

Snowflake

13
400



JUN 21 2002

gr

EF1918LIA
02/069341-USDIP
June 20, 2002 10:41 AM

TSA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Turkey

Please draft a letter from me to the Defense Minister of Turkey and the Chief of Staff of Turkey, saying how pleased we are that they have taken over the ISAF and that we look forward to working with them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-15

.....
Please respond by 06/25/02

TURKEY

7/7
fyee
7/8
Larry Di Rita *DL*

Response Attached

SP3
7/3

JUN 21 02 11:50

U16299 02

06-21-02 12:02 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/11512

20 Jun 02



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF1923 U6

USDP 7/3/06

ACTION MEMO

I-02/009341

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Letters to Turkish MOD and Commander of Armed Forces

- Attached for your review and approval are letters to the Turkish MOD and the Commander of the Armed Forces applauding Turkey's commitment to lead the ISAF.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letters to Turkish MOD and Commander of Armed Forces (Next under).

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, NESA, (b)(6)

DASD W.P. Rodman

PDASD _____



snovflake

June 20, 2002 11:51 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking Deployment Orders

I just got a DepOrder to authorize deployment of a Marine Corps Exchange officer. The tracking sheet shows the order was stuck in the General Counsel's office from May 28 to June 12 and in the Policy office from June 3 to June 14.

That is inexcusable. Please get procedures, so that doesn't happen unless there is a very good reason.

Thanks.

DHR dh
062002-16

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

6/25/02
—> Adm (←
See attached.
You may want
to mention key
facts to SD.
Doug Feith

370

20 June 02

JUN 24 02 11:57 AM

U16300 02

11-L-0559/QSD/11514 06-24-02 11:57 AM

JUN 24 2002

Memorandum for: Mr. Feith

Subject: DEPLOYMENT ORDER TRACKING

SecDef stated his displeasure with a Deployment Order that was apparently held up between GC and Policy. Details as follows.

- Deployment Order subject: Marine Corps Exchange officer to United Kingdom.
- The process:
 - Joint Staff and Policy agreed all Depords would be delivered to the Policy front office after a JS General Officer chop, as the entry point to OSD.
 - Policy tasks regional office and General Counsel with 48-hour suspense to complete their coordination.
 - USDP signs immediately following GC and region chop.
 - Calls made by USDP's Sgts & MA's if 48-hour deadline is exceeded.
- The particulars of this Depord:
 - A Joint Staff Action Officer gave an advance copy of the Depord to OGC on 28 May. This was a courtesy copy not yet chopped by a Joint Staff General Officer.
 - The Depord was delivered to Policy on 3 June and tasked to ISP and OGC.
 - Between 4 & 12 June OGC and Joint Staff Legal exchanged draft versions of the Depord and agreed on the final language on 12 June.
 - Signed by OGC 12 June. *Haynes's office*
 - Signed by ISP 13 June. *Creech's office*
 - Signed by USDP on 14 June. *Feith*
- Bottom Line:
 - The Policy tracking system is not broken. Several status calls were made to OGC. OGC & Joint Staff were slow to complete legal coordination.
 - This Depord mistakenly did not receive highest priority because it was for a single exchange officer to the UK.
 - USDP & OGC MA's have agreed to push all Depords through Policy within 48 hours.

11-L-0559/OSD/11515

1/R/BSE

PD
EF444
1945

June 21, 2002 3:35 PM

02/009432-05DP

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Preemption

Deliberate

Please prepare a one-pager explaining that the President's preemption doctrine is not really a doctrine, as much as it is a policy aspect of his broader approach.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062102-10

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

6/24

381

21 Jun 02

U16301 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11516

Preemptive Action An Element of U.S. Defense Strategy

- Preemption is not an independent or overarching doctrine, but rather a supporting element of U.S. defense strategy
- U.S. willingness and capabilities for preemption serve all U.S. defense policy goals:
 - Assure allies and friends of U.S. commitment to act effectively against terrorist threats
 - Dissuade future military competition by developing and signaling the capability to act preemptively against egregious threats
 - Deter threats and coercion against U.S. and allied interests by broadening the range of options available to the President to discourage aggression in any form
 - If deterrence fails, defeat any adversary—through rapid transition of U.S. forces from forward posture into an effects-based campaign to swiftly defeat adversaries, while retaining the option to decisively defeat any adversary
- Preemption must be linked with other supporting elements of strategy
 - Threat of retaliation to reflect our intention to:
 - Deny sanctuary to terrorists, destroy perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and directly confront those who harbor them
 - Threaten swift use of conventional or nuclear means against traditional threats
 - Protection of critical bases of operation to deny enemy objectives and defend against missiles, WMD, and information operations
- Transformation: The Armed Forces must be transformed to provide the capabilities—including preemption—needed to execute the defense strategy. These include improved intelligence and surveillance and the ability to strike quickly fixed and mobile targets at any distance without warning

SNOWFLAKE

June 21, 2002 3:33 PM

Done 6/28

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Balance

6/28

6/28

You heard the questions I was asked about how we get balance between trade and national security. We need to get a group inside the Building thinking about that.

Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062102-9

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

09/31

6/28.

SecDef -

A good first take.
I recommend you tell
Krieg to organize
the short term effort he
outlined and come to SEC/you
with their report within 15-30
days.

Dilata

21 June 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11518

U16303 02

June 27, 2002 1400

TO: Secretary of Defense
FROM: Ken Krieg 
CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Your note on Trade-Security Balance dated June 21 (attached)

The Deputy had a very productive conversation with a group of high-tech industry CEOs today which advanced the outreach to that industry. The meeting highlighted, however, our diverse views within the Pentagon on trade and security. You have three staff groups with different mindsets:

- Policy has a protect secrets (and the technology that carries them) mindset;
- Acquisition has a concern about off-shore manufacturing and industrial base health; and
- C3I has a mindset that while there are challenges in protecting information, technology is progressing so rapidly that we need new approaches to what we protect and how we protect it.

Obviously, this is a characterization and others are involved (i.e., Services). However, I would start with these three staff groups and charge them with a very quick turn project (two weeks) with a rough outline as follows. They should work together (Jaymie Durnan and I could facilitate) to come up with several optional concepts to approach balancing trade and security. The concepts should be at the level of goals, principles for decision-making, and broad approach. They should not be highly detailed or fully staffed work.

The principles that should guide their thinking about the problem are:

- The worldwide rule sets are changing more rapidly than our processes.
- We are moving toward an information centric approach and both information operations and information assurance are critical.
- But technology is moving very rapidly and we need new concepts and principles to guide our work; and
- In general, more trade is good and in our national interest.

Then, we would schedule a session with you and some of your senior managers (a small group at first – SEC plus Stenbit and Feith or his designee) to discuss the

11-L-0559/OSD/11519

relative merits of the various approaches. Once you choose a path, we would form the relevant team to turn that guidance into a plan of action.

I have not formally staffed this response. Standing by for guidance...

P.S. I have attached a highlighted summary of a 1999 DSB study on Globalization and Security. It is quite relevant as a "thought-starter"; its recommendations are as follows:

- DoD needs a new approach to maintaining military dominance.
- DoD needs to change substantially its approach to technology security
- DoD must realize fully the potential of the commercial sector to meet its needs.
- DoD should take the lead in establishing and maintaining a real-time, interagency database of globally available, militarily relevant technologies and capabilities.
- DoD must ensure the integrity of essential software-intensive systems.
- DoD should facilitate transnational defense industrial collaboration and integration.
- DoD needs to reform its personnel security system.

It's long, but if you whip through the highlighted portions, you will get most of the value.

Final Report
of the
Defense Science Board
Task Force on
Globalization and Security



December 1999

Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology
Washington, DC 20301-3140

11-L-0559/OSD/11521

TASK FORCE MEMBERS, ADVISORS, AND STAFF

CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Dr. Donald A. Hicks, Chairman, Hicks & Associates, Inc.; former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

MEMBERS

Mr. Denis A. Bovin, Vice Chairman, Investment Banking and Senior Managing Director, Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.

Dr. Joseph V. Braddock, Founder and Director, The Potomac Foundation; co-founded BDM International, Inc.

The Honorable Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs, Harvard; former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

Professor Charles L. Cooney, Executive Officer and Professor of Chemical & Biochemical Engineering, Department of Chemical Engineering, MIT

The Honorable Gilbert Decker, Executive Vice President, Engineering and Production, Walt Disney Imagineering; former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition

Mr. James H. Dykstra, President, SISCORP; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (Senate)

Mr. Gordon R. England, Executive Vice President, General Dynamics

Dr. Vitalij Garber, Director of Interoperability, OUSD(A&T); former Assistant Secretary General, Defense Support, NATO

Dr. E.G. (Glenn) Gaustad, Vice President, Engineering and Technology, Raytheon Systems Company

Dr. Theodore S. Gold, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Programs, Institute for Defense Analyses; former Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Warfare Deterrence and Biological Warfare Defense Programs)

Mr. Everett D. Greinke, Vice President, GMD Solutions; former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs and Technology

Dr. Robert Hermann, former Senior Vice President, Science & Technology, United Technologies Corporation

Mr. Frank Kendall, Consultant; former Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)

Dr. Don Lebell, PE, Engineering and Management Consultant; former Manager of Information Systems (Automation, Water and Energy Resources), General Electric

The Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, II, Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Dr. Robert W. Lucky, *Corporate Vice President, Applied Research, Telcordia Technologies*

Dr. Joseph Markowitz, *Consultant; former Director of Technology, DoD/Intelligence Community Information Operations Technical Center*

Mr. Walter E. Morrow, Jr., *Director Emeritus, Lincoln Laboratory, MIT*

The Honorable Dr. William Schneider, Jr., *President, International Planning Services, Inc.; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology*

GEN Lawrence A. Skantze, USAF (Ret.), *Consultant; former Commander, Air Force Systems Command*

Mr. Francis J. Sullivan, *Principal, Frank Sullivan Associates; former Staff Director, U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations*

The Honorable William H. Taft, IV, *Ambassador, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; former Deputy Secretary of Defense and U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO*

MAJ GEN Jasper Welch, USAF (Ret.), *Principal, Jasper Welch Associates; former Defense Policy Coordinator, National Security Council*

The Honorable John J. Welch, Jr., *Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd.; former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition*

Dr. Herbert S. Winokur, *Partner, Capricorn Management, G.P.*

Dr. Michael I. Yarymovych, *Chief Scientific Advisor to ANSER and Chairman, NATO Research and Development Organization; former Vice President and Associate Center Director, Systems Development Center, Rockwell International*

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Joseph T. Cahlin, *Senior Staff Officer, Defense Security Service*

Mr. Victor F. Ciardello, *Director, Financial and Economic Analysis, OUSD(A&T)*

Mr. John T. Elliff, *Director, Controlled Access Program, Community Management Staff, CIA*

Dr. Paris Genalis, *Deputy Director, Naval Warfare, OUSD(A&T)*

Mr. Don Henry, *Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development & Acquisition)*

The Honorable John D. Holum, *Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs*

Mr. J. William Leonard, *Principal Director (Security and Information Operations), OASD(C3I)*

Mr. Robert W. Maggi, *Director, Plans, Policy and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State*

CAPT Robert D. Maslowsky, USN, N62, *Director, Command and Control Systems Division*

Mr. Thomas J. Murtagh, *Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Export Finance), OUSD(A&T)*

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

Executive Summary

WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

Globalization—the integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples—is not a discernible event or challenge, is not new, but it is accelerating. More importantly, globalization is largely irresistible. Thus, globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers must adapt.

Globalization has accelerated as a result of many positive factors, the most notable of which include: the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; the spread of capitalism and free trade; more rapid and global capital flows and more liberal financial markets; the liberalization of communications; international academic and scientific collaboration; and faster and more efficient forms of transportation. At the core of accelerated global integration—at once its principal cause *and* consequence—is the information revolution; which is knocking down once-formidable barriers of physical distance, blurring national boundaries and creating cross-border communities of all types.

HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT DOD?

Globalization affects DoD in two distinct, if overlapping, ways. First, it is altering fundamentally the composition of DoD's supporting industrial base while, in turn, necessitating a reengineering of DoD acquisition and business practices. Second, and perhaps more significantly, it is reshaping the military-technological environment in which DoD must compete. These twin trends present DoD with both opportunities for and challenges to the maintenance of global military dominance.

Globalization's Impact on DoD's Supporting Industrial Base

DoD once depended upon, and could afford to sustain, a dedicated domestic industrial base for the development, production and provision of its equipment and services. Today, the "U.S. defense industrial base" no longer exists in its Cold War form. Instead, DoD now is supported by a broader, less defense-intensive industrial base that is becoming increasingly *international* in character. This transformation is due largely to the confluence of four factors: (1) deep cuts in U.S. defense investment in the Cold War's wake (procurement and R&D are down 70 percent and 25 percent in real terms, respectively, since the late-1980s), (2) an explosion in commercial sector high-tech R&D investment and technological advancement, (3) a sustained DoD acquisition reform effort; and 4) a shift in procurement emphasis from weapons and platforms, per se, to the sophisticated information technologies so amplifying their capabilities.

Yesterday's U.S. defense industry is, with few exceptions, reconstituting itself into a global, more commercially-oriented industry. The traditional core of the defense industrial sector—those firms still focusing nearly exclusively on the defense market—comprises firms that will focus increasingly on the integration of commercially-

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

developed advanced technology to produce military capabilities. That which remains of the traditional U.S. defense sector:

- has undergone an intense period of consolidation;
- has already begun—although mainly in the lower industrial tiers—the process of integration across national borders, via mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and strategic partnerships with European counterparts, who are themselves in a period of rationalization and consolidation; and
- is now supplied to a significant degree by the commercial sector and is increasingly dependent on commercial business and defense product exports for growth and good health.

The commercial sector, which pays scant attention to national boundaries, is now driving the development of much of the advanced technology integrated into modern information-intensive military systems. This is especially true of the software and consumer microelectronics sectors. Accordingly, future U.S. military-technological advantage will derive less from advanced component and subsystem technology developed by the U.S. defense sector than from the military functionality generated by superior, though not necessarily U.S.-based, defense sector systems integration skills.

The economic and technological imperatives for increased DoD reliance on the commercial sector have also necessitated a reengineering of the Department's acquisition and business practices. Acquisition reform initiatives launched in the early 1990s had evolved by late 1997 into a broader, ongoing Defense Reform Initiative. The most striking aspect of DoD's business practice reengineering is the ongoing, Defense-wide transition to an all-electronic business operating environment. Within just a few years, virtually all DoD business operations, and many critical military functions (e.g., logistics), will be conducted over the Internet and World Wide Web.

Benefits and Risks of Industrial Base Globalization

The potential benefits of globalization are manifold. Increased use of the commercial sector cannot be separated from the effects of globalization. Nor is increased DoD reliance on the commercial sector reversible without sacrificing the huge gains in capability achieved through rapid insertion of leading-edge commercial technology (particularly information-related), and comparable gains in efficiency through use of commercial services. Greater commercial reliance also has the potential to increase the pace of modernization by reducing system acquisition cycle time. The DoD experience of product development cycles for defense systems of 18 years contrasts sharply with much shorter such cycles for most commercial products.

Moreover, commercial acquisition could lower substantially the cost not only of new systems, but also of system upgrades and operational support. Indeed, the impact on DoD capabilities of the post-Cold War decline in defense resources has been manageable only through greater use of commercial products and services. Finally, the Department's adoption of "world-class" commercial business practices—enabled by the full exploitation of Internet-based information technologies—could enhance dramatically

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

DoD's organizational efficiency and effectiveness. This could allow DoD to cut overhead costs and reinvest the savings in force modernization, and to improve its logistical support to the warfighter.

Cross-border defense industrial integration—and transatlantic links in particular—can help spread the fiscal burden of new system development and production and, from a U.S. perspective, facilitate greater access to our allies' technology and capital. Competition between transatlantic industrial teams—each consisting of both European and U.S. members—could yield innovative, high-quality products, and, for domicile governments, a greater return on defense investments. Such competition would likely stimulate innovation and create the incentive to adopt the industrial and acquisition-related efficiencies that generate downward pressure on system cost and acquisition cycle-time. Transatlantic defense industrial links are a potential source of greater political-military cohesion within NATO and of a stronger alliance industrial underpinning, and thus would help to promote more uniform modernization and thus enhance U.S.-European interoperability.

Such links could also amplify NATO fighting strength by enhancing U.S.-European interoperability and narrowing the U.S.-European technological gap. Perhaps most important, strong transatlantic industrial links could help DoD avert a distinctly negative outcome: the emergence of protectionist "Fortress Europe-Fortress America" defense trade blocs that could serve to widen the U.S.-European military-technological gap and weaken overall NATO integrity.

To be sure, there are risks to DoD in relying more heavily on a fully globalized commercial sector and on a transnational defense industrial base. On balance, however, the Task Force found these risks to be manageable and noted comparable vulnerabilities in DoD's traditional approach to defense procurement—reliance on a captive U.S. defense industry. But while the Task Force deemed the risks manageable, it recommends more aggressive and accountable management of those risks.

The Department's transition to an Internet-based business operating environment—designed in part to enhance civil-military integration—places most of DoD's digital activities and information within the cyber-reach of any and all who want to rapidly gather intelligence on the United States and/or who wish us harm. Such global interconnectivity could provide potential adversaries an open-source intelligence boon. Adversaries scanning DoD websites will likely exploit electronic data mining and aggregation capabilities to piece together rapidly and inexpensively information on U.S. capabilities, operations and personnel that heretofore would have taken much more time, effort and resources to obtain.

Global interconnectivity can also provide adversaries an electronic penetration pathway into U.S. information systems to harm the confidentiality, integrity or availability of essential information and functionality. Such activities are now referred to broadly in national security parlance as information operations. The principal risk associated with commercial acquisition is that DoD's necessary, inevitable and ever-increasing reliance

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

on commercial software—often developed offshore and/or by software engineers who owe little, if any allegiance to the United States—is likely amplifying DoD vulnerability to information operations against all systems incorporating such software.

Commercial software products—within which malicious code can be hidden—are becoming foundations of DoD's future command and control, weapons, logistics and business operational systems (e.g., contracting and weapon system support). Such malicious code, which would facilitate system intrusion, would be all but impossible to detect through testing, primarily because of software's extreme and ever-increasing complexity. Of equal concern is the ubiquity of exploitable, though inadvertent, vulnerabilities in commercial software. In either case, the trend toward universal networking increases the risk. Inevitably, increased functionality means increased vulnerability.

Compounding matters, the current personnel security system is ill-configured to mitigate the growing information operations risks. The problems lie generally in the over-classification of information (which skews allocation of security resources), and the inherent limitations of the security clearance model (which provides little, if any, monitoring of personnel for five to 10 years after the clearance is granted). The current security model deals principally with the confidentiality of information, neglecting the integrity and availability of information and information systems.

Information technology has also outpaced some of the core concepts upon which the traditional DoD security system is based: the control of physical access, and the distinctions between classified and unclassified information. Security programs have focused on the control of physical access to information and materials, because the spies of the past generally have exploited their physical access to the material they wanted to compromise. However, the practices and tools of physical access control (e.g., access to facilities, controlled areas, or photocopiers) are ineffective against the remote cyber-spy and trusted insider cyber-traitor. The current personnel security system also tends to focus primarily on classified information and activities. It is clear today, however, that the classified world is not the only one with a security requirement. DoD has a number of unclassified systems that are, in every sense, "mission critical" (e.g., wartime blood supply management networks) yet essentially unprotected by the existing security system.

The traditional risk associated with cross-border defense industrial integration is the unauthorized or unintended direct or third-party transfer of "sensitive" U.S. military technology. However, the strong compliance record of foreign-owned, controlled or influenced (FOCI) firms operating in the U.S. under DoD security agreements (e.g., Security Control Agreements, Special Security Agreements, Voting Trusts, or Proxy Board Agreements) indicates that the risks are manageable. Several U.S. government studies, in fact, conclude that our risk mitigation measures have been very successful. Indeed, the evidence shows that regulatory compliance has been of a higher order for domestic subsidiaries of foreign parents than for domestic firms. To be sure, unauthorized technology transfer is a serious problem. Yet, it is a longstanding and, in all

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

likelihood, enduring one that comes from all azimuths, including U.S. citizens cleared to the highest levels and legitimate exports. So long as the established security mechanisms are in place, the risk of unauthorized disclosure can be mitigated, if imperfectly.

Beyond unauthorized technology transfer, the risks associated with cross-border defense linkages are less clear-cut. To the extent that foreign direct investment in the U.S. defense sector leads to the offshore relocation of domestic development and manufacturing facilities, it could result in the erosion of certain domestic defense industrial skills. There is legitimate concern about potential disruptions in the supply of critical components or subsystems should sole industrial sources for such articles move offshore or come under foreign ownership. And, there is a related concern about potential loss of DoD influence over weapon system design should cross-border consolidation result in a very few large transnational firms selling to dozens of major buying nations (thus reducing DoD's market share). The Task Force examined these potential risks, but found none of them new, nor compelling when cast against the potential benefits of transnational defense industrial integration.

Globalization's Impact on the International Military-Technological Environment

From a long-term strategic standpoint, globalization's most significant manifestation is the irresistible leveling effect it is having on the international military-technological environment in which DoD must compete. Over time, all states—not just the U.S. and its allies—will share access to much of the technology underpinning the modern military.

The international conventional arms market, once driven mainly by political imperatives, is now driven increasingly by economic imperatives. This is perhaps less true of the United States—the Arms Export Control Act requires conventional arms transfers to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives—but the U.S. defense sector is far from immune to the trend. The economic pressure on firms to export, combined with their governments' willingness to let them do so and with the increasing level of cross-border collaboration, will progressively erode the effectiveness of conventional arms and defense technology export controls worldwide. When combined with the black and gray market availability of most types of defense products, and the pressure on already export-minded firms to offer their most sophisticated equipment, these trends suggest that, with few exceptions, advanced conventional weapons will be available to anyone who can afford them. 

The technology DoD is most anticipating leveraging to maintain military dominance is that which the United States is *least* capable of denying its potential competitors. Access to commercial technology is virtually universal, and its exploitation for both civil and military ends is largely unconstrained. The most important enabling technologies for information-intensive U.S. concepts of warfare—access to space, surveillance, sensors and signal processing, high fidelity simulation, and telecommunications—are available to the U.S., its allies, and its adversaries alike. Indeed, owing to the proliferation of military technology, the commercialization of former military-specific technology, and the increasing reliance of militaries worldwide on commercially-developed technology, and the general diffusion of technology and know-how, *the majority of militarily useful*

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

technology is or eventually will be available commercially and/or from non-U.S. defense companies. The so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" is, at least from a technology availability standpoint, truly a global affair.

Potential competitors are exploiting their newfound access to militarily useful technology in a manner strategically detrimental to DoD. They are not trying to match U.S. strengths or achieve across the board military parity with the United States. Rather, as several recent DSB Summer Studies have pointed out, potential competitors are channeling their more limited defense resources into widely-available capabilities that could allow them to exploit a fundamental weakness of American power projection strategy: the absolute reliance of most U.S. forces on unimpeded, unrestricted access to and use of theater ports, bases, airfields, airspace and coastal waters. By 2010-2020, potential adversaries, exploiting a truly global military-technical revolution, will likely have developed robust capabilities—conventional and unconventional—for disrupting U.S. homeland preparations to deploy to the theater of conflict; denying U.S. forces access to the theater; degrading the capabilities of the forces the U.S. does manage to deploy; and, in the process, raising, perhaps prohibitively, the cost of U.S. intervention. In short, technological leveling—globalization's most strategically unsettling manifestation from a U.S. perspective—is clearly the engine of the emerging "anti-access" threat.

Consequently, there is growing risk inherent in U.S. power projection and force modernization strategy. Left unchecked, this may lead to a decline in the U.S. military's utility for influencing events abroad or protecting U.S. global interests at acceptable cost—a serious erosion of military dominance. At the root of the problem are the inherent limitations—namely, sluggish deployment times and heavy dependence on theater access—of the legacy, primarily short-range, general-purpose force elements to which the vast majority of the Services' modernization funding is currently dedicated. *Viewed in this light, the continued budgetary, strategic and force structuring primacy of legacy systems in DoD budgets has a clear and high opportunity cost: the investment agility necessary to transform U.S. strategy and forces to meet the emerging strategic challenges posed by global military-technological leveling.*

Compounding this problem are the continuing declines in DoD research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and defense industry internal research and development (IR&D) spending, and the related skewing of such R&D investment toward near-term priorities and away from fundamentally new capabilities. The result is severely depressed U.S. military-technological innovation at a time when the premium on innovation has never been higher.

Theoretically, the U.S. could mitigate the undesirable effects of global military-technological leveling by coordinating with its allies the multilateral control of conventional military and dual-use technology exports. This approach worked reasonably well during the Cold War through the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (CoCom). However, multilateral controls today are no longer a significant factor affecting access to highly sophisticated dual-use technology and they have been only marginally more successful in the conventional weapons arena. CoCom's success

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

derived from its members facing a common threat—the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser extent, China—and sharing a common objective: retarding Warsaw Pact and Chinese technological advancement. CoCom also benefited from the disproportionate leverage the United States, its leading advocate, held over the other members as the guarantor of Western security. The Cold War's end undermined this cooperative impetus, and the U.S. can no longer count on its allies, its closest competitors in the high-tech sector, to follow America's lead. The lukewarm success of CoCom's successor, the Wassenaar Arrangement, is a testament to the declining utility of multilateral technology controls in the post-Cold War era.

The strategic significance of global military-technological leveling cannot be overstated. It presents a direct challenge to perhaps *the* fundamental, if subliminal, assumption underlying the modern—and certainly post-Cold War—concept of U.S. military superiority: that the United States enjoys disproportionately greater access to advanced technology than its potential adversaries. This assumption also underpins the logic holding that technology controls are the *sine qua non* of U.S. military dominance.

The reality is that the United States' capability to effectively deny its competitors access to militarily useful technology will likely decrease substantially over the long-term. Export controls on U.S. technologies, products and services with defense/dual-use applications will continue to play a role in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives. However, the utility of export controls as a tool for maintaining the United States' global military advantage is diminishing as the number of U.S.-controllable militarily useful technologies shrinks. A failure by U.S. leadership to recognize this fundamental shift—particularly if masked by unwarranted confidence in broad or even country-specific export controls—could foster a false sense of security as potential adversaries arm themselves with available technology functionally equivalent to or better than our own.

Clinging to a failing policy of export controls has undesirable consequences beyond self-delusion. It can limit the special influence the U.S. might otherwise accrue as a global provider and supporter of military equipment and services. This obviously includes useful knowledge of, and access to, competitor military systems that only the supplier would have, and the ability to withhold training, spares, and support. Equally obvious, shutting U.S. companies out of markets served instead by foreign firms will weaken the U.S. commercial advanced technology and defense sectors upon which U.S. economic security and military-technical advantage depend.

KEY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

DoD has not been aggressive in capturing the benefits of or mitigating the risks posed by globalization. Change has come slowly due to a range of factors, including cultural impediments, legal and regulatory obstacles, and restrictive and unclear policies. The Department needs to change the way it does business in a number of areas:

The Department needs a new approach to maintaining military dominance

Globalization is irresistibly eroding the military advantage the U.S. has long sought to derive through technology controls. Accordingly, the more the United States depends on

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

technology controls for maintaining the capability gap between its military forces and those of its competitors, the greater the likelihood that gap will narrow. To hedge against this risk, DoD's strategy for achieving and maintaining military dominance must be rooted firmly in the awareness that technology controls ultimately will not succeed in denying its competitors access to militarily useful technology.

DoD must shift its overall approach to military dominance from "protecting" militarily-relevant technologies—the building blocks of military capability—to "preserving" in the face of globalization those military capabilities essential to meeting national military objectives. Protection would play a role in an overall strategy for preserving essential capabilities, but its primacy would be supplanted by three other strategy elements: direct capability enhancement, institutionalized vulnerability analysis and assessment, and risk mitigation efforts designed to ensure system integrity.

To shift its approach from *technology protection* to *essential capability preservation*, the Task Force recommends that DoD: 1) establish a permanent process for determining a continuously-evolving "short list" of essential military capabilities, and 2) develop strategies for preserving each essential capability. Both the list of essential military capabilities and the strategies for their preservation are needed to inform the development of U.S. warfighting strategy and the forces to underpin that strategy (by identifying how and with what the U.S. will need to fight to remain dominant), DoD positions on technology and personnel security (by helping to identify those capabilities and/or constituent technologies which DoD should attempt to protect and how vigorously they should be protected); and DoD acquisition risk mitigation measures (by identifying those systems that should be the focus of intense efforts to ensure system integrity).

DoD needs to change substantially its approach to technology security

The United States has a national approach to technology security, one in which the Departments of State and Defense both play essential roles. The Task Force does not challenge the propriety of the Department of State's statutory obligation to evaluate proposed defense technology transfers against U.S. foreign policy objectives. That said, the leveling of the global military-technological playing field also necessitates a substantial shift in DoD's approach to technology security, the principal objective of which is to help maintain the U.S. military-technical advantage.

DoD should attempt to protect for the purposes of maintaining military advantage only those capabilities and technologies of which the U.S. is the sole possessor and whose protection is deemed necessary to preserve an essential military capability. Protection of capabilities and technologies readily available on the world market is, at best, unhelpful to the maintenance of military dominance and, at worst, counterproductive (e.g., by undermining the industry upon which U.S. military-technological supremacy depends). Where there is foreign availability of technologies, a decision to transfer need only be made on foreign policy grounds by the Department of State. DoD should no longer review export license applications as part of its role in the arms transfer process when foreign availability has been established. This will allow the DoD licensing review to

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

concentrate on cases where the availability of technology is exclusive to the United States.

Moreover, military capability is created when widely available and/or defense-unique technologies are *integrated* into a defense system. Accordingly, DoD should give highest priority in its technology security efforts to technology integration capabilities and the resulting military capabilities themselves, and accordingly lower priority to the individual technologies of which they are comprised.

For those items and/or information that DoD can and should protect, the Task Force believes security measures need improvement. The means for such an improvement might come from a redistribution of the current level of security resources/effort, whereby DoD relaxes security in less important areas and tightens up in those most critical. In short, DoD must put up higher walls around a much smaller group of capabilities and technologies.

DoD must realize fully the potential of the commercial sector to meet its needs

To leverage fully the commercial sector, DoD must do more than simply acquire available commercial products and adopt commercial practices. In some cases, DoD must engage commercial industry in an effort to shape the development of new products and services to better meet its needs. In many cases, DoD must adapt its often-bloated system requirements to, and develop new concepts that fit, operationally acceptable commercial solutions. The Task Force makes two primary recommendations designed to help DoD meet this overarching objective.

First, the Secretary of Defense should give commercial acquisition primacy and broader scope by establishing it as the modernization instrument of first resort. DoD should seek to meet its modernization needs, whenever possible, with commercial solutions (including integrated services, systems, subsystems, components and building-block technologies) acquired using commercial acquisition practices. The Secretary should grant waivers to the acquisition of commercial *products and services* only when program managers can demonstrate that either no commercial options exist or that available commercial options cannot meet all critical performance requirements. DoD should employ commercial acquisition *practices* in all cases. The Task Force recognizes that some integrated, military-specific systems (e.g., precision-guided munitions and combat aircraft) are not and will likely never be provided by the commercial sector. Even here, DoD should meet its needs, whenever possible, with commercial components and subsystems. DoD can and should tap the commercial market to support virtually all of its modernization requirements.

Second, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology should form and routinely employ "Commercial Acquisition Gold Teams" to provide and manage advocacy for expanded DoD leverage of the commercial sector. The Task Force believes that Gold Teams should be employed during the earliest stages of the acquisition process (the concept definition phase), where they will have the best opportunity to reduce both the time and cost of developing and fielding new systems. Gold Teams should be

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

focused initially on the commercial industry sectors from which the Task Force believes DoD can derive immediate and profound benefit: air and sea transportation; logistics and sustainment; communications and information systems; space-based surveillance; and high-efficiency ground transportation. The organizational character and composition of the Commercial Acquisition Gold Teams are best determined by the USD(A&T). Teams could be either standing or *ad hoc* in character. Personnel could be either in-house (i.e., DoD), drawn from the contractor/FFRDC community, or a mix of the two.

In addition to these two core recommendations, DoD must also: 1) engage proactively in commercial standards management; 2) conduct a comprehensive review of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) with the intent of asking Congress to eliminate remaining statutory barriers to DoD procurement of commercial products and services and also commercial sector disincentives for doing business with DoD; and 3) field on the World Wide Web interactive "distance-learning" software that would allow commercial firms to quickly familiarize themselves with the FAR/DFARS; rapidly determine which regulations apply to their specific contracts; and comply fully with those regulations.

DoD should take the lead in establishing and maintaining a real-time, interagency database of globally available, militarily relevant technologies and capabilities

Such a database, which would facilitate rapid and authoritative determination of the foreign availability of a particular technology or military capability, would serve two principal functions. First, it would allow those involved in the export licensing and arms transfer decisionmaking process to determine which technologies and capabilities are available abroad and thus no longer U.S.-controllable. Second, it would facilitate enhanced access by U.S. government and industry weapons developers to the global technological marketplace by illuminating potential foreign sources and/or collaborators.

DoD must ensure the integrity of essential software-intensive systems

With DoD's growing reliance on commercial software increasing its vulnerability to information operations, the Department must redouble its efforts to ensure the integrity of essential software-intensive systems. To this end, the Task Force makes two primary recommendations. First, the Secretary of Defense should affirm the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) as responsible for ensuring the pre-operational integrity of essential software-intensive systems. In turn, the ASD(C3I) should develop and promulgate an Essential System Software Assurance Program which:

- identifies a point organization for software acquisition review to promote the purchase of commercial software while monitoring its vulnerabilities;
- identifies unambiguously the point in the acquisition process where a system's operator should assume responsibility for its integrity throughout its operational life;
- updates guidance concerning program managers' software integrity assurance responsibilities and declare such integrity a Key Performance Parameter (KPP);
- considers the "clean room" acquisition of certain essential systems or subsystems (i.e., one-hundred percent DoD-controlled system development and production);

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

- introduces "red-teaming" and independent vulnerability analysis procedures into the acquisition process for all essential systems;
- develops specifications and guidelines for the certification of software trustworthiness at a set of pre-defined levels;
- sponsors research at DARPA and NIST on trust certification and management in software, software design methodology, proof of software correctness, taxonomy of vulnerability, and smart (if non-exhaustive) testing; and
- considers using public (hacker) testing to test algorithm, code and system resilience.

Second, the Secretary of Defense should reaffirm the responsibility of essential system operators to ensure the integrity of those systems throughout their operational life, and assign to the OASD(C3I) Defense Information Assurance Program (DIAP) office the tasks of monitoring and establishing incentives to ensure operator compliance, and of overseeing the administration of the resources required for this purpose. The OASD(C3I) DIAP office should be upgraded (in terms of personnel, equipment and funding) and assigned the full responsibility of overseeing program office/operator identification, programming and execution of the required resources, and of submitting a consolidated information assurance budget. In turn, the operators should:

- ensure that intrusion and anomaly detection systems are in place, current, and operating at peak efficiency;
- ensure that sufficient excess capacity is available to counter expected denial-of-service attacks, and/or that other measures are taken to improve recovery and reconstitution of essential systems;
- ensure that systems originally intended as independent backups are still independent given changes in technology and threat by using dedicated vulnerability-analysis "red" teams;
- ensure adequate configuration control of essential systems; and
- deny unauthorized access—using physical, technical and personnel security measures.

The Task Force also recommends that DoD: 1) expand its red-teaming and vulnerability-assessment capabilities; 2) ensure a sufficiently staffed, trained, and motivated workforce to acquire and operate essential systems; and 3) enhance security and counter-intelligence programs to deal with the new challenges presented by relying on commercially purchased systems and subsystems of foreign manufacture.

DoD should facilitate transnational defense industrial collaboration and integration

Greater transnational, and particularly transatlantic, defense-industrial integration could potentially yield tremendous benefit to the United States and its allies. The Task Force, however, identified a range of factors working to inhibit foreign industrial interest in greater integration with their U.S. counterparts. These include insufficient clarity in DoD policy on cross-border defense industrial mergers and acquisitions, and an overly burdensome regulatory environment surrounding both foreign direct investment in the U.S. defense sector and the transfer of U.S. defense technology, products and services.

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

The Task Force makes three principal recommendations to erode these barriers to effective defense sector globalization. First, DoD should publicly reaffirm, on a recurring basis, its willingness to consider a range of cross-border defense industrial linkages that enhance U.S. security, interoperability with potential coalition partners, and competition in defense markets. Special attention should be paid to illuminating—to the extent practicable—DoD's broad criteria for merger and acquisition approval, and DoD's policy rationale (e.g., the national security benefits of cross-border defense consolidation). Second, the Department of Defense should engage the Department of State to jointly modernize the regulatory regime and associated administrative processes affecting the export of U.S. defense articles. Third, DoD should also modernize the administrative and regulatory processes associated with foreign direct investment (FDI) to facilitate FDI in the U.S. defense sector.

The Task Force also recommends that DoD adapt existing bilateral industrial security arrangements to respond to the emergence of multinational foreign defense industrial organizations. The change in the structure of the defense industry raises a question about whether the existing security practices are appropriate to its inevitable globalization.

DoD needs to reform its personnel security system

Personnel security is the foundation upon which all other safeguards must rest. However, the Task Force is convinced that, with far more information than necessary being classified by the Original Classification Authorities, the DoD personnel security program is forced to sweep too broadly and is consequently spread thin. Over-classification also leads to an over-allocation of security resources to the protection of classified information at a time when greater resources must be devoted to developing new types of security measures tailored to the challenges created by global information technology. DoD should make a serious commitment to developing a coordinated analytic framework to serve as the basis for classifying information, and for implementing that framework rigorously.

DoD personnel security also depends too heavily on the security clearance process. The clearance process does provide a vital initial filter, weeding out individuals with criminal records or other conspicuously irresponsible conduct. Beyond that, however, its utility fades precipitously—a fact with which the Department must come to grips. Unrealistic expectations of the clearance process have inadvertently undermined the very alertness, accountability and situational awareness necessary for security in a networked world.

In the dynamic, networked environment created by global information technology, DoD needs to develop an enhanced situational awareness approach to personnel security that considers new vulnerabilities, threats, and response requirements. Emerging information technologies (e.g., near real-time data mining of financial and foreign travel databases) hold the seeds of effective defensive options. Compartmentation is also a valuable security instrument. DoD should place a premium on protecting information that is properly determined to require control in codeword compartments. Also needed is an appropriate security program for government and defense industry personnel who occupy "sensitive but unclassified" information technology positions (e.g., those critical for

DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security

protecting information systems from hostile disruption or manipulation via the global information infrastructure). Here, monitoring on-the-job performance may be more important than full field background investigations.

In the information age, no single set of personnel security countermeasures will suffice; DoD must achieve a complementary mix of technical, procedural, human resources management and traditional personnel security measures. To this end, the Task Force recommends that DoD:

- Adapt its personnel security system to the information age by streamlining the security classification and clearance processes; ensuring that classifications are justified to mitigate the problem of over-classification; and moving away from a rigid clearance structure.
- Compartmentalize its most sensitive information and activities by restoring the "need to know" principle for classified data stored on electronic systems (taking advantage of security, privacy and intellectual property rights management developments in the e-commerce sector.)
- Institute a situational awareness approach to personnel security combining technical monitoring and human resources management tailored to positions presenting the greatest risks and vulnerabilities.
- Develop a new situational awareness program for personnel in sensitive (classified and unclassified) information technology positions.
- Work with the Intelligence Community to develop more effective situational awareness measures to address the insider threat at the classified level, making greater use of outside research and independent threat/vulnerability evaluation.

Globalization brings with it opportunity and risk. Boldness is required to meet this challenge and to capture the benefits of globalization while mitigating its risks. Leadership is the key. Success will hinge on DoD's ability to establish clear policy guidance that is understood within the Department and across U.S. Government agencies, in the Congress, in U.S. industry, and by allies and friends abroad.

June 24, 2002 9:38 AM

000.5

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Financing GWOT

You have to be in charge in getting our finances shut off for the war on terrorism for the Department of Defense.

Please figure out who is doing what in the government, what the interagency committee is doing in the NSC, what needs to be done, and who I can write or call or meet with to get the thing going. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062402-13

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

24Jun02

U16304 02

snw/ake

June 24, 2002 9:51 AM

471.96

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Space Review

If you are comfortable with this Pete Aldridge memo on space review, go ahead and sign my initials and let her go, but have O'Keefe taken off. He is worrisome.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/15/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Space Review

DHR:dh
062402-15

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

24 Jun 02

U16305 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11538

May 3, 2002 5:57 PM

SPB
6/21
6/24

6/21
any DIB
TO: Pete Aldridge
Jim Roche
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Space

Please come up with a proposal as to how we sit down and think through all the problems we have with space.

I want to talk about immediate funding issues and systemic difficulties in our space work. We need to think of it strategically. We need to address tactically whether we are too dependent on space.

Thanks.

DHK:an
050302-33

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

6/18
Aldridge response
attached.
D. Rite

June 15, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002


To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

CC: Jim Roche
Pete Teets
Steve Cambone
John Stenbit

From: Pete Aldridge 


Subject: Space Review

You asked us to come up with a proposal to "think through all the problems we have with space." This is what we propose to do:

1. We are establishing a joint Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board effort to provide observations and propose solutions. The utilization of these established Boards avoids a problem in the use of advisory committees, and we can bring in very good people with a variety of experience and viewpoints.
2. We are developing a Terms of Reference (TOR) for the effort. Bill Schneider has the task to develop the first draft. The tasks will include outlining our problems in management and funding space programs, industrial base capacity, systems engineering skill base, systemic issues, potential solutions and vision for the future (dependence on space, protection, access, and space control)
3. We are identifying candidates for the effort. Tom Reed is the leading candidate to chair the study effort, and others, like Tom Moorman, Dick Garwin, Bob Kohler, and Jimmie Hill, are on the list of candidate study participants.
4. We will set up a Steering Committee to guide the effort (Roche, Aldridge, Teets, Cambone, Stenbit, Pace/Cartwright, Don Kerr, Sean O'Keefe)  NO
5. We will plan to have an interim report in time to influence the FY04 budget preparation and a final report to influence the DPG next year.

We will give you a status report when the TOR is complete and the study team is formed.

Action: Press on _____ Rethink this _____ See me _____



**SIGN
HERE**

11-L-0559/OSD/11540

June 24, 2002 5:09 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting on CIA's Role

Please set up a meeting with Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, Doug Feith and Gen. Myers (or Gen. Pace) on this memo on CIA's role.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/17/02 GC memo to SecDef re: CIA Support in Afghanistan

DHR:dh
062402-58

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

24 Jun 02

U16306 02



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002 MAY 21 AM 9:50

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

JUN 24 2002

May 17, 2002, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 5/19/02*

SUBJECT: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Support in Afghanistan

9/23
Letter Ref

- In the ~~Task Force II~~ ^{SPECIAL FORCES} Briefing on April 24, 2002, Col. Mulholland asserted that CIA's advantage over Special Operations Forces (SF) in Afghanistan is attributable to the following: (1) CIA's legal authorities are broader and more flexible than those of DoD; and (2) CIA is better funded for special operations than DoD.
- My comments:

(1) Legal Authorities

- CIA: Legal authority for CIA's intelligence operations in Afghanistan stems primarily from Title 50 of the U.S. Code and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333. Under these authorities, CIA is responsible for collecting, disseminating and producing foreign intelligence using human sources. Additionally, CIA has the exclusive authority to conduct "covert action" other than in times governed by a report under the War Powers Resolution. Covert action, which does not include traditional military activities, is defined as action taken to influence political, economic, or military activities abroad where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged.
- DoD: Legal authority for DoD's military operations flows principally from the Constitution and from Title 10 of the U.S. Code. When acting pursuant to the President's Commander in Chief authority, there are few constraints on DoD's conduct of military operations. Likewise, Title 10 contains provisions that provide authority for a wide variety of military operations, including those of special forces (SF).

(2) Funding: CIA undeniably enjoys greater discretion than DoD in expending funds. CIA's legal authorities allow it to expend funds both more



SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	5/23
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	5/24
MA BUCCI	5/23/02
EXEC SEC WHITMORE	5/28/02

11-L-0559/OSD/11542 858621 / 02

quickly and for a wide variety of purposes “notwithstanding any other provisions of law.” See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. 403j.(a) (very broad authority for the Agency to expend funds for myriad purposes and in unconventional ways, including for personal services contracts and recruit-and-pay programs).

- Conclusion: CIA has different, more flexible legal authorities than DoD. For DoD to have similar legal and fiscal flexibility and become less reliant on CIA would require statutory changes, revisions to E.O. 12333, or a special Presidential determination. Note, however, that CIA’s success in Afghanistan may not be attributable solely to broader legal authorities or funding, but rather to its effective use of pre-existing foreign liaison relationships and human intelligence networks. Greater DoD engagement in areas in which it already has legal authority, such as area familiarization activities and “advance force operations,” might increase DoD’s effectiveness and lessen its dependence on CIA.

110

COORDINATION: NONE

cc: USD (P)
CJCS

MTE

1/27
06/00
Snowflake

Done 6/28

June 24, 2002 4:03 PM

China

TO: Doug Feith
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: PRC

6/28
LARRY OR FIVE

Please get back to me with that information on the invitation to the PRC and what I said and what the Chinese said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062402-51

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

6/27

RESPONSE ATTACHED

VR

U16307 02

24Jun02

06-25-02 10:12 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/11544

Snowflake

June 25, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: China Invitation

Was I invited to China by Hu when he was here? I don't recall it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-39

.....
Please respond by 06/26/02


11-L-0599/OSD/11545

JUN 26 02 06:39

06-26-02 10:40 AM

June 26, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

FROM: Douglas J. Feith 

SUBJECT: Your Willingness to Visit China

- On June 22, 2002, *The Washington Times* reported that you “will not accept China’s invitation to visit the country, but will send a representative to discuss resuming military exchanges with the Chinese army.” (Tab A)
- During a June 21, 2002 press conference, you said, “I currently do not have any plans to visit China.” (Tab B)
- On May 1, 2002, President Hu invited you to visited China “at your convenience.” In the reporting cable, you said you “would like to do it, but did not offer a date.” (Tab C)

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/11546

SENSITIVE

June 24, 2002 2:57 PM

100.54

TO: Steve Cambone
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Defense Guidance

Here is a paper on the defense guidance. I have a feeling it is from Jim Wade.
 Please take a look at it, and then see me about it and tell me if you think there are things we ought to do to get a better vector.

Thanks.

Attach.
 Undated "The Defense Guidance"

DHR.dh
 062402-48



Please respond by 07/26/02

24JUN02

U16308 02

SENSITIVE

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
 DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/11547

~~SENSITIVE~~

THE DEFENSE GUIDANCE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

BACKGROUND

Defense Strategy – Citing relevant elements of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of September 30, 2001:

“Defense Strategy” – A new framework to defend the nation and secure a viable peace. The framework is built around four defense policy goals:

- Assuring allies and friends
- Dissuading future military competition
- Deterring threats and coercions against U.S. interest, and
- If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

The above defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set of (7) strategic tenets that comprise the essence of U.S. defense strategies.

Two of the seven strategic tenets are of particular relevance to the preparation of this year’s Defense Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2003-2007, namely:

A Capabilities-based Approach

The new defense strategy is built around the concept of shifting to a “capabilities-based” approach to defense. That concept reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actions will pose threats to vital U.S. interests or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now, and,

- Transforming Defense

The defense strategy calls for the transformation of the U.S. military and the Defense establishment over time.

From the above, it is to be noted that a national military strategy has yet to be developed and approved for implementation.

In order to achieve the Secretary of Defense’s vision of transforming the Department of Defense in support of our new national defense policy goals, the Defense Planning Guidance should be object-oriented and directional both in time and scope. From the above set of approved defense goals, a national military (operational) (working) strategy should be provided at the start of this process, through which the DPG (and its transformation activities) can direct their planning. A purpose of the DPG/PBS process would be to assess, verify, and where appropriate, change the military operational strategy provided at the start of the planning process. The capability-based planning approach, through a directed transformation program, would, in the end, develop, test and verify the over-arching national military strategy, and details comprising its multi-layered

SENSITIVE

elements. From this over-arching strategy, many sub-set defense and service specific strategies/scenarios and a basis for programs then can be developed to fill out the toolbox for future contingencies. One result of this approach, the meaning of "transformation" would be definitized, and, a starting path for the transformation process, through the Defense Planning Guidance would be developed and exploited. The military strategy would then form a decisional basis for programs – future and past.

CURRENT STATE OF THE DRAFT DPG

My review over the last several days consisted of reading/studying the fifth and final drafts. The plan for earlier reviews of programs and policies essential as input to the Defense Planning Guidance was delayed. The review has raised an important question. What is the purpose and role of this DPG?

In my judgment, Dr. Steve Cambone and his Deputy Dr. Chris Lamb have done an outstanding job in their preparation of this year's draft, compared to last year's guidance. The detail in the draft guidance addresses almost all the relevant issues of the Defense program through questions, study assignments, and is quite thorough in data assembly. The problem here is what are we trying to do at this time with the guidance document? This document at this moment, similar to last year's, is an information and study-driven effort, lists studies and briefs to be completed over the next 3 to 18 months – as an input for decisions downstream, timing to be determined. Also, the draft guidance is, in the main, bottoms-up planning. Emphasis has been correctly given toward swiftness, jointness, precision, and information, and is in tune with the Secretary of Defense priorities. However, the approach to reaching definitive transformation objectives is open-ended – and achieving, on a timely basis, a continuum of successful transformation activities is seriously questioned.

Past DPGs focused on the Soviets, and with such a continuum in threat, with each subsequent year, the DPG simply addressed updating current issues. But, there is a major sea change between past and today's DPGs. Current and future DPGs now face the immense challenge of major change. What are our needs today, tomorrow and how do we make these changes happen? The document has to be oriented toward the continuum of change, and the problem of institutional resistance, with increased demand on resources. In sum, the output of the new DPG/PBS effort should be directive on **CHANGE** – from today to tomorrow, and on a continuum time-scale.

CONCLUSION

My review initially was to ascertain the extent of support of the Rapid Dominance construct in the new guidance. The current "open-end" approach of this draft guidance raises the concern as to how can the Department manage transformation, develop a viable, new military (operational) strategy, and through a management process that can overcome the immense difficulties always faced with a large bureaucracy **IN PLACE**.

~~SENSITIVE~~

I would assess the current informational-study approach in the draft Defense Planning Guidance will result in a lengthened, more intractable, more argumentative process, due to the open-ended, non-focused approach, and a new operational strategy will be difficult to achieve, noting we are well into the second year of the Administration.

RECOMMENDATION

I would recommend the construct of Rapid Dominance (the title is of lesser importance) to be the soundest and most viable operational construct developed to date, and could be utilized in the current draft DPG as the working strategy, for future assessment, verification and change.

Let me review the key essentials of Rapid Dominance (the title is of lesser importance):

Rapid Dominance is an integrated political and military construct for applying lethal and non-lethal force, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Its purpose is to affect, influence, and control the will and perception of an adversary by imposing a regime of unrelenting stress through the mechanisms of shock and awe.

Rapid Dominance is:

- Beyond Joint, it's "Unified" using forces that are born joint, not just interoperable.
- A collaborative, holistic approach, which uses the military in concert with all other elements of national power to achieve desired effects across the entire engagement spectrum from peace to war.
- NCA, NSC/Interagency, Multinational, Coalition, Joint and Service partners.
- Predicated on effects-based targeting.
- A new level of knowledge/understanding, which provides more options in peace and the critical path for rapid and decisive victory in war.
- Improving our "aim." (We already have the world's best "precision").
- Based on four core characteristics -- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance in execution and control of the environment.

Rapid Dominance unifies all instruments of national power into a collaborative team to impose our political will (change the adversary's unacceptable behavior). The idea behind Rapid Dominance is to engage the right targets, with the right tools, at the right times, for the right reasons in order to achieve the desired effect. It treats the adversary as an extremely complex and adaptive "system of systems" -- exactly the kind of dynamic, problem-solving entity for which effects-based targeting is designed.

It leverages the Intelligence Community and National Agencies as well as business, industry, academia, expatriate, religious, regional, and international contacts and

~~SENSITIVE~~

organizations, including NGO (Nongovernmental Organizations) and PVO (Private Voluntary Organizations) to provide a new level of military, political, economic and societal knowledge. This new level of knowledge, when used correctly, will help to prevent war. Should prevention fail, this same knowledge and intimate understanding will provide the most rapid and decisive path to victory in war.

The Department today can implement such a construct. Future effort, as provided through the DPG, would enhance significantly the Department's capabilities to meet the uncertainty of the future.

What is missing in the current guidance and applicable to all new strategies is:

- **Knowledge/Intelligence.** The development of a new infrastructure of knowledge, capable over time of providing needed input in all areas, countries across the globe toward their makeup, culture, leaders, economic infrastructure, military forces to include their doctrine, training, and capabilities, etc.
- **Leaders and their People.** Impact and control "will and perception" of the enemy leadership and its population. Population control following military operations is a relatively new area of need for the Department. Destruction of opposing military force remains an essential focus for our military force, but force effectiveness should be further enhanced through increased focus on the "mind and will" of the opposing side.
- **Education and Training.** Our force structure of the future will demand changes in our current methods of education and training of our officer corps and senior non-coms.
- **Swiftness** will demand more attention to decentralization, in the actual conduct of military operations.

Snowflake



EF1974

02/009536-0520

6/28 Done

June 24, 2002 2:38 PM

IRAO

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Iraqi WMD

Please take a look at this unclassified paper. "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." Should we do it or should you?

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Who put it out—do

Thanks.

Attach.
02/13/98 "Iraqi Weapc

DHR:dh
062402-40

.....
Please respond by _

6/24

~~When cleared~~

USDP -

What about doing something with it? Perhaps

you or someone could brief the press? Note

6/28 SecDef's first question.
any D. Rice D. Ritz

~~DR~~

~~DR~~

6/27/02

Note to SD:

This is a CIA product, which has now been updated.

.....
Interagency clearance is now underway. So the attached version is outdated.

~~DR~~ Doug Feith

~~USDP -~~

~~ISIA~~

24 JUN 02

U16310 02

06-25-02 18:12 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11552

12
Snowflake

EF1974
02/009536-USD
June 24, 2002 2:38 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi WMD

Please take a look at this unclassified paper, "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." Should we have Torie do something with that, or should you?

Who put it out—do you know?

Thanks.

Attach.
02/13/98 "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"

DHR:dh
062402-40

.....
Please respond by 07/05/02

6/27/02
Note to SD:

This is a CIA product, which has now been updated.

Interagency clearance is now underway. So the attached version is outdated.

6/25

~~USD~~

~~ESA lead suspension is 7/10~~

Doug Feith

~~TR~~

~~ES~~

06-25-02 18:12 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/11553

7C
U.S.C.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

13 February 1998

11-L-0559/OSD/11554

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Overview

The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn's biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council and accepted by Iraq following the war to eliminate and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further, the UN established sanctions to prevent the purchase of equipment and materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.

On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the world's experts conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to resume development and production of WMD. They believe Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.

This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of "sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and Saddam's efforts to end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has also enhanced indigenous capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged; he is actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD

programs while wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of operational missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems. Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military purposes against Iran and to suppress rebellious segments of his population in Kurdish-held areas.

Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and the IAEA

Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM inspections and has taken an increasingly hard line since March 1996 when the UN began inspecting security facilities suspected of concealing WMD-related documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq admitted (after Husayn Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former head of Iraqi military industries, defected in August 1995) that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the UN:

- Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15 days after the Security Council enacted the resolution in 1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs.
- Baghdad has modified each declaration several times to accommodate data uncovered by UNSCOM and the IAEA and has provided new information only when confronted with direct evidence. For

The Husayn Kamil Connection



Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the preeminent military industries' official and a fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the Al-Husayn missile—an indigenous modification of the Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological weapons on Iranian prisoners of war:

- After the Gulf war, Kamil—first from his position as Minister of Defense and then as the director of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization—led Iraq's efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.
- Husayn Kamil's influence over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible for using Saddam's security services—of which he was a member in the early 1980s—to hide proscribed materials and documents from the United Nations.

Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program did not die with his defection and subsequent murder.

as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn—Saddam's second son—has assumed many of the responsibilities for concealing the proscribed programs. In addition, many of the leading scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:

- Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi—who serves officially as a presidential adviser and is a leading official in Iraqi relations with UNSCOM—was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and nonconventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi received rare public praise from Saddam for his role in the development of the Al-Husayn missile.
- Humam Abd al-Khalig Abd al-Ghafur—currently Minister of Culture and Information—is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former head of its nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA. He led an Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in October 1997.
- Jafar Dia Jafar is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his position—unlike that of Sadi—appears to be largely nominal.
- Dr. Rihab Taha is the leading official in charge of Iraq's biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum toxin and directed testing on animal subjects. Taha is also politically well-connected—she is married to the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.



150 boxes of documents presented to UNSCOM at a chicken farm in Iraq in August 1995.

example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.

Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996, mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive" and the inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has applied the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities—on one occasion security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit UN access to Special Republican Guard garrisons that are responsible for executing the highest priorities of Saddam's inner circle:

- Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected Iraqi officials removing documents and material from buildings and even burning documents to prevent them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out after their entry was delayed for several hours.
- Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country in November 1997.

- Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escorts have endangered UN helicopter flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot and grabbing the flight controls. Security guards have harassed inspectors on the ground.

Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of cooperation while working hard to conceal essential information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided incomplete documentary evidence to support its claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant information was buried within a massive volume of extraneous data, all of which was intended to create the appearance of candor and to overwhelm UNSCOM's analytic resources:

- For example, Iraq released detailed records of how many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents.
- UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of the documentary material and concluded that, despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not release its most important WMD-related documents.

Biological Weapons

No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August 1995, when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection, the existence of an offensive biological warfare (BW) capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax¹ (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin² (19,000 liters), and aflatoxin³ (2,200 liters)

¹ Inhalation of anthrax spores—an infectious dose is about 8,000 spores or less than one-millionth of a gram—is fatal within five to seven days nearly 100 percent of the time.



Remains of chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled missile warheads secretly destroyed by Iraq.

after years of claiming that they had conducted only defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing BW-filled munitions—including 25 Scud missile warheads (five anthrax; 16 botulinum toxin; four aflatoxin), 157 aerial bombs, and aerial dispensers—during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq acknowledged researching the use of 155-mm artillery

² Botulinum toxin, which would most likely be dispensed as an aerosol, can kill in as little as 24 to 36 hours by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.

³ Aflatoxin is a liver carcinogen that can kill years after ingestion.



Destroyed chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled R-400 aerial bombs.

shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol generators to deliver BW agents:

- UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production equipment, seed stocks, and growth media claimed by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
- UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its production of biological agents and could be holding back such agents, which are easily concealed.

Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in 1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of BW agents at the facility between 1989 and 1990.

UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in the summer of 1996:

- Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate civilian facility designed to produce single-cell proteins and biopesticides.
- Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of Baghdad) and the security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a BW production facility from the outset.

Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support claims that it destroyed all of its BW agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration, submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological weapons program":

- In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on Ricin, but did not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced the biological agent Ricin.⁴
- Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a small-scale BW program at known facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. Without effective UN monitoring, Baghdad could probably begin production within a few days. For example, Iraq can convert production of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed material.

Chemical Weapons

Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and against its own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi forces

⁴ Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 500 micrograms.

Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Date	Area Used	Type	Approximate Casualties	Target Population
August 1983	Haji Umran	Mustard	fewer than 100	Iranians/Kurds
October to November 1983	Panjwin	Mustard	3,000	Iranians/Kurds
February to March 1984	Majnoon Island	Mustard	2,500	Iranians
March 1984	Al Basrah	Tabun	50 to 100	Iranians
March 1985	Hawizah Marsh	Mustard/Tabun	3,000	Iranians
February 1986	Al Faw	Mustard/Tabun	8,000 to 10,000	Iranians
December 1986	Umm ar Rasas	Mustard	reportedly in the thousands	Iranians
April 1987	Al Basrah	Mustard/Tabun	5,000	Iranians
October 1987	Sumar/Mehran	Mustard/nerve agents	3,000	Iranians
March 1988	Halabjah *	Mustard/nerve agents	reportedly in the hundreds	Iranians/Kurds

* Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have caused some of the casualties.

While precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of numerous Iraqi chemical attacks against civilian villages in the 1987 and 1988 time frames—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to both the Iranian and Turkish borders.

delivered chemical agents (including Mustard⁵ agent and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun⁶) in aerial bombs, aerial spray dispensers, 122-mm rockets, and several types of artillery, both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical munitions and had a major production capacity.

UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000 empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors, and eight different types of delivery systems—including ballistic missile warheads—in the past seven years. Following Husayn Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:

- Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX⁷ than it previously admitted. Baghdad acknowledged, despite previous claims that it only conducted research, that it had conducted pilot production of about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
- Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf war—an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life of chemical agents.
- Perfected techniques for the large-scale production of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-term storage.

UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and production

⁵ Mustard is a blister agent used primarily to cause medical casualties by blistering the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is extremely persistent and presents a long-term hazard.

⁶ Sarin and Tabun are G-series nerve agents that act within seconds of exposure and can be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. These agents kill by paralyzing the respiratory muscles. Both are relatively nonpersistent and present more of a vapor hazard than a skin hazard.

⁷ VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to—but more advanced than—G-series agents, in that it is far more persistent. VX presents a far greater skin hazard and would be used for long-term contamination of territory.



UNSCOM inspector in protective suit opening filling plug for sample-taking inside a Scud/Al-Husayn chemical-agent-filled missile warhead.

equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much as 200 metric tons of chemical precursors, 70 Scud warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled munitions has not been verified:

- Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW production. In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production within a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels—including VX—within two or three years.
- Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it once used to produce chemical agents and has the capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW production.

Ballistic Missiles

Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819 operational Scud-B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union, an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and modify its warhead (for example, the Al-Husayn with a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq also had programs to indigenously produce long-range missiles (such as the Condor) that never entered the production phase:

- UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,



Handling of leaking 122-mm rockets filled with the chemical nerve agent sarin prior to destruction.


30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and related equipment.

- UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction of only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by being fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars or used in static tests and training.

Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles imported from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately explained the disposition of important missile

components that it could not produce on its own and may have removed before destruction. There are still many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile programs:

- Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of missiles by integrating guidance and control systems it concealed with indigenously produced parts.
- Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes, and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has not verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.
- Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts through clandestine procurement networks. In 1995,



UNSCOM supervision of the destruction of Scud/AI-Husayn long-range missiles.

Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment (gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted under UNSCOM questioning that it received a similar shipment earlier in 1995.

- In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major elements of missile systems from UNSCOM inspectors.

Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger, longer range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage systems and clustered engine designs, that theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have uncovered evidence that Iraq has continued missile

research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps within one year:

- Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs—within the UN-allowed 150-km range limit—serve to maintain production expertise within the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently flight-tested the Al-Samoud, which UNSCOM describes as a scaled down Scud, successfully. Iraq probably will begin converting these efforts into long-range missile programs as soon as sanctions are lifted.



Scud/Al-Husayn missile launchers before destruction.

- Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham—currently used to support its authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication buildings at the facility are spacious enough to house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
- Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and administrative facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent size and capacity.
- Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium enrichment techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
- Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991 by using IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.

Nuclear Weapons

Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was focused on building an implosion-type weapon. The program was



Centrifuges for uranium enrichment secretly destroyed by Iraq.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:

- Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation of its nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq acquire sufficient fissile material.
- Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement,

weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.

- Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program.

Appendix A

Iraqi Biological Warfare Program

BW Agent Production Amounts^a

BW Agent (Organism)	Declared Concentrated Amounts	Declared Total Amounts	Comments
Anthrax (<i>Bacillus anthracis</i>)	8,500 liters (2,245 gallons)	85,000 liters (22,457 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually three to four times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Botulinum toxin (<i>Clostridium botulinum</i>)	19,400 liters (10x and 20x concentrated) (5,125 gallons)	380,000 liters (100,396 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Gas Gangrene (<i>Clostridium perfringens</i>)	340 liters (90 gallons)	3,400 liters (900 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.
Aflatoxin (<i>Aspergillus flavus</i> and <i>Aspergillus parasiticus</i>)	N/A	2,200 liters (581 gallons)	Production amounts and time frame of production claimed by Iraq do not correlate.
Ricin (Castor Bean plant)	N/A	10 liters (2.7 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.

BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Anthrax	Botulinum Toxin	Aflatoxin	Comments
Missile warheads Al-Husayn (modified Scud B)	5	16	4	UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral destruction of these 25 warheads due to conflicting accounts provided by Iraq.
R-400 aerial bombs	50	100	7	Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of 157 bombs, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm this number. UNSCOM has found the remains of at least 23.
Aircraft aerosol spray tanks F-1 Mirage modified fuel drop tank	4			Iraq claims to have produced four, but may have manufactured others.

BW Agent Growth Media^b

Media	Quantity Imparted	Unaccounted For Amounts
BW Agent Growth Media	31,000 kg (68,200 lbs)	3,500 kg (7,700 lbs)

^a Total refers to amount of material obtained from the production process, while *concentrated* refers to the amount of concentrated agent obtained after final filtration/purification. The *concentrated* number is the amount used to fill munitions.

^bMedia refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.

Appendix B

Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program

CW Agent Stockpiles

CW Agent	Chemical Agents Declared by Iraq	Potential CW Agents Based on Unaccounted Precursors ^a	Comments
VX	at least 4 metric tons	200 metric tons	Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995.
G-Agents (Sarin)	100 to 150 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
Mustard	500 to 600 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.

CW Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Estimated Numbers Before the Gulf War	Munitions Unaccounted For ^b	Comments
Missile Warheads -Al Husayn (modified Seud B)	75 to 100	45 to 70	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 30 warheads.
Rockets	100,000	15,000 to 25,000	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nearly 40,000 chemical munitions (including rockets, artillery, and aerial bombs) 28,000 of which were filled.
Aerial Bombs	16,000	2,000	
Artillery Shells	30,000	15,000	
Aerial Spray Tanks	unknown	unknown	

^aThese estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq may also retain a small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to quickly resume CW production at known dual-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides. UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of some 45 different types of CW precursors (1,800,000 liters of liquid and 1,000,000 kilograms of solid).

^bAll of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of these warheads.

Appendix C

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program

Item	Initial Inventory	Comments
Soviet-Supplied Scud Missiles (includes Iraqi modifications of the Scud: the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km)	819	UNSCOM accepts Iraqi accounting for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq has not explained the disposition of major components that it may have stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some Iraqi claims—such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests—are not believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest that Iraq retains a small missile force.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Missiles	Unknown	Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced/procured and tested all major subcomponents.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Warheads	120	Iraq claims all 120 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional CW/BW warheads beyond those currently admitted.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Airframes	2	Iraq claims testing two indigenous airframes in 1990. It is unlikely that Iraq produced only two Scud airframes.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Engines	80	Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests—53 of which failed quality controls—are unverifiable and not believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue.
Soviet-Supplied Missile Launchers	11	UNSCOM doubts Iraq's claim that it unilaterally destroyed five launchers. The Soviet Union may have sold more than the declared 11 launchers.
Iraqi-Produced Missile Launchers	8	Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers.

software

June 24, 2002 12:29 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Galileo

413.77

We ought to push forward on this memo from Stenbit. It is crazy for Europe to be spending money on a Galileo. It is just a waste of money. They should be investing in forces and capabilities.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/19/02 ASD(C3I) memo to SecDef re: Galileo [U10060/02]

DHR:dh
062402-33

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

X

8/21
[Signature]
Larry Di Rita

U16311 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11569

24Jun02

120
1430

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

2002 JUN 19 PM 2:13

SECDEF HAS SEEN

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

INFO MEMO

JUN 24 2002

June 19, 2002 1:19 PM

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Galileo

- In reply to your question about the technical problems with Galileo, the overriding problem is their plan to use the same frequency as our military code. If that happens, and a Galileo receiver falls into the wrong hands, we would have to jam their signal in an area of conflict, and our signal would be jammed as well. We can mitigate this problem, but at increased difficulty.
- We have no problem with the EU's moving forward, provided they meet our four objectives:
 - That the performance of any civil terminal be better in the presence of both GPS and Galileo satellites in the field of view than with one or the other alone.
 - That there be no interference with the frequency used by our military codes.
 - That Galileo does not initiate a regulatory regime that would force the U.S. to have a Galileo receiver in order to fly aircraft in Europe, or on ships to enter European ports.
 - That NATO not be expected to fund the Galileo shortfall through member nations' military funding.

Prepared by: Ray Swider, C3I, (b)(6)

*✓ CJCS
Copy to: CROUCH*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/21
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	6/29
MA BUCCI	5/30/24
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/20



11-L-0559/OSD/11570

U10060 /02

June 24, 2002 12:09 PM

080

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: YEO

Please give me some more background on this Young Entrepreneurs' Organization. Is it a spin-off from the YPO? Apparently, it is 15 years old.

I would be curious to see a list of the kinds of people who attend and participate and how many people attend this. Ken Adelman might know something about it—please check with him.

Also, see if I could just go in, make a brief comment and then answer questions. It could be a terrific group, but we need some more information.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/19/02 Schedule note re: YEO 14 August Event

DHR:dh
062402-31

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

2452002

U16312 02



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

19-Jun-02 11:27 AM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
THROUGH: Mr. Larry Di Rita
FROM: Cathy Mainardi
SUBJECT: Young Entrepreneurs' Organization (YEO)

The YEO is celebrating their 15th year anniversary and have invited you to deliver the keynote address during their program at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington 14-17 August. They will accommodate your schedule.

Long Range schedule for August and letter of request are attached.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Accept _____

6/23

JUN 24 2002

Regret _____

SECDEF -

I recommend you

Other _____

decline.

Di Rita *6/23*

Thank You,
Cathy Mainardi

SPD
6/24

Brien Biondi
Chief Executive Officer



1199 N. Fairfax Street Suite 200 Alexandria, VA 22314-1437 USA Tel: 703.519.6700 x140 Fax: (b)(6) bbiondi@yee.org

TO C+D
cc Mr G. Rota

June 13, 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary:

More than 450 entrepreneurs of the world's most successful business owners will be present in our Nations capital from 14-18 August, 2002. This group represents The Young Entrepreneurs' Organization (YEO), a leading global organization of successful business founders and company owners under the age of 40. *As we celebrate our 15th year anniversary we would be most honored to have you welcome these future leaders of the world to our Nations capital.*

Established in 1987, YEO now has nearly 4,700 members in 138 cities and 34 countries around the globe. Collectively, YEO represents companies which employ some 500,000 workers and earn more than \$68 billion in sales. Its members' companies are both private and public corporations that are regularly featured in Fortune, BusinessWeek, Inc. Magazine and The Wall Street Journal.

In one of our most recent International events, The Young Entrepreneurs' Organization ---key business owners who drive our global economy---were welcomed by Hong Kong Chief Executive **Tung Chee-Hwa**. This privilege of having a world leader introduced to our members demonstrated the mutual importance of a political presence during our events.

YEO would like to invite you to deliver a keynote address during our program at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, DC. Because we understand your busy schedule, our conference agenda throughout the days of 14-17 August, 2002 is flexible to accommodate your schedule.

I look forward to hearing from you soon and certainly appreciate your consideration in this matter. Please feel free to call me 703-519-6700 ext 140 you need any additional information or have any questions.

Kind regards,

Brien Biondi
Chief Executive Officer

6/17
→ Cathy M
Sked Mh

Larry Di Rita
6/17

Long Range Calendar - Secretary of Defense - as of 06/17/02

AUGUST 2002

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
				1 <i>SD @ Asia (t)</i>	2 <i>SD return from Asia (t)@ 9:15am</i>	3 <i>JR/DR visit to Kissingers @ Connecticut</i>
4 <i>JR/DR visit to Kissingers @ Connecticut</i>	5	6	7 <i>DSD vacation @ Utah</i>	8 <i>DSD vacation @ Utah</i>	9 <i>DSD vacation @ Utah</i>	10 <i>Kailey's birthday DSD vacation @ Utah</i>
11 <i>DSD return from Utah</i>	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23 <i>a.m. JR/DR to Chicago 2 p.m. Depart to TAOS</i>	24 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>
25 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	26 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	27 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	28 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	29 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	30 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>	31 <i>DR @ TAOS</i>

AUGUST 2002

*Congress August Recess: House: July 27 - September 3
Senate: August 3 - September 3*

11-L-0559/OSD/11574

June 24, 2002 11:56 AM

Action 7/8

Don

331

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Town Halls

They tune into all the town halls at Defense Logistics Agency, don't they? Why would they need a separate one any more than the Army, the Navy or the Air Force would?

Thanks.

Attach.
060102-8 SecDef memo

DIR dh
062402-29

.....
Please respond by 07/28/02

U16313 02

24 Jun 02

6/8 showWare

R/4

June 1, 2002 4:08 PM

Sir: 6/12/02
Scheduling
internal town hall
and AFRTS interview
for early July.
T.C.

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Message to DoD



4/21

6/21

What do you think about my just going on the internal television network for DoD and talking to them about the need to transform and inject a sense of urgency into what we are doing. Please see me about it.

Need one for
Defense Agencies

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060102-8

Please respond by 06/21/02

SECRET HAS BEEN

JUN 7 2002

Believe we need to do some Defense Agencies.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is located here in the Washington Metropolitan Area. Believe we should do a town hall there. The audience is primarily DoD

Civilian
V/REP 6/24

June 24, 2002 11:05 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rewards

000.5

Please get a report on how the reward program is working. My impression is it has fallen flat on its face, and no one is doing anything. No one is getting any money, we are not offering the right incentives, the bureaucracy over at State is hopeless, we don't have any visibility into what CIA is doing, nor do we have any compilation of what DoD is doing.

I thought the NSC interagency group was supposed to sort that out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062402-24



Please respond by 07/26/02

eounche

U16314 02

June 24, 2002 10:43 AM

000.5

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Strategy

Please take a look at this article on Newhouse.com on what is missing in the war on terrorism and let's discuss it.

Regards.

Attach.
Wood, David. "What's Missing in the War on Terrorism: An Overarching Strategy,"
Newhouse.com. 06/19/02

DHR:dh
062402-22

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

24 Jun 02

U16315 02

Newhouse.com
June 19, 2002

Analysis

What's Missing In The War On Terrorism: An Overarching Strategy

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. war on terrorism, after an explosive start in Afghanistan last fall, has dwindled to a few scattered military missions and dozens of unrelated and sometimes conflicting diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement initiatives.

Critics say the Bush administration needs to devise a powerful offensive plan to coordinate America's largely untapped energy and resources. Such a strategy would sort out goals and set priorities on everything from deploying Special Forces teams to coordinating intelligence data to balancing the competing needs of security and civil liberties at home.

"What seems to be lacking in American policy-making at this juncture is not the means to fight a war on terrorism, or the public support to do so, but the grim determination to sweep away the prewar clutter, to mobilize the strength of the nation and to see the thing through," said Robert Killebrew, a retired Army strategist and senior Pentagon consultant.

"Clearly, we're moving on a lot of fronts. What I don't see yet is the offensive strategy we need to win," Killebrew said.

Experts said the strategy must clearly define the enemy. And it must be built around a powerful vision of what victory would mean -- as well as what defeat would entail.

"Terrorism is a technique, a tactic. You can't wage war on a technique," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security adviser from 1977 to 1980.

Winning this war, said Killebrew, "is being able to walk on an airplane without fear, to enter public buildings without being searched, to welcome immigrants to this country."

As is, much of the action in the war on terrorism seems uncoordinated and counterproductive. Consider:

-- Under a budget of \$350 billion for national defense, the Pentagon's contractors are churning out such breathtakingly expensive weapons as the \$204 million F-22 stealth fighter, designed during the Cold War for fighting vast fleets of high-tech enemy bogeys. Meanwhile, troops hunting real al-Qaida terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan wear broken-down boots and carry radios that don't work.

-- The State Department is launching a \$75 million effort to lure Muslim students to visit the United States, to foster greater understanding and to shrink the "swamp" of anti-American resentment from which terrorists might draw recruits. A major focus of this effort is to counter allegations that the United States is anti-Muslim.

Yet Attorney General John Ashcroft has announced tough new restrictions on visitors from Muslim and

Middle Eastern countries, including fingerprinting and photographing them at the border. And the United States is still holding an unknown number of Muslims in secluded detention, under suspicion of ties to terrorist organizations. Both actions have drawn angry protests from Arab students.

-- Along with reducing anti-American resentment, a major U.S. goal has been to keep nuclear weapons and nuclear material away from terrorists. Part of that effort has been to dissuade countries from obtaining or using nuclear weapons technology.

But some U.S. actions send the opposite message, critics say. The Bush administration has proposed building a new earth-penetrating nuclear warhead. U.S. policy now embraces the idea of nuclear pre-emptive strikes. And in its new treaty with Russia, the United States insisted on storing weapons rather than destroying them, as it has urged other nuclear states to do.

"All these decisions have a huge impact on nuclear stability out there in the world," said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. With the United States itself vulnerable to nuclear attack, "We, especially, should not be talking about first use of nuclear weapons," he said.

-- While trying to enlist Islamic governments in the war on terrorism, for crucial help in supporting U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives and to crack down on terrorists in their own countries, U.S. officials have set as a strategic goal the toppling of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, by military means if necessary.

The idea has found little enthusiasm in the Islamic world and could cause even more trouble ahead.

An actual attack on Iraq, said Killebrew, "will enrage our allies and make it untenable for any state to be a pro-American Arab state, and that will set back our ultimate victory in the war on terrorism for generations."

White House officials did not return repeated phone calls asking for information on strategy or comment on the critics' points.

To be sure, President Bush and his top lieutenants have often articulated broad ideas on how to fight terrorism.

In the smoky, chaotic hours after Sept. 11's stunning attacks, Bush put into motion a simple and direct policy: Terrorists were to be pursued relentlessly and given no safe haven; those who harbored or tolerated terrorists were also the enemy. Those orders spawned a flurry of diplomatic, intelligence and military activity, including the destruction last fall of Afghanistan's Taliban government.

Bush's top national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, sums up the U.S. approach his way: "Power matters."

Speaking April 29 at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, Rice said the administration intended to use its full military, economic and diplomatic muscle to deny terrorists safe haven; to prevent them from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; and to strike before terrorists can attack.

Such efforts must at the same time advance such American values as "democracy, human rights, equal justice, free speech, the rule of law, honest government, respect for women and children, and religious

tolerance," Rice said. "We seek not merely to leave the world safer but to leave it better."

One key failing of this approach, however, is that it only vaguely defines the enemy.

Brzezinski, at a forum May 29 sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, said that defining precisely who the terrorists are -- for example, as disaffected Islamic radicals who share a hatred of American culture -- would help define how the United States should wage its war.

That, in turn, would help set a U.S. priority either on attracting Muslim students here to study -- or keeping them out.

Simply designating the enemy as "terrorists," said Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush in 1989-92, can get the United States mixed up in conflicts on others' terms -- like Israeli action against Palestinian "terrorists" and Indian raids against Pakistani "terrorists."

"Whenever anybody has a local conflict, they can say, 'We're fighting your fight, United States -- terrorism!' And I think we have to be very careful about that," Scowcroft said.

Moreover, some of Bush's rhetoric about the war on terrorism, without being more fully explained by a detailed strategy, has had unintended consequences, some say.

Such blunt statements as "You're either with us or against us" have encouraged zealots in the tense confrontation between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India to "ratchet up the intensity," Brzezinski said.

The dark alternative to victory, Killebrew said, "is a world where no nation is able to enforce its laws. Where kidnapping and murder are common. Where we close our borders to the world and we have to decide what is an acceptable level of fear, how many dead Americans each year is tolerable.

"The American flag won't come down, but it will be a different country. We will lose our freedoms a little more every year, along with a constant toll of dead Americans."

Snowflake

June 24, 2002 10:05 AM

Middle East

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Looking at the Moslem World

What do you think we ought to do with this memo from Andy Marshall? I think he is right.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/19/01 Net Assessment memo to SecDef re: Thinking Strategically about the Moslem World (a la Saffire) [U19649/01]

DHR:dh
062402-18

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

ajunda

U16316 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11582



DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

SECRET

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

19 December 2001

Copy to:
USO(P) Faith
ASD(C3I) Stenbit
(Handwritten initials and circled numbers)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM ANDY MARSHALL *Acumy*

SUBJECT: Thinking Strategically about the Moslem World (à la Safire)

A couple of weeks ago we met to discuss the Safire article in which he puts forward Nixon's view of what we ought to do. At the end of our discussion you requested that I put down some ideas of my own. What follows are my first thoughts.

As I mentioned at our meeting, I believe we should look at alternative ways in which the Moslem world might evolve over the next couple of decades, decide which of these worlds we like, and then work toward those futures. Attachment A develops three alternative worlds, the first of which is, I think, by far the preferred one. This is a world in which Turkey and Iran are the major Moslem powers and the Arabs nations are relegated to a much-reduced position. What could we do to move in this direction? First, we ought to build up our relationship with Turkey, making Turkey a strategic ally in a much fuller sense than we have here-to-fore. We should help Turkey further develop in the direction it is already going: a democratic state and that is increasingly successful economically. We want Turkey to develop and have an expanded role because it could have a significant influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and indeed in controlling Iraq and perhaps other parts of the Middle East. Second, accelerate what seems to be the move toward a change of regime in Iran. Bernard Lewis thinks that we could do this by making it clear that there will be future consequences to any continuation of terrorism supported by Iran. We could also expand radio and television broadcasts into Iran. Some Iranians in Los Angeles already are sending programs into Iran; this could be supported and augmented by the US government. We could also design and produce TV antennas that would be less visible and so less subject to state control. An antenna that could lie flat on a roof or perhaps be built into other features of a house is an example. A third aspect of a strategy would be to put less reliance than we have on the Saudis and Egypt. We could hedge our bet on these corrupt and possibly fragile regimes by seeking better, closer relations with the other Gulf States. In any case, the other Gulf States have historically sought alliances with the dominant Western power; since the Saudis have claims against parts of their territory and this is a way of keeping them at bay. We should also explore long-term investment strategies in alternative energy sources and accelerate the transition to a more hydrogen-based energy regime. There are also some extraordinarily interesting developments in solid state physics that provide materials that produce electricity from heat. Such devices could increase the energy efficiency of

1) Bolster Turkey

2) Regime Change in Iran

3) De-emphasize Saudi, Egypt

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>4/12/20</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/15/20</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>6/10/01</i>

1-L-0550 SD/11583

U19649 /01

automobiles and many other energy consuming processes. The objective would be to increase our flexibility through less dependence on the Saudis and also to keep a downward pressure on oil prices. We should limit the funds available to the Saudi's for supporting and spreading the Wahhabi version of the Moslem faith, which without their support would be a minor radical heresy.

In summary, we should shift our attention to and build up the non-Arab parts of the Moslem world. Turkey and Iran are the two most obvious cases where this might seem possible. It is interesting that within the Moslem world after the first couple of centuries it was the Turks and the Persians who largely dominated that world. Both are ancient peoples with a long history as centers of empires and a sense of community that is lacking in Saudi Arabia, which was put together only in the 1920's. Within the Arab world we ought to shift our attention and reliance away from Egypt and Saudi Arabia to other Arab countries such as the smaller Gulf States and, should we be able to replace Saddam Hussein, increase the role of Iraq. Iraq among the Arab states has been the most successful in producing a technically educated cadre capable of something like modern western standards of performance.

Attached for further reading:

Attachment A, Three alternative Moslem world,
Attachment B, notes from a meeting on the longer term strategic consequences of the current war on terrorism.

June 25, 2002 11:47 AM

471.96

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Space

Please take a look at this note from Jim Roche on space. My instinct is he is right—don't you agree?

Thanks.

Attach.
06/19/02 SecAF memo to SecDef re: Various Notes

DHR:dh
062402-12

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

2574403

U16318 02

SecDef -

This is a response to
4 snowflakes, subjects highlighted:

DiRita

Larry Di Rita

6/21

Mr. DiRita

VADM G





SAB

6/23

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 10 00 AM 2002



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Various Notes

Boss,

There were four recent notes from you that I wanted to address briefly.

1. Reliance on Space. I *do think* that the industrial base for space is in bad shape, as I've noted to you often. I'll let my friend, John Stenbit, be the optimist, but I've seen too many problems in the space area to be sanguine that all is well these days. Too many systems under development are not healthy, and the industry seems to be doing little to fix itself. Thus, I believe we have to be more imaginative in thinking about space, and we have to be careful not to throw money at an industry that is having very hard times performing. For example, GPS is vulnerable to jamming. The first response is to accelerate GPS III. Yet, the issue is more complicated. For some of us, the issue is accuracy of weapons, and such weapons have both GPS and inertial systems on board. What to do? Well, a better inertial system most likely fixes the problem since the time of flight of a weapon like JDAM is so short. And, a new and better inertial guidance unit would be a heck of a lot cheaper. Another issue is the possibly overextended use of GPS for accurate clocks. We need to understand this issue better than we do presently. Point: a sensible response may include taking actions other than a rush to increase the power of the satellites. In time, this should be done, but at a deliberate pace. Similarly, Spaced Based Radar should not be a macho technology demonstration. Rather, we are trying to understand what is needed for ground-moving-target-indications, and how the space component should be a complement to a portfolio of systems to include JSTARS or Global Hawk. Much cheaper than attempting to solve all problems with spacecraft alone. In fact, given the basic radar equation (effective power is a function of one over the distance the energy must travel *raised* to the *fourth* power), any radar in space that tried to be the equivalent of JSTARS would cost a large fortune. As to our

11-L-0559/OSD/11586

dependency, and looking for a "way ahead," I agree with Pete Aldridge on the idea of a Defense Science Board\Scientific Advisory Board (USAF). Also, given the emerging dearth of systems engineers, we may wish to sponsor a National Institute for Systems Engineering. Pete Aldridge, Pete Teets and I are looking into this.

2. Misuse of the Purchase Card as unveiled by the GAO. Our own auditors have been on this wicket since I arrived. The GAO was ahead of us in some cases. The misuse is a disgrace, and we have both our FM organization and the AF IG jointly investigating. We will go after any and all abusers, as well as making our Commands more aware of the potential to misuse the card. I'm especially upset about the \$40K in late rental car charges; this is just sloppy management.

f

Presented
Service
with hearing
new for hearing
to be done
later in the
subcommittee

3. End-strength. This has been very emotional in the Air Force. As a base is opened overseas, we get a long-standing commitment. And, we still have Northern Watch and Southern Watch, etc. to fulfill. For example, we had about 8K folks deployed to SWA on 10 September. We added about 12K for OEF. But, we still have 18K there now, and they need rotational replacements! Further, Noble Eagle adds a new mission for us, as does the heightened protection of US air bases. And, we have done better in recruiting and retention than anticipated. *Still, you are quite right.* We have to adapt faster, and deal with our skill-mix problem soonest. It is in our own interests (e.g., an addition of 7000 people costs us about \$350 million a year, and grows; that's more than the costs of doing a major upgrade for seven AWACS aircraft.) The bureaucracy always finds it easier to just add people, and it finds all kinds of reasons not to let people go (e.g., I found the Guard holding onto airmen from Noble Eagle even though we are partially stood down.) Overall, there is the issue of "waiting for the next shoe to drop." What have John and I done? We've met with all of our three and four star generals, as well as many others involved. While I can make a good case for force protection people, I've directed that we end stop-loss and the mobilization of other than force protection personnel and a handful of other specialties. We should be under 2% end-strength by 1 October, vice the 4% you were shown, and well under the 1% level by 1 November. I'll have the drawdown curves for you in a week or so.

4. Video from UAVs. I've given my input to Pete, since I was a copy addressee. The Bosnia footage is from neither a Global Hawk nor a Predator. Still, we have issues that need to be addressed. In short, Global

Hawk is fine because it uses military links and is encrypted. Predator is not, mainly because it is still very developmental and we did not want to spend money on encryption until we understood just how we were going to use the video, etc. We did not envision, for example, that we would be feeding video in other aircraft, or directly to soldiers on the ground. By March 2003, we will begin to use some commercial encryption. Since Predator video is perishable for the most part, this should do the trick--and far cheaper than using NSA-level encryption.

Boss, this should bring us up to date. I wanted you to know that we've been working each of your questions.

n/a


James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

cc:
DepSecDef

Snowflake

June 25, 2002 7:28 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: UBL

6/26/02
Done.
TC.

6/27
Lame DI File

Afghanistan

Please make sure no one in the White House is saying we are going to catch UBL by 9/11, and let's make sure if we hear it anywhere around this building, we knock it down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062302-7

.....

Please respond by 07/12/02

25Jun02

U16319 02

snoflake

June 25, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Modernization

I just took a look at the memo Newt Gingrich sent you on March 27. It sounds to me like he is on the mark.

701

Please know that I am anxious to have you make progress on modernization. Newt thinks you are going to have to insist on a modern contract proposal if we are going to make any real headway.

Do let Paul or me know what we can do to help and please keep us posted.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/27/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
062502-5

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

25 JUN 02

U16320 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11590

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

Memo to Deputy A. Rita

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)
 Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2002 4:36 PM
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
 Cc: Herbits1@aol.com; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil
 Subject: for secdef depsecdef

SECDEF HAS SEEN
 JUN 24 2002

to secdef, depsecdef
 from Newt 3/26/2002

attached is a memo I just sent Winkenwerder and Quam on the work they are doing to modernize healthcare for DOD. They are making real progress but the next phase of getting the bureaucracy to write the contract proposals is really difficult and encouraging winkenwerder to really insist on a modern contract proposal could be a big step toward having better healthcare while saving up to \$22 billion over the next five years.

Winkenwerder is doing really well but I think it would help if he knew he had support from secdef and depsecdef to continue moving to modernization
 newt

to Bill Winkenwerder and Lois Quam

It sounds like you are making real progress on thinking through a 21st century system of healthcare for DOD. I am a little concerned about several steps that could make it more difficult to achieve the increase in quality and savings in money:

1. the bureaucracy historically developed a very different type of contracting than the model required for high quality, advanced technology healthcare. It is really important to ensure that the actual proposal writers spend time learning the principles and metrics of this more modern system. They should not be trying to marginally improve the traditional system which is what they are familiar with but rather should start from the requirements of the new, more modern contracting system and then design it anew. That may require some training or some oversight. In its absence I will be very surprised if they do not gradually and despite themselves revert to writing large sections in the old pattern.

2. It would probably help to hire an outside consultant who is an expert in how modern health contracts are written to help the senior civil service learn the new model, to be available to brief the news media from an objective standpoint on why the new model will deliver better quality care than the old model, and to be able to meet with congressional staff and members of congress to explain the new system and the fact that it is based on the developments in the private sector which provide better services at lower cost.

Finally, I think Torie Clarke and Powell Moore need to be apprised at some point of these exciting new developments because some of the current contract holders are almost certainly going to try to fight any significant modernization which would expose them to new competitors and new requirements. It is important to design the entire process and the way it will be explained to the news media and the legislative

3/28/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11591

branch to ensure that the focus is always on better quality care and more modern systems for the military families and retirees.
Newt

June 25, 2002 7:21 AM

Done
6/25

320.2

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: CNO Letter

Please make sure you give me the CNO letter. I don't remember it. Let's look at it. Shouldn't something like that be logged in, so we know when we have answered and when we haven't?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-6

.....
Please respond by _____

6/25

- CNO letter is attached
- CNO letter was logged in to C+D on 11 April and was forwarded to USD(P+R) for action
- David Chu has been working this issue in general with all services + will brief you 6/25
- David Chu SDH 14593 with CNO on 6/25

U16321 02

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-055920 SDH 14593



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

April 18, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

- Attached memo to Admiral Clark (Tab A) addresses your concern with his proposal (Tab B) to exceed the FY 2003 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)-specified military manpower level of 376,000 in both FY 2002 and 2003.
 - Admiral Clark proposes drawing down the Navy's military end strength from the current level of 393,000 to 383,000 by the end of FY 2004.
 - The higher number includes reserve component (RC) personnel currently on active duty, primarily for force protection, but it exceeds the DPG level.
- During recent Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG) deliberations, we deemed it appropriate for the Department to look for ways to reduce long-term military manpower needs by 1) reducing forward presence, 2) reexamining missions, 3) streamlining headquarters, 4) civilianization, and 5) leveraging technology.
 - Appropriate OSD activities have been tasked to study these issues, with the goal of reducing military requirements by the end of FY 2003. The groups will provide mid course status updates to me by mid May.
- This problem is not unique to the Navy. All four Services currently exceed the FY 2003 President's Budget levels for FY 2002, as directed in your FY 2003-07 DPG.
 - Given the RC mobilization, we expect all four Services to share the Navy's problem, so the response sets a precedent for the others.
- The memo advises Admiral Clark of the SLRG-directed studies and encourages him to help find less military manpower-intensive ways to meet operational needs.
 - It acknowledges that the results of the studies will not be available in time to allow the Services to comply with the DPG direction for FY 2002.
 - It also indicates we will expect the Services to comply by the end of FY 2003.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A.

COORDINATION: USD (Comptroller) (Tab C)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Sidney L. Evans, Jr., USAF. (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/11594



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

I appreciate your concern that the global war on terrorism is stressing naval forces, as they are currently constituted. I know your concerns are shared by all three Military Departments.

During our Senior Leadership Review Group deliberations last month, I tasked Under Secretary Chu to initiate a process to reduce our long-term military manpower requirements. We have tasked activities throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the extent to which reducing forward presence, reexamining missions, streamlining headquarters, converting lower priority military billets to civilian, and leveraging technology will reduce long-term military manpower requirements. These groups will report back to me by the end of June. I realize the Services will not be able to take advantage of these recommendations before the end of the current fiscal year.

In the long run, however, I am convinced real progress can be made toward realigning existing military manpower resources in accordance with these recommendations. As a result, I fully expect the Services to comply with the Defense Planning Guidance targets by the end of Fiscal Year 2003. I look forward to your help in ensuring our military footprint is kept as small as possible to meet operational needs.



11-L-0559/OSD/11595



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

270 / 100 11 04 2: 24

Secretary Rumsfeld
via SECNAV

30 March 2002

Sir,

A quick note to forward the attached manpower memo.

I understand the desire to limit end strength increases. That said, I have almost 393,000 people on active duty today. As we build the FY04 FYDP, I intend to implement manpower reductions which will absorb the 10K reserves currently on active duty (primarily for force protection) into our active duty base and execute FY-04 with 383,000 end strength. In other words, I will provide this new post 9/11 security requirement and reduce our active duty baseline by 10,000 people. To accomplish this, I must increase my active duty end strength.

It would be irresponsible for me to recommend a manning strategy which did not provide for the security of our people and the base structure necessary to wage the global war on terrorism. This plan does that.

Request your approval of this approach as we build our FY-04 program.

Very respectfully,

Vern Clark
Admiral, US Navy

1106544 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11596



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
MAR 20 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations *V. E. Clark*

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

- Priorities of the Global War on Terrorism have driven Navy to re-baseline our military personnel requirements in two ways:
 - Maintain higher levels of ship and squadron manning during interdeployment periods to enable accelerated deployment of forces if required to meet operational requirements.
 - Provide sufficient manpower to maintain Force Protection Bravo Plus. A minimum of 4383 (5200 max) additional personnel are required to meet this unanticipated requirement.
- Navy's strategy would draw down from today's on-board count of 392K military (Active and Reserve) to about 383K while maintaining the higher level of capability dictated by current circumstances. We will reduce end strength associated with decommissioning ships (about 3000 actives). We expect to release the majority of Reserves by the end of FY03, replacing those providing force protection with a combination of active military, civilians, or contractors. To accomplish this, we will require flexibility in both the number and the budgeted cost of military manpower.
- Request OSD allow Navy the flexibility to determine both the most cost efficient and executable manpower mix required. Specifically:
 1. Authorize Navy to execute to the 2% flexibility in active end strength in FY02 and FY03 as allowed in law.
 2. Authorize the use of PBD 736 O&M,N funding allocated for Security Forces/Technicians for the increased military cost and/or technology.
 3. Permit Navy to establish its POM04 active end strength controls as needed to meet requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the increase in the active end strength.

APPROVED: _____
DISAPPROVED _____
OTHER: _____

COORDINATION: None.
Prepared By: CDR Tom O'Loughlin

Copy to: SECNAV

11-L-0559/OSD/11597

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov S. Zakheim 29 April 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11598

ACTION MEMO

April 18, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

FROM: Jeanne B. Fites, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Integration)

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

- Attached memo for Secretary Rumsfeld's signature to Admiral Clark (Tab A of package at Attachment 1) addresses the Secretary's concern with the Navy's proposal (Tab B) to exceed the FY 2003 Defense Program Guidance (DPG)-specified military manpower level of 376,000 in both FY 2002 and 2003.
 - Admiral Clark proposes drawing down the Navy's military end strength from the current level of 393,000 to 383,000 by the end of FY 2004.
 - The higher number includes reserve component (RC) personnel currently on active duty, primarily for force protection, but it exceeds the DPG level.
- During recent Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG) deliberations, we initiated panels to look for ways to reduce long-term military manpower needs by 1) reducing forward presence, 2) reexamining missions, 3) streamlining headquarters, 4) civilianization, and 5) leveraging technology.
 - The groups will provide mid course status updates to me by mid May.
- This problem is not unique to the Navy. All four Services currently exceed the FY 2003 President's Budget levels for FY 2002, as directed in your FY 2003-07 DPG.
 - Given the RC mobilization, we expect all four Services to share the Navy's problem, so the response sets a precedent for the others.
- The SecDef memo advises Admiral Clark of the SLRG-directed studies and encourages him to help find less military manpower-intensive ways to meet operational needs.
 - It acknowledges that the results of the studies will not be available in time to allow the Services to comply with the DPG direction for FY 2002.
 - It also indicates we will expect the Services to comply by the end of FY 2003.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A.

COORDINATION: OUSD (Comptroller)

Dov S. Zakheim
APR 29 2002

Concur with minor edits.

Dov S. Zakheim

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Sidney L. Evans, Jr., USAF, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/11599



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

I appreciate your concern that the global war on terrorism is stressing naval forces, as they are currently constituted. I know your concerns are shared by all three Military Departments.

During our Senior Leadership Review Group deliberations last month, I tasked Under Secretary Chu to initiate a process to reduce our long-term military manpower requirements. We have tasked activities throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the extent to which reducing forward presence, reexamining missions, streamlining headquarters, converting lower priority military billets to civilian, and leveraging technology will reduce long-term military manpower requirements. These groups will report back to me by the end of June. I realize the Services will not be able to take advantage of these recommendations before the end of the current fiscal year.

In the long run, however, I am convinced real progress can be made toward realigning existing military manpower resources in accordance with these recommendations. As a result, I fully expect the Services to comply with the Defense Program Guidance targets by the end of Fiscal Year 2003. I look forward to your help in ensuring our military footprint is kept as small as possible to meet operational needs.

Planning



11-L-0559/OSD/11600

June 25, 2002 7:49 AM

560.1

✓

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CVN-77 and CVNX

Is this note from Newt on CVN-77 and CVNX something that you ought to show or talk to Vern Clark about or should I? Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/21/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: CVN-77 and CVNX

DHR:dh
062502-12

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

8/6

~~SECDEF~~ I've discussed with CNO in detail. He presented a CVNX/CVN-77 brief to DEPSECDEF yesterday (8/5) as part of the program reviews with much of the attached as options. V/REJ

257 JUN 03

U16322 02

11-105591 OSD 1601

received 6/26 0945

June 25, 2002 8:50 AM

761

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Health Reform

Please take a look at the attached note and tell me what we can do to fix it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-22

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

25 JUN 02

U16323 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11602

02 JUN 177

There is a significant opportunity to conduct the DoD's administrative transactions more efficiently. They currently pay around \$8.00 per claim, because they don't use industry standard codes. (Medicare is the industry standard which the private sector adopted.) Claims costs are more commonly in the \$1.



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG -1 PM 5:09

INFO MEMO


August 1, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Defense Reform: Defense Health Program (DHP) Claims Processing Costs

- You sent me a note which indicates that the Defense Health Program (TRICARE) pays \$8 per claim rather than Medicare's \$1 and asked what we could do to fix this (TAB A).
- TRICARE does use industry standard codes to process claims. However, TRICARE costs are higher because TRICARE offers three different benefit packages with a complex system of authorizations and referrals and reimbursement rates. TRICARE claims processing costs are in fact similar to private insurers' claims, which cost between \$6 to \$10 per claim. Additionally, TRICARE requires military-unique data to be submitted for processed claims; this requirement increases claims costs.
- The \$1 cited for Medicare claims includes only the cost of processing the actual claim for the single Medicare benefit. The cost of processing Medicare managed care claims is about \$5 per claim.
- Nevertheless, we can still initiate improvements to reduce TRICARE claims processing costs. These include:
 - Increase electronic claims – Current electronic submission rates for TRICARE are 20 percent (excluding pharmacy and TRICARE for Life claims) compared with the industry standard of 65 percent.
 - Increase auto-adjudication of claims (as opposed to manual) – TRICARE auto-adjudication rates are below 50 percent.

SPL ASSTANT DI RITA	8/3
SR MA LAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	U12424 / 02
DEPT SEC WHITMORE	

11-L-0559/OSD/1-1804

- Reduce claim inquiry rates – TRICARE inquiry rates are four times higher than Medicare.
- The Department is now implementing two approaches to reducing TRICARE claims processing costs.
 - First, the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) will be processing claims for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries separately from regular TRICARE claims, making these claims easier to process and resulting in lower cost per claim.
 - Second, TMA is developing initiatives to increase electronic claim submission and improve provider and beneficiary education. These initiatives, along with the development of future managed care support contracts using industry best business practices and less military unique requirements, should result in the necessary improvements and reduce TRICARE claims processing costs.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

June 25, 2002 8:29 AM

000.5

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Victory

For your possible interest, I have attached a paper from Newt Gingrich on victory over terrorism. Some of the speechwriters or some of our folks might want to use some of those pieces that are still relevant.

Thanks.

Attach.
Sep 2001 Gingrich paper: "Ten Principles for Victory Over Terrorism"

DHR:dh
062502-21

.....

Please respond by _____

25 Jun 02

U16325 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 25 2002



Ten Principles for Victory Over Terrorism

September 2001
Newt Gingrich

The attack on September 11 was a 21st century Pearl Harbor committed by a 21st century enemy, and launched a 21st century war.

The President was exactly correct when he said – We are not about punishing those who did this one thing. We are about defeating terrorism. He said in his Texas way, – We will “whip” them. – “Whipping” isn’t the same as punishing. “Whipping,” in Texan—means defeat.

Secretary of State Colin Powell at a State Department press conference also had it exactly right when he stated we will form a coalition willing to work with us, but we will act unilaterally whenever necessary. Our opponents are terrorism and the states that support them. Paul Wolfowitz at the Pentagon also got it exactly right when he explained that it is not just the terrorists, nor the structures, but the states that harbor and protect the terrorists.

In August of 1990, we orchestrated 28 countries for eight months, put 500,000 American troops in the field and bombed Iraq for 42 days over the invasion of Kuwait. If that was the appropriate-scale campaign over the invasion of a distant country, then for the most powerful nation in the history of the world, the question is, what is the appropriate-scale campaign after thousands of American civilians have been killed in our own cities? It is important to understand this. This is not about a tiny thing. This is not about a few Tomahawk cruise missile strikes. This is not about three Special Forces teams performing magical missions.

Defeating terrorism is an enormous task. It may be closer to the Second World War in terms of scale and complexity to any conflict since then.

In that context, there are ten principles that will create the potential for victory.

Principle One: We are at war.

We have been at war at least since 1990, when Saddam invaded Kuwait. Terrorists have been continually killing Americans since then. This time terrorists crossed the threshold of killing enough Americans in our own country that it cannot be avoided by our political system.

As of September 11, terrorists have come into American territory to use American aircraft to kill thousands of innocent Americans. That was an act of war more despicable and more costly in American lives than Pearl Harbor.

We are at war. We have to defeat terrorism or they will end safety, freedom, and civilization, as we know it. We have no alternative. We must win.

Principle Two: In wars your enemies are allowed to be clever, courageous, and determined.

On the Washington Post website there was a headline that read, "Taliban warns of revenge. Afghanistan's ruling Taliban warned of revenge if the United States attacked their country in retaliation for this week's devastating terrorist assaults."

Well, why shouldn't they? If the Taliban, given the choice of being on the side of civilization and the side of terrorism chooses terrorism, and we are so foolish as to only bomb their country, why shouldn't they seek revenge? When you go to war, you seek victory, so that they are no longer in power, so they do not have the power to take revenge, so they cannot threaten you. Time is always on the side of the evil. It is an important premise of history. Time is always on the side of evil because they can wait, they can plan, and they can look for vulnerabilities while the good go about their daily business. But in order to defeat terrorism, the good have to mobilize for decisive victory.

Principle Three: In war, your vision of success is decisive for the rest of your achievement.

It is important for this administration to codify what the President has said.

In World War II we picked a very specific goal--unconditional surrender. It was quite clear. We occupied Germany, Japan, and Italy. We created democracies. The world has been better ever since. That was a direct goal.

In the Civil War, Lincoln chose a specific very, very hard goal--unconditional victory, and he paid with more lives to achieve that goal than in any other American war.

In Korea, we tolerated the goal of stalemate because we thought the geopolitical consequences were too great. We have had troops in the Korean Peninsula since 1950. Korea has been a long campaign, this is the 51st year.

Ten Principles by Newt Gingrich
September 2001

premise of history. Time is always on the side of evil because they can wait, they can plan, and they can look for vulnerabilities while the good go about their daily business. But in order to defeat terrorism, the good have to mobilize for decisive victory.

Principle Three: In war, your vision of success is decisive for the rest of your achievement.

It is important for this administration to codify what the President has said.

In World War II we picked a very specific goal--unconditional surrender. It was quite clear. We occupied Germany, Japan, and Italy. We created democracies. The world has been better ever since. That was a direct goal.

In the Civil War, Lincoln chose a specific, very, very hard goal--unconditional victory, and he paid with more lives to achieve that goal than in any other American war.

In Korea, we tolerated the goal of stalemate because we thought the geopolitical consequences were too great. We have had troops in the Korean Peninsula since 1950. Korea has been a long campaign, this is the 51st year.

In Vietnam, we decided that defeat was preferable to the risk of victory, not that we could not win, but the nation, the body politic, after a decade of agonizing internal struggle, decided that defeat was preferable to the cost of victory.

In Desert Storm, we arranged a coalition for or a limited goal--kick Saddam out of Kuwait and weaken him. That was a very specific goal. It turned out, in my judgment, in retrospect, to have been wrong, and I think all of the architects of it would now agree. They thought he would fall as a consequence, an underestimation of the survival mechanisms of dictators.

It is vital that we have the right vision. It is not going after bin Laden, who is trivial in this larger context. It is not going after the specific terrorist organization that launched the attack in New York. Yes, it would be useful to know who they are, yes, we should get them, but they are a symptom of the disease. If we eliminate them, we will simply create martyrs. They will be the bin Laden brigade. There will be a new generation of their children who decide to fight us.

The only legitimate vision is the defeat and the destruction of the system of terrorism, and that requires that we declare terrorism to be a crime against humanity, just as we did with piracy, and that we refuse to accept the existence of any regime which harbors, supports, or protects terrorists. Anything short of that simply sows the seeds so that in a few years organized terrorism will come back.

I was on the National Security Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, and we spent three years studying the world of 2025. Our number one unanimous conclusion by a bipartisan panel of 14 people was that the most significant threat to the United States is a weapon of mass destruction going off in our cities, biological, chemical, or nuclear.

We know today, that Saddam Hussein is willing to accept any level of sanctions to keep his program for weapons of mass destruction, that Iran has a massive program underway, that North Korea, while its population is starving despite being the largest recipient of U.S. food aid in Asia, has a massive program of weapons of mass destruction.

You read what these countries are saying and you wonder why no one understood Hitler in the 1930's, just as we don't understand our generation's Hitlers. So we have to take their words and their programs seriously.

Principle Four: The stakes are enormous.

The Second World War we understood. Our way of life was threatened. A world in which the German Nazis, the Imperial Japanese, and the Italian fascists had won would have been a stunningly different world. Today we face a similar stark choice. There are principles at stake on two grounds. The first is the very fabric of a free worldwide economic political structure, the ability to travel, the ability to have a decent job. Also consider the necessity

in the global economy to have just-in-time delivery where Taiwan or Thailand or China or Mexico is making something that arrives at the auto factory exactly on time for production. Terrorists are directly threatening the entire fabric of the world we have built for the last 60 years.

Second, if we do not defeat terrorism while it is still using conventional weapons, we will inevitably in our lifetime be faced with terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This is a tragic, but providential warning, of a much worse future.

Principle Five: Issue a series of ultimatums.

Sudan will cease to house terrorists or we will replace the government of Sudan. The Taliban will cease to house terrorists or we will replace the Taliban. This does not mean you have to be stupid. It does not require us, for example, to decide that we will put seven American infantry divisions in Afghanistan. It may mean we decide to allocate \$3 billion to hire every Afghan who does not like the Taliban and arm them and then help them with American firepower. And in less than a year, my guess is American air power, combined with armed Afghans, would drive the Taliban from power.

Similarly, in Iraq, we should not do something indirectly with volunteers as guerrillas. We are the most powerful nation in the world. If we want to eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein, we have the capacity to eliminate it. We did not say, let's set up a free Japanese guerrilla movement in 1942. We did not say the OSS could liberate Europe. We said the OSS is a helpful addition while we land at Normandy and bomb German cities.

This is a serious nation, and if this is a serious war, then the message is simple. Saddam will either close down all of his efforts toward weapon systems of mass destruction, and he will expel all of his terrorists or we will create a government in Iraq that will agree not to do this. We must insist on change, because we now have vivid proof in New York and Washington of the future if we do not. The next time it will not be an airplane. The next time it will be a chemical weapon or it will be a germ agent or it will be a nuclear weapon. We must take this seriously. No one should say they have not been warned by the facts of their own life during the week of September 11.

Principle Six: To achieve victory we must plan for a coercive, not a consensual campaign.

In a consensual campaign you say, I really wish the Sudanese would be nice, but they won't do more than X. In a coercive campaign you say, anyone not doing X, anyone not doing the minimum we have set, we will have to replace. So we just need to know which team you are on, and there are only two teams on the planet for this war. There's the team that represents civilization, and there's the team that represents terrorism. Just tell us which team you are on because there are no neutrals.

The Swiss Banks have to now break their secrecy law to find out everything we need to know about terrorism, period. If not, we should isolate the Swiss Banks, and they will not be part of the world banking system. Again and again, across the planet, when the United States is serious, it is amazing how many people decided that they are on the side of civilization.

This is not asking permission, this is stating a fact. There are two scorecards, which scorecard do you want? We are going to replace the government who choose the terrorist scorecard, so if you would like to be on the replacement list, we need to know it because we have a planning process underway, and we already have two lined up, and you know if you want to be third, we need your information.

The key word is replace, not punish. You do not punish governments that are dictatorships because they do not care if you kill their civilians. They do not care if you kill their infantry. If we have killed 100,000 Iraqis, and it has not replace Saddam's dictatorship it should teach us something. Saddam could not care if every Iraqi died, as long as he was the hero of the myth. We have to talk about replacement, not about punishment.

Principle Seven: The campaign has to be comprehensive.

We should reach out economically, diplomatically, and militarily to all Muslims who oppose fanatical terrorists. We should offer the future of a better way of life for every Palestinian who would like to live in peace and prosperity. We should be clear to every Muslim country that we are not anti-Muslim. We are anti-fanatic, and we would like to have good relations with every non-fanatic. It is as important to be prepared to be economically supportive as to be militarily effective.

One of the keys to winning the Cold War was the Marshall Plan, which was at least as important as creating NATO or the CIA or the Strategic Air Command. We should have a comprehensive understanding that in this war, we will be the proactive ally of creating prosperity, and safety and freedom for the entire Muslim world that wishes to live in civilization. We will only be coercive and focused on those fanatics who give us no choice, including governments that give us no choice. It cannot be only a military or an intelligence campaign. It has to be an economic, military, diplomatic, and political campaign.

Principle Eight: The coalition must be the largest willing to support our plan.

It is a very important distinction. We cannot write a plan designed to have a big coalition. We have to write a plan to win and then recruit to the plan. Countries that are not willing to participate but also not harbor any terrorists are fine. This is a passive support we will tolerate. But, we should not tolerate opposition. For example, Uruguay may decide they're not in this fight. That's fine, as long as they do not harbor terrorists. No country can harbor terrorists and claim to be out of the fight.

Principle Nine: We have to sustain freedom every day.

A worldwide economic system and a high-speed prosperous free society is inevitably vulnerable to a deeply committed state-supported terrorism. It is inevitable. Whatever we brilliantly figure out how to stop this time, they will study, and they will look for the one thing we have not figured out because they only have to hit once. They do not have to hit every day. We have to sustain freedom every day.

It is unavoidable, if you intend to remain a prosperous, free society, that our campaign must be 90-percent offense and only 10-percent defense. Our job is to root out the terrorists, root out the organizations, and root out those governments which support them because only by pursuing evil abroad can we stop evil from entering the United States. We cannot ever passively build a system that will stop evil from entering the United States. We can only slow it down.

Principle Ten: We must continuously communication to the American people and most people around the world about what it means to be on our side.

This war will be fought in the age of 24-hour news channels. The powerful wrenching images of Americans dying on September 11 will gradually fade as new images are projected on a daily and even hourly basis. Our opponents will maneuver to maximize civilian casualties in any American action. The timid and the undecided will seek every opportunity to explain why we should accept minimal results, be patient, and avoid aggressive action.

Mistakes will happen. It is vital that the right explanations and the right language are available within the news cycle on a 24-hour basis. It is also vital that those words and explanations fit both the American people and audiences around the world.

Information campaigns are the decisive campaigns of the 21st century. They have to be organized, resourced, and led just like any other aspect of warfare. This campaign to defeat terrorism will only last as long as the popular support sustains it and that support will require a substantial continuing information campaign both at home and abroad.

June 25, 2002 8:26 AM

373.24

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Defense

Please take a look at the attached from Newt Gingrich on air defense. He suggests we ask for an assessment of the largest ground threat we might face from Iran, North Korea, Iraq, etc.

Why don't you get that fashioned for me and I will sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/11/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Air Defense

DHR:dh
062502-20

.....
Please respond by _____

25Jun02

U16326 02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, May 11, 2002 5:23 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: for secdef,depsecdef-a truly bold idea on air defense

JUN 25 2002

D

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt may 11,2002

a truly bold proposal on air defense

you should ask someone to assess the total forces spent on organic air defense and the likely threats it is sized against.

Other than the first few weeks in Korea in 1950 I know of no occasion in the last half century where the United States ground forces had to worry about an overhead air threat. There may have been one or two occasions in Viet Nam but I do not remember them.

During the Cold War it made sense to have an organic ground anti-air capability because the Soviet Union was so large that the air to air assets could not stop Soviet air for the first week or so of an all out war in Central Europe.

You might ask for an assessment of the largest air to ground threat that we might face from Iran, North Korea, Iraq, etc. Our JOINT doctrine is to win air superiority and have airpower (we have three fixed wing air forces and the Army and Marines also have rotary air forces) kill enemy air threats.

There might be some limited anti-air capability you would want to keep. Maybe some in Korea. A handful of battalions that could move with expeditionary forces and would serve as a strategic reserve (but even then I doubt if you would need more than four battalions for every contingency outside Korea).

If those resources were diverted from anti-air to anti-missile capabilities it would make a lot of sense. There are a lot of places where we could face a very dangerous anti-missile capability and we probably need more anti-missile assets since air superiority cannot shoot down missiles and in the opening weeks we cannot have any faith that air power can defeat mobile scuds.

The ground forces (army and marine) ought to own the anti-missile forces so we are not talking about a cut in their assets but rather a shift from anti-air to anti-missile.

June 25, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Jim Roche
CC: Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Predator Ground Stations

452R

Please take a look at the attached from Newt Gingrich on Predator ground stations.
Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/12/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Predator Ground Stations

DHR:dh
062502-19

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

2574noa

U16328 02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, May 12, 2002 5:32 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil
Cc: john.keane@hqda.army.mil; kernan@jfc.com.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil;
ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil;
stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: ground stations for predator for ground force immediate links

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt may 12,2002
predator ground stations

someone asked me why we could not have ground units getting direct feed from the predators. I checked with the folks at general Atomic and the numbers are pathetically cheap(\$30,000 for a portable unit).. Every unit in Afghanistan could have a predator downlink that is light and direct for a total for the country of one million or less. This data could be available for every patrol and every unit sent out for contact as well as for the headquarters in the cities. It could also be provided to our allies in country as an example of franchising the most modern technology to people who cooperate with us.

there are undoubtedly some key questions (can we turn off the local download for sensitive missions,etc.)
clearly this ought to be tested in the field here at home and become ubiquitous as a way of creating situational awareness.

the following came from General Atomic.

The Rover Ground Receiver System consists of a Receiver/Antenna assembly, Receiver Battery and a Ruggedized Laptop Computer. The breakdown of weight and price is provided below.

Receiver/Antenna assembly:

Weight ~ 10 lbs

Price ~ \$ 30,000 each

Receiver Battery:

Weight ~ 2 lbs

Price = Government Furnished Equipment(standard issue BA-5590/U)

Ruggedized Laptop Computer:

Weight = 10 lbs

Price = Government Furnished Equipment

Total weight of system is less than 22lbs. Total price of the system \$30,000 each plus cost of GFE items.

Please note: The Predator aircraft requires a Rover modification in order to encode and transmit video and data to the ground systems. The price of the aircraft modification is approximately \$15,000 each.

snoflake

June 25, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Resistance

381

Please take a look at the attached from Newt Gingrich.

Larry, please set up a meeting for Cambone, you, Giambastiani, Wolfowitz and me to discuss Newt's memo on the three centers of resistance.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Resistance

DHR:dh
062502-18

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

25Jun02

U16329 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11619

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS C...

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:24 AM

APR 22 2002

To: (b)(6) osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Subject: secdef-1

General Assessment for Secretary of Defense and Specific Proposals
March 4, 2002
Newt Gingrich

I. You face three centers of active, serious resistance to your goals:

1. External opponents (Iraq, etc.)
2. The traditional Pentagon
3. Congress

Each will attempt to continue its established behavior and avoid your efforts at change.

Clarity, decisiveness, explicit delegation and relentless follow up are vital on all three fronts.

Winning the Public Information Campaign is an unavoidable sine qua non of victory in all 3.

You must establish a rhythm of rapid small experiments at change and bold aggressive planning for action on all fronts.

June 25, 2002 8:06 AM

333 DSb

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo

Please type up this memo, starting with the word "equipment," which I have marked, and make it as an attachment and then send it to Tom White, with a copy to Paul Wolfowitz:

Attached are some thoughts that were sent to me as a result of a visit to Fort Lewis.

Please let me know what you think of it.

Regards.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/25/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Fort Lewis Visits

DHR:dh
062502-17



Please respond by 06/28/02

25 Jun 02

U16330 02

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

②
wha/sh

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, February 25, 2002 9:32 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil

Cc: Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Herbits1@aol.com;
stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil; zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: Fwd: DEPSECDEF VIsits IBCT at Fort Lewis

please print out for secdef,newt

this is such a powerful critique of the lav and IBCT I have forwarded it to Paul on his trip but it suggests several action items which would save DOD money and produce a better force,
newt



(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

Sent from
Newt Gingrich

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 25 2002

From: MacGregor, Douglas A COL ODTF
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2002 9:11 AM
To: 'thirdwave2@aol.com'
Subject: DEPSECDEF Visits IBCT at Fort

copy sent to Wolfowitz

Sir, sat through a meeting in which the Generals assume that the DEPSECDEF who knows nothing about land warfare will be transformed with the help of his army exect into a wildly enthusiastic supporter of this peacekeeping constabulary force. Assumption is that his exposure to wildly enthusiastic and thoroughly rehearsed soldiers conducting dismounted infantry tactics from the 1960s will greatly impress him. Doug

You may want to alert him to the following:

Equipment:

LAVs are cast off models from Canada and are nearly 10 tons lighter than the prototypes coming off the assembly line now. In addition, the LAVs that the CSA want carry no armament other than a 50 CAL MG (used by my Grandfather in WW I) or a 40mm Grenade Launcher.

Mobile Gun System (105 on LAV) will not be available until 2004 or 2005. Worse still, the ammunition for this soft recoil must be developed independently because the gun cannot fire existing 105mm ammunition. In addition, the MGS will be 18 inches taller than an M1A1 tank and have to stop to shoot. Wheels cannot provide a stable platform - some RMA! Other variants - engineer, C2 and so on face considerable problems. Variants will not be C130 capable. Current 23 ton LAV variant of IAV has trouble with C130 deployability and must deflate tires.

BRitish Army declined to participate in the future scout combat system program because the UK insisted on tracks for survivability and mobility. UK rejected wheeled solution for combat.

Communications:

LAVs have flat panel displays mounted in them to convey the impression of high-tech battle command. However, all of the communications are legacy and single service - nothing new.

IBCT organization. Nothing new.

IBCT is a motorized rifle brigade of 3700 troops. It is part of 17,000 man interim division. Joint C4ISR capability does not exist inside the IBCT. As a result, the Joint C4ISR connectivity runs through the division, not directly to the Joint Task Force. In addition, the Colonel that commands the brigade has the same staff structure as a normal brigade and must depend heavily on division headquarters for command and control. Plan is to deploy an MG with a division headquarters to any future JTF. Purpose is to maneuver the 3700 man IBCT.

IBCT is acutely lacking in sustainment. It cannot operate independently for more than a couple of days. Its fire support is a man-intensive towed 155mm battalion. This is dinosaur technology - the 155mm howitzer was originally developed in 1905.

IBCT has no aviation component and would depend on division to provide that. This means IBCT is untrained to integrate Army aviation let alone USAF aviation.

IBCT is calling its reinforced scout company of 250 men in turretless LAVs a reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition squadron. However, there is nothing to validate a superior reconnaissance capability based on its equipment now or in the future. Most important, the RSTA unit cannot perform armed reconnaissance. By the way, in the USMC, the 25mm automatic cannon on the LAVIII is referred to as a disengagement weapon because the platform cannot engage in direct fire combat and survive. This is why the USMC relies heavily on tanks and AAVs in its MEUs and MAGTFs.

Mission Profile:

The IBCT permanently converts combat troops to peacekeeping constabulary troops. To disguise this reality, the CSA says the unit is designed for the "high end of small scale conflict." In Army parlance that is peace enforcement. However, given the inability of wheeled armor in Mogadishu to break through and rescue troops on the ground, the notion of peace enforcement is open to serious question as well.

TACTICS:

The tactics being practiced are a mix of dismounted attacks with fire support on the 1960s Vietnam model or kicking down doors in Sarajevo and Brcko to arrest thugs.

SOLUTION: Buy 200 LAVs and put them in a pool. Let units assigned to peacekeeping duties draw them as necessary for use. This is what the British Army does in Cyprus and Ulster and it saves money. It also avoids the permanent conversion of warfighting formations to peacekeeping. By the way, rotational readiness makes this quite easy and cost effective.

June 25, 2002 4:32 PM

320.2

TO: ADM Clark
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: End Strength

I was just given a copy of your 30 March letter—I had not seen it previously, as you will see from VADM Giambastiani's note. It has traveled a circuitous route, but you apparently have met with David Chu on it.

I am worried about your letter, however. If you look at the third full paragraph, next to the bottom, it has a difficult, long sentence, and then says, "This plan does that." My impression is that, grammatically, you are saying your plan does not provide for the security of our people and the base structure necessary to wage the global war on terrorism. I doubt that is what you meant, but that is what it seems to say.

Please take a look.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/30/02 CNO ltr to SecDef w/attached memo [U06544/02]

DHR:dh
062502-76



Please respond by 07/12/02

25 June 02

U16331 02

June 25, 2002 7:21 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: CNO Letter

Please make sure you give me the CNO letter. I don't remember it. Let's look at it. Shouldn't something like that be logged in, so we know when we have answered and when we haven't?

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
062502-6

.....
Please respond by _____

6/25

- CNO letter is attached
- CNO letter was logged in to C+D on 11 April and was forwarded to USD(P+R) for action
- David Thur has been working this issue in general with all services + will brief you 6/26
- David L. 055910 OSD/1626 with CNO on 6/26
L. 10/10/02



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

200 APR 11 PM 2:24

Secretary Rumsfeld

Via SECNAV

30 March 2002

Sir,

A quick note to forward the attached manpower memo.

I understand the desire to limit end strength increases. That said, I have almost 393,000 people on active duty today. As we build the FY04 FYDP, I intend to implement manpower reductions which will absorb the 10K reserves currently on active duty (primarily for force protection) into our active duty base and execute FY-04 with 383,000 end strength. In other words, I will provide this new post 9/11 security requirement and reduce our active duty baseline by 10,000 people. To accomplish this, I must increase my active duty end strength.

It would be irresponsible for me to recommend a manning strategy which did not provide for the security of our people and the base structure necessary to wage the global war on terrorism. This plan does that.

Request your approval of this approach as we build our FY-04 program.

Very respectfully,

Vern Clark
Admiral, US Navy

1106544 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/11627



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
MAY 29 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations *V. E. Clark*

SUBJECT: Meeting Military Personnel Requirements for the Global War on Terrorism

- Priorities of the Global War on Terrorism have driven Navy to re-baseline our military personnel requirements in two ways:
 - Maintain higher levels of ship and squadron manning during interdeployment periods to enable accelerated deployment of forces if required to meet operational requirements.
 - Provide sufficient manpower to maintain Force Protection Bravo Plus. A minimum of 4383 (5200 max) additional personnel are required to meet this unanticipated requirement.
- Navy's strategy would draw down from today's on-board count of 392K military (Active and Reserve) to about 383K while maintaining the higher level of capability dictated by current circumstances. We will reduce end strength associated with decommissioning ships (about 3000 actives). We expect to release the majority of Reserves by the end of FY03, replacing those providing force protection with a combination of active military, civilians, or contractors. To accomplish this, we will require flexibility in both the number and the budgeted cost of military manpower.
- Request OSD allow Navy the flexibility to determine both the most cost efficient and executable manpower mix required. Specifically:
 1. Authorize Navy to execute to the 2% flexibility in active end strength in FY02 and FY03 as allowed in law.
 2. Authorize the use of PBD 736 O&M,N funding allocated for Security Forces/Technicians for the increased military cost and/or technology.
 3. Permit Navy to establish its POM04 active end strength controls as needed to meet requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the increase in the active end strength.

APPROVED: _____
DISAPPROVED _____
OTHER: _____

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: CDR Tom O'Loughlin

Copy to: SECNAV

11-L-0559/OSD/11628

June 25, 2002 3:39 PM

TO: Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pat Tillman

340

Here is an article on a fellow who is apparently joining the Rangers. He sound like he is world-class. We might want to keep our eye on him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Isaacson, Melissa. "Marching to His Own Ideals," *Chicago Tribune*, 06/02/02

DHR.dh
062302.71

.....

Please respond by _____

25 June 2

U16333 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11629

Marching to his own ideals

Idealize anyone in sports these days and you're setting yourself up to look foolish. Idolize and you're almost guaranteed to regret it.

And then right when you've finished wading through another week, another scandal and another reason to tell your kids to take down the latest poster they've laced up on their wall, there's the story of Pat Tillman.

Tillman is the Arizona Cardinals safety who last week told his team thanks, but he was walking away from pro football and a multiyear, multi-million-dollar contract offer to join the Army Rangers, elite soldiers who throughout U.S. history have specialized in dangerous missions and a force that currently is playing a major role in Afghanistan.

At 25, Tillman said he was joining because he was approaching the Rangers' age limit of 28. He told this to his agent and his coaches and the general manager of the Cardinals, the people he had to tell.

He did not grant interviews or answer calls. Not because he hates talking or hates sports-writers, but because Tillman and his younger brother, Kevin, a minor-league baseball player who also wants to join the Rangers, do not believe they merit any special consideration or attention.

Ken Caminiti says he's not doing interviews anymore either. After acknowledging at length in last week's issue of Sports Illustrated that he formerly used steroids, including the season in which he was named the National League's most valuable player, Caminiti told ESPN Radio he felt used and sandbagged by the magazine. He said he was shocked by the reaction his comments elicited inside baseball and across the country.

Caminiti apologized to base-



AP photo by Brian Fitzgerald

Pat Tillman is an individualist, whether biking to Cardinals' training camp or enlisting in the Army Rangers.

ball for his comments, recanted some of the things he said in the magazine (despite lauding the article's author) and somehow managed to make himself sound even more of a weasel than he was in the first place. So now he's not talking, he said.

Jose Canseco's not talking either, except, of course, to say that you should buy his tell-all book when it comes out. Then you can bet he'll be talking in order to hawk as many as he can.

After that he no doubt will stop talking because, like Dennis Rodman once did, he will discover he has misquoted himself and taken himself out of context.

Caminiti had an even more unusual take on such things when asked by Dan Patrick about his SI quote that "at least half the guys are using steroids."

"I don't know if I mentioned half or not," Caminiti said. "That is something that might have been thrown in my face or in my mouth. That's not true.

That's a false statement. I didn't mean half ..."

That's the easy way out, of course. Just claim some reporter has taken advantage of you after you have spilled your guts in several lengthy interview sessions and you can bet a good number of people will not only forgive your sins but make a martyr out of you to boot.

Any way you look at it, it's still cowardice.

Then there's Tillman, who turned down a five-year, \$9 million offer sheet from the St. Louis Rams as a free agent last year out of loyalty to the Cardinals. Now he demonstrates an integrity and courage that comes not just from volunteering to fight the Taliban but from answering to his own ideals.

You might be tempted to think the guy is a little light on the uptake for walking away from the prime of a lucrative career, not to mention leaving a new wife at home. But this is a man who graduated summa cum laude after 3½ years at Arizona State with a 3.82 grade-point average in marketing, not some crazy kid who enlists in the Army on a drunken dare.

A seventh-round draft pick thought to be too small and too slow for the NFL, Tillman has made a life of proving people wrong, setting a Cardinals franchise record with 200 tackles in 2000, and following his heart.

In exchange for lining up for Uncle Sam, Tillman will be paid little more than \$1,000 a month. He says he wants to return to football in three years.

You wouldn't want to be the unsuspecting flanker who comes across the middle on him after his hitch is up. You wouldn't want to be the enemy now.

Either way we're not likely to hear about it from Tillman.

June 25, 2002 2:24 PM

334

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SLRG

Let's give some thought to who we might want to add into the Senior Level Review Group.

My view is that all the people at the top are working their heads off. We may want to get a next layer down energized, knowledgeable, engaged and feeling they understand our part of it. That would be like the Vice Chiefs (as opposed to just the Chiefs), the Under Secretaries of the Services, the number twos in the OSD and maybe some assistant secretaries. We could move it across the hall and do it over there, with a larger group, and see if we can recapture the same informal mood.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-68

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

2574n0a

U16335 02

June 25, 2002 12:53 PM

ITALY

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Italy and the JSF

I should probably write Martino in Italy with respect to his joining the Joint Strike Fighter. Please ask Doug Feith or Pete Aldridge to draft a letter for my signature.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-55

.....
Please respond by 07/02/02

25JUN02

U16336 02

June 25, 2002 12:31 PM

PAKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pakistan

If we are going to get the Paks to really fight the war on terror where it is, which is in their country, don't you think we ought to get a chunk of money, so that we can ease Musharraf's transition from where he is to where we need him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-54

.....

Please respond by 07/19/02

257400a

U 16337 02

June 25, 2002 12:21 PM

292

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Service-Related Disability

Gen. Myers tells me he did his transition out before he knew he was going to be named Chairman, and he had briefings. Of course, in one of the briefings the VA tells them to gather up all their medical records and find out how much disability VA can give them.

So they take a 60-year-old man whose hearing or knees have declined and say, "Gee, you get 10, 15 20 percent disability." I think that is wrong. I don't think people should be encouraged to file for disability. Colin Powell is on disability because of hearing loss. There isn't a 60-year-old person who doesn't have some hearing loss, and it doesn't necessarily mean it is service-related. I was a Navy pilot, but I'm not on disability because I have hearing loss.

Let's get a policy on this and find out how we want to do it. But I am not impressed with the way it is being handled. We have to have respect for the taxpayers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-52

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

25Jun02

June 25, 2002 12:14 PM

100.54

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR-
SUBJECT: Guidance for Focus

We need to get a piece of paper that tells us what we want to tell the NSA to focus on, what NIMA should focus on, what JSOC should focus on and what kind of guidance we want to give the Joint Staff.

These are policy questions to some extent—they are also administrative. Why don't you and Larry Di Rita think that through.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-51

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

U16339 02

25Jun02

June 25, 2002 12:00 PM

334

TO: Larry Di Rita
 VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Meetings

I need to start seeing all invitations to meetings for the Homeland Security Council, beginning immediately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 062502-50



Please respond by _____

25 JUN 02

U16340 02

June 25, 2002 11:59 AM

326

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

I would like to see my background sheet corrected to include my Naval Reserve service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-49

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

astunoe

U16341 02

June 25, 2002 11:46 AM

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Memo

471.96

Thanks for your memo of June 19. Please provide leadership on the space matter. It sounds to me like you are on the right track. Let me know what I can do to help.

With respect to the purchase cards, I think it is important to land all over some folks. That behavior is not acceptable.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/19/02 SecAF memo to SecDef re: Various Notes

DHR:dh
062502-48

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

25 Jun 02

U16342 02

SecDef -

This is a response to 4 snowflakes, subjects highlighted.

D. Ritz

Larry Di Rita
6/21

M. Di Rita
VADM G
SAB
6/20

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 1200 PM 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Various Notes

Boss,

There were four recent notes from you that I wanted to address briefly.

1. Reliance on Space. I *do think* that the industrial base for space is in bad shape, as I've noted to you often. I'll let my friend, John Stenbit, be the optimist, but I've seen too many problems in the space area to be sanguine that all is well these days. Too many systems under development are not healthy, and the industry seems to be doing little to fix itself. Thus, I believe we have to be more imaginative in thinking about space, and we have to be careful not to throw money at an industry that is having very hard times performing. For example, GPS is vulnerable to jamming. The first response is to accelerate GPS III. Yet, the issue is more complicated. For some of us, the issue is accuracy of weapons, and such weapons have both GPS and inertial systems on board. What to do? Well, a better inertial system most likely fixes the problem since the time of flight of a weapon like JDAM is so short. And, a new and better inertial guidance unit would be a heck of a lot cheaper. Another issue is the possibly overextended use of GPS for accurate clocks. We need to understand this issue better than we do presently. Point: a sensible response may include taking actions other than a rush to increase the power of the satellites. In time, this should be done, but at a deliberate pace. Similarly, Spaced Based Radar should not be a macho technology demonstration. Rather, we are trying to understand what is needed for ground-moving-target-indications, and how the space component should be a complement to a portfolio of systems to include JSTARS or Global Hawk. Much cheaper than attempting to solve all problems with spacecraft alone. In fact, given the basic radar equation (effective power is a function of one over the distance the energy must travel *raised to the fourth power*), any radar in space that tried to be the equivalent of JSTARS would cost a large fortune. As to our

dependency, and looking for a "way ahead," I agree with Pete Aldridge on the idea of a Defense Science Board\Scientific Advisory Board (USAF). Also, given the emerging dearth of systems engineers, we may wish to sponsor a National Institute for Systems Engineering. Pete Aldridge, Pete Teets and I are looking into this.

2. Misuse of the Purchase Card as unveiled by the GAO. Our own auditors have been on this wicket since I arrived. The GAO was ahead of us in some cases. The misuse is a disgrace, and we have both our FM organization and the AF IG jointly investigating. We will go after any and all abusers, as well as making our Commands more aware of the potential to misuse the card. I'm especially upset about the \$40K in late rental car charges; this is just sloppy management.

3. End-strength. This has been very emotional in the Air Force. As a base is opened overseas, we get a long-standing commitment. And, we still have Northern Watch and Southern Watch, etc. to fulfill. For example, we had about 8K folks deployed to SWA on 10 September. We added about 12K for OEF. But, we still have 18K there now, and they need rotational replacements! Further, Noble Eagle adds a new mission for us, as does the heightened protection of US air bases. And, we have done better in recruiting and retention than anticipated. *Still, you are quite right.* We have to adapt faster, and deal with our skill-mix problem soonest. It is in our own interests (e.g., an addition of 7000 people costs us about \$350 million a year, and grows; that's more than the costs of doing a major upgrade for seven AWACS aircraft.) The bureaucracy always finds it easier to just add people, and it finds all kinds of reasons not to let people go (e.g., I found the Guard holding onto airmen from Noble Eagle even though we are partially stood down.) Overall, there is the issue of "waiting for the next shoe to drop." What have John and I done? We've met with all of our three and four star generals, as well as many others involved. While I can make a good case for force protection people, I've directed that we end stop-loss and the mobilization of other than force protection personnel and a handful of other specialties. We should be under 2% end-strength by 1 October, vice the 4% you were shown, and well under the 1% level by 1 November. I'll have the drawdown curves for you in a week or so.

4. Video from UAVs. I've given my input to Pete, since I was a copy addressee. The Bosnia footage is from neither a Global Hawk nor a Predator. Still, we have issues that need to be addressed. In short, Global

potential
Service
high hearings
next time
to June
before a House
subcommittee

f

Hawk is fine because it uses military links and is encrypted. Predator is not, mainly because it is still very developmental and we did not want to spend money on encryption until we understood just how we were going to use the video, etc. We did not envision, for example, that we would be feeding video in other aircraft, or directly to soldiers on the ground. By March 2003, we will begin to use some commercial encryption. Since Predator video is perishable for the most part, this should do the trick--and far cheaper than using NSA-level encryption.

Boss, this should bring us up to date. I wanted you to know that we've been working each of your questions.

r/a


James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

cc:
DepSecDef

June 25, 2002 11:02 AM

015

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: ICC

I think we ought to get this "*Washington Post* vs. International Law" article out and make sure the press is aware of it—get it through the press. Torie might want to get it to the bureau chiefs.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/18/02 *Wall Street Journal* Op-ed, "*Washington Post* vs. International Law"

DHR:dh
062502-43

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

U16343 02

257400a

ity" and were a "pretext for discrimination."

Berry

The irony is that the Civil Rights Commission exists to investigate exactly this sort of behavior elsewhere. It's also notable that Ms. Monroig's is just one of nine similar EEOC complaints recently filed by staffers. That's an astonishing number for a federal agency with only about 75 employees. At least three of these cases have been settled by Ms. Berry under undisclosed terms that

Thernstrom, detailed the Commission's role in April, and that has defined Ms. Berry's tenure. Ms. Thernstrom said that in theory the Commission has an important role to play in the national dialogue on race, but in reality "it hurts more than it helps."

President Bush has the power to replace Ms. Berry as Chairman and it's past time he did to spare the Commission, and the country, further embarrassment. WSJ. 6/18/02

Washington Post vs. International Law

We've never liked the idea of the International Criminal Court, and we like it even less having seen what happened last week to the Washington Post.

The United Nations tribunal investigating war crimes in the Bal-

kans ruled that retired Post reporter Jonathan Randal, who is American, can be forced to testify about what he saw in Bosnia in 1993. If he doesn't comply, the court can instruct the French police to pick up Mr. Randal in Paris, where he now lives.

As the Post's lawyers argued at The Hague, the ruling sets a dangerous precedent and puts journalists who cover wars at greater risks. Journalists bear public witness to conflicts. If they come to be seen as future prosecution witnesses, they might become victims of a tyrant's second thoughts about allowing an important witness to stay alive. Reporters' future access to troubled areas, and thus their ability to publicize wrongdoing, might be undermined by this ruling.

But more important, the court's reasoning highlights an inherent problem with the International Criminal Court, which opens its doors on July 1. Unchecked by democratic institutions of a sovereign state, these tribunals can and often are forced to make up the rules as

they go along. They might ignore such niceties of American jurisprudence as, say, the First Amendment. That's one reason the Bush Administration refuses to support it.

A world court doesn't have to observe the First Amendment.

In this case, Mr. Randal challenged a subpoena to testify in

the case of a Bosnian Serb politician charged with genocide and crimes against humanity. Mr. Randal had quoted the accused as advocating the expulsion of non-Serbs from northwest Bosnia. The "ethnic cleansing" campaign went into full swing a few months later.

Court insiders say Mr. Randal's testimony isn't crucial to the case as many journalists who covered Bosnia have testified voluntarily. Mr. Randal was the first exception, and the judges were clearly piqued that someone dared question their authority. In the ruling, they made clear the court "is not bound by the laws and judicial pronouncements of any State."

That's precisely our point. The court sees itself as free of the constraints that courts within a national judicial system must observe. That's also what the International Criminal Court is asserting for itself. The Post's editorial board has supported the International Criminal Court, but maybe this real world experience will prove to be educational.

h.
Eig
Am
well
tion
for
J
trul
mor
with
oth
lanc
for
it w
reas
Fou
tion
of th
of th
infor
To
suffr
tath
ful
the
hur
whi
to
is
mi
tal
in
int
dr
vo
dr
sc
ho
hic
th
r
de
a

6/26 software
1.000

4/2

6/26/02

June 25, 2002 10:58 AM

Sir:

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Quotes

[Handwritten initials]

Attached. Also reviewed sent and with papers / reporters who got it during T.C.

*Leave in file
6/27*

Please give me back that piece of paper that shows what I said in India and what I said in Pakistan on Al Qaeda being or not being in Kashmir.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-42

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

U16344 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11644

25 Jun 02

Summary of Secretary Rumsfeld's position on Al Qaeda in Kashmir

Kuwait Transcript (6/10/02)

- "There are scraps of information that suggest that al Qaeda is active in that area. We are concerned about it because it is rather clear that quite apart from what may evolve as India and Pakistan's interest in lessening tensions, you could imagine that al Qaeda might have an interest in increasing tensions in the region. So the issue as to whether or not they are there, and if so where, and what may be done about it is of interest to all parties. Certainly, if they're found they'll be visited."

Qatar Transcript (6/11/02)

- "I've not been on the ground in the LOC in Kashmir. It is a difficult part of the world. It is 15- to 20,000 feet high in the northern three-quarters of the LOC. It's mountainous. I don't know anyone has perfect visibility into what is taking place there."
- "Second, there is a concern that very likely, there were already militants in there and that someone could engage in an act that could create an incident that someone could say, well, you know those people just came across the LOC. But they might very well have already been there."
- "Needless to say, a third worry is the fact that we know al Qaeda and Taliban left Afghanistan and transited into Iran and into Pakistan and it's conceivable that some of them might decide that it would be in their interest to create an incident, purposely, not for the benefit of Kashmir, but to cause a conflict between India and Pakistan, with the hope that they could pick up the pieces to their advantage."

India Transcript (6/12/02)

- ★ I have seen evidence, well let me rephrase it -- I have seen indications that there in fact are al Qaeda operating in the area that we're talking about near the Line of Control. I do not have hard evidence of precisely how many or who or where, and needless to say there are an awful lot of people in the world who want to do everything possible to stop al Qaeda from planning and executing additional terrorist acts.

Pakistan Transcript (6/13/02)

- ★ "I think what I said in the United States, and on this trip in earlier stops, is what I know to be the facts, and the facts are that I do not have evidence and the United States does not have evidence of al Qaeda in Kashmir. We do have a good deal of scraps of intelligence that come in from people saying that they believe al Qaeda are in Kashmir or in various locations. It tends to be speculative; it is not actionable; it is not verifiable, and I believe I made that clearly, that distinction clear, when I responded to a question in Delhi, I think. In any event, that is, in so far as I know, that is the situation, and I did express that during one or more of my discussions here in Pakistan."
- "So I would also add that the government here has arrested -- I don't know how many people, but a very large number of al Qaeda and Taliban. We have benefited from that by

intelligence gathering information that has helped the United States and other countries all across the globe in gathering information and intelligence that enables us to work to prevent additional terrorist attacks. We've got to keep in mind what this is about: this is about people who go around the world killing innocent men women and children, and our task is to gather information so we can stop those attacks from happening."

Media's Response

Washington Post (6/13/02)

- One day after reporting "indications" that al Qaeda was active in the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld backed away from the suggestion, stressing that such reports were second-hand and "speculative."
- The shift in emphasis reflected a shift in location: On Wednesday, when Rumsfeld told reporters the terrorist group might be working in Kashmir, he was in India, which has long made the allegation in an effort to tar rival Pakistan.
- But today Rumsfeld was in Pakistan, which considers the militants fighting Indian rule in Kashmir as freedom fighters. And Pakistan has been a "truly wonderful" U.S. ally in the fight against al Qaeda, Rumsfeld noted.

London Telegraph (6/15/02)

- Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, sought to calm a furious diplomatic storm in Pakistan yesterday by abandoning his claim that al-Qa'eda fighters were active in the disputed Kashmir region.
- Instead, Mr Rumsfeld went out of his way to praise Pakistan, lauding the "truly wonderful" co-operation in the war against terrorism from the president, Gen Pervaiz Musharraf.
- But Pakistani officials had earlier accused Mr Rumsfeld of swallowing "Indian propaganda" and observers criticised his performance as "spoiling" American diplomacy. The row began when Mr Rumsfeld appeared to accept persistent Indian claims that al-Qa'eda terrorists were present in Kashmir.
- After meeting the Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, Mr Rumsfeld said: "I have seen indications that there are al-Qa'eda operating near the line of control, but I do not have hard evidence of precisely how many or who or where."
- The accusation infuriated Pakistan and the fact that Mr Rumsfeld appeared to lend it substance caused officials close to Gen Musharraf to utter rare words of criticism of America.
- "I don't know where they got it from," said Maj-Gen Rashid Qureshi, spokesman for Gen Musharraf. "It seems they believed Indian propaganda."
- Mr Rumsfeld later emerged from talks with the Pakistani military ruler and said America had no evidence of al-Qa'eda presence in Kashmir.
- Instead, he said: "We do have a good deal of scraps of intelligence that come in from people who say they believe al-Qa'eda are in Kashmir, or are in various locations. It tends to be speculative, it is not actionable, it is not verifiable."

Received 4/26 0715
Done 6/27

June 25, 2002 10:56 AM

110.01

TO: Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Supplemental

We have to get the '02 Supplemental passed before Congress leaves for vacation. What do we do to get it to happen? I have talked to Andy Card. He says they are pushing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-41

.....

Please respond by 06/26/02

25Jun02

U16345 02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



ACTION MEMO

June 26, 2002, 6:30 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Supplemental

- You asked what we could do to get the Congress to pass the Supplemental before they leave for vacation.
- Under separate cover, we forwarded for your signature letters to each of the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Appropriations Committees and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. These letters emphasized the urgency of passing the Supplemental as soon as possible and identifies actions that would likely be taken if not passed by July 15th.
- While I have had discussions with Chairman Lewis, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee for the House Appropriations Committee, and key staff of the Defense Subcommittee for the Senate Appropriations Committee to emphasize the urgency of DoD getting the Supplemental before the July 4 recess, there are bigger politics here than just the Defense Supplemental (i.e., raising the debt ceiling).
- || • I strongly recommend that you place telephone calls to Chairmen Young, Bryd, Inouye, and Lewis to emphasize the urgency of the Congress passing this Supplemental before they leave for the July 4th recess or soon after Congress returns.
- Attached are some points that you may want to emphasize regarding the urgency of the Supplemental and some critical authorities that we need to fight this global war on terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef call to Chairmen Young, Bryd, Inouye, and Lewis.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/11648

Urgency for Passage of the Supplemental Request

- The Department of Defense (DoD) urgently needs the Emergency Supplemental passed. It has been over 90 days since the President requested these funds; we expected the Congress to pass the Emergency Supplemental **before** the Memorial Day recess.
- If passage is delayed beyond July 15th, the Department will need to take certain actions to ensure that we have sufficient funding for essential activities through the end of September.
- These actions will likely include:
 - Canceling training,
 - Deferring depot maintenance for ships and aircraft,
 - Postponing facilities maintenance and repair, and
 - Reducing spare parts and supplies purchases that will hurt future readiness.
- These degradations would reduce the ability of our forces to meet America's global commitments and to prosecute the war on terrorism with the intensity that the threat requires.
- It is also critical that the Congress provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with special authority and \$420 million requested for payments to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key nations supporting the global war on terrorism. We also need the \$100 million in further authority should reimbursement costs exceed \$420 million.
 - These resources and authority must be provided to the Defense Department, not the State Department since DoD is one fighting this war and, therefore, should be the organization to validate the military and logistical requirements and to disburse the assistance.
 - There should be no earmarking of these resources; we need to be able to disburse this assistance to those countries who have provided us with the most support.
 - General Franks is also very concerned about this issue, and has been phoning Committee Chairmen to win their support.

June 25, 2002 10:54 AM

China

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: China Invitation

Here is an article that says I declined an invitation to visit Beijing. That is not true. If you get the transcript of what I said at the Foreign Press Club, I did not. I believe I said I didn't have any plans to go.

Please find out if I was invited when Hu was here. If so, I need to know it. I think we need to straighten this out, possibly when we meet with the *Washington Times* people this week and maybe get a letter drafted beforehand.

Thanks.

Attach.
News article

DHR:dh
062502-40

.....
Please respond by 06/26/02

U16346 02

25Jun02

June 25, 2002 10:38 AM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thanks

3355D

I have been poring over a series of memos from you that I have not responded to.

Know that the overwhelming majority I have moved around the building for action and comment.

You are an amazing fountain of ideas. They are stimulating, thought-provoking and useful, and I appreciate it, my friend. Keep them coming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-37

25 JUN 02

U16347 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11651

June 25, 2002 10:38 AM

0200PAE

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA&E

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on PA&E for you to think through and take action on as you see fit.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/08/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: PA&E

DHR:dh
062502-36

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

25Jun02

U16349 02

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD From Newt Gingrich

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, April 08, 2002 6:41 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Cc: zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: PA and E

For secdef. depsecdef
from Newt 4/8/02**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JUN 25 2002

cc given to Wolfowitz

further on P,A and E

This is an agency with a tired bureaucracy asking tired questions and providing tired and distractingly useless analysis.

It is also a civilian agency much more susceptible to complete overhaul than are the services. Yet overhauling it decisively would also set a standard of how serious you are in dealing with the services.

P,A and E can be very important and very helpful if it is the Secretary's agency. That means it should report directly to secdef and the head of it should have direct access to secdef. For practical purposes this could be coordinated by depsecdef in alliance with the vice chairman of the Joint chiefs but it should not fall below that level. This standard will change dramatically the quality of who you can get to lead the agency.

It is important to remember that P,A and E is really only valuable if it has a sense of the future, is measuring big decisions against that future and is asking groundbreaking questions. That requires secdef to develop a template against which new systems and new efforts are measured.

Your new P,A and E should focus on asking big questions and getting big answers. Today's P,A and E is reduced to chasing tiny chipmunks in an exhausted boring fashion and that lowers the quality of thinking and planning for the whole department because people get used to debates over chipmunks. We need a P,A and E designed to look for the antelopes of the transformation process and get the big things right even if it means ignoring little things.

Finally, P,A and E is an opportunity to invent the future rather than marginally change the past. You should list in three to five pages the P,A and E you want. You ought to invite three to five smart outsiders like Grady Means at PWC and Chris Demuth to review your paper and propose how such an agency could operate. You should then hire a person to transform the agency. You ought to figuratively eliminate all current jobs, define the new jobs and allow the current personell to bid on the new jobs but not be guaranteed them. This should all be done with a keen awareness of how much we need new knowledge and new thinking and a new

sense of direction in asking the rest of the building tough questions.

If you cannot get to a 21st century P,A and E you are better to abolish it and find a new method of asking questions. A tired bureaucratic P,A and E is an absolute obstacle to transformation and simply provides bureaucratic hoops for the services to jump through after which they can "prove" they have been validated because they met the bureaucratic standards of P,A and E.

June 25, 2002 10:28 AM

020 PA&E

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Restructuring PA&E

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on restructuring PA&E. It also refers to UAVs and Operation Southern Watch.

What do you recommend?

Thanks.

Attach.
04/08/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: PA&E

DHR:dh
062502-35

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

2574402

U16350 02

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com**JUN 25 2002****Sent:** Monday, April 08, 2002 2:12 PM**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;**Cc:** zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil**Subject:** for today's phone call

to secdef, depsecdef

from newt 4/8/02

I sent Dov Zackheim the following letter in response to a letter he forwarded from PA and E about the Predator and Southern Watch.. He understands the problem and it requires a thorough restructuring of pa and e.

The absolute lack of seriousness in the PA and E letter to me indicates a moribund institution that needs to be rethought from the ground up and potentially have a large part of its work force replaced or ata minimum retrained.

To: zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil**Cc:** Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil**Subject:** Letter on UAVs and OPeration Southern Watch

Thanks for sending me the letter on analyzing the idea of using unmanned air vehicles for southern watch. If this is typical of the work PA and E does you should abolish the agency and rehire.

1. I did not recommend simply substituting Predator B for U-2 overflights. Far more importantly I suggested using Predator B for regular fighter aircraft. The Predator B can carry Amraam, Harm, and Hellfire (the first two can be used above anti-aircraft gun range, the last one requires coming lower). My suggestion was that we experiment initgially with a gradual use of predator B and see if we could build it up to ultimately being three-fourths of the flights with the manned aircraft largely as reinforcement and for unusual developments. The theory was that we would save a great deal of money, and risk fewer people, and learn a lot about continuous operations with unmanned aircraft.

2. The Predator B paragraph is a function of remarkable lack of serious work on PA and E's part. It describes "a next generation variant currently on the drawing board--would probably offer a better substitute for the U-2....But the characteristics and costs of this new UAV are not yet clearly defined." The first two Predator Bs were delivered to the Air Force in January, cost around \$3 million. I am attaching an email from the retired Navy three star (and former head of top gun) who will be glad to brief someone at PA and E

4/8/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11656

if they would like to work hard enough to either write emails or make phone calls.

I am being this blunt because you should be furious with whoever gave you this letter.

3. Why in the world would a Global Hawk cost the same as a U-2? If we are not getting substantial increase in value we should cancel the program.

4. The letter does helpfully note that we may want to buy a sigint variant of the Predator B so we could gather that data. Admiral Tom Cassidy (attached) might have some specifics for that.

Could you send this back in the system and ask them to talk with people who know Predator B, compare its operating costs with the total southern watch costs and see if we can't actually save a good bit with no decline in capability and possibly with an increase in operational capability.

Thanks
newt

SNOW/TKR

June 25, 2002 10:24 AM

322

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Consolidation

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich that includes a memo from MacGregor, Come in and see me about it, and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Consolidation

DHR:dh
062502-34



Please respond by 07/26/02

25 Jun 02

U16351 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11658

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

(Newt Gingrich)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, April 07, 2002 9:57 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Cc: stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil; Herbits1@aol.com

Subject: for secdef

JUN 25 2002

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 4/7/02*Copy rec'd by Wolfowitz, Dr. R. T.***SECDEF HAS SEEN**

saving money by building leaner, more combat oriented structures.

The following memo from MacGregor is so lucid it is worth your trying to implement.

Sir, I outlined 5 years ago a plan to consolidate AMC, TRADOC and FORSCOM into one headquarters modeled on CONARC that would also implement the reorientation of training and doctrine to the training centers as outlined by Jim Warner. Frank Finelli is quite familiar with this strategy to reduce overhead, as well as the constipation of decision making that results from too many four stars inside the Army.

Further, the three star mobilization headquarters - 1st and 5th Army - should also vanish. In place of these headquarters, I outlined the Strategic Reserve Corps concept for the Army resulting in the establishment of a n ARNG and Army Reserve Headquarters at Fort McPherson. It seems to me that this idea has finally matured in light of the desire to create a Homeland Security CINC or CINCNORTH headquarters. Fort McPherson would provide the ideal Army reserve component command on the three star level for that purpose. I discussed this at length with MG (ARNG) ret Bill Navas (currently residing in Arlington) five years ago. He was then on the NGB and strongly supported both the reorganization of the ARNG along the BTP lines, as well as the establishment of the Army Strategic Reserve Corps Headquarters at Fort McPherson. It was obvious that giving the ARNG/RC community another three star and serious operational headquarters was a big political win for any administration with the foresight to do it.

In addition, I argued to GEN Reimer that it was time to stand down USAREUR through an agreement that would shift responsibility for political-military interface to USEUCOM. (A similar approach should be taken with USAFE).

Please keep in mind that none of this was popular with the serving four stars at the time since it amounted to the elimination of (3) four star jobs inside the Army (AMC/FORSCOM and USAREUR) - something I think the SECDEF would favor now. Appropriate timelines and plans for this could be drawn up in the Army Staff

4/8/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11659

for the approval of the SECDEF. It is not hard since AMC is largely civilian and will require a mix of contracting and reapportionment of responsibilities to Fort Monroe and the DA Staff where most of AMC and many of TRADOC's actions can be performed.

In the last briefing that I provided to you on *Breaking the PHalanx*, there is a slide that depicts the conversion of the Army structure to an expeditionary structure modeled to some extent on the US Navy. It shows on the right the three corps structures - XVIII, III and Strategic Reserve - that are designed to provide ready deployable forces through Army Land Combat Command at Fort Monroe. On the left it shows either Joint Force Land Component Commands in the regional unified commands designed to replace the deploying headquarters along with the existing numbered Army headquarters in places like Hawaii and Panama. Or, if the SECDEF presses ahead with the Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept, the SJFHQs replace these. Five years ago, I theorized that the conversion of the Army WW II mobilization system to a dual structure - administrative and logistical C2 from CONUS + operational C2 integrated with the Joint command structure in the unified commands - would have to precede the establishment of Standing Joint Force Headquarters. But the rapidity with which that occurs is entirely a function of how fast the SECDEF wants to go. If we continue on the current course, I think standing up the JFLCCs in the interim would probably work better. V.R. Doug Macgregor

snowflake
↓

June 25, 2002 10:20 AM

381

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transformation

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on transformation. There is just no way I am going to have Wolfowitz and Pace do what Newt is suggesting.

The question is: what is the alternative? Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/06/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Transformation

DHR:dh
062502-33



Please respond by 07/26/02

2574n02

U16352 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11661

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich
SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
 Sent: Sunday, January 06, 2002 9:40 PM
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
 Cc: Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Herbits1@aol.com
 Subject: the big decision for 2002-to transform or not to
 please give to the secretary, Paul and Larry, thanks newt

JUN 25 2002

Thank you for squeezing me into your schedule Saturday.

The key point of my visit is simple but very hard. Transformation is very hard. The services will all legitimately resist it because that is what large bureaucracies do. The book Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is filled with proof of the 1920s and 1930s and there is no reason to believe the core culture and system have changed.

Therefore you face a big decision.

1. Give up on fundamental transformation, get the best change you can without a focused effort, be a successful war SecDef and the services and the country will love you.
- or
2. decide you are really serious about transformation and establish a system of accountability and focus which ensures the best possible chance of having broken through by the end of 2004 and actually dramatically changed the system by 2009 when President Bush gives his successor the legacy of the Rumsfeld years.

The rest of this memo assumes you are really serious about transformation and outlines the first unavoidable step.

1. You must appoint Wolfowitz and Pace to be in charge of transformation and that means you must relieve them of 80% of their other duties. If their duties are too pressing then you must create a second Deputy Secretary and second Vice Chairman in charge of transformation. You and Myers should always know and concur in what is going on but you two have to fight the war, work with the white house and try to manage relations with the media and the congress. I do not see how the two of you can pay continuing consistent attention to transformation no matter how much you want to.

As an analyst I would argue that this is non-negotiable. The building is too big and tough to be transformed part time or below the authority of the very top. It isn't that it will take longer without them. It will never happen. The services will simply adapt the new technologies to the same old doctrines and force structures.

To get transformation you simply must have two top people involved.

2. once they are assigned the transformation job (or you have announced anew program to get a second depsecdef and second vice chief) we can outline the transformation plan so it can happen with surprising speed. After three months of thinking about this I am confident we have crossed a watershed and can build a transformational system that will work with amazing speed but it can only be done starting at the top.

By the way this was always the Deming rule. He would never work below the CEO because if the CEO was not committed then the corporation could not change. You have a real war to fight so you simply must designate someone with power in both the civilian and military hierarchy to get this done.

I believe working with them we could have a very bold transformation plan in 60 days that would be intellectually very hard for the services to reject.

2. Every step of transformation has to involve civilian and military working together. Only when transformation has been driven into the uniformed services will it be complete and this can only be done by senior military working side by side with senior civilians.

let me know how I can help
newt

cc: Dr. Wolfowitz
L. D. Ritz

1/7/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11662

June 25, 2002 10:06 AM

IRRAQ

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Winning the Argument

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on winning the argument on Iraq. It seems to me that he makes a good point, and that we ought to be able to fashion the argument ourselves off of these kinds of materials.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
06/16/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Winning the Argument on Iraq

DHR:dh
062502-31

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

25 JUN 02

U16353 02

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
 Sent: Sunday, June 16, 2002 10:17 AM
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
 Subject: an australain witness to Saddam's dangerousness

JUN 25 2002

for secdef, depsecdef
 from Newt 6/16/2002
 winning the argument on Iraq

I am not sure Butler would agree with a unilateral American operation but his book is a profound testimony to why Saddam needs to be replaced. you might want to promote its sales in paperback for citizens and reporters who wonder if you are exagerating. The following is a review I did for Newt.Org

Richard Butler The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security (New York,Public Affairs, 2000, 262pp)

This is MUST reading for anyone who would understand why President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld continue to push for the replacement of Saddam Hussein.

Butler was a career Australian diplomat who had been the Australian Ambassador for Disarmament and was named head of the United Nations Special Commission on Disarming Iraq. This book outlines the Iraqi determination to get weapons of mass destruction, the politics of the United Nations leadership (Kofi Annan and others) trying to paper over Iraqi deceptions to achieve a "victory" of diplomacy despite reality, and the ultimate victory of Saddam over both the UN and the Clinton Administration. It is a sobering story.

Just as Hitler's Mein Kampf explained Nazi Germany's future for those who would read it (as Churchill did) so Butler's outline of Hussein's world explains clearly what the issue is and why Saddam is working so hard to develop weapons of terrifying capability:

Deputy Prime Minister "Aziz had stated quite plainly that Iraq had used chemical weapons on Iran, that it maintained biological weapons, and that these were intended specifically for use against Israel. The world picture he painted was one already familiar from Saddam Hussein's speeches. There is an Arab world, an Arab ethnos, led perhaps by shaky governments in some quarters, but that needs to be united and vigilant against the Persians in the Northwest and the Israelis in the Southwest. Iraq was fitted for the task of leading and defending the overall Arab ethnos. For that purpose, it had sought, obtained, used, and would use again in the future weapons of mass destruction." pp. 118

Butler asserts: "Iraq's main triumph was the removal of all disarmament inspections

6/17/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11664

and the shutdown of all monitoring systems....Is Iraq as dangerous as it was a decade ago? Elementally, yes. Although a good portion of the arms Iraq had acquired were removed, Saddam still satisfies the three criteria usually advanced in judging whether or not a crime was committed: motive, means, and opportunity. He clearly continues to have the motive and means to threaten great danger, and now the opportunity for renewed weapons development, given the extended absence of international arms control in Iraq."(p218.

Butler introduces Iraq in a chapter entitled A Glimpse of Terror.

He recounts again and again the true nature of Saddam's regime. "The regime of Saddam Hussein. Its brutal and tyrannical nature has been documented..in detail for almost two decades. The political currency of his regime is homicide, frequently threatened and often delivered ,the callousness of the regime toward its own people--a quality we witnessed daily in our dealings with Iraq, something which gives the lie to Saddam's public protestations that his primary goal is to lift the awful burden of international sanctions from the backs of the Iraqi people...he could give up sanctions relief at any time by giving up his weapons. He has resolutely refused to do that, thus trading off the welfare of the Iraqi people...for his own power and weapons....

"This is Saddam Hussein's regime: cruel, lying, intimidating, and determined to retain weapons of mass destruction--weapons capable of killing thousands, even millions at a single blow." (pp 4-5)

On chemical weapons:"VX was not the only chemical weapons agent or the only nerve agent made by Iraq. Essentially Iraq made virtually all of the prohibited agents and used some of them both in and outside Iraq. But VX was and is the most devastating of them. It can be sprayed as a liquid or scattered into the atmosphere as an aerosol. A missile warhead of the type Iraq has made and used can hold some 140 liters of VX, ...enough of the chemical to kill *up to 1 million people* (Butler's italics) A single droplet on the skin constitutes a lethal dose."pp. 7-8 Butler goes on to note the missile range limit the UN has imposed on Iraq is "a limit Iraq is now breaching." (p.8).

"A more plausible alternative is that Iraq used VX on its own citizens. Dr. Christine Gosden at Liverpool University in the United Kingdom has long studied Saddam Hussein's attack in 1988 on Kurds in the Northern Iraq village area of Halabja. Gosden has evidence that nerve agents--including VX, she firmly believes--were among the chemical cocktail used against these northern areas. The overall size of Iraq's VX production remains unknown to this day."pp.11

on biological weapons:

"intelligence materials I had seen indicating that Iraq may have transferred some of its biological weapons equipment in shipping containers for safe storage in another country."pp 116

Butler goes on to recount Iraq's propoganda efforts, the rise of a French-Chinese-Russian effort to lift the sanctions, the dishonesty of some of Kofi Annan's staff in

trying to manipulate information, suppress reports of Iraqi behavior and help lift the sanctions (while Butler is pro-United Nations and pro-multilateralism his story is actually an indictment of the current UN structure as an effective instrument of civilization and a reminder that it serves a well paid incestuous bureaucracy with an interest in looking good rather than doing good). Those who would reform the United Nations would do well to study Butler's account of internal maneuvering and manipulation. It is an institution that should be taken seriously and should be made more transparent and more accountable.

Butler concludes "weapons of mass destruction are fundamentally different from other threats to peace. They cannot be the subject of politics as usual because of their capacity to destroy everything. "(p.238)

"No one is watching Saddam Hussein. You can be certain that he is not waiting idly for the UN to suddenly realize its fault. He is building--building weapons, as are other rogue states.

"If a single missile loaded with nerve gas was to hit Tel Aviv, the world will never be the same. If a single canister of VX was released into the New York City subway system, the world will never be the same. If a single nuclear explosion hollowed out central London, the world will never be the same.

"To conclude this book, I recall its opening epigraph, that is, the quote from Edmund Burke; 'The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.' Now consider these questions: what would Burke conclude from the challenge to all humanity posed by weapons of mass destruction? Would it meet the test of the triumph of evil if we did nothing?

"Absolutely."

A testimony to Saddam's evil and the need to act by an Australian. It should be must reading for every doubtful American.

snovflake

June 25, 2002 10:03 AM

0914

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Embassy Stovepipes

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on embassy stovepipes and DoD. Please come back to me with a proposal on that.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/03/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Embassy Stovepipes

DHR:dh
062502-30



Please respond by 08/02/02

25 JUN 02

U16355 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11667

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 2 5 2002

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, June 03, 2002 7:36 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil; keman@jfc.com.mil;
john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil
Subject: embassy stovepipes and dod
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt June 3,2002
Embassy stovepipes and DOD

the following memo was sent me by two colonels from a war college. It suggests a topic of integration and coherence that ought to be assigned to someone.

Here's an issue that could easily be fixed, but only by the "boss" himself:

The military team at embassies is generally divided between attachés and military assistance personnel. This division leads to confusion on mission objectives, presents a split view to the ambassador, hampers the effective collection of intelligence, and sometimes results in schizophrenic Department of Defense (DoD) policy implementation overseas from the embassy.

The attachés (Defense Attache Office--DAO) are the ambassador's "loops" (they wear 4 braids to represent his 4 star equivalency) and are his eyes and ears in country. The attachés represent the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the JCS, the service secretaries and chiefs, and the CINC. The attachés operate at the strategic level. Attachés are sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Security Assistance Officers (SAO)[sometimes called Military Group, Military Assistance, Security Cooperation or other names], on the other hand, are primarily focused on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and implementing the CINC's Theater Security Cooperation [TSC] plan (training for foreign officers [IMET], exercises, etc.). In other words they work the operational and tactical lane. To confuse the issue further, in some countries the SAO's are the U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) and handle Force Protection (FP) for the CINC. World wide there are 37 SAO's vs. 122 DAO's assigned as USDR--SAO's are used as USDR mainly in Latin America. SAO's are sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

The DAO is located in spaces build to store, handle and transmit classified material; whereas in many embassies, the SAO is located in unclassified spaces with foreign nationals collocated inside.

The system as it stands radically stovepipes U.S. interests and objectives abroad. Most attachés feel they work for the J2/J5, whereas the SAO's feel they work for the J3. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the various instructions dealing with the DAO, SAO and USDR (OSD and JCS directives) are confusing and contradictory on many responsibilities and duties.

In order to immediately improve the coordination and implementation of U.S. DoD policy overseas within the embassy team the two offices should be combined. "A house divided unto itself can not long stand."

p.s. The French, Israelis, British, Germans, Chinese, Russians, etc. don't split their embassy team leadership up. A combined team doesn't necessarily make them more effective or efficient, but does make them more coherent.

June 25, 2002 9:55 AM

470

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Crusader

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on Crusader and tell me if you think we are on that track. It sounds to me like we are not.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/08/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Crusader

DHR:dh
062502-28

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

eaounoe

U16356 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11670

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich **SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JUN 25 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com**Sent:** Wednesday, May 08, 2002 6:29 AM**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil**Cc:** jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil**Subject:** for secdef depsecdef-beyond Crusader maximizing the speed of transformation

For secdef,depsecdef
from Newt May 8,2002

Making the Crusader decision a step toward implementing transformation

Simply cancelling transformation does not guarantee transformation although it does free up resources and create an opportunity.

Left alone the traditional bureaucracy may see this as an opportunity to absorb the funds into another long,slow development ,even slower implementation process.

There is an opportunity to work with General Keane to create a defined goal of a very rapidly developed, ~~much more accurate and more air transportable~~ system that has the speed to move with high speed armored forces, can replace a number of traditional 155s and uses the best of the Crusader advances (eg. automated loader, precision fires) to develop a fieldable variant within the same time frame as Crusader.

Since Crusader was being fielded at a leisurely pace it should be possible to actually cut through the usual slow planning and testing process and actually field a weapon within the current schedule.

Thus the Army would have a new agile highly accurate system with a smaller logistics tail and greater capability without having lost a single year.

If it is done collaboratively so the Army is involved in thinking through the requirements and the process of testing and fielding it should be a model of how to move rapidly toward transformational technologies.

This would allow you to create a transformational system in a transformational way and could become a model for other development.

This can only be accomplished by close osd-army collaboration in the discussion planning process and a willingness to cut through red tape and if necessary ask Congress to help modernize the procurement process.

Finally, done properly this should be a joint weapons capability which fits into our future vision of an integrated transformed battle space and it ought to include the potential for the Marines to buy it if it is agile enough and a big enough improvement over their current weapons set. It could also be a system "franchisable" to key allies if it is a transformational leap over their current capabilities.

5/8/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11671

June 25, 2002 9:30 AM

470

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Crusader

Attached is an old note from Newt Gingrich on Crusader you might want to be aware of.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Crusader

DHR:dh
062302-26

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

Sattler - Mark it "Don" D. Rumsfeld
Aldridge response attached.
8/9

Rec'd 0900 / 6-26

25JUN02

U16357 02



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

July 22, 2002, 3:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. 'Pete' Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics) *Pete Aldridge*

SUBJECT: E-mail from Newt Gingrich

- Mr. Gingrich provides a proposal to leverage Crusader capabilities through force structure adjustments (TAB A).
- In light of the Crusader termination, the proposal is no longer relevant.
- My staff will informally pass Newt's e-mail to the Army's Future Combat System program staff for their possible use.
- No further action is required.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Walt Squire, (b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich

JUN 25 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2002 7:37 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Cc: jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: for secdef,depsecdef--crusader


for secdef, depsecdef
from newt May 7,2002
Crusader and transformation

F.P.A.

the attached proposal by Colonel MacGregor outlines a way to use the Crusader to force transformation and save substantial money simultaneously. It may be too late for this kind of consideration but I respect Doug's generally transformational thinking enough that I thought it was worth your reading.

attachment

- Now, more than ever, the relationship between technology, military organization and combat must be seamless because military capabilities really begin to transform within new organizations that bring soldiers, technology and tactics together. Leveraging the *Crusader's* asymmetric advantage to attack with precision is critical to success in future operations because the character of post-Cold War target sets with short dwell time demand the capability to sense and shoot, discover and destroy, quickly and efficiently!
- Today, the Army's senior leaders's insistence on the re-capitalization of the old WW II force including the artillery structure with 500 Crusaders militates against the emergence of this capability. It also sacrifices the opportunity to reduce the numbers of tube artillery systems along with their supporting personnel inside the U.S. Army. As a result, there are few if any savings involved and the Army's capacity to contribute to joint strike and maneuver operations remains limited or non-existent.
- **What does this new joint strike formation look like and what does it do?** On the ground, traditional WW II fire support concepts must change from single service artillery organizations massing huge volumes of fire from many tubes, to joint strike formations employing mixes of Crusaders, MLRS/ATCM, and UCAVs as shooter nodes to destroy large numbers of small, distributed, and fleeting targets quickly and near simultaneously.



- **Why change?** No single platform is transformational. Tanks alone were not revolutionary at all as demonstrated on the Western Front in 1918. It was only after tanks were organized with air power, infantry and

supporting artillery, that armored warfare became truly effective. The same is true for the Crusader. As a replacement system for the Paladin, it will never achieve its potential. Organized effectively with other strike assets inside a joint, networked command and control structure, Crusader's impact will be dramatic.

- Existing artillery systems lack environmental and ballistic survivability, and cannot process enough information or move fast enough to adequately support and augment ground maneuver forces with accurate and devastating firepower. Rocket and missile systems offer great range, but despite technological advances, lack responsiveness and capacity to engage, offer few munitions, require significant logistics and cost, and risk collateral damage from the large dispersion of unitary and sub-munitions effects. The structure of Army Artillery command and control is single service. During DESERT STORM, nearly all USAF requests for rocket artillery support to destroy Iraqi air defenses were rejected or ignored.
- Potential savings. On average 27 soldiers are required to operate and sustain a single, self-propelled tube artillery system. In towed artillery battalions, the figure is probably higher. If 300 Crusaders are organized in a configuration that mixes 9 MLRS/ATCMs and some number of UCAVs, the \$ savings could be enormous. Hundreds of guns can be retired and soldiers shifted to other more productive forms of employment or simply eliminated. The numbers of artillery battalions could be reduced from nearly 40 to 25-30 strike formations depending on the reorganization of combat maneuver formations.
- Finally, no balance of power or distribution of forces is immutable. For every measure there is a countermeasure. We must remain open to the possibility that directed energy technologies along with the proliferation of nano technologies will negate or neutralize some or much of our striking power from the air or the sea and provide for counter-measures of our own. Crusader is such a countermeasure.
- Strongly recommend that the Army be directed to model these strike formations in simulation, as well as field one from existing assets. Simulations of similar formations conducted by Dr. (BG (ret)) Shimon Naveh of the IDF have validated this concept in dramatic fashion.

June 25, 2002 9:28 AM

302

TO: Steve Cambone
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Forces

Please come in and talk to me about this memo from Newt Gingrich on standing joint task forces.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/06/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters

DHR:dh
062502-25

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

25Jun02

U16358 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11677

From Newt Gingrich

JUN 26 2002

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, May 06, 2002 8:41 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: for secdef,depsecdef-standing joint task forces
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt may 6, 2002
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters

Cc: D. Rita Wolfowitz

Ed

The current experience in Afghanistan should be more than enough to accelerate the development of a requirement that every CINC have a standing joint task force headquarters. The current plan is that seven months after US forces arrived in Afghanistan a JTF Headquarters will be stood up. This is an absurdity.

People need to work and train as they will fight., JTF Headquarters need to be fully prepared and practiced and they need to replace the single service component headquarters. If we keep the single service component headquarters we are simply adding a new layer of bureaucracy. The goal should be for the JTF Headquarters to command the troops below them and not merely coordinate the services. That is the only way we will force true jointness and interoperability.

Secdef should reflect on the lesson of Afghanistan, instruct JFCOM to go to a robust test of the JTF headquarters system as soon as possible (with adequate funding and personnel for same) and should insist on a schedule for all CINCs to stand up JTF headquarters AND dismantle single service component headquarters within a year.

June 25, 2002 8:05 PM

490

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Congressional Record

6/27
Larry Di Rita

I have asked three times to get copies of the debate from the Congressional Record on the Crusader, with the sections marked, so I can know who did well by us and who did poorly by us.

Why can't I get it?

I want the same thing for the debate that took place today on the bill. Someone ought to get it, mark it for me and give it to me—and not wait a week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-78

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

6/27
Sec Def -
This is the debate
that occurred around
the floor vote on the
Lerin-Werner Amendment,
which passed 96-3.

25 JUN 02

U16359 02

11-L-0559/OSD/T1679

The heroes were Santorum and Sessions.

X. Di Rita

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S. 2514, which the clerk will report.

The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2514) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

AMENDMENT NO. 3899

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, momentarily, I will be offering an amendment on behalf of the majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee which addresses the Crusader artillery system program and the Army's fire support requirements.

The amendment would do two things: First, it would take \$475.6 million out of the Crusader program and put the money into a separate funding line for Future Combat Systems research and development, the Army's armored systems modernization line.

In terms of making sure this issue is very clear, it is essential to understand that the first action this amendment would take would be to move that \$475 million from the Crusader program but keeping it in the Army's Future Combat Systems research and development program; that is, the Army's armored systems modernization line.

It would do a second thing which was very important to the majority of the Armed Services Committee; that is, that it would require the Chief of Staff of the Army to conduct an analysis of alternatives for the Army's artillery needs and to submit his findings to the Secretary of Defense no later than 1 month after the date of enactment of this bill.

Under this amendment, the Department would not be permitted to spend the \$475 million until after the Secretary of Defense adds his own conclusions and recommendations to the Army Chief of Staff's report and forwards the report to the Congress. With his own decision, the Secretary of Defense would, under our amendment, be required to submit the recommendations of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

They may be two different recommendations, as they were during the hearing that we had, where we had the Secretary of Defense saying the Crusader should be terminated immediately, and the Chief of Staff of the Army giving us the reasons he believed the Crusader system made sense in terms of modernization, made sense in terms of transformation. It was a very important hearing for all of us, including the Presiding Officer, who was present at that hearing.

At that point, after that period had run--1 month after the date of enactment--the Secretary would be

June 26, 2002 10:51 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Unclassified Threat Briefing

337

Can we get that threat briefing at NATO brought down to an unclassified version that has any "oomph" still in it? I suspect you probably could. Let's try to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062602-14

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

26 Jun 02

U16360 02

Action 7/8

June 26, 2002 9:37 AM

Done 7/22

560.3

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Submarines

Please explain to me what the commander of the Navy's submarines was talking about recently when he discussed "the critical role" of the subs gathering intelligence on Al Qaeda, and why he is saying their cores are burning up.

Thanks.

Attach.

Jaffe, Greg. "Overuse of Nuclear Submarines Risks Burning Up Reactor Cores," *The Wall Street Journal*, 06/26/02

DHR:dh
062602-10

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

267un0a

U16361 02

Wall Street Journal
June 26, 2002

Overuse Of Nuclear Submarines Risks Burning Up Reactor Cores

By Greg Jaffe, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

NORFOLK, Va. -- The commander of the U.S. Navy's submarines recently warned his bosses that the fleet, which has played a critical role in gathering intelligence about the al Qaeda terrorist network, should slow its pace of operations.

The vessels' nuclear-reactor cores are burning up faster than planned due to added missions since Sept. 11, shortening the submarines' life spans, Vice Adm. John Grossenbacher told his superiors. "I've told them this next year we need to see a reduction in the tempo of operations," he said. "They are working on it."

The 380-foot-long submarines' missions, which include secretly delivering teams of Navy commandos to hot spots around the globe and intercepting telephone conversations, have risen more than 30% since the terrorist attacks, Navy officials said. To accomplish the missions, submarines are skipping port calls, traveling more quickly between hot spots and forgoing some maintenance and training missions.

The warning comes at a time when the Navy's top submarine officers are battling their own service and the defense secretary's office in seeking to add more attack submarines to the arsenal of 54. Navy plans call for the number to drop to about 51 during the next decade.

Submarines are extremely effective platforms for gathering intelligence, but at \$2.2 billion for a new attack sub they are also very expensive. "The capabilities that the subs provide, such as gathering intelligence, are capabilities that are in much demand," a senior Navy official said. "The question is whether submarines are the most cost-efficient way to perform these tasks."

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld hasn't included buying more attack subs on his list of military priorities.

Since Sept. 11, the service's attack subs have spent about 80% of their deployed time performing missions, most of which have been associated with gathering intelligence. "They are really going to destroy the force if they continue at this current pace," said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, a defense think tank in Arlington, Va. "Eventually you could have a serious accident."

Adm. Grossenbacher has told his senior leadership that during the next year, the Navy needs to reduce the percentage of time its subs spend on missions while deployed to about 72%. To put that into practice, the submarine force likely will have to begin turning down more assignments, which are given to it by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon. This wouldn't be the first time it refused assignments -- it did so during the Kosovo war in 1999. But with the push to gather intelligence that could head off another deadly terrorist attack, declining missions isn't done lightly.

Submarines are particularly adept at gathering intelligence because they "cannot be tracked like satellites and are more stealthy than unmanned aerial vehicles," said Michael Vickers of the Center for Strategic

and Budgetary Assessments. He said a combination of super-stealthy unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned minisubmarines might provide a cost-effective substitute on some missions shouldered by the submarine force.

June 26, 2002 9:33 AM

322

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army South Command

Wasn't I supposed to get briefed by White on the movement of some headquarters from Puerto Rico to somewhere else?

Please make sure he does do that before they make a decision. Second, when they do the brief, I want to know why the headquarters even has to exist. It is enormous.

Thanks.

Attach.
Edmonson, George. "Georgia, Texas Vie for Army South," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 06/25/02

DHR:dh
062602-9



Please respond by 07/26/02

6/28

- Secret -

The Army is still preparing its proposal. It's leaking, so members are getting anxious. No decision yet, and there will be until you see. Looks like about 10 days away. *D. R. H.*

26 JUN 02

U16362 02
11-L-05597 OSDMA 685

Atlanta Journal and Constitution
June 25, 2002

Georgia, Texas Vie For Army South

Downsized command moving from Puerto Rico

By George Edmonson, Staff

Washington --- Georgia and Texas are the leading contenders to get the Army South command when it moves from Puerto Rico, but the prize is unlikely to be as big as originally expected.

Downsizing and transformation probably will reduce the command to about 600 positions when it leaves the Caribbean island, Army spokesman Lt. Col. Tom Budzyna said Monday.

"From what I can see, . . . it does look like the states of Georgia and Texas seem to be the favorites," Budzyna said. Bases also have been considered in other states, including Louisiana and Mississippi.

The move to relocate the base has been in progress for months. No announcement is scheduled, Budzyna said. "We're leaning forward, so to speak, waiting for a decision, because we expect one," he said

Last week, Rep. Mac Collins (R-Ga.) wrote Army Secretary Thomas White a letter noting his "utmost concern with a decision that I understand will be announced very soon regarding the future location of the United States Army South." Collins complained that "if what I have been told is correct," the Army had not followed the open process that officers outlined earlier to members of Congress.

Dan Kidder, a spokesman for Collins, said the congressman is scheduled to meet today with Brig. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, deputy director of strategy, plans and policy directorate at the Pentagon, to discuss the relocation plans.

Collins was a leader of a bipartisan group of Georgia lawmakers and other officials who met with Army representatives in February as rumors swirled that Fort Sam Houston near San Antonio had been selected.

Georgia has pushed for relocation of the command to Fort Benning near Columbus, retired Army Brig. Gen. Philip Y. Browning Jr. said. Browning, who attended the February meeting, is executive director of the Georgia Military Affairs Coordinating Committee.

Fort McPherson near Atlanta is under consideration as well, and Browning said the state also supports that location. But he acknowledged that, with the anticipated staff reductions, "It may not be such a big deal."

Texans have been supporting Fort Sam Houston. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-Texas) has written to White at least twice to promote the base, listing such advantages as a low cost of living, available space and a strong market for bilingual employees.

Army South completed its move from Panama to Puerto Rico in 1999.

When relocation began to be considered, remaining on the island was an option. But Budzyna said

Monday that Puerto Rico is not viable now because of the goal of reducing staffing from the current level of about 1,200.

Army South is one of 17 major commands. Its area of responsibility is the Caribbean region and Central and South America.

June 26, 2002 9:14 AM

015

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Remarks on ICC

Please take a look at the transcript of my comments at the Foreign Press Center on the International Criminal Court (near the end of the event), and tell me if I am accurate. Please give me an edited version that you think would be a more accurate way to describe our problem.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/21/02 Foreign Press Center Transcript

DHR:dh
062602-3



Please respond by 07/19/02

26 JUN 02

U16363 02

task and end that task. At that stage, we would discuss a phase two and determine, A, ought there be a phase two, and if so, what ought it to include.

There have been two things that have been outside of the -- what I've just said. One was some assistance we're providing with respect to roads and water and various things on Basilan Island. A second thing that went on was an exercise in a different part of the island, and they tended to be disconnected from what you're discussing.

My guess is that some point in the days ahead, the Philippines government will announce whatever it is they've decided and we've decided ought to follow on, in the event that we and they decide anything ought to follow on. And I think it's really a judgment for the Philippine armed forces to make as to whether or not and when they feel they have the kind of training and assistance that would enable them to do their task.

You're right, the reports indicate that a leader, one of the leaders, one of the senior leaders of the Abu Sayyaf group, is reported to be killed early this morning. There are other leaders and there are other members of the group, and terrorism is terrorism. And what the president of the Philippines will decide with respect to that is really for her to say.

(Cross talk.)

Now -- no! I've got to have a man! I've got to have a man! (Laughter.) I'd rather not --

(Cross talk.)

Oh, here's a mike. You've got one. Go.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: (Off mike.)

Rumsfeld: We're going to come right back to you.

Q: Frank Caller from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Why is it so important for the Bush administration that American troops involved with peacekeeping be granted immunity from the International War Crimes Tribunal?

Rumsfeld: There is a thing called the International Criminal Court, and there was a treaty, and it was signed by a number of nations, and it's going into effect later this month or the 1st of July, I believe. It is an unusual court in this sense. Historically, international courts have been for a discrete purpose for a discrete period of time, and often under the umbrella of the U.N. or some other organization that created it. For example, there's been one in the Balkans, which we all know about.

The International Criminal Court is distinctive in several respects. Number one, it is not limited by time. It is not limited by subject or focus. It is not under the umbrella of any organization that could manage it from the standpoint of responsibility and behavior.

Another thing about it that's distinctive is that it attempts to take jurisdiction over the people of countries that have not signed it, which is a difference in how this has usually been handled. The U.S.

position on it was that this administration -- that President Clinton signed it and said he would not send it to the Congress for ratification, which is kind of an unusual technique. The president looked at it and decided that it should be unsigned, if there were such a technique or a process, and it appears there isn't, so instead, notification was given to the appropriate people that the United States did not consider it effective for the United States.

Now, why would we care? The reason we would care is that if you think about it, it is very easy to make a charge or an allegation of wrongdoing, and the defense against that then falls to the person accused and you then have to spend a pile of money and a pile of time defending yourself against a politicized allegation or charge of wrongdoing which never happened.

We have looked at this and made a judgment that it would cause the United States pause to be willing to participate and put U.S. forces in countries where they could become subject to the international court and you could end up with a politicized prosecutor or people making allegations or charges, and then people would -- U.S. military forces would be subject to those kinds of allegations.

If you think back to what happened during the Afghan conflict, there were a number of instances where the Taliban and the al Qaeda -- their training books tell them how to do this, how to lie, how to misinform people, how to claim that civilians have been killed, innocent men, women and children, when in fact it was al Qaeda and Taliban being killed or bombed. And they have put their -- they systematically put their command headquarters and their radars and their artillery and their command centers in close proximity to mosques and to hospitals and to schools and in civilian areas.

Now, the United States believes that its role in the world, along with other like-thinking countries, in contributing to peace and stability is important, and I believe it's important and the president believes it's important. And we argued against the treaty on the basis that, to the extent it puts people that we would put at risk for their lives also at risk legally, in a process that's not controlled by any organization, that is assuming jurisdiction over people that had not participated in the treaty, that has no time limit and no supervision whatsoever, it seemed to us a bad idea. And I worried that we -- the United States, if that happened, we could become cautious, more limited, some would say isolationist, unwilling to participate in things to the extent I believe it's useful to the world to have -- for us to participate.

So there is a portion of the treaty that says that a country can exempt a nation from the treaty. So, for example, in the case of East Timor, we have a very few number of people there. We want to be there because we're working with the Australians, we're working with the Indonesians, we think that's a -- with the East Timor people -- it's been a good thing. And it's been working so far. They've had an election. And --- but when the subject comes up for renewal and we look at it and we see that -- what we'd like to get is their agreement that we would be exempted. Now, the same thing is coming up in the U.N. very recently with respect to one of the countries in the Balkans, as I recall. And we have forces there.

And -- but all we would say is that we would like that government to say that our people would be exempt from this court which, I believe, we ought to be exempt from so that there isn't that kind of political harassment that can take place unfairly, particularly when you know you're fighting the global war on terror and you know the terrorist training books are encouraging people to make those kinds of charges and allegations, and you know the press prints them instantaneously. They are right there in the press; the minute the charge is made, it's out there. And then the world says, "Aha!" And six weeks later when you finally get on the ground and look what happened, it did not happen that way at all, and that story is not very newsworthy. And that's a shame.

