to the briefings last week. The names of Members who attended are in bold type.

Attachment:
As stated

C32

31 Jul 02

HASC INVITEES
(Attendees are bolded)

Republicans
Bob Stump, Arizona - Chairman
Duncan Hunter, California
James V. Hansen, Utah
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania
Joel Hefley, Colorado
Jim Saxton, New Jersey
John M. McHugh, New York
Terry Everett, Alabama
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Maryland
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, California
J.C. Watts Jr., Oklahoma
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
John Hostettler, Indiana
Saxby Chambliss, Georgia
Van Hilleary, Tennessee
Walter B. Jones, North Carolina
Lindsey Graham, South Carolina
Jim Ryun, Kansas
Bob Riley, Alabama
Jim Gibbons, Nevada
Robin Hayes, North Carolina
Heather A. Wilson, New Mexico
Ken Calvert, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut
Ander Crenshaw, Florida
Mark Steven Kirk, Illinois
Jo Ann Davis, Virginia
Ed Schrock, Virginia
Todd Akin, Missouri
Randy Forbes, Virginia
Jeff Miller, Florida
Joe Wilson, South Carolina

Democrats
Ike Skelton, Missouri - Ranking
John M. Spratt Jr., South Carolina
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Lane Evans, Illinois
Gene Taylor, Mississippi
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Martin T. Meehan, Massachusetts

Robert A. Underwood, Guam
Rod R. Blagojevich, Illinois
Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Tom Allen, Maine
Vic Snyder, Arkansas
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Washington
Loretta Sanchez, California
Jim Maloney, Connecticut
Mike McIntyre, North Carolina
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Cynthia A. McKinney, Georgia
Ellen O. Tauscher, California
Robert A. Brady, Pennsylvania
Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Baron P. Hill, Indiana
Mike Thompson, California
John B. Larson, Connecticut
Susan A. Davis, California
Jim Langevin, Rhode Island
Rick Larsen, Washington

HAC-D INVITEES
(Attendees are bolded)

Republicans
C.W. Bill Young, Florida – Chairman HAC
Jerry Lewis, California – Chairman HAC-D
Joe Skeen, New Mexico
David L. Hobson, Ohio
Henry Bonilla, Texas
George Nethercutt, Washington
Randy "Duke" Cunningham, California
Rodney Frelinghuysen, New Jersey
Todd Tiahrt, Kansas

Democrats
David Obey, Wisconsin – Ranking HAC
John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania - Ranking HAC-D
Norm Dicks, Washington
Martin Olav Sabo, Minnesota
Peter J. Visclosky, Indiana
James P. Moran, Virginia

GENERAL INVITEES
(Attendees are bolded)

Republicans
Shelley Moore Capito, West Virginia
Christopher Cox, California
Kay Granger, Texas
Adam Putnam, Florida
Paul Ryan, Wisconsin
Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Fred Upton, Michigan
Mark Kennedy, Minnesota
John Shimkus, Illinois
Lee Terry, Nebraska
Steve Buyer, Indiana
Dave Camp, Michigan
Ernest Fletcher, Kentucky
Porter Goss, Florida
Melissa Hart, Pennsylvania
Johnny Isakson, Georgia
Jim Ramstad, Minnesota

Democrats
Chet Edwards, Texas
Allen Boyd, Florida
Benjamin Cardin, Maryland
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Harold Ford, Jr., Tennessee
Charles Stenholm, Texas
Robert Cramer, Jr., Alabama
Steny Hoyer, Maryland
Robert Matsui, California
David Price, North Carolina

snowflake

7:40 AM

TO: Admiral Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Why should other services have ~~DATs~~ DATE beyond the Army since none of the other services have area programs?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080802.02

Please respond by: 8/15/02

U13340 /02

Snowflake

4:49 PM

TO: Gen. Tommy Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Have we refused the Italians an opportunity to participate in ISAF or anything else involved with Afghanistan? People are telling me that is the case. Is it so?

Thanks.

Italy

DHR/azn
080802.13

Please respond by: 8/15/02

8 Aug 02

U13341 /02

snowflake

July 1, 2002 2:43 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Manhunts

7/24

7/25

How do we organize the United States armed services for manhunts? We are going to have to be doing it into the future. We are not well organized to do it now. We are not organized, trained or equipped to do it.

Let's get some work done and get a report and recommendation up to me soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-36

Please respond by 08/02/02

AUG 1 2 2002

Response attached
Also, Chairman has briefed you on his proposals for "the Top Seven" and Gen. Holland has gone back to re-think how to reduce SOF footprint etc. Will be coming back to you soon.
Dick

Tab A

7/24

snowflake

June 28, 2002 5:50 PM

TO: Tom White
Gordon England
Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Ops Centers

Please take a look at the ops center your Service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot be readily done by a departmental ops center.

I ask the question because, in a traditional sense, the Services today don't have operations as such. I recognize the need to keep track of assets, but that is being done in several other places, I would think.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-14

Please respond by 08/02/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 12 2002

8/9

SECDEF —
All 3 Service Secretary responses are attached.
V/R
EB

U13404 /02

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 12 2002

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2002, 1:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG - 5 2002

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Support for Service-Specific Operations Center

- Response to Secretary of Defense question, "Please take a look at the ops center your service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot readily be done by a departmental ops center?"

- The Army Operations Center (AOC) is our internal nerve center to track, synchronize, and formulate recommendations for decision-making. It enables Army leadership to anticipate, assess, and coordinate support requirements in peace and war.

- The AOC provides critical internal networking with Major Army Commands and serves as our direct communications link to Service Component staffs to assure rapid analysis and response to Combatant Commanders. The absence of an AOC jeopardizes our ability to achieve both internal and external synchronization necessary to support our warfighting force.

- The AOC directs actions to carry out critical U.S. Code Title 10 responsibilities such as mobilizing and resourcing our force, and is our mechanism to plan, implement, and track requirements and actions outside the warfighting arena.

- Examples include identification of remains and mobilization of Reserve Component personnel immediately following September 11, as well as planning and sourcing of Force Protection personnel at Army installations in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE. These functions are service-specific and are most effective when organized at the service level.

- As the AOC workload is service-oriented, the potential efficiencies of a consolidated DoD operations center appear to be limited and do not outweigh the effectiveness of a focused organization. Recommend continued organization of the AOC as a Service-specific entity.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: LTC Jay Hooper, (b)(6)

Printed on Recycled Paper

U13405 /02

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 12 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG 6 2002

SUBJECT: Ops Centers

On June 28th you asked, ***"Please take a look at the ops center your Service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot be readily done by a departmental ops center"***

The Air Force Operations Center provides vital, service-specific operational data to the Chief of Staff and me. Each member is hand-selected from the 1C3 (Command and Control Specialist) Air Force Specialty Code career field and must have a minimum of six years operational experience. The NMCC requires direct feeds from the Services on status of forces and relies on the trained judgment of the AF Ops Center personnel to "separate the wheat from the chaff" to provide time sensitive, relevant AF information consolidated from all of the Major Commands (MAJCOMs). The ops center monitors worldwide air and space operations and serves as the sole continuous communications/coordination link between Headquarters Air Force and the MAJCOMs, Joint Staff, and war-fighting Combatant Commanders. Air Force personnel can call from any location in the world, 24-hrs a day to receive clarification, guidance, and assistance in resolving major/critical operational AF issues.

During contingencies, the AF Ops Center coordinates personnel mobilization and equipping, supplying, and maintaining for MAJCOMs, Component Commands, and Field Agencies performing the wide range of current missions. As the executive agent for the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan (JEEP) and key player in the Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs, the AF Ops Center demonstrated its capabilities during the Air Staff evacuation immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The Chief and I rely on our ops center staff to manage all AF operational reporting policies and procedures, disseminate vital information to key leadership, and publish timely, accurate information into the USAF Operation Summary. Additionally they provide coordination on all CJCS deployment orders in support of the warfighter and provide Air Staff support on all current operational issues. The value of the Air Force Ops Center as a continuously available working group in close proximity to CHECKMATE, Operational Readiness, Personnel Recovery, and other warfighting planning cells cannot be underrated. No other single command center has the capability to assure responsiveness and continuity of Air Force operations under any peacetime, emergency, or contingency circumstances.

Bottom-line, the Air Force Operations Center plays a key role in supporting senior Air Force leaders in executing Title 10 missions to mobilize, demobilize, equip, supply, and maintain the capabilities of the Air Force, especially during crises and contingencies. The ops center ensures the right air and space capabilities get to our warfighters on time. It is the 24/7 eyes, ears, and voice of the Air Force and performs a vital role that is not covered by the NMCC.

James G. Roche

Attachment:
Ops Center Memo

cc: DEPSECDEF

U13407 /02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 12 2002

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG -8 AM 6:40

INFO MEMO

August 7, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

Fr: Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy

Subj: Operations Centers

- In lieu of separate service operations centers, the centers could be either collocated within one facility or centralized into one integrated center. Collocating would not yield meaningful benefits except it might save some small amount of overhead but likely not enough to justify the disruption and relocation cost.

- I vote against centralization. While centralization does promise savings at the time of initiation, those savings almost always start to erode quickly. In industry, centralized organizations tend to continue to grow in scope and bureaucracy while providing less service to their customers. Customers then tend to build up shadow organizations to meet their needs that are no longer being met by the centralized function. This situation is even more pronounced in the DoD. Look at our centralized defense agencies as examples. They are too big, too costly and need to be downsized or outsourced.

- My vote is to keep separate service operations centers.

8/9

SECDEF -
All three Service Secretaries have responded along more or less this line. AF & ARMY sent to you within past 3 days. DiRita

ASSISTANT DI RITA	8/9
SMA AMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	8/9
EXECSEC WHITMORE	8/9

U13020 /02

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 12 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG 6 2002

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James G. Roche

Attachment:
Ops Center Memo

cc: DEPSECDEF

311 CCC

6 Aug 02

U13407 /02

snowflake

June 28, 2002 5:50 PM

TO: Tom White
Gordon England
Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Ops Centers

Please take a look at the ops center your Service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot be readily done by a departmental ops center.

I ask the question because, in a traditional sense, the Services today don't have operations as such. I recognize the need to keep track of assets, but that is being done in several other places, I would think.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-14

Please respond by 08/02/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 12 2002

8/9

SECDEF —
All 3 Service Secretary responses are attached.
V/R
Ed

U13404 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10870

Snowflake

EF 1729
12:50 PM

file

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: May 26, 2002

8/9

SUBJECT:

I would like to get about every two months a report on how Paddy Ashdown is doing in executing his plan.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052602.01

Please respond by: 6/30/02

26 May 02

8/12

Crouch response attached.

V/R
Ed

snowflake

June 24, 2002 2:49 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Study Groups

Larry DiRita 8/9

Please give me a note as to each of the study groups we had at the beginning of the year, the number of civilians on each, and the number of military (including retired).

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062402-43

Please respond by 7/19/02

8/12

Cambone response attached.
V/R
ED

3194

24June02

U13423 /02

snowflake

11:10 AM SPS 8/13

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Is there any truth to this article?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080902.04

452V

Please respond by: 8/18/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 1 2 2002

8/14
Aldridge response attached.
V/R
EA
8 Aug 02

Key information left out of aircraft report

By Dave Moniz
USA TODAY

WASHINGTON — A key report on the flight safety of the embattled V-22 Osprey excluded test data that raise doubts about the aircraft's stability, military and civilian aviation officials say.

The study, prepared by NASA a year after a fatal Osprey crash that killed 19 Marines in April 2000, concluded that the military aircraft has no major design problems. At the time the report was released, the Pentagon was debating whether to kill the program or give the aircraft another chance with a new round of testing. Crucial new flight tests could begin as soon as next month. But a Pentagon official and a civilian scientist who were each involved with preparing the report told USA TODAY that damaging data, including critical information from wind-tunnel tests of the Osprey's rotor blades, were not included in it. The wind-tunnel tests, conducted by a NASA scientist in California, suggest that the Osprey's unique rotor design could cause instability in flight, the officials said.

The Defense official said that the Osprey has a serious problem with its handling, and that the problem becomes clear in the data left out of the report.

The final NASA study, which didn't mention the test results, concluded that "there are no known phenomena that would stop the safe and orderly development" of the Osprey.

The officials said other concerns, such as the Osprey's vulnerability to unstable air flows from its rotors, also were not mentioned in the NASA study and raised questions about the aircraft's ability to land in emergencies and fly off ships.

NASA officials declined to comment and referred questions to the Pentagon. Capt. David Nevers, a Marine Corps spokesman, said there was nothing sinister about the exclusion of wind-tunnel test data. Nevers said the tests were deemed insignificant by NASA and Osprey officials, in part because they involved a single rotor. The Osprey has two rotors.

Pentagon officials said that only one rotor was available for testing by NASA and that testing one rotor was less expensive.

But the officials who spoke to USA TODAY discounted the Marine Corps' explanation. At a minimum, the single-rotor wind-tunnel tests should have been mentioned in the NASA study and prompted further tests, the officials said.

August 13, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 14 2002

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: V-22 Report

452 V

You asked me if there was any truth to the USA Today story that key information was left out of a flight safety report on the V-22. The short answer is "maybe", but it did not make any difference.

This V-22 report reported in the article was prepared by an independent team headed by a NASA expert and was requested by me after another "blue ribbon" panel prepared a report which I though was too optimistic. In my view, even this second report was too optimistic. While a summary stated that "there are no known phenomena that would stop the safe and orderly development" of the V-22, there were some 17 recommendations dealing with testing and control authority improvements. That is not an indication of a healthy program.

There was "speculation" that some test data was not included in the report, but no hard evidence that it was deliberately overlooked. In my view, the aircraft had "serious controllability problems" whether this test data was included or not. I am concerned about hover performance being below predictions, combat maneuverability margins, landing site compatibility (ships and unprepared sites), and high rate of descent limitations. However, the only way we could validate my judgment versus those of several experts in two separate reports was to put the program back into an "event driven" flight test program. That we have done.

I will personally review the flight test status on September 6.

Action: None. Information Only.

13 AUG 02

August 13, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

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13 AUG 02

snowflake

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DHR/azn
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snowflake

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-23

Please respond by 08/20/02

15 Aug 02

SPD 8/19

48/19

INFO MEMO

U-090/DR August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.
  - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C3I) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.
  - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.
- Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.
- The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.
- DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

EF 2064 LH

2002 AUG 16 PM 3:32 USD/P 8/12/02

INFO MEMO

I-02/010249-HA&APL

AUG 12 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 8/12/02

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

AFGHANISTAN

You asked about coordination between CENTCOM and NGOs and about what we are doing to help Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) President Hamid Karzai.

What is Working Well: Coordination between DoD civil affairs personnel and representatives from the UN, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

- ATA Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani directs weekly meetings with the UN, NGOs, and DoD civil affairs representatives. DoD civil affairs personnel coordinate their assistance plans with various local and national Afghan officials, as well as USAID.

- As you know, DoD and State are also working on new plans to improve high-level coordination with the ATA on both Afghan civil and military reconstruction.

What Needs to be Improved: Ensuring that international assistance reinforces the ATA.

- There is a need to improve the capacity of Afghan ministries to do their work. With UN and U.S. help, Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani has established 12 program secretariats to manage international community assistance. UN personnel will work in each secretariat to help form the core of an effective Afghan Government office.

- The Principals have directed USG agencies to channel, as much as possible, assistance and reconstruction money through the Afghan Ministry of Finance. This will strengthen the ATA.

- State officials have discussed requiring NGOs to provide their plans to the appropriate Afghan program secretariat in order to receive U.S. funds. State and USAID should implement this idea as soon as possible and even consider requiring ATA approval of NGO plans in the longer term.

12 AUG 02

Prepared by: Michael J. McNerney, Stability Operations, (b)(6) 12-02 14:53 IN

- State and Treasury are pressing Tokyo donors to fulfill their pledges. President Bush will send a letter to leaders of key international donor governments asking them to increase their assistance.

- USAID personnel will soon co-locate with DoD civil affairs teams throughout Afghanistan, thus increasing the synergy of their work.

Joe Collins, DASD (Stability Operations) will travel to Afghanistan on August 14, 2002. Upon return, he will provide further analysis and recommendations.

COORDINATION: Next under.

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/10882

Coordination
(Afghanistan and Non-Governmental Organizations)

GC	William J. Haines II	July 19, 2002 Copy of USDP revisions provided August 5, 2002
Director, Joint Staff	LTG John Abazaid	July 25, 2002 Copy of USDP revisions provided August 5, 2002
DASD, NESA	William Luti	July 16, 2002 Copy of USDP revisions provided August 5, 2002

Snowflake

July 1, 2002 3:44 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR-

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and NGOs

I just looked over this NGO relationships paper. It is worrisome. We are not doing a thing to help Karzai with these issues, nor is State.

It is inexcusable. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
06/29/02 CJCS Talking Points

DHR:dh
070102-49

Please respond by 07/26/02

15JUL02

U10745 /02

Dwn to TF

UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF HAS SEEN

CCJ5
TALKING POINTS

JUL 01 2002

6/30

SUBJECT: NGO Relationships with CJCMOTF and Activities in Afghanistan

SUMMARY. The following information is provided regarding the relationship between the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) and the UN, NGOs, and USAID and the status of Non-Governmental Organizations and activities functioning in AFG.

- CJCMOTF works closely with the UN, IOs/NGOs, and USAID to eliminate duplication of effort, coordinate, and share information among all participants.

- CJCMOTF has a close working relationship with the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC). The UNJLC attends weekly meetings that the CJCMOTF co-chairs with the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) to discuss and update issues. Various NGOs also attend these meetings.

- CJCMOTF also coordinates with IO/NGOs at semi-weekly meetings conducted at the AACA office. The CJCMOF keeps the IO/NGO community informed of location and status of its projects by submitting information to the UNJLC's Afghan Information Management System (AIMS) website. CJCMOTF has transferred nine previously approved OHDACA funded projects to various NGOs. ?

- CJCMOTF meets weekly with USAID representatives to coordinate issues and communicates frequently to resolve issues. The CJCMOTF is currently monitoring one project, the Sultan Rasia School in Mazar-e-Sharif, originally approved for OHDACA funding and subsequently transferred to USAID. Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding is currently being staffed to co-locate a limited number of USAID personnel with Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) to facilitate HA project identification and execution.

- As of Jun 02, the CJCMOTF financed approximately $4M of Humanitarian Assistance projects in the following sectors:

Agriculture	$ .7M
Bridge/Road	$ .01M
Hospital/Medical	$1.1M
Irrigation	$ .2M
Other	$ .1M
Schools	$1.6M
Water Wells	$ .4M

UNCLASSIFIED

• An estimated 370 Non-government Organizations (NGO), International Organizations (IO), and United Nations (UN) agencies are working in AFG.

• Primary United Nations organizations functioning in AFG consist of: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations Development Program, World Health Organization, World Food Program, and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

• Major Non-governmental organizations functioning in AFG consist of: International Committee of the Red Cross, International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, Hope Worldwide, HALO (Hazardous Area Life Support Organization) Trust, GOAL (Irish NGO), and Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development.

• Funding

• USAID currently manages approximately $184M for FY 2002 for Afghan relief and reconstruction. USAID categorizes funded programs into seven major "sectors". Sectors and allocated funds are as follows:

• Humanitarian/Recovery (Food)	$77M
Humanitarian/Recovery (Non-Food)	$22M
Agriculture/Rural Economy	$45.5M
Improving Health Care	$10.7M
Educational Opportunities	$ 6.7M
Stability/Good Governance	$21.3M
Other	$ .5M

• Top 5 recipients USAID is financing through grants (approximately $109M) this year are as follows:

• United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP): $77.3M for road construction, logistics support, food procurement and vehicle purchase.

• International Organization for Migration (IOM): $10.14M for IDP care and transportation, and women's programs.

• International Rescue Committee (IRC): $7.6M for water/sanitation, health education, Cash For Work, food and shelter, and seed.

- GOAL (Irish NGO): $7.1M for shelter, water/sanitation, seeds, construction materials, food, Food For Work, and Cash For Work.

- Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED): $6.9M for camp management, infrastructure rehabilitation, non-food items, coal, food, IDP shelter, and earthquake response.

- UN has financed $851M worth of projects throughout its agencies.

- NGOs not funded by the United Nations or USAID have reported committing an estimated $911.24M worth of projects in AFG.

- The International Community pledged over $1B for Afghan reconstruction at the Tokyo Donors' Conference. To facilitate donor contributions, currently exceeding $1B, the UN and other donors established the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund that is managed by the World Bank. USAID will be the major implementers of the bulk of the US government assistance.

Approved By _____
C. A. D'Angelo
COL, USA
Chief, J5-CMO Div

Prepared By _____
Mark Martin
MAJ, USA
CCJ5-CMO
24 Jun 02

snowflake

July 19, 2002 9:55 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: DLA to TRANSCOM

Why don't we move a big chunk of the Defense Logistics Agency to TRANSCOM, and let them tell us what pieces they shouldn't have and get off the pot.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071902-28

Please respond by 08/16/02

020 DLA

19JUL02

EF2549CW

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN 1:02/012001
AUG 17 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J. D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

AUG 16 2002

RUSSIA

Subject: Testimony to MoD Ivanov

- A copy of Secretary Powell's and your testimony was delivered to the Ministry of Defense this morning.

16 Aug 02

Snowflake

August 15, 2002 10:14 AM

RUSSIA

TO: J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Testimony to MoD Ivanov

You are going to send Powell's and Rumsfeld's testimony to Sergei. I think he probably already has it, but I think it is good for them to have that.

Thanks.

DHR/dh
081502-7

Please respond by [illegible]

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 17 2002

8/17

Crouch response attached.
V/R
EJ

15 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10890 U13628 /02

8/16

Snowflake

August 15, 2002 10:14 AM

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081502-7

Please respond by Oct 1 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 17 2002

8/17

Crouch response attached.
V/R
EJ

15 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10891 U13628 /02

8/16

EF2549CW

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN 1:02/012001
AUG 17 2002

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16 Aug 02

snowflake

June 4, 2002 10:23 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: David Hackworth

7/16 7/18

After reading this chapter, do you have any impressions?

Thanks.

Attach.
Hackworth, David, *Hazardous Duty,* Chapter 12: "It's the System Stupid: Washington, 1996"

DHR:dh
060402-14

Please respond by 06/28/02 7/16

Myers Response attached
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CHAPTER 12

IT'S THE SYSTEM, STUPID:

WASHINGTON, 1996

Sometimes a friend from the services—past or present—asks what's eating me. When this happens, I reply, "I keep wondering if it's possible we're about to close out a hundred years of total war with nothing to show for it but better body bags."

I have spent half of the twentieth century, a century of horrendous violence, chasing wars. In my lifetime, the military has always reflected America at its best, the American tradition of stand-up-and-be-counted, shoot-straight values. Down at the fighting level, in many ways, the military is the last bastion of the finest American beliefs: Thou shall not lie, cheat, or steal still means something there. Today, it inspires me to go into the field with our young Marines, Rangers, grunts, fighter jocks. They still burn with the warrior spirit, the sense of selfless service I first saw during World War II. And I can feel it.

But when I scope out our top military leaders, too often I see political animals obsessed with their careers and bringing home the pork. This all-pervasive new breed of top dogs is made up of polit-

ically correct operators, from the President right on down—bloated, self-serving, and morally corrupt. All talk the good talk, but few have ever walked the hard walk. Because of such sorry leaders, I have had to watch the U.S. military go from a fine, duty-first organization of good men and women to an outfit fragged by the "system." For too many members of our armed forces, serving in the military has become merely a job, not a calling or a passion. Dedication, the vital glue that holds a military team together, has been grossly corrupted by the same sickness that is destroying America: *me, me, me.* The real tragedy is that this sick system is eliminating or driving out our finest young warriors. We are losing our very best, the ones who stand tall and win wars.

The essence of leadership is integrity, loyalty, caring for your people, doing the honorable thing. Over and over since Vietnam, I have seen political expediency killing these values. When slickness and cheap compromise run the show, people who refuse to cave in and play the game get zapped. And when that happens, the ultimate loser is our country.

This system mows down its victims in all the services. Truth tellers are not wanted. Consider the case of Colonel David Hunt, one of the finest serving warriors I know. As a young lieutenant in Korea, he threw himself on a live frag grenade to save a soldier. He's the only guy I know who can do more damage to a grenade than a grenade can do to him. He commanded two battalions, one for two years, in Korea. One day his division commander, Major General Jack Woodall, told him he had the best battalion in Korea—the hardest charging, the most efficient, the best trained, the most spirited. It could, it would, be the point battalion in war. But Woodall wasn't going to recommend Hunt for brigade because he didn't want to use up that vital slot. He wanted to save it for a new-breed corporate general, a young Prince. He told Hunt he'd never make general because he was too outspoken, too abrasive, too apt to piss off the wrong people. Here's what he really meant: No way ever would Hunt win any prizes as a salesman for the Military Industrial Congressional Complex. He wouldn't be a General Smoothie. He might not use the right fork. He'd have his mouth full of snuff and be looking for someplace to spit. Worst of all, he'd always tell the truth.

Here was a guy who could be another Grant, another Patton, another Abrams; here was a real fighter who could win battles and provide his warriors with genuine leadership. But he was doomed because he called 'em as he saw 'em. When I heard the story, I asked to see him. I hadn't met him, I just knew him by reputation. And he

lived up to it completely. By chance, a few days later, I met with Jim Morrison, then the vice president of Business Executives for National Security, a first-rate reform group, and Senator Sam Nunn. When the senator asked me what was wrong with the military, I told him the Hunt story.

"How did this happen?" he snapped.

"The dancers and prancers go to the top," I said. "They don't make waves. They hustle bucks for their services regardless of the consequences."

"What can we do about it?" he asked me.

"Your committee confirms all senior officer appointments," I said. "You put the stamp of approval on anyone recommended for brigadier general and above. You've got to make sure that the Pentagon sends you war fighters, not Perfumed Princes."

Nunn said he would do it. He wrote up a goodie and sent me a copy. It basically said: When you are considering people for senior grades, don't just consider somebody with a perfect record who has punched all the right tickets. We need war fighters, we need people who tell it like it is. He introduced it in the 1991 Defense Authorization Report. The report stressed that leaders should spend substantial time with troops to learn and to bond. It was a giant step toward killing ticket punching, which cost so many lives in Vietnam and has done so much damage since. Senator Nunn felt good about writing the document. So did I. When he sent me a copy, I got a rush. *Oh, hallelujah,* I thought. *We finally cleaned up the system. Now we will get war fighters at the top.*

I called a buddy of mine, very smart about politics, an aide to a senior senator. And he said, "Ah, forget it, Hack. Nothing's gonna happen."

So then I went to Lieutenant General Bill Carpenter, who was by chance the top combat commander in Korea and Hunt's ultimate boss man.

"You've got to save this guy," I said. "We're losing an Abrams here."

Carpenter was one of our finest, fightingest studs and damn smart, too. We went back a long way. Bill commanded a rifle company attached to my battalion in Vietnam where he was recommended for the Medal of Honor.

"Okay, Hack," he said. "I'll look into it."

Carpenter spent one day with Hunt's battalion, one full day and night during a live-fire exercise. He stayed in the trenches with the soldiers while the bullets were whistling and explosions were crashing

all around them. It was so real he even cautioned Hunt about how far he was bringing his boys in training.

"That's how you train soldiers for warfare," Hunt said. "You don't train them by watching a video. You train them on a field of battle, getting them as close to the real thing as you can."

"Yeah," General Carpenter said. "But you're on the edge of overdoing it."

Carpenter was impressed enough to put in a special, glowing report on Hunt, recommending he be promoted and sent to war college. That saved a true warrior's ass from being shuffled aside and put out to pasture as a lieutenant colonel. He made bird colonel; they sent him to the war college and Harvard to get his master's, all the right system punches to prepare him for a star. But he has never gotten a regular brigade, so he is finished in the Army. Because he's not a salesman. Just a great leader who knows his job and leads his warriors by follow-me example.

Recently I went down to the Pentagon to visit Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff. He's a good man, movie star handsome with short-cropped silver hair, a six-foot-three Paul Newman in Army green trying hard to change the system.

I mentioned Hunt.

"I love him," he said.

"Why don't you make him a general?" I said.

He looked at me and changed the subject to the threat of mines in Bosnia. I could see the pain in his cool blue eyes. It's the System. The fucking System. The deadly System we have to shoot between the eyes.

Right now, no matter what position you hold within that system, to buck it means death. James H. Mukoyama, a valiant captain in my Hardcore Battalion in Vietnam, rose to major general in the U.S. Army Reserves. In 1994, he went before Congress and testified that federal Reserve units were being converted to state Guard units at the cost of combat efficiency, risking soldiers, lives just to preserve pork. A Government Accounting Office study confirmed that the damage to the taxpayer was more than $180 million. Mukoyama's reward? The Perfumed Princes in the E-ring forced him to retire. The first Asian American in our country's history to command a division, he had served America for over three decades. The top brass treated him like a guy with the Ebola virus. No gold watch. Just a gaping, bleeding belly wound where he fell on his sword, doing the right thing for his country.

When it comes to big bucks, the Perfumed Princes don't hesitate

to cheat, lie, and steal. They trashed Sanford Mangold, a brilliant Air Force officer who was sure to be a general. The Air Force had rated him in the top 1 percent of its colonels and he was a boy wonder at the Space Command. Then he blew the whistle on MILSTAR to his boss, a lieutenant general who agreed with him. MILSTAR was a Cold War dinosaur, a satellite system that could maintain communications in spite of radiation within a "nuclear environment." Sandy felt the system was no longer necessary since the Soviet Union was dead. He showed how we could save $640 million immediately and nearly $5 billion over five years by paring it down. The Army, Navy, and Marines all bought his idea.

Then Les Aspin gave the MILSTAR a death row reprieve even as the Defense Secretary was conducting a phony "bottom-up" review. The delay gave Sandy's enemies at Space Command an opportunity to save their Crown Jewel. Because they could not argue the case on the merits, they went after Sandy personally, stacking the deck, lying, and doing everything they could to diminish his credibility. It worked. MILSTAR was back on the books and Sandy was out on the streets. It took him 210 days and $50,000 in legal fees to clear his name. Later, I went to the Air Force Chief, General Ronald Fogleman, and told him that Sandy was a good man, a truth teller, that he should be part of the Chief's personal staff. Fogleman subsequently tried to right a wrong by awarding Sandy the Meritorious Service Medal for "outstanding leadership, integrity, and intellect." "I missed the chance for general," he told me. "But I did not join to be a general. I joined to serve my country." Again, America was the loser.

If you are not a Perfumed Prince or a courtier, you get killed. If you know how to work the system, it will work for you. Slickness is all. If you know the game, you can break all the rules. The trick is never to get caught—and if you do get caught, be sure to have friends in high places.

Not long ago in *Newsweek*, I nailed Air Force General Joe Ashy, who has four stars, for spending nearly $250,000 to fly himself and a blond bombshell from Naples, Italy, to Colorado Springs. When he was reassigned from NATO to head the Space Command in Colorado, he used a C-141 Globemaster, capable of carrying two hundred passengers for himself, a twenty-one-year-old female "enlisted aide," and his cat Nellie. The aircraft had a crew of thirteen, including a chef, along with a plush VIP compartment, the equivalent of a presidential suite—all for the use of the general and his twenty-one-year-old. To support this costly junket aloft, the Air Force had to

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arrange two hazardous air-to-air night refuelings. This took two KC-135 tankers, each with a crew of five, one from England for a rendezvous over the Azores, one from Delaware to refuel over the East Coast, to bring the general home. His trip cost the American taxpayer nearly a quarter of a million dollars. To fly commercial would have cost $1,465. In Colorado Springs, General Ashy then splurged another $100,000 for a new conference room—because the old one didn't have a view of Pikes Peak. The money wasted on that quarter-of-a-million-dollar flight would have bought sixty-two shells for an M-1 tank, more than enough for the crew's annual gunnery training. It could have paid for fifty hours of flight time to train fighter pilots.

I'll say this for General Ashy, he knows how to look after the troops. According to a retired Air Force sergeant major, he gave his "aide," a gorgeous Air Force enlisted woman, an equally gorgeous black negligee. To boost morale, I suppose. Generals are not supposed to have enlisted aides except as cooks or stewards. Their aides are supposed to be junior officers. A lackey on his staff coming to his defense over the flight told me, "All the senior officers do it, it's an entitlement." There was an investigation. The general got a slap on the wrist. He had to reimburse the government about $5,000. The official story was that he wrote and mailed his check the day the judgment came out.

My gut feeling was *This is a check that is gonna get lost.* I called Charlie Murphy, a former Marine who works for Senator Chuck Grassley, a Republican reformer from Iowa. Charlie is a bulldog, the Ralph Nader of high-ranking military corruption.

"Hey, Charlie," I said. "I got a feeling this check's never going to hit the bank."

"I do, too," he said. "But I got a plan."

His plan was to call the Defense Department's Inspector General in ninety days, long enough for the check to clear the Bank of Siberia, and ask for a copy of the paperwork. Three months later, I phoned Charlie again. He got in touch with the IG and discovered that the check had never been banked. The Air Force went to DEFCON 1 on damage control: It was lost in a drawer, locked in a safe, left behind when the Secretary of the Air Force flew overseas—everything but the tooth fairy ate it. Finally, the check turned up in the safe of Sheila Widnall, the Secretary of the Air Force, a good pal of General Ashy. Only then was it deposited. Later I discovered that the Air Force was going to pay $300,000 to buy a VIP pallet like the one Ashy used for the secretary so she could also fly high. I confronted the Air Force flacks with the story. A general and colonel huddled three hours

concocting a cover. I was on deadline, so I rang an Air Force captain who was baby-sitting the action.

"What the hell's taking so long?" I asked her.

She was as frustrated as I was. She said, "They are crafting a reply."

"Out of what—granite?"

They finally came back and said the whole project was on hold. But I knew the order was already at the factory. Several weeks later, after the story ran in *Newsweek*, the Air Force quietly canceled the secretary's VIP flying palace.

While chasing the Ashy story, I was lied to more than I have ever been lied to in my life by officers, majors and colonels who should have known better, but were protecting their bosses. The experience left me with the view that if I could, I would eliminate every flack position in the U.S. military. All the flacks do is spin, deceive, and promote their service. This takes thousands of people and costs the taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars every year.

The Ashy story was just one small example of the horror stories that now come my way every week from frustrated warriors. Only the big ones make fleeting headlines: Tailhook; the U.S.S. *Vincennes* cover-up—from Captain Will Rogers who shot down the Iranian Airbus to Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, according to Roger Charles, lied about what really happened—the Air Force sweetheart deal with Lockheed, a $500 million ripoff; the Army's attempts to hide friendly fire deaths during Desert Storm and now Gulf syndrome. These are only the tip of the iceberg.

Why is this happening? Too many generals and admirals no longer ask what they can do for their country but what they can do for their individual services and for themselves. They've forgotten about defending America and their sacred obligation to look out for the troops. They have also forgotten the oath they took as young ensigns and lieutenants.

It blows me out how badly the media cover the defense story. Half of the discretionary spending in the federal budget goes to the military, which eats up one sixth of the total budget. When the military screws up, the facts—and the stories—are earth-shaking. The media latch on to stories like Tailhook, and rightly so, but it is always off covering O. J. or finding out who Timothy McVeigh's girlfriend was in kindergarten when billions are being blown and lives are being lost. You'd think editors would devote more of their own scarce resources to bulldogging stories like MILSTAR; or the early Bradley,

that flaming coffin; or the $39 billion B-1, a military albatross; or the Sergeant York antiaircraft system that cost $13 billion and couldn't shoot down a fat pigeon sitting on the end of its gun.

How different the picture is today from the way we Americans started out. My ancestors had muskets and hand axes and they carried their blankets and rations on their backs. Back then they were led by a few good dedicated men. If an order was bullshit, the troops sounded off: "Look, Captain, this doesn't make a damn bit of sense." We had a democratic army, not a Prussian military machine that clicks heels to all orders right or wrong. Back then the tooth was long and sharp and could bite like hell and inflict great pain on our enemies. There was little tail. But from 1776 to now we've grown an incredible bureaucratic tail and the teeth have been getting smaller and smaller. If we keep going this way, we will end up trying to gum our future enemies to death.

Our military setup is essentially the same organization George Washington had at the Delaware, except that in 1948 we threw in the Air Force. If IBM did not change with the times, it would belly up, which it almost did. But the U.S. military machine has locked itself in concrete.

Featherbedding is worse than stupid. It weakens our national defense. During the peak of the Cold War, the United States contributed almost 400,000 troops to NATO. After the Iron Curtain collapsed, that force was reduced to 100,000 troops. Our cutting edge in Europe today is made up of only four U.S. fighting brigades with a total of 12,000 fighters. Half of them are now in Bosnia enforcing the peace. But if you look around the assorted command posts in Europe, you will find 12,000 clerks, jerks, and generals—as many desk men as warriors. Even though the force level has been reduced by almost 300,000 people, the top brass has hardly been touched. Not one chalet or villa has been closed down or one VIP aircraft mothballed. A battalion commander in Europe told me, "All we do is suffer VIPs. In the American component of NATO, there are 4 four-stars, 6 three-stars, 27 two- and one-stars, and their staffs all oversupervising twelve combat maneuver battalions." *Never have so few been commanded by so many to so little good purpose.*

Since 1946 the United States has spent about $14 trillion (in 1996 dollars) on military toys and boys supposedly defending America. We tend to forget how much that really represents. If you lined up a fleet of bulldozers on the East Coast and pushed everything into

the drink on the West Coast—every building, every car, every bridge, and every brick and stick made by human beings—and replaced them with brand-new stuff, you would still have a pocketful of change left over from $14 trillion.

Insane spending has turned our military machine into a gadget-loaded truck with a hundred more gold-plated cylinders than it needs. In 1996, defense spending continued at 80 percent of Cold War levels. This does not track when you figure 60 percent of all defense spending during the Cold War was to stop the Soviets.

Since the end of the Cold War we have cut troops and mothballed or retired thousands of ships, guns, and airplanes, but the United States still spends on average $300 billion a year defending the globe, more than the rest of the world combined. This massive post–Cold-War spending places an unacceptable burden on the American economy and saddles the nation with a military force that is far too powerful in some respects and too weak in others. The Japanese and the Germans spend a fraction of their GNP defending themselves. Why shouldn't they? We do it for them while they clean our clocks on the economic front. Meanwhile, the United States spends $30 billion per year on education—a mere 10 percent of the defense budget—on our youth, the hope and future of this country. Where are our priorities, especially when you consider that for the moment we have no serious enemy threatening us?

Look at our main adversaries for the foreseeable future: Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria. All lack a strong industrial base. Their combined total population is just 140 million. Their combined military strength consists of 2.7 million men and women outfitted with mostly worn-out gear from the former Soviet Union. Their combined defense budgets are half of what we spend on education. None of these countries has the Bomb yet or an effective army, navy, or air force. Their major capability is terrorism and chemical-biological sneak attacks. North Korea remains a serious threat, but it looks like the North Koreans may be only a few years away from bellying up.

Yet we are continuing to buy more and more Cold War relics designed to fight an "Evil Empire" that died when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. Paradoxically, as the Pentagon budget increases, the size of our armed forces decreases. In 1991, during Desert Storm there were 2.1 million people on active duty. Today we have about 1.5 million.

Our troop strength has been reduced by almost 30 percent, yet

we have seen no corresponding decline in defense spending, and the fat cats in the Pentagon and other high headquarters have not really felt the retrenchment knife. Ordinary Americans remain ignorant of the waste and the rip-offs until they hear the horror stories: the $7,000 coffeepots; the $12,000 hooks for the C-17 transport that cost a couple of hundred bucks at the local hardware store; and $250,000 airplane rides for generals. And that news seems to stick in their heads about as long as a Jay Leno joke.

The Perfumed Princes have it down to a science. Even when they retire, they pass through a golden revolving door and go to work for the same guys from whom they used to buy weapons. They get big salaries for ringing up their former subordinates and saying, My company's gear is just right for you. The newest twist is for foreign countries to rent our retired generals. For example, General Carl Vuono, who used to be the Army Chief of Staff, runs a company called Military Professional Resources, with two thousand retired American generals and admirals and other officers for rent. His boys were training the Croatians long before President Clinton sent in the regulars.

It has been nearly forty years since President Eisenhower warned us about the Military Industrial Congressional Complex, but we still haven't brought it under control. Military leaders, politicians, and defense contractors form what has been called the Iron Triangle, a dollar-gobbling, three-legged monster with the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House as the main players. They work in concert to keep defense money in play, many of the hoodwinkers moving from one leg to another as opportunities arise. The MICC has a strong and supportive constituency, the first leg being the politicians and their pork. Defense pork means jobs for the lawmakers' districts and states and jobs mean votes. Votes mean reelection. Building a bigger pig trough to wallow in is the endgame of the Iron Triangle.

Who needs more B-2 bombers, more Sea Wolf submarines? Who needs another Nimitz-class carrier? We could save hundreds of billions of defense dollars if we had leaders with enough common sense and courage to do the job right. What's a good citizen supposed to think when Congress approves buying a new fleet of bombers? The people who build the bombers have worked it all out. They know how many congressional districts there are in the United States. In district after district, someone is building a part of the new bomber. So when a vote comes up in the House of Representatives, the bomber gang can say to the politicians in Washington, "Look, you're going to lose jobs in your district if you don't vote for this weapon." The

tail assembly is made in one guy's district, the rudder is made in another. And so it goes. Then the bomber cabal fans out into those districts and whispers to the people, "Your Representative wants to vote against our bomber, and that vote is going to cost you your job. Your local economy is going to go down the tubes. You gotta put the squeeze on him." So the faxes and phone calls and letters start raining down on Washington, and even the politician smart enough to know America's national security wouldn't miss a beat if no more bombers were produced will still vote for it. And every time he plays along with the bomber boys, he's sticking a knife in your back and keeping the guys who end up face-to-face with the enemy from having the right stuff.

That's how the game is played today and the tragedy is that too many of our top military leaders are playing right along with the politicians and the defense contractors. Among the Perfumed Princes in the E-ring, knowing how to sell a weapons system to Congress is prized far more highly than knowing how to fight a unit in battle. They are spending us broke on wonder toys while shortchanging the boys who do the fighting and dying. We have wonderful young soldiers, high school and college graduates full of idealism who would fall on a grenade in a second to save their buddies or their country. But as they rise through the ranks, they become corrupted. Somewhere around lieutenant colonel all too many become so obsessed with making it to the Pentagon's inner E-ring, they'd poison their mother if that's what it took to get them there.

The higher these officers rise, the more they lose their nerve—because they have more to lose. These are not leaders who would take the point, stand tall to correct a wrong, or fall on their sword for their men. Politically correct, they go along to get along. They are not risk takers: To take risks, you have to have balls; what they have is bureaucratic cunning. So this democracy of ours, which is the best form of government going, is hurting. That's what's causing the anger and frustration of ordinary citizens today. But few within the Beltway are listening to the drumbeat. Washington has become as bad as London during the American Revolution, when the king and lords could not understand why all that tea was floating in Boston Harbor.

The MICC is winning big-time. Let's consider a few examples. The Navy needs sixty attack submarines to sink a Soviet submarine fleet that has already sunk. During the Cold War, we had about one hundred attack submarines to do that job. We retired forty. We retired the U.S.S. *Los Angeles* even though it had twenty years of shelf

life left. But now we are building one Sea Wolf sub per year at $4 billion a pop because they provide ten thousand jobs. They are certainly not a military necessity. My solution: Send those ten thousand sub-making employees to Hawaii. Even if we pay their salaries, all room and board, and throw in all the luaus they can hula to and grog they can drink, we will still save about $3.4 billion a year by not building, crewing, and maintaining the unneeded subs.

We are currently building two new aircraft carriers and the MICC is pressing for a third. With planes, goodies, and crew, the total life-cycle cost for these three will be about $60 billion. This will give us eleven carriers. Building them means a lot of jobs in Virginia, one place where the Republicans and Democrats do not have a gridlock. Both Senator John Warner (R-Va.) and Senator Charles Robb (D-Va.) pull the same rope at the same time in the same direction. Carriers in Virginia mean jobs, and jobs mean Warner and Robb will return to their MICC seats of power.

We now have more flattops than we need. Even in Desert Storm, we only used six, four in the Red Sea, two in the Gulf. Many naval experts say five big carriers and six mid-size carriers will do the job nicely. The U.S. Navy has almost twice the number of carriers of the combined forces of the rest of the world. One of our big carriers has more strike power than all other foreign carriers combined. Russia has only one clunky supercarrier, and it's on its ass for lack of maintenance, spare parts, and serviceable aircraft with only eight qualified pilots able to launch off its rusted deck.

We also have a new fleet of fighters in the works. The F-22 stealth fighter will take the place of the F-15. The total package for four hundred F-22s will run over $72 billion. The purpose of this new gold-plated wonder weapon is to shoot down the Soviet Union, even though the Evil Empire crashed in 1990. Some strategists like former naval officer and Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence J. Korb, now of the Brookings Institution, say we could maintain our technological edge and keep our stealth capability as sharp as it was in the Gulf War with fifty to seventy-five of these aircraft. The Pentagon has dozens of other costly wonder weapons—many are relics from the Cold War—fighters, missiles, and whiz-bang stuff. The MICC says we urgently need these weapons even though they are aimed at an enemy that has ceased to exist. On top of that the individual services want even more.

Budgetary sleight-of-hand jeopardizes our warriors and steals defense dollars from where they are needed to sharpen combat readiness. Grunts don't have many guardians or much political clout.

Grunts don't contribute to political action committees like the people who make stealth aircraft or $60 billion worth of aircraft carriers. Between 1991 and 1993, seventy members of the House Armed Services Committee scooped up almost $3.5 million from PACs. The two biggest beneficiaries were Pennsylvania's John Murtha, who gobbled up $331,200, and Texas's Charles Wilson, who raked in $285,150. Both are big cheerleaders for a costly, bug-ridden, half airplane–half helicopter that does two things well: crash and waste heavy-duty money. It's no coincidence the V-22 Osprey is built in their districts.

Defense contractors make up the second leg of the MICC. They have had a license to steal since just before World War II, and with forty-seven years of Cold War, this abuse has become a virtual science. Until only recently, most defense contractors operated on a cost-plus basis and the taxpayers paid dearly. Flat-out cheating, heavy padding, and out-and-out corruption have become endemic. Not long ago I checked through just a few headlines in *Newsweek*'s stacks: Litton Industries agrees to reimburse government $82 million for overcharging on a defense contract. Northrop Corporation found guilty of rigging bids on the stealth bomber to the tune of over $60 million. Grumman agrees to pay U.S. government $20 million to avert criminal charges for defrauding the U.S. Navy. Curtiss-Wright pays $17.5 million to settle charges that top executives fraudulently overcharged the Navy. Gencorp and Alliant Techsystems pay $12 million for conspiring to cheat the military on the sale of cluster bombs. United Technologies pays $150 million for improperly billing the government for military helicopters. Eight suppliers were accused of providing substandard hardware to the U.S. military, defective stuff such as ammo and aviation parts used by our warriors in combat.

According to the General Accounting Office, CEOs of giant defense contractors are some of the highest-paid executives in the U.S.A. Here's a recap of the latest available figures: James Mellor of General Dynamics ($11.3 million); Bernard Schwartz of Loral ($4.6 million); Dennis Picard of Raytheon ($2.5 million); Daniel Tellep of Lockheed Martin ($2.4 million); Harry Stonecipher of McDonnell Douglas ($1.6 million); Krent Kresa of Northrop Grumman ($1.6 million). By one report, Schwartz was expecting to get an $18 million bonus for arranging the sale of Loral's defense division to Lockheed Martin, a merger that would mean thousands of layoffs.

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The military brass at the Pentagon make up the third leg of the Iron Triangle. Sadly, many three- and four-star generals put service over country and forget their oath of office: to defend America, not their service's budget. These Perfumed Princes fight for their individual service's budget harder than they fight any external enemy. I learned while working in the Pentagon that the U.S. Air Force was a bigger enemy to the U.S. Army than the North Vietnamese we were fighting at the time or the Soviets we were preparing to fight. Almost every three- and four-star is not a war fighter but a super arms salesman, whose job it is to schmooze the lawmakers and hype their service's needs.

The most recent schmooze champs come from the Air Force, madly selling the need for those four hundred new F-22 fighters as well as a fleet of $350-million-a-copy C-17 cargo planes. If we acquired only a dozen C-17s for combat assaults, the balance of the air fleet could be modernized with Boeing 747 cargo aircraft at half the cost. And we do not need all four hundred of those new fighters. The Navy is hustling for new carriers and submarines, and fighting hard to stop the fleet from being trimmed. The Army is spinning the need for a multibillion-dollar digital battlefield and fleets of new helicopters and tanks even though the tank itself will soon be obsolete. And the Marine Corps is beating the drums for that costly lemon, the V-22 Osprey.

Each service jealously guards its overlapping missions and competes with the other services for more, more, more, just the way poker players always want more chips. Their interservice rivalry blinds them. They can't admit that their forces are too large for today and will be inadequate and too expensive for tomorrow. Despite all the we-can-bomb-them-back-to-the-Stone-Age bluster, no single service can win a war by itself. Wars take a team effort despite the hype put out by the U.S. Air Force about how it won Desert Storm.

In this era of huge national debt with our bonehead politicians eagerly assuming the role of Global Cop regardless of the cost, there is no room for duplication, overlap, or waste. But we are wallowing in redundancy. To pick just one example, we have two ground forces—the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. Both are in sharp competition, especially for post–Cold-War 911 missions in places like Somalia and Haiti, the only games in town. Both forces do the same thing: break things and kill people. The Marine Corps, which is in theory a primarily light, hit-and-pull-out amphibious force, has not hit any beaches for real since the 1950 Inchon invasion during

the Korean War. After that, Marine divisions fought as Army divisions for the next two years in Korea, the decade of the Vietnam War, and again during Desert Storm. Now the Marine Corps, like the Army, has developed a heavy-tank capability. Meanwhile, the Army, while whistling the Marine Corps hymn, is buying ships to replicate the U.S. Marine Corps's floating reserve strategic mission. It sounds like something from *M*A*S*H*, except that it's real and we're paying for it with scarce tax dollars.

President Clinton hasn't just joined the Military Industrial Congressional Complex, he's become its main cheerleader. One month before the 1994 State of the Union speech, President Clinton gave the Pentagon another $11 billion, then told Congress, "We must not cut defense spending any further." Even that was not enough. After the Republicans ripped his knickers in the off-year congressional elections for neglecting defense, he breathlessly flung another $25 billion into the Pentagon larder. That was supposed to square away the "readiness gap." Now we have a readiness gap. Remember the bomber gap? Remember the missile gap? The readiness gap is the same type of con. Ready for what? Mexico to invade? A Canadian blitzkrieg attack? As things now stand, President Clinton is spending more on defense than Richard Nixon proposed at the height of the Cold War.

Instead of whipping our forces into realistic shape for post–Cold-War missions, President Bill Clinton caves in to every Perfumed Prince and defense contractor who wails Gimme, Gimme, Gimme. Here's why. He's politically vulnerable because not only did he not serve in Vietnam, but he got caught lying about his draft status. Then he ushered in his administration with his misguided gays-in-the-military initiative, which turned off just about everyone who has ever worn a uniform. Scrounging votes in Connecticut, he gave the kiss of life to the Sea Wolf after George Bush cut off its air supply. The B-2 bomber was dead on arrival in California. Then President Clinton, snapping after the state's fifty-four electoral votes, did a double shuffle to keep it alive. First, he announced he would not fund the B-2 in the 1997 budget. Then he waffled, going ahead with the $496 million allocated for 1996. He did this, even though the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have said no more B-2s. My guess is that the B-2, like the B-1 resuscitated by Ronald Reagan, will be born again. And of course the President isn't the only politician playing this game. Anywhere in America where there's a defense factory, you find a politician and a deal. This mess is bipartisan. Campaigning in California, Bob Dole sounded like Clinton—

though in slow motion—about the B-2. The bottom line: You pay $30 billion, they get to hustle twenty-five thousand California votes.

Ike knew all about this insidious cabal. Just before leaving office, when he coined the phrase the Military Industrial Congressional Complex, his advisers convinced him he should drop "congressional" because it would rub too many porkers the wrong way. Before he turned the White House over to JFK, he said, "In the councils of governments we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic process. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can couple the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machine of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."

Because most of us slept through the speech, we now have pretty much four of everything. To start with, we have four air forces, one each for the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and, of course, the U.S. Air Force itself. All do long-range "deep strike" operations and all do close air support missions. Would you believe we also have: four legal corps; four intelligence commands; four personnel centers; four chaplain branches; and four information/data commands. We also have: four training systems from boot to flight training right up to charm schools for new generals; four supply systems and four research and development commands. Hey, there are even four different color socks and four different hats!

Imagine GM or Ford having four sets of everything. The stockholders would revolt. CEO heads would roll. But at the Pentagon piggy bank these are the rules: Don't worry about the taxpayers; bigger is better; always preserve pork fat while cutting military muscle. Whenever you need more money, simply scream, "The bogeyman is coming." Believe me, the Pentagon's cash addiction is America's real enemy, the enemy within.

Each service is spending millions of dollars duplicating research and development work. Today, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are all developing defense systems to deal with missiles. The same is true on close air support. The Army has the Apache helicopter; the U.S. Marine Corps has the F-18C, the Harrier jet, and Super Cobra gunship; the U.S. Navy has the F-18D; and the U.S. Air Force has the F-15E and F-16. Of course, they are slowly phasing out the best one, the A-10 Warthog, because it's apparently not sexy or costly

enough. Only the A-10, the Apache, and Cobra choppers reliably put iron down on the close air support target. The others—all fast burners—can't stay over the targets long enough, fly too fast, and are too thin-skinned. Using a fast burner aircraft to provide combat air support is like trying to throw a golf ball from a car going 500 miles per hour into a coffee mug from a freeway overpass.

Our waste would run a small nation. We are now paying $5.5 billion a year for forty-two Guard combat brigades. Hanging on to them is like General Motors keeping a buggy division. I brought this up one day with Mike Stone, as we were sitting in his Pentagon office, not long after Desert Storm. The downsizers were all over him and he was griping to me about not having enough defense dollars to keep the Army fighting fit.

"You know," I said, "you've got to get rid of the Army National Guard's combat brigades and divisions."

"Hack," he said, "it would be easier to get rid of God."

The National Guard is entrenched, totally bulletproof. Every politician on the Hill fights to keep it, because the Guard is in every district and state. It's been that way since before the days of Abe Lincoln. The Joint Chiefs of Staff say they only need fifteen National Guard combat brigades. President Clinton insists for political reasons on keeping forty-two. Those twenty-seven unneeded brigades cost $3 billion a year. So we're keeping the Guard on the porkroll even though Desert Storm proved once again that the Guard's combat brigades were a waste of good money. War is now come as you are, so there is no longer time for the National Guard to get ready. Today's Army and Marine combat units have to be as ready as a jet fighter sitting on a carrier's catapult, always prepared to launch.

We are even being ripped off on what we pay defense contractors for research and development. Here's how it works: The taxpayer pays billions to develop a new weapons system. The contractor then sells the system overseas and his profits skyrocket, because he hasn't had to pay the full bill for R and D. There have been attempts to control this scam, but the porkers have resisted them. The 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, going their way, slid right into the trough.

Blubber, bureaucracy, and duplication do not give the United States a stronger force or the edge in a fight. In fact, they produce a weaker military force, because during lean times no individual service has enough to do the job and eventually all become as hollow and limp as a used straw. To get an idea of our current girth, just check out the Pentagon in Washington D.C., ten square miles of posturing and stealing surrounded by reality. In 1945, at the end of

World War II when the U.S. military had 13 million men and women in uniform, there were 25,000 people in the Pentagon. Today, when our military is down to 1.5 million there are 26,000 people trying to look busy in that same five-cornered, concrete bunker and thousands more big and little bureaucrats squirreled away in office buildings all over town. Amazing. More clerks than trigger pullers. Doesn't make much sense. Clerks do not put holes in enemy soldiers.

At present, we have only 192,000 trigger pullers out of 732,000 people on active duty in the Army and Marines. That is like leaving 75 percent of the cops in the police station to shuffle papers, rather than out on the beat fighting crime. You can find the same blubber at every headquarters in the military. Down in the trenches, where warriors fight and die, we never have enough people.

Looking back, as long as I've been around, backstabbing and interservice rivalry have been a running sore. It amazes me we won World War II with so much throat cutting going on between the admirals and generals. Back in the 1940s, the Army and Navy were constantly fighting and undercutting each other. The Navy wanted priority for the Pacific and the Army wanted priority for Europe. Neither would release critical resources—aircraft, landing craft, ships, and other war-fighting gear—to the other, and in some tactical situations they would not even support each other. Vietnam was even worse. Naval Air had its own set of targets and the U.S. Air Force had theirs. The Marines and Army each had their separate war, and neither would coordinate their efforts. It was as if the four services were fighting four different wars. In the Delta, the Army was pretending it was the Marines. In the north, fighting big land battles, the Marines were acting more like the Army. Meanwhile, almost 60,000 young men were KIA and 300,000 more were ground up as WIA, partly because there was no unity of command, a vital principle of war, or concentration of effort (the principle of mass) or even one single game plan (the principle of objective).

We, a superpower, lost our first war in U.S. history to a third world army that never had one airplane over our battle positions, one sub or ship attacking our convoys, or one SCUD missile sputtering overhead; yet they kicked our ass. In 1980, Jimmy Carter's hostage rescue mission failed in the Iranian desert because all four services jumped into the act to justify their budgets. Everything failed. A U.S. Navy chopper flown by U.S. Marine Corps pilots crashed into a U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft killing U.S. Army troopers. The operation was a humiliating disaster. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 was just

as bad. It was a Keystone Kop comedy. The Navy bombed the Army. The Marines, with only one infantry battalion, outperformed the Army's eight parachute battalions. SEALs drowned. Green Berets were killed in badly planned missions. Things got so bad an officer on the beach in a firefight had to use a credit card to call Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the fastest way to get the U.S. Navy off Grenada to adjust its gunfire, since the Army and Navy radios couldn't communicate with each other. That was almost forty years after World War II, where this kind of stupidity happened all the time. The same thing happened during the rehearsals for the 1994 invasion of Haiti. These disasters all occurred because we had four different squads playing under four different coaches, all trying to stick it to each other. Joint service operations have been anything but joint.

And when they do try to play together—watch out. Not long ago the Pentagon decided to conduct an antiterrorist exercise on the island of Guam. The ostensible idea was to see what would happen if terrorists tried to capture a nuclear weapon. Their real purpose was to justify maintaining a seldom-used air base on the island.

Here's what happened. U.S. Marines posing as terrorists set out to see if they could steal a nuke coming to Guam aboard a plane from South Korea. The "bomb" was supposed to be a dummy. But unknown to most of the participants in the exercise, the plane arrived carrying live weapons along with the dummies. Then the aircraft was parked on a sector of a runway over an underground fuel dump.

During the mock raid, the Marine "terrorists" tossed a concussion grenade that rolled up against the leg of a USAF security guard. In this case, the soldier happened to be a young woman, Airman Laurie "Ranger" Lucas. The grenade blew off her foot and killed her. The Marines had been ordered to use concussion grenades since they were running an exercise anyway, the idea was they might as well take out a broken gate in order to replace it at taxpayers, expense from the training exercise budget. What about Ranger Lucas? Training accident, you know.

If the Marines had lobbed that grenade a mite harder, the exercise would have created more devastation than the Oklahoma City bombing. The grenade would have ignited over the fuel dump, torching off 220,000 gallons of aviation fuel stored under the plane with the nukes. The explosion would have been conventional, not nuclear, but there's no doubt it would have spewed radioactive debris into the winds and across the Pacific. Oh, the colonel would have gotten not only his new gate but a rebuilt airfield—and a new asshole.

A very close call.

CHAPTER 13

CHANGE— OR BELLY UP:

WHITEFISH, 1996

Now that you've gotten inside what's gone down from Desert Storm to Bosnia, you can see that our military machine is sputtering like a worn-out tank. Any mechanic can see it's only hitting on two cylinders while using a hell of a lot of expensive gas. If a doctor looked at our armed forces, he'd see a bloated patient, lacking coordination and into advanced denial. A business management expert would see redundancy, inefficiency, and obsolescence; skewed priorities; a corrupt personnel setup; and a lousy accounting system. Our military is a sick institution, and if we don't do something about it, the Republic, the very source of our freedom, is going to die.

It is always a bitch to cause change. Woodrow Wilson said, "If you want to make enemies, try to change something." The first thing that needs to be changed is a lot of minds. For many in our country, U.S. military spending has become a sacred cow. A cow that has been well milked. This is the prevailing mind-set: We must not challenge the idea of national defense. It has become like social security

and Medicare—entitlements few lawmakers have the guts to challenge or cut.

Those who have a vested interest in the system—or are soaring on a hawk trip—say, "You gotta be a Commie or a loony tune to want to cut defense spending." This is the prevailing view of a lot of wild-eyed Congress members, most generals, all weapons makers, and one hell of a lot of uninformed citizens. They have all been conditioned to believe and fear that the Nazis, the Russians, the bogeymen, are coming. When they hear me pushing for military reform, these people say, "Only a traitor or a fool would want to tamper with the defense apparatus of the U.S.A."

My answer is, the hell with that. Change is urgently required. We've got to say, "What's the smart way to defend America without going broke, without collapsing like the Greeks and Romans, the Spanish, the French, the Dutch, the British, and the Soviets?"

In arguing for peace through strength, Ronald Reagan had it half right. But all he did was throw money at the problems. He solved nothing. I shudder when I look at how our 1995 tax dollars were spent: 50 cents for entitlements, 16 cents for interest on the debt, 17 cents for defense. That leaves us only 17 cents on the dollar to run the nation—for education, health, highways, transportation, and everything else. If entitlements, interest, and defense spending are not brought under control, even that 17 cents is going to shrink like a cheap T-shirt. In a few cases we are headed in a positive direction, such as closing redundant bases—we've already cut over a hundred of them—for an enormous savings. But we need to apply the same nonpartisan approach to every aspect of military spending, from tent pegs to satellites, from squads to divisions. Everything has to be challenged. We must constantly ask ourselves, "Is this particular expenditure necessary?" We need to say, "Look, is there a smarter way of defending America?"

I think there is.

The first step is to clean up the military's top leadership. We must find leaders who will put country and soldiers first, not their individual service and their career, war fighters in the great tradition of Matt Ridgway, Chesty Nimitz, Jimmy Doolittle, and Vic "the Brute" Krulak. To paraphrase JFK, we need leaders who will ask not what their service can do for them, but what they—and their service—can do for their country. We haven't lost all the good guys, studs like General Hugh Shelton and Admiral Snuffy Smith. And as much as it pains me to say it, President Clinton deserves full marks for putting three top warriors who care about people and want to do the right

thing in charge of the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps: General Ronald Fogleman, General Dennis Reimer, and General Charles Krulak, son of the Brute. But these good appointments haven't changed the behavior of the Perfumed Princes entrenched throughout the system. The culture is all-pervasive and the Perfumed Princes are in position to outscheme and outlast these few good men. When a problem is systemic, reform must also be systemic. What we need is a total overhaul, a task that could take ten years.

We have to get back to the bare bone basics, like a sergeant before going on patrol. That sergeant doesn't get into an esoteric exercise. He asks his captain, "What's the mission? How many men am I going to have? What's the enemy situation?" Then he scopes out the weather and terrain and moves out. The first thing America has to do is identify its real enemies—today, next year, and on into the middle of the twenty-first century. We can no longer afford to inflate our enemies list just to justify our weapons list.

Sure, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria are out there growling today. Down the track, China and Russia could be far bigger and more dangerous fire breathers. Let's consider for a moment the kind of threat they present. With North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, we could be looking at smaller versions of Desert Storm. With the rest of the little guys it's terrorism, bombs, chemical and biological weapons. With China and Russia the danger is total war: ICBMs, massed armies, and mass destruction right here on Main Street U.S.A. as well as the enemy's home ground. That is a worst-case scenario, of course. None of it may happen. But it's what we have to plan and spend for intelligently. Right now we are not gearing our efforts to genuine threats but to the overwhelming momentum of the Military Industrial Congressional Complex. We have to plan for two quite different kinds of war: low-tech and high-tech. Low-tech fighting of the kind we saw in Somalia hasn't changed much since the boys took up throwing rocks in the Stone Age to decide who got to be chief and which tribe would sit on the top of the mountain. Low-tech is man pitted against man—small-scale, deadly, and with significant political repercussions. High-tech is laser against laser, long-distance war with satellites and digital battlefields, the mighty computer chip driving whiz-bang weapons only now in their infancy.

Right now, our high-tech and low-tech capabilities are out of sync. We are behaving and spending as if we are already living and fighting in a *Star Wars* galaxy. But you've seen that Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, or Tuzla aren't exactly Jedi warrior stuff. For the immediate future, given the end of the superpower face-off and the nature

of our new, fragmented world, we are a lot more likely to find ourselves in a shitload of low-tech Mogadishu-style fights than high-tech shootouts. But our obsession with high tech, the search for the ultimate wonder weapon, has kept us from striking the right low-tech–high-tech balance.

We have to have a high-tech force that is ready to defend our skies and to fight futuristic over-the-horizon wars. Contrary to the general impression, Desert Storm came nowhere near what lies ahead. The irony is that even in high tech, our thinking is behind the power curve. We have a lot of good weapons systems with fifteen or twenty years shelf life left in them. We are replacing them early with stuff that's supposed to be whiz-bang, but is at best only next year's model. For example, we are replacing the F-15 fighter, one of the best ever made, with the F-22, when we should be thinking about a whole new family of missiles controlled by satellites and computer chips to take over the Wild Blue Yonder. We need to be looking even farther over the horizon. The weapons we have now, with updates, should last us easily into the 2010–2020 time frame. They are good enough to protect us against anybody out there right now. We should hold the line with these weapons while we invent and test a new generation of genuine future-shock hardware capable of convincing any Nasty, big or small, that if he slaps leather we will shut off his lights.

In the meantime, we have to recognize that our most frequent fights are going to be low-tech and then put a far greater priority on getting our warriors the right stuff. We have to spend more money to provide them a new family of small arms and lightweight, reliable communications gear. They need a better mine detector that can sniff out plastic mines. Our research and development people should devote the same attention they give to stealth technology to better personal gear in the form of body armor as well as improved detection and protection from nuclear-biological-chemical attack. Not as in Bosnia, where the supply system, crashing at the last minute, couldn't put body armor and winter gear on our warriors, throw a bridge across the Sava River in less than a week without making it a rat fuck, or get combat forces to the right place at the right time.

We should put people with hands-on experience, not just whiz-bang engineers and salesmen, in charge of weapons development. As things stand now, the whole process of getting war toys is staffed out to people who stand to make bigger bucks the more we spend, people with little fiefdoms to defend, people who have never been shot at, people who have worn white lab coats all their lives. Among the

people who set the priorities for new weapons, we should also have a lot more experienced warriors. And we should give them veto power over projects like MILSTAR and the early Bradley that turn into dollar-sucking monsters.

The truth is, we need to change and reform the entire U.S. armed forces. To do the job, we need a task force of the best brains in America. Here are the sorts of ideas I think we should be looking into. The most important, long past due, is to consolidate all our fighting forces into one unified service.

- We could merge the Army and the Marine Corps, giving the new outfit its own air arm including strategic bombers, and eliminate the Air Force.
- We could put the Navy in carge of all strategic missiles. The Navy would keep its traditional role and its own air arm, as well. In the short term, this would mean that swabbies would be manning missile silos on land. Long-range, and as quickly as possible, the missiles would be moved to subs at sea.
- We could form a new Strategic Mobility Command, taking the planes from the Air Force and the cargo ships from the Navy, and tasking it with all our air lift and sea lift needs.
- We could reconfigure the Pentagon, eliminating the separate service chiefs and the civilian secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in favor of a combined Defense Force headquarters, run by a civilian Secretary of Defense.
- We could eliminate the current evaluation-report system and the zero-defects mentality that produce highly inflated evaluations for Perfumed Princes who avoid all risks while destroying original thinkers and truth tellers. The existing system only encourages lying and officers who are afraid to step up to the plate. We would be better off with a simple report that asked, "Would you want to see your son serve under this guy in combat?"
- We could get rid of the Pentagon's command assignment system, its promotion boards, and its insistence that everyone be a jack-of-all-trades: romping, stomping combat leader, clever manager, brilliant staff officer, and West Point-caliber instructor. To destroy ticket punching and get warriors where we need them, we could return

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the choice of battalion and brigade leaders to division commanders; squadrons and groups to wing commanders; and ships to fleet commanders—and establish a professional Command Corps.

- We could, in light of the Boorda suicide, set up a better fail-safe system to make sure that our four stars in all the services are emotionally stable and able to stand up to the enormous stress and psychological pressures they must face every day.
- We could merge the National Guard and the Reserves into one streamlined organization. To cut waste and sleaze, the new outfit would be under federal, not state, control, where the politics of pork is even worse than in the Beltway.
- We could merge the duplicate, non-war-fighting functions of the services—intelligence, medical, legal, acquisitions, research and development, logistics, training, chaplain, and support—so that we have one, not four, outfits for each task. We could also consolidate all the service academies into a single American Defense Academy.
- We could set up a Weapons System Closing Commission to operate like the Base Closing Commission. No more than 5 percent of the commissioners to come from defense contractors—and none of those could vote on any weapon they themselves make.
- We could transform the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), isolating the final decision on defense contracts from politicians and generals. We could make it impossible for Bill Clinton to promise Sea Wolfs to Connecticut and Bob Dole to promise B-2s to California. Those decisions could be in the hands of independent boards of review composed of people who are barred from ever working for defense contractors.
- We could control congressional porkers swilling at the trough by making sure that no more than one fourth of the members of the Armed Services/National Security Committees or the Defense and Military Construction Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees represent states or districts with major military installations, military contracts, or large numbers of civilians working on defense contracts. No member of

those bodies should accept any Political Action Committee contributions from any company that has received more than $1 million in defense contracts or that earns more than half its total revenue from the Defense Department. The terms of senators and representatives chairing those committees and subcommittees should be limited to no more than four years. The fun and profit would go out of serving, but we would sharpen our focus on the tip of the nation's spear and wind up with a less costly, more effective defense.

- We could nail shut the MICC's revolving door by banning anyone who serves on a military-related committee of Congress or who serves in a flag-rank position in the military from working for any defense contractor for at least five years after leaving the job. That goes for the senior staff of both institutions. Period. No exceptions.
- We could restore the draft in the form of universal national service for all young men and women, who could choose between military or civilian assignments. This would save money and restore a sense of civic duty and other basic American values to our youth while keeping the military in better tune with democracy.

These ideas are not as extreme as they may sound. Senator Barry Goldwater, an Air Force Reserve major general who knew the armed forces from the inside, fought hard to reform the military. In 1986, it looked for a time like help was on the way when Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act. The legislation made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the head man of our military. The goal was to no longer have the four service chiefs bickering like fish salesmen on a hot day. This act increased attention to joint operations—the coordination of all the combat power of all the services in pursuit of a single mission, the winning of wars.

The nature of high-tech warfare, such as we saw in Desert Storm, requires total integration, total unity of effort. In other words, one coach to ensure that everyone runs down the field in the same direction and uses only one game plan. This single act gave the United States quick and decisive victories with minimum casualties during the Panama invasion and Desert Storm. The recent operation in Haiti again showed unity in action. Army choppers flying off Navy carriers. All services worked very well together. As a result, they got the job done quickly and with minimum fuss.

But the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was just the first wobbly step toward military reform. In 1995, Congress established a bottom-up commission headed by Harvard's John White to study the roles and missions of each service with the goal of streamlining the military machine and preparing it for the twenty-first century. The commission looked into twenty-five areas, from equipment acquisition to procurement to supply management to war fighting. Unlike the Goldwater-Nichols Act, this commission accomplished zilch. The commission merely rubber-stamped the status quo, perhaps because its brain trust was composed largely of retired generals and admirals who had created the mess in the first place. Reformers 0—MICC 10. White, who accomplished considerably more for himself than for his country, followed that time-tested principle: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. He became the number two man in the Pentagon.

The idea of a bottom-up review is brilliant, but it can only work when the people conducting it are the sort of straight shooters you've met in this book: Jim Burton, Bill Carpenter, Dave Evans, Dave Hunt, Sandy Mangold, Jim Morrison, Jim Mukoyama, Mike Wyly. They would bring integrity, vision, and moral courage to the job. They would not be bought, bent, or intimidated by the MICC. They would slay that evil sucker.

The military will never volunteer for this trip. The Perfumed Princes won't reform themselves. That would be like expecting the Mafia to share crime intelligence with the FBI. They have had it too good for too long. You cannot expect the hangman to burn the rope. If nothing is done, economics alone will force change, but it will be the wrong kind. The point is soon coming when Congress will have to say to the Pentagon, "We don't have $300 billion to give you. We have only $200 billion." But what will happen then? The ticket punchers will preserve the flagpoles, the headquarters, the staff cars for the brass; but there will no longer be enough warriors in the foxholes, and flagpoles don't shoot cannonballs.

We have to wake up. Paradoxically, the larger society is driven by well-meaning but misplaced idealism that constantly gets us stuck in the wrong fights. We keep writing moral checks we can't cover. We have seen them bounce in Vietnam and Somalia and we will probably see "Returned for Insufficient Funds" in Haiti and Bosnia. We can't just jump into every fight around the globe, no matter how hard television tugs at our heartstrings. We have to balance compassion with realism and ask ourselves before each mission, Is our national security endangered? Is this operation really necessary? Are there things we better fix at home first? As things stand now, we

don't ask these questions until the flag-draped coffins turn up at Dover and Travis Air Force bases. We have to think harder about consequences before we act, before the honor guards are firing their last salutes, before we get more white headstones and mothers like Gail Joyce wondering whether their young warriors have died in vain.

The same idealism has led us into a wrongheaded form of political correctness that now threatens to tear our armed forces apart at the very moment it has been going through the trauma of downsizing. The purpose of our military is to defend a democracy, not to be a democracy. To forget this is to invite disaster. Desert Storm and Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, show beyond any doubt that we've got an enormous job ahead of us to make sure that our armed forces are combat-ready to whip anyone who wants to destroy us. Under the circumstances, it is astounding to me that the first item on President Clinton's political agenda after his inauguration was gays in the military followed by his energetic efforts to put women into combat positions. Beyond that, the Army right now is getting ready to cut twenty thousand people; so we are going to see one or two more divisions disappear. At the same moment, maddeningly, we are keeping more than 16,000 people with asthma, heart conditions, and other medical problems that make them nondeployable. If they were discharged, there would be no need to lose those divisions. This PC-think has to stop. If our society continues to put its bleeding heart ahead of military muscles already stretched to the limit, we're going to end up knocking our ownselves out.

It may be mission impossible to cure everything wrong with America at once, but cleaning up the military is the first step in shoveling out the barn. If the military isn't as clean as an M-16 rifle before firing, then there's no way America can be put right, because it is going to jam. A "new look" military would give our nation a strong nuclear deterrence, a high-tech force ready for the twenty-first century and a low-tech force to protect our national security interests and to fire brigade hot spots. Now is the time to strike, while no serious enemy is breathing down our necks. It will take about ten years to make the transition. Israel did it when they formed the Israeli Defense Force, surrounded at the time 200 to 1. So it's not an impossible mission. But, as Ike warned, citizens must get involved. Change begins when people finally get angry enough to say, "Enough is enough," and demand reform.

Change can save a lot of money, too, right at the moment we need it most. History shows that uncontrolled defense budgets are a terminal illness for empires and superpowers. I believe that the sav-

ings from this kind of reform, in today's dollars, would run $100 billion a year. Eventually we could save $150 billion each year even as we are creating a much more effective military machine. According to the Center for Defense Information, a reform-minded think tank headed by John J. Shanahan, a retired vice admiral, each billion dollars spent on military procurement produces 25,000 jobs. If spent in the civilian sector, the same billion would create 30,000 jobs in mass transport, or 36,000 in housing or 41,000 in education or 47,000 in health care. As the *Defense Monitor,* the think tank's journal, has put it: "The irony is that continued military spending to support military related jobs is forcing budget cuts for superior job creating civilian activities." So reform could produce more jobs and more meaningful jobs. At the same time, maybe we should just give some of the savings back to the people from whom it was taken—the taxpayers.

I have been around soldiers and wars long enough to see the Death Wheel turn a lot of times. I have seen things get splattered over and over again, always the same patterns, the same mistakes. We never remember or learn from the past. But unlike so many of our top brass, fortunately—or unfortunately—I don't suffer from CRS.

Perhaps my memory's so good because as a teenager I saw so many fine young men wasted because of impostors masquerading as combat leaders and slick, shallow politicians who got off on the strongest aphrodisiac of them all—POWER—all of them pretending to be altruistic leaders.

Hackworths live a long time. Several of my forebears made it to the over-100 mark and a lot of them were raising hell and drinking good whiskey well into their nineties. So be warned, all you Perfumed Princes and Propaganda Poets, all you slick political porkers and weapons makers with your hands in the till. I intend to keep sniffing around like an old coyote, chewing on the Military Industrial Congressional Complex and calling 'em as I see 'em.

I intend to continue to tell it like it is to my fellow citizens with the hope that one day they will become so damn mad they'll stomp out the bad guys and retake charge of this great but sinking republic.

Since I'm no longer able to defend America by swinging my sword with the young studs, I will continue picking my targets and honing my pen into the ultimate bayonet. Hopefully the pen *will* prove to be mightier than the sword.

Meanwhile, as the troops say: Keep ten, watch out for mines—and stay up on the radio.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I couldn't have told this story without the help of John Boyd, Jim Burton, Bill Carpenter, Roger Charles, David Evans, Ernie Fitzgerald, Dave Hunt, Larry Joyce, Sandy Mangold, Jim Morrison, Jim Mukoyama, Charles Murphy, Chuck Spinney, Jim Stevenson, Mike Suessmann, Mile Wyly, and all those other hundreds of honest soldiers who live by the adage that loyalty is not to the boss or the institution, but to the truth. I am particularly grateful to those who can't be individually named for their courageous assistance because to do so would get their gold watches broken along with their necks.

Maynard Parker at *Newsweek* had the vision and nerve to put me back on hazardous duty along the fronts of the New World Disorder.

Henry Morrison, agent supreme, shepherded this book safely through Manhattan's Valley of the Shadow of Death, ably assisted by Joan Gurgold.

Will Schwalbe at William Morrow and Company, Inc., was a

publisher with guts, Jim Wade, an editor with a fine eye and ear for the military, and Zachary Schisgal, a sensitive coordinator.

Heidi Duncan, Liza Hamm, Rita Hanson, Chris London, and Charlot Schwartz kept the copy moving under pressure above and beyond the call of duty.

Tim Grattan, best friend and partner in crime, offered solid advice and the shelter of Grouse Mountain Lodge in Whitefish, and our pals at Hawk's Cay Hotel provided emergency commo and logistic support.

Lucille Beachy Mathews kept the fort at Fire Support Base Hoboken after Eilhys, Tom, and I crossed the line of departure.

Ben and David Hackworth selflessly sacrificed time with their dad while he closed in on a writer's scariest enemy—the deadline.

G L C

ABRAM:

AK-47

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

CM-406-02
15 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 7/15

SUBJECT: David Hackworth

- You requested my impressions of Chapter 12 from David Hackworth's book *Hazardous Duty* (TAB).

- General impression: Hackworth made an emotional appeal for reform of the military in 1996 and then outlined his ideas for changing "the system." I found myself in agreement with many of Hackworth's points; however, his reliance on anecdotal information dealing with a number of complex issues led him to draw several inaccurate, wide-ranging, and faulty conclusions which serve to detract from his main contention: the need to reform "the system." A number of these conclusions have, in fact, been proven wrong in the six years since the book. Moreover, some of his ideas have already been accomplished. The key questions before us today are: how to achieve transformation in the midst of war and how to make "the system" (military, industrial, Congressional) more responsive to change. Going back to Hackworth's prescriptive list of ideas at the end of the first Clinton administration may not be the best path to transformation in the current strategic environment.

- Once you understand that Hackworth was never promoted to general officer, and therefore thinks that most flag and general officers are "perfumed princes" who don't take care of the troops, you understand the harsh rhetoric directed at the senior uniformed leadership. Many of our senior officers fought with distinction and valor on the same battlefields as David Hackworth, and they continue their selfless service to their country and Commander-in-Chief.

- Agree that the "essence of leadership is integrity, loyalty, caring for your people, doing the honorable thing." These values are core today and they've become far more ingrained since Vietnam.

- Most of the personnel stories he cites are based on anecdotal information involving US Army personnel, I doubt their applicability to all Services. From a few very specific examples he leaps to general theorems for the entire Department. I don't buy it.

- Much of the equipment he maligns performed well during OEF (e.g., C-17, B-1, large deck aircraft carriers). Just to cite an example, it would have been a showstopper if DoD had taken Hackworth's advice to buy only a dozen C-17s and fill out the rest of the inventory with 747s. These 747s would not have been able to land at Kandahar, Jacobobad, or Karshi Khanabad.

- Completely agree with his assertion that we need more jointness. Also agree with his conclusion that we are keeping too much of the wrong capability in the Army National Guard.

- I dispute Hackworth's assertion that the "U.S. military machine has locked itself in concrete" since Washington crossed the Delware. While change is never easy for any large organization, the Department has successfully evolved, and in many cases even "transformed," to exploit opportunities and to meet the challenges to our National Security.

- Additionally he confuses low/high tech war with low/high intensity conflict. For example, low intensity conflict doesn't have to mean using low-tech combat capability. However, he is on target when he says that high tech warfare requires total integration and unity of effort, as we have just demonstrated in Afghanistan.

- I take issue with Hackworth's central suggestion to consolidate all our fighting forces into one unified service. Service cultures are vitally important. I offer the Canadians' poor experience with a combined Defense Force headquarters as an example of how bad an idea it really is.

- Bottom line: I would caution against using Hackworth's long list of ideas (circa 1995-1996) as the prescription for transformational change in 2002. He has some good ideas, some bad ideas, some already accomplished, and some in work. In my opinion, we need to set the conditions for change in "the system" and continue to do the right thing for the country. Fights like Crusader will erupt from time-to-time, but that should not detract us from a transformation path that enables us to wage war effectively today and better defend ourselves in the future.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment
As stated

Prepared By: General Richard B. Myers, (b)(6)

snowflake

July 20, 2002 12:54 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Categories

7/24

7/25

I want to see a piece of paper that shows me what the dollars and percentages are of the DoD budget for different categories. I heard yesterday that environment is $4 billion. Health has to be $28 or $30 billion. All-in personnel costs have to be some number and a percent.

There are so many things we are doing that have nothing to do with defense or are paying for past things, like environmental cleanup or retirees' health. We ought to find some ingenious ways to cluster these things that I can use in a speech or in testimony.

* Please come up with some categories, but not the numbers or percentages. Let me look at them, and then I will edit that before you take the trouble to punch the numbers. (He did the numbers anyway.) ~~Second~~ Last page

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072002-7

Please respond by 08/16/02

7/24
Response attached

7/24

20 Jul 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10927 U13636 /02

7/23
1530

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

July 23, 2002 1:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Categories

- Attached is a summary of broad categories that we use to define the Defense budget (Tab A). This is a chart that we used in justifying the FY 2003 budget request to both the Congress and the Press.

- You also asked me to come up with some broad categories that we could use to cluster things that do not directly contribute to the defense of the nation. Attached is a proposed list of categories (Tab B). Many of these are the same categories that we used to develop what we considered to be "nontraditional" defense programs last year.

  - Full Funding of Civilian Retiree Costs – Last year the Office of Management and Budget realigned funding so that each federal agency would finance the full retirement cost for their civilian employees.

  - Environmental Programs – The $4.1 billion funds not only cleanup for past DoD contamination ($1.3 billion), but also compliance with current environmental and pollution laws.

  - International Activities – Support provided to international activities such as Regional Centers and the Cooperative Threat Reduction for the Former Soviet Union.

  - Law Enforcement – Support provided to law enforcement organizations such as counterdrug activities and weapons of mass destruction civil support teams.

  - Medical Programs – Support to provide medical to military members, their families, and military retirees plus non-defense unique medical research such as cancer.

  - Social Welfare Support – Support provided social programs such as blankets for the homeless and youth development programs.

  - Other Nontraditional Defense Programs – Support provided to activities such as WC-130 Hurricane Fighters and the Civil Air Patrols, which is a youth oriented program serving the civilian auxiliary of the Air Force and is used for inland search/rescue and disaster efforts.

10.01

23 JUL 02

COORDINATON: None.

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)

FY 03 DoD Budget

(Discretionary Budget Authority)



* Includes Military Construction, Family Housing and Revolving Funds

(Dollars in Millions)	FY 2003		Percentage of Total DoD Budget	
Full Funding of Civilian Retiree Costs	**3,304.4**		**0.9%**	3.3
Environmental Programs		**4,108.2**	**1.1%**	4.1
Environmental Restoration	1,278.2			
Environmental Compliance	1,705.7			
Environmental Conservation	152.0			
Pollution Prevention	247.5			
Environmental Technology	205.1			
Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC)	519.7			
International Activities		**608.8**	**0.2%**	
Support for International Sporting Competitions	19.0			
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid	58.4			
Former Soviet Union Cooperative Threat Reduction	416.7			
Regional Centers	63.3			
Warsaw Initiative/Partnership for Peace	51.4			
Humanitarian Demining				
Law Enforcement		**915.1**	**0.2%**	1.0
Drug Interdiction & Counter-drug Activities (excludes $82.5 million for DoD drug testing and demand reduction)	766.4			
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	148.7			
Medical Programs including Research		**14,706.2**	**3.9%**	14.7
Defense Health Program	14,706.2			
HIV Research				
Cancer Research				
Social Welfare Support		**80.2**	**0.0%**	
Homeless Blanket Program	3.2			
National Guard Challenge Program	63.6			
Starbase Youth Program	13.4			
Historically Black Colleges & Universities				
Other Non-Traditional Defense Programs		-	**0.0%**	
Civil Air Patrols - Youth oriented program serving civilian auxiliary of USAF; used for inland search/rescue & disaster efforts.	19.7			
WC-130 Hurricane Fighters				
Mentor Protégé				
Museums				
Chemical Agents & Munitions Destruction Demilitarization - Destroys US inventory of lethal chemical agents and munitions and related material.	1,490.2			
Total DoD Budget Authority	**378,624.5**			

7/22
1530

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

COMPTROLLER

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COORDINATON: None.

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10931

U13637 /02

110.01

23 JUL 02

FY 03 DoD Budget

(Discretionary Budget Authority)



* Includes Military Construction, Family Housing and Revolving Funds

11-L-0559/OSD/10932

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Full Funding of Civilian Retiree Costs	**3,304.4**		**0.9%**	3.3
Environmental Programs		**4,108.2**	**1.1%**	4.1
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Museums				
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snowflake

July 20, 2002 12:54 PM

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SUBJECT: Categories

7/24

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
072002-7

Please respond by 08/16/02

7/24
Response attached

7/24

20 Jul 02

snowflake

June 26, 2002 4:52 PM

TO: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Capabilities

Please take a look at this memo I sent out to you on March 29, and tell me where you think we are.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/29/02 SecDef memo re: Capabilities [032902-19]

DHR:dh
062602-21

Please respond by 08/02/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
AUG 19 2002

8/2

VCJCS response attached.
V/R
Ed

Source

U13642 /02

snowflake

March 29, 2002 12:08 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

CC: GEN. MYERS
GEN. PACE

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

army DI Rite 4/3

SUBJECT: Capabilities

We have to find ways so that when OSD and I look at proposals, we look less at what the Services and their stovepipes bring up to us, and more at what the CINCs look at in the world—namely, the capabilities the CINCs need to deal with the problems that could occur.

That calls for a robust PA&E.

I don't know what it means with respect to JROC or mechanisms in the Services or the Joint Staff that could contribute, but I don't see much of a contribution at this stage from any of them.

Why shouldn't we require that the Services, when they make presentations, discuss how they fit into the joint world from a CINC's perspective, rather than what they want?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032902-19

Please respond by 04/12/02

4/1

CAMBONE RESPONSE ATTACHED.

N/R

Snowflake

EF15B LA
02/007163-OSDP

May 8, 2002 8:13 AM

TSP

TO: Doug Feith

CC: J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Chechnya

RUSSIA

What do you think of this note from Newt Gingrich about Chechnya? It is interesting. That might be the kind of thing we could do with Russia.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Chechnya

DHR:dh
050802-16

Please respond by 05/31/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 1 9 2002

8/17

SECDEF —
Crouch response attached.
V/R
Ed
20 May 02

MAY 8 02 13:5

05-08-02 14:35 IN

8/16

snowflake

August 17, 2002 2:54 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Tom White, Gordon England, James Roche, Doug Feith, Pete Aldridge, David Chu, Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Decentralization

I have been urging that OSD do fewer operational activities and that such activities be decentralized in some instances to the Services.

One of the risks in decentralizing in DoD is that there continues to be a degree of centrifugal force in the Services to be insular and separate. That is a harmful and destructive pressure. The goal—just the exact opposite—is to get the Services joint earlier.

Therefore, how we handle those two competing goals is important. My recommendation is that when we decentralize activities down to the Services, we don't decentralize an activity to all four Services. Instead, we should look for opportunities to decentralize an activity down to a single Service, as we did with space, where we made the Air Force the Executive Agent. The advantage of doing it that way is it does not contribute to a still greater centrifugal force pulling the Services apart. Indeed, it does quite the opposite, in that it forces the Service to begin to manage an activity for all of the other Services, thereby forcing a certain jointness.

I hope that you will keep that in mind as we move forward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081702-3

Please respond by —

OSD

17 Aug 02

U13685 /02

Snowflake

#2816

August 20, 2002 7:17 AM

France

TO: General Myers

CC: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

I would like to stop the assignment of Dupré to Paris. I don't think a two-star is appropriate.

I think we ought to assign an O-6 so we don't end up with a two-star there if he gets promoted.

I will ask the General Counsel to prepare a proposal to change the law, so we can go back to an O-6, as in other countries.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés

DHR:dh
081902-45

Please respond by 09/06/02

8/29

Prior response attached

SR-3

(20Aug02)

U13717-02

8/23
1830

THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG 23 PM 12: 10

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

France

- You asked Gen Myers to stop the assignment of Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, as the Defense Attache (DATT) – France (TAB) in order to avoid having a two star fill this position. Brig Gen Dupre is projected to be promoted to Major General in June 2003.

- I certainly agree that the DATT-France position should be downgraded to a Colonel and fully support your legislative proposal to change the law that currently requires the grade to be an O-7. However, in the interim, recommend Brig Gen Dupre continue with his scheduled assignment based on the timing of your request.

- Brig Gen Dupre is already in France. He has relocated his family and received his household goods. He is currently scheduled to assume the position on 4 September. In addition, Brig Gen and Mrs. Dupre both just completed four months of extensive preparation and training at the Defense Intelligence Agency. The incumbent, RADM Larry Poe, has also shipped his household goods and is preparing to retire.

- In light of these circumstances, recommend Brig Gen Dupre be allowed to serve as DATT-France until his promotion to Major General. This solution avoids a two-star in the position and alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while affording the department sufficient time to amend the legislation and adequately prepare his replacement.

- The Air Force concurs with curtailing his assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the assignment of Brig Gen Dupre to be Defense Attaché – France until the month prior to his effective promotion date to Major General (currently projected as May 2003).

22 Aug 02

COORDINATION: NONE

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	8/23

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION

_____Approve _____Disapprove _____Other

11-L-0559/OSD/10940 U13869 /02

SPD 8/19

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

48/19

INFO MEMO

U-090/DR

August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.

  - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C3I) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.

  - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.

- Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.

- The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.

- DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Snowflake

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-23

Please respond by _____

Response attached

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

22 AUG 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

FROM: AFSLMO

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché France – Major General (select) Dupre

We were informed that the Secretary of Defense has concerns about the assignment of Brigadier General Felix Dupre as the Defense Attaché (DATT) in Paris and is directing that he not be allowed to continue in the assignment. While we certainly don't contest the concern about the grade of this position, and frankly we agree it could be downgraded to that of a colonel, we offer the following for your consideration:

1. General Dupre is already in France. He arrived 12 Aug and as of the 21 Aug, received shipment of his household goods. General Dupre has begun a period of transition with the current DATT, Rear Admiral (Upper) Poe. An official Transfer of Responsibilities Ceremony is scheduled for 4 Sep.

2. Dr. Cooke approved General Dupre for the assignment in Oct 01. Since then, General Dupre and his wife, who were both already fluent in the French language, underwent 4 months of extensive preparation and training with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Also subsequent to Dr. Cooke's approval, General Dupre was selected, nominated, and confirmed for promotion to the grade of major general. Our current projections indicate his promotion to the grade of major general will be effective in Jun 03.

3. Rear Admiral Poe is a naval reservist currently serving an active duty tour. Our understanding is he has other commitments following the conclusion of his scheduled tour in Paris.

4. As you know, title 10, U.S.C., section 714 requires an officer selected for assignment as DATT France hold the grade of (or be on a promotion list to) brigadier general. We understand you have initiated independent action to pursue legislation to return this position to that of a colonel.

5. The Air Force currently does not have another brigadier general or colonel prepared to assume the unique duties of DATT France. We project it would take a minimum of 6 months to adequately prepare another officer to assume these duties.

In light these circumstances, we submit for your consideration that General Dupre be allowed to remain as the DATT France for a period of 1 year. We believe this course of action alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while giving the department time to work towards properly aligning the grade of this billet and adequately preparing a replacement.

RICHARD S. HASSAN
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Air Force Senior Leader Management Office

Snowflake

August 15, 2002 10:20 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: MoD Ivanov in Washington

MoD Ivanov is going to be here between September 18 and 21, departing on September 21. The only thing he wants to do is see me, meet with the four and see Condi.

We need to think through the schedule and how often I want to see him. We need to decide whether I want to do anything with him one evening. I have kind of a modest temptation to take him to dinner and have Joyce included, as opposed to a big dinner in his honor—but we will want to talk to Colin Powell about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-9

Please respond by 09/06/02

8/19

→ To T. D. Crouch

FYI.

D. Rita

LARRY DI RITA
8/20

7/22
1900

snowflake

July 22, 2002 10:43 AM

001.1 WH

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: November 17

I called Andy Card and suggested he might want to have the White House invite in the families of the Americans, and possibly even the Greek driver, who were killed by the November 17 terrorist group: Captain George Tsantos, a Naval officer I believe, and his Greek driver; Sgt. Robert Judd, who was wounded in 1984—I think he is now at Great Lakes; Capt. Bill Nordeen, U.S. Navy, in 1988; Sgt. Stuart, U.S. Army, in 1991; and, of course, the CIA station chief Welch.

There might be some way to honor them, since the November 17 group looks like it is getting pretty well shattered out there.

Andy is looking into the thought. If it happens, Ambassador Tom Miller might be appropriate to brief the families.

We ought to have somebody in the Pentagon who looks after those folks, the families of those people, as well. Let me know what we do for them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-22

Please respond by 08/09/02

8/19
Jim Haynes
- 1: Mtg a function of what you discussed with Hadley?
Larry

snowflake

August 19, 2002 7:37 AM

09/14

TO: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: DATTs

Please find out how good our DATTs in Pakistan Yemen, Philippines, Japan, Korea and Saudi Arabia are and let me know.

In the future, I would like to know who is going to be sent to these countries and what their qualifications are before they go.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/15/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: "DATTs Beyond the Army"

DHR:dh
081702-15

Please respond by 09/06/02

19Aug02

U13726 /02

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 17 2002

U-089/DR

August 15, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: DATTs Beyond the Army

Sir, you asked why Services other than Army should have DATTs since they do not have Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs.

- Technically, the Air Force and Navy have FAO programs. Unlike the Army, these programs do not include career paths but do develop regional expertise.

- Distribution of 131 DATT billets is relatively constant. Army dominates (72 Army, 34 Air Force, 19 Navy, and 9 Marine).

- Three major considerations drive Service affiliations of DATT assignments. Not all billets require Army FAOs.

  - Requirement for area expertise. These needs prevail in Asia, Africa, Latin America and parts of Europe. These DATTs are predominately Army.

  - Service interest or emphasis. These DATTs are assigned based on our predominant military interest in a host country, or to maximize access. Examples are an Air Force DATT in Israel and Navy DATTs in Singapore and Norway.

  - Liaison and representational emphasis. In these countries there is usually a senior U.S. military commander and/or strong military and intelligence exchange relationship, resulting in primarily representational DATT duties. Examples are the U.K., Germany, Italy, Japan and Australia. Requirements are for senior O-6s with strong operational experience and interpersonal skills.

- The three one-star DATT billets (Russia, China and France) rotate among the Army, Air Force and Navy. This permits Services to plan ahead and provide officers with requisite language and attaché training. A process where Services compete for these positions would be preferable. Army FAOs would probably dominate.

Jacoby understands your wishes on France

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L. E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy

U13729 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10947

snowflake

7:40 AM

TO: Admiral Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Why should other services have ~~DATs~~ DATIs beyond the Army since none of the other services have area programs?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080802.02

Please respond by: 8/15/02

SECDEF—
Jacoby response attached.
V/R
ED

8/15

U13730 /02

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
508 SCOTT DR
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-5357

SECRETARY
2002 AUG 21 PM 12:25

12 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: USTRANSCOM/DLA Integration

1. You asked for my thoughts on how we should handle the issue of USTRANSCOM/DLA integration. As you know, this has proven to be an emotional issue in some quarters. In our discussions during your visit to USTRANSCOM, I highlighted the progress on global distribution achieved by partnering with DLA on Strategic Distribution. With the current organizational structure, we've made some good strides improving customer wait time, location of stocks, and improved velocity to the warfighters.

2. In tackling the integration issue, I see three possible courses of action. First, stay the course, status quo, with the proposed study. However, I see problems with this approach. The contract for the study was just signed 6 August essentially leaving only seven weeks to conduct the study and provide recommendations. That said, I doubt we'll receive the out-of-the-box thinking we seek based on the time constraints as well as the complicated technical details of a transformation issue of this magnitude.

3. The second option is an evolution of our current efforts with DLA. We could integrate certain pieces of DLA into USTRANSCOM. Key would be identifying where the efficiencies can be gained for a global distribution chain. This course of action, while immediate, remains evolutionary and may not provide the true transformation change of business practices, maximizing resources, and exploring the full potential of possibilities within the two organizations.

4. The third course of action is the most aggressive, deliberate, transformational, and is the one I recommend. The following series of actions would help us shape the final end state as well as make immediate improvements to the current system. As a first step, realign DLA under USTRANSCOM, with no other organizational or resource changes to either organization. Two immediate benefits: it would bring DLA under a command structure (emphasizing the critical warfighting aspects of global distribution); and it would remove much of the external influences/interferences currently surrounding any discussion of the two organizations. I believe change to the customer would be transparent, in fact, I guarantee it.

5. Once realigned, the TRANSCOM and DLA staffs will work together to determine the best way to truly meld DLA and USTRANSCOM core competencies, processes, and organizations. To achieve this, some missions/resources might require divestiture or realignment. Our assessment will be focused on transforming DOD's global supply chain

U13748 /02

using best commercial practices, while integrating it into our force deployment processes. We will provide you with quarterly updates on our progress, and develop the supporting business plans for our proposals.

6. In summary, the third option advocates taking concrete actions now vice continued, laborious study and piecemeal change. It allows the experts in the two organizations, under a single commander, to sort out the attendant details with a common focus and direction. Most of all, it aligns with our warfighting strategy of integrated and simultaneous force projection and sustainment in support of the warfighting commanders.

7. I look forward to working this effort aggressively and am ready to discuss further at your convenience.

JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

cc:
CJCS
USD (AT&L)
Dir, PA&E

snowflake

July 20, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Gen. Handy

CC: Gen. Myers
Pete Aldridge
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: DLA

020 DLA

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how you think we ought to handle DLA.

One thought would be to have you take a look at it and tell me what portions ought not to be transferred to TRANSCOM. I need to get my head into it to see if I really think it is a good idea. But, at least at the moment, with a minimum of information, it strikes me that it might make sense.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072002-17

Please respond by 08/16/02

20 Jul 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 20 2002

یەکێتی نیشتمانی کوردستان
سکرتێری گشتی

الاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني

الامين العام

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Secretary General

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

August 19, 2002

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was an honor for me to meet with your Excellency in the White House last week. I was heartened to learn of your attention to the intricacies of the Iraq issue, and your commitment to the vision of a democratic Iraq.

The institutions of self-government in the Kurdistan Region, free Iraq, can be a catalyst for wider democratization of the whole of the country. Our model proves that Iraq can be different, and Iraq need not be governed by tyranny. We also understand fully that our interest lies in close partnership with the United States. Furthermore, this is a part of the Islamic Middle East in which U.S. support is widely appreciated and acknowledged. Therefore, it is only logical to predict that Saddam Hussein identifies Iraqi Kurdistan as a priority target in his effort to neutralize plans aimed the removal of his regime.

I am confident that the United States is fully aware of our vulnerabilities in the face of possible onslaught by Saddam's army or WMDs. Given the seriousness of the present situation, it is urgent that the United States Government publicly states a robust commitment to defend the territory and people of Iraqi Kurdistan.

In particular there is need to train our military personnel to assist in supporting possible US Air Force combat missions that will be necessary to repel Iraqi aggression. Mobile Training Teams should be dispatched to our territory to arrange for this as a matter of urgency. This will be seen as a serious deterrence to Baghdad aggressive intentions.

Further, we are seriously concerned about the use of chemical and biological weapons against our people. It is imperative that our friends in the United States make available to us mobile clinics, means of protection and antidotes to deal with this serious possibility.

The PUK is a partner with the United States in this noble endeavor to bring about a democratic Iraq—we look forward to working closely with you and your colleagues for our common interest in democracy and stability in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Jalal Talabani

8! Snowflake

August 20, 2002 6:16 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter from PUK Secretary General

Please make sure someone answers this letter from Talabani, and I want to see the words before it goes out.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/02 Jalal Talabani (Secretary General, PUK) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
082002-22

8/20

Please respond by 09/06/02

SWT -
- Draft response
- Coord with Policy
D.R.

8/21

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 23 2002

IRAQ

Mr. Jalal Talabani
Secretary General
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Sulaimaniya, Iraq

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter expressing the views of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. I appreciate your courage and commitment to a free Iraq.

We are well aware of the threat Saddam's forces pose to the people living in northern Iraq. We plan to continue working with opposition leaders to prepare for the likely contingencies.

We are looking into the matters you raised and will remain in contact through the appropriate United States Government channels.

Sincerely,

23 OCT 02

U17347 /02

Snowflake

August 20, 2002 6:07 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Congressman Kirk

Attached is a letter from Congressman Mark Kirk, which I found had some interesting ideas.

Regards.

Attach.
07/03/02 Kirk ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
082002-19

Please respond by _____

DHR

20 Aug 02

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM

2002 JUL -3 PM 3:36

TO: Secretary Don Rumsfeld
Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: U.S. Rep. Mark Kirk (R-IL)
DATE: July 3, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 20 2002

Re: Iraq

Paul indicated he was open to a few thoughts on Iraq which I worked on heavily 1996-99 (aka the "Bad Years"). Very briefly, I wanted to provide you with some thoughts. I would rally support in the House when the time comes to act on any of these ideas. These ideas form an option short of "Desert Storm II" which could replace the Saddam government.

We need to build a Crescendo of Tension against Saddam that will encourage him to make a mistake, alienating him from Europeans and his Arab neighbors. I would propose a six-step plan:

1. **Extend Operation Northern Watch (ONW) coverage to all of Iraqi Kurdistan.** I am a veteran of ONW (April-May 2000). Over one million Kurds live South of the ONW line. The new areas to be covered are southern half of the area controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and all of the area controlled by the small Halabja-based IMK (recall Halabja is the site of Saddam's 1988 gas attack that killed 5,500 civilians). Both groups are highly motivated to fight Saddam's Fifth Corps and would be emboldened by ONW air coverage. The legal basis for extending ONW aircover to all Kurdish areas is the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 688 that requires the government of Iraq not to oppress its people.

2. **Declare a No Drive Zone for Northern Iraq.** Clinton National Security Advisor Sandy Berger sold out the CIA and opposition to Saddam in April of 1996 when he failed to respond Iraq's armored thrust against the Iraqi National Congress in Irbil. In an infamous phrase, Berger said "we are not going to war with Iraq today." Organized opposition crumbled, the INC dissolved inside Iraq and the two Kurdish factions (the PUK and Kurdish Democratic Party or KDP) divided. By declaring a No Drive Zone, the United States would demonstrate a tangible commitment to the KDP that the U.S. would prevent any future armored attack by Saddam. It would encourage cooperation between the KDP and PUK and would enable them to rehost the CIA and Arab Iraqi opposition in Northern Iraq. This action could also be based on a Bush Administration doctrine of "fully implementing" UNSC 688.

3. **Establish an Opposition Core Group office in Irbil.** With MacArthur-like tones of "returning to the Philippines", the U.S. should sponsor a return of the INC and an opposition core group to its offices in Irbil. Key representatives of Iraq's 73 opposition groups at the meeting should include Dr. Ayad Alawi (Iraqi National Accord), Sharif Ali Ben Hussein (Constitutional Monarchists), Jalal Talabani (PUK), Masud Barzani (KDP), Dr. Muhammed Salih Bahr Al-'ulum (Ahl Al Bayt), Dr. Abu Ahmad Al Ja'afri (Da'war Islamic Party), and Baqir AlHakim (Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq - SCIRI).

U10811 /02

4. **Use KDP and PUK-Controlled Transmitters to Broadcast Radio-Free Iraq (RFE/RL) AM and TV to Baghdad.** The United States already produces high quality content from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague that is broadcast via shortwave to Iraq. By using KDP and PUK-controlled transmitters in Iraq, every cab driver and TV viewer in Baghdad would have easier access to unbiased news and views about Iraq. The U.S. should also broadcast the RFE/RL content via direct satellite to Iraq.

5. **Indict Saddam.** The United States has had enormous success with ad hoc war crimes tribunals for Germany, Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In the case of Germany, the U.S. had custody of both defendants and evidence. The Yugoslav tribunal had a much harder task – it did not have custody of defendants or the evidence. Both were painstakingly assembled. In the case of Iraq, we already have custody of the evidence as captured during Desert Storm and painstakingly translated by DIA. The establishment of an Iraqi War Crimes Tribunal would help to stigmatize Saddam much as the Yugoslav indictment of Milosevic helped to turn him into a pariah. It would be a dramatic boost to the coalition.

6. **Recognize a Liberation Government of Iraq.** Once the ONW protection is in place and the INC has reestablished offices in Irbil, the United States should derecognize Saddam and recognize an Arab-based liberation government in Irbil. Using ONW aircraft and KDP/PUK ground forces, we could protect this government with little military effort. Once established, the government would be a magnet for any disaffected Iraqi military officer willing to risk a five hour drive from Baghdad to escape. Over time the drain on Saddam will force him to attack the north, alienating Iraq from sympathizers in Europe and the Arab world. Such an attack by Saddam would galvanize support for a U.S.-led coalition to finish him off and install the Liberation Government in Baghdad.

7. There was a classified program executed against Milosevic during Operation Allied Force that was quite effective. If I have the chance, I would review it with you and its application to Iraq.

Just a few thoughts.

11-L-0559/OSD/10957

snowflake

August 19, 2002 4:09 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

CC: Lt. Gen. Hayden
Gen. Myers
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Assessment

I received some material on the tri-border matter from Mike Hayden. He is wondering if we ought to begin to distribute materials on this subject more widely.

You will recall George and I agreed it should be tightly held.

I am going to be out of town for the last week of August. I would like to leave the decision in your hands as to how widely material on this subject ought to be distributed. Please decide and tell General Hayden directly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081902-29

000.5

19 Aug 02

U13846 /02

Snowflake

August 20, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

I notice that the intel on possible force protection risks in Saudi Arabia is changing and getting worse. We ought to think about how we want to be arranged there.

Let's talk at some point.

Thanks.

DHR/dh
082002-8

Please respond by _____

Saudi Arabia

20 Aug 02

U13848 /02

#286

THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

- You asked Gen Myers to stop the assignment of Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, as the Defense Attache (DATT) – France (TAB) in order to avoid having a two star fill this position. Brig Gen Dupre is projected to be promoted to Major General in June 2003.

- I certainly agree that the DATT-France position should be downgraded to a Colonel and fully support your legislative proposal to change the law that currently requires the grade to be an O-7. However, in the interim, recommend Brig Gen Dupre continue with his scheduled assignment based on the timing of your request.

- Brig Gen Dupre is already in France. He has relocated his family and received his household goods. He is currently scheduled to assume the position on 4 September. In addition, Brig Gen and Mrs. Dupre both just completed four months of extensive preparation and training at the Defense Intelligence Agency. The incumbent, RADM Larry Poe, has also shipped his household goods and is preparing to retire.

- In light of these circumstances, recommend Brig Gen Dupre be allowed to serve as DATT-France until his promotion to Major General. This solution avoids a two-star in the position and alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while affording the department sufficient time to amend the legislation and adequately prepare his replacement.

- The Air Force concurs with curtailing his assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the assignment of Brig Gen Dupre to be Defense Attaché – France until the month prior to his effective promotion date to Major General (currently projected as May 2003).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION SEP 3 2002

U13869 02

_____Approve _____Disapprove _____Other

U13869.02

3

THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG 23 PM 12: 10

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

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COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION

_____Approve _____Disapprove _____Other

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

INFO MEMO

U-090/DR

August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.

  - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C3I) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.

  - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.

- Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.

- The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.

- DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Snowflake

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-23

Please respond by _____

Response attached

113536-02

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

22 AUG 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

FROM: AFSLMO

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché France – Major General (select) Dupre

We were informed that the Secretary of Defense has concerns about the assignment of Brigadier General Felix Dupre as the Defense Attaché (DATT) in Paris and is directing that he not be allowed to continue in the assignment. While we certainly don't contest the concern about the grade of this position, and frankly we agree it could be downgraded to that of a colonel, we offer the following for your consideration:

1. General Dupre is already in France. He arrived 12 Aug and as of the 21 Aug, received shipment of his household goods. General Dupre has begun a period of transition with the current DATT, Rear Admiral (Upper) Poe. An official Transfer of Responsibilities Ceremony is scheduled for 4 Sep.

2. Dr. Cooke approved General Dupre for the assignment in Oct 01. Since then, General Dupre and his wife, who were both already fluent in the French language, underwent 4 months of extensive preparation and training with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Also subsequent to Dr. Cooke's approval, General Dupre was selected, nominated, and confirmed for promotion to the grade of major general. Our current projections indicate his promotion to the grade of major general will be effective in Jun 03.

3. Rear Admiral Poe is a naval reservist currently serving an active duty tour. Our understanding is he has other commitments following the conclusion of his scheduled tour in Paris.

4. As you know, title 10, U.S.C., section 714 requires an officer selected for assignment as DATT France hold the grade of (or be on a promotion list to) brigadier general. We understand you have initiated independent action to pursue legislation to return this position to that of a colonel.

5. The Air Force currently does not have another brigadier general or colonel prepared to assume the unique duties of DATT France. We project it would take a minimum of 6 months to adequately prepare another officer to assume these duties.

In light these circumstances, we submit for your consideration that General Dupre be allowed to remain as the DATT France for a period of 1 year. We believe this course of action alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while giving the department time to work towards properly aligning the grade of this billet and adequately preparing a replacement.

RICHARD S. HASSAN
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Air Force Senior Leader Management Office

Snowflake

#280

August 20, 2002 7:17 AM

TO: General Myers

CC: RADM Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

I would like to stop the assignment of Dupré to Paris. I don't think a two-star is appropriate.

I think we ought to assign an O-6 so we don't end up with a two-star there if he gets promoted.

I will ask the General Counsel to prepare a proposal to change the law, so we can go back to an O-6, as in other countries.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés

DHR:dh
081902-45

Please respond by 09/06/02

U13717-02

snowflake

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG 26 PM 3:27

July 16, 2002 4:44 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: ~~Donald Rumsfeld~~

SUBJECT: Budget Amendment

Here are two papers by ~~our Comptroller~~ Dov Zakheim explaining the $10 billion war reserve and how it fits into our overall budget.

With the President's budget amendment on the Hill, I thought these would help you get your head into the numbers.

Thanks.

Attach.
Talking Points, Defense Emergency Response Fund paper

DHR:dh
071602-4

8/24 USD(C) Dov - See Secdef Note Pls

10.01

Ask Dov if this is still true - If so send why 2 memos?

24 Aug 02

TALKING POINTS RE: $10 BILLION

- The $10 billion budget amendment is needed to continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

- The remaining $369 billion simply does not provide us with funds to continue Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle into fiscal year 2003.

- Of that $369 billion —

  $6.7 billion is for inflation;
  $14.1 billion is for must pay bills such as Tricare for Life accrual, and pay raises;
  $7.4 billion is for fully funding training optempo and realistic weapons system costing;
  $9.4 billion is for procurement of munitions and other items that could be expended in Afghanistan or elsewhere;
  $0.6 billion is for programs generated by the Nuclear Posture Review.

- That leaves about $331 billion to meet baseline requirements, such as missile defense. This baseline excludes any activity in Afghanistan.

- But $331 billion is also the level of the FY 2002 enacted budget. Therefore, we were only able to fund new requirements, such as for transformation programs, by

  - reducing our program with cuts totaling $9.3 billion—these included important programs like SBIRS-LO and Navy Area Wide;

  - terminating Crusader.

- Unless we can draw upon the funds in the budget amendment for the $10 billion, *we have no money left* for Afghanistan operations, *at whatever tempo*, beginning October 1, 2002.

  - Clearly, at this time we cannot predict how far into FY 2003 the $10 billion would support Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle.

  - For this reason as well, we cannot predict whether there would be any funds available to support follow-on Global War on Terrorism operations in FY 2003.

The Defense Emergency Response Fund

$10 Billion Request

- The $10 billion is to support the continuation of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. If money is diverted to fund other operations, then there will be less available to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan. There is no money in the baseline budget to fund the incremental cost of the global war on terrorism.

Military Operations **$7.82 billion**

- Of the $10 billion, $7.8 billion finances approximately 4 months of military operations, based on current operating tempo beginning October 1, 2002. These funds support deployed forces so that readiness and procurement accounts are not adversely impacted.
  - $5.3 billion finances: combat operations; sustainment of forces in the theater (food, supplies, etc.), training of troops prior to deployment, intelligence and communication requirements, cost of maintaining facilities and base support in the theater, the transportation of troops and supplies to and from the areas of operation.
  - $2.5 billion finances: the incremental additional cost of military pay, subsistence of troops deployed, travel costs; medical costs, and the pay of mobilized Reserve and National Guard troops.

Munitions **$0.2 billion**

- Finances the procurement of critical munitions that are in short supply.
  - $35 million finances 700 Hellfire missiles for the Navy and Marine Corps.
  - $94 million finances munitions for the Army and the Special Operations Forces to replace munitions expended.
  - $25 million finances a variety of bombs including, laser-guided bombs; and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs for the Navy and the Air Force

Classified Programs **$1.98 billion**

- Finances classified program in support of the continuing war on terrorism. Additional information addressing this requirement can be provided under separate cover.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

October 21, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Identifying and Locating Non-Citizens Serving in the Military

I have learned that the Department's ability to identify and locate non-citizens who are serving in the military is degraded by the lack of accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Our inability to retrieve this data limits our ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

I have been advised that the necessary infrastructure to provide this information exists today, but that our capability is precluded by incomplete and inconsistent data collected during our initial recruiting process. As a result, these problems directly and adversely affect the DMDC database and our security clearance/investigations database.

I request that each of you, working with the Military Departments as necessary, ensure that information regarding the place of birth and citizenship status of all non-citizen military members is collected, entered, and kept current in the Military Departments' personnel databases, the DMDC database, and in our information systems pertaining to DoD security clearances and investigations.

Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments

U13976-02

11-L-0559/OSD/10969

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

GENERAL COUNSEL

ACTION MEMO

October 10, 2002, 11:30 AM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

DEP SEC DEF HAS SEEN 1st pg OCT 2 2002

- In light of the article (under), entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002, the Secretary asked that I review the Department policies and assess whether we are doing things properly.
  - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- We can do better. I propose you sign the memorandum attached, based on the following Discussion and Conclusions.

DISCUSSION

- The DoD-wide database relies on the Military Departments' inputs.
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
  - The Military Departments' inaccurate and incomplete data cause DMDC information to be incomplete regarding non-citizen military personnel and their locations during military service.
    - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. For May 2002, the Army reports 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
    - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services.
    - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab B.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CALDWELL	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

U13976/02

- OASD (C3I) is concerned that the lack of information accuracy and consistency within the Military Departments' databases, and therefore DMDC's database, regarding place of birth and citizenship status limits DoD's ability to identify and locate non-citizens serving in the Armed Forces effectively.

  - OASD (C3I) also asserts that these deficiencies may be problematic in the post-September 11 environment.

  - OASD (C3I) believes the incomplete database limits DoD's ability to identify military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

- DMDC advises that the problem will continue, unless action is taken to improve the accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to DMDC.

CONCLUSIONS

- The Department should have the ability to identify and locate non-citizen military members by country of citizenship and place of birth. It may also be important to be able to identify naturalized U.S. citizens by their former country of citizenship.

- While the infrastructure to make such identifications exists today, the collection and data entry of needed information elements are inconsistent and thus degrade our capability to identify foreign nationals quickly.

- The keys to correcting the current problems are to collect the needed data at the initial contact point in the recruiting process, then to enter the data into the record keeping system, and then flow the needed data elements into the appropriate Military Department personnel systems and background investigation systems.

- The USD (P&R) and the ASD (C3I) have oversight for these systems.

- The memorandum at Tab A directs USD (P&R) and ASD (C3I) to work with the Military Departments as necessary to fix the data problems and maintain the capability to identify and locate non-citizens serving with the military.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R), ASD (C3I), OSD/LA, OSD/PA at Tab C.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

"This can't be a U.S.-only [issue]...I am particularly dismayed that our coalition partners can't get together on this," Myers said. "This isn't a matter of big dollars either. It is a matter of where to put investment."

However, allies--even those within the NATO alliance--have invested very little of their comparatively smaller defense budgets in C4ISR capability.

During the 1999 Bright Star exercise, for example, and the war over Kosovo a few months later, a mismatch among allied C4I capabilities was highlighted as an area in need of improvement (*Defense Daily*, Nov. 3, 1999).

In the United States, the military services have taken steps to improve their own interoperability as well as the relationships deployed units have with allied forces. For example, the Navy has enjoyed some measure of success with its Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN) concept, which has to date been used in support of multi-national training events and the war over Afghanistan.

The CWAN concept is to build a network that could be used for any operation and would remain as a "lasting infrastructure, including web servers built on the concept of web-centric warfare," for future engagements, according to Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn, deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and resources.

Newhouse.com
June 11, 2002

18. Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands Of Foreigners In U.S. Military

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

ELKRIDGE, Md. -- His heart remains at home deep in the heart of Africa, 12,000 miles away. But one day recently, Thierry Dany Osungs raised his right hand and in a steady voice swore to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, becoming one of the tens of thousands of citizens of other countries who enlist and serve in the U.S. military.

Non-citizen soldiers embody an old and honorable tradition of dual loyalty that dates back at least to the American Revolution. For generations of immigrants, military service has been a reliable means of earning a living as well as eventual citizenship.

But today, the services are enlisting growing numbers of non-citizens at a time when the United States is trying to tighten restrictions on immigration and aliens because of concerns about terrorism.

U.S. officials acknowledge there are serious weaknesses in the federal safeguards against criminal aliens or terrorists entering the country and obtaining the status of permanent resident that is required for military service. There are evident weaknesses as well in the procedures the Defense Department uses to check and approve potential enlistees.

Last year almost 8,000 foreigners were sworn into U.S. military service, a 50 percent increase from 1995 and about 4 percent of all those who signed up in 2001. The Pentagon does not keep count, but if all alien enlistees served a typical four-year term, there could be more than 30,000 on active military duty.

Once they're sworn in, they are eligible to serve as machine gunners, artillerymen and helicopter crewmen. They may drive tanks, load bombs onto jet strike fighters, handle explosives, rig parachutes and man guardposts and checkpoints.

Citizenship is required for officers, however, and in general, only officers can become qualified to pilot aircraft. Exceptions are made for senior enlisted helicopter aviators who attain the rank of warrant officers.

But in fact, the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from.

"There are so many, it becomes unmanageable to try to track them all," said Army Lt. Col. James P. Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman.

Acquiring permanent U.S. resident status requires background and fingerprint checks. And Defense Department officials said once an alien applies to enlist in the armed services, he or she must again undergo FBI fingerprint checks and an extensive background investigation, as well as pass medical screening and an intelligence test.

Once in the service, aliens may not hold any jobs that require a security clearance, a further measure that keeps them away from sensitive technology and information.

"I don't feel uneasy about this," said Frank Shaffery, deputy director of recruiting for the Army, citing an extensive network of checks and background investigations designed to weed out unsavory or untrustworthy individuals. "But as with any system, a person -- any person -- could misrepresent themselves. U.S. citizen or not."

However, the problem of aliens obtaining permanent resident status by fraud "is pervasive and serious," the U.S. General Accounting Office reported after an investigation earlier this year. The GAO said immigration officials "believe that some aliens are using the benefit application process to enable them to carry out illegal activities such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking and terrorism."

The job of weeding out such individuals falls to notoriously overworked military recruiters, and it can be a difficult one. Until last week, Army recruiters could call an 800 number at the Immigration and Naturalization Service to make sure an applicant's papers weren't forged. But that service is no longer available, and Shaffery said he did not know why. INS officials could not immediately explain the matter.

To double-check against enlisting illegal or criminal aliens, military applicants like Osungs are fingerprinted here at the Military Entrance Processing Station outside Baltimore.

Osungs' prints were sent electronically to the FBI, which is supposed to automatically check both its database and that of the INS to ensure the applicant has no criminal record or other legal blots on his record. Osungs' fingerprint check turned up no "hits" from the FBI.

But the Justice Department's inspector general, Glenn A. Fine, said there are "significant deficiencies" in these systems, and that matching up the FBI and INS fingerprint databases is a goal that "remains years away."

Military applicants also undergo an extensive background check by the Defense Security Service or the White House Office of Personnel Management. But these background checks do not have to be completed before the applicant is sworn in and receives military training.

One applicant was sworn into the Marine Corps 18 months ago and is serving on active duty, even though OPM is still struggling to complete his background check, Navy Petty Officer Glenn Sprague said.

And while aliens are supposed to be limited to serving a single four- or six-year term unless they first become American citizens, a spot check turned up evidence that even this rule is not rigorously enforced.

One Marine sergeant, a Filipino by birth and by citizenship, said he recently reenlisted for another four years. He seemed surprised that that was illegal. "Nobody ever mentioned any limit to me," he said.

Other aliens, who enlisted before the single-term rule went into effect, are serving full careers as non-citizens in the U.S. military.

"I enlisted in November 1982 and it's been a good life, if you don't mind working hard," said Navy Petty Officer Pornchai Boonmast, a 41-year-old who was born in Ban Lopburi, Thailand. He has served as a fireman apprentice and a boiler technician on two warships and has been stationed in

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

September 3, 2002, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

9/10 (1) Get PA/LA coord (2) Prep for DepSec signature

- In light of the article (under) entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002, you asked that I review the Department policies and assess whether we are doing things properly.
  - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- We can do better. I propose you sign the memorandum attached, based on the following Discussion and Conclusions.

Larry Di Rita 9/10

DISCUSSION

- The DoD-wide database relies on the Military Departments' inputs.
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
  - The Military Departments' inaccurate and incomplete data cause DMDC information to be incomplete regarding non-citizen military personnel and their locations during military service.
    - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. For May 2002, the Army reports 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
    - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services.
    - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab B.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

- OASD (C3I) is concerned that the lack of information accuracy and consistency within the Military Departments' databases, and therefore DMDC's database, regarding place of birth and citizenship status limits DoD's ability to identify and locate non-citizens serving in the Armed Forces effectively.

  - OASD (C3I) also asserts that these deficiencies may be problematic in the post-September 11 environment.

  - OASD (C3I) believes the incomplete database limits DoD's ability to identify military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

- DMDC advises that the problem will continue, unless action is taken to improve the accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to DMDC.

CONCLUSIONS

- The Department should have the ability to identify and locate non-citizen military members by country of citizenship and place of birth. It may also be important to be able to identify naturalized U.S. citizens by their former country of citizenship.

- While the infrastructure to make such identifications exists today, the collection and data entry of needed information elements are inconsistent and thus degrade our capability to identify foreign nationals quickly.

- The keys to correcting the current problems are to collect the needed data at the initial contact point in the recruiting process, then to enter the data into the record keeping system, and then flow the needed data elements into the appropriate Military Department personnel systems and background investigation systems.

- The USD (P&R) and the ASD (C3I) have oversight for these systems.

- The memorandum at Tab A directs USD (P&R) and ASD (C3I) to work with the Military Departments as necessary to fix the data problems and maintain the capability to identify and locate non-citizens serving with the military.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) and ASD (C3I) at Tab C.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP) (b)(6)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Identifying and Locating Non-Citizens Serving in the Military

I have learned that the Department's ability to identify and locate non-citizens who are serving in the military is degraded by the lack of accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Our inability to retrieve this data limits our ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

I have been advised that the necessary infrastructure to provide this information exists today, but that our capability is precluded by incomplete and inconsistent data collected during our initial recruiting process. As a result, these problems directly and adversely affect the DMDC database and our security clearance/investigations database.

I request that each of you, working with the Military Departments as necessary, ensure that information regarding the place of birth and citizenship status of all non-citizen military members is collected, entered, and kept current in the Military Departments' personnel databases, the DMDC database, and in our information systems pertaining to DoD security clearances and investigations.

cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments

COORDINATION

USD (P&R): Dr. Chu, August 1, 2002, with comments:
"We are also looking into whether some form of background check for non-citizens would be wise."

ASD (C3I): Mr. Stenbit, August 13, 2002.

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Enlistment and Commissioning Standards for Immigrants

BACKGROUND:

The Department of Defense supports the enlistment of aliens to the extent permitted by existing law and subject to their being otherwise qualified for service in the United States Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to describe the conditions under which such enlistments are allowed.

DISCUSSION:

- Title 10, United States Code, Sections 3253 and 8253, state that to be eligible for enlistment in the regular Army or Air Force in time of peace, an individual must be an American citizen or lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. While there is no equivalent statute limiting enlistment in the regular Navy and Marine Corps, the same citizenship requirements for the Army and Air Force are also generally applied to those Services.

- For enlistment into the Reserve Components, Title 10, United States Code, Section 12102, states, "...no person may be enlisted as a Reserve unless (1) he is a citizen of the United States or (2) has been admitted to the United States for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act....or has previously served in the Armed Forces or in the National Security Training Corps".

- Accordingly, the Military Services do not recruit non-citizen nationals unless they have been issued a "Green Card" by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

- To be eligible for appointment as a commissioned or warrant officer, U.S. citizenship is required (Section 532 and 591 of Title 10). For Reserve officer appointments, an individual must be lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act or has previously served in the Armed Forces or in the National Security Training Corps (Section 12201 of Title 10). For Regular appointment, when tendered, U.S. citizenship is required.

- By law, National Guard officers must by U.S. citizens (Title 32, United States Code, Section 313).

- With respect to Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs, since most students are here on student visas (not the same status as "Green Card" holder), they cannot contract into an ROTC program which is a requirement in order to receive scholarship monies. They may enroll and participate in ROTC programs as non-scholarship cadets, usually for the first two years in college or university – beyond that, they would need to be eligible to contract (i.e., be a U.S. citizen) or have received a waiver pending eligibility.

- The Department of Defense does not become involved in the citizenship process, does not sponsor individuals for citizenship, nor support applications for citizenship or entry into the United States. This process is an individual responsibility.

- Citizenship or permanent resident status does not guarantee enlistment into the Armed Forces; eligibility for enlistment is also conditioned upon qualification under prescribed age, physical fitness, aptitude, education, and moral character standards that are applicable to all candidates. These established standards govern the acceptability of aliens just as they determine U.S. citizens' eligibility to serve in our Armed Forces.

- Permanent resident aliens are restricted from enlisting in many of our military's more technical programs and specialties because of mandatory security clearance requirements. Positions requiring citizenship include occupations such as electronics and intelligence ratings, aircrew positions, and special warfare programs such as Navy SEALs. This is not a requirement that can be waived.

- Background security checks for enlistees are similar same for citizens and resident aliens. Both groups undergo a National Agency Check based on full set of fingerprints against FBI files. In addition, an INS files check is conducted for resident aliens.

- The table below shows the percent of non prior Service enlistees who were non-citizens (i.e., resident aliens) by Fiscal Year:

Non Citizen Non Prior Service Accessions

	# Non Citizens	%	Total # Accessions
FY01	7,940	4	188,695
FY00	7,814	4	183,883
FY99	8,423	5	181,187
FY98	8,195	5	179,817
FY97	7,596	4	188,895
FY96	6,500	4	179,133
FY95	5,267	3	167,287

- Further information about immigration law and policy as it pertains to the military entrance of resident aliens may be obtained from the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service General Counsel, 4420 North Fairfax Street, Arlington, Virginia, 22203.

REPARED BY: Dr. Jane Arabian, OUSD(P&R)/Accession Policy Directorate, (b)(6)

COORDINATION

USD (P&R): Dr. Chu, August 1, 2002, with comments:
"We are also looking into whether some form of background check for non-citizens would be wise."

ASD (C3I): Mr. Stenbit, August 13, 2002.

OSD/LA: Mr. Richard L. McGraw, September 20, 2002

OSD/PA: 10/7/02

ACTION MEMO

July 30, 2002, 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

- The *Newhouse News Service* published an article criticizing the Department of Defense entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002. You asked that I review the Department of Defense policies and assess whether we are doing things properly. Tab F.
    - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
    - The inability to provide complete information regarding non-citizen military personnel and locate them during their military service results from inaccurate and incomplete data maintained by the Military Departments and reported to DMDC. DMDC identifies the problems in Tab B.
        - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. Tab C. However, between May and June 2002, the Army reduced to zero its 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
        - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services. Tab D.
        - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab E.
- OASD (C3I) has expressed concern that the lack of information accuracy and consistency within the Military Departments' databases, and therefore DMDC's

database, regarding place of birth and citizenship status prevent DoD's ability to effectively identify and locate non-citizens while in the Armed Forces.

- OASD (C3I) also asserts that these deficiencies may be problematic in the post-September 11 environment.

- OASD (C3I) believes the incomplete database limits DoD's ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

- DMDC advises that the problem will continue, unless action is taken to improve the accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to DMDC.

CONCLUSIONS.

- The Department should have the ability to identify and locate non-citizen military members by country of citizenship and place of birth. It may also be important to be able to identify naturalized U.S. citizens by their former country of citizenship.

- While the infrastructure to make such identifications exists today, the collection and data entry of needed information elements are inconsistent and thus degrade our capability to quickly identify foreign nationals.

- The keys to correcting the current problems are to collect the needed data at the initial contact point in the recruiting process, to then enter the data into the record keeping system, and then flow the needed data elements into the appropriate Military Department personnel systems and background investigation systems.

- The USD (P&R) and the ASD (C3I) have oversight for these systems.

- The memorandum at Tab A directs USD (P&R) and ASD (C3I) to work with the Military Departments as necessary to fix the data problems and maintain the capability to identify and locate non-citizens serving with the military.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) David S. C. Chu I beg to
We are also looking into whether
some form of background check
for non-citizens should be made.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

July 25, 2002, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

- The *Newhouse News Service* published an article criticizing the Department of Defense entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002. You asked that I review the Department of Defense policies and assess whether we are doing things properly. Tab E.
    - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
    - The inability to provide complete information regarding non-citizen military personnel and track them during their military service results from inaccurate and incomplete data maintained by the Military Departments and reported to DMDC. DMDC identifies the problems in Tab A.
        - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. Tab B. However, between May and June, 2002, the Army reduced to zero its 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
        - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services. Tab C.
        - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab D.
- OASD/C3I has expressed concern that the lack of accuracy and consistency in the

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

ASD/C3I Coord: JPS

information within the Military Departments' databases, and therefore DMDC's database, regarding place of birth and citizenship status prevent DoD's ability to effectively track non-citizens while in the Armed Forces.

- OASD/C3I also asserts that these deficiencies may be problematic in the post-September 11 environment.

- OASD/C3I believes the incomplete database limits DoD's ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin background and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

- DMDC advises that the problem with tracking non-citizen military personnel will continue, unless action is taken to improve the accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to DMDC.

CONCLUSION: When data are properly entered and maintained, and modified according to citizenship changes, DMDC has the capability to track non-citizen military personnel. DMDC lacks this capability due to inaccurate and incomplete data provided from the Military Department. For the reasons OASD/C3I identified, DoD should have a policy of tracking non-citizen military personnel. To achieve this objective, the Military Departments should be directed to acquire and timely report accurate information to DMDC.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R), ASD/C3I.

Attachments:
As stated

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

September 19, 2002, 3:30 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

- In light of the article attached, entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002, you asked that I review the Department policies and assess whether we are doing things properly.
  - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- We can do better. I propose you sign the memorandum attached, based on the following Discussion and Conclusions.

DISCUSSION

- The DoD-wide database relies on the Military Departments' inputs.
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
  - The Military Departments' inaccurate and incomplete data cause DMDC information to be incomplete regarding non-citizen military personnel and their locations during military service.
    - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. For May 2002, the Army reports 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
    - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services.
    - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab B.

OSD/LA Coord 9/20/02

- OASD (C3I) is concerned that the lack of information accuracy and consistency within the Military Departments' databases, and therefore DMDC's database, regarding place of birth and citizenship status limits DoD's ability to identify and locate non-citizens serving in the Armed Forces effectively.

  - OASD (C3I) also asserts that these deficiencies may be problematic in the post-September 11 environment.

  - OASD (C3I) believes the incomplete database limits DoD's ability to identify military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

- DMDC advises that the problem will continue, unless action is taken to improve the accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to DMDC.

CONCLUSIONS

- The Department should have the ability to identify and locate non-citizen military members by country of citizenship and place of birth. It may also be important to be able to identify naturalized U.S. citizens by their former country of citizenship.

- While the infrastructure to make such identifications exists today, the collection and data entry of needed information elements are inconsistent and thus degrade our capability to identify foreign nationals quickly.

- The keys to correcting the current problems are to collect the needed data at the initial contact point in the recruiting process, then to enter the data into the record keeping system, and then flow the needed data elements into the appropriate Military Department personnel systems and background investigation systems.

- The USD (P&R) and the ASD (C3I) have oversight for these systems.

- The memorandum at Tab A directs USD (P&R) and ASD (C3I) to work with the Military Departments as necessary to fix the data problems and maintain the capability to identify and locate non-citizens serving with the military.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R), ASD (C3I), OSD/LA, OSD/PA at Tab C.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

LtCol Steve Linder
Marine Corps Military Assistant
OSD Executive Secretariat
(b)(6)

29 Aug 02

MEMORANDUM

TO: C&D

SUBJ: U10221/02

1. Please return the attached package to SC with Mr Di Rita's edits for correction.

Thanks
Steve

Semper Fidelis!

(SIC. PKL 413976-02)

413976-02

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT: **Early Bird**

Take a look at the attached article, "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military." Why don't you find someone in the general counsel's office to review what our policies are and whether we are doing things properly.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.01

Attach: "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military", *Newhouse.com*
David Wood, Newhouse News Service, June 11, 2002

Please respond by: 6/26/02

8/27
GC - Please fix memo for Sec Def signature -
D. Rumsfeld

6/22
To: GC -
Please give me Sec Def an assessment. Thanks.
D. RR

6/21

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Identifying and Locating Non-Citizens Serving in the Military

I have learned that the Department's ability to identify and locate non-citizens who are serving in the military is degraded by the lack of accuracy and consistency of the Military Departments' data that are collected and reported to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The Department should have the ability to identify and locate non-citizen military members by country of citizenship and place of birth. It may also be important to be able to identify naturalized U. S. citizens by their former country of citizenship.

Our inability to retrieve this data ~~in a post September 11th environment may prove to be problematic and is unacceptable. It also~~ limits our ability to identify and rely upon military personnel whose country of origin, background, and cultural familiarity may prove valuable in support of specific military missions and objectives.

I have been advised that the necessary infrastructure to provide this information exists today, but that our capability is precluded by incomplete and inconsistent data collected during our initial recruiting process, ~~and subsequently entered into the Military Departments' personnel records systems.~~ As a result, these problems directly and adversely affect the DMDC database and our security clearance/investigations database.

I request that each of you, working with the Military Departments as necessary, ensure that information regarding the place of birth and citizenship status of all non-citizen military members is collected, entered, and kept current in the Military Departments' personnel databases, the DMDC database, and in our information systems pertaining to DoD security clearances and investigations.

cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments

CDR Greg Wittman
Navy Military Assistant
OSD Executive Secretariat
(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO: C+D

9/16

SUBJ: U13976/02

Please pass back to GC for action per TSA.

Need to: 1) Get PA + LA coord and add at TAB C

2) Prep for DSD sig.

Thanks,

U13976-02

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

September 3, 2002, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Tracking Non-Citizens Serving With The Armed Forces

- In light of the article (under) entitled "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in U.S. Military," dated June 11, 2002, you asked that I review the Department policies and assess whether we are doing things properly.
  - According to the article, "the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from."
- We can do better. I propose you sign the memorandum attached, based on the following Discussion and Conclusions.

DISCUSSION

- The DoD-wide database relies on the Military Departments' inputs.
- The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database system does not generate its own place of birth or citizenship information. The Military Department personnel systems have data elements for both the place of birth and country of citizenship.
  - The Military Departments' inaccurate and incomplete data cause DMDC information to be incomplete regarding non-citizen military personnel and their locations during military service.
    - There are 20,000 records with unknown citizenship data. For May 2002, the Army reports 12,673 unknown citizenship records.
    - As of April 2002, approximately 31,000 non-citizens are serving in the Armed Services.
    - Information regarding enlistment and commissioning standards for immigrants is at Tab B.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	

413926-02

3:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT: **Early Bird**

Take a look at the attached article, "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military." Why don't you find someone in the general counsel's office to review what our policies are and whether we are doing things properly.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.01

Attach: "Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands of Foreigners in US Military", *Newhouse.com*
David Wood, Newhouse News Service, June 11, 2002

Please respond by: 6/26/02

6/22

To: GC -
Please give me your
an assessment. Thanks.
D.R.

6/21

U10221 /02

nation costs, compared to killing the program after its Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase ends in April 2003, according to a letter last week from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Congress.

17. **Myers: Command And Control Interoperability Problems Persist**
(Defense Daily)....Hunter Keeter
DoD continues to have problems with the interoperability of its numerous command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, according to Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

18. **Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands Of Foreigners In U.S. Military**
(Newhouse.com)....David Wood, Newhouse News Service
...The Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from.

19. **Secrecy On Missile Defense Grows**
(Washington Post)....Bradley Graham
As the Pentagon boosts spending and intensifies development of a national antimissile system, it is also taking steps to shield the program from Congress and the public as well as traditional oversight measures within the Defense Department.

CONGRESS

20. **Levin Questions Missile Defense Agency's Classification Policy**
(Inside Missile Defense)....Thomas Duffy
Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said this week he would do everything he can to make public information regarding the Bush administration's national missile defense flights tests after the administration decided last month to classify the targets and decoys used in those tests.

21. **War With Iraq Isn't Inevitable, Says Armed Services Committee Chairman**
(European Stars and Stripes)....Lisa Burgess
Despite media reports that claim President Bush has decided to wage war against Iraq, neither a majority of administration officials, members of Congress nor military officers is committed to the prospect, a senior senator said Monday.

22. **Lawmakers Sue Over ABM Pact Withdrawal**
(Washington Post)....Neely Tucker
Thirty-one members of Congress sued the Bush administration in federal court yesterday, charging that President Bush violated the Constitution when he decided earlier this year to drop a 30-year-old nuclear weapons pact with Russia.

23. **'We Should Have' Known, Goss Says Of 9/11**
(Washington Post)....Dana Priest and Juliet Eilperin
With six years of access to highly classified CIA information about Osama bin Laden, Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), co-chairman of the joint congressional panel examining the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies, has come to some bold conclusions about the Sept. 11 attacks.

24. **Party Leaders Favor Security Agency**
(Washington Post)....Bill Miller and Juliet Eilperin
Leaders of both parties in Congress yesterday supported the idea of creating a Department of Homeland Security by Sept. 11, even as they hinted they might seek substantial changes to President Bush's proposal for the biggest reorganization of the federal government in more than 50 years.

NAVY

25. **Navy Clears Some F-14s To Return To Carrier Duty; Others Need Fixes**
(Norfolk Virginian-Pilot)....Dale Eisman
The Navy has cleared 45 of its F-14 Tomcats to return to full duty but will have to replace the nose wheel assembly on more than 20 percent of the planes inspected since it suspended carrier operations on all 156 Tomcats last week.

"This can't be a U.S.-only [issue]...I am particularly dismayed that our coalition partners can't get together on this," Myers said. "This isn't a matter of big dollars either. It is a matter of where to put investment."

However, allies--even those within the NATO alliance--have invested very little of their comparatively smaller defense budgets in C4ISR capability.

During the 1999 Bright Star exercise, for example, and the war over Kosovo a few months later, a mismatch among allied C4I capabilities was highlighted as an area in need of improvement (Defense Daily, Nov. 3, 1999).

In the United States, the military services have taken steps to improve their own interoperability as well as the relationships deployed units have with allied forces. For example, the Navy has enjoyed some measure of success with its Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN) concept, which has to date been used in support of multi-national training events and the war over Afghanistan.

The CWAN concept is to build a network that could be used for any operation and would remain as a "lasting infrastructure, including web servers built on the concept of web-centric warfare," for future engagements, according to Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn, deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and resources.

Newhouse.com
June 11, 2002

18. Pentagon Does Not Track Thousands Of Foreigners In U.S. Military

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

ELKRIDGE, Md. -- His heart remains at home deep in the heart of Africa, 12,000 miles away. But one day recently, Thierry Dany Osungs raised his right hand and in a steady voice swore to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, becoming one of the tens of thousands of citizens of other countries who enlist and serve in the U.S. military.

Non-citizen soldiers embody an old and honorable tradition of dual loyalty that dates back at least to the American Revolution. For generations of immigrants, military service has been a reliable means of earning a living as well as eventual citizenship.

But today, the services are enlisting growing numbers of non-citizens at a time when the United States is trying to tighten restrictions on immigration and aliens because of concerns about terrorism.

U.S. officials acknowledge there are serious weaknesses in the federal safeguards against criminal aliens or terrorists entering the country and obtaining the status of permanent resident that is required for military service. There are evident weaknesses as well in the procedures the Defense Department uses to check and approve potential enlistees.

Last year almost 8,000 foreigners were sworn into U.S. military service, a 50 percent increase from 1995 and about 4 percent of all those who signed up in 2001. The Pentagon does not keep count, but if all alien enlistees served a typical four-year term, there could be more than 30,000 on active military duty.

Once they're sworn in, they are eligible to serve as machine gunners, artillerymen and helicopter crewmen. They may drive tanks, load bombs onto jet strike fighters, handle explosives, rig parachutes and man guardposts and checkpoints.

Citizenship is required for officers, however, and in general, only officers can become qualified to pilot aircraft. Exceptions are made for senior enlisted helicopter aviators who attain the rank of warrant officers.

But in fact, the Pentagon does not keep track of its alien personnel. It knows nothing about where and for how long they actually serve, what kind of training they receive or the kinds of jobs they hold, officials acknowledged. Nor can Pentagon officials say where the aliens are from.

"There are so many, it becomes unmanageable to try to track them all," said Army Lt. Col. James P. Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman.

Acquiring permanent U.S. resident status requires background and fingerprint checks. And Defense Department officials said once an alien applies to enlist in the armed services, he or she must again undergo FBI fingerprint checks and an extensive background investigation, as well as pass medical screening and an intelligence test.

Once in the service, aliens may not hold any jobs that require a security clearance, a further measure that keeps them away from sensitive technology and information.

"I don't feel uneasy about this," said Frank Shaffery, deputy director of recruiting for the Army, citing an extensive network of checks and background investigations designed to weed out unsavory or untrustworthy individuals. "But as with any system, a person -- any person -- could misrepresent themselves. U.S. citizen or not."

However, the problem of aliens obtaining permanent resident status by fraud "is pervasive and serious," the U.S. General Accounting Office reported after an investigation earlier this year. The GAO said immigration officials "believe that some aliens are using the benefit application process to enable them to carry out illegal activities such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking and terrorism."

The job of weeding out such individuals falls to notoriously overworked military recruiters, and it can be a difficult one. Until last week, Army recruiters could call an 800 number at the Immigration and Naturalization Service to make sure an applicant's papers weren't forged. But that service is no longer available, and Shaffery said he did not know why. INS officials could not immediately explain the matter.

To double-check against enlisting illegal or criminal aliens, military applicants like Osungs are fingerprinted here at the Military Entrance Processing Station outside Baltimore.

Osungs' prints were sent electronically to the FBI, which is supposed to automatically check both its database and that of the INS to ensure the applicant has no criminal record or other legal blots on his record. Osungs' fingerprint check turned up no "hits" from the FBI.

But the Justice Department's inspector general, Glenn A. Fine, said there are "significant deficiencies" in these systems, and that matching up the FBI and INS fingerprint databases is a goal that "remains years away."

Military applicants also undergo an extensive background check by the Defense Security Service or the White House Office of Personnel Management. But these background checks do not have to be completed before the applicant is sworn in and receives military training.

One applicant was sworn into the Marine Corps 18 months ago and is serving on active duty, even though OPM is still struggling to complete his background check, Navy Petty Officer Glenn Sprague said.

And while aliens are supposed to be limited to serving a single four- or six-year term unless they first become American citizens, a spot check turned up evidence that even this rule is not rigorously enforced.

One Marine sergeant, a Filipino by birth and by citizenship, said he recently reenlisted for another four years. He seemed surprised that that was illegal. "Nobody ever mentioned any limit to me," he said.

Other aliens, who enlisted before the single-term rule went into effect, are serving full careers as non-citizens in the U.S. military.

"I enlisted in November 1982 and it's been a good life, if you don't mind working hard," said Navy Petty Officer Pornchai Boonmast, a 41-year-old who was born in Ban Lopburi, Thailand. He has served as a fireman apprentice and a boiler technician on two warships and has been stationed in

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

2002 AUG 27 AM 8:46

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

August 26, 2002 6:00 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Briefing to Senator Hagel: reference Snowflake 082002-17

- On the afternoon that you called me, I sent the attached memo to your office. Apparently you did not receive it.
- There are no outstanding requests from Senator Hagel for a briefing and he is scheduled to be in Nebraska this week.
- The classified version of this memo is in your office. This is an unclassified copy.

Attachment:
As stated

Snowflake

August 20, 2002 5:57 PM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

I don't feel like I am being kept up to date on how we are briefing Hagel—who is doing it, where it is being done, whether or not I am aware of it before it happens, what the topics are, and who is sitting in.

I need to be on top of that. It is important, and I do not feel like anyone is getting back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082002-17

Please respond by 09/3/02

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

~~TOP SECRET/SCI~~

INFO MEMO

August 16, 2002, 1330

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Ops/Intel Briefing on Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.)

- At the request of Senator Hagel, we provided an Ops/Intel briefing for him at 1100, 15 August 2002 in S-407, The Capitol. Senator Hagel was present with no staff. In attendance from DoD was Peter Rodman, ASD/ISA; Powell Moore, ASD/LA; Col Jeff Burton, JCS/J-2(Deputy); Mr. Bob Ross, JSC/J-2 Iraq Analysis; Mr. Paul Wolfe, JCS/J-2 Iran Analysis; Mr. Jon LaPointe, JCS/J-2 Saudi Arabia Analysis; and Lt Col Keith Zuegel, JCS/LA.

- The JCS/J-2 briefing to Senator Hagel was conducted almost entirely by the analysts (**Tab 1**). There are no pending requests for additional briefings for the Senator, but we offered to brief him at a future date on our views on combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

- Additionally, we have found that Senator Hagel had asked and received similar briefings from CIA and DoS. We are contacting both to obtain additional information on briefers and materials presented. A list of topics requested of CIA (**Tab 2**) and DoS (**Tab 3**) from the Senators office is attached.

COORDINATION: ASD/ISA

Attachment:
As Stated

~~TOP SECRET/SCI~~

Unclassified upon removal of attachments

Prepared by: Lt Col Leo Clark, ASD/LA, (b)(6)

X02648-02

CIA (4)

- Iran's support for terrorist groups operating inside Israel.
- Iran's role in Afghanistan.
- The domestic situation inside Iran; the reform movement; the relative strengths of Khatami, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and other key figures.
- The extent of Azeri separatism in Iran. Role of Mehmet Chechregani.
- Iran's policies toward Iraq, the Iraqi opposition, and a possible US invasion of Iraq.
- Any initiatives to improve US-Iran relations.
- US-Russian initiatives re: Iran's nuclear programs.

- US policy toward the Iraqi opposition. The recent meetings in Washington.
- Our assessment of the role/capabilities of the opposition inside and outside of Iraq.
- What likely comes after Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
- The status of our diplomatic efforts at the UN and in the Arab world to support our policy of regime change toward Iraq.
- Iraq's diplomatic initiatives in the Arab world.
- Iraq's support for terrorism, especially against Israel and the United States.
- Iraq's links to al-Qaeda.

- The status of the US-Saudi relationship.
- Saudi links to terrorist groups.
- Saudi support for the war on terrorism, Israeli-Palestinian peace, and regime change in Iraq.

DOS

(U).

Iran

- General threat assessment of Iran (Nuclear, Chemical, biological and missile capabilities)
- Iran's support for terrorist groups operating inside Israel.
- Iran's role in Afghanistan / al Qaeda (recent turnover of Al Qaeda to Saudi Arabia)
- The domestic situation inside Iran; the reform movement; the relative strengths of Khatami, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and other key figures.
- The extent of Azeri separatism in Iran.
- Iran's policies toward Iraq, the Iraqi opposition, and a possible US invasion of Iraq.
- Any initiatives to improve US-Iran relations.
- US-Russian initiatives re: Iran's nuclear programs (Bushehr)

Iraq

- Threat assessment of Iraq - (Nuclear, Chemical, biological and missile capabilities)
- Capabilities of Iraq's conventional forces (both in the no-fly zones and in the heart of Iraq)
- US policy toward the Iraqi opposition. The recent meetings in Washington.
- Our assessment of the role/capabilities of the opposition inside and outside of Iraq.
- What likely comes after Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
- The status of our diplomatic efforts at the UN and in the Arab world to support our policy of regime change toward Iraq.
- Iraq's diplomatic initiatives in the Arab world.
- Iraq's support for terrorism, especially against Israel and the United States.
- Iraq's links to al-Qaeda.
- Regional support necessary for successful military operation in Iraq (overflight rights, refueling rights, intelligence, border control, basing rights, etc.)

Saudi Arabia

Note: The press has reported that at a meeting of the Defense Policy Group, RAND analyst Laurent Murawiec stated, "The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader," and "Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies."

- The status of the US-Saudi relationship.
- Saudi links to terrorist groups.
- Saudi support for the war on terrorism, Israeli-Palestinian peace, and regime change in Iraq.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

August 14, 2002 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Briefing for Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska)

- Senator Chuck Hagel made a request to the Joint Staff for an intelligence briefing on Thursday, August 15 at 11:00 a.m. on Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. General Shaffer, the J-2, is scheduled to go up and conduct this briefing in Room S-407, the Capitol's secure room, but at my request, Peter Rodman will accompany him. It has been our practice for a representative from the Policy operation to participate in briefings like this. Doug Feith, Peter Rodman and I thought that you should be advised of this briefing.

Snowflake

August 20, 2002 5:57 PM

Middle East

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

I don't feel like I am being kept up to date on how we are briefing Hagel—who is doing it, where it is being done, whether or not I am aware of it before it happens, what the topics are, and who is sitting in.

I need to be on top of that. It is important, and I do not feel like anyone is getting back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082002-17

Please respond by 09/03/02

20 Aug 02

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-468-02
27 August 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 8/27

SUBJECT: Revision of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

- Request you direct OSD to publish formal guidance on SROE.
  - In response to direction you provided during our recent meeting (TAB A), I have directed my staff to begin a formal review. To accomplish this as efficiently and effectively as possible, recommend your staff establish an overarching policy to provide direction.
  - Having guidance up front with the themes (TAB B) identified will significantly enhance and shorten the process, as well as provide the engagement necessary for an issue of this importance. My staff and I will then operationalize the policy and publish an implementation document (CJCS instruction).

RECOMMENDATION: Publish a DOD guidance directive that provides broad policy direction on SROE.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____ Other_____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen G. S. Newbold, USMC; Director for Operations; (b)(6)

U14039 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11001

snowflake

May 21, 2002 7:19 AM

242

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ROEs

1. I think the review period ought to be cut from five to three years.

2. We particularly have to focus on the Northern Command in the next cycle.

3. We have to focus on SAPs, as we discussed in the meeting.

4. I think that, to the extent that people down the chain of command alter the ROEs, they should have the obligation of notifying their superiors up the chain as to how they were altered, and it ought to come all the way up the line to me, so that you and I know what is actually happening.

5. Finally, I do not think lawyers ought to drive this process. I would get it back into the operations channel.

I do believe we are in a new national security circumstance, and that means we have to review the entire package.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-67

Please respond by 06/21/02

Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)
Recommended "Themes"

- Integrates new Unified Command Plan
  - Includes USNORTHCOM and emerging Homeland Defense missions
- Includes ROE from all DoD missions:
  - Conventional operations both overseas and in CONUS
  - Special operations
  - Military assistance to civil authorities
- Simplifies ROE language; understandable to operators in the field
- Establishes a tone that empowers subordinate commanders
  - Provides maximum operational flexibility
- Establishes an upward reporting system for revisions
  - Provides senior decision makers the maximum visibility of ROE in effect during ongoing operations

Tab B

snowflake

May 21, 2002 7:19 AM

242

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: ROEs

1. I think the review period ought to be cut from five to three years.

2. We particularly have to focus on the Northern Command in the next cycle.

3. We have to focus on SAPs, as we discussed in the meeting.

4. I think that, to the extent that people down the chain of command alter the ROEs, they should have the obligation of notifying their superiors up the chain as to how they were altered, and it ought to come all the way up the line to me, so that you and I know what is actually happening.

5. Finally, I do not think lawyers ought to drive this process. I would get it back into the operations channel.

I do believe we are in a new national security circumstance, and that means we have to review the entire package.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-67

Please respond by 06/21/02

381

21 May 02

U14040 /02

snowflake

TAB A

#26

July 15, 2002 11:08 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Capabilities

381

I need a list of the capability of the United States Armed Forces to deliver what kinds of capabilities to what locations within what number of hours, and with what kind of lethality and firepower. That should include air, sea and land.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-26

Please respond by 08/16/02

15 Jul 02

Tab A

U14041 /02

snowflake

TAB A

#26

July 15, 2002 11:08 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Capabilities

381

I need a list of the capability of the United States Armed Forces to deliver what kinds of capabilities to what locations within what number of hours, and with what kind of lethality and firepower. That should include air, sea and land.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-26

Please respond by 08/16/02

15 Jul 02

Tab A

U14041 /02

snowflake

10:55 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DM

DATE: August 28, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please take a look at this request from Jack Valenti and tell me what you think. I am happy to do it. He is a friend of 30 plus years. If you think there is no problem with it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082802.01

Attach: Valenti Request of 8/26/02

Please respond by: 9/6/02

28 Aug 02

8/21
1600
Snowflake

EF2271
02/010760 - USDP

July 19, 2002 7:17 AM

FSP

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

JUL 23 2002

SUBJECT: Poland Equipping Afghanistan

Poland

Yesterday the Polish MoD said he wanted to help equip Afghanistan with Russian equipment. Is anyone working on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071902-5

Please respond by 07/26/02

19 Jul 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11008

U14150 /02

Snowflake

August 7, 2002 8:55 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DM

SUBJECT: CJTF Briefing

Afghanistan

What do you think about your folks cleaning up that CJTF briefing I got and then have us show it to the principals. I think it has some good stuff in there.

Take a look.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080702-11

Please respond by 08/20/02

7 Aug 02

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/11009 U14156 /02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 AUG 30 PM 5:11

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2002 – 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) David S. C. Chu 30 Aug 02

SUBJECT: Echelons of Medical Care --Snowflake

- You asked, "Shouldn't we be reducing one or two of those layers out there"? Yes. Indeed, perhaps the construct "levels of care" should be abandoned; instead, we should focus on prompt evacuation of casualties to the specialized facilities best able to care for them, principally in the United States.

- This should reduce both the deployment burden and the deployment footprint.

- The challenge is to maintain enough capacity in theater to stabilize patients for transport, and to care for those who cannot be stabilized but must receive more substantial care immediately.

- Bill Winkenwerder, our Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, will be joining a Joint Staff visit to the Middle East and Central Asia September 21-26, during which this will be one of the subjects for review.

- I anticipate that there will be a need to acquire additional "kits" to install in our transport aircraft, to permit the return airlift of patients, as well as some requirement for training (and perhaps some reallocation of personnel). There should be sufficient air transport capacity to carry out the alternative approach.

- We are working with the Military Departments and PA&E to update the "733 Wartime Medical Requirements Study." This new study will review medical readiness, including echelons of care, to reflect current requirements. Based on its results, we will provide recommendations on a new doctrine in November 2002, so that any funding needs can be reflected in the FY 2004 President's Budget Request.

Prepared by: William Wikenwerder, (b)(6)

U14183 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11010

TAB

A

snowflake

25102

July 22, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Echelons of Medical Care

I am told that the medical divisions of DoD still have the same five echelons of care that they have had since before Vietnam. Shouldn't we be reducing one or two of those layers out of there?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-10

Please respond by 08/16/02

snowflake

7/23/02

July 22, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Echelons of Medical Care

I am told that the medical divisions of DoD still have the same five echelons of care that they have had since before Vietnam. Shouldn't we be reducing one or two of those layers out of there?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-10

Please respond by 08/16/02

7/01

22 July 02

U14184 /02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002

August 30, 2002 – 1:00 PM

DepSecDef Action _____

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 AUG 30 PM 5:23

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)
David S. C. Chu 30 August 02

SUBJECT: MG Stanley—SNOWFLAKE

- The endorsement of Cliff Stanley by John Herrington (Tab A) is consistent with several other recommendations we've received. MG Stanley is clearly a strong candidate, whom we will plan to interview.

- You also raised the question of whether this should be a two-star post, vice a three-star. The principal argument for three stars is that the incumbent must deal on an equal footing with the three-star personnel chiefs of the four services, one of which is his (or her) own. Often the incumbent must convey unwelcome bad news (to take one non-random example, "we're adopting a new policy on candidates for senior posts"). A difference in grade creates exactly the wrong incentives for the incumbent.

- The alternative is to civilianize the post.
  Pro: Facilitates longer tenure, provides clear independence.
  Con: Changes "back channel" communications capability, may inhibit our ability to effect other "cultural" changes.

- For the last reason, I'd like to move gradually on civilianization by starting with a distinguished retired three or four star, with a strong personnel background. Indeed, we had identified a candidate, but he declined our offer.

- For this reason, recommend we keep this as a three-star post for now. Your support of that recommendation is needed before the Chairman, JCS, will forward the list of nominees. I would be glad to work with the Chairman to identify another three-star slot to meet his needs.

210 Marines

20 Aug 02

RECOMMENDATION:

Approve DL SEP 10 2002
Disapprove _____
See me _____

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

U14185 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11014

snowflake

8/15/02

August 14, 2002 7:04 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Cliff Stanley

Here is a card from a former Secretary of Energy, John Herrington, who knows Cliff Stanley pretty well. You might want to read his card and take a good look at him.

My personal view is that we ought to make that a two-star billet, not a three-star one.

Thanks.

Attach.
07/29/02 Herrington note to SecDef

DHR:dh
081402-1

Please respond by 09/06/02

9/5
Chu response/recommendation attached.

SD
9/9

U14186-02

JOHN S. HERRINGTON

7/29/02

Dear Don,

There's a African American marine General named Cliff Stanley who is up for Dep. ASD Plans, Personal, Policy. It's a three star slot under David Chew. Cliff worked for me as a major when I was ASN manpower in 81-83 and he is one of the most outstanding men I have ever met. His wife was gun downed on a D.C. street and is in a wheelchair. He's managed that, raised kids, and made it to two star. They don't come any better. You should meet him, you'll love him. He's being offered a top job at the University of Penn and I became aware of this situation when he called to have me write him a rec for the job. The Marine Corp shouldn't lose him. They have so few black generals, especially of his quality. Can you put in a word w/ Chew?

You missed a great Grove, but we all know what you are doing is more important. You were missed, and we are proud of you — keep up the great job.

Sincerely,

John

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11016

snowflake

8/15/02

August 14, 2002 7:04 AM

210 Marines

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Cliff Stanley

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DHR:dh
081402-1

Please respond by 09/06/02

14 Aug 02

U14186 /02

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You missed a great Grove, but we all know what you are doing is more important. You were missed, and we are proud of you - keep up the great job.

Sincerely -

John

(b)(6)

111-0559/OSD/11018
INSPECTED-PASSED

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 SEP -4 AM 8:05

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

September 3, 2002 – 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) David S. C. Chu 3 Sep 02

SUBJECT: 179 Day Rule(s)—SNOWFLAKE

- You lamented the "179 day rule" (Tab A).
- There are at least two such rules:
  - One in the Joint Federal Travel Regulation since the late 1950s, governing the maximum length of a Temporary Duty Assignment (TDY) (versus a Permanent Change of Station, or PCS).
  - A second, based in law, requiring that reservists serving on active duty more than 180 days be counted against active end strength.
- The TDY rules can be waived by the Service Secretaries and by the chief of the agency each designates to handle this issue, and by the Commanders/Deputy Commanders of the Combatant Commands.
- The end strength rule does not apply to mobilized reservists. Moreover, since the President's declaration of national emergency makes end strength limits moot as long as it is in force, at the moment this is really an accounting issue.
- What both rules do, however, is create a mindset in which 179 days is often seen as appropriate for an assignment. I believe we should instead ask what assignment length we <u>want</u>, from both the performance (tenure in job) and personnel management (hardship) perspectives. We have the tools to tailor what we do to those needs if we will only ask the question correctly (although I acknowledge the reserve accounting rule is artificial, and we will be proposing a change to it with the FY 2004 President's Budget Request).

- I will work with the Military Departments to establish a revised mindset. That we need one is confirmed by a recent request from the Joint Staff to make all tours at Guantanamo one year PCS unaccompanied (Tab B). This lumps interrogators in with all the support personnel (guards, etc.), and is likely to create severe morale problems. It reaches this result from a rule-based approach, rather than the one I recommend we adopt: that is, what tour length makes sense, from both a performance and a personnel management perspective? And could we get the result we need with volunteers?

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Steve Westbrook, Director, Per Diem Committee (b)(6)
Dan Kohner, OASD/RA (Manpower and Personnel) (b)(6)

TAB

A

snowflake

→ RA

7/23/02

July 22, 2002 10:49 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: 179-Day Rule

I keep hearing that the 179-day rule is just terribly damaging—that people go out, are there just long enough to figure out what they are doing and then leave.

Isn't it being overused and abused?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-24

Please respond by 08/09/02

TAB

B

9/15/02

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-0756-02
14 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Permanent Billets for Joint Task Force (JTF)-160 and JTF-170 in Support of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Interrogation Efforts

1. The Secretary of Defense believes permanent presence of interrogation personnel at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, will better meet interrogation needs.

2. The Chairman and I have reviewed the situation at Guantanamo and concur in the SecDef assessment. The Services should establish a permanent change of station tour length for a 1-year unaccompanied tour. This action will result in continuity for all interrogation operations.

3. Request that OSD direct the Services to establish a permanent duty station at Guantanamo Bay for military and civilian personnel engaged in interrogation operations as part of JTFs 160 and 170 in support of the War on Terrorism. The permanent billets will remain within the Services' budget levels and manpower end strength. Request OSD (P&R) establish a separate program element code for these billets to ensure the integrity of the interrogation mission is maintained.

4. A proposed DepSecDef memorandum is enclosed directing the Services to take this action. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

John P. Abizaid

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Copy to:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Permanent Billets for Joint Task Force (JTF)-160 and JTF-170 in Support of Guantanamo Bay Interrogation Efforts

I believe that permanent presence of interrogation personnel at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, will better meet interrogation needs. Services are directed to permanently assign interrogation personnel in support of JTF-160 and JTF-170 in coordination with Commander, US Southern Command.

The Services will establish a permanent change of station tour length for a 1-year unaccompanied tour for both military and civilian personnel at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The permanent billets will remain within the Services' budget levels and manpower end strength. OSD(P&R) will establish a separate program element code for these billets to ensure the integrity of the interrogation mission is maintained.

Copy to:
Commander, USSOUTHCOM

Snowflake

* I-02/011472

July 31, 2002 4:42 PM

EF 2449

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Expatriate Iraqis

Iraq

We need a plan to take advantage of expatriate Iraqis in Moslem countries who might be in opposition to Saddam Hussein.

What are we doing about that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073102-8

Please respond by 08/16/02

O/C

USDP —

~~Do you want the + Lt~~
~~to handle~~

Luti & Strand have been tasked to respond.

V/R

LB

U14272 /02

08-02-02 12:

11-L-0559/OSD/11026

snowflake

September 3, 2002 11:18 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Relevant Readings in Volume III of the OSD History

Please take a look at this DoD history piece that Goldberg sent me. It is quite interesting.

Do you think any others ought to receive it?

Thanks.

Attach.
03/01/02 OSD Historian memo to SecDef re: Relevant Readings in Volume III of the OSD History

DHR:dh
090302-11

Please respond by 09/27/02

020 0 059

20 Sep 02

U14274 02

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1777 NORTH KENT STREET
ARLINGTON, VA 22209-2165

HISTORICAL OFFICE

March 1, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Relevant Readings in Volume III of the OSD History

The following selections in Volume III seem to have relevance to today's world.

Foreword – pp. i-ii – A two page distillation of the main themes of the book.

Chapter XXX. – Conclusion - pp. 673-79.

The concluding chapter is an overview of the New Look period, including relations with reluctant and difficult allies, interservice rivalries and competition for money and forces, the impact of rapid technological change, and the search for a smaller and more technologically advanced military machine.

Chapter XXIX – Strategic Perspectives – pp. 654-72.

This chapter deals with the problems of bringing about a transformation of the military establishment in the face of resistance from the military services and other interests. It illuminates the difficulties the top leaders of government encounter when they seek to devise new policies to meet emerging challenges and threats.

Chapter VI – Debating Defense of the Continental Vitals - pp. 114-39.

Perhaps more than any other major military program continental defense was marked by uncertainty and indecision. In competition with other programs for money it usually had to give way. In particular, the military services preferred to spend their money on other programs. Chapter XIII, pp. 277-306 is a followup.

Chapter II – Reorganizing Defense – pp. 21-43.

The perennial problem of civil – military relations plagued Eisenhower throughout his term of office. The reorganization of DoD in 1953 illustrates the difficulties of bringing about desired changes.

Alfred Goldberg
OSD Historian

Chapter XXIX

Strategic Perspectives

The year 1956—a presidential election year—saw a forceful effort by President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson to apply pressure on the Joint Chiefs to develop an overall military strategy and the war plans to implement it. In addition to the usual annual production of war plans, Wilson tasked the Joint Chiefs to prepare for FY 1958 and FY 1959 a comprehensive military strategy paper that would provide overarching guidance for the armed forces. He was asking for a paper like the one that Eisenhower had called on the Joint Chiefs to prepare in 1953, early in the administration. Consideration of the new strategy paper coincided with JCS development of the war plans JSCP-57 and JSOP-60. All of these papers inevitably were affected by the continuing interplay between them that engaged the planners and the Joint Chiefs.

A Newer Look?

In January 1956 Wilson completed three years in office, during which he had endured what must have seemed never-ending battles between the services over money, weapon systems, and roles and missions. During these years there had occurred striking changes in the international order that would have to be taken into account by the Defense Department in planning for the future. The time had come, Wilson decided, to take another look at DoD's military strategy for the future. On 27 January he directed the Joint Chiefs to develop a new outline military strategy and guidance for determining the "size, nature, composition and deployment" of the armed forces for FY 1958 and FY 1959. Two matters, he reminded them, had already been settled and were not open to reconsideration: preservation of a sound U.S. economy would continue to be

"a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect," and atomic weapons would be used from the outset in a general war and in any lesser hostilities "whenever it is of military advantage to do so." For certain long-range programs—aircraft, missiles, shipbuilding, base construction, reserves, and the mobilization base—guidance should be projected beyond FY 1959 as appropriate. Budget planners would need the new JCS study for their FY 1958 submissions early in August.[1]

Thus Wilson, without fanfare or rhetoric, launched an effort (prolonged, as it turned out) to adapt the policies of the administration's first term and devise new ones to meet the emerging challenges of the missile era—what would later be called the "New New Look." Later in the decade Albert Wohlstetter aptly summed up the challenges in the phrase the approaching "balance of terror," a situation of mutual deterrence resulting from the rapid growth of American and Soviet air delivery capabilities and the early prospect of nuclear plenty on both sides. The consequence would be a greater likelihood of small wars and creeping Communist expansion, as well as more intense competition in the diplomatic and economic spheres, straining the solidarity of U.S. alliances and relations with Third World countries.[2]

Wilson probably expected no radical proposals from the Joint Chiefs, and they gave him none. He had, however, suggested that they first talk the matter over with the president, advice that they apparently did not heed. Their reply on 12 March was prepared during a week's stay at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico. Among the first items of business considered there, the chiefs contemplated a surprise contribution by the Army's new chief of staff, General Maxwell Taylor. "A National Military Program," a short paper written about a year earlier, outlined an emerging "flexible response" strategy, which would become the Army's preferred alternative to the orthodox "massive retaliation" strategy. It should be "suitable for flexible application to unforeseen situations . . . . In short, the military program of the United States should include all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war and at the same time contain the potentiality of waging any war, large or small." Secretary Brucker had applauded the paper, but Taylor's colleagues were not impressed. "Quite content with the status quo," as Taylor later put it, they read it "politely" and "then quietly put it aside." When Brucker sent it to him, Secretary Wilson similarly pigeonholed it with a scribbled "no further action."[3]

In their reply to Wilson the chiefs stated that the existing military programs, as best they could forecast, would remain valid through 1958-60 and "continue to represent the minimum U.S. military forces required for national security." This was not a reassuring judgment for, as they went on

to warn, they perceived the whole free world situation to be "gradually deteriorating" and moving within a few years toward a condition of "great jeopardy" for the United States unless something were done to reverse the trend. The problem was political, social, and psychological, not military. U.S. national policy was based on deterrence of wars, large and small, but visible strength in being, while indispensable, was not alone sufficient to deter war

> It must be reinforced by a world-wide understanding that the United States will use that strength promptly . . . when necessary . . . . There is a feeling throughout the world that the United States lacks the essential determination to act in time . . . Decisiveness is endangered by the need to obtain concurrences of our allies and by the requirements of our constitutional processes . . . . Our military strength will have little effect if every word and deed of our government and its representatives do not attest our national resolution to act promptly when the moment of decision arrives. We must appreciate the fact that the effect of our free debates and the operation of our free press tend to present a picture of confusion and indecisiveness to the rest of the free world.[4]

This was an old plaint; the really bad news came in their estimate of the cost. Annual military spending in the period 1958-60 might, with great difficulty the JCS thought, be held down to the range of $38-40 billion, still a tolerable level for the prospering U.S. economy. But military aid should be expanded to at least $4-5 billion annually (about a $3 billion increase over current levels), in part to finance an adequate NATO air defense system and to provide more modern weapons worldwide. All this pointed to annual defense expenditures that could reach $45 billion, a heavy burden for the U.S. economy to support, but the JCS could not forecast any change in the military situation that would warrant much reduction. Military aid had indeed strengthened the recipient countries both economically and militarily, but had not enabled them to "become self-sustaining"; some of them had even begun to "demand continued and increasing financial support as the price of their adherence to our alliances." Military assistance needed to be examined with a view to "increased selectivity and definite cutoff dates."[5]

The president's reaction to the paper was caustic. The Joint Chiefs, he remarked, painted a "very dark picture," which would seem to warrant calling for a declaration of emergency, going to "field conditions," a wartime budget, even a garrison state—in which case, he added sardonically, the services would be reduced to a "much more Spartan mode of living."

He pronounced unrealistic the extraordinary powers proposed for the president "in anything like the present circumstances." We were not worse off now, he said, than we were three years ago, especially with regard to the Soviets, who in fact had been dissuaded from military aggression. The president seemed to share, to some degree, the Joint Chiefs' disenchantment with the allies; the premise seemed to be that they were not themselves threatened, that the United States "must practically pay" for their help in fighting communism, that "we [the allies] are fighting your war." It might be better, and certainly cheaper, he wryly added, "to encourage some nations to be neutral." The president also expressed annoyance with the unceasing demand of the military services for ever-increasing budgets. Why couldn't they cut manpower, especially in the Army and Marines? Wilson pointed out that DoD spending was actually several billion dollars larger than current funding would indicate, since the services were still living in part off of past appropriations and various one-time savings.[6]

Eisenhower told Radford to have the JCS rewrite their paper, and he specified organization and content. He wanted a version in three sections: first, the domestic military situation, with an upbeat review of developments in the last three years and a focus on the emerging role of missiles; next, the U.S. alliance system, how to sustain confidence and cohesion, be more selective in choosing allies, and correct the "we are fighting your war" syndrome; third, the world security problem, with a critical look at the role of military power. Colonel Goodpaster of the White House staff would send a written outline for the chiefs to follow.[7]

Radford could have had no doubt that he had, in effect, been given new and far-reaching marching orders. The president had dropped a parting remark of unmistakable meaning: "Each Chief of Staff . . . [should] take the same attitude toward the importance of a sound economy as he knows Admiral Radford does—to recognize it as a fundamental element of over-all U.S. security strength." A few weeks before, in his budget message, the president had proclaimed to the nation the need for new and expanded domestic spending—for schools, housing, highways, etc. Now he had the shocking forecast of $42-45 billion national security budgets beginning in 1958. Which of these imperatives would have to yield was clear enough. Service and aid budgets must be reduced, even at the cost of structural changes in U.S. forces. The primacy of a sound economy was an absolute. So was his conviction that in the last resort the nation's security came first—but only in the last resort, which was not yet.[8]

Over the next few weeks the president hammered on the economy theme and the responsibility of the service chiefs to take it to heart and broaden their perspectives. Repeatedly he insisted that each service chief should see himself less as a champion of his service and more as a "national military" adviser. "The patriot today," he declared, "is the fellow who can do the job with less money."[9]

"A little staggered," as Radford admitted, the JCS submitted a new report on 17 April. It followed the president's prescribed outline to the letter, including sub-topics; the tone was far from euphoric, but less depressing than its predecessor. However, their new version, labeled "further views," still retained their gloomy conclusions of 12 March. It carefully affirmed "confidence" that the comparative strengths of the two superpowers provided a "margin of relative advantage in general war" for the United States and its allies—although this was "not bound to persist and may change" at any time. The trend in comparative strengths, the JCS believed, still was not favorable enough to justify curtailment of existing programs. If the president had hoped to goad his military advisers to more venturesome thinking he must have been disappointed. They studiously avoided matters of interservice dispute, and much of the paper simply paraphrased current policy. They seemed to feel that obstreperous or otherwise "difficult" allies were not worth the effort of placating and perhaps should be left to their own devices. On one point—how to cope with the Communist bloc's current non-military competitive tactics—the Joint Chiefs revealed heightened caution in their thinking. "Our military mode of international action alone," they admitted, could only borrow time by deterring aggression. Meanwhile, the free world must rely on political, economic, and psychological strategies to combat communism.[10]

When the president saw Radford on 18 April, the day after receiving the Joint Chiefs' "further views," he offered a few noncommittal comments and turned to other matters.[11] The whole exercise must have seemed to him futile. The JCS had let him down. Still, Radford seems to have committed himself without reservation to the president's stated purposes. From that point on he was demonstrably searching for a new strategy and force structure that could be accommodated within the austere budgetary framework the president believed the nation's economic health required. Since national strategic interservice planning was the Joint Chiefs' exclusive bailiwick, it would fall to them to define the choices.

War Planning

Defining choices had become increasingly difficult for the Joint Chiefs during the New Look years—1953-56. Strategic planning was marked by a high degree of volatility and sharp competition between the military services. After the plenty of the Korean War era the services had difficulty adjusting to what they regarded as lean postwar years. The constraints on money and people directed by the White House and powerfully driven by President Eisenhower intensified the battles between the services to establish their respective missions as indispensable and even dominant. Such considerations carried heavy weight in the approach of all of the services to war planning, as revealed in the discussions of the Joint Chiefs. Consequently, the existing elaborate structure of war planning failed to produce plans on a timely basis and thereby further compounded the difficulty of decisionmaking at the highest levels of national security planning.

The Eisenhower Joint Chiefs inherited a system of strategic planning, promulgated in mid-1952, that envisaged the annual preparation of long-range, mid-range, and short-range plans looking ahead 10, 7, and 4 years, respectively.* The system had not worked well, and its output had fallen far behind schedule. By the end of 1955 it should have produced three Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates (JLRSE) projected through June 1965, three mid-range Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOP) through June 1962, and four short-range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans (JSCP) through June 1957.† But the long-range plan was abandoned as "impracticable" in March 1954 after two successive drafts had been rejected. The JSCPs fared best: one was completed for FY 1955 and one for FY 1956, each three months late. The more complex JSOPs fell far behind: JSOP-56 never materialized, and work on JSOP-57 was suspended in 1954 after prolonged wrangling among the planners. In the end it was decided to substitute a mid-range war plan (JMRWP) aimed at a July 1957 D-day. In conjunction with the basic policy paper, JCS 2101/113, this would cover both war and peace contingencies. Effectively completed by the end of 1954, the JMRWP was finally approved on 15 April 1955, little more than two years (instead of the prescribed three) before its assumed D-day of a general war.[12]

* Adjustments in these numbers occurred in 1955.

† The plans were not, of course, intended to cover the entire time span between approval of a plan and its projected terminal date. The short-range plan, the JSCP, assumed a D-day of 1 July, six months after JCS approval, and would guide use of military forces during the initial phase of a war. The mid-range plan, the JSOP, would begin on 1 July three years after JCS approval and would apply to the four years thereafter. The long-range plan, the JLRSE, would begin five years after approval and would apply to the five years thereafter.

Most of the issues that had slowed completion of joint strategic plans during the first three years of the Eisenhower administration concerned the probable nature, weaponry, duration, and patterns—especially beginnings—of a general war. Throughout this period general war continued to be perceived as the major peril facing the nation. If not the most likely conflict, it was the chief contingency that had to be planned for.

Early on, during discussion of the first JSCP in 1953, planners confronted perhaps the most basic and intractable of the general war issues: whether to rely mainly on strategic nuclear retaliatory power to bring the war to an early end by crippling Soviet warmaking capacity (the Air Force view) or to develop balanced forces of all services capable of dealing with any military threat. The Air Force position required a clear priority in peacetime for development of forces needed at the outset of war with logistic support for the first six months only, on the assumption that these forces, spearheaded by the nuclear retaliatory elements, would quickly triumph. Air Force planners did not reject the possibility of a more protracted conflict involving the other services, but assigned the primary role to strategic bombing. Later these differences were finessed by submerging them in more general phraseology, and the JSCP was updated and issued in April 1954 as the plan for the following year. It retained the focus on general war, with no provision for limited conflict except a statement that ready mobile forces should be on hand to deal with limited aggression anywhere.[13]

Later, during discussion of the JMRWP in October 1954, the Air Force planners asserted that the initial atomic phase of the war must be the "primary consideration in military planning." The other services, conceding the probability of an initial Soviet nuclear surprise air attack, still insisted that a large-scale buildup of forces after D-day should be planned in order to provide flexibility for whatever strategy the situation might dictate. Deadlocked, the Joint Chiefs sent up individual views. Radford took a position close to that of the Air Force but with a difference. Accepting the remote possibility of extensive post-D-day operations, he stressed as more likely that both sides would be for some time too "devastated and stunned" to fight back effectively. Since the first to recover would have the upper hand, it was imperative in any event to ensure maximum mobilization of reserves up to six months after D-day "to absorb the initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus" for further offensive action. In November Wilson endorsed Radford's view.[14]

Arguments over the opening and subsequent duration of a general war held up preparation of the FY 1956 JSCP. During the debate the

Army surfaced for the first time an alternative view that general war might emerge by unintended escalation from conventional local origins and perhaps even remain conventional. In the final version the JCS quashed the view that general war might thus flower from a very small seed, but left open the (remote) possibility of a prolonged aftermath. In January 1955, six months before the joint planners began work on the FY 1957 JSCP, NSC paper 5501 endorsed as a "possibility the Army's small-origins theory of general war."[15]

On 15 March 1956, two days after the joint planners submitted to the chiefs a draft of the FY 1957 JSCP, the president approved NSC 5602/1, which repeated verbatim (par 11) the small-origins theory of general war. It also asserted, however, that nuclear weapons would be integrated with conventional weapons and used with them "in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President." Radford sprang into action. On 28 March he wrote his colleagues criticizing as "a radical departure" from the new policy affirmed in NSC 5602/1, the statement in the draft FY 1957 JSCP that it was possible that atomic weapons would not be used from the outset in a general war. Two days later, at a meeting in his office, the president obligingly told the Joint Chiefs he was "clear in his own mind" that nuclear weapons (including air defense weapons as soon as available) would be used "in any war with the Soviets." Radford pointedly remarked that the reluctance "in some quarters" to plan on this basis flew in the face of the "actual fact" that "we are already largely committed as regards our force structure, and will become increasingly so as time goes on."[16]

Following up quickly, Radford met with his fellow chiefs in his office on 3 April to discuss new guidance for the JSCP. They approved a formulation that atomic weapons would be used "against the USSR" in the event of a Soviet attack on the United States or on U.S. forces and also, as authorized by the president, in other military operations not against the USSR (presumably Communist China or other Soviet allies) when to the advantage of the United States. On 5 April Radford directed that, as he had implied in his 28 March memo, this guidance should apply to all joint strategic planning—more particularly to JSOP-60, on which the planners had been working since August 1955.[17]

Taylor Challenges Massive Retaliation

This move brought Taylor back into the fray. On 12 April he formally objected to the application of the new policy to mid-range as distinct from short-range planning. Within the time frame of JSCP-57, he pointed

out, when the United States would still enjoy a comfortable nuclear superiority over the USSR, the threat of massive retaliation for even a small Soviet aggression would probably have enough credibility to deter an attack. But by 1960, when the Soviets were expected to attain nuclear parity, the threat of massive nuclear retaliation against any level of Soviet aggression would have very low credibility indeed. For a "massive retaliation for anything" strategy to command an iota of credibility it would require continued U.S. air-nuclear superiority well into the period in which the USSR was expected to enjoy parity with the United States. This would require beefing up SAC even beyond the level LeMay was demanding, soaking up the already meager portion of the budget available for limited war forces. Taylor warned that the USSR, "recognizing the unprofitable character of general nuclear war, will seek to achieve its ends through subversion, infiltration and local aggression in situations in which general atomic warfare . . . is not an appropriate response." He proposed an amendment to the recently approved guidelines for JSOP-60 to provide not only a deterrent nuclear capability but also "ample forces of all services with the capability of waging limited war with conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons." But on 17 April, in revised guidance for JSOP-60 and JSCP-57, Taylor's fellow chiefs rejected his proposal, stating merely that the existing force structure was "adequate to cover the military contingencies we might face in the planning period to be covered."[18]

As it turned out, even this decision was not final. Three weeks of debate ensued. At the White House on 14 May Radford alluded to his current difficulty in extracting unanimous decisions from the Joint Chiefs on the JSOP, especially on the question of whether atomic weapons would be used in "small wars." To suggest in a plan that atomic weapons would not be used, he stated, would leave "the way . . . for a building up of service requirements." The president took the hint. He felt "that we would not get involved in a 'small war' extending beyond a few Marine battalions or Army units. If it grew to anything like Korea proportions, the action would become one for use of atomic weapons."[19]

Thus armed, Radford had no difficulty two days later in mustering a majority—himself, Twining, and Burke—to redefine general war as any war "in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the U.S. are overtly engaged." In any armed clash between the two, the United States would use atomic weapons from the outset. Taylor and Marine Corps Commandant Pate held to the 17 April guidance limiting use of atomic weapons to the response to a Soviet attack on the United States or its forces overseas that, in the latter case, threatened their survival. They also insisted on the possibility, based on NSC 5602/1, of a major conventional

conflict with the USSR restrained on both sides by awareness of the risk of mutual annihilation. Taylor and Pate reaffirmed the view, which the chiefs had held in earlier plans, that operations of substantial scope could be expected in the later phase of the war. Even during the initial phase, there should be preparations and deployment for a general offensive in Europe.[20]

Radford lost no time in wrapping up his victory, in meetings with Wilson on 21 May and the two of them with the president the next day. Wilson then notified the chiefs of his concurrence with the chairman's position and directed them to proceed with planning on the assumption that "in a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset," and in lesser hostilities "when required in order to achieve military objectives"—i.e., without requirements for presidential authorization.[21]

There was an epilogue. Taylor solicited and gained an audience with the president and Radford on 24 May (the president had told the Joint Chiefs on 30 March that any of them "could always come along with Admiral Radford to see him," i.e., not alone). Taylor asserted that the JCS majority's emphasis on a big war starting with a Big Bang was contrary to the NSC's view (i.e., as stated in NSC 5602/1) that the two powers were more likely to back into war through a series of small actions and counteractions. Moreover, the argument that if the worst case was provided for, lesser ones could be handled in stride, was not supported by experience; brush fires must be dealt with at their own level. Moreover, the costs of building up "tremendous atomic forces and the defenses against them" would leave no funds for the kinds of forces needed to handle small wars.

The president heard Taylor out, then replied at length. He made no concessions. "It was fatuous to think that the U.S. and the USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons." The definition of general war to which Taylor objected was not important: "the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the USSR," and it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be used by both sides and at once. As for local wars, the president asserted that the use of tactical atomic weapons would be no more likely than old-fashioned "block-busters" to trigger the Big War. The United States must rely on countries attacked or threatened to defend themselves, with American help in organizing and equipping their forces, and on small U.S. mobile support forces armed with tactical atomic weapons that "have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces." But the United States would not "deploy and tie down our forces around

the Soviet periphery in small wars." Massive retaliation, though maligned by some, would be the key to survival.[22]

As he listened to Radford's follow-on remarks enumerating some of the "far-reaching effects" of the president's decisions, Taylor knew that on these issues he was playing against a stacked deck: a built-in adverse majority in the JCS, a defense secretary who reflexively supported his boss and usually the JCS chairman as well, and a president who had made up his mind. On 29 May the Joint Chiefs received a revised draft JSOP-60. Subsequently, they deadlocked on the issue of the Air Force's demand, resisted by the other services, for more B-52s to replace B-47s. Radford noted that the aggregated cost estimates of the services far exceeded what the nation could afford. On 20 June Wilson once again sent back the draft paper to the JCS for further study, stipulating budget ceilings of $38 billion, $39 billion, and $40 billion, respectively, for FYs 1958-60.[23]

The Eisenhower-Radford Plan

Two weeks later, on 5 July, Radford gave his colleagues a paper outlining what Taylor later characterized as "the most drastic proposal of the New Look period." It declared that the essential aims of current military policy—capabilities to wage both general and limited war, reduction of overseas deployment, support of allies with atomic weapons if attacked, continued economic strength—now dictated certain measures. Beginning in 1957 Army forces in Europe and Asia would be reduced to small atomic task forces* responsible, with allied forces, for dealing with limited Communist aggression in those areas. Elsewhere, air and naval forces and a slimmed-down Marine Corps, all armed with atomic weapons, would take over the limited-war mission. At home the Army, with drastically reduced strength, would devote itself mainly to civil defense. Tactical air forces and airlift and sealift would also be severely cut back, but SAC and the Navy's antisubmarine warfare and strategic striking forces would be modernized at current levels. The "Radford Plan," as it was soon called, probably came as no great surprise to the other members of the JCS. Radford had ample warrant for his boldness, for every significant feature of the plan could be traced to the president himself. There was no need to worry that the plan went too fast or too far for the president.[24]

The Joint Chiefs considered Radford's paper on 9 July. Taylor "took the offensive at the start," stressing the plan's inconsistency. If it went into

* Ironically, the model for these groups was similar to the future "battle groups" Ridgway described in his memoirs

effect, he pointed out, by 1960 U.S. forces would be shaped mainly to fight a general war with the USSR, beginning with a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. For the kinds of conflict, ranging from small local aggressions to regional wars on the scale of Korea, such components as SAC and continental air defense forces would become, in large part, "sterile assets." In lower-level conflicts, "small atomic task forces . . . cannot substitute for forces [eliminated in the plan] able to seize and hold ground." The plan was militarily unsound. It might deter the Soviets from initiating general war, but it could not deter or effectively combat infiltration, subversion, coups d'etat, or limited aggression. Politically, Taylor feared, the plan threatened disaster—a wave of force reductions among allies, defections from NATO, increasing neutralism.[25]

Taylor was fighting more than concepts at this meeting. Radford's manpower figures showed that by 1960 the armed forces would take a one-third cut of about 800,000. The Army would, of course, bear the brunt, losing between 400,000 and 500,000 men, while the Navy would be cut 200,000 and the Air Force 150,000. Reportedly Radford did not circulate this manpower plan to the services, but he did send it to Assistant Secretary McNeil to provide the basis for a costing analysis. It is likely that Taylor—and perhaps the other chiefs as well—were aware before the meeting of the scale of the proposed manpower cuts. Taylor's account of the 9 July meeting, however, gave no hint that the information was discussed. His presentation, he wrote, was "received in strained silence. The other Chiefs gave me no support, the Chairman undertook no defense. The meeting broke up with no final action."[26]

The immediate aftermath, however, brought important consequences. On 13 July the *New York Times* carried on its front page the first of a series of articles by veteran reporter Anthony Leviero, giving a generally accurate account of the whole episode. Leviero, using the 800,000 figure for the total cut, accurately cited the Navy and Air Force cuts and split the difference to arrive at the Army cut of 450,000. But his most startling "revelation" was that Radford's proposal had precipitated a "revolt" by the other chiefs, who "united in vigorous protest." Top Defense officials, Leviero reported, had also reacted with alarm to what they perceived as a proposed "withdrawal to a Fortress America."[27] The *New York Times* story provoked alarmed reactions at home and abroad also and apparently influenced Wilson to order an indefinite suspension of the preparation of JSOP-60. On the 15th, the *Times* claimed that it had been assured by "competent Defense Department sources" that its published account was "entirely accurate."[28]

Taylor's assumption during the 9 July meeting that his colleagues' silence following his aggressive rebuttal signified support of the

chairman, was not necessarily correct. For them, Taylor's vigorous counterattack may have been an unexpected boon. Although the reasons of the other chiefs for opposing Radford probably differed significantly from Taylor's, all wanted at least to keep their existing programs, with their built-in tendency to grow instead of shrink. Radford's plan would make hash of existing mission assignments and called for a leap into a very cloudy future. The JCS evidently preferred the traditional incremental approach, one year at a time, fighting each budget battle as it came.

By the time the Leviero articles appeared, Radford's plan was on the shelf. Nevertheless, Leviero's revelations caused a "tremendous hullabaloo," as Taylor put it. Radford promptly issued a statement characterizing as "a mixture of fact and pure speculation" the views attributed to him. He did concede that manpower needs might well be reduced in the future by the introduction of new weapons, and he did not specifically deny any of the particulars of the articles, including the reported "revolt" of the service chiefs. Wilson on 7 August said that he had never seen the reported Radford paper and denied that any personnel reductions had been decided on.[29]

In Congress leading legislators hastened to voice their alarm loudly and publicly: an 800,000-man cut would be a national security disaster, and adoption of the plan would dictate a revision of foreign policy. Similar outcries came from NATO leaders, particularly West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sent his highest-ranking general, Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, to Washington to gain assurances that U.S. troop withdrawals were not in the offing. Taylor must have taken particular pleasure in speaking to Heusinger for the Joint Chiefs on this point.[30]

Air Force Perspectives

The abortive Eisenhower-Radford plan was the administration's first major response to the multiple challenges that would soon produce the so-called "New New Look." Had the plan not been foiled by the explosive domestic and international response to Leviero's journalistic coup, it might have superseded the New Look as the approved national strategy in the summer of 1956. As the revolt precipitated by its unveiling showed, however, it would, like the New Look before it, have been imposed on four, in varying degrees, dissenting and resisting services.

In the Air Force, the strategic air offensive, spearheaded by SAC, reigned supreme as the dominant war doctrine. Before 1950, when the Soviets had no atomic stockpile, the envisaged priority targets were population centers and war industries. When the Soviets acquired an

atomic stockpile and a growing delivery capability, SAC's primary mission increasingly came to be seen, as General LeMay explained, to "fight the air battle first, . . . [and] as quickly as possible destroy their capability of doing damage to us."[31]

By 1955, as the expectation grew that within a few years both sides would possess ready combat forces able to destroy each other's cities and industries, that target system seemed to be losing its utility. As long as the United States had a larger and varied stockpile of atomic weapons, as currently it did, the alternative "counterforce" strategy of attacking only key military targets promised to give it the upper hand. Objections to counterforce included the requirement for large numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and their cost, and the need for more accurate advance identification and location of Soviet forces than the Air Force possessed in mid-1956. Theoretically, a U.S. counterforce strategy could be effective only during a stage in the superpower arms race when U.S. offensive forces, even if vulnerable (like their adversaries) to a surprise attack, were still capable of overwhelming enemy defenses. In October 1955 Air Force Secretary Quarles referred to the next stage of the arms race, commonly labeled mutual deterrence, as "a stalemate that would be paradoxically, our best hope for peace."[32]

In the Air Force few agreed with Quarles. The prerequisites seemed too daunting and complex to be sustained for more than a brief period. An effective nuclear deterrent required offensive forces of sufficient power to overcome enemy defenses, plus defenses invulnerable to surprise or counterattack. Such forces seemed impossible for both sides to possess at the same time. To maintain a stalemate, on the other hand, both sides must have major offensive nuclear capabilities while "lacking defenses capable of protecting their vital areas from destruction by the enemy"—a theoretical standoff that would later be called "mutual assured destruction."[33]

Doctrinal thinking in the Air Force was not wholly preoccupied with the Big War. Not surprisingly, SAC's institutional rival, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), became a hotbed of concern for the problems of limited war, in part in an effort to broaden TAC's mission orientation beyond a defensive strategy. At an Air Force Commanders' Conference in May 1954, General Otto P. Weyland, the TAC commander, proposed that his command be authorized to create a mobile tactical air force, based in the United States, to deter brushfire conflicts abroad. In July 1955 Weyland's original proposal for tactical mobility took on reality when TAC activated the Nineteenth Air Force at Foster AFB, Texas, as an operational headquarters for what would later be called the Composite Air Strike Force. It reflected, announced Vice Chief of Staff General White, the "new look" in tactical

air forces resulting from TAC's new nuclear strike and aerial-refueling capabilities, "to meet the threat of lesser wars." The following year Weyland told the Symington airpower hearings that the United States needed adequate tactical air forces in being to deter brushfire wars, just as SAC deterred global wars. SAC's "postures and concepts," he asserted, were "limited to major war situations."[34]

Actually, current intelligence in 1956 indicated that the Soviets had no small-wars aim in view, but were going all out to develop long-range air and rocket forces and had prospects of forging ahead of the corresponding American efforts. In the Suez crisis later in 1956 the Soviets threatened to unleash IRBMs against the British and French, raising the ominous prospect of major local aggressions by Soviet client states, backed by the Soviets. Responding to this challenge, by late 1956 Secretary Quarles was publicly arguing that the ability to deter general war included also the ability to deter little wars, and the following February Twining asserted that local aggression would be dealt with by all appropriate U.S. resources, including "part of the strategic force," to end it quickly before it spread.[35]

Flexible Response and Other Army Strategies

Like the Air Force, the Army claimed a dominant role in the next Big War and lesser ones as well. For the Air Force the "Big" one was a short war, an all-out "exchange" of thermonuclear strikes that might leave "our" side not too damaged to declare victory. To the Army the Big War was a probably long, escalating, nuclear and conventional war, a replay of World War II with modern trappings. Army planners also foresaw a variety of less than all-out conflicts, some with a nuclear component, but all likely to thrust the Army into a leading role.[36]

During General Ridgway's tour as Army chief of staff he launched an ambitious retraining and doctrinal development effort to begin the task of readying his forces to operate in the presumed nuclear environment of the 1960s. The army of that period, he later wrote, would be "a streamlined, hard-hitting force, armed with a wide variety of nuclear weapons . . . and greatly improved non-nuclear weapons," and organized in "aggregations of small 'battle groups' of all arms—infantry, armor, artillery, and engineers." In both offensive and defensive maneuver, dispersion would be the basic rule for survival. In the face of the airpower orientation and Air Force domination of approved national military strategy, Army thinking, as presented by Ridgway, tended to assume a defensive, reactive cast aimed primarily at discrediting the strategy of

massive retaliation. Ridgway pointed out that the United States had reacted defensively to Communist hostility by building a network of alliances around the world, involving commitments, "some vague, some specific, to take action, to deploy forces, or to provide materiel support .... Those . . . pledges . . . express our intent to meet force with force . . . in local or global wars, with or without the use of nuclear weapons." By developing their own adequate nuclear deterrent, Ridgway believed, the Soviets could force the United States in a big war to confront them where they were stronger, in ground forces and supporting air forces, and on large land masses where superior American naval power could not be brought effectively to bear. Ridgway's proposed solution was "a fast-moving, hard-hitting, joint force in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized, and the preponderance of any one part [read, SAC] is de-emphasized."[37]

Ridgway and his successor, General Taylor, thought much alike on most aspects of the Army's role in modern warfare. The purpose of a "proper" national strategy, in Taylor's stark definition, was "to deter war, particularly the general atomic war which will be so mutually destructive as to offer little choice between the fruits of victory or defeat." So compelling was this aim that its requirements must be "amply" satisfied before additional preparations were undertaken to fight and win an all-out nuclear war. It should not be difficult, Taylor thought, to deter the deliberate initiation of all-out war by either the USSR or the United States, because both were aware of the "unremunerative character" of such a contest. The greater danger was that the superpowers might back into the Big War, "either by mistake or by way of a series of smaller military undertakings which expand into general war." It followed, therefore, that the national strategy must provide for deterring not only general war but limited aggression as well, "or of quickly suppressing it before it can grow"—without threatening or resorting to retaliation so massive as to provoke a like response.

In order of emphasis (not as preclusive priorities) Taylor listed the essential aims of his strategy: "to deter general war, to deter or win local war, and, finally, to cope with a general war if deterrence fails." This strategy required—in order of emphasis—maintenance of technological superiority over the Communist bloc, an effective atomic retaliatory capability and continental defense system, adequate (not merely token or "tripwire") ready forces deployed abroad to provide a buffer against aggression, other ready mobile forces at home, armed for both conventional and atomic combat and prepared to move rapidly to danger spots as needed, naval forces to keep important sea lanes open, and indigenous allied forces supported in part by military aid. To these he cautiously

added a requirement for limited mobilization of backup forces to reinforce the active forces during a period of tension either before or after hostilities began. The total bill would surely "exceed any peacetime budget in United States history." But the money would go mainly to buy deterrent strength.[38]

Taylor's strategy thus eschewed a "fixation on the requirements of survival in general atomic war," concentrating instead on measures to deter such a war.[39] Among these measures, perhaps second only in importance to the air-nuclear retaliatory capability, was the deterrence or quick suppression of limited and local wars precipitated by Communist aggression. Such conflicts were prone to escalate. Radford's plan, much of current Air Force planning, and the approved massive retaliation strategy disposed of general war costs simply by positing a presumably victorious war ending shortly after an opening nuclear exchange. But the rigid rejection by Taylor's critics, notably the president, of even the possibility of a long war, conventional or less than apocalyptically nuclear, surely placed them well below the conceptual level of Taylor's hypothesis, which stressed the unpredictability of such events and candidly accepted calculated risks.

The Navy: Independent Player

In this period of trenchant debate over national security policy, the Navy occupied a middle position between the Air Force's primary emphasis on strategic nuclear airpower and the Army's reliance on multiservice forces. This position began to emerge late in 1953 when the chief of naval operations, Admiral Robert Carney, became Ridgway's quasi-ally in resisting the drastic force cutbacks imposed on the Army and Navy in the so-called "Interim Look." Carney protested, although in the end he accepted the massive retaliation strategy, but with reservations that went to the heart of the Navy's perceived role in the New Look. "The new emphases," he said at budget hearings in 1955, "have in no way altered the roles and missions of the Navy. It is still responsible for the accomplishment of its fundamental assigned mission: To gain and maintain control of the seas."[40]

Carney's successor, Admiral Burke, who took office on 17 August 1955, had previously registered his opposition to massive retaliation. He criticized as excessive and counterproductive its reliance on nuclear strategic airpower and its failure to provide adequate conventional forces to deal with the multifaceted threat of limited Communist aggression. But he supported the use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts,

when appropriate. In 1956, as the junior member of the Joint Chiefs and an old friend of Radford, he refrained from active support of Taylor's views. Broadly speaking, the New Look and its impending revisions seemed unlikely to threaten the Navy's independent strategic mission of controlling the seas. Dissent might have jeopardized the Navy's interests as the lesser victim, after the Army, of prospective budget and force cuts. In a nuclear war, carrier striking forces, while unable to penetrate to the enemy's continental heartland, could complement SAC's bombers by attacking port and coastal installations. But until the development, several years down the road, of the 1,500-mile ballistic missile fired from a submerged nuclear-powered submarine, the Navy had no competitive alternative to the Air Force's long-range nuclear bomber.

Burke moved energetically to hasten that day. With *Nautilus*, the first nuclear sub, already at sea, Burke actively promoted the building of a nuclear-powered fleet. Against considerable resistance in his own service, he also put his weight behind the Navy's participation with the Army in the Jupiter IRBM development directed by Secretary Wilson in November 1955. A year later the Navy withdrew from the joint effort in order to build its own solid-propellant Polaris fleet ballistic missile.

Burke's strategic views matured steadily during this period and drew closer to those expounded by Taylor in the spring of 1956. During the Senate airpower hearings in June 1956 he asserted that the Navy planned not to rival, but to complement the Air Force's capabilities by preparing "to deal with isolated danger spots during periods of cold war as well as limited or global war." In November, protesting a proposed drastic reduction by OSD in the Navy's FY 1958 budget, he reasserted the unlikelihood of all-out nuclear war. Overemphasis on strategic bombers and nuclear weapons drained funds from other, more needed limited-war defense forces. Noting that several local conflicts had been contained or averted in recent years "without recourse to nuclear weapons," Burke recognized that quick settlement of such conflicts might require use of tactical nuclear weapons, but only as a last resort, with utmost care to avoid escalation to all-out war. A year and a half later, when Taylor renewed his attack on the massive retaliation strategy, Burke endorsed it fully, creating for the first time a majority of the Joint Chiefs favoring a primarily limited-war orientation of national strategy.[41]

The outcome of this prolonged debate between the services was once again, as in previous years, delay in acceptance and approval of the two war plans under consideration by the JCS. JSCP-57, on which work had begun in July 1955, and the initial draft of which had been submitted to the JCS on 13 March 1956, was not approved by the Joint Chiefs until

21 December 1956. As for the hotly debated JSOP-60, it experienced an even longer delay. In July 1956 Secretary Wilson ordered indefinite suspension of its preparation, and planning was not resumed until 1957.

The differences in strategic perspective between the major elements of the national security structure became sharper and more pronounced as the president, Wilson, and Radford sought to impose their strategic views on the military services. The administration's avowed intent to give what seemed overriding priority to strategic nuclear forces caused fear in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps that their status vis-à-vis the Air Force would be seriously diminished. Changes in strategic direction and large cuts in funds and manpower could seriously impact their operational capabilities and their missions. Under the pressure of tight ceilings for money and manpower the services felt compelled to battle for their own interests. Able to secure only minor modifications in the thrust of administration policy, the services engaged in intense, sometimes desperate, competition to secure larger shares of the limited resources made available. The issues that erupted from this competition in turn became the subject of heated public and congressional debate that clearly influenced policy decisions.

This period provides a fascinating and classic object lesson, and an instructive paradigm, of how American national security policy and its military strategy elements are fashioned. The events of these years seemed to lend point to the sardonic view that the real war was not between the United States and the Soviet Union but between the U.S. military services. Still, the continuing interaction of the policymaking process, with all of its twists and turns, uncertainties, and retreats, exemplified the American democratic process. From it emerged a synthesis that, even if it left most, if not all, parties dissatisfied in some measure, nevertheless was accepted as a workable modus vivendi.

Chapter II

Reorganizing Defense

"No more painful than backing into a buzz saw," was Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett's wry characterization, shortly before leaving office, of efforts to reorganize the Army's seven technical services.[1] He and many others in the Truman administration believed, nevertheless, that these services and the rest of the worn baggage inherited by the new unified defense establishment five years earlier were ready for change. So did presidential candidate Eisenhower, who charged in a major campaign speech in September 1952 that unification of the armed forces was still not working—"too much form and too little substance"—and that current defense operations wasted "time, money, and talent with equal generosity." The next administration, he said, should create "at the earliest possible date next year . . . a commission of the most capable civilians in our land to study the operations of our Department of Defense." Soon after his inauguration, the new president followed up this pledge by directing his new defense secretary to submit by 1 May a plan for improving the operations of his department, without doubt one of the most important assignments for anyone in the administration during the next four years.[2]

Wilson Takes Charge

Wilson lost no time in naming, on 19 February, a blue-ribbon committee to study the Defense Department and recommend improvements in its organization. Headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, the panel included the president's brother, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Dr. Arthur S.

Flemming, outgoing defense secretary Lovett, Dr. Vannevar Bush, David Sarnoff, and JCS chairman General Omar N. Bradley. The committee counsel was H. Struve Hensel. The committee was to be assisted by a five-man staff headed by Don K. Price, and, appointed later, three distinguished retired military officers as consultants: George C. Marshall, Chester W. Nimitz, and Carl A. Spaatz.[3] Welcoming the committee on 2 March, Wilson told them that their mission was to devise an organization that would "get the cooperation of the whole without destroying the initiative of the pieces."[4]

Although reorganizing Defense was a campaign pledge to wrap up what the new administration regarded as unfinished business inherited from its predecessor, it was not in the main a partisan issue. Substantially the same mix of views on the problem could be found in both administrations. The service secretaries in both administrations, especially the Navy secretaries, were jealous of their prerogatives and resisted domination by the defense secretary. Conversely, Wilson's predecessor, Lovett, had held that his office should be strengthened.[5] Truman's Joint Chiefs, who carried over into the new administration to serve out their terms, brought their views with them. The objects of contention were neither absolute authority, nor total autonomy, but degrees of each—and certainly negotiable.

At the same time the membership of the new committee—which Wilson presumably had cleared with the president—suggested that the chief purpose of the reorganization would be to increase the authority of the secretary of defense. That aim had two prominent and aggressive advocates on the committee, Lovett and Bush; another member, General Bradley, could be counted on to support it up to a point, as could the president's brother, Milton Eisenhower. The remaining members were either neutral or moderate proponents of a strong defense secretary. The key player in this lineup was Lovett. Highly respected by Republicans and Democrats alike, he was probably the most knowledgeable expert on defense organization. Even Marshall could not match Lovett's experience. Lovett had recently analyzed his experience at length in his letter to President Truman in November 1952 published in the *New York Times* on 8 January. Most emphatically he advised that the status and power of the defense secretary, still ambiguous in his opinion, should be clarified to ensure his authority over the military departments and the Joint Chiefs and his primacy as the president's adviser on defense matters. Only in time of war would the Joint Chiefs command and operate, and then under the direction of the secretary, who in turn would report to the president as commander in chief.[6]

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Lovett's letter was a primary source for the committee's study as well as for Wilson's own homework. On 26 February, responding to a request from Chairman Rockefeller for guidance, Wilson wrote a seven-page analysis of the organization problem, astonishingly detailed for someone only a month into his new job. As might be expected, he began by putting defense organization in the context of organization theory, the standard dichotomies of staff-and-line, centralization-and-decentralization, headquarters-and-field, that he had learned at the feet of Alfred P. Sloan at General Motors. "The most effective way to organize the Defense Department," he wrote, "is in the form of a decentralized organization for administration (Army, Navy, Air) and a centralized organization (the Defense Department itself) for coordinated policy and control." He would not, in short, scrap the old edifice and replace it with, say, a monolithic new structure framed along functional lines as some had proposed. But within the old framework, he wanted a simpler, cleaner structure.[7]

Wilson then laid out the bounds within which the committee would be expected to work, cautioning that his memo was not his "formal recommendation or final thinking." Clearly, however, it was intended to be regarded as a quasi-mandate. The staff assumed that the committee's mission was to "help the [secretary] organize the set-up the way he is accustomed to function, more or less along the lines of his memorandum." It stipulated that the three existing assistant secretaryships (comptroller, manpower and personnel, and international security affairs) should be retained, and the statutory boards replaced by new assistant secretaries with a smaller competent staff and redefined duties, to which the secretary could add at will.[8]

Wilson had little to say about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a bundle of issues in itself. Since its glory days as the high command at the president's right hand in World War II and Korea, the JCS had declined, in the view of one critic, into "a debating society rather than a vigorous strategic planning body, and . . . a staff organization overloaded with [such] minor details as . . . how many coffee roasting plants should be operated by the Army." Wilson proposed creating a deputy chairman as a fifth member, of equal military rank to the other four and second ranking under the chairman.* Presumably the deputy would relieve the chairman of some of his growing workload but Wilson did not specify how. He had no suggestions regarding the overall role of the JCS, but did pick up Lovett's idea of adding a "combined staff" of recently retired, still vigorous and healthy former chiefs to advise the secretary on the effectiveness and balance of defense

* In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act established the position of vice chairman of the JCS.

CHART 1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 APRIL 1953





rams, and make "physical audits of what is going on." Finally, Wilson for the committee's views on the question of the chiefs' voting s, and on Lovett's so-called "gray areas" of disputed jurisdiction. He ed his concern that the various defense entities below the OSD (the services, National Guard, Reserve components, etc.) be given full portunity to voice their opinions.[9]

The Committee Follows Instructions

Facing the president's desire for quick action and the members' own manding schedules the committee did not linger over its assignment. ter its initial meeting on 2 March it met 10 more times, mostly on eekends, at the Pentagon.[10] On 11 April it submitted its final report to lson, who promptly forwarded it with his full approval to the president.[11]

The report focused on the secretary's relationships with his principal ficials. In his letter of transmittal, however, the chairman stressed the ommittee's belief that the secretary should also provide, through the three military departmental secretaries, for a "thorough analysis and possible evision of the organization and procedures" of those departments. Reinforcing this recommendation in his own message transmitting the approved report to Congress, the president stated that the service secretaries had been directed to initiate studies "with a view toward making those Secretaries truly responsible administrators, . . . and attaining economies wherever possible."[12]

Beginning on a grim note—"the continuing challenge of providing adequate national defense without wrecking the national economy"—the report moved on to the salient point that in 1947 Congress had established a central organization to exercise direction, authority, and control over the nation's defenses, and a decentralized organization for administration through the three military departments. Experience had indicated that, while its fundamental principles were still sound, the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense required improvement (1) to establish clear lines of authority and responsibility within the department, (2) to enable the secretary to clarify service roles and missions, (3) to make effective use of modern science and industry in planning, and (4) to achieve maximum economies without injury to military strength and its productive support. To attain these objectives, the secretary must have (1) clear and effective authority over the entire organization and control over its chief personnel; (2) a system to provide "complete, accurate, and understandable" information for decisionmaking; and (3) an independent audit of programs and performance, through inspection where necessary.

The report's recommendations had five broad organizational aims: (1) to make clear the authority of the secretary; (2) to clarify command channels within the department, especially to raise the status of the secretaries of the military departments; (3) to enhance the status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the top military planning and advisory body by clarifying the role of the chairman, improving the subordinate staff structure, and clearly establishing executive responsibility for unified commands; (4) to abolish certain statutory boards in the secretary's office and provide him sufficient assistant secretaries to perform essential staff functions; (5) to enable the secretary to ensure the promotional prospects of officers assigned to his office.[13]

Lovett's 18 November letter had noted "contradictions and straddles" in the 1947 and 1949 national security acts regarding the powers of the secretary and suggested that they should be clarified. On 26 February the committee received a long memorandum from Roger Kent, Lovett's general counsel still in office, concerning the "gray areas" in the department. Kent instanced cases in which the service secretaries had directly challenged the secretary's authority, citing their prerogative under the 1947 act to "separately administer" their respective military departments. Certain statutes enacted since 1947 had in fact vested authority directly in the military departments, giving rise to the view that they were to be administered independently of the secretary of defense, even though in the same act he was given "authority, direction and control" over his whole department, including the three military departments. Similarly, individual chiefs of staff and the military heads of certain technical services and bureaus had claimed that in some areas they too were legally required to act independently of their civilian superiors. In Kent's view—which Lovett supported, and other executive agencies and previous organization plans had adopted—the proper solution was to transfer all functions of all agencies and employees of the department to the secretary, with exceptions as necessary.[14]

None of the experts who advised or submitted statements to the committee challenged the view that the secretary should have "complete and effective authority" over the entire department. Ironically, it was one of the committee's own senior military consultants who voiced the most extreme opposition to strong secretarial powers. Admiral Nimitz, a blunt spokesman for the Navy's resistance to unification, urged that the authority of OSD be sharply reduced and that the secretary's role be redefined to include that of chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with the principal function of extracting monies from Congress and seeing to their proper expenditure. The secretary's office, Nimitz asserted, should be

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divested of any authority over manpower and personnel, international security affairs, legal and legislative affairs, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group—and the admiral was confident that the secretary could find still other functions that his office could do without.[15]

Nimitz was a solitary champion of these views on the committee, however. His colleague, General Spaatz, favored enhancing the authority of both the secretary and the JCS chairman. Meanwhile a new legal opinion drafted by the General Counsel's office determined that corrective measures to "clarify" the secretary's authority would not be needed, concluding that existing legislation already supported the "supreme" authority of the secretary "to run the affairs of the Department of Defense and all its organizations and agencies." It declared that "the power of the Secretary of Defense extends to all matters arising in the Department of whatsoever kind or nature; that the statute provides that the power and authority of the Secretary are superior to the authorities possessed by any other official, officer or member of the Department; that the Secretary's power in the Department is the superior power irrespective of when or how any other individual's power was derived."[16]

Convinced by the new ruling, the committee recommended that the superior power of the secretary should be "confirmed by decisive administrative action, and if necessary by statutory amendment," presumably to protect it against future challenge. On the other hand, the three military departments should "continue to be separately organized and administered by their respective Secretaries subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense." The secretary, finally, exercised his authority "subject to the overriding authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief," who was, moreover, free to deal directly with subordinates of the secretary of defense, including the military chiefs of the services. In time of war the president as commander in chief could be expected to assume much more active command over strategic operations, "but this is not in any way inconsistent with the National Security Act provision 'that the Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.'"[17]

The Unified Commands

Having thus established the primacy of the secretary within his department, the report next asserted the similar status of the three military

departmental secretaries within their respective departments: "The Secretary of each military department carries full responsibility for the administration of his department. No witness disagreed with the principle that the military chief of each service should be completely subject to the direction of civilian authority." Owing to the elusive character of the distinction between civilian and military affairs, parallel civilian and military channels linking the defense secretary with each service secretary and each military service chief would be administratively impracticable. The president and the secretary of defense would normally communicate with a military service chief or other military officers through the appropriate civilian secretary. In emergencies the communication might go directly to the recipient, but even then "such a channel of communication does in no sense take the military chief of a service out from under his responsibility to the Secretary of his military department, or relieve him of the obligation to keep his service Secretary fully informed." Effective implementation of this principle, the report added, might require adjustments in the internal organization and procedures of each military department.[18]

This elucidation of the service secretaries' status derived mainly from an ongoing controversy over the role of the military service chiefs as executive agents of unified commands. The Key West Agreement of 1948* had provided that when a unified command was created, the Joint Chiefs should designate one of their members as executive agent for the command. Under this provision, for example, they had later designated Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins executive agent to administer the unified command in Korea. Subsequently Collins had asserted that when wearing this hat he reported to the secretary of defense through the Joint Chiefs, rather than through his superior, Army Secretary Frank Pace. The latter had promptly taken the issue to Secretary Lovett. Assistant Secretary Coolidge, whom Lovett assigned to deal with the problem, proceeded to write a legal opinion that when the chiefs established a unified command, the executive agent (specifically the Army chief of staff) was not independent of supervision by the secretary of the Army. The JCS, he argued, should be required to "treat the Secretary of a military department whose Chief of Staff has been appointed their agent as if the department itself had been appointed." Lovett reportedly had decided to adopt this course, but Truman left office before the issue could be brought before him.[19]

Soon after the new administration took over, the issue was revived when the chiefs submitted a new unified command plan for Europe, following the traditional practice of designating a particular military service

* See Rearden, *Formative Years*, 393-97.

chief as executive agent for each overseas command. General Counsel Kent recommended that Wilson confront the issue squarely. If the unified command plan were approved in its present form, he pointed out, "it could be argued that Secretary Wilson had ratified the Key West paper"; that paper should be amended to provide for appointment of a military department as executive agent. Following the line of reasoning elucidated by Lovett, Kent, and others, the Rockefeller Committee accordingly declared that the executive agent provided by the Key West agreement was "undesirable." The committee recommended that the Key West agreement be revised accordingly, and that all orders transmitted by a unified command specify that they were issued by direction of the secretary of defense.[20]

During the hearing, General Bradley voiced the concern of the Joint Chiefs that the military might be unable, under this procedure, to exercise operational control over their forces, particularly in an emergency. In their last working session, the committee clarified the language of the report to ensure, "that, for the strategic direction and operational control of forces and for the conduct of combat operations, the military chief of that department should be empowered to receive and transmit orders and to act for that department in its executive agency capacity."[21]

The Joint Chiefs and Their Chairman

One of the basic aims of the reorganization was to improve the machinery of strategic planning, centered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its supporting staff and committees. Eisenhower shared the belief of many critics in a basic weakness of the JCS system—a tendency of the chiefs and especially their committees and the Joint Staff—to be excessively influenced by loyalty to their respective services and by traditional service biases. This tendency, the Rockefeller Committee asserted, must be resisted. JCS plans must "provide for the defense of the Nation as a whole." The chiefs "must rise above the particular views of their respective services and provide the Secretary of Defense with advice which is based on the broadest conception of the national interest."[22]

A major anomaly in the existing defense structure was the dual role of the Joint Chiefs as planners and advisers and as administrators and commanders, the former prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, the latter by subsequent delegation. One of the committee's first recommendations was that the Key West agreement be revised to eliminate command functions delegated to the JCS by the secretary of defense—notably in the establishment and administration of unified commands, as

mentioned earlier—"in order to enable them to work more effectively as a unified planning agency." In its planning role the corporate JCS also benefited from the practical experience of its individual members as chiefs of their respective services in implementing JCS plans. But the committee looked primarily to the JCS chairman, with enhanced powers, to organize the subordinate structure of the JCS and the Joint Staff with a view (1) to freeing the chiefs to concentrate on their primary function of strategic planning, and (2) as the president later put it, to divorce "the thinking and the outlook of the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services and to center their entire effort on national planning for the over-all common defense of the nation and the West." To this end the committee recommended that selection of the director of the Joint Staff be subject to the approval of the secretary, and assignments of officers to the JCS committees and to the Joint Staff be subject to approval of the chairman. To give the secretary a basis for full understanding of the background of each issue in making decisions, it was important also to bring into the planning process at all levels the independent views of other parts of the secretary's office and the expertise of scientific and technical specialists.[23]

The report recommended a variety of additional responsibilities for the JCS chairman, more or less inferable from the provision of the National Security Act. He should prepare JCS meeting agendas and help the chiefs "to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable." For example, to send matters referred to the JCS, if he saw fit, back to the secretary for proposed reassignment to a military department; to appoint consultants to the JCS from outside the department; to set up ad hoc committees to advise the JCS; and to determine which matters should be referred to the chiefs or delegated to other JCS bodies—in effect, with the help of the director of the Joint Staff, to serve as a general manager of the JCS system.[24]

The committee expressed particular concern for strengthening the role of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), senior advisers to the JCS on overall strategy. Officers assigned to this group needed to have an exceptional grasp of strategic matters, not only in their traditional international context but especially with respect to the effects of new weapons. They should also be chosen for their demonstrated emancipation from traditional service biases and appreciation of the need for integration of service plans. The committee urged that the JSSC be reinforced with prestigious civilian scientists, both physical and social, as well as with outstanding retired officers, and that it be given an important role in the integration of new weapons into the armed forces.[25]

CHART 2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

30 JUNE 1953



Streamlining OSD

Of all the proposed organizational reforms, elimination of the Munitions Board commanded widest support. Given statutory sanction in 1947,* it consisted, like other Defense boards, of representatives from the military departments sharing equal power with the civilian chairman. From its inception it had been a hotbed of interservice rivalry, which intensified during the Korean War when it was overwhelmed by an unanticipated large-scale mobilization. Another statutory agency, the Research and Development Board, on the other hand, had had the good fortune to receive a new charter from Secretary Lovett in May 1952, under which its chairman functioned, in effect, as an assistant secretary. The Rockefeller Committee recommended that both boards be transferred to the secretary of defense and their functions divided between three assistant secretaries: supply and logistics, research and development, and applications engineering.[26]

The disposition of these two statutory boards was part of a sweeping reorganization of defense functions contemplated by the committee. The statutory board (or agency) form of organization, the committee argued, was too rigid and unwieldy and should be replaced by assistant secretary positions to which the secretary could flexibly assign functions as required. The three existing assistant secretary positions—comptroller, international security affairs, and manpower and personnel—should be retained with their present responsibilities, and five more created to absorb the functions of the two eliminated boards, the Defense Supply Management Agency, the Office of Director of Installations, and the Office of Legislative Affairs. In addition the general counsel should be raised to assistant secretary rank.[27]

This reshuffle of existing functions was viewed, the president confidently asserted at the end of April, as "the key to the attainment of increased effectiveness at low cost in the Department of Defense." As a "simple token testimony" he pledged an OSD staff reduction of about 500 people.[28]

In its final recommendations, the committee deplored the professional stigma that, despite official denials, seemed to be fastened on military officers assigned to OSD. It urged the secretary of defense to insist on full cooperation by the military departments "in assigning highly qualified officers" to all OSD agencies and in assuring them that such service would offer important opportunities for career advancement. It was imperative, moreover, that officers serving there "do not lose standing in their respective services through a lack of appreciation of the importance of this assignment or of the accomplishments of the individual officer while

* It was the successor to the Army-Navy Munitions Board, created in 1922.

on such duty. At the present time, many officers feel that assignment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense isolates them from their service and deprives them of an equal opportunity for promotion with other officers of the same age and rank." In general the committee held that civilian OSD officials should have exclusive authority to write formal efficiency reports for military personnel serving under them, and military departmental secretaries should direct their selection boards to give the same weight to OSD service as to military service elsewhere.[29]

The Congressional Hurdle

Wilson forwarded the committee's report to the president on 13 April. On that same day Rockefeller and staff director Don Price conferred with Wilton B. Persons and Bryce Harlow of the White House staff on the tactics of submitting the plan to Congress. The group decided to submit it as an executive reorganization measure, the president's preference. It would not require statutory passage and allowed the legislators 60 days to "take it or leave it." On the 23d, in a meeting between the president and congressional leaders, the omens were judged to be favorable. Informal contacts with both houses continued. By the beginning of the next week an agreed draft of the president's message had cleared the Justice Department, as private briefings continued. On 30 April the president officially transmitted his message, and copies were made available to the press.[30]

The president's message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6, as it was now labeled, briefly reviewed the circumstances that had led him to conclude, after six years of experience under the National Security Act, that the defense establishment was "in need of immediate improvement." The Communist powers had chosen, he said "to conduct themselves in such a way that these are years neither of total war nor total peace." Nevertheless, he was convinced that the Defense structure was fundamentally sound, and would not be adversely affected by the changes now proposed. He stressed three major objectives: (1) The military establishment must rest firmly on basic constitutional principles and traditions, chiefly on a "clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility," essential not only to preserve democratic institutions but also to protect the integrity of the military profession. Military leaders "must not be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of partisan politics." (2) Because adequate defense demanded more of the nation's resources than anticipated, "maximum effectiveness at minimum cost is essential." (3) Finally, it was imperative to develop "the best possible military plans," incorporating the "most competent and considered thinking . . . military, scientific, industrial, and economic."[31]

After encountering no hurdles in the Senate, the plan ran into hostile fire in the House, primarily over the new powers accorded the JCS chairman. This issue set the tone of the debate. Behind the criticism lurked the suspicion that the plan reflected a power play by the Army members and their supporters on the committee with the backing of Commander in Chief Eisenhower—aimed at "Prussianizing" the high command by centralizing power in a large, Army-dominated general staff. In the immediate postwar years the Army had led the march toward unification and the concept of an integrated general staff with a single chief of staff. A prominent retired National Guard general and leading critic of the Army charged that it "has engaged in an unrelenting struggle for power."[32] Throughout May unfriendly articles appeared from time to time. On the 30th, Rep. Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, Republican Whip and member of the Armed Services Committee, released to the press a letter he had written the president along with the latter's response. Speaking to Arends's question, "Does the proposal in any way represent a step toward our having an overall armed forces General Staff comparable to the Prussian General Staff?," the president answered at length: "The plan does not give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs command powers over the other three members of that body, it does not give him a vote in their proceedings, it does not . . ." and so on down a long list of other attributes describing the popular image of the "Prussian" General Staff.[33] Meanwhile, the chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, Clare Hoffman, a bitter foe of the National Security Act and enlarged powers for the JCS chairman, had introduced on 27 May a resolution providing that all aspects of the plan should take effect except those relating to that issue. Several weeks later he ordered a hearing on the resolution. Testifying before the House committee, Rockefeller, Kyes, and Dodge argued that the purpose of the chairman's enlarged powers was, in Kyes's words, "to afford the responsible official the managerial latitude normally given to any management head and to remove management detail from the heavily burdened members of the JCS."[34]

On 22 June the House Government Operations Committee, belying earlier signals of a favorable disposition toward the reorganization plan, approved Hoffman's resolution to delete the clauses that increased the power of the JCS chairman. Two days later, it rejected the entire plan. But on 29 June, after intensive administration lobbying, the full House decisively reversed the committee's vote, 235 to 108. On 30 June the reorganization plan became effective.[35]

The Hoover Commission Proposals

Organization of the Department of Defense subsequently became a major object of inquiry by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (known as the Second Hoover Commission).* Recommendations in June 1955 by its Committee on Business Organization in the Defense Department resulted in the merger of the assistant secretaryships for research and development and for applications engineering, and establishment of the Defense Science Board. Another recommendation, to organize the administration of research and development uniformly in the service departments under an assistant secretary in each, although approved by the administration, failed in Congress in 1956, along with a proposal to raise the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs to under secretary level.[36]

A more difficult problem addressed by the commission concerned the changed position of the Joint Chiefs in OSD resulting from their exclusion from the chain of command. The 1953 reorganization had intended to make the JCS a staff agency with a purely planning and advisory role, while increasing OSD participation in formulating defense policy. But as the system evolved, the secretary's office, with its augmented corps of assistant secretaries, became a business-oriented bureaucracy devoted largely to applying fiscal and managerial controls to the services' procurement, supply, and other logistic operations. Apparently, this trend accorded with Wilson's wishes and suited his view of OSD's proper role in the DoD firmament. But it also deprived the JCS of the leaven of civilian experience and outlook that the Rockefeller Committee had hoped to infuse into the formulation of defense policies and strategic plans. Also, the service chiefs tended to be even more focused than before on the daily business and special interests of their respective services, contrary to the intent of the 1953 reorganization that they delegate their administrative duties and cultivate broader perspectives. Late in 1955 one of them estimated that he spent only 18 apparently unrewarding hours a week on Joint Staff work, which he regarded as more than ample. As a corporate entity the JCS came to be centered in the office of the chairman and the Joint Staff and the committee empire that the former controlled.[37]

One of the staff working papers of the Hoover Commission roundly criticized these developments, asserting that the chiefs were still immersed in details, devoted too little time to broad planning, and were too partisan. The recommended remedy was to give the secretary "a high level group to advise directly in the field of strategy, missions [and] force levels." This

* The predecessor Hoover Commission had carried out a similar study in 1948.

proposal harked back to a similar one by Lovett and McNeil, rejected by the Rockefeller Committee with the argument that such a staff would overlap or conflict with the role of the JCS. As an alternative the committee had recommended strengthening the Joint Strategic Survey Committee by adding to it distinguished scientists and outstanding retired officers. Little was done to adopt these proposals, and the JSSC continued to function in the JCS system much as before. The Rockefeller Committee had also regarded the expansion of the secretary's office by the addition of several new assistant secretaries as a kind of alternative to the proposed new committee, and in the end opted for that solution because of the perceived need for individuals of elevated rank and salary to provide the desired talent and prestige.[38]

Unintended Consequences

Missing from the blessings that Eisenhower told Congress and the nation he expected to flow from the Defense reorganization was a solution to the apparent inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function as a corporate body. Lovett and other critics tended to see this as the principal challenge facing the secretary and one of the most compelling reasons for strengthening his authority and that of the JCS chairman.[39] Eisenhower had grown up with parochial service attitudes in the Army, and as a young officer presumably shared them. But from early in World War II he had held high leadership positions in national and multinational organizations in which single-service points of view were often irrelevant or counterproductive. Long before he reached the White House he had shed these attitudes, and apparently saw no reason why mature and intelligent individuals in high positions should not be expected to do likewise. In mid-1953, with the Korean quagmire behind him, he moved quickly to replace the Truman chiefs of staff, whose terms expired shortly, with a new set selected before his inauguration, a distinguished group of officers whom he repeatedly praised thereafter as possibly the most able ever appointed to these posts.[40]

For one of them, Admiral Arthur Radford, recruited from commander in chief, Pacific, to replace Bradley as JCS chairman, he had especially high hopes. An odd choice, Radford had opposed unification and been a leader of the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. But the admiral persuaded both Eisenhower and Wilson that he had changed his spots and was ready to support Eisenhower's national strategy, involving sharp reductions in conventional forces and defense spending and more emphasis on atomic

weapons and airpower. Apparently he asked for no commitments on treatment of the Navy. But in May, before Radford assumed his new post, Eisenhower demanded from him a sort of "prenuptial" agreement in the form of a public statement that his confirmation as JCS chairman would require a "divorce from exclusive identification with the Navy," that henceforth he would be loyal to the Defense Department as a whole and would serve as "champion of *all* the services, governed by the single criterion of what is best for the United States." How much of Radford's conversion was genuine and how much opportunism is not clear, but for practical purposes it was complete. From then on he was the "president's man," his chief military adviser and spokesman, his most reliable supporter against the often fractious service chiefs, and a persuasive vindication of his belief that a chief of staff or commander such as Radford could be weaned from partisan loyalty to his own service.[41]

But except for Radford the new Joint Chiefs did not shed their service loyalties and biases. Indeed, the president's constant criticism of these attitudes may have served to intensify them. For his part, Eisenhower apparently was surprised and disappointed, and soon incensed by the persistence of attitudes which he could only regard as self-serving lack of vision. His reaction revealed not only the depth of his own "emancipation," but his unwillingness or inability to recognize any validity in these opposing viewpoints. Why, indeed, should he have expected otherwise? Each of the new chiefs now found himself in a position to which he must have aspired for many years. To be chief of staff of his own service was the traditional ultimate goal of every ambitious officer. To be told at this juncture—the beginning of a new administration and the end of a debilitating and frustrating war—that he must not strive to expand his service, or take on new missions, or compete with his sister services, flew in the face of the whole military culture.

Eisenhower's hope that the services could work together without friction like a well-oiled machine under a single coordinated plan in which each service played a fixed assigned role was shown to be unrealistic from the beginning. The service chiefs were persistently competitive, each demanding more resources than the administration was willing to give and lacking in sensitivity to the possible repercussions on the needs of other services or the national economy. "Every recommendation made by the military authorities," Eisenhower complained, "seems to be for an increase in strength or in money or both." Recalling that the Army, his own service, had held on to its horses for 50 years after cavalry had become obsolete, he remarked that he had yet to hear of any service being willing to give up something. Each service chief should, he insisted,

subordinate his identity to that of a team member of national military advisers to the president. He should even initiate reductions in his program, including transfers of a function to another service that could perform it more efficiently and cheaply.[42]

The services were also incorrigibly image-conscious. Each publicly flaunted its sophisticated new weaponry, advanced doctrine, and asserted role in the ultimate defeat of the Communists, while engaged in an endless competition for headlines and broadcast time. Most of this was normal, if flamboyant, public relations activity, aimed at improving service morale. Some was more covert and politically motivated, ostensibly conducted behind the back of the service chief or secretary. In the spring of 1956 the "competitive publicity," as an exasperated Eisenhower called it, reached such a pitch that he took all three service chiefs "to the woodshed" in his office, castigating them for leaking information, some of it classified, to the press.[43]

Service competition also found a public outlet through the testimony offered at congressional hearings on the Defense budget. Service spokesmen, while praising their own service's weaponry and performance, on occasion disparaged those of their service rivals. Eisenhower angrily lectured the chiefs on this practice. A service chief of staff, he declared, "should not present just the picture of his own service alone. Each service supplements the other in over-all military strength. Those testifying should not make it look as though each does the job alone."[44]

Eisenhower's most serious grievance against the chiefs pertained to their refusal, or inability, to accept wholeheartedly all the prescriptions of his new national cold war strategy, the so-called New Look, worked out and supposedly agreed to by all of them in the fall of 1953 and winter of 1954. Occasionally he protested that he did not expect them to "abandon their basic convictions" and that he laid no claim to ultimate wisdom in these matters. Practically speaking, this meant little. A dissenter was entitled to a hearing (with Admiral Radford in watchful attendance and Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster busily scribbling for the record). Once heard, if he failed to change the president's mind, he was expected to refrain from airing his dissent publicly or from stirring up arguments in official circles.[45]

The framing of the New Look strategy and its subsequent development over the next three years are traced in detail in later chapters, but its effect on Eisenhower's deteriorating relations with the chiefs can be summarized here. The core elements of the New Look centered on heavy reliance on nuclear airpower; modernized but drastically reduced ground forces, concentrated as far as practical in and near the continental United States; and integrated air-ground-sea continental defense forces. Indigenous allied

forces, aided by U.S. support forces and materiel as needed, would provide for their own defense against Communist aggression. The whole system was designed to be affordable under peacetime cold war budgets and adequate for the nation's defense over the long haul. The Air Force had assured preeminence as the chief arsenal of the nation's nuclear and conventional airpower, with nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles only a few years down the road. By mid-1956, war plans assumed, a war with the Soviet Union would be fought with nuclear weapons and initiated by air strikes against one or both homelands. The Navy had a secondary, more specialized role with its nuclear and conventional sea power, including carrier-borne aviation and supported by the Marine Corps' amphibious forces with their own tactical aviation. Since naval carriers could also project nuclear air strikes against an enemy's coastal regions, the Air Force and the Navy together held a de facto monopoly of offensive airpower, soon to be enhanced by the nuclear submarine armed with mid-range nuclear ballistic missiles. These two services were thus principal beneficiaries of Defense budgets. The Air Force's budget actually continued to grow despite peacetime economics, and the Navy's suffered only moderate reductions.

The Army, traditional home of the nation's land power and the dominant service during the Korean War, found itself relegated to underdog status through massive force and budget reductions. Subsequently, although it shared with the Navy the building of the first intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it was denied an operational mission for them. Its first chief of staff after the war, Matthew B. Ridgway, a Korean War hero and NATO supreme commander, fiercely resisted the New Look manpower cuts as best he could short of insubordination. For his pains Eisenhower brushed off his protests as "parochial." Retiring in mid-1955 after only a two-year term, Ridgway continued the fight with speeches and magazine articles.[46] His successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, a World War II hero and Far East commander, was a more formidable adversary, both politically and intellectually. He became chief of staff at a time when the pace of the growing Soviet threat had suddenly quickened, with major advances, both technical and quantitative, in airpower and nuclear capabilities. By 1956 these advances had brought alarmingly nearer than previously anticipated the attainment of parity between the two powers in their capacity to destroy each other by surprise attack. For the first time an all-out general war, precipitated by reciprocal fear of being attacked first, seemed a real possibility.[47]

Taylor did not settle for mere protests of personnel cuts. His answer to what he viewed as the administration's overweening emphasis on a

cold war strategy of "massive retaliation" proposed the first coherent alternative strategy the president had yet had to confront. Later known as "flexible response," it stressed deterrence and measured response at all levels of aggression, with balanced forces, conventional as well as nuclear, appropriate to the task. Massive retaliation remained on the menu but, as Taylor pointed out, the National Security Council itself had already declared an all-out Soviet air attack on the United States as the least likely of all contingencies in a situation of nuclear parity. The most likely Communist strategy was seen as a "nibbling" expansion through local and proxy aggression and fomented insurrection and subversion, mainly in underdeveloped and vulnerable Third World countries as already demonstrated in Southeast Asia, Greece, Guatemala, the Philippines, and elsewhere. The priorities of effort for dealing with these challenges, Taylor believed, should be ordered accordingly.[48]

These views put him on a collision course with the president. Confronting him (by invitation) in his office in May 1956, Taylor challenged as unrealistic the assumption in the current 1960 war plan that a war with the USSR would necessarily start with an all-out nuclear attack by one or both sides. Far more likely, he argued, it would come "through a succession of actions and counteractions." Since not only big wars, but small ones, as well, must be deterred, diverse types of forces were needed. "We should first calculate what is needed for deterrence and provide that; we should then provide the requirements for flexible forces usable in small wars, and finally put what remaining effort we have into the requirements for fighting an all-out war."[49]

Eisenhower rejected Taylor's reasoning. Tactical nuclear weapons, he went on, had "come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces" and should therefore be freely used in small wars wherever appropriate. However, the United States should generally not "tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars," but rather build up indigenous forces in the regions threatened. It was folly to contemplate moving large numbers of divisions overseas in the early months of an all-out war. "Massive retaliation . . . is likely to be the key to survival . . . . Planning should . . . [assume] the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved." Taylor's position, the president implied, was motivated by understandable nostalgia for "the same great role [for the Army] in the first year of war in relation to the other services as formerly." Regrettably the "Chiefs of Staff still thought much too much each in terms of his own service." The Army should recognize that its new role, to maintain order at home in the initial stages of war, was "truly vital." He was confident that the nation's

security required primary reliance on nuclear weapons. He did not claim to be "all wise in such matters," but "he was very sure that as long as he . . . [was] President he would meet an attack in the way indicated."[50]

From the president's vantage point the new JCS "system" would seem to offer rock-solid support for his defense policies. Radford "rubbed in" Taylor's defeat, pointing out that the president's decision supported the majority view of the Joint Chiefs.[51] In fact, a majority of the chiefs, knowing that the president had already made up his mind, dutifully went along. This was another of the JCS decisions against the Army that on major issues over the past three years had become almost the norm. Wilson's almost ritual concurrence simply added another nail. The real decision was the president's. All the others were only decisions to advise.

Public relations disasters confirmed the president's growing discontent with the way the 1953 reorganization was working out. Although only the Army's chief of staff had openly and fundamentally opposed the New Look strategy, only the Air Force chief, its principal beneficiary, had supported it with any enthusiasm, but without abating his open efforts to gain larger appropriations. None of the chiefs had shown any concern, except as directed by higher authority on particular issues, for the impact of his service's rising demands in treasure or resources on the health of the national economy which, next to the Communist menace, the president regarded as the single greatest threat to the nation's security. "In working for permanent security," he lectured the Joint Chiefs in March 1956, "we must give due consideration to the right 'take' from the economy—one which will permit the economy to remain viable and strong."[52]

Even Wilson and Radford, the president's two Defense stalwarts, were not totally undemanding. Wilson's loyalty to the president was beyond question, but as head of the hungriest of the agencies feeding on the economy, he felt obliged periodically to defend its needs and interests, including even service protests against budget and manpower cuts. Prospective increases in DoD spending over the next few years, he protested to the NSC on one occasion, "were not the result of extravagance, but were based on the realities which we faced. . . . The problem ultimately gets back to the basic matter of U.S. commitments and U.S. troop deployments." Discussing the rapid growth of Soviet airpower, he "opposed the view that we should simply sit where we are. We should speed up, should increase both our production of B-52s and our production of new fighter aircraft. Otherwise we could not honestly go before the people of the United States and honestly tell them we were staying ahead of the Russians."[53] At a meeting of the NSC on 17 May Wilson confessed that "try as they would, he and Admiral Radford simply could not carry out

their commitments on the basis of the budgets on which the Defense Department now operates." Radford agreed.[54]

A few days earlier Eisenhower reached a decision that "some reorientation of the whole organization ought to be made sometime next year." The kind of "reorientation" he had in mind revealed the extent to which he had lost confidence in the service chiefs as key elements of the machinery for developing defense policy, and, conversely, his continued reliance on Wilson and Radford to ride herd on the system. The authority of these two, already strengthened in the 1953 reorganization, he wanted further enlarged, while the services would be reduced to "a more operational, less policy role," making the chiefs, in effect, "assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—i.e. giving him the power to select and reassign them. The Chiefs would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own service—not of developing over-all policy."[55]

The president had in mind other changes aimed at curbing the chiefs' propensity to make trouble when "off the reservation": requiring prospective appointees to take an oath to accept decisions once made, and officials who served in the Pentagon not to disclose any "security information" after retirement, as well as other rules for statements on government policies by retired officers. Eisenhower also began to reconsider instituting a senior defense advisory staff, a new, more senior military committee ("senior officers divorced from service") modeled on one he had set up when chief of staff.[56]

Eisenhower found less fault with the civilian than with the military side of the 1953 reorganization. Perhaps because he was less involved than Wilson in the selection of the service secretaries and in subsequent dealings with them, he seemed to expect less of them than of the service chiefs. Most of the latter were former associates or old friends, whose opposition he seemed to regard almost as a betrayal. His complaints of the service chiefs' performance, both individually and as a corporate group, were not matched by similar strictures concerning the secretaries. The latter, indeed, offered less resistance than the chiefs to the president's policies.[57]

Nothing was done in 1956 to implement Eisenhower's few remarks on Defense reorganization.* During the presidential election campaign the

* In 1956 Congress finished the task begun in 1948 of codifying the laws governing the military establishment (Titles 10 and 32). Inadvertently, the new legislation incorporated old provisions that gave command authority to the chief of naval operations and the Air Force chief of staff, thus conflicting with the president's authority to put units of those services in unified commands. As it happened, this issue was never raised. For some reason the Army chief of staff received no command authority, remaining legally an adviser to the secretary of the Army. See Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 163-64; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 11; PL 1028, 84 Cong (10 Aug 56).

topic was relegated to a back burner, and Wilson did not seem eager to have his responsibilities enlarged, as the president desired. The following June he stated emphatically that he regarded the existing organization of the Defense Department as "sound" and "responsive to the President, the Congress and the American people." He urged the purveyors of radical changes "to advocate them only after the most careful thought and when experience has proved that they are necessary."[58]

Over the horizon and unexpected was the next Soviet "surprise," Sputnik. It would bring a new sense of urgency and lend impetus to a new, more far-reaching reorganization of the Defense Department in 1958.

snowflake

February 28, 2002 9:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: OSD History

Please ask the historian, Mr. Goldberg, which pages in here he thought I ought to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
1953-1956 *Strategy, Money and the New Look-History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*

DHR:dh
022802-3

Please respond by 02/29/01

snowflake

September 3, 2002 12:51 PM

TO: Gen. Handy

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Logistics

I was talking to Newt Gingrich the other day, and I asked him to give you a call. He may be calling. If so, please tell him I gave you a heads up.

He is interested in logistics and the possibility of using the private side, as used to be done many years before.

After you talk to him, please give me a call and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR dh
090302-24

Please respond by 09/20/02

September 3, 2002 11:06 AM

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Concentrating Power

This piece on the Panama case is interesting.

Regards.

Attach.
Thurman, Maxwell R. and Hartzog, William, "Simultaneity: The Panama Case," *Army*, November 1993.

DHR:dh
090302-8

Please respond by _____

Panama

SIMULTANEITY
The Panama Case

Operation Just Cause proves the point that overwhelming power concentrated on an enemy's 'center of gravity' resolves a conflict decisively with minimal casualties.

In the past several years, there has been a series of crises, notably in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Macedonia, which ultimately involved the use of U.S. military forces. Congress is now debating the use of U.S. forces in Somalia and the prospect of employing the U.S. military in the UN peacekeeping or enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, U.S. force levels continue to decline as the nation reshapes its post-Cold War armory.

As policy concerning the use of U.S. forces in crisis intervention is reviewed, some facts must be considered. Where the United States clearly led the intervention effort—Panama and the Persian Gulf—overwhelming military force was employed using the principle of simultaneity of operations to conclude the intervention quickly with minimal casualties.

In contrast, the United Nations, given no standing forces and saddled with limited budget flexibility, normally considers entering into peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations while looking to its member states to voluntarily contribute forces. Thus, it is forced to think about the minimum force that can be made available to the on-site UN commander.

The notions of minimization and gradualism are tired relics of the Vietnam War and are to be avoided. Rather, the successes of Operations Desert Storm and Just Cause taught us valuable lessons in the principle of simultaneity of operations. The lessons center on the commitment of decisive forces to achieve victory in the shortest possible time with a consequent reduction in casualties.

Simultaneity is the generation of simultaneous effects that combine to create overwhelming and focused power relative to enemy sources of power (the centers of gravity) in a campaign or major operation. Mass implies concentration in space and time. Simultaneity implies dispersion in space of actions whose effects are concentrated to achieve a specific aim.

Simultaneity is made possible because of today's mobility and communications. Its purpose is to paralyze the enemy's decision-making process and create indecision. Its by-products are minimal collateral damage and rapid, decisive conflict termination, both very important in any use of military force today. Though conditions may limit the degree to which simultaneity can be achieved, it is usually the best goal during planning and execution.

Perhaps the best example of simultaneity in our recent military history took place on a hot Panamanian night in December 1989 when nearly 28,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines undertook Operation Just Cause. Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Troops (METT) available made it possible. Simultaneity became a goal during the planning phase of the operation and a reality during the execution phase.

11-L-0559/OSD/11074

AP/Wide World

By Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman
U.S. Army retired
and
Lt. Gen. William Hartzog

By 1989, Gen. Manuel Noriega had been indicted in the United States on drug charges, stood accused of human rights violations against his countrymen and blatantly ignored the results of a free election in May.

In response, the United States had imposed fiscal sanctions on Panama that, when coupled with a $4.5 billion debt and a decline in foreign investment, added to a steadily deteriorating economy.

Yet, Noriega clung to power.

Approximately 15,000 U.S. military personnel and their families were in Panama at the time, spread over 18 defense sites. The soldiers' mission was to defend the Panama Canal and to provide assistance throughout the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) region. Their presence was rooted in the Torrijos-Carter Treaty of 1979 that also established a timetable to turn the canal over to the Panamanians.

As relations between Noriega and the United States deteriorated in 1989, harassment of U.S. citizens and hostile incursions to U.S. defense sites became commonplace —371 incidents occurred between May and November that year. During May alone, coinciding with the ill-fated elections, there were 127 incidents of harassment or incursion.

Numerous diplomatic efforts tried, but ultimately failed, to improve the situation. All the while, military contingency planning was ongoing. In the most general terms, the plans that eventually led to Just Cause

TT-L-0559/OSD/11075

4

AP/Wide World

A U.S. M551 Sheridan tank and high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles cordon off the area around the Vatican embassy grounds, where Manuel Noriega had sought refuge.

followed a common path—common in that before 1989, the plans assumed an ill-defined enemy and were oriented toward the physical defense of canal facilities. The key point is that the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) was considered an ally or no worse than neutral.

When events in 1988-89 changed that, the METT conditions underlying this discussion were formed. We will discuss simultaneity as a precept in the planning for Just Cause starting in the summer of 1989 through its execution between December 1989 and January 1990.

To frame our discussion, a series of key words and phrases in the matrix (chart) on Page 20 helps describe simultaneity.

Before May 1989, participants in contingency planning for Panama envisioned handling initial problems of internal unrest with forces stationed in the country and gradually introducing additional forces only in response to escalating threats. Throughout the summer of 1989, it became increasingly obvious that the indictment, sanctions and diplomacy were not going to cause Noriega to go, and planning for more decisive military action needed to be escalated.

These are factors that influenced the planning process:

- Noriega moved frequently to a number of command posts throughout the country.
- The PDF was spread in small units throughout the country.
- An organized paramilitary force had formed and was growing in capability daily.
- The PDF had not only a corrupt leader, but a second echelon of corrupt leaders leading a corrupt system.

There was a clear need *to plan* to attack a wide array of power nodes simultaneously to achieve decisive results should an attack be ordered.

In early July, a new concept was briefed by USSOUTHCOM to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-3 that recognized the increased threat and began synchronizing the arrival of military reinforcements rather than introducing them sequentially. Shortly thereafter, a review of existing planning by the incoming commander in chief of USSOUTHCOM with tactical leaders of the reinforcing forces solidified the notion that if military operations were to be undertaken, they must be decisive, rapid and cause as few casualties as possible.

By late summer, contingency planning had evolved in this way:

- Daily operations and demonstrations were intensified to display U.S. capabilities in accordance with the treaties.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance were focused to "know" the potential enemy.
- Potential risks to U.S. interests were reduced.
- The plan provided for the neutralization of the PDF and its leadership by the rapid intervention of an overwhelming force to prevent Noriega's forces from escaping to the Panamanian jungles and, thus, prolonging the conflict.
- Minimal casualties and collateral damage consistent with safeguarding American lives became a key consideration in the plan.

As options were formed, discarded and reformed, concurrent planning went on in four separate but closely connected nodes. Much policy and strategy work and interagency coordination took place in Washington, D.C.

Strategic planning focused on development of the commander in chief's intent and concept, and it took place at Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM. Most of the campaign planning took place at Ft. Bragg, N.C., at HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps and HQ, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The planning for and execution of daily operations leading up to Just Cause was done by HQ, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama at Ft. Clayton, Panama. At the operational and tactical levels, air planning was done primarily by HQ, 12th Air Force.

Though the nodes were far-flung and the interests of each headquarters often differed, clear and simple guidance and frequent coordination created continuity.

Three events between August and December proved crucial to Just Cause's success.

On 3 October, a group of PDF officers tried to overthrow the Panamanian dictator and to reorder the defense force's leadership. The coup was ill motivated, ill conceived and ill led. The failed coup, however, proved tremendously instructive because it demonstrated that major elements of the PDF—even with rudimentary equipment—could and would move rapidly to reinforce or mass in response to a threat.

Second, it underscored U.S. assessment of the levels of violence that Noriega and

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11-L-0559/OSD/11076

his regime were capable of as coup leaders were summarily executed.

Third, analysis indicated many shifts in PDF leadership and restationing of some units based mostly on personal or unit loyalty, rather than capability. The conclusion was that not only Noriega but also the entire coterie of leaders would need to be neutralized simultaneously.

During several meetings in October with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USSOUTHCOM laid out concepts that envisioned conditions that would require movement from daily operations through mobilization and employment of forward-deployed forces to protect American lives and interests.

A presentation was also made on the size and type of continental U.S.-based augmentees that would be needed. It was during the course of these sessions that all levels began to fully appreciate the challenges of achieving simultaneity on such a large scale:

■ *Agreeing to a "trigger event" for the plan.* It was extremely difficult, even during planning, to settle on an event or a series of events or a spectrum of conditions that would trigger U.S. military action. It was crucial, however, that all levels have a common view of the general parameters that might set in motion such actions.

If this had not occurred, the opportunity to maximize the effects of simultaneity might have been held hostage to discussion. The trigger event would ultimately lie in Noriega's actions.

■ *Generating the required lift.* The challenge of assembling and lifting a 30,000-man force scattered among several locations in the continental United States and Panama, and targeting it in a precisely timed fashion against multiple objectives was a tough challenge. Time and distance were risk enough. There also were the vagaries of weather, call-up of the civilian reserve fleet, use of reserves and a myriad of other potential war stoppers.

■ *Protection of our own.* There was inherent risk to American citizens, interests and property if the dictator started hostilities before the U.S. force required to ensure simultaneity could be assembled and applied. To reduce that risk, some weapons systems—Sheridans, Apaches, OH-58s and the like—were secretly introduced early to reduce the time needed for buildup.

■ *Defining the nature of the "center of gravity" or focus of effort.* Consensus was reached that if or when the decision was made for military intervention, eliminating Noriega would not suffice. The PDF would have to be removed. While the bull's-eye was Noriega, there was a small group of his equally corrupt subordinates in the "9-ring."

They had already quashed the coup and shown no interest in installing the government elected in May. There were also subordinate units and commanders in the "7 and 8 rings" who had proven their abilities to move their units rapidly to crisis spots.

From a geographical perspective, it became clear that there were important targets in heavily populated bull's-eyes of the major cities. They included command and control facilities, headquarters communications facilities, public works facilities and the like.

There were a number of other only slightly less crucial facilities in the five-to-ten-mile areas immediately adjacent. Finally, there were also airfields and unit sites more than 30 miles (the "6 and 7 rings") from the cities. It was absolutely clear that *all* targets, both in terms of structure and geography out to about the "6 ring," had to be dealt with simultaneously.

Noriega further complicated the planning by moving from command post to command post.

■ *Developing branch plans and force redundancy.* The senior leadership at both the national and theater levels exhaustively probed as many "what ifs" as could be conceived and articulated. As events in Panama unfolded, a tremendous number of "what ifs" were considered serious enough to be passed to the JTF level for either troop list modification or for formal rehearsal. Considering the breadth of possibilities examined, the resulting depth of redundancy in capabilities and rehearsals to achieve simultaneity was unprecedented.

The third and perhaps most important event in the fall was the series of rehearsals for the operation. Although no one knew how much rehearsal time there might be, all were convinced of the necessity to "wring out" each detail so that *if* the operation were needed, rapid and simultaneous action would be assured.

In these drills, each level's limits of duties and responsibilities were clarified. By November 1989, the operational and tactical levels, both the forward-deployed force (then a part of JTF Panama) and the contingency force (under XVIII Airborne Corps, later JTF South; of JSOC, later Joint Special Operations Task Force), were engaged in a robust series of target-by-target rehearsals. Where accurate mock-ups were needed, they were built; when secrecy was prudent,

Reuters/Bettmann

Joint U.S.-Panamanian patrols provide security in a Panama City district destroyed during the fighting as a U.S. soldier helps in the clean-up effort.

11-L-0559/OSD/11077

it was maintained; where repetition was needed, many iterations occurred; where reconnaissance was possible, it was conducted; and finally, where large-scale combinations of major parts of the operation were critical to achieving simultaneity, synchronized rehearsals were conducted on a joint scale.

Several practices were followed throughout that proved crucial.

■ Though there was never a complete "dress rehearsal" of all parts of the operation, there were frequent leaders' after-action reports following major blocks of rehearsals to share lessons learned.

■ As many "what ifs" as were conceivable were rehearsed—few were initially allowed to seem "implausible."

■ As much live fire as possible late in the rehearsal process proved vital.

On 16 December, members of the PDF killed a U.S. Marine officer in Panama City. On 17 December, President George Bush ordered the execution of Operation Blue Spoon, quickly renamed Just Cause. H-hour was designated as 0100 on 20 December.

Nets were opened, command posts activated, units assembled, leaders deployed, reconnaissance intensified, and the operation began. Forces were assembled from six bases in the continental United States and 18 locations within Panama.

The "what ifs" of ice storms, international relations and the impact of media exposure were all quickly accommodated. Long-planned task forces came to life. Planes flew, ships sailed, and, on the night of 20 December, 27,081 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines attacked 27 targets simultaneously. By dawn of the 21st, most military objectives were accomplished.

Just Cause offers major four lessons that should be considered in planning operations whether unilateral, coalition, U.S. only or UN directed.

■ While exhausting every effort to settle peacefully, preparations for the use of force should begin early if there is any possibility of military operations.

■ While there may be situations in which incremental applications of military force may be effective, in most instances it will be preferable to use overwhelming, sudden, simultaneous, precise and well-rehearsed force to achieve decisive ends.

■ Achieving coordination, precision, focus and combat power required for such

		Strategic	Operational	Tactical
PLANNING	M	• Clarity/Simplicity • International Consensus • Interagency Understanding • Branches/Sequels	• Clear Concept	• Understanding Intent • Doctrinally Sound Tactical Missions
	E	• General Capabilities • Leadership • Third Country Impacts	• Vision of Day after the Battle —Residual Capabilities —Governmental Change —Weapons	• Targeting • Deception • Communications
	T	• Extreme Distances	• Varied Terrain (Urban/Rural)	• Redundancy/Branches
	T	• Strategic Lift • Overwhelming Force • Diversity of Force • National Command Authorities' Intent • Define Lanes	• Warfighting Headquarters • Intratheater Mobility • Joint Operations • Commander in Chief's Intent	• Synchronization • Operations Security • Commander's Intent/Rules of Engagement • Rehearsals
EXECUTION	M	• Retesting Validity • Nurturing Internationalism • Media	• Media	• Doctrinally Sound Tactical Missions
	E	• International Law	• Planning for Day after During Execution • Creativity	• Impact of Leaders • Relative Capabilities • Impact of Deception • Television
	T	• Continental U.S. weather	• Weather (30-90 degrees)	• Night
	T	• Training —People —Joint Training —Leaders • Equipment • Staying in Lanes	• Work the Plan—Update • Command and Control—Conventional/Special Operations Forces/Interagency • Linguists	• Emphasizing Strengths • Operations Security • Rules of Engagement/Surgical/Control

METT = Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops

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decisive action can be done with careful planning, well-rehearsed preparation and forceful execution.

■ Joint and coalition forces can handle complexity if rehearsal time is available. Distributed simulations will enhance rehearsals.

These lessons in achieving simultaneity are best explained by another look at the chart on Page 20.

■ *International considerations in planning.* At the strategic level, coalitions provide the flexibility in regional considerations (basing, overflight and the like). The lack of a coalition can easily thwart simultaneity during strategic assembly and lift. In this case, some third country landing rights were arranged, and the potential strategic impact of Cuba was carefully considered.

■ *Vision.* A clearly articulated vision of the "day after battle" is essential. The intent or concept must be articulated in some detail and commonly held by national, theater and tactical leaders. It also must be consistently reviewed and, if still valid, defended throughout execution. Ever-changing conditions pressure leaders, commanders and warriors at every level that could lead to unwarranted changes and the loss of simultaneity. In this case, it was useful to frequently review the concept against the intent of the National Command Authorities.

President Bush's instructions were clear: create an environment safe for Americans, ensure integrity of the Panama Canal, provide a stable environment for the freely elected Panamanian government and bring Noriega to justice.

■ *Concept.* Of equal importance was the simplicity and utility of the commander's concept.

His drumbeats were night operations, swift entry, overwhelming force, neutralization of Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force, constant rehearsal (trigger event date unknown), and rules of engagement that facilitated minimal casualties and minimal collateral damage consistent with safeguarding American lives.

While there was clearly a bit of "how to" in the guidance, generals and individual servicemembers understood it.

■ *Lanes.* An important element in achieving simultaneity is the need for all leaders to stay in their respective lanes and follow mission orders. As mentioned earlier, this presupposes the definition of what those lanes are or might be.

In Just Cause, while there were numerous opportunities for "stovepiped" or skip-echelon guidance, *none* occurred. There was a trust and confidence among the leadership at the National Command Authorities level and among the multiservice group of conventional and special operations commanders. The biases, differences and disagreements were left on hundreds of sand tables and exercises and did not make it to the battlefield.

■ *Deception.* From early summer 1989 until 19 December, JTF Panama undertook a series of well planned and well executed, usually joint, operations from squad to battalion size.

They often were centered around the need to demonstrate that the U.S. military could move freely about Panama in concert with the accords of the Carter-Torrijos Treaty. Each operation was also designed to collect information about the response capabilities of the PDF.

These operations not only provided valuable training and intelligence but helped boost the confidence of the U.S. civilian population in our forces.

Even more important was the deception effect these operations had on Noriega and the PDF. They proved essential to the surprise achieved on 20 December. Each operation helped condition the PDF and, in particular, its leadership, to believe that military force would be employed only in small packages. Later, many PDF officers said they had also viewed the series as evidence that the U.S. military would never attack.

What is the lesson here with regard to simultaneity? It is simply that a valid, well-prepared conditioning plan can convince opposing leaders to adopt a mind-set that leaves them unprepared for decisive action or flexible response when the battle is joined.

In Just Cause, neither Noriega nor any of his immediate subordinates were able to exercise effective leadership at the crucial time or place.

An M113 armored personnel carrier covers a street in Panama City.

DoD

11-L-0559/OSD/11079

■ *Execution. (Work the plan/flexibility.)* Throughout the early days of Just Cause, there were a number of challenges to the plan that were overcome by flexibility. Ice storms hampered departure for part of the airborne force. Hostages taken by the PDF had to be rescued. Radio stations continued to transmit after having been initially suppressed. Noriega was not captured in any of his targeted headquarters.

Any one of these battlefield challenges could have fixated major parts of the U.S. force to the point that sledgehammer impact would have been lost. They did not.

Redundancy, rehearsal and reserves gave commanders the flexibility to deal rapidly with each challenge and to keep the plan generally intact. Every target had primary and secondary forces assigned to it. All forces had rehearsed the strikes in detail. In addition, in each phase, there were small packages of highly mobile, uncommitted forces whose mission was to be prepared to respond to the unknown. The result was the maintenance of momentum that facilitated simultaneity.

■ *Negotiators.* In the midst of operations, the presence of skilled military negotiators is important in avoiding possible stalemate. During Just Cause, the two most notable instances involved Noriega's surrender and the "campaign in the west."

With little warning, Maj. Gen. Marc Cisneros, the commanding general of JTF Panama and the deputy commanding general, JTF South, was given the mission to act as the contact between U.S. forces and the *Papal Nuncio*. Noriega had fled to the *nuncio's* enclave, which had diplomatic standing and could not be attacked. Gen. Cisneros was uniquely prepared for this task and carried it out with great skill that led to Noriega's arrest without bloodshed.

In the far western provinces of Panama, there were a number of PDF garrisons beyond the reach of the initial 27 invasion targets. To neutralize each garrison without a series of fights, a "reinforced" negotiation campaign was undertaken. A Special Forces team approached each compound accompanied by a readily visible airmobile force. Together, they proved successful in having the garrisons surrender peacefully.

■ *Training.* All examinations of simultaneity must include acknowledging the necessity for and impact of training. Most Army commanders in Just Cause were veterans of the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center.

The Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps leaders also each had similar large-scale, demanding training experiences. Over and over, the notion was stated that the battles in Panama had already been fought before —many times, in many places.

A ten-year training revolution that involved clear warfighting doctrine, clear training doctrine and a generation of training center-experienced leaders built the baseline for simultaneity and success in Just Cause.

We have had major elements of simultaneity in our doctrine for years. Mass, timing, synchronization of impacts and all of the myriad tools that underline those notions have been long understood.

What is different? The difference is that the world has shrunk in the satellite era, and war has become extremely lethal. We also are now a force primarily based in the continental United States. In the next ten years, we will be asked to assemble and rapidly deploy to distant target areas, fight decisively and precisely to achieve the nation's goals with a minimal loss of life, injury or damage. We will be expected to conclude operations rapidly and to redeploy to the continental United States—all of these in the light of public scrutiny.

Just Cause was in many ways the first modern example of simultaneity—a complex, difficult operation involving many moving parts working in close harmony. The result was irrefutable—mission accomplished in short order with few casualties.

The principle of simultaneity is to use superior military force in very precise applications against an enemy in order to achieve overwhelming power at all potential centers of gravity or sources of power within a very short time to collapse resistance cataclysmically. This confines the violence of the conflict in time and space and permits rapid conflict termination on favorable terms with minimal collateral damage and minimal casualties.

Commanders have long sought to achieve overwhelming success in as short a time as possible. Most long campaigns started out being short in concept. Germany's Schlieffer Plan visualized a short, crushing campaign of a few weeks, but ended in the protracted trench warfare of World War I.

During our preparation for combat with the Soviets in the Cold War period, U.S. strategists often spoke of the desirability to turn within the enemy commanders' decision cycle. Simultaneity permits us to collapse the enemy's decision-making process to the point of uselessness.

Perhaps the single toughest task in this entire business is how to get started. Said

DoD

A fire rages in a Panamanian Defense Force headquarters compound the day after the initial assault—the result of heavy damage inflicted by air support and Sheridan light tanks.

11-L-0559/OSD/11080

Reuters/Bettmann

U.S. troops guard an approach to the Vatican embassy, during the negotiations that led to the surrender of Manuel Noriega.

simply, when the planning sheet is blank, what is it that drives the conceptualizer to pursue simultaneity rather than a more sequential or incremental approach? There are at least five conditions that are conducive to thinking simultaneity:

- The availability of good intelligence to identify enemy centers of gravity—those places, people, weaponry, information nodes or conditions that, if controlled, take away the enemy's flexibility.
- Clearly articulated, broadly supported, universally understood end states—while an operation may be envisioned as being phased, the conditions signaling success must be stated in sufficient detail and with sufficient clarity to ensure understanding by the task force commanders, the privates and the American people.
- Opportunity for creating surprise (either tactical, operational or strategic)—although difficult in the satellite age, the ability to conduct operational security and deception operations are key factors in carrying out simultaneity.
- Sufficient force of the right sort must be made available to do the job—overwhelming, prepared to operate jointly, well rehearsed, timely.
- Decisive leadership at each echelon—leadership that understands not only the explicit orders but the implicit challenges, able to persevere regardless of the vagaries of rapidly changing conditions.

Today, forces can be concentrated from dispersed locations and applied to separated but functionally linked objectives in a very short time. Communications allow coordination of functions, forces and details of planning and execution as never before. Mobility and communications technology are now at hand to shrink the period of application of forces to near simultaneity anywhere on the globe. The trends in the technology of weapons design will lead to weapons of greater precision and lethality which, when applied in a focused near-simultaneous fashion, will continue to increase our ability to bring about quick, decisive results with minimal casualties and minimal collateral damage.

What about the use of the principle of simultaneity in future operations? If military or paramilitary force is to be used decisively, the objective should be to so overload the opposition's command and control system as to paralyze it. "Laying down" a peacekeeping force in Bosnia quickly, in a matter of hours, for example, would create the physical presence for substantially reducing resistance to the intervention.

Simultaneity makes that happen. To fail to do this leaves the opposition with the opportunity to retain arms and reposition equipment, melt into the hinterlands or into the population to wait for a call to arms on different terms, thus wresting the initiative away from U.S. military forces or UN peacemaking forces. Gradualism is to be avoided. It will cost precious lives. Vietnam taught us that lesson.

Speaking Freely

Several years ago I was assigned to Ft. McPherson, Ga., and it was my custom to run at noon every day with four or five other officers.

At the time, the post did not have the athletic facility it has now, and our locker room was a small area on the second floor of an old warehouse. There were no assigned lockers and little emphasis was given to rank.

As a group, we talked rather freely, often about the lack of an adequate locker room.

On one particularly sweltering summer day, the air conditioner was out, the heat and humidity unbearable, and the complaints plentiful.

I had just stripped down to shower, and although I didn't recognize the fellow dressing beside me, I remarked, rather offhandedly, "This place might improve if any of the generals around here ever darkened the doors!"

He nodded in agreement, and I went to shower.

I was just finished when one of my buddies, who had overheard my comment, stuck his head in the shower room and said, "You might consider staying in the shower a little longer. That guy sitting beside you just put his shirt on, and he's a major general!"

JOHN C. LATIMER

ARMY will pay, on publication, from $25 to $50 for true, first-person anecdotes. Contributions will be returned only if accompanied by a S.A.S.E.

11-L-0559/OSD/11081

snowflake

July 19, 2002 7:05 AM

TO: Tom White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Jim Haynes
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DOMS Missions

I want to start signing deployment and execute orders with respect to the Director of Military Support missions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071902-1

Please respond by _____

384

19 Jul 02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

INFO MEMO

September 4, 2002 – 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) David S. C. Chu 4 Sep 02

SUBJECT: Tenure at the Military Academies—SNOWFLAKE

- In a note to me earlier this summer, you expressed your opposition to tenure at the Military Academies (attached).

- We don't really have tenure at the Academies in the sense that the term is used in civilian universities.

  - Civilian faculty (half of Naval Academy faculty, one quarter at the other two) either are appointed in a "career conditional" status (Army, Air Force) or in normal General Schedule career status (Navy), but with a significantly longer probationary period. Especially in the Army/Air Force case, current federal disciplinary regulations concerning employee conduct and performance provide adequate controls on substandard performance for faculty employees.

  - Military faculties are mostly on three-year rotational tours (among our longer tours!). The exceptions are "senior military" billets at West Point and the Air Force Academy, in which officers are awarded professional status in the latter part of their careers through a competitive process. These officers serve until retirement (about six years at West Point, eight years at the Air Force Academy), but may be rotated through operational tours at periodic intervals to bring them up to date on operational practices. The Naval Academy is just beginning a similar program.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

snowflake

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: July 23, 2002

SUBJECT:

I don't think any military academy ought to have tenure for anyone. Tenure is a sickness.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072302.06

Please respond by: _____

snowflake

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: July 23, 2002

SUBJECT:

I don't think any military academy ought to have tenure for anyone. Tenure is a sickness.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072302.06

Please respond by: _____

snowflake

C9/6

July 22, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Innovation Entity

Please take a look at the innovation entity that CIA created. I think a man by the name of (b)(6) heads it up.

Please tell us whether you think DoD ought to do anything like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-9

9/5

Please respond by 08/16/02

Aldridge: Response attached

Larry Di Rita

snowflake

1

September 9, 2002 11:25 AM

TO: The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Secretary of Veterans Affairs

CC: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Initiatives

I have been receiving positive reports on progress between Defense and VA regarding the President's Veterans Health Care Task Force. I hope you are hearing the same thing, and that you will let me know if there is anything that may not be moving along as it should.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/28/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: "Monthly Progress Report on Department of Defense/Veterans Affairs Initiatives for July 2002"

DHR:dh
090902-32

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 AUG 29 PM 3:29

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

AUG 28 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 09 2002

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Monthly Progress Report on Department of Defense/Veterans Affairs Initiatives for July 2002

- **Presidential Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for Our Nation's Veterans (Task Force).** The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs briefed the Task Force on 10 July on current Department of Defense health care initiatives with Veterans Affairs. Dr. Winkenwerder outlined his strategic objectives with Veterans Affairs including the establishment of a single payment rate for medical resource sharing; initiating programs to improve the exchange of health information; increasing Veterans Affairs participation in the TRICARE program; and developing an interagency strategic plan to identify a joint vision and objectives for future Department of Defense/Veterans Affairs collaboration.

- **Task Force Interim Report.** The Task Force issued its Interim Report on July 31, 2002. General findings include the following:

  1. Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense efforts must be to improve:

     Interoperability --- business practices, medical records, information technology systems, and financial systems;
     Coordination --- joint procurement and strategic planning; and
     Accountability --- top leadership commitment and performance measurements.

  2. Joint facilities and merger of programs will not yield desired results. Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense have different missions.

  3. Clear, sustained commitment of top leadership to collaboration is critical. Efforts of current leadership were praised. Desire to make this permanent.

- **The role of Veterans Affairs in the next generation of TRICARE Contracts.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs approved language for the Request for Proposal to remove barriers and encourage direct sharing between military treatment facilities and Veterans Affairs Medical Centers.

Prepared by: Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HA)

ASSISTANT DI RITA
MA GIAMBASTIANI
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE

snowflake

September 9, 2002 11:29 AM

TO: Gen. Hagee

CC: Gen. Myers
Gordon England
Gen. Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Camp Pendleton Follow-Up

I was asked a question during my visit to Camp Pendleton about a citizenship issue with respect to a 9/11 victim. The attached memo provides some background info you may find helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/302 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: "*Washington Times* Article 'U.S. Ready to Boot Grieving Grandma'"

DHR:dh
090902-33

Please respond by _____

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

2002 AUG 30 PM 3:33

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2002, 4:00 PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 09 2002

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Washington Times Article "U.S. Ready to Boot Grieving Grandma"

- To provide you with information regarding the possible deportation of the mother of a September 11, widow. You were asked about this issue during your appearance at Pendleton, and committed to give solving the problem "a good try."
- Mrs. M. Hemenway is the surviving spouse of Petty Officer 1st Class Ronald F. Hemenway who died in the attack on the Pentagon. Mrs. Hemenway's mother, Mrs. Jolanda Sannino, 79, was transported by the Navy from Italy to assist her daughter and two grandchildren in the aftermath of the attack. Mrs. Sannino's one-year visa expires September 13, 2002.
- Press accounts would have you believe that the bureaucracy has been unfeeling. Not true.
- A relatively senior Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official is handling this case personally. INS is prepared to grant Ms. Sannino a temporary visa, good for 6 months.
  - Situation is complicated in that Mrs. Hemenway is not an American citizen. She will be naturalized in about two months.
  - Mrs. Hemenway has been uncooperative (despite Navy efforts) in meeting requirements to complete necessary paperwork and meet scheduled appointments that address her citizenship visa questions
  - When Mrs. Hemenway becomes a citizen, her mother can be recognized as the family member of a citizen and can seek to become a resident alien.
- Navy and INS appear firm that this will have a positive outcome.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Information only.

COORDINATION: N/A

PREPARED BY: John Molino, DASD (MC&FP), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA RUCCI	
C WHITMORE	2/3

11-L-0559/OSD/11090 U14187 /02

snowflake

EF1945
02/009432

July 19, 2002 7:13 AM

Norwood

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Preemption

Let's get that paper on the concept of preemption turned into a memo to the President.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
071902-2

Please respond by 08/02/02

7/22

USDP –
Hoehn has lead. Suspense is 7/25.

VIR LB

Signed

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 10 2002

333 SD

Rear Admiral J.L. Betancourt, Jr., USN
Commander
Navy Region Southwest
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, CA 92132-5100

Dear Admiral Betancourt:

It was a pleasure seeing you on my recent trip to San Diego. I appreciate the hospitality and hard work that was evident throughout.

Sincerely,

10 Sep 02

U14526 02

Rear Admiral J.L. Betancourt, Jr., USN
Commander
Navy Region Southwest
937 North Harbor Drive
San Diego, CA 92132-5100

Larry Di Rita
9/6

Dear Admiral Betancourt:

It was a pleasure seeing you on my recent trip to San Diego. I appreciate the hospitality ~~you and your staff provided.~~ and hard work that was evident throughout.

~~Please convey my thanks for their hard work and professionalism.~~

Sincerely,

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

Let's send a thank you to Admiral J. L. Betancourt for his hospitality in San Diego.

Thanks.

email to Zeno Gamble
0830, 30 Aug

cc: Lohse

DHR/azn
082902.04

IA 1071

Please respond by: _____

Specifics —
Delman did the trip
& in Tuesday.

snowflake

EF2286
02/010773 C 1/4

July 22, 2002 7:50 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Reward Program

9/9

Please get me the information on the Department of State reward program. I want to know what they have given out. I don't need to know the names, but I need to know what dollars they have given out, for what purposes and on what dates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-5

Please respond by 08/09/02

8/27
RESPONSE ATTACHED.
V/R

07-23-02 07:02 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11095 U14540 /02

Snowflake

283

August 15, 2002 4:26 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Computers in South Korea

Korea

You are going to get back to me on the subject of jamming our computers in South Korea.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-26

Please respond by 09/06/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 09 2002

9/6
Response attached
SB 9/9
C 9/9

15 Aug 02

09 AUG 16

Tab

snowflake

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: July 23, 2002

SUBJECT: **Violation of Airspace**

360

I want to know what the Justice Department will do to stiffen the penalties on this flying near the White House.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072302.11

Attach: 7/18/02 Info Memo re: Violation of Airspace

Please respond by: 7/30/02

23 Jul 02

GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

July 18, 2002, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Your Question About Violation of Airspace

- You commented that one of the ways to keep people from flying close to the White House and Capitol is to start prosecuting violators of the no-fly zone.

- On July 2, 2002, I spoke with the General Counsel, Department of Transportation (DOT), and Chief Counsel of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), both of whom are working on this issue.

- The General Counsel of DOT provided me a briefing paper summarizing what DOT is doing to stop the airspace violations.

  - Post September 11 airspace violations demonstrate a substantial disregard for safety and security. Accordingly, violations will usually result in a 30-90 day license suspension for single, inadvertent, first-time operation within a restricted or prohibited area and a license revocation for a deliberate violation.

  - New initiatives by the FAA include posting graphic displays of restricted areas on the Internet and meeting with pilot organizations to enlist their assistance in increasing pilot awareness of the restrictions. They intend to continue to work with the Defense Department on better ways to publicize restrictions.

- I provided the Deputy Secretary with talking points for a telephone call to the Deputy Secretary of Transportation. (See attached.) I understand he made the call.

Coordination: NONE

Attachments:
As stated.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

snowflake

July 3, 2002 12:49 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Violation of Airspace

Larry Di Rita 1/22

One of the ways to keep people from flying close to the White House and the Capitol and clarify who the planes are that are up there is to start prosecuting the people who break the no-fly zone over the White House and the Capitol.

Please get work going on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070302-9

Please respond by 08/02/02

7/20
Haynes response attached

Larry Di Rita
7/22
7/22

GENERAL COUNSEL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

7/3/02

NOTE FOR DEPSEC DEF

· Recommend you call Deputy Secretary of Transportation using attached talking points.

W J Haynes

Talking Points for Telephone call to Deputy Secretary of Transportation (Michael Jackson (b)(6)

- The threat of aerial attacks in the national capital region is significant.
- DoD has a CAP over the Washington area to engage any attackers.
- We understand there have been a large number of unauthorized intrusions into the restricted airspace since September 11.
- We hear that these intruders have been "innocent" of malicious intent, but even so, this "clutter" is not helpful – and apparently is not decreasing.
- This "clutter" is dangerous for at least three reasons:
    - Each intruder is at risk of being shot down.
    - Each intruder diverts attention from the real bad guys, nullifying the CAP
    - Each intruder drains costly resources
- Because of this, we want to make doubly sure that DoT and FAA are doing everything they can to reduce this clutter, such as:
    - Revoking licenses
    - Imposing substantial financial penalties for violating the restrictions, whatever the reason for the violation
    - Publicizing widely the dangers and the consequences
    - Other?
- Jim Haynes spoke yesterday with your general counsel (Kirk Van Tine) and the chief counsel of the FAA (David Leitch), who are working on the issue.
- I would appreciate your following up closely on this important and urgent matter.

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

GENERAL COUNSEL

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2002, 8 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel WJHaynes 7/31/02

SUBJECT: Criminal Enforcement of Airspace Violations

360

- You asked what the Department of Justice was doing to stiffen the penalties on flying near the White House in violation of airspace restrictions (TAB A).

- The enforcement attorney at the FAA says that no criminal statute covers the White House. As I noted in my previous memo, the FAA uses regulatory and civil sanctions to sanction violators.

- Attorneys at the Justice Department say that there is a federal misdemeanor statute that covers violations of airspace restricted "in the interest of national defense." However, those restricted areas cover military operating areas, not the White House.

- I have asked Peter Verga, Special Assistant for Homeland Security, to pursue an interagency solution through the working groups under the Homeland Security Council. In the meantime, my staff has begun to work directly with attorneys at Justice and the FAA to fashion alternatives to permit prosecution of those who violate White House restricted airspace.

31 Jul 02

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk (b)(6)

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

GENERAL COUNSEL

INFO MEMO

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31 Jul 02

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/(b)(6)

snowflake

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: July 23, 2002

SUBJECT: **Violation of Airspace**

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DHR/azn
072302.11

Attach: 7/18/02 Info Memo re: Violation of Airspace

Please respond by: 7/30/02

360

23 Jul 02

GENERAL COUNSEL

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1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

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Coordination: NONE

Attachments:
As stated.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

snowflake

July 3, 2002 12:49 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Violation of Airspace

1/22 Larry Di Rita

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DHR:dh
070302-9

Please respond by 08/02/02

7/20
Haynes response attached

Larry Di Rita
7/22

7/22

GENERAL COUNSEL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

7/3/02

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- Jim Haynes spoke yesterday with your general counsel (Kirk Van Tine) and the chief counsel of the FAA (David Leitch), who are working on the issue.
- I would appreciate your following up closely on this important and urgent matter.

9/6 1600

snowflake

August 5, 2002 9:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Airspace Violations

360

I can't imagine why if the restricted area covers military operating areas, it wouldn't cover the White House as well. That is the Commander-in-Chief.

Thanks.

Attach.
07/31/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Criminal Enforcement of Airspace Violations

DHR:dh
080502-12

Please respond by 08/20/02

9/5

Response attached
SB C 9/10
9/9

5 Aug 02

snowflake

#279

C 9/9

TAB

August 12, 2002 2:36 PM

JB

TO: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Future Combat Vehicles

Army Dir Rlts

9/9

Please give me your views as JROC Chairman on this memo from Pete Aldridge.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/06/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Army and Marine Corps Future Combat Vehicles

DHR:dh
081202-37

Please respond by 09/06/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 10 2002

Response Attached
SRG

TAB

Snowflake

ACTION 1/15 0900

January 11, 2002 3:40 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Stories

Afghanistan

Someone ought to run down what the fellow in the back of the room said about the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan saying that they had released those 6 or 7 people. I can't believe it, but we ought to run it down and see if it is true.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011102-19

Please respond by _____

11 JAN 02

U14635 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11111

snowflake
1/15
0900

INFO
JS 1/15
1045

January 12, 2002 12:03 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Letters of Condolence

I think I probably ought to write the spouse or parents, whichever one, of any person who is killed in the war on terrorism, even if it is not in combat. The letter drafted for Mrs. Chapman was excellent. I don't think I should write the parents.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011202-11

Please respond by 01/16/02

TO: SWT (!)

Larry

Larry Di Rita
1/22

U14636 02

snowflake

January 12, 2002 11:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Torie Clarke
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: New Name for PK-HA

Please take a look a look at this memo from Doug Feith. Tell me what you think the name should be.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/05/02 USD(P) Action Memo to SecDef re: Title Change [U00339/02]

DHR:dh
011202-9

Please respond by 01/23/02

U14637 02

January 16, 2002

Memo to SecDef

From: Di Rita

Subj: Title Change for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

- Doug's proposal is:

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations and Humanitarian Affairs

- It fits the responsibilities but strikes me as cumbersome.

- I propose shortening it to:

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability Operations

I prefer this DR

→ To: USD(P) -

Doug - Revised my opinion.

Larry Di Rita

1/18

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

POLICY

2002 JAN -8 AM 9:57

2002 JAN -8 AM 09:50 60-PK

ACTION MEMO SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 12 2002

Larry Di Rita 1/10

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 1/5/02

SUBJECT: Title Change for DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs

You asked if we should change Joe Collins' title from DASD Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs to a broader phrase (TAB 1).

His responsibilities cover a wide functional portfolio as indicated below:

- Interagency political-military planning for complex contingencies, complex humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters;
- Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, embassy protection, and migrant operations;
- Support to peace negotiations, international peace operations, and DoD support to peace operations;
- Building foreign capacity for complex contingency operations;
- DoD programs in humanitarian assistance, demining, and HIV/AIDS programs; and,
- Landmine policy and DoD participation in laws of war issues, e.g., Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Given these responsibilities, an appropriate title for Dr. Collins is DASD for Stability Operations and Humanitarian Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve title, "DASD for Stability Operations and Humanitarian Affairs."

COORDINATION: None.

YES ___ NO ___ SEE ME ___

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Matthew Vaccaro, SO/LIC (PK-HA), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/9
[illegible] GIAMBASTIANI	1/11
[illegible] UCCI	1/11
[illegible] SEC WHITMORE	1/12

Received in Policy 11/29/01 @ 1523 Faith Copy

snowflake

November 15, 2001 11:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Collins' Title

Should we change Joe Collins' title with "peacekeeping" in it to some nice, broader phrase?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111501-16

To: USD(P) - Yours for action.

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
11/29

12/12/01
→ Bob Andrews.
Let's do this immediately. By 12/13/01.
Ideas?
DJF

snowflake

ACTION
TS 1/15
1035

January 12, 2002 11:04 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Press Briefings

A couple of thoughts on press briefings:

1. Should we ask them to speak standing up and say their name and the organization they represent?

2. I notice in the press briefings that it is almost impossible to hear what the question is. Should we have a better microphone system where people can be heard in the questions so the listening audience can know what they asked?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011202-8

Please respond by 01/16/02

000.7

12 Jan 02

U14638 02

snowflake

January 12, 2002 9:07 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Benefits

Attached is a suggestion from Bill Timmons. Why don't you take a look at it?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/09/02 Timmons ltr to SecDef, "Victim Compensation"

DHR:dh
011202-2

Please respond by 01/21/02

3/16

HHT –
Please see
if we responded to this
with a letter to
Mr Timmons. (SWT)

12 Jan 02

U14639 02

57 G 1/11

FAX

TIMMONS AND COMPANY
SUITE 850
1850 K STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

PHONE: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Number of pages (including cover page): 2

DATE: January 9, 2002

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
(b)(6)

FROM: William E. Timmons

1/10

SecDef -
There are
Survivor benefits,
group life insurance, etc
If you are inclined to more
than a cursory response, I can
have Dr Chu provide him
more detail directly.
Dick

Attachment

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons

Date: 9 January 2002

Subject: Victim Compensation

Don, I suggest you consider a program to compensate the families of military (and other government officials such as CIA) who die in the line of duty in the Afghanistan theater of operations.

I watch the bizarre management of U.S. government, Red Cross, Salvation Army, and many other organizations' funds raised in the aftermath of 11 September. Amounts of benefits apparently are calculated on formulas that include number and ages of dependents, salary, lifetime income expectation, pain and suffering, and who knows what else (life insurance?). As tragic and heart rendering as these cases are, the fact is that other than the heroic firefighters, police, and emergency workers most victims were at the wrong place at the wrong time....and were not serving in defense of our country. I understand that some families are receiving many millions of dollars in compensation.

However, families of military and intelligence officers have no corresponding benefits even though victims are on the front line of our nation's battle against terrorists. This is wrong!

Therefore, it seems to me that you might request Congress as well as the various charitable organizations to compensate the families of those who lose their lives in combat and support operations during the current conflict in a manner similar to programs for civilians. This might even be appropriate for the President's State of the Union Address. I think it would be well received by all patriotic Americans.

Just a thought.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. William E. Timmons
Timmons and Company
Suite 850
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Bill,

Thanks so much for your note on compensation. I appreciate it.

I will get David Chu to look into it. I understand there are some things that happen automatically, but it is a good idea and we will sort through it.

Best regards,

snowflake

ACTION
JS 1/16
1013

January 14, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Enron

009

I wonder if we ought to tell AP and the *Washington Time* the truth, namely that I did not own any Enron, Joyce did. She did not own individual shares, she owned an S&P 500 stock fund that had to own Enron because it was part of the S&P 500, and the fund owned a small number of shares of each stock in the S&P 500. The stock fund was sold in February 2001, shortly after I was sworn in.

When you think you have it written down, you should check the phraseology with me and then with Terry Robbins, so we are absolutely right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-4

Please respond by 01/15/02

14 JAN 02

U14641 02

snowflake

INFO
JS 1116/1131

January 14, 2002 8:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Danforth MilAir

I talked to Colin Powell and Condi. They made no promises to John Danforth about airplanes or jets or anything else, so we don't have to do a lick.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-10

Please respond by _____

U14642 02

snowflake

January 14, 2002 7:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Confirmation Process

I think people are going to focus on the slow confirmation process this month.

Please give me a piece of paper that shows the date I sent each name to the White House and the date they were sworn in, so people will see how long it took.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-2

Attached
Larry Di Rita 1/18

Please respond by 01/17/02

→ WHLO 1/16

Susan B —

Please give me the latest copy of our tracking sheet.

Thx.

Larry

Larry Di Rita

14 Jan 02

U14643 02

FIRMATION STATUS 1/18/01

Position	Name	SecDef Selected/ Sent to WH	Days from Selection to Nomination	Nominated	Days from Nomination to Confirmation	Confirmed	Sworn-in	Days from Selection to Swearing-in
y Secretary	Paul Wolfowitz	1/20	25	2/15	13	2/28	3/2	42
D (Legislative Affairs)	Powell Moore	2/20	63	4/23	8	5/1	5/4	74
D (Public Affairs)	Torie Clarke	2/20	45	4/5	42	5/17	5/22	92
USD (AT&L)	Pete Aldridge	2/14	69	4/23	15	5/8	5/10	86
PDUSD (AT&L)	Michael Wynne	4/20	52	6/12	30	7/12	7/17	87
DUSD (L)	Diane Morales	4/4	61	6/5	37	7/12	7/17	103
DDR&E	Ron Sega	5/7	65	7/12	21	8/3	8/14	97
ATSD (NCB)	Dale Klein	7/16	92	10/18	20	11/8	11/15	119
USD (Policy)	Doug Feith	3/1	59	4/30	72	7/12	7/16	135
DUSD (P)	Steve Cambone	3/21	81	6/12	37	7/19	8/1	130
ASD (ISP)	J.D. Crouch	3/21	46	5/7	84	8/1	8/6	135
ASD (ISA)	Peter Rodman	3/21	53	5/14	58	7/12	7/16	115
ASD (SOLIC)	Tom White (Acting)	--	--	--	--	--		
USD (Comptroller)	Dov Zakheim	1/23	50	3/13	48	5/1	5/4	101
General Counsel	Jim Haynes	2/20	63	4/23	24	5/17	5/24	94
Dir. (OT&E)	Tom Christie	4/3	51	5/24	48	7/12	7/17	104
Inspector General	Joe Schmitz	3/30	78	6/18				
ASD (C3I)	John Stenbit	4/4	99	7/13	20	8/3	8/7	123
USD (P&R)	David Chu	2/26	64	4/30	26	5/26	6/1	95
ASD (Force Mgt Policy)	Charlie Abell	2/26	33	3/29	34	5/3	5/8	72
ASD (Health Affairs)	Bill Winkenwerder	7/29	52	9/21	25	10/16	10/29	90
ASD (Reserve Affairs)	TBD							
	Average days		60		35			100

MATION STATUS 1/18/01

Position	Name	SecDef Selected/ Sent to WH	Days from Selection to Nomination	Nominated	Days from Nomination to Confirmation	Confirmed	Sworn-in	Days from Selection to Swearing-in
avy								
Secretary	Gordon England	2/28	60	4/30	22	5/22	5/24	121
Under Secretary	Susan Livingstone	4/3	34	5/7	72	7/19	7/25	112
Acquisition	John Young	4/13	59	6/12	30	7/12	7/17	94
Financial Management	Dino Aviles	4/3	69	6/12	30	7/12	7/17	104
Manpower & Reserve Aff.	Bill Navas	4/5	62	6/7	35	7/12	7/17	102
Installations & Env.	H.T. Johnson	5/1	57	6/28	35	8/3	8/7	96
General Counsel	Alberto Mora	4/3	69	6/12	37	7/19	7/25	112
Air Force								
Secretary	Jim Roche	2/28	67	5/7	17	5/24	6/1	91
Under Secretary	Peter Teets	8/10	80	10/30	37	12/7	12/13	483
Acquisition	Marvin Sambur	4/5	116	7/31	98	11/8	11/26	591
Financial Management	Michael Montelongo	4/14	58	6/12	30	7/12	8/6	112
Manpower & Reserve Aff.	Michael Dominguez	5/15	57	7/12	21	8/3	8/13	88
Installations & Env.	Nelson Gibbs	4/22	80	7/12	21	8/3	9/10	498
General Counsel	Mary Walker	8/10	45	9/25	43	11/8	12/11	121
Army								
Secretary	Tom White	2/28	61	5/1	23	5/24	5/31	90
Under Secretary	Les Brownlee	7/31	90	10/30	8	11/8	11/14	104
Acquisition	Claude Bolton	9/6	62	11/8	42	12/20	1/2	116
Financial Management	Sandra Pack	7/20	80	10/10	28	11/8	11/14	114
Manpower & Reserve Aff.	Reggie Brown	4/20	52	6/12	30	7/12	7/16	86
Installations & Env.	Mario Fiori	5/1	71	7/12	21	8/3	8/13	102
General Counsel	Steven Morello	4/2	65	6/7	35	7/12	7/26	114
Civil Works	Mike Parker	5/7	42	6/19	97	9/26	10/2	505
	Average days		65		37			188

snowflake

Action
1117
0630

January 14, 2002 12:52 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Report on Industrial Base

Thanks for your report on the health of the industrial base. It looks like you are moving.

Paul, what do you think about either you or Dov Zakheim sending this to OMB, so they know what we are doing?

Thanks.

635

Attach.
01/09/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef, Health of the Industrial Base

DHR.dh
011402-45

Please respond by 01/16/02

14 Jan 02

U14644 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 14 2002

January 9, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Tom White
Gordon England
Jim Roche

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Health of the Industrial Base

When I came on-board in May 2001, I established five specific goals for AT&L, one of which was to improve the health of the defense industrial base. The motivation for this goal was the fact that a strong industrial base was essential to provide the superior military capabilities required by our armed forces. A healthy industrial base was more competitive, more innovative, better able to attract essential talent, and more attractive to external investors.

The goal had two aspects: 1) improve the health of our "traditional" contractors; and, 2) encouraging "non-traditional" contractors to do business with DoD, by being more "commercial friendly".

Attached are some 20 initiatives I have started within AT&L to accomplish this goal. These initiatives cover the areas of profit policy, shared cost savings, performance-based payments, cost accounting standards, commercial-friendly contracts, public-private partnering, improving export control processes, international cooperation, improving the internal merger and acquisition review process, and performing industrial base assessments. If accomplished, all of these should go a long way to accomplish the goal, and we have metrics to measure our progress.

For information only.

Attachment

Health of Defense Industrial Base

Objective: **Adopting Commercial Practices -** Establish a strategic approach to the adoption of commercially friendly acquisition practices in all functional disciplines.

Pricing/Payment

1. Use of performance-based payments (AI/DP) (Goal 3 #1):
USD (AT&L) policy of November 2000 encouraged the use of Performance-Based Payments (PBP) for fixed price contracts, linking contractor financing to actual performance. AI produced a User's Guide to Performance-Based Payments in Jan 2001. AI continues to lead multi-service/agency IPT that developed a PBP Distance Learning Module (DLM) in November 2001, is monitoring a DFAS cycle time pilot and developing C-17 lessons learned module in partnership with Boeing. **Projected completion date for the C-17 module is May 2002.**

2. Reform Cost Accounting Standards & Cost Principles (DP) (Goal 3 #2):
Currently revising the FAR to clarify that cost principle rules do not apply to firm-fixed price or fixed-price with economic price adjustment contracts awarded without the submission of certified cost or pricing data. Encourage the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) Board to pursue proposed streamlining revisions to the CAS provided by the USD (AT&L) in September 2000. Continue to streamline cost principles. **Projected completion date is October 2002.**

3. Shared Saving for Contractor Cost Efficiencies (DP/IP) (Goal 3 #3):
Develop incentive approaches to motivate contractors to eliminate excess and underutilized facilities and achieve other cost efficiencies. **Projected completion date to publish a final Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement is September 2002.**

4. Profit Policy (DP) (Goal 3 #4):
Revise the cost based incentives policy ("Profit Policy") to provide more commercial-style incentives for innovation, cost efficiencies, and contractor investment in independent research and development and less for capital investments. **Projected completion date to publish a final Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement is April 2002.**

5. Implement the New Cost Share Policy (DP/ARA/AI) (Goal 5 #1):
Recent USD (AT&L) policy requires that the government minimize the use of cost sharing and specifically directs suspension of the use of IR&D to supplement funding of defense programs unless there is a reasonable probability of a commercial application related to the research and development effort. Changes are being made to the DoD 5000 series to reinforce this requirement. **Projected completion date to publish a revised DoD 5000 series is January 2002.**

Acquisition Strategy & Oversight

6. Change the DoD Cultural Mindset Regarding Intellectual Property (AI/DP) (Goal 3 #5):
Many potential non-traditional commercial companies are reluctant to do business with DoD. Government treatment of their intellectual property (IP) rights is the most often-cited rationale for that reluctance. The challenge is then to develop and provide practical guidance and educate the acquisition workforce in both government and industry as to the inherent flexibility of existing regulatory guidance regarding IP and thus bring about a paradigm shift in the treatment of IP. **Projected completion date to submit legislative changes is March 2002.**

11-L-0559/OSD/11129

7. Reform government property management to commercial-like practices (AI/DP/ARA) (Goal 3 #6):
Lead a team to ensure the Federal Acquisition Regulation regarding Government Property in the Hands of Contractors adopts commercial practices to the maximum extent. **Projected completion date to publish final Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement rule is December 2002.**

8. Expand FAR coverage on commercial contract types & incentives (AI/DP) (Goal 3 #7):
A policy encouraging use of long-term contracts, non-cost based incentives and recognition for consistent excellent performance using commercial style incentives was signed by USD AT&L on 4 Jan 2001 focused on enabling DoD to access non-traditional suppliers and expand the Defense industrial base. Established commercial contracting goals in a USD (AT&L) memorandum on Feb 5, 2001. Published a guidebook titled "Incentive Strategies for Defense Acquisitions." The next step is to expand Federal Acquisition Regulation coverage on commercial contract types and incentives. Also, refining commercial policies (Part 12) by providing a guidebook on clarifying use of commercial item determinations. **Projected completion date to publish final Federal Acquisition Regulation rule is October 2002.**

Performance-Based Requirements including Logistics

9. Institutionalize packaging reform and expand industry-packaging pilots (AI/Log) (Goal 3 #9):
Packaging reform initiative seeks to move DoD packaging practices to more commercial-like packaging practices. Pilots were established two years ago with General Electric (GE) and Honeywell. This pilot effort is expanding to bring in Raytheon and other interested participants. Changes to the DFARS, MIL-STD-2073, Logistics Material Management Regulation (DoD-4140) and the DoD 5000 series are in process to institutionalize the pilot results. **Projected completion of all regulation changes is January 2003.**

10. Expand Strategic Supplier Alliances (SSA) (DLA/AI) (Goal 3 #10):
SSA is a buyer/seller agreement that transcends purchasing transactions resulting in reduced costs and delivery times. It focuses on improving and expanding SSAs by standardizing the process and preparing a lesson learned guidebook. The senior level-working group is developing alternatives for component acquisition executive participation and to streamline the process to establish additional SSAs with our major suppliers. **Projected date to identify new strategic supplier alliances with the components is March 2002.**

11. Adopt Public-Private Partnering for Depot-Level Maintenance (L&MR/AI) (Goal 3 #11):
DoD is not free to choose the most cost effective depot—when choosing between public and private sector resulting in increased cost to DoD. Use public-private partnering arrangements where it makes good business sense to maximize use of capacity, reduce ownership costs of infrastructure, reduce costs of products and services, and leverage recapitalization of plant and equipment.

Export Control Process

12. Improve Export Control Management (OUSDP/DUSD/ITS) (Goal 3 #12):
Current export licensing policies and procedures were developed for the Cold War era and are ill suited for the interconnected global economy of the 21st century. These policies and procedures are outdated and adversely affect the competitiveness of the U.S. defense industrial base. Improve the transparency of the license request review process by establishing electronic connectivity between industry, State, Commerce & DoD to electronically process export license requests and associated technical data. In our studies we are identifying critical technologies that require export control, e.g. aerospace, missile, space and UAV in order to provide a realistic feed to the munitions control list. **Projected completion date to demonstrated interoperability to be accomplished by late spring---if Dept of State supplies requisite data.**

11-L-0559/OSD/11130

13. Update of US Munitions List (OUSDP/DUSD/IP/ITS) (Goal 3 #13):
Review US ML for appropriate additions, deletions, transfers to CCL and clarifications. **Projected completion date for all Tranches is February 2003.**

14. Conclude binding agreements on ITAR Country Exemptions with UK and Australia (OUSDP/DUSD/ITS) Goal 3 #14):
Negotiate agreements with the U.K. and Australia for ITAR exemptions in order to speed export license requests. **Promulgate exemptions by July 2002.**

15. Issue Implementing Guidelines for DoD Component Use of Existing ITAR Exemptions (OUSDP/DUSD/ITS) (Goal 3 #15):
Issue guidance to the DoD components to enhance the use of existing ITAR exemptions. **Projected completion date for issuance of DoD Guidance on use of existing ITAR exemptions is dependent on USDP action and cannot occur before April-May 2002.**

International Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Cooperation

16. Declaration of Principles (DoP) Activities (IC):
The SecDef and his U.K. counterpart signed the U.S.-U.K. Declaration of Principles for Defense Equipment and Industrial Cooperation on February 5, 2001. A "Statement of Principles" of a similar nature was signed by the SecDef and his Australian counterpart on July 17, 2001. Both of these documents set forth a mutually agreed vision of closer government and industry defense cooperation through harmonization of relevant laws, regulations, and policies wherever possible. Additional DoPs are being negotiated with The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The net effect of DoD's DoP-related activities, once successfully implemented, will promote healthy allied defense industrial base as well as substantially benefit the U.S. defense industry by increasing their ability to team with foreign industry and facilitate defense exports to key allied and friendly nations. **Projected completion dates for signature of DoPs with Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden is Jan-March 2002. Projected completion of legislative and policy changes, and corresponding legally binding agreements with foreign nations, is mid-calendar Year 2003.**

17. Major Cooperative Program Activities (IC):
AT&L has supported several 'flagship' government-to-government cooperative programs -- such as Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), and Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS) -- that meet common defense requirements and promote defense industry-to-industry cooperation. MEADS and MIDS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) documents were signed in mid-2000. U.S.-U.K JSF MOU documents were signed in January 2001. The collective value of the current international agreements for these three cooperative programs alone exceeds $30B. Cooperation in transatlantic programs of this magnitude will serve as a key stabilizing factor in U.S. and European defense acquisition relationships that will help counteract 'Fortress America vs. Fortress Europe' defense export tendencies on both sides of the ocean. **MOU document signatures with additional prospective JSF partners are projected for February-June 2002. Next phase MEADS MOU negotiations begin in mid-2002.**

Domestic and International Industrial Base

18. Improve the Merger and Acquisition Process (IP/OGC):
We are refining DoD merger and acquisition policy to formalize a more systematic, disciplined review process. We are also actively participating in the interagency team (DoJ-FTC) to assist them in better harmonizing the US and European Competition Commission Antitrust review process on cases involving national security considerations. Ongoing initiative.

19. Shipyard Productivity Assessment (IP):

We have recently completed a study evaluating productivity differences between U.S. and foreign shipbuilding companies. Results will be used to assist U.S. shipyards in their ability to successfully compete in world shipbuilding markets. **Projected completion June 2002**

20. Supplier Base Assessment (IP) (Goal 3 #9):

Proactive continuous process to identify industrial base assets (i.e., products, technologies, processes and facilities) that represent potential risk or concern for continuing supply. We will identify unique or critical suppliers where manufacturing/production capacity is less than demand, the supply is threatened by financial challenges, commercial market interactions or other means, or there exists significant potential challenge from unreliable foreign sources. For each market sector, we will identify the field of suppliers, capacity vs. need, barriers to entry and potential product alternatives. The process will be developed to assess the extent of risk to DoD and the impact of loss of the capability and to propose mitigation measures. Ongoing - **Projected completion date for Phase I is March 2002.**

11-L-0559/OSD/11132

4/15 0900

Snowflake

January 14, 2002 1:06 PM 1/17 1722

Done

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Milton Bearden

Let's go ahead and set up a meeting with Milton Bearden. Even though he was wrong, it might be useful to talk to him.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/07/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef, Predictions

DHR:dh
011402-46

Afghanistan

Please respond by 01/21/02

1/17

To: Rich Haver
Please see about setting this up. Thanks
D.R.

done 1/17 SC
Copy to: Cathy M

Larry Di Rita

14 Jan 02

U14645 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11133

JAN - 2 2002

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

I-01/015490

JAN 1 4 2002

January 2, 2002 2:33 PM

EF-0440

DepSecDef INFO

Schlight 8 Jan 02 0900

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

07 JAN 2002

SUBJECT: (U) Predictions

For your information:

- Milton Bearden is a former CIA station chief in Pakistan who was responsible for running the CIA's covert action program in support of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet-supported government from 1986 to 1989.
- He authored an article (Tab B) in the November/December 2001 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires" in which he wrote:
  - "Some have called for arming and forming an alliance with Afghanistan's now leaderless Northern Alliance...the recipient of military and financial support from Russia and Iran...in the U.S. quest to locate and neutralize the bin Laden network and replace the Taliban regime."
  - "But this is not a wise course--not simply because of the cold irony of allying ourselves with the Russians in any fight in Afghanistan, but because it is not likely to achieve either goal. It is more than doubtful that the Northern Alliance forces could capture bin Laden and his followers, and there is no reasonable guarantee that they could dislodge the Taliban."

(*)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/9
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/11
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/10

COORDINATION: Tab A.

Attachments: Tab B

Prepared by: Dr. William J. Luti (b)(6)

DASD 1/10

PDASD

SECDEF -
Milt Bearden is one of the guys Peter Dailey said you should talk to sometime. D.R.

UNCLASSIFIED

Larry Di Rita 1/10

11-L-0559/OSD/11134

U00413 /02

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Mr. Douglas J. Feith

snowflake

January 14, 2002 2:17 PM

OBE 1/17 DCH

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Disposition of Walker

3839

I agree that eventually the Department of Justice ought to get Walker. I just wonder if the Department of Justice knows we can keep him for a while, and maybe there will be some cross-referencing and some additional information that would help their case.

I am curious to know what the rush is.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/10/02 GC Action Memo to SecDef, Walker [U00533/02]

DHR:dh
011402-50

Please respond by 01/16/02

14 JAN 02

U14646 02

snowflake

EF/32SCA
OL 1006284-02 DP
C9/9

April 22, 2002 2:25 PM

file

281

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Leverage

9/9

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich, which I think is right on the mark. I am convinced that we can considerably leverage the combat and information power of our allies if we connect them to our capabilities and do so at relatively little extra cost for our allies.

It seems to me what we need to do is make a major proposal for NATO that sets in process a study group to begin this process of interconnectivity, so that we greatly expand our combined capabilities around the world.

Please come to me with a proposal to do that.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Allies

SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 12 2002

22 Apr 02
8/27

DHR:dh
042202-29

Please respond by 05/10/02

POLICY RESPONSE ATTACHED.
V/R

SPD 9/9

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEE

APR 2 2 2002

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:34 AM
To: (b)(6) osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: secdef-10

IX. Our allies should be encouraged to buy into transformation so they can have their defense dollars dramatically enhanced in combat and information power by being part of the American network. Properly designed the American national assets can empower our allies at virtually no cost to ourselves. This should be a major ongoing project because it will accelerate transformation in the Pentagon, lower our allies' opposition to and hostility about our efforts, and greatly expand our combined capabilities around the world.

Snowflake

ACTION
JS 1/17
0655

January 14, 2002 3:10 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: UN Strategy

UN

Here is a memo on UN strategy. Please write a memo from me to the Vice President on this issue, with a copy to Condi Rice.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/21/01 SecDef MFR, UN Strategy

DHR:dh
011402-52

Please respond by 01/21/02

14 Jan 02

U14651 02

December 21, 2001 8:23 AM

SUBJECT: UN Strategy

We need a strategy for the UN, a willingness to say no so that people have to bid for our vote. We have the wrong strategy.

We constantly think that every time we are against something, we have to compromise in the middle. That is the wrong philosophy.

DHR:dh
122101-11

Snowflake

Action 1/17 JS 0645

January 14, 2002 2:09 PM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Taiwan

I have not had time to read Chris Williams' memo of January 3. Would you please look at it and then do whatever needs to be done in connection with it.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/03/02 Chris Williams memo to SecDef, U.S.-Taiwan Military/Security Cooperation

DHR:dh
011402-48

Please respond by 01/28/02

China/Nato

14 Gaps

U14652 02

Copy to: Keith Rodman (done-14) Dep Sec

SECDEF HAS SEEN [redacted] Larry Di Rita JAN 14 2002 1/8 1/10

January 3, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Chris Williams

SUBJECT: U.S.-Taiwan Military/Security Cooperation

Sir:

I visited Taiwan from November 26-December 1, 2001, for discussions with senior Taiwanese military and civilian officials, including the Minister of Defense and Vice Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and key subordinates, the senior National Security Council official who handles military affairs, and the head of the Mainland Affairs Council (responsible for relations with Beijing). (A partial listing of officials with whom I met is attached for your review.) I also visited a naval base, where I inspected two of Taiwan's four antiquated submarines (a World War II-era GUPPY class and a SEA DRAGON class), as well as a combined underground command center/- airbase that houses U.S.-built F-16 fighters. On the return leg, I stopped in Honolulu for discussions with CINCPAC Admiral Blair. Below are my key findings and recommendations.

Key Findings

Finding #1: The U.S.-Taiwan military/security relationship is unfocused and adrift. There has been virtually no follow-up since President Bush's arms sales decisions last April. The dialogue between the sides has been limited and perfunctory; there has been no significant or sustained senior-level contact. Your earlier guidance to aggressively explore opportunities for broadening "operational linkages" between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries has largely gone unheeded. Numerous opportunities to promote an enhanced dialogue, broadened cooperation, and detailed interactions on "hardware" (e.g., arms sales) and so-called" software" issues (e.g., operational linkages, military education and training, force planning, modeling and simulation, intelligence sharing, etc.), have been missed.

The absence of senior-level dialogue and attention has yielded damaging results. Many top Taiwanese civilian and military officials are uncertain about U.S. intentions; some have even begun to question Washington's commitment to Taiwan's security. Media reports suggesting that the Bush Administration is reconsidering various arms sales decisions and reviewing whether to downgrade relations with Taipei in order to promote improved ties with Beijing on counter-terrorism, have added to the confusion. For example, a 28 November Voice of America report suggesting that the Bush Administration had reversed its earlier decision to sell diesel-electric submarines to Taipei, sent shock waves throughout Taiwan's political and military circles. A recent Washington Post article intimating that the U.S. Government was looking to reinvigorate U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts – at Taiwan's expense – as a "reward" for Beijing's "assistance" in the war on terrorism, produced a similar reaction. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has done little to clarify the record or reassure Taiwan's leaders following the appearance of such reports.

Another example is Pete Aldridge's recent decision to cancel the Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) system. Given Taiwan's keen interest in acquiring sea-based air- and missile-defenses, including

I'VE ASKED RODMAN TO GIVE YOU A 1 PAGE SUMMARY TO READ

FOIA Case: 11142 OSD/11142

U.S.-built AEGIS destroyers equipped with the Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) system, many Taiwanese civilian and military officials find the Aldridge decision perplexing. To make matters worse, to my knowledge no one in the U.S. Government has discussed with senior Taiwanese officials either the basis for this decision or the implications of it for Taiwan's security and U.S.-Taiwan arms cooperation.

The confusion and uncertainty over U.S. policy has sparked a contentious and counterproductive debate within Taiwan's political and media circles about Washington's commitment to Taiwan's security. That debate has forced President Chen Shui-bian, a strong proponent of strengthened U.S.-Taiwan security ties, onto the defensive, and has diverted his time and attention away from his positive military reform agenda (see below) in order to answer domestic critics. Furthermore, the uncertainty over U.S. intentions may help explain why, during the most recent low-level arms talks here in Washington, the Taiwanese side appeared to "hedge its bets" by announcing that Taipei is undecided on whether it will procure all of the defense articles and services previously approved for sale or release by the U.S. Government, including such high-profile items as diesel-electric submarines, KIDD-class destroyers, a missile early warning radar, and technical information on the PAC-3 missile defense interceptor system.

Finding #2: President Chen is struggling mightily to promote long-overdue reforms in Taiwan's military and civilian security establishments and in Taiwan's outdated military strategy. He and his senior civilian advisors, along with certain pro-reform military officers, recognize that significant strategy, policy, organizational, and other reforms must be undertaken in order to transform Taiwan's current military force into an agile, effective 21st Century deterrent and hence provide a stronger, more durable foundation for discussions with the mainland over Taiwan's future political status. They understand that defense reform/transformation encompasses a wide range of issues, including establishment of an effective civilian oversight structure (especially in the areas of strategy, force planning, and budgeting), joint force development and integration, enhanced training and doctrine, improved C4ISR, etc.

None of the proposed reforms will prove easy, however. Certain elements in Taiwan's military are fiercely resistant to change. For institutional reasons, the Taiwan Army is most opposed to rapid change; its leaders have opposed significant investment in air and naval systems. At the same time, the Army controls almost every key position responsible for military strategy and operational planning and continues to cling to the Army-centric "decisive [land] operations at the beach" strategy which is directed at what may be the least likely scenario facing Taiwan: a massive amphibious invasion.

The Army's approach is also inconsistent with President Chen's bold new military strategy, known as "decisive off-shore operations," that seeks to reduce the relative priority of counter-amphibious landing operations (and associated ground force weapon systems) and increase investment in systems that can paralyze the enemy's ability to conduct offensive operations. In a June 2000 speech, President Chen stated that "we must develop our military readiness in the direction of precision deep strike, early warning, and information dominance linked with 'decisive off-shore operations'." Many observers viewed Chen's remarks as a logical extension of a shift in strategic direction spelled out by former Chief of General Staff Tang Fei in 1999, which prioritized development of an enhanced deterrent capability over purely passive defense operations. Taiwan's requests during the last round of arms talks probably reflected President Chen's emphasis on developing more effective counter-strike capabilities,

especially against the PLA's increasingly lethal air defense network and mobile missile launchers. As you may recall, their request included the High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), a land-attack capability for their existing HARPOON anti-ship missiles, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition; the U.S. denied Taiwan's request for these items.

President Chen has an excellent opportunity to boost the reform/transformation agenda when in the coming weeks he announces a reshuffling of the entire senior military leadership (owing to the scheduled retirement of the current Chief of General Staff Gen. Tang Yiao-ming). Most important will be the selection of a new Defense Minister, a position that will gain increased clout and authority following the enactment and implementation of Taiwan's National Defense Law and the Defense Reorganization Act. (President Chen had a hand in crafting both of these laws during his years of service in the Legislative Yuan.)

President Chen clearly is looking for, and would benefit greatly from, a signal that the Bush Administration supports his military reform/transformation agenda, including a more robust defense strategy. An American initiative to begin a high-level and intensive (albeit unofficial) dialogue with President Chen's administration, with expanded interactions between the two defense establishments as its primary focus, would constitute just such a signal. Both President Bush's approval of a robust package of arms sales last April and his subsequent public assertions that the United States would help defend Taiwan in the face of PRC coercion or aggression, conveyed a new clarity and firmness in U.S. policy. As noted above, however, Taiwan's leaders more recently have received confusing signals about U.S. policy. I am convinced that President Chen and his advisers would be even bolder in promoting the necessary defense reforms and transformation if they were convinced that Washington firmly backs their efforts.

Finding #3: Taiwan's armed forces are professional, dedicated, and motivated. Yet they suffer from decades of isolation that significantly limits their understanding of modern military doctrine and strategy, joint force integration, operational training methods, planning tools, C4ISR, and more. For decades U.S. policy toward Taiwan's defense has been passive: We waited for Taiwan to submit its annual "wish list" of requested defense articles and services, then rendered judgments on those requests – with oftentimes little or no explanation as to why certain items had been approved or rejected. The Bush Administration's decision to abandon the once-a-year arms talks in favor of a broader set of discussions of strategy and other matters, marks a step in the right direction. Still, implementation has lagged.

Only recently has the U.S. begun to study Taiwan's actual capabilities, shortfalls, and future needs (as with the Air Defense, Naval Forces, Early Warning, and other assessments conducted by PACOM, the Joint Staff, and Services.) Unfortunately, the U.S. has been unwilling to share the detailed results of those assessments with Taiwan's military and civilian leaders. If Taiwan's military is to grow and mature, then we must help them understand their shortcomings and jointly develop appropriate strategies for remedying identified deficiencies.

In addition, the United States has sold Taiwan certain platforms over the years, but has imposed unnecessary and counterproductive restrictions on the provision of modern armaments, effective training, and other assistance that dramatically limit the deterrent potential of those platforms. For example:

- According to experts, the Lafayette-class frigates we sold Taiwan's Navy are ill-equipped; they carry only subsonic anti-ship missiles with an effective range of just 35 miles, surface-to-air missiles with only a 2-mile range, and a Gatling gun that is ineffective against PRC Sunburn high-speed anti-ship missiles.

- The version of F-16 we sold Taiwan (the so-called "Model T" variant) doesn't exist anywhere else. The weapon systems, avionics, and tactical training given to Taiwan along with the airframe did not meet Taiwan's expectations, nor did they match that which we had provided to other foreign recipients of the F-16. The U.S. has refused to provide Taiwanese pilots with education and training in airpower doctrine and tactics tailored to what we know about the capabilities and shortfalls of the PLA Air Force. U.S. military personnel are not allowed to train Taiwanese personnel in Taiwan, and U.S. pilots can't fly backseat with the Taiwan Air Force (similar to the training provided by the French on board Taiwan's French-built Mirage 2000s).

- President Clinton agreed in 2000 to sell Taiwan AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. However, he directed that those missiles be stored in Arizona until such time as Russian-made AA-12 missiles were acquired by Beijing. Taiwan's Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence (J-2) told me during my visit that Beijing has in fact taken possession of the first tranche of AA-12 missiles from Moscow. Regardless of whether U.S. intelligence can verify Taiwan's claims of such transfers, withholding these missiles until some future date clearly inhibits the Taiwan Air Force's ability to train and operate with these missiles and hence undermines its capability to deter PRC air attacks on Taiwan.

The above examples are but the tip of the iceberg. Similar restrictions exist with respect to visits to Taiwan by U.S. military officers (0-6 and below only); restrictions on the number of Taiwanese students and trainees in the U.S.; the U.S. refusal to provide Taiwan with Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) codes and equipment; and much more. Such restrictions are no longer appropriate, if they ever were.

Proposals for Consideration

I am firmly convinced that a strong push from the top of the U.S. Government is needed to get the U.S.-Taiwan military/security dialogue and defense cooperation back on track. In this regard, the following proposals are put forward for your consideration.

First, I recommend that you seek President Bush's approval for a private communication to President Chen that expresses support for his defense reform/transformation agenda, encourages him to move forward even more aggressively to implement those reforms, and indicates that the U.S. Government will match his efforts with concrete proposals of its own for expanded defense cooperation. Such a communication might also underscore the importance of seizing the current opportunity to promote pro-reform civilian and military officials as President Chen considers up-coming personnel changes. More importantly, it should clearly signal an end to the recent period of neglect in U.S.-Taiwan military/security relations and a new determination to proceed with a far-reaching set of initiatives aimed at bolstering defense cooperation between the sides.

This communication could take the form of a letter from President Bush or from you or Condi. Or it could be a "non-paper" delivered through a trusted intermediary. Regardless of the form, the message should be sent soon, as it could well influence near-term personnel, budgetary, and other decisions President Chen intends to make.

Second, I recommend that you seek President's Bush's approval for you to meet with Taiwan's new minister of defense in May or June of this year. (The new minister should be in place by February or early March.) A meeting in late spring or early summer would allow staffs adequate time to prepare a substantive agenda appropriate for such a meeting. The centerpiece of such a meeting should be discussion and approval by the ministers of a detailed, joint workplan for broadened defense cooperation and expanded interactions between the sides for the coming year and a verbal agreement that the ministers will meet again at an appropriate date in order to review progress in implementing the joint workplan.

Such a workplan could include a proposed schedule of reciprocal visits by high-ranking officials, including between Doug Feith and/or Peter Rodman and their civilian counterparts at Taiwan's NSC and Defense Ministry, and between mid- and senior-level officers (including flag officers) from PACOM, the Joint Staff, and the Services and their counterparts in Taiwan's General Staff and Services. It should also assign points of contact/leads within each bureaucracy for accomplishing the workplan (in order to ensure accountability). One objective of such senior-level interactions could be to begin to develop a "five-year plan" of proposed defense cooperation that the ministers could discuss and approve during their second meeting. In addition, the workplan should include a list of specific initiatives in the areas of "hardware" (arms sales) and "software" (exchanges, training, education, operational linkages, etc.). (A notional list of initiatives is provided below.) These initiatives, along with the senior-level dialogue, would constitute the centerpiece of the new program of expanded defense cooperation.

(Note: Assuming the President approves your participation in such a meeting, one can expect a lively inter-agency discussion over where such a meeting should occur. In fact, where the meeting occurs is far less important than the substance of the meeting, especially the ministers' agreement to initiate reciprocal visits and approval of the joint workplan.

Third, I recommend that you direct OSD Policy to lead an aggressive effort to develop for your consideration a wide-ranging set of initiatives for significantly expanded defense cooperation between the sides' civilian and military establishments, for inclusion in the joint workplan mentioned above. The OSD Policy staff has already given this much thought, and therefore it shouldn't take an inordinate amount of time to generate such proposals. Such an effort must include the Joint Staff, the Services, PACOM, the NSC staff, and perhaps even the State Department. Nonetheless, you should insist that the menu be as bold and inclusive as possible. This cannot be allowed to become a "lowest common denominator" exercise.

Below is a notional list of possible initiatives for your consideration:

- Undertake intensive follow-up on arms sales issues, in order to reach mutual agreement soon on what previously approved defense articles and services Taiwan will procure, precisely what capabilities will be included (including associated training and support), and construction/delivery schedules. In addition, undertake a detailed review of Taiwan's future

arms sale needs, focusing particularly on improving Taiwan's counter-strike deterrent capabilities (e.g., suppression of enemy air defenses and destroying mobile missile launchers).

- Establish secure means of peacetime and crisis communication between senior civilian and military authorities. One approach would be to install dedicated secure phone lines in the Pentagon, White House Situation Room, and at PACOM on the U.S. side and the Ministry of Defense HQ and Presidential office in Taiwan.
- Expand military-to-military contacts, to include lifting the current restrictions on U.S. flag officer travel to Taiwan; expand U.S. observation of Taiwanese military exercises and facilitate Taiwanese observation of U.S. military exercises (and consider joint exercises starting with search-and-rescue or special forces); increase Taiwanese participation in Joint Staff wargaming seminars and simulations; etc.
- Expand and accelerate on-going "software initiative" discussions, including in the areas of C4ISR, logistics, personnel, and joint force operations.
- Broaden military intelligence sharing and exchanges, especially involving DIA, NSA, and Service intelligence components.
- Place a small contingent of active duty military officers in American Institute on Taiwan (AIT) spaces in Taipei, headed by an 0-6 or 0-7, during 2002. Ensure PACOM has a senior rep in that office as soon as it is stood up.
- Provide Taiwanese civilian and military officials with detailed briefings on the findings and recommendations of previous and planned U.S. studies and assessments of Taiwan's defense capabilities, shortfalls, and needs.
- Expand "operational linkages" to allow, among other things, U.S. and Taiwanese aircraft, ships, and shore units to communicate. On a strictly controlled basis, establish mechanisms for sharing information on both sides' warplans, with an eye to improving deconfliction capabilities (e.g., IFF codes and hardware) and possible coordination.
- Expand educational and operational training of Taiwan's military personnel, including intensive study of military doctrine and tactical training on systems already in Taiwan's inventory or approved for sale or release.
- Finalize and implement detailed plans for sharing of missile early warning data.
- Increase exchanges on electronic warfare, information assurance, and critical infrastructure protection.
- Expand interactions aimed at improving Taiwan's strategy and force planning capabilities, programming and budgeting processes, net assessment analyses, modeling and simulation tools, etc.
- Increase the number of positions dedicated to Taiwan arms sales issues within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

This list is, of course, illustrative only. I am confident that OSD, PACOM, and the Joint Staff can develop a more thorough and detailed list for your consideration.

Conclusion

There are generally two schools of thought regarding U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan. The first school holds that the United States should not undertake to significantly enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. Adherents of this school typically posit one or more of the following arguments in support of their position: (1) Enhanced cooperation would serve as an irritant in the far more important

U.S.-PRC relationship, and therefore should be avoided; (2) Taiwan's military is incapable of effectively operating advanced hardware and systems – indeed, such capabilities in the hands of Taiwan could complicate U.S. military operations in the defense of Taiwan; and (3) A dramatically improved military posture vis-à-vis the mainland could make Taiwan's political leaders less willing to engage Beijing in discussions on reunification. This first school has clearly held sway over U.S. policy toward Taiwan for well over a decade, while the philosophy behind it has largely animated U.S. warplans and governed our approach to arms sales decisions over this period as well.

A second school of thought rejects the above line of reasoning and instead argues that enhancing Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, as called for in the Taiwan Relations Act, is an imperative. This school holds that, with the support of the United States and others, Taiwan's military can become a much more capable fighting force and can contribute significantly to deterrence of coercion and/or aggression by Beijing; that bolstering Taiwan's ability to deter PRC coercion and/or aggression can reduce the requirement for massive and prompt U.S. military intervention in times of crisis; and that Taiwan's political leaders are more likely to enter into meaningful discussions with the mainland over the island's future political status if a "margin of safety" exists in the cross-Strait military balance. Finally, this school asserts that placing the U.S. in the role of Taiwan's security guarantor *ad infinitum* is unhealthy both for the United States and for Taiwan, a fledgling but vibrant democracy.

I find the second school of thought much more persuasive and much more consistent with U.S. strategic objectives and the American political culture. It is in line with President Bush's Asia strategy, which places primary emphasis on bolstering cooperation with friends and allies in the region. The strategy also sees the PRC in a much more realistic light (e.g., regional competitor vice "strategic partner") and rejects making "improved relations" with Beijing the focus of our Asia policy. The views of this second school also dovetail nicely with the findings and recommendations contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report.

President Chen and his fellow advocates of reform face serious economic, political, and other obstacles in their quest to transform Taiwan's military strategy, policy, organizations, etc. They wish for Taiwan to become less dependent upon the United States in times of crisis and more self-reliant. These are goals we can and should embrace. The United States should accept President Chen's efforts at face value, and act in a timely way in order to bolster our mutual security. The actions and initiatives proposed herein are, I believe, entirely consistent with both the letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. I am convinced they will strengthen peace and stability throughout Asia.

I hope this memo proves useful to you. Please let me know how I might be of assistance on this or any other matter. Best regards.

PARTIAL LIST OF MEETINGS/VISITS

Minister of Defense – WU, Shi-wen

Vice Minister of Defense – Dr. Peter CHEN

Chief of General Staff – Gen. TANG, Yao-ming

Vice Chief of General Staff – Gen. HUOH, So-yei

Deputy Chief of General Staff (J2) – Lt. Gen. CHEN, Chia-lin

Deputy Chief of General Staff (J3) – Lt. Gen. HU, Cheng-fu

Deputy Chief of General Staff (J5) – Lt. Gen. HUNG, Cheng-Lo

Deputy Fleet Commander – Vice Admiral WANG, Li-Shen

Deputy Chief of Naval Staff – Rear Admiral REY, Kung-shu

Chief of N5 – Rear Admiral KONG, Chia-cheng

Chief of Military Intelligence Division – Maj. Gen. ZHAO, Lian-di

Director of Procurement Bureau – Lt. Gen. CHEN, Lang-jun

Director of Communication and Electronic Information Bureau – Lt. Gen. LIN, Chin-gin

Chief of International Affairs Division – Maj. Gen. LEE, Jung-chang

Vice Commander of Jia-shen AFB – Maj. Gen. WANG, Wu-hang

Air Wing Commander – Maj. Gen. WANG, Ming-e

Senior Advisor, National Security Council, KO, Chen-Heng

Chairperson, Mainland Affairs Council, Dr. TSAI, Ing-wen

Visit to Jia-shen Air Force Base

Visit to Fleet Command Headquarters

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Richard B. Cheney
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

322

Dear Mr. President:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to assess more fully the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. On July 30, the President approved our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command" be established effective October 1, 2002. With headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, and elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the new U.S. Strategic Command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two combatant commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept additional missions in the future.

Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

20 SEP 02

U14779-02

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
2369 Rayburn House Office Building
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11151

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable John Warner

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11152

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Robert Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Ted Stevens

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11153

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. On July 30, the President approved our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command" be established effective October 1, 2002. With headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, and elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the new U.S. Strategic Command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two combatant commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept additional missions in the future.

Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc: Honorable Ted Stevens

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11154

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Ike Skelton

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11155

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. On July 30, the President approved our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command" be established effective October 1, 2002. With headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, and elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the new U.S. Strategic Command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two combatant commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept additional missions in the future.

Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable David Obey

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11156

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 20, 2002

Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6018

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002, the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

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Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable John P. Murtha

U14779-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11157

EP2678

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

POLICY

ACTION MEMO

August 27, 2002
I-02/011854-STRAT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 9/5/02

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification of Change 1 to 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

At Tab A find suggested letters that notify Congress that the President recently approved the following changes to the 2002 UCP (Tab B):

- Creation of a new combatant command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the disestablishment of the current U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command, effective 1 October 2002;
- New command will have its headquarters at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, with elements at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado; and
- New combatant command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept evolving missions (Global Strike, Integrated Missile Defense, IO, C4ISR) in the near future.

Coordination on the letters is at Tab C.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letters notifying Congress of UCP change.

9/19 Larry Di Rita 9/20

9/19 Pls let me see letters we sent when we made the first changes (North Com, etc.) D.H.

Attachments:
as discussed

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	9/16

Larry Di Rita 9/19

Prepared by: Burgess Laird, Strategy, (b)(6)

U14779-02

COORDINATION

Office of the General Counsel	Daniel Dell'Orto	August 22, 2002
OSD Legislative Affairs	Leo T. Clark	August 15, 2002
Vice Director, Joint Staff	MG James Hawkins	August 20, 2002

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

20 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Subject: Congressional Notification of Change 1 to 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to coordinate on your letter[1] notifying Congress of Change 1 to the 2002 UCP. I concur in the letter as written.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Commander Hornbeck, (b)(6)

Approved & Secured with ApproveIT
by: JAMES A. HAWKINS, 20 August 2002, 16:47:07

JAMES A. HAWKINS
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Reference:
1 OUSD(P) memorandum, I-02/011854-STRAT, 15 August 2002, "Congressional Notification of Change 1 to 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)"

OSD Legislative Affairs
Correspondence Control Cover Sheet

Document Number: 3969 **SecDef/DepSec Coordination** **Classified Coordination:**

Date of Correspondence: 15-Aug-02 **Assigned Due Date** 19-Aug-02 **Date Received:** 15-Aug-02

Subject: Congressional Notification of Change 1 to 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

CCD Control Number: W00845-02 **Member of Congress:**

Originating Agency: Policy

Agency POC: Burgess Laird **Agency POC Telephone:** (b)(6)

Routing List: **Transfered To** **Date Transfered:**

Action Officer Perkins, Christopher (COL) for Concur / Non-Concur 15 AUG 02

Comments:

Routing List: **Transfered To:** **Date Transfered:**

DASD: Concur / Non-Concur

Comments:

Routing List: **Transfered To:** **Date Transfered:**

ASD LA: Concur / Non-Concur

Routing List: **Transfered To:** **Date Transfered:**

Comments:

- Spoke w/ Jan 8/15/02, 1320 BMC

Picked up by: Donald B. Laird
(PRINT NAME)
Donald B. Laird
(SIGNATURE)

Dear :

It is my privilege to notify you, in accordance with section 161(b)(2) of title 10 United States Code, that on July 30, 2002 the President of the United States approved changes to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP).

During the review that led to the 2002 UCP, which ~~was approved by~~ the President approved in April, General Myers and I contemplated the creation of a new, single command to develop synergy from the capabilities resident at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. We chose, however, to defer that decision in order to more fully assess the implications of such a change.

We recently completed this assessment and concluded that sufficient synergies exist at present, and particularly in the future, to warrant the creation of a new command. On July 30, the President approved our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command be disestablished and that a new "U.S. Strategic Command," be established effective October 1, 2002. With headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, and elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the new U.S. Strategic Command will assume the missions and responsibilities currently assigned to the two combatant commands in the near-term, and will be poised to accept additional missions in the near future.

Thank you for your continued support on the UCP. I look forward to working with Congress on these matters.

Sincerely,

D. J. DeWitt as edited 8/22/02
Acting GC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Change to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve Change-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, and direct the creation of a new combatant command named U.S. Strategic Command, effective October 1, 2002. The Space Command and the present U.S. Strategic Command will be disestablished on that same date.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf consistent with title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), of this action.

W00886-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11163

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 13 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South

I understand the rationale behind your decision to move the United States Army South (USARSO) from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. It is important, though, that you execute the relocation in a manner that preserves your ability to undertake a comprehensive analysis of basing and infrastructure requirements during BRAC 05.

Further, the decision to administratively organize the relocated command under the United States Army Forces Command is a step in the direction of flatter, more efficient headquarters. I ask that you work closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to assist in the ongoing analysis of the component command support structure, focusing on SOUTHCOM and its subordinate component commands as a test bed.

U14839 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11164

snowflake

1:49 PM

Via Facsimile

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: September 11, 2002

SUBJECT: **POTUS MEETING**

I spoke with the President this morning and he indicated he had a very helpful visit with you. I am delighted we set up that channel.

Thanks so much. Keep in touch.

DHR/azn
091102.03

U14840 /02

FAXED
azn 9/13

Snowflake

September 12, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Paper on Iraq

Please take a look at this Carnegie Endowment paper, "Iraq: A New Approach" and tell me if there are any good ideas in it.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Iraq: A New Approach," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002.

DHR:dh
091202-9

Please respond by 10/04/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 12 2002

IRAQ

A NEW APPROACH

AUGUST 2002

CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
for International Peace

11-L-0559/OSD/11167

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A NEW APPROACH

Coercive Inspections

Jessica Mathews

The summary proposal that follows draws heavily on the expertise of all those who participated in the Carnegie discussions on Iraq and on the individually authored papers. Further explanation and greater detail on virtually every point, especially the proposal's military aspects, can be found therein.

With rising emphasis in recent months, the president has made clear that the United States' number one concern in Iraq is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No link has yet been found between Baghdad's assertively secular regime and radical Islamist terrorists. There is much else about the Iraqi government that is fiercely objectionable but nothing that presents an imminent threat to the region, the United States, or the world. Thus, the United States' primary goal is, and should be, to deal with the WMD threat.

In light of what is now a four-year-long absence of international inspectors from the country, it has been widely assumed that the United States has only two options regarding that threat: continue to do nothing to find and destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, or pursue covert action or a full-scale military operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein. At best, the latter would be a unilateral initiative with grudging partners.

This paper proposes a third approach, a middle ground between an unacceptable status quo that allows Iraqi WMD programs to continue and the enormous costs and risks of an invasion. It proposes a new regime of coercive international inspections. A powerful, multinational military force, created by the UN Security Council, would enable UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams to carry out "comply or else" inspections. The "or else" is overthrow of the regime. The burden of choosing war is placed squarely on Saddam Hussein.

The middle-ground option is a radical change from the earlier international inspection effort in which the playing field was tilted steeply in Iraq's favor. It requires a military commitment sufficient to pose a credible threat to Iraq and would take a vigorous diplomatic initiative on Washington's part to launch. Long-term success would require *sustained* unity of purpose among the major powers. These difficulties make this approach attractive only

11-L-0559/OSD/11169

in comparison to the alternatives, but in that light, its virtues emerge sharply.

Inspections backed by a force authorized by the UN Security Council would carry unimpeachable legitimacy and command broad international support. The effort would therefore strengthen, rather than undermine, the cooperation the United States needs for long-term success in the war against terrorism. It would avoid a direct blow to the authority of the Security Council and the rule of law. It would avoid setting a dangerous precedent of a unilateral right to attack in "preventive self-defense." Although not likely to be welcomed by Iraq's neighbors, it would be their clear choice over war. Regional assistance (basing, over-flight rights, and so on) should therefore be more forthcoming. If successful, it would reduce Iraq's WMD threat to negligible levels. If a failure, it would lay an operational and political basis for a transition to a war to oust Saddam. The United States would be seen to have worked through the United Nations with the rest of the world rather than alone, and Iraq's intent would have been cleanly tested and found wanting. Baghdad would be isolated. In these circumstances, the risks to the region of a war to overthrow Iraq's government—from domestic pressure on shaky governments (Pakistan) to governments misreading U.S. intentions (Iran) to heightened Arab and Islamic anger toward the United States—would be sharply diminished.

Compared to a war aimed at regime change, the approach greatly reduces the risk of Saddam's using whatever WMD he has (probably against Israel) while a force aimed at his destruction is being assembled. On the political front, coercive inspections avoid the looming question of what regime would replace the current government. It would also avoid the risks of persistent instability in Iraq, its possible disintegration into Shia, Suni, and Kurdish regions, and the need to station tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the country for what could be a very long time.

A year ago, this approach would have been impossible. Since then, however, four factors have combined to make it achievable:

- greatly increased concern about WMD in the wake of September 11,
- Iraq's continued lies and intransigence even after major reform of the UN sanctions regime,
- Russia's embrace of the United States after the September 11 attacks, and
- the Bush administration's threats of unilateral military action, which have opened a political space that did not exist before.

Together, these changes have restored a consensus among the Security Council's five permanent members (P-5) regarding the need for action on Iraq's WMD that has not existed for the past five years.

CORE PREMISES

Several key premises underlie the new approach.

- ***Inspections can work.*** In their first five years, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was responsible for inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical, biological, and missile materials and capacities, and the IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq's nuclear ones, achieved substantial successes. With sufficient human and technological resources, time, and political support, inspections can reduce Iraq's WMD threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level. (The term *inspections* encompasses a resumed discovery and disarmament phase and intrusive, ongoing monitoring and verification extending to dual-use facilities and the activities of key individuals.)
- ***Saddam Hussein's overwhelming priority is to stay in power.*** He will never willingly give up pursuit of WMD, but he will do so if convinced that the only alternative is his certain destruction and that of his regime.
- ***A credible and continuing military threat involving substantial forces on Iraq's borders will be necessary both to get the inspectors back into Iraq and to enable them to do their job.*** The

11-L-0559/OSD/11170

record from 1991 to the present makes clear that Iraq views UN WMD inspections as war by other means. There is no reason to expect this to change. Sanctions, inducements, negotiations, or periodic air strikes will not suffice to restore effective inspection. Negotiations in the present circumstances only serve Baghdad's goals of delay and diversion.

- *The UNSCOM/IAEA successes also critically depended on unity of purpose within the UN Security Council.* No amount of military force will be effective without unwavering political resolve behind it. Effective inspections cannot be reestablished until a way forward is found that the major powers and key regional states can support under the UN Charter.

NEGOTIATING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

From roughly 1997 until recently, determined Iraqi diplomacy succeeded in dividing the P-5. Today, principally due to Iraq's behavior, Russia's new geopolitical stance, and U.S.-led reform of the sanctions regime, a limited consensus has reemerged. There is now agreement that Iraq has not met its obligations under UN Resolution 687 (which created the inspections regime) and that there is a need for the return of inspectors to Iraq. There is also support behind the new, yet-to-be tested inspection team known as the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC, created in December 1999 under Resolution 1284). Because three members of the P-5 abstained on the vote to create UNMOVIC, this development is particularly noteworthy. The May 2002 adoption of a revised sanctions plan was further evidence of a still fragile but real and evolving convergence of view on the Security Council.

Perhaps paradoxically, U.S. threats to act unilaterally against Iraq have the potential to strengthen this limited consensus. France, Russia, and China strongly share the view that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force—a view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. All four know that after eleven years of the United Nations' handling of the issue, a U.S. decision to act unilaterally against Iraq would be a tremendous blow to the authority of the institution and the Security Council in particular. They want to avoid any further marginalization of the Council since that would translate into a diminution of their individual influence. Thus, U.S. threats provide these four countries with a shared interest in finding a formula for the use of force against Iraq that would be effective, acceptable to the United States, and able to be authorized by the Council as a whole. *That formula could be found in a resolution authorizing multinational enforcement action to enable UNMOVIC to carry out its mandate.*

Achieving such an outcome would require a tremendous diplomatic effort on Washington's part. That, however, should not be a seen as a serious deterrent. Achieving desired outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, what power is for. Launching the middle-ground approach would amount, in effect, to Washington and the rest of the P-5 re-seizing the diplomatic initiative from Baghdad.

The critical element will be that the United States makes clear that it forswears unilateral military action against Iraq for as long as international inspections are working. The United States would have to convince Iraq and others that this is not a perfunctory bow to international opinion preparatory to an invasion and that the United States' intent is to see inspections succeed, not a ruse to have them quickly fail. If Iraq is not convinced, it would have no reason to comply; indeed, quite the reverse because Baghdad would need whatever WMD it has to deter or fight a U.S. attack. *Given the past history, many countries will be deeply skeptical. To succeed, Washington will have to be steady, unequivocal, and unambiguous on this point.*

This does not mean that Washington need alter its declaratory policy favoring regime change in Iraq. Its stance would be that the United States continues to support regime change but will not take action to

11-L-0559/OSD/11171

force it while Iraq is in full compliance with international inspections. There would be nothing unusual in such a position. The United States has, for example, had a declaratory policy for regime change in Cuba for more than forty years.

Beyond the Security Council, U.S. diplomacy will need to recognize the significant differences in strategic interests among the states in the region. Some want a strong Iraq to offset Iran. Others fear a prosperous, pro-West Iraq producing oil to its full potential. Many fear and oppose U.S. military dominance in the region. Virtually all, however, agree that Iraq should be free of WMD, and they universally fear the instability that is likely to accompany a violent overthrow of the Iraqi government.

Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial U.S. presence required for enforced inspections and what will be widely felt to be an unfair double standard (acting against Iraq's WMD but not against Israel's), public opinion throughout the region would certainly be less aroused by multilateral inspections than by a unilateral U.S. invasion.

Thus, if faced with a choice between a war to achieve regime change and an armed, multilateral effort to eradicate Iraq's WMD, all the region's governments are likely to share a clear preference for the latter.

IMPLEMENTING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

Under the coercive inspections plan, the Security Council would authorize the creation of an Inspections Implementation Force (IIF) to act as the enforcement arm for UNMOVIC and the IAEA task force. Under the new resolution, the inspections process is transformed from a game of cat and mouse punctuated by diversions and manufactured crises, in which conditions heavily favor Iraqi obstruction, into a last chance, "comply or else" operation. The inspection teams would return to Iraq accompanied by a military arm strong enough to force immediate entry into any site at any time with complete security for the inspection team. No terms would be negotiated regarding the dates, duration, or modalities of inspection. If Iraq chose not to accept, or established a record of noncompliance, the U.S. regime-change option or, better, a UN authorization of "use of all necessary means" would come into play.

Overall control is vested in the civilian executive chairman of the inspection teams. He would determine what sites will be inspected, without interference from the Security Council, and whether military forces should accompany any particular inspection. Some inspections—for example, personnel interviews—may be better conducted without any accompanying force; others will require maximum insurance of prompt entry and protection. The size and composition of the accompanying force would be the decision of the IIF commander, and its employment would be under his command.

The IIF must be strong and mobile enough to support full inspection of any site, including so-called sensitive sites and those previously designated as off limits. "No-fly" and "no-drive" zones near to-be-inspected sites would be imposed with minimal advance notice to Baghdad. Violations of these bans would subject the opposing forces to attack. Robust operational and communications security would allow surprise inspections. In the event surprise fails and "spontaneous" gatherings of civilians attempt to impede inspections, rapid response riot control units must be available.

The IIF must be highly mobile, composed principally of air and armored cavalry units. It might include an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan–Iraq border, an air-mobile brigade in eastern Turkey, and two or more brigades and corps-sized infrastructure based in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Air support including fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft and continuous air and ground surveillance, provided by AWACS and JSTARS, will be required.

The IIF must have a highly sophisticated intelligence capability. Iraq has become quite experienced in concealment and in its ability to penetrate

11-L-0559/OSD/11172

and mislead inspection teams. It has had four unimpeded years to construct new underground sites, build mobile facilities, alter records, and so on. To overcome that advantage and ensure military success, the force must be equipped with the full range of reconnaissance, surveillance, listening, encryption, and photo interpretation capabilities.

The bulk of the force will be U.S. For critical political reasons, however, the IIF must be as multinational as possible and as small as practicable. Its design and composition should strive to make clear that the IIF is not a U.S. invasion force in disguise, but a UN enforcement force. Optimally, it would include, at a minimum, elements from all of the P-5, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as others in the region.

Consistent with the IIF's mandate and UN origin, Washington will have to rigorously resist the temptation to use the force's access and the information it collects for purposes unrelated to its job. Nothing will more quickly sow division within the Security Council than excesses in this regard.

Operationally, on the civilian front, experts disagree as to whether UNMOVIC's mandate contains disabling weaknesses. Although some provisions could certainly be improved, it would be unwise to attempt to renegotiate Resolution 1284. Some of its weaknesses can be overcome in practice by tacit agreement (some have already been), some will be met by the vastly greater technological capabilities conferred by the IIF, and some can be corrected through the language of the IIF resolution. Four factors are critical:

- *Adequate time.* The inspection process must not be placed under any arbitrary deadline because that would provide Baghdad with an enormous incentive for delay. It is in everyone's interest to complete the disarmament phase of the job as quickly as possible, but timelines cannot be fixed in advance.
- *Experienced personnel.* UNMOVIC must not be forced to climb a learning curve as UNSCOM did but must be ready to operate with maximum effectiveness from the outset. To do so, it must be able to take full advantage of individuals with irreplaceable, on-the-ground experience.
- *Provision for two-way intelligence sharing with national governments.* UNSCOM experience proves that provision for intelligence sharing with national governments is indispensable. Inspectors need much information not available from open sources or commercial satellites and prompt, direct access to defectors. For their part, intelligence agencies will not provide a flow of information without feedback on its value and accuracy. It must be accepted by all governments that such interactions are necessary and that the dialogue between providers and users would be on a strictly confidential, bilateral basis, protected from other governments. The individual in charge of information collection and assessment on the inspection team should have an intelligence background and command the trust of those governments that provide the bulk of the intelligence.
- *Ability to track Iraqi procurement activities outside the country.* UNSCOM discovered covert transactions between Iraq and more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries between 1993 and 1998. Successful inspections would absolutely depend, therefore, on the team's authority to track procurement efforts both inside and outside Iraq, including at Iraqi embassies abroad. Accordingly, UNMOVIC should include a staff of specially trained customs experts, and inspections would need to include relevant ministries, commercial banks, and trading companies. As with military intelligence, tracking Iraqi procurement must not be used to collect unrelated commercial or technical intelligence or impede legal trade.

CONCLUSION

War should never be undertaken until the alternatives have been exhausted. In this case that moral imperative is buttressed by the very real

11-L-0559/OSD/11173

possibility that a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein, *even if successful in doing so*, could subtract more from U.S. security and long-term political interests than it adds.

Political chaos in Iraq or an equally bad successor regime committed to WMD to prevent an invasion from ever happening again, possibly horrible costs to Israel, greater enmity toward the United States among Arab and other Muslim publics, a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations and the Security Council, and a giant step by the United States toward—in Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase—political self-isolation are just some of the costs, in addition to potentially severe economic impacts and the loss of American and innocent Iraqi lives, that must be weighed.

In this case an alternative does exist. It blends the imperative for military threat against a regime that has learned how to divide and conquer the major powers with the legitimacy of UN sanction and multilateral action. Technically and operationally, it is less demanding than a war. Diplomatically, it requires a much greater effort for a greater gain. The message of an unswerving international determination to halt WMD proliferation will be heard far beyond Iraq. The only real question is can the major powers see their mutual interest, act together, and stay the course? Who is more determined—Iraq or the P-5?

11-L-0559/OSD/11174

I

A MILITARY FRAMEWORK FOR COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

Charles G. Boyd, Gen., USAF (Ret.)

The premise underlying the framework presented below distinguishes between Saddam Hussein with and without weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, or chemical. Without such weapons he is a problem for the Iraqi people; with them he is a problem—a huge one—for the rest of the world. Thus, the objective of the United Nations—and the United States—should be to disable rather than remove him, since that is the only course of action that can be sanctioned in international law and the only one likely to attract significant multilateral support. It may also have the added benefit of making Saddam's future removal easier for the Iraqi people.

The framework assumes that the United States can persuade the UN Security Council's permanent members (P-5) to accept the concept of *coercive* inspections by conditionally forswearing its own unilateral option of military invasion. The condition of the forswearing would be that Saddam complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to WMD inspections as well as to the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687).

Yet a second assumption is that Saddam will never, under any conceivable circumstances, comply with any effective inspection terms unless he becomes convinced that the alternative is his certain destruction and that of his regime. A coercive U.N. inspection program must therefore be accompanied with an unambiguous assurance that Iraqi obstruction of the inspection process would release the United States from its pledge not to invade. That assurance, to be credible and utterly clear, must be made in the form of a Security Council resolution, which builds on Resolution 687 and the UNMOVIC charter (Resolution 1284). It could, but need not, seek to commit all participants in the inspection program to participation in an invasion should Saddam invite it by obstructing the process. At that point, the United States could proceed unilaterally or with a coalition of the willing.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The basic concept of a coercive inspection program is one in which a robust military enforcement arm would be added to support UNMOVIC and IAEA, through adoption of the new Security Council resolution mentioned above. An Inspection Implementation Force (IIF) would consist of modern air and land forces sufficient to impose entry into or destruction upon any potential weapons site, or, with augmentation, transition into a credible invasion force.

The inspection program would consist of two phases: (1) initial disarmament or certification; and (2) ongoing monitoring and verification. For the purposes of this paper, the latter phase will not be developed other than to assume that once certification has been accomplished, force requirements

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will be largely reduced, and most of the IIF may be withdrawn from each host country. Provisions for its rapid reconstitution would, however, be included in the resolution should Saddam choose to resume obstruction of the inspection process.

The initial disarmament phase would consist of locating and disassembling or destroying all WMD weapons, materials, and related facilities. It would continue until the UNMOVIC executive chairman certifies full Iraqi compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions and Gulf War WMD provisions. No time limit should be placed on this phase, but with adequate team composition it should be accomplished in less than two years.

Once chartered, the executive chairman must have full authority to choose:

- All inspection details as to location, timing, and duration without further instructions from the Security Council;
- Whether and to what purpose U.N. military forces will accompany inspection teams;
- When the operations of Iraqi air and ground forces will be proscribed (corresponding to periods during which inspection operations are under way); and
- What reconnaissance targets are to be covered by the IIF forces in service of the inspection process (that is, reconnaissance tasking authority).

Choice of, and confidence in, the UNMOVIC executive chairman will be crucial to the success of the inspection program because he must be vested with considerable power and freedom to operate independently from Security Council day-to-day supervision and instructions. The Security Council should retain the power to remove the executive chairman if necessary but must determine not to interfere with his authority in the field.

Since this concept depends for its success on the use of powerful military forces to ensure inspectors can go where they wish and see what they want, the executive chairman must have the authority to determine when and to what purpose the IIF accompanies the inspectors. Some, perhaps a majority, of the inspections will be conducted under fairly benign circumstances in which a sizable accompanying military force will not be required and might even be an impediment to the atmosphere the inspectors are trying to create. Other inspection sites may be prized highly by both inspectors and the Iraqi government and require powerful forces with unmistakable intent to ensure immediate access. Still others may produce circumstances in which the executive chairman chooses to withdraw his inspectors and call for destruction of the site by on-call air power. These choices should be left to the executive chairman, always with an eye toward ensuring sufficient force to succeed in the task while providing complete security for the inspection team. The size and composition of these forces and method of employment should be left to the IIF commander.

When inspections are to be conducted in which the chief inspector requires accompanying force, the safety of the inspectors and the success of their mission must be assured by restricting all Iraqi military operations in the air and on the ground. "No-fly" and "no-drive" zones must be established throughout that region of the country in which the inspection is being conducted. No Iraqi ground forces would be allowed to assemble and move; no air forces—fixed wing or helicopter—would be allowed to fly. The IIF commander, through established notification procedures, would inform Iraq of the time, duration, and area throughout which Iraqi forces must stand down. Any violation of that prohibition would constitute a hostile act subjecting the offending Iraqi forces to attack and destruction, as well as the military installations from which they came. It would also constitute Iraqi noncompliance, in the clearest form, with conditions of the Security Council resolutions and would release the United States and its potential coalition partners from the pledge not to invade.

Intelligence, always key to military success, is equally so to the envisioned inspection program. Discovering illicit weapons programs and storage sites and overcoming very effective Iraqi concealment

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techniques will require sophisticated planning and teamwork.

The kind of intelligence capability that only the United States can provide must be made available to the inspectors: satellite and U-2 imagery, Global Hawk, Predator, relevant electronic surveillance, and other covert capabilities. A military photo interpreter unit should also be provided by the IIF. The executive chairman would be able to define the intelligence requirements to be fulfilled by the IIF commander.

Operational and communications security must be of the highest order in this concept of operations. Whereas true surprise inspections were not routine throughout UNSCOM's history, they must now become the standard. To avoid the problem of Iraq moving illicit materials before the inspectors arrive and to reduce the problem of civilian mobs gathering "spontaneously" at the intended inspection site, the exact time and location of inspections must be utterly unknown to the Iraqis in advance.

Operational security will be enhanced by not requiring advance approval of inspections from New York. UNSCOM's frustration with Iraqi bugging of their rooms and facilities can be avoided this time with the help of top-rank security professionals. The IIF can also provide state-of-the-art encrypted communications capability as well as special equipment for conducting private, secure interviews with Iraqis.

INSPECTION IMPLEMENTATION FORCE: COMPOSITION AND TASK

The force in support of the inspection program must be carefully constructed to fulfill the following requirements:

- *Robust and responsive enough to support any size inspection team on any size inspection site, including those previously designated "sensitive" or off limits, such as presidential palaces or even military bases.* When used, the force accompanying inspectors must constitute an utterly intimidating presence on any potential inspection site.
- *Small enough, and multinational enough, that it does not appear to be an invasion force looking for an excuse to invade.* The objective of removing Saddam's WMD but not Saddam himself must be credible—not only to Saddam but also to those whose support we seek in the region and the Security Council.
- *So composed that it can quickly become an invasion force if necessary.* This means an adequate amount of pre-positioned equipment and supplies such that, with the addition of troops, it can be turned into a fighting force. It also means a force composed in such a way that no critical tasks are left to the multinational players, in the event that some choose not to participate should an invasion be required.

The force required for enforcing the inspection program must be very mobile, principally involving air-mobile and armored cavalry units. It must also have very rapid response units trained and equipped for riot control, in the event that the element of surprise fails and Iraq is able to assemble a civilian crowd for disruptive purposes. A notional force suited to this mission would include an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan–Iraq border, an air-mobile brigade or two in eastern Turkey, and two or more brigades with corps-sized infrastructure, poised in northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, around which an augmentation force could be developed if necessary.

Air support would be critical, since the safety valve during inspection operations will be those aircraft enforcing the no-fly, no-drive zones. The IIF commander will decide what areas will be restricted from Iraqi use, and for what duration, in support of inspector activity. During those periods, continuous air and ground surveillance with AWACS, JSTARS, Predator, and Global Hawk will be required, as well as the lethal force provided by fighter and fighter bomber aircraft. Iraq is currently denied use of 60 percent of its airspace by forces of Southern and Northern Watch but not to the degree of denial envisioned in this concept of operations. IIF air forces

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must be capable of sustaining no-fly, no-drive coverage for up to a 24-hour period over two-thirds of Iraqi territory. The force required to do that would be two to three times the current Northern and Southern Watch components in equipment and personnel.

Although the United States could deploy all of the constituent force elements for the duration of an effective inspection program, a more international solution would have far more political value. One of the most important ways to convey the Security Council's seriousness will be to collect implementation force elements from the states most concerned with and affected by Iraq's clandestine weapons programs, with of course the exception of Israel and Iran. A combined force with components from the P-5 as well as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would not only collect a significant array of military capabilities but would also signal powerful political resolve to Saddam's regime. Although most of the named states would be unable to contribute major military units, collective participation at any level will convey a strong international community commitment to countering proliferation. The cost of operating these forces should be defrayed by Iraq, under the provision of Article 9 of Resolution 1284.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Although any number of arrangements might suffice for the command of the implementation force, the Security Council should establish or authorize the simplest practical setup. Just as civilian authorities set objectives for U.S. forces (and U.S. officers are responsible for achieving those objectives), UNMOVIC's executive chairman would set tasks for the UN implementation force commander. That commander, on behalf of the United Nations, would command the resources, determine the appropriate levels of force, and exercise the latitude needed to accomplish authorized missions. One overall command can direct and integrate the operations of air and ground units, even if units are widely distributed to ensure regional security. Each ground force component's responsibilities would normally be set by geographical boundaries, and each could include elements from several different nations. Air elements from different nations routinely work together in the region and could be integrated into a responsive command structure. Selecting commanders and staff members from the large collective body of those who have studied and experienced Iraqi military practices will further magnify the raw military potential of the combined force. The overall commander of the IIF should be from the nation committing the largest number of forces, presumably the United States.

With the Security Council defining the overall outcomes that the inspection program must accomplish to end sanctions and blunt Iraq's threat to its neighbors, and the executive chairman setting specific inspection objectives, the IIF will have the unique and critical role of compensating for the eventualities no policy body can foresee. The implementation force must therefore be extremely well equipped, well trained, and in a high state of readiness.

The notional force described above is intended for purposes of approximate scale only. Current military planners with sophisticated planning tools not available to this author can define force type and size with far greater precision. That will be the easy part of turning this concept of operation into a real plan.

Of greater difficulty will be forging the political solidarity necessary to confront the issue of Iraq's WMD in an effective manner. Two principles described earlier are indispensable to the success of this or any concept of effective weapons inspection in Iraq: (1) inspections must be conducted at the location, time, and duration of the inspector's choosing, and (2) any major incident or pattern of Iraqi obstruction of the inspection process will ensure a full-scale invasion to follow. Given that choice—and no other—Saddam Hussein will relent.

With the future of threat reduction depending on the precedent set in eradicating Iraq's illicit weapons, all nations should view the concept of coercive inspection backed by force as an investment in their future security.

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2

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR WEAPONS INSPECTORS IN IRAQ

Rolf Ekeus

For a UN inspection organization there are two principal approaches to obtaining necessary data on Iraq's WMD program: One is on-site inspections carried out by its own inspection teams; the other is intelligence sharing by governments. Although the former is by far the most important, especially with regard to quantity, intelligence sharing has proven indispensable for a successful inspection regime. More than 30 governments provided UNSCOM with intelligence data, but more regular intelligence sharing was limited to fewer than five.

There are certain requirements to make such cooperation effective and feasible:

- Governments must have confidence in the competence of the leadership and arrangement of the UN inspection team. This requires professional handling and protection of data provided to the future inspection organization (UNMOVIC).
- The head of information collection and assessment in the inspection organization should be an expert with a background in intelligence. In UNSCOM, first a Canadian and then a British citizen were in charge of this work. Both had credibility in the eyes of the major potential contributor organizations because they had worked inside the military intelligence organizations of their respective home countries. The United States and the United Kingdom can be expected to provide significant intelligence, but it is necessary that the head of the information collection and assessment unit comes from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand, because their respective intelligence organizations cooperate broadly and are credible in the eyes of the United States. The senior American in the organization should preferably have a good standing with the U.S. intelligence community as well.
- The inspection organization cannot handle defectors in regard to their protection, families, identity, and so on, but it is important that some selected experienced inspection personnel be allowed to carry out debreifings and interviews directly. Those who have had in-country experience—in other words, the UN inspectors—are best placed to interview Iraqi defectors, who are notoriously imprecise about locations and dates. UN inspectors, knowledgeable about local geography and other circumstances, could be much more effective in debreifings than other personnel without such skills.
- Feedback is essential for effective work. Thus, the providing organization must be given the chance to get access to the inspection organization's assessment of the usefulness of its intelligence. This

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can be done by information about inspection activities or internal analysis for which the shared intelligence has been used. Only then can the government in question evaluate the credibility of its sources. Therefore, a dialogue must be created between the user and provider of such sensitive information. However, the inspection organization must protect this dialogue from other governments: It must be a matter of a purely bilateral exchange of information.

- In UNSCOM's experience, a pre-condition for a government's cooperation about information on companies in its country that had, wittingly or unwittingly, supplied material to Iraq's WMD program was that all information about such companies—or access to their management or technical personnel—was absolutely confidential in relation to other governments, including allies.
- Starting in 1996, UNSCOM applied some in-country listening arrangements in support of inspections, which raised reasonable suspicions that Iraq was hiding material from the inspectors by moving sought-after equipment or components in the country to avoid detection. This type of asset is politically sensitive and must be handled with discretion under the personal direction of the head of the inspection organization. Such operations require close cooperation, including protected communications, with supporting governments. Here, there is a temptation for supporting governments to use the system for "extracurricular" purposes: This must be avoided at all costs. Some clumsy efforts in that direction were made during UNSCOM inspections. They brought some harm to UNSCOM's credibility and yielded nothing of value to the perpetrator.

OVERHEAD IMAGERY

No inspection regime would be effective without access to overhead imagery—satellite or other. UNSCOM had an excellent and flexible system in its arrangement with the United States, which provided it with imagery taken from high-altitude reconnaissance flights. Under UNSCOM auspices, the United States was operating U-2s over Iraq from a base in Saudi Arabia. The U-2 flights were employed either with high-resolution cameras directed at sites, factories, and installations associated with the WMD project or with a "sweep-camera" that could cover large areas of Iraqi territory. The latter was useful for detection of new construction activities such as facilities above- and underground or work on roads, the electrical grid, or water supply installations. Linked to the potential of quick on-site inspections, the U-2 operations became a uniquely effective tool of inspection.

U-2 operations would work well for a new inspection regime, provided that the inspection regime is free to determine the objects for photography. Furthermore, as was the case for the UNSCOM–United States cooperation, the imagery must be the property of the inspection organization, and no sharing with other governments should be done without prior approval of the United States.

Because of the large quantity of imagery, a primary screening by the United States would be helpful, because the inspection organization would otherwise be forced to employ a number of additional staff for photo interpretation (UNSCOM had only two such staff members). Screening areas concerning images especially requires a large number of photo interpreters. To help with this task, Israeli photo interpreters assisted UNSCOM under arrangements worked out in cooperation with the U.S. government.

Considering the small but not insignificant risk of attack by Iraqi air defense on the U-2, arrangements must be made to protect the U-2. UNSCOM practices could be followed. Thus, 24 hours prior to the planned entry of the U-2 into Iraqi airspace, the Iraqi government should be notified concerning points of entry and exit. Of course no approval is expected, but Iraq must recognize

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the notification before the entry into Iraqi airspace. The U-2 aircraft must carry UN insignia, and the pilot must carry UN inspector identification.

SATELLITE IMAGERY

Ideally, satellite imagery should be made available to the international organization. However, satellite imagery, due to secrecy rules, is under strict governmental control, which makes its use restrictive and not available for the flexible needs of an international organization. With radically improved resolution quality, commercial satellite imagery can be of some use, but such imagery would require considerable capability for photo interpretation, which would also limit its usefulness for an international organization.

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3

MULTILATERAL SUPPORT FOR A NEW REGIME

Joseph Cirincione

As the dominant military power on the planet, the United States alone can conduct a wide range of military operations against Iraq. But it does not have to act alone. There is now considerable support in the UN Security Council for enforcing a robust inspection regime to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions. Such joint action offers considerable promise of success with few of the risks attendant large-scale unilateral military operations in the Gulf.

Since the mid-1990s, however, the Security Council has been deeply divided over Iraq and unable to take effective measures. The council-mandated disarmament process has been highly politicized, and the integrity of inspections compromised. Nonetheless, the Security Council remains the most important source of international legitimacy in dealing with questions of international peace and security.

In the absence of international support, unilateral military action against Iraq may well entail serious short-term and long-term problems for the United States and the international legal system the United States has helped create. In addition to global economic disruptions and regional instability, there will be serious consequences for the rule of law and international institutions, particularly the relevance of the UN Charter and the authority of the Security Council.

PAST DIVISIONS UNDERMINED INSPECTIONS

The history of UNSCOM demonstrates that strong political support from the Security Council for the inspection agency is not only a prerequisite for UNSCOM's success but also its lifeline. Serious divisions in the Security Council, particularly among its permanent members, constantly undermined UNSCOM's work in Iraq and eventually prevented it from implementing its mandate. As Iraq's influence grew in the council, UNSCOM's integrity was questioned, while attempts were made to shift the burden of proof to UNSCOM. Operation Desert Fox deepened the council's schism, as Anglo-American military action angered the other P-5 members. In the end, the credibility of UNSCOM was badly damaged by its special relationship with Washington and its reported involvement in espionage activities, which eventually cost it the council's support and precipitated its demise.

Divisions within the Security Council also overshadowed the future of the new inspections body, UNMOVIC. A paralyzed Security Council was not able to agree on a new omnibus resolution establishing a new inspections system for nearly one year. Even when the council finally adopted Resolution 1284 in December 1999, its division was manifested by the abstentions of three permanent members, seriously weakening UNMOVIC's mandate

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at its inception. It is little surprise that Iraq quickly rejected the new mandatory resolution adopted under Chapter VII.

The council's continued divisions had negative effects on the sanctions regime too. As the humanitarian situation gravely deteriorated (as a result of Iraq's refusal to implement the council-mandated humanitarian program over five years), Russia, China, and France also became advocates of Iraq's humanitarian cause. Iraq finally accepted the oil-for-food program in 1996, but the program has accorded Iraq a powerful economic leverage in the council. Because the program allows Iraq to choose its trade partners, Baghdad has actively exploited the program to cultivate its influence in the council and mobilize its allies to change the council's policy by granting them lucrative trade deals. The Clinton administration's relatively hands-off policy toward Iraq in the wake of Desert Fox lent a hand to Iraq (albeit unwittingly). In the fall of 2000, a paralyzed sanctions committee was unable to act on Baghdad's bid to erode the sanctions, which allowed Baghdad to restore international air links.

NEW SUPPORT FOR UNMOVIC

Recently, however, council unity has gradually returned. There is now a strong consensus in the council on the need for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq and unanimous support for UNMOVIC.

As the Bush administration brought Iraq back into focus, its initiative to revamp the sanctions regime in the spring of 2001 created a new dynamic in the Security Council. Washington's active diplomacy resulted in French and Chinese agreement to restructure the sanctions regime by adopting the Goods Review List (GRL). After September 11, Russia joined the U.S. effort to fight terrorism and the relationship between the two countries warmed considerably. As Washington threatened to take military action against Baghdad, Moscow stepped up its efforts to persuade Baghdad to accept weapons inspections, and in November 2001 Moscow joined the consensus on Resolution 1382 (2002) in which the council expressed its intention to adopt the GRL within six months. This led to the adoption of resolution 1409 in May 2002—the most sweeping restructuring of the sanctions regime yet. Thus, the council was able to restore agreement on the most important humanitarian issue.

Although the council enjoys a new spirit of cooperation on Iraq, this does not mean that the P-5 is now completely united on Iraq issues. Russia, for example, remains eager to negotiate a "comprehensive" settlement, and some differences remain concerning the secretary-general's role.

REGIME CHANGE

Following Desert Fox, and claiming to have degraded Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver WMD, the Clinton administration quietly disengaged from Iraq. Desert Fox was not aimed at bringing Iraq back into compliance with Security Council resolutions but was an attempt to neutralize Iraq's WMD programs militarily. As a consequence, with the exception of the continued enforcement of the "no-fly" zones, U.S. military threats on Iraq diminished significantly. There was a corresponding increase in Iraqi recalcitrance.

The Bush administration's military threats have had a significant impact on Iraq's position on weapons inspections. A year ago, Iraq was adamant, rejecting Resolution 1284 and declaring its firm rejection of anything associated with the resolution, especially UNMOVIC and its executive chairman, Hans Blix. Iraq repeatedly stressed that it had completed its disarmament obligations and flatly rejected the possibility of weapons inspections. However, as the United States stepped up its threat to change the Iraqi regime by force, the Iraqi leadership resumed dialogue with Secretary-General Annan, hinting at the possibility of accepting inspections.

In his dialogue, the secretary-general has sought to focus on the return of weapons inspectors, but Iraq has claimed that no major disarmament issues remain, while attempting to shift the focus of dis-

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cussions to the mechanism of lifting sanctions, no-fly zones, U.S. threats on its government, and the creation of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)–free zone in the Middle East (alluding to Israel's nuclear weapons program). As long as there were no immediate military threats, the Iraqi leadership did not need its trump card—weapons inspections—to stave off U.S. strikes. In addition, from Iraq's perspective, the United Nations, along with the Arab League, is a useful policy tool to mobilize global and Arab opinion against the United States. The Iraqis thus try to use the secretary-general and weapons inspectors to serve as convenient buffers to U.S. military action. In a sense, they are "human shields" for the Iraqi leadership.

USE OF FORCE

Despite the council's unity regarding the new sanctions regime and the resumption of weapons inspectors, it remains sharply divided over the way forward on the issue of disarmament in Iraq, particularly the prospects for the use of force. Russia, China, and France, albeit to varying degrees, remain important allies for Baghdad. Even if Iraq continues to reject weapons inspections, they would not support U.S. military action—especially if Washington's declaratory objective is to overthrow the regime. Generally speaking, these nations can be expected to oppose to the use of force against Iraq to the greatest extent possible.

This is not limited to Iraq issues. Russia and China, and to a lesser extent France, are wary of the Bush administration's unilateral policies, especially regarding its perceived haste in resorting to military force. Russia and China are particularly averse to the use of force, as was demonstrated during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military campaign in Kosovo. They also have serious concerns about the implications of the use of force for issues of their own concern, such as Chechnya, Taiwan, and Tibet. The three nations share the view that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force—a view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. Increasingly unsettled by U.S. power and its developing unilateralism, they would seek to check U.S. military action through the United Nations. Although U.S. primacy is indisputable outside the United Nations, within the Security Council the United States remains equal to these other nations as a veto-wielding permanent member.

These council members fear, however, that despite their strong opposition, the United States administration still prefers military solutions to these international security issues, sidestepping the United Nations, as in the case of Kosovo. The irony is that adamant opposition from other council members could drive the United States away from the Security Council, further marginalizing the council and the United Nations. Washington's unilateral resort to military force would certainly undermine the council's authority and credibility, and correspondingly, the power and prestige accorded to the other permanent members.

Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom are well aware of this dilemma. This suggests that even though they oppose Washington's use of force to remove Saddam Hussein, they may realize that it is in their interest to work out a formula for the use of force against Iraq that is acceptable to the United States and that can be authorized by the council as a whole. It follows that if Washington seeks the Council's authorization for the use of force to "support inspections," opposition from Russia, China, and France may not be insurmountable—although it may still require considerable diplomatic efforts.

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

In light of the growing unity among the P-5 regarding Iraq issues, the United States could first pursue the goal of establishing an effective inspection regime through the current system established by Resolution 1284. The current process, including UNMOVIC's preparatory work and the secretary-general's effort to bring inspectors back to Iraq, enjoy broad international support.

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There are several immediate options for improving the effectiveness of inspections and increasing the pressure on Iraq to accept inspections:

- *Measures under Article 41.* The United States could pursue vigorous and creative diplomacy to explore various UN-mandated measures that have not yet been tried. For example, a number of measures enumerated in the Article 41 of the UN Charter have not been applied, such as complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. The council could also reinstate travel bans on ranking Iraqi officials. In addition, the United States could seriously pursue the establishment of an international tribunal on war crimes in Iraq. Confronted with the possibility of all-out U.S. invasion, other council members would be more willing to consider these measures. They will certainly increase pressure on the Government of Iraq to accept weapons inspections.
- *Use of force to support inspections.* The United States could seek Security Council authorization for the limited use of force to coerce Iraq into accepting weapons inspections. A new council resolution could contain a deadline for Iraqi compliance. This option offers an important diplomatic advantage for the United States by according international legitimacy to military action against Iraq. Negotiations in the council may require considerable time and effort and may also result in certain constraints on the use of force and rules of engagement. Nonetheless, the international community would accept the legitimacy of U.S. military action and even extend military assistance. This option would also provide incentives to other council members. It would preserve the council's unity and authority. Faced with the prospect of all-out U.S invasion, even Iraq's staunch allies in the council may be swayed to agree to take decisive measures against Iraq, including use of force. They share Washington's concern about Iraq's WMD programs, but they seek to control them through the United Nations.
- *Subcontracting inspections.* It might be possible to persuade other P-5 members to replace Resolution 1284 with a new inspections system fashioned after the "subcontract" model—that is, inspections would be conducted by a coalition of "willing" governments. UNMOVIC's current mandate would be implemented by groups of inspectors provided by like-minded governments. UNMOVIC could be totally disbanded or significantly reduced to a liaison office to the secretary-general. The concept of subcontracting is nothing new in UN peacekeeping operations. Since the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the United Nations has subcontracted peacekeeping operations to a coalition of governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), East Timor (UNTAET), and Afghanistan (ISAF). In these cases, peacekeeping forces are not traditional UN peacekeepers led by UN commanders; rather, they are multinational security operations authorized by the Security Council.

The subcontracted inspections model may have some merits—it would be more agile and coherent and much easier to achieve synergy between inspections and military operations. But it would require colossal diplomatic efforts to persuade Russia, France, and China to consent to this model. Although the council is united on the need for weapons inspections in Iraq, there remain serious differences as to how the United Nations should devise and implement an effective inspection system. Should Washington seek to reinforce the current inspections regime based on Resolution 1284, it would encounter a number of challenges in achieving the unity of the P-5. The council's current unanimous support for UNMOVIC did not come easily. Therefore, it remains an open question whether the council will support any attempt to alter the current inspections regime based on

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Resolution 1284. Russia, France, and China would resist any dilution of UNMOVIC's UN character and object to reinstating a system similar to UNSCOM. Reestablishing a "Super UNSCOM" would require a new Security Council resolution.

COERCIVE INSPECTIONS: THE MIDDLE GROUND

A most viable approach would appear to be the use-of-force option. Without changing the current inspection system established by Resolution 1284, the Security Council could authorize the use of force specifically for the purpose of enforcing inspections. Because all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council regarding Iraq's disarmament obligations were adopted under Chapter VII, it would be a logical course of action for the Security Council to order enforcement action. As in the case of Operation Desert Storm, a coalition of like-minded countries would deploy armed forces and initiate military action so that UNMOVIC inspectors could carry out its mandate. Decisions on the modality of military operation, such as air cover, military escort, and limited occupation, could be left to a coalition of governments. Meanwhile, reaffirming the previous council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 687 and 1284, including its commitment regarding sanctions, would increase international legitimacy, the credibility of the Security Council, and hence the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. diplomacy.

Finally, a new diplomatic initiative should take into account the timeline of the current process initiated by the secretary-general. Should Iraq accept UNMOVIC inspections, this would trigger a new process centered on UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Obviously, such a process will generate a new dynamic in the council.

CONCLUSION

Although disarmament in Iraq requires a rigorous inspection system that at least threatens the use of force, the council's unity and international support are also critical in establishing effective inspections. Securing other P-5 members' agreement remains a major challenge for the United States. In the face of Baghdad's diplomatic offensives and shared interests with council members, Washington will have to commit to consistent and strenuous diplomatic engagement with other P-5 members to achieve and preserve council unity.

The P-5's recent positions on Iraq indicate positive developments and hint at useful clues to future action. First, the council is now united on the need for weapons inspections and unanimously supports UNMOVIC. Second, the U.S. threat to change the Iraq regime has engendered changes on the part of Russia, France, and China, signalling their willingness to agree to more decisive measures on Iraq. Third, Washington's vigorous diplomatic engagement with other P-5 members is required for obtaining international support for military action, and its sustained focus on Iraq is key to achieving P-5 unity in the Security Council. Finally, while a divided Security Council has limited the secretary-general's use of his good offices, a united council could allow him to play a supportive role by conveying a strong, unequivocal message to Iraq.

It should be obvious that it is always in Washington's interest to secure the council's support for its policy goals and the international legitimacy this confers. It now appears possible that the United States could develop an acceptable formula for multilateral military action to support inspections and secure council authorization for the limited use of force.

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4

PERSUADING SADDAM WITHOUT DESTABILIZING THE GULF

Patrick Clawson

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seems unlikely to cooperate with the inspections mandated by UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) in the absence of credible threats of the use of force. Comprehensive economic sanctions did not have that effect. Saddam showed that he could endure comprehensive sanctions longer than the international community could sustain them; in the end, it was the United Nations that substantially loosened the restrictions rather than Saddam who cooperated with UNSCR mandates. It also seems unlikely that Saddam would be induced to cooperate were there a "light at the end of the tunnel," because it seems that his ambitions are so grand that he cannot be accommodated.

Indeed, the prospect of limited air strikes may be insufficient to secure Saddam's cooperation. Saddam seems to have decided that such air strikes will be episodic rather than sustained and that the limitations the United States will impose on itself about what targets to hit will prevent the strikes from being regime-threatening. At the least, air strikes have to date not been sufficient to secure Iraqi cooperation with UNSCR mandates, which suggests that Iraqi cooperation may come only with a credible threat of regime overthrow.

Making the threat of regime overthrow credible will not be easy, given the heated rhetoric used by the last three U.S. presidents, which to date has not produced much. U.S. coup-promotion activity has not impressed Saddam. Nor has U.S. assistance to the Iraqi opposition led Saddam to feel sufficiently threatened so as to cooperate with UNSCR-mandated inspections. He may well question U.S. resolve to commit the forces necessary for his overthrow. In this environment, it seems unlikely that any U.S. declaratory policy, no matter how explicit or severe, will be sufficient to secure Saddam's cooperation with the inspections.

Even if persuaded of U.S. resolve, Saddam may believe that regional states will be unwilling to provide the United States the access it would need to carry out regime-threatening military action. He would have good reason to believe that Turkey and the Arab Gulf monarchies prefer the status quo, with a weakened Iraqi regime and an implicit U.S. security guarantee in the event of Iraqi aggression, to the alternatives—either the "bad" alternative of a failed state in Iraq or the "good" alternative of a democratic pro-Western Iraq. (A federal democratic Iraq with a largely autonomous Kurdish region is a very bad precedent in Turkish eyes, whereas the Saudis would not like losing their position as the United States' privileged partner in the Gulf, nor would they like seeing Iraq become an oil superpower displacing Saudi Arabia's position as lynchpin of the world oil market.) Saddam may also believe that he can successfully pressure regional states not to give U.S. forces sufficient access to threaten his regime; after all, he has had great success with the

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argument that Iraq will be in the region forever while the United States may leave.

If this analysis is correct, then securing continuing Iraqi cooperation with inspections will require a sustained U.S. presence in the region enforced by a U.S.-led military force of a size and character sufficient to threaten the overthrow of Saddam's regime. But such a force could threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf in at least two ways: by bringing into question the close security cooperation between the United States and regional states and by undermining the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

ENDANGERING U.S.–REGIONAL TIES

Were they to agree to a sustained U.S. presence aimed at Iraq's regime, regional states would think they were doing the United States a considerable favor. In return, they would expect the United States to address some of their concerns; in particular, the Arab monarchies would expect U.S. pressure on Israel, and Turkey would anticipate military aid, better access to U.S. trade and finance, and assistance in its relations with the European Union. But many in the United States would regard a continuing U.S. deployment on Iraq's borders as a favor to the regional states, because those states would be the ones being protected from Saddam. There would likely be calls for the regional states to assist with other U.S. foreign policy objectives in return for the U.S. protection against Saddam, similar to the pressure on Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s to finance a variety of U.S. initiatives (from Somalia to the Korean peninsula) and to participate in peace talks with Israel. With the regional states expecting the United States to do them favors and at least some in the United States expecting the regional states to do the United States favors, the potential for disappointment and disagreement is great. This will not help U.S. relations with the regional states and could lead to a serious deterioration of relations.

Even setting aside the potential asymmetric expectations, it would hardly be surprising if regional states were reluctant to sign on to a continuing threat against their neighbor Iraq. Constructing an alliance to threaten another state is no easy task. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was hard enough to hold together as a defensive alliance. Despite the close societal ties between the United States and Western Europe, it is by no means clear that NATO could have worked had it been an alliance designed to attack the Soviet bloc. Asking the Gulf Arab monarchies to sign up to an alliance for attacking Iraq is particularly difficult because of the strong historical and social links between those states and Iraq. It would be very difficult for Arab states to cooperate with former colonial powers in an attack on a fellow Arab state.

UNDERMINING THE STABILITY OF THE GULF MONARCHIES

Preserving monarchical rule in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is not and should not be a long-term U.S. objective; monarchy is not a system the United States wishes to promote, and monarchies are not necessarily particularly stable. That said, at present, the alternative to the Gulf monarchies is probably worse: There is every reason to think that overthrow of the monarchies would be at the hands of anti-Western, anti-democratic Islamists. For that reason, the United States may well have a short-term interest in ensuring the stability of the Gulf monarchies, while encouraging them to move toward more transparent and accountable governments with legislatures that have more powers and are more freely selected.

The existing U.S. troop presence in the Gulf is unpopular with social conservatives and nationalists in the GCC states. How much political impact this generates is unclear. After all, the GCC states are not democracies, and the ruling families have traditionally conducted foreign and security policy without much reference to popular opinion. The redeployment of U.S. forces to desert bases, far from the sight of the civilian population, has lowered the profile of the U.S. presence. That said, a large-scale U.S. presence, especially if it were poised to

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strike hard at Iraq, would sit badly with many in the GCC countries. That would provide an opportunity for the Islamist opposition to reach out to a larger audience with their violent anti-regime message. The ruling regimes have been intensely aware of the Islamist danger and have been prepared to take strong action to keep a lid on the opposition, so it seems quite unlikely that any of the GCC regimes would be overthrown in the wake of a larger U.S. military presence. However, if some GCC regime already faced serious internal problems—splits in the ruling family, serious socioeconomic problems, and so on—then the larger U.S. military presence could become a rallying point for anti-regime agitation.

Furthermore, there is a risk that GCC regimes might seek to redirect criticism about the U.S. presence into criticism of the United States instead of criticism of their own regimes for cooperating with the United States. This was certainly the strategy in the 1990s, with the result that radical anti-Western forces were able to win the recruits needed for repeated attacks on U.S. targets, from Khobar Towers to the USS *Cole* to the World Trade Center.

Besides the two destabilizing impacts of a sustained large U.S. military presence analyzed above, a third potential problem would be an Iranian perception that the United States is preparing for a strike against the Islamic Republic. Any military force suitable for threatening Saddam's regime would also provide a capability that could be used against Iran, and any prudent military planner has to worry about capabilities as much as intentions. On top of which, the Bush administration's hostility to the Islamic Republic's hardliners and its evident interest in promoting democratic forces could lead the revolutionaries who control Iran's levers of power to worry that the United States would use its military force in the Gulf against Iran if the opportunity presented itself. Certainly in the last few months, there have been many serious Iranian analysts and policy makers who have assumed this is the U.S. intention. The risk is that a U.S. force designed to secure Iraqi cooperation could lead to acute tensions with Iran that could escalate into periodic military confrontations, along the lines of the U.S.–Iran naval clashes in 1988–1989—clashes that included the largest surface naval confrontation of the last half century.

WHAT TO DO?

It is by no means apparent how to press Saddam into permitting inspections without threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the most realistic way to frame the issue is to say that restarting inspections will require a continuing substantial U.S. force presence of a sort that will complicate U.S. relations with Gulf countries and may threaten their internal stability, and then to allow the reader to judge whether that risk is worth taking.

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5

CALCULATIONS OF IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS

Shibley Telhami

In designing a strategy to gain the support of Iraq's neighbors for limiting Iraq's nuclear potential, it is important to begin by separating the strategic calculations of governments in the region from their domestic political calculations.

At the strategic level, governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, especially under Saddam Hussein. Even Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates, who fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and who worry about weakening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including reinstating international monitors. But some states, especially Iran and Syria, also worry about overwhelming U.S. power in the region. Their calculations are thus more complex: They do not want to see Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, but they also fear U.S. dominance—and in Syria's case, Israeli strategic dominance—especially U.S. occupation of Iraq. This leads to the following considerations: On the one hand, any option that would rule out a U.S. military campaign may get their support; on the other, trust in the United States is so low that there is the belief that uncertainty about Iraq's nuclear potential may be a major deterrent to U.S. war plans.

Even aside from public sentiments, one should not underestimate the strategic reluctance of other states in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, to support a U.S.-led war on Iraq for two reasons: (1) states in the region fear the possible disintegration of Iraq or the continued instability emanating from Iraq; and (2) they fear possible U.S. military-political control of Iraq that would alter the strategic picture to their disadvantage. All this suggests that, strategically, states in the region could rally behind an international plan to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear capabilities, if they could be persuaded that this option is indeed intended as a genuine alternative to the war option and not part of a process designed to lay the groundwork for justifying a war.

On the domestic political level, no state in the region can ignore public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. Certainly one of the major barriers to getting the support of Arab governments for a war option is public pressure. Indeed, much of the public in the Arab world is sympathetic to Iraq's efforts in general. It is important then to understand how the public in the region, including the elites, views this issue. First, most people there do not understand that the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is based on UN resolutions. Instead, they see the policy as a strategy intended to prevent only Arab states from acquiring such weapons. Second, those who do understand the role of UN resolutions raise the question of "double standards" in applying those resolutions, always with examples from the Arab–Israeli conflict. Third, the sense of humiliation and helplessness is so pervasive in the region after the

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violence on the Israeli–Palestinian front of the past several months that many wish for an Arab deterrent, even if possessed by Saddam Hussein. Fourth, while many wish for such an outcome, most do not believe that it is likely and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify keeping Iraq in a box or declaring war on it. This view has become even stronger in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly identifying U.S. interests with Israeli interests and perceiving the United States as dominating decisions at the United Nations. Fifth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq's population and a prevailing assumption that the sanctions, not the Iraqi regime, are ultimately to blame for this suffering.

Even so, the public in the region is not likely to mobilize against steps by governments in the region to contain Iraq's capabilities, such as support for the reinstatement of UN monitors, in the same way that it would likely mobilize in the event of war. The difficulty comes when Iraq defies measures to contain its programs. It is clear that Iraq could gain a great deal of sympathy, especially in the event of punitive measures for lack of compliance—something we have often witnessed in the past. In other words, Iraq could have the capacity to time its defiant actions for maximum sympathy, such as at times of high regional anger over U.S. policy toward the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. So any effective policy would have to be designed to reduce this possibility.

Taking these strategic and political calculations into account, an effective policy intended to gain the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors in limiting Iraq's nuclear potential would have to include several important elements:

- *Securing strong U.S. assurances that it intends the policy as an alternative to war and that if the policy succeeds, the war option will be off the table.* But even if the implied threat of war in case peaceful measures fail is projected in the name of the United Nations, not the United States, there should be no illusion: Most actors in the region will continue to see U.S. moves as tactical, intended ultimately to justify the war option.
- *Making progress in the Palestinian–Israeli negotiations.* It is hard to imagine any successful policy toward Iraq, military or otherwise, as long as violence continues unchecked. A full settlement of this conflict is not a necessary condition; rather, a de-escalation of the violence and the onset of a genuine political process that projects hope will be important for securing regional cooperation for U.S. policy toward Iraq.
- *Providing incentives, in addition to threats, to Iraq.* This will be important in securing Iraqi cooperation, especially given the public sympathy with Iraq in the region. These incentives could include lifting economic sanctions completely and allowing for increasingly normal relations between Iraq and its neighbors. These measures would also go a long way toward addressing regional public concerns about the hardship in Iraq. But it is important to recognize the implications of such an approach: It entails that the priority of limiting Iraq's WMD capabilities supersedes the objective of removing Saddam Hussein.
- *Beginning a forum for addressing WMD on a regional basis, focusing on strategic concerns about the uneven proliferation of weapons in the region.*
- *Differentiating among Iraq's neighbors.* Not every state has the same concerns, even if most have much in common in their attitude toward Iraq.

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6

THE RUSSIAN ELITE AND IRAQ: AN UNEXPECTED PICTURE

Rose Gottemoeller

Our interest is that Iraq should have a stable and predictable regime, friendly to Russia. And naturally, we do not want to see weapons of mass destruction produced there. We are convinced that the political resource for resolving problems with Iraq has not been exhausted. However, if the United States does not correct its unbearable urge to fight as soon as possible, that resource may never be used.

—Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, State Duma of the Russian Federation[1]

Rogozin's statement of Russia's current interest in Iraq is succinct and interesting because it does not stress the economic issues that are so often assumed to be the driving force behind Russian policy. Instead, he focuses on requirements for stability, predictability, and the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States clearly articulates similar requirements. So if Rogozin represents a view widely held among Russian elites, then there is a basis for cooperation between Russia and the United States in trying to address the Iraq problem.

The *if* is a big one, however, because it contains several elements. First is the obvious one: Do Russian political elites really share Rogozin's view that stability, predictability, and an absence of WMD are at the heart of Russian interests in Iraq? The second is only slightly less obvious: Would Rogozin and the Russian elites ever go along with the notion of moving quickly to a military invasion of Iraq? And if they did go along, would they be willing to extend Russian military support to the invasion? Alternatively, would they press hard for a different solution, one that would emphasize diplomacy and a strengthened inspection regime?

This paper examines these questions to provide a sense of how Moscow might react to precipitate U.S. use of military force or to efforts to craft an alternative solution. The paper draws exclusively on sources in the Russian media and on that basis

1. Dmitry Rogozin Comments, *Izvestiya*, April 30, 2002.

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forms a picture of likely public and elite opinion in Russia. It does not emphasize Western sources or the diplomatic record, except to the extent that it is reflected in Russian media commentary.

Before launching into an examination of recent comments on these issues in the Russian media, it is worth noting that since September President Putin has often taken pro-American steps that go against the flow of elite opinion in Russia. No matter what views are being expressed in the Duma, the press, or among the intelligentsia, therefore, Putin may decide to acquiesce to the Bush administration in whatever they do in Iraq. This acquiescence, however, might be a far cry from providing active support to a military operation. It might be more akin to the Russian attitude toward the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: Moscow would stress that the U.S. policy is a mistake, but not one to which the Russian Federation will respond either with anger or precipitate action of its own.

THE QUESTION OF RUSSIAN INTERESTS

On the question of how the elites define Russian interests in Iraq, the oil interest group seems to be running to type. For example, Konstantin Kagalovsky, board member of the Yukos oil company, inveighed against an invasion of Iraq "by our American friends." He was not, however, focused only on the difficulties that this would cause for Russia—he noted that the consequences of such an attack would be deeply contrary for both "us and America." At the same time, he cautioned against the "gift horse" that the United States was offering:

> The Americans are telling us that it is very important for us that there be a different regime in Iraq, and that they will guarantee that that regime will make Iraqi debt payments to us...The Americans also promise that once a new Iraqi regime is in place, they will help us get contracts in Iraq...Both of these positions are a raw deal, but now they are going to be supported in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies.[2]

Kagalovsky's comments illustrate that elite positions in the oil industry are as would be expected: suspicious that the new advantages that the Americans are offering would be better than the promises that they already have in hand from the Iraqis. More interesting is his portrayal of the approach inside the Russian government: Although he and his industry are holding firm, the government agencies are moving toward the U.S. view. This conveys clearly that elite opinion in Moscow is by no means stuck on the Russian oil industry position.

It must be said, however, that of the commentators reviewed for this analysis, only Rogozin was so succinct in portraying Russian interests as rooted in stability, predictability, and the absence of WMD in Iraq. Indeed, the lack of widespread geostrategic analyses in the current media discussions was striking, but it may reflect no more than a temporary silence among those, such as Yevgeny Primakov, who have traditionally been the voice of a "Eurasian" policy for the Soviet Union and Russia. In other words, the current preeminence of Putin's U.S.-leaning policy may have temporarily silenced those who would normally have been articulating more of a geostrategic view of Russian interests.

THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION

The lack of a Russian consensus on its interests in Iraq does not, however, imply ready Russian support for U.S. military action. On the contrary, Russian experts stress both that the United States will have to go it alone and that U.S. forces should not expect a repeat of the easy time that they had in toppling the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

2. Konstantin Kagalovsky Interview, *Vremya MN* [Moscow News], April 17, 2002.

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As Alexei Arbatov commented in an interview in May, "Using aerial bombardment alone in Iraq will not do the trick; the United States will need a ground operation. In Afghanistan, the ground operation was carried forward by the Northern Alliance, under the leadership of Russia and the USA. But in Iraq, no one will want to do this dirty work for the Americans."[3]

One commentator went so far as to say that Iraq for the United States will be as Carthage was for Rome: an eventual victory but won only after a long war that significantly taxed the Roman Empire.[4] This image of an imperial power about to enter a quagmire is one that a number of Russians seem to relish, perhaps based on their own experience in Chechnya. However, they do not specifically compare Iraq to Chechnya. Instead, they warn against "naïve" hopes, such as counting on "marionette-style fighters from the ranks of (Iraqi) dissidents."[5]

Thus, the answer to the question of whether Russia would support a U.S. invasion of Iraq with its own military forces is a clear *no:* As far as Russia is concerned, the United States will have to go it alone. The more general question of whether Russia would go along with such an invasion has a more nuanced answer, however. Russian elites seem ready to stand aside and let the Americans go forward if they are determined to do so. As Georgy Mirsky put it, "Russia will not hinder the Americans."[6]

In some sense, Russian commentators may be preparing their public for what they believe will be the likely response from the Kremlin: Putin's acquiescence to a U.S. invasion of Iraq, similar to the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

THE QUESTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE OPTION

A number of Russian commentators echo Rogozin's view that political tools for addressing the crisis have not been exhausted.[7] They note that Iraq has not so far refused dialogue with the United Nations. They also note that as soon as others walk away from diplomatic efforts, the Iraqi leader will be tempted to preempt the situation.[8] This attitude indicates that Russia, if it should acquiesce to U.S. military action, will continue to press on the diplomatic front as well.

Even more naturally, the Russian elites would be positively disposed to a reasonable alternative to a full-scale U.S. invasion. The scope and definition of that alternative is not clear from the Russian media, except to emphasize a strong commitment to continued engagement at the negotiating table. However, the current Russian stance at the United Nations suggests that a use of force to support inspections might not be out of the question, if only to maintain the continued viability and legitimacy of the UN system.

Moreover, although they do not occupy the first rank of argument, the interests of Russian companies would not be disregarded. Russian media commentators convey the sense that they are simply waiting for the giant to falter. This would not be because they expect to gain in the old Cold War zero-sum sense, but because they believe it will create the conditions for a new political process. In this, Russian experts would hope to take a decisive role, especially to support the interests of Russian companies.[9]

3. Alexander Kuranov interview with Alexei Arbatov, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 23, 2002. This view that the United States will not be able to engage in "push-button warfare" and will have to do its own dirty work is currently common in the Russian press. See, for example, Georgiy Mirsky Comments, *Izvestiya*, April 30, 2002; and Sergey Sergeyev, "Baghdad Marsh," *Vek*, May 17, 2002.
4. Sergei Norka, "Head to Head," *Vek*, June 7, 2002.
5. Rogozin, *Izvestiya*.
6. Mirsky, *Izvestiya*.
7. See, for example, Vladimir Skosyrev, "Iraqi 'Nut' Difficult to Crack," *Vremya MN*, April 30, 2002; Sergeyev, "Baghdad Marsh"; and Norka, "Head to Head."
8. See, for example, Vladimir Skosyrev, "To Get Soaked in Self-Defense," *Vremya MN*, June 18, 2002.
9. This argument has already been present in the Russian press. See Skosyrev, "Iraqi 'Nut' Difficult to Crack."

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CONCLUSIONS: ENGAGING RUSSIA

To sum up, Russian elites will not be tied fast by Russian oil companies in regard to defining Russian national interests in Iraq. Likewise, they will not be driven to precipitate steps against the United States, in the United Nations or elsewhere. At the same time, they will likely urge, and strongly so, the continuation of a diplomatic-political process to resolve the crisis. This could include the option of armed support to inspections.

The flip side of their attitude in the political arena is that although they might acquiesce to a U.S. invasion of Iraq, Russian elites will be unwilling to lend military support to the United States. It is difficult to tell from existing media commentary, but this unwillingness may well extend to supporting roles that are now well established in Afghanistan, such as the sharing of intelligence data.

This summary leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, what would be the Russian attitude toward other former Soviet states that chose to support a U.S. military operation? Would Russia object strongly to the U.S. use of military bases on former Soviet territory? What means would it use to pressure its neighbors against providing such support? Russian elites have not been speculating widely on such issues, although it seems likely that Russia would try to prevent widespread U.S. staging from countries that are its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Another set of questions revolves around what goals Russia would have for itself in a continuing political process. "Advantage for Russian companies" is a straightforward goal but too simple when juxtaposed against the very evident elite opinion that victory will not come easily and that the United States may in fact become bogged down in Iraq. In that case, Russia might have to step up to a more active role in solving the Iraq problem. What that role might comprise is difficult to see, given that Russia has not traditionally been good at engineering face-saving remedies for other parties at the negotiating table. At the moment, however, the Kremlin seems to be setting itself up for just such a role.

These two sets of questions highlight both problems and opportunities that may emerge in engaging Russia in a middle-ground option involving the use of force to support inspections. On the problem side, complex tensions are already arising between Moscow and Washington as Putin tries to walk a line between pushing for continued progress on the diplomatic front and acquiescing too quickly to a U.S. invasion. Those in Washington who are strong supporters of invasion might be tempted to conclude that Russia is not a reliable partner. Its role as an interlocutor might therefore be prematurely diminished.

On the opportunity side, the strong interest of Russia in a continued political-diplomatic process, when joined with the diversification of its policy away from simple oil company interests, means that Russian decision makers might be able and willing to play an active role in formulating a middle-ground option. Russian commentators already emphasize that Russia is urging Iraq to embark on a more flexible policy toward the West.[10] If that role can be developed successfully, then Moscow could be very helpful. The dynamic between the problem and opportunity sides, however, will be decisive in determining whether this outcome is possible.

10. See, for example, Elena Suponina, "Baghdad Changes Color: Russia Forces Iraq to Be Like Everyone Else," *Vremya novostei*, May 21, 2002.

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7

THE UNSCOM RECORD

Stephen Black

Following the Gulf War, as an integral part of the cease-fire agreement, the UN Security Council imposed on Iraq a total ban on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and certain ballistic missile systems. The prohibition was implemented by the director general of the IAEA and a new organization, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Under Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq was required to declare its WMD programs, including extant weapons and related facilities. UNSCOM and an Action Team (AT-IAEA) established by IAEA's director general were tasked with verifying Iraq's declarations, eliminating proscribed items and facilities, and instituting a system of ongoing compliance monitoring. The cease-fire resolution called for immediate on-site inspections of both declared capabilities and those sites designated by UNSCOM. In addition to facility access, a subsequent exchange of letters between the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq secured for investigators a host of complementary rights and privileges: full freedom of movement into and within Iraq; full rights to request, record, and retain any relevant items or documents; right to conduct interviews; freedom to conduct both ground and aerial surveillance; right to collect and analyze samples of any kind; and right to install equipment for inspection and monitoring purposes. While Iraq was permitted to have an observer present for interviews and aerial inspections, there were no substantive operational limits placed on UNSCOM and AT-IAEA.

Despite the complexity of the task, both UNSCOM and the Action Team remained small organizations throughout the 1990s. UNSCOM comprised 21 international arms control experts, administered by an executive chairman. Based in New York, the executive chairman led an office of about 50 headquarters staff and another 50 support staff at field offices in Bahrain and Baghdad. The Action Team was based in Vienna with about a dozen staff members. Headquarters personnel planned inspection missions, with additional mission staff seconded by supporting governments.

Even with an annual budget of only about $30 million, UNSCOM managed to field more than 250 visiting inspection teams between 1991 and 1998 and maintained a permanent monitoring presence in Iraq for five years. The vast majority of the personnel and equipment utilized by the commission was provided at no cost by supporting governments.

On-site inspections were the principal means of verification used by UNSCOM and the Action Team. Teams of varying sizes—from three to more than 80 inspectors—conducted short-notice and no-

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notice inspections of a range of Iraqi installations, including declared WMD stores; declared research, development, and production sites; dual-use facilities; and undeclared locations suspected of proscribed activities. On-site inspections included, among other things, simple factory tours, environmental sampling, materials and equipment inventories, physical surveys, and document and computer searches. Other teams confined their inspections to conference rooms where they interviewed Iraqi military personnel, weapons scientists and engineers, industrial managers, financial officers, and high government officials. The teams were supported by aerial inspections conducted by both commission helicopters and a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

Inspections were the principal source of information, but investigators also operated a host of sensor and monitoring systems to verify Iraqi compliance. As part of their search for undeclared WMD assets and to facilitate ongoing monitoring, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA installed and operated a network of remote monitoring video cameras, chemical air sampling systems, aircraft- and vehicle-mounted gamma ray detectors, helicopter and man-pack ground penetrating radar, and other specialized information collection systems. In addition to their own operations, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA requested and received sensitive national information from supporting governments. Other important sources of data were suppliers of equipment and materials to the Iraqi WMD programs, Iraqi defectors, and open-source information.

Contrary to the incomplete initial Iraqi declarations of April 1991, UNSCOM and AT-IAEA were able to uncover vast amounts of undeclared weapons, materials, and facilities. By using the full spectrum of inspection rights and information sources, the investigators either located or forced the disclosure of major aspects of Iraq's WMD infrastructure.

Iraq initially denied that it had conducted any nuclear activities outside of those already under IAEA safeguards and that all were in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Inspections, however, revealed a massive, covert, multi-facility effort directed toward the production of nuclear weapons, several undeclared uranium enrichment projects, and a crash program to utilize safeguarded reactor fuel in a nuclear device.

While Iraqi ballistic missile activities were public knowledge, the full extent of the program was not. Investigations proved that Iraq had not disclosed all relevant missile systems and forced Iraq to declare more than 80 SCUD missiles, more than ten mobile missile launchers and related equipment, at least 45 chemical and biological weapons special warheads, successful programs to indigenously produce SCUD-type missile components, and efforts to continue proscribed missile research and development covertly.

The chemical weapons (CW) investigation similarly started with basic knowledge of the Iraqi program but with uncertainty about its scale and scope. As a result of inspections, Iraq increased its initial declarations by about 30,000 CW munitions (filled and unfilled); admitted a range of CW research and development efforts including the VX nerve agent, incapacitating agents, and binary munitions; and yielded for destruction hundreds of pieces of CW manufacturing equipment. The chemical team also oversaw the destruction of all declared CW munitions, agents, precursors, and research, development, and production facilities.

Discovery of the Iraqi biological weapons (BW) program was one of the commission's greatest successes. Despite long-running Iraqi denials, commission investigators proved the existence of an offensive Iraqi BW program. Under pressure from UNSCOM, Baghdad was forced to declare several BW production facilities; bulk production of BW agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin; and production of BW munitions, including at least 25 SCUD warheads and more than 150 aerial bombs.

The successes achieved in investigating the Iraqi WMD programs belie a much larger difficulty encountered by the disarmament regime. Despite the requirements of the cease-fire agreement, in the spring of 1991 the Government of Iraq decided to

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actively conceal important aspects of its proscribed programs, most notably its entire nuclear and biological weapons programs. The concealment policy evolved over the course of 1991 and eventually included releasing to inspectors only a portion of its WMD holdings. Iraq released the least modern, least effective weapons but retained sufficient records and documents to allow the restart of the WMD programs and as much of its WMD and missile research, development, and production infrastructure as possible, often under the cover of permitted dual-use activities.

Iraq's concealment policy and operations were coordinated by high-ranking officials and involved a number of intelligence and security organizations. The concealment process used a host of techniques to mislead and obstruct investigators, including rapid evacuation of designated inspection sites; unsupervised, unrecorded unilateral destruction of proscribed materials; denial of access to inspection sites; destruction of documents prior to inspection; and a pervasive system of surveillance capable of providing advanced knowledge of inspection sites and topics.

Although UNSCOM and AT-IAEA were able to confirm many Iraqi claims and in some cases produce a technically coherent picture of past WMD activities, after almost eight years of intensive work they were never able to claim complete, or even sufficient, knowledge. When disarmament work was halted in 1998, the commission considered Iraq's ballistic missile, CW, and BW declarations to be incomplete and inaccurate. The myriad lingering questions and areas of uncertainty fall roughly into two categories. First, investigators are uncertain of the completeness of Iraqi declarations: It appears that Iraq has not declared all relevant activities and materials. Barring significant, good faith Iraqi cooperation, quantitative accounting for proscribed materials will remain incomplete. Similarly, Iraq's effort to conceal know-how, technical capabilities, and WMD-related infrastructure calls into question the investigator's qualitative knowledge of the weapons programs. Although a complete qualitative knowledge is not specifically necessary for disarmament accounting, it is a critical component of the long-term monitoring of Iraq's dual-use infrastructure. Iraq's policy of concealment and its known past efforts to retain proscribed items serve to magnify these uncertainties as they may represent just the tips of icebergs.

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THE IAEA IRAQ ACTION TEAM RECORD: ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS

Garry B. Dillon

The report of the IAEA director general to the Security Council on October 8, 1997, (S/1997/779) provides a comprehensive summary of the IAEA activities and findings regarding the investigation, destruction, removal, and rendering harmless of significant components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program. In this report the IAEA concluded, inter alia, that its mandated activities had resulted in a coherent picture of Iraq's program; that there were no indications of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing a nuclear weapon; nor were there any indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

These conclusions were recorded in conjunction with the recognition that some uncertainty is inevitable in any countrywide technical verification process that seeks to ensure the absence of readily concealable items or activities. At the time of reporting, it was the IAEA view that the few remaining uncertainties did not detract from its ability to implement effectively its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials or their related activities and facilities. It was also the IAEA view that the investigation of the remaining uncertainties, or any other matter that may come to light, was provided for and could be accomplished within the scope of the OMV plan. Nothing arose to change these views from October 1997 to December 1998.

ACTIVITIES OF THE IAEA IRAQ ACTION TEAM

The first IAEA inspection in response to its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687 commenced in Iraq on May 15, 1991. As of October 1997, the IAEA had completed a series of 30 inspection campaigns in Iraq involving some 500 site inspections and utilizing more than 5,000 person-days of inspector resources. During those campaigns the IAEA supervised the destruction of more than 50,000 square meters of factory floor space of nuclear program facilities, some 2,000 weapons-related items, and more than 600 metric tons of special alloys. The IAEA also arranged for and supervised the removal from Iraq of all weapons-usable nuclear material—essentially highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel—and accounted for and placed under its control, all other known nuclear materials—some 500 tons of natural uranium in various chemical compounds and some 1.8 tons of low enriched (2.6 percent) ura-

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nium dioxide. In addition to these activities, the IAEA began phasing in its OMV activities in November 1992 and commenced its continuous presence in Iraq through the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group in August 1994.

The results of the inspections and discussions with Iraqi counterparts showed that by January 1991, through its Tuwaitha-based Atomic Energy Commission and later through the Nuclear Weapons Project (coded Petrochemical 3, or PC-3), Iraq

- had procured and domestically produced substantial amounts of natural uranium compounds at Al Qaim and had built and commissioned plants at Al Jesira to convert such compounds to supply materials for production-scale enrichment processes;
- had investigated several processes for the enrichment of uranium, including diffusion, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and centrifuge, as well as laboratory-scale work on laser isotopic separation (LIS) and chemical and ion-exchange separation processes;
- had built and was in the process of commissioning a 15kg HEU/EMIS plant at Al Tarmiya and was building a similar plant at Al Sharqat;
- had, with significant foreign assistance, developed and successfully tested a workable single-cylinder centrifuge and was building a centrifuge machine production facility at Al Furat;
- had produced more than one ton of natural uranium metal and was further developing purification, casting, and machining technologies;
- was equipping and commissioning a major facility at Al Atheer for the production of HEU-"fueled" nuclear weapons;
- had, in conjunction with Al Atheer, carried out a semi-empirical program at Al Qa Qaa for the production of explosive lenses and was soon to "cast" the first full-scale explosive package;
- had, in the second half of 1990, embarked upon a "crash program" to extract the HEU material from the research reactor fuel to produce a single nuclear weapon;
- had irradiated in the Tuwaitha IRT-5000 research reactor domestically produced natural uranium targets and separated gram quantities of plutonium; and
- had undertaken three field experiments with radiation weapons containing radioactive materials produced by irradiating zirconium dioxide (actually its hafnium impurity) in the IRT research reactor.

Although Iraq had been close to the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot-cascading of single cylinder centrifuge machines,[1] and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon, by December 1998 the IAEA was satisfied that there were no indications of Iraq having:

- produced a nuclear weapon;
- produced more than a few grams of weapons-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes;
- otherwise acquired weapons-usable nuclear material; or
- retained any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

Furthermore, all of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its crash program, had been verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.

1. Iraq's capabilities with respect to machine manufacture and particularly cascading are prudently overstated.

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IRAQ'S COOPERATION

Cooperation is very difficult to measure. An inspection authority is likely to be afforded cooperation until it requires information or access that the inspected party does not wish to provide. Unless the authority requires such information or access, it may conclude that it has received the ill-described "full cooperation," although it may, from its own perspective, have asked all the wrong questions and visited all the wrong locations. It must also be recognized that the manner in which the inspection authority asks for information or access can greatly affect the response of the inspected party.

Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA has been variable, starting at a low level with Iraq's initial complete denial of its clandestine nuclear program, soon dipping lower with the denial of access to a military site where EMIS components were being concealed, and reaching its nadir during the two "standoffs" occurring in inspection number six (September 22–30, 1991).[2]

It is distinctly feasible that the improvements in cooperation, which gradually followed these confrontations, resulted from Iraq's realization that it was impossible to continue to deny that its clandestine program was not specifically dedicated to nuclear weapons production. Iraq's cooperation was tested on many occasions with the IAEA's introduction of "capable site" inspections that involved visits to locations with no known association with Iraq's nuclear program but that the IAEA judged to have capabilities to support prohibited nuclear activities. Apart from a few politically motivated grumbles, Iraq provided the necessary cooperation to facilitate these inspections, which by December 1998 had involved more than 60 sites.

It is fair to summarize Iraqi cooperation as being essentially adequate from late 1991 until difficulties reemerged in August 1998 with Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and eventually the IAEA. It is also fair to say that Iraq's motivation to cooperate was shattered by the statement that, regardless of Iraq's compliance, the embargo and the sanctions would not be lifted as long as President Saddam Hussein remained in power. Fortunately, as it would be regarded in some quarters, Iraq could be relied upon to make yet another public relations blunder and emerge as the "villains of the piece."

FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES

Like most such ventures, the UNSCOM–IAEA activities in Iraq received a surfeit of moral support and, after Iraq's "unfrozen assets" were exhausted, woefully inadequate financial resources. The IAEA Iraq Action Team was limited to a budget of no more than $3 million per year, in addition to logistical services provided through UNSCOM. To complete its mandated activities, the Action Team drew on the inspection resources of the IAEA Department of Safeguards—for which the department received no compensation—and cost-free personnel resources from IAEA member states. For the future, the costs of full operation of the IAEA's OMV plan in 1998 were estimated to be in the range $10 to 12 million per year, in addition to logistical services to be provided through the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and to require some 20 person-years of human resources. On an annual basis, the task was assessed to include but not be limited to 500 site inspections, 100 key personnel interviews, 100 capable site inspections, and 200 ground-based radiation surveys, to be comple-

2. Following the IAEA team's discovery of a cache of technical documents at the Al Niqabat Centre, the team was detained for five hours, after which the Iraqi counterpart removed, sanitized, and later returned the documents. The next day the Iraqi counterpart prevented the IAEA team from leaving the Al Khyrat complex with a second cache of documents, a standoff that lasted 96 hours.

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mented by fixed and rotary wing aerial radiation surveys, in parallel with a wide-area monitoring plan involving vegetation, aquatic, deposition, and aerosol sampling and analysis.

It would be relatively easy to justify twice the effort, but it is far from clear that this would bring twice the assurance. For comparison, the IAEA's OMV plan translates to about 2,000 person-days of inspection per year, but the total person-days of inspection expended by the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 1998 was 10,500.

Another apposite, though perhaps oversimplified, comparison assumes that the real product of the IAEA Department of Safeguards is person-days of inspection, from which simple arithmetic would yield a unit cost of approximately $10,000. Averaging ten person-days of inspection per year to have been spent in Iraq from 1980 to 1990 results in an undoubtedly overstated total "investment" of $1,000,000 over the decade. During that same period, Iraq is variously estimated to have spent up to $5,000,000,000! These are scarcely the statistics of an even playing field.

CONCLUSION

Technical inspection authorities that are comprehensively and competently staffed, adequately funded, and supported by unwavering political support for their mandate can provide a satisfactory level of assurance of compliance.

This conclusion presupposes that the "complyee" is able to recognize some benefit from compliance. In a cease-fire context, the "carrot and stick" approach to motivation seems to be entirely appropriate. However, the carrot should represent a tangible benefit, not merely the withholding of the stick. Indeed, during 1998, Iraq repeatedly claimed that "the light at the end of the tunnel had gone out."

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NEW INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED?

Terence Taylor

The purpose of this brief paper is to lay out some issues for discussion in relation to the conduct of possible future inspections in Iraq. The UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are doubtless taking account of the points raised in this paper (and others) in their planning. In offering some thoughts on ways to enhance the inspection process, this paper is not intended to imply that the inspection organizations are not already doing so.

MANDATE

UN Security Council Resolution 687 remains the basis for the obligations placed on Iraq with regard to cooperating with UN inspection teams. Any agreement on the return of inspectors should adhere as closely as possible to Resolution 687, which the Government of Iraq has repeatedly affirmed. Any dilution of the resolution's obligations would seriously impede inspections under the aegis of UNMOVIC and IAEA. The success or otherwise of the inspectors would depend heavily on the degree of cooperation offered by Iraq. As the experience of the previous inspection system demonstrated, even limited cooperation can yield substantial results. However, the task of UNSCOM and the IAEA was further complicated by Iraq's elaborate deception and concealment plans. Eventually, by 1998, Iraq withdrew all cooperation once it was clear that the UN Security Council was becoming even more divided and that the threat of the use of substantial and destabilizing force had faded from the scene. This brief analysis will not deal with these external political and military issues. Nevertheless, it needs to be appreciated that a high degree of agreement in the Security Council and a perception in Baghdad of the possibility of the use of substantial military force were key elements that induced a limited but sufficient degree of cooperation to allow UNSCOM and the IAEA to achieve important successes.

INSPECTION PROCESS

Although the impact of external dynamics is critical to the inspection process, UNMOVIC and the IAEA should maximize their chances of success by exploiting as far as possible the internal dynamics of inspection procedures.

The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the IISS or any other organizations.

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Critical elements of this process include:

- *Reestablishing the baseline.* A fundamental initial step would be to confirm the current state of knowledge of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, drawing on the information available when inspectors were last in Iraq. In particular inspectors will need to confirm the location of key dual-use equipment that was tagged and monitored by the inspectors.[1] If all aspects of Resolutions 687 and 715 are to be met, a system of monitoring will have to be put in place to help ensure continuing compliance by Iraq with its obligations. This will require the re-opening of a verification and monitoring center in Iraq.
- *Addressing unresolved issues.* Uncovering the critical unresolved issues in relation to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs will be the most challenging aspect facing any future inspection organization. The Security Council has been unanimous on at least one issue, which is that Iraq has not divulged all that is required to meet its obligations under Resolution 687. At the request of Iraq, a series of Technical Evaluation Meetings, attended by a wide range of independent experts (not UNSCOM), was held from February to July 1998. After four sessions the experts concluded that Iraq had not met its obligations in particular in relation to the production of VX nerve agent, the disposal of missile warheads, and its biological weapons program.

It will be important to adopt a plan that deals with these two challenges simultaneously from the start. If the inspectors return, a most important period to exploit would be the very early part of the inspection process, when Iraq is likely to perceive that it is in its interest to demonstrate cooperation. This early period would provide the best opportunities to uncover inconsistencies and new information but would allow no time for a learning curve for the new inspectors.

The Iraqi side has a detailed knowledge of what was known to UNSCOM and the IAEA and is very experienced in receiving inspectors, handling visits to sites, and preparing for interviews. They will have learned from the earlier experience of the occasions when they inadvertently allowed UNSCOM and the IAEA to obtain access and information directly related to the WMD programs. If Iraq decides that it is in its interest to allow the inspectors to return, without a real intention of declaring and dismantling all aspects of the prohibited programs, it would most likely seek to introduce the maximum amount of predictability into all aspects of the inspection process and to minimize the degree of flexibility in procedures. In addition, future inspectors are likely to be faced with a carefully prepared and subtle concealment plan. The Iraqi regime has unrivaled experience in such activities and has had ample time to prepare.

MEASURING COOPERATION

A key factor in enhancing the capabilities of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections in Iraq will be an understanding of how UNMOVIC commissioners and the IAEA can measure the extent of true cooperation by the Iraqi side. This is needed to convey to the UN Security Council a convincing assessment of Iraqi compliance with the relevant agreements. Aspects that would require some sort of criteria for measurement of cooperation could include:

- *Access.* The extent to which the Iraqi side allows prompt and unimpeded access to sites in re-

1. Under procedures agreed with Iraq, the inspectors placed serial numbers on key dual-use equipment (for example, fermentation equipment, flow meters, and the like). Under the terms of Resolution 715, UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring teams made regular inspection visits to ensure equipment was in place and was not being misused. Certain areas such as missile testing sites were placed under continuous video surveillance. Another important activity was environmental monitoring for levels of radioactivity to help monitor compliance with the nuclear aspects of Resolution 687.

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sponse to requests in accordance with the mandate allowed under Resolution 687 is a most important criterion. Promptness in allowing access is as important as the degree of access allowed. In making an assessment, the degree of cooperation shown in the case of site inspections carried out without notice would be particularly important. There has been a history of the Iraqi side trying to politicize access to sites that they consider to be sensitive by attempting to impose delay or completely deny access. Such attempts in future should reflect negatively in any assessment. In 1996 (by a memorandum of understanding, or MOU, only) and in 1998 (under an MOU endorsed by Resolution 1154), special arrangements were made for access to sensitive sites. These included introducing additional independent experts and senior diplomats and inevitably led to delays and a serious degradation of the inspection process. These MOUs were developed for particular circumstances and need not set precedents for future UNMOVIC and IAEA activities.

- *Information.* There has been some backsliding on information and activities already admitted by the Iraqi government. For example, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has stated on CNN in May 2002 that while Iraq did produce biological weapons agents, they did not put them into weapons delivery systems. It is clear from UNSCOM documentation that evidence was found that the Iraqis had done so and had later admitted to it.[2] Such actions during any future inspection process would clearly constitute a serious breach of Iraq's obligations. Because the Security Council is on record agreeing that Iraq has not yet met all its obligations in regard to accurately declaring its WMD and prohibited missile programs, the extent and the promptness with which new information is given would be vital measures of genuine cooperation. Some of the key matters that remained unresolved when inspections ended in 1998 included missiles and biological and chemical weapons. For example, the Iraqis cannot account for critical missile components, including warheads and rocket fuel, or explain the whereabouts of 17 tons of growth media for biological agents. Nor has Iraq given a satisfactory explanation of the disposal of 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals. These chemicals could be used to manufacture thousands of chemical weapons. Further, the United Nations does not know the whereabouts of many thousands of chemical munitions. Iraq would have to make substantial and early progress in handing over convincing explanations of these issues and others to demonstrate genuine cooperation.
- *Personnel.* While the focus in considering Iraqi weapons programs is often on weapons and equipment, information on the personnel directly engaged in the programs is equally important. In relation to future compliance, the activities and whereabouts of key personnel may even be more important. Under the previous inspection system, UN inspectors were denied access to key personnel on a number of occasions. Also not all the key personnel have been disclosed, particularly in relation to the biological weapons program. An important demonstration of cooperation would be the readiness of the Iraqi side to make such people promptly available for interviews when requested. Also the Iraqi side should be prepared to allow inspectors to conduct interviews at, for example, interviewees' normal place of work and not only in set-piece interviews.
- *Technical support of inspections.* An important support to inspectors under the previous system was aerial surveillance provided by high-

2. An example can be found in the UNSCOM Executive Chairman's report to the UN Security Council of October 10, 1995.

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level aircraft (U-2) and helicopter-borne teams. There may now be additional or alternative means of providing such surveillance, for example, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Aerial support will also be needed to conduct the environmental monitoring. Another area requiring a clear understanding and agreement is in sample taking and analysis. The readiness of Iraq to make and comply with the necessary agreements to enable these and other essential support activities to take place would be an important indicator of genuine cooperation.

- *Security of personnel and information.* The previous inspection system was, from the beginning, subject to an aggressive Iraqi effort to steal information through illegally obtaining documents, electronic eavesdropping on inspectors in their accommodations and offices, and intercepting telephone and facsimile communications. These efforts were directed at all parts of the system from New York to the inspectors in the field. UNMOVIC and the IAEA are well aware of this experience and are no doubt planning the appropriate measures to assure the security of information and communications to prevent their operations from being compromised. If Iraq should be found to be conducting such activities against the inspection organizations in future, this should be viewed as a most serious breach of its obligations, signifying that Iraq is not cooperating seriously.

CONCLUDING POINTS

The challenge facing the new inspection organization, should it be deployed in Iraq, of having a complete grasp of all the background information should not be underestimated. The Iraqi side will have the details at their fingertips. It is vitally important that UN member states provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA with any new information they might have on activities since the ending of inspections in 1998. Resolution 687 calls on all UN member states to assist in the effort to find and dismantle Iraqi WMD and prohibited missile programs including by supplying information. Returning inspectors would face a particular challenge in assuring the degree of continuing compliance since inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 in addition to satisfying outstanding issues on past weapons programs. For example, on the nuclear side, work on components for nuclear weapons (apart from the fissile material element) was extraordinarily difficult to uncover even in the period from 1991 to 1998. Rigorous and continuous compliance monitoring is essential for any serious assurance that Iraq is observing its obligations. Such monitoring can only be successful with proper cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. This in itself will be an important measure to assess Iraq's seriousness in meeting its obligations.

As stated earlier, although inspectors can enhance their capabilities with astute planning, retaining maximum flexibility to achieve some element of surprise, and making sure that full technical support can be provided (in particular overhead surveillance), the external dynamics will most likely be the determining factor. In particular, if the Security Council does not remain resilient and united in backing the inspection process and compelling Iraq to meet its obligations, all the efforts of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, no matter how imaginative they might be, will come to naught. Iraqi perceptions of the possible use of substantial force will also have a direct bearing on the degree of its cooperation.

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ESTABLISHING NONCOMPLIANCE STANDARDS

David Albright

Any inspection system in Iraq must have a clear definition of when Iraq is not complying with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions that mandate that it does not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the ballistic missiles to deliver them. Iraq has often violated its commitments under these resolutions during the last eleven years. Too often Iraqi noncompliance was tolerated, or Iraq was given repeated opportunities to comply. A future inspection system must include a set of "redlines" that demonstrate noncompliance and, if crossed, are sufficient justification for actions by members of the Security Council. The most important redlines are adequate cooperation and transparency.

The fundamental resolution governing Iraq verification requirements remains Resolution 687 adopted in April 1991. Under this resolution, Iraq is to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-related assets, and longer-range ballistic missiles programs (ranges over 150 kilometers). Iraq is to accept the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that these programs are not reconstituted. With regard to its nuclear weapons program, Iraq is permanently prohibited from possessing separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium or obtaining technology for producing such materials.

Resolution 687 and several subsequent Security Council resolutions have led to an extensive system of inspections and ongoing monitoring in Iraq. The IAEA Action Team, UNMOVIC, and its predecessor UNSCOM have had an extensive understanding of when Iraq did not comply, or, conversely, when it did comply, with its fundamental obligations. These concrete experiences provide a strong foundation for creating a set of standards to determine noncompliance under a future inspection regime.

The best judges of whether Iraq is complying with its obligations remain the IAEA Action Team and UNMOVIC. Each group should retain the authority to determine noncompliance in its respective area of responsibility. Although the Security Council is responsible for deciding a course of action in the event of noncompliance, the inspectors should make the fundamental decision about Iraqi compliance based on a set of technical verification measures and standards.

The first and foremost measure of compliance is Iraqi cooperation. Although Iraq can legitimately resist certain requests by inspectors, the inspection authorities have extensive experience in judging whether Iraq is cooperating with core requirements.

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A lack of cooperation, as judged by either inspection agency, should be sufficient by itself to find that Iraq is in noncompliance with its obligations.

Efforts by Iraq to impose unilaterally limitations on the inspectors should be viewed as noncooperation. The inspection agencies and the Security Council must maintain their right to determine the rules and obligations of the verification process.

Another equally important indicator of compliance is transparency. Inspectors should be able to verify Iraqi compliance with minimal effort. To that end, Iraq should take steps to make its industrial activities, its decision-making processes, its facilities, and its imports visible to the inspectors. The inspection agencies should not have to create elaborate ruses to obtain information from Iraq, as was too often the route forced on UNSCOM. In addition, the inspectors should not have to find a "smoking gun" to prove noncompliance. If inspectors detect a pattern of evasion or camouflaging activities and receive no satisfactory explanation of such behavior, they should conclude that Iraq is in noncompliance with its obligations.

Iraq has accepted a wide range of specific verification requirements that provide the methods for the inspectors to determine technically that Iraq is free of WMD and in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq must, for example, permit inspectors regular and no-notice access to designated sites, submit full and complete declarations, answer questions from inspectors, produce personnel for questioning and discussion, permit monitoring of sites, equipment, and individuals, and allow environmental monitoring. Iraq can never be expected to provide one hundred percent compliance with all such requirements. A local authority may temporarily deny access to a site, despite the wishes of the central Iraqi government. Iraqis may slight a declaration. They may overlook questions, view them as too difficult to answer, or be just lazy. However, a pattern of not fulfilling these requirements is sufficient to conclude that Iraq has not complied with its obligations. In addition, the inspectors must gain sufficient insight and knowledge through these activities to conclude that Iraq is complying with its obligations.

Too often in the past, the international community viewed the Iraqi inspection process as a "cat-and-mouse game" in which inspectors were expected to demonstrate that Iraq was hiding banned activities or otherwise not in compliance with its obligations. Through dramatic unannounced inspections, the use of information from intelligence agencies or defectors, or old-fashioned detective work, inspectors often did uncover a prodigious amount of secret Iraqi WMD activities. But such an approach was not sustainable and cannot be a basis for an inspection process in the future. The international community, and in particular the Security Council, must understand that the burden of proof is on Iraq to demonstrate compliance.

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TRACKING IRAQI PROCUREMENT

Fouad El-Khatib

A credible mechanism to detect potential illegal procurement attempts by Iraq represents a key element of a comprehensive monitoring strategy in nonproliferation. Such a mechanism is required to deter Baghdad's regime from acquiring goods and technologies necessary for the development of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) force.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

Seeking to Develop Indigenous Capabilities

The embargo imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran–Iraq War and the UN sanctions after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm have constituted a double-edged sword. On one hand, they slowed down Iraq's acquisition of WMD. On the other, they pushed Iraq to pursue actively the development of an indigenous capability. Those indigenous efforts were and are still premised on low reliability, low technology, relatively low safety, and particularly pragmatic experimentation.

Regardless of international sanctions, from 1993 and at least until 1998, Iraq covertly negotiated transactions with more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries around the globe, scattered from the Western world to Eastern Europe and Asia. Competitive deals, some worth several million dollars, were negotiated with the support of small trading companies established in the Middle East or within Iraq—the so-called local market. They covered a wide variety of goods and technologies to restore, upgrade, and expand the country's industrial and military assets. Traders did not foresee any problem in procuring specific raw materials or machinery from well-known foreign companies. Some contracts were to be fulfilled with foreign currency payments, and some through barter terms involving Iraqi oil products. Not all the transactions were finalized: Some were terminated in their early stages; others were to be implemented after the lifting of the embargo. Nonetheless, some contracts were actually implemented and resulted in the delivery of goods to Iraq. All of those transactions were undertaken in violation of UN sanctions, through a highly centralized procurement network with a constantly evolving pattern involving various ministries.

Since 1998, numerous press reports mentioned Iraq's continuing illegal procurement attempts from foreign countries of goods subject to monitoring by weapons inspectors.

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Difficulty Enforcing Export-Import Legislation

Outside of Iraq, the effectiveness of export-import controls as a tool for limiting the spread of WMD-related technologies is being called into question by economic globalization and a complex array of international developments.

Today more countries are beginning to show greater awareness, willingness, and interest in international cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls. At the state level and on a legal basis, institutions necessary for effective export control systems are more or less established. However, many governments often face a daunting task in implementing those controls. They lack resources and, at times, the will to enforce national legislation to comply with international standards. Also there remain a number of countries that are faced with government corruption and political or economic instability—all of which have relegated export control issues to a very low priority. Some of these countries may serve as transit points to leak dual-use technologies and equipment to countries or groups of concern. In those cases, local customs authorities are poorly trained and ill equipped to identify sensitive material or technologies, which hinders effective implementation and enforcement of export laws. In addition, most of the proscribed procurement from foreign companies may be undertaken following legal and international routes with appropriate low-signature measures to conceal the true end-use objective.

Despite Iraq's efforts to produce everything indigenously, a conservative assessment would conclude that today Iraqi engineers and scientists certainly still depend on foreign expertise, imported critical components, spare parts and materials, especially in the nuclear, missile, and chemical fields and to a lesser extent in the biological field. Such a reality tends to moderate the clear and present danger and suspicions about what actually could have been achieved by Iraq since 1998. Nevertheless, all experts agree that vigilance is necessary. Technical breakout scenarios identified by UNSCOM are still possible, as dual-use technologies and knowledge are spreading worldwide more freely and easily. Moreover, implementation without hampering civilian application remains ethically confusing due to the dual-use aspects of research, industrial equipment, and material.

TRACKING IRAQI PROCUREMENT: WHAT COULD BE DONE?

There is no silver bullet solution to impair illegal or undeclared procurement attempts. However, determined implementation of a mix of internationally endorsed measures could contribute to deterring Baghdad from pursuing such objectives while remaining credible vis-à-vis the international community. Those measures embrace new national legislation and improved information strategies, appropriate support and allocation of resources to UNMOVIC and the IAEA Action Team, and planning of intrusive export-import focused multidisciplinary inspections.

Legislation and Information Strategies

As additional political signs of cooperation, the Iraqi government could pass legislation on reporting of proscribed rearmament efforts to an international authority, including procurement-related attempts, to be both legal and praiseworthy. It could amend its constitution to reflect its resolve not to procure, develop, acquire, or use any WMD. Baghdad could also accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Important UN-sponsored information dissemination efforts could be engaged to increase awareness about WMD proliferation risks and export-import regulations, especially in industry circles. The international community should also engage in improving the education and training of customs control agents worldwide.

Mechanisms for updating lists of controlled items should be streamlined into timely responses to challenges posed by newer techniques, processes, and materials being developed as substitutes to controlled items.

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In the medium term, severe international penalties for export control violations should be elaborated and imposed when WMD-related items are involved. Personal responsibilities should be involved.

Quality and Quantity of the Resources Made Available to UNMOVIC

Tracking illegal procurement cannot be undertaken without external, fresh, and reliable information to assist in verifying the compliance of Iraq and the completeness of its import declarations. Aside from access to open-source information, requests for intelligence materials should be renewed and stressed to supporting governments.

Currently few customs experts work in UNMOVIC. Those who do mainly review Iraq's requests for imports to identify dual-use goods from prohibited items in the UN Security Council Resolution 1051 list or the GRL of goods.[1] Instead of hiring private contractors for trade controls at border posts, training a pool of UNMOVIC customs experts to conduct on-site inspections in conjunction with multidisciplinary teams should be strongly promoted.

Operations Undertaken by Weapons Inspectors

The minimum UNMOVIC can and should do is what UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team already did. It is recommended that strong multidisciplinary operational planning for the purpose of intrusive monitoring of procurement attempts be well thought out.

Beyond traditional on-site inspections of declared or undeclared industrial sites by internationally mandated bodies, access to all premises on Iraqi territory should be implemented as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 687 to deter Iraqi citizens from undertaking trade or financial operations related to illegal procurement activities. Inspecting the following bottlenecks could contribute to identifying undeclared end-users or proscribed activity:

- Border posts on roads but also rail and civilian and military air and maritime ports and routes could be randomly checked by technical inspections teams combined with highly competent customs experts. On-site monitoring could be complemented by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) aerial surveillance of unusual routes.
- The structural compartmentalization of the Iraqi programs tends to preserve the secrecy surrounding potential illegal procurements. Nevertheless, a highly centralized and hierarchical paper processing system at ministry levels is its Achilles' heel. Intrusive challenge inspections of commercial departments in various ministries and commercial banks could unveil suspect trading activities.
- Diplomatic premises abroad could also be subject to challenge inspection upon strong evidence or suspicion of financial assistance and attempts to use immunity to cover up illegal transactions.[2]

Continual monitoring or unannounced spot inspections of government-owned or private trading companies could be rewarded with catches of whole procurement networks of proscribed activities. But it should be noted that once a company's illegal activity has been unveiled, it has often been disbanded and a new one created elsewhere. Such efforts would be a high-value, low-probability "fish and catch game," especially in the absence of reliable current intelligence information.

Conversely, what should such monitoring *not* be? Monitoring procurement activities should not be designed to be limited to monitoring a specific site, some specific Iraqi program, or any specific declaration process. It should be designed to catch proscribed procurement activities, undertaken by Iraq, whether they are undertaken inside or outside the

1. The Goods Review List (GRL) is a list of import items subject to ongoing monitoring.
2. Closer analysis by legal advisers of articles 22, 24, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) is necessary to ascertain the legality of such an option within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 1284.

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country. It should not, however, impede nonprohibited procurement activities. Tracking Iraqi procurement should not be about military, technical, or commercial intelligence. International inspectors should take into consideration Iraq's legitimate concerns and protect confidential business and security information of the Government of Iraq not relevant to applicable UN Security Council resolutions. Notwithstanding, all efforts should be made to uphold the dignity of individuals faced with such highly intrusive measures. This should by no means restrict access to sites or relevant information of interest pertaining to importation of material and technologies related to proscribed programs.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

First, despite UN sanctions, Iraq has demonstrated over the last few years its intention to import dual-use goods and monitored items to enhance indigenous industrial capacities. It has also demonstrated its ability to smuggle proscribed items. Second, in many countries, the enforcement of international export controls standards is still flawed and subject to relatively easy deception measures.

Whatever happens in Iraq, several of the proposed measures can be initiated without being too costly. Their implementation would reinforce the international efforts by setting new standards, improving awareness and expertise of the potential actors.

When monitoring resumes, the first six months might offer the maximum opportunities for discoveries; meanwhile Iraq's level of cooperation would be expected to score high. However, during this period, the newly trained inspectors will be under the burden of re-baselining all their data on old and possible new sites, as well as establishing programs to monitor such sites. Most inspectors will be obtaining their first real field experience, while being under extreme political pressure to provide quick results. After a year, one can expect the inspectors to become familiar with the country and its facilities, but the level of cooperation on the Iraqi side might progressively decrease. Beyond initial discoveries, the deterrent factor of the proposed measures will remain.

11-L-0559/OSD/11212

12

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

David Cortright

The UN arms inspection effort in Iraq is the most comprehensive, most intrusive weapons monitoring program ever established. The successful completion of the program is crucial to the security of the region and the world and may serve as a precedent for future disarmament efforts. This paper explores the legal basis for that effort. It begins by examining the main provisions of the two primary UN Security Council resolutions mandating the disarmament of Iraq. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the two resolutions, which reveals a number of ambiguities and contradictions in the existing legal framework. The paper addresses these ambiguities and concludes with options for a diplomatic strategy to induce Iraqi acceptance of renewed weapons inspections.

RESOLUTION 687: THE FUNDAMENTAL MANDATE

When the Government of Iraq signed the Gulf War cease-fire agreement in 1991, it thereby accepted the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Section C of that resolution specifies Iraq's disarmament obligations and establishes UN mechanisms for implementing this disarmament mandate. By agreeing to Resolution 687, Iraq accepted unconditionally "the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including:

> All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto. . . .
>
> All ballistic missiles with a ranger greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities. . . .
>
> Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable materials or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.[1]

To implement this resolution, Iraq was directed to submit within fifteen days a "declaration" on the locations, amounts, and types of all specified weapons.[2] Resolution 707 (1991) reiterated this

1. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, S/RES/687 (1991), April 3, 1991, par. 8 and 12.
2. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 9(a).

11-L-0559/OSD/11213

demand in calling for Iraq to submit a "full, final, and complete disclosure" of its weapons activities and capabilities.[3] During the 1990s Iraq submitted nearly two-dozen such disclosures to UN officials. All of these disclosures were subsequently shown to be false.[4]

Resolution 687 directed the secretary-general to form the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations. Iraq was directed to yield possession to UNSCOM of all specified weapons and related items and to destroy all specified missile capabilities and launchers under UNSCOM supervision.

Resolution 687 further ordered that "Iraq shall not acquire or develop nuclear weapons." It directed the IAEA to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, with the assistance and cooperation of UNSCOM. The IAEA was also directed to implement a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the prohibition on nuclear weapons activities.[5]

Resolution 687 noted that the disarmament actions to be taken by Iraq "represent steps toward the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery." Four preambulatory paragraphs in the resolution made reference to the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free from WMD.[6]

In Section F of Resolution 687, the Security Council decided that, upon council agreement that Iraq has met the requirements of the disarmament mandate, the prohibitions against importing Iraqi oil and against financial transactions with Iraq "shall have no further force or effect."[7]

Subsequent Security Council actions sought to implement the work of UN weapons inspectors, as follows:

- Resolution 699 (1991) approved the operational plans for UNSCOM and IAEA, as submitted by the secretary-general in documents S/22614 and S/22615. The implementation plans envisioned three stages for the inspection process: (1) the gathering and assessment of information; (2) the disposal of weapons and other specified facilities; and (3) ongoing monitoring and verification. The plans approved in Resolution 699 covered the first two stages.
- Resolution 707 (1991) condemned Iraq's violations of its commitment to comply with the UN disarmament mandate and demanded "full, final, and complete disclosure" of all aspects of its WMD programs. The resolution provided UNSCOM and IAEA complete air surveillance rights and demanded that they be allowed "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all" sites they wished to inspect.
- Resolution 715 (1991) approved the operational plans for ongoing monitoring and verification developed by UNSCOM and IAEA, as submitted by the secretary-general in documents S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1. The operation plans approved in Resolutions 699 and 715 gave UNSCOM and the IAEA unprecedented and extraordinary powers to conduct intrusive inspections.
- A list of import items subject to ongoing monitoring was approved in Resolution 1051 (1996) and was revised as the Goods Review List in Resolution 1409 (2002).

3. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 707*, S/RES/707 (1991), August 15, 1991, par. 3(i).
4. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "UNSCOM: Between Iraq and Hard Place?" *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2002), p. 142.
5. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 12 and 13.
6. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 14.
7. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 687*, par. 22.

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RESOLUTION 1284: RENEWING THE MANDATE

Following the departure of UNSCOM from Iraq in December 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 in December 1999 creating a new weapons inspection body, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. The resolution also developed a new plan for the fulfillment of the UN disarmament mandate.

The adoption of Resolution 1284 reflected two contrasting developments, as articulated in the preambulatory paragraphs: Iraq's partial progress toward the implementation of the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687, and Iraq's failure to implement those provisions fully.[8]

The weapons inspection provisions of Resolution 1284 assumed that much of the work of disarming Iraq had already been achieved, and that the disarmament mandate could be completed through a series of tasks that UNMOVIC would identify and then accomplish within a year. The resolution envisioned the following timeline for the completion of weapons inspections:

- sixty days after entering Iraq UNMOVIC and IAEA will submit for Security Council approval a work program for implementing a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification and accomplishing "key remaining disarmament tasks"; and
- one hundred twenty days after the ongoing system of monitoring and verification is fully operational, if Iraq is cooperating in all respects, the Security Council would suspend sanctions for renewable periods of 120 days.

COMPARING 1284 AND 687

An analysis of Resolution 1284, in comparison to Resolution 687, reveals the following:

- The new arrangements under Resolution 1284 reaffirm all the terms of the UN disarmament mandate. UNMOVIC is granted all the powers and responsibilities that were given to UNSCOM in Resolution 687. The role of IAEA as stated in Resolution 687 is reaffirmed. The Government of Iraq is required to fulfill all the obligations imposed upon it in Resolution 687 and "shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect."[9]
- Resolution 1284 introduces new disarmament requirements without specifying what those obligations would entail. Paragraph 2 of the resolution declares that UNMOVIC will establish and operate a "reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification." No definition of the term *reinforced* is provided, either in the resolution or the approved UNMOVIC work plan. The resolution calls upon UNMOVIC to "identify . . . additional sites" to be covered by such a system. According to the Government of Iraq, the number of sites previously monitored was more than 500. The new language thus suggests "a certain direction toward expanding the number of sites."[10] The operational plan for UNMOVIC approved by the Security Council in April 2000 offers no specific guidance on the operation of a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.[11] The requirements for such a sys-

8. See preambulatory paragraph 9 in United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, S/RES/1284 (1999), December 17, 1999.
9. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, S/RES/1284 (1999), December 17, 1999, par. 4.
10. Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Analysis of Security Council Resolution 1284," December 1999, available at <*http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/iraq/for-ministry/iraq-mfa-res1284.htm*>.
11. United Nations, *Note by the Secretary-General Transmitting the Organizational Plan for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission Prepared by the Executive Chairman*, S/2000/292, April 6, 2000, par. 14–16.

11-L-0559/OSD/11215

tem are important because the suspension of sanctions is contingent upon satisfactory reports that this system is fully operational.

- Resolution 1284 places the burden for specifying Iraq's disarmament obligations on UNMOVIC rather than on the Baghdad government. Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284 requires UNMOVIC and the IAEA to develop work programs for implementing "the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations" under Resolution 687. The same paragraph further decides that "what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise."[12] This language is very different from that of previous measures, which required Iraq to submit a "declaration" (Resolution 687) or a "full, final, and complete disclosure" (Resolution 707) of all of its weapons capabilities.

- The operational and staffing plans for UNMOVIC differ from those of UNSCOM. Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1284 makes UNMOVIC accountable to the secretary-general. The executive chairman of UNMOVIC is instructed to report to the Security Council through the secretary-general. By contrast, the chairman of UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council. Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1284 specifies that UNMOVIC staff will be international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the UN Charter.[13] Staff members of UNSCOM were provided by, paid for, and accountable to their individual governments. Under the provisions of Resolution 1284, UNMOVIC staff members are part of the UN Secretariat and are not to be held accountable to or influenced by any single UN member state.

- Resolution 1284 states that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets and archives of UNSCOM and that it shall assume UNSCOM's part in agreements previously negotiated with the Government of Iraq.[14] UNMOVIC thereby inherited two previous agreements, one negotiated by UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus in June 1996 and the other by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in February 1998, that specify modalities and procedures for inspecting so-called sensitive sites.[15] Presumably these agreements still hold.

- Section D of Resolution 1284 alters the procedures for the lifting of sanctions as an inducement for Iraqi cooperation. In place of the language of paragraph 22 of Resolution 687, which declares that upon completion of the specified disarmament tasks, "sanctions shall have no further force or effect," Resolution 1284 states merely that the Security Council "expresses its intention" to suspend sanctions for 120 days if the chairmen of UNMOVIC and IAEA report that Iraq has cooperated "in all respects."[16] Continuing this suspension would require an affirmative vote by the Security Council every 120 days. This gives any permanent member of the council the power to terminate the suspension.[17]

- The suspension of sanctions outlined in Resolution 1284 is subject to "the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures" to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items referred to in paragraph 24 of Resolution 687, namely weapons and military-related goods.[18]

12. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 7.
13. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 5 and 6.
14. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 11.
15. de Jonge Oudraat, "UNSCOM: Between Iraq and Hard Place?" p. 143.
16. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 33.
17. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 35.
18. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 33.

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Resolution 1284 expresses the Security Council's intention to approve arrangements for such measures before it decides to suspend sanctions.[19]

- The previous language of Resolution 687 concerning a Middle East zone free from WMD is mentioned only once in a preambulatory paragraph and is not included in the text of Resolution 1284, thereby weakening the legal commitment to this objective.

ADDRESSING AMBIGUITIES: UNMOVIC'S MANDATE

As noted, the legal foundation for insisting upon comprehensive, intrusive inspections in Iraq remains solid. Resolution 1284 does not weaken the disarmament mandate established in Resolution 687. However, there is an apparent contradiction between the acknowledgement in the preamble to Resolution 1284 of "the progress made by Iraq toward compliance" and the provisions in paragraph 2 of that resolution calling for a "reinforced" system of monitoring and the inspection of "additional sites." Further ambiguity is introduced by the language of paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284, which places the burden for defining the "remaining disarmament tasks" on UNMOVIC rather than the Government of Iraq. This seems to imply, contrary to available evidence, that Iraq has provided adequate disclosures in the past and that the responsibility for completing the disarmament process rests primarily with UNMOVIC.

A contradiction also exists between the requirement of paragraph 4 of Resolution 1284 that UNMOVIC be allowed "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas" and the provisions of paragraph 11 that UNMOVIC "shall assume" UNSCOM's part in the legal agreements previously negotiated with the Government of Iraq. The February 1998 memorandum of understanding between the UN secretary-general and the Government of Iraq, which was approved by the Security Council in Resolution 1154 (1998), established modalities for independent experts and senior diplomats to accompany inspectors at sensitive sites. As noted by Terence Taylor, the former chief inspector of UNSCOM, these procedures slowed and degraded UNSCOM inspections. Nonetheless, paragraph 11 of Resolution 1284 indicates that UNMOVIC is bound by this agreement.

It is safe to conclude from the above that UNMOVIC faces a more restrictive legal framework and operating environment than UNSCOM did. The new agency may not be "UNSCOM Lite," as some have suggested, but it faces unique obligations and restrictions. These are the result of the political differences within the Security Council that produced the sometimes contradictory language of Resolution 1284. They also reflect the results of UNSCOM's nearly eight years of experience and the significant progress that was achieved in eliminating most of Iraq's WMD. Because the political climate has changed and much of the work of disarming Iraq has already been accomplished, it seems clear that UNMOVIC will be required to operate under a more limited mandate than its predecessor.

UNCERTAINTY OVER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS

Another major contradiction concerns the terms and conditions for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. On the one hand, Resolution 1284 offers specific benchmarks and a timetable for the easing of sanctions pressure (120 days after the reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification system is fully operational). But the resolution also significantly weakens the commitment to lifting sanctions. The resolution merely expresses the Security Council's "intention" to suspend rather than its obligation

19. United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1284*, par. 36.

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to do so. Resolution 1284 employs the term *suspend* rather than *lift*, and it requires that the suspension must be renewed by an affirmative Security Council vote every 120 days.

The ambiguities in this area have direct bearing on the diplomatic prospects for inducing Iraqi acceptance of renewed weapons inspections. Without a clear commitment to the lifting of sanctions in return for compliance, it will be difficult to persuade the Baghdad government to permit the return of weapons inspectors. According to former UNSCOM chair Rolf Ekeus, "the language of suspension injects an element of instability and insecurity. That is probably the major reason why Iraq has been withholding its approval of the resolution."[20]

Uncertainty about the lifting of sanctions is reinforced by the position of U.S. government officials, who have stated their intention to maintain sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. In a March 1997 speech at Georgetown University, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that the United States does not accept the view that sanctions should be removed when Iraq fulfills its obligations to the United Nations.[21] In November 1997 President Bill Clinton remarked that "sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as [Hussein] lasts."[22] In light of these and other statements from U.S. officials, the Iraqi government could reasonably conclude that the United States would oppose any lifting of sanctions, regardless of whether or not it complies with weapons monitoring. The U.S. government position of maintaining permanent sanctions against Saddam Hussein goes beyond the legal mandate of UN policy and is not authorized in Security Council resolutions. It is a major obstacle to the prospects for inducing Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspections.

A further obstacle to the suspension or lifting of sanctions is the absence of a Security Council plan to establish an ongoing arms embargo against Iraq, as required by Resolution 1284. Paragraph 33 of that resolution makes any suspension of sanctions subject to the "elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures" to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited weapons. Nothing has been done to consider or develop such arrangements, however. This is a significant omission because the "effective financial measures" referred to in the resolution are bound to be complicated, especially in light of a provision of paragraph 36 referring to "payment" for authorized civilian exports and imports. This is an oblique reference to the UN escrow account, which currently controls all revenues from approved oil sales and provides payment for the import of civilian goods into Iraq. Reference to the matter of "payment" raises the contentious issue of whether and how oil revenues are to be returned to Iraqi government control. The Security Council has not yet considered whether or how this is to be done, with what degree of continuing UN monitoring or control. Until this matter is addressed and decided, according to the language of paragraphs 33 and 36 of Resolution 1284, the council cannot suspend sanctions.

INDUCING IRAQI COMPLIANCE

To resolve ambiguities in the conditions for lifting sanctions and to provide an incentive for Iraqi cooperation, the Security Council should clarify and restate the original commitment in Resolution 687 that sanctions will be lifted when the UN disarmament mandate is fully implemented. This would provide a carrot to accompany the many sticks that have been applied or threatened to gain Iraqi com-

20. "Shifting Priorities: UNMOVIC and the Future of Inspections in Iraq, An Interview with Ambassador Rolf Ekeus," *Arms Control Today*, March 2002, p. 5.
21. Madeleine K. Albright, "Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability: United States Policy Toward Iraq," speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1997.
22. Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "For Iraq: A Doghouse with Many Rooms," *New York Times*, November 23, 1997, p. A4.

11-L-0559/OSD/11218

pliance. Inducement strategies have been successful in other settings, notably North Korea, as means of persuading targeted regimes to accept nonproliferation and disarmament objectives.[23] Experience has shown that incentives are most effective in these settings when they are strictly conditioned on compliance and when they are accompanied by credible coercive pressures. Any inducements offered to Iraq must be linked to clear and unequivocal compliance by the Baghdad regime.[24] The lifting of sanctions must be subject to certification by UNMOVIC and the IAEA that Iraq's capabilities for developing WMD have been fully eliminated.

23. For a thorough analysis of the North Korea case, see Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
24. For a fuller discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of inducement strategies, see David Cortright, ed., *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), a report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

11-L-0559/OSD/11219

snowflake

Rcvd 27 Aug C

8:29 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please look into this business about pilots using amphetamines. I don't think that is a good idea. What's going on?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080902.02

Please respond by: 8/25/02

8 Aug 02

U14910-02

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

SEP 6 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr. MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators

- You directed that we "look into this business about pilots using amphetamines." (TAB A)

- Dextroamphetamine, known as "go pills," has been used by military aviators since World War II to counter the effects of fatigue during combat operations. It is only used if alternatives such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps or exercise are either unsuccessful or not an option. There have been no reported safety incidents involving aircrew members' use of "go pills."

- The wing commander, or deployed commander equivalent, in consultation with the senior flight surgeon, determines if the use of Dextroamphetamine is medically warranted. The authorization for its use is time and/or mission specific.

- Countering pilot fatigue is an "off label" use of Dextroamphetamine; informed consent is necessary from the crew member. Commanders may not order its use. There is no penalty, punishment, loss of benefits, or adverse action of any kind for those who decline the use of stimulants. Ground testing prior to combat use and rigorous accountability measures must also be in place.

- Military medical research laboratories are currently studying alternative drugs to effectively combat pilot fatigue, including Modafinil, a Food and Drug Administration approved medication used to treat narcolepsy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by: COL John Powers, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 40336, 40197

U14912-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11221

snowflake

Rcvd 27 Aug C

8:29 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

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Thanks.

DHR/azn
080902.02

Please respond by: 8/25/02

U14910-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11222

Operational Use of Dextroamphetamines in Aviators

COORDINATION

PD, C&PP	CAPT Jack Smith	JWS 28 Aug, 2002
C of S, HA	Ms. Diana Tabler	has seen 9/6/02
PDASD, HA	Mr. Ed Wyatt	
USD, P&R	Dr. David S.C. Chu	David S.C. Chu 18 Sep 02

snowflake

C 9/16

September 12, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Information on Websites

Do you have anyone working on this memo I sent Toric on August 29?

Thanks.

Attach.
082902.02 SecDef memo to Clarke

DHR:dh
091202-6

Please respond by 09/20/02

9/13

→ SecDef –
Yes. John Stenbit has it. See attached.
D. Rit
Sep 9/16

12 Sep 02

114943-02

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

It appears that terrorist groups are extracting information from all of our websites around the world. I think what we ought to do is have somebody with some brains go through and systematically look at all websites and think of things that could be helpful.

For example, in the intel brief I was told they are accessing the background sheets of all the scientists at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, obviously to try to compromise them, or kill them.

I think we ought to really pare down what is on the DoD websites; army, navy, air force, every one of them. Here and around the world. We ought to get a systematic way of doing that and calling people's attention to things that might be problematical.

For example, should my background sheet mention my children's names. I think not.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082902.02

Please respond by: 9/2/02

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 16 2002

INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

September 10, 2002 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action:_____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

SUBJECT: Web Site Administration

I am replying to your inquiry to Torie Clarke about information on DoD websites.

OPSec = Operational Security.

- DoD Web Site Administration policy, which is applicable to all unclassified web sites, requires information to be reviewed prior to posting using an OPSEC-based process and protection to be applied according to data sensitivity. Since 1998, DoD policy has prohibited posting personal information relating to family members. In December 2001, removal of lists of names and other personally identifying information (e.g., e-mail addresses) from public web sites was directed pursuant to changes in application of the Freedom of Information Act.

- The Joint Web Risk Assessment Cell (JWRAC), established in February 1999, does OPSEC-based reviews of the DoD public web content. The JWRAC is located at DISA and manned by drilling (i.e., part-time) reservists. Using data mining tools, they review sites for inappropriate content (e.g., classified, personal information, OPLANS, CONOPS). Discrepancies are referred to the owing Component for remediation; required registration of public sites provides ownership data. The JWRAC also does special studies/vulnerability assessments as requested by individual components (e.g., EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, DTRA). During the past year the JWRAC has identified over 1,500 discrepancies, undertaken 14 special studies, and expended nearly 1,500 days of effort. From September to December 2001, daily reports of findings were being provided.

- The DoD has between 700 gigabytes and 1 terrabyte of accessible web content and major efforts (e.g., Federal e-gov initiatives) are moving more content in that direction. A message to the field will be staffed for your signature highlighting the risks and reiterating the need to apply the OPSEC review process, limit details, and protect information according to sensitivity when posting to the web.

  Action.

  - While DoD policy restricts certain types of data from posting, some Federal agencies have few guidelines. The DoD CIO will propose the Federal CIO Council establish basic guidelines to facilitate increased overall security and safety.

COORDINATION: ASD(PA)

cc: General Myers, CJCS

(b)(6)

Prepared by: Linda Brown/DASD(S&IO)

11-L-0559/OSD/11226

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

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For example, in the intel brief I was told they are accessing the background sheets of all the scientists at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, obviously to try to compromise them, or kill them.

I think we ought to really pare down what is on the DoD websites; army, navy, air force, every one of them. Here and around the world. We ought to get a systematic way of doing that and calling people's attention to things that might be problematical.

For example, should my background sheet mention my children's names. I think not.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082902.02

Please respond by: 9/10/02

U14946 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11227

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

INFO MEMO

September 16, 2002 5:17 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action: _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

SUBJECT: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility at DIA

You asked what actions we should take to give the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) more flexibility (per Admiral Jacoby's August 23 memorandum).

- I agree with Admiral Jacoby that we should seek legislation to grant DIA the authority to use personnel services contracts similar to the authority granted to the CIA. This would be consistent with your desire to make DoD intelligence support more agile and responsive to military activities, the war on terrorism, and crisis situations, and therefore I recommend that we propose this legislation for the DoD Intelligence Community.

- I also want to share some thoughts on his other points.

  - Defense Intelligence Senior Experts: We already have the authority to approve requests to establish these positions, known as Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL), so further action is not required. We can accommodate DIA requests for DISL positions without making changes to current policy, and I have asked Admiral Jacoby to forward his requests to me.

  - DoD policy to budget 100% of the salary of military personnel billets regardless of whether they are filled: This is a complex matter that has far-reaching budget implications and affects all non-service assignments. It is also a matter of some concern on the Hill. I support Admiral Jacoby's recommendation to seek an internal solution, rather than go to Congress for legislation.

- Comparison between CIA personnel legislation and that of the DIA: It is worth noting that the CIA is not happy with the authority it possesses now, and is in the midst of making some radical revisions, so a comparison between CIA and DoD

would not be helpful at this time. We will monitor and assess developments, and report back to you warranted.

- I have a related item that I would like to discuss with you regarding DIA Human Intelligence. It is a very important budget and policy issue, and I look forward to discussing it with you at our meeting on October 4.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Christopher Mellon, DASD (Intelligence), (b)(6)

snowflake

September 3, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: John Stenbit

CC: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility

I have reviewed Admiral Jacoby's August 23 memo on recommendations for additional management flexibility.

What action should we take?

Thanks.

Attach.
08/23/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: "Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibilty"

DHR:dh
090302-2

Please respond by 09/27/02

Rec'd by ABS 9/4/02 9:30 am

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

U-087/DR

23 August 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility

On July 19, during my office call, you asked me to identify policies which inhibit DIA flexibility. Modifications to four policies listed below would significantly improve management of Defense intelligence activities.

- Personal Services Contracts. The Government is normally required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other procedures required by civil service law. This significantly limits the ability of Defense intelligence to hire specific expertise to support short-term or project-specific efforts. Examples include experts on al Qaeda, chemical-biological warfare, Islamic militant personalities, and linguists to support interrogation and document exploitation. CIA has much greater flexibility to address unforeseen requirements for specific expertise because of its authority to use personal service contracts. The situation would be rectified if Congress granted Defense intelligence components the same personal services authorities granted in legislation to CIA.

- Defense Intelligence Senior Experts. DoD has established a ceiling on the number of senior civilian technical experts (referred to as Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) positions) authorized for each intelligence agency. These positions are the technical, non-managerial equivalent of Senior Executive Service personnel and offer salaries above the grade of GS-15. DISL opportunities improve retention of superior, in-depth intelligence expertise. The retention and application of expertise is critical in the current environment. Increasing DISL authorization does not increase appropriated salary. The DoD ceiling on DISLs should be eliminated and organizations should be permitted to manage personnel to their salary limit.

- Unfilled Military Billets. A funding source to maximize the flexibility offered by the above proposals could be National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) funding allocated to unfilled military billets. DIA and the unified command intelligence centers are required by DoD policy to budget the salary of military personnel billets. We are required to reimburse the departments for 100% of the authorized billets regardless of actual fill. In recent years, the departments have been decreasing their fill rates. In FY02, Defense intelligence military billets were only filled at approximately 85%. Due to budget policy, Defense intelligence lost between $60M and $80M in fiscal guidance which flowed to the Services to pay salaries for billets they did not fill. Between FY99

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCK	
[illegible]	[illegible]

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and FY02, the loss was about $340M. This is a windfall for the departments and a loss of Defense-wide intelligence capability. If we could cost and program for military billets at the average fill rate, for example, for the previous three years, funding for the unfilled billets would be available to execute the full implementation of any or all of the above policy change proposals, specifically personal services contracts or other mechanisms to work with the private sector to meet needs.

You also asked me to compare CIA personnel legislation with our own and determine whether or not CIA authorities would improve DoD intelligence effectiveness. Our assessment is ongoing. In addition to the personal services contracting issue noted above, we will report findings as we develop a more detailed understanding of CIA's exceptional personnel authorities and how they might be applied to benefit Defense intelligence.

COORDINATION: NONE

Enclosures:
1. Personal Services Contracts
2. Defense Intelligence Senior Experts
3. Unfilled Military Billets

cc:
DEPSECDEF
DIR(PA&E) Lembow
ASD C4I Stenbit
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/11232

Authority to Use Personal Services Contracts

PURPOSE: To request that Congress grant authority for DIA to use personal services contracts.

BACKGROUND: 5 U.S.C. 3109 states that Agencies shall not award personal services contracts unless specifically authorized by statute to do so. A personal services contract is characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates between the Government and the contractor's personnel. The Government is normally required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other procedures required by the civil service laws. Obtaining personal services by contract, rather than by direct hire, circumvents those laws unless Congress has specifically authorized acquisition of the services by contract. Without this exception to law, intelligence support to military operations are limited by the number of government assets that are available. It is important to note that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) currently has the authority to use personal services contracts (Sec 8., 50 USC, 403j).

RECOMMENDATION: That Congress grant authority for DIA to use personal services contracts to support analytical and collection activities with short-term or project specific efforts to support crisis requirements. For example, the intelligence analytic staff could be augmented with personnel with specific expertise to support such efforts as the Global War on Terrorism. Examples include experts on al Qaeda, the country of Yemen, chemical and biological warfare, Islamic militant personalities, etc. Another example is the need for additional interrogators or document exploitation personnel with special language proficiencies to interrogate detainees quickly or eliminate a backlog of potentially important captured documents.

Enclosure 1

Retaining Senior Intelligence Experts

PURPOSE: To request elimination of the OSD established ceiling on Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) authorizations in the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System.

BACKGROUND: DISL personnel are the senior technical experts in specific areas of intelligence (e.g., regional experts (Middle East, South Asia, Latin America) or subject matter experts (e.g., chemical and biological warfare, information operations, computer forensics, counterintelligence, clandestine collection). They are distinct from Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DI SES) managers. 10 U.S.C. 1606 provides a DoD DISES ceiling of 492. OSD policy states DISL totals will approximate 30% of DISES. This ratio applies to the number of DISL authorized within agencies. For protocol purposes DISL personnel are treated like SES personnel. This is important as it gives them entrée' to meetings and forums which sometimes exclude GS-15s and below. The pay level for DISL is equivalent to SES. Agencies pay DISL salary from the total for salary appropriated to the agency. Increasing DISL authorizations does not increase appropriated salary. Agencies must manage to their salary limit. Internal priorities have to be established for the number of senior grade and GG-grade authorizations filled.

As DIA is a people intensive operation and as the nature of its intelligence analysis, production and collection capabilities requires significant expertise, the DISL structure is important. Because of the related salary and benefits, DISL positions are reasonably competitive with similar civil sector jobs. DISL opportunities improve retention of superior technical experts. They ensure the agency has a broad range of world class experts to oversee production, quality control intelligence products, and mentor junior analysts and technical collectors. DIA is currently authorized 25 DISL. This is insufficient to cover the wide range of required expertise.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate the OSD-established ceiling on DISL authorizations allowing DIA to manage the number within its annual civilian pay appropriation.

Enclosure 2

Unfilled Military Billets

PURPOSE: To generate funding to provide maximum flexibility to implement the other policy change proposals, request that DoD change its policy regarding military billets being costed and programmed at 100% of authorization.

BACKGROUND: The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), a component of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), funds most intelligence analytical capabilities in DIA and the unified commands. This Defense intelligence community lost between $60M and $80M in fiscal guidance in FY 02 (about $340M over the period FY99-02) due to budgeting for unfilled military billets. DoD requires the GDIP to budget at 100% for military billets even though the historical actual fill rate falls between 80%-95%. This overstates our military budget and reduces Defense intelligence capabilities. Intelligence funds would be available to maximize the flexibility offered by the other proposed policy changes if the GDIP was allowed to program for military billets based on a composite average of filled military positions, for example, the average for the past three years, versus programming for 100% of the authorized billets - filled or not. The program amount could be modified every year to account for the latest three year average of fill rate.

RECOMMENDATION: That DoD allow the GDIP component of the NFIP to cost and program for military billets at the average fill rate based on the past three year average. The DoD Comptroller is aware of this issue.

Enclosure 3

snowflake

September 3, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: John Stenbit

CC: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibility

I have reviewed Admiral Jacoby's August 23 memo on recommendations for additional management flexibility.

What action should we take?

Thanks.

Attach.
08/23/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: "Policies Inhibiting Management Flexibilty"

DHR:dh
090302-2

Please respond by 09/27/02

OSD 11236-02

U14950 /02

Rec'd by ABS 9/4/02 9:30am

6:35 PM

SECRET

2002 SEP 17 AM 9:21

TO: ~~Admiral Giambastiani~~ LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: August 22, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please find out how many Muslim senior officers we have, from colonel up. Do we know that kind of information?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082202.12

Please respond by: 9/4/02

U14952 /02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

2002 SEP 1 7 AM 8:04

INFO MEMO

SEPTEMBER 18, 2002 – 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) David S. C. Chu 18 Sep 02

SUBJECT: Muslim Senior Officers

There are six active duty colonels who state they are Muslim in their official records. There are no active duty general or flag officers who state they are Muslim. Attached is a table of active duty members by Service and grade who are recorded as Muslim.

Just under eleven percent (10.8 percent) of the force have no religious preference recorded. Another 20.9 percent state that they have no religious preference.

Attachment: as stated

11-L-0559/OSD/11238 U15183 /02

RELIGION AFFILIATION MUSLIM - AUGUST 2002

GRADE	ARMY	A.F.	M.C.	NAVY	TOTAL
E01	62	27	18	38	145
E02	99	26	39	61	225
E03	229	115	123	234	701
E04	470	130	93	239	932
E05	417	188	90	245	940
E06	342	101	68	88	599
E07	191	79	22	14	306
E08	30	12	7	3	52
E09	9	6	1	2	18
W01	10	0	0	0	10
W02	15	0	1	0	16
W03	6	0	2	0	8
W04	0	0	2	0	2
O01	19	6	1	0	26
O01E*		5	3	0	8
O02	21	4	9	0	34
O02E*		2	1	0	3
O03	53	19	1	0	73
O03E*		8	4		12
O04	13	11	1	0	25
O05	6	1	0	0	7
O06	3	3	0	0	6
TOTAL	1995	743	486	924	4148

* Indicates prior enlisted experience