

**Feasibility Assessment:** Outsourcing a greater percentage of repairs will require legislative changes, with all their attendant risks. The other proposals have precedents within DoD, but require constant guidance from the DoD senior leadership.

In all cases contract specifications should be written by a contractor (who cannot bid on the contract of course), rather than by the affected agency or agencies. DoD already applies this process for support contracts of all kinds, including independent verification and validation of R&D contracts.

Business Executives for National Security recommends that every defense agency and activity be directed to complete a strategic sourcing study of its organization and report to SecDef. **A more practical solution would be to *contract out* strategic sourcing studies and evaluations of each of the Defense Agencies.**

### **Consolidating Agencies**

In part by drawing upon outsourcing as above, and web-related automation outlined below, DoD could consolidate several of the civilian defense agencies. In particular, the following need to be consolidated, **with instructions to reduce personnel by 15% NLT end FY 02:**

- 9 **Intelligence:** combine DIA, NSA, NIMA, DIS—possibly also NRO, DARO, and Defense Support project Office
- 9 **Health:** combine TRICARE, OCHAMPUS, DMPA (Defense Medical Programs Activity/a field activity)-and possibly USUHS (Uniformed Services University for the Health Sciences)
- 9 **Personnel:** combine WHS (Washington Headquarters Services), DoDEA (DoD Education Activity), HRFA (Human Resources Field Activity) and DEOMI (Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute)
- 9 **Acquisition:** considerable consolidation is possible here as well. but that requires further investigation and discussion
- 9 **Audit function:** consolidate DCAA (Defense Contract Audit Agency) with DCMC (Defense Contract Management Command) and with Service Audit Agencies
- 9 **Restructure criminal investigations organization:**
  - Create Defense bureau of Investigation out of elements of DCIS (Defense Criminal Investigation Service), NCIS (Navy Criminal Investigation Service), AF/OSI (Office of Special Investigations), Army CID (Criminal Investigation Division)—civilianize investigators

- Consolidate all basic training at FLETC
- Outsource specialized and advanced training
- Consolidate all forensic labs under Army as executive agent, and consider outsourcing lab activity
- Consolidate all computer crime lab activity under USAF (including R&D and training)
- Transfer protective service function (bodyguards) from CID to Military Police

**9 Cables:** if OSD Executive Support Center and SecDef cables have not been consolidated with NMCC, this can be done by end FY 01 (WHS continues to provide administrative support)

**Feasibility Assessment:** The bureaucracy will hate all of the foregoing ideas: the DoD-wide Agencies will scream that they are reforming themselves, if only given time. The Service agencies will likewise resist change. No bureaucracy reforms itself. The DoD-wide agencies must all respond to your dictates, the Service secretaries likewise are committed to change. With pressure from your and their immediate offices, these changes are eminently feasible.

## USING THE WEB

DFAS has instituted an Employee/Member Self-Service System (E/MSS) that enables employees and retirees to change routine pay information and discretionary allotments on the web. Active duty military employees still use paper—DoD employees stationed on every base process their forms. E/MSS should be extended to the military. We could incentivize people to use the system, or alternately, simply tell people they have no other option. Best option of all: **contract out E/MSS on a fee-for-service basis, and have the company expand and publicize the system.**

Other services that could be handled over the web (and contracted out) include:

- 9 Household goods
- 9 Parking passes

## Web-Based Training

DoD spends about \$14 billion annually in training programs. The DSB recommended moving training from the schoolhouse to “just-in-time just right” training in the units.

**Current advances in distributed and distance learning would accomplish this objective.**

An example is the American Society of Military Comptrollers (ASMC), which is converting its five-day refresher classroom course to a web-based course. This will reduce per diem, and travel costs, as well as instructor fees.

In general, the cost of designing learning programs would be offset by savings in TDY and other costs associated with moving people to schools, as well as instructor costs.

DoD could immediately undertake studies to design such programs. The studies should be let to private contractors.

**Purchasing Goods**

DFAS only pays bills when three paper items are in hand—contracts, invoices and receiving reports. Pushing full-bore to have all three automated will reduce mistakes, increase processing speed, and minimize the disbursement disparities that infuriate Congress and the GAO. It will also reduce personnel.

DFAS has begun a process called Wide Area Workflow. This should be contracted out for expanded design and then the process itself should be contracted out as well.

**Leave**

Like travel (see above) leave can be automated. The Services may have a strong case for keeping leave processing in-house. But automating the process (the USAF has a prototype) and rendering it uniform across the Services, will save time, and personnel costs. The expansion of the USAF prototype should be contracted out, and a decision can then be made whether or not the entire process can be outsourced.

**Feasibility Assessment:** Many of the foregoing web-related initiatives are already the subject of pilot projects. Defense Agencies must respond to your dictates. All of the foregoing are eminently feasible.

**INDIRECT COST CONTROL**

Direct PA&E to validate current definitions of forces and infrastructure and identify the dollars allocated to each. Within forces category identify dollars allocated to combat, and combat support. These reformulations will enable a more accurate estimate of tooth-to-tail funding ratios, and facilitate program adjustments.

## BRAC AND DEPOTS

Both BRAC reform and outsourcing depot work are motherhood items-except to the Congress. Moreover, the case for savings from BRAC is one that is hotly disputed. One possibility is to focus on specific facility reductions, in particular **further consolidation of DoD laboratories. This could be part of a complete overhaul of the DoD labs system.** Such an overhaul would include a number of elements:

- Hiring private sector scientists under special DoD program (e.g. Interagency Personnel Act) for three year tours
- Relocating consolidated labs close to Service development and procurement centers-about 40% of all labs are support personnel.
- Benefits of consolidation-apart from savings-interaction of researchers, sharing scientific data, etc.
- Most promising areas for consolidation (where there is much duplication among separate service labs): behavioral research, medical research, chemical and biological defense, engineering
- In conjunction with consolidation, **contract out at least an additional 25% S&T work to universities:**
  - Universities have lower overheads. Their researchers are on the cutting edge.
  - In contrast, government labs are populated by aging officials many of whom are not leaders in their scientific fields (according to DSB reports, among others)
  - To sweeten the pot for Senators in particular, commit to contracting out at least 50% of activities from labs that are closed to universities in states in which the closed labs were located

All savings could be returned to Service budgets for procurement and or development programs

- Contracts could be classified, so as to prevent uncleared foreign students and academics from participation

**Feasibility Assessment:** As noted above, anything related to BRAC is inherently controversial. There is no agreement on BRAC within either party. Focusing on labs bites off a smaller part of the problem, but considerable coordination will be required especially with the Majority and Minority leaderships. Committing to keeping r&d

resources and activities within the same states where closed labs were situated should help DoD's effort.

## OTHER IDEAS

### **Activity Based Costing**

This approach to costing, which lumps together all activities that contribute to a given outcome and calculates their associate costs, is a favorite of reformers because it has been successfully implemented in private industry. Moreover, there have been some Service experiments with ABC.

**Feasibility Assessment:** Little money has thus far been saved though ABC. Moreover, the task is very time consuming, and is a particular drain on senior managers who must make the decisions that could save money. I worry that DoD will engage in a "drill" not unlike zero-based budgeting, another great idea that got nowhere in government. Perhaps once other reforms are implemented DoD can turn to ABC.

### Restructuring the FYDP

BENS in particular has taken the lead in suggesting a new programmatic alignment that reflects the post-Cold War era in which we live. While it is difficult to identify direct cost savings from such a realignment, there will be indirect savings as choices among programs can be made with more visibility into their content and better understanding of their relevance.

The following is a derivative of the BENS proposal for a major new force program alignment that also reflects the new thrusts that DoD is likely to implement:

#### Warfighting Programs

- Program 1: Strategic Forces
- Program 2: Defense Forces: Missile, CBW and Homeland Defense
- Program 3: Major Theater Warfare Forces
- Program 4: Intervention, Presence and Strategic Mobility Forces
- Program 5: Special Operations Forces

#### Support Programs

- Program 6: Space, Intelligence and C4I Forces
- Program 7: Research and Development Programs
- Program 8: Personnel, Training and Development Programs
- Program 9: Central Supply, Maintenance and Sustainment Programs
- Program 10: Medical Programs
- Program 11: International Support Activities

Note that PA&E should be realigned as well, to reflect the FYDP program realignment.

**Feasibility Assessment:** This matter rests solely in the hands of SecDef and DepSecDef.

#### **INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE**

There is no way any of the aforementioned or other ideas can be implemented unless there are incentives for the Services to implement change. Only if they are assured that they will retain whatever savings they realize will the Services undertake necessary arrangements such as outsourcing.

For OSD, JCS and the Defense Wide Agencies, it is more a matter of resisting union and/or Congressional pressure. Unlike the Services, OSD, and the Defense-Wide Agencies, and even JCS, are not semi-independent bodies. They will respond to your direct intervention and control-if they know you really mean business (which unfortunately has not been the case with previous SecDef's, who lost interest quickly). That doesn't mean you need to chair waste-of-time meetings with Agency heads every other week. It does mean having them report to you on progress every two months.

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:37 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Workforce

7

Here is another note from Dov Zakheim on the subject of DoD workforce. Let's get together so you can tell me what you think I ought to do about it and how I ought to get something started, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/9/01 Zakheim Memo: "Cutbacks in DoD Workforce"

DHR:dh  
041001-33

020 OSD

10 Apr 01

U12596 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4397

*Signature*

To: Snyder

*BTG SC RHR*

*FD*

*SC 2/4 Part of previous*

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dov S. Zakheim  
SUBJECT: Cutbacks in DOD Workforce  
DATE: 9 January 2001

- 3 There is consensus that the DOD workforce is bloated.
- The only way to achieve real savings--even in the BRAC process--is to eliminate slots.
- During the past decade, we have cut back on the military more than we have on DoD civilians. In part this is due to the power of the civil service unions, the civil service laws, some obstruction by Congress, and a lack of creativity regarding how to move people out of jobs.
- Several areas are ripe for reduction:
  - DoD Agencies in general. The Cohen Task Force on which I served noted that several of these agencies are Fortune 500 equivalents that in practice are managed by GS-15s--example: the Commissary Agency.
  - Intelligence agencies. It's time we merged the various intelligence shops within DoD.
  - Auditors, Inspectors and Investigators. We spend about \$1 billion annually on these folks. Do they save us the equivalent of their salaries?
  - Some will counsel that you to cut the Joint Staff. They already went through a cut of about 10%. I was the Cohen Task Force guy responsible for recommendations regarding the Joint Staff. My target was in the region of 20-25%. Some more cuts are possible, but not major ones.
  - OSD: More cuts are possible here. There is lots of dead wood. Look in the bowels of OSD agencies like the former DSAA (now renamed); also in C3I and Acquisition. The Cohen task force identified more cuts in OSD. It did not pursue my recommendation that principal deputies' offices were ripe for abolition.

*yell*

*yell*

*cur*

*cur*

*?*

I can provide more details if you need them.

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:31 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Bureaucracy

What do we do about the Pentagon bureaucracy? Please take a look at this memo from Marty Hoffmann and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1 //O I Hoffmann Memo: "Pentagon Bureaucracy"

DHR: dh  
041001-31

0311 Transition

10 Apr 01

U12597 /02

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1 Jan01

Memo To : The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Defense Secretary Designate

Subject : Transition Opportunity/Issue : Pentagon Bureaucracy

From : M. R. Hoffmann

In a change of Administration, particularly when the whole National Security establishment needs such a major reorientation (weak word), the question of the copious **overstaffing** of the Pentagon needs quick attention. ✓

There are a number of devices to do this, such as consolidation of the **functions** of two offices, the retention of an incumbent individual in a job which is then abolished; leaving jobs unfilled and then abolishing, etc. Distinction must be made between statutory positions (required by Congress) and those over which the Executive Branch has control for this purpose.

The problem will be sorting out the **really** key positions (as opposed to those positions in which the incumbent was not **up to the job**). People like Hamre, Perry etc **from** the recent Administration may be helpful, as well as recently retired Military and Civilians among the various self-styled experts in Washington in whom you have particular confidence ( CSIS and others may have material already "in the can" which could be helpful). Proposing Legislation abolishing certain jobs gives the opportunity to leave them unfilled until the resulting legislative issue is resolved .

snowflake

TO: Secretary Paul O'Neill

CC: Bob Zoellick

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>4</sup> A

DATE: May 5, 2001

SUBJECT: **Debt Forgiveness is none of my business, but:**

I am cool to the debt forgiveness proposals that are floating around. Forgiving debt teaches people that it's fine to borrow and not pay back.

We would be better off teaching the world the lesson of free trade. Instead of forgiving debt, why not allow any country that has sizable debt and is poor by some reasonable measure, to trade freely with the U.S. That is to say they can make things and sell them in the U.S. without duties or tariffs.

It would be the best possible incentive. Further, I don't think it would cause much damage to the U.S. and it would enable people here to buy things from poor countries at lower prices than would otherwise be the case.

Any thoughts?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
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U12600 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4401

snowflake

May 7, 2001 11:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: BRAC Success Stories

I asked Bill Cohen to give me some of the success stories on BRAC. You ought to start a file there so we have it. Here are three.

Also, we ought to give some thought to getting all former Secretaries of Defense in line to support a BRAC.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/26/01 Cohen ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
050701-15

3233

7m aug 01

U12601 /02



600 Thirteenth Street, NW

(b)(6)

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Suite 640

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Washington DC

20005-3096

February 26, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

In response to your question about base closing success stories, I recall three particular examples:

**Fort Devins, Massachusetts:** 3,000 jobs were created, replacing the 2,100 civilian jobs that were lost. Current tenants include Gillette Manufacturing, Boston/Maine Railroad, a federal prison medical facility, and the Oxbow National Wildlife Refuge.

**Charleston Naval Air Base, South Carolina:** In 1998, 2,700 jobs had been created and at the time, they expected the creation of an additional 8,700 jobs over five years to replace the original 6,200 jobs lost. Some of the tenants are Charleston Marine Manufacturing, Charleston Shipbuilding, NOAA, U.S. Postal Service, and the National Community Conservation Corps.

**Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire:** 1,300 jobs were created, replacing 400 lost jobs.

These are just a few examples. I encourage you to contact Randall Yim, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations, for more examples. Randall is a true asset for the Department and I am confident that he will serve you as adeptly as he served me.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,  
  
William S. Cohen  
Chairman and CEO

11-L-0559/OSD/4403

snowflake

May 11, 2001 8:53 AM

TO: William Schneider, Jr.  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Program and Budget

I read your May 8 piece on the current developments affecting the FY 01/FY 02 Defense program and budget on leasing.

By this memo I am asking **Dov Zakheim** to initiate the process to get this moving and coordinated with the appropriate people, including the General Counsel.

Thanks-good work.

Attach.

5/8/01 Schneider memo to SecDef re: Current Developments . . .

DHR:dh  
051101-5

*100,54*

*11 May 01*

U12608 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4404

*William Schneider, Jr.*

**MEMORANDUM**

May 8, 2001

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
Hon. Paul Wolfowitz  
Hon. Dov Zakheim

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Current developments affecting the FY 01/FY 02 defense program and budget.

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*1. Addressing regulatory and statutory obstacles to the use of commercial financing concepts of capital asset leasing and the sale-leaseback of DoD real property assets.*

At the suggestion of Steve Friedman, I met yesterday with lease finance specialists at Citicorp (New York). Two purposes were served by the meeting. First, I briefed them on potential interest in the DoD to apply commercial financing techniques to selected DoD assets to illustrate an opportunity for the use of these techniques. Second I sought to obtain their views on statutory and regulatory obstacles that prevent the use of commercial lease finance techniques to permit the DoD to finance selected capital asset acquisitions and the sale-leaseback of DoD real property.

Two potential capital asset lease concepts were discussed: (1) C-17 strategic airlift aircraft, and (2) a replacement aerial tanker for the existing fleet of ~ 500 KC-135 aircraft. The opportunity cost of tying up appropriated funds for decades on long-lived capital assets is an important incentive for the use of lease finance in the private sector. In view of the likelihood of tight **topline** budget constraints, preserving scarce Budget Authority for transformation and recovery of the capability of currently deployed forces is a high priority. The use of lease financing can contribute to these ends without a requirement for additional Budget Authority.

DoD interest in extensive sale-leaseback of DoD real property assets was also briefed to the group. They were familiar with the current privatization efforts associated with on-base housing (a pilot project is underway at two of 21 bases) and base utilities (electric power, water, etc.).

The group believes that the financial markets will be very receptive to DoD interest in the use of lease financing for both capital assets and real property, though significantly different investor segments are involved. The capital asset lease market involves the

exploitation of tax arbitrage for the ~ 50 institutional investors who dominate the market for capital asset lease financing. The real property sale/leaseback investor market has fewer residual tax advantages so a different group of investors are involved. However, according to the lease finance specialists, active DoD interest and accommodating regulations would produce a "very strong" favorable response from the investor base.

The lease financing specialists will consult further with Counsel concerning identification of specific statutory, regulatory, and policy obstacles to the use of commercial lease financing techniques for both capital assets and real property. This report should be available in approximately one week. This information will enable us to respond to Senator Stevens' strong interest in facilitating the use of such financing.

*2. Senator Stevens' interest in introducing statutory changes relating to leasing/sale-leaseback in the FY 01 DoD supplemental appropriations bill.*

I met last week with Steve Cortese (Staff Director of both the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Defense subcommittee) concerning his follow-up to our breakfast meeting with Senator Stevens. Cortese affirmed the Chairman's intense interest in increasing the role of commercial financing in defense acquisition. Cortese is seeking to include statutory relief in the FY 01 supplemental appropriation bill (this will require a waiver for an authorization) if the obstacles can be promptly identified. I indicated that I would share the results from our discussions with private sector lease finance specialists. The Senate Appropriations is conducting a parallel investigation of the subject, and will coordinate with the Military Construction subcommittee concerning real property sale-leaseback policy.

If we are able to develop a credible FY 01 initiative (perhaps augmented by follow-up FY 02 authorization initiatives), we will be able to advance the President's agenda. This is particularly so related to acquisition and financial management reform as well as quality of life/morale improvements, and can be done without a requirement for a significant increase in appropriated funds

*3. Developments pertaining to Budget Resolution authority for the use of "advance appropriations" to finance naval shipbuilding (SCN: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy).*

There is considerable interest in the use of "advance appropriations" to facilitate the financing of the USN's shipbuilding and conversion program. The unique characteristic of the shipbuilding program is that the normal "full funding" concept imposes a very considerable opportunity cost on DoD procurement. For example, an aircraft carrier that costs ~ \$6 billion takes more than six years to produce. In the early years of the procurement, the rate at which Budget Authority is converted into Outlays is quite slow; only about 7% in the first year. The remainder of the BA must be appropriated and scored against the budget caps, but remains unused until it is later required (and converted into Outlays). The use of advance procurement is established in budget policy

(approximately \$23 billion is now done, mostly by civil agencies), but relatively little use has been made of it for policy reasons in the DoD.

Because of the steep decline in shipbuilding over the past several years, the SCN account will only support a 220-ship fleet (at the current rate of 6.5 ships per year). To increase the construction rate to a level that would sustain a 310 ship level (the desired size), a rate of 9 ships per year will be needed. This level of shipbuilding will require an additional \$3-4 billion in new Budget Authority – a figure that will cut into the President's efforts to transform the defense establishment, finance the shedding of excess infrastructure, and supporting the existing force structure.

Through the use of advance appropriations, it will be possible to support the construction of 8 additional ships (54 versus 46 in the baseline FYDP) without a requirement for additional appropriated funds. Advance appropriations will permit funding of 4 complete SSGN conversions and three additional cruiser conversions (e.g. Vertical Launch Systems, combat system upgrades, etc.). In addition, this approach will permit clearing \$1 billion of prior year shipbuilding bills, and the exercise of cost-effective prepayment options for leases on all T-5 tanker leases and 8 of the 13 Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS) leases.

On Friday (5 May) through a parliamentary maneuver, the use of advance appropriations by the Navy for the SCN account was effectively prohibited. It is my understanding that Congressman Norm Dicks will act to change the conference outcome of the Budget Resolution in the House this week to permit the use of advance appropriations for the SCN account. Dicks is also reported to be considering action on a suitable appropriations bill to achieve the same effect.

~~snovflake~~

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: May 14, 2001  
SUBJECT: Attachment

Attached is a memo that I wrote after talking to the Inspector General of the DoD.  
The people coming in ought to be given a copy so that they are aware of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
051401.20  
Attach.

*020 DHR*

*14 May 01*


U12610 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4408

MEMORANDUM

3/2/01

Comments From the IG



1. Information System. DOD bad record.
2. Information security is not good.
3. Defense personal security program in disarray.
4. DOD can't identify operating costs or financial statements
5. Acquisition reform is work-in-progress.
6. Military health system cost pressures fraud
7. Supply management is a challenge. Reform is incomplete
8. Real property maintenance is \$22 billion, or 23%. Excess capacity on bases.
9. ?
10. Personnel

snowflake

May 21, 2001 4:53 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Readiness

Here is Pete Aldridge's paper on readiness. It has some interesting ideas.

I don't have the vaguest idea how we get the system to look at this thoughtfully. If it is not QDR, what is it?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/10/O | Aldridge memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on An Approach to Readiness

DHR:dh  
052101-59

*322*

*21 May 01*

U12611 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4410

MTG - (Holt) word  
Pete J-8 & Ad M AC  
Then MTS DR



April 10, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

Cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Thoughts on an Approach to Readiness

The "Transformation" Task Force work has given me an idea on how we can approach the establishment and measurement of "Readiness" for our armed forces.

The Task Force outlined three time periods for responses to conflict;

--Set Conditions--the rapid response force engaged within **24** hours. These would be the highly effective "transformational" forces that would be sent first to the conflict.

--Establish Control--**additional** forces engaged within 4 days. These would be a combination of transformational forces and legacy forces.

--Decisive Resolution--these would be the remaining legacy forces engaged within **30** days.

more action by  
2:15 PM  
11/11/01

These periods can define the readiness requirements for the military forces and units.

--Those transformation forces to be deployed for the "Set Conditions" phase must be at **100%** readiness for personnel, training, equipment and deployment.

--Those additional transformation forces required for the "Establish Control" phase can be at a lower day-to-day readiness, but must be ready to deploy within the 4 day period described. Transformational forces for this phase could be those rotating off of "alert" for phase one or just completing their training **period**.

--Legacy forces would be on two' readiness or alert levels--those to deploy within 4 days to augment the transformation forces and those to deploy within **30** days of the "Decisive Resolution" phase.

With this logic we have a rationale to tie readiness to our strategy and the rationale to identify the funding necessary to achieve the proper levels of readiness.

snowflake

May 21, 2001 8:34 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
Barry Watts

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ) A

SUBJECT: Transformation and Budget

Attached is a memo from Bill Owens that you ought to take a look at, and then we ought to discuss.

381

Attach.  
3/2 1/0 1 Owensltr to SecDef re: Transformation

DHR:dh  
052101-9

21 May 01

U12613 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4412

②

Fax to (b)(6)

March 21, 2001

Personal Memo for the Secretary of Defense

Don,

I'll take advantage of your offer to provide a few thoughts. I know how profoundly complex and demanding the challenges you face are, and I'll keep this brief.

I BELIEVE THAT:

**-TRANSFORMATION IS THE ONLY PATH.** There is simply **too much risk in not proceeding**. Risk of not finding the money for **recapitalization of platforms** and systems, risk of potential enemies "skipping the present day generation of **legacy** systems" and being able to gain disproportionate advantage, risk of missing the potential of the **"RMA"**, and the risk of losing the **budget savings and efficiencies** of reducing the redundancy of the services. You may be the only person who has the stature, perseverance, and work ethic to **make** it happen, but I believe it will be a lonely **journey** as **there** are many who oppose real **transformation**.

**-THE BUDGET IS THE CORE OF TRANSFORMATION.** **Culture** will follow. Everyone in the Pentagon ultimately responds to the budget process and allocation. **The BUDGET BECOMES THE POLICY. POLICY RARELY TRANSFORMS ITSELF INTO A CLEAR BUDGET.** Your involvement in the macro allocations and some of the particularly relevant details of the budget will deliver the strongest message of "transformation". **NO** one understands the "requirements process across the department, *no* general or admiral and *no* civilian (although many will profess to understand). The system will not do justice to real change and will invent ways to **avoid** real **change** in the budget (leaving **the** policy articulation to you and **the** service secretaries.. **hence "they"** win and will be able to **"outwait** the transformation artists".

**-There are measures which can be used to monitor "budget and hence, policy transformation".**

**-A FEW MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSFORMATION.**

- (1) **Balance the accounts.** Establish the right percentages (of the total budget) for various elements of the budget, and then measure where we are and where we need to be to get the right balance, e.g. R&D, Procurement, **O&M**, Personnel, etc. The last 8 years of budgets have been dramatically **UNBALANCED**, and if not balanced the budget will simply result in one problem (for example current readiness) being replaced by another as time passes. The budget is unbalanced today in the following ways (**for example**): procurement is not sized for the current force structure, there is too much money going to **tacair** (and not enough for bombers), the replacement rate for physical inventory (buildings, **etc**) is sadly low, the personnel budget is for a force of **60%** of our actual numbers of people, there is no measure of the

C4ISR budget that is manageable (and it is dramatically underfunded). Note: You and Colin might want to have a look at the **balance** of funding between State and Defense, also.

- (2) **C4ISR/RMA**. "If America can see the battlefield 24 hours a day, real time, all weather and deliver the information to our troops and the enemy can't, we win!" (a) Get a true measure of the **platforms** which perform this uniquely critical function **and monitor it for the duration of your tenure**. For **example** numbers, ages, and replacements for Guardrail aircraft, **AWACS, JSTARS, E-2Cs, S-3s**, Rivet Joint aircraft, **U2s, P3s**, various imaging satellites, **sigint** satellites, **comms**. Satellites, **UAVs, etc.** (All of these are **underfunded**, aged, and programs for **followons** are starved). **Ensure that there is enough money to provide replacements in each category** (b) Have a close look at the data links (link 16, **SCDL, CEC, LOCE, etc**) and demand that the services **BUY ENOUGH OF THEM** and make them **INTEROPERABLE**. (you might have a look at link 16 for an **interesting** case study) (c) have a serious look at **how** commercial **TCP/IP/XML internet** protocols and **C++** and **Java/Jimi** software could revolutionize this area (d) **Increase the funding for the C4ISR area by 100% and make it transparent**.
- (3) **"new measures of readiness"** With your (VERY IMPORTANT) strategic review **define these measures** (including personnel factors) to achieve the **goals** you've set. This will be a revolution in itself, and it translates into **BILLIONS**. **Monitor the funding and results and ensure that "just enough"** money goes to these accounts.
- (4) **Business Measures**. The supporting **elements** of **LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND MEDICAL** are **VERY** redundant and often not interoperable across the services. In each of the **four areas** dramatic consolidation and focused outsourcing should be considered. I believe there is **\$10B** in savings here. You might **monitor the budget in each of these areas and set goals (perhaps 20-25%) for reductions** over 2 years. These four areas are full of possibilities for reorganization.
- (5) **Procurement**. Pick a top **10** list of areas **where** you believe there are big redundancies **and/or** savings (and little impact on our capability), **and personally monitor the decisions to reduce expenditures** (possible areas are: **tacair, submarines, strike systems, helicopters**).

Don, I'm sure you are besieged with advice. I'm sure mine is no better than many others. If I can help, I'm here for you, and regardless, I'll be cheering for you! I have sent you a copy of a book I published last May, "**Lifting the Fog of War**". It has a number of other suggestions, and it may be worth having one of your staff review it for possible (more controversial) ideas,

Very best wishes,

Bill Owens

(b)(6)

snowflake

July 13, 2001 7:23 PM

SUBJECT: Discuss w/the Chairman

I want to talk to General Shelton about the reaction to Bin Laden's threats—  
pulling Marines out of Jordan and sending 10 ships to sea.

What does that cost us? How much does that advantage a terrorist just to threaten  
things?

DHR:dh  
071301-29

00015

1356101

U12621 /02

snowflake

July 16, 2001 3:38 PM

TO: Gordon England  
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear vs. Diesel Submarines

Attached is a paper **from** Bill Owens that is worth reading.

**Thanks.**

Attach.

7/1/01 Owens memo to **SecDef re:** Nuclear vs. Diesel Submarines

DHR:dh  
071601-37

5603

165001

U12622 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4416



conference on **his** command ship, **the USS BLUE RIDGE**, then alongside **FBE**. His second in command of the exercise, the RAN's **COMFLOT, CDRE** Jim Stapleton was also in attendance and echoed **VADM Metzger's** remarks. "WAILER (one of three submarines committed to the exercise and under the **command** of **LCDR** Brett Sampson) was very professionally operated and was very quiet."

He said the Australian diesel-powered submarine was ideal for working in littoral waters and was hard to detect. "The man in charge of the maritime component, **ADML Mullard**, was extremely challenged by WAILER." Asked if the opposing forces had found **WALLER**, **VADM Metzger** responded, "We could find her on the surface".

Very best,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Owens". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "B" and a cursive "Owens".

Bill Owens

**PS.** I liked **very** much your **QDR TOR** document. (I offered just a few editorial changes)

snowflake

July 16, 2001 6:41 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Balanced Strategy

381

Please take a look at this memo **from** Steve Rosen to Eliot Cohen and then let's talk.

We have to get going.

**Thanks.**

Attach.

6/28/01 Rosen memo to Cohen: The Balanced Strategy: Long Term Dominance

DHR:dh  
071601-66

16 Jul 02

U12623 /02

28 June 2001

Memorandum for     Eliot A. Cohen  
From                 Stephen Rosen  
Subject              The Balanced Strategy: Long Term Dominance

Eliot Cohen distinguished two major forms of **warfighting—engagement** and limited operations, on the one hand, and regional wars, on the other—in his memos on “The Balanced Strategy.” This memo develops the third element of the strategy. What kind of peacetime activities can the United States engage in to maintain its current, favorable position in the world? To do so, it is useful to ask how we got to where we are.

No one in the world wishes to challenge US fighter aircraft and pilots or engage our fleets on the high seas. Except under very special circumstance, no one would wish to mass armored forces to invade other countries in areas where we can bring to bear our precision strike capabilities. In those military areas, we are so good that people do not want to challenge us. That is why we are so secure today. Looking ahead, we will build missile defenses that will make it harder for countries to develop coercive ballistic missile threats. Over the long term, our objective is to have missile defenses that are so good that no one will wish to challenge us in this area as well.

What are the other kinds of capabilities we need to secure our long term position? Countries around the world know that if they use military force to challenge the US or its friends directly, they will suffer. So the tendency will be to challenge us indirectly, with attacks that are ambiguous. Attacks will be mounted in ways that are harder for us to detect, or in ways that make it harder for us to identify the responsible decision-makers. Attacks will be mounted that do not directly attack our allies, but which make them fear for their security. Cruise missiles will be launched that attack targets in ways that make it hard to identify where those cruise missiles came from. These attacks depend for their success on two things: denying the US early and complete information as to what they are and where they came from, and attacking the friends of the US without directly attacking the US or US forces.

What can we do to make it too hard for hostile countries to even think about mounting such attacks? If we can develop better awareness of military activities in large areas of the world, day and night, good weather and bad, day in and day out, adversaries will find it harder and harder to mount the kinds of attacks that disguise their character and origins. This new awareness would also augment our ability to detect, prepare for, and defeat conventional military attacks. By demonstrating to our friends our ability to keep track of threats to our interests, we can avoid repeats of the unfortunate surprises presented to us by the North Korean missile tests. This kind of 24/7 coverage cannot be created overnight, but it builds on existing systems and technologies. The new awareness has been explored as a potential program for many years, and can be deployed incrementally, as resources permit. Our goal is dominance through awareness.

11-L-0559/OSD/4420

snowflake

July 16, 2001 5:29 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Destruction

RUSSTIA

Here is a memo on chemical weapons destruction. You should meet with Susan Cook and figure out what we want to do about it here in the Department.

I am also told she is quite good, but she is being hired away by the National Security Council. We ought to make sure that if she does, that they reimburse us. I am getting tired of them hiring everyone from the Pentagon **free**.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated info paper re: U.S. CW Destruction Assistance to Russia

DHR:dh  
071601-54

1654101

U12626 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4421

## U.S. Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction Assistance to Russia

- Russia possesses **40** thousand MT of **CW**, largest stockpile in world, in seven locations. Over **80%** is nerve agent in five locations.
- In **1997** Russia ratified Chemical Weapons Convention (**CWC**) for elimination of stockpile, influenced by US and other international pledges of assistance. Russia accepts responsibility for **CWC** compliance, but notes lack of resources.
- In **1997** Helsinki Summit, US agreed to seek necessary **funds** to build nerve agent **CW** destruction facility (**CWDF**) at **Shchuch'ye**, under DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (**CTR**) program.
  - Planned to destroy **5460** MT **nerve-agent** stockpile, including over one million modern, ready-to-use munitions posing a serious proliferation risk
  - Congress authorized **\$229.5** million for **CWDF (FY94-99)** for facility design, development of munitions processing equipment, site preparation and construction. All activities ongoing except construction.
- Due to lack of Russian commitment to **CW** destruction and insufficient Russian and international funding, **FY2000** National Defense Authorization Act (**NDAA**) prohibited construction and use of future funds for construction.
- **FY2001 NDAA** continued ban, but noted availability of **FY1999 funds** for **CW** activities. Also **listed** five concerns with Russian progress in:
  - Full and accurate disclosure of size of existing **CW** stockpile;
  - Annual commitment to allocate at least **\$25,000,000** for **CW** elimination;
  - Development of a practical plan for destroying stockpile of **nerve** agents;
  - **Enactment** of law providing for elimination of all nerve agents at one site;
  - Agreement to destroy **CW** production facilities at **Volgograd** and **Novocheboksarsk**.
- Russia now moving to satisfy **most** concerns:
  - Bilateral discussions on **CW** declarations;
  - Increased **FY2001** budget for **CW** destruction support over **\$100** million;
  - Moved destruction responsibility **from** Ministry of **Defense** to new **Russian** Munitions Agency, under **Zinovy Pak**, who is restructuring **CW** destruction program to **streamline** and reduce cost;
  - Assessing feasibility of destroying all nerve-agent at **Shchuch'ye**;

- **CWC** monitors approved destruction plan for **Volgograd** and **Novocheboksarsk CW** production facilities.
- International support/pledges to Russia for **CW** destruction, most contingent on continued US assistance, have increased by tens of millions of dollars.
- Construction can begin **approximately 45** days after Administration approval of project.
- **Full** facility construction would require additional **\$657.5** million (**FY2002-2008**) in US assistance.

snowflake

July 16, 2001 5:24 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget and Transformation Goals

381

Please take a look at this memo from **Dov Zakheim** on Bill Owens' ideas. What do you propose that we do in managing the budget to get our transformation goals achieved?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/26/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Base Reductions

DHR:dh  
071601-53

16JUL01

U12627 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4424

INFO MEMO

June 1, 2001, 9:13 AM


FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim JUN 1 2001

SUBJECT: Transformation and Budget

- Bill Owens is always full of great ideas, and his note to you of May 21 is no exception. I really like his idea about establishing percentages for elements of the budget--where it's feasible. Pete and I are already doing so for R&D, and its S&T portion, in the FY 02 budget. Improving infrastructure requires a different metric, as we have discussed. Likewise personnel costs respond to different requirements.
- Bill's idea that you monitor key aspects of our program is also a good one. I suggest choosing no more than three in each of his categories--that way you really can maintain a sharp focus and telegraph your priorities. For example--in the C4ISR/RMA area, you might focus on UAVs (e.g. Global Hawk), imaging satellites, and the SBIRS program. In the procurement accounts, you might focus on the Trident conversion to cruise missile subs, and on a tac air and a land forces program.
- Finally, I intend to look closely at the personnel redundancies that Bill discusses in his Business Measures paragraph. You have begun to receive memos from me on steps I'm taking in this area generally, and more will be coming.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Dov S. Zakheim  (b)(6)

snowflake

May 21, 2001 8:34 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
Barry Watts

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ) A

SUBJECT: Transformation and Budget

381

Attached is a memo from Bill Owens that you ought to take a look at, and then we ought to discuss.

Attach.  
3/21/01 Owens ltr to SecDef re: Transformation

DHR:dh  
052101-9

U12628 /02

21 MAY 01

11-L-0559/OSD/4426

01 MAY 11 9

Fax to (b)(6)

March 21, 2001

Personal Memo for the Secretary of Defense

Don,

I'll take advantage of your offer to provide a few thoughts. I know how profoundly complex and demanding the challenges you face are, and I'll keep this brief.