And all -- if you think about, Dr. Kissinger recently was -- they attempted to serve a subpoena on him for something that happened 25 years before in Chile, and something he was not aware of or knowledgeable about. And the effect of it could be that people wouldn't want to travel, they wouldn't want to go into another country. The United States and other countries wouldn't want to put their people on the ground where they could be subject to irresponsible and inaccurate challenges and lies.

So it is -- it is -- I'm trying to make the case that it is not a good versus bad. It is -- the motive is certainly appropriate, and other international tribunals are certainly appropriate. But I personally think they ought to be for a purpose, with a time frame, with some supervision over them by responsible, accountable nations, as opposed to free of that accountability.

(Cross talk.)

Staff: One more, sir.

Rumsfeld: I'm told I can take one more question, and you're it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, it has been told in the recent papers, some East European countries, despite the difficult periods they are in, makes a lot of effort -- I am -- (name inaudible) -- from Radio Romania. Romania, for an example, took some decisions and made some efforts in helping the international forces in Afghanistan. Can you make some comments about that?

Rumsfeld: Well, there's no question but that a number of Eastern European countries have been enormously helpful. They've been helpful with, in some cases, troops; in some cases medical assistance, in some cases sharing intelligence, in some cases helping to block bank accounts of terrorists. There are a host of ways that these countries have stepped forward and said, "We want to participate in this; this is a serious problem in the world."

And if you were going to -- as I say, if you dropped a plumb line through all the countries I went through and all the countries I met with, a number of them being NATO aspirants, the one thing that was common -- in the Gulf, in South Asia, in Europe, in Estonia, in Germany -- was the fact that they are sensitive to the threat of terrorism, they appreciate the fact that a single country alone can't deal with it, that we have to cooperate together. And there's no question but that we are deeply appreciative and grateful for the wonderful support and cooperation we've received.

Now, I am going to excuse myself, and I want to say that it's been a delight being with you -- (laughter) -- even though -- even though a couple of you folks -- (laughter, cross talk) --

Moderator: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you, friends of the Foreign Press Center.

"THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE IS A PRIVATE COMPANY. FOR OTHER DEFENSE RELATED TRANSCRIPTS NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS SITE, CONTACT FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE AT (202) 347-1400."

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06212002_t0621fsdfpc.html

1:07 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 26, 2002
SUBJECT: Attached

33350

Attached are some thoughts that were sent to me as a result of a visit to Ft. Lewis.

Please let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
062602.01

Attach: Memorandum dated 6/26/02

Please respond by:

6/17/02

U16364 02

26 Jun 02

MEMORANDUM

June 26, 2002

Equipment

LAVs are cast off models from Canada and are nearly 10 tons lighter than the prototypes coming off the assembly line now. In addition, the LAVs that the CSA want carry no armament other than a 50 CAL MG (used in WWI) or a 40 mm Grenade Launcher.

Mobile Gun System (105 on LAV) will not be available until 2004 or 2005. Worse still, the ammunition for this soft recoil must be developed independently because the gun cannot fire existing 105mm ammunition. In addition, the MGS will be 18 inches taller than an M1A1 tank and have to stop to shoot. Wheels cannot provide a stable platform – some RMA! Other variants – engineer C2 and so on face considerable problems. Variants will not be C130 capable. Current 23 ton LAV variant of IAV has trouble with C130 deployability and must deflate tires.

British Army declined to participate in the future scout combat system program because the UK insisted on racks for survivability and mobility. UK rejected wheeled solution for combat.

Communications

LAVs have flat panel displays mounted in them to convey the impression of high-tech battle command. However, all of the communications are legacy and single service – nothing new.

IBCT organization. Nothing new.

IBCT is a motorized rifle brigade of 3700 troops. It is part of 17,000 man interim division. Joint C4ISR capability does not exist inside the IBCT. As a result, the Joint C4ISR connectivity runs through the division, not directly to the Joint Task Force. In addition, the Colonel that commands the brigade has the same staff structure as a normal brigade and must depend heavily on division headquarters for command and control. Plan is to deploy an MG with a division headquarters to any future JTF. Purpose is to maneuver the 3700 man IBCT.

IBCT is acutely lacking in sustainment. It cannot operate independently for more than a couple of days. Its fire support is a man-intensive towed 155mm battalion. This is dinosaur technology – the 155mm howitzer was originally developed in 1905.

IBCT has no aviation component and would depend on division to provide that. This means IBCT is untrained to integrate Army aviation let along USAF aviation.

IBCT is calling its reinforced scout company of 250 men in turret less LAVs a reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition squadron. However, there is nothing to validate a superior reconnaissance capability based on its equipment now or in the future. Most important, the RSTA unit cannot perform armed reconnaissance. By the way, in the USMC, the 25mm automatic cannon on the ALVIII is referred to as a disengagement weapon because the platform cannot engage in direct fire combat and survive. This is why the USMC relied heavily on tanks and AAVs in its MEUs and MAGTFs.

Mission Profile

The IBCT permanently converts combat troops to peacekeeping constabulary troops. To disguise this reality, the CSA says the unit is designed for the "high end of small scale conflict." In Army parlance, that is peace enforcement. However, given the inability of wheeled armor in Mogadishu to break through and rescue troops on the ground, the notion of peace enforcement is open to serious question as well.

TACTICS

The tactics being practiced are a mix of dismounted attacks with fire support on the 1960s Vietnam model or kicking down doors in Sarajevo and Brcko to arrest thugs.

SOLUTION

Buy 200 LAVs and put them in a pool. Let units assigned to peacekeeping duties draw them as necessary for use. This is what the British Army does in Cyprus and Ulster and it saves money. It also avoids the permanent conversion of war fighting formations to peacekeeping. By the way, rotational readiness makes this quite easy and cost effective.

TO: Secretary Tom White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 26, 2002

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached are some thoughts that were sent to me as a result of a visit to Ft. Lewis.

Please let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
062602.01

Attach: Memorandum dated 6/26/02

Please respond by: 7/7

MEMORANDUM

June 26, 2002

Equipment

LAVs are cast off models from Canada and are nearly 10 tons lighter than the prototypes coming off the assembly line now. In addition, the LAVs that the CSA want carry no armament other than a 50 CAL MG (used in WWI) or a 40 mm Grenade Launcher.

Mobile Gun System (105 on LAV) will not be available until 2004 or 2005. Worse still, the ammunition for this soft recoil must be developed independently because the gun cannot fire existing 105mm ammunition. In addition, the MGS will be 18 inches taller than an M1A1 tank and have to stop to shoot. Wheels cannot provide a stable platform – some RMA! Other variants – engineer C2 and so on face considerable problems. Variants will not be C130 capable. Current 23 ton LAV variant of IAV has trouble with C130 deployability and must deflate tires.

British Army declined to participate in the future scout combat system program because the UK insisted on racks for survivability and mobility. UK rejected wheeled solution for combat.

Communications

LAVs have flat panel displays mounted in them to convey the impression of high-tech battle command. However, all of the communications are legacy and single service – nothing new.

IBCT organization. Nothing new.

IBCT is a motorized rifle brigade of 3700 troops. It is part of 17,000 man interim division. Joint C4ISR capability does not exist inside the IBCT. As a result, the Joint C4ISR connectivity runs through the division, not directly to the Joint Task Force. In addition, the Colonel that commands the brigade has the same staff structure as a normal brigade and must depend heavily on division headquarters for command and control. Plan is to deploy an MG with a division headquarters to any future JTF. Purpose is to maneuver the 3700 man IBCT.

IBCT is acutely lacking in sustainment. It cannot operate independently for more than a couple of days. Its fire support is a man-intensive towed 155mm battalion. This is dinosaur technology – the 155mm howitzer was originally developed in 1905.

IBCT has no aviation component and would depend on division to provide that. This means IBCT is untrained to integrate Army aviation let alone USAF aviation.

IBCT is calling its reinforced scout company of 250 men in turret less LAVs a reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition squadron. However, there is nothing to validate a superior reconnaissance capability based on its equipment now or in the future. Most important, the RSTA unit cannot perform armed reconnaissance. By the way, in the USMC, the 25mm automatic cannon on the ALVIII is referred to as a disengagement weapon because the platform cannot engage in direct fire combat and survive. This is why the USMC relied heavily on tanks and AAVs in its MEUs and MAGTFs.

Mission Profile

The IBCT permanently converts combat troops to peacekeeping constabulary troops. To disguise this reality, the CSA says the unit is designed for the "high end of small scale conflict." In Army parlance, that is peace enforcement. However, given the inability of wheeled armor in Mogadishu to break through and rescue troops on the ground, the notion of peace enforcement is open to serious question as well.

TACTICS

The tactics being practiced are a mix of dismounted attacks with fire support on the 1960s Vietnam model or kicking down doors in Sarajevo and Brcko to arrest thugs.

SOLUTION

Buy 200 LAVs and put them in a pool. Let units assigned to peacekeeping duties draw them as necessary for use. This is what the British Army does in Cyprus and Ulster and it saves money. It also avoids the permanent conversion of war fighting formations to peacekeeping. By the way, rotational readiness makes this quite easy and cost effective.

Portion of Email from Col. Douglas MacGregor, 2/25/02 to Newt Gingrich

June 26, 2002 4:49 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Money to Afghanistan

Please find out what kind of assistance the US, any agency or department, is giving each of the warlords and what we are giving Karzai to distribute around the country. We need to see what that balance is.

Is the DoD giving any food, weapons or money to any of the warlords or to Karzai? Is the CIA doing that? Is State doing it? How are the donor funds coming in? We need to get a sense of that balance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062602-20

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

26Jun02

U16365 02

June 26, 2002 1:30 PM

Done 7/8

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter re: Gen. Hill

Jim Haynes thinks it is probably best for you not to answer that letter about General Hill. Why don't you visit with him about it, and then the two of us can talk and decide how we want to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062602-18

Southcom

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

Ab Sogor

U16366 02

Tab



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-389-02
3 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

Handwritten signature of Richard B. Myers in black ink.

SUBJECT: Letter Re: Gen Hill

- In response to your memo of 26 June (TAB), I plan to review the DoD Inspector General's report when it is completed and then meet with the DoD General Counsel.
- We can then meet and discuss how to approach Senator Warner's request.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Jane G. Dalton, Capt, JAGC, USN (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


11-L-0559/OSD/11700

June 26, 2002 3:32 PM

500

TO: Gen. Ralston, SACEUR, USCINCEUR
 Gen. Eberhart, USCINCSpace/CINC NORAD
 Adm. Ellis, CINCSTRAT
 Adm. Fargo, USCINCPAC
 Gen. Franks, USCINCCENT
 Gen. Kernan, CINCUSJFCOM
 Gen. Holland, USCINCSOC
 Gen. Schwartz, CINCUNC/CFC/USFK
 MG Speer, USACINCSO

CC: Gen. Myers
 Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Saving the Taxpayers' Money

Attached is a memo from Gen. John Handy. It strikes me that there are many opportunities for these types of savings. If you have any other examples, I would appreciate your sending them along.

It is important that we all focus on moving dollars from waste to warfighting.

Thanks.

Attach.
 06/03/02 Memo from CINTRANS

DHR:dh
 062602-16

26 Jun 02

U16367 02

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 02 JUN 24 PM 1:13
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62226-5357



3 June 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: TCCC

JUN 26 2002

SUBJECT: Responsive Transportation Support

1. As discussed with the Secretary during his visit to USTRANSCOM, we continue to look for opportunities to reduce costs while still meeting the requirements of the warfighters.
2. The following is an illustration of how early collaborative planning allows us to make smart decisions on the way we move forces. An infantry battalion rotating back to the United States from Afghanistan was originally scheduled to redeploy by air at a cost of roughly \$5M. We worked with USCENTCOM and the Department of the Army to redeploy using a combination of intra-theater air and sea lift, leveraging a ship already in the theater. This method cost DOD about \$200K--a resultant savings of \$4.8M, illustrating the power of collaboration and cooperation between theater combatant commanders and the Services. With sufficient lead-time, we can provide supported commanders responsive transportation support while making best use of DOD's resources.
3. I look forward to providing you more examples of innovative actions that are reducing our cost of doing business, with focus on good stewardship of our nation's resources.

VR

 JOHN W. HANDY
 General, USAF
 Commander in Chief

cc:
CJCS

DSD: Note efficiency

Rec'd 6/28/02 7:39 AM

June 27, 2002 7:39 AM

Done 7/8

560.05

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shipbuilding

Please tell me what I am supposed to do with this Dov Zakheim memo on shipbuilding.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/01/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Shipbuilding [U05740/02]

DHR:dh
062702-5

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

7/1
Aldridge response attached.
Dikate
7/2

27 Jun 02

U16368 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11703

June 28, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Shipbuilding

You asked what should you do with Dov Zakheim's shipbuilding memo. The answer is nothing.

The Navy has taken this study, and one previously completed by AT&L, and is incorporating the results into a DPG directed study and into their FY04-09 Program Objective Memorandum. We will see the results in September and will provide a decision package for you on how to proceed with shipbuilding and the budget to go with the plan.

11-L-0559/OSD/11704



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 APR -1 PM 4: 29

INFO MEMO

April 1, 2002, 9:54 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D*

JUN 27 2002

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding

- Per your tasking to me (and your statements at Congressional hearings) that I put together a study of possible shipbuilding futures, and their impact on the shipbuilding base, I enclose a set of preliminary PA&E slides, which were developed in concert with the Navy.
- The slides are consistent with the Navy briefing you received last week. They do offer several alternatives, however. These are:
 - maintaining the current program;
 - an alternative the Navy prefers
 - and a PA&E "middle option." *(A PROGRAM VICE REQ'TS ALTERNATIVE)*
- All of the plans will require an increase in FY 07 and 08 funding; the "middle option" calls for an average of \$1.6 billion in additional shipbuilding funds beginning in FY 04.
- If we are serious about changing the mix of the fleet, and maintaining the shipbuilding base, the middle option, and its costs, seems quite reasonable.

COORDINATION: NONE

SECDEF 4/3

Attachments:
As stated

Dov can brief at an upcoming program meeting PA&E is offering a thoughtful alternative.

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (P)
Director, PA&E

*D.S.Z.
Larry D. ...*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>4/3</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>4/4</i>
MA RUCCI	<i>4/4</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>4/2</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/11705

U05740 /02



PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



INFORMATION MEMO

March 27, 2002; 5:00 PM

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

FROM: Barry D. Watts *BDW*

SUBJECT: Results of Shipbuilding Study

- PA&E developed, with Navy participation, three potential future fleets and the build plans necessary to achieve them.
- The size of the Navy can be increased to 350-375 ships by 2020 if the funds allocated to shipbuilding are increased to \$13.1B per year in FY00 constant dollars.
 - PB03 allocates \$11.5B per year to shipbuilding.
 - The Navy submitted an alternate plan that requires \$14.3B per year.
- The increase in numbers is due to the introduction of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
 - Our future fleets include 50-70 of these ships. The LCS is not yet designed, so this is a notional estimate rather than an actual requirement.
 - The LCS is projected to cost about \$400M per ship. If the costs rise too far above this, the LCS concept will become uncompetitive with an all-high-end surface combatant mix. In this case, it will be difficult to sustain a fleet larger than about 325 ships.
- A submarine build rate of two boats per year can sustain a force of 50 SSNs plus 4 SSGNs through 2025, provided that we begin building two SSNs per year in FY06.
- All of the plans considered required above-average funding in FY07 and FY08.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

Attachment: Shipbuilding brief.

Prepared By: M. Webster Ewell, (b)(6)

BOTH NAVY + PA&E ESTIMATES ARE REASONABLE. MY SEP 00 ANALYSIS OF MAINTAINING A 315 SHIP NAVY (NO LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS CONSIDERED)



11-L-0559/OSD/11706 *REQUIRED \$12-14B PER YEAR*




The Future Fleet: Options and Shipbuilding Plans

27 March 2002

OSD/PA&E



Concept of the Future Navy




Current nominal composition:
CVBG = CV + 6 CG/DDG
ARG = 3 amphibs, no escorts

Future nominal composition:
CVBG = CV + 3 CG/DDG
ARG = 3 amphibs + DDX + 2 DDG

OSD/PA&E



Navy Global CONOPS circa



OSD/PA&E



Ship totals for three 2020 fleets

	Fleet #1	Fleet #2	Fleet #3
CVs	12	12	12
Amphibs	36	36	36
CG	22	27	27
DDG	61	60	60
DDX	20	12	31
LCS	52	70	12
SSBN	14	14	14
SSN	58	50	50
SSGN	4	4	4
MIW	26	26	26
CLF	36	36	29
Support	25	25	25
TOTAL	364	372	326

- Fleet #1 was provided by the Navy
 - Navy plans to reach 375 ships by 2025
- Fleet #2 is a variant which:
 - Builds more LCS
 - Caps the DDX buy at 12
 - Changes submarine build profile to 2 per year
- Fleet #3 is provided to show what could happen if LCS is too expensive


Illustrative Only

- DDX, LCS not yet designed

OSD/PA&E



Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #1




- 364 ship fleet, including 20 DDX, 52 LCS, 56 SSNs

OSD/PA&E



Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #2




- 372 ship fleet, including 12 DDX, 70 LCS, 50 SSNs

OSD/PA&E



Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #3



- 326 ship fleet, including 31 DDX, 12 LCS, 50 SSNs


OSD/PA&E




DD(X)-LCS Mix

- **Peacetime presence requirement for DD(X) is 12 ships**
 - Navy plan builds 20 DD(X), pending ongoing war fighting and industrial base analyses
 - These plans assume a two-gun, large magazine DD(X)
- **LCS requirement depends on concept of operations and final ship characteristics**
 - 70 LCS gives full-time presence in 4 forward nodes + SOUTHCOM
 - Assumes 4 crews per 3 ships
- **LCS concept is viable only if unit cost of LCS is at most one-third that of a large surface combatant**
 - Fleet #3 is an alternative if the LCS concept turns out to be unworkable

OSD/PA&E



Submarine Force Structure



■ Navy Plan: Refuel all 688s, 4 SSGNs, and 1 SSN/yr FY04-07; 2 SSNs/yr FY08, 09, 16, & after FY 18; 3 SSNs/yr FY10-15, 17, 18
 ▲ Refueling all but 2 688s, 4 SSGN, 1 SSN/yr FY04,05; 2 SSNs/yr starting in FY06
 ● Refueling all but 2 688s, 4 SSGNs, and 1 SSN/year FY04-30

OSD/PA&E



Submarine Force Structure

- **Plan #1 sustains a fleet of 53 SSNs and 4 SSGNs**
 - Two additional submarines would need to be built before FY10 to sustain the Navy's desired force structure of 55 SSNs
- **Plan #2 sustains a fleet of 50 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, without ever building three submarines per year**
 - A force of 55 submarines can be sustained by building 2 SSNs in FY05
 - FY03 advanced procurement funds would be needed

OSD/PA&E



Amphibious Ships

- **LHA(R) timing**

- Fleet #1 builds LHA(R) in FY09, FY13, FY16, and FY18
- Fleet #2 builds LHA(R) in FY06, FY09, FY12, and FY14
- LHA's reach end of service lives in 2011-2015

- **LHA(R) will be designed to operate JSF, V-22**

- Delaying the replacement of the existing LHAs is not consistent with the establishment of Expeditionary Striking Groups

- **LHA(R) program can support an FY06 start provided LHA(R) is a modified LHD and not a new design**

OSD/PA&E



Industrial Base Analysis

Only very rough estimates of the industrial base implications of the three plans can be made now because some crucial inputs are not available

- **LCS Design**

- Size, extent of composite material use, systems complexity
- Will a third bidder emerge?

- **DDX Design**

- Capacity of some yards varies with ship displacement

- **Outcome of LPD-17 consolidation negotiations**

- **Will SSNs remained “teamed” at 2 per year?**

***The Navy will provide industrial base results by 29 March
(?)***

OSD/PA&E



Backup




OSD/PA&E



Shipbuilding Program of Record

- Uses CAIG cost estimates



OSD/PA&E



Calculation of Fleet #2

	CVs	Amphibs	CG/DDG	DDX	LCS
12 CVBG	12		36		
12 ARG+			24	12	
Guam Sqd			1		
LCS Squadrons					
SOUTHCOM			4		12
EUCOM			5		15
CENTCOM			7		21
PACOM			6		18
Japan/Korea			1		4
Total	12	36	87	12	70

- Escorts per CVBG and ARG+ from Navy IWARS analysis
- LCS force structure supports 1.0 presence of a squadron consisting of 4 LCS + 1 CG/DDG in each of 5 nodes
 - Multiple crewing of LCS assumed

OSD/PA&E



Submarine Force Requirement

- The QDR process did not address SSN force structure
- Requirement is based on 1999 JCS Study
 - 55 SSNs for warfighting, 68 for peacetime presence/ISR missions

Changes since 1999:

- Guam homeporting
 - 3 SSNs homeported in Guam generate ~7 SSNs worth of peacetime presence, mostly due to reduced transit times
- 4 SSGNs added to the force
 - Greater underway time due to dual-crewing allows each SSGN to contribute ~2 SSNs worth of peacetime missions
- With these changes, a fleet of 50 SSNs and 4 SSGNs can generate ~62 SSNs worth of peacetime presence

OSD/PA&E

June 28, 2002 5:32 PM

Dove


350.09

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DIA

I ought to have an interview with Jake Jacoby about his thoughts on DIA and what he thinks ought to be done in the intelligence business here. I think I would probably like to have Steve Cambone sit in, and invite Gen. Myers as optional.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-13



Please respond by 07/26/02

28 Jun 02

U16373 02

June 28, 2002 10:31 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ROE

I keep reading press articles that there are problems with the ROE in Afghanistan. I would like you to sort through it. If there are changes we ought to make, please let me know promptly. It sounds like changes are needed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-9

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

28 Jun 02

U16374 02

June 28, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Article

See Attached.
Appeared in the Dawn
Pakistan

Henry Kissinger

Please give me a copy of Henry Kissinger's latest article on India and Pakistan. I believe it was written in the last two or three weeks, and apparently it mentions me. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-7

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

28 Jun 02

U16375 02

Player, Ricco, Maj., USMC

To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: Published in the Pakistani Dawn

6/10/02

Halting the slide toward war

By Henry A. Kissinger

US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's visit to the Indian subcontinent to help arrest the slide toward war is one of the most complex assignments undertaken by an American official in recent years. For the conflict between India and Pakistan takes place on many levels: the passions of both sides override traditional calculations of self-interest; the two countries possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems and have threatened to use them; important interests of major powers are involved. Nevertheless, no country - not even the world's only remaining superpower - is in a position to impose a solution.

The Kashmir issue is one of the residues of the settlements of the period immediately following World War II. The subcontinent had had a high degree of geographic, cultural and religious cohesion but no unified political framework prior to British rule. Britain brought about political structures based on western political values and institutions. These values raised the issue of the coexistence of the Muslim and Hindu religions in a country where Hindus formed the vast majority. Britain tried to solve the problem by partition: regions with a Muslim majority (more or less) were formed into the state of Pakistan; the rest of the territory became contemporary India.

All this was accomplished amid unspeakable massacres carried out by both sides. But the borders could not be drawn unambiguously; today's India retains a population of 150 million Muslims, making it the second most populous Muslim country in the world after Indonesia. In 1971, East Pakistan seceded, aided in no small part by an Indian military invasion, forming the present state of Bangladesh.

The current crisis in Kashmir goes back to the bloody days of partition. In 1947, hesitation by the Hindu ruler of the predominantly Muslim population in Kashmir precipitated interventions by both Indian and Pakistani troops and eventual accession of the ruler to India. The conflict ended, to the satisfaction of neither party, essentially along the existing line of demarcation - the so-called Line of Control - leaving the largest part of the population and the most important territory on the Indian side. In 1948, a UN resolution called for a plebiscite to determine the will of the population. That vote has never taken place.

In the half-century since, the issue of Kashmir has become embedded in the fabric of how the two nations justify their existence. For Pakistan, Kashmir symbolizes its claim to governing those parts of the Indian subcontinent where Muslims are in a majority. For India - which today has a larger Muslim population than Pakistan - the future of Kashmir is a test of its national cohesion. For, were the Pakistani claim sustained, the political future of the 150 million Muslims in India might be in play.

No wonder there have been three wars over the future of Kashmir. And, inevitably, the issue of Kashmir has proved unsuitable for mediation; there is no compromise foreseeable between the clashing passions. Pakistan calls for American mediation to add pressure to its claim for a change in the Line of Control. India rejects any mediation and, indeed, any outside role because it will not grant the principle of the Pakistani claims. Neither the United States nor Russia - or any other group of countries - has been able to do more than ameliorate the impasse.

Matters have once again reached the boiling point because, for at least a decade, Pakistan has been supporting guerilla activity in Kashmir by tolerating infiltrators crossing the Line of Control, frequently with the support of

Pakistani intelligence services. Since the Line of Control runs along mountain ridges, many of them above 10,000 feet in elevation, support camps have been established to facilitate these border crossings.

Paradoxically, this state of affairs, however painful, was tolerable to India so long as Pakistan was isolated. And for several decades, Pakistan was governed by civilians who mismanaged its economy and finances and, since October 1999, by an unelected military government headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf. These governments sought to sustain themselves by appeals to Islamic fundamentalism.

But the attacks of Sept. 11 brought home to Musharraf the vulnerability of Pakistan's position. He overcame diplomatic isolation by turning full circle. He abandoned the Taliban in Afghanistan, turned on fundamentalists in his own country and opened Pakistani territory to American operations against Al Qaeda.

These measures were widely welcomed in America. In India, they raised the spectre of a Pakistan modernizing with western help and investment, relinked to the United States by cooperative ties, but continuing to support terrorism against India, thereby giving the open wound in Kashmir a subcontinental scope and turning Pakistan into a permanent thorn in India's side. The Dec. 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Indian parliament provided a pretext to settle the Kashmir issue, and perhaps the challenge of Pakistan itself, conclusively.

The temptation is great to turn the issue of global terrorism against Pakistan and to reduce Pakistan's capacity to serve as a symbol for India's Muslim population. And precisely because Pakistan's leaders view India's motives in a similar manner, they are making nuclear threats that have a certain plausibility.

In this manner, the issue of Kashmir merges with some of the basic principles of Indian foreign and security policy. These are naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean, friendly regimes on India's borders and pre-eminence in the entire arc from Singapore to Aden. The single-minded pursuit of this policy has provided occasions for most of India's neighbours to experience India's considerable military prowess. This confluence of motives has brought about a situation dangerously close to developing its own momentum.

In terms of the war against global terrorism, the United States opposes the violation of demarcation lines by terrorist groups and the use of terrorism against civilian populations. This is why the Bush administration has used its influence in Pakistan to press ever more insistently on an end to infiltration and the closing of the camps near the Line of Control facilitating it. The United States also has a major geopolitical interest in cooperative relations with India, the world's largest democracy. A position of major influence for India in the region between Singapore and Aden is - or can be made to be - compatible with America's strategic interests in both the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

But the dynamics of the situation are far from clear-cut. The Al Qaeda terrorists are on Pakistan's side in the war in Kashmir. But they despise Musharraf for siding with the United States in Afghanistan. They would celebrate his downfall either because he appears weak vis-a-vis India or because he loses a war. Thus, even while Musharraf says (and probably sincerely) that he is trying to control cross-border actions, he may lack the ability to enforce it. And many elements of the Al Qaeda (and perhaps some in the Pakistani intelligence services) have a vested interest in Musharraf's downfall by ignoring his orders and starting a war.

This danger confronts America with a grave dilemma. Even though the Pakistani regime has serious flaws, Musharraf has been a staunch ally in the battle against the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism since Sept. 11. In January, Musharraf separated Islam from cross-border violence and began a process of controlling the Islamic schools teaching global jihad. Were the most moderate Islamic regime in the region to collapse while America looks on, the consequences for Afghanistan and the entire region could be serious.

Radicals would gloat about the precariousness of friendship with the United States and the unreliability of American security assurances. Our military forces in Afghanistan would lose their rear area; Al Qaeda might rediscover a base territory. Osama bin Laden in Kabul is one thing; Osama in Islamabad would be devastating.

The situation could easily get out of hand if India would feel obliged to respond to terrorist attacks by elements not controlled from Islamabad (and even more so to deliberate provocations). Even if its intentions are limited, India may misjudge the Pakistani "red line" at which the war escalates, perhaps into the nuclear field. For Pakistan is in a position vis-a-vis India analogous to which the United States perceived itself to be in Europe during the cold war. In the face of the superiority of the Indian conventional army, Pakistan treats nuclear arms as the indispensable balancer. Hence its threshold for nuclear use is lower, and renouncing nuclear weapons may, in fact, make a war more likely.

But the major nations have no reason to accept the counsel of despair that the momentum of events is beyond control, especially on an issue where their interests are so congruent and so engaged. Indeed, the tensions along the Line of Control are an almost a unique case of crisis calling for multilateral diplomacy. Russia will not look lightly on a radicalization of the Islamic world - this is why Russian President Vladimir Putin has been personally so active. China has a relationship with Pakistan stretching over a decade - partly as a counterweight in the Sino-Indian border disputes. Europe - especially Great Britain - has a historic interest in a peaceful evolution of the area.

All these countries - whatever their other differences - seem to agree with the parameters outlined earlier: opposition to terrorist infiltrations, opposition to the weakening of Pakistan. In these conditions, the United States cannot confine itself to exhortations; it must instead take the lead in crystallizing these general interests into a more precise calculus of incentives. American policy must help chart the narrow path that presses Musharraf to prevent infiltration across the Line of Control, while making clear to India that a war would seriously weaken India's vital interests, including the cooperative Indian-American relationship that has been making such significant progress.

Finally, there is the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. The world has listened to the reciprocal threats of both sides with amazing equanimity - almost as if nuclear war were a natural disaster like the weather, beyond human control. But nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent would cross a dividing line heretofore resistant to all passions, in all wars of the nuclear age. The other nuclear powers - especially Russia and the United States - should not accept that nuclear weapons become conventional. All aspirations to nonproliferation will disappear if the risks of nuclear use are not made to exceed those generating resort to them.

At least Moscow and Washington - possessing the largest nuclear capabilities - should convey to the parties their insistence on this dividing line and begin urgent studies on specific measures to give effect to these warnings. But these measures can work only if there is a de-escalation of the military buildups along the Line of Control side by side with the end of infiltration.-Copyright 2002, Los Angeles Times Syndicate International.

Riccoch Player
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Military Assistant

Office: (703) 697-9312 Fax: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

www.defenselink.mil

June 28, 2002 7:34 AM

388.3

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Arms Control

Please take a look at this paper on what China and Russia are trying to do on these treaties. You ought to get yourself tooled up for that.

Thanks.

Attach.
385322AI 6-02, "Selected Arms Control Agreements In Debate and In Force"

DHR:dh
062802-6



Please respond by 08/02/02

28 Jun 02


U16376 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11730

Notes

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 28 2002



Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

Would prohibit new production, enrichment, or reprocessing of fissile material for nuclear weapons worldwide. Does not address existing fissile material stockpiles.

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

A Chinese-led effort to hold discussions with the goal of a legally binding international agreement to not militarize outer space.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996)

Already signed by over 160 nations, this treaty bans nuclear weapons testing. Enforced through an international monitoring system and on-site inspections.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (1994)

The 182 non-nuclear-weapon state signatories—India, Israel and Pakistan have not signed—entered into an international legal commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and agreed to accept IAEA safeguards covering all peaceful nuclear activities.

UNCLASSIFIED

385322A1 6-02

16
700

SHOW HERE

EF2059 - 4

June 28, 2002 7:20 AM

hndw

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow Up

Please make sure I send *Rumsfeld's Rules* to the assistant to the ChoD who was with us at dinner last night. I promised to do so. I will autograph it if you tell me what to put on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-3

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

7/2/02

MR D. ZITO -
Col Buccia -

See attached response.

v/r
Lawler

07-01-02 11:56 14

11-L-0559/OSD/11732

11 102 88

EF8059 - 4

June 28, 2002 7:20 AM

hndw

020 SD

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Please make sure I see
with us at dinner last
what to put on it.

7/9
SMT -

he ChoD who was
raph it if you tell me

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-3

*Do a note to
Col Sabiror with
a downloaded copy
of Rumsfeld's
as indicated in this
open loop
"response" (1)
D. Sabiror*

.....
Please respond by _

*MZ
Col E*

See attached response.

*1/2
Lauren*

28 JUN 02

U16377 02

07-01-02 11:54 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/11733

JUN 1 02 09:21

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

This Message: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jim Macdougall
07/08/02 01:30 PM

To: Steven.Bucci@osd.smil.mil, James.Settele@osd.smil.mil
cc: Katherine Johnson/CACERP/RUE/ISP/OUSSDP@OUSSDP, Lauren
Haber/USDP/OUSSDP@OUSSDP
Subject: Snowflake EF2059 (FOUO)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Sirs:

Snowflake EF2059 reads "Please make sure I send *Rumsfeld's Rules* to the assistant to the ChoD who was with us at dinner last night. I promised to do so. I will autograph it if you tell me what to put on it."

The Uzbek officer's name is: Colonel Alisher Sabirov. He's the Deputy Chief of the Uzbek Joint Staff. Recommend SecDef thank him for his important role in developing U.S.-Uzbek bilateral defense and security relations.

vr, Jim

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/11734

January 8, 2002 11:00 AM

ACTION
1/8
1815

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: FYDP

Please have Pete Aldridge tell us what the dollar amounts are for the FYDP on this attachment.

100.58

Thanks.

Attach.
01/07/02 Program Reductions, etc.

DHR:dh
010802-13

.....
Please respond by _____

P Jan 11

U16391 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11735

showfile

**EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE**

January 7, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DoD Programs—Terminated or Reduced

In one of our recent meetings you indicated you would like to see the list of programs we have eliminated or reduced.

I have attached that list. As the Vice President said in that meeting, we will undoubtedly be hearing about these once the Congress comes back into session and you announce the Fiscal Year 2003 budget. When Congress gets the budget and Members discover the intention of the Department to discontinue or reduce these programs, there will be a good deal of clamor from the Hill on these matters. You will undoubtedly receive phone calls, letters and/or visits from Members of the House and Senate on a number of these.

Respectfully,

Attach
List of Reductions and Cuts

DHR:dh
122901-2

**SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

11-L-0559/OSD/11736

DRAFT -- EYES ONLY -- SENSITIVE

1/7/2002 9:49 AM

FY 2003 Major Defense Program Reductions, Postponements, Terminations

<u>Navy</u>	(\$Millions in FY03)
• Slowed Production of Amphibious Transport Ships (LPD)	-1,033
• DD-21 Terminated/Convert to DD-X R&D program	+111
• Postpone next generation nuclear aircraft carrier	-309
• Terminate Navy Area Missile Defense	-100
• Reduce V-22 purchase by 32 Aircraft (15 next year)	-403
• Begin Phase-out of 19 Spruance-Class Destroyer	-70
• Begin Phase-out of F-14 Fighter Aircraft/S-3 Anti-sub Aircraft	-35
• Complete Phase-out of Inchon-class helicopter carrier	-48
<u>Air Force</u>	
• Postpone/Restructure Low-Altitude Space Based IR System	-785
• Begin deactivating Peacekeeper ICBM	+137
• Deactivate 33 of 90 B-1 Bombers	-120
• Begin phase-out of 14 C-5As and 56 C-130s Cargo Aircraft	0
<u>Army</u>	
• Begin Phase-out of 1000 Vietnam-era Helicopters	-100
• Terminate 19 army 'legacy' ammo/weapons programs	-631
<u>Department-wide</u>	
• 15 percent Headquarters staffing reduction	-320
• 10-15 percent Defense Agencies cuts	-100
• Close overseas nuclear storage sites	<u>-64</u>
	3,870
<u>Other:</u>	
• Deep cuts to non-reimbursable DoD detailees	
• Congressional Passage of 2005 Base Closures	

DRAFT – EYES ONLY – SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/11737

SENSITIVE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 OCT 11 AM 10:44



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

October 11, 2002 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Reserve Mobilization "Requirements" -- SNOWFLAKE

- As you requested (Tab A), I have reviewed the Joint Staff recommendations on reserve mobilization, as they stood on October 8, and offer the following observations:
 - Army and Marine Corps proposals for force protection/mobilization processing appear generous. I recommend the Joint Staff look at how we handled force protection in the first two months after 9/11, as a guide to methods that would reduce demands. (I'm assuming the period of heightened need would be one to two months long.) In contrast, Air Force protection numbers seem unrealistically low, and its provision for air defense may be too lean.
 - I would also question the backfill numbers for the Services (too high).
 - Navy has made no allowance for helping Coast Guard with port security, which I believe is a significant vulnerability.
 - In-theater force levels look high for all Services, but no detailed list was available. I will attempt to review in more detail.
 - It does not appear from the plan presented that much provision has been made for post-hostilities responsibilities.
- Bottom line: Numbers appear moderately generous, and the concepts behind them sometimes inconsistent. Not surprising: Numbers were developed (independently?) by the individual Services, then merged by Joint Staff. Near term needs could perhaps be trimmed, but long-term needs may be greater than estimated, depending on U.S. responsibilities in the post-hostility period.

SENSITIVE



11-L-0559/OSD/11738

U16398 /02

SENSITIVE

I conveyed these observations to Joint Staff before the Chiefs' meeting, and it is conceivable they may take some of them into account when they present to you.

- I have discussed these observations with Dr. Cambone, and they have benefitted from his comments, but he may wish to add additional points for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION: Info only

COORDINATION: None

Attachment

cc: Dr. Cambone

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

SENSITIVE

2

11-L-0559/OSD/11739

snw/haRe
9/30/02

SENSITIVE

September 26, 2002 1:28 PM

TO: David Chu
Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reserve Call-Ups

I would appreciate it if you two would screw your heads into the issue of necessary reserve call-ups in the event of a conflict in Iraq.

Please talk to General Myers and hear what his estimates are. Then, let's think carefully about numbers, what additional scrubbing needs to be done, what the timing would be, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092602-3

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

SENSITIVE
11-L-0559/OSD711740

showtime

9/30/02

~~SENSITIVE~~

September 26, 2002 1:28 PM

TO: David Chu
Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reserve Call-Ups

I would appreciate it if you two would screw your heads into the issue of necessary reserve call-ups in the event of a conflict in Iraq.

Please talk to General Myers and hear what his estimates are. Then, let's think carefully about numbers, what additional scrubbing needs to be done, what the timing would be, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092602-3

.....
Please respond by 10/11/02

326

26 Sep 02

~~SENSITIVE~~
11-L-0559/OSD/11741 U16400 /02

Snowflake

January 3, 2002 8:47 AM

Action
x 01/04
0902

TO: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ivanov

Please figure out a program for us to work out our arrangements with Ivanov.
Please schedule a rhythm over the next six months so we get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010302-9

.....

Please respond by _____

RUSIA

3 Jan 02

U16403 02M

11-L-0559/OSD/11742



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

3294
E FOSI 4 S/A 1/18

ACTION MEMO

I-02/000794-RUE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Mr. Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *AF 1/2/02*

SUBJECT: Letter to Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov

Letter at Tab A summarizes this week's Senior Advisors Groups meetings; enlists Ivanov's support for "energizing" the working groups agreed at the meetings; and invites Ivanov to meet with you in February (at Wehrkunde), March and April.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letter to Minister Ivanov at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab B.

Attachments:
As stated

Mr. Sergey Borisovich Ivanov
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Minister:

I received a report on this week's Senior Advisors Group meeting, co-chaired by Under Secretary of Defense Feith and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy. To address and resolve the issues discussed, the Group decided to form a small number of working groups, co-chaired by U.S. and Russian senior Defense Ministry subject matter experts.

The three agreed-upon working groups will focus on: 1) strategic offensive weapons reductions, transparency, and predictability; 2) military-technology cooperation (including missile defense cooperation); and 3) combating terrorism (which will address, among other activities, a framework document for cooperation). Mr. Feith also proposed a fourth working group that would deepen our cooperation in the area of biological warfare counterproliferation. As we recently discussed in Brussels, this is a potentially fruitful area for expanded U.S.-Russian cooperation.

The U.S. and Russia still have much to do in order to fulfill the potential of our new strategic framework. To reach that goal, you and I need to give energy to these new

11-L-0559/OSD/11744

working groups to ensure momentum is retained and that we make as much progress as possible before President Bush and President Putin next meet.

As we discussed in Brussels, it is important that form follow substance on any agreements. That is, we should remain open to the form of the arrangement(s), but the form should not be predetermined: the nature and scope of our work together in a specific area will determine the form of the arrangement. Let's get the substance right and I am sure the appropriate form will follow.

As we discussed in our last phone conversation, I hope we can meet for a couple of hours in Munich on the margins of the Wehrkunde Conference on Saturday, February 2. I suggest we begin early in the afternoon; perhaps 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. I also would like to plan on meeting at least two more times before the Summit: A day or two during the weeks of March 11-15 and April 22-27. I invite you to come to the U.S. for one of those meetings. The Senior Advisors Group and the Working Groups can meet in between our meetings.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/11745



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Mr. Sergey Borisovich Ivanov
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Minister:

I received a report on this week's Senior Advisors Group meeting, co-chaired by Under Secretary of Defense Feith and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy. To address and resolve the issues discussed, the Group decided to form a small number of working groups, co-chaired by U.S. and Russian senior Defense Ministry subject matter experts.

The three agreed-upon working groups will focus on: 1) strategic offensive weapons reductions, transparency, and predictability; 2) military-technology cooperation (including missile defense cooperation); and 3) combating terrorism (which will address, among other activities, a framework document for cooperation). Mr. Feith also proposed a fourth working group that would deepen our cooperation in the area of biological warfare counterproliferation. As we recently discussed in Brussels, this is a potentially fruitful area for expanded U.S.-Russian cooperation.

The U.S. and Russia still have much to do in order to fulfill the potential of our new strategic framework. To reach that goal, you and I need to give energy to these new working groups to ensure momentum is retained and that we make as much progress as possible before President Bush and President Putin next meet.

As we discussed in Brussels, it is important that form follow substance on any agreements. That is, we should remain open to the form of the arrangement(s), but the form should not be predetermined: the nature and scope of our work together in a specific area will determine the form of the arrangement. Let's get the substance right and I am sure the appropriate form will follow.



11-L-0559/OSD/11746

As we discussed in our last phone conversation, I hope we can meet for a couple of hours in Munich on the margins of the Wehrkunde Conference on Saturday, February 2. I suggest we begin early in the afternoon; perhaps 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. I also would like to plan on meeting at least two more times before the Summit: A day or two during the weeks of March 11-15 and April 22-27. I invite you to come to the U.S. for one of those meetings. The Senior Advisors Group and the Working Groups can meet in between our meetings.

Sincerely,

January 4, 2002 7:18 AM

Aaron
15 11/14
1235

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wanted List

When should we announce who we consider to be the higher-level Al Qaeda and higher-level Taliban that we are looking for, what their names are, what their titles were, whether or not they are dead or alive, and whether or not they have been captured, so the world can know what we are looking for.

Is that a good idea or a bad idea? It sure sets a hurdle. On the other hand, it clarifies things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-3

.....
Please respond by _____

0005

4 Jan 02

U16404 02

January 4, 2002 7:23 AM

INFO
14
1230

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tribunals

015

I want to think through what I think about tribunals, and then I want to sit down with the Vice President, David Addington and Jim Haynes and discuss it before we go public with any of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-4

.....
Please respond by _____

4 JAN 02

U16405 02

January 4, 2002 7:27 AM

INFO
15 01/04
1230

378.61

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Non-Lethal Riot Control Agents

On the subject of non-lethal riot control agents, the President will delegate to me the authority in the CENTCOM AOR on a temporary basis until they rewrite the Executive Order.

DHR:dh
010402-5

.....
Please respond by _____

U16406 02

4 JAN 02

January 4, 2002 9:14 AM

ACTION COMPLETE 15
11/12/02

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reduced Pace

000.7 STD

Why don't we think about going to a total of three or four days a week press availability, instead of five, since much of the action in Afghanistan is temporarily on a different pace. We could do one of them at CENTOM, one on a subject other than Afghanistan and one or two by me.

What do you think would be the effect of that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-8

.....
Please respond by _____

1/10
SecDef -
You're doing one
next week. You did one
This week.
D.R.

4 JAN 02

U16407 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM: 
DATE: January 8, 2002
SUBJECT: Reduced Pace

Agree in general with your recommendation to reduce the number of briefings. As a matter of fact, we look for opportunities **not** to brief.

I recommend we not announce this as a policy and let the reduction occur gradually.

11-L-0559/OSD/11752

January 4, 2002 8:31 AM

DS /NRB
5/15/01

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

I think we ought to have a meeting on Saudi Arabia. It seems to me it is time to review our policy with respect to that country and see if we can't put a full court press on them to get them to do things that are ultimately going to be in their best interests.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-16

8 Jan 02

U16408 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11753

Agmon
1-4
103

January 4, 2002 8:32 AM

TO: Jim Roche
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CAPS

384

Please get me a program as to how I ought to propose that we begin reducing the CAPS over the U.S. We have to calm it down from an expense standpoint.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-17

.....
Please respond by _____

U16409 02

4Jan02

Snowflake

January 4, 2002 9:37 AM

Handwritten notes: "No. 11/15/02" and "JS" with a checkmark.

RUSSIA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ivanov Letter

Here is this letter from Ivanov for your action.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/01 MoD Ivanov ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
010402-22

.....
Please respond by _____

4Jan02

U16410 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11755

Snowflake

December 30, 2001 9:10 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

Attached is a copy of a letter I was presented by Ivanov when I met with him earlier this month in Brussels.

On the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative I have shown each of you—I told him I thought it best come from NATO, rather than from the U.S. to Russia. Therefore, we are going to feed it in through the NATO process.

Regards,

Attach
12/17/01 MoD Ivanov ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
123001-1

11-L-0559/OSD/11756

Moscow 17 December 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am most grateful for your positive evaluation of the contribution of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

I support your assessment that today we must increase the level of cooperation between our countries in this area since the danger of threats associated with activities of terrorist organizations not only will remain in the near term but will in all likelihood increase.

Overall, we agree with your proposal on the "Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative." At the same time, the limited volume of information we have received does not permit us to conduct a thorough analysis of your proposal. In this regard, we would like to receive from you a more detailed explanation of the proposed measures with the American vision of the ways and means for achieving this "Initiative."

In my view, the ideas laid out in the "Initiative," either in toto or as separate points, could be one of the topics discussed in the framework of the planned new format for relations between Russia and NATO.

I hope that cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the United States Department of Defense becomes a significant contribution in the development of a constructive partnership between our governments and in guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security.

Respectfully,

Minister of Defense, Russian Federation

(signed) S. Ivanov

(Addressed to)

His Excellency
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/11757

DROP OFF TO
C: D

FROM: SECDEF TRIP
MTB w/ MOD IVANOV.
VIC CDR SETTELS

Москва, 17 декабря 2001 г.



Уважаемый господин Министр!

Весьма признателен за Вашу высокую оценку вклада Министерства обороны Российской Федерации в дело сотрудничества в борьбе против международного терроризма.

Поддерживаю Ваше мнение о том, что сегодня необходимо повышать уровень взаимодействия наших стран в этой области, так как опасность угроз, связанная с деятельностью террористических организаций, в ближайшее время не только сохранится, но и имеет все послышки к возрастанию.

В целом мы согласны с Вашим предложением по "Инициативе Евро-Атлантической безопасности". Вместе с тем, ограниченный объем полученной информации не позволяет провести углубленный анализ Ваших предложений. В этой связи хотелось бы получить от Вас более детальное разъяснение предлагаемых мер с американским видением путей и механизмов реализации "Инициативы".

На мой взгляд, идеи, изложенные в "Инициативе", в целом или в ряде пунктов могут стать одним из вопросов для обсуждения в рамках планируемого нового формата отношений между Россией и НАТО.

Надеюсь, что сотрудничество между министерствами обороны Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки станет весомым вкладом в дело развития конструктивных партнерских отношений между нашими государствами и обеспечения евро-атлантической безопасности.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

С.Иванов

Его Превосходительству
Господину Дональду Рамсфелду
Министру обороны Соединенных Штатов Америки

11-L-0559/OSD/11758

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS & DIRECTIVES DIRECTORATE

December 26, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

ATTN: Marie Lindsay

SUBJECT: Translation Service

Attached is a copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary of Defense from a foreign official. This is a request for translation service. Please call for pickup or send via fax .


WHS Correspondence
Control Division

Attachment:
As stated

Received 12/27/01
Completed 12/28/01
Please see attached.

12/28

11-L-0559/OSD/11759

January 4, 2002 10:55 AM

Aston 1/5 1240

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper on Deterrence

PAPER RETURNED 1/5

Where is the paper I gave you on weakening deterrence that you were supposed to edit and get back to me? I need it. I want it. Please give it to me, even if you haven't done it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-27



Please respond by _____

000.5

4 Jan 02

U16411 02

December 12, 2001 12:20 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weakening of Deterrence

I dictated a paper on things that have weakened the deterrent. Paul and I started working on it. It was retyped and given to him to edit.

Please get it back from him no later than close of business today. I want to have it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121201-15

.....
Please respond by 12/12



**From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz**

5 JAN 2002

Don -

Here is a copy of your
draft on deterrence, along
with a chart on the subject
that I put together last April.

I will get you some additional
thoughts this weekend.

Paul W.

December 11, 2001 3:28 PM

SUBJECT: How U.S. Deterrence Has Been Weakened

February 1993—First attack on the World Trade Center

April 1993—The assassination attempt against President George H.W. Bush went unpunished

Fall 1993—the pull-out after the Mogadishu difficulties

± 1995—attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia

1990s—U.S. softness in North Korea policy

1996—Abandonment of the Iraqi opposition in the North of Iraq

1998—attack on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya

1998—U.S. let Khaddafi off for responsibility in Pan Am 103

2000—Attack on the USS COLE in Yemen

1990s, weakness with respect to enforcing UN inspections and sanctions on Iraq

In short, for some eight years, the U.S. deterrent was weakened as a result of a series of actions that persuaded the world that the U.S. was “leaning back,” not “leaning forward.” For example, pulling a U.S. ship out of Haiti when it was fired on by rifles; pulling U.S. forces back three kilometers in Kosovo, when three people were captured; treating the rescue of the pilot Grady in Bosnia as though it was a victory for the U.S.; and timidity in the Kosovo campaign, including ruling out the use of ground troops and flying at 15,000 feet, etc.

All of these things contributed to a weakened deterrent in that they told the world that the U.S., if tweaked, would flinch, thereby persuading hostile nations and actors that they can harm the U.S. without risk to themselves.

DHR:dh
Deterrence

11-L-0559/OSD/11763

This is our record on dealing with major terrorist actions against the U.S. over the last 20 years.

	Perpetrators Caught	"Source" Identified	Perpetrators Punished	"Source" Punished
Beirut	No	Yes	No	No
LaBelle Disco (Libyan)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pan Am 103	Yes	Yes	Partly	No
World Trade Center	Yes	No	Yes	No
Bush Assassination	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not really
Riyadh	No	No	No	No
Khobar	Yes	Maybe	Yes	No
Nairobi/Dar Es Salaam	Yes	We think so	Yes	No
Cole	Some	Maybe	Not yet	No

HARDLY A CREDIBLE DETERRENT.

In addition, there is a small possibility that there could have been a foreign terrorist connection to Oklahoma City, TWA 800 or Egyptian 990. Of course, US investigations have concluded that OKC was purely domestic and that the other two were not terrorists. Probably so, but if not there is someone else sitting out there who knows he got away with murder.

11-L-0559/OSD/11764

15 1-5
1045

January 4, 2002 10:57 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Quote

470

FYI

Attach.
Quote from Proverbs

DHR:dh
010402-28



Please respond by _____

In days of old, manhood was proved with a hatchet in the other fellow's skull. Then civilization buried the hatchet elsewhere and taught man how to do in his enemy with a political device that came to be known as the official leak; which is a second cousin once removed of gossip--demonstrating that the tongue is the sharpest weapon given to man and sometimes it is long enough to cut its own throat.

"A Soft tongue breaketh the bone."
Proverbs 25:15

4 Jan 02

U16413 02

1/4 1400
snowflake

January 4, 2002 11:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letters to Jordan and Pakistan

These letters from Dov are wrong. I don't think we want to say we are paying them for what they are doing for Enduring Freedom. I think what we want to do is tell them we are paying them some money, but it certainly isn't everything that they have done with respect to Enduring Freedom.

I think the letters are misleading and dangerous.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/03/02 draft letters for Jordan and Pakistan

DHR:db
010402-31

Please respond by _____

DBS

Larry Di Rita

2/13

4 Jan 02

092

U16414 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11766

2008
12/26 1350
December 21, 2001 1:43 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jordan and Pakistan

You did a terrific job on the Jordan and Pakistan project. I assume from what you said that the good news has already been given to both of them. Good news travels fast.

Nonetheless, I would like to have a letter drafted from me to the President and the King explaining what has been done. I felt strongly about it. I have been urging it on, and I want them to know that I personally care.

Please see that this gets worked out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122101-18



Please respond by _____ *SICOPF*

Draft Responses attached.

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
1/3



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency
General Pervez Musharraf
President, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear President Musharraf:

I appreciate the substantial assistance you have provided in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and I am pleased to advise you that the Congress has passed legislation that will allow ~~me~~ to make direct payments to your country for the support you are providing. *US* *Some* *Some of*

We anticipate that President Bush will sign the legislation soon. Shortly thereafter, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Dov Zakheim, will forward an initial payment. We would hope to provide further funds and will work with your government to deal with this in the most effective manner.

Thank you again for all you have done in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Sincerely,

and to Congress



11-L-0559/OSD/11768



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Majesty
King Abdullah II
Amman
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Your Majesty:

I appreciate the ~~substantial~~ assistance you have provided in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and I am pleased to advise you that the Congress has passed legislation that will allow me to make ~~direct payments~~ to your country for the support you are providing. *in* *Some of*

We anticipate that President Bush will sign the legislation soon. Shortly thereafter, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Dov Zakheim, will forward an initial payment.

Thank you again for your support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/11769

January 4, 2002 2:13 PM

Action
5-1
10/4/02

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Karzai

Done
1/5/02

Atg hamistaw

Let's see if I can get a telephone appointment with Karzai. I want to talk to him about this note.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/28/01 SecDef MFR

DHR:dh
010402-34

.....

Please respond by _____

4 Jan 02

U16415 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11770

December 28, 2001 12:01 PM

SUBJECT: Call to Karzai

I need to decide when I call Karzai to talk about Nagibullah and ask him if not
now, when?

DHR:dh
122801-10

AsG: When the father there?

11-L-0559/OSD/11771

Action
117
1310

January 4, 2002 6:05 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Assistance

Please come up with a plan and explain it to me orally as to what we ought to do in the war on terrorism by deciding what we want out of each country and asking them for it, rather than going at them with what we think they might give us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-43



Please respond by _____

000.5

4/Jan 02

U16416 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11772

January 4, 2002 6:41 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Crusader

Handwritten: Action
1/8
0620

Handwritten: 470

Have you ever drafted something that will explain the Crusader to the President? I need it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-48

.....
Please respond by _____

Handwritten: 7 JAN 2002

Handwritten: Sec Def -

Handwritten: We did a one-page talking paper for you on December 21.

Handwritten: It should be somewhere in your office but I'll resubmit it.

Handwritten: Paul W.

Handwritten: 4 JAN 02

U16417 02

CRUSADER TALKING POINTS

Crusader of 2001 is Not Crusader of the 1990's

- Designed to replace 1960's system (Paladin); by 1999, Crusader had grown to a 60 ton-design, making it impractical to airlift. That was the reason that it became a symbol of the Army's heavy mentality.

Crusader of 2001

- Weight reduced by 20 tons; now can put two on a C-17.
- Numbers reduced from nearly 1200 to less than 500; it will be focused on the most modernized part of the force, the so-called transformation force that brings digitization to the ground battle.
- Higher fire rate than older artillery and robotic loading allows 25% reduction in guns per battalion and a 33% reduction in people per gun.
- A single Crusader outshoots a battery of Palladins.
 - 33% increase in range, three times more accurate
 - 10 to 1 increase in sustained rate of fire
 - Completely robotic; allows for 2/3 reduction in manpower from equivalent force
- Full Nuclear-Bio-Chemical protection, unlike current systems.
- Bottom line:
 - 50% less lift, Greater firepower, Less logistics, Fewer soldiers in harms way
 - Functional in all weather, applicable to all contingencies across the entire spectrum of operations

Fully Digitized Command and Control System is Truly Transformational

- Crusader processes situational awareness data from multiple sources into easily understood messages that are delivered directly to the crew, eliminating the need for fire direction centers.
- Crew knows onboard where friends and foes are on the battlefield; current artillery crews must be told by others, causing long delays.
- Artillery integrated into Joint Air and Ground Forces vs. Army only currently
- Sensor-to-Shot Fired in less than one minute vs. 10-12 minutes today. Against moving target, this is the difference between a kill and a miss.
- The new Crusader is like a ground-based AC-130 – rapid and accurate fires against mobile targets. For example, a Crusader could be linked up to Predator in a way that no other artillery system could do.

January 4, 2002 6:42 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Paper on Pros and Cons

Done 4/22

489

You owe me a piece of paper explaining the pros and cons of going for populations with nuclear weapons as opposed to other targets.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-49

.....
Please respond by _____

4/22/02

U16418 02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

APR 13 2002

I-02/001054-SFO

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy

APR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Targeting of Populations With Nuclear Weapons

- You have asked for a memo explaining the pros and cons of targeting civilian population centers with nuclear weapons as opposed to other targets.
- As you are aware, there is a rich literature on the philosophy of deterrence and, more specifically, what types of targets should be held at risk in order to deter an adversary or potential adversary.
- Deterrence is a function of numerous variables, some of which are difficult to quantify.
- The deliberate targeting of civilian populations as such with nuclear weapons, however, would be a significant change in traditional U.S. policy, would carry political implications, and would be inconsistent with a fundamental principle of the law of armed conflict.
- The pros and cons of such a policy are discussed in the attached memo (Tab A).

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Commander Brad Walker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559 OSD/11776

Targeting of Populations with Nuclear Weapons

- **The deliberate targeting of civilian population centers (cities) is immoral and illegal.**

- The intentional targeting of cities with nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the Just War Doctrine. The Just War Doctrine insists that the intentional use of force against innocent civilians is immoral. It is based on Jewish and Christian Scripture, and since the 4th Century, has been the dominant position of Christian churches and theologians, including Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin.

- The deliberate targeting of civilian populations also is contrary to the law of armed conflict, which has its origins in the Just War Doctrine.
 - In the 1996 case involving nuclear weapons before the International Court of Justice, the United States took the position that use of nuclear weapons must comply with the law of armed conflict.

 - That position was taken because we wished to retain the right to use nuclear weapons in conformity with international law; the contrary position would deprive us of the strongest argument that use of nuclear weapons could be legal. We might change our position, but no international or foreign court would be likely to agree with us.

 - The November 1992 and April 1999 (current) OSD Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons require (1) protection of the civilian population, so far as possible; and (2) minimizing collateral damage, so far as possible.

 - The prohibition against attack on civilian populations as such is a fundamental principle that is, for example, clearly stated in U.S. military manuals.

- Related to these considerations of morality and legality is the general hostility of the American people to the U.S. declaration of nuclear threats to cities.
 - The Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, which admittedly did not fail, may have been perceived by many as implying deliberate targeting of the cities, but MAD was acceptable only in the context of the Cold War as an alternative to "Armageddon."

- Although a nuclear attack on a lawful military target may result in horrendous collateral civilian casualties, the intentional targeting of cities would produce far greater civilian casualties possibly involving millions of lives.

- **The deliberate targeting of civilian centers is likely to be worse than ineffective for deterrence; it may invite challenges instead of deterring them.**

- A U.S. deterrence policy based on deliberately targeting cities is likely to be ineffective in many circumstances. These circumstances include when the opponent does not believe the threat, or when the opponent does not consider it a sufficient threat for a variety of possible reasons. A U.S. deterrent threat to cities in these conditions will not be effective, and may invite challenges.
 - When an opponent believes that the United States is unlikely to execute a nuclear attack against cities except in the most extreme case, and therefore concludes that it has the liberty to threaten and attack U.S. interests in circumstances short of that case (e.g., Ho Chi Minh, Saddam Hussein);
 - When an opponent is a tyrant who places little value on the welfare of the general population (e.g., Mao, Stalin);
 - When an opponent such as Bin Laden has little or no responsibility for the welfare of a country's population;
 - When an opponent is so highly motivated by ideological or other goals that a threat to its civilian centers will not deter them (e.g., Hitler, Gen. Anami, the Japanese War Minister at the end of World War II, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, and Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis).

- **The deliberate targeting of cities does not assure U.S. friends and allies.**
 - Because U.S. threats to cities are of questionable deterrence effectiveness and credibility, and could instead encourage challengers to confront the United States, such threats are inadequate to provide assurance to U.S. friends and allies. Providing this assurance is one of the key goals of U.S. nuclear capabilities.

- **The deliberate targeting of cities does not contribute to military defense.**
 - In addition to being ineffective for deterrence, the targeting of cities would provide very little if any immediate military benefit in the event of war. While encouraging challenges, it would do little if anything to reduce an opponent's capabilities to strike the United States. In contrast, the targeting of military capabilities could reduce an opponent's capability to hurt the United States. Contributing to the defense of the American population by destroying an enemy's military capabilities is one of the key goals of U.S. nuclear forces.
- **The deliberate targeting of cities encourages the unlimited use of nuclear weapons.**
 - Deliberately destroying an opponent's cities would give the opponent no incentive to avoid the deliberate destruction of U.S. cities. In contrast, if the U.S. kept the conflict limited by not striking the opponent's cities, the opponent could be motivated to preserve that limitation and its cities by avoiding U.S. cities. In the event of war, i.e., if deterrence fails, the mutual targeting of population centers would ensure the worst possible of all war scenarios in terms of population casualties.
- **The deliberate targeting of cities does not provide a president with adequate options for deterrence or defense.**
 - Every U.S. President of the nuclear age has sought to avoid being limited to the targeting of cities because such threats are of questionable deterrence value and carry the considerable regrets described above. In each case they have called for alternative targeting options as the basis of deterrence. President Carter, for example, entered office questioning why a single SSBN wouldn't provide an adequate threat to cities, and therefore constitute a sufficient deterrent. He subsequently approved the "countervailing strategy", which called for significant improvements in the U.S. strategic capability to threaten and strike military targets of all types.
 - The advantage of targeting cities, as highlighted by proponents of such an approach to deterrence, is the limited requirement it places on U.S. nuclear forces. For every U.S. president, however, the significant problems associated with the nuclear targeting of cities have outweighed that benefit.

Coordination

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Feith *[Signature]*

APR 19 2002

General Counsel

Mr. Haynes

*sketched
with
8/15/02*

Principal Deputy Under Secretary
Defense (Policy)

Dr. Cambone

January 4, 2002 6:51 PM

ACTION
1/7
1325

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request

Please prepare a brief for me that covers the following:

1. A 6-12 month plan for C3I.
2. The major issues or problems you anticipate you will encounter.
3. Your plan for overcoming those problems.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-54



Please respond by _____

020 C3I

4 Jan 02

U16419 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11781

TO: Secretary Jim Roche
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: January 5, 2002
 SUBJECT: Boeing 767

Why don't you give Newt Gingrich a call and fill him in. He's on television a lot, and it would be helpful for him to have a sense of what you sent me in the memo on the transport aircraft.

Thank you.

YS2

DHR/azn
 010502.08

Please respond by: _____

5 Jan 02

U16420 02

December 21, 2001 12:58 PM


TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Roche
Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boeing 767

Attached is a note I got from Newt Gingrich. What is happening? He is a pretty smart fellow.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/18/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
122101-26



Please respond by _____

1/3

Secretary Roche response attached

Larry Di Rita

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 7:57
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
Cc: Torie.Clarke@osd.mil
Subject: vetoing the Boeing-767 power grab
could you give this to the Secretary, Paul, Ed and Larry, thanks newt

SECDEF HAS SEEN**DEC 21 2001****Vetoing the Boeing 767 power grab**

From the outside the Boeing 767 gimmick looks like a joint Air Force-Senate power grab. My impression is that the Air Force did not have your approval to push this rube goldberg contraption. The Senate clearly is trying to ram it down your throat on their terms with a ten year gimmick that is totally to Boeing's advantage and to the disadvantage of the taxpayer and of our men and women in uniform.

If you decide you need more tanker capacity you should first explore airlines in financial difficulty and see if you could not buy a bunch cheap. Second, you might go to Boeing to have a longer term lease purchase or purchase. I know of no planning which suggests that you will need fewer tankers in ten years and ought to retrofit the planes and turn them back to Boeing.

You ought to get the President to issue a veto threat that is quite simple. If the Congress wants to give you the authorization to buy tankers you deem necessary on terms you deem best for the taxpayer and the men and women in uniform you would be glad to accept it as a possible but not required use of money. If the Congress wants to micromanage your authority and dictate the terms and conditions you will insist on a veto and go to the country over who should run the Pentagon and why pork barrel masquerading as defense is indefensible and despicable. As you know McCain and Gramm are already hot on this and they represent the public's mood.

Properly framed this is a 90-10 issue which will help teach the Air Force and other services not to try to end run you and will teach the Congress that they have to negotiate with you and cannot run over you.

Welcome back.
Newt

12/19/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/11784

3 January 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Newt's note on leasing 767's

9/13

Boss, while I find Newt's policy and political views very attractive, I don't think I would turn to him for investment advice.

Some facts:

1. Unlike a firm, we must get permission to look at a major lease arrangement from the appropriators since there is the possibility of using O&M funds for an acquisition of assets. Thus, all we received from the Appropriations Bill is authority to investigate whether a lease could make business sense. The Committees threw in four VIP 737's just for fun; we never asked for this authority. No monies were authorized or appropriated.

2. We have been given such authority in the past for VIP 737's, but since Boeing's business jet business was doing well, no deal could be struck, and they were not leased. If we can't get a good deal from Boeing on 767 Tankers, then we won't do this deal either.

3. Why consider a lease? Like all good businessmen, we see a Boeing which has just laid-off 30,000 employees, and which has about 25+ 767's built, sitting in inventory without customers. Further, they are venturing into the international market with 767 Tankers (four for Italy, and four for Japan). Thus, they just might be hungry enough to give us a good deal which would get them going on 767 building again, get a good launch for their international tanker business, and start the USAF on a path to replace all 600+ tankers over the years with 767's. Also, buying tankers like one buys cars would limit the opportunity for the Air Force acquisition community to start adding bells and whistles. Further, replacing our oldest tankers would save us a lot of maintenance costs for old 707's, and the costs to update their engines and avionics.


4. Why not look at some aircraft ^{from} ~~from~~ a defunct airline? One, our first look yielded 767's with more hours on them than a lot of our current 707's! Two, we are learning that a major rehab of an aircraft costs a lot of money, and does not restore the plane to a day-one condition. It still is an old airplane. The 707's were overbuilt because there wasn't much experience on jets at the time. The 767 is very much not overbuilt. Thus, it may be more problematic to do major refurbishments on them, or any other modern jet. Boeing has built 767 AWACS aircraft for Japan, so we know that the plane can be modified for military use.

5. However, doing a lease is not easy, and this one has lots of baggage added by the Congress. It may not be possible to make a good business case under the circumstances (unlike good market based rules). If we do get to a point where we think we have a deal, we will vet it

11-L-0559/OSD/11785

through our system (to include Paul and you), and then we must vet it ahead of time with the SAC and HAC.

Thus, Newt need not be concerned. Whatever happens, we have to get a win for the taxpayers, or we won't make the deal. The same goes for the four VIP 737's.



James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

cc:
DepSecDef
Pete Aldridge

Security

January 7, 2002 8:15 AM

ATTN
JB 1/7
1730

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Honoring the VP

Should we name a room here in the Pentagon for the Vice President, as a former Secretary of Defense? Or should we not? I was thinking of something like the auditorium. He is the one former Secretary who has gone onward and upward.

600

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-6

.....
Please respond by _____

7 Jan 02

U16421 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11787

ACTION
117
1725

January 7, 2002 8:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Budget

110.01

One of the aspects of the SecDef office on the budget issue that worries me is security and communications. I have a feeling there is no limit beyond which either one would go if they thought something was needed by way of security or communications. There need to be limits on everything.

Why don't you make sure those pieces are disaggregated as well? We ought to handle this on a careful basis, however, and then we want to manage the costs down. I am concerned about the taxpayers. I think it is important that we understand how hard this is to do, and that no one has ever done it before. Not only should we do it, but we should show others that it can be done and that they get it done

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-7



Please respond by _____

7 JAN 02

U16422 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11788

January 5, 2002

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

Subj: Our budget

With Rick Friedland's assistance, I've been working with Doc Cooke's budget people to get the numbers in a manner that would allow you to see our office budget as well as how the components (Under Secretaries) are doing.

The hard spot is our office, because the figures aren't disaggregated to the level of detail that a manager can use to plan and forecast. The presumption always has been that an expense for the Secretary is a legitimate expense and should be covered.

Also, the focus tends to be on the really big items with less detail available on the smaller items. For example, you can see what the Comptroller's salary costs are, but you can't see how many periodicals he is paying for throughout his department.

Rick has been great in conveying to the budgeteers how you use budget metrics to enforce discipline on the organization and how they might present the figures in a more usable way.

I expect to see a draft this coming week that will be more satisfying than previous versions have been.

11-L-0559/OSD/11789

117
1738 ACTION
DS

January 7, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Homeland Security

384

I think we in the Pentagon ought to figure out things we can advise military and military spouses to do with respect to homeland security. If we did a good job of it and figured out things private citizens could do, it might be a real service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-10

.....

Please respond by _____

7 JAN 02

U16423 02

January 7, 2002 8:58 AM

ACTION
05 11/2
1742

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Release Info

I think it is time to release, on an unclassified basis, the names of the senior people we have captured or killed and let the press know who they are, where they are and other information we may have.

000.5

Let's get it pulled together before the next press briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-11

.....
Please respond by _____

75 am 02

U16424 02

Action
ds 1/7
1745

January 7, 2002 10:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld M
SUBJECT: Wanted List

000.5

Please give me the information as to how long people have been on "FBI Ten Most Wanted" list, for how many decades, how long they leave them on and then take them off and never find them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-17



Please respond by _____

7 JAN 02

U16425 02

INFO
05 1/8
09/15

January 7, 2002 11:12 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wanted

000.5

When we come up with a list of top Taliban and Al Qaeda, in addition to their names, phonetic pronunciation, title of the senior post they held, and what we think their current disposition is—dead, captured, or at large—we ought to put down the dollar amount of reward currently out for the individual.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-21

7 JAN 02

U16426 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11793

INFO
1/8
1/15

January 7, 2002 1:54 PM

TO: Powell Moore
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Travel to Central Asia

I spoke with Tom Daschle today about his trip to Central Asia. I told him that his delegation could go into Afghanistan if General Franks felt the security conditions permitted it.

517

I asked him for his help in developing an understanding among the Congressional leadership, both House and Senate, that would limit the number of future trips to one per month per House.

I also asked his help in limiting the size of the delegations, and to think about further restricting those who would actually go into Afghanistan on any given delegation to just the members and perhaps one staff assistant.

Further, Senator Daschle agreed that any delegation would be subject to General Franks' final determination of whether it were safe and appropriate for a trip to proceed into Afghanistan.

Senator Daschle said he would work with Dennis Hastert to develop such an arrangement.

Powell, you ought to follow up with his staff to make sure we have a common understanding.

7 Jan 02

Thanks.

DHR:db
010702-40

U16427 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11794

January 7, 2002 2:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vieques

Pureza Rita

Please somehow figure out a way to get an answer from Wolfowitz on this memo from July 6 on Vieques.

Thanks.

Attach.
07/06/01 SecDef memo

DHR:dh
010702-42

done
Larry Di Rita
2/13

7 JAN 02

U16428 02

Snowflake

July 6, 2001, 9:55am

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vieques

I noticed this article about an alternative base to Vieques that was apparently done by the Center for Naval Analysis completed in August but never released. Were you aware of it?

cam

11-L-0559/OSD/11796

program to other areas, and the other services may increase their own efforts to deal with the problem.

The plan will "enhance the quality of life for our soldiers and their families," said Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki. "We want to ensure that no Army child is left behind."

The Army's effort has practical as well as altruistic roots: Like the other armed services, it faces increasing difficulty retaining qualified officers and enlisted personnel. Paying more attention to quality-of-life issues such as education has become critical to recruitment and retention.

"You lose a good soldier who, if you had spent just a little time [on support services], might have stayed in—that costs money. It's tied to budget dollars," said Patrick Jenkins, a retired Army colonel and defense consultant who has observed a sharp rise in the armed forces' concern for family-related issues in recent years.

Jenkins, who made 18 military-related moves in a 22-year career, learned firsthand that frequent transfers pose problems for students at all ability levels. His family faced continual challenges for both of their two children but especially for their youngest son, Andrew, now 17, who is learning disabled.

"Andy has been on an individual instruction plan since second grade. So every place we've gone, we've had to go through this learning process about what the standards were and what they'd give us," Jenkins said.

Last fall, when he moved to Robins, Ga., under contract to work for the Defense Department, local school officials refused to accept Andrew's credits from a Washington-area school. "They just said it's our way or no way," Jenkins said.

Faced with the prospect that Andrew—then a junior in high school—would be moved back at least a full year or shifted onto a vocational track, Jenkins elected to quit his job and returned to Washington and Andrew's old school.

"I took a 14% pay cut and don't regret it a bit," Jenkins said.

To be sure, students with exceptional drive and talent find ways to surmount many of the problems, but even they pay a price at the margins—not because their parents are in the military, but because of what comes with moving so often. And students with fewer resources may face harder consequences.

While educational disruptions are a problem for all children whose parents move, military-connected students are affected disproportionately. For them, the problems are also more likely to continue into high school, which experts consider especially serious.

"High school is high-stakes. You don't have a lot of time to recover," said Mary M. Keller, chief researcher on the study that led to the Army's new plan.

"Military kids have always moved, but high school is different now. The world of high school has ramped up."

For one thing, competition is growing for admission to college and more factors are weighed in the balance. For another, as more and more states adopt standards-based education reforms, establish more detailed requirements for promotion and graduation and impose their own competency tests, students who move frequently must run a gantlet of often-conflicting demands.

"Sometimes rules and regulations and bureaucracy get in the way. We don't always do the right thing," conceded William Harrison, superintendent of schools in Cumberland County, N.C., which encompasses Ft. Bragg and the city of Fayetteville.

"We want to make sure every youngster has an opportunity to have his needs taken care of," said Harrison, a signer of the new agreement who believes greater effort by school officials can make a difference at the school and classroom level.

The problems take many forms, ranging from what looks like bureaucratic trivia to issues that seem more difficult to resolve.

For instance, military transferees have learned to carry copies of their records with them, but many schools refuse to accept anything but official transcripts, which can take weeks or months to arrive.

Minor as it may seem, "the impact of records not getting there or arriving late has real significance for the life of the child," Harrison said.

Yvonne Rosario, now an 18-year-old senior at E. E. Smith High School in Fayetteville, said she passed the state competency test with the highest possible grade while attending another school in Hoke County, N.C. When she transferred to Fayetteville, her transcript did not reflect that fact, owing to a clerical error.

Teachers told her she only thought she had passed the test and had to take it again, Rosario said. "I went straight to the guidance office, but I had to be in tears for them to believe me." It took five days of calling Hoke County officials to straighten out the problem, then another snafu forced her to repeat the process.

More serious, since grading systems and even the curriculum abbreviations used on transcripts vary widely, transferring students often have trouble getting full credit for work they have done, including advanced courses.

Grade point averages and class rankings may be reduced at the new school because its systems are different. A Sebring, Fla., high school tried to knock down A's that Bianchi earned in Hawaii because Sebring used a different grade chart.

In Virginia, her GPA and class rank were reduced because extra credit she had earned by taking more challenging courses at a previous school was disallowed.

New students may also face educationally costly delays in being placed in appropriate classes or courses. Rosario had to spend a year taking earth science when she moved to Cumberland County because there was no room in the honors biology class she was qualified to take.

Standardized tests and promotion requirements pose other hurdles. Bianchi had to

pass high school competency tests three times—in Hawaii, Florida and Virginia. "A sixth grader could have passed the tests, but I was missing class time for things I needed to learn," she said.

And, because curricula and course sequences vary, a class taught to freshmen in one system may be required for seniors in another. Or new students may be barred from advanced courses because they have not had prerequisite classes.

Bianchi took prestigious International Baccalaureate courses in her senior year at Mount Vernon High School but could not receive an IB diploma because her earlier schools had not offered the program.

Along the way, she gave up swimming because in one school it conflicted with the marching band. Getting a leadership post in the Mount Vernon band, which almost all seniors did, was out of the question for her because those honors were awarded at the end of junior year—before she arrived.

As for the National Honor Society, she said the chapter at her school in Hawaii admitted only juniors and seniors; by the time she reached that level, she was attending schools in Florida and Virginia that accepted students only after they had attended more than one full year.

"I had the grades, but I never got in it," she said.

What saved Bianchi, now a Basic Cadet at the Air Force Academy, was exceptional determination, a tablecloth-sized list of community service and other outside activities, and the fact that the service academies must reserve 100 places each year for the children of career members of the military.

Through it all, Bianchi has remained philosophical. "I'm a stronger person because of it," she said.

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
July 6, 2001

14. Study: N.C. Bases Offer Alternative To Vieques
By Dale Eisman, The Virginian-Pilot

WASHINGTON - A study commissioned by the Navy concluded that the service could replace its controversial Vieques Island bombing range by making better use of military facilities in eastern North Carolina.

There is "no single training range that is superior in all respects" to Vieques, but a complex including ranges at Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, Dare County and Fort Bragg, N.C. "is a promising alternative," according to the report by the Center for Naval Analyses.

Completed in August but never formally released, the study was obtained Thursday by The Virginian-Pilot. It undercuts longstanding Navy arguments that the 900-acre Vieques range and nearby offshore training areas are irreplaceable.

Instead, the analysis suggests that with only modest improvements the Carolina complex "could become comparable to Vieques in terms of the quality of tactical training it offers" and would have the advantages of being closer to Norfolk-based forces and in an area where military training enjoys broad public acceptance.

CNA is one of several federally funded think tanks that routinely undertake research projects for the Pentagon. A Navy spokeswoman declined comment Thursday on the center's Vieques study, other than to say it would be passed along to a task force that will lead a formal search for alternatives to Vieques.

Testifying last week on Capitol Hill, Navy Secretary Gordon H. England, who expects to appoint the task force soon, referred several times to the CNA report. His comments suggested the findings helped persuade him that the service can find other places and perhaps other training methods to replace Vieques. England has said the Navy intends to leave Vieques by mid-2003. Norfolk-based forces have trained there for more than 50 years. The service and the Bush administration are under pressure from congressional Republicans to fight to hold the range.

Gov. Gila M. Calderon and other political leaders in Puerto Rico insist that the Navy must vacate the range immediately.

The struggled over Vieques, a small island just east of the main island of Puerto Rico, has become a focal point in the larger debate over Puerto Rico's status as a U.S. commonwealth. Calderon opposes statehood or Puerto Rican independence but supports modifying the relationship between San Juan and Washington.

After a misaimed bomb killed a civilian security guard employed by the Navy in April 1999, a collection of pro-independence demonstrators and environmental activists camped out on the range for more than a year, stopping Navy exercises.

The demonstrators were evicted in May 2000, but incursions on the range since then have led to more than 100 arrests and growing sentiment among Latino political leaders on the U.S. mainland that the Navy should find another place to train.

An agreement negotiated in January 2000 by President Clinton and Pedro Rossello, then governor of Puerto Rico, would permit Vieques voters to decide the range's fate in a referendum now scheduled for Nov. 6. The Bush administration wants to abandon that plan and most of the \$40 million economic aid package that goes with it.

The CNA report suggests the Carolina complex of ranges would be "less vulnerable to unfavorable political developments," in part because Navy, Marine Corps, and Army use of the facilities for exercises similar to those done in Vieques is well-accepted by nearby residents.

CNA analysts examined existing ranges and other military facilities, including the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as alternatives to Vieques. Each was graded for its suitability, availability, risk and cost.

The Carolina range complex scored highest, receiving "A" or "B" grades in every area other than its suitability for tactical aircraft maneuvers in-

volving live bombing. The Navy could conduct those operations at Eglin Air Force Base, in northern Florida, the report suggested, or could use ranges in Dare County and near Cherry Point to practice tactical maneuvering and an Army range at nearby Fort Bragg for live bombing.

Pacific Stars and Stripes
July 6, 2001

15. Navy Says It Will Be Difficult To Replace Vieques Training Range With Single Facility

By Donovan Brooks, Guam bureau chief

FINEGAYAN — As the Navy continues wrestling with concerns raised about its Vieques training range, one thing is clear: A single facility cannot replace it, said Capt. Kevin Wensing of the Navy Office of Information on Tuesday.

Public opposition, galvanized by a bombing accident that killed one man in 1999, has put pressure on the Navy to reconsider its use of Vieques.

Although the Navy has a Pacific range that offers similar training opportunities, it's simply too far for Atlantic Fleet ships, Wensing said.

Panelists on a recent "Meet the Press" television show said Washington policymakers were considering whether the Atlantic Fleet could use the Farallon de Mendinilla range for training.

Farallon is in the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, about 150 miles north of Guam. "That would be a sort of disqualifier for the Atlantic Fleet. It's really a time-distance factor," Wensing said. Sending East Coast-based ships to the Pacific for training would take them far from their areas of responsibility for extended periods. "It's a long way to be traveling," Wensing said.

Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England announced last month that the Navy is planning to stop training at Vieques in May 2003. However, the Navy will need to find other places for the bombing, naval gunnery, mortar and

heavy weapons and amphibious assault training. Off Vieques is unrestricted sea and airspace necessary for anti-submarine warfare training, Wensing said.

The Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research-and-development center, has been tapped to study the Navy's options along the East Coast and around the Gulf of Mexico. Potential options include two ranges in Florida, another in south Texas, Camp Lejeune, N.C., and a gunnery range across the Atlantic in Scotland.

"Those are the primary places. What they're looking for is a combination of sites," Wensing said.

An August 2000 report by the CNA concluded that there is no single substitute for Vieques, Wensing said.

The Navy feels while the two-year timetable to leave Vieques is difficult, it is reasonable and achievable, Wensing said.

Another issue is the November referendum for Vieques residents mandated by Congress.

Wensing said based on public sentiment on the island, it's likely the vote would oppose a continued Navy presence. "The secretary of the Navy feels the referendum is bad public policy. It allows a local referendum on a national security issue. It's not a good precedent to set," Wensing said.

The Navy is lobbying to change the law calling for the referendum. Puerto Rico has scheduled a nonbinding referendum on the same question for July 29.

Dallas Morning News
July 6, 2001

16. Bombing Range Protest Planned

Environmentalists leading opposition

By Jim Vertuno, Associated Press

AUSTIN — Environmental groups are staging a full-scale assault, including a three-day beachfront protest next month, on any plan to use the South Texas shoreline as a warfare training site.

Snowflake

January 7, 2002 2:06 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: China's Evaluation of QDR

China

Please send me a copy of China's evaluation of the QDR. I may want to send it to the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-43

.....
Please respond by _____

7 Jan 02

U16429 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11799



SP 1/12
12/18
Bret

er 21, 2001

**From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz**

- 7 JAN 2002

Sec Def -

Here is the Chinese review
of the QDR that I mentioned
to you, along with a draft
memo for the President.

(This is the second item from
December 21 that appears to have
gone missing!)

Paul W.

At least
to the
link it makes

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 21, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Chinese Review of QDR

Don,

Attached is the article from the Chinese press that I mentioned to you. At least our competition appreciates what we're doing!

I am including with this a memo you could sign to forward the article to the President and the others members of the NSC if you wish to do so.

However, you may just want to send it to the Vice President, if you think it makes us sound too ferocious.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Paul W." with a stylized flourish at the end.

11-L-0559/OSD/11801



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Chinese Assessment of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Although the QDR has been overshadowed at home by war on terror, it is being carefully assessed overseas. Key countries are interpreting the QDR and coming to their own conclusions about what is new. Attached is a fascinating Chinese assessment of the QDR.

This assessment shows immense respect for program contained in the QDR and captures some of the key strategic departures articulated in the document such as its treatment of Asia; the shift to capabilities-based planning; its emphasis on homeland security; and the specific goals that will drive U.S. transformation efforts. Comparing the 2001 QDR to major strategic reviews of the last decade, the article states that new strategic approach "has the most new concepts, represents the greatest strategic adjustment, has the most latitude for interpretation, and contains the most profound implications."

Of course, the Chinese are not happy about what they see as a U.S. armed force "which has a transparent environment and which can launch strikes freely and as it pleases." Nor is that the way in which we want to actually conduct ourselves in the world. However, when it comes to how we are viewed by our military competitors, Machiavelli is probably right that it is better to be respected than loved.

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Deputy Secretary of State
Deputy National Security Adviser
Chief of Staff to the Vice President



11-L-0559/OSD/11802

118
0800
signature

Action
118
1150

January 7, 2002 5:54 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Regularly Scheduled Meetings

I need a meeting:

1. Every three weeks on transformation and progress towards it.
2. Every month on the subject of Department metrics and progress toward our goals.
3. Every three weeks on the subject of my breakfast file.
4. Every month on a plan as to how we are improving business, management, and operations of the Department.

337

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-54

.....
Please respond by _____

Colony M

LARRY DI RITA
1/22

7 Jan 02

U16431 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11803

January 7, 2002 5:56 PM

ACTION
1/10/02
155

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Planning Ahead

320

Joe Ralston's last day is December 1, 2002.

Congress is going to be out of session October and November. That means we probably need to get a nomination ready to go to the President by June.

Given the immediacy of this, we need to take it into consideration when we think about SOUTHCOM and PACOM.

I need to know what other important assignments are coming up, so I can consider them as well.

Please give me a paper that tracks all the CINCS, Chiefs, Vice Chiefs, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, so I know when their current appointments will end and the number of years they will have served as of those dates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010702-57

.....
Please respond by _____

175 Jan 02

U16432 02

January 8, 2002 2:58 PM

ACTION
DS 118
1720

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rewards

000.5

I told the Vice President, Condi and Colin that we need to get our act together on rewards.

Please start moving through the interagency process some way to figure it out and solve Pete Geren's problem. Be sure we get CIA laced into this thing. That is going to be the easiest way to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010802-15

.....
Please respond by _____

8 JAN 02

U16434 02

January 8, 2002 3:16 PM

Action
DS 11/8
1420

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: White House Issues

Everyone over there would like to have the White House Mess contracted out to somebody who knows how to do it and pull back the military. Why don't you get on that?

HW/MH

Also, everyone over there agrees that White House Communications is just terrible. For example, VP Cheney is at Camp David trying to reach Andy Card or someone, and no one has ever heard of him.

Those old White House operators they used to have were just world-class, and what we have isn't. We ought to think about what we do about it. It is not user-friendly. I called over for Andy Card the other day, and they asked me how to spell his name!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010802-18

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Jan 02

U16435 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11806

1/7
15:30
snowflake

January 8, 2002 4:51 PM

Larry Di Rita
1/7

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Article

11-102
= really please
see attached

1/18/02
1/18/02

Afghanistan

Please give me a copy of that *Wall Street Journal* article that took all the press quotes that were wrong for Johnny Apple and all those other people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010802-20

.....
Please respond by 01/14/02

8Jan02

U16436 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11807

Wall Street Journal
December 24, 2001
Pg. 1

News Media Showed Tendency To Misfire During Early Phase Of War In Afghanistan

By Matthew Rose, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

NEW YORK -- On Oct. 27, six days after the U.S. escalated the bombing of Taliban front lines, National Public Radio senior news analyst Daniel Schorr was pessimistic. "This is a war in trouble," he said during the "Weekend Edition" show.

On Oct. 31, the New York Times's R.W. Apple Jr. compared the war in Afghanistan to the U.S. experience in Vietnam. "Signs of progress are sparse," the newspaper's chief correspondent wrote in a news analysis.

"There does not appear to be a political force capable of replacing the Taliban," said staff editorial writer Jacob Heilbrunn in the Los Angeles Times on Nov. 4.

Five days later, the strategically important city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Northern Alliance troops aided by U.S. bombing sorties. The army overran Kabul a few days later. Three weeks after that, the Taliban's southern stronghold of Kandahar was taken. In Bonn, Germany, various anti-Taliban forces from Afghanistan were negotiating a deal to set up an interim government.

As was the case with some off-base guesswork in the early phase of the Gulf War, the American media were significantly off-target on Afghanistan. Analysts and commentators widely declared the Northern Alliance was a ragtag band with no chance against superior Taliban forces supported by the local population. They said U.S. air power couldn't be effective in a mountainous country like Afghanistan. They said bombing would inflame the Muslim world, especially Pakistan. They said the faction-ridden Afghans would never be able to form a government.

"The press likes to talk about Vietnam syndrome as it affects generals, but it affects reporters more," says Michael Kelly, editor of the Atlantic Monthly.

The pessimism was also striking in an Oct. 18 article in The Wall Street Journal datelined Peshawar, Pakistan. "Opposition Afghan leaders trying to fashion an anti-Taliban uprising say U.S.-led bombing has seriously undermined their efforts," the article began, going on to say: "Instead of a thankful Afghan population, popular support for the Taliban appears to be solidifying and anger with the U.S. growing. And rather than a relatively quick Taliban collapse, the U.S. may have to settle for continued governance by the movement, perhaps shorn of its top two or three leaders."

After Kabul fell in mid-November, Mr. Apple noted the shift in mood. "What a difference a week makes," he wrote on Nov. 16 under the heading "Letter From Washington." In an interview, Mr. Apple says his late-October column was "unduly pessimistic, but it was a reflection of the state of mind at the time. This is journalism, not history."

Paul Steiger, managing editor of The Wall Street Journal, says, "The article accurately reflected what people on the ground in and around Afghanistan felt the day it was written. We can all be grateful that their pessimism proved wrong."

The errors in judgment are one reason U.S. news organizations, almost alone among American institutions, have seen their reputation slide since Sept. 11. According to a study by the Pew Research Center that was released in late November, the percentage of those surveyed who thought media coverage of "the war on terrorism" has been excellent declined to 30% in mid-

November from 56% in mid-September. Pew is an independent research group that studies public attitudes on the press and politics.

The cautious military briefings of the first weeks along with limited access to the front lines made writing about the war in its early stages particularly hard. For a generation of reporters rooted in Vietnam and Watergate and now supplying much of the analysis and commentary, skepticism and distrust of Washington are the norm. Memories of deceit and failure breed pessimism, and can make experts misfire.

The war has also brought some first-rate journalism. Reporters have made accurate early calls on how the war would be fought, its unconventional nature and the problems of finding al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in the south. There has been courageous reporting from the front lines, and the war has already claimed the lives of eight journalists.

It will take a comprehensive review of the media's war coverage to reach a definitive assessment of how the press performed. And that awaits an end to a war that, despite major victories and gains, has yet to achieve its principal goals of capturing the al Qaeda leader and his Taliban counterpart and shutting down the terrorism network.

Before the war proved them wrong, the press forged a variety of judgments that traded well on the media's exchange of stock notions and became pervasive. Reporters and commentators are already confessing their mistakes. Some concede knowing little about Afghanistan and international terrorism.

What follows are five of the most pervasive myths that permeated discussion of the battle for Afghanistan in newspapers and on TV and radio.

Myth #1: History repeats itself.

The failure of British and Soviet excursions into Afghanistan spells doom for American involvement, too. The U.S., as it did in Vietnam, will get bogged down in a quagmire, struggling on unfamiliar terrain to fight nimble guerrilla forces.

In the weeks following Oct. 7, when U.S. and British military forces began dropping bombs on Afghanistan but before the first significant military victory, commentators began to speak darkly about the war's progress.

Like Mr. Apple, some raised the specter of Vietnam, noting that for all the bombs dropped on that country, successes were rare. Barely a day went by without a newspaper recording the views of Russian veterans of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

"Now, like the British and Russians before him, [President Bush] is facing the most brutish, corrupt, wily and patient warriors in the world, nicknamed dukhi, or ghosts, by flayed Russian soldiers who saw them melt away," wrote Maureen Dowd on Oct. 28 in her New York Times column on the op-ed page. A few days later, Mr. Heilbrunn in the Los Angeles Times declared the first round of the war a failure: "The United States is not headed into a quagmire; it's already in one."

An assistant to Ms. Dowd, Marc Santora, says the column wasn't pessimistic and was supposed to suggest that defeating the Taliban forces would require a "severe amount of force." Mr. Santora says there was a "moment of hesitation" in Washington that the column was designed to overcome.

Mr. Heilbrunn says he still isn't convinced that there is a viable political regime in place, especially if it doesn't have strong Western support. But he acknowledges that his earlier view was "too saturnine. It may not be completely wrong, but I thought the Northern Alliance was a fairly fictitious force that would inevitably begin to feud." And now? "I am cautiously optimistic, but that could be proven wrong, too."

One of the most prominent exponents of the quagmire theory was Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and former adviser to President Kennedy. In a Nov. 2 op-ed piece in London's Independent newspaper, Mr. Schlesinger said perhaps U.S. military brass "should have reflected on Vietnam." He added, "We dropped more tons of explosives on that hapless country than we dropped on all fronts during the second world war, and still we could not stop the Vietcong."

In an interview, Mr. Schlesinger says he underestimated improvements in military technology, especially the ability to drop bombs with increased accuracy. "I rejoice that I was wrong," Mr. Schlesinger says, adding that U.S. experience in Afghanistan, coupled with the rapid success against Iraq a decade earlier, could put to rest the specter of Vietnam.

Myth #2: The Taliban regime is popular.

With support in the countryside, especially among the southern Pashtuns, the Taliban can call on an army imbued with religious fervor. Because the Taliban brought law and order, the populace embraced the regime's restrictions.

Within the U.S., few were able to agree on how many troops the Taliban had at its disposal. On CNBC, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey put the number at 45,000 during comments on Geraldo Rivera's former TV show "Rivera Live!" on Nov. 5. The Wall Street Journal said 60,000 in a news story on Nov. 20. The Pentagon hasn't released an official estimate.

In the weekly New York Observer, freelance columnist Nicholas von Hoffman wrote a 1,500-word critique of the U.S. effort entitled, "Why Are We in Afghanistan?" The Nov. 19 piece said, "We are mapless, we are lost, and we are distracted by gusts of wishful thinking," to believe Afghans would switch sides so easily. "Moreover, as hellish as the Taliban are, it appears that the ordinary people of Afghanistan prefer them to the brigands and bandits with whom we've been trying to make common cause."

The week the column appeared, gleeful Kabul residents shaved their beards and displayed posters of Indian movie stars to show their delight in being rid of the Taliban. Mr. von Hoffman says he still thinks declaring war was a bad idea -- because "there is by definition no way to say you've won" -- but also pleads ignorance.

"Nobody knew anything about Afghanistan, myself included," Mr. von Hoffman says. "It turns out there really wasn't an army there. Turns out we probably still are clueless." He conceded that "in the prediction business, ... you almost never get it right."

Myth #3: High-altitude bombing won't work.

There are too few targets. And bombing could turn major cities into death-traps for special-operation forces.

The use of air power was a significant component of U.S. victories in Iraq and Kosovo, but its use in Afghanistan was immediately criticized by commentators from both ends of the political spectrum. On the right, Charles Krauthammer wrote in an op-ed piece in the Washington Post of Oct. 30 that the war was going poorly because it "has been fought with half-measures." Why, he asked, had the U.S. "not loosed the B-52s and the B-2s to carpet-bomb Taliban positions?" William Pfaff, in the biweekly New York Review of Books of Nov. 29, wrote that the bombing was creating too many humanitarian problems, such as refugees.

Mr. Krauthammer says he was 100% correct. After the intensity of front-line bombing was increased, victories came to the Northern Alliance and as a result other Afghans flocked to the anti-Taliban cause, he notes.

The column "was prescient and had an effect," Mr. Krauthammer adds. Mr. Pfaff says in an e-mail message that he was skeptical about the war-winning capacities of special forces, "having once been one of them myself, a long time ago. Obviously I was wrong."

William Arkin, an NBC News military analyst and former Army intelligence analyst, went on CNBC on Oct. 10 and told Mr. Rivera: "I think sooner or later we're going to have to bite the bullet and get in there in a big way or we're going to have to admit some kind of a defeat." Oct. 29, Mr. Arkin told Mr. Rivera that 70 bombing missions a day in a place the size of Texas weren't having the desired effects on the ground. He told Chris Matthews of CNBC's "Hardball" on Oct. 23 that the war could last "into the winter, and beyond."

Mr. Arkin in an interview says he was reflecting the mood of his sources at the time. "I'm doing reporting here and people seemed to be nervous and disgruntled about the way the war was going and that's something that needs to be aired," he says. Mr. Arkin says he still thinks air power is an ineffective way to secure the ultimate goal of killing or capturing Taliban leader Mohammed Omar or Mr. bin Laden. "Look, did anyone question whether we were ultimately going to win? No. The question was how are we going to win and how long is it going to take?"

Given that neither of the two leaders has been captured more than three months after Sept. 11, Mr. Arkin says his critique is still appropriate.

Myth #4: The Afghans will make bad allies.

The ragtag Northern Alliance, which controls only 10% of the country through a loose and fractious affiliation of tribal leaders, won't be able to unite and fight the Taliban. In addition, the antipathy between tribes from the north and south will keep them from forming a unified administration.

An article in the Nov. 12 Newsweek described a demoralized Northern Alliance unit wearing running shoes, eating rice, beans and scraps of mutton, and with no easy ways to communicate. Jon Meacham, Newsweek's managing editor, says the article "reflected the reality on the ground at the time and raised questions a lot of people were wondering about in Washington and Afghanistan."

The Washington-based New Republic magazine offered one of the gloomier assessments. "Of all the proxies the United States has enlisted over the past half-century, the Northern Alliance may be the least prepared to attain America's battlefield objectives," the magazine said in an unsigned editorial that ran in the Nov. 19 edition but was written much earlier. Instead, the magazine called for ground troops as the only way of taking Kabul.

Peter Beinart, the New Republic's editor, says the Northern Alliance's change in fortunes came only after the U.S. started bombing Taliban front lines with the help of special-operations troops on the ground in mid-October. Mr. Beinart, though, concedes that the magazine underestimated the Northern Alliance's capabilities.

Doubts on government building appeared in the Los Angeles Times of Oct. 26. A headline noted in part that "U.S. airstrikes are seen as damaging to political goals, and attempts to form a government are called overly ambitious."

Even after the fall of Kabul, panelists on CNN's "Larry King Live" on Nov. 23 were pessimistic about the chances of forming a unified government. "I think we have to be very careful, Larry, not to get our hopes up," cautioned one of the panelists, Bob Schieffer, host of CBS News's "Face the Nation." Mr. Schieffer says in an interview, "I think I meant we had to be patient." He adds that there probably will still be problems in establishing a viable government in Afghanistan. "We will know when we have won, but we are not there yet." Indeed, the formation of an Afghan government remains a work in progress.

Myth #5: The Muslim world will boil over.

The U.S. will outrage Muslims the world over and cause the masses to rise up, toppling leaders like Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. The furor will also send the Persian Gulf states into turmoil. President Bush's comments about capturing Mr. bin Laden "dead or alive" will only deepen the anger.

It remains to be seen whether the cooperation the U.S. quickly wove together with many Muslim nations will fray if the war on terror drags on or sparks a backlash in any of the nations loosely tied to the U.S. effort.

But some commentators saw an immediate threat that hasn't yet materialized.

What are the real-world consequences of the campaign, asked columnist Katha Pollitt, in the Nov. 19 issue of the Nation, a left-leaning magazine. "Thousands of new Taliban fans and recruits for anti-American suicide missions? A protracted war with a determined, hardy foe that draws in Central Asia, enrages the Muslim masses and destabilizes Pakistan or Indonesia or another country to be named later?"

Ms. Pollitt says in an interview that it's a good tactic to be cautious, especially about war and foreign policy, and that "a lot of innocent people" have been killed so far. "Nobody knows the future, but I don't think we've seen the end of the story. People are talking about war on Iraq."

In an Oct. 15 commentary on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered," Mr. Schorr, the senior news analyst, said, "Whatever success the Anglo-American alliance is having pounding the Taliban into dust, it's having little success winning the hearts and minds of Islamic peoples." He noted anti-American rioting from Nigeria to Indonesia. "Most alarming of all, anti-American feeling is rising in Pakistan, where the Taliban came from, threatening the stability of the Musharraf regime," he said.

"I had to eat a little crow," Mr. Schorr says in an interview. "I have never been in Afghanistan and know nothing about Pashtuns and the rest of it." Mr. Schorr, who worked with legendary newsman Edward R. Murrow at CBS News, says this war has been harder than most to understand because it's not a conventional fight against a country and its government. He says his view was also influenced by the instinctive distrust of government, and in particular the military, typical in his generation of reporters.

That could now change, Mr. Schorr says, although he is wary of predicting that. "I don't want to predict how anything else will come out," he says.

January 8, 2002 7:53 AM

ACTION COMPLETE 1/11/02 ds

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Briefings

000.7 SD

I would like to see a paper that shows the number of press briefings I have done in the Pentagon pressroom.

Please break it out by the total number, the number with Myers, the number with Pace, the number with Tommy Franks, and the number with foreign dignitaries. I would like it to show from the beginning of the year in one group, since September 11 in a second cluster and then totals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010802-3

.....

Please respond by 1/15/02

*Response attached
D. Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita
lll

8 JAN 02

U16438 02

January 10, 2002 4:00 PM

TO: SecDef
FROM:  Torie Clarke
SUBJECT: Press Briefings

You have conducted 54 briefings in the Pentagon pressroom. The breakdown is as follows:

- Briefings by yourself: 22
- Briefings with General Meyers: 20
- Briefings with General Pace: 4
- Briefings with General Franks: 3
- Briefings with Foreign Dignitaries: 5*

The following chart details when the briefings were conducted:

	Pre 9/11/01	Post 9/11/01	2002	Total
SecDef	15	7	0	22
SecDef & CJCS	0	19	1	20
SecDef & VCJCS	0	4	0	4
SecDef & CINCCENT	0	3	0	3
SecDef & Foreign Dignitaries	2	2	1	5

*Note: You have conducted 16 briefings/media availabilities with foreign dignitaries at the Pentagon in 2001. However, only five of those briefings/media availabilities were conducted in the DoD pressroom.

January 8, 2002 8:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funds in Russia

Done 1/22/02

RUSSIA

Please get someone to look into this waste of Defense fund dollars on luxuries. See if it is accurate, see what the penalties have been and what we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/07/02 *Defense Week*, Donnelly, "U.S. Fund in Russia Spent Defense Dollars on Luxuries"

DHR:dh
010802-9

.....
Please respond by 1/15/02

1/19

SECRET -

This happened as result of a Whistleblower. DOD Inspector General did investigation and made criminal referrals. Criminal investigation is in progress.

Di Rita

Done 1/22
Copy BTM

STANOA

We are heading toward a goal of instantaneous attack. I think we're almost there," said Roche in a Dec. 21 interview. "Once the commander says that it's a legitimate target, we want to be able to attack now. Not three hours from now."

Roche praised the flexibility of operation commander Army Gen. Tommy Franks, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., who allowed the Air Force to experiment with its young weapon systems.

"We are now learning an enormous amount by having all these systems in there," Roche said.

Persistent ISR is not just about finding and engaging targets quickly. It is also about receiving a constant picture of a region in order to make sure troops know where to camp and how the enemy is arranged, said an Air Force official.

"The only way to make sure you didn't miss anything is to have an eyeball on it all the time," the official said.

Even more important is making it easier for personnel to decipher what it all means.

"The real key to persistent ISR is assessing the battlefield before the fight begins," a congressional analyst told Defense News Jan. 3.

The Air Force will use these lessons to try and develop a multisensor command-and-control system within the decade, Roche said. The system would tie together manned and unmanned sensors in the air, on the ground and in space, allowing it to focus on an area with pinpoint accuracy continuously in all weather conditions, he said.

"We're using up enormous bandwidth," said Roche. "If we're going to try to do 24-7, we need a portfolio of sensors because no one [sensor] is going to do it," Roche said.

Gail Kaufman contributed to this report.

Defense Week
January 7, 2002
Pg. 1

26. U.S. Fund In Russia Spent Defense Dollars On Luxuries

By John M. Donnelly

Officials working for a Pentagon-funded corporation created to convert former Soviet military organizations into civilian enterprises spent at least \$1 million of U.S. taxpayer money on things like golf, tennis, theater, meals and first-class airfares, according to the Defense Department Inspector General.

Since the autumn of 2000, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service has been conducting a criminal probe of some of the officials involved in the Defense Enterprise Fund. The fund, a private not-for-profit corporation, has received \$67 million from the U.S. government since Congress created the program in fiscal 1994 to turn former Soviet swords into plowshares in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Officials spent roughly half that money managing the fund's affairs, the report said. They invested another \$38 million in former Soviet enterprises that today are worth less than half that—just \$15 million. And they spent at least \$1 million of it, and almost assuredly more, living high on the hog in Moscow, St. Petersburg and elsewhere.

The Inspector General says the story illustrates the importance of monitoring all programs that reimburse contractors' costs. The Defense Enterprise Fund is one of a handful of U.S. programs designed to convert former Soviet military bodies to peaceful ends that have not gone according to plan.

Last August, Defense Week disclosed that the program was being investigated and that the man who blew the whistle on its problems said he was having trouble feeding his family in Russia, while the man who oversaw the loss of half the fund's investments had been promoted to fund president.

The whistleblower, Matthew Maly, made other allega-

tions not included in the Inspector General's report, the second the office has done on the fund. Maly says the fund bribed officials. He says millions meant to convert military electronics and satellite-tracking organizations instead was spent opening restaurants and bankrolling questionable projects.

Robert Odle, an attorney representing the fund's board, in an interview last summer, disputed Maly's charges, saying: "We found nothing that supports his allegations." Odle also said the fund's poor return on investments was due to the difficult investment climate in Russia.

The new Pentagon Inspector General report did not name any names but described misspending on an almost operatic scale, especially considering the fact that the number of employees at the Russia fund was never more than 48 in its first half dozen years, according to The Moscow Times.

'Unreasonable' expenses

The new report, published New Year's Eve, looked at how the fund spent defense dollars in just three of the eight years it has been in existence—fiscal 1997 to 1999. In those three years, fund employees spent about \$1 million on "unallowable and unreasonable" expenses, the audit said.

The employees spent the \$1 million not only on sports, dining and other avocations, but also on housing allowances and pension contributions far above the norm.

It stands to reason that, in the five years of the fund's existence that the auditors didn't examine, more unjustifiable sums of money were spent on such pleasures.

For its first three years, the fund's loans and equity investments were run by its own employees. Then, in 1997, the Pentagon transferred management of the money to Global Partner Ventures, LLC, a firm owned by two employees of the fund.

In 1999, the fund hired a new firm, New York-based Siguler Guff and Company, LLC, to manage the fund's investments until 2004. The fund has received no new U.S. funds since 1997.

When Congress set up the fund in 1994, it wanted the program to be free of the tape that usually comes with government grants, so that it could perform more like a private organization. So Congress left the fund unshackled by government rules that limit or ban certain expenditures of federal dollars.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is the Pentagon organization responsible for grants made to the fund. The agency's deputy director, Air Force Maj. Gen. Robert Bonjiovi, said in a letter to the Inspector General published in the audit that the fund "is not a DOD agency and is not under the direction, control or supervision of DOD." Instead, it is "regulated by internal documents typical of a venture capital firm."

Bonjiovi conveyed no outrage about first-class airfares or symphony tickets bought with taxpayer dollars. The Inspector General's most "significant conclusion," Bonjiovi said, is that the fund's expenses "were not found to be in violation of the terms of the grant."

Living large

Among the expenses the Inspector General said would have been "unallowable" if the fund was operating under usual federal spending rules:

- In fiscal 1999 alone, the fund managers spent \$29,500 of grant funds to buy first-class tickets for six trips, mostly for the owners of the management firm.

- Between fiscal 1997 and 1999, the program "incurred at least \$192,600 for meals and entertainment, including the cost of a country-club membership, employee lunches at their Moscow and St. Petersburg offices, a subscription to the symphony, tennis fees and theater tickets."

- "In November 1997, the fund paid about \$96,800 for a membership to a country club, including \$85,000 for the initial membership fee and about \$1,800 in yearly dues for employees."

- In August 1998, the fund spent \$10,000 in yearly dues to the country club.

- The organization spent \$95,800 for meals served in their offices.

January 8, 2002 3:10 PM

ACTION
1/8
1922

IRAQ

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Exile Support

I talked to Colin Powell at lunch today on the subject of why State is halting support for the Iraqi exile group. He said they are not, but are continuing at \$500,000 per month so they can keep functioning. However, they have an audit problem, and the group seems unwilling to tell them how they are spending the money.

You ought to get the Deputies back on this subject, I would think.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/06/02 *New York Times*, "U.S. Halts Support for Iraqi Exile Group"

DHR.dh
010802-17

.....
Please respond by _____

8 JAN 02

U16440 02

there is no opposition ready to take power in Baghdad.

"Even those who argue that he is dangerous because of weapons of mass destruction have nothing to say about our lack of preparation," said Leon Fuerth, who was the national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore and now teaches international relations at George Washington University. "There are other ways to really, really increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein without making this the next top order of business."

New York Times
January 6, 2002
43. U.S. Halts Support For Iraqi Exile Group
By The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5 — The United States has suspended most financial support for a group of Iraqi exiles who oppose the rule of Saddam Hussein, after an audit by the State Department found irregularities in the group's accounting practices, the department said this week.

In 1998, Congress authorized millions of dollars in aid to groups seeking to overthrow Mr. Hussein. The Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella group based in London, has been one of the main recipients of that assistance.

"A recent audit conducted by the State Department's Office of the Inspector General identified financial management and internal control weaknesses regarding the accounting of U.S. funds," the department said in a statement this week. It said the inspector general instructed the State Department to "withhold, or at least restrict, future funding" of the foundation linked to the Iraqi National Congress until the bookkeeping improved.

The temporary restrictions on financing were first reported on Saturday by The Los Angeles Times.

The State Department said it hoped to continue supporting the group, calling it "part of a broad-based effort by Iraqis to confront the Iraqi regime."

"We believe regime changes would be good for the Iraqi people, and good for the

region, and there is value in supporting an umbrella organization for many groups and individuals who oppose the Iraqi regime working towards that day when the Iraqi people have a better government," the department said in a prepared statement.

The department has provided the group \$500,000 to keep its operations going until new accounting procedures are put in place, the statement said.

Korea Times
January 7, 2002
44. ROK, US Foreign Ministers Set To Meet Over N.Korea
By Shim Jac-yun, Staff Reporter

South Korean Foreign Affairs-Trade Minister Han Seung-soo plans to meet U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in late January to discuss pending issues, including the resumption of dialogue with North Korea, the Foreign Affairs-Trade Ministry said yesterday.

"Working-level officials from the two allies are now discussing details to realize the meeting," Yim Sung-joon, deputy foreign minister, told The Korea Times.

The exact place and agenda for the envisioned meeting have yet to be determined.

"For now, the meeting is likely to be held in Washington or New York. But it could also take place in Tokyo, depending on the situation," Yim said.

Explaining the background for the proposed meeting, Yim cited the need for South Korea to start the diplomacy involving the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Han is set to visit Japan in mid-January.

Seoul officials said Han and Powell will also discuss a possible visit to Seoul by U.S. President George W. Bush and other bilateral economic and trade issues.

Prior to the Han-Powell meeting, senior officials from the two allies and Japan will get together in Seoul to coordinate policy on North Korea.

During the so-called Trilateral Coordination and Over-

sight Group (TCOG) meeting, the officials will exchange opinions on the latest state of inter-Korean relations which have remained stalled since the sixth inter-Korean ministerial talks ended without reaching any agreement in November.

In particular, the officials will focus on how to draw North Korea back into dialogue.

The two Koreas have organized reunions of separated families and other reconciliation events since their landmark summit in June 2000.

But inter-Korean ties faltered last year over Washington's tough stance toward Pyongyang.

They will also discuss food aid to the famine-stricken North by the World Food Program (WFP) and the sinking of a suspected North Korean spy boat by Japan's coast guard in the East China Sea.

Yim will represent South Korea at the TCOG meeting. James Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and Hitoshi Tanaka, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, will attend the meeting.

In the meantime, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is reportedly planning to visit South Korea and Japan later this month. The visit, if realized, will be Rumsfeld's first trip to Seoul and Tokyo since taking office in early 2001.

While in Seoul, Rumsfeld is expected to meet with his South Korean counterpart Kim Dong-shin to discuss security issues, including the missile defense project now being pursued by the U.S.

Rumsfeld originally planned to visit the two countries last November but the visit was postponed due to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on his country.

Korea Herald
January 7, 2002
45. IAEA Officials To Visit Nuclear Laboratory In North Korea
By Hwang Jang-jin, Staff reporter

A delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will begin a week-long visit to North Korea Saturday to discuss Pyongyang's implementation of nuclear safeguard obligations, a Seoul official said yesterday.

Officials of the U.N. nuclear watchdog will visit an isotope production laboratory in the North's Yongbyon nuclear complex. They will also discuss measures to inspect other nuclear facilities, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said.

The North offered to open the laboratory to IAEA inspectors during talks in Vienna early November.

Oli Heinonen, director of the safeguards department of the IAEA, will lead the delegation.

The U.N. officials are expected to discuss wider inspections of the communist country's key nuclear facilities, the official said.

The United States and the IAEA urged the North to allow inspections of used fuel rods from a 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessing facilities that could show whether North Korea has developed nuclear weapons.

The IAEA demanded that the North allow an early inspection of its past nuclear activities, which will last at least three to four years.

The North rejected the demand, insisting that it is only required to admit inspectors when a significant portion of a nuclear reactor construction project is completed, as defined in the 1994 Agreed Framework agreement.

The North froze its suspected nuclear weapons program under the 1994 accord with the United States in exchange for nuclear reactors producing less weapons-grade plutonium.

The \$4.6 billion project was to be completed by 2003, but delays have pushed back the finish until at least 2008.

Snowflake

INFO
13 1/10
1258

January 9, 2002 3:55 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marc Herold

Here is an article that is not terribly complimentary to Marc Herold. We ought to remember that for the briefers.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/08/02, Wooten, *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, "Left Using Cynicism to Spin War"

DHR:dh
010902-19

.....

Please respond by _____

AF

9 Jan 02

U16441 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11820

If you have the view that America is essentially an arrogant, thuggish society with aggressive impulses that have to be checked by civilizing forces, whether international treaties or domestic behavior-police, there's no doubt we're not above "covering up" civilian slaughter, too.

That's the charge making its way into the mainstream media -- based on a compilation of information gathered by a professor in New Hampshire from world press accounts of the war in Afghanistan that includes tabulation from highly unreliable sources in the region.

The professor, Marc W. Herold, has assembled numbers purporting to establish that 3,767 civilians have been killed by U.S. bombs in Afghanistan.

From that, others who share Herold's political views posit the hypothesis that our coverup -- the mainstream media and the Bush administration -- invites retaliation. This from Roberto J. Gonzalez, an assistant professor of anthropology at San Jose State University, in an opinion article reprinted in the AJC on Sunday:

The coverup "might create a dangerous future for Americans," he writes. "Such restrictions keep us from understanding how the rest of the world views the war, and why it might provoke future attacks on the United States. They may also breed complacency, ignorance and national insecurity."

The original essay on which he relied comes from "an economist" at New Hampshire.

This is how this professor (who spent 1968-1975, the Vietnam years, as a graduate student at Berkeley) thinks: "The actions of the Bush-Rumsfeld-Rice trio speak eloquently to these efforts: calling in major U.S. news networks to give them their marching orders, buying up all commercial

satellite imagery available to the general public, sending Colin Powell off to Qatar to lecture the independent Al Jazeera news network, and lastly, when that failed targeting the Kabul office of Al Jazeera and scoring a direct missile hit on it."

He is careful to point out that "I have avoided granting greater reliability to U.S. or British sources -- the ethnocentric bias . . . I have eschewed making judgments about the relative reliability of one nation's news agencies and reporters vs. another's."

One of his previous contributions was to offer a course at New Hampshire on anarchy. The course was in response to student interest "and mine as well," he told *The Boston Globe* in 1999. "I've always been interested in this whole way of looking at life and society," he said then. "I've always had a lot of problems with authority structures, domination, exploitation, discipline and the like."

The essay that forms the basis for the coverup allegation is available on-line. Judge its balance for yourself. The web address is: [www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_n_deaths.htm](http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm)

The left's reaction to this war has been a textbook case in how to spin political opinion. The president's overwhelming popularity among Americans, and the on-ground successes in Afghanistan, make direct challenge unpromising.

So it's largely framed as "we should understand why they hate us," followed by the left's cynicism. Or it's cynicism couched as medicinal patriotism.

The past few months has produced a rather strange breed of resentment and pessimism.

The assumption is that America's enemies are most certainly justified in thinking us unsavory because of our actions around the world, in refusing to sign global warming treaties, in refusing to get treatment for our oil addiction, in exploiting the weak, in parading our culture and capitalism before the world's noble misbegottens -- the likes of

whom we're killing and covering up.

Almost two decades ago Washington activist Mitch Snyder claimed that 3 million people were homeless -- and that claim became "truth." He made it up -- to advance a political agenda.

Snyder's point was to focus media attention on his issue. Alas, much of what passes for academic "studies" these days is a professor's politics in academic garb.

The problem is that once the premise passes into the mainstream media, it becomes a "documented" fact.

How many were killed unintentionally? We may never know how many were killed intentionally. At the World Trade Center.

Jim Wooten is associate editorial page editor.

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot

January 7, 2002

Pg. B11

61. Base-Closing Plan Holds Future Opportunity

By Richard D. Hearney

Congress has now voted to close as many as 25 percent of domestic military bases beginning in 2005. Those who see the move as a pink slip to scores of American communities need to take a look at places that have already gone through the process. The pink slips have turned out to be tickets to economic revitalization and growth for most former base communities.

The decision to shut down bases may seem odd during a war, but it reflects the need to spend military dollars even more wisely as we combat terrorism. As President Bush declared recently: "Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases obsolete programs or obsolete weapon systems." Closing unnecessary bases can free \$3 billion a year for more pressing needs.

From a defense perspective, the closings should begin sooner in order to save billions on bases that have long lost their value. But the deferral is a valuable gift of time for communities that could prepare for when the military leaves.

Experience shows that cities and towns can overcome disruption and wind up with healthier, more diversified economies. There are models and options aplenty for communities that take advantage of the extra two years to revamp their economies.

Between 1989 and 1995, the Defense Department closed nearly 100 major facilities in 28 states. Today, the majority of affected communities have more than made up the lost jobs by converting bases to new uses or privatizing defense work the Pentagon used to do.

The federal government has pitched in with programs to transfer ownership of base facilities or to provide favorable leases for reuse.

• Alexandria, La., the home of the former England Air Force Base, has created 1,800 jobs -- more than double the number of civilians working on the base at closure -- and generated \$5 million in revenues by leasing space to a range of commercial ventures.

• The former Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, which lost 927 civilian jobs when it closed in 1995, now employs more than 3,000 people at the new Austin-Bergstrom International Airport.

• In Indianapolis, a decision to privatize manufacturing operations at the former Naval Air Warfare Station saved 2,000 defense jobs. An additional 1,700 jobs were created by conversion to new uses, and a planned technology park on part of the site is expected to add an additional 3,000 jobs.

Communities that may be affected by future closures can duplicate these success stories by positioning themselves now for life without a base. The critical first challenge is accepting that the base is not a permanent fixture and beginning to imagine how to match or exceed the economic benefits it produces. Upon making the psychological leap, local leaders should follow a multi-step approach:

• Build regional consensus for an agreed vision of the future. Broad agreement on where the community wants to go can help eliminate turf bat-

January 9, 2002 3:57 PM

Action
to 110
300

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Concepts

Please schedule Torie to come up and tell me what her concepts are for this year for briefers, briefings, substance, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-20

.....
Please respond by 01/16/02

600.7

9 Jan 12

U16443 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11822

WFO
1/10
1305

January 9, 2002 3:59 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bandar

Saudi Arabia

We don't need a meeting with Bandar. I understand he is meeting with the President, the Vice President, Condi and Colin. I can't imagine why, but that is what is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-21

.....
Please respond by _____

9 JAN 02

U16444 02

Arrow
11/10
1307

January 9, 2002 4:02 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Policy

3836

We need to get a policy on the press and the Red Cross with respect to the detainees being taken to the United States and/or Guantanamo Naval Base.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-23



Please respond by 01/16/02

9 Jan 02

U16445 02

January 9, 2002 4:04 PM

ACTION
85 1110
1325

RUSSIA

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Russians and Iranians

On our daily report, I don't know if you have information on the number of Russians and Iranians in the country, but it would sure be nice for us to begin to keep track of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-24

.....

Please respond by _____

U16446 02

qJan02

Action
1/10
1330

January 9, 2002 4:11 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Requirements at Guantanamo

353.6

I hope you are into the legal issues about what kind of quarters we have to provide detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base. I am perfectly willing to come up with something short of the Geneva Convention rules, if it requires they have private cottages for officers, as I am told it does, and that we have to give them cigarettes, which are bad for their health, and a daily stipend.

Please get a proper briefing together and tell me what you recommend.

I suspect if we consider them unlawful combatants, which they are, we don't need to do that much, and we can come close on anything that is reasonable.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-25

.....

Please respond by 01/16/02

4 Jan 02

U16447 02

January 9, 2002 5:59 PM

INFO
11/10
1528

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Your Memo

Thanks for your memo of December 18. It is helpful.

DHR:dh
010902-31



Please respond by _____

322

9 Jan 02

U16448 02

2001
12/18
Gutko

18 December 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM JIM ROCHE, SECAF

SUBJECT: Two "good news" observations

Mr. Secretary,

I have wanted to pass along two positive points that I have observed for your enjoyment and/or consideration.

1. In my years of active duty and association with the Services, I have never seen the routine cooperation I now see between the AF, Navy, and Army (probably the Marines as well, but I haven't observed that yet). When I visited the Air Operations Center in Incerlik, the room was called to attention with an "Attention on deck." It took me about five steps before I realized that I was not on the bridge of my ship, so why was a naval expression used in an Air Force ops center? The reason was that the senior officer was a Naval Officer. We routinely work very closely together in this Afghan scenario from Predator to F-18's, or USAF tanking F-14's from the carriers, to Air Tasking Orders on-line (as opposed to hand delivered in the 1991 conflict.) From a number of conversations with the officers, it is clear that the working relationships are close and normal. Quite a breakthrough in cultural terms. I sense that the Services actually do believe that "We will never fight alone again, ever."

2. I am always amazed by the "military experts" who make their livings telling us how we should change this and/or that, while the forces continue to do well in conflict. It is one thing to do so as you have done, where you have caused the Services to challenge basic points of principle, not to destroy capabilities, but to adapt to a changed world. In the Gulf War, the Bosnian conflict, and the conflict in Kosovo, land based fighter-bombers had an advantage as compared to Naval carriers. So, the "talking heads" started the drumbeat to rid the nation of large-deck carriers. Then, along comes Afghanistan, and those very large-deck carriers become a critical part of our ability to kill the Taliban. Working closely with Air Force tankers (about 55% of the over 3500 tanker sorties have been to service our Naval colleagues) and a combined air operations center for the CinC, Navy tac air has done a superb job. Does this mean the demise of land-based fighter-bombers? Heavens, no. In fact, the number of F-16 and F-15 sorties over Afghanistan equal the number of our bomber sorties. It is the modern marvel of tankers, centrally controlled so as to service a large number of aircraft aloft. The larger point is that the US has understood the notion of the "portfolio effect" to deal with uncertainty of combat. One type of force is more suited here, the other there. A US comparative advantage.

na


11-L-0559/OSD/11828

Snowflake

January 9, 2002 6:03 PM

ACTION
1110
1529

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Statistics

TRACKED ON
CICS TRACKER

Afghanistan

Please have someone pull together some data and statistics on what took place in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001, until today, January 9, 2002, in terms of number of flights, amount of ordnance, number of countries who cooperated in the coalition, number of bases we used, number of sorties, number of people involved, etc.—anything that is statistically interesting.

I need to start capturing some of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-32

.....

Please respond by 01/16/02

qJanaa

U16449 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11829

January 9, 2002 6:09 PM

Don 1/16 06:40

h'160

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper Flow

Please help me out with this memo from Tom White. He wrote it October 16. He signed it December 10. It came up here December 12. You initialed it December 18, and then Giambastiani initialed it December 20. I am just reading it.

How does all that happen?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/01 SecArmy Info memo to SecDef [U19345/01]

DHR:dh
010902-33

.....
Please respond by 01/11/02

U16450 02

1/12
→ Sec Def - I can't account for the Oct 16 - Dec 10 delay. In fact, that's my circle and question mark on the document. Regarding the dates in ~~my~~ ^{our} office,
- I recall that I had gotten a similar note from Dave Chu that showed slightly different info. I worked the discrepancy a little and summarized the results in my note on the cover sheet. I try not to be just a pass-through. Much of what comes here is not in a condition to just send in. It takes a little time to get it to the level of review. Regarding the time to get it to you Dec 14-19 I am

020409

11-E-0559/OSD/11830



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2001, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 09 2002

SUBJECT: The Army Foreign Language Program

- The current need for skilled linguists in response to the current crisis has reinforced the need for the Army to continue to review and refocus the language requirements that are necessary to maintain operational readiness.
- The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published the Army Language Master Plan as a roadmap to ensure the Army is effectively and efficiently utilizing the linguist assets, to include documenting an Army language mix that is more relevant based on critical mission requirements.
- The United States Military Academy has focused its foreign language training on Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. Total enrollment for academic year 2001 is 117, 115, 188, 322, 139, 103, and 467 respectively. Foreign language enrollment data is at Tab A.
- There are currently 1,904 language qualified soldiers in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. The status of fill for FAOs is 102% (includes those officers on retirement orders).
- The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), including the DLI-Washington office (DLI-W) offers instruction in 85 languages. Twenty language programs are now taught at the Presidio of Monterey. Based on new requirements, DLIFLC may add 3-7 new resident programs this year. All 85 languages are currently available on-demand through the DLI-W contract programs. These can be increased if DoD requirements change. A list of the FY 2001 languages is at Tab B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: MAJ Gregory J. Hadfield, (b)(6)

Note: There are 1185 students studying Arabic, 554 studying Mandarin Chinese. Total of 1739 of 5245 total students, or roughly 30% in Chinese and Arabic. Dilt

*LARRY DI RITA
12/8*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	12/18
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	12/20
MA BUGGI	12/18
EXECSEC WHITMORE	12/14

*RETURNED FROM
14-DEC TRIP Rm
U19345 101 12/16*

January 9, 2002 7:05 AM

TO: Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eulogy

Action complete

293

I may have to do a eulogy in the next month or two. Would you dig up a couple of good eulogies and let me look at some constructs? I am for brevity, elegance, eloquence, warmth, sensitivity and all that good stuff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-1

.....
Please respond by ~~01/10/02~~

T 1/13

1/11
Sec Def -
I have Tony
scheduled to see you
Monday to discuss. (Jan 14)
Larry D. R. E

9 Jan 02

U16451 02

January 9, 2002 7:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Karzai

Done 1/9/02

Afghanistan

Is Karzai President, Interim President or Interim Prime Minister?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010902-5

.....
Please respond by 01/09/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 09 2002

1/9 -

*In accordance with the
U.N. agreement by which
the government is established,
his official title is Chairman
of the Interim Administration*

9 JAN 02

U16453 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11833

ANNEX III

REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE UN TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN

The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan hereby

1. Request that the United Nations and the international community take the necessary measures to guarantee the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan as well as the non-interference by foreign countries in Afghanistan's internal affairs;
2. Urge the United Nations, the international community, particularly donor countries and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority;
3. Request the United Nations to conduct as soon as possible (i) a registration of voters in advance of the general elections that will be held upon the adoption of the new constitution by the constitutional Loya Jirga and (ii) a census of the population of Afghanistan.
4. Urge the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces;
5. Invite the United Nations and the international community to create a fund to assist the families and other dependents of martyrs and victims of the war, as well as the war disabled;
6. Strongly urge that the United Nations, the international community and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to combat international terrorism, cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop production.

ANNEX IV

Composition of the Interim Administration

Chairman:..... Mr. Hamid Karzai

Membership (of whom 5 will be Vice-Chairs)

Department of Defence:
Department of Finance:
Department of Foreign Affairs:
Department of the Interior:
Department of Planning:
Department of Commerce:
Department of Mines & Industries:
Department of Small Industries:
Department of Information & Culture:
Department of Communication:
Department of Labour & Social Affairs:
Department of Hajj & Auqaf:
Department of Martyrs & Disabled:
Department of Education:
Department of Higher Education:
Department of Public Health:
Department of Public Works:

January 9, 2002 8:01 AM

ACKNO
1/9
1821

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader Talking Points

470

On these Crusader talking points you sent me, under the fourth bullet point of "Crusader of 2001" it says, "A single Crusader outshoots a battery of Paladins." Nowhere does it explain what a Paladin is, and nowhere does it explain what a battery is. Also, under the bullet point "bottom line," there is no way anyone would know what 50% less lift means with respect to a Crusader.

Please have someone go back over this and rewrite it in English, with an eye towards who the reader will be. Then I will send it along to the President.

Let's try to get it done fast. This has been dragging on.

Thanks.

Attach.
Crusader Talking Points

DHR:dh
010902-8

.....

Please respond by 1/9/02

Let's get it done

9 JAN 02

U16454 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11835

CRUSADER TALKING POINTS

Crusader of 2001 is Not Crusader of the 1990's

- Designed to replace 1960's system (Paladin); by 1999, Crusader had grown to a 60 ton-design, making it impractical to airlift. That was the reason that it became a symbol of the Army's heavy mentality.

Crusader of 2001

- Weight reduced by 20 tons; now can put two on a C-17.
- Numbers reduced from nearly 1200 to less than 500; it will be focused on the most modernized part of the force, the so-called transformation force that brings digitization to the ground battle.
- Higher fire rate than older artillery and robotic loading allows 25% reduction in guns per battalion and a 33% reduction in people per gun.
- A single Crusader outshoots a battery of Palladins.
 - 33% increase in range, three times more accurate
 - 10 to 1 increase in sustained rate of fire
 - Completely robotic; allows for 2/3 reduction in manpower from equivalent force
- Full Nuclear-Bio-Chemical protection, unlike current systems.
- Bottom line:
 - 50% less lift, Greater firepower, Less logistics, Fewer soldiers in harms way
 - Functional in all weather, applicable to all contingencies across the entire spectrum of operations

Fully Digitized Command and Control System is Truly Transformational

- Crusader processes situational awareness data from multiple sources into easily understood messages that are delivered directly to the crew, eliminating the need for fire direction centers.
- Crew knows onboard where friends and foes are on the battlefield; current artillery crews must be told by others, causing long delays.
- Artillery integrated into Joint Air and Ground Forces vs. Army only currently
- Sensor-to-Shot Fired in less than one minute vs. 10-12 minutes today. Against moving target, this is the difference between a kill and a miss.
- The new Crusader is like a ground-based AC-130 – rapid and accurate fires against mobile targets. For example, a Crusader could be linked up to Predator in a way that no other artillery system could do.

January 10, 2002 7:53 AM

ACTION
AS 11/10
1502

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Marc Herold

Attached is a note that came in from CENTCOM in response to my questions on Marc Herold. I am not sure I agree with the Colonel's recommendation at the bottom.

I think we ought to make sure people get a sense of who this fellow is.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/08/02 CCPA Information Paper re: Marc Herold

DHR:dh
011002-2

.....

Please respond by _____

A fgh aniston

10 Jan 02

U16455 02

CCPA INFORMATION PAPER

8 January 2002

1. Purpose. To provide information concerning Professor Marc W. Herold.

2. Facts.

a. Marc Herold is a Professor of Economics at the University of New Hampshire. He received his M.B.A. in International Business and Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. His areas of interest as a professor are Third World Development, Women and Development, Multinational Enterprises, Postmodernism and Development Philosophy.

b. On or about 5 Dec 01, Professor Herold published an Internet article, "Who Will Count the Dead?; U.S. Media Fail to Report Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan." The article is an excerpt from an upcoming book, September 11 and the U.S. War.

c. His thesis is that the U.S. media have not reported casualties and relied totally on Department of Defense accounting for civilian casualties. Herold lays the blame on the administration and the actions of "Bush-Rumsfeld-Rice." He also claims that the military targets claimed to be hit were "long-abandoned military facility."

d. According to Herold, he used the following media accounts for his tabulations: The Times of India, three Pakistani dailies, Singapore News, Sydney Morning Press, Herald Sun, Afghan Islamic Press, Agence France Press, Pakistan News Service, Reuters, BBC News Online, al-Jazeera, and a variety of other "reputable sources."

e. His tabulation chart is a day-by-day accounting of his claims of civilian casualties and includes the location of the alleged bombing, the province in Afghanistan, the number of civilian deaths, weapons used, commentary and the sources used for his finding.

f. In his Internet article, the chart is summarized and includes the "date of the U.S. bombing, Taliban 'claim' as stated in the report, Pentagon/State Department 'truth,' and his personal assessment.

g. Although his article and allegations have primarily been published and distributed via numerous Internet sites, publications such as BBC, Toronto Globe and Mail and the Guardian have published articles.

3. Recommendation. That all spokespersons continue to maintain the high ground and reaffirm that we strike military targets. Any blame for civilian casualties rests squarely on the shoulders of the Taliban and Al Qa'ida. The first civilian casualties were a result of a terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The U.S. and coalition go to painstakingly detail to minimize the risks of civilian casualties and damage to civilian facilities.

PREPARED BY:



Rick Thomas
Colonel, USA
Deputy Chief of Public Affairs

APPROVED BY:



Rick Thomas
Colonel, USA
CCPA/7-6393

11-L-0559/OSD/11838

1/9 PASSED
FROM
CENTCOM

ACTION
to 110
1504

January 10, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lunch w/Greenspan

I should have lunch with Allen Greenspan about every three months, and I would like to do one fairly soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-4

.....

Please respond by 01/14/02

000.7153

10 Jan 02

U16456 02

January 10, 2002 8:33 AM

15
1/10
1506
Action

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Condolences

293

I think I want to write letters of condolence to the spouses, or parents if they have no spouse, of all who die in this Afghan war, whether it is in combat or by some other cause.

Please see that we work up something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-5

.....

Please respond by 01/15/02

10 JAN 02

U16458 02

January 10, 2002 8:49 AM

RE: TOW 1110
1515

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Costs of War

*11/14
0640
Action
Complete*

000.5

If you will draft this memo FAST that I can send to Andy Card, Mitch Daniels and the Vice President, I will get it off.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/07/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef, "Handling Costs of the War"

DHR:dh
011002-8

.....
Please respond by 01/11/02

107 and 2

U16459 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11841

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: January 11, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Budget Debate

Don,

Within six hours of your asking for this memo, the President decided in our favor.

We wrote it so that you could still send it; it endorses the decision, instead of arguing for it.

However, I would advise letting the dust settle a bit on this issue. This memo could be useful a bit later, when the President rolls out the budget. Right now, it doesn't serve a useful purpose and may sound like gloating at Mitch Daniels' expense.

Paul W.

1/12
Mr. D. Rumsfeld *DRL*
VADM G _____
SOS 1/12



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Acknowledging Costs of War in the FY 03 Budget Presentation

The President has decided to include war costs in the FY 2003 budget. This is good economics and good management, and plays it straight with the American people.

It's good economics because it will stimulate the economy at a time when it's needed most. The stimulus will come from both the actual expenditure of funds, and through the expectations we create. The alternative would be to suppress ongoing DoD expenditures, e.g., procurement and construction, which would discourage business investment and job creation. Curbing spending in the midst of a recession would be bad economics.

It's good management because it will ensure program stability, keep military readiness high, continue fixing our broken infrastructure, and sustain the transformation we've begun. The alternative would be to suppress non-war expenditures, which could cripple training, repair, and maintenance; and halt – if not reverse – the momentum for transformation. Another alternative would be to hide the costs of war. President Johnson tried that in the 1960s. The result was to wreck the defense investment budget for almost two decades – I know, because that was the situation I inherited in 1975.

It plays it straight with the American people. Americans understand we're at war and expect that there is a cost. There is strong support for this war effort and a willingness to sacrifice. We should not pretend that there won't be continued costs next year. The alternative would be to postpone the acknowledgement of war costs until later in the year and ask for a supplemental, which may then look like mismanagement – why didn't we have an estimate earlier of what the cost would be and budget accordingly?

Of course, there may be a deficit. But like King Canute's advisors, wishing it away will not change reality – nor fool the American public. We are fighting a war in the midst of a recession: exactly the circumstances the President has said repeatedly would cause us to re-examine our budgetary assumptions.



11-L-0559/OSD/11843

EYES ONLY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 10 2002

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: January 7, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Handling Costs of the War

Don,

In one of our meetings on Saturday you asked for a paper to make the point that hiding the costs of the war, the way OMB apparently wants to do, is bad economics and bad politics. I asked David Chu to prepare the excellent talking paper attached.

I had David prepare this as a talking paper that you might use with the Vice President or the President. Let me know if you would like us to turn it into a memo.

One gets the clear sense that many in the White House are concerned that if they show just how bad the deficit may be next year, it will hurt the President in the Fall elections and lend ammunition to critics of the tax cut.

However, the President said very clearly he would not touch the Social Security surplus unless there were a national emergency or recession. We now have both. We have to confront the need for deficit spending and it is better to do so now rather than later:

1. If we don't plan properly for the costs of the war, we could end up damaging the economy, the way Lyndon Johnson's attempt to have guns and butter during the 1960s dragged us down for a decade afterwards. Getting that argument on the table now will, of course, make the proponents of "butter" unhappy because it will signal clearly that we have to tighten our belts on the domestic side. However, unless the President does so now with all the prestige and authority he now holds, it will become increasingly difficult as time goes on;
2. Balancing the budget over the long term is one thing, but trying to balance the budget on the back of a recession is bad economics. When Daschle talks about fiscal responsibility, one is tempted to remind people that it's the same approach Herbert Hoover adopted in taking us into the worst depression in American history.

EYES ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/11844

Acknowledging The Cost of the War Against Terrorism

- The cost of the war must be acknowledged as part of the FY2003 budget presentation in February. It must be budgeted for explicitly now -- NOT later, as OMB prefers.
- This is good economics, good management and good politics.
- It's good economics because it will stimulate the economy, which is in a recession that began in March, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The stimulus will come from both the actual expenditure of funds, and through the expectations we create.
 - The alternative is to suppress the ongoing expenditures of DoD, e. g., procurement and construction, which will discourage business investment and job creation.
 - The alternative is analogous to raising taxes in the midst of recession, as the Democratic leadership seems prepared to do.
- It's good management because it will keep the quality and readiness of our military on track, continue fixing our broken infrastructure, and sustain the transformation President Bush has begun. The alternative is to suppress non-

war expenditures, which could cripple training, repair, and maintenance; and halt – if not reverse --the momentum for transformation.

- The alternative is hiding the cost of the war. Lyndon Johnson tried that in the 1960s. The result was to wreck the defense investment budget for almost two decades --I know, because that was the situation I inherited in 1975.
- Worse, Johnson's policies led to stagflation in the 1970s, one of the most difficult economic periods since the Great Depression. We must not repeat this mistake.
- It's good politics to acknowledge the cost of the war now, because the American people understand we're at war and expect that there is a cost. They support our efforts; over 90% endorse current US military action in Afghanistan according to the mid-December Gallup Poll. Six months from now public focus could well be elsewhere; trying to present a "bill" for the war at that juncture will look like mismanagement --why didn't we know earlier what the cost would be?
- OMB seems reluctant to acknowledge that there could be a deficit. But like King Canute's advisors, wishing it away will not change the reality – nor fool the American public. OF COURSE there could be a deficit –we are fighting a war in the midst of a recession, exactly the circumstances the President said so many times would cause him to re-examine his budgetary assumptions.

January 10, 2002 9:21 AM

Action
15 11/0
15/9

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Colombia

Colombia

I notice that Colombia may cancel their agreement with the FARC. That might give us an opportunity. Why don't you get the interagency looking at it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-11



Please respond by 01/11/02

10 JAN 02

U16460 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11847

January 10, 2002 9:26 AM

Action
1/10
1520

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Briefing

The next time I do a press briefing, we should certainly mention the people who have been killed and condolences to their families in my opening remarks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-12

.....

Please respond by _____

000.750

Sir -

Covered in your remarks
w/ Australian MOD today.

V/A
Delonci

105am 02

U16461 02

Action
to 11/0
1845

January 10, 2002 11:51 AM

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AF Briefing

Paul Wolfowitz says there is an Air Force briefing I should see on the fusing of targeting information. He says it is only 15 minutes.

Please set it up for me to see.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-15

.....
Please respond by 01/18/02

10Jan02

U16463 02

January 10, 2002 11:57 AM

Done
1/19
0932

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: For Pentagon Briefers

We should not make any mention of the State Department reward program. They have a program, I don't understand it, and I don't know that they understand it. We should say that we understand there is a State Department reward program. We have nothing to do with it. If anyone has questions about it, they should ask them to explain the complexities of it.

000.5

Any statements we have made at the Pentagon about rewards or bounties relate to a separate program administered by a different agency. What we have said is correct.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-16

.....
Please respond by _____

Jerry Di Rita

1/18

10 Jan 02

U16464 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: January 18, 2002
SUBJECT: For Pentagon Briefers

Concur. I will ensure we discuss with briefers on a recurring basis.

January 10, 2002 5:28 PM

AS
1/11
1207
ACTION

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Veterans

Why don't you call a meeting for some Saturday afternoon on the veterans' thing, and sit the people down in a room.

If it takes legislation to change the incentives so both sides are leaning forward to do the right thing—take advantage of leverage on pharmaceutical purchasing, take advantage of empty hospital beds, and take advantage of reductions in milcon to build hospitals if we have empty beds and they need places—get the legislation written.

If it takes getting it through the Congress, tell the White House staff the President wants it through. One of the first things the President told me when I took this job was to get it solved, and here we are, it is a year later and we haven't done a lick.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011002-20

.....
Please respond by _____

292

10 Jan 02

U16465 02

ACTION
43 1/11
1157

January 11, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: OMB and FAIR

Sometime in the next three days, please explain to me what this circled item on OMB and Robin Cleveland is about.

168

Thanks.

Attach.
01/07/02 AT&L Weekly Activity Report [U00267/02]

DHR:dh
011102-1

.....
Please respond by 01/14/02

11 Jan 02

U16466 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OFFICE OF THE

2002 JAN -7 AM 10:15

JAN 11 2002

USD(AT&L) Weekly Activity Report (Dec 28, 2001 - Jan 4, 2002)

Pat 1/7/02

Global Hawk Crashed - On December 30, a Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle supporting OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM crashed. The crash site has been located and secured. An investigation is underway, and major components are being recovered. A classified paper has been forwarded discussing additional details.

Microphone Design Inspired by Fly's Ear Enabling Acoustic Localization with Very Small Microsystems. Engineers are creating a microchip-microphone inspired by the fly's extraordinary ear, as part of the DARPA Acoustic Microsensor Project. These devices will enable new sensing capabilities and operational modalities in military scenarios such as battlefields and urban environments.

OMB does not intend to approve the Department's latest FAIR Act Inventory. OMB's Robin Cleveland sent a December 11th memo to DepSecDef requesting support for completing A-76 competitions in FY 02 for 5% of the FAIR Act Inventory and competing an additional 10% in FY 03. The Department's outyear intentions for A-76 competitions, however, are in conflict with these goals. Ms. Cleveland further requests that the next FAIR Act Inventory (due in June) should produce larger competition pools and projections of A-76 competitions than the Department's most recent inventory. In the interim, OMB does not intend to approve the Department's latest inventory and consequently the inventory list will not be made available to Congress or to the public.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>1/10</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>1/10</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>1/10</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/10</i>

INFO 1/11/02 AS

January 11, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gertz and Scarborough

000.7 SD

This is a very perceptive column Gertz and Scarborough have. If you see them, you might say so.

The only thing wrong with it is we never rejected ground troops in Afghanistan. We kept that option cocked and ready. We just didn't have to do it. The rest of it is right on the mark.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/11/02 *Washington Times*, "Inside the Ring," "Rummy's lessons"

DHR:dh
011102-10

.....

Please respond by _____

11 Jan 02

U16468 02



information by people in government and he would reduce the amount of inappropriate back-grounding of classified information."

Mrs. Clarke said, "You have a fair number of people, not a lot, but you have a fair number of people who are going through a bit of a culture shock. There is not quite the flood of information that there has been in the past, and I will fully tell you that I believe a lot of that information was inappropriate."

Here's one he missed: Pentagon officials tell us Mr. Rumsfeld was flabbergasted recently when presented with a military plan to house al Qaeda terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, using minimal security controls. "You've got to be kidding," Mr. Rumsfeld said in dismissing the plan and calling for much tighter controls over the hardened terrorists.

Chechens captured

Among the hundreds of al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan are a significant number of Chechens — Islamic separatists from the Russian enclave where a major low-level war has been under way for the past several years.

Officials tell us the Chechens most likely will be turned over to the Russian government, which is eager to find out more about the links between al Qaeda and the separatists in Chechnya, in southern Russian.

Six-year war

President Bush reminded reporters earlier this week at his ranch in Texas that the war against international terrorism will be long and arduous. Just how long, the president didn't say.

However, Pentagon officials tell us military planners privately are preparing for a conflict that will last a minimum of six years. That's the internal assessment that is being used for planning and budgeting for operations, which almost certainly will exceed \$

tions.

Press coverage

We talked to an Army officer and specialist in unconventional warfare (working with an indigenous force to defeat an enemy) about how the press was covering operations by Army Special Forces, better known as the Green Berets.

Here's what he said:

"They are missing the subtle aspect of Unconventional Warfare and war through surrogates. Air power is very effective, but isn't sufficient to turn conflicts. With covert operators from Special Forces and CIA (sometimes hard to make a distinction), air power is directed and evaluated. Fear is spread throughout the enemy population because they never know when, where, or how they will meet their death. Every shadow and noise is cause for fear.

"Tribes that haven't worked in concert for years are suddenly engaging in coordinated attacks that make them effective fighting forces. Did air power effect this action? I would sooner guess that covert operators are cajoling, bribing, and threatening these tribes to work towards our end. This is war through surrogates. Few realize that tens or hundreds of such operators can shape a battlefield, war or country. The introduction of thousands of conventional troops could cause more problems than they might solve.

"The bottom line is that small numbers of American forces can bring about great changes without the risks associated with the massive infusion of conventional forces. Sometimes the actions of these unconventional forces are unseen, fostering incorrect assumptions and conclusions."

Lessons learned

We already know that lessons learned in Afghanistan have convinced the Pentagon to buy more small-unit operations and unmanned vehicles and airborne

budget will include money for more special operations AC-130 gunships. Gen. Tommy Franks, the war commander, has used the hovering battleships to blast terrorist targets from Tora Bora to Kandahar. With few air defenses to worry about, the plane's highly accurate cannons can kill people and destroy vehicles as targets emerge.

Sources say the Pentagon will buy four to eight of the converted C-130 aircraft, adding to Air Force Special Operations inventory of 21 AC-130s.

Gen. James Jones, the Marine Corps commandant, was so impressed by the gunships he is thinking of buying a Marine version.

Rummy's lessons

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has learned lessons from the last three major conflicts — Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Kosovo — in his management of public statements.

Vietnam: Mr. Rumsfeld refuses to estimate the number of enemy dead — numbers released with great confidence by military briefers in Vietnam.

Persian Gulf: Mr. Rumsfeld shies away from discussing the hunt for Osama bin Laden and, unlike other senior officials, never speculates on his whereabouts.

Military analysts contend the previous Bush administration focused too much on Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Persian Gulf war, leaving a feeling of unfulfillment when the war ended and Saddam stayed in power.

Kosovo: Mr. Rumsfeld refuses to estimate the number of destroyed armored vehicles and other military equipment.

During the air war over Kosovo, NATO gave running totals of the number of tanks and artillery pieces destroyed. Reporters later tried to disprove the estimates.

Mr. Rumsfeld also refused to rule out the introduction of large number of ground troops in Afghanistan, even though the idea was debated and rejected.

In Kosovo, President Clinton ruled out a ground invasion. Analysts contended the announcement sent the wrong signal to Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, who held out for 78 days.

• Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters. Mr. Gertz can be reached at 202/636-3274 or by e-mail at bgertz@washingtontimes.com. Mr. Scarborough can be reached at 202/636-3274.

Action
1/9
1252

January 8, 2002 5:04 PM

000.5

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article

You might want to write *Time* magazine and explain to them that State Department runs one rewards program, but another Government agency runs a second rewards program. You could note the fact that the reward I announced had, in fact, been approved personally by the head of that agency.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/14/02 *Time* magazine, p. 14

DHR:dh
010802-22

.....
Please respond by 01/16/02

8Jan02

U16477 02

"I Fly This Plane!" "I Know Bush!"

YOU KNOW WE'VE REACHED some kind of watershed in the stressful post-Sept. 11 world of airline security when the public has to decide who's telling the truth, the pilot or the Secret Service agent. That's what happened in the case of a member of President Bush's security detail who was thrown off an American Airlines plane on Christmas Day because of alleged problems with paperwork permitting him to carry a handgun. The pilot says the agent, identified in news reports as Walied Schater, got belligerent. Schater, through lawyers, says he was discriminated against because he's of Arab descent.

Whoever is right, the event may increase calls for something the airlines have pressed for since Sept. 11: the ability to identify just who is getting on their planes. "This case lends support to our calls for some kind of government-approved profiling," says Michael Wasscom of the Air Transport Association. "If we had more information about this man, who was carrying a weapon, we could have avoided any problems." —By Sally B. Donnelly




The Disappearing Omar Reward

IS THERE A REWARD FOR THE capture of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar? No one seems quite sure. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced on Dec. 13 that Washington planned to offer \$10 million for Omar's capture, to go along with the \$25 million dangled for nabbing Osama bin Laden. But Rumsfeld didn't consult ahead of time with the State Department—which runs the rewards program and decides which evildoers warrant a price tag on their head—and a reward had not been approved. It still hasn't. "You just can't create these rewards on your own," says a State Department aide. One problem: the rewards



are usually offered for terrorists under U.S. indictment, and Omar hasn't yet been charged with a crime. The State Department could still come through with the reward, and a senior Administration aide insists that if someone turns in the Taliban chief, "we could probably pay some money." But do bounty hunters take jobs? —By Douglas Waite



Democrats: Don't Gloat About Enron




AS CONGRESS gears up for hearings on Enron's \$60 billion collapse, some Democrats are savoring a chance to investigate links between the company and its many C.O.P. friends in the White House and Congress. But the scandal may wind up tainting Democrats as well. Florida's state pension fund, which lost \$325 million on Enron, is examining, as part of a broader inquiry, what role Frank Savage, a major Democratic donor, may have played in the state's loss. The fund's investments were directed by

Alliance Capital Management, where Savage was a senior executive and chairman at the same time he sat on Enron's board. State officials want to know whether he inappropriately pushed Enron's stock on the pension fund while the energy

giant was failing. Alliance more than doubled the state's stake in Enron since last August, buying 5.6 million shares in three months, even as stock prices fell and analysts questioned the firm's management and accounting practices. Coleman

Stipanovich, deputy executive administrator of the pension fund, said his staff would like to learn what Savage knew of Enron's internal problems and what, if anything, he passed on to fund managers at Alliance. "We're going to want to be satisfied there was no undue influence," he told TIME.

An Alliance spokesman said Savage, who headed an international subsidiary until leaving the firm in August, had no influence on Enron trading. Savage did not return calls for comment. Since joining Enron's heavily Republican board in 1999, he has donated \$100,000 to Democrats and is raising money for New York gubernatorial candidate Carl McCall. Which proves, if nothing else, that Enron was a bipartisan debacle. —By Michael Weisskopf



419
0800
snowflake

April 8, 2002 4:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Protocol Gifts

In the future, I want someone to ask me about the gifts. Clearly the people who are choosing the gifts are not choosing the ones I would. In my judgment, the book for the Greek MoD was exactly wrong.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-42

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02



005

8APPRO2

U16532 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11859

April 8, 2002 4:14 PM

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Info on Guantanamo

Please get me a paper that tells when the Guantanamo lease was signed by the United States, what the amount of money was, what the provisions are generally, what the current annual payment is and what the length of the term is—I think it is forever.

I want to send it to Alan Greenspan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-43



Please respond by 04/19/02

8APR02

U16533 02

April 8, 2002 3:04 PM

334

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Trilateral Commission Transcript

Please give me a cleaned up transcript of the Trilateral Commission meeting. I want to send it to Francois de Rose in France.

Also, we should develop a list of people around the world who are friends of mine that we can send things that would be of interest to them. They can then arm themselves as to what we are doing and be supportive, as I know they want to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-38



Please respond by 04/12/02

8APR02

U16534 02

April 8, 2002 2:37 PM

Doug 4/12

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Rich Haver
Larry Di Rita

334

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: NIC

Please give me some names of people you think might be appropriate to be appointed to the National Intelligence Council chairmanship. It is an important job and is full-time.

Do it fast, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-36

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

4/12

HAYER RESPONSE ATTACHED

DIRITA

*W/R
EL*

8 APR 02

U16535 02

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

April 11, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Richard Haver

SUBJECT: Chairperson; National Intelligence Council (NIC)

BACKGROUND:

- I served in NIC, 1995 to 1998, NIO for Info Warfare then Chief of Staff
- Little pattern to NIC leadership over the past 20 years
- Bob Gates ran both the DDI and NIC at different times
- Gates favored the NIC, wanted the Community view point in forefront
- Woolsey had fishing buddy and Harvard Professor, Joe Nye head the NIC
- Tenet favored CIA DDI (Analysis Organization), moved John McLaughlin from NIC to DDI, put emphasis on DDI then promoted John to DDCI
- NIC influence reduced since 1997, moved John Gannon from the DDI to the NIC, then ignored him
- In 1998 DCI added the "Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production" hat to the NIC, it did little to improve the NIC

CANDIDATES:

- No Priority Order
- Short Bio on Each, more information anytime you need it
 - a. Congressional
 - i. Gardner Peckham; Newt associate, Conservative, Constructive critic of the Community, plenty of friends and enemies to contend with
 - ii. Taylor Lawrence; Shelby associate, now at Northrup-Grumman, smart, young, drove the Senate critical look at Intelligence Community problems, not afraid to make waves

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

- iii. Mark Lowenthal; headed the House Intelligence Committee Staff, currently “Special Assistant to the DCI” working for George and rumored to be his first choice. Smart, spearheaded the “IC-21” report on intelligence organization
 - iv. Mike Swetnam; close to Henry Hyde, experienced, tough on the quality of intelligence presently President of Potomac Institute Policy and Research
 - v. Chris Williams; played a role in the transition, always very interested in intelligence, currently with Bennett Johnson’s firm and still working the hallways
- b. State /Policy
- i. Linton Brooks; Arms Control Ambassador, Navy Submariner, smart, skillful user of intelligence, Deputy Administrator of Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Energy Department
 - ii. Bob Kimmet; Mr. Everything during previous Administrations, demanding and avid intelligence consumer, Big Thinker, presently Vice President of AOL Time Warner for Global Strategy. He would drive George crazy, no way to control him
 - iii. Bob Murray; Democrat, President of the Center for Naval Analysis, former Under Sec. Navy and Ambassador, a little long in the tooth, intense interest in intelligence and estimate process
 - iv. Nina Stuart; Self employed in Texas, close to Bob Inman, held senior career positions in DoD, State and White House. Only woman on my list, very tough, smart, effective manager and constructive critic of intelligence

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

2
11-L-0559/OSD/11864

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

c. Defense

- i. Paul Van Ripper; retired head of Marine Corps Intelligence. Strong leader, effective military contributor to the estimative process and knows the Defense issues
- ii. Rich Mies; currently answering his own phone at CNA. Strong intelligence background, big thinker, effective manager, could bring leadership and direction to a badly adrift organization
- iii. Tom Brooks; Democrat, retired head of Naval Intelligence and AT&T executive ranks. Remains current and engaged. Strong credentials in policy and making intelligence work

d. Intelligence Community

- i. (b)(6) senior civilian in Naval Intelligence. Best analytic mind in the intelligence community. Started as a Russian translator, father career NSA. Knows what he knows, what he doesn't know and what it means in crisp sentences.
- ii. (b)(6) couldn't help myself, always looking for opportunities for (b)(6) to better herself
- iii. (b)(6) retired career CIA analyst, now senior executive at SAIC, works directly for President Bob Byster. Knows the community, effective writer and the best CIA analyst before he retired. Was in line for the NIC job before Bob Gates took over.
- iv. (b)(6) former senior intelligence officer at Treasury, staff of the PFIAB, and has a world-class mind. Presently Vice President of Goldman Sachs in charge of their global security account. Campaign finance chairman for Rick Fazio's campaign against Senator Clinton. He would think rings around Tenet and McLaughlin.

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

COMMENTS:

- So long as George is DCI the NIC will stay at the margins of value
- Lowenthal would demand and get the most support, but will not make waves
- Congressional list very capable, but will confront difficulty winning in fights in the community, they don't know where the bodies are buried
- State/Policy list would probably cause the DCI the most trouble. Each could tap old friends for help and contacts, George would find anyone of them difficult to control.
- Defense list is high quality. NIC could use the management skills and leadership a former military officer would bring. DCI could easily work with anyone of them.
- Community list has plus and minus. Sheck has never been outside Navy, Stuart has been in Texas for 10 years, Fort would be crazy to leave a ½ million dollar job and Joan is not likely to be interested.

SECRETARY EYES ONLY

April 8, 2002 2:33 PM

400.13

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Credit Cards

This is not an adequate answer to this article. Please get someone in the General Counsel's office or someone to give me a decent answer on the credit card misuse.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/28/02 SecArmy info memo to SecDef re: Credit Card Abuse [U05934/02]

DHR:dh
040802-35

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

8APP000

U16536 02

March 18, 2002 1:53 PM

TO: Gordon England
Tom White

CC: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

This is very troubling. How can someone charge all these items and then not be prosecuted?

Please explain.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/18/02 Brian Faler, "GAO Calls Navy Lax on Employee Fraud," *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
031802-S4

..... **NOT BE SEEN**

Please respond by 03/29/02 **FOR 08 2002**

7/15 *4/15*

White response attached.

D. White

4/15

U04933-02

11-L-0559/OSD/11868



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2002 APR -3 PM 12: 52



INFO MEMO

March 28, 2002, 7:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, *White* SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

- Reference the Secretary of Defense statement and question, ~~TARA~~, "This is very troubling. How can someone charge all these items and then not be prosecuted?" This statement and question are reference to a Washington Post article at ~~TARB~~, "GAO Calls Navy Lax on Employee Fraud." *attached*
- Ms. Tanya Mays, a previous Navy employee, is alleged to have misused government credit cards while she was assigned to the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, CA.
- A supervisor from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (OASA (FM&C)) selected and hired Ms. Mays from a Civilian Personnel Office generated competitive list, after inquiring and receiving favorable references from her Navy supervisors. There was no mention of the alleged government credit card abuse from her Navy supervisors.
- The OASA (FM&C) was notified during March 2002 of Ms. Mays' alleged government card abuse and immediately turned the case over to Army's Office of General Counsel for further review and determination of appropriate action.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Robert Speer, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA
SR MA GIAMBASTIAN
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE

4/5
2/5

Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/11869

U05934 /02

Washington Post
March 18, 2002
Pg. 15

22. GAO Calls Navy Lax On Employee Fraud Report Cites Personal Shopping Charges

By Brian Faler, Special to The Washington Post

Scores of Navy employees at two San Diego facilities have been using government credit cards to buy their groceries. And luggage. And DVD players. And almost none of them have been punished.

The General Accounting Office, the congressional watchdog agency that has been investigating employees at the two centers, reported last week that many there have been using those cards for personal shopping sprees. And, despite previous warnings, congressional hearings and investigations, the GAO said, the Navy still isn't doing enough to stop them.

The cards, which look and work much like regular credit cards, were created to help cut down on bureaucratic red tape for government purchases of goods and services.

But GAO investigators, along with several members of Congress, say the Navy has taken the program too far, distributing the cards "willy-nilly," in the words of one senator, without any credit checks and with virtually no oversight or enforcement.

"Every shred of evidence that I have seen says that internal controls at the Pentagon are weak or nonexistent," Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) told the House government efficiency subcommittee last week. "That means there is an army . . . authorized to spend money with no checks and balances. The potential for abuse and fraud is virtually unlimited."

Grassley and Rep. Stephen Horn (R-Calif.), chairman of the House panel, have asked the GAO to expand its probe in the Defense Department to determine whether there is a larger problem of credit card abuse. The GAO has reported on similar problems at the Education Department.

Officials representing the Defense Department, as well as others representing the two Navy centers, acknowledged at the subcommittee hearing that credit card fraud continues to be a problem among employees, but they said they are clamping down on the abuses.

"We are painfully aware of the issues of purchase cards, and I am here personally to commit that we will make sure these cards are used appropriately," said Deidre Lee, a defense procurement official.

Lee and other defense officials blamed the two naval facilities' previous management for the lax enforcement and said that officials have since reduced the number of cards circulating and have expanded the offices responsible for overseeing the accounts.

There are now 1.7 million Defense Department cards in circulation. Cards were used during fiscal 2001 to ring up \$9 billion in charges. Some charges are billed directly to the federal government; most are sent to the individual cardholder, who, after paying the bill, is supposed to be reimbursed by his or her agency. Most cards have a credit limit of \$2,500 per transaction.

At last week's hearing, Grassley cited one woman, Tanya Mays, as a particularly egregious offender at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego. He said that, according to GAO records, Mays charged almost \$12,000 to her government card -- including a personal computer, a kitchen range, gift certificates and clothing. Both the Navy and the U.S. attorney in San Diego declined to pursue her case, Grassley said, and Mays transferred to the Army, where she is now a budget analyst. She was not asked to repay the money, he said.

Mays could not be reached for comment. The Post e-mailed her and asked the Army's press office to forward its requests to her. The office declined to provide Mays's phone number, saying it was private. They added that because she was never prosecuted, they have no record of the alleged improprieties.

Grassley said he named Mays out of frustration, add-

ing, "When you put one of these cards under the microscope, it seems like the whole problem comes into much sharper focus."

Los Angeles Times
March 17, 2002
Pg. 30

23. U.S. To Resume Vieques Training By Reuters

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico - The Navy will conduct a new round of training exercises on the island of Vieques in a few weeks, a move that protest groups said Saturday would reactivate their civil disobedience campaign.

A press assistant for the governor's office said that Secretary of State Ferdinand Mercado received a letter from the U.S. Navy Friday informing him that it would conduct about 22 days of training from as early as April 1.

Groups opposing the use of the 33,000-acre island as a Navy training and bombing range said they would try to disrupt the maneuvers through by sneaking onto the bombing range during the training.

The protests would be the first since the civil disobedience campaign was halted after Sept. 11.

Washington Times
March 18, 2002
Pg. 8

24. Hit By Inmate, X-Ray Guards Reassigned

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba (AP) — Two guards at Camp X-ray, the detention center holding 300 al Qaeda and Taliban guerrillas, were transferred after an inmate struck one of them, military officials said yesterday.

Two male soldiers at the field hospital were reassigned after a detainee hit one of them while being escorted to the bathroom, said Pat Alford, commander of the fleet hospital. The guards usually travel in pairs.

The detainee, who was being treated for bone loss in his forearm, was sedated for one night after the disruption.

Earlier yesterday, Capt. Shimkus, commanding officer of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, said the soldiers were reassigned after "breaking the rules." But "the initial report provided by a military official was incorrect," spokeswoman Maj. Rumi Nielson-Green said.

The two men were reassigned to Camp X-ray and could eventually return to the fleet hospital.

Since the first captives arrived at this remote outpost in January, some have spat on or yelled at the guards. One inmate bit a soldier.

A hunger strike that began on Feb. 27 but has since fizzled apparently was prompted by a guard who stripped an inmate of a towel he put on his head for morning Islamic prayers.

Detainees later said the strike was also to protest their indefinite detention.

On Saturday, five detainees skipped dinner, 12 skipped lunch and seven skipped breakfast.

Military officials also said yesterday that two other male soldiers at the hospital were reassigned after requesting a transfer.

The two men were moved to administrative duties shortly after the first batch of inmates arrived in January, said Marine Maj. Stephen Cox, a spokesman for the detention mission.

The two men "simply were uncomfortable in that environment," Maj. Cox said.

The captives, accused of having links to either the fallen Taliban regime in Afghanistan or Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, are expected to be moved from the hastily built Camp X-ray to Delta Camp by next month.

Delta Camp will be equipped with toilets, beds and ventilation and eventually could be expanded to hold more than 2,000 detainees.

New York Times
March 18, 2002
News Analysis

25. Bush Finds That Ambiguity Is Part Of Nuclear Deterrence

By David E. Sanger

April 8, 2002 1:46 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Edgar Bronfman

Here is a note from Steve Herbits. I would be happy to meet with Edgar Bronfman sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/06/02 Herbits memo to SecDef re: Mideast

DHR:dh
040802-32

000.7150

Please respond by _____

4/8

SecDef -
Great. Told Steve
we were trying to
arrange Condi and
he said that was preferred
by Bronfman's lights but
that we'll set you up
if Condi doesn't do it.

8 Apr 2002

U16537 02
11-L-0559/OSD/11871

Larry

Memo to SecDef
4/6/02

From: S. Herbits

Re: Mideast

SECRET

APR 08 2002

You may recall that I worked for Edgar Bronfman who, since 1979, has also been President of the World Jewish Congress. He remains one of the preeminent figures in lay Jewish life worldwide.

Edgar is also a supporter of President Bush's Mideast policy, a commitment strengthened since Thursday's speech.

The World Jewish Congress (www.wjc.org.il), established in 1936, is an international federation of Jewish communities and organizations. As an umbrella group it represents Jews from the entire political spectrum and from all Jewish religious denominations, serving as a diplomatic arm of the Jewish people to world governments and international organizations.

Edgar has asked that I help him obtain an opportunity to share his views with a senior Administration official and to learn how he might be helpful.

Over the years, Edgar has met with virtually all national security advisors; he met with the Vice President when he was Secretary of Defense; and has met with most Presidents. He has complete, on-call access to Israel's top leadership.

Would it be possible for Edgar to meet with you, Condi or the Vice President in the near future? I am sure a 15-minute meeting would be productive.

Thanks.

April 8, 2002 11:02 AM

4/8

334

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Trilateral Commission

Dove 4/10

Please get me a tape of my Trilateral Commission questions and answers session,
or at least a transcript—or both.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-26

.....

Please respond by 4/14/02

8APPROA

U16538 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: April 10, 2002

SUBJECT: Trilateral Commission

Attached is a copy of the Trilateral Commission transcript and a tape of the same as you requested.

I have also enclosed a transcribed copy of Bill Perry's introduction from the Commission. It is also on the tape.

11-L-0559/OSD/11874

April 8, 2002 8:09 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Dmr 4/20

320.2

Here is a note on the Blue Force Tracker we talked about on Saturday. Please take a look at it and tell me what you think.

If you agree, let's get it into the DPG.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 SecDef memo to USD(AT&L), "Blue Force Tracker" [031802-30]
03/29/02 USD(AT&L) info memo to SecDef [U05633/02]

DHR:dh
040802-14

.....
Please respond by 04/19/02

S:R -
Approved in DPG
J
4/20

8 APR 02

U16539 02

March 18, 2002 11:16 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Larry Di Rita
4/2

Please come back to me with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Blue Force Tracker

DHR:dh
031802-30

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

4/1

Response Attached.

Larry Di Rita
4/2
4/2

A WELL THOUGHT OUT
STATEMENT DIRECTING A STUDY
OF HOW TO PROCEED WITH
THIS IMPORTANT CAPABILITY
IS A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR
11-7055910SP/1876
THE BBS



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

MAR 29 PM 1:27

March 29, 2002

APR 08 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) *3/29/02*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker (BFT) – Snow Flake

- Blue Force Tracker is a generic term that applies to systems that keep track of friendly forces and minimize fratricide.
- There are several Blue Force Tracker systems in use or under consideration.
- *Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration*
We have ACTD's actively addressing BFT issues.
- JROC is actively guiding the Department towards an objective BFT capability.
- The attached paper provides some details.

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	<i>Buti</i>

Blue Force Tracking (BFT)

Background

- Today, a number of legacy systems provide (BFT); none provide an automated Common Operational Picture (COP) of all friendly forces.
- A diversity of systems provide BFT for selected military units. For example, the Army's Movement Tracking System provides BFT for some of their forces – primarily logistics ground units. The Army Space Command runs a Mission Management Center (MMC) under CINC USSPACECOM where these systems are managed and results are provided to other CINCs.
- Also, semi-automated friendly force location reporting (via tactical data links) and manual reporting systems augment existing automated systems in assembling blue force picture.

Status

- In May 2002, USSPACECOM will request JROC validation of a Beyond Line of Sight / Non-Line of Sight (BLOS / NLOS) Mission Needs Statement (MNS). USSPACECOM intends to brief the JROC again in September 2002 to request validation of a concept of operations for legacy operations, an operational concept for the objective BFT capability, and ORD-level requirements for a BFT augmented payload. USSPACECOM will also make recommendations for Lead Service / Executive Agent responsibilities. The draft MNS currently indicates that an objective BFT system should have full time, two way, LPI / LPD, global availability.
 - This Joint Staff effort should define the operational requirement for an optimum "objective system" for BFT. Selection of a technology to provide BFT should evolve from this requirement.
- Two ACTDs explore near- and intermediate-term technologies to support broader BFT capabilities.
 - A proposed Joint Blue Forces Situational Awareness (JBFSAs) ACTD would provide fusion of existing BFT systems into a common plot. This proposal is in the process of soliciting a service sponsor and obtaining funding commitments.
 - The Personnel Recovery Extraction Survivability aided by Smart Sensors (PRESS) ACTD proposes an automated global, satellite-based personnel locator (GPRS) system as a possible solution for BFT. [Note: OSD staffing actions are in progress to preserve space/weight in GPS III for GPRS until the USAF makes a final recommendation on the best satellite host for this system.]

April 8, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Focus

000.5

Please see me about how we keep the focus back on terrorism, rather than the Middle East, in the event there are more terrorist events.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-13

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

8APR02

U16540 02

April 8, 2002 7:51 AM

326

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Availability and Mobilization of Reserves

Here is a note I sent Steve Cambone. On reflection, it seems to me it is up your alley.

Would you please take a look at it and let me know what you think?

Also attached is a second memo I sent Steve Cambone that I would appreciate your looking into.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/01/02 SecDef memo to PDUSD(P), "Availability of Reserves" [040102-54]

04/01/02 SecDef memo to PDUSP(P), "Mobilization of Reserves" [040101-53]

DHR:dh
040802-11

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

8 APR 02

U16541 02

April 1, 2002 6:53 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: Availability of Reserves

cc Ch.

I think we also ought to look into that subject that came up about the Guard and Reserve, and whether we even want Guard and Reserve available only after 120 or 180 days. I would rather have fewer forces capable of responding faster, not more not capable of doing anything for six months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-54

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

April 1, 2002 6:51 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilization of Reserves

LC
chw

Don't you think the DPG ought to address the subject that the Army is currently arranged so that they have to mobilize to do anything, since they have put some critical elements into the Reserves and Guard? I think they said the Navy or the Air Force did the same thing.

We have to get that fixed. Now is the time to put it in the DPG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-53

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

DELONNIE
AIR FORCE
did, not
Navy.

April 8, 2002 7:41 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bureaucracy

Done 4-20

310.1

Don't you think we ought to put something in the DPG about getting flatter organizations, the way corporations and the rest of the society is because of computers and automation. We don't need the rigid structures we have.

Bureaucracy is driving people nuts. If we can take two or three layers out of this place, we will be a lot better off.

Let's get it into the DPG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-6



Please respond by 04/19/02

Sir-

*I am working
on this language*

3/20

U16542 02

8 Apr 02

February 23, 2002 11:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL

SUBJECT: Responsiveness

Please get some folks thinking about how we can get a flatter organization in this bureaucracy and get more people's ideas up. Should there be 1-800 numbers, an e-mail address, or an ombudsman?

When I spoke at Nellis, I talked of the frustration of getting these bureaucratic processes to work properly, and I felt a palpable agreement with it—they don't get their checks, or something is wrong with the healthcare. There needs to be a way to make the thing more responsive.

After you finish getting an office budget, please get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022302-3

.....
Please respond by 03/15/02

April 8, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: STEVE CAMBONE
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Processes

310.1

I do want to get a list of all of the processes in this building that are major and shorten them by 20 percent for a start.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-5

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

8 Apr 02

U16544 02

January 29, 2002 2:44 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shorten Processes

Please come up with a proposal of how we can shorten the processes in this building. I think we simply have to mandate it—that the budget process is going to be shortened by three months, and something else is going to be shortened by some amount of time.

If you could get me a calendar for the year that shows me when things start and end, I will just arbitrarily do it and see who screams.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-28

.....
Please respond by

02/18/02

*See list of all answers
& length*

11-L-0559/OSD/11886

showWare
4/12/02

Settled

Complete

Larry Di Rita
7/15

Rec'd 4/19
8/6

April 9, 2002 9:52 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressional Fellows

I think we can't let one Service cut the Congressional fellows. We have to get all Services to do it at once. I think the Air Force alone has 20 or 30. I think we just claim it is wartime, and we are not going to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040902-10

Please respond by 04/26/02

2004

(Circular stamp)
CPT BTM
4/11/02

4/10
To: DR Chie
I believe you are working on a global proposal. Please advise.

9 APR 02

4/27
Secret

Chie memo attached. I will schedule a briefing.

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
4/11

Larry Di Rita
4/11

U16547 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11887



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 APR 22 AM 7:25

PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

ACTION MEMO

April 12, 2002, 11:00 AM

FOR: Secretary of Defense

DepSecDef _____

FROM: ^{for} Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Charles Bell
Apr. 12, 2002

SUBJECT: External Utilization of Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel

- This is an update to the report I provided in March on military members serving outside the Department; it provides an assessment on where we stand, and outlines our proposed plan for establishing stronger controls.
- The Services have provided descriptions of their current validation/evaluation processes for each area (fellowships, details and assignments outside the Department, training with industry and graduate education). By the end of April, each will submit reports to me defining the external requirements they presently are supporting.
- To support a rigorous and systematic review, my staff has established a set of criteria for each area that will allow an analysis of the merit of the requirement, including its benefit to DoD; we also will confirm the extent to which DoD is being reimbursed for the performance of its people.
- The Services will conduct this analysis and report the results no later than June 30, 2002.
- ~~(Tab A) contains the criteria to be used in each area.~~
- The Legislative Fellowship program is a subset of the overall fellowship program. A review was conducted and a process developed to limit the growth of the program.
 - A proposal to establish a ceiling on the program with a 33% reduction and redistribution according to DoD Component size is ~~provided in Tab B.~~ *being developed*
 - If you feel we are on the right track, this ceiling proposal will be coordinated and staffed with the Services.
 - Legislative Fellowship billets within this ceiling will still be validated using the criteria for all fellowships.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE



111-0559/OSD/11888

U07048 /02

- Based on inputs from the Services, we have reviewed the current processes for validating requirements for graduate education and training with industry. Those validations are systematic and rigorous; therefore, we plan to focus our energy on the weaker components (e.g., fellowships and details). Nonetheless, we will closely review the Service descriptions of presently validated requirements (due end-April) to ensure that the levels of education and types of industry represent a good match for current and future Department requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: *Will Discuss in briefing, to be scheduled.*

- Approve criteria for external utilization areas in Tab A.
- Apply criteria to details and assignments outside the Department, and fellowships and report the results no later than June 30, 2002.
- Maintain graduate education and training with industry programs using currently established validation processes.

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

COORDINATIONS:

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MPP)

Van Alstyne, 12 Apr 02

Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP)

Cobbell April 14, 2002

Attachments;

As stated

Prepared by: LCDR Brad Roberson, OASD/FMP/MPP/OEPM,

(b)(6)

UCD (P.R.)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

100 100 100 100 100

4/17 -

Dr Chu -

Should we have a Department-
wide policy, rather than
one service at a time?

When will you be ready to
brief revised fellowship proposal.
Will schedule for SecDef/DepSec
when ready.

U06960 /02

Larry Di Rita
4/8

April 9, 2002 7:39 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Question at Press Conference

Larry Di Rita
4/15

SECRET
U130

Please check the question I was asked at the press conference about a Saudi Arabian website saying they are giving money to martyrs for suicide bombers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040902-3

.....
Please respond by 04/16/02

SAUDI ARABIA

4/16

CLARKE RESPONSE

ATTACHED

V/R
EP

9 APR 02

U16548 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM:  Title

DATE: April 11, 2002

SUBJECT: Question at Press Conference Regarding Saudi Website

As requested, here is the transcript that contains your exchange about the Saudi website. The highlighted portion of the transcript is the only mention of websites of any kind.

Here is our response to query on the subject:

Q: Do you have a comment on the report that the government of Saudi Arabia is, like Iraq, paying the families of suicide bombers in the Palestinian Territories?

A: I have no indication that what you say is true. The website of the government of Saudi Arabia notes (attached), in one location, that the government of Saudi Arabia provides financial support to Palestinian victims killed, injured, imprisoned or rendered homeless by Israeli soldiers.

71 [The Saudi government's financial support to the Palestinian people is in keeping with its traditional support of Arab people in need.] But questions about the specifics of the Saudi support should be directed to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, here is the Department of State response to query on the same:

Q: What about reports that the Saudi government has set up a fund to support families of Palestinians killed in the violence - including families of suicide bombers?

A: We have seen reports that the Saudi government has set up a fund to provide financial support to families of Palestinians killed or injured in the ongoing violence. I'd refer you to the Saudi government for specific information on this fund. We oppose any action seen to be supporting or condoning suicide bombings or violence targeting civilians.

attachment as

Rumsfeld: I suppose. (laughter) It wasn't to save money on gas, I don't -- (laughter)

--

Yes?

Q: It now appears that the government of Saudi Arabia, as well as Iraq, has been making payments to the families of the suicide bombers. Given what you've said about what you think about the Iraqi policy, I'm wondering what's your reaction to that.

Rumsfeld: I have no information whatsoever that suggests that the government of Saudi Arabia is doing what Iraq is.

Q: There's apparently some item on their website where they say that they have set up a fund for martyrs.

Rumsfeld: No information on that.

Yes?

Q: General Myers, a readiness question. Six months into the fight here, one of the key vulnerabilities of the U.S. military is the tanker fleet. The Air Force has said everything brought into Afghanistan is going by tanker. It's been pretty well known that the tanker fleet was having a lot of problems early on in terms of readiness over the last year. Can you give us a snapshot look in terms of the readiness of the tanker fleet? And are you crafting new basing methods to reduce wear and tear on the fleet?

The reason I ask is the Pentagon wants to buy -- lease a hundred of these things from Boeing -- new ones.

Rumsfeld: "The Pentagon wants"?

Q: The Air Force --

Rumsfeld: Buildings don't want. (scattered laughter)

Q: People in the Pentagon want. We need some more tankers. It's a problem --

(cross talk, scattered laughter.)

Rumsfeld: People in the Pentagon. Where? Who?

Q: Air Force Secretary James Roche, and I think your own staff wants to.

Rumsfeld: We want to lease air --

Q: Air tankers --

Rumsfeld: Tankers.

Q: -- to alleviate the pressure on the old fleet we have now. I just want a snapshot on



**Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
Information Office
Washington, D.C.**

PRESS
RELEASES

March 20, 2001

CURRENT
NEWS

HOME

FINANCE MINISTER SPEAKS OUT ON AID TO PALESTINIANS

STATEMENTS

Minister of Finance and National Economy Dr. Ibrahim Al-Assaf said today that the Saudi government has to date given a total of SR 8.9 billion [U.S. \$2.37 billion] in aid to the government and people of Palestine. Dr. Al-Assaf, speaking at a press conference in Riyadh, reiterated the Kingdom's staunch support of the Palestinian intifada [uprising], and declared that assistance to the Palestinian people, a firm Saudi policy ever since the days of King Abdulaziz, has been translated into unlimited initiatives in various political, economic and social areas and at various local, regional and international levels. He referred in particular to the sum of SR 2.2 billion [\$585.89 million] since Madrid, that includes the Kingdom's donation of \$300 million as announced at the international conferences for the support of the Palestinian Authority. This assistance, he explained, is disbursed by the Saudi Development Fund (SDF), partly for SDF projects but also to support the Palestinian budget.

Dr. Al-Assaf said that the emergency Arab Summit in Cairo in October 2000 accepted a proposal made by Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz concerning the establishment of a fund for the intifada. This fund has resources of \$200 million, with the Kingdom's share standing at \$50 million, and targets the families of victims of the intifada, specifically to educate the sons of martyrs and rehabilitate the injured. Dr. Al-Assaf added that the Crown Prince's second proposal, to establish a fund for Al-Aqsa, with resources of \$800 million in which the Kingdom's share is \$200 million, is dedicated to finance projects that would protect the Arab and Islamic identity of Al-Quds [Jerusalem].

Assistance to the Palestinians, the Finance Minister went on to say, includes supporting the Palestinian Red Crescent Association, providing equipment for hospitals and medical institutions, and rebuilding damaged houses. Aid also goes to students at Palestinian universities, and to a number of development projects in Palestine.

Dr. Al-Assaf noted that the supervising authority of the two funds decided recently to respond to a request from the Palestinian Authority for an interest-free loan of \$60 million and a grant of \$10 million for the

Palestinian Ministry of Health. Saudi financial support for the Palestinians during their latest ordeal, he said, includes grants of \$30 million to the Palestinian Authority, plus another \$10 million in February 2001. This is in addition to medicine valued at millions of dollars. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia sent medical aircraft to transport 105 injured Palestinians for treatment in the Kingdom's hospitals.

In addition to this government support, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin Abdulaziz initiated a fund for private donations in support of the Palestinians' struggle. The Saudi people responded unstintingly to this initiative, emanating from their feelings, as fellow Arabs and Muslims, for the fraternal ties that bind them to the people of Palestine. To date, Dr. Al-Assaf declared, cash donations have exceeded SR 240 million [\$64 million]. There have also been donations in kind such as medical supplies, jewelry, real estate, and vehicles, including ambulances. Donations are still coming in to the committee, chaired by Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, that was set up to coordinate the fundraising. This committee, Dr. Al-Assaf said, has pledged a sum of SR 20,000 [\$5,333] to each family that has suffered from martyrdom. A total of SR 124 million [\$33.07 million] has been transferred for this purpose, and to provide for the injured.

Saudi support for development of the Palestinian economy has also been forthcoming, including long-standing exemption from customs duties for all Palestinian products coming into the Kingdom. This economic advantage is significant in contributing to the development of the potential of the Palestinian economy.

- end -



**Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
Information Office
Washington, D.C.**

PRESS
RELEASES

April 1, 2001

CURRENT
NEWS

HOME

PRINCE SULTAN AFFIRMS KINGDOM'S SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN FUNDS

STATEMENTS

Speaking at the Education Fair he attended yesterday, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector-General Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz referred to his speech at the Arab Summit recently concluded in Amman, Jordan as clearly reflecting the Kingdom's policy, and noted that Saudi Arabia has always promoted joint efforts for the benefit of the Arab World. He described what the Israeli authorities are doing against the Palestinians as suicidal, inhuman and irresponsible, and running counter to all principles of human rights.

At a press conference later yesterday following a visit to the Riyadh Schools, Prince Sultan specifically refuted reports that had shed doubt on the Kingdom's support for the Palestinians. In a statement on Friday on his return from the Amman Arab Summit he reiterated the inalienable support of Saudi Arabia to the funds of Al-Aqsa and the Al-Quds intifada, noting that the financial support extended to the Palestinians over the last six months aimed at enabling them to face the siege imposed on them by the Israeli authorities.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, who supervises the Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Quds intifada, has issued directives for SR 8,920,000 [U.S. \$ 2,378,666.67] to be paid to 892 Palestinians who have lost their houses or farms, each receiving SR 10,000 [\$ 2,666.67]. This raises the sum of money extended to the Palestinians by Committee to over SR 150 million [\$ 40 million]. Financial assistance is currently being extended to the families of those martyred, injured, handicapped, or imprisoned in Israeli jails, as well as to these Palestinians whose houses or farms have been destroyed by Israeli soldiers.

The fair, organized by the Ministry of Education at the King Abdulaziz Historical Center in Riyadh, chronicles educational development in the Kingdom, partly through theatrical performances and film presentations. In his address, Minister of Education Muhammed Al-Rasheed pointed out the Kingdom's efforts to educate the handicapped and disabled as well as its success in reducing illiteracy, which now stands at only 8.4 percent for

males. Minister Al-Rasheed later reported that Prince Sultan had stressed the importance of sending more Saudis on scholarships abroad to study archaeology in order to preserve the country's antiquities. Prince Sultan has also decided to convert into a museum of education the Saqr Quresh School, where he pursued his early studies.

- end -

April 9, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prep for Press Conference

Done 9/11

Yesterday before my press conference, no one told me that the Department of Justice had decided they don't want the Saudi detainee in Norfolk, nor did I know the ships' deal had been signed with Aden to go back into port.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040902-2

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

000.75D

9 April 02

U16549 02

show/hide
1115
2002



April 9, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request for Assistance

4/12
Larry Di Rita

Please take a look at this letter from (b)(6)
(b)(6) and tell me what you think I ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach. (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
040902-6

325

.....
Please respond by 04/19/02

4/12

SECRET
- I suggest I ask ~~Col deVries of Exec Sec~~
and Dr Baxter to make discreet
inquiries of the Recruiting
commander to ascertain the facts and
we can make a better recommendation
to you
Proceed on that basis
Discuss

9 APR 02

U16551 02
11-L-0559/OSD/11899 *J. Rut*

Rob

March 21, 2002

Donald and Joyce,

Hi, hope you both are doing well. Just thought I'd drop you guys a line to let you know you are always in our thoughts and prayers. We have been wanting to see you when you come to El Prado, but it seems like you've come and gone before we even realize your here. We would like to see you next time if that's possible. We will be sending you an invitation for our son, (b)(6) graduation on May 26. Hope you will be able to come. (b)(6)

and a classmate were going to join the National Guard and go to Phoenix and go to Universal Technical Institute and be roommates. They went to Albuquerque to take a test and physical. which he passed them both. When taking his physical the doctor asked him for any medical history information. He told him when he was 8 yrs. old he was hospitalized for Shingella, which is an intestinal virus. He had a very high fever and diarrhea, and was in the hospital for around 5 days. He also told the doctor that he has had around 3-4 migraines. I did take him to the doctor on 1/31/01 because he had a head congestion that turned

44-L-0559/0560/0561/0562

Information:

(b)(6)

Could you write a letter of recommendation

into a migraine. The doctor prescribed him miguin (midrin) Anal, which I just found out about, he had a head ache and migraine around 4-8 mos. ago. He never told me anything he took some tylenol + it went away. The doctor thought (b)(6) told him he had an MRI for the migraine that he had, when he saw the doctor. So he requested copies of all the doctors office notes, which he did receive. (b)(6) said he never said anything about an MRI, because he doesnt even know what it is. I wrote a letter stating he has never had an MRI done in his life.

Well apparently they dont believe us because he was disqualified to join the service. I talked to his recruiter, (b)(6) and he doesnt think theres anything we can do.

Please. Mr. Rimsfeld can you help us out in any way possible? If we can get him into the National Guard he will be able to go with his class- (Basic Training) mate in June. He is really looking forward to joining, since his older brother is in the service. Can you please call us and let us know anything? What do we do?

God Bless You Both,

(b)(6)

0559/OS

(b)(6)

April 10, 2002 8:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: European Base Closures

Larry Di Rita

3

USEFIDE HAS SEEN

Where do we stand on European base closures?

Thanks

DJR:dh
041002-8

.....
Please respond by 4/17/02

4/17

4/15

- Quick response attached.
- Will provide brief when the master plan draft is forwarded for your review

D.R.

To: Ray M. Beis

Please get me a short update for SecDef on all ABs. Didnt Gen Schwary just make a big announcement, too?

Please advise.

Larry

Larry Di Rita

4/8

Settled

Done 4/21

Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

NA70 323.3

10 Apr 02

U16552 02

4/17
7430



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 22 2002

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Jr., DUSD(I&E)

Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.
4, 17, 02

SUBJECT: European Base Closures Snowflake

- The snowflake at TAB A requests status on European base closures. To date, DoD has returned or reduced operations at 915 or 68 percent of the 1342 European sites existing in 1990. This compares favorably to the reduction of about 1000 or 60 percent of the 1669 sites DoD operated overseas in 1990. The majority of these previously planned actions have now been completed.
- The Army's Efficient Basing-East initiative is an example of a new effort to reduce European presence. The Army plans to return 13 sites and improve access to training areas by consolidating more of its forces into the Grafenwoehr area. *(the Army's major training grounds in Germany)*
- In the Pacific, U.S. Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea recently agreed on a "Land Partnership Plan" to close 16 installations and combine three others into one, reducing our presence in ten years to 23 major installations. A similar action on Okinawa should produce a 21% reduction in acreage over the next several years.
- SecDef's Overseas Basing Requirements study ~~(OBR)~~ *(attached)* asked the Chairman to direct the geographic commanders to develop overseas master basing plans within six months of the QDR. DUSD(I&E) approved the Joint Staff's recent request for a six month extension to align this effort with other overseas presence studies. Steve Cambone, Peter Pace, and I met with the DepSec to consider ways to rationalize various overseas basing studies underway. Policy is drafting a response.
- The Congress ~~(OBR)~~ requested overseas master basing plans by April 1st. The Joint Staff is completing an interim report. We will continue to closely monitor this study because of its importance. *for your review*

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

cc: Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, DepSec
Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, USD(AT&L)



11-L-0559/OSD/11903



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 1 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Review of Overseas Basing Requirements

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) may change some aspects of current military strategies and thus affect some defense programs, including overseas basing arrangements. In particular, there may be opportunities to consolidate U.S. facilities to improve our ability to manage installations in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. Long-term basing requirements will need to reflect any new strategies.

I request that you direct the geographic combatant commanders to prepare, in coordination with their Service component commands, draft master overseas basing plans for their respective areas of responsibility. Their plans should consider opportunities for ensuring joint land use among all Services, where appropriate. They should also take into account the need for training and highlight those areas in which sufficient facilities and opportunities are unavailable. This should assist our efforts, following completion of the QDR, to determine CONUS basing needs as well. Please consolidate the combatant commanders' draft master basing plans and submit in coordination with the Service Secretaries for my review within six months after completion of the QDR.

The point of contact for questions regarding this request is Mr. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Aldridge".

cc Secretaries of the Military Departments
Commanders of the Combatant Commands



11-L-0559/OSD/11904

ATCH 1

April 10, 2002 8:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: MOU

Please see me on the MOU you sent to Condi. She wants to talk about it.

One of the things she is concerned about is our deciding who ought to serve in the NSC. She said this is the President's thing. I said everything is the President's. The Department of Defense is, so is the Department of HHS. Everyone thinks it's important. It is not clear that one is a lot more important than another. I told her I thought your concern was probably the issue of military versus civilian people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041002-7

.....
Please respond by 04/19/02

334 NSE

10 April 02

U16553 02

April 10, 2002 8:39 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO WMD Briefing

470

I think we should plan a briefing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world for me (with someone) to do at the NATO meeting. It would be in a very restricted session with ministers, perm reps plus one.

Then we should take the same briefing around to all the capitals. I think that is an important thing that needs to be done. It needs to include images, and it should not oversell the case.

I want to personally approve it well before we go over in June.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041002-6

.....

Please respond by 05/10/02

10APR02

U16554 02

April 10, 2002 8:32 AM

4/10

UK

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: London Press Coverage

4/17 Larry Di Rita

Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, tells me there is a program in London every day where they have the "Rumsfeld sound bite of the day." They take something from a press briefing and play it.

Please see if you can get a transcript of some of that stuff. It would be interesting to see.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041002-5

.....
Please respond by 04/26/02

4/16
Response Attached


Larry Di Rita

4/17

10 APR 02

U16555 02

April 17, 2002 11:00 AM

 **TO:** SECDEF
FROM:  Torie Clarke
SUBJECT: London Press Coverage

Interesting indeed. Apparently Robertson decided to do some follow up. See attached.

Atchs:

"Eddie Mair's Diary," Guardian (UK), April 17, 2002

"The Donald Rumsfeld quote collection," BBC (UK) web site, Feb. 7, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/11908



Go to: [Guardian Unlimited home](#)

[Guardian Unlimited](#) [Archive](#)

[Network home](#) [UK news](#) [World latest](#) [Books](#) [Money](#) [Film](#) [Society](#) [The Observer](#)
[Politics](#) [Education](#) [Shopping](#) [Work](#) [Football](#) [Jobs](#) [Media](#) [Search](#)



Eddie Mair's diary

A few words from our sponsor

[Search again >](#)

Guardian

Wednesday April 17, 2002

Back in September, it became clear to me that Donald Rumsfeld was something out of the ordinary. The US secretary of state for defence was, like many others in the Bush administration, giving regular news conferences on the war against terror. But Mr Rumsfeld stood out from the crowd.

There is his physical presence; that quizzical, slightly off-beam look in his eye. He could be about to announce either that he's going to nuke Jerusalem or that he's baked cakes for the entire press corps - it always seems he could go either way.

But the clincher is what he says. I was at one of his news conferences and he made me laugh out loud several times with his - well, let's call it "original turn of phrase". There may be a war on, but this guy wasn't going to let it spoil his FUN.

And so Broadcasting House began something called The Donald Rumsfeld Soundbite of the Week. We started replaying the best nugget from the lips of one of the most powerful men on the planet. Over the months, though his news conferences have become disappointingly scarce compared to the early days, he has never let us down:

- "Were they Afghans, they could melt into the scenery"
- "Eh, incentivise a large number of people to begin crawling through those tunnels and caves looking for the bad folks"
- "This is fantastic. I've got a laser pointer. Holy mackerel. That's terrific"
- "We do know of certain knowledge that Bin Laden is in Afganistan. Or some other country. Or dead"
- "Charlie. The barnyard"

We always thought that if Mr Rumsfeld ever got to hear of this, we'd be marched straight to Guantanamo Bay. I can now reveal that we seem to be in the clear.

The phone rang in the office the other day, and on the other end was none other than the secretary general of Nato, Lord Robertson. He explained to our producer that he had had a meeting with Mr Rumsfeld and had mentioned Soundbite of the Week.

Well, it seems Mr Rumsfeld finds it hilarious. Funnier, in fact, than we do. We're sending Lord Robertson a compilation tape which he's going to give to the defence secretary next time he sees him.

I don't know whether to be pleased or angry.

Anyway, I'll leave you with my favourite soundbite so far:

"I believe what I said yesterday. I don't know what I said. But I know what I think. And I assume it's what I said".

Words to live by.

No, really.

· Eddie Mair presents PM and Broadcasting House on BBC Radio 4

▲

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002

BBC CATEGORIES TV RADIO COMMUNICATE WHERE I LIVE INDEX

SEARCH GO

BBC NEWS

- Front Page
- World
- UK
- UK Politics
- Business
- Sci/Tech
- Health
- Education
- Entertainment
- Talking Point
- In Depth

Programmes

BBC SPORT

BBC Weather

SERVICES

Daily E-mail

News Ticker

Mobiles/PDAs

Feedback

Help

Low Graphics

Programmes: **BH**
Thursday, 7 February, 2002, 15:24 GMT

The Donald Rumsfeld quote collection



Mr Rumsfeld clarifies a point

You probably thought you had missed them, that they had gone forever.

However, for your enjoyment, Broadcasting House has diligently gathered together this fine collection of off-the-cuff remarks from one of the only remaining world superpower's most ingenious wordsmiths.

Rivalled only by the president himself, Mr Rumsfeld is prodigious in his output.

Now, straight from the horse's mouth, hand-crafted from the finest *Soundbite™*, mounted and polished for your pleasure, we give you:

the Donald Rumsfeld library of quotations.

Simply click on the buttons and enjoy them again and again, in the comfort of your own sanatorium.



Mr Rumsfeld and his laser

WATCH/LISTEN

ON THE STORY

- Donald Rumsfeld: Melting Afghans
- Donald Rumsfeld: Looking for the bad folks
- Donald Rumsfeld: Laser pointer
- Donald Rumsfeld: Real threat
- Donald Rumsfeld: Charlie
- Donald Rumsfeld: Orcom
- Donald Rumsfeld: Where is Bin Laden?
- Donald Rumsfeld: As Shakespeare said
- Donald Rumsfeld: Inhumane? No
- Donald Rumsfeld: Low density
- Guest appearance by Energy Minister Brian Wilson: The value chain
- Donald Rumsfeld: What did I say?



Programme: **BH**

LAUNCH console FOR LATEST AUDIO/VIDEO



- Home
- Latest programme
- Your say
- Our Archive
- Eddie Mair



Say it again

- LINKS
- PM
- The World at One
- The World This Weekend
- Radio 4

April 10, 2002 8:10 AM

Done

383.6

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Department of Justice Comments

I keep seeing people in the Department of Justice shooting their mouths off about this Saudi we are holding. It seems to me if they don't want somebody that is fine. They should just tell us. But they don't have to announce to the public and make it look like we are holding someone they don't have charges against who couldn't be prosecuted and convicted.

It makes us look bad. All they have to do if they don't want someone is to tell us they don't want them, and then keep their mouths closed and go about their business.

If you can't pull that off, let me know and I'll pull it off.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041002-3

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02 *7/16* **SENDER**

Jim Haynes jerked on Justice Chain (Larry Thompson.) You have also made known your "minimum of high regard."

10A PRO2

U16556 02 Message delivered/received.
11-L-0559/OSD/11912 *Larry Di Rita 7/14* *D, Rte*

April 10, 2002 7:51 AM

380.01

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Security Clearances

What is the status on security clearances? What is the backlog? What has the progress been?

Please show me a month-to-month since I have been here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041002-1



Please respond by 05/03/02

10 APR 02

U16557 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11913

4/23 1930
snowflake

12:18 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 11, 2002
SUBJECT: Strategic Planning

Done

381

4/27 Larry Di Rita

Take a look at this email that Dick McGraw forwarded to me and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041102.07

Attach: Email to Dick McGraw from S. Stevens (4/10/02)

Please respond by: 4/17/02

*Sir -
Not sure I understand the memo.
Point 2 is interesting, but may not be applicable
to a military organization.
Military discipline requires "C3"; "I3" is ok
for planning, not execution, I think.
The last paragraph might yield a useful result,
but we'd need to define the "functional
outcomes" we are interested in.*

*SC
4/23*

11A PRO2

U16558 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11914

McGraw, Richard, CIV, OASD-PA

From: Stedman Stevens (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 9:14 PM
To: Dick McGraw
Subject: Enjoyed dinner

Dick-

Really enjoyed dinner. Glad we were able to get together. Single malt scotch is a good thing.

Following up on Strategic Planning in the DOD environment discussion, while your task is monumental, I think you can change the organization by re-orienting the focus on functional outcomes as opposed to which branch or team can best execute against this situation. Essentially, reverse engineer.

1. Strategic planning is changing. Strategic planners in the last 40 years think and implement strategically. Strategic planners of the future will think strategically and implement tactically. Your B-52 scenario is an excellent example.
2. Today, C-3 is changing to I-3. Command, control and communication is now input, ideas and information. C-3 is structured to manage a massive organization. I-3 is maximizes flexibility and functionally.
3. There is an interesting parallel in the Pharmaceutical industry. Large, billion dollar drugs are bureaucratic silos of individuals who think a zero sum game. (sound familiar) My budget, for my drug is all I care about, my turf. I believe their high growth, high profit fundamentals are changing as we speak, particularly influenced by flexible CRO's.
4. The University system is a unique bureaucracy, in that it is tenured. The Global Summit in which you were a participant(an excellent one) was the result of a strategic plan built on consensus model between Professors, business leaders, administrators, etc..

Dick, with above in mind to achieve the quantum leap in thinking, my best suggestion would be:

Put 2 representatives of each of the stakeholders (branches and other) in a room together with a short period of time (days), a high charge of authority with a consensus model and re-align around key motivating interests of U.S. use of force, i.e. the military. The key is to build consensus around functional outcomes. From there identify drivers that will lead to success. People will rise to the occasion. Be prepared to live with it.

All the Best,

Stedman

(b)(6)

TO: Jim Haynes
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 11, 2002

SUBJECT: ICC

T 5/1

015

I think it looks as though the JCC is going to go through. It strikes me that that means we are going to have to think through how the Department of Defense ought to be organized and arranged to deal with it, and what we need to get the US government to do so that the US government can deal with it, and what we need to get NATO to do so NATO can deal with it, if it in fact is going to happen.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041102.04

Please respond by: 4/18/02

Settle
one
ARMY OFFICE
7/18

11APRO2

U16559 02

7:22 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
 Steve Cambone
 Marc Thiessen
 Tony Dolan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 11, 2002

SUBJECT: **Wolfowitz Testimony**

350.001 DSD

Attached is some good material we ought to try to reuse from Paul's speech here.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041102.01

Attach: Testimony of DSD Re: Transformation 4/9/02

Please respond by: _____

11 APR 02

U16560 02 ⁰¹



**TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
TRANSFORMATION
APRIL 9, 2002**

The Imperative for Transformation

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: You have provided our country great bipartisan support and strong leadership, and our relationship with the Committee and its staff has been truly outstanding. I appreciate the opportunity to return today to talk about how the Department of Defense plans to meet the challenges of the 21st Century through the transformation of our forces.

This Committee and the Congress have played a major role in transformation efforts in the past, including the role in several institutional changes of transformational character, such as the 1947 National Security Act, the 1973 All-volunteer Forces Act, and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. And Congress has sponsored and supported numerous transformational technologies, including stealth, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions. As we undertake what may be the most significant transformation of our military forces in many decades, we hope to continue to work closely with the Congress to achieve our common national security objectives.

In the civilian economy today, we are witnessing a transformation in the manner, speed and effectiveness with which industrial and commercial tasks can be accomplished; these transformational efforts derive from the impact of advances in technology in computing, communicating and networking that, taken together, constitute an Information Revolution whose effects extend far beyond technology into the organization and even the culture of the business and commercial worlds.

This enormous rate of change can be explained in significant measure by a law known as Moore's Law, after Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, who first advanced the proposition that the power of computers will double every 18 months or so. Put more dramatically, that means that the power of computers increases by a factor of a thousand in a little more than a decade. But, the effect of this, as we know from daily life, extends far beyond just technological changes. Indeed, transformations that result from increased capability are due, in even greater measure, to innovative minds that take this technology and use it to transform everything—from how we work to how we navigate on the highways and how we ship packages around the world.

This transformational potential affects our military as well—in terms of both hardware and brainpower. In the current campaign, for example, young non-commissioned officers routinely integrate multiple intelligence collection platforms by simultaneously coordinating what amounts to several "chat rooms." We have seen them creatively improvise with new military applications not unlike the technology they have grown up with. They display an agility

that comes from being completely comfortable with this new way of doing things.

In the same way, the agility that we need to continue meeting threats here and abroad depends on more than just technology, although that must be a fundamental part of our response. It is tied to changing our organizational designs and embracing new concepts. Transformation is about more than what we buy or how much we spend on technology. One of my key points today is that transformation is about changing the military culture into one that encourages, in Secretary Rumsfeld words, "innovation and intelligent risk taking."

Twelve months ago, some might have questioned the continued investment in improving our advantage, in real and intellectual capital. Given the huge military lead we enjoy, some were even asking: who will fight us now? But, September 11th brought home the fact that, while it is likely few would seek to meet us head to head, they can still attack us. They can still threaten us. And when they did attack last September, using box cutters and jetliners, our response required much more than just box cutters and jetliners. Our response, as we seek to deny future terrorists avenues to similar attack, has been—and must be—disproportionately asymmetrical. And it does not come cheaply or without great effort at innovation.

My second key point is that, although we now face the enormous challenge of winning the global war on terrorism, we must also address the equally large challenge of preparing our forces for the future. We cannot wait for another Pearl Harbor or 9/11, either on the ground, in space or in cyberspace. Our ability either to deter or defeat aggression will continue to demand unparalleled capabilities—from technology to training and decision-making. That is why we must develop the transformational capabilities that will provide our crucial advantages a decade or more from now. Even as we take care of today, we must invest in tomorrow—an investment we simply cannot postpone. It is a process of balancing the risks of today with those of tomorrow, one that should ultimately redefine how we go to war.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the French and British military establishments looked on the transformational issues of the time with a victor's sense that the next war would be fought like the last. But by the spring of 1940, with the Germans' lightning strikes across the Meuse and through the Ardennes, it was clear then that blitzkrieg—a term coined by Western journalists to describe this unmistakably new phenomenon—had redefined war and would shape battles for years to come.

We do not have to look back 60 years—or even twenty years—to find dramatic examples of military transformations. In Afghanistan today, brave Special Forces on the ground have taken 19th century horse cavalry, combined it with 50-year-old B-52 bombers, and, using modern satellite communications, have produced truly 21st century capability. When asked what he had in mind in introducing the horse cavalry back into modern war, Secretary Rumsfeld said, "it was all part of the transformation plan." And it is. Transformation can mean using old things in new ways—a natural result of creative innovation.

These two examples suggest my final key point: our overall goal is to encourage a series of transformations that, in combination, can produce a revolutionary increase in our military

capability and redefine how war is fought.

In the example from Afghanistan, we can see how dramatically our military has changed in just the 11 years since the Persian Gulf War. During that war, one of our biggest concerns was trying to destroy Scud missiles, the only Iraqi system whose capability we had underestimated. We flew hundreds of sorties and dropped thousands of pounds of bombs in the attempt to attack these elusive and fleeting targets that our pilots could not find from the air. Brave Special Operations Forces on the ground in western Iraq succeeded in finding Scuds, but did not have the capability to direct air strikes. In the end, as a result, we managed to take out only one Scud "launcher," and that one was a decoy. The successful operations in Afghanistan demonstrate how much progress has been made in the last decade, but that is only a glimpse of where we can go in the decades to come.

Long before September 11th, the Department's senior leaders—civilian and military—began an unprecedented degree of debate and discussion about where America's military should go in the years ahead. Out of those intense debates, we agreed on the urgent need for real changes in our defense strategy. The outline of those changes is reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2003 budget request.

Our conclusions have not gone unnoticed. One foreign observer reported that the QDR contains "the most profound implications" of the four major defense reviews since the end of the Cold War. What is most interesting about this analysis is its source: a Chinese military journal. That Chinese observer thinks the QDR is important as a outline for where we go from here—and we think so, too.

Among the new directions set in the QDR, the following four are among the most important:

First, we decided to move away from the two Major Theater War (MTW) force planning construct, which in its day was a major shift from the Cold War paradigm that planned for a global war focused on the defense of Europe from a massive Soviet invasion. The two MTW concept called for maintaining forces capable of nearly simultaneously marching on and occupying the capitals of two regional adversaries and changing their regimes. Today's new approach emphasizes deterrence in four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors in the same timeframe, while preserving the option for one major offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace the regime. By removing the requirement to maintain a second occupation force, we gain more flexibility in planning for a wider array of contingencies, and we gain more flexibility in investing for the future.

Second, during the QDR the senior civilian and military leaders agreed on a new framework for assessing risk. We agreed that we couldn't simply judge the program on how it addressed near-term warfighting risks. A new framework was required, one that would get other risk up on the table as well. We identified four categories of risk: force management risks dealing with how we sustain our people, equipment, and infrastructure; operational risks dealing with the ability of our forces to accomplish the missions called for in near-term military plans; future challenges risks dealing with the investments and changes needed today to permit us to

deal with military challenges of the more distant future; and institutional risks involved with inefficient processes and excessive support requirements that jeopardize our ability to use resources efficiently. The approach we adopted in light of this framework sought to balance risks in all of these categories, and avoid extreme solutions that would lower risks in some areas while raising other risks to unacceptable levels. While reasonable people may differ on specific decisions regarding our investments and budgetary decisions, it is important that we understand the need to balance among the different risks that we confront.

Third, to confront a world of surprise and uncertainty, we are shifting our planning from the “threat-based” model that has guided our thinking in the past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future. We don’t know who may threaten us or when or where. But, we do have some sense of what sort of capabilities they may threaten us with and how. And we also have a sense of which capabilities can provide us important new advantages.

Fourth, to support this capabilities-based approach to force planning, we worked to define goals to focus our transformation efforts. Historically, successful cases of transformation have occurred in the face of compelling strategic and operational challenges. Therefore, we endeavored to determine what those challenges in the 21st century and the goals to address them might be.

Many Transformations to Revolutionize Warfare

The U.S. military is pursuing not a single transformation, but a host of transformations including precision, surveillance, networked communications, robotics and information processing. When these transformations come together, the resulting synergy could produce a revolutionary level of improvement in the ability of U.S. joint forces to dominate the battlespace. The convergence of military transformations within our land, air, sea, space and information forces could allow the development of new concepts of operations that will further exploit our ability to conduct military actions in a parallel rather than a sequential manner. We will be better able to overcome the enormous challenges posed by distance and geography. In short, transformations over the next several decades can give U.S. forces new asymmetric advantages while reducing many of our current vulnerabilities.

Six Transformational Goals—Taking Care of Today while Investing in Tomorrow

Setting specific transformation goals has helped to focus our transformation efforts, from investments to experimentation and concept development. The six goals identified in the QDR are:

- First, to defend the U.S. homeland and other bases of operations, and defeat nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery;
- Second, to deny enemies sanctuary—depriving them of the ability to run or hide—anytime, anywhere.
- Third, to project and sustain forces in distant theaters in the face of access denial threats;
- Fourth, to conduct effective operations in space;

- Fifth, to conduct effective information operations; and,
- Sixth, to leverage information technology to give our joint forces a common operational picture.

Protecting Critical Bases of Operations and Defeating NBC Weapons

Above all, U.S. forces must protect critical bases of operations and defeat weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. No base of operations is more important than the U.S. homeland. Defending the American homeland from external attack is the foremost responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces. Vast oceans and good neighbors no longer insulate the United States from military attacks that emanate from abroad. The attacks of September 11 revealed the vulnerability of America's open society to terrorist attacks. Therefore, we must shore up our vulnerabilities to all forms of attacks.

Projecting and Sustaining Forces in Anti-Access Environments

Future adversaries are seeking capabilities to render ineffective much of the current U.S. military's ability to project military power overseas. Today, U.S. power projection depends heavily on access to large overseas bases, airfields, and ports. Saturation attacks by ballistic or cruise missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads could deny or disrupt U.S. entrance into a theater of operations. Advanced air defense systems could deny access to hostile airspace to all but low-observable aircraft. Military and commercial space capabilities, over-the-horizon radars, and low-observable unmanned aerial vehicles could give potential adversaries the means to conduct wide-area surveillance and track and target American forces.

New approaches for projecting power are needed to meet these threats. These approaches must place a premium on enhancing U.S. defenses against missiles and NBC weapons; conducting distributed operations; reducing the dependence of U.S. forces on major air and sea ports for insertion; increasing U.S. advantages in stealth, standoff, hypersonic and unmanned systems for power projection; and developing ground forces that are lighter, more lethal, more versatile, more survivable, more sustainable, and rapidly deployable.

Denying Enemies Sanctuary

Adversaries will also seek to exploit territorial depth and the use of mobile systems, urban terrain, and concealment to their advantage. Mobile ballistic missile systems can be launched from extended range, exacerbating the anti-access and area-denial challenges. Space denial capabilities, such as ground-based lasers, can be located deep within an adversary's territory. Accordingly, a key objective of transformation is to develop the means to deny sanctuary to potential adversaries—anywhere and anytime.

This will require the development and acquisition of robust capabilities to conduct persistent surveillance of vast geographic areas and long-range precision strike—persistent across time, space, and information domains and resistant to determined denial and deception efforts. The awesome combination of forces on the ground with long-range precision strike

assets was amply demonstrated in Afghanistan. It offered a glimpse of the potential future that integration efforts can achieve if consciously exploited through U.S. transformation and experimentation efforts.

Leveraging Information Technology

U.S. forces must leverage information technology and innovative network-centric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint forces. Our ability to leverage the power of information and networks will be key to our success in the 21st century. New information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly distributed joint and multinational forces and for ensuring that these forces have better situational awareness-about friendly forces and those of adversaries-than in the past. C4ISR systems draw combat power from the networking of a multitude of people using an array of platforms, weapons, sensors, and command and control entities, which are collectively self-organized through access to common views of the battlespace. Leveraging information technology and harnessing the power of networks poses three challenges: We must make information available on a network that people will be willing to depend on and trust. We must populate that network with new types of information needed to defeat future enemies and make existing information more readily available. And we must deny enemies' information advantages against us. The ultimate goal is to empower U.S. forces through the network, as Assistant Secretary of Defense John Stenbit has put it, "to move power to the edge." The edge doesn't just mean the guy in the foxhole -- it refers to anyone who urgently needs information anywhere on the network.

Assuring Information Systems and Conducting Information Operations

Information systems must be protected from attack and new capabilities for effective information operations must be developed. The increasing dependence of advanced societies and military forces on information networks creates new vulnerabilities. Potential adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through their own computer network attacks. Closely coordinating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities and effective integration of both with intelligence activities will be critical to protecting the current U.S. information advantage.

Enhancing Space Capabilities

The Department of Defense must enhance the capability and survivability of its space systems. Both friends and potential adversaries will become more dependent on space systems for communications, situational awareness, positioning, navigation, and timing. In addition to exploiting space for their own purposes, future adversaries will likely also seek to deny U.S. forces unimpeded access to and the ability to operate through and from space. A key objective for transformation, therefore, is not only to capitalize on the manifold advantages space offers the United States but also to close off U.S. space vulnerabilities that might otherwise provoke new forms of competition. U.S. forces must ensure space control and thereby guarantee U.S. freedom of action in space in time of conflict.

Taken together, these six goals will guide the U.S. military's transformation efforts and improvements in our joint forces. Over time, they will help to shift the balance of U.S. forces and

capabilities. U.S. ground forces will be lighter, more lethal, and highly mobile; they will be capable of insertion far from traditional ports and air bases; and they will be networked to leverage the synergy that can come from ground forces and long-range precision fires from the air and sea. Naval and amphibious forces will be able to assure U.S. access even in area-denial environments, operate close to enemy shores, and project power deep inland. Air and space forces will be able to locate and track mobile targets over vast areas and strike them rapidly at long-ranges without warning. These future attributes are the promise of U.S. transformation efforts.

Providing Capabilities to Meet the Transformational Goals

While new technologies represent only a portion of the Department's overall transformation program, transformational investments account for 17 percent (about \$21 billion) of all procurement and RDT&E in 2003, rising to 22 percent by 2007. Over the next five years, we plan to invest more than \$136 billion in transformational technologies and systems. Of this, \$76 billion represents new investments to accelerate or start new transformation programs.

It is important to note that we have applied a very strict definition to programs we include in these totals as transformational (the system should offer the warfighter a distinctly new kind of capability). Many things that enable transformation, or extend current capabilities, are not included in these figures. For example, the \$1.7 billion in this budget for funding for the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and other precision guided munitions. This category also includes buying more C-17s to modernize our lift capability, and buying stealthy F-22s, and is, in fact, critical to making transformation work. The total additional investment in systems to support transformation approaches \$25 billion in the FY03 budget and \$144 billion over the FYDP.

Not included in either of these totals is the \$10.5 billion that the budget invests in programs for combating terrorism, which is \$5.1 billion more than we were investing in that area just two years ago and approximately \$3 billion more than we have budgeted on missile defense in '03. That is due, in very great measure, to new priorities we must address in the wake of September 11th—needs that range from immediate necessities of hiring guards and building jersey barriers to long-term necessities like training first responders and refining our intelligence response to the on-going threat of terrorism.

There are many new transformation starts in this budget, many of which will not reach fruition within our programming horizon. Because they are new programs, there are limits to how much we can usefully invest in today. However, many R&D programs today, if successful, will place increased demands on procurement in the out-years. As transformation initiatives mature, we need to be prepared to make adjustments in the programs to take advantage of success. In doing so, however, we will constantly have to weigh the risks I referred to earlier between the need to be adequately prepared for future wars and the need to sustain the current force and to be adequately prepared for war tomorrow.

Let me highlight some of the capabilities we are investing in to meet the transformation

goals:

Protecting Bases of Operations. To address the goal of protecting the homeland and other bases of operations, and defeating NBC weapons and their delivery means, we are pursuing advanced biological defenses and accelerating the development of missiles defenses. Missile defense investment includes increased funding for the Airborne Laser program, a directed energy weapons to destroy ballistic missiles in their boost-phase. The budget invests \$8 billion in transformational capability to support defense of the U.S. homeland and forces abroad—\$45.8 billion over the five year Future Years Defense Plan (2003-7), an increase of 47% from the previous FYDP.

Projecting Power in Denied Areas. To address the goal of projecting power into denied areas, we are developing new, shallow-draft fast transport ships to move forces into contested littoral areas more rapidly and less dependent on traditional ports. Similarly, we are developing the V-22 aircraft for inserting amphibious and special operations forces into denied areas. We are also developing unmanned underwater vehicles that can help to assure U.S. naval access in denied areas. Overall, the 2003 budget requests \$7.4 billion for programs to support the goal of projecting power into denied areas, and \$53 billion over the five year FYDP (2003-7)—an increase of 21%.

Denying Enemies Sanctuary. In the area of denying enemies sanctuary, we are developing a space-based radar system to provide a persistent, global ground surveillance and tracking capability. We are converting four SSBNs to carry more than 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles each and up to 66 SEALs.

We are also accelerating a number of unmanned vehicle programs. Unmanned surveillance and attack aircraft like Global Hawk and Predator offered a glimpse of their potential in Afghanistan. The 2003 budget increases the number of unmanned aircraft being procured and accelerates the development of new unmanned combat aerial vehicles capable of striking targets in denied areas and sustaining persistent surveillance and strike capability over key targets. The budget includes \$1 billion to increase the development and procurement of Global Hawk, Predator, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

DoD is also taking steps to shift the balance of its weapons inventory to emphasize precision weapons—weapons that are precise in time, space, and in their effects. We are developing a range of new precision and miniature munitions for attacking deep underground facilities, mobile targets, and targets in dense urban areas and for defeating chemical and biological weapons. We are also developing new families of ground-launched munitions, such as the GPS-guided Excaliber artillery round that will further the precision revolution in our ground forces. The 2003 budget requests \$3.2 billion for transformational programs to support the objective of denying sanctuary to adversaries, and \$16.9 billion over the five year FYDP (2003-7)—an increase of 157%.

Leveraging Information Technology. We are also leveraging information technology to create a single, integrated air picture. We have increased investment in datalinks and communications, such as Link-16, needed to transmit targeting information rapidly from sensors

to shooters. And we are pursuing the development of laser communications in space that has the potential to provide fiber optics-quality broadband, secure communications anytime and anywhere U.S. forces may operate. This capability could have a revolutionary effect across many of our programs because bandwidth limitations are one of the key constraints on our ability to exploit unmanned systems, networked information systems, and new surveillance capabilities. Laser communications is a good example of the synergistic effects that capabilities in one area can have on others. The 2003 budget requests \$2.5 billion for programs to support the objective of leveraging information technology, and \$18.6 billion over the five year FYDP (2003-7)—an increase of 125%.

Conducting Effective Space and Information Operations. Finally, we are increasing investments also in information and space operations. Many of these are highly classified programs. The 2003 budget requests \$174 million for programs related to information operations—\$773 million over the five-year FYDP (2003-7)—an increase of 28%. The 2003 budget requests about \$200 million to strengthen space capabilities—\$1.5 billion over the five-year FYDP (2003-7)—an increase of 145%.

We couldn't have made these investments without terminating a number of programs and finding other savings. Although this year's defense budget increase is the largest in a long time, virtually the entire increase was "spoken for" by needed increases to cover inflation (\$6.7 billion), "must-pay" bills for health care and pay raises (\$14.1 billion), unrealistic costing of readiness and procurement (\$7.4 billion), and funding the war (\$19.4 billion). We have saved some \$9.3 billion by terminating a number of programs. Major terminations include the DD-21 Destroyer program, which has been replaced by a restructured DD (X) program that will develop a new family of surface combatants with revolutionary improvements in stealth, propulsion, and manning levels. We have cut 18 Army legacy systems. Although the Navy Area Missile Defense program was terminated because of delays, poor performance and cost growth, we are still looking to develop sea-based defenses under a replacement program.

It is important to point out that in the area of missile defense, we are pursuing some parallel technologies to meet the same objectives—for example, the kinetic kill boost vehicle and a space-based laser. At this point, we are not certain which of these programs will work best. But, we think that pursuing both will help us reach our goal faster—success in one will inform the other. As we continue, however, it is very likely that one of these programs will not survive. As with the Navy Area Missile Defense program, when it becomes clear we have reached a dead end, we must be willing to cut a program, take what we have gained, and redirect our energy and efforts in more potentially productive directions. This sort of intelligent risk taking, which can sometimes produce dead-ends, is a necessary part of transformation.

Transformation: Beyond Platforms and Systems—Changing the Culture

As we have seen in Afghanistan, transformation is more than a simple introduction of new technology. Although the Germans were the first to make tanks a decisive instrument of war, they did not invent the tank; nor were they the first to use the tank in combat, or in figuring out that tanks could prove decisive in warfare. What they did do first was use it to devastating effect through: the combination of armor with air and radio communications; the willingness to

risk employing a new and bold doctrine; allowing armor to emerge in an army traditionally dominated by infantry; delegating responsibility to lower levels so that units could operate with the autonomy that armor and radio communications could give them. The success of blitzkrieg went beyond technology. It even went beyond doctrine, beyond speed, beyond communications. It was when all these elements came together that blitzkrieg was born. It was a culture change from top to bottom.

We may draw other transformation lessons from changes in culture. The introduction of the all-volunteer force was certainly transformational. Throughout the Cold War, one measurement of the military balance was through end-strength comparisons between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. After Vietnam, the U.S. moved away from conscription. This bold move meant a smaller force, but a force that was better trained, better prepared, and more highly motivated. The end result is a peerless cadre of officers and NCOs who are dedicated to serving our nation.

Another transformational development is in our unparalleled ability to conduct night operations. Particularly given our experiences in Vietnam, we knew we had to fundamentally reduce our vulnerabilities in this area. So, we acquired technology such as night vision goggles, that allow us to virtually turn night into day. We conduct extensive night training operations. And we have turned a vulnerability into an advantage. Today, it is not hyperbole to say we "own the night."

The campaign in Afghanistan has planted the seeds of culture changes in other areas that will prove to be as significant, I think. Historically, Special Operations Forces have operated separately from conventional forces. But, this campaign necessitated their close integration with conventional forces, especially air forces. One of the results, of course, is the order of magnitude change in how precise we are in finding and hitting targets from just a decade ago. This is not only changing the culture of Special Operations Forces, but it is changing how the rest of the force thinks about Special Operations as well.

What it means to be a pilot today is undergoing a transformation as well. Not long ago, an Air Force F-15 pilot had to be persuaded to forego a rated pilot's job to fly an unmanned Predator aircraft from a location far from the field of battle. It was a difficult choice for this woman who was trained in the traditional cockpit. But, she received assurance from the most senior leadership of the Air Force that her career would not suffer as a result. Of course, UAVs have made a significant impact in the current campaign and promise even greater operational impacts—which is why the Air Force leadership is working hard to encourage others to pilot UAVs and become trailblazers in defining new concepts of operations.

Accelerating cultural change and fostering innovation. Some of the greatest military transformations in the 20th Century were the product of American innovation—the development of amphibious warfare, aircraft carriers, stealth and nuclear-powered submarines, to name a few. Great names like Billy Mitchell and Hyman Rickover are associated with such developments, and it is no secret that the unconventional ways of some of these innovators were sometimes difficult for their large organizations to adjust to. But, less iconoclastic officers also had difficulties when they clashed with perceived wisdom.

In the period between the Wars, one infantry officer began writing about the future of armored warfare, only to have his commander tell him that if he published anything contrary to "solid infantry doctrine," it would mean court-martial. The commander even tried to scuttle the officer's career. It took the intervention of Pershing's chief of staff to put the soldier's career on a new path. That officer, so interested in the future of armored warfare, was Dwight Eisenhower.

One of our fundamental goals is to encourage all the potential Eisenhowers who are thinking about war of the future. Instead of stifling those who seek to look forward so we can lean forward when necessary, we must encourage and reward them. We intend to accelerate the development of a culture that supports the sort of innovation, flexibility and vision that can truly transform the face of battle.

From my observations, the Armed Forces today are much more congenial toward innovation and innovators. Certainly the way in which the Commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, has experimented in Afghanistan demonstrates an openness to change—an openness that is helping us win the war and transform the military. But, it will always be a challenge for a large institution like the Defense Department to encourage innovation while, at the same time, allowing the organization to continue getting its job done. And we have to work constantly to encourage that creative tension.

Another way we can support the acceleration of a more innovative culture is through the processes of experimentation and training. In an environment where real intellectual R&D takes place, intelligent risks don't produce failure. They produce insights and lessons. Taking risks is all part of a discovery process, captured by the Rumsfeld Rule that states: "When you're skiing, if you're not falling you're not trying."

Experimentation and Concept Development

One of the best arenas for encouraging our forces to try hard, lean forward and risk failure is through field exercises. Over the last century, military field exercises and experiments that were oriented toward emerging challenges at the operational level of war have been important enablers of military innovation and transformation.

Field exercises that incorporate experimentation—at both the joint and the service levels—provide an indispensable means for tackling emerging challenges. In the period between the wars, Marine Major Pete Ellis perceived that war in the Pacific was likely to come, and he proposed a landing concept that we now call amphibious warfare. The Marine Corps saw that the realization of this doctrine would require special training and special equipment. Over time, and through repeated exercises, the Marines perceived the need for three different types of landing craft: one for the first troop assault; a second for the second larger troop landing; and a third to put tanks ashore. Taking Ellis's idea from the drawing board to practice beaches resulted in success in the sands of Iwo Jima, Okinawa and others.

The ability of modern communications to integrate widely disparate forces puts a much

greater premium on joint operations than we have already recognized with Goldwater-Nichols and the many innovations that flowed from it. Along with experimentation, the development of joint operational concepts and operational architectures will drive material and non-material transformation solutions and establish standards for interoperability, in much the same way that amphibious warfare was perfected. New operational concepts—the end-to-end stream of activities that define how force elements, systems, organizations, and tactics combine to accomplish military tasks—are critical to the transformation process. They may even reveal how we can accomplish our aims with fewer people and resources.

General Keman can address in more detail how Joint Forces Command is developing a joint experimentation plan that uses wargames, synthetic environment experiments, and field experiments to develop and evaluate joint concepts. This summer, JFCOM will conduct Millennium Challenge, an exercise that seeks to exploit our asymmetric advantages through joint operations.

Training

Secretary Rumsfeld has said that, if you were to give a knight in King Arthur's court an M-16, and he uses the stock to knock his opponent's head, that is not transformational. Rather, transformation occurs when the knight gets behind a tree and starts shooting. But, just because he starts shooting, that doesn't make him a marksman—only training can do that.

Likewise, training must go hand in hand with the fielding of new concepts and capabilities. We must train as we will fight. We must train as we will fight. And today, we will always fight with combinations of mission-oriented joint forces—selected from our services and those of our allies. We must therefore emphasize a culture that stresses joint sharing of information, concepts and awareness to ensure our troops can fight on day one of the battle with experience and confidence. At the conclusion of Desert Storm, when I visited the 2nd Armored Division inside Iraq with then-Defense Secretary Cheney, the Secretary asked a very tough Senior Master Sergeant whether the war had been difficult. The sergeant answered: “not nearly as tough as the National Training Center.”

Recognizing how important such training has been to our operations, a centerpiece of our training transformation effort will be the Joint National Training Center, which will include a live training component connecting multiple live training exercises and allowing “best of” practices to circulate among the services. It will also include a virtual capability that will link main service training centers. Over time, we want to increase the amount of joint field training that our forces receive as well. Ultimately, these practices will encourage all the services to fight jointly because they have trained jointly.

Organizational Re-Design

We have seen the need in our transformation efforts to re-design some of our military organizations to harness the tremendous power of new technologies and exploit the synergy of joint forces. In the early 1900s, the head of the Royal Navy, Admiral Jackie Fisher, recognized a similar need. He understood that the British Navy was no longer arrayed for war as it was likely

to unfold in the coming century. He initiated a dramatic re-conceptualization of the Navy's organization, its missions and how it would carry out its tasks. His visionary strategy included both weapons and doctrines that would come on line over a period of time. His vision helped produce a revolutionary new battleship as well as an organizational structure more suited to the world as it was then.

In the same way, DoD is taking steps to realign its organizations to better integrate and deploy combat organizations that can respond rapidly to events that occur with little or no warning—the type of environment that characterizes our world today. Joint forces must be scalable and organized into modular units that allow combatant commanders to combine the appropriate forces to deter or defeat a specific adversary. They must be organized to enhance the speed of deployment, speed of employment and the speed of sustainment. The forces must be highly networked with joint and multinational command and control, and they must be able to integrate into multinational operations.

To strengthen joint operations, the Department is developing options to establish Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands. Each headquarters will be established under uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical system requirements, thereby permitting the movement of expertise among commands. Each SJTF headquarters will have the means to develop a common relevant operational picture of the battlespace for joint and multinational forces. It will also have mechanisms for a responsive integrated logistics system that provide warfighters easy access to necessary support without burdensome lift and infrastructure requirements. SJTF headquarters will also use adaptive mission planning tools that allow U.S. forces to operate within the adversary's decision cycle and respond to changing battlespace conditions.

Related to the development of such headquarters, the Department is also examining options for establishing actual Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs). SJTF organizations could provide the organizational means to achieve a networked capability. They would employ new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military advantages and joint force synergies at lower total personnel levels. A single Standing Joint Task Force could serve as the vanguard for the future transformed military. It could undertake experiments as new technologies become available as well as offer immediate operational benefits.

Professional Military Education

We also need to ensure that the classroom education our senior military leaders receive includes military transformation. As these leaders go on to assume greater and greater responsibilities for military operations, personnel, acquisition and administration, it is vital that they appreciate the importance of transforming the military and that we instill in them a spirit that not only tolerates, but nurtures innovative thinking and encourages risk-taking and failure in the pursuit of new ideas and capabilities. We want to inculcate in them an entrepreneurial spirit and an understanding of how militaries have been transformed historically, as well as an awareness of how private companies have transformed themselves in the face of discontinuous change.

Conclusion

Even as we fight this war on terror, potential adversaries scrutinize our methods, they study our capabilities, they seek our weaknesses. They plan for how they might take advantage of what they perceive as our vulnerabilities. So, as we take care of today, we are investing in tomorrow. We are emphasizing multiple transformations that, combined, will fundamentally change warfare, in ways that could give us important advantages that can help us secure the peace. We realize that achieving this goal requires transforming our culture and the way we think. We must do this even as we fight this difficult war on terrorism. We cannot afford to wait.

Filename: SASC-Transformation-9--singlespaced
Directory: C:\DOCUME~1\davisj\LOCALS~1\Temp
Template: C:\Documents and Settings\davisj\Application
Data\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dot
Title: TESTIMONY OF U
Subject:
Author: Marc Thiessen
Keywords:
Comments:
Creation Date: 4/8/2002 9:57 PM
Change Number: 3
Last Saved On: 4/8/2002 10:01 PM
Last Saved By: SECDEF
Total Editing Time: 5 Minutes
Last Printed On: 4/9/2002 9:09 AM
As of Last Complete Printing
Number of Pages: 14
Number of Words: 6,277 (approx.)
Number of Characters: 35,781 (approx.)

TO: Larry Di Rita
 CC: Steve Cambone
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 12, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Homeland Security**

OZO HLS

I noticed in the paper there is talk about a new Homeland Security Department by Mitch Daniels. If they do that, the impingement on DoD will be enormous. We certainly better get our arms around that and get it headed off fast!

See me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 041202.24

Please respond by: 4/17/02

IAA PROA

U16561 02

4/1
0800 Snowflake

2:47 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 12, 2002
SUBJECT:

I may have to be here on April 23 and 24 to go see Prince Abdullah in Crawford if Abdullah keeps coming on his trip which he is scheduled to do but he may cancel it. If he does come, Cheney thinks that I should brief Abdullah on US military capability because he seems to have someone briefing him incorrect stuff on our capabilities.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041202.18

Please respond by: 4/15/02

Dme

Saudi Arabia

IAAPRO2

U16562 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11934

TO: Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 12, 2002
 SUBJECT: Press Access

New L. Amy D. R.

000.7

Send Mary Marshall, (b)(6) has her fax, the piece of paper you prepared about all the access to the press we have given; those two paragraphs that you gave me in preparation for the Marvin Kalb activity.

SECRET

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041202.04

Please respond by: _____

4/16/02


Done 4/23

Larry Di Rita
9/26

MARY MARSHALL - FAX: (b)(6)

12APPRO2

4:24
1600

TO: SECDEF
FROM:  Tom Clarke
DATE: April 25, 2002
SUBJECT: Press Access

I sent Mary Marshall the information you asked about, and more.

7:57 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 12, 2002

SUBJECT: **Brian Williams Transcript**

Why don't you get the transcript of, I believe it was Brian Williams, where I was asked what was the same and what had changed, and I said the one thing that hasn't changed is the men and women in the armed services. Give me a transcript of that. We ought to figure out how we can use that. I think it is a useful thing to let the people in the military know how their leaders feel about them.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041202.02

Please respond by:

4/18/02

000,777 SD

12 Apr 02

U16564 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM:  Torie
DATE: April 18, 2002
SUBJECT: Brian Williams Transcript

As requested, here is the transcript from the Brian Williams interview. I have highlighted and tabbed the spot where you address the work and the performance of the men and women of the military. We include words like this in all your remarks. We will continue to do so. I agree that this is an important message that we can't deliver often enough.

11-L-0559/OSD/11938

DefenseLINK

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Search:

[Home](#)

[Site Map](#)

[DoD Sites](#)

[NEWS](#)

[IMAGES](#)

[PUBLICATIONS](#)

[TODAY](#)

[QUESTIONS?](#)

NEWS

[About News](#)

[DoD News](#)

[Advisories](#)

[Contracts](#)

[Live Briefings](#)

[Photos](#)

[Releases](#)

[Slides](#)

[Speeches](#)

[Today in DoD](#)

[Transcripts](#)

[American Forces News](#)

[Articles](#)

[Radio](#)

[Television](#)

[Special Reports](#)

[Search](#)

[News Archive](#)

[News by E-mail](#)

[Other News Sources](#)

Updated: 02 Apr 2002



United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04012002_t0328sd2.html

Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld **Thursday, March 28, 2002**

Secretary Rumsfeld Television Interview with MSNBC

(Television Interview with Brian Williams, MSNBC TV)

Williams: Secretary of Defense, Secretary of War.

Rumsfeld: We're not running out of targets, Afghanistan is.

Williams: The president's point man at the Pentagon. A candid exclusive interview.

Rumsfeld: We've got thousands of al Qaeda been trained, they're all over the world.

Williams: And, an extraordinary look at a Washington veteran facing the challenge of his life.

Rumsfeld: When it's all over, either you did a good job for the country or you didn't.

Annoucer: Brian Williams reports: Rumsfeld at Defense. Here is Brian Williams.

Williams: Thank you for joining us. He presides over a war like no other, and he has become arguably more than anyone else the public face and voice of that war. An experienced insider who late in life has been thrust into new and uncharted territory. He is Donald Henry Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense.

Before September 11th, many Americans may not have known or cared for that matter who ran the Pentagon. Since then, of course, it has come to mean a great deal as the Secretary has taken a central role in a drama still unfolding. But who is Don Rumsfeld?

Despite the burdens of his job, he may be the most confident man in America, the oldest ever Secretary of Defense, he was also the youngest. A man tapped by presidents who once had presidential ambitions of his own, a skilled political in-fighter devoted to public service, whose blunt talk has touched a nerve and found an audience.

Rumsfeld: We're looking for them, we intend to find them, and we intend to capture or kill them.

Williams: Over the next hour, Donald Rumsfeld close-up. Where we're headed in the war on terrorism, and a look back at Rumsfeld's path to power, and some perspective from his predecessors, six former secretaries of Defense, and the president who put him at the Pentagon the first time around, President Gerald R. Ford.

But we begin with Donald Rumsfeld himself reminding us how our world has changed.

Rumsfeld: Our margin for error has shrunk enormously. When you think of the power and reach of weapons, and the fact that the weapons of mass destruction can kill not thousands as we had with the attacks on the Pentagon here in this building where we sit, and also in New York, but tens of hundreds of thousands of people can be killed. We don't have a big margin for error. We have to be right. We have to see that we go after these folks where they are.

Williams: If we all knew what you know, would we be more or less nervous about daily life in the United States?

Rumsfeld: Oh, my goodness. I don't know that it serves any useful purpose to be nervous about things. It's a difficult world. It's a dangerous world. There are a lot of people who have been trained to kill, and to terrorize. They're located in 40 or 50 countries in cells today as we talk. And they are willing to sacrifice their lives to kill other people. Can we deal with that? Sure. Is it likely there will be another terrorist attack? Sure, it is true.

Williams: You just said almost in passing, will there be another terrorist attack, sure. Boy, that's a long walk from where we were September 10th.

Rumsfeld: Oh, I guess for the general population maybe. I was sitting in this room on the 11th with a group of Congressmen and had just finished saying to them that there would be another event of some type in the next six, eight, ten, twelve months, they could be reasonably certain there would be some event in the world that would make them proud that they were willing to be wise enough to invest in our military capabilities. And a note came in saying a plane had just hit the World Trade Center. So, I mean, you don't have to be omniscient to figure that out. That's the nature of the world we live in.

And the response in the country has been wonderful. It really has. And, of course, we have called up some 72,000 reserves and guard who are on active duty today, left their family, left their jobs, and are serving.

Williams: Do you worry at all that America has gone back to normal too quickly?

Rumsfeld: No, not a bit. The American people have really a wonderful center of gravity, and if you look over our 250, 60, 70, 80 years, whatever it's been now, on big issues, and this is a big issue, the people of this country have been right. They've been right over and over and over again. And they're not going to be wrong on this. They know the risks.

Williams: As wars go, this has been such a hypodermic needle as opposed to a hand grenade. The first boots on the ground were CIA. It's been mostly special ops, very few of the traditional 101st, 82nd, what we've all come to know as war.

Rumsfeld: Well, there was not a Taliban or al Qaeda army, so one is unlikely, nor is there a Navy, nor is there an Air Force. Rather, there were a large number of terrorists and supporters of terrorists, and well-armed, effective, well organized, and well financed. And, therefore, what we had to do was to recognize there was no road map for this kind of war. And, of course, the problem is, you had the Taliban and the al Qaeda arrayed in caves and tunnels, and dug in spots all across a ridge line, and we had the Northern Alliance with our Special Forces folks trying to get them to surrender or stop fighting, and they refused. The only thing you can do is to bomb them and try to kill them. And that's what we did, and it worked. They're gone. And the Afghan people are a lot better off.

Williams: The United States didn't get them all. They are gone. Do you worry that too many of them got away?

Rumsfeld: Oh, goodness. I worry that they're all over the world. You bet. There were thousands trained in those training camps, but there is no question if it's not an army, a navy, or an air force, all they have to do is just meld into the mountainside, go into a cave, go back into their village, go across one of those porous borders of Afghanistan. They've transited, we know, they've gone through Iran down into ships, and headed -- tried to get into Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, and various other Middle Eastern countries. All you can do is keep after them, keep putting pressure.

Williams: I have to ask you, though, the bin Laden question. I'll try to ask it in an inventive way. I had a general say to me on the air back in about October, Osama bin Laden will be dead by Christmas. Are you in your heart of hearts surprised, disappointed that he's not dead, or is he? Is he a pile of bones in one of the many caves that American forces have reduced to rubble, and how to know that?

Rumsfeld: Well, we don't know whether he's alive or dead or where he is. We think he's probably alive, and we think he's probably in Afghanistan. But, I'm not surprised in the slightest. When this began in early September, I, from the very outset, suggested that it would be unwise to personalize this into the single person, as for example the Gulf War was personalized into Saddam Hussein. Wrong for a lot of reasons. Wrong because no one person is determinative in this. I mean, Saddam, if Osama bin Laden died today, there probably are four, five, six, eight, ten people who can step in and manage that apparatus in a reasonable, competent way. Certainly we know of three or four who could. Would it be nice to catch him? Sure. Do we think we will? Sure. But do I get up every day and think that that's the single most important thing in the world we're doing? Goodness, no. We've got thousands of al Qaeda have been trained; they're all over the world. We have to go find them.

Williams: How much of an effort is underway to do DNA matching to see if that pile of bones in that corner could be him?

Rumsfeld: Oh, there's no question but that as we go into caves and do various things, and look for remains, why, that people are aware that there are DNA ways to do that.

Williams: So there are teams, and it is their job to try to do a match based on remains?

Rumsfeld: It's not a Department of Defense responsibility, and I'm not very knowledgeable about it.

Williams: And it would be better to announce that his remains were found than the contrary?

Rumsfeld: If they were found. And if they aren't, life will go on. We'll keep doing our job.

Williams: Much more still to come with Donald Rumsfeld, including the nuclear terror threat, how real is it? And in a visit to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a fascinating exchange about the Oval Office habits of his boss.

Rumsfeld: President Bush wears a coat in the office because he respects the Office of the President.

(Commercial break.)

Williams: Welcome back. September 11th made it painfully clear that terrorism against American targets is not the distant threat that many of us might have once thought. Hijacked jetliners fully loaded with fuel flying into office buildings took care of that. But is there an even greater, more deadly threat to come? Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. We asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld: There is no question but the terrorists and terrorist organizations want weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, however, are more difficult to handle and manage, more difficult to detonate, more difficult to transport, and if I were asked, among those nuclear, chemical and biological, which did I think was the more likely and the more worrisome to me at the moment, I probably would say biological. It can be done in relatively small places with dual use equipment, and there are a variety of delivery mechanisms. Some biological weapons involve contagions, and that's a terribly dangerous thing.

Williams: How much do you worry about that for the United States, and on a very local level for members of your own family, your grandfather?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think about it, about our country, and we do a lot of intelligence gathering on it. We do a good deal of investing to see that we have some capability to deal with those kinds of problems. And we have to recognize that those countries that are developing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons pose a very serious threat to the world.

Williams: How hard is it for you to overcome what must be a temptation, to use the phrase someone used in the Vietnam War, to go over and pave that area overseas?

Rumsfeld: Oh, goodness. I don't know that I have much trouble resisting that. I think that we live in a complicated world, and sometimes there are solutions that are

simple, neat and wrong. We need to be wiser and more thoughtful about what we do.

Williams: And doesn't this conflict fit nicely with your design of redesigning the military. You've got drones flying pilotless, which a lot of people in this building do not like because it means there are pilots out of work as we speak.

Rumsfeld: Oh, they're learning to like it. People change. It's not easy to change for people, but this building has really accomplished a lot in the last 12 months in terms of transformation.

Williams: American forces are in countries, as we speak, that you probably never dreamed they'd be deployed in when you started this job. Where does it end?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think we have to keep the pressure on, and we can't allow Afghanistan to be stopped as a haven and a sanctuary and simply have some other country become the sanctuary and the haven. So what we have to do, as the president said, is go after the terrorists where they are, but also make sure that other countries are not creating a sanctuary for terrorists, as a substitute for Afghanistan. So we're trying to help train some folks in Yemen, we're trying to help train some folks in the Philippines, and relatively small numbers of people, in the hundreds, not in the thousands.

Williams: You have no concerns that we're in too many places right now?

Rumsfeld: Look, my concern is that the al Qaeda will find a country where they can find a sanctuary and a haven, and continue their attacks on the United States, on our friends and allies, and on our deployed forces, and on our interests. And we can't let that happen.

Williams: Will we have several months notice if the United States goes into Iraq? That's not the kind of thing you can decide on a Thursday and execute on a Friday, is it?

Rumsfeld: Big things take time, but I guess those are issues that the president has to worry about, and I have to advise him. And I'm old fashioned, I tend to give my advice in private.

Williams: We don't get to see the president like you do. What would people be most surprised to know about George W. Bush?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think they're getting to know him. I did not know him well at all. I of course was a contemporary of his father's. And his father was at CIA when I was Secretary of Defense the last time. What I have found is that he is exactly what he seems to be. He is a very well rooted individual, well centered. He's got an easy sense of humor. He has a very strong will. He listens very well, makes a decision, and it's just a delight to work with somebody who if he's there today he will be there tomorrow, and a week later, and two weeks later. And I think people can sense that, he is a determined individual, and that's a good thing for a president. He also looks at the big picture. He directionally knows where he wants this country to go.

Williams: He knew enough, apparently, to hire a bunch of professionals.

Rumsfeld: I guess.

Williams: Our conversation about the president continued as we paid a visit to the Secretary's office, where we were shown some favorite Rumsfeld memorabilia, and given a close up look at that famous stand up desk of his. George W. Bush may be 14 years Rumsfeld's junior, but the Secretary admires the president's emphasis on dignity and respect in the White House.

Williams: Because he runs an Oval Office where you've got to wear a suit and tie?

Rumsfeld: What's wrong with that?

Williams: We've just gone through an administration where jogging shorts were welcome. What does decorum count for?

Rumsfeld: It's recapturing something that's important, and if you think about it in the Congress they refer to each other as the distinguished gentleman. Now, why do they do that? They do that because civility is important. President Bush wears a coat in the office, because he respects the office of the President, and for the American people. It's an institution that he values, reveres.

Williams: And a little of that doesn't hurt on occasion?

Rumsfeld: Sure doesn't.

Williams: Nor, apparently, does it hurt to be the target of Saturday Night Live, something else the Secretary and this president have in common. When we come back we'll hear what Secretary Rumsfeld thinks of this.

(Video clip.)

(Commercial break.)

Williams: Are you amazed at the interest in Donald Rumsfeld generally, in his shirts and ties and suits every day, and his glass frames, and his face, demeanor, and answers to questions?

Rumsfeld: I'll tell you, it is kind of funny. My wife teases me about it once in a while, but I don't think about it a lot, to be honest. I've got so much to do, I get up about 5:00 in the morning, I'm in here about 6:30, and I guess last night was about average, I got home at about 7:30, and then I worked another hour, hour and a half at home. And I've been doing that six, seven days a week. You don't have a lot of time to muse about those things. I saw one thing on Saturday Night Live, I think it was, which I must say made me laugh.

(Video clip.)

Williams: Tell me you knew what Saturday Night Live was before that aired.

Rumsfeld: I did. I'd heard of that. I'd not seen it, but I'd heard of it.

Williams: There was a published report that this was a first for you.

Rumsfeld: Watching it on video, goodness gracious, I don't stay up that late.

Williams: Yes, they've been doing it for 26 years.

Rumsfeld: I know, but I haven't made it.

Williams: It's axiomatic that that now affords you icon status that you've been parodied on that broadcast.

Rumsfeld: Is that right?

Williams: Yes. Did they do a good job.

Rumsfeld: Well, who am I to say, I don't have anything to compare it with except me.

Williams: Well, what did your kids think?

Rumsfeld: Well, it made me laugh, it made them laugh.

(Video clip.)

Williams: Are you that mean a briefer downstairs?

Rumsfeld: No, not even close. I like the people in the press. They do their job, I do my job, and they're good professionals.

Rumsfeld: That characterization is so far from the mark that I am shocked, sort of.

Rumsfeld: I do those briefings because I really believe, and am told, I have to. And the reason you have to is because you're dealing with multiple audiences. You've got all the men and women in uniform that you need to communicate with, you've got the other elements of government, the Congress, you have the rest of the world that is wondering what it is the United States is doing.

Williams: How often are you forced to shave the truth in that briefing room, because American lives are at stake?

Rumsfeld: I just don't. I think our credibility is so much more important than shaving the truth. So when I don't know something I just say I don't know it. If it's something I'm not going to talk about, I just say I'm not going to talk about it. If it's advice I give the president or the National Security Council I just tell them I don't get into that. If it's an intelligence matter I say that we don't discuss intelligence. There isn't a need for anyone to do that in the Pentagon.

Williams: The United States did use misinformation in World War II liberally. And a recent attempt in this building to maybe engage in a little misinformation you received some unshirted hell from people, and kind of took it back. Mistake?

Rumsfeld: I don't know. There's no question we have to do information operations. For example, if the Taliban is telling people that the food we're delivering is poisoned, we have to tell them it's not. If they're saying this is a war against Moslems, we have to tell them it's not, that that's not true. And so we had a radio program that we were beaming there, and that is not misinformation, that is not disinformation, it is information. And that is what we were doing. And the information operations activities that the Pentagon was planning to do in the Office of Strategic Information were perfectly appropriate.

For whatever reason, the implication was drawn that they were going to do things that were not appropriate. So what do you do? Well, I said, let's close up the shop. Since that's what the perception is, let's close it up. We'll go ahead and do what we have to do anyway. I said that at the press briefing, and we will. We'll do exactly what we have to do to protect the lives of the men and women in uniform, and to see that our country is successful, but it doesn't involve lying.

Williams: The word swagger has been used involving Donald Rumsfeld from time to time. Is that a pilot thing? Is what you have a pilot thing?

Rumsfeld: I don't think so. My wife Joyce tells me I walk like a sailor, because I kind of walk from side to side. But, I don't think of it as a swagger. I think of it as the way I walk.

Williams: Well, there's a certain -- there's a bearing, that once you've been tested, taken a few risks, pushed the edge of the envelope as they like to say, that fewer and fewer things scare you in life. Does anything scare you anymore?

Rumsfeld: The only thing I really worry about is doing a good job. I worry that the decisions we make have to be the right ones, because people's lives are at risk, and therefore you have to -- when you make your judgment you have to think it through carefully, and you have to recognize that you've got to have a darned good reason for doing something.

Williams: More of our conversation with Secretary Donald Rumsfeld coming up. And when we continue, making a career of being useful to presidents. And how it was once thought that Donald Rumsfeld might just be a presidential contender himself.

(Commercial break.)

Williams: Returning to Washington was an adjustment for Rumsfeld. He soon learned that things had changed.

Rumsfeld: It's a different town, Washington, D.C. I came here in 1957, fresh out of the Navy, and it was a relatively small town, Eisenhower was president, and we've had wars, and assassinations, and the press corps has grown, and television has come of age. It's a different feeling here. The Congress is a different place than it was when I served there in the 1960s. The one thing that is the same is the men and women in uniform. The people who serve our country, who voluntarily risk their lives to defend our country are very much the same kinds of people that I knew 25-30 years ago in the armed forces.

Williams: What does your life story teach young people? It must strike you that you're a long way from Winnetka when you can't walk through an airport unrecognized. What does that mean about the American Dream?

Rumsfeld: Well, I guess my dream was to be a Navy pilot, and I did that for a while and loved it, but I guess the only person more surprised that I'm back here after being gone for, what, 25-26 years was my wife, and that the two of us still just muse at funny turns life takes, because I had no intention of coming back into government, but given what's happened, I'm very pleased I'm here, and anxious I can -- pleased that I can contribute.

Williams: Is there a metaphor here with JDAMS that you can take -- you can take an old-fashioned steel gravity bomb and slap new technology on it, and suddenly you have a new weapon. Are you a new weapon?

Rumsfeld: Well, I hope so. I hope so. It's true. You know, there's always a risk that people will be wedded to the past. On the other hand, perspective can be valuable. And I've seen an awful lot of people fall in an awful lot of potholes, and to the extent we can avoid some of those, why, that's a good thing for the country, and a good thing for the men and women in the service.

Williams: Who keeps you honest?

Rumsfeld: Oh, my goodness, there's a mob of press people down there who work over me every once and a while, and I guess at my age I don't know that I need a lot of help keeping me honest. I'm not running for anything. I'm just trying to serve the country.

Williams: To use a military metaphor, is it safe to say you're a guy who's flown his missions, and satisfied with your lot in life, and others can take it or leave it?

Rumsfeld: I'm afraid that's the way I feel. I just want to do a good job.

Williams: Donald Rumsfeld wasn't counting on a war on terrorism, nor was the president he serves, but like George W. Bush, Rumsfeld finds his role transformed since September 11th. Again, he's a man who has flown his missions, and sometimes there is no substitute for that.

I'm Brian Williams, thank you for joining us.

(End of program.)

 [Printer-friendly Version](#)

 [Email A Copy](#)

[Privacy & Security Notice](#) | [External Link Disclaimer](#) | [Web Policy](#)
[About DefenseLINK](#) | [Contact Us](#)

TO: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 15, 2002
 SUBJECT:

Someone is claiming that the INS is doing things that hurt Afghans in America and someone ought to look into it and find out what's going on so we know.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 041502.51

Please respond by: _____

AFGHANISTAN

15 APR 02

U16565 02

6:27 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT:

Richard Perle asked me what we were going to do about Brilliant Pebbles. He told me that Ken Avian and Lowell Wood briefed the Defense Policy Board. He was curious to know what had happened.

You and I have always thought that is something that ought to be looked into. Is it being looked into? Richard has the feeling that it is not likely to be given, unless it receives some impetus.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.50

Please respond by: _____

393.24

15 Apr 02

U16566 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11949

6:11 PM

TO: Secretary England
Secretary Roche
Secretary White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT: **DPG**

For your information.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.48

Attach: Defense Planning Guidance (4/15/02)

Please respond by: _____

100.54

ISAPR02

U16567 02

April 16, 2002
9:39 AM

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)

The following are the several categories which we have discussed as helpful in providing guidance in the DPG.

Category A - Specific instructions to do or not to do something, to increase or decrease something, to change or to add something, etc. Language in this category would be fairly specific and directive.

Category B – Guidance to look at a subject area and report back with options as to how an area can best be handled - how it could best be rationalized, how we could best strengthen, add or consolidate what we are doing in an area. And, in so doing, make sure that you consider the following specific option among any other you feel should be considered.

Category C - Same as Category B, except there is no specific option that must be included.

Category D – Present a plan (guidance may be to one or more of the services) within “X” days or weeks, that will provide a way to approach a specific subject that might then be assigned to Categories A, B or C above, but which we need more information on before we can make such an assignment.

DHR/azn
041502.azn.misc.

11-L-0559/OSD/11951

4:49 PM

TO: Albert Simms

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT: *The New York Times Article*

093

Here is a copy of the article that I mentioned in my earlier memo. I assume your answer will still be the same.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.46

Attach: *New York Times* "National" **New Mexico Town is on Indian Land** /12/02

Please respond by: _____

15 APR 02

U16568 02

April 12, 2002

New Mexico Town Is on Indian Land, and in Limbo

By **MICHAEL JANOFSKY**

TAOS, N.M., April 11 — Early last year, the local police arrested Del E. Romero, a member of the Taos Pueblo, on charge of aggravated battery after a man was severely beaten in a parking lot here. On probation at the time, Mr. Romero was sent to jail.

But he was lucky the incident happened where it did.

A state judge dismissed the charge last month because of customs and laws, originating with the king of Spain in the 1500's, that have preserved certain lands throughout the southwestern United States as "Indian country," no matter where they are or who owns the buildings on them.

Until the judge, Peggy J. Nelson, ruled, few people in Taos knew that half the town, including the parking lot where the incident occurred, is on Indian land, part of a grant to indigenous people by Spain that was upheld by Mexico after it won independence in 1821, and by the United States after New Mexico became a territory in 1853 and a state in 1912.

Indian lands, even if not connected to a reservation, are sovereign, like foreign countries, and only tribal and federal authorities have the right to arrest and prosecute American Indians accused of committing crimes on them. Courts in other states, including North Dakota, South Dakota and Florida, have upheld the standard in similar cases.

Now Mr. Romero, 32, is free, and many Taos residents are wondering what impact Judge Nelson's ruling will have on this famous art community of 6,000. Already, limited resources prevent federal and tribal authorities from pursuing every criminal case on Indian land, and now fears are mounting that

**Serious
Success**
begins with
The New York Times
Job Market

- Search our job listings
- Receive job alerts
- Post your résumé

Put yourself
in a
**better
position**
Click Here

state and local authorities may be less aggressive, knowing that a defense lawyer can raise the issue of venue and have the case thrown out.

Reflecting on Judge Nelson's ruling, Chief Neil W. Curran of the Taos Police Department, said, "Once it becomes common knowledge, and you're a Native American inclined to become involved with something like shoplifting, you'll know to do it in Indian country."

The implications of the ruling were not lost on Judge Nelson. In a letter explaining how history and cases elsewhere influenced her decision, she told Mr. Romero's public defender, Alan Maestas, and the local district attorney's office that Congress needed to clarify issues of jurisdiction over all Indian lands.

For now, the matter is in the courts. The state has appealed the ruling to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, and each side expects the loser to petition the state Supreme Court to hear the case. Eventually, it may go to the United States Supreme Court, which some legal experts say has eroded tribal authority.

Speaking last week in Albuquerque at the Federal Bar Association's annual conference on Indian law, Senior Judge William C. Canby Jr. of the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco said this is "a terrible time for tribes to find themselves in court, especially the Supreme Court."

Representative Tom Udall, a Democrat whose district includes Taos, said Congress had not examined the issues. But until it does, Mr. Udall said, he urges local, state and federal law enforcement officials to define their responsibilities for the sake of "comfort in the community."

Chief Curran said that after Judge Nelson ruled, Mayor Frederick A. Peralta and Town Attorney Tomas Benavidez told him to respond to crimes as if nothing had changed.

But the larger concern, Chief Curran said, is how the police will handle a case, and already there are uncertainties. Despite telling the force's 17 officers that their work will proceed as usual, Chief Curran said an officer responding to an assault last Sunday night called him at home to ask if he should investigate what happened.

"So it has already caused problems," Chief Curran said. "The

officer had to call me for direction."

Beyond that, residents who live or work in the north side of town, which includes the historic square, galleries and hotels, said they wonder what may happen with the crimes like shoplifting or drunken driving that tribal authorities and agents from the F.B.I. and the Bureau of Indian Affairs judge not worth pursuing.

Felonies are prosecuted by the federal government. Norm Cairns, an assistant United States attorney for New Mexico, said his office had also prosecuted some misdemeanors. But in the case of other offenses, Mr. Cairns said, "logistics, manpower and resources have to be taken into consideration."

Senior officials with the Taos Pueblo declined to comment, pending final review of Judge Nelson's ruling. A spokeswoman for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Nedra Darling, did not respond to requests for information.

To Chief Curran and the local district attorney, Donald Gallegos, any problems in the short term can be addressed by deputizing police and sheriff's department officers as federal agents, something Mr. Udall said could be done without Congressional involvement. Meanwhile, Chief Curran said, "We have encouraged the United States attorney to prosecute the Romero case."

All that brings little solace to people like Mike Neglia, whose father owns the Taos General Store, which faces the parking lot where Mr. Romero is accused of beating a man.

"It's very concerning," he said of uncertainties about law enforcement response. "We have just two middle-aged ladies working here. It would be easy for a couple of guys to take what they want and leave. We could call the cops. But then what?"

**LAW OFFICE
ALBERT SIMMS
P.O. BOX 681
TAOS, NEW MEXICO 87571**

Phone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM

DATE: APRIL 15, 2002

Summary
- recent Indian case
is not a land claim

TO: Donald H. Rumsfeld
FAX NO: (b)(6)
RE: New Mexico Properties (Indian Claim)

Hi Don,

I got your fax Friday p.m. and dispatched Ian to get a New York Times but they were out. So I phoned Les Taylor, the lawyer for Taos Pueblo. He was out too but called this morning.

The case you read about was a recent ruling by Peggy Nelson, my good friend who is the state district court judge in Taos. It involved criminal jurisdiction of the state and town over citizens of Indian nations such as Taos Pueblo. We all know that states have no criminal (and very little civil) jurisdiction on Indian land. This recent case went a step further: the state has no criminal jurisdiction over citizens of the Pueblo on former Indian land either. The citizens in question had been arrested by Town police in the vicinity of Taos Plaza and since the northern half of Town of Taos (and most of El Prado) was formerly part of the Pueblo Grant, the judge ordered them dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This is supported by lots of precedent from higher courts. I think it's wrong.

The state has appealed and the Pueblo's lawyer says the Pueblo will offer to enter into a law enforcement compact with the town and county.

Albert Simms

4:28 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT: DPG

Given the mess up in our satellites programs, don't you think there ought to be something in the DPG on the subject?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.45

Please respond by: _____ *4/20/02*

100.54

15 APR 02

U16569 02

5:55 PM

TO: Secretary Roche
Secretary England
Secretary White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT: **2001 Accomplishments**

Attached is a copy of the document I was looking for. It notes seven of the major accomplishments (areas of change) DoD achieved during 2001. As you will note, our mutual friend was central to each one. Not bad for a year's work!

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.44

Attach: 2001 Accomplishments

Please respond by: _____

0210 DDD

15 APR 02

U16571 02

The Department of Defense has been hard at it. Consider what was accomplished in one year—2001. The Department has:

- Adopted a new capabilities-based defense strategy out of the Quadrennial Defense Review;
- Replaced the decade-old two Major Theater War construct for force-sizing, with a new approach;
- Adopted a new approach to balancing risks;
- Reorganized and revitalized the missile defense research and testing program, which will be free of the constraints of the ABM Treaty this June;
- Reorganized DoD to better focus our space capabilities;
- Through the Nuclear Posture Review, adopted a new approach to strategic deterrence that increases security while making deep reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear weapons; and
- Within a week or so, we will present to the President a new Unified Command Structure.

And much of this was accomplished while fighting a war on terrorism. Not bad for a Department that is supposedly so resistant to change.

MFR/2001 Accomplishments

11-L-0559/OSD/11959

Snowflake

1:32 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002
SUBJECT: American/Taliban

*Done per
Mr Haynes - Deal from
file*

AFGHANISTAN

What's the status on the Louisiana-American Taliban El-Qaeda fellow? We need to get that straightened out and what we are going to do about him.

Should he be moved to the Department of Justice?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.40

4/20/02

Please respond by: _____

15APR02

U16572 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11960

Snowflake

1:17 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Tony Dolan
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT:

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich. I think it is a good idea. Let's think about doing something that day.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041502.35

Attach: 4/12/02 Email from Newt Gingrich

Please respond by:

4/20/02

Lebanon

U16573 02

ISAPRO2

11-L-0559/OSD/11961

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From
Newt Gingrich

Copied to Wolfowitz

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2002 6:28 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: kr@georgewbush.com; llibby@ovp.sop.gov
Subject: Apeil 18

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt april 12,2002

April 18 is the 29th anniversary of the first suicide car bomb against an American target. It destroyed the American Embassy, killed 63, destroyed most of the available human intelligence for the American government on the situation in Lebanon.

This bombing was directed by the Iranian government through Hezbollah. It was the beginning of the war on the Americans which has now been waged by our enemies in the region with only occasional reactions by the Americans.

This would be a good date for a thoughtful speech about a generation of hate, a generation of raising people willing to die for their cause, a generation of dictators seeking weapons of mass destruction so they can use them.

We need to place each day's horrors in an historic and strategic context.

Sadly the United States ignored the evidence that the Iranians were directly involved in every major action against us in Lebanon (killing hundreds of Americans) and began the process of State Department efforts to negotiate with Syria while the Syrians ruthlessly manipulate the terrorist organizations to their advantage.

Maybe this would be a good day to reflect on the objective requirements of winning in a generation long war with terrorists and dictatorships.

8:18 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002
SUBJECT:

326

Attached is a note from Dick Myers to me. I think we need to make sure we have all the people we could conceivably need in specific skills as part of the active force rather than some of them in the reserve, as it is currently arranged.

Second, we need to make a decision as to how many people we think need to be first deployers.

Please screw your head into it and get back to me with a proposal.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041502.31

Attach: 3/4/02 Info Memo to SD from Gen. Myers re: 2/12 SVTC

Please respond by: _____ *[Signature]*

15 APR 02

U16574 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR -4 PM 1:54

INFO MEMO

CM-202-02
4 March 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 11 2002

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Questions from 12 February Secure Video Teleconference Regarding Strategic Plan and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

*3/2
LARRY DI RITA*

- The following is provided in response to your questions (TAB) regarding the National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism (NMSP-GWOT) and the IRR.
- The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services (including the Coast Guard), combatant commands, and key Defense agencies, has developed a draft strategic plan (the NMSP-GWOT) that provides both a framework and direction for military efforts in the war on terrorism.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ is intended to facilitate iterative and adaptive planning over the duration of the war as policy decisions are made and terrorists reveal themselves around the globe. It establishes an integrating framework within the context of our Defense Policy Goals and your strategic planning guidance to organize, synchronize, and prioritize a global campaign. It also bridges national strategic guidance and theater campaign plans.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ has been reviewed by Service and combatant command planners (general/flag officer level) and incorporates advice from OSD's strategy office. My intent is to finalize the draft plan and take it to the Tank in the coming weeks, then bring it to you.
- The IRR is a manpower pool of individuals with some military service obligation remaining, or those who subsequently volunteer to remain in the IRR once their initial obligation is met. Each Service, including the Coast Guard, has an IRR whose members have no obligation to drill, are normally not members of specific units, and are normally not paid unless recalled to active duty. However, they can be mobilized to fill specific positions during a crisis and are a potential source of unique skills and experience. Currently, 1,441 IRR members have been recalled to active duty from an aggregate pool of 348,508.

(Andy heading)

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DIR	3/6
PR MA GIAMBERINI	23/8
MA SUCCI	3/7
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/6

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, (b)(6)

12:47 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 15, 2002

SUBJECT: **Trilateral Commission Transcript**

334

I have checked the people on this list that I think we ought to include on the special mailing list. Type of their current names and addresses, and then give it to me, and I will sit down with Torie and we will select things to go. Give me this note with the list.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041502.29

Attach: SecDef Overseas Friends 4/11/02

Please respond by: _____ 4/20/02

15APR02

U16575 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11965

April 8, 2002 3:04 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Trilateral Commission Transcript

Please give me a cleaned up transcript of the Trilateral Commission meeting. I want to send it to François de Rose in France.

★

Also, we should develop a list of people around the world who are friends of mine that we can send things that would be of interest to them. They can then arm themselves as to what we are doing and be supportive, as I know they want to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040802-38

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

4/11/02

★ Sn - Torie asked me to help her with this portion. I went through the most current Christmas card list and came up with the attached individuals - will you please review & advise? Thanks.

(b)(6)

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
Overseas Friends

(b)(6)

Torino, Italy

(b)(6)

Zurich, Switzerland

(b)(6)

Rome, Italy

(b)(6)

Cordoba, Spain

(b)(6)

London, England

(b)(6)

Belgium

(b)(6)

Rome, Italy

(b)(6)

Stockholm, Sweden

(b)(6)

Brussels, Belgium

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Paris, France

(b)(6)

Mexico

(b)(6)

Jerusalem, Israel

AZN
DHR Personal/Overseas friends
4/11/02

11-L-0559/OSD/11967

(b)(6)

Westmeath, Ireland

(b)(6)

Zurich, Switzerland

(b)(6)

Athens, Greece

(b)(6)

Cordoba, Spain

(b)(6)

Tel Aviv, Israel

(b)(6)

Montreal, Canada

(b)(6)

Paris, France

(b)(6)

Paris, France

(b)(6)

Paris, France

(b)(6)

Germany

(b)(6)

Tokyo, Japan

(b)(6)

Paris, France

(b)(6)

Dusseldorf, Germany

AZN
DHR Personal/Overseas friends
4/11/02

11-L-0559/OSD/11968

(b)(6)

La Romana, Dominican Republic

(b)(6)

Stockholm, Sweden

(b)(6)

The Netherlands

(b)(6)

Stockholm, Sweden

(b)(6)

Japan

11:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002
SUBJECT: **Meeting**

000.7150

I need a meeting with you, Admiral Giambastiani, Dov Zakheim, Jim Roche, Pete Aldridge, David Chu, Paul Wolfowitz, Steve Cambone. They don't need the subject. Just tell them I want to meet them, and give me this paper for the meeting.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041502.28

Attach: 4/11/02 Personal letter to SD from Dov Zakheim

Please respond by: _____

15 APR 02

U16577 02

PERSONAL

April 11

0930

To SecDef:

D m -

Although Paul has organized a group of us to prepare material for you regarding PA&E's future, I wanted to send you a few private thoughts. Paul's effort includes Barry Watts, who is administratively in my "shop," and it is awkward for me to put thoughts on paper that would naturally be shown to Barry as well....

For the past dozen years I've given a lot of thought to how PPB in general, and PA&E in particular, should be reformed. I've run the DPG (under Fred Ikle), I've been a program analyst (at the Congressional Budget Office) and now I'm also budgeteer. I've lectured on PPB, taught the subject at places like Columbia, and published widely for the past dozen years on PPB and long range planning/programming issues.

PA&E is not the organization you and Pete Aldridge, or Dave Chu once knew. Its leadership is weak. Its staff is mediocre. I was given limited administrative direction over PA&E but not substantive control. Barry Watts was not my choice for the director's job. I had someone else in mind, and the people I chose as my deputies, Larry Lanzilotta and Tina Jonas, represent the kind of person I would have chosen—strong managers, capable leaders, and, most important, self-starters.

PA&E is riddled with analysts who view the Services and Joint Staff in adversarial terms, and whose own focus is on second and third order issues. Newt Gingrich is right. PA&E as currently constituted does nothing for you.

To get what I believe you need—a Chief Analyst who sits at your elbow, and provides unbiased analysis of top level, long term issues that both feed into and derive from the DPG, I believe you need to set the following parameters:

O The Director of PA&E must report to you and no one else.

11-L-0559/OSD/11971

O PA&E should be a relatively small office, somewhat larger than Andy Marshall's, that focuses on top-level analysis and first-order strategic choices. To take a current and example, PA&E should not simply evaluate whether Crusader is a cost-effective replacement for Paladin but rather determine:

- the political-military *context* in which an indirect fire capability is required
- the overall range of choice within which a decision about Crusader should be made— e.g can direct fire (whether airborne and ground based) do the job? Are there other sources of indirect fire?

O PA&E should **not** be in charge of the PPB process.

- Policy should manage the Guidance—Policy is an advocate of long term change
- Comptroller should manage a merged program/budget review. You merged the review to so as to be more efficient

1) by eliminating duplication of the decision making process—to prevent revisiting program review decisions during the budget review, as was the cast in the past

2) by beginning to merge the program and budget data bases making time available for a post-POM review by Steve Cambone and his DPG team

3) by allowing for more streamlining of the process, per Ken Krieg's efforts..

O PA&E has transmogrified from the unbiased analytical office that it was under Pete Aldridge and Dave Chu to an advocate of its own pet rocks that worked poorly with the J-8 in particular. In fact, the PA&E staff is unhappy with me because I have developed a very close working relationship with Pete Pace and the J-8. During last year's program review "out of court" settlements of lesser issues, I frequently sided with the J-8 over PA&E because the J-8 presented a better case.

Bottom line: I recommend that you reconstitute PA&E as an Andy Marshall-like analytical office (with about 25-30 people at most); hire a new dynamic director who reports only to you; and keep PA&E out of the PPB management business.

11-L-0559/OSD/11972

— Don

- to Sully
From Went April 12, 2002

DOV Zacklein's memo
on PAW E IS RIGHT.

25-30 people in small office

- answering big questions.

to shock of this scale

Change will educate all of

DOV to your ~~seriousness~~.

- Seriousness.

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 15, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Prince Abdullah**

Before you go too far preparing the briefing for Prince Abdullah, get with the Vice President or Scooter Libbey and get the notes from that meeting so we know what specific issues Prince Abdullah raised so that we can know what specific issues we need to address in the briefing.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
 041502.27

Please respond by: _____

Saudi Arabia

ISAPRO2

U16578 02

11:20 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002
SUBJECT:

048 CIA

I think we ought to get a complete listing of all the CIA money that has been passed out to which people so we have a sense of how we can start to pull these threads together. If he doesn't want to give it to the NSC that is fine with me. But I do want to see it myself.

Do you want me to do it or do you want to do it?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041502.25

Please respond by:

4/23/02

ISA PRO 2

U16579 02

#17 showfile
1993

9:10 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002
SUBJECT:

Larry Di Rita
4/17

4-18 Dove

220

Bio Attached

Should we take a Sgt. Major with when we go to the "Stans" the next time?

Should we have one with us when we go to Ft. Lewis and the Air Transport Command? *SM.*

Thanks.

DHR/azn
04/15/02

Please respond by: 4/16/02

Larry - Sgt Major of Army is travelling w/ us.

U16580 02

/SAPR02

9:27 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 16, 2002
SUBJECT: *The Washington Post* Article

What is this article about "Military Courts Get New Powers?" I don't understand it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041602.05

Attach: Early Bird: *Military Courts Get New Powers* **The Washington Post**; 4/14/02

Please respond by: 4/16/02

015

16APR02

U16582 02

Washington Post
April 14, 2002
Pg. 6

Military Courts Get New Powers

Life Sentences, Adultery Prosecutions Among Rules Bush Invoked

By Associated Press

Military courts could sentence some criminals to life without parole and forbid witnesses to talk to reporters under changes to the manual for courts-martial issued by the White House.

The changes also spell out for the first time rules for prosecuting members of the military for adultery. The rules say the adultery must either damage military order and discipline or hurt the military's reputation.

The new rules, issued Friday, take effect May 15. As commander in chief, President Bush has the power to write regulations controlling military courts.

Bush's new rules allow military courts to sentence defendants to life in prison either with or without parole for serious crimes such as murder, rape and kidnapping. Previously, the courts could sentence those criminals to a life sentence with no determination of whether parole would be allowed.

The new rules also allow military judges to issue "gag orders" prohibiting witnesses or parties to a case from discussing the case outside the courtroom. Civilian courts sometimes issue such orders to prevent public statements judges believe could improperly influence jurors.

Eric Seitz, a California lawyer who has been involved with more than 1,000 court-martial cases, said the gag order could be unconstitutional, depending on how broadly it is applied.

"I suppose that in the military people can be ordered not to communicate to people outside the command structure," Seitz said. "But outside of that, there may be a problem with a military judge ordering civilians not to talk."

Adultery by a member of the military is a crime that can lead to a dishonorable discharge and up to one year in prison.

The new rules state that adultery "is clearly unacceptable conduct" but that to be a crime it "must either be directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting." That means the adultery must have a divisive effect on a military unit or be so well known that it dishonors the military.

In deciding whether to charge someone with criminal adultery, commanding officers should consider circumstances including the rank of the offenders, the misuse of government time or resources, whether the adultery persisted despite orders to halt it and its impact on the military unit.

"The way in which adultery is pursued as a crime has been vastly unfair for years," Seitz said. "High-ranking officials have affairs in full view of other officials and then the military decides to make an example of a private. If these rules create a more fair situation, I am for it."

Earlier rules had said that adultery must damage military discipline or hurt the military's reputation to be a crime, but they did not spell out how that was to be determined.

The military had several public cases of adultery during the late 1990s. In 1997, Lt. Kelly Flinn, the Air Force's first female B-52 pilot, resigned rather than face adultery charges for an affair with the husband of another Air Force member.

Flinn's case led to charges by critics that there was a double standard that shielded male officers from adultery charges.

Since then, at least four generals and admirals have been punished for adultery and related offenses. They include retired Maj. Gen. David Hale, the highest-ranking Army officer to face a court-martial since 1952, and Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney, then the Army's highest-ranking enlisted soldier.

show file
1003

12:43 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT:

Handwritten scribbles and initials.

383.6

Give me a copy of that Amnesty International article. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

Faint handwritten notes.

DHR/azn
041302.15

Please respond by: 4/26/02

4/23

did not copy entire page.
17APPRO2

U16583 02

8. **Pentagon Wish List Gets Costlier**
(Chicago Tribune)....Michael Kilian
The estimated cost of new major weapons systems and other big ticket items has risen \$6 billion since September, according to a Defense Department report.
9. **Repairing The Pentagon**
(Washington Post)....Unattributed
Done by Sept. 11, 2002 -- that's what the people at the Pentagon hope. They want the awful hole in the building's side to be repaired by the anniversary of the attack.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

10. **Accidental Blast Kills 4 American Soldiers In Afghanistan**
(New York Times)....Thom Shanker
At least four American soldiers were killed and one was wounded in the Afghan desert outside Kandahar today in an accidental explosion while the troops were disposing of rockets seized during the war, officials said.
11. **Four GI's Killed On Demolition Duty In Afghanistan**
(Washington Post)....Peter Baker
Four U.S. soldiers were killed and at least one was wounded today while trying to defuse explosives in the southern city of Kandahar, military officials said.

ARMY

12. **'Good Ole Boys' Still Run Spy Shop**
(Insight Magazine)....Timothy W. Maier
Federal prosecutors are reviewing records and documents to determine whether criminal charges are warranted against senior officials at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) for gross mismanagement by bullying employees in violation of federal work rules, Insight has learned.
13. **Soldier Killed, 3 Injured When Grenade Explodes**
(Baltimore Sun)....Unattributed
A grenade exploded during a live-fire training exercise at Schofield Barracks, killing a soldier and injuring an Annapolis man and two others, Army officials said yesterday.

CAMP X-RAY

14. **Pakistani Officials Plan Guantanamo Visit**
(Washington Times)....Unattributed
Pakistani officials are heading to Cuba soon to meet with Pakistani prisoners held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, officials said yesterday.
15. **Amnesty: U.S. Harming Detainees' Rights**
(Publication)....Unattributed
The treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, undermines human rights and may be cruel and degrading, Amnesty International said in a report sent to the U.S. government last week and made public in London yesterday.

IRAQ

16. **Rumsfeld Disputes Value Of Iraq Arms Inspections**
(Washington Post)....Walter Pincus
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday he was skeptical that a new United Nations arms inspection regime would build confidence that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is not developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
17. **Skepticism Of New Weapons Search In Iraq Seems To Counter Bush Call**
(Wall Street Journal)....Greg Jaffe
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, appearing to undercut President Bush's call for renewed weapons inspections in

Amnesty International news release:

<http://www.amnesty.org>

[back](#)

USA: Treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay undermines human rights.

Amnesty International memorandum to the US government

15 April 2002 AI Index : AMR 51/054/2002

Despite repeated statements since 11 September that it remains committed to international law and standards, the US Government is failing to match its actions to this rhetoric following the attacks on New York and Washington last year, Amnesty International said today.

The organization released today the text of a memorandum sent to the US Government detailing some of the organization's concerns under international law and standards relating to detainees in US custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay.

"The US government must ensure that all its actions in relation to those in its custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay comply with international law and standards," Amnesty International said. "This is crucial if justice is to be done and seen to be done, and if respect for the rule of law and human rights is not to be undermined."

Amnesty International is also renewing its request for access to the detainees held in Camp X-Ray in Guantánamo Bay, who are due to be transferred later this month to a new facility under construction at the naval base. The organization has had no reply to its initial request made on 22 January.

As the memorandum details, the USA has denied or threatens to deny the internationally recognized rights of people taken into its custody in Afghanistan and elsewhere, some 300 of whom have been transferred to Camp X-Ray in Guantánamo Bay. Among other things, Amnesty International is concerned that the US Government has:

- transferred and held people in conditions that may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and that violate other minimum standards relating to detention;
- refused to grant people in its custody access to legal counsel, despite ongoing interrogations which may lead to prosecutions;
- refused to grant people in its custody access to the courts to challenge the lawfulness of their detention;
- refused to disclose full information about the circumstances of many of the arrests, including whether they occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere;
- undermined human rights protections in cases of people taken into custody outside Afghanistan and transferred to Guantánamo Bay. For example, six Algerian nationals were seized in Bosnia-Herzegovina and transferred to Camp X-Ray, in apparent violation of Bosnian and international law;
- undermined the presumption of innocence through a pattern of public commentary on the presumed guilt of the Guantánamo detainees;

11-L-0559/OSD/11982

- threatened to apply a second-class justice system by selecting foreign nationals for trial before military commissions - executive bodies lacking clear independence from the executive and with the power to hand down death sentences, and without the right of appeal to an independent and impartial court;
- raised the prospect of indefinite detention without charge or trial, or continued detention after acquittal by military commission, or repatriation that may threaten the principle of *non-refoulement*;
- failed to show that it conducted an impartial and thorough investigation into allegations of human rights violations against Afghan villagers detained by US soldiers in Afghanistan.

The US government has refused to grant any of the detainees in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay prisoner of war status, or to bring any disputed cases before a competent tribunal as required under the Geneva Conventions.

"The USA's pick and choose approach to the Geneva Conventions is unacceptable, as is its failure to respect fundamental international human rights standards," Amnesty International said.

The organization is making numerous recommendations to the US government in the memorandum, and is separately seeking further information on cases raised in it.

****The memorandum is available on the web at:
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510532002>**

**** Amnesty International has already issued two reports on the arrests of thousands of non-US nationals inside the USA in post-11 September sweeps, which also found a failure on the part of the US authorities to live up to international human rights standards. Please see
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510442002>**

COPYRIGHT NOTICE

The copyright for all information available at this Web site rests with Amnesty International. You may download and read these documents. You may not alter this information, repost or sell it without permission. If you use any of these documents, you are encouraged to make a donation to Amnesty International to support future research. The address of your nearest AI office can be found here.

[back](#)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

# Introduction - All detainees and prisoners have rights	1
# The USA's stated commitment to international law and standards	7
# Human rights safeguards circumvented - the urgent need for <i>habeas corpus</i>	11
# US responsibilities relating to detainees in Afghan and Pakistani custody	15
# The investigation into killings and alleged ill-treatment of detainees by US soldiers	17
# Concerns over identification of detainees, and their access to family	22
# The interrogation of detainees and denial of access to counsel	26
# The status of detainees captured in connection to the conflict in Afghanistan	29
# The conditions of transfer to, and detention in, Guantánamo Bay	32
# Undermining the presumption of innocence	37
# The principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> and the right to seek asylum	40
# The prospect of indefinite detention without trial or after acquittal	42
# The threat of trials by military commission	44
# The death penalty	58
# Conclusion and recommendations	59

4/19 1102

12:27 PM

SF23
4/19

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT:

Do we have to brief the contingency planning guidance at the National Security Counsel?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041302.13

Please respond by: _____

- Yes, we do.
- Briefing is being prepared
- I've asked diRita to find time.
- Will brief Rice, Powell, V.P. ahead of time
- Suggest you brief President in private, first; then give a "high level" brief to full NSC.

SK
4/18

1337

INAPRO2

U16585 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11985

TO: Powell Moore
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 DATE: April 17, 2002
 SUBJECT: Congressman Taylor

We need to get an answer for Congressman Taylor about that Uzbekistan chemical waste issue.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 041802.01

Please respond by: _____

Interim response attached
 4/23
 4/20

UZBEKISTAN

19A PR02

U16586 02

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Powell Moore

DATE: April 25, 2002

SUBJECT: **Congressman Taylor's Uzbekistan Question (Ref. snowflake # 041802.01)**

Health Affairs is coordinating with the DUSD (Installations and Environment), the Joint Staff, and the Department of the Army, to formulate a response to Congressman Taylor's recent query regarding U.S. forces stationed in Uzbekistan.

The Department of the Army has assessed the health implications of the environmental hazards identified at this site. The risks to U.S. service personnel are assessed to be low and no acute health problems have been reported. The Department of the Army provided Congressman Taylor with a classified briefing on this issue on March 21. Congressman Taylor has indicated that he desires an update on the potential health risks in the form of a letter from you.

Health Affairs will have a letter ready for your signature no later than May 2.

11-L-0559/OSD/11987

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 17, 2002
 SUBJECT:

Here is a copy of a letter from Barbara Boxer. You might want to ask to meet with her and talk to her and explain our department's and government's position on this subject.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
 041902.19

Attach: Letter from Barbara Boxer dated 3/20/02

Please respond by: _____

AFghanistan

17 APR 02

U16587 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11988

BARBARA BOXER
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES
COMMERCE SCIENCE
AND TRANSPORTATION

ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS
FOREIGN RELATIONS

United States Senate OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
SUITE 112
WASHINGTON DC 20510-0505
(202) 224-3553

2002 APR -8 AM 8: 23

senator@boxer.senate.gov
http://boxer.senate.gov

March 20, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301



Secretary of Defense

SA0007186

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

I am very disappointed that the Bush Administration has rejected proposals to expand the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan beyond Kabul. This decision, I fear, will allow for continued lawlessness in many parts of Afghanistan and make it even more difficult to reconstruct a viable post-Taliban Afghanistan.

In particular, I am concerned that the lack of an international force will make it difficult for women to regain their rightful place in Afghan society. There are many reports that the lack of security has hindered the restoration of women rights, reconstruction, and the delivery of desperately needed assistance to women and children. This is one of the important reasons why U N Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Afghan Interim Administration Chairman Hamid Karzai have repeatedly called for the expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force.

The Washington Post ran an editorial today which contained a line I hope you will take to heart: "If the Afghan people were liberated from Taliban rule only to fall prey to returning warlords, history will not credit the United States with much of a victory." I fear that the time and funds needed to properly train and deploy a national Afghan military will allow various warlords to recreate the instability of the early 1990s that led to the rise of the Taliban.

Mr. Secretary, I urge you to reconsider your position on this matter. So that we can speak about the issue of Afghan women and an international security force in greater detail, I renew the request that you might find time on your busy schedule to meet with me and Mavis Leno and Elle Smeal of the Feminist Majority.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

Barbara Boxer
United States Senator

1700 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 240
SAN FRANCISCO CA 94111
(415) 403-0100

312 N. SPRING STREET
SUITE 1748
LOS ANGELES CA 90012
(213) 894-6000

501 I STREET
SUITE 7-600
SACRAMENTO CA 95814
(916) 448-2787

1130 O STREET
SUITE 2450
FRESNO CA 93721
(559) 497-5109

600 B STREET
SUITE 2240
SAN DIEGO CA 92101
(619) 239-3889

201 NORTH E STREET
SUITE 210
SAN BERNARDINO CA 92401
(909) 888-8525

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/11989

U06218 /02

9:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT: **Meetings with the Members of the House of Representatives
And Meetings with the US Senate**

032

I just completed both visits today. They are vastly more efficient than doing hearings or individual calls.

I get a chance to see 40-50 Senators on a friendly basis, as opposed to a hostile basis. It is off the record, classified and relaxed. It's the same thing with the House. I get to see a few hundred members of the House of Representatives at a crack, on a friendly basis. They get to hear a lot of nice comments from other members that are particularly friendly and, all in all, it is an enormously valuable one-hour on each side.

It seems to me that I ought to do these visits more often. We ought to keep offering us up and every time they are in session we ought to do it every two or three weeks. The reaction is so positive and people are so appreciative. They all say they are interested in having us come up. I think we are not making as effective use of these opportunities as we could be.

Please come to me and show me a schedule for the rest of the year as to how you propose to do it.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041702.45

Please respond by: _____

11A9202

11-L-0559/OSD/11990

U16588 02

6:48 PM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT: **Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

Done 4/17

Done 6/20

383.6

Please get back to me and make sure you tell me what was going on with that Congressman's problem in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba who talked to us in the House today.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041702.41

Please respond by: _____

Done

U16589 02

11-L-0559/OSD/11991

11APR02

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 17, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Illinois Delegation**

032

When the Illinois delegation came down, was it just the Republicans or was it Republicans and Democrats. It seems to me it was just Republicans. If that is the case, we ought to have the Democrats down too, I think.

See me.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
 041702.40

Please respond by: _____ *1/25/02*

17 Apr 02

U16590 02

TO: Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 17, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Kandahar Blast Victims**

Afghanistan

These people who were killed I think we may want to mention at one of the early press briefings coming up.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041702.39

Attach: Kandahar Blast Victims Named Article

INAPRO2

Please respond by: _____

4/19/02

Special correspondent Kamran Khan contributed to this report.

Kandahar Blast Victims Named

From news services

The Pentagon yesterday identified four American soldiers killed in an explosion while blowing up suspected abandoned Taliban rockets near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

The four Army soldiers killed during the explosives clearing operation Monday were Staff Sgt. Brian Craig, 27, of Texas; Staff Sgt. Justin Galewski, 28, of Kansas; Sgt. Jamie Maugans, 27, of Kansas; and Sgt. 1st Class Daniel Romero, 30, of Colorado.

Their hometowns were not provided.

Craig, Galewski and Maugans were members of the 710th Explosive Ordnance Detachment based at San Diego. Romero was with the 19th Special Forces Group based at Pueblo, Colo.

The accident is under investigation, the Pentagon said.

U16591 02

snowflake

1:54 PM

Done

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT:

1 copy to [unclear]

400.13

I just read this memo from Jim Haynes on credit card abuse. Seems to me it is important to remember that when you are in arrears, you are charging the government interest, and when you charge the government interest for personal things you have charged on the government credit card, you are stealing money from the government.

I don't think that a lax attitude about this is the proper thing. It reflects misunderstanding about the cost of money.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041702.26

Attach: Haynes response to snowflake (3/15/02) Re: Credit Card Abuse 4/8/02

Please respond by: 4/23/02

*4/30
Haynes response
attached*

5/1

19APR02

U16592 02



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

April 29, 2002, 8:20 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*
4/30/02

SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

- After reading our memorandum on credit card abuse, you expressed concern that arrears result in interest charges to the Government (TAB A).
- The current delinquencies are almost entirely a problem with the travel card program, and not the purchase card program.
- Under the travel card program, cardholders are personally responsible for card debts although they sign an agreement to use the card only for official travel expenses. The Government does not pay interest under the travel card program.
- The cardholder is personally responsible for any late fees that might accrue under the travel card program, except in very unusual and limited circumstances related to mission-critical travel.
- I agree that we cannot have a lax attitude, and Dr. Aldridge and Dr. Zakheim have an extensive process ongoing to review and improve management controls for both the purchase card and travel card programs.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Elizabeth Buchanan, (b)(6)

cc: USD (AT-L)
USD (Comptroller)



11-L-0559/OSD/11995



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

April 3, 2002, 12:05PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 4/3/02*

SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

- You asked about the \$62 million of credit card waste and card misuse. There are two different charge card programs with different issues.

- The travel card program

- Senator Grassley said that DoD personnel defaulted on \$62 million in "official" travel expenses. We believe this figure is generally correct.
- The contractor reported debts on individual cards of \$60 million (M). It collected \$22M and asked DoD to collect \$35M through salary offset. DoD is now collecting most of this through salary offset.
- Senator Grassley and Representative Horn provided to you a list of 709 officers who reportedly were in arrears on their travel cards. There is no allegation of misuse – rather, Grassley and Horn allege payments are late.
- Cardholders are personally responsible for card debts although they sign an agreement to use the card only for official travel expenses.
- The Military Departments are investigating and will prepare a response.

- The purchase card program

- There are allegations that both civilian and military personnel used the purchase card for personal purchases.
- It appears that there has been an uneven record of the use of internal controls, although efforts are underway to rectify this.
- Both programs: USD(AT&L)(purchase card proponent) and USD(C)(travel card proponent) are developing initiatives to provide better internal controls over both the purchase and travel card programs.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Elizabeth Buchanan

(b)(6)



March 15, 2002 8:33 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

*any DI Files
7/12*

What is the story on the \$62 million of credit card waste and officers using the cards to make personal rather than official purchases?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-8

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

*48- 2/4/16
sec Def -
Zakheim and Allbidge
recently announced a series
of steps to tighten
procedures, improve accountability,
and intensify action against
violators, too. ~~...~~
~~...~~
S. Lib.*

1:38 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT:

Please see me on the attached remarks from Newt Gingrich.


Thank you.

DHR/azn
041702.24

Attach: Email from Newt Gingrich re: Predator Buy 4/9/02

Please respond by: 4/22/02

452 R



17 Apr 02

U16595 02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD / From Newt Gingrich

cc to Wolfowitz

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2002 11:52 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: predator buy

for secdef, depsecdef
from Newt 4/09/02
Predator orders

we are currently buying predators at a pathetically low rate. Given losses in combat and the potentia; use of this system we should be ordering probably four times their current production run for the original Predator (we are getting two a month).

We should also place a two year order for Predator Bs so they can ramp up the production facility (they currently have two delivered and three on order, they should have an order for at least 36.)

At \$3 million a copy you could be wrong in buying too many and still waste less money than most expensive systems lose routinely. A typical cost overrun for a bog system would pay for all the Predators you will buy.

We keep letting the best be the enemy of the good and time wasting perfect analysis kill entrepreneurial instinctive action.

snowflake

1:24 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 17, 2002
SUBJECT:

We might want to use this story of the Atlanta bomber some time with your press people if they wonder why we can't find somebody.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041702.20

Attach: Info on Eric Rudolph 4/16/02

Please respond by: _____

UNCLASSIFIED HAS BEEN
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/2002

4/23
response attached

4/24

000.5

17 Apr 02

U16594 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12001

4/24
Lone DI

4:24
1:00

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Tonye Clarke
DATE: April 25, 2002
SUBJECT: Atlanta Bomber

I have provided the article to each of the press officers, the speechwriters and the public inquiries directorate. We will use the information whenever we can. This is very compelling information.

April 16, 2002/Di Rita

Subj: Wanted: Eric Rudolph /Atlanta Bomber

As we have discussed. He went on the Most Wanted List May 1, 1998. The attached article from a couple weeks ago indicates the FBI has stopped searching for him after four years, \$30 million.

Note this particular passage from the article:

“The last known sighting of Rudolph was in July 1998...Investigators believe Rudolph is still alive and he is hiding somewhere nearby, possibly in one of the hundreds of caves and abandoned mines in the region or in the Nantahala National Forest, which covers about 500,000 acres.”

For comparison purposes, Afghanistan covers 157 million acres.

Welcome

Netscape F

CNN.com / U.S.

SEARCH

- MAIN PAGE
- WORLD
- U.S.
- WEATHER
- BUSINESS
- SPORTS
- POLITICS
- LAW
- SCI-TECH
- SPACE
- HEALTH
- ENTERTAINMENT
- TRAVEL
- EDUCATION
- IN-DEPTH

FBI cuts search for accused Olympic bomber

March 20, 2002 Posted: 11:00 PM EST (0400 GMT)

[5-day For](#)
[Try 4 issu](#)
[Centuries](#)
[Shop our](#)

From Henry Schuster and Brian Cabell
CNN



Eric Robert Rudolph

ATLANTA, Georgia (CNN) -- After a nearly four-year, more than \$30 million manhunt, the FBI is scaling back its search for suspected 1996 Olympic bomber Eric Robert Rudolph, according to officials in the case.

Rudolph has been on the FBI's Most Wanted list since May 1998 for a string of bombings in Atlanta, including the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Summer Olympics, and an abortion clinic in Birmingham,

Alabama.

At one time, more than 200 agents from the FBI and other federal and state agencies were combing the hills of western North Carolina looking for Rudolph, but the search was cut back years ago.

Recently, the Southeast Bomb Task Force had about one dozen agents operating out of an annex to the FBI field office in Atlanta and had an agent on duty full-time in Andrews, North Carolina. Now, even that presence is to be cut back, an FBI official said.

"We are pretty much done," said Todd Letcher, who runs the Southeast Bomb Task Force. The task force has also finished compiling evidence to be turned over to a defense team, should the case against Rudolph ever reach court.

While Letcher said no final decision has been made, the fugitive part of the investigation will probably be transferred to the FBI's field office in Charlotte, North Carolina. That is most likely to happen in June, he said.

"We will continue to look until we find him or find evidence that he is dead," a senior FBI official told CNN. "But basically, it is a fugitive case."

VIDEO

CNN's Art Harris talks with surviving daughter of an Olympic park bombing victim (July 27, 2001)



Play video

- SAVE THIS
- EMAIL THIS
- PRINT THIS
- MOST POPULAR

- QUICK NEWS
- LOCAL
- COMMUNITY
- MULTIMEDIA
- E-MAIL SERVICES
- CNNtoGO
- ABOUT US/HELP

- CNN TV
- what's on
- show transcripts
- CNN Headline News
- CNN International
- askCNN

- EDITIONS
- CNN.com Asia
- CNN.com Europe
- CNNenEspanol.com
- CNNArabic.com
- set your edition

Languages

Time, Inc.

The official said it made more sense to have that probe run out of North Carolina.

EXTRA INFORMATION



[The hunt for Eric Rudolph](#)

LEGAL RESOURCES

Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms assigned to the task force have been asked to work on other cases, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Letcher himself ran the FBI's operation to receive tips on the terrorist attacks for several weeks.

[Latest Legal News](#)

[Law Library](#)

[FindLaw Consumer Center](#)

Select a topic

The first bombing Rudolph is accused of was the Centennial Olympic Park blast, which killed one person and wounded more than 100 others. He also is charged with carrying out 1997 bombings at an abortion clinic and a gay-oriented nightclub in Atlanta.

Rudolph disappeared after the 1998 bombing of a Birmingham abortion clinic that killed a police officer and seriously injured a nurse, Emily Lyons. Lyons said she understands the decision to scale back the task force, but said she wonders if Rudolph will ever be caught.



Nurse Emily Lyons was seriously injured in the 1998 bombing of a Birmingham abortion clinic.

"If he's like the Unabomber that took so long to be caught, I may be gone by then. I'd love to have it happen while I'm still alive and fairly young. Reality? I'm not sure if that will happen," said Lyons, who was maimed and blinded in one eye in the explosion at the New Woman All Women Clinic in Birmingham.

Rudolph was living in a trailer on the outskirts of Murphy, North Carolina, where investigators tracked him the day after the Birmingham bombing in January 1998. By the time federal agents

moved in, he had disappeared.

The last known sighting of Rudolph was in July 1998, when he surfaced to get supplies from health food owner George Nordmann.

Investigators believe Rudolph is still alive and he is hiding somewhere nearby, possibly in one of the hundreds of caves and abandoned mines in the region or in the Nantahala National Forest, which covers about 500,000 acres.

Rudolph and his family moved to the area when he was a teenager. Investigators and those close to Rudolph said he would occasionally disappear into the woods for weeks on end and that he grew marijuana in the woods.

"I still believe Eric is in western North Carolina, I believe he's still alive and I believe one day he'll be caught," said Charles Stone, a retired Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent who was a task force supervisor.

By June, only a very small group of people will be maintaining the case files

12:52 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 17, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please get back to me fast with the formers and the currents on the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board and how we are going to respond to those questions.

Thank you.

Done 4/20

334 DSB

DHR/azn
041702 17

Please respond by: _____

4/17/02

4/19 -

SecDef - A summary of what we did to educate the reporter is attached. Torie's proposed actions (letter from Foley, speak with [redacted]) are appropriate. No [redacted] should have let it go. Di Rita

17 April 02

U16595 02 -
11-L-0559/OSD/120000

April 18, 2002 10:00 A.M.

TO: SECDEF
FROM: TORIE CLARKE
SUBJECT: Defense Science & Policy Boards

We have done several things and will do more:

- 1) Provided Ricks, with pre and post Jan. 2001 DPB ad DSB rosters demonstrating impartiality of members.
- 2) Talked with Ricks, urged him to talk with certain members.
- 3) Sent attached emails
- 4) Have contacted Tom Foley to request a letter to the editor from him.
- 5) Have talked to Tom Ricks
- 6) Will talk with Ricks' editor.

Attachments:
As stated

mct
041702-17

11-L-0559/OSD/12007

Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA

From: Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 3:04 PM
To: 'rickst@washpost.com'
Subject: like ships passing....

In case we don't hook up again:

I don't know what information you may have already gotten from Press Ops, but let me pile on:

On the DPB, at least six members resigned to take Admin positions. Among the holdovers is Harold Brown. New members include Barry Blechman (Carter ACDA), Jim Woolsey and James Schlesinger (Rs & Ds). In addition, the SecDef added Tom Foley. Additionally, we added a Nobel prize winner and retired Admirals and Generals -- not exactly partisan types.

On the Science Board, the pattern continues. Members represent a very diverse and respected group of science, technology and security experts. Dr. Etter was DUSD (S&T) from 98-2000. Paul Kaminski was the USD (AT&L) from 94-97.

Most importantly is the SecDef's approach to this process. He assembled a range of highly respected individuals from a variety of experiences and backgrounds. They include former Secretaries of Defense, Nobel prize winners and retired military. They were chosen for their experience and insights; political persuasions are irrelevant. The Boards' membership reflects Secretary Rumsfeld's principles regarding all DOD matters -- that is -- we are non partisan in all that we do. As he has said, "Do nothing that is or could be seen as partisan. We have to earn the support of all the people of the country and in the Congress. To do so we must serve all elements of our society without favor."

The Secretary has made that point clear repeatedly in meetings and in writing. There is zero-tolerance for partisanship of any kind on his watch.

I hope this helps, Tom. Let's try to hook up.

tc

Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA

From: Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Saturday, April 13, 2002 2:57 PM
To: 'rickst@washpost.com'
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: in the meantime...

Tom:

Did talk with Larry briefly about this. A few things:

At the very beginning of his term here, the SecDef told Larry repeatedly and with emphasis that he wanted Democrats on both Boards. Thus you have Foley, Woolsey, Brown, etc.

Additionally, he frequently meets with various former SecDefs -- Rs and Ds -- as well as others from the national security arena that happen to be Democrats (e.g. Gary Hart).

Additionally, the SecDef's principles (I'll find a copy and get them to you) on how to run this place start with the statement that we are non-partisan in our approach to all matters and issues.

In short, I think has gone out of his way -- and succeeded -- to be very non-partisan.

The people selected for the DPB and DSB were picked because of their extensive and varied backgrounds and experiences in national security affairs, not their political persuasion.

tk

tc

GR: First thing in the a.m., can you find for me a copy of the SecDef's principles?

7:28 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 18, 2002
SUBJECT: **Black Hole**

I looked at your "Black Hole" memo again today. It was dated December 20, 2001. I think we have cut out two or three of those layers.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041802.06

Please respond by: _____

312

18 Apr 02

U16596 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12010

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

FEB 11 2002

December 20, 2001 10:20 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: The "Black Hole"

You have frequently complained at staff meetings that paper takes far too long to get to you. You've called it the "black hole."

- I thought I would give you some observations as to the source of your concern.
- If my experience is the same as that of others (and your comments indicate that it probably is), there are simply too many layers between your senior staff and you.
- When I first came on board, my replies to your "snowflakes" went virtually directly to you.
- Then we were told they needed a special format.
- Then we were told they had to go through the Executive Secretary.
- Then we were told they had first to go through Larry DiRita.
- Then we were told they had to go through DepSecDef.
- Then we were told they had to go through Jaymie Durnan, DepSec's special assistant.

That is a lot of layers.

There will always be at least one person, often more, who will be unable to resist the temptation to make some change, however minor, to whatever is sent to you.

Every change takes time: time for the paper to get back to your senior staff, time to revise, time to send it out again.

No wonder you are upset.

I wonder if this will ever get to you.

11-L-0559/OSD/12011

4/22 snowflake
1500

7:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 18, 2002
SUBJECT:

Have someone pull together a list of the countries I have been in and the cities in those countries and the number of times. Also the same thing with the states, the bases and troop visits.

333 SD

If I looked at this as a template, we will begin to see what I have not been doing that I should be doing, and time seems to fly. So we want to try to get some balance into it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041102.14

Please respond by:

4/18/02

5/8

→ Col Belman -

Please let's discuss this. P.L. like you to do this. Thank

D. Rita
7/9

18 Apr 02

7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 18, 2002
 SUBJECT:

339 JROC

In the future, these events that I go to, the read-ahead should tell me how many people are going to be there, what the format is.

How many will be at this Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, for example.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041802.11

Please respond by: 4/19/02

18 APR 02

U16598 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12013

422
1300
snowflake

7:35 AM

Done 5/7

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 18, 2002
SUBJECT:

689

Attached is the *ArmyTimes.com* article on the office complex near the Pentagon. We want to make sure we get that stopped. Please do it and then tell me.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041802.09

Attach: Early Bird: *ArmyTimes.com* DoD May Revamp Plans For New Office Complex 4/16/02

Please respond by:

4/24/02

*To: ASP/ATIL -
Pete -
Done*

180CT02

U16600 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12014

Even though Khan has repeatedly threatened to attack Gardez, Wardak's fighters said he was having lunch in the US compound yesterday.

New York Times
April 17, 2002

11. Pentagon Revamping Command Structure

By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON, April 16 — The Pentagon is revamping its worldwide command structure, underscoring the new priorities of defending against terrorist attacks and injecting more innovation into how the military trains, equips and fights.

These changes in war-fighting duties at home and abroad, expected to be announced on Wednesday by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, aim to help the military deal more effectively with unconventional threats from unpredictable sources, as in the Sept. 11 attacks.

"It will be a plan which will restructure and streamline a number of aspects of the military command, which we believe will better fit it for the challenges of the 21st century," Mr. Rumsfeld said on Monday.

The biggest change will be the creation of the Northern Command to coordinate responses to terrorist attacks within the nation's borders, senior military officials said today. The command would coordinate its activities with the White House Office of Homeland Security.

The command would have a four-star general in charge of all military personnel involved in flying patrols over American cities, guarding the coasts and responding to major terrorist attacks, the officials said.

President Bush is widely expected to nominate Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, head of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to the new post. General Eberhart would also be responsible for coordinating the military's response to disasters like floods, hurricanes and forest fires, officials said. The Army works on those tasks now.

The commander would also oversee a unit known as

the Joint Task Force Civil Support, which is trained to respond to attacks that involve chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The Joint Forces Command, based in Norfolk, Va., now supervises the task force.

Under the new plan, the biggest overhaul in the command structure in decades, the Joint Forces Command would cede its responsibility to defend the Eastern Seaboard to the Northern Command and focus primarily on providing combat-ready forces to commanders around the globe.

The plan seeks to make the Joint Forces Command battle laboratory for training the armed services to fight together more effectively.

The plan, which has been outlined to Congress and allies, will draw new lines of geographic responsibilities for the regional commanders in chief, known as Cincs (pronounced sinks). Those senior commanders take presidential orders from the defense secretary through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The 1986 law that created the system also required that the command structure be reviewed at least every two years. The last time changes were made was in 1999 under Defense Secretary William S. Cohen.

Military officials said Russia would for the first time be assigned to the "area of operations" of an American regional commander, in this case the commander in chief of the European Command. As much because of sensitivities in Moscow as anything else, officials said, Russia had not fallen under the responsibility of any of the so-called war-fighting commanders. Managing the United States-Russia military-to-military relationship had been the domain of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Details of the changes have been dribbling out for months. National security experts said the details in their totality amounted to a significant reorganization of the military.

"Most of the changes are details in how military works," Michael O'Hanlon, a military

analyst at the Brookings Institution, said. "But having one person in charge of the military's response to homeland security and one-person response for innovation is important and useful."

ArmyTimes.com
April 16, 2002

12. DoD May Revamp Plans For New Office Complex Near Pentagon

By Vince Crowley, Times staff writer

The Defense Department plans to build a new office-building complex beside the Pentagon, but the project may be scaled back from original proposals because of concerns that a large facility could become a target for terrorists.

The Defense Department is seeking \$18 million in fiscal 2003 to buy about seven acres of vacant riverfront property next to the Pentagon, according to DoD documents. The site, near the Potomac River in Arlington, Va., formerly was a hotel.

When first envisioned, proposals included an office tower complex of as much as 900,000 square feet — one-fifth the size of the Pentagon itself — which, when renovations are complete, will accommodate about 25,000 people.

However, the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, which killed 125 employees, has sparked security concerns about building a new landmark military structure that could become a target.

Planners are now looking at options on a much smaller scale — in the range of 250,000 to 300,000 square feet, said Glenn Flood, a Pentagon spokesman.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would have final say over any military construction within 100 miles of the nation's capital, Flood said.

The project originally aimed to consolidate workers from more than 50 sites around the Washington, D.C., area that are now leased by the military.

Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer
April 16, 2002

13. Shelton Upgraded To Fair Condition

A staff report

Gen. Hugh Shelton continues to make progress at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, officials said.

His condition was upgraded to "fair" on Monday and he was moved to a regular ward at the hospital in Washington.

The timing of any surgery would depend on the rate of Shelton's neurological progress.

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been hospitalized since injuring his spine in a fall at his home in Virginia on March 23.

Shelton is former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps. He stepped down Oct. 1 as the nation's senior military official in uniform.

Fayetteville (NC) Observer
April 17, 2002

14. Army Official Praises Bragg

White describes future of defense

By Henry Cuningham, Military editor

The Army's top civilian leader Tuesday hailed Fort Bragg and its role in defending the nation.

"Fort Bragg, as it has traditionally been for the past 80-some years, is central to the Army's future," Army Secretary Thomas E. White said.

White cited the rapid-deployment capabilities of Fort Bragg's 18th Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division and special operations forces.

"You wrote the book here on power projection with the combination with Pope Air Force Base that has now been emulated in a number of installations across our Army," White said.

Fort Bragg paratroopers board Air Force airplanes at Pope's Green Ramp for local training and worldwide deployments. Pope C-130 Hercules cargo planes routinely carry Fort Bragg soldiers on airdrop

4/18/02 snowflake

7:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: April 18, 2002
SUBJECT:

5/7

383.6

We need a good answer for Senator Nelson and Senator Roberts on Spiker. They have asked if we would move him from MIA to POW. We need to get a good answer. He says Peter Rodman's got it.

Get back to me on it, please.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041802.03

11/05/02

Please respond by: _____

18 Apr 02

U16601 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12016

4/20
1300

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: April 20, 2002
SUBJECT:

We are getting questions on the Northern Command. I am answering them, and others are. We ought to start getting a list of Q&As and make sure they are cleared with Ridge so he is not surprised and he knows how we are answering them.

NORTH Com

Thanks.

DHR/azn
042002.05

Please respond by:

4/24/02

4/22

4/22

SECRET -

SecDef -

Attached are the Q&As that were part of our press package. We briefed these throughout the Administration, and provided copies to Governor Ridge's staff. We also sent Cambone to 144-L-6559 OSD/120177 separately.

~~We did this. We briefed Abbott prior to the roll-out so he and Ridge would be on the same page, too. I'll send you what we are using.~~

Di Rita

20 APR 02

144-L-6559 OSD/120177 U16602 02

- The QDR's defense strategy extends America's influence and preserves America's security while recognizing the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise.
- The revised UCP underscores three key tenets of the QDR:
 - ✓ The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the United States from all enemies.
 - ✓ The U.S. military must sustain its forward commitment to allies and partners.
 - ✓ To meet emerging challenges, the U.S. military must transform.

Questions and answers:

Q. What exactly is the UCP? What does it do?

A. First issued in 1946, the Unified Command Plan periodically revises the missions and responsibilities (including geographical boundaries) of each unified combatant command, such as European Command and Central Command.

Q. What is Russia's status under the Unified Command Plan?

A. For the first time, the U.S. European commander will have responsibility for security cooperation and contingency response planning with Russia. During the Cold War, these issues were managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new status will allow for more cooperation and coordination at the operational level between the militaries of the United States and Russia, and is a signal that the Cold War is over. A commander will have more flexibility to plan exercises and training with the Russians.

Q. What will be Pacific Command's responsibilities under the new Unified Command Plan?

A. The U.S. Pacific Command's responsibilities are unchanged, except that Alaskan territory and the waters of the Pacific out to 500 nautical miles from the U.S. west coast will be assigned to Northern Command for homeland defense responsibilities. Forces based in Alaska will remain assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command. National Science Foundation missions in Antarctica will continue to be supported through PACOM's area of responsibility.

Q. Who is the new Northern Command Commander in Chief?

A. The Secretary of Defense will nominate a candidate to the President. In keeping with longstanding policy, we will announce the selection when the President submits the nomination to the Senate.

Q. Where will the Northern Command be located? Will it be co-located with Joint Forces Command or North American Aerospace Defense Command?

A. Choice of the headquarters site is based on several considerations: military effectiveness, existing facilities, location, force protection, infrastructure and costs. The "preferred alternative" location for the headquarters is Peterson AFB, Colorado. Alternative locations are Offutt AFB, Nebraska and Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia. A final decision will not be made until the Department of Defense reviews environmental assessments of each site being considered. The decision will come within 30 to 90 days after the announcement.

Q. What are the responsibilities of the new Northern Command?

A. The Northern Command will be responsible for the planning of homeland defense missions and DOD's support to civilian authorities in accordance with U.S. law. The U.S. Northern commander will also have responsibility for security cooperation and military coordination with Canada and Mexico as well.

Q. What will be the relationship between Northern Command and Governor Ridge's Office of Homeland Security?

A. The new combatant commander will be responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense, as is every other combatant commander. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will work directly with the Office of Homeland Security, much as the Department of Defense currently works with other cabinet agencies and federal government organizations when needed.

Q. How will this choice affect Joint Forces Command?

A. JFCOM will become the fifth functional combatant command along with SPACECOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM and TRANSCOM. JFCOM's mandate is to play a central role in advancing "jointness" in the U.S. armed forces and it will now be able to focus primarily on those aspects of its mission as well as on assisting with and enhancing DoD's transformation mission.

Q. What is the significance of assigning homeland defense responsibilities to Northern Command?

A. Northern Command will have responsibility for homeland defense missions and DoD's support to civilian authorities. NORTHCOM's mission is a consolidation of some missions currently being performed by Joint Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The military also plays a supporting role to local, state, or non-DoD federal agencies.

Q. Will the Department of Defense be asking for a relaxing or rescinding of the Posse Comitatus act involving military involvement in civilian law enforcement?

A. No. Federal law prohibits direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement and we have no intention of requesting a change to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

Q. Why will the JFCOM commander no longer be assigned to be Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic?

A. JFCOM will no longer have a geographic area of responsibility, thus the commander's responsibilities will not align with the NATO function of SACLANT. The UCP only directs what will be changed in the U.S. chain of command. It does not presuppose NATO command decisions.

Q. How do Canada and Mexico factor into the UCP?

A. The NORTHCOM commander will need to develop plans for the defense of all approaches -- air, land, and sea -- to the United States. As such, he will need to coordinate with our adjacent neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Additionally, the NORTHCOM commander will have responsibility for security cooperation and contingency response planning with Canada and Mexico. Contact between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and their counterparts in Mexico and Canada will continue as it has in the past. The UCP allows routine military interaction and security cooperation to be agreed upon and coordinated through our unified commands. The UCP will provide an operational-level mechanism for cooperation and coordination in addition to, not in place of, existing strategic-level interaction.

4/22
13:00
snowflake

1:31 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 20, 2002
SUBJECT: The Trip to The West


3/5

33350

I don't want or like security guarding me when I am on military bases and in military buildings. If it is safe enough for everyone else, it's safe enough for me unless there is a very specific threat. When I was at Scott and Ft. Lewis, the security people were all around and walking in the halls and leading, and that's just ridiculous. Let's get it stopped.

DHR/azn
042002.02

Please respond by: _____



20 APR 02

U16605 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12021

April 22, 2002 7:53 AM

Done 5/1

NORTHCOM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Cost to Stand Up Northern Command

Abercrombie of Hawaii made some comment that we are asking for \$300 million dollars to stand up Northern Command. That sounds like a lot of money to me.

What is up? Dov Zakheim was with me and he didn't know anything about it either. How can that be?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042702-9

.....

Please respond by 05/03/02 4/30

Sec Def U16604 02

U16604 02

P.S. - We have provided this detail to Abercrombie via Ike Skelton, who also asked.

*- There is \$10 million in the '02 Supplemental
- The \$300 million he is referring to is probably in the '03 budget. We have requested \$296 million for a variety of expenses related to Homeland Security, including costs associated with Northcom. Of that \$296 million, some \$80 million are targeted at Northcom for personnel, etc. That is an estimate, and we will be getting better definition on the numbers.*

22APPRO

IT-L-0559/OSD/12022