I BELIEVE THAT:

-TRANSFORMATION IS **THE ONLY PATH**. There is simply **too much risk in not proceeding**. Risk of not finding the money for **recapitalization** of platforms and systems, risk of potential enemies "skipping the present day generation of legacy systems" and being able to gain disproportionate advantage, risk of missing the potential of the "RMA", and the risk of losing the budget savings and efficiencies of reducing the redundancy of the services. You may be the only person who has the stature, perseverance, and work ethic to **make** it happen, but I believe it will be a lonely journey **as there are many who oppose real transformation**.

-THE BUDGET IS THE CORE OF TRANSFORMATION. Culture will follow. **Everyone in the Pentagon ultimately responds** to the budget process and **allocation**. **The BUDGET BECOMES THE POLICY. POLICY RARELY TRANSFORMS ITSELF INTO A CLEAR BUDGET**. Your involvement in the **macro allocations** and some of the particularly relevant details of the budget will deliver the strongest message of "transformation". NO one understands the "requirements process across the department, no general or admiral and no civilian (although many will profess to understand). The system will not do justice to real change and will invent ways to avoid real change in the budget (**leaving the policy articulation** to you and the service **secretaries...hence "they"** win and will be able to "outwait the transformation artists".

-There are measures which can be used to monitor "budget and hence, policy transformation".

-A FEW MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSFORMATION.

- (1) **Balance the accounts**. Establish the right percentages (of the total budget) for various elements of the budget, and then measure where we are and where we need to be to get the right balance, e.g. R&D, Procurement, O&M, Personnel, etc. The last 8 years of budgets have been dramatically UNBALANCED, and if not balanced the budget will simply result in one problem (for example current readiness) being replaced by **another** as time passes. The budget is unbalanced today in the following ways (for example): **procurement** is not sized for the current force structure, there is too much money going to **tacair** (and not enough for bombers), the replacement rate for physical inventory (buildings, etc) is sadly low, the personnel budget is for a force of **60%** of our **actual** numbers of people, there is no measure of the

C4ISR budget that is manageable (and it is dramatically underfunded). Note: You and Colin might want to have a look at the **balance** of funding between State and Defense, also.

- (2) **C4ISR/RMA.** "If America can see the battlefield 24 hours a day, real time, all weather and deliver the information to our troops and the enemy can't, we win!" (a) Get a true measure of the platforms which perform this uniquely critical function and monitor it for the duration of your tenure. For example numbers, ages, and replacements for Guardrail aircraft, **AWACS, JSTARS, E-2Cs, S-3s**, Rivet Joint aircraft, **U2s, P3s**, various imaging satellites, **sigint** satellites, **comms**. Satellites, **UAVs**, etc. (All of these are underfunded, aged, and programs for follow-ons are starved). Ensure that there is enough money to provide replacements in each category (b) Have a close look at the data links (link 16, **SCDL, CEC, LOCE**, etc) and demand that the services BUY ENOUGH OF THEM and make them **INTEROPERABLE**. (you might have a look at link 16 for an interesting case study) (c) have a serious look at how commercial **TCP/IP/XML internet** protocols and **C++ and Java/Jimi** software could revolutionize this area (d) Increase the funding for the C4ISR area by 100% and make it transparent.
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- (4) **Business Measures.** The supporting elements of **LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND MEDICAL** are VERY redundant and often not interoperable across the services. In each of the **four** areas dramatic consolidation and focused outsourcing should be considered. I believe there is **\$10B** in savings here. You might monitor the budget in each of these areas and set goals (perhaps 20-25%) for reductions over 2 years. These four areas are full of possibilities for reorganization.
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Don, I'm sure you are besieged with advice, I'm sure mine is no better than many others. If I can help, I'm here for you, and regardless, I'll be cheering for you! I have sent you a copy of a book I published last May, "**Lifting the Fog of War**". It has a number of other suggestions, and it may be worth having one of your staff review it for possible (more controversial) ideas,

Very best wishes,

Bill Owens

(b)(6)

snowflake

July 19, 2001 8:26 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Taiwan

I haven't had a chance to read Chris Williams' memo, but here it is. Please read it and factor it in. He is a very smart fellow, and you ought to use him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/18/01 Williams' memo to SecDef re: Taiwan Matters

DHR:dh  
071901-8

*China Chats*

*19Jul01*

U12632 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4429

July 18, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Chris Williams *AW*

SUBJECT: Taiwan Matters

*Gin:*  
I was recently asked by Peter Rodman to review materials related to the US-Taiwan Defense Talks scheduled to begin today in Monterey, CA (the so-called "Monterey Talks"). This memo provides some thoughts on the Monterey Talks and other issues in the US-Taiwan security relationship.

In general, follow-up from the President's April decisions regarding arms sales to Taiwan has been painfully slow. Bureaucratic foot-dragging is to blame. It's the classic "I know the President decided we should do this but..." response. Work continues, albeit at a snail's pace, on fleshing out "what the President really meant" when he approved enhanced electronic warfare cooperation, shared ballistic missile early warning data, and more. Although I didn't have time to delve too deeply, I detected little or no follow-up in terms of getting other nations to help us sell submarines to Taiwan as well. The arrival of Peter Rodman and Peter Brookes (the new DASD for Asia-Pacific, replacing Fred Smith) should help move the process along.

As for the Monterey Talks, there is a large and growing gap between what the sides expect out of the talks and the statures of the delegations. Taiwan's delegation includes two of their three deputy national security advisors, the Vice Chief of the General Staff, and other senior military officers. The US delegation is being co-led by Fred Smith and Peter Brookes, and includes low- to mid-level officials from the Joint Staff, US Pacific Command, the State Department, and the NSC staff.

In terms of substance, the Taiwanese apparently expect the Talks to get into weighty policy matters and to discuss in detail plans for following through on the President's arms sales decisions. The US side instead views the Talks as a forum for general discussions about the threat and to hear from the Taiwanese about their efforts to protect its critical infrastructure and counter Beijing's coercive strategy, etc.). The U.S. is apparently not prepared to discuss in any detail how it intends to follow up on the April arms sales decisions. This difference in agendas, expectations, and representation could be a recipe for needless disputes. It also brings into sharp relief the need for a new process for addressing the numerous, varied issues that arise in our bilateral security relationship.

Major Mark Stokes, the Taiwan Desk Officer in OSD, has developed a framework that, I believe makes good sense. He has recommended a tiered structure including the following: a first "tier" for policy-level discussions (so-called "Defense Consultations"); a second "tier" for detailed discussions regarding prospective or already approved arms

118  
1830  
11-L-0559/OSD/4430

sales; and a third "tier" for continued military-to-military dialogue (a key element of the Rumsfeld-directed enhanced emphasis on "expanded operational linkages"). Major Stokes' proposal is that the DASD for Asia-Pacific in OSD (Peter Brookes) should lead the first and second "tier" talks, and PACOM should lead the third "tier" talks. I differ from Mark slightly in that I recommend that either Assistant Secretary Rodman or Under Secretary Feith should lead the first "tier" talks. Having Feith or Rodman lead the first "tier" talks would increase their stature and would guarantee that serious security policy issues are addressed or decided at an appropriately senior level, given their import and sensitivity. Otherwise, I strongly endorse Major Stokes' proposal.

I understand that State has balked at formalizing the mil-mil/expanded ops linkages tier, presumably because they are afraid the US military will get too deeply in bed with the Taiwanese military. In fact, as you know, the PACOM-Taiwan General Staff (TGS) relationship is long-standing and strong. There is no compelling reason for State to be involved in these talks, however, and the PACOM-TGS linkages must continue and should be expanded and strengthened regardless of State's views. Stated differently, if State objects to formalizing the talks, then so be it; everyone should understand that the talks will continue, however.

This raises another issue: PACOM's Admiral Blair has come in with a message to SecDef urging that PACOM be designated the "Executive Agent" for all military/security/policy matters related to Taiwan. I strongly urge you to reject this well-intentioned but misguided suggestion. Denny's staff tends to think that only they know how to deal with the Taiwanese (and Chinese for that matter). Their at times arrogant attitude also can be seen in their refusal to share copies of the PACOM assessment of Taiwan's HK-17 national military exercise with Major Stokes and other OSD staff in Washington. (You will recall that PACOM, with Washington's approval, sent a small team of observers to witness the exercise this Spring.) Given the political sensitivities involved, there is every reason for Washington to maintain control over the US-Taiwan security agenda.

Therefore, if you haven't responded to Denny's message already, I recommend you gently reject Denny's "Executive Agent" suggestion. At the same time, however, your response can commend Denny for the good work he and his staff have done on certain warplans and cite the important and growing role PACOM will play in your concept of "expanded operational linkages." Major Stokes may have already drafted a reply along these lines.

Incidentally, Taiwan's Minister of Defense has invited me to visit Taiwan in mid-September to meet with him and other senior military and civilian officials, visit military bases, talk with political leaders, etc. This will, of course, be an unofficial, personal visit. It's been fifteen years since I visited Taiwan and I'm looking forward to the visit, especially in the wake of President Bush's arms sales decisions and public comments about defending Taiwan, the national Party's recent suggestion for a "confederation" between Taiwan and the mainland, etc. I also plan to visit with Denny Blair and his staff en route and/or on the return leg. Denny had earlier asked me to consult with him on

*SecDef -  
I have drafted  
response, worked  
over by the  
Deputy, to  
show you.  
Jimmy*



July 23, 2001 7:42 PM

Guidance-Assume

- No supplemental.
- Honest budget numbers.
- Get to 3.0% S&T by '07.
- Get to MD + \$8.0 by '07.
- Increase lift.
- Reduce average age of aircraft by purchase of some new and reduction of older aircraft.
- Get infrastructure to best practices by 2007.
- Get shipbuilding on a steady state at 300 ships.
- Stratify pay increase.
- Get emphasis for:
  - o High demand, low density assets.
  - o Info. Ops.
  - o Compatibility -interoperability.
- Include cost of BRAC
  - o Cost of weapon cancellations.

110.01

2374101

U12634 /02

- o Increase +\$2 billion by '07.
  - o Costs on OSD/Joint Staff/Defense Agencies/CINC Headquarters.
  - o \$ for Standing Joint Task Forces.
  - o 2% for modernization and transformation, i.e., 10% of force transformed by '07.
- 
- Readiness-Budget and requirements and reverse declines.
  - Assume accrued health care costs.
  - Maintain-ramp up to achieve optimum backlog by '07

DHR:dh  
072301-63

snowflake

July 23, 2001 7:44 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Crystal City

*689*

Let's fashion a plan to get our people onto military bases and out of Crystal City and other high-rent locations.

DHR:dh  
072301-2

*now  
unclassified  
snowflakes*  

---

*to file only if  
we don't already  
have them.*  
*JK*

*23374101*

U12637 /02

! snowflake

July 24, 2001 10:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: BRAC

3233

Here are some thoughts on BRAC.

Thanks.

Attach.  
072301-45 BRAC

DHR:dh  
072401-3

2434101

U12639 /02

July 24, 2001 7:48 AM

SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC we ought to keep the following in mind:

1. Total base closings.
2. Letting the private sector use a portion of a base-joint use.
3. Pickling (not using) a base and keeping it, not cleaning it up but not selling it.
4. Joint service bases (AF plus Navy, etc.).
5. Selling part of a base and keeping the rest.
6. Moving offices from Crystal City and other high rent city areas to bases.

DHR:dh  
072301-45

snowflake

July 24, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Detailees

Dov Zakheim claims they are still getting requests for detailees. I have never seen one. I hope we are not approving any additional detailees-we don't want to.

Please advise me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072401-12

383:6

2454101

U12640 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4438

snowflake

July 25, 2001 11:28 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Russia

RUSSIA

FYI.

Attach.  
4/30/01 SecDef memo: "Meeting with Sharansky" [043001-29]

DHR:dh  
072501-27

25JUL01

U12641 /02

snowflake

April 30, 2001 1:33 PM

SUBJECT: Meeting with Sharansky

The Russians, KGB types, can smell weakness in a minute.

The Clinton people told the Russians that they needed additional help from the Russians so they could keep Congress from toughening the laws against Russia. The KGB-types in Russia knew that the Clinton administration would help cover up their proliferation activities for them.

In dealing with Russia, we need a big stick and a big carrot. They have an inferiority complex. They want to be taken seriously. They want the U.S. to take them seriously, particularly.

It makes no sense for them to be helping Iran.

**Putin** cannot deliver for the Russian people in terms of the economy, so what he believes he needs to do is give them pride by being nationalistic.

We need to have a stick and a carrot with respect to missile defense in dealing with the Russians.

In five years, Iran will have nuclear weapons. There is nothing we can do to stop it.

DHR:dh  
043001-29

11-L-0559/OSD/4440

snowflake

July 25, 2001 11:13 AM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: VCSAF

The Secretary of the Air Force tells me he talked to you about the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force that he and Jumper want, and that you said he looked good. He assumed that meant it was okay to go forward.

I have to work with the Vice Chiefs of the Services as much as the Chiefs, so I need to interview people like that. I am sure you know that, but apparently the Secretary of the Air Force assumed everything was a go and he sent the paperwork up.

I am afraid that got too far along for my comfort level. If I am uncomfortable with my meeting with him, he is not going to get the job.

Please protect me so I don't get preempted like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072501-5

020 AF

25 Jul 01

U12642 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4441

snowflake

July 25, 2001 9:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Facilities

Who is the Director of Washington Headquarters Services?

I have no problem if we want to direct that that person establish a process for managing facilities requirements of the Defense Agencies so we can ensure sound management of the available space.

Certainly, we need a **DoD-wide** database to identify facilities on bases that may be suitable for use by an organization currently housed in leased space.

We also need to make sure we have funds for renovation of underutilized facilities, or the resources to build facilities on bases to get people out of expensive leases.

We also need an overall process by which the Department manages our leases and facilities.

Let's get it done.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/19/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef: "Leased Facilities vs. Underutilized Bases"

DHR:dh  
072501-14

U12645 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4442

600

25Jul01

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim →

SUBJECT: Leased Facilities vs. Underutilized Bases

Sir,  
Answer to your  
question  
Cde Ball  
7/19  
7/19

July 19, 2001, 10:00 am.

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
JUL 25 2001

(D)

- The Department has reduced its rental costs by about \$400 million since 1994, in great part, by moving onto bases. Recent successes include the Naval Sea Systems Command move to the Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., and Military Entrance Processing Stations located in Hawaii, Georgia, Texas, and California moving onto bases in those states.
- DoD has not fully capitalized on the opportunities of moving activities out of leased space onto bases. Impediments to move to bases from leased space include:
  - the absence of a reliable DoD-wide database to identify facilities on bases that may be suitable for use by an organization currently housed in leased space;
  - insufficient funds for renovation of underutilized facilities, or resources to build new facilities on bases to meet the needs of activities leasing elsewhere;
  - the lack of an overall process by which the Department manages its leases and facilities requirements for Defense Agencies.
- These impediments are most acute for Defense Agencies, which typically do not control bases onto which activities could be relocated.
- You may wish to task the Director, Washington Headquarters Services to establish a process for managing the facilities requirements of the Defense Agencies that ensures the sound management of available space.

①

②

③  
Good point

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment

Prepared By: David L. McNicol, (b)(6)

SECDEF -

We'll pick up some of this in the base closure process, but what we can do without waiting, we will. Dov's suggestion is a good one. James H...

11-L-0559/OSD/4443

23  
2000

JUL-02-2001 14:40

P. 02/03

June 22, 2001 6:27 PM

TO: **Dov Zakheim**

cc: **Paul Wolfowitz**

FROM: **Donald Rumsfeld** 

SUBJECT: Empty Bases

One of the **things** that came up today in the **budget meetings was** the **fact that we have** these empty bases and yet we **are renting** a lot of **expensive** space downtown for **headquarters**. Why don't **we** move some of **these activities out of the** expensive leases and put them into the bases **that are underutilized?**

Thanks.

DHR:db  
062201-3 I

July 26, 2001 4:34 PM

SUBJECT: Reaction

If you think about it, we got pounded on **Kyoto**, and now we are getting pounded on our biological protocol. We are probably going to get pounded on the ABM treaty, if we ever pull out of it.

It makes you wonder if there isn't a way to present something better. We are not against the environment, and yet it came out that way on **Kyoto**, even though there were 94 or 95 Senators who voted against the darn thing.

On the biological treaty, it came out with the State Department and the White House looking like we were doing it because the pharmaceutical industry and business wanted us to, which wasn't the reason at all.

We have to cast these things in a way that shows we are concerned about problems and people.

For example, Eisenhower used to say that what is really important about planning is not the plan, but the process of planning so that you can make adjustments. One of the problems with a bad agreement like **Kyoto** or the biological protocol is that you end up with a document and a structure that makes people think it has solved a problem when, in fact, it hasn't. People stop addressing the problem and stop planning and working on it.

The real issue is how do we take care of the environment, not whether or not the **Kyoto** agreement is good. The real issue is how you deal with biological weapons, not the 200-page protocol that would do nothing to help that problem.

We need to avoid taking steps that stop people from analyzing a problem and dealing with it, as though it was static.

When we are approaching something like an announcement here at the Pentagon, we ought to think through how we want to put it, how we want to cast it. We don't want to tie it to things like jobs or industry, that kind of thing-that's the way a lot of people think. What we want to do is get it in people-related terms, in terms of our interests and problems, and in terms of solving things.

Let's think about this.

DHR:dh  
072601-34

370.64

2650101

U12649 /02

July 27, 2001 9:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (J)  
SUBJECT: Actions

We need to fashion a package of actions for September:

- Cancel programs and activities.
- Reduce the number of headquarters.
- Revise the assumptions in some war plans.
- Refashion our alliances-add nations.
- Get our allies to do more-transfer responsibility i.e., Japan, Korea.
- More support (dollars) from allies.

020 DAG

DHR:dh  
072701-7

2956/01

U12652 /02

CLOSE HOLD

snowflake

July 27, 2001 9:28 AM

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Open Items

110.01

I am leaving for Australia, but I have several open items with you.

1. As we discussed, the issue of that woman's call to Bruce **Dauer**, giving us our mark for '03, needs to be sorted out.
2. Second, I have asked **Dov Zakheim** and Paul **Wolfowitz** to work with you to make sure you and I are talking about exactly the same baseline and what is and what is not in it. You will recall there was some misunderstanding early in this administration between **DoD** and **OMB** about what was in our baseline. I don't want any misunderstandings again, so I need to make sure we are all on the same wavelength.
3. Last, I would like a copy of the paper you gave the President and the President gave me when he gave me the '02 budget mark. I recall it said '03 and each year thereafter would be inflation plus 10. I take it that that means inflation plus \$10 billion each year, as opposed to inflation plus an initial \$10 billion, but then only inflation in each of the following years, not an additional \$10 billion each year. Please clarify.

2752101

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072701-2

CLOSE HOLD

U12653 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4447

snowflake

July 27, 2001 7:50 AM

3233

SUBJECT: BRAC

There are a number of ways to manage bases:

- Close a base completely, clean it up environmentally, and transfer it completely for a profit or to a non-profit.
- Close a base, but don't shut it down, don't sell it and don't clean it up— simply pickle it.
- Close part of a base, no longer operate it and pickle it.
- Lease out a part of a base.
- Sell a part of a base.
- Close a base and sell it or turn it over to someone else to clean it up (from an environmental standpoint).
- Don't close a base; instead, fill up all or part of it with other DoD or government activities that are currently leasing higher-rent space in other areas.
- Use some creative ideas with builders and developers for them to construct buildings on our bases that they then own and rent.

DHR:dh  
072601-31

2774101

U12654 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4448

snowflake

July 30, 2001 10:20 AM

TO: Rich Haver  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DH*  
*fn*

SUBJECT: Intel Requirements

You two need to follow up on what intel requirements we want to push towards the DCI to fit our strategy and our QDR.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/13/01 SecDef memo

DHR:dh  
073001-8

350.09

3074101

U12657 /02

snowflake

July 13, 2001 7:16 PM

TO: Rich Haver  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Advice for DCI

Don't forget that George Tenet said he needed some advice from us as to what intel requirements we will impose on him to fit our new strategy and approach.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071301-26

11-L-0559/OSD/4450

snowflake

July 31, 2001 10:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld' *DR*  
SUBJECT: OSD "Hidden" Assets

*020 OSD*

The so-called "hidden" assets that OSD has, namely some 707 people that are doing OSD work but are not on the rolls, are listed on page 5 of Punaro's "Transforming OSD for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" paper. It makes you wonder if those organizations are able to detail people to OSD-maybe they have too many people, and they ought to be cut.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/17/97 Punaro Briefing: "Transforming OSD for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," p. 5

DHR:dh  
073101-26

*2152102*

U12660 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4451

# Examples of Hidden Assets

| ACTIVITY   | #   | BILLETS HELD AT                    |
|--|-----|------------------------------------|
| Active Guard & Reserve (AGR)                           | 69  |                                    |
| Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (A&T)           | 33  | DLA, Services                      |
| Intelligence Systems Support Office (C <sup>3</sup> I) | 21  | Air Force                          |
| Defense Agency Detailees in C <sup>3</sup> I           | 44  | DISA, DIA, NSA                     |
| Defense Support Project Office (C <sup>3</sup> I)      | 17  | Air Force (13), Navy (3), Army (1) |
| Business Process Reengineering Center (A&T)            | 34  | DLA                                |
| DoD Continuity of Operations Support Office (Policy)   | 20  | DLA                                |
| Housing Revitalization Support Office (A&T)            | 12  | Services                           |
| Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction (A&T)             | 9   |                                    |
| Life-cycle Information Integration Office              | 25  | DLA                                |
| Base Closure & Transition Office (A&T)                 | 15  | OEA                                |
| USD(A&T) Non-OSD Personnel-Misc                        | 156 |                                    |
| USD(Policy) Non-OSD Personnel-Misc                     | 148 |                                    |

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/OPTIONS ONLY/PRE-DECISIONAL

# Transforming OSF the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

A Briefing to the Secretary of Defense  
William Cohen

Arnold L. Punaro  
Chairman, Defense Reform Task Force  
October 17, 1997

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/OPTIONS ONLY/PRE-DECISIONAL  
11-L-0559/OSD/4453

snowflake

July 31, 2001 11:27 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Transforming

Please take a look at p. 17 from Punaro's study. Why shouldn't some of those items be moved, as he suggests-the ones that are connected to you?

Thanks.

Attach.

1 O/17/97 Punaro Briefing: "Transforming OSD for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," p.17

DHR:dh  
073101-33

381

31 Jul 01

U12663 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4454

### (3) Focus on Core Functions

#### Major OSD Non-Core Activities Identified as Candidates for Transfer

| EXAMPLES  | OSD OFFICE  | POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENT |
|---|-------------|----------------------|
| Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office          | USD(A&T)    | NRO                  |
| Def. Advisor, NATO*                             | USD(Policy) | Army                 |
| CALS Program Management                         | DUSD(Log)   | DLA                  |
| Cooperative Threat-Reduction Program Management | ATSD(NCB)   | DSWA                 |
| Humanitarian Assistance Program Management      | ASD(S&R)    | Army                 |
| National Security Education Program             | ASD(S&R)    | NDU                  |
| Counterdrug Program Management                  | ASD(SO/LIC) | Services             |
| Demining Program Management                     | ASD(SO/LIC) | Army                 |
| ACTB Oversight                                  | USD(A&T)    | DARPA                |
| TRICARE Program Management                      | ASD(HA)     | Director, TRICARE    |
| FOIA/Security Review                            | ASD(PA)     | WHIS                 |
| POW/MIA Office                                  | ASD(ISA)    | Army                 |
| Counter Proliferation/Start-II Ratification     | ASD(ISP)    | DSWA                 |
| Unified Medical Program Budget                  | ASD(HA)     | Director, TRICARE    |

| Positions Identified |     |
|----------------------|-----|
| Policy               | 118 |
| A&T                  | 104 |
| P&R                  | 33  |
| Compt                | 2   |
| C3I                  | 3   |
| OT&E                 | 37  |
| PA                   | 31  |
| Other                | 41  |
|                      | 379 |

\*Already planned for transfer

Plus 77 other programs

Total Billets Identified: 379

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/OPTIONS ONLY/PRE-DECISIONAL

*Each as of 11.  
me who don  
or 16.11*

# Transforming OSD for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

A Briefing to the Secretary of Defense,  
William Cohen

Arnold L. Punaro  
Chairman, Defense Reform Task Force  
October 17, 1997

PRELIMINARY DRAFT/OPTIONS ONLY/PRE-DECISIONAL

11-L-0559/OSD/4456

snowflake

July 31, 2001 9:58 AM

TO: Gordon England  
James Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Okinawa

When Colin Powell met with the Prime Minister of Japan, the subject came up of the behavior of U.S. servicemen in Japan and on Okinawa. There is no question but that if there is one more incident, it will be a very serious problem.

I understand that Jim Roche had a stand down for U.S. personnel in Okinawa recently. I think each of you ought to think through what we can do to get this problem under control.

We can no longer afford to drift from one incident to the next. One more could be seriously adverse to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073101-2

Japan

3150 01

U12664 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4457

~~snowflake~~

July 31, 2001 8:35 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Threats

We ought to think through General Shinseki's concerns about narco-trafficking, international organized crime, terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-state entities, and his characterization of them as "complicators" more than threats.

He points out, properly, that these are basically police functions. On the other hand, the U.S. military today has no doctrine for police work, and most of these problems either do now or could in the future exceed police capabilities.

Therefore, we ought to give some thought as to how, if at all, we want to address them. It seems to me that the place to begin doing that is in the budget.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073101-18

000.5

3150

U12667 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4458

---

T 8/1

~~snoflake~~

May 21, 2001 7:10 PM

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Chiefs 3/23/01

General Ryan

1. Need to fashion new alliances. Forging peace, not keeping peace.
2. Need to be interested in Latin America and Africa.
3. Oil. Indonesia, Caucuses, Venezuela.
4. Need to eliminate the Congressional restrictions on Azerbaijan.

Shinseki

1. Concerned about narco-traffickers. International organized crime. Terrorist organizations. They are more complicators than threats. Four concerns are terrorism, organized crime, narco-trafficking, WMD with non-state entities. These are all basically police functions. The U.S. military has no doctrine for police work. It exceeds most police capabilities.

DHR:dh  
052101-67

11-L-0559/OSD/4459

snowflake

July 31, 2001 3:18 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cost Saving Initiatives

Thanks for your priorities. I would like you to specify what those program reviews are-the big ones.

Second, it seems to me you are going to have to come up with some cost saving initiatives that relate to your office and the defense agencies. I rank that as right up near the top.

By August 15 I need to have a look at what you have proposed so we will be ready to announce the ones we are going to do within the Department and have time to prepare to send up to the Hill the ones that require legislation. We need to send both of them to the Hill by Labor Day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073101-44

110,01

3150101

U12669 /02

July 28, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

Cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: USD(AT&L) Priorities

You asked for our priorities in the area of our duties and responsibilities. Listed below are my priorities, with the most important being at the top:

--QDR and the FY03 Budget

--Various Program Reviews and Milestone Decisions

--Acquisition and Logistics Process Improvements

--Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) Legislation

--Missile Defense Management Principles

--Chemical Demilitarization Program Plan

--Space Commission Implementation Guidance

--Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan

--AT&L Defense Agencies Review

--Navy Shipbuilding Rationale

--S&T Revitalization

--Business Initiative Council (BIC) Implementation

11-L-0559/OSD/4461

MEMORANDUM

*Handwritten:* Many - What are the numbers?

8/5/01

**A List of Flags to be Planted**

Reduced number of CINCs from 9 to 7.

Require one CINC per war zone. (Iraq)

Reduce number of defense agencies from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Reduce number of healthcare offices from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Reduce number of IGs from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Reduce number of legal offices from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Reduce congressional relations activities from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Reduce public affairs activities from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Merge duplicative activities within the services.

Merge duplicate activities between OSD and the Sr. Staff (LA, PA, Policy, Legal)

Develop an ombudsman system to review problems that are first surfaced in the press or by legislative inquiries to identify the repetitive problems so directives and/or laws can be changed to reduce the repetition of the same kinds of poor work, poor service or excessively complex procedures.

*Vertical handwritten:* U20 Day

*Vertical handwritten:* SAUG 01

DHR/azn  
080501.06

8/6/2001  
9:46 AM

U12674 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4462

snowflake

August 6, 2001 2:06 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detailees

Here is Dov Zakheim's memo. These numbers are wrong.

Please send it to somebody else and let's get the right numbers and quit horsing around.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/2/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Baseline

DHR:dh  
080601-17

*040*

*6 Aug 01*

U12678 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4463

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2001 15:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Baseline

- You recently asked about the number of DoD detailees and where they are located.
- Summarizing data obtained from Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and Personnel and Readiness (P&R):

| From:                |     | To:              |     |
|----------------------|-----|------------------|-----|
| Army                 | 135 | Other DoD        | 13  |
| Navy                 | 93  | Federal Agencies | 330 |
| USAF                 | 151 | White House      | 62  |
| USMC                 | 21  | Legislative      | 76  |
| Others               | 91  | Think Tanks      | 9   |
| (OSD, DoD, Agencies) |     | Non-US           | 1   |
| TOTAL                | 491 |                  | 491 |

- Of these 491 detailees (including Legislative Fellowship Program), 355 are reimbursable and 336 are non-reimbursable.
- I can provide you details of where they are located, if you wish to see them.

PREPARED BY: CDR Michael A. Zieser, USN

July 31, 2001 10:24 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Baseline

How do you do an across-the-board cut if you don't have a good baseline?

If we can't figure out where our detailees are, how do we know how many actual employees we have in the various entities that would be cut back?

DHR:dh  
073101-22

Copy to *Chen* *8/3*

→ *Dr Chen, UNDP(R)*

*David-*

*I gave this to SecDef  
but said I was skeptical  
of the numbers and that  
I would provide you a copy.*

*Dirk*  
*8/3*

snowflake

August 6, 2001 1:57 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Chris Williams' Memos

Please disaggregate Chris Williams' memo and send the pieces to the proper people. He has some good ideas there.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/31/01 Williams Memo to SecDef: "Various Items"

DHR:dh  
080601-15

OLO  
DUD

6 AUG 01

U12680 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4466

SECRET: I will  
provide copies to  
Dep Sec / Feith.

CLOSE HOLD

*Chris Williams*  
*Chris Williams*

Larry 8/3

July 31, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *AW*

SUBJECT: Various Items

Sir, below are some brief comments on three items of interest.

Follow Up from Australia

Congratulations on your recent, successful visit to Australia to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. I have worked very closely with the Australians over the years and your and Secretary Powell's presence was both appropriate and well received. In short, your and Secretary Powell's presence helped reassure (one of the key pillars in the new defense strategy) our Aussie friends and others in the region of the importance the Bush Administration attaches to our alliance relationships, especially in Asia.

At the same time, the proposal for enhanced security cooperation and planning among the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant development -- a positive one that's long overdue. Of course, a formal treaty alliance (or some other highly legalistic/mechanistic approach) is not feasible politically. Nor is it desirable at this stage. Indeed, attempting to negotiate a formal arrangement now would be counterproductive and could detract from what I assume is the central objective of the endeavor: to improve the capabilities of like-minded democracies -- all of whom to one extent or another share concerns about the rise of China -- to jointly resist aggression in the region and improve military interoperability and security cooperation/coordination.

Many in China will see the new initiative as directly aimed at countering Beijing's regional aspirations and its ability to threaten and coerce its neighbors. Keep in mind that this new initiative comes on the heels of Japan's new found willingness under Prime Minister Koizumi to play a more substantial role in regional security affairs -- another worrisome development from Beijing's perspective. Therefore, it can be expected that some in China will loudly object to the "proposed anti-Beijing alliance," although I suspect that China's political leaders may well mute their direct criticism of the initiative in order to keep US-China relations "on track" in the wake of Secretary Powell's visit and to avoid giving more impetus to the idea. (Recall China's heavy emphasis on D&D -- that is, "denying" outsiders insights into their real thinking and "deception" as to their true motivations, intentions, and capabilities.)

Although as described in the media the proposal is primarily aimed at improving the security dialogue among the four powers, it is vitally important to put some "meat" into the nascent concept. In this regard, I strongly recommend significantly expanding and enhancing joint military exercises and other "visible" forms of cooperation that go beyond simply "broadening the dialogue." You might consider asking both Admiral Denny Blair at CINCPAC and your OSD staff to prepare a menu of options for your review for expanded "operational linkages" and exercises, in addition to more dialogue. I am planning to visit Denny at PACOM HQ in late September, and would be happy to discuss this with him in greater detail, if you believe that would be appropriate.

Another advantage of the initiative is that it would help promote greater cooperation between the South Korean and Japanese militaries at a time when politicians in both capitals are still steaming over the "history textbooks" incident. I note that the media

coverage suggested that South Korea had not been approached yet on the initiative, which if true is an oversight that requires immediate rectification. South Korean President Kim believes that China can provide insight into and positive influence on North Korean leader Kim Chong-il, and therefore one should not necessarily expect that South Korea will "leap" at the opportunity to join in a dialogue that could aggravate Beijing.

#### Backchannels and Missile Defense

I recently had a conversation with a well-placed source who asserted that the NSC leadership is "using various intermediaries and backchannels to send reassuring messages to Putin" re US missile defense plans and intentions. Without knowing the context or details, I would be uncomfortable with any strategy that places even a modest reliance on the use of "cut-outs" or "backchannels". First, one cannot be assured that the message is being effectively conveyed (or accurately reported on the back end). Second, many intermediaries will be tempted to propose or try to negotiate their own "solutions" to the "problem" -- which in the end will only complicate the bilateral dialogue. And third, I see no reason for sending any message other than strength and determination at this critical, early stage.

Beginning with your performance at Wehrkunde, the Administration has done a masterful job in promoting two complementary ideas: first, the inevitability of US deployment of effective theater and national missile defenses, as they become available and starting with modest increments of capability; and second the inevitability of a US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. "It's comin' so you'd better adjust your thinking accordingly..." has been the strong message, reinforced again and again in meetings with Congress, the allies, the Chinese, and the Russians. Any action or statement that calls into question or undermines that sense of inevitability is both unnecessary and counterproductive. I'm concerned -- again without knowing any of the specifics of the case -- that they just might be (unintentionally) signaling a lessening of US resolve.

#### Dealing with Congress on Missile Defense

As the Armed Services Committees begin marking up their respective authorization bills, some partisan Democrats will be strongly tempted to impose statutory restrictions on the missile defense program (e.g., by requiring that any testing be compliant with the ABM Treaty, etc.). Some in the Congress and in the Administration will likewise be tempted to proffer some "compromise" language that "avoids a bloody fight" over this issue. I strongly counsel against entertaining such notions of "compromise" at this stage in the process.

In fact, the President has enormous leverage over the authorizers right now, and especially over Carl Levin. Levin is indeed a very tough negotiator, but in the end he will fold if he knows he can't get his way. (I've seen this up close and personal in over a dozen House-Senate conference committee negotiations and other venues.) Levin simply cannot tolerate a situation wherein he is held responsible for failing to get a Defense authorization bill signed into law by the President. There have been numerous close calls over the past 15 years, but the pressure to "get a bill" -- and thus retain some measure of stature, jurisdiction, and relevance -- is in the final analysis simply overwhelming for any SASC chairman. This is especially true for Levin: this is his first year chairing the committee.

Therefore, the President should make clear right away that he will veto any defense authorization bill that reaches his desk if it includes onerous restrictions on the missile defense program. Senator Levin will no doubt do his best to make vetoing the bill difficult for the President (by including authority for closing unneeded bases, for example), but the President simply must stick to his guns. Some on the NSC and White House staffs will

He is  
right. This is  
enormous leverage  
for us.  
D.H.K.

no doubt argue that compromising now to get a "united front" will strengthen our hands in dealing with the Russians, or in dealing with the Congress on bills unrelated to defense. I couldn't disagree more. What has brought and will continue to bring the Russians to the table is the President's steadfast commitment to deploying effective defenses and jettisoning anything (the ABM Treaty, Congressionally-imposed testing restrictions, etc.) that gets in the way of that goal.

I hope you find this information useful. Welcome back from Australia, sir, and best regards.

snowflake

August 6, 2001 2:06 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Camp Bondsteel

Someone should stick a budget on Camp Bondsteel and reduce the costs--\$148 million a year is too much. Please put a budget on them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080601-16

*Serbia*

*6 Aug 01*

U12683 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4470

1730

INFO MEMO

August 1, 2001 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Budget for Camp Bondsteel

- You recently asked about the budget for Camp Bondsteel's annual operating costs.
- Camp Bondsteel costs are budgeted in Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF). The costs are:

|   |                        |
|---|------------------------|
| Initial Start-Up cost   | <b>\$200 million</b>   |
| Annual Operations<br>(includes utilities and contractor support -- messing, etc.) | <b>\$148.5 million</b> |

- The annual operating costs are included in the present level of funding in the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund and are not provided as part of a supplemental appropriation.

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: CDR Michael A. Zieser, USN

snowflake

August 8, 2001 8:58 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Foreign Support

Here are the percentages apparently that we pay countries where we have forces.  
We ought to get a standard percentage, and it ought to be high.

Why don't you get some folks working on it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080801-7

092

8 Aug 01

U12688 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4472

August 7, 2001 10:40 AM

snoflake

SUBJECT: Support

Foreign forces are supported by host countries as follows:

- Korea 37%
- Germany 27%
- Japan 76%
- The Gulf ± 50%

DHR:dh  
080701-8

11-L-0559/OSD/4473

snowflake

August 10, 2001 2:40 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Dealing w/Russia

*Signed 8/16  
forward to  
Personnel  
Office  
not controlled  
by CID*

Please read this *USA Today* article about the trip of Paul O'Neill and Don Evans.

It strikes me that we are doing everything exactly the way we agreed we wouldn't do it.' We are running around to Russia legitimizing them before we get a dad burn thing.

My guess is that they will feel they have already gotten all they need, and then we will be faced with the issue as to whether or not we want to pull back the Russian-American business dialogue and all the other things we seem to be offering for nothing.

I am very uncomfortable with the way this is going.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/10/01 *USA Today*, "Russia Policy Seems Familiar"

DHR:dh  
081001-19

*RUSIA*

*10 50001*

U12702 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4474

On the larger issue of the future of centers like Warner Robins, Roche was clearly optimistic.

"Our planes are getting older and older, so maintenance is going to be more and more important to us," Roche said.

"We need the ALCs (air logistics centers) for the long run," he said.

After the press conference, Ron Smith, a retired Air Force major general and a former base commander at Warner Robins, said the vote of confidence was the most important part of Roche's comments.

"I couldn't be happier if I'd written the script for him myself," Smith said.

USA Today  
August 10, 2001

Pg. 8

#### 16. Russia Policy Seems Familiar

By Bill Nichols, USA Today

WASHINGTON — During last year's presidential campaign, George W. Bush was frank about Russia's economic troubles. Russian President Vladimir Putin would have to establish a legal code and accounting practices "so that if countries invest capital, there's a normal rate of return," the candidate said during a presidential debate Oct. 11.

But when Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Commerce Secretary Don Evans visited Moscow last month, they seemed to have found these problems solved. "They're just individuals who look you straight in the eye," Evans said of the Russian business executives he met. O'Neill added, "I'm really impressed with how together they are."

So together that Bush and Putin announced a new "Russian-American Business Dialogue" when they met in Genoa, Italy, last month. Among its goals: spurring private investment in Russia and helping Moscow become a member of the World Trade Organization, the Geneva-based body that writes the rules for world trade.

What had happened in the nine months since candidate

Bush's criticism? Administration officials say President Bush's push for more private investment follows on his campaign pledge to move away from multibillion-dollar international loans to Russia and focus on business-to-business contacts at the grassroots level.

But officials from the Clinton administration take a more cynical view. They say Bush's Russian business offensive isn't driven by economics, but by politics, namely an attempt to buy Russian acceptance of Bush's plan to build a national missile-defense system.

For now, Russian officials oppose such a system, as well as Bush's call to replace the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bars national missile defenses. In Genoa, Bush and Putin agreed to hold talks that would couple missile defense with potential reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld leaves Saturday for Moscow to continue those negotiations.

Mark Medish, President Clinton's Russia specialist on the National Security Council, says Bush appears to be adopting the same policy that he criticized the previous administration for advancing: economic engagement with Russia.

"It's not as if there is some group of Republican businessmen who are going to have more success with Russia as it is than Democratic businessmen were going to have," Medish says.

Administration officials contend that Bush's new initiative is in response to encouraging trends in Russia's economy since Putin took power last year.

Evans is scheduled to take a group of U.S. businessmen to Russia in October to assess potential investment opportunities. Corporate leaders say the Bush team, given the high-level corporate experience of Cabinet members such as Evans and O'Neill, may have an advantage in steering more U.S. investments to Russia, particularly with their connections in the energy sector. Before they joined the Cabinet,

Evans headed a Denver-based oil company and O'Neill was chief executive of Alcoa.

In the wake of Russia's financial disaster in 1998, when the ruble lost approximately two-thirds of its value and most foreign investors fled, Putin has managed to stabilize his country's economy.

Russia has run a budget surplus for two years. The economy, which collapsed in 1998, grew 8.3% last year, after adjusting for inflation, which has fallen sharply, from 85% in 1998 to 20% last year.

"We try not to naively paint a picture that isn't realistic. There's a long way to go," says Blake Marshall, executive vice president of the U.S.-Russia Business Council. "But the situation has improved dramatically in the last couple of years, and we're very favorably impressed by the Putin team."

Much of Russia's growth has been generated, however, by temporary conditions: a weak ruble that has made Russian exports less expensive, and several years of high prices on the world market for oil and natural gas, of which Russia has abundant reserves.

"No one can question that the Russian economy today is healthier than anyone would have dared predict in the fall of 1998 after the financial crisis," then-U.S. ambassador to Russia James Collins said in June in a farewell address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia. "But to be honest, the investment that Russia has attracted over the past few years is minuscule, compared to that which has flowed to other transition economies, and to that which the country should attract, given its rich natural endowment and its talent and educated workforce."

Economists who watch Russia closely agree that Putin's progress must be measured against the giant steps Russia still must take to put in place the kind of free-market system that would attract large sums of foreign dollars. Foreign direct investment in Russia in 1999 was still a paltry \$3.3 billion. By contrast, according to the World Bank, foreign investors poured \$39

billion into China, \$12 billion into Mexico and \$7 billion into Poland in 1999, the last year for which figures are available.

From establishing basic property rights to reducing tax rates to continuing to fight widespread corrupt&, Russia has years of hard work ahead before it can be in a position to really woo foreign investment, experts say.

"The emperor still doesn't have many clothes," says Joseph Ilacqua, a Bryant College economist who specializes in the states that made up the former Soviet Union. "It's a long-haul situation and there remains a great amount of risk. Honest, hard-working people are not going to get rich quick."

Given the remaining economic question marks about Russia's transition to a market economy, opposition Democrats and missile-defense opponents see the beginnings of a grand bargain.

Indeed, Putin and other senior Russian officials have made no secret of the fact they would amend or abandon the ABM Treaty only if such a move were made worthwhile by financial incentives or security guarantees.

Michael McFaul, a Russia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says the new U.S.-Russia business initiative appears similar to the programs pursued by the joint U.S.-Russia commission co-chaired by Al Gore when he was vice president. Bush disbanded the commission after complaining that it failed to deal with pervasive corruption in Russia.

McFaul says he finds it "rather ironic" that Bush lambasted the commission. "It seems to me that they're basically re-inventing the wheel with these new contacts." But as a policy driven by economics rather than geopolitics, he adds, "I'm not convinced that they are terribly serious about this."

snowflake

August 14, 2001 4:13 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Steve Cambone  
 Larry Di Rita  
 Andy Hoehn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Briefings for the President

339 W4

I am probably going to be briefing the President for a couple of hours Friday, August 24, in Texas on the QDR, the Defense Planning Guidance and the Nuclear Posture Review.

I will need some very good ammunition and briefing material.

Certainly among them ought to be a tick list of the major transformational, or significant, changes we are undertaking-like standing joint task forces, budgeting of perstempo and the paradigm shift.

We need to get a good, succinct brief together.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/10/OI Comptroller info memo to SecDef re: Prior Notification **Reprogrammings**

DHR:dh  
081401-4

14 Aug 01

U12706 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4476

August 16, 2001 12:28 PM

SUBJECT: Working with Congress

To get big things accomplished through Congress, we need two or three handfuls of Congressmen and Senators-men and women-who will rise above their immediate constituency demands. They are there. A number have offered their help.

As Edmund Burke said, "A representative owes his constituency, not simply obedience to the mood of the moment, but his best judgment."

There is no question but that it takes courage, but we are finding them. And I believe we will find enough who feel the urgent need to fix something important that is not working right.

032

DHR:dh  
081601-7

16 Aug 01

U12709 /02

August 16, 2001 9:48 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Steve Cambone  
J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Some More Thoughts on Russia

*Russia*

Another few itches they have are:

- Limits on defensive interceptors.
- Space and sea basing.

A couple of other areas for possible discussion are:

- Economic participation on missile defense.
- Early warning.
- Time phrasing as to when we do what.
- Testing for some period.

DHR:dh  
081601-1

*16 Aug 01*

U12710 /02

August 16, 2001 12:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Europe

*Europe*

Europe is kind of floundering around criticizing us on so many things. It is kind of like idle hands make mischief.

I wonder if we began some initiatives in NATO to get them working on some projects-that they could then resist doing-that we could shift the burden from us to them.

Why don't we think about some projects we could urge them to do that would be good for the alliance if they were willing to do them. If they were not willing to do them, it would at least shift the responsibility back to them for their failure, rather than giving them the opportunity to criticize us for unilateralism.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081601-24

*16 Aug 01*

U12711 /02

✓ snowflake

August 20, 2001 1:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: F-22 and Joint War

Let's have a meeting sometime when someone explains to me how the F-22 helps the joint war.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082001-40

452F

20 Aug 01

U12722 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4480

15 August 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 20 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF  
SUBJECT: F-22 Ground Attack

8/16 0715

Leader,

There will be many rumors about the F-22 floating about, and one is that the plane is only an air-to-air fighter. While optimized for air superiority, the basic F-22 also carries two high-precision bombs so as to use its terrific stealth to attack the new surface-to-air missile systems. Our transformational concept will take the plane and enhance it to attack deep mobile targets (like TELs) in conjunction with ISR assets, but especially with Army forces on the ground.

na / Jim

James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Air Force

-THE ISSUE ON ALL THESE CONCEPTS IS "WHERE'S THE MONEY?"

-ARMY IS THE STRONGEST DETRACTOR OF F-22. THEY DON'T SEE HOW IT WILL HELP THE JOINT BATTLE.

MTC

How will it  
11-L-0559/OSD/4481

snowflake

August 23, 2001 7:44 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: General Hugh Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Road in Kosovo

)  
Serbia

I talked to Colin Powell on the phone Wednesday evening and urged him to get the State Department working to open the road from Skopje airport to Kosovo. He said he would get right on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082301-2

23 Aug 01

U12724 /02

snowflake

September 10, 2001 9:16 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Anchor Chain Memo

Please reread this anchor chain memo and the memo that Col. Bucci sent me.  
What do you think we might want to do with respect to it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/4/01 MA memo to **SecDef** re: The Perception of the "Masses"

DHR:dh  
091001-12

020 DAD

1050881

U12726 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4483

Time what do.

September 4, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: SecDef

SUBJECT: The Perception of the "Masses"

g 9/4 CIRCULATING  
THIS + "THE FIRST  
SEVEN  
MONTHS"  
HELPS MOVE  
THE BAL

Sir,

The attached document was given to me by another colonel in the building. He told me,

"Booch, you need to read this. It's being circulated, I don't know who wrote it, but it is good. It really hits on the issues that most of us care about. If you think it is worth it, or that it will help, you may want to show it to your boss. He needs to know what issues are important to the minions."

You will recognize the comments, as you are the author. Clearly, we have not gotten your message out within the building.

When I revealed the source to my friend, he was thrilled. He asked if you really believed what was written, and I assured him you never said anything you did not really mean. He said, "Wow, he does understand what is at stake. I am going to make sure I circulate this!"

I thought you might be interested, as in this case; the informal communications "system" is working in our favor.

Very Respectfully,

COL Bucci *S, 7/4*

## DRAFT-Z

June 25, 2001

SUBJECT: The DoD Challenge

What is the biggest change in the Pentagon over the past 25 years? Almost without notice, the reservoir of trust-the glue that makes relationships work-has been drained. The answer is that there has been an erosion of confidence between:

- . The senior military leadership and their subordinates, as seen in the increase in resignations of junior officers, those who could be the military leaders of the future.
- Political leadership and the Armed Forces due to under funding that has left the impression that our government undervalues military service.
- The Department of Defense and Congress, leading to a layering of restrictions and requirements that have reduced the DoD's ability to manage the Department.

The Defense establishment is tangled in its anchor chain. To manage DoD efficiently and to transform the Armed Forces for the 21<sup>st</sup> century we need to first transform the Department-how it operates internally, how it deals with its industrial suppliers, and how it interacts with the Congress.

The Armed Forces have been fortunate in attracting and retaining truly outstanding men and women, who voluntarily put their lives at risk to perform the noble work of defending our country. But government too often provides training and equipment that are more appropriate for the Cold War than for the coming decades.

DoD is one of the largest enterprises on earth, but its leadership has little control over the resources, personnel, and operations of the Department. DoD:

- Is unable to reallocate savings to more effective ends, so managers at all levels have no incentive to save dollars.
- . Can't account for millions of transactions valued at more than \$2.6 trillion.
- Is required by law to submit 905 reports to Congress per year, many of which are of marginal value and probably little read, despite the hundreds of trees sacrificed.

**DRAFT-2**

- Has to respond to some 2,500 to 3,000 inquiries of concern or complaint from Members of Congress each week.
- Has a backlog of some 150,000 security clearances.
- With a \$300 billion budget, needs Congressional approval to build a \$500.000 building and is required to maintain some 20-25%+ more facilities than are needed.
- Is monitored closely by the General Accounting Office, more than eight Inspectors General and a testing organization that report to Congress, with the result that the Department has so many auditors and inspectors—some 24,000—that they approximate the number of U.S. Army “trigger pullers” that can be deployed at any one time.
- Has overhead that has grown to the point where it is estimated that only 14% of the DoD manpower is directly related to combat operations.
- Has antiquated personnel policies, many of which were designed to manage a conscript force of single men, but now manage a volunteer force with families.
- Has several different personnel systems that enlist their workforces for four-year tours, as opposed to bringing them onboard for a career.
- Has policies that uproot personnel and families every few years to move them to new assignments, and then, after training them and benefiting from their fine services, shove many out while still in their 40’s.
- Has policies that commission officers, train them, and then bounce them and their families from assignment to assignment every two to three years, to the point that the most successful officers skip across the tops of the waves so fast that they can’t learn from their own mistakes because they are seldom in an assignment long enough to see what they were; and then we ease them out to retirement between the ages of 45 and 55, while still in their prime.
- Has benefit and assistance programs for military personnel that some critics say emulate the failed Soviet model of centralized systems for housing, commissaries, and healthcare, rather than using private sector competitive models that are the envy of the world.
- Has three separate Post Exchange systems, and a law prohibiting DoD from consolidating them without the approval of Congress.

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## DRAFT-2

- . Is faced with a process where in the year 2000 54% of the President's DoD R&D programs were changed by Congress and 32% of its procurement programs.
- Has three or four different health systems and three or four surgeons general: rather than a single service that an efficient, large-scale enterprise would fashion.
- . Grade and rank systems more than 100 years old and which were rejected years ago by the for-profit sector in favor of flatter, more nuanced organizations and compensation arrangements.
- . Financial management and information systems designed to report to Congress and comply with the maze of laws, amendments and requirements that have grown geometrically and accumulated over decades, rather than systems designed to provide the financial information managers need to manage.
- Rules, regulations and approval requirements that guarantee the Defense establishment infrastructure remains decades behind in recapitalization, rather than the more efficient models most companies use, including outsourcing, sale/lease back arrangements, and privatizing.
- . Organizations and practices that perpetuate separateness, as we talk of "jointness," causing many dedicated, well-organized, able people to work hard doing things that need not and/or should not be done.
- Despite some 128 DoD acquisition reform studies, an acquisition system that since 1975 has doubled the time it takes to produce a weapon system, while the pace for new generations of technology has shortened from years to 18 months, guaranteeing that DoD's newest weapons will be one or more technology generations old the day they are fielded.
- . Processes and regulations so onerous that many commercial businesses, developing needed military technologies, refuse to do business with DoD.
- A U.S. defense industrial base that has declined from 20+ companies in 1976 to 5 major firms today, with the 6<sup>th</sup> a foreign firm.
- Seeks a warrior culture, but slides from what some estimate to be in the neighborhood of a 55/45 teeth-to-tail ratio to a 45/55 ratio (percentages depend on classification categories).

## DRAFT-2

- Statutory requirements that include some \$7 billion of non-traditional defense programs that run the gamut of non-defense interests from education, drugs and the environment to snakes, fossils and cancer research.
- Metrics more focused on inputs, efforts and intentions than on outputs and results.
- A pattern of legal and/or Congressional challenges to most major program decisions.
- A Defense Authorization Bill that in 1962 was one page; in 1975 totaled 75 pages; today, packed with requirements, prohibitions, stipulations, entitlements and mandated organizational structures, it has ballooned to 988 pages, during a time when the number of men and women in the armed forces has dropped from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.

This situation has undoubtedly evolved over the past decades as a result of a series of instances that caused distrust between the Congress and the Department. Unfortunately, the result has not been improved oversight. Quite the contrary, each new layer of control and micromanagement has compounded the problem of accountability. From a practical standpoint, DoD no longer has the authority to conduct the business of the Department, and, as a result, its performance is deteriorating.

The maze of constraints on the Department forces it to operate in a manner that is so slow, so ponderous and so inefficient that whatever it ultimately does produce is late, wasteful of taxpayer dollars, and has the unintended result of leading to still more letters of complaint and calls of criticism from Congress, more critical hearings and more condemnation in GAO reports, to be followed by a still greater number of amendments, restrictions and requirements to try to correct the seeming mismanagement.

Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces for the tasks ahead is important. However, transforming how DoD functions and its relationship with Congress may be even more important. Without transforming the Department, the transformation of the armed forces may not be possible. What may be needed is an “omnibus process” to overhaul this relationship and a “compact” so controls, requirements, reports and regulations in future years will have a sunset provision and do not again compound over time.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are outstanding people who care about our country both in Congress and working throughout the Defense Department,

## DRAFT-2

none of whom would knowingly damage national interest, that is our circumstance.

Our country functions smoothly today because of the rule of law. If all contracts in our society had to be adjudicated or were subject to constant oversight, the system would break down completely. Fortunately, that is not the case. Almost all of our business and personal relationships are based not on oversight, inspections: audits, adjudication or micromanagement. Rather, they are based on trust.

Today that is not true. Over time, the regulations and requirements that have been laid on are so onerous that, over time, they are smothering incentive, innovation and risk taking.

The late Senator Everett Dirksen used to tell the story about how to cook a frog. He said if you put a frog into a pot of boiling water, it will jump out. But, if you put a frog in cool water, it will be comfortable in its new surroundings. Then, if you slowly turn up the heat, the frog will not notice. Eventually the water will boil, and you will have a cooked frog.

That is what has happened. It has taken decades of small, logical, or at least understandable, individual acts to create a situation where in the aggregate they prevent the Department from serving the national interest.

No large institution willingly reforms itself. Resistance to change is great. To accomplish the task will take the best efforts of the President, the civilian and military leadership in the Department, and, importantly, the leaders' and Members of the House and Senate.

During his term each President has available only the Defense capabilities left by his predecessors. So, too, the decisions he makes and the capabilities invested in during his term will be available not to him, but to his successors.

So it is our responsibility to get about the task of transforming this great national asset, the Department of Defense, that is so needed to preserve peace and stability in our still dangerous, untidy and dynamic world.

The country and the men and the women of the Armed Forces who put their lives at risk deserve no less.

DHR:dh  
SR/current MFRs/Challenge  
6/25/01 11:10 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/4489

September 10, 2001 9:03 AM

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

We ought to start feeding into our missile defense arguments that missile defense is not about today-it is about tomorrow. People who think you can wait as that threat grows and then all of a sudden, instantaneously, have missile defense capabilities are flat wrong, particularly **Biden**.

The task of government is to prepare for the future, not to sit there and say we don't need to do this until the threat is so great that it is too late.

DHR:dh  
091001-8

373 24

15 Sep 01

U12727 /02

September 14, 2001 9:51 AM

SUBJECT: SACEUR, CINCSPACE

I spoke to the President on 13 September after the NSC meeting and told him I was thinking about asking General Ralston and General Eberhart to stay on in their CINC posts, as SACEUR and CINCSPACE.

I indicated I thought it would be best to have seasoned hands in those jobs-that Eberhart had done a good job over the air and space defense of the United States during the past few days and that Ralston was clearly the star of the CINCs. I said I was going to see if we could keep them onboard.

He said he thought that was an excellent idea and that he supported it.

DHR:dh  
291401-3

Evcom

145-2801

U12731 /02

snowflake

September 16, 2001 5:40 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Germany

I think it was General Shelton who told me that the German Chief of the Defense Staff said that if the U.S. is going to go to war, Germany wants to go with us. They don't want to be second fiddle to France or the UK, and they are anteing up a brigade and some aircraft, I believe.

We ought to get that message communicated properly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091601-13

*Germany*

*16 Sep 01*

U12732 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4492

September 16, 2001

2:42 PM

SUBJECT: Memorandum of phone conversation between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and His Royal Highness Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defense, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2:20-2:35 p.m. 9/16/01

The call started by Prince Sultan expressing his sincere condolences, and those of the government of Saudi Arabia and Saudi people to the Secretary, the President of the United States and the American people.

HRH described the September 11 acts as "criminal acts that killed thousands of innocent people."

Then HRH stated, "I affirm the Kingdom's pledge to provide every possible help within its power to identify the perpetrators and those who were behind them, as well as work actively with the U.S. in the area of intelligence sharing.

SecDef expressed his appreciation, indicated that there is no question that the U.S. will be asking for the full cooperation of the Prince's government as well as other governments.

HRH reaffirmed to SecDef that the Kingdom of SA has imposed additional security measures to protect the expatriates of the US as well as imposing new security procedures and measures to ensure the safety of the "friendly armed forces" in the region, including US forces.

SecDef expressed his appreciation and indicated to HRH that 20 minutes ago he has read a report detailing such new measures and procedures.

HRH emphasized and affirmed that the Kingdom of SA "strongly condemns, in the case of proven evidence, any perpetrators who might have belonged to Islamic countries or the Islamic faith. Islam does not condone at all, or under any circumstances, such criminal acts."

SecDef stated that he and his government fully recognize that the enemy, in this case, is terrorism and not any religion or any group of people. He stated, "Our enemies are those who perpetrate acts of terror or try to terrify my country, and jeopardize our interests, as well as the interests of other." He went on to say, "The US will go after those who supported such acts as well as the countries that protect them and provide them with safe haven." SecDef stated that he had a phone conversation with Secretary Powell during the last hour, and they talked about the Taliban group and the relationships between that group and other countries, including SA. SecDef stated that the Taliban has created a "welcoming

Saudi Arabia

16508901

environment for Al Qaida.” SecDef stated, “We hope that countries will take the necessary steps to expel the Taliban diplomatically and clearly express their dissatisfaction with the behavior of the Taliban.”

HRH stated, “We absolutely support you in that call [regarding Taliban]. It should be absolutely clear that no side should deal with the Taliban.”

SecDef stated that the problem of terrorism is much larger than the attacks on the US last Tuesday. SecDef stated, “Our consistent efforts will last not only for weeks or months, but for years to come.” SecDef also stated, “A wide range of efforts-political, diplomatic, economic, and military-will have to deal with the unconventional activities that we have witnessed.” SecDef also stated that the problem is wider than the latest attack on the US. He stated, “We should not forget what others are doing, such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as well as what is happening in different countries.”

HRH stated, “Our views are identical, and we reconfirm to you, Mr. Secretary, that the Kingdom of SA, as it did during the second Gulf War, will stand by the United States. Saudis and Americans shed blood together. We reaffirm the Kingdom’s readiness to stand by the United States, as we did a decade ago.”

SecDef indicated it was wonderful to hear such a commitment from HRH. He expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to have this phone conversation and expressed his desire to meet in the weeks ahead, face to face, with HRH, either in the US or in the Kingdom of SA.

HRH indicated that this is a valuable and cherished wish of his to meet as quickly as possible with SecDef. He said, “God will stand by what is right, and right will prevail.” Once again, HRH conveyed to SecDef the strong sentiment and condolences coming from His Majesty and the Crown Prince to the President, the administration and the friendly American people. HRH also reaffirmed to SecDef everything that came in the phone conversation between the Crown Prince and POTUS.

Gamal R. Helal  
U.S. Department of State  
Senior Diplomatic Interpreter for USG side

dh  
091601-1C

September 16, 2001 3:45 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Ralston

*EUCOM*

I talked to General Ralston and asked him to stay on for another year. He agreed to stay on through the end of 2002. He is currently scheduled to leave in May, but there is a foreign ministers' meeting in May and a defense ministers' meeting in June of '02. Then there is a head of state November of '02, where you deal with NATO enlargement, and he said he could stay until the end of the year.

So that is set, except that he is also SACEUR, and we probably need to communicate with NATO and see that they are comfortable extending him. I suppose that is done through the Department of State. You should probably have Wolfowitz or Feith coordinate that with the State Department.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091601-8

*165020*

U12734 /02

snowflake

July 23, 2001 1:07 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: DSB Research

You should probably circulate the reports that Bill Schneider is referring to here to the appropriate people.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/1 8/01 Schneider memo to SecDef re: DSB Research Issues

DHR:dh  
072301-35

334 DSB

2356 01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3 140

DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

July 18, 2001

①  
SECDEF HAS SEEN  
JUL 23 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: William Schneider, Jr., Chairman

Subject: Your interest in the subject of homeland defense and related DSB research issues of joint scientific and policy interest.

I met with Richard Perle today to coordinate the activities of the Defense Science Board and the Defense Policy Board. Perle mentioned your interest in the homeland defense issue. The Defense Science Board is in the process of publishing a six-volume study it has conducted over the past year. A copy of the Executive Summary (Volume I) is attached. The study, *Protecting the Homeland* addresses the following subject areas:

- Defense Against Biological Weapons(\*)
- Defensive Information Warfare (\*)
- Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (\*)
- Unconventional Chemical Warfare Defense
- Intelligence Needs for Civil Support

Titles with an asterisk (\*) have already been published, the two remaining volumes are in their final stages of preparation. We would be pleased to provide you with a briefing on any or all of the parts of the study if you wish to receive it.

The DSB will complete its major study effort on precision strike next month, and the final report will be presented at the annual Summer Study in California. In view of your interest in the subject of the transformation of the armed forces, the DSB effort on this matter is very pertinent. I have offered, and Richard Perle has accepted the offer of a briefing on the DSB's work in view of the DPB's policy related interest in transformation,

# *Protecting the Homeland*

*Report of the Defense Science Board*

*2000 Summer Study  
Executive Summary  
Volume I*



February 2001

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense  
For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

11-L-0559/OSD/4504

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


THE SECRETARY OF STATE 2001 JUL 24 AM 11: 07  
WASHINGTON

July 20, 2001

Dear Don:

Thank you for your July 13 note forwarding Beverly Deane Shaver's letter regarding your classmate and friend, Lt. jg James Deane, Jr., USN. When I go to China, I will raise both his case and the overall issue of POW/MIA cooperation. I will urge the Chinese to work with your Office of POW/Missing Personnel which I understand will have representatives in China in August.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell

The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

U12812 /01

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11-L-0559/OSD/4505

snowflake

July 13, 2001 5:34 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: LT(jg) James Deane, Jr.

Here is a letter from Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver about her husband. Her husband, Jim, was a classmate of mine in Naval flight training and a very close friend. I hope that you will raise this issue on your trip to China.

Regards.

Attach.

7/12/01 Shaver ltr to Asst. Sec State Jim Kelly

DHR:dh  
071301-19

China

1352101

11-L-0559/OSD/4506

U12445 /01

(b)(6)

**ROBBINS & ASSOCIATES, LLC**  
**SUITE 830**  
**333 WEST WACKER DRIVE**  
**CHICAGO, IL 60606**

**TEL.** (b)(6)  
**E-MAIL:** (b)(6)

**Date:** July 13, 2001

**To:** (b)(6)

**Company:** OSD

**Fax #:** (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)

**Total # of Pages:** 3

For SecDef from Dr. Shaver. This came by fax, so there are no enclosures included with the copy.

Tks,  
NP

Sir,

Copies provided to Larry Di Rita  
Adm. Grambastiani

*Adm*

11/13  
11/00


P. 1

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4507

Pardo

JUL 13 01 08:04a



**FXI**

(b)(6)

The Honorable **Jim Kelly**  
**Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs**  
 U.S. Department of State  
 2201 c **Street**, NW  
 Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Kelly:

I have been given your address by (b)(6) and some POW/MIA family membm. This letter is a plea for your help.

I am the "widow" of (b)(6), USN, the copilot of a P4M Martin Mercator electronic countermeasure plane shot down off the coast of Shanghai August 23 (22<sup>nd</sup> U.S. time), 1956. Although he was declared deceased by the Navy in 1957, intelligence reports of that era, declassified only in 1992-1993, reported that my husband and one other crewman were rescued and imprisoned in China. The reports of his whereabouts continued for two years.

In 1990 the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense confirmed to a Chinese friend of mint that the PRC had indeed captured two "pilots" from the P4M plane. In March, 2000, I was told by Mme Li Xiaolin, head of the American sector in the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, that they could not help me, as all the information about my husband was still "highly classified" and "vital to the national security of China".

(b)(6) was a member of VQ-1, the same squadron which flew the EP3 to Hainan. Unlike the crew of that plane, he was not so fortunate. Dead or dive, he is still in China.

I am asking that, as you assist Secretary Powell to prepare for his imminent trip to China, you urge him to raise the issue of my husband's case with President Jiang, and to also deliver my 1999 letter to Jiang. I also ask that this case be raised again during President Bush's visit in October.

I do believe that there is, at least, a small but reasonable chance that my husband Gould still be alive, and that his case should be given the maximum weight and attention from the government he so valiantly served.

-2-

I am enclosing some background for further details, (b)(6) and Secretary Rumsfeld, an old friend of my husband, are both familiar with (b)(6) and I of course, will provide any information or assistance. I will be very grateful for your help.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Enclosures.

cc: (b)(6)

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Mr. Alan Liotta, Defense POW/MIA Office

snwflake

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 4, 2001  
SUBJECT:

Please give me a report in plain, clear, declaratory sentences, without acronyms I won't understand, that addresses the subject of the **re-capitalization** of all platforms that relate to C4ISR in DoD. There must be **40** or **50** of them.

Specifically, I want to see the way to services have handled those assets in terms of **re-capitalizing** them.

Also, I would like an average number as to how the services have **re-capitalized** their basic "meat and potatoes" business; Air Force airplanes, Navy ships, Army tanks, etc.

Thanks.

*Response Attached*

Larry Di Rita

8/17

*SP3 8/17*

*8/17*

*3/1/02*

*4 Aug 01*

DHR/azn  
080401.08

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2001, 4:50 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Re-capitalization of "Meat and Potatoes" Platforms

- The attached paper provides average age data for the Services' major "Meat and Potatoes" platforms. We will not know the Services' plans for re-capitalizing until we receive their FY 2003-2007 budget estimates on October 1, 2001. At that time we will give you an update.
- Your parallel question on re-capitalization of C4ISR platforms will take us an additional couple of weeks to answer due to the sheer number of such platforms, the need to assess sensor age separately from platform age, and the high probability that these platforms will not be replaced on a one-for-one basis (i.e., a constellation of satellites could replace, or partially replace, one or more aircraft types).

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

## AVERAGE AGES OF MAJOR WARFIGHTING PLATFORMS

| <u>Platform</u>                     | <u>Average Age in 2000</u> | <u>Average Age Goal</u> |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b><u>Army</u></b>                  |                            |                         |
| M1 Abrahms Tank                     | 11                         | 13                      |
| M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle      | 9                          | 13                      |
| AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter      | 12                         | 13                      |
| UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter          | 13                         | 12                      |
| CH-47 Chinook Cargo Helicopter      | 12                         | 10                      |
| <b><u>Navy and Marine Corps</u></b> |                            |                         |
| Attack Submarines                   | 14                         | 16                      |
| Surface Combatants                  | 14                         | 18                      |
| Aircraft (all types)                | 17                         | 11                      |
| TacAir Aircraft                     | 11                         | 11                      |
| <b><u>Air Force</u></b>             |                            |                         |
| TacAir Aircraft                     | 11                         | 12                      |
| Strategic Bombers                   | 25                         | 22                      |
| Strategic Airlift Aircraft          | 24                         | 20                      |
| Tanker Aircraft                     | 38                         | 30                      |

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2001 15:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Baseline

- You recently asked about the number of DoD detailees and where they are located,
- Summarizing data obtained from Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and Personnel and Readiness (P&R):

|                      |     |                  |     |
|----------------------|-----|------------------|-----|
| From:                |     | To:              |     |
| Army                 | 135 | Other DoD        | 13  |
| Navy                 | 93  | Federal Agencies | 330 |
| USAF                 | 151 | White House      | 62  |
| USMC                 | 21  | Legislative      | 76  |
| Others               | 91  | Think Tanks      | 9   |
| (OSD, DoD, Agencies) |     | Non-US           | 1   |
| TOTAL                | 491 |                  | 491 |

*040*

- Of these 491 detailees (including Legislative Fellowship Program), 155 are reimbursable and 336 are non-reimbursable.
- I can provide you details of where they are located, if you wish to see them.

PREPARED BY: CDR Michael A. Zieser, USN

U12856 /02

*2 Aug 01*

snowflake

ACTNS Q 9/70

August 6, 2001 5:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Directive

I think we need to get a directive out that by a specific date the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Service Secretariats will have fully interoperable systems so we can communicate with each other.

That message alone ought to help.

Thanks.

3/1

DHR:dh  
080601-27

6 Aug 01

U12857 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4514

TO: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 9, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Information Technology (IT) Support for OSD**

My staff tells me that we do not have a corporate OSD approach to managing our IT assets. To facilitate our ability to make effective business decisions, we need a reliable, secure IT infrastructure (hardware, software, and personnel).

Accordingly, I direct you, as the DoD Chief Information Officer, to take a broad look at our IT infrastructure and recommend a way ahead.

Please present your recommendations to me by September 14, 2001. Thanks.

11/5/01

U12858 /02

10/20/01

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS  
AND INTELLIGENCE

DATE 16 Aug 2001

MEMO FOR VADM GIANBASTIANI

*Sir,*

As requested here is a copy  
of Snowflake.

*V/R*

*CDR BARNABE HE JENPLE*

August 8, 2001 4:10 PM

FOR: Secretary of Defense  
FROM: John Stenbit   
SUBJECT: OSD IT Networks

Attached is a summary of OSD IT networks. The present fragmented approach has significant weaknesses, both in effectiveness and security. There is a lot of history here, and plenty of blame to go around, but the fact remains that little change has been effected through the present approach.

We have been working with the components on a way ahead, but I have also attached a memo for you to direct the CIO to present you with recommendations by mid-September.

1540 - VADM G.  
Snowfall

August 8, 2001

Information Technology Support in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

- The Army maintains the Pentagon IT backbone, which includes OSD networks. Each OSD component (list attached) operates its own sub-net.
  - There is no centrally managed configuration control board. Components may erect their own firewalls and other security devices as they see fit.
- Each component provides its own IT support staff. According to Comptroller figures, OSD has 605 IT staff supporting 6,980 computer users. (One IT person for every 11.5 workers). The federal agency average is 40.6.
- The FY02 OSD IT Budget proposal is \$63.2 million. Of that, \$46.7 million (almost 75%) is dedicated to funding stovepiped systems that support only one component. Moreover, it probably is understated since components can add money from their internal funds.
  - This is at least \$9,054 per person. Gartner Group estimates IT spending per federal employee at \$6,658 in 2001. However, the financial services sector (with security requirements comparable to DoD's) spends an average of \$23,639 per employee.
- IT management with OSD is split:
  - The Information Technology Advisory Group (ITAG) is a consensus-based forum consisting of the IT managers from each OSD component.
  - The Information Technology Directorate (ITD) resides in C3I and has the responsibility to oversee "enterprise initiatives" yet has no budget authority.
  - The Information Technology Executive Committee (ITEC) consists of mid-grade SESs who provide direction and adjudicate issues that cannot be resolved at the ITAG level.
- In sum, the management structure for information technology issues within OSD is a group with no coercive power (the ITAG) reporting through a directorate with no budget authority (the ITD) to a committee that is neither low enough to see issues in detail nor high enough to effect real change (the ITEC). This split approach also has sub-optimized security within OSD networks, as evidenced by disappointing results on "red team" assessments.
- Due to the level of level of frustration with OSD IT in many quarters, the CIO chartered a Rapid Improvement Team in March 2001 to identify alternate management approaches for managing OSD IT. The team plans to report to the-Deputy Secretary later this month.

## OSD Components

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

C3I

Comptroller

Director, Administration and Management

Executive Secretariat

General Counsel

Gulf War Illness, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployment

Health Affairs

Immediate Office of the SecDef

Legislative Affairs

Director, Operational Test & Evaluation

Personnel and Readiness

Policy

Program Analysis & Evaluation

Public Affairs

Reserve Affairs

Washington Headquarters Service

August 11, 2001 7:54 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cable to Secretary Powell

Would you please try to find a copy of the cable I sent to Colin Powell after we were in Greece telling him I was glad I was able to talk him into having Burns be Ambassador to NATO?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081101-1

*SEE ATTACHED. WE  
COULDN'T FIND A CABLE,  
ONLY THIS MEMO.*

*V/R  
Ed 8/20*

*NATO 230*

*11 Aug 01*

U12859 /02

snowflake

August 16, 2001 12:45 PM

*Complete*

TO: COL Bucci  
CC: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Deployment Orders

Besides getting me that deployment paper in English and including Europe, Japan and permanent changes of station, shouldn't it include Marine guards at embassies on a separate sheet?

What about deployed forces aboard ship?

Eventually we want to have a list of total number of **detailees** who aren't working for the Department, so we get a full sense of all of this **optempo**.

Please work out a format with **VADM Giambastiani**.

In addition to the piece of paper you gave me, I would also like to have some clue as to what they are doing in those countries, if it is not obvious, which in some of the cases it isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081601-16

*370*

*16 Aug 01*

U12860 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4523

## Active Duty Military Summary

Personnel Assigned Overseas

→

|                            |              |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| U. S. Central Command      | 3,444        |
| U. S. European Command     | 107,176      |
| U. S. Joint Forces Command | 2,010        |
| U. S. Pacific Command      | 155,364      |
| U. S. Southern Command     | <u>4,646</u> |

*Sub-Grand Total - Personnel Overseas*      272,628 →

Deployed Personnel      41,106\*

Other Personnel Afloat      66,040

*Sub Total Personnel Overseas*      107,466 →

*Grand Total*      379,774

\*Includes 8,802 personnel afloat

*Final Active Duty Force* \_\_\_\_\_

*Reserve Force* \_\_\_\_\_

*Naval Reserve* \_\_\_\_\_

*Grand Total* \_\_\_\_\_

## Active Duty Military Personnel Assigned Overseas

| Country                      | Army         | Navy         | Marine     | Air Force  | Coast Gd | Total        |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|------------|----------|--------------|
| <b>U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND</b>  |              |              |            |            |          |              |
| Bahrain                      | 24           | 1,466        | 70         | 30         | 1        | 1,591        |
| Egypt                        | 335          | 30           | 1          | 66         | 0        | 432          |
| Eritrea                      | 0            | 0            | 1          | 1          | 0        | 2            |
| Ethiopia                     | 0            | 0            | 1          | 0          | 0        | 1            |
| Jordan                       | 3            | 0            | 0          | 7          | 0        | 10           |
| Kazakhstan                   | 3            | 0            | 0          | 3          | 0        | 6            |
| Kenya                        | 6            | 1            | 124        | 4          | 0        | 135          |
| Kuwait                       | 346          | 6            | 0          | 38         | 0        | 390          |
| Oman                         | 0            | 2            | 3          | 25         | 0        | 30           |
| Pakistan                     | 0            | 1            | 0          | 6          | 0        | 7            |
| Qatar                        | 33           | 3            | 0          | 13         | 0        | 49           |
| Saudi Arabia                 | 316          | 32           | 185        | 256        | 0        | 789          |
| Somolia                      | 0            | 1            | 0          | 0          | 0        | 1            |
| Yemen                        | 1            | 0            | 0          | 0          | 0        | 1            |
| <b>CENTRAL COMMAND TOTAL</b> | <b>1,067</b> | <b>1,542</b> | <b>385</b> | <b>449</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>3,444</b> |
| <b>U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND</b> |              |              |            |            |          |              |
| Albania                      | 1            | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0        | 2            |
| Algeria                      | 0            | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0        | 1            |
| Armenia                      | 0            | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0        | 1            |
| Austria                      | 5            | 0            | 0          | 5          | 0        | 10           |
| Belarus                      | 2            | 0            | 0          | 0          | 0        | 2            |
| Belgium                      | 935          | 106          | 10         | 538        | 0        | 1,589        |
| Bosnia / Herzegovina         | 1            | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0        | 2            |
| Botswana                     | 0            | 0            | 0          | 2          | 0        | 2            |
| Bulgaria                     | 1            | 1            | 0          | 2          | 0        | 4            |
| Cameroon                     | 1            | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0        | 2            |
| Chad                         | 1            | 0            | 0          | 0          | 0        | 1            |
| Cote D'Ivoire                | 4            | 1            | 103        | 2          | 0        | 110          |
| Croatia                      | 4            | 0            | 0          | 0          | 0        | 4            |

| Country        | Army   | Navy  | Marine | Air Force | Coast Gd | Total  |
|----------------|--------|-------|--------|-----------|----------|--------|
| Cyprus         | 3      | 0     | 127    | 4         | 0        | 134    |
| Czech Republic | 2      | 0     | 0      | 5         | 0        | 7      |
| Denmark        | 2      | 6     | 1      | 12        | 0        | 21     |
| Estonia        | 0      | 1     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 1      |
| Finland        | 2      | 2     | 0      | 3         | 0        | 7      |
| France         | 11     | 18    | 2      | 23        | 0        | 54     |
| Georgia        | 2      | 0     | 1      | 0         | 0        | 3      |
| Germany        | 56,456 | 345   | 566    | 15,348    | 0        | 72,715 |
| Ghana          | 2      | 0     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 2      |
| Gibraltar      | 0      | 5     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 5      |
| Greece         | 83     | 284   | 2      | 92        | 0        | 461    |
| Hungary        | 10     | 0     | 0      | 7         | 0        | 17     |
| Israel         | 7      | 3     | 2      | 14        | 0        | 26     |
| Italy          | 2,335  | 7,431 | 95     | 4,243     | 0        | 14,104 |
| Latvia         | 0      | 0     | 1      | 0         | 0        | 1      |
| Lebanon        | 3      | 0     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 3      |
| Liberia        | 1      | 0     | 0      | 2         | 0        | 3      |
| Luxembourg     | 9      | 0     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 9      |
| Macedonia      | 19     | 0     | 0      | 0         | 0        | 19     |
| Morocco        | 1      | 0     | 7      | 4         | 0        | 12     |
| Mozambique     | 0      | 0     | 0      | 1         | 0        | 1      |
| Netherlands    | 385    | 25    | 2      | 291       | 0        | 703    |
| Niger          | 0      | 0     | 0      | 1         | 0        | 1      |
| Nigeria        | 0      | 0     | 0      | 2         | 0        | 2      |
| Norway         | 8      | 16    | 12     | 44        | 0        | 80     |
| Poland         | 5      | 0     | 1      | 3         | 0        | 9      |
| Portugal       | 17     | 58    | 0      | 943       | 0        | 1,018  |
| Romania        | 3      | 1     | 0      | 2         | 0        | 6      |
| Senegal        | 0      | 2     | 1      | 0         | 0        | 3      |
| Serbia         | 3      | 0     | 0      | 3         | 0        | 6      |
| Slovakia       | 0      | 0     | 0      | 1         | 0        | 1      |
| Slovenia       | 0      | 0     | 0      | 1         | 0        | 1      |
| South Africa   | 3      | 2     | 0      | 5         | 0        | 10     |
| Spain          | 40     | 2,051 | 102    | 270       | 0        | 2,463  |

| Country                           | Army          | Navy          | Marine       | Air Force     | Coast Gd | Total          |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|----------|----------------|
| Sweden                            | 0             | 1             | 0            | 4             | 0        | 5              |
| Switzerland                       | 0             | 1             | 0            | 4             | 0        | 5              |
| Syria                             | 1             | 0             | 0            | 1             | 0        | 2              |
| Tanzania                          | 0             | 1             | 0            | 0             | 0        | 1              |
| Togo                              | 0             | 0             | 0            | 1             | 0        | 1              |
| Tunisia                           | 1             | 2             | 1            | 2             | 0        | 6              |
| Turkey                            | 189           | 26            | 1            | 1,842         | 0        | 2,058          |
| Ukraine                           | 3             | 1             | 0            | 3             | 0        | 7              |
| United Kingdom                    | 389           | 1,259         | 152          | 9,647         | 0        | 11,447         |
| Zaire                             | 2             | 0             | 0            | 1             | 0        | 3              |
| Zambia                            | 0             | 0             | 0            | 2             | 0        | 2              |
| Zimbabwe                          | 1             | 0             | 0            | 0             | 0        | 1              |
| <b>EUROPEAN COMMAND TOTAL</b>     | <b>60,953</b> | <b>11,649</b> | <b>1,189</b> | <b>33,385</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>107,176</b> |
| <b>U. S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND</b> |               |               |              |               |          |                |
| Canada                            | 13            | 0             | 2            | 85            | 0        | 100            |
| Greenland                         | 0             | 0             | 0            | 139           | 0        | 139            |
| Iceland                           | 2             | 1,058         | 51           | 647           | 0        | 1,758          |
| Mexico                            | 4             | 2             | 1            | 6             | 0        | 13             |
| <b>JT FORCES COMMAND TOTAL</b>    | <b>19</b>     | <b>1,060</b>  | <b>54</b>    | <b>877</b>    | <b>0</b> | <b>2,010</b>   |
| <b>U. S. PACIFIC COMMAND</b>      |               |               |              |               |          |                |
| Alaska                            | 6,517         | 82            | 14           | 9,614         | 2,004    | 18,231         |
| American Samoa                    | 0             | 0             | 0            | 0             | 5        | 5              |
| Guam                              | 30            | 3,220         | 0            | 1,642         | 67       | 4,959          |
| Hawaii                            | 15,904        | 15,295        | 6,317        | 4,606         | 704      | 42,826         |
| Johnston Atoll                    | 91            | 0             | 0            | 21            | 0        | 112            |
| Marshall Islands                  | 26            | 0             | 0            | 0             | 0        | 26             |
| Northern Mariana Islands          | 0             | 0             | 0            | 0             | 83       | 83             |
| Australia                         | 7             | 70            | 11           | 72            | 0        | 160            |
| British Indian Ocean Territory    | 4             | 638           | 0            | 24            | 0        | 666            |
| Burma                             | 1             | 0             | 0            | 1             | 0        | 2              |
| Cambodia                          | 2             | 0             | 0            | 0             | 0        | 2              |

| Country                       | Army          | Navy          | Marine        | Air Force     | Coast Gd     | Total          |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| China                         | 5             | 3             | 2             | 5             | 0            | 15             |
| Fiji                          | 0             | 1             | 1             | 0             | 0            | 2              |
| Hong Kong                     | 4             | 8             | 0             | 2             | 0            | 14             |
| India                         | 3             | 0             | 0             | 4             | 0            | 7              |
| Indonesia                     | 8             | 0             | 0             | 3             | 0            | 11             |
| Japan                         | 1,743         | 19,219        | 15,647        | 13,560        | 13           | 50,182         |
| Korea (South)                 | 28,396        | 0             | 75            | 9,078         | 0            | 37,549         |
| Laos                          | 1             | 0             | 0             | 2             | 0            | 3              |
| Madagascar                    | 0             | 0             | 0             | 1             | 0            | 1              |
| Malaysia                      | 1             | 3             | 0             | 5             | 0            | 9              |
| Mongolia                      | 0             | 0             | 0             | 1             | 0            | 1              |
| New Zealand                   | 1             | 2             | 0             | 3             | 0            | 6              |
| Philippines                   | 9             | 5             | 0             | 8             | 0            | 22             |
| Russia                        | 8             | 0             | 5             | 10            | 0            | 23             |
| Singapore                     | 6             | 95            | 65            | 44            | 0            | 210            |
| Sri Lanka                     | 0             | 2             | 0             | 0             | 0            | 2              |
| St. Helena                    | 0             | 0             | 0             | 2             | 0            | 2              |
| Thailand                      | 40            | 8             | 149           | 28            | 0            | 225            |
| Vietnam                       | 5             | 0             | 3             | 0             | 0            | 8              |
| <b>PACIFIC COMMAND TOTAL</b>  | <b>52,812</b> | <b>38,651</b> | <b>22,289</b> | <b>38,736</b> | <b>2,876</b> | <b>155,364</b> |
| <b>U. S. SOUTHERN COMMAND</b> |               |               |               |               |              |                |
| Puerto Rico                   | 803           | 2,050         | 15            | 68            | 608          | 3,544          |
| Virgin Islands                | 1             | 2             | 0             | 2             | 7            | 12             |
| Antigua & Barbuda             | 0             | 0             | 0             | 1             | 0            | 1              |
| Argentina                     | 2             | 0             | 3             | 8             | 0            | 13             |
| Bahamas, The                  | 0             | 18            | 0             | 0             | 0            | 18             |
| Barbados                      | 2             | 2             | 0             | 2             | 0            | 6              |
| Belize                        | 1             | 1             | 0             | 0             | 0            | 2              |
| Bolivia                       | 7             | 2             | 0             | 6             | 0            | 15             |
| Brazil                        | 3             | 9             | 0             | 3             | 0            | 15             |
| Chile                         | 4             | 8             | 0             | 6             | 0            | 18             |
| Colombia                      | 15            | 0             | 0             | 6             | 0            | 21             |
| Costa Rica                    | 0             | 0             | 0             | 0             | 1            | 1              |

| Country                       | Army           | Navy          | Marine        | Air Force     | Coast Gd     | Total          |
|-------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| Cuba                          | 5              | 445           | 27            | 0             | 1            | 478            |
| Dominican Republic            | 1              | 1             | 2             | 1             | 2            | 7              |
| Ecuador                       | 6              | 2             | 0             | 5             | 0            | 13             |
| El Salvador                   | 7              | 1             | 1             | 2             | 0            | 11             |
| Guatemala                     | 7              | 0             | 1             | 1             | 0            | 9              |
| Haiti                         | 4              | 0             | 0             | 1             | 0            | 5              |
| Honduras                      | 177            | 2             | 0             | 209           | 0            | 388            |
| Jamaica                       | 0              | 5             | 1             | 0             | 3            | 9              |
| Nicaragua                     | 3              | 0             | 1             | 1             | 0            | 5              |
| Panama                        | 3              | 5             | 1             | 0             | 0            | 9              |
| Paraguay                      | 2              | 0             | 0             | 1             | 0            | 3              |
| Peru                          | 3              | 11            | 0             | 5             | 1            | 20             |
| Uruguay                       | 1              | 2             | 0             | 2             | 0            | 5              |
| Venezuela                     | 6              | 2             | 0             | 10            | 0            | 18             |
| <b>SOUTHERN COMMAND TOTAL</b> | <b>1,063</b>   | <b>2,568</b>  | <b>52</b>     | <b>340</b>    | <b>623</b>   | <b>4,646</b>   |
| <b>GRAND TOTAL</b>            | <b>115,913</b> | <b>55,468</b> | <b>23,969</b> | <b>73,785</b> | <b>3,493</b> | <b>272,628</b> |

snowflake

August 16, 2001 11:48 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Azores

370

Why do we have 26 people in the Azores?

Thanks.

SECDEF -

THIS DEPLOYMENT IS FOR A CONTINUOUS SERIES OF RESERVE ENGINEERING UNITS (EVENLY 2 WEEKS) THAT ARE CONDUCTING ROAD IMPROVEMENTS AROUND THE LATES FIELD AIR STATION. DEPLOYMENT STARTED IN JUNE AND ENDS IN SEPT. RESERVE UNIT NUMBERS FLUCTUATE BETWEEN 20 AND 30. ALL RESERVES ARE FROM OHIO + PENNSYLVANIA.

DHR:dh  
081601-21

*Ed*

*Why ?*  
*DR*

*v/r*  
*Ed 8/20/01*  
*16 Aug 01*

U12861 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4530

*8/20/01*  
*DHR*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

8/20

700 Sec Def

Sir

The deployment serves several purposes.

(1) It gives our reserve engineers a real mission to accomplish on their Annual Training (AT) rather than having "invented" training. This is both satisfying for the troops, and actually is better training.

(2) It provides a needed service to our Air Stations, which is a critical installation, without having to move engineering assets there physically.

( L. B. )

# Lajes Field Facts



## United States Forces Azores

The United States Forces Azores command was established in 1953 as a subordinate unified command under the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va. It now falls under the United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

In peacetime, the U.S. Forces Azores Commander (COMUSFORAZORES) is assisted by a small, joint staff composed of Navy, Army and Air Force personnel. The command is responsible for contingency planning.

In wartime, COMUSFORAZORES assumes operational control of assigned U.S. military forces. The command mission would be to support North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in the area, to assist in local defense, if requested, and to protect and evacuate U.S. citizens from the Azores, Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, or other areas of the world.

A U.S. military officer in the Azores, an Air Force colonel, serves jointly as COMUSFORAZORES and as commander of the 65th Air Base Wing, Air Combat Command.

Page maintainer: Capt Kristen Skopec

65ABW/PA

DSN: (b)(6) Cml: (b)(6)

Last updated: June, 2001 Last reviewed: June, 2001

peoples. It stretched around the world from Africa, Indonesia, and India to Labrador and Brazil and was ruled by one of the smallest and most underpopulated nations of Europe. Even today, Portuguese cultural traditions continue as the core element of many of these diverse areas, especially of the Azores.

### The Joint Staffs Vision:

A Joint Team fostering access and promoting stability in support of U.S. and allied interests and maximizing the capabilities of forces in or assigned to our area of responsibility.

### The Joint Staffs mission:

To conduct operations within the Azores, to coordinate all U.S. military and political-military policy matters, and to coordinate the deployment and sustainment of forces from, through and within the Azores. On order, provide support to other U.S. agencies in support of the Government of Portugal and the Regional Government of the Azores.

Page maintainer: Capt Kristen Skopect

65ABW/PA

DSN: (b)(6)

Cml:

(b)(6)

Last updated: June, 2001

Last reviewed: June, 2001



# UNITED STATES FORCES AZORES

*Lajes Field*

*Terceira, Azores*

**COMMANDER: Col Judith Fedder, USAF**

**DEPUTY COMMANDER: Col Ronald L. Bean, USAF**

**CHIEF OF STAFF: Cmdr Tom McKenna, USN**

**SENIOR ENLISTED MEMBER / FIRST SERGEANT: SMSgt Wayne C. Clark, USAF**

● *The Voice of the Mid-Atlantic*

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Lajes Field is the home of all U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy military forces in the Azores. In 1953, the U.S. Forces Azores Command was organized as subordinate Unified Command under the Command-in-Chief Atlantic. In peacetime, the U.S. Forces Commander (COMUSFORAZ) is assisted by a small joint staff responsible for contingency planning. The 65<sup>th</sup> Air Base Wing is the largest component of U.S. Forces Azores .

The wing's primary mission is to provide support to Department of Defense aircraft transiting Lajes Field, and to provide support services and facilities for other U.S. military organizations in the Azores. Additionally, Lajes services aircraft from other nations, including Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Venezuela, etc.

● *Terceira*

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● *Terceira*

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The Azores are located in the mid-Atlantic some 2,300 miles east of New York and 900 miles west of Lisbon, Portugal. Consisting of nine islands, they are, in fact, the tops of a series of volcanoes. Fertile, and lush green throughout the year, the islands were discovered and populated by the Portuguese in the mid-15th century. When first discovered, the only signs of life on the islands were sea birds and the land hawks (os acores) for which the archipelago was named. The islands are the oldest Portuguese overseas territories of what was once one of the largest colonial empires in European history. This empire included millions of square miles and hundreds of thousands of subject



# The History of Lajes Field

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↻ Welcome!.. Due to the large file size of this series of documents, we have loosely broken the history into the following areas:

You are free to click on the pictures to see an enlarged view.

↻ Introduction through World War II ↻

↻ Post World War II through the Arab-Israel Conflict of 1973 ↻

↻ Air Rescue Mission ↻

↻ Distinguished Visitors ↻

↻ Humanitarian Efforts ↻

↻ Silk Purse and the 1980s ↻

↻ The 1990s and the Gulf War ↻

↻ U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Unit ↻

↻ Naval Security Group Activity and Naval Air Facility ↻

↻ Lajes of Today and Conclusion ↻

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↻ Back to the History Office Homepage ↻


Updated 23 February 2001

# The History of Lajes Field - Page 8

*A B-1B "Lancer" bomber lands at Lajes Air Base after a Global Power mission in 1994.*

## ✧ Lajes Today ✧

✧ Today, Lajes continues to support transiting aircraft during the course of Operations Joint Guard, Deny Flight, Provide Comfort, and Southern Watch. Beginning on 1 October 1999, the Air Force transitioned into an expeditionary aerospace force in order to meet the national security requirement of the 21st Century. The large cumbersome Air Force of the Cold War era, sized to respond to major war conditions, had been replaced by a "light, lean and lethal" force able to deploy and respond in aerospace expeditionary force packages. Lajes supported these large AEF movements across the Atlantic. Lajes also has hosted B-52 and B-1 bomber aircraft en route from global air missions. Lajes also supports many routine NATO exercise, such as the biennial Northern Viking exercise.



✧ Supporting these missions and aircraft movements represents a total Team Lajes effort. Team Lajes consists of the dedicated men and women of all branches of the military services, the hardworking Portuguese workforce, and the dependents who give much to the success of Lajes. In 1997 and 1998, Lajes was recognized with many awards from ACC and the Air Force. The most prestigious was the Air Combat Command nominee for the 1998 Commander-In-Chief Installation Excellence Award and being chosen as a runner-up at the Air Force level.

## ✧ Conclusion ✧

✧ For 55 years, Lajes has been the Crossroads of the Atlantic bridging the gap of the wide open ocean expanse. In most contingencies that required U.S. aircraft and allied forces to cross the Atlantic, Lajes had a supporting role. From the B-17s and C-47s to B-1s and C-17s, Lajes was and will continue to be the fueling station that gets the aircraft and crews where they need to "fly, fight and win."

*While cows grazing on the flightline may not be a normal occurrence at Air Force bases, it is part of the culture that makes Lajes a unique place for transient personnel and those stationed here.*



11-L-0559/OSD/4536



[| Previous Page |](#)



[↻ Back to the General History of Lajes Field ↻](#)

[↻ Back to the History Office Homepage ↻](#)

Updated 26 February 2001

# The History of Lajes Field - U.S. Navy Units

## ↻ U. S. Naval Security Group Activity ↻

↻ In 1952, a Navy High Frequency Direction Finding station was established at Villa Nova. It was subsequently moved in 1954 to Agualva when the Secretary of the Navy established the United States Naval Communication Unit, Number 42, under an Officer-in-Charge with 26 enlisted members. In 1958, the Secretary of the Navy designated the unit as the United States Naval Security Group Activity, Terceira Island, Azores. The mission of the NSGA was to operate a High Frequency Direction Finding facility and provide communications and related support including communications security and communications manpower assistance to Navy and other Department of Defense elements within the local area. The NSGA was a tenant of the U.S. Air Base Wing at Lajes Field which provided support to the unit. World events dictated the fate of the NSGA in the 1990s. As the Soviet threat diminished and the U.S. military budget constrained funds, the NSGA was decommissioned on 20 May 1994.

## ↻ U. S. Naval Air Facility NAF ↻

↻ The U.S. Naval Air Facility was established by the direction of the Secretary of the Navy on 18 January 1957. The primary mission at the time of its establishment was to maintain and operate facilities, and provide services and materials in support of aviation operations for units of operating forces of the Navy and other activities as designated by the Chief of Naval Operations. The NAF also took over the function of Detachment 1, Fleet Aircraft Service Squadron 106 (FARSON) that had performed naval aircraft maintenance since 1954 before being absorbed by NAF.

*P-3s like this one became a common sight at Lajes Field from late 1960s to early 1990s.*



↻ Basic construction of the Naval Air Facility, on the southwest side of Lajes Field, (current location of the Portuguese civilian Terminal) started in August 1954 and was completed in December 1957. The facilities then included a hangar, attached shops and offices, taxiways, and aircraft parking spaces. Upon establishment, NAF was primarily engaged in the support of Atlantic carrier aircraft and provided maintenance, supply, and communications support to various detachments of the Airborne Early Warning Squadrons. The increased emphasis on Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) operations in the Atlantic, alone with the introduction of the P-3A Orion long-range ASW aircraft, contributed directly to the importance of NAF and to its strategic location in the mid-

Atlantic.

↻ From the outset, NAP Lajes had been actively involved in Atlantic ASW operations and coordination efforts with adjoining U.S. /NATO commands. In the early 1960s NAF Lajes provided maintenance, logistics and communications support simultaneously to five different patrol squadrons conducting Mediterranean and mid-Atlantic surveillance, in support of the Cuban missile crisis.

↻ In September 1967, NAF Lajes received its first permanent detachment with the arrival of three P-3 aircraft, associated ASW flight crews, and ground support personnel. This permanent detachment provided NAF with

11-L-0559/OSD/4538

realistic ASW support capabilities, and enhanced the ASW responsiveness by assigning operational control of the patrol aircraft to the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Facility.

➤ In May 1974 NAF moved to the northeast side of Lajes Field (Fiddlers Green T-820 area). The renovated facilities there included a hangar with supply and maintenance spaces, a separate administrative building, and the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations (ASWOC). Since 1 December 1991, no P-3 aircraft had been assigned to Lajes as a result of the drawdown of military forces and shrinking military budgets. Eventually, NAF closed its doors in 1993.

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
➤ [Back to the General History of Lajes Field](#) ➤

➤ [Back to the History Office Homepage](#) ➤

Updated 26 February 2001

August 16, 2001 1:50 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
James Roche  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: "Where's the Plan?"



452B

Please take a look at this Lexington Institute paper and tell me what you think the answer is.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/14/01 Lexington Institute paper: "B-1 Versus B-2: A Defining Moment for Donald Rumsfeld"

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
ANSWER ATTACHED.

DHR:dh  
081601-26

8/20 0808

16 Aug 01

U12863 /02

17 August 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

SUBJECT: Loren Thompson's diatribe **Re B-2**

Boss,

This is fun! Loren is an old friend, but we don't pay, and defense contractors do: Northrop has paid Loren and his institute for years. Loren likes most any weapon system and every defense contractor (and many of them "contribute.") Hey, everybody needs to make a buck. Loren actually is a nice guy, and often thoughtful. And, while I very much agree with him on the F-22 (see attached), I believe he is way off the mark on the **B-2**.

1. In **para 1** he notes some adverse comments about the B-1. No kidding! That's why we are doing what we are doing for the B-1 fleet: fixing it. In **para 2** he takes a cheap shot at Jim McCarthy. But, I understood Jim's point **re** the B-1, and that's why I focused on it first.

2. In **para 4**, he criticizes the AF for wanting to buy "fighters" (somehow, he forgets his earlier pieces on the F-22, although he may have had the JSF in mind). In any event, the last "fighter" acquired by the AF was the F-16. The "fighter Mafia" failed: since the introduction of the F-16, the AF has built the C-17, the C-130J, the Global Hawk, the B-1, the **B-2**, Joint Stars, and the F-117. The only other aircraft was the F-15 ground attack model, the "E." But, this was done in the early 1980's. Sometime or other, we need to replenish our air superiority and medium attack force. Thus, the F-22.

3. I love him for saying that I have done anything at "warp speed." **Re** going "native," I'm afraid he was not at a long dinner I had with the CEO of Northrop long before I was confirmed arguing that history had passed the **B-2** by. I have been involved with the **B-2** for 18 years; yes, 18. This week is the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the IBM PC. The **B-2** was designed before the PC was in an office, and well before cell telephones. It is a marvel of 1970's technology. For instance, in those years, no one knew that supercruise was feasible (a key feature of the **F-22**).

4. With respect to the efficacy of our current long-range attack fleet, let me take him up on his 40,000 aim points in Desert Storm. Within five years, if we were to use just half the fleet of **B-52's**, B-1's and **B-2's**, we will be able to drop over 2,000 large, highly precise weapons against "aim points" in but ONE SORTIE! So, even at only one sortie a day, with only half of our fleet, we would exhaust the aim points in less than 20 days. And, this assumes that the Navy launches no Tomahawks.


11-L-0559/OSD/4541

5. What **Loren** doesn't get is that "aim points" are fixed targets. That was the problem of the old era. We have that problem knocked out cold with precision standoff weapons. Where we are very weak is in the area of going **after** mobile targets that increasingly are dangerous (ballistic and cruise missile launchers; mobile surface-to-air missile batteries; and mobile command centers.) And, for these important targets of this **new** era, big bombers are not as helpful as very fast attack aircraft, which can respond to a target within minutes.

6. As to the **B-2** itself, it is a **fine** machine that did very well in **Kosovo**, and we will continue to modernize all 21 aircraft. However, they have the lowest readiness rates of all of our aircraft because the stealthy materials are tough to maintain. The after decks are cracking, yet again. The plane is designed with software of the B-1 generation. The engines are variants of the B-1's engines. It cannot be used in daylight because it is very vulnerable to any fighter of the last 50 years, if sighted. It is slow, and will need F-22's to allow it to operate in daylight.

7. To get a new **B-2** would cost us upwards of \$36 billions of dollars for 40 planes which still couldn't fly during the daytime, were just as slow, and would only be superfluous for going after fixed targets. Meanwhile, others are thinking of very fast and very stealthy long-range attack aircraft.

Thus, "the plan" is to fix the B-1's and use their three rotary launchers to launch stand-off cruise missiles (oh, the B-1 has 50% more capacity than does the B-2), use the B-52's just as **trucks for** conventional cruise missiles, and employ the B-2's for on-top, precision bombing. Meanwhile, we are going to begin concept development studies of the future long-range attack aircraft, which will exploit technology of this century.



James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Air Force

## MR RUMSFELD'S FIVE MOST URGENT INVESTMENT CHALLENGES

Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

President-elect Bush's choice of a seasoned manager as Defense Secretary was a smart move, because the challenges the Pentagon faces are daunting. The Clinton Administration's combination of global engagement with a "procurement holiday" has produced a rapidly aging, overworked arsenal. It now falls to Donald Rumsfeld to figure out how to recapitalize decrepit systems.

The problem is concentrated in aircraft fleets. During the Clinton years, air power became the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. But **most categories of Air Force planes have exceeded their maximum acceptable average age or are within months of doing so**, and similar situations exist in the other services. Here are the five most pressing problems.

1. A third of the Air Force's **long-range bomber** fleet consists of B-52's built in the 1960's. Most of the other planes are B-1's originally intended to serve as an "interim" bomber until the stealthy B-2 became available. The service's oxymoronic "**Bomber Roadmap**" envisions operating these relics until after 2040. That may be the most dangerous defect in the entire U.S. force posture, because if access to foreign bases is lost the Air Force's other strike aircraft will not be usable. In 1995 Mr. Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney signed a letter calling for further production of the B-2. They were right, and need to act now to buy a less expensive version of the nation's only stealthy, long-range strike system.

The average age of the fleet is 30 years. The commander of One and a Half Wing recently found himself flying into a hangar with his new B-2's and the old B-52's. The 1960s-vintage B-52's will be replaced by the B-2's. Congressional micromanagement is distorting program decisions and driving up costs. Mr. Rumsfeld must be funded. He needs to help Congress understand the situation.

3. Much has been made of two recent crashes by the Marine Corps' new V-22 Osprey "tiltrotor." Few people outside the Corps have noticed that the obsolete helicopters the V-22 is supposed to replace have been crashing at the rate of one every six months since the mid-1990's. Marine Corps aviation is in a state of disarray, due mostly to aging airframes. The service's future depends on replacing existing assets with the V-22 and a vertical-ascent version of the Joint Strike Fighter.

4. Electronic warfare (jamming) is critical to the success of air campaigns. Non-stealthy aircraft must have it to survive, and stealthy aircraft depend on it for an extra margin of safety. But the Navy's **EA-6B Prowler**, the only dedicated jammer in the U.S. arsenal, is grossly overworked and in need of electronic upgrades to cope with new threats. The current airframe is likely to be replaced after 2015, but in the meantime it is essential to modernize Prowler with new wings and digital electronics.

5. The Air Force provides the Army with airlift for rapidly responding to distant crises. But the average age of its 500 C-130 intratheater airlifters is 23 years, and the average age of C-5, C-17 and C-141 intertheater air-lifters is 25 years. The service considers 25 to be the maximum acceptable average age, so it needs to replace many planes in both categories over the next four years. Excellent replacements -- the **C-130J and C-17** -- are already in production. But the service is so strapped for funds that both production lines are at risk. It needs to make a commitment to buy more of both planes -- now.



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## What the Air Force Needs from the Next Quadrennial Review

Issue Brief

November 6, 2000

By Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

The U.S. Air Force has awakened from the Clinton Administration's "procurement holiday" with a massive hangover. Almost everything it owns is aging rapidly, and needs to be replaced. Like the other services, it is looking for relief in next year's Quadrennial Defense Review. Unlike the other services, it has developed a persuasive case for why its needs should come first.

The core of this case is not that high operating tempos are running the service ragged, or that the service is on the cutting edge of information-age warfare. All of the services will make those claims in the QDR. The core of the Air Force case is that America cannot preserve global military supremacy unless it invests adequately in aerospace power -- something it is not doing today. Every facet of U.S. military power hinges on securing and exploiting command of the air and of space.

All of the services benefit from aerospace power, but the Air Force carries a disproportionate burden in providing it. It provides all of the long-range strike aircraft, all of the strategic airlift, almost all of the space-based sensors and communications, and most of the air-superiority assets.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- The B-2 bomber proved itself in the Balkan air war, but 21 planes are not enough. The service needs to build more with updated electronics and improved maintainability. The QDR should embrace moving toward an all-B-2 bomber fleet.
- Space is the arena of greatest warfighting leverage for the U.S., but Air Force efforts to exploit it have been hobbled by low budgets. The service needs funding to develop cheaper launch vehicles, space maneuver capabilities, and a space-



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## The Air Force Rethinks Global Strategy

Issue Brief

November 16, 2000

By Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

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While the political system has been distracted by a seemingly interminable presidential campaign over the last several months, the U.S. Air Force has begun a transformation of its global warfighting strategy. It's a safe bet the defense advisors to Bush and Gore are barely aware of the change, but it has the potential to rewrite Pentagon war plans and spending priorities.

The new concept is called "Global Reconnaissance Strike," and it is designed to deal with the danger that future adversaries will deny U.S. forces access to overseas bases in wartime. Drawing on the experience of the **Kosovo** air war, the strategy shifts (or "inverts") the main weight of bombing campaigns from in-theater fighter-bombers such as the F-15 and F-16 to long-range bombers originating outside the theater of operations. The planned theater force during the early days of conflict would be reduced (or "distilled") to a small complement of very capable fighters -- **F-22 Raptors** -- able to protect bombers and long-range surveillance planes in hostile airspace.

This is a complete reversal of the Air Force's strategy since Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990's. That strategy (which was widely interpreted as the triumph of the service's "fighter mafia" over the bomber community) assumed hundreds of short-range fighter-bombers could be sent to war zones in the early days of an air campaign. Now the Air Force has decided the necessary bases might not be available, either because they are put off limits by local governments or because enemies destroy them. So it is reserving what bases exist for its most advanced air-superiority fighter, the stealthy **F-22**, while looking outside the theater for strike assets.

The implications for Pentagon spending priorities are profound. First, the need to bolster the long-range bomber force -- which today contains only 21 stealthy **B-2's** -- increases. Second,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

snowflake

TO: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 17, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Information Technology (IT) Support for OSD**

My staff tells me that we do not have a corporate OSD approach to managing our IT assets. To facilitate our ability to make effective business decisions, we need a reliable, secure IT infrastructure (hardware, software, and personnel).

Accordingly, I direct you, as the DoD Chief Information Officer, to take a broad look at our IT infrastructure and recommend a way ahead.

Please present your recommendations to me by September 14, 2001. Thanks.

*Response attached - complete*

*413.57*

U12865 /02

*10 Aug 01*

11-L-0559/OSD/4546

August 17, 2001 ~~4:10 PM~~

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: John Stenbit *for Lyn Wells 8/17/01*

*g*  
*8/17*

SUBJECT: OSD IT Networks (INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY)

Attached is a summary of OSD IT networks. The present fragmented approach has significant weaknesses, both in effectiveness and security. There is a lot of history here, and plenty of blame to go around, but the fact remains that little change has been effected through the present approach.

We have been working with the components on a way ahead, but I have also attached a memo for you to direct the CIO to present you with recommendations by mid-September.

SECDEF - THIS IS THE PACKAGE ON IT  
I ~~ASK~~ PROMISED YOU. LYN WELLS HAS  
WORKED THIS FOR JOHN STENBIT.

RECOMMEND YOU SIGN ATTACHED  
ACTION MEMO.

August 17, 2001

Information Technology Support in the Office of the Secretary of Defense


- The Army maintains the Pentagon IT backbone, which includes OSD networks. Each OSD component (list attached) operates its own sub-net.
  - There is no centrally managed configuration control board. Components may erect their own firewalls and other security devices as they see fit.
- Each component provides its own IT support staff. According to Comptroller figures, OSD has 605 IT staff supporting 6,980 computer users. (One IT person for every 11.5 workers). The federal agency average is 40.6.
- The FY02 OSD IT Budget proposal is \$63.2 million. Of that, \$46.7 million (almost 75%) is dedicated to funding stovepiped systems that support only one component. Moreover, it probably is understated since components can add money from their internal funds.
  - This is at least \$9,054 per person. Gartner Group estimates IT spending per federal employee at \$6,658 in 2001. However, the financial services sector (with security requirements comparable to DoD's) spends an average of \$23,639 per employee.
- IT management with OSD is split:
  - The Information Technology Advisory Group (ITAG) is a consensus-based forum consisting of the IT managers from each OSD component.
  - The Information Technology Directorate (ITD) resides in C3I and has the responsibility to oversee "enterprise initiatives" yet has no budget authority.
  - The Information Technology Executive Committee (ITEC) consists of mid-grade SESs who provide direction and adjudicate issues that cannot be resolved at the ITAG level.
- In sum, the management structure for information technology issues within OSD is a group with no coercive power (the ITAG) reporting through a directorate with no budget authority (the ITD) to a committee that is neither low enough to see issues in detail nor high enough to effect real change (the ITEC). This split approach also has sub-optimized security within OSD networks, as evidenced by disappointing results on "red team" assessments.
- Due to the level of level of frustration with OSD IT in many quarters, the CIO chartered a Rapid Improvement Team in March 2001 to identify alternate management approaches for managing OSD IT. The team plans to report to the Deputy Secretary later this month.

## OSD Components

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  
C3I  
Comptroller  
Director, Administration and Management  
Executive Secretariat  
General Counsel  
Gulf War Illness, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployment  
Health Affairs  
Immediate Office of the SecDef  
Legislative Affairs  
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation  
Personnel and Readiness  
Policy  
Program Analysis & Evaluation  
Public Affairs  
Reserve Affairs  
Washington Headquarters Service

snowflake

August 29, 2001 4:45 P.M.

TO: SecDef  
FROM:  Torie Clarke  
SUBJECT: Update on Marshall Paper Recommendation (original snowflake response attached)

Although interest is low, I recommend we get the Andy Marshall paper out in September coinciding with POTUS/ SecDef speeches and culmination of QDR process.

Although the long-lead recommendation (e.g. publication in *Foreign Affairs*) could be difficult within the next thirty days, we could and should execute the other tactics.

Please let me know if you have any questions or comments.

cc: Larry DiRita, Steve Cambone, Powell Moore, Vice Admiral Giambastiani

Attachment  
08/01/01 Memo

310.1

U12866 /02

29 Aug 01

11-L-0559/OSD/4550

August 1, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Torie Clarke  
SUBJECT: Marshall Paper

Background

Although interest in Andy Marshall's paper was sky high earlier this year, curiosity has leveled off somewhat over the last several weeks.

The QDR/TOR reflect much of the paper's major points. That may lessen the newsworthiness of the paper and may inspire some critics to claim the QDR consultations and work were meaningless, that you had the whole thing figured out already.

Strategy

Recognize value lies in emphasizing the innovative and forward thinking, more than hard news. Reach out to policymakers and opinion-elites with established interest in national security.

Potential Tactics

- Capitol Hill Briefings (likely-staff)
- Publication in thoughtful outlet (*e.g. Foreign Affairs, Wilson Quarterly*) with permission to distribute more widely.
- 1-2 segments on Jim Lehrer; NPR
- Pentagon Press Corps briefing
- On-line discussion groups with defense organizations/think tanks
- Brookings/AEI seminar (all day) with individual panels on major elements (C-SPAN coverage possible).

snowflake

October 1, 2001 8:37 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Declaration of War

TDA

*Captive*  
*10/2/01*  
*0847*

Please look at this note from Newt Gingrich. What do you think we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/12/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

2 October

DHR:dh  
100101-7

0311

Sir-

We discussed this point and agreed that a declaration of war would be equivalent to granting the terrorists rights they do not possess.

Newt is right to suggest, however, that the war be properly framed. You might think about combining:

- Congressional Resolution
- NATO Declaration
- Pres. Bush's Speech
- Your formulations of the campaign

U12870 /02

into a speech that lays out the basis for the war. The president might use it in an Columbus Day speech - 1 mo. anniversary of the attack - or when to

1 Oct 01

11-L-0559/OSD/4552

8c

(b)(6)

From: Tili  
 Sent: Wednesday, October 1, 2003 7:44 AM  
 To: [ingram@pentagon.com](mailto:ingram@pentagon.com); [marie.nestel@od.pentagon.mil](mailto:marie.nestel@od.pentagon.mil); [mmatalin@georgewbush.com](mailto:mmatalin@georgewbush.com); [michael\\_bacile@omb.eop.gov](mailto:michael_bacile@omb.eop.gov)  
 Cc: [jack@georgewbush.com](mailto:jack@georgewbush.com)  
 Subject: **declare war**

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
 OCT -1 2003

the **current anger as exhibited** In the Post op ed pages will last for about a week, then the **forces** of bureaucracy and legality will begin to equivocate and **avoid** the directed passions of changing history  
 this week is an historic but very brief moment  
 we **MUST** declare war and turn the current situatuion into a military national security problem before it becomes a criminal justice problem  
 the American people want retribution and victory (something Jim Baker said on tv last night), the President said last night we were at war and must get retribution (something George Schultz reinforced on tv last night)  
 this **MUST** be captured in a declaration of war and the passage of a series of very decisive bills liberating the CIA, funding intelligence and defense and establishing a legal framework to go to the **UNited Nations** and the World  
 read Wes Clark's Waging Modern War and you will see how the lawyers crippled the campaign

(D)

**THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS MOMENT, ANYTHING LESS THAN A DECLARATION OF WAR WILL CRIPPLE THIS ADMINISTRATION AS WE PROCEED**  
 newt

cc LD  
 Adm. Giambristano

snowflake

*Paul Wolfowitz*  
10/2/01

October 2, 2001 12:34 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Israeli MoD

We just talked to the Israeli MoD. He offered again to give us as much information from his four decades of experience of his country with terrorism. I think we ought to review and see how we feel about the linkage we have through the intel community and see if we may want to strengthen the relationship directly through DoD on the subject of terrorism and see what they know that we don't know and that we may not be seeing in our intel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100201-17

*ISLML*

*2 Oct 01*

U12872 /02

snowflake

*After NSO 192 ✓*

October 7, 2001 9:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CINCPAC Input on Intelligence

Here are the notes Denny Blair left on intelligence. Please take a look at them and see if you think they are worth typing up and me reading them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
CINCPAC: "Organizing Military Intelligence"

*350.09*

DHR:dh  
100701-9

*7 Oct 01*

U12875 /02

- Best intel is integrated  
with ops and plan

- Let CIA inform policy

- MI must be tied to  
military plan and ops

- Washington-based military  
intelligence must look

outward  
= Planning is done at  
CINC staffs and JTF staffs  
= Ops done at JTF level

= Task force best

- Service intel must focus  
on ops / tactical adaptation  
and development

A = Sword / SHIELD

- What would a JMI do?

= Use SECDEF authority to  
employ intel as we  
currently employ forces

= Task organize, move, federate

= Right now this is done

pretty well voluntarily, would  
need example

together

≡ IMINT - FY. B

≡ SIGINT - FY. M

≡ Recce - FY. stuff

- Invite / agree on partnership  
with CIA

≡ Ops cooperation / do - little

≡ HUMINT talking / do - have

≡ Analysis cooperation / do - pretty good

- Budgeting is tough, but I do B  
not bad

snowflake

*Acad 10/10/01*

October 8, 2001 5:45 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Putin and NATO

Putin keeps talking about some security relationship with NATO, now more than ever because of the "clash of civilizations" and the like. I wonder if you ought to get a small group of people, maybe some people from the Policy Board and see if we can figure out what we might propose before someone proposes something bad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100801-12

*PLS TA*

U12877 /02

*DR 0101*

11-L-0559/OSD/4559

snowflake

*Action Complete 9/10/01*

October 8, 2001 2:22 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Schedule CENTCOM Phone Calls

I need to have two daily phone calls with General Franks—one in the morning and one in the afternoon-before the morning NSC meeting and before the afternoon PC.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100801-8

*Complete 1/9/02*

*CENTCOM*

U12878 /02

*8 Oct 01*

snowflake

10/10  
11/10

October 9, 2001 9:12 AM

SUBJECT: Casualties

We have seen the reports that four Afghan men, who may have been associated with a contractor dealing with land mines, may have been killed. We have no information from the ground to verify this, and have no reason to believe that it was a result of coalition ordnance fired from the air, as opposed to the great deal of Taliban ordnance fired from the ground. Nonetheless, we regret a loss of life.

Terrorists killed thousands of innocent people from dozens of countries, of all races and religions, in the United States on Tuesday, September 11, at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in the four hijacked aircraft. Thousands of innocent lives are still at risk today and will be until we are able to deal with the terrorists.

If there were an easy way to root out terrorist networks, it would be a blessing—but there isn't.

Coalition forces will continue to make every reasonable effort to select targets with the least possibility of unintended damage, but, as in any conflict, there will be unintended damage.

DHR:dh  
100901-3

Afghanistan

9 Oct 01

U12879 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4561

snowflake

*Acrony 10/12/01*

October 9, 2001 7:31 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Other Terrorist Organizations

I need to quickly figure out what this business is that Safire wrote about that Powell is saying that Hizbullah and Hamas are on another list, but in fact they may or may not be, and that that is really begging the question. Let's get that figured out and see what happened and what is going on before I answer that question again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100901-1

*000.5*

*9 Oct 01*

U12880 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4562

*Approved 10/10/01  
1042*

snowflake

October 10, 2001 8:31 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: India

Please find out a way to get the letter to India Minister **Singh** out of this building today.

In addition, please make sure **Wolfowitz** has some deliverables for **Colin** when he leaves on Sunday with respect to **mil-to-mil** with India.

Please tell **Wolfowitz** we have to find ways to make **Singh** look effective. He is friendly to us and, if they take away his defense or foreign minister portfolio, we lose and probably so does Pakistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101001-4

*INDIA*

*10/10/01*

U12885 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4563

snowflake

October 12, 2001 2:56 PM

SR MA TO SECDEF  
has seen

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SecDef Office

380.01

All these cameras were in my office when I was not here, and every single Top Secret paper on my desk and on my stand up desk was open-deployment orders, everything. That is inexcusable. We simply cannot behave that way.

SFC (b)(6) was standing in here with them while all these papers were out for God and the world to see.

In the future, somebody has to train people how to do it, and if you can't train somebody, then they will have to stand in here themselves.

U12889 /02

10/16/01

Sir,

All classified papers were turned over when the camera crew was setting up the office for the photo shoot. The only documents that I did not turn over were personal notes about buying socks and picking up shirts and shoes. I did not turn these over as I felt they were not classified. I had someone standing by to let me know when you were coming down the hall, so that I could turn the documents back over prior to your arrival. This was done due to an earlier snowflake in reference to people putting documents back were they came from on your desk. The procedure is to sanitize all desk tops prior to press corps or photographers coming into the office. In the future all papers will be turned over. Public affairs has been briefed that no press or photographers are allowed in the office without the approval of Mr. DiRita or VADM Giambastiani, and SFC (b)(6) will escort and stay with them while in the office until the interview or photos begin.

1201101

*VR*

U12889 /02

SFC (b)(6)

*SRB 10/16*

11-L-0559/OSD/4566

snowflake

*Handwritten:* 10/16 / 1102

October 13, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Future Military Actions

Here is a two-page memo from you. I have looked at it, but I need to know what you think I should do with it. This doesn't help me. You should tell me who should receive this information, and it should be drafted in a form to send to them.

I started to read it, and I stopped. The reason I stopped is that I knew I didn't have time to try to figure out what I ought to do with it. You folks have got to help me on that.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated **draft Feith** memo

DHR:dh  
101301-17

*Handwritten:* 281

*Handwritten:* 136401

U12893 /02

FEIT DRAFT

INCOMPLETE

The next military actions should be selected to drive home one or more strategic themes of the war and not merely to cause marginal damage to a particular terrorist group. Appropriate strategic themes include:

- state support for terrorism,
- the WMD threat and
- the breadth of the US war effort.

SECDEF HAS SEE

OCT 13 2001

The Chairman should consider simultaneous actions in three theaters, perhaps Iraq, Lebanon and Colombia. If such simultaneous action can be executed successfully, the effect will be to:

- surprise and impress the enemy with our boldness, capability and large ambitions;
- give credibility to the President's broadly stated goals in the war on terrorism;
- enhance the effectiveness of our diplomacy, helping to induce states to hasten to get themselves off the terrorism-supporter list;
- make the point that states pay a price by calling attention to themselves through their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq and Syria are two of the leading state sponsors of terrorism. Both have active WMD programs.

Syria is one of the two principal state supporters (the other is Iran) of Hezbollah, based in Lebanon. Syria has occupied Lebanon militarily for a quarter century, crushing the sovereignty of the only Arab country that has ever had a (more or less) democratic government (and has ever given non-Moslems substantial political power). If Syria's military assets in Lebanon were struck, along with Hezbollah targets, it would:

- punish Syria's support for Hezbollah,
- embolden the Lebanese to take back control of their country,
- send a strong warning to Iran that there is a price to be paid for supporting terrorism,
- help persuade other states supporting terrorism that it is time to end that support, and

- reduce the risk of a Syrian-Israeli war triggered by additional Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.

Iraq has perpetrated and supported terrorist acts and organizations for many years, including the 1993 assassination attempt against President George H.W. Bush. The Saddam Hussein regime is a recidivist international aggressor, a murderous tyranny and an active pursuer of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. If that regime manages to purchase fissile material, it could have nuclear weapon within months (though it will take a few years if it must produce the fissile material indigenously). Military action against Iraq could:

- set back Saddam's WMD programs,
- punish Iraq's support for terrorism,
- punish Iraq's threats to US and UK aircraft and crews upholding the UN-mandated no-fly-zones,

snowflake

Agree  
10/16/01  
TAS

October 13, 2001 10:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mike Bigham

Attached is a note and background sheet from Mike Bigham, who I suggested we bring in to help with bioterrorism. He is a very smart fellow.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/08/01 Bigham ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101301-7

231.2

13 Oct 01

U12895 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4570

**Michael F. Bigham**

(b)(6)

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**OCT 13 2001**

October 8, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
2206 Kalorama Road, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20008-1621

Dear Don,

Many thanks for your thoughtful note. Given your demanding schedule it was all the more appreciated. We wish you the best of luck on the current military campaign. You and the team are to be congratulated for actively managing the expectations of the American people about the likely duration and **difficulty** of this **effort**.

As regards **bioterrorism** I agree that the threat is real. After September 11 no one can doubt that terrorists would use such a weapon of mass destruction given the **opportunity**. We may well have more time to prepare for such an attack as contrasted to more conventional weapons. While the technological challenges associated with biological weapons have prevented their successful use by terrorists to date history can be a misleading predictor of the **future**. Technological advances often arise suddenly. Since the potential loss **from** such a weapon of mass destruction can be substantial I believe that some sense of urgency is warranted.

The **bioterrorism** threat has many dimensions. My sense is that several agencies are working on parts of the problem but that no one is providing central guidance to fashion an overarching, coordinated strategy. We can ill afford a patchwork approach to so vital a defense. In **asymmetrical** warfare terrorists hit where there is weakness, with civilian targets high on their list. We cannot **afford** gaps in our strategy; the consequences would be simply too grave.

I believe that the domestic component of the challenge must by its very nature be "defensive" with a focus **on** early detection and **containment**, rapid mobilization of response, specialized training of relevant health and rescue personnel, and establishing secure sources of critical medicines and supplies. Conceptually these "domestic" responsibilities would fall logically under Secretary Ridge. I only hope that he will be **afforded sufficient** authority to **control** the essential elements of the strategy. Secretary Thompson is actively involved in elements of the solution but does not appear to have responsibility for the broader strategy.

The external component is principally "offensive" and would logically fall under the purview of the Defense Department, with the active support of the State Department. Proactively rooting out and destroying the capabilities of rogue states and terrorist

11-L-0559/OSD/4571

organizations to wage biological warfare are critical to overall success. Aggressive diplomatic **efforts** to prevent proliferation of biological capabilities by the State Department must also be part of any **effective** long-term solution. Such **external** strategies are essential because a domestic strategy alone is not **sufficient**.

Structurally I would **suggest** the creation of a position that would likely report to Secretary Ridge (or potentially into the **Defense** Department) that would have responsibility for establishing and coordinating an overall strategy for domestic **defense** against biological terrorism. The position should possess as much authority for **implementation** as possible to be **effective**. While the role would concentrate on domestic "defensive" strategies it must be integrated with **elements** of the **external** "offensive" strategies so that both approaches remain strategically **aligned**.

The person who fills this role must be a strong analytical thinker, an effective communicator and a demonstrated leader. The individual will also need proven organizational skills, an **entrepreneurial** drive, a working knowledge of the biological sciences and access to a network of scientific thought-leaders. In all candor I am not lobbying for a full-time post. However, false modesty aside, I recognize that my **experience** and abilities are well suited for such a position. Perhaps I have **been** unwittingly training for such a role these many years in the biotechnology industry.

**In** short, I am prepared to devote whatever time and **effort** is necessary to **insure** the success of our national preparedness against biological terrorism unless and until someone more qualified emerges. **Suki** and I are thoroughly enjoying our life on our "**ranchette**." However, we would be open to relocating to Washington, **D.C.** if the role to be **filled** is **significant enough** to warrant it.

I rely upon your usual good judgment to determine where I may play the most useful role. Consider me a "strategic asset in reserve" to be deployed wherever I can be most **effective**. I have already faxed my resume to **Ms. Jennifer Perry** (**hard** copy enclosed) and have had a preliminary conversation with Mr. **Larry DiRita**. He indicated that either he or one of his colleagues would be in touch once their game plan firmed up. I will await **their call**.

On a separate note I believe that the tragic events of September 11 have **created** an historic opportunity to recast our military into a force more appropriate to the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> **century** as you have articulated so well. You are the right man at the **right** place at the right time. **Carpe** diem. History teaches us that such windows of **opportunity** are fleeting.

Please give our warmest regards to Joyce.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

**Michael F. Bigham**  
Vice Chairman  
Corixa Corporation  
W (b)(6) / F (b)(6)

**Experience:**

Dec. 2000-  
Present

**CORIXA CORPORATION**

Vice Chairman

Seattle, WA

Successfully merged **Coulter Pharmaceutical, Inc.** into **Corixa Corporation**, a public biotechnology company focused on the treatment and prevention of autoimmune diseases, cancer and infectious diseases by understanding and directing the immune system. **Corixa** is headquartered in Seattle, WA with significant operations in South San Francisco, CA and Hamilton, MT. The merger of **Coulter** and **Corixa** in December 2000 represented the largest merger between two independent biotechnology companies. The **Coulter** shareholders received approximately 45% of the combined entity, an ownership position with an announced value of over \$900 million.

July 1996-  
Dec. 2000

**COULTER PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.**

President and Chief Executive Officer

South San Francisco, CA

**Coulter Pharmaceutical, Inc.** was a public biotechnology company focused on the development of novel therapies for the treatment of cancer and autoimmune diseases. The Company was developing a family of cancer therapeutics based upon two drug development programs: therapeutic antibodies and targeted **oncologics**. The Company's most advanced product candidate was **Bexxar™**, a **monoclonal** antibody conjugated to a radioisotope for the treatment of non-Hodgkin's **lymphoma**.

Crew **Coulter** from 10 people in July 1996 to over 215 people at the time of merger, **including** the initial phase of a planned 30 person sales force. Successfully completed an initial public offering in January 1997 and three subsequent follow-on equity offerings. Signed a corporate collaboration with **SmithKline Beecham** in December 1998 for \$132 million, the largest of its kind at that time between a large pharmaceutical company and a biotechnology company for an oncology drug. Moved Company into a new R&D Campus in March 1999 comprised of three build-to-suit 50,000 sq. ft. buildings phased in over a three year period.

July 1988-  
June 1996

**GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.**

Foster City, CA

Executive Vice President for Operations and Chief Financial Officer

**Gilead Sciences** is a public biotechnology company developing human therapeutics for the treatment of **viral** infections, vascular disease and cancer. Joined **Gilead** in 1988 as the eighth employee. Areas of responsibility included sales and marketing, finance and operations, and corporate development.

*Sales and Marketing:* Developed the sales and marketing department in anticipation of the June 1996 launch of the company's first product *Vistide*, an antiviral for the treatment of **CMV retinitis**. Oversaw the hiring of a 25 person direct sales force in the U.S. and a ten person customer support team. The Company's first product was approved by the FDA in June 1996.

*Finance and Operations:* As the "financial architect" of **Gilead** raised approximately \$450 million through seven equity financings from investors worldwide. **Gilead's** financing strategy has become a case study at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. In addition to four public offerings, fundraising activities included two rounds of venture capital financing, a private investment from a corporate partner, equipment leasing, academic and government collaborations, and corporate collaborations. **Gilead** had approximately \$310 million in cash at the time of my departure and a market capitalization over \$1 billion. **Gilead** was able to retain worldwide rights to all of its clinical products due to its strong balance sheet.

*Operations:* Responsibilities included facilities, manufacturing, and information services. Directed the implementation of a new, integrated accounting system to accommodate the broader financial management and commercialization needs associated with a product launch.

*Corporate Development:* Negotiated a large multi-year research and development collaboration with Glaxo, Inc. in 1988 to finance our long-term research program. The agreement was the first external R&D agreement with a biotechnology firm in Glaxo's history. Other collaborations included arrangements with American Home Products and the Rega Institute in Belgium.

Augé. 1984-  
July 1988

**HAMBRECHT & QUIST, INC.**

San Francisco, CA

Co-head of Healthcare Investment Banking

Youngest person to have been appointed to this position in the history of the firm. Provided corporate finance and merger and acquisition services to private and public emerging growth companies primarily in the healthcare industry.

Responsibilities included establishing strategic direction for the healthcare corporate finance group, creating a dedicated healthcare funds management effort, managing client relationships, initiating business development activities, making independent sales calls, devising financial strategies and presenting financing proposals to senior management, directors and investors.

Activities included several initial public offerings, follow-on public offerings, convertible debt issues, private placements, corporate acquisitions, R&D

partnerships, and a Eurodollar **convertible** debt financing. Concentrated primarily on biotechnology, medical technology and healthcare services industries.

Designed, developed and marketed **Hambrecht & Quist's** first public mutual **fund**. Raised **\$55** million in May **1987**. Devised an innovative structure to permit investments in public and private companies in the healthcare industries. Recruited four regional underwriters as co-managers; developed comprehensive marketing materials, advertisement and a sales videotape; established an **800** service; trained a telemarketing staff; and implemented a nationwide advertising campaign. The fund is listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

**Hambrecht & Quist** (now "JP Morgan H&Q") is a leading investment bank providing venture capital and corporate finance services to emerging growth companies primarily in the high technology, healthcare and information services industries.

**1983 - 1984** STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DECISIONS INC. Menlo Park, CA  
Assistant to the President. Developed and introduced a novel credit market analysis and education service, working directly with the company president. *Marketing:* Designed and implemented a successful marketing plan that produced some **30** new clients. Generated **160** sales meetings in **15** cities over a **15-week** period. *Management:* Coordinated production of publications and sales materials; recruited research assistants; negotiated vendor contracts; and streamlined the accounting system. *Director:* Remain an active member of the Board of Directors.

Summer **1982** GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. New York, NY  
 Summer Associate in Corporate Finance. Prepared and presented financial analyses for public debt and equity offerings, merger advisory services, and new business development.

**1979 - 1981** PEAT, **MARWICK** MITCHELL & CO. Washington, DC  
 Private Business Advisory Service. Youngest professional recruited into a department that provided tax, audit and management consulting services to emerging growth companies. Industry experience included software, **financial** services and airlines.

CPA. Passed the CPA Examination on my **first** sitting in May, **1979**.

**Education: STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS**

**1981 - 1983** MBA, June 1983. Courses chosen to develop a broad range of business skills with an emphasis on small business management and marketing. Active member New Enterprise-Small Business Club. Co-founder of Friends of **Arjay** Miller Club; raised **\$5,000** and enrolled **225** graduate students as paying members. Captain of intramural basketball team.

**1975 - 1979 UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA**

**BS** degree in Commerce with Distinction. Awarded Beta Gamma Sigma for superior academic performance. Elected President of Beta Alpha Psi-National Honorary Accounting Fraternity; earned first national awards for Most Improved Chapter and Outstanding Chapter. Elected Treasurer and Athletic Coordinator **Chi** Phi Fraternity. Elected to the Raven Society. Member Varsity Track Team (1975-1977).

**Accountant of the Year.** Awarded this honor in January 1994 by the **McIntire** School of Commerce at the University of Virginia for outstanding achievements in the accounting profession. Served on the Business Advisory Board (1994-1998).

**Personal:**

(b)(6)

September 2001

snowflake

D. Aaron  
10/16  
11:20

October 13, 2001 11:26 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Good Relations

Doug, you are going to have to take the lead to make sure we keep good relations with all the countries around the world that have offered to assist. Either we find a way for them to assist, or we make sure they don't feel like we are **stiffing** them.

You need to get your office organized so we handle these things skillfully.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101301-8

092

13 01 01

U12896 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4577

snowflake

*Accord  
Dell  
TAS*

October 15, 2001 12:27 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Overhead

The issue came up as to whether we should release some overhead. Torie indicated she wanted to, and the request went to Clapper. Clapper called and asked the DCI if he could instead of calling me.

Is that the right way it should have gone?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101501-34

*10.01*

*15 Oct 01*

U12898 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4578

snowflake

Approved 10/16/01  
10/17

October 15, 2001 2:06 PM

TO: David Chu  
cc: Charles Abell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Language Training

I read the memo of June 25 on language training. It seems to me that languages like French, German and Portuguese aren't going to do us a lot of good in the future, whereas Chinese, Arabic and Spanish will.

Why don't you take a look at how you feel we are doing in the academies and various other schools.

Thanks.

Attach.  
U11836/01 P&R info memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101501-43

0914

15 Q. 701

U12900 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4579

715  
1440



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



7/10/01  
1255

**INFO MEMO  
SECDEF HAS SEEN**

OCT 15 2001 June 25, 2001, 3:30 PM

FORCE MANAGEMENT  
POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action *copy provided*  
THROUGH: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *copy provided*  
FROM: Charles S. Abell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP) *7-1-01*  
SUBJECT: Service Academy and ROTC Cadet Language Requirements *(RESPONSIBLE TO SECDEF QUESTION)*

- Each of the Service academies offers foreign language study, with differing requirements as follows:
  - United States Military Academy – Offers training in Spanish, ~~Portuguese, German, French~~, Arabic, Chinese, or Russian. Requires two semesters of study for all cadets with no option to “test out” of this requirement.
  - United States Naval Academy – Offers training in Spanish, ~~German, French~~, Chinese, Russian, or Japanese. Requires 12 credit hours only for those midshipmen in Humanities/Social Science degree programs. No requirement for other midshipmen. Requirement can be met via testing.
  - United States Air Force Academy – Offers training in Spanish, German, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian, or Japanese. Requires two semesters of study for all cadets with no option to “test out” of this requirement.
- There are no language requirements for ROTC cadets beyond what may be required by their specific university or degree program.
- There are no requirements for language training during Professional Military Education (Staff or War College) for any Service. No language study is offered.

COORDINATION: NONE.

|                       |        |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |        |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI    | —      |
| MA BUCCI              | —      |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE      | AC 7/5 |

Prepared by: Major Brenda K. Leong (b)(6)

snawflake

*Info  
Della  
10/14*

October 15, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: *Jim Roche*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Quote

Thanks for the note and the quote. I appreciate it.

DHR:dh  
101501-29

*3355D*

*15 Oct/01*

U12903 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4581

Larry Di Rita

THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

10/12

10/11/01

To: Sec Def 

Da,

You were terrific this morning. I  
much enjoyed your thoughts.

Attached please find a quote my  
gang found for me. It captures  
something special about the American  
culture and war. It also is  
very consistent with your theme.

LD/Dir

OCT 15 2010

The Honorable James **G. Roche**  
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD  
Thursday, 11 October, 1300 - 1400  
**Ritz-Carlton** Hotel, Pentagon City, VA

*War is repugnant to the people of the United States; yet it is war that has made their nation and it is through their power to wage war that they dominate the world.*

*Americans are **proficient** at war in the same way that they are proficient at work. It is a task, sometimes a duty. Americans have worked at war since the seventeenth century, to protect themselves from the Indians, to win their independence from George III, to make themselves one country, to win the whole of their continent, to extinguish autocracy and dictatorship in the world outside. It is not their favored form of work. Left to themselves, Americans build, cultivate, bridge, dam, canalize, invent, teach, manufacture, think, write, lock themselves in struggle with the eternal challenges that man has chosen to confront, and with an intensity not known elsewhere on the globe. Bidden to make war their work, Americans shoulder the burden with intimidating purpose. War is a form of work, and America makes war, however reluctantly, however unwillingly, in a particularly workman-like way.*

*- **John Keegan, Fields of Battle, 1966***

snowflake

*Agenda 10/15/01*

October 15, 2001 11:44 AM

TO: Jim Roche  
CC: Gen. Jumper  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 4-Stars

Does it make sense to you that of all the Air Force 4-stars, seven are fighter pilots, three are transport pilots and one is not rated?

DHR:dh  
101501-31

*210 AF (3F4)*

*15 Oct 01*

U12905 /02

**AIR FORCE 4-STAR BACKGROUNDS**  
(7 fighter pilots, 3 transport, 1 non-rated)

fighter 7

Transport 3

not rated 1

MYERS (CJCS)  
F-4, F-15, F-16  
600 combat hours in SE Asia

FIGHTERS

(CSAF)R  
F-4, F-15, F-15  
1400 hours in SE Asia

FIGHTERS

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

001 15 2000

BEGERT (PACAF)  
C-5, C-21, C-130, C-141, KC-10, KC-135  
875 combat hours in Vietnam as forward air controller

TRANSPORT/TANKER

EBERHART (SPACECOM)  
F-4E, RF-4C, F-15, F-16  
300 combat missions as FAC in Vietnam

FIGHTERS

FOGLESONG (New VCSAF)  
F-15, F-16  
No combat hours

FIGHTERS

HANDY (Soon to be CINCTRANSCOM)  
C-130, C-7, C-141, C-9, KC-10, C-17,  
300 C-130 combat hours in SE Asia

TRANSPORT/TANKER

HOLLAND (CINCSOCOM)  
C-130, AC-130, HC-130, MC-130, MH-53,  
MH-50, H-3  
79 AC-130 combat missions

TRANSPORT/HELOS

HORNBURG (soon to be Air Combat Cmd)  
O-1, O-2, OV-10, F-100, F-4, F-15A/C/E, F-16/C,  
KC-10  
560 combat hours in SE Asia (O-1, O-2, OV-10, F-100)  
and in Desert Storm (F-15E) and Bosnia (F-16C)

FIGHTER

LYLES (AF Material Cmd)  
Not a pilot

NON-RATED

RALSTON (SACEUR)  
F-105, F-4, F-15, F-16  
147 combat missions SE Asia

FIGHTERS

MARTIN (AF CMD USAFE)  
F-4, F-15  
161 combat missions SE Asia

FIGHTERS

SMA copy  
- Tracker updated  
11/10  
1427

October 15, 2001 10:39 AM


snovflake

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Press

000750

We had that piece in the *New York Times* that pulled off of my earlier remarks. Why don't we start doing it systematically and get one in the *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *LA Times*. Just keep pulling things out of the remarks I am making and make short **articles out of them.**

Thanks.



Larry Di Rita  
11/9

DHR:dh  
101501-20

15 OCT 01

U12911 /02

11  
1400

November 6, 2001

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Torie Clarke  
SUBJECT: Press

We are well on our way with this effort:

New Kind of War- New York Times (done)

QDR Intro- Washington Post (done)

More Like a Cold War- WSJ (tent-before you for edits)

Other potential topics we're working, based on your recent remarks include:

Events of 9/11 changed world.

Transformation -Now more than ever.

11-L-0559/OSD/4587

snoflake

Agew  
10/18  
044

October 17, 2001 7:09 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: New Defense Agency

I am inclined to agree that we are going to have to stand up a new defense agency of some kind. It would be designed to gather and develop timely, useful intelligence against the new highly asymmetric adversaries and support the effort against them.

It is pretty clear to me the intel operation isn't doing the job with the way it is working now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101701-4

020

170501

U12916 /02

snowflake

D. Rumsfeld  
10/18/2001

October 17, 2001 4:46 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Book

Thanks so much for the information on Kaplan's book, *Warrior Politics*. I will get it and read it.

Thanks, my friend, keep those good ideas coming.

DHR:ah  
101701-24

092

17 OCT 01

U12917 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4589

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 9:14 AM  
To: rtyler@gingrichgroup.com  
cc: krvs60@charter.net; klubbers@bellsouth.net; cdemuth@aei.org; kr@georgewbush.com; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; libby@ovp.eop.gov

Subject: bok review, Kaplan's Warrior Politics

Robert Kaplan Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York, Random House, 2002, 179pp) is a brilliant essay which should be read by every citizen deeply concerned about America's role in the world and the realities of an evolving and uncertain global system.

Kaplan is a brilliant reporter on the depth of violence and chaos in much of the world (see his The Coming Anarchy). He has been in key parts of the violent third world and he understands the objective realities of millions of rootless young men with inadequate futures, a vivid sense that they are not getting the good life the rest of the world is living and a deep reversion to ethnic and religious fanaticism as a way of life that is more fulfilling than poverty without a cause.

Kaplan argues correctly that the modern world is much like the ancient world. Humans are human and the problem of violence in and against society is as eternal as Cain and Abel. He brilliantly carries us from Churchill's The River War (a study of the British role in the Sudan 1881-1898) a book Kaplan first bought in Khartoum in the mid-1980s. Kaplan understands that the roots of historic conflict run much deeper than today's story and he combines Churchill's personal sense of history with Churchill's role in history.

Kaplan carries us through the lessons of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Livy, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant and a series of other scholars who have tried to cope with the challenge of violence and human society. He offers wise thoughts about America's role in the world, the inevitable nature of third world violence in the next half century and the challenge of creating effective responses and sustainable strategies and institutions.

I highly recommend Kaplan's new book to anyone who is trying to understand what needs to be done in response to September 11. In fact there are a number of references in this book to asymmetric power, fanaticism and the intelligent use of unsuspected force outside the rules of modern state warfare which are prescient of what we are now living through.

A very wise, thoughtful book.

cc LD  
Adm G

ANZ  
Get Bill

snowflake

*AW*  
*10/18*  
*2001*

October 18, 2001 10:40 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
Steve Cambone

cc: PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UAVs

*4526*

I just looked at these memos from Dov Zakheim on what we are doing on UAVs.

It looks to me that we are not doing anywhere near enough. I think we have to think this through more carefully.

We should have UAV gun ships like the AC-130s. We should have multiples of these capabilities.

We should have all-weather UAVs capable of flying in bad weather.

I want someone with some creativity to screw his head into this and come to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/15/01 USD(C) memo to SecDef; 10/16/01 USD(C) memo to SecDef

*180CT01*

DHR:dh  
101801-1

U12920 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4591

23  
000

snowflake

September 27 2001 14:14 PM  
**SECRET HAS SEEN**  
OCT 18 2001

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: UAVs

*9/10/17*

Please find out how many UAVs we have ordered out of this new fund of money. We are going to need a lot of them, not 12 or 20, but a lot more-it is pretty clear.

We ought to get somebody on the project of finding out what the various Services have and what is currently in development, and get a proposal down to me for orders that should be placed.

Thanks.

*9/28*

*Response attached. USD (C)*

DHR:dh  
092701-13

*Also, detail on  
Other HD-LD items.*

~~*Please provide*~~

*D. Rita*

~~*D. Rita*~~

Larry Di Rita  
*10/16*

Larry Di Rita  
*9/28*

*SLP*  
*10/16*

10/16  
1700

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

Oct 18 2001

**INFO MEMO**

October 15, 2001, 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)

- The Department plans for an additional 8 Predators (medium altitude endurance UAV) and the amount necessary to remove and prepare 15 Hunter (short-range, tactical UAV) air vehicles currently in storage. To date, two Predator UAVs have been ordered
- System capabilities for the Global Hawk (high altitude endurance UAV) program are being accelerated. We will contract for additional UAVs as soon as money is available.
- By the end of the calendar year, there will be 12 Predator systems (4 vehicles per system), five Pioneer (short-range UAV) systems (8 vehicles per system), four Global Hawk air vehicles, and approximately 40 Hunter air vehicles in the inventory. This results in approximately 132 UAVs of all types.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4593

**Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental  
As of October 15, 2001**

| <u>Item</u>                        | <u>Svc</u> | <u>Released</u> |            | <u>Supp. to be Released</u> |              | <u>Deferred (a)</u> |            | <u>FY 02 Budget</u> |              | <u>Total</u> |              |
|------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                                    |            | <u>Qty</u>      | <u>\$M</u> | <u>Qty</u>                  | <u>\$M</u>   | <u>Qty</u>          | <u>\$M</u> | <u>Qty</u>          | <u>\$M</u>   | <u>Qty</u>   | <u>\$M</u>   |
| Predator B                         | Air Force  |                 |            | 2                           | 14           |                     |            |                     |              | 2            | 14           |
| Predator Attrition Vehicles        | Air Force  |                 |            | 6                           | 21           |                     |            | 6                   | 20           | 12           | 41           |
| Global Hawk Sensors                | Air Force  |                 |            |                             | 63           |                     |            |                     | 185          |              | 248          |
| Predator Power Upgrades            | Air Force  |                 |            |                             | 14           |                     |            |                     |              |              | 14           |
| UAV Deployments and Operations     | Air Force  |                 |            |                             | 65           |                     |            |                     |              |              | 65           |
| Distributed Common Ground System   | Air Force  |                 |            |                             | 172          |                     |            |                     |              |              | 172          |
| Distributed Common Ground Stations | Army /Navy |                 |            |                             | 64           |                     |            |                     |              |              | 64           |
| Hellfire Wing Kits                 | Air Force  |                 |            | 6                           | 12           |                     |            |                     |              | 6            | 12           |
|                                    |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
| <b>Total Funding</b>               |            |                 |            | <b>12</b>                   | <b>\$425</b> |                     |            | <b>6</b>            | <b>\$205</b> | <b>18</b>    | <b>\$630</b> |

**Notes:**

(a) Not funded in the \$40 billion Emergency Supplemental.

**Low Density/High Demand  
FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental  
As of October 15, 2001**

| <u>Item</u>          | <u>Svc</u> | <u>Released</u> |            | <u>Supp. to be Released</u> |              | <u>Deferred (a)</u> |            | <u>FY 02 Budget</u> |              | <u>Total</u> |              |
|----------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                      |            | <u>Qty</u>      | <u>\$M</u> | <u>Qty</u>                  | <u>\$M</u>   | <u>Qty</u>          | <u>\$M</u> | <u>Qty</u>          | <u>\$M</u>   | <u>Qty</u>   | <u>\$M</u>   |
|                      |            | Rivet Joint     | Air Force  | --                          | --           | 2                   | 270        | --                  | --           | --           | --           |
| EP-3                 | Navy       | --              | --         | 1                           | 75*          |                     |            | 2                   | 124          | 3            | 199*         |
| EA-6B Mods           | Navy       |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            | --                  | 137          | --           | 137          |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
|                      |            |                 |            |                             |              |                     |            |                     |              |              |              |
| <b>Total Funding</b> |            | --              | --         | 3                           | <b>\$345</b> | --                  | --         | 2                   | <b>\$261</b> | 5            | <b>\$606</b> |

**Notes:**

\* Includes \$15 million to fix the EP-3 recovered from China.

(a) Not funded in the \$40 billion Emergency Supplemental.

(b) Funding supports production acceleration and building increased manufacturing capability.

**Precision Guided Munitions  
FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental  
As of October 10, 2001**

Quantities are estimates and will change as contracts are negotiated.

| Item  | Svc       | Released |              | Supp. to be Released |              | Deferred (a) |              | FY Budget |              |
|---|-----------|----------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|
|   |           | Qty      | \$M          | Qty                  | \$M          | Qty          | \$M          | Qty       | \$M          |
| Tactical Tomahawk (b)   | Navy      | --       | --           | 15                   | 50           | --           | --           | 34        | 50           |
| Tomahawk Upgrades   | Navy      | --       | --           | 440                  | 550          | --           | --           | --        | --           |
| Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) (b)   | Navy      | --       | --           | 4500                 | 100          | --           | --           | 1417      | 41           |
|   | Air Force | 2400     | 57           | 1400                 | 33           | --           | --           | 8383      | 187          |
| Standoff Land-Attack Missile - Expanded Response (SLAM-ER)                          | Navy      | --       | --           | 45                   | 25           | 45           | 25           | 30        | 26           |
| Conversions from Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to Conventional (CALCM) Missile | Air Force | 296      | 138          | --                   | --           | TBD          | 15           | --        | --           |
| Hellfire  | Navy      |          |              | 500                  | 35           | 670          | 47           | --        | --           |
| Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM)                                   | Air Force | --       | --           | --                   | --           | 90           | 30           | 190       | 105          |
|   | Navy      |          |              |                      |              |              |              | 57        | 40           |
| Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) (c)   | Army      | --       | --           | 107                  | 78           | 203          | 147          | 6         | 61           |
| Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)  | Air Force | --       | --           | --                   | --           | --           | --           | 104       | 55           |
|   | Navy      | --       | --           | --                   | --           | --           | --           | --        | --           |
| Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)                                       | Air Force | --       | --           | --                   | --           | --           | --           | 76        | 45           |
| Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW)   | Air Force | --       | --           | --                   | --           | --           | --           | 300       | 110          |
| <b>Total Funding</b>  |           |          | <b>\$195</b> |                      | <b>\$871</b> |              | <b>\$239</b> |           | <b>\$720</b> |

**Notes:**

- (a) Not funded in the \$40 billion Emergency Supplemental.
- (b) Funding supports production acceleration and building increased manufacturing capability.
- (c) The FY 02 budget funds will buy the ATACMS BAT/Block II. The supplemental request is for the unitary warhead variant.

1700  
SECDEF HAS SEEN  
OCT 18 2001

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2001, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Platforms in the  
Emergency Supplemental

- The Department has requested Emergency Supplemental funds for the following ISR platforms:

| <u>Platform</u>             | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>\$ in Millions</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Rivet Joint (Boeing 707)    | 2               | 270                   |
| EP-3                        | 1               | 60                    |
| Predator B Systems          | 2               | 14                    |
| Predator Attrition Vehicles | 6               | <u>21</u>             |
| Total                       |                 | 365                   |

- Additionally, the Department has requested Supplemental funds for the following ISR sensor upgrades:

| <u>Sensor</u>                               | <u>\$ in Millions</u> |
|---|-----------------------|
| U-2 Sensors                                 | 52                    |
| Compass Call Sensors                        | 70                    |
| Navy Special Aircraft Sensors               | 30                    |
| Global Hawk Sensors                         | 63                    |
| Predator Power Upgrades                     | 14                    |
| 6 Hellfire Wing Kits                        | 12                    |
| Air Force Distributed Common Ground System  | 172                   |
| Army/Navy Distributed Common Ground Station | <u>64</u>             |
| Total                                       | 477                   |

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John Roth (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4597

snowflake

October 19, 2001 11:44 AM

*TWQ 10/15/01  
DSS/L*

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

I have signed this letter to the president of Uzbekistan, but I am concerned about it. He specifically said he didn't want overt attacks out of his country, and here we are asking for AC-130s.

Now, I am a little reluctant to put that in writing. I think that is the kind of thing that should go through the intel channel orally.

Second, if you decide the letter should go, and as I said I am concerned about it, it seems that at the minimum we should make sure it goes through the intel channel. He has explicitly said he does not want anything going through the MoD or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101901-13

UZBEKISTAN

10101

11-L-0559/OSD/4598

U12922 /02

snowflake

*Printed 10/25/01*

October 22, 2001 11:25 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Network Phraseology

I think we ought to talk to the networks about their statements that we are bombing Kabul, and make sure they understand we are NOT bombing Kabul.

Nine-tenths of the time we are bombing military targets on the outskirts of Kabul-they keep saying it is Kabul, as though it is civilians, which it is not.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102201-17

*11/21/01*

*22 Oct 01*

U12925 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4599

snowflake

D. Agnew  
10/25  
10/24

October 22, 2001 11:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Foreign Assistance

Complete  
Response below  
10/24/01

I feel an urgent need for you to get a cell working to make certain we are doing absolutely the maximum we can about all the countries that have offered assistance. We need to make absolutely sure Gen. Franks is using them to the maximum extent possible.

0005

I think the worst thing we could do would be to stiff them by not engaging them at all or not allowing them to be engaged to the extent they want to be.

We have to find ways to do that. It is important.

Please let me know what you are doing and how I can help.

Thanks.

10/24/01

→ SD

Last week I set up such a cell under a fellow named Keith Dynn who works for Steve Cambone. Cambone is organizing the effort.

22 Oct 01

DHR:dh  
102201-19

Meanwhile we are systematically working with the Joint Staff, the State Department ("thank you" cables have gone out), CentCom and the embassies of contributing countries. Rodman, ~~and~~ Crouch and I have begun a series of meetings with Ambassadors.

At the DSD's suggestion, I have asked Cambone to have the cell produce a short daily report. ~~HL-0530/08D/4000~~ yesterday. Doug Feith

U12926 /02

snowflake

Arten  
10/25  
0911

October 22, 2001 3:21 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Statements

I have been very open in public in saying countries ought to do what they feel comfortable doing with respect to the war on terrorism.

I do not feel that way about Germany, South Korea or Japan, countries where we have made major commitments of effort for them. We ought to put heat on them to make sure their statements are supportive and that they don't wiggle an inch.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102201-25

*00.5*

*22 Oct 01*

U12927 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4601

snowflake

10/24/00

October 24, 2001 2:01 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: PDB

339wH

On the Presidential Daily Brief today, there was supposedly a wrap up of one or two pages. George Tenet asked me about it. I didn't even see it. Could you please dig it out and let me see it?

Thanks.

SIR-

10/24  
1430

THIS WAS A "RED STRIPE" ITEM WHICH DENNY WATSON SHOWED YOU THIS MORNING. IT SUMMARIZED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS. YOU TOLD DENNY IF THE PAPER WAS OVER OPTIMISTIC AND WAS "BALONEY" I HAVE DENNY'S STAND-IN BRINGING IT DOWN AGAIN IF YOU'D LIKE TO SEE IT AGAIN. ✓/Red Ed

DHR:dh  
102401-25

SECRET HAS BEEN

U12939 /02

To mme AM

2700101

10/24  
1440

11-4-0559/OSD/4603

YES NO - SEE ME -

snowflake

INTO  
10/26  
0832

October 25, 2001 6:38 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Deferring for Olympics

You can't be serious that someone in the interagency is talking about deferring the war for the Olympic games. I raised it, and everyone just laughed.

DHR:dh  
102501-1

353,8

.....  
Please respond by 10 | 27

25-0501

U12941 /02

snowflake

Fulford 10/25/01  
DHR

October 25, 2001 10:09 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper Flow

*Not done -  
Lester to discuss  
w/ Dikita - someone to  
call Andy Card &  
explain*

Andy, the memo on offensive nuclear weapons I sent the President on October 22 had not gotten to him by the time I met with him on October 23—when I was to discuss with him his upcoming October 24 meeting with the Chiefs on the same subject. Condi said it hadn't gotten it up to him.

I wonder if there is some way we can avoid paper getting stuck.

Needless to say, I have the same problem over here!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102401-28

.....

312

25 Oct 01

U12942 /02

Approved  
10/22  
11/31

cc: Cmdr Newbourne

October 25, 2001 12:03 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
cc: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Copy to  
10/26

SUBJECT: Testing and the ABM Treaty

Please draft a letter from me to the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, indicating what we have decided to not do (the unclassified version) in order to avoid breaking the ABM treaty. Wednesday morning Carl Levin asked me to send a letter.

Please get a draft to me, preferably by 3:00 p.m. on Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102501-25

.....  
**Please respond by 3:00 p.m. Friday, October 26, 2001**

Sir -  
Completed.

SC  
10/26

39324

2506T01

U12943 /02

Handwritten: ~~12/17~~  
12/26

snowflake

October 25, 2001 12:59 PM

PAKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reimbursements to Pakistan

Colin Powell keeps telling me we are getting some very big bills for Pakistan's assistance with airports, fuel, etc.

Have you seen anything like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102501-29

.....

Please respond by 10/30

25 OCT 01

U12944 /02

snowflake

Handwritten initials and date: "A. Wolfowitz" and "10/26/01"

October 25, 2001 11:55 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Op-ed

310.1

Please take a look at this draft **op-ed** from the Quadrennial Defense Review. Do you think I ought to send it in?

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/2/01 Thiessen draft op-ed

DHR:dh  
102501-24

.....  
*Please respond by **5:00 p.m. today, October 25, 2001***

25 OCT 01

U12947 /02

October 12, 2001 5:00 PM

TO: The Secretary of Defense  
FROM: Marc Thiessen  
SUBJECT: QDR Oped

*MTH*  
10/12/01

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
OCT 25 2001

Here, per your request, is an op-ed based on the QDR introduction.

If you approve, we could give it to the *Wall Street Journal*.

Attach.

Draft Oped, 10/12/01

*Paul W.*  
*Do you think*

# The Next War

By Donald H. Rumsfeld

On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious attack. Not by traditional armies waging traditional military campaigns, but an unprecedented attack by hidden enemies, willing-and able-to strike our people where they live and work.

These attacks were more than the first salvos of a new kind of war. They were a wake up call, a warning that we are entering a dangerous new period in American history-one in which the United States' historic invulnerability has been replaced by a new era of vulnerability; one in which new enemies strike our cities and our people in novel and surprising ways; one in which more and more adversaries possess weapons of increasing range and power-weapons that will allow them to bring war to the American homeland.

In the wake of these attacks, we face two important challenges: First, to win the war that is upon us-by liquidating the terrorist networks so they can no longer threaten our people.

And second, to prepare now for the *next* war-a war that may be vastly different not only from the wars of the past century, but also from the new war on terrorism we fight today.

The September 11<sup>th</sup> strikes caught us by surprise. In the decades ahead, we will almost certainly be surprised again. Too much of our ~~military~~ planning has, in recent years, been gripped by what one scholar of Pearl Harbor called "a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely."

But, as we have painfully learned in recent weeks, the likely dangers of this new century will be quite different from the familiar dangers of the past century. Until three weeks ago, an attack like the one we suffered September 11<sup>th</sup> seemed unimaginable to most Americans. In the decades ahead, we will face other threats that seem just as unimaginable to us today.

For this reason, adapting to surprise—adapting quickly and decisively—must be a condition of 21<sup>st</sup> Century military planning. To deal with surprise, we must shift our defense planning from the "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" model for the future. Instead of focusing on **who** our next adversary might be or **where** a war might occur, we must focus on **how** an adversary might fight—and develop new capabilities to deter and defeat them. Rather than planning chiefly for large conventional wars in distant theaters, we must plan for a world of new and different adversaries, who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric weapons (such as civilian airliners turned into missiles) to achieve their objectives.

DRAFT (1,053 Words)

Preparing for this world was the objective of the Quadrennial Defense Review-, which was submitted to Congress September 30th. The ~~QDR~~<sup>Review</sup> outlines a new defense strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century centered around four key goals: Assuring U.S. friends and allies of America's steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its security commitments; dissuading potential adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression; and decisively defeating any adversary if dissuasion and deterrence fail.

To meet these goals, we must both maintain America's existing military advantages in key areas, and develop new ways to deny our enemies the advantages **they** seek through asymmetric capabilities.

This ~~requires~~ the transformation of our Armed Forces-a transformation that will enable us to protect the U.S. homeland, while projecting U.S. forces in distant corners of the world-often in hostile environments, where our adversaries have deployed new weapons designed to ~~keep us out of their regions.~~<sup>enable them to do what they wish against their neighbors.</sup>

We must have the ability to protect U.S. information systems, and ensure persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement of adversary forces and capabilities. We must enhance the capability and survivability of U.S. space systems, and develop new ways to harness information technology and find new ways to provide for more

DRAFT (1,053 Words)

effective joint operations. And, over time, we <sup>we will</sup> ~~must~~ divest ourselves of legacy forces-and ~~reinvest~~ those resources in new concepts of warfighting, new capabilities, and new ways of organizing our forces that maximize our effectiveness and the combat potential of America's men and women in uniform.

The ~~Quadrennial~~ Defense Review was largely completed before the September 11 attacks. But in important ways, these attacks confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted from this review-particularly its emphasis on homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing for asymmetric threats, on the need to develop new concepts of deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to balance the different dimensions of risk to include the risks to people, modernization and transformation.

However, the September 11 attacks did change one thing: <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ sense of urgency. Transformation cannot wait ~~until tomorrow~~. New threats have arrived, quite literally, at our doorstep-and other more dangerous threats are rapidly emerging. We must act now to prepare for the next war-even as we wage the current war against terrorism.

Another thing has changed: our perspective on what this country can afford for its defense. In 1950, General Omar Bradley urged President Truman to spend at least \$18 billion on defense. The Joint Chiefs gave an even higher estimate at \$23 billion, and the Services' estimate was still higher still- \$30 billion. But the President and Congress <sup>back in 1950</sup> ~~decided~~ we couldn't afford that much- \$15 billion was as

A

DRAFT (1,053 Words)

much as we could afford, Six months later, ~~we were~~ suddenly ~~in a~~ war in Korea, and we ~~could~~ afford \$48 billion just fine.

Today, we are at war once again. The unspeakable loss of life—and damage to our economy—from the attack of September 11, 2001 should give us a new perspective on what we can afford for the forces that underpin our freedom and our prosperity for the decades ahead—costs that do not begin to compare with the cost in human lives and resources if we fail to ~~do~~ prepare for the future.

Yes, we must win the war on terrorism. But as we do so, we must also prepare now for the **next** war. We owe to our children and grandchildren --to do so.

##

snowflake

*Approved 10/26/01*

October 25, 2001 12:03 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: *Powell Moore*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Testing and the ABM Treaty

373.24

Please draft a letter from me to the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, indicating what we have decided to not do (the unclassified version) in order to avoid breaking the ABM treaty. Wednesday morning Carl Levin asked me to send a letter.

Please get a draft to me, preferably by 3:00 p.m. on Friday.

Thanks.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Sec Def -

.....

5.m. Friday, October 26, 2001

*FYI, Powell  
used your press  
talking points to  
make some "heads up"  
phone calls to the  
Big 8 and a few others  
before you went on TV  
today. Sorry*

25OCT01

U12948 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4615

snoflake

1072  
11-L

October 26, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
cc: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press

000.7

The press is going to continue to be inaccurate. We want to clean it up, but we don't want it to look like I am trying to clean it up, so I don't go down there. It seems it would be better to have me do press briefings three days a week rather than two, so I would always be able to set anything right within one day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102601-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

260201

U12951 /02

snowflake

Agree  
10/27/01

October 26, 2001 4:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Scoreboard

We need a scoreboard. We have been racking up some gains around the world—  
people in Bosnia have been picked up, the French have picked up some people,  
etc. We need to have some kind of tabulation that shows what we have done to  
move this thing along, to show progress.

Thanks,

DHR:dh  
102601-23

.....  
Please respond by 10/30

092

26 Oct 01

U12952 /02

Agree Only  
29/24

October 29, 2001 7:57 AM

R U S S I A

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld M  
SUBJECT: Ivanov and Intel

If Ivanov comes over, I want to do an intel exchange with him. That means you or Haver have to get with the DoD intel people and see what we have on the subject of interest to him, namely terrorism and the financing of terrorists via the Gulf.

Please see me if you have a question. Otherwise, let's pull some material together and see what we can get down to a level of classification that it would be okay to give the Russians.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102901-2

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

29 OCT 01

U12955 /02



snowflake

Arrow 11/5  
1708

October 29, 2001 1:53 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Response

Attached are some thoughts you might want to think about sending (after heavy editing) to Michael Getler at *The Washington Post*.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Draft reply  
1 0/28/01 *Washington Post*, Michael Getler, "The Formidable Mr. Rumsfeld"

DHR:dh  
102901-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.7 SD

for next 01

U12958 /02

Dear Mr. Getler,

This note is in connection to your piece in *The Washington Post* on October 28.

I don't know where you got the impression that the story that "provoked my comments on October 19 was The Post article written by Pentagon reporters Tom Ricks and Vern Loeb." That is not correct. I was not aware of the article by Ricks and Loeb.

What I was aware of was that there had been leaks by people in government to people outside of government about the fact that there was to be a classified special operations activity. I was told that it had been reported on television the preceding evening. So the premise of your article was not correct.

Second, you indicated that, "No appeal was made by the government to withhold information. What should one make of that? It doesn't say the article was discussed beforehand with the government. On the other hand, it is possible that top Pentagon officials knew of The Post story and gave an off-the-record nod." Then you drew some inaccurate conclusions as to why one might do that.

The reason the Pentagon did not try to "stop the story," if it did not, would likely have been that the story had already been on television the night before. You seem to be trying to psychoanalyze why the Pentagon is doing what it is doing. The problem with it is you are beginning with inaccurate assumptions.

Later your article says the video would have been more credible if the film were shot by a television journalist. While you may be correct, I assume you are not suggesting that a TV network journalist should have parachuted in with the commando raid and then required that the special operations forces protect him or her while they were filming the activity.

Later you point out there was no film of the helicopter that crashed, killing two soldiers. True. There was no cameraman around when the helicopter crashed in a heavy cloud of dust, nor would video of that accident been possible, given the dust.

Finally, your article praises Arthur Sylvester. If I am not mistaken, Arthur Sylvester is the one who said it was okay for government to lie.

For an ombudsman, you have a long way to go.

*Michael Getler*

# The Formidable Mr. Rumsfeld

It's been another week of bad news. Stories about the use of anthrax as a weapon of domestic terror have pushed the fighting in Afghanistan farther down the front page.

Little information is available about the war, and the Pentagon's restrictive information policies seem aimed at keeping it that way. On the other hand, the war effort has an authoritative spokesman in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who may not reveal much but who projects the sense of being in charge, and of knowing what is going on and who is adept at explaining this complex baffle.

In the war against anthrax terrorism, the opposite seems to prevail: lots of information but much of it confusing and contradictory; lots of voices but many of them confusing. No sense of informed leadership is producing trust within the public. Former governor Tom Ridge is brand new as director of the Office of Homeland Security, but this may not be a job for a politician.

Rumsfeld, however, is in his second tour as the military's civilian boss. He appears as a formidable and determined pursuer of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. But he also presents a formidable challenge to the press's effort to cover American forces and actions.

On Monday Rumsfeld once again opened a press conference with a stern warning that officials who leak information are violating federal law and putting soldiers' lives at risk. The secretary said he understood the role

of a free press, but this warning was meant to tighten still further his office's control over how this war is reported and further inhibit relations between Washington reporters and their sources.

The story that provoked Rumsfeld's comment was an Oct. 19 Post article by Pentagon reporters Tom Ricks and Vernon Loeb. It reported the start of the ground phase of the

## Ombudsman

war, with small numbers of U.S. Special Forces operating in southern Afghanistan. The story was carefully written, did not disclose targets or locations and built upon public comments by officials that suggested such actions were near.

More is going on here, however. In The Post's account of Rumsfeld's blast over the leaks, the paper repeated its policy of not publishing material it believes would jeopardize lives or security and said it reviews potentially sensitive material with administration officials. "In the case of Friday's article," the paper reported "no appeal was made by the government to withhold information." What should one make of that? It doesn't say the article was discussed beforehand with the government. On the other hand, it is possible that top Pentagon officials knew of The Post story and gave an off-the-record nod. That wouldn't seem too surprising because the next

day, the Pentagon was ready to show off its prowess with night-vision television footage of what it said were airborne commandos parachuting into Afghanistan.

It would have been more credible if that film were shot by a TV network journalist. It would have had less of a propaganda feel to it and might have provided more information without violating security. During the raid, a helicopter standing by in Pakistan for rescue duty crashed, killing two soldiers. There was no film of that. On Oct. 17 a Pentagon military spokesman described the Taliban's combat power as "eviscerated." On Oct. 25 the tone changed. "They are proven to be tough warriors," the spokesman said. In between, not much appears to have changed on the battlefield. Aside from what foreign correspondents in northern Afghanistan and neighboring countries provide, little independent reporting is happening.

As of this writing, there is no indication of reporters on the USS Kitty Hawk from where troop-carrying helicopters are launched, or with elements of Army divisions, or at bases from where Special Forces or Rangers operate.

Nor is there an advocate for the press and its mission inside the Pentagon in the form of a veteran journalist within the inner circle as an assistant secretary of defense. A long history of such people exists—former reporters Arthur Sylvester, Phil Goulding, Tom Ross and Ken Bacon, to name just a few.

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## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

### Terror's Effect on Charity

see an increase in the  
some be 2002

We, as individuals, can't or  
the world's problems. b

snowflake

October 30, 2001 3:08 PM

N 12/7/01  
0647

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accuracy of Weaponry

*(copy file  
see work)*

We need an effort in DARPA to get more precise weapons, so they are 95% rather than 85% accurate. There is too much collateral damage.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103001-55

*470*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*30 Oct 01*

U12961 /02

November 7, 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
DEC 03 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge *PAL*

Subject: Accuracy of Weapons

This is in reply to your question concerning DARPA efforts to increase the accuracy of our weaponry and thus reduce the amount of collateral damage (Attached). Collateral damage and other unintended weapons effects flow from two principal causes: (1) inaccuracy in weapon guidance and control, and (2) errors in target location and identification. DARPA has programs in each of these areas that address technical shortfalls.

Weapon Guidance: Precision guided munitions estimate their position from satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) data and internal inertial navigation system (INS) instruments. Improvements to these weapon subsystems are critical for more precise weapon delivery. DARPA has several efforts directed towards minimizing this error contribution, primarily through developing low-cost, high-performance GPS/INS guidance and other sensor technologies.

- The DARPA GPS Guidance Package effort is investigating deeply coupled GPS INS technology for improved guidance performance and will deliver initial versions in 2002.
- The DARPA Airborne Pseudolite program has demonstrated a technical capability to deliver improved GPS performance (particularly improved vertical position accuracy) in local areas through the use of an airborne GPS pseudo-satellite transponder.
- Terminal guidance seekers exist (like on Hellfire) to provide essentially "zero" guidance errors, but DARPA's work in this area is oriented to make these sensors less expensive.

Target Location and Identification: Errors in target identification and location result in incorrect aim-point assignment to weapons and contribute directly to weapon miss distance. DARPA has been exploring system-of-system networked targeting approaches for the engagement of particularly challenging mobile and "pop-up" targets. In addition, target location performance is limited by accuracy and resolution of the data products used in generating initial target coordinates; DARPA is also addressing this need.

- The DARPA Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) program offers the potential to engage surface moving targets from long standoff ranges with GPS accuracies. AMSTE seeks to network multiple airborne ground surveillance radars to develop a fused target solution that can be passed to a weapon in-flight to provide aim point updates. Recent AMSTE flight tests demonstrated less than 10 meter weapon delivery performance against moving targets. Further development in

FY 2002 will focus on long-term tracking of high-value targets using radar signatures to differentiate target vehicles from non-targets. An integrated AMSTE capability will be demonstrated in an operational exercise environment in FY 2003.

- The DARPA Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) program is investigating concepts to permit networked airborne receivers on platforms of opportunity to cooperatively geolocate short-dwell threat emitters. The AT3 program goal is to provide less than 50-meter target location error in less than 10 seconds from ranges in excess of 50 nautical miles. Multiple detections and other sensor support will further reduce target location error to support real-time targeting. AT3 will begin flight tests in FY 2002.
- DARPA is also developing a lightweight, low-cost, three-dimensional imaging laser sensor for deployment on small, unmanned aerial vehicles.
- The DARPA Symbiotic Communications program is addressing deficiencies in accuracy and resolution of the data products used in generating initial target coordinates by developing a capability to produce high-resolution Digital Terrain Elevation Data passively, day or night, in all weather and in real-time. In FY 2003, the Symbiotic Communications program will conduct an airborne demonstration of the ability to generate passive Digital Terrain Elevation Data.

Upon completion of these projects we should be able to achieve "single digit" meter accuracies for our precision weapon systems. More precision will permit the warheads to become smaller with less chance of collateral damage (e.g., the small diameter bomb).

For Information Only

snowflake

Afghanistan 11/5/06

October 30, 2001 9:00 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Specificity on Bombing

I think you have to start getting to the television networks here and around the world every day and tell them to stop saying we are "bombing Kabul," we are "bombing Qandahar" and we are "bombing Mazar-e Sharif."

We are not. We are bombing outside of those cities. We need to really pound that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103001-14

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

30 OCT 01

U12963 /02

FOUO

Approved  
DUB  
1315

October 30, 2001 11:26 AM

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: LD/HD

350.09

Here is a note from John Stenbit. Are you satisfied with it? If not, draft a memo from me to Dov Zakheim with a copy to Paul Wolfowitz, telling him what I should do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/24/01 ASC(C3I) memo to SecDef [U17846/01]

DHR:dh  
103001-27

.....  
Please respond by 11/2

U12964 /02

FOUO

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/4629

30 OCT 01

10/26  
1403

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

OCT 25 AM 9:57

October 24, 2001, 7:30 AM

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: John P. Stenbit *JPS*  
SUBJECT: LD/HD

OCT 30 2001

- You asked if we are doing all we should be doing with regard to LD/HD.
- Significant additional resources have been added in the 02 budget amendment and the supplemental for LD/HD. There are always pressures for more. However, LD/HD needs to be addressed in the broader context of integrated intelligence. For example, decisions regarding JSTARS aircraft or Moving Target Indicators on Global Hawk need to be considered in light of plans for space-based MTL. Trade-offs need to be considered between airborne and space-based imagery and SIGINT as well.
- Under Steve Cambone's guidance, and with members of the Kerr panel, AT&L, the J-8, PA&E and Rich Haver, we are looking at this broader context, including:
  - information we're not able to collect on the rest of the world given the demands of ENDURING FREEDOM,
  - improvements that we have planned as well as radical opportunities yet to be exploited,
  - a description of the information that decision-makers could have available if various options were chosen, and
  - rough estimates of additional resources that would be required, recognizing that money is not unlimited, and that trade-offs need to be made and overlaps eliminated between intelligence upgrades and areas such as Department-wide transformation, missile defense, C3, the NPR, etc.
- We are shooting to have a first cut of this to you in the next few days. Once this is in hand, we'll be better positioned to answer your question about what more we should be doing for LD/HD.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L)  
USD(P)

Prepared by: Lin Wells, (b)(6)

|                       |       |
|-----------------------|-------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 10/26 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI    | 10/27 |
| MA BUCCI              |       |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE      | 10/26 |

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
11-L-0559/OSD/4630

U17846 /01

snowflake

SMA Copy  
-Tracker updated

11/10  
1422

October 30, 2001 12:27 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P*  
SUBJECT: Quick Response

Have you developed a quick response cell?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103001-38

.....  
Please respond by 10/31

091.112

3021701

U12966 /02

November 1, 2001 11:10 A.M.

TO: SECDEF  
FROM:  TOMMIE CLARKE  
SUBJECT: Quick Response

You suggested setting up a quick response cell to monitor and then react to Taliban disinformation. We think we can quicken our responses by strengthening the existing cells rather than by adding a new one.

The OSD Executive Support Center under Pete Verga is working to improve the information flow from CentCom and the Joint Staff into OSD. We have asked for a plan from them by COB Friday.

The Information Operations Task Force -- organized by the Joint Staff with SOLIC oversight -- considers responding to Taliban disinformation to be a key mission. We are working closely with them and will continue to do so.

And finally, Admiral Quigley has been traveling this week with General Franks and the two of them have been discussing ways to strengthen the information flow. Buy-in from CentCom is crucial.

Bottom line: We don't need more cells. We need to make the existing cells work, and work together. We are pushing this hard at all levels, and your involvement helps.

mct  
103001-38

11-L-0559/OSD/4633

snowflake

Prep  
11/13

October 30, 2001 2:21 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Sunday Stakeouts

The next time we are going to do the Sunday shows, let's plan about 20+ minutes for the stakeout-it is a full range of people; it is terrific. They don't do it at CNN, only at the networks.

We ought to allow enough time to do a good job with them. Since I will have already prepped myself for the show, there is no reason to go out there and then cut it short.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh  
10/30/01-46



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

000, 775D

32 OCT 01

U12968 /02

snovflake

TO: Secretary Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 31, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Naval Officers**

*T*  
~~*11/15*~~  
*12/5*  
*Done 2/16/03*

Is it true that one out of every five naval officers is an M.D., physician's assistant, or other type of health professional?

If so, is that such a core competence of the Navy that it makes sense to have that percentage of the naval officers in that one discipline?

*Secretary*

Thank you.

*11/15*

*SecDef*

DHR/azn  
102701.17

9:35 AM


*It is true. We validated the number when we did the Sept 10 War on Bureaucracy speech. It's a long-standing issue in the navy. No response yet from SecNav, but I assume he's aware of it.*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*A. Leta*

U12969 /02


# Percent of Medical Department Officers\* to Total Officers by Service



*\* Medical Department Officers include Doctors, Dentists, Nurses, Medical Service, Warrant Officers*

Source: HMPDS and Defense Link

# Percent of Medical Department Officers to Total Officers for Navy / Marine Corps



**\*\* Navy/USMC included together since Navy provides all medical support to the Marine Corps**

Source: HMPDS and Defense Link

snowflake

*R. Aron*  
*11/7*  
*07/22*

October 31, 2001 8:59 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Russia and WMD

*Complete*  
*3 Nov*  
*Atq of Interest*  
*+ Putin in*

*RUSSIA*

For the trip to Russia, I will need some specifics as to how we could elevate for the two presidents the subject of keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. I can then start the work with Ivanov.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103101-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*[Signature]*

*31 OCT 01*

U12971 /02

snwflake

INFO Dill  
0722

October 31, 2001 10:32 AM

TO: Attorney General John Ashcroft  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Justice

Joyce and I were in Florida one time walking along the beach. There is a plaque.  
The quotation on the plaque reads:

“On June 13, 1942, eight trained saboteurs paddled ashore on rafts from Nazi submarines in Florida and Long Island. Carrying fake IDs, explosives and \$175,000 in cash, Hitler’s agents had come on a mission: Blend into American society and blow up U.S. factories. On Long Island, four were spotted. Two defected and betrayed their comrades. FDR ordered all eight to be tried by military tribunal. On August 8, 1942, six were executed in a D.C. jail, buried in unmarked graves.”

We were standing at the spot where the saboteurs first arrived ashore in Florida. It is interesting that from the day they landed in Florida to the day they were executed, it was plus or minus 57 days.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
103101-15

000.5

31 Oct 01

U12972 /02

snowflake

*Infer 1/1/02*

October 31, 2001 10:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Speechwriters  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ivanov Focus

*no update*

*RUSSIA*

I think one focus of my meeting with Ivanov should be to try to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorist networks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103101-18

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten mark]*

*31OCT01*

U12973 /02

October 31, 2001 8:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Predator

452R

Item 19 of today's *Early Bird* says the Predator was given poor reviews recently by the Pentagon director of operational testing.

Please find out who said what, and the date—I would like to know what their problem is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103101-4

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/14 (11/16)

SecDef -

A descriptive memo from Tom Christen, of Op. Test & Evaluation, is attached. I have the full study. In a nutshell, the standard of evaluation specified in 11-L-0559/OSD 4641 was probably higher than we have implied in Predator's use. Di Rita

318CT01

U12974 /02

11-L-0559/OSD 4641



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1700 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700

INFO MEMO

October 3, 2001, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas P. Christie, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation <sup>TPC</sup>

SUBJECT: Predator Medium Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operational Test and Evaluation Report

- The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has completed its assessment of the subject system's performance in its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). In the attached report, I conclude that:
  - The IOT&E was adequate for the conclusions reached in this assessment.
  - **The Predator UAV is not operationally effective.** This conclusion is based on poor performance in target location accuracy, ineffective communications, and limits imposed by relatively benign weather. The system's performance renders Predator not operationally effective in meeting the mission requirements specified in the 1997 Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
  - **The Predator UAV is not operationally suitable.** This conclusion is based on the system's inability to provide continuous coverage at operating ranges up to 400 NM as required by the ORD, poor reliability, and lack of Joint Interoperability Test Command certification of four of the system's seven critical interfaces.
- Title 10, U.S.C. Section 2399, provides for the submission of this report to the congressional defense committees accompanied by such comments as you wish to make. Copies have been sent to the USD(AT&L) and the Secretary of the Air Force. They may prepare separately a comment letter for your signature to be forwarded to the congressional defense committees.

RECOMMENDATION: No action is required unless USD(AT&L) or the Secretary of the Air Force prepares comments for your signature.

Attachment:  
As stated,

Prepared By: Col Curtis L. Cook, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/USD/4642

Inside The Air Force  
November 2, 2001  
Pg. 1

## **Air Force Officials Downplay DOD Testers' Criticism Of Predator**

Senior Air Force officials are lining up to support the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle weapon system after the Pentagon's chief tester issued a report calling the system ineffective and unsuitable for military operations.

The Air Force's two-star general in charge of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs said in a memo the system was highly effective during his tour as intelligence director for U.S. European Command.

**Maj. Gen. Glen Shaffer**, director of ISR programs for the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, recently sent the memo to the one-star officer responsible for acquisition of the ISR programs for the Air Force.

"As EUCOM J-2, I used Predator daily for ISR, combat ops, force protection, and IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield]," **Shaffer** said in a handwritten note on the memo for Brig. **Gen. Henry Obering**. "Predator has seen combat in Kosovo and Iraq.

"It is demanded, no, argued for between [commanders-in-chief. This is an incredibly effective platform," he added.

Service sources said Air Force Secretary **James Roche** is expected to sign a letter to senior defense and congressional officials downplaying the report's findings and encouraging continued procurement of the system, and **Shaffer's** memo is one document that could be included with **Roche's** letter.

The Predator UAV employs **electro-optical**, infrared and synthetic aperture radar from about 15,000 feet above sea level. The system has been widely used since the early 1990s during missions in the Balkans and southwest Asia, and senior Air Force officials say the system is in high demand among regional commanders. Each vehicle costs less than \$2 million without sensors. Officials demonstrated the vehicle's ability to carry and launch Hellfire missiles during tests early this year. Some reports claim the **weaponized** Predator is being used against terrorists in Afghanistan, but Pentagon officials declined to confirm the reports.

During an Oct. 16 breakfast, Air Force Chief of Staff **Gen. John Jumper**, who is widely credited with initiating the efforts to arm Predator with Hellfire missiles, said the system is a "workhorse" UAV.

Despite its widespread use, the system has not yet met the requirements for initial operational capability.

Tom Christie, the Pentagon's director for operational test and evaluation, recently issued a report highlighting a number of what he calls shortcomings in the Predator system. DOT&E is an Office of the Secretary of Defense directorate tasked to provide objective recommendations on the development of Pentagon programs.

The report criticizes Predator for "poor target location accuracy" and "ineffective **communications**." It

also says unfavorable weather can seriously complicate Predator operations.

**InsideDefense.com** first reported on the DOT&E evaluation this week.

Although the report does not suggest grounding Predator or hampering its contributions to military operations, Christie said the service should fix problems with the system in order to meet the requirements laid out in the Predator operational requirements document.

Pentagon officials said Oct. 31 the report, although an important part of the development process, should not be taken as a criticism of the system's capabilities. The tests manifesting the report involved air vehicles developed for the initial Predator advanced concept technology demonstration, Air Force sources said, and production Predators include **workarounds** that address several of the problems identified in Christie's report.

"We built the airplane before an **ORD** [got] started drafting. So what you had was some estimates on what potential was out there, when they wrote the requirements document," one Pentagon official said. "When the operational test was conducted, it was using the **ACTD** aircraft and it was conducted over a year ago, against that requirements document. And the operational test community has to use the requirements document as your benchmark to grade you against.

"There are still things that we'd like to work on, but a lot of those problems cited in that report have since been mitigated in Predator," the official added.

Another service source said formally upgrading the vehicle around the current **workarounds** would be inefficient at best. If the system isn't broken, don't fix it, the source said.

Air Force sources also said the service briefed **OSD** on the issue months ago, so the report was no surprise.

**Shaffer** acknowledged Predator's limitations, but said the system is effective for military operations.

"While **OSD** does not consider Predator to be operationally suitable or effective, I must point out that Predator has provided critical support to theater **CINCs** for many years," the general said. "Because Predator was rapidly transitioned **from** [advanced concept technology demonstration] to the warfighter, it does have some difficulties and limitations with respect to reliability and maintainability. However, Predator's utility at providing combat commanders with a flexible 'birds-eye view' of the area of responsibility for **24-hour** coverage capability remains in high demand today and must be maintained for the foreseeable future."

Air Force sources said the report is likely not to have an effect on the Pentagon's plans to buy the system; further, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is said to be a staunch supporter of Predator.

The administration earmarked about \$10 million in emergency supplemental funding for two Predator **B** air vehicles. Congress passed the \$40 billion supplemental shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Officials continue to dole out the money.

Predator **B**, which is manufactured by General **Atomics** Aeronautical Systems Inc., can fly faster and has achieved flight at altitudes of 48,000 feet above sea level. Powered by either a turbo prop or jet engine, the newer model has six hardened wing points -- triple the number on Predator -- to carry missiles. Additionally, Predator **B**'s payload is larger.

Those vehicles will partially fill a shortfall that emerged when the service lost more than the expected seven per year due to shoot-downs or mishaps. General Atomics has also been marketing the Predator B to the service because its enhancements are expected to improve survivability.

Service officials are expected to buy three Predator B UAVs, according to an Air Force source.

Congress has also supported the UAV program. House appropriators doubled the president's \$19.6 million procurement request for Predator. Legislators said the \$39.6 million they recommended for Predator procurement should be spent only earmarked on Predator B aircraft -- one turbo prop and one jet model.

House appropriators have marked up the FY-02 defense budget request but have not filed their report. Senate appropriators have not yet taken up the defense bill.

*-Amy Butler*

2001 JUL 30 AM 8: 47

**INFO MEMO**

July 26, 2001 4:56 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 07/27/01*

SUBJECT: Budget Comparison

- You requested information on budget comparisons between 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 by appropriation category (TAB A).
- The attached charts show budget trends by appropriation category (TAB B).
  - First chart shows the changes in spending levels by decade.
  - Second chart shows how different defense postures have affected budget levels.
- Between 1980 and 1990, spending in every major appropriation category increased.
  - Spending on RDT&E and procurement increased by the largest percentages (72 percent and 42 percent respectively).
  - Operations & Maintenance (O&M) increased by 35 percent.
- Between 1990 and 2000, force reductions were reflected largely in the Procurement and Military Personnel accounts (-38 percent and -32 percent respectively).
- Between 1990 and 2000, despite the decreases in force structure, spending on O&M did not decrease proportionately (- 10 percent).
- Given relatively stable force levels since the early 1990s, historical trends suggest that Procurement and R&D may be underfunded, and that the O&M account must grow in real terms.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, (b)(6)

7-17  
082

July 13, 2001 10:41 AM

~~snowflake~~

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Budget Comparison

Could we learn anything interesting by looking at percentage increases between, say 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 in these different categories in this paper? Would it show areas that we are neglecting?

Thanks.

Attach.


6/8/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Budget Comparison[U10605/01]

DHR:dh  
071301-14

*To Barry Watts  
Practitioner*

11-L-0559/OSD/4647


FY 01 Consist



7/20/01

11-L-0559/OSD/4648

FY 01 Constant



7/20/01

11-L-0559/OSD/4649

snowflake

7-17  
082

July 13, 2001 10:41 AM

10.0

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget Comparison

Could we learn anything interesting by looking at percentage increases between, say 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 in these different categories in this paper? Would it show areas that we are neglecting?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/8/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Budget Comparison [U10605/01]

DHR:dh  
071301-14

*To Barry Watts  
Practitioner*

135410

11-L-0559/OSD/4650

U13046 /01

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *m*  
DATE: September 6, 2001  
SUBJECT:

By Saturday night, if possible, I'd like a piece of paper that lists some of the ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction events that have occurred in the last five to ten years.

Just a bullet point listing of the No Dong North Korea launch, the Indian nuclear explosion, the Pakistan nuclear explosion, etc. is sufficient. I want to suggest that there could well be an event in the period ahead.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090601.37

*471.94*

*6 Sep 01*

U13071 /02

## Fact Sheet on Ballistic Missiles & NBC Weapons

- New relationships/new patterns associated with Post Cold War proliferation.
  - Global proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and technology.
- Foreign assistance continues to have major effect.
- “Second Tier Proliferation” – Previous recipients of assistance now sharing these missile and NBC technologies with others.
- **States with Ballistic Missiles and NBC Capabilities**

| Capability               | 1972    | 2001 |
|--------------------------|---------|------|
| Ballistic Missiles       | 9       | 28   |
| Nuclear Weapons Programs | 5       | 12   |
| Chemical Weapons (CW)    | 10      | 16*  |
| Biological Weapons (BW)  | unknown | 13   |

\* 10 additional states less 4 original states

- Number of ballistic missiles, of all ranges, possessed by all countries (excluding US, UK, FR, and Russia): **Approximately 4,000**
- **States Currently Possessing or Seeking Ballistic Missiles with Ranges in Excess of 1,000 KM** (excluding US, UK, FR, and Russia):
  - China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt
- US Intelligence Community projects that during the next 15 years the United States will most likely face ICBMs threats from North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly from Iraq.
- **Ballistic Missile Use in Conflicts Since 1979**

| Conflict  | Dates            |
|---|------------------|
| Afghanistan                                     | 1979-1989        |
| Iran-Iraq                                       | 1980-1988        |
| Libyan Attack on Lampedusa                      | 1986             |
| Persian Gulf War                                | 1991             |
| Iranian Attacks Against Dissident Camps in Iraq | 1994, 1999, 2001 |
| Yemen Civil War                                 | 1994             |
| Chechnya  | 1999-2000        |

### Significant Worldwide Missile and NBC Developments, 1995-2001

| DATE        | EVENT  |
|-------------|--|
| 1995        | China fires CSS-6 SRBMs into waters near Taiwan.   |
| March 1995  | Aum Shinrikyo releases sarin in the Tokyo subway in a terrorist attack.  |
| 1996        | China completes a series of nuclear tests and then signs the CTBT.<br>China fires CSS-6 SRBMs into waters near Taiwan. |
| April 1998  | Pakistan conducts a successful flight test of the Ghauri (a No Dong copy)  |
| May 1998    | India conducts nuclear tests, claiming five devices including a thermonuclear device of 43 kilotons yield.             |
| May 1998    | Pakistan conducts nuclear tests, claiming six devices including a boosted fission device.                              |
| July 1998   | Iran flight-tests the Shahab-3 (a No Dong variant).  |
| August 1998 | North Korea launches the three stage Taepo Dong I as a "space launch vehicle" to ICBM range.                           |
| April 1999  | India successfully tested the Agni II MRBM.<br>Pakistan successfully tests the Ghauri MRBM and Shaheen I SRBM.         |
| Aug 1999    | India releases proposed nuclear doctrine prepared by advisory committee.<br>China conducts a test flight of the DF-31. |
| 2000        | China conducts a test flight of the DF-31.   |
| Jan 2000    | UK customs authorities seize missile components from Taiwan bound for Libya.   |
| April 2000  | India conducts a failed test of the Dhanush (Prithvi variant from a ship).   |
| July 2000   | Iran flight tests the Shahab-3.  |
| Sept 2000   | Iran flight-tests the Shahab-3.  |
| 2001        | China conducts a test flight of the DF-31.   |
| Jan 2001    | India conducts flight-test of the Agni II MRBM.  |

Sources:

1997, 2001 Proliferation Threat and Response

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, September 1999

Worldwide NBC Weapons and Missile Threat, Annual Report to Congress, June 2001

snowflake

Act of 9/20  
0925

September 13, 2001 5:30 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Missile

471.94

We need a strategic ICBM missile that is conventionally armed, probably more than one. What do we do about it?

DHR:dh  
091301-16

13 Sep 01

U13075 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4654

snoflake

Actual: D970  
0812

September 14, 2001 9:05 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Foreign Reaction to Events September 11, 200 1

000,5

When I meet with foreign leaders from now on, I would like to have some sense of what they or their governments said about the bombing-whether they were supportive and offered assistance or not, so I can thank them, if appropriate.

If they were harmful, I will remember that, too.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
091401.1

14 Sep 01

U13077 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4655

snowflake

Arvid Qabo  
0911

September 14, 2001 9:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA Recruitment on College Campuses

*OYOCIA*

Please put somebody on the task of finding out how many colleges threw the CIA off campus and do not let them recruit.

I would also like to know how many colleges allow them to physically recruit on campus with other potential employers during so-called "job fairs."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
#91401-2

*14 Sep 0*

U13073 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4656

snowflake

INFO 

September 16, 2001 10:49 AM

322

SUBJECT: Military Leadership

1. I talked to General Keane about wanting him to stay a bit where he is.
2. I am talking to General Shelton about possibly revising some of the CINCDoms, and there might be some earlier opportunities. But, in the back of my mind, I have it that he goes to Joint Forces Command when Buck Kernan completes his two years.

DHR:dh  
091601-2

16 Sep 01

U13081 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4657

snowflake

April 20/01  
04/10

September 16, 2001 1:08 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Record

*Action complete.  
Log general 9/19/01.  
Record being kept.  
Will also draft  
"Memo for the record."  
384*

We need to get a written record.

Today I approved, via General Shelton, the use of fighter protection for Air Force One for its transit to and from Washington and New York.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091601-6

*16 Sep 01*

U13083 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4658

snowflake

*Agency W 9/20/01*

September 16, 2001 5:05 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Hugh Shelton  
Gen. Richard Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*


SUBJECT: PC Meetings

*Complete.  
Begin 9/A.*

*334 NSC*

On repeated occasions over the last eight months, we have ended up going over to the National Security Council, not having coordinated between me and the Chairman or the Vice before we arrived, or with the CINC. The effect of that, obviously, is that we end up with multiple positions or not knowing each others' positions or views.

It is not good for the Department, and it is not acceptable. We have to get hold of the calendars and find ways to make sure we coordinate before we go over there. If we can't we may want to change what we are going to discuss and tell them we need more time, rather than going over there disjointed and uncoordinated.



Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091601-12

*16 Sep 01*

U13084 /02

snowflake

**CLOSE HOLD**

*W Action  
9/19/2016*

September 17, 2001 2:47 PM

*Gave copy to MA to give to RRS.*

*Complete 9/21  
1200*

*Germany*

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: German MoD

You should give a copy of this Scharping memo to Hugh Shelton.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/16/01 DepSecDef memo of ~~phonecon~~ w/German MoD

DHR:dh  
091701-28

*[Handwritten scribble]*

*17 Sep 01*

**CLOSE HOLD**

U13087 /02

FILE-0539/OSD/4661

**CLOSE HOLD**

16 September 2001

503  
9/17

9  
9/17

MEMO FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WOLFOWITZ

SUBJECT: Phonecon with German MOD Scharping 1245-1300EDT 16 Sept 01

Don,

Details of my conversation with Scharping next under

*Paul W.*

**CLOSE HOLD**

11-L-0559/OSD/4662

# CLOSE HOLD

16 September 2001

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

FROM MA DSD

SUBJECT: DSD phonecon with German MOD Scharping 1245-1300EDT 16 Sept 01

MAJOR POINTS:

1. The DATT called prior to this phone call stating that the Germans were going to offer 10,000 troops (Special Forces, Light infantry, artillery and logistics) plus a Tornado air wing, naval minesweepers and a 20 man planning cell in CENTCOM. The DATT said that the Germans were very **nervous** about this information getting out before they had a chance to build their internal coalition inside parliament.
2. When the DSD called, Mr Scharping did not offer those forces. RE deploying German military forces outside of Europe, Scharping responded that the German government was “constrained – **politically constrained**” but that they had been in discussions daily RE same – and **were ready to deploy forces outside of Europe – “even if that meant the end of the coalition”** (presumably the Greens might pull out of the coalition). Scharping “has talked with Party Leaders and that **they will get Parliamentary support.**” **They just need time to build their coalition.**
3. Mr Scharping thought that the tragedy could usher in “**worldwide cooperation.**”

DETAILED NOTES OF CONVERSATION

1. Mr Scharping called at 1245 and offered condolences and informed DSD that his daughter was working in NYC and had been 200 yards from the WTC at the time of the strike and that he couldn't get ahold of her for over 2 hours. Scharping said, “we will support you 100% in dealing with the tragedy and the consequences.”
2. “The German FM will visit Washington on (or about) Tuesday to discuss the steps we will have to take together. Germany is looking into all our capabilities. We are unsure of the scenarios – but want to be prepared.” *Scharping may be thinking of coming to Washington himself.*
3. Mr Scharping articulated several times the need for daily contact between the US and German defense departments.

CLOSEHOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/4663

## CLOSE H...

4. The DSD asked what opinion was in Germany of a strategy to respond to the strike / combat terrorism. Mr Scharping stated that the Germans believed that it would require a wide spectrum of responses (finance, intelligence, military was only one part of the response).
5. The DSD mentioned that this was the first time that NATO had invoked Article 5. Scharping acknowledged same and agreed that it was "very significant."
6. The DSD asked if the possible German commitment included deploying military forces outside of Europe. Scharping responded that the German government was "constrained – politically constrained" but that they had been in discussions daily re same – and were ready to do so – even if that meant the end of the coalition (the Greens may pull out of the coalition). Scharping "has talked with Party Leaders and that they will get Parliamentary support." Scharping said that his personal attitude and that of the Chancellor and Foreign Minister was **that "they know exactly what our responsibility is and they know what to do."**
7. Scharping stated that the "tragedy enabled an opportunity for world-wide cooperation."
8. The DSD ended the conversation stating that if Mr Scharping came to Washington next week that he would look forward to meeting with him.

The DSD MA talked to our DATT in Berlin after the conversation. The German military is not allowed to guard the interior of US military bases in Germany, but if we feel we need more security all we have to do is ask and that the Germans will make it happen.

Semper Fi

LtCol Davis

## CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/4664

snowflake

*INFO* *Stiegel*  
*1/1/01*

September 17, 2001 5:28 PM

*(Logged in decisia matrix 3*

*384*

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Air Escort

Andy Card is the guy who decides if he wants air escort for Mrs. Bush. He said he did not believe it was necessary.

I agreed, and it won't happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
09/17/01-12

*17 Sep 01*

U13088 /02

snowflake

T 11/15

September 20, 2001 2:05 PM

Approved 9/26/01

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Airport Security

USO (AT&T)

Larry Di Rita  
9/27

360.33

You ought to get DARPA to lead a project for a high-tech, high capital airport security system. The odds of FAA pulling it off are probably fairly low.

It is probably something that ought to be done. Please think about it and talk to Newt Gingrich about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092001-5

SecDef -

DARPA has

done a comprehensive study. Pete's Summary memo is attached. I will recommend he have DARPA brief DOT/FAA, unless otherwise directed, as his memo proposes. Di Rita

20 Sep 01

OK  
Don R

U13093 /02

NOV 9 11 40 07  
2001 NOV 9 11 40 07

November 7, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 


Subject: Airport/Aircraft Security

You may recall a memo you received from Newt Gingrich, "Creating an American System of Security for Airports, Airplanes and Seaports." I talked with Newt and on September 22, directed that DARPA undertake a study to look into means to enhance airport and airline security. The response was presented in a briefing to me and my staff on November 2, 2001.

The response provides an integrated examination of aviation security and suggests a number of technology solutions.

The fundamental aspects of the approach includes a series of layered security initiatives which a passenger or airport employee will encounter as he/she enters the airport facility which continue even when the passenger enters and is on-board the aircraft. The features include:

- A peripheral security system using video surveillance, "smart" identification cards, radio frequency tags and license plate readers to ensure people are in the right place at the right times, whether they be employees or passengers.
- A Secure Passenger Check-In Concept featuring an EZ-Pass procedure with smart card boarding passes for passengers who willingly provide biometric ID information and undergo various database and background checks in exchange for expedited security processing. If a passenger chooses not to opt for EZ Pass processing, he will be issued a disposable smart card boarding pass and go through the standard security process which features a series of security portals checking for weapons, chemical/biological agents and levels of human anxiety. A random selection of EZ-Pass passengers and airport employees would also be subjected to the standard security processing procedure.
- Automated baggage and carry-on inspection technologies such as 3-D tomography, high energy X-ray and pulsed fast neutron analysis
- A Common Area Security system featuring facial recognition technology and broad area chemical/biological detectors.
- A Suspicious Activity Monitoring module which is a collection of artificial intelligence technologies underlying the layered portal system and networked to law enforcement databases to mine and extract information about possible malicious intent
- An airport employee "randomized" work schedule scheme which provides work assignments shortly before employees begin work in order to counter an inside collaborator

|                       |   |
|-----------------------|---|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |   |
| SR MA GIAMPASTIANI    |   |
| MA RUCCI              |   |
| EXEC SEC WHITMORE     |  |

U18375 /01

- A final jetway check where the jetway is covered with electrotextile wallpaper containing embedded sensors as a security check before entering the aircraft.

On-board the aircraft, the security approach emphasizes consequence management and recovery should someone have successfully passed through the groundside system. The features include:

- A contingency flight control system that can be pilot or ground controller initiated to safely land an aircraft at the nearest location. It cannot be over-ridden by anyone on the aircraft once initiated.
- An airfiltering system to detect and counter chemical/biological release.
- Cockpit and panel hardening using lightweight and blast resistant materials. These materials can also be applied to air cargo containers.
- Downlink of video, flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder information. To conserve bandwidth, software agents that determined an emergency was occurring on-board would initiate transmission.
- Reduction of fuel flammability using new polymer additives.

We would like to initiate an "Aviation Security Technology Program", working with FAA, which would feature:

- Reagan National Airport as a working groundside test bed facility for many of these technologies;
- Use of a military facility to conduct more dramatic and active tests to try to "beat the system;" (We would not be able to do this in a commercial airport)
- Adaptation of a government commercial aircraft equivalent as an airborne test bed.



We will be working the plan with DARPA and the FAA and will brief you on the results as soon as they are available.

Attached is a copy of the briefing from DARPA, if you would like to scan it.

*Can provide.  
It's 53 pages.  
Doherty*

ACTION: Develop the Plan \_\_\_\_\_ Drop the Idea \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

snowflake

Rec'd 9/26/01

September 20, 2001 3:48 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legal Gaps in War on Terrorism

My friend Jack Marsh gave me this memo on legal gaps in the war on terrorism.

Please look at it and, if you think it merits it, send it over to the Attorney General and the White House Counsel, Al Gonzalez.

If it should be put over my signature, please draft the memo and I will sign it. If you think it would be more appropriate coming from the General Counsel, then will you please sign it.

I will send a thank you note to Jack Marsh, and if you need more detail, he and his associate are available.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/20/01 Marsh memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092001-13

000,5

26 Sep 01

U13097 /02



JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

ATTORNEY AT LAW

9/20

(b)(6)

TELECOPY PAGE

DATE: 20 Sep '01 TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Hon. Dan Rumsfeld

OFFICE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_ TELECOPY NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: John O. Marsh, Jr

PHONE NUMBER: (b)(6) FAX: (b)(6)

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE): \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE: Memo AS per your Request

SHOULD ANY PAGES BE MISSING, PLEASE CALL (b)(6)

September 20, 2001

Don:

The attached memo is in response to the discussion yesterday.

I have deliberately left my name off the memo.

Marty **Hoffman**, I am sure can be of great help to you on the issues raised.

Assistance in preparation of this memo came in **large** measure from (b)(6) Attorney, who is widely recognized **for** his legal and technical experience in the National Security field. There was also input **from** (b)(6) Attorney, formerly **Department** of Justice, Computer Crime Prosecutor.

*Don - please detach this  
page from the memo.  
Great seeing you.*



## MEMORANDUM

To: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Date: **September 20, 2001**

Re: **Legal** Gaps in War on Terrorism: Technology and Infrastructure

---

As we discussed yesterday, I include below a partial summary of gaps in legislative and regulatory programs that could impede our ability to conduct a war on terrorism. Many of these gaps center on the nation's ability to prepare for and recover **from** attacks on critical infrastructure. Presidential Decision Directives 62 (WMD, **Chemical**, Biological) and PDD-63 (**protection** of information infrastructure) were simultaneously approved in May 1998, but never fully funded or implemented by the Congress. As a result, several consistent problems exist:

1. There is a new global **information** infrastructure, the Internet, which is being exploited by terrorist groups **for** communication. It is estimated that 90% of **internet traffic** is in the private sector and only 10% in government. It is hard to monitor and **surveil**, while difficulties are compounded on the domestic scene **for** police and intelligence agencies, in part due to **laws** that have not kept pace with technology.
  2. Where critical **infrastructures** are owned and operated by industry, or at the state and local level, the Federal government may lack clear authority to direct appropriate actions and developments – including preparedness, response, and reconstitution. This may be especially true **for** the Department of **Defense**.
  3. The law has failed to keep pace with technology. Activation of certain national security emergency preparedness programs and authorities has already led to government and industry confusion – which we cannot afford at this time.
  4. **Finally**, many the “**cyber**” programs for national security emergencies have not been developed or overhauled for Homeland Defense and critical infrastructure needs.
- Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”) & Executive Order 12919

The DPA provides the Administration with an important tool to prioritize and allocate **preferential** delivery of goods and services needed **for** the national defense. Executive

Order 12919, passed by President Clinton in 1994, splits responsibility **for** implementation between **DoD, FEMA,** and the Department of Energy. Congress has never overhauled the DPA for particular Homeland **Defense** needs and contingencies. As a result, both Congress and the Administration disagree over whether the authority may be used for a complete range of critical **infrastructure** needs – many of which are outside of the Defense Department’s traditional areas of jurisdiction (e.g., network and critical **infrastructure** services, which are owned principally by industry and administered by **civilian** agencies). If we do not clarify and facilitate its application, the nation will lack an essential preparedness and recovery **tool** for this war on terrorism.

Senator Bennett has taken the lead on this issue.

- Communications Act of 1934

The Communications Act of 1934 is the principal delegation of authority to restore telecommunications **services after** an attack. However, neither Congress nor the FCC has clearly applied this law to Internet services and technologies. Fear of government regulation has prevented this application. As a result, the President lacks clear authority to coordinate recovery and restoration of the Internet.

- **Example:** The National Communications System (DISA) does not have clear-cut jurisdiction to manage restoration for portions of the Internet, including private networks and cable-delivered Internet services.
- **Gap:** **Many** of the President’s emergency programs for restoring critical services in the aftermath of an attack are based on the DPA or the Communications **Act** of 1934. Since neither has been **carefully** overhauled, the nation lacks clear-cut and tested processes for critical infrastructure response and restoration

- Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)

The nation’s **ability** to require industry cooperation for electronic **surveillance** is bounded in several authorities, including the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA). Pursuant to these laws, providers of telecommunications services are required to assist law enforcement in executing electronic surveillance orders. CALEA directs the telecom industry to design and deploy networks to support law **enforcement** assistance and capability requirements. Neither Congress nor the Administration has overhauled the law for Internet services delivery – which is a **significant** tool for terrorists.

- **Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”):** The ECPA restricts government and certain industry **behavior** in monitoring transmissions in storage and in transit. This is the principal privacy statute for information and network security. Congress has not overhauled this legislation **for** technological developments or **for** Homeland **Defense**

needs. In addition., the law is poorly written and restricts government administrators from monitoring **traffic** on its networks.

- Antitrust laws (Sherman and Clayton Acts)

Industry continues to worry that cyber-security cooperation may lead to prosecution under the nation's antitrust laws (Sherman and Clayton Acts): The Department of Justice has issued Administrative guidance, but Congress needs to provide clear protection. This will **afford** a **foundation** for industry to devise better security cooperation mechanisms and programs.

- Quarantine Laws – A province of the Governors of the States

State and local jurisdiction governs the nation's quarantine programs **absent** an interstate connection. New regulations are aimed at coordinating a Federal nexus. These regulations are newly issued and Congress might need to re-examine a more pronounced Federal role.

- Government Information Security & National Security Systems

Congress passed the Government Information Security Reform Act ("**GISRA**") last year, and split jurisdiction for managing **government** systems between **DoD** and OMB. **DoD** has jurisdiction **for** national security systems, which include classified information technology and five unclassified categories. These five unclassified categories have not been examined **carefully** for over ten years. Many of the government's **unclassified** systems, if breached, would have **significant** national security ramifications. The Administration and Congress should review this area carefully, and re-assess whether the Defense Department authority should be expanded over additional unclassified systems and networks.

- Indemnification **for** production of vaccines has been a show stopper.

The Defense Department Joint Vaccine Accelerated Program (JVAP) was held up for nearly a year (due to bureaucratic wrangling over **indemnification**) after a successful bidder was selected. Indemnification was included in the RFP. The personal intervention of the Dep. Sec. was necessary to get the issue moving.

- Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) and Executive Orders (EO's)

Executive orders of **the** President when they lack statutory authority are not viewed favorably on the Hill, and, **therefore**, suffer in the Appropriations process. Both PDD 62 (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and PDD 63 (Critical Information **Infrastructure** protection) were initially implemented using the Executive Order approach.

- Presentation To The American Public

It is important in **the** presentation of these issues by the Administration to the public that **they always** are being **framed** in the context of protecting individual rights and **liberties**. Changes in laws are necessary to effectively safeguard the Constitutional guarantees of our Republic. This is a vital and achievable goal.

- Process Recommendation

Much has been done to identify potential gaps and relevant policy levers by a **number** of Congressional and Presidential Commissions addressed to terrorist-related issues, including, for example, the Bremer Commission, the PCCIP Commission, the Rudman Commission, the Governor **Gilmore** Panel, and others. These **efforts** examined **terrorism-**related issues **from** slightly **different** perspectives, with some concentrating on the roles and responsibilities of government (and, within it, the intelligence, law enforcement or **defense** communities), and with some more attuned to potential private sector contributions. I thus recommend, as a process matter, an immediate **effort** to bring together key participants and **staff from** these Commissions to conduct a comprehensive collection, comparison and re-evaluation of these ideas in light of recent events. This could be accomplished quickly.

snowflake

Agreed  
9/24/01

September 21, 2001 6:25 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Nurse Problem

Let's see if you can get this nurse problem solved and send a nice letter to her.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Letter to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092101-10

750

2150001

U13098 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4676

(b)(6)

Honorable Sec of Defense  
Mr Rumsfeld

I am sending you this fax in the hopes that you may help me obtain a commission in the United States Air Force Reserve as a registered nurse. I received my nursing degree in 1995 at the age of 48 and started applying for my commission as an officer. Air Force regulations state I was too old to become an officer. I have been fighting this archaic regulation and attitude for the last 5 years. Sir, I ask you how can I be a registered nurse outside of the Air Force but too old to be a nurse and an officer in the Air Force Reserve? I have had two different opportunities offered to me to become an officer and a nurse but due to the archaic regulation on age for commissioning an officer was turned down even with great references from my former commanding officers. Sir if we were to literally apply this regulation to other occupations, for example political careers or career politicians then from the president on down would be too old to serve. I found out this year that there are age waivers available but the nurse recruiters on the west coast did not know about the age waivers. I would appreciate any help you could give me sir in gaining my commission and help fighting this injustice.

(★)

(★)

Sincerely

(b)(6)

Home #  
Work #

snowflake

Agenda  
9/26  
11/19i

September 22, 2001 8:16 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Article on Deterrence

We need an article that includes deterrence. If you recall, everyone was saying the U.S. didn't need missile defense because the standard Cold War deterrence would dissuade people-"no one would dare threaten the U.S. with an ICBM because there would be an address."

000,5

Here we are, after September 11, and the terrorists did dare to attack the U.S. and left an address.

It is a "wake up call from Hell." It is now abundantly clear we cannot rely on the traditional deterrents to deter asymmetrical threats-terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, cyber attacks and chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The people that have those capabilities are not and will not be deterred by standard deterrents.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092101-5

22 Sep 01

U13000 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4678

snowflake

*FUFOR 9/26  
0425*

September 22, 2001 1:37 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Coalitions

*Afghanistan*

I submit the following as a good rule of thumb:

“The mission must determine the coalition; the coalition ought not determine the mission.”

DHR:dh  
092201-14

*29 Sep 01*

U13102 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4679

snowflake

*Handwritten signature*  
9/19/01

September 22, 2001 12:31 PM

TO: General Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Areas of Focus

Please have the CINCs keep a close eye on the Taiwan Straits and the Russians with respect to Georgia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092201-20

*Georgia*

*22 Sep 01*

U13103 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4680

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 23, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Material**

DR

AG 9/24/01  
1557

You or someone you designate should convene a meeting and have people think through the supplies they have of various things like **TLAMs, CALCMs** and the **like** and get number counts.

They need to think about what we may have ahead of us over the next one to three years and be sure we have the right stocks of the right things.

My guess is we are going to have too many things we are not going to need and not enough of things we may need.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092301.8

47194

23 Sep 01

U13106 /02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 23, 2001

DR

9/24  
1550  
INFO

SUBJECT:

Here is a letter John Robson received from this fellow who worked with him, which is self-explanatory. If you want to have someone interview him, fine. Use your own judgment.

John says he is a fine person.

Thank you.

23 2

DHR/azn  
092301.17  
Attach: (b)(6) letter to John Robson

23 Sep 01

U13108 /02

John,

I hope you haven't been back in government long enough to forget me; as you may recall I work in the Life Sciences Group here at Robertson, based in **Boston**. I was of course happy to learn that you and your wife came through last Tuesday unscathed. I was actually in DC on my way to a FDA panel hearing when the attacks struck. When I heard of the Pentagon crash, I found my way over there (I am a Navy reservist) and spent the rest of the day helping in the recovery efforts. It was a terrible scene, though of course dwarfed by the destruction in NYC.

I will call you as well, but to minimize the demands on your time I am sending you this **email** first. In summary, in the wake of these attacks and in anticipation of a wider conflict I am making all possible efforts to get in a position where I can directly contribute to the effort. I don't think you know my background, but I served seven years as a US Naval Aviator (1987-1994) and am currently a LCDR in the reserves. My educational background includes a MA in International Relations as well as a MBA from the University of Chicago.

For reasons I can explain when we talk, I believe the **most** appropriate opportunities may exist in DOD or the to-be-established Office of counterterrorism. Given your involvement in the administration, I would like to obtain **any** advice you can provide on how to go about this task or whom to contact. While you do not know me well, I am certain that Mark Simon or John **Conlin** will provide references and assurance that I am worthy of your support.

I will try to call you tomorrow.

Best Regards,

Ben

(b)(6)

---

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snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 23, 2001  
SUBJECT: Talking Points

Actual 9/24/01

I want to come up with a new set of talking points to circulate to everybody. I think we've got another four or five points that are important we could get everyone using.

Thank you.

350021

Copy to  
9/25/01

DHR/azn  
092301.23

23 Sep 01

U13109 /02

# **DRAFT**

September 25, 2001

## **Our freedom and way of life are under attack and at stake.**

The war on terrorism is a war to preserve freedom-ultimately, freedom from fear. Americans are free people. If we decide we can't do anything about terrorism, we have no choice but to give up that freedom.

That will not. Nor will we compromise. To cede an inch to terrorism is to invest it with the power of permanent blackmail. The moment we do so, every freedom is lost, because people who live in fear are not **free**.

We must not underestimate the magnitude of terrorism's purpose or the extent of its threat. These were more than simple acts of terrorism by radical or unbalanced individuals. The purpose of this attack was not to destroy buildings. It was to destroy a belief: that people should live **free**. The intent was not even to end life alone: it was to end a way of life.

## **The only defense is a good offense.**

We must defend ourselves against terrorism. But we can't place a shield over every building, port, subway station, crowded place or citizen in the nation. There will always be another target or method of terror. And even if it were possible to defend ourselves fully against terrorism, which it is not, we would have to forfeit our freedoms to do so.

The only way to deal with terrorism is to stop it, eliminate it, destroy it at its core. The only defense against terrorism is an offense: taking the battle to terrorist organizations and countries around the world that tolerate, facilitate, finance or otherwise support them. **We** have to drain the swamp terrorists live in.

## **We will destroy terrorism and anyone who supports it, using all the tools at our command-political and military.**

This war requires a broad front that addresses terrorists, their networks, and the infrastructure of terrorism. Terrorist organizations are dispersed across dozens of countries around the globe. They rely on sophisticated financial, military and political systems. They cannot flourish without at least the tacit support of some of the governments that host them.

Consequently, to destroy terrorism, we must bring the full force of the U.S. government and our friends around the world to bear. That includes military force against direct terrorist targets where possible. But it also includes **freezing** their financial pipelines, destroying state support for terrorism and working through diplomatic channels, among other approaches.

## **International coalitions will evolve as different countries help in different ways at different times.**

The coalitions being formed to fight terrorism will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concerned about terrorism, and properly so, each country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not come as a surprise that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the United States is engaged, while other countries will not. Which group any country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity.

**We are after terrorists and the regimes that support them, not the people of these countries or Islam in general.**

This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to make it safe for them to do so.

Nor is this a war against Islam or any other religion. Terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world's Muslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who will become our allies in this struggle.

**Terrorism is a new kind of enemy.**

Many people have compared the September 11 attack to Pearl Harbor. **But** the planes that attacked Pearl Harbor bore the flag of the enemy. We knew who they were, where they lived and what was important to them, and we set about the work of destroying it. In the case of terrorism, the enemy often has no face, no capital, no armed forces and no **clear** targets to destroy. It is a new kind of enemy that demands new kinds of methods, against both terrorist organizations and states that facilitate terrorism and do have clear targets.

**This will take time.**

The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist organization is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. It will take time and pressure on the countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to be successful. Our first, second or third wave of efforts may not produce specific people. But we are patient and determined.

**It will require sacrifice.**

The era of antiseptic warfare-in which planes drop bombs from 20,000 feet, cruise missiles are launched from miles away and no American or allied soldiers are hurt-is **over**. Those means alone will not destroy this enemy. **We** must expect the loss of life. **But** this is a war to preserve our way of life, and our way of life is worth sacrificing for.

**This is a ruthless, sophisticated enemy that will stop at nothing and may very well strike again.**

Terrorists have no respect for human life, but they do have computer networks, communications systems, sophisticated organizations and large sums of money. The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States was carefully planned. There may well be more attack plans in place. That is why we should **all** be more alert. But ultimately, the only defense against terrorism is a good offense. We have to go to the heart of terrorism and destroy it.

**We must not alter our way of life.**

The most important response to this attack may be what we don't do: alter our way of life. America's way of life is unique. Helicopters and fighter jets don't permanently fly overhead, and armed troops don't regularly patrol the streets. The solution to terrorism isn't to relinquish that way of life; it's to destroy those who threaten it.

Terrorists can choose to murder civilians and destroy buildings, but only we can choose to live in fear or to relinquish our freedoms. To do so would be to lose the war on terrorism without firing a shot: we would, quite simply, be giving the terrorists what they want---our **freedoms**.

snoflake

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*Accepted 9/24/01*

DATE: September 23, 2001

SUBJECT: **War on Terrorism**

I want to draft and put out under my name some thoughts on dealing with the press in the new War on Terrorism.

I think we can write the Bible for this, like Rumsfeld's Rules, we can get us doing it right, and then get the rest of the government doing it right, and get their views focused on it.

Get someone started on that, and let's see if we can't have a draft by Tuesday.

Thank you.

*0005*

*Accepted 9/25/01*  
*Q*

DHR/azn  
092301.28

*235920*

U13110 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4688

**Principles for Working with the Media in the War on Terrorism**

The Administration will follow the following guidelines in working with the media as they cover the war on terrorism:

■ **Policy of openness**

A free nation cannot survive without a free press and an open government. These are among the foremost values we are fighting for in the war on terrorism. Consequently, we will make information available in a timely and accurate fashion so that the American people, the Congress and the world can assess and understand the facts about national security and defense. Information will be withheld when it might harm national security and/or place the men and women in uniform at risk.

● **Inquiries about military operations**

- Generally we will not discuss, confirm or deny operational details, including what forces or equipment have been deployed, where they are going, what they will do or when. Since correcting misinformation, off-the-record conversations and background confirmations help to form a picture of operations and intelligence and invite assumptions and interpretations on the next story, we will generally avoid doing so.
- We will confirm that deployment orders have been signed with the following guidance: "The United States is repositioning its military forces where required to prepare for and support the President's campaign against terrorism and to support efforts to pursue terrorists and those who support them."
- We will comment on the capabilities of units and equipment but generally not their specific roles in specific operations.
- We will discuss results of military operations, once concluded, to the degree the information does not compromise future operations.
- We will report casualties.

■ **Inquiries about intelligence:**

We will not discuss intelligence matters or comment, confirm or deny intelligence reports. Doing so could place people's lives at risk and compromise operations.

- Because of the nature of this campaign, the news relating to our efforts will involve many departments of the government.

snw/flake

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 23, 2001

SUBJECT:

Get me an IO Briefing. Torie's worried about it. She thinks they are saying and doing things different from what I am doing, and I had told the NSC I wanted to get them briefed. But I want the IO people first of all, to read everything I've written or said on this subject, and then I want them to see me and brief me on what they are doing.

That should be Monday or Tuesday, I'm afraid.

Thank you.

*Actn  
9/24/01  
1680*

*Complete  
Briefing  
9/24/01 1680*

*350.09*

DHR/azn  
092301.32

*23 Sep 01*

U13111 /02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 23, 2001

SUBJECT: NSC

*Approved  
9/24  
15112*

Every three or four days, let's send the memo on all the requests for assistance that the Pentagon has received since September 1<sup>st</sup> to the Key National Security Council people so they know.

Thank you.

*334 NSC*

DHR/azn  
092301.33

*23 sep 01*

U13112 /02

snowflake

Arrival Date  
10/2

September 24, 2001 10:36 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: TRANSCOM Request

TRANSCOM

Please take a look at this letter from Robertson, tell me what you propose and I will tell you what I would like you to do fast.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/20/01 TRANSCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092401-8

24 Sept 01

U13113 /02



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
508 SCOTT DR  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-6357

SM  
4/22  
4/9/23  
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SEP 20 2001 FOR  
OSD(LA)  
USD(AT+L)  
USD(P+R)

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary *Air -*

In response to the terrorist attacks on America and their resultant very negative effect on the **financial** health of the airline industry, Congress is considering legislation to provide relief to this very **vital** partner of ours in the national defense effort. That said, a review by my **USTRANSCOM** and **Air Mobility Command** staffs indicates that a very significant portion of the airline industry is not fully covered by the proposed legislation.


While **it** would appear that all passenger carriers, without limitation, are covered, it is not clear that cargo carriers will be equally covered under the section that addresses **loan** guarantees. Make no mistake, **all** of our Civil Reserve Air Fleet **partners** are vital to our **mission--scheduled** and charter alike. And, the smaller, unscheduled passenger and cargo carriers comprise that most critical portion **of the** industry that we rely on day-to-day to move **DoD** people and cargo around the world in support of regular deployments and exercises conducted by the various theater commanders. In the year **2000** alone, these carriers provided over **20%** of our cargo movement and virtually **all** passenger movement for the **department**.

I would appreciate your help in **ensuring** that legislation to assist this vital component of our national defense include all the air carriers that are so critical to our efforts. Your **input** to Secretary **Mlneta**, Mr. Card, or Dr. Lindsey would be very helpful in ensuring appropriate **support** to all our commercial partners.

Sincerely

CHARLES T. ROBERTSON, JR.  
General, USAF  
Commander in Chief

cc:  
CJCS



snowflake

*INFO*

September 24, 2001 4:46 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Participation

I don't want anyone in the Public Affairs staff talking about Saudi Arabia at all.

As a general matter, with respect to any other country's participation, I think our answer should be that we are going to leave it to other countries to characterize the ways they are assisting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092401-31

*Saudi Arabia*

*24 Sep 01*

U13116 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4695

snowflake

Approved  
D 9/26  
1104

September 24, 2001 4:09 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Baker

Ambassador Howard Baker called me today. He said Nakatani, the Japanese MoD, is a good man, a "comer." We should stay close to him and find things for him to do. He is already putting ships with the Kitty Hawk. He wants to cooperate with us in every way, so we ought to think of things they can do to help move along that relationship.

Have we ever set up the arrangement that he and I agreed we would do to stay in closer touch?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092401-27

*Top*

*24 Sep*

U13117 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4696

snowflake

INFO

September 24, 2001 6:10 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Input

352.001 FD

For the folks working on a speech and the op-ed, here is some material I have kicking around my office.

I haven't edited any of it; I just dictated it off the top of my head. Some of it might be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
SecDef materials

DHR:dh  
092401-34

29 Sep 01

U13118 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4697

September 22, 2001 9:55 AM

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Terrorism

1. **Terrorist Attack.** The September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack on the U.S. was carefully planned. There may well be more attack plans in place, and we must recognize that. It is likely that the terrorists planned not only the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack and future attacks, but that they planned how they would hide and what evidence they wished to leave behind for us to find to confuse our search. Therefore, it will take a sustained effort to root them out.
2. **Expectations.** The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as the Al-Qaida network, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. We recognize that it will take time and pressure on the countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to be successful. Therefore, the fact that the first, second, or third wave of our efforts does not produce specific people should not come as a surprise. We are patient and determined.
3. **Worldwide Support.** The legitimacy of our actions does not depend on how many countries support us. More nearly the opposite is true: the legitimacy of other countries' opinions should be judged by their attitude toward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life.
4. **Coalitions.** The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concerned about terrorism, and properly so, each country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not. Which group any country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity. We recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay their cooperation with us. That needs to be understood and accepted. In short, the mission must determine the coalition; never let the coalition determine the mission.

5. **Fear.** We understand that people have fears-fear for themselves, their families and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact. However, we need people's help and any information they can provide that will assist us. A number of countries are helping quietly and we appreciate that. Indeed, we ask people across the globe to provide us any information they have that can help in rooting out terrorists and their networks.
6. **Against Terrorism, Not the People.** We are after terrorists and the regimes that support them. This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to make it safe for them to do so.
7. **Not Against Islam.** This is not a war against Islam or any other religion. The Al-Qaida terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world's Muslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle.
8. **Secondary Effects.** Finally, there will be secondary effects, We recognize that as we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will have effects in a number of countries. We have to accept that, given the importance of the cause. As a result, relationships and alliances will likely be rearranged over the coming years.

DHR:dh  
SR/current MFRs/thoughts on terrorism

# Rumsfeld warns against leaks

[ 12 SEP 01 Press Briefing]

**Mr. Rumsfeld:**

And it seems to me that it's important to underline that when people deal with intelligence information and make it available to people **who are** not cleared for that classified **information**, the effect is to reduce the chances that the United States government has to track down and deal with the people who have perpetrated the attacks on the United States and killed so many Americans.

Second, when classified information dealing with operations is provided to people who are not cleared for that classified information, *the inevitable effect is that the lives of men and women in uniform are put at risk*

*This notice is posted in several locations around the rooms of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the Capitol.*

MEMORANDUM

9/23/01

When we are discussing the size of the Defense Budget, whether it should be **\$328M** or **\$336M** or **\$348M**, it's important to keep in mind that the U.S. economy lost over a trillion dollars in the last week since the World Trade Center and Pentagon disasters.

DHR/azn  
092301.06

11-L-0559/OSD/4701

MEMORANDUM

9/23/01

What is victory? This is a war against our way of life, so victory is for our children to be able to go out of the house, play in the yard, and go to school without our fearing for their lives.

The battles along the way will not be the Battle of the Bulge, or Midway. They will be the UAE terminating their diplomatic relations with Taliban. That is a victory. It drains the swamp the terrorists live in. It will be a bank freezing the account of a terrorist network. It will be a businessman, deciding to no longer launder money for the terrorist networks. It will be a father, telling a 12 year old, to not go train for terrorism. It will be a neighbor, seeing something suspicious, and calling the FBI.

DHR/azn  
092301.27

11-L-0559/OSD/4702

MEMORANDUM  
9/23/01

In 1975, Henry Kissinger kept saying that "the U.S." is the most powerful nation on earth," because it gave him strength as Secretary of State in negotiating with the world.

I, on the other hand wanted to tell the truth; that we were in fact the most powerful nation in the world, but that the trends were seriously adverse to the U.S., and, if we didn't reverse those adverse trends, we would be something other than the most powerful nation in the world, and, at the present time, we were "roughly equivalent" with the Soviet Union. We were well ahead in some categories, and they were ahead in some categories.

There was an enormous tension between the two of us and the two concepts for very good reasons. His position was rational from his standpoint, mine was rational from mine. We needed to get Congress to increase DoD's budget so the U.S. did not drift into second place.

In year 2001, there is a similar construct bedeviling the Bush Administration.

Specifically, there is today a real and present threat of biological and chemical weapons and increasing nuclear weapons against the United States, our deployed forces, friends and allies. The problem with proliferation has been pervasive and real. In my view, it is vital that we tell the world that, that we tell the country the truth, so we can alert the world to the threat, that they can take the proper precautions, that they will move aggressively after terrorists and nations that harbor terrorists, and that we will invest in the capabilities to deal with the asymmetrical threats.

On the other hand, there are those who are concerned about the American people and people around the world, by revealing the fact that we do not have defenses against chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and not wanting to admit it, fearful that it will create panic and drive the stock market down still further.

There is no doubt in my mind that I was right in 1975.

There is no doubt in my mind but that I am right now. The truth has to be told. Only then will people have the information they need to act off of those truths in a way that will help prepare the nation to deal with what are very real threats.

DHR/azn  
092301.16

## V. The Wider Context of the Global Terrorist Threat

As President Bush declared on September 20;

“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated... And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”

In this war, the United States confronts not simply those responsible for the outrages of September 11, and their supporters. We confront an international network of terrorist groups, and states that provide them financial and other forms of assistance—terrorists of global reach. These groups and states have many links.

Because of the size and sophistication of this network within which al-Qaida operates, we may discover that other terrorist groups or state supporters also played a role in the September 11 attacks. Our investigation continues. But one thing is clear: There is no doubt of al-Qaida’s central role in the events of September 11, made possible by the support of the Taliban.

Yet another grave danger faces us—the danger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups or their state supporters. They are all actively seeking such weapons, and their willingness to use them to do grievous harm to Americans or to our friends can no longer be doubted. This only adds compelling urgency to our broad campaign against the terrorist threat.

The task is therefore as the President stated on September 20:

“We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.”

**MEMORANDUM**

9/23/01

The U.S. and the Free World won WWII with patience. We won the Cold War with patience. And we will win the war against terrorism with patience.

In the case of WWII the U.S. did not engage in a single activity for months after Pearl Harbor. They planned, got the architecture in place, developed the capabilities, and then moved patiently and inexorably.

DHR/azn  
092301.07

MEMORANDUM

9/23/01

*Vocabulary*

We should not talk about attacks, but effects. We look interested in not inputs but outcomes.

The normal buildup campaign, post-campaign, and come-home victorious, is not the concept. It will be sustained. We need to take time to set the architecture and then sustain the effort for the long term.

External/Internal – Those categories seem not to apply. Would you characterize the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as internal or external? It is not self-evident.

Come up with new words for Armys, Navys or Air Forces.

Talk about “liquidating their connections and systems.”

Come up with a different word for “occupying territory.”

Talk about “severing relations.”

No beachheads; no physical battlefields; no D-Days; no long marches and no Wellington at Waterloo.

DHR/azn  
082201.04

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

**Is the action necessary?**

- **A Good Reason:** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, as they will be, whatever we do must be in our national interest. If people could be killed, we better have a **damn** good reason.
- **Legal Basis:** In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later as their invalidity is exposed.
- **Diplomacy:** All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once force is engaged.

**Is it doable?**

- **Achievable:** When the U.S. commits forces, the task should be achievable-at reasonable risk-something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to know our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply doesn't know how to do well.
- **Clear Goals:** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved those goals and can honestly exit or turn the task over to others.
- **Command Structure:** The command structure should be clear, unambiguous and one the U.S. can accept-not UN control or a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, we should insist on prior agreement from the coalition partners that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission must determine the coalition; never allow the coalition to determine the mission.

**Is it worth it?**

- **Lives at Risk:** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S., and our coalition partners, if any, must be willing to put lives at risk.
- **Resources:** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

- **Public Support:** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time is required. If there is a risk of casualties, we should acknowledge that at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe the engagement can be done antiseptically, on the cheap, with zero casualties.
- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world if we prevail; if we fail; and if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the deterrent and U.S. influence. We need to ask what kind of precedent a proposed action would establish.

**If so--**

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should be willing to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully early, during the pre-crisis period, to alter the behavior of others and to try to prevent the conflict. If that fails, we need to be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail.
- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things-not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy will simply wait us out.

**Finally--**

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners and not make the task sound even slightly easier or slightly less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less than we believe we can deliver, since it is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

**Note:**

**Guidelines, Not Rules:** Finally, while these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules or a simple formula to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. does engage, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. The future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the manner in which it is applied.

Decisions on engagement will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. Guidelines will be most effective not in providing answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

snowflake

Accord Ritz  
09/19

September 24, 2001 4:03 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

471

Please write a thank you letter to Mr. Grossinger. Then send the letter to Steve Cambone and ask him to have someone think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/22/01 (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092401-25

24 Sep 01

U13119 /02

TEL No.

Jul 07.01 8:02 P.01



(b)(6)

9/22/01

To: **The** Defense Secretary.

In December 1944 my last month of my tour of duty. Flying **B24** Liberators. We were presented with a new type of mission. At the time the Germans were attacking in **ardennes** trying to **drive** to the sea. **The** design of the **mission** was the use of fighter fuel tank filled with **80** gallons of **nepohm**. **B24** Bomb Ray was the only **one** who could handle 6 to 8 tanks. So the second Bomb division made up of six hundred plus **B24's** was to handle the job. A white phosphorus hand grenade was **the** fuse. A **15'**arming wire was to be used so the tanks would **clear** the Bomb Bay.

The **deadly** results of the bomb was that the flame would cover the area of a football field. But the most serious result **was** the entire area would be robbed of oxygen and kill or disable anyone in the area. The results would be disastrous. So it was scrapped.

But I thought it would be a perfect attack weapon with fighters **plus** **B52's** in the **Rocky** Terrain where the **Talaban** hide and then attack.

(b)(6)

Sir,

Every American is trying to help

8/9/24

(cc: Bob)

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snowflake

Q Arwen  
9/27  
0840

September 25, 2001 7:00 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Y*  
SUBJECT: MRC?

On this memo, you are right. You ought to get that word around so everyone understands it and we all play off the same sheet of music.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/25/01 Cambone response to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092501-12

000.5

2550801

U13122 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4712

25 September 2001 10:30 AM

TO: Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FROM: Steve Cambone 

You asked if the campaign against terrorism is a "MRC."

No Sir, I do not believe so.

The campaign reflects our strategy of assure, dissuade, deter and defend/defeat. It also reflects the elements of our strategy -

- Homeland Defense
- Deter forward
- Defeat coercion or aggression
- Engage in security cooperation
- Conduct SSCs

In terms of force sizing, I believe the campaign is a "defeat the efforts of" operation conducted on a global, not regional, scale.

It is critical to give the campaign the right name. If it is called an MRC - which is the old language - or a "decisive defeat" your CINCs will drain away your forces and your flexibility as they set their war plans in motion. If they do, the President will be hamstrung.

Consistent with our strategy, the President may decide on a decisive defeat once the situation develops. But, as the strategy holds, that is an option he retains.

11-L-0559/OSD/4713

snowflake

September 24, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Campaign

Is the worldwide campaign against terrorism an MRC?

Thanks.

11-L-0559/OSD/4714

smowflake

*D. Acem*  
*9/27*  
*CSAO*

September 25, 2001 6:58 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *J*  
SUBJECT: George Shultz

Please make sure you have George Shultz on our clip list that we send talking points and things like that. You also might want to send him any other speeches I did besides the one on efficiencies.

*3350*

Thanks.

Attach.  
Response to Sec. Shultz

DHR:dh  
092501-11

*108550*

U13123 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4715



GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

HOVER INSTITUTION  
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2001 SEP 21 PM 4: 22

September 12, 2001

Dear Don,

Congratulations on the way you are handling a severe challenge. Your performance was exemplary. Your press conference was clipped and authoritative. You gave reassurance at a time when it is needed.

Remember that the best defense is a good offense.

Remember also the brilliant statement you made last week about bureaucratic reform. I read extensive excerpts, and you made one of the best statements on this subject I have seen anywhere. Please have someone ship me a full text, and tell your Senior Executive Council to keep their eyes on this ball even as other pressures mount.

With my respect and admiration,

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20330

U15735101



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
Distinguished Fellow  
Hoover Institution  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA 94305-6010


Dear George,

Thanks so much for your note and your support. I appreciate it a great deal.

I have enclosed the copy of my remarks at the DoD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff that you requested.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, written over the word "Sincerely,". The signature is a cursive-style name that is difficult to decipher but appears to start with a large 'P'.

Enclosure

snowflake

*Info* *9/27*  
*0850*

September 25, 2001 8:03 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Putin's Statement

If you meet with Ivanov in Europe, I think you ought to ask him about Putin's statement in the press that Putin warned us about Usama bin Laden, and whether the press reports are correct.

*Russian*

Putin may have raised the issue, but the statement reported suggests that the U.S. government had a warning that he was going to do what he did, and that is not true to my knowledge.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092401-21

*25 Sep 01*

U13125 /02

snowflake

Acted  
09/26  
1:05

September 21, 2001 12:57 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Acadmies

Let's get the military academies focused on pushing Arabic language instruction soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092101-2

11-L-0559/OSD/4719

*INFO 09/27/01*

snowflake

September 25, 2001 7:22 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: US Efforts for Muslim Countries

*Related to 092401-1*

We ought to start talking about what the US Government did for Muslim countries such as Kuwait, Bosnia, and bombing in Serbia to keep the Christians from doing what they were doing. We don't need to be on the wrong side of this Muslim issue.

*310.1*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092501-14

*29 Sep 01*

U13127 /02

snowflake

Approved  
09/24/01  
0954  
September 24, 2001 9:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Comments on Islam

Related to  
092501-14

The argument that we are fighting Islam is nonsense. We have come to the aid of Muslims several times, the biggest being the Kosovo air war and Bosnia, and we ought to get a couple of examples and get them into my talking points.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092401-1

11-L-0559/OSD/4721

snowflake

INFO  
9/27  
10:00 AM

September 26, 2001 11:50 AM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Airport Security

I mentioned in the NSC meeting today that you were pleased with the airport security proposals that seemed to be evolving. The President said that you had been instrumental and the guiding light in fashioning them, and he was appreciative.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092601-8

36033

26 Sep 01

013128 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4722

September 26, 2001 7:52 AM

*Done 1/29 / 1000 45*

TO: Dov Zakheim  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Stimulus Package

What do you think about going into Congress for a one-time fix on infrastructure and getting it up to snuff-both housing and military infrastructure on the bases we need. It would be an excellent stimulus package. Now is the time to do it.

If we wanted to add anything, we could think of some things like that that would be helpful in terms of jobs and stimulus.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092601-3

*110.01*

*26 Sep 01*

U13131 /02

DEPSECDEF

9/28

GC WJHaynes 9/28 (note need page)  
LA [signature] 9/28 w/ [signature]

INFO MEMO

September 28, 2001, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim [signature]

SUBJECT: Stimulus Package

- A one-time fix on infrastructure is not executable, but we could greatly accelerate the pace that the Department eliminates the military construction backlog and achieves a 67-year replacement cycle for all of our facilities.
- The most executable program is to clear the backlog of C-3 and C-4 facilities in 5 years. The military construction backlog consists of two pieces, construction and sustainment. Assuming 5 years, the additional amount required would be approximately \$12 billion each year for both construction (\$8.0 billion in FY 02) and sustainment (\$3.9 billion in FY 02).
- Regarding family housing, the Department could effectively double the budget rate it spends on maintenance and construction. This would equate to an additional \$2.1 billion each year over funded levels. The additional funding is a combination of sustainment to improve current housing and the privatization and construction of new units.
- 
- The totals would be as follows:

|                    | <u>FY 02</u> | <u>FY 03</u> | <u>FY 04</u> | <u>FY 05</u> | <u>FY 06</u> | <u>FY 07</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>Sustainment</u> |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Budgeted           | 5.2          | 5.3          | 5.6          | 6.0          | 6.0          | 6.3          |
| Additional         | <u>3.9</u>   | <u>3.9</u>   | <u>3.9</u>   | 3.9          | <u>3.9</u>   | <u>3.9</u>   |
| Subtotal           | 9.1          | 9.2          | 9.5          | 9.9          | 9.9          | 10.2         |
| <u>MilCon</u>      |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Budgeted           | 4.3          | 2.8          | 3.4          | 3.4          | 4.0          | 4.2          |
| Additional         | <u>8.0</u>   | <u>8.0</u>   | <u>8.0</u>   | <u>8.0</u>   | <u>8.0</u>   | <u>8.0</u>   |
| Subtotal           | 12.3         | 10.8         | 11.4         | 11.4         | 12.0         | 12.2         |
| <u>Fam</u>         |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Budgeted           | 2.1          | 2.1          | 2.1          | 2.1          | 2.1          | 2.1          |

|            |            |            |            |            |            |             |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Additional | <u>2.1</u> | <u>2.1</u> | <u>2.1</u> | <u>2.1</u> | <u>2.1</u> | <u>2.1</u>  |
| Subtotal   | 4.2        | 4.2        | 4.2        | 4.2        | 4.2        | 4.2         |
| Budgeted   | 11.6       | 10.2       | 11.1       | 11.5       | 12.1       | 12.6        |
| Additional | 14.0       | 14.0       | 14.0       | 14.0       | 14.0       | <u>14.0</u> |
| Total      | 25.6       | 24.2       | 25.1       | 25.5       | 26.1       | 26.6        |

- The above funding would eliminate the military construction backlog and move to a 67-year replacement cycle.

Note - This would have an interesting impact on any BRAC analysis. Our choices about what not to invest in would influence commission choices for closure.  
 WJHaynes  
 General Counsel  
 9/28/01

Note - Concur w/above comments regarding BRAC. But this is worth checking with key Congressional leaders to get a feel of type of support we could expect.  
 M.L. Kefti 4A

COORDINATION: Military Services

Prepared By: Larry Lanzillotta, 697-6143

snowflake

*D. Acton  
9/28/01*

September 27, 2001 7:42 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: CAP

Andy Card called. He wants CAP coverage for the VP going to Wyoming this weekend. He has authorized it. I agreed to it. Please see that it happens.

Thanks.

*384*

DHR:dh  
092701-1

*Card  
9/28/01*

*2750901*

U13132 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4726

snoflake

Account 9/28  
PAG

September 27, 2001 7:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

Please get this letter from (b)(6) answered. I have kept the paper to read.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/10/01 (b)(6) letter

DHR:dh  
092701-3

322

2754901

U13135 /02

(b)(6)

September 20, 2001

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

Great being with you and Joyce the other night at the Greek Embassy. I regret very much Ann wasn't able to join us. Tom Miller is a great choice and you should be proud that one of "yours" is getting an Embassy. My thanks to you as well for the kind comments about (b)(6) and I having played a part in your career.

You may or may not know (b)(6) an old friend of mine who met you at one of the Rand dinners, he says.

He has asked me to send along what he considers an important message on military readiness. He wrote the letter before last Tuesday's horrible events and says the message is even more pertinent now.

I am imposing on (b)(6) friendship to get this to you personally in the hope that you can take a look at it.

Many thanks.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

*HANG in there all friends*

*Copy sent to  
Lang D.P.E.*

*DM*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your note and the nice thoughts.

We will get a letter off to (b)(6) thanking him, and I assure you I will read his paper carefully.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

September 10, 2001

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have met, the last time when my wife and I were guests of Harold Brown at a Rand Director's dinner, but we have had little personal contact. Anecdotically, with the recommendations of Albert Wohlstetter and Andy Marshall, I hired Jim Roche to head the Northrop Analysis Center, when you also were considering him. And, my wife and I had your seats at the Gala during President Reagan's first Inaugural when you were unable to attend (thank you). (b)(6) was able to work through the chaotic reservation situation.

To give you a feeling for my background, with the exception of the years spent at the University of California at Berkeley receiving my PhD in Nuclear Physics, I have been involved in defense related activities since I was an Army First Lieutenant during World War II. I have had technical and management roles at Boeing and Northrop, served as a Director on the board of three Defense Companies, and chaired or served on Task Forces of the Defense Science Board for the last thirty years. I also have and continue to serve on advisory panels for the National Laboratories. And, most importantly to me, I served during the second Reagan Administration as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

I only present my background since it is the foundation for my enclosed commentary "Beyond Mad: Toward a Seamless Deterrent". I hope you will find the paper useful. I believe that it is consistent with the statements made by both you and President Bush and expresses the issue of deterrent in an important way. It strongly supports the purchase of additional B-2C bombers.

11-L-0559/OSD/4730

Many of us are totally supportive of this Administration's position that a major change is required in our military services if we are to be prepared for future threats - so different from that of the Cold War. At the same time those of us with Washington experience recognize the difficult task you face in dealing with the super sand boxes of Congress, the Military Services, and the Defense Industry. Many of these supported systems are really social welfare programs that bring jobs and votes. The real hope for the necessary change is for an increase in the Defense budget. As you know the defense budget percentage of the GDP has gone from 6% when I was USDRE in 1986 to the present 2.9%. Yet, Defense is the one governmental responsibility that only the Federal Government supports.

Recognizing that you have to deal with your share of megalomaniacs, I am somewhat embarrassed, since I'm not of that ilk, to relate the following success while I was Under Secretary. However, it makes a point that I trust will be helpful to you.

I began to develop the technical capability in Stealth at Northrop during the Sixties and continue to believe in its great importance. In that period before I left Northrop to become USDRE, I focused on the B-2 bomber and paid little attention to our efforts in the competition that resulted in the F-22 fighter. However, when I went into the Department in the late summer of 1985, I had to focus on that program since the proposals were due in about one month. I was astonished to find that the requirements for stealth were completely inadequate. Since it was clear technically that it could be a stealthy fighter, what had happened? Those in the Air Force without the necessary knowledge had had experience with the F-117 fighter that, while stealthy, had poor aerodynamic characteristics. They wanted a high performance fighter. But the B-2 bomber incorporating a new generation of stealth technology had proved that an aircraft could be both stealthy and efficient.

As a result I forced a four-month delay in the competition and changed the specifications to require a stealthy fighter. The reaction was world class. All of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Air Force castigated me. Those in the Congress with the proper access demanded an explanation, and those companies in competition with Northrop accused me of conflict of interest because of Northrop's experience with Stealth. As you know from your own experience, I had made a great financial sacrifice in coming into government and had no financial ties to that company. Only the program's classification prevented a front-page attack in the New York Times or the Washington Post.

But I held firm. No one could justify building a non-stealthy fighter when we had F-15s and F-16's. As you are well aware, the Air Force now is using the F-22's stealth as an argument against the group calling for its cancellation. (Note that from an acquisition stand point the first development contract for the F-22 was signed in 1986.) General Joe Ralston, then a colonel, can confirm my actions.

Surprisingly, when the dust had settled, I received a visit from the Vice Chief of Staff - representing the Air Force - who commended me for my action.

I bring this issue up because I believe that the Air Force is just as remiss in understanding the importance of long-range force projection and a stealthy bomber- centric force. I believe that the arguments in my paper are valid, and that the Senior Leadership and their consultants are just as incorrect as those in my time. I have known, supported, and admired Jim Roche and Larry Welch for twenty years, but they are missing the point as badly as the Air Force did sixteen years ago.

You have pointed out that major military impacts can be made with a small percentage change of the force. I fully believe that proceeding with the purchase of the B-2C will give that impact. The Navy and the Army have much to do to meet the new requirements, but the Air Force should have a major role in the deterrent force.

We have seen the last ten years pass with little effort to change our military force to meet the new requirements. It would be a tragedy for the Nation's future if the Clinton Drift were allowed to continue through this Administration.

Sincerely yours,

(b)(6)

The stealth capability of the B-2C is sometimes questioned. Drs. John Foster & Bill Perry were the original chairmen of the Red Team concerned with this issue. Dr. Foster recently has been thoroughly briefed on this subject and would be an excellent reference if you were concerned. (b)(6)

snowflake

*ACON*  
*1/23*  
*1/20*

September 27, 2001 8:11 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Television Station

We have to figure out how to stop that al Jhazari television station in Qatar. It is a disaster.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092701-7

*000,77*

*27 Sep 01*

U13134 /02

snowflake

*INFP*  
*10-2*  
*0932*

September 29, 2001 11:03 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: ICBM

Let's go forward on the conventional ICBM.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092901-18

*471.94*

*29509201*

U13142 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/4734

117  
1200

snowflake

December 3, 2001 8:41 AM

~~TO:~~ Gen. Myers  
~~FROM:~~ Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Target Approval

How do we shorten the target approval process in Afghanistan? Even if we shorten it by five minutes, we have performed a service.

Someone ought to take a look at it minute-by-minute and see what we can do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120301-14

Afghanistan

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SECDEF 1/15  
RESPONSE  
ATTACHED.  
V/R  
Ed  
3 DEC 01

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/4735

1/17  
U13146 /02

snowflake

TO: Honorable John Ashcroft  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 4, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Dennis Hastert**

I was with Speaker Hastert the other day, discussing the drug program in South America. He is, as you undoubtedly know, very interested in the subject.

One of the things he mentioned was that the government does not seem to address money laundering. "There are billions of dollars being moved around, and we don't do very much about it."

I thought I would just pass that along to you. He may ask you about it. He may have a point.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
080401.11

South Ame cor


4 Aug 01

August 6, 2001 5:54 PM

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels

CC: Honorable I. Lewis Libby  
Honorable Paul Wolfowitz  
Honorable Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: DoD Baseline, etc.

As a follow-on to our telephone conversation, and in order that there be no misunderstandings, I want to be certain that we are in complete agreement regarding the following points as they affect our discussion of what “baseline, plus inflation, plus \$10 billion” for each of the next five fiscal years might mean,

As we understand it:

- “Baseline” means not less than \$328.9 billion, even if the Congress reduces that figure in its action on our budget submission.
- In the less than likely event that Congress increases our budget, OMB would work to see that the new higher level would become the new DoD baseline, so as to accommodate the impact on the DoD program of the changes the Congress makes.
- As we agreed, OMB’s inflation factors are not required by law. It is the President’s budget, and he can use any inflation factors he wishes. I am told that in prior years for DoD special deflators were used for such things as fuel, procurement, and the like, for the reason I mentioned, namely that DoD can be uniquely impacted. Nonetheless, your decision is that “inflation” for DoD will be the standard OMB “inflation” factors. This means that OMB will likely be using a health care inflation factor that will be 5% to 7% less than both recent and expected health care inflation. This could mean a shortfall of \$0.5 to \$1 billion.
- Next, you will address the unacceptable situation whereby DoD as employer and military personnel as employees both contribute to Medicare, and yet DoD gets no reimbursement from Medicare for the medical services DoD provides

CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/4737

U13534 /01

## CLOSE HOLD – SENSITIVE

to Medicare-eligible retired military personnel treated in military hospitals. We agreed that you would explore this matter further and reply to us as soon as possible.

- Further, we agreed that you will work to **find** a way to move the new over-65 health care accrual charge out of the **Defense topline**. The size of the accrual has no effect whatsoever on overall federal outlays, since it is paid by **DoD** and then nets out as a receipt to the over-65 medical care trust fund. We agreed that you would try to have an answer for us on this matter in a week's time, if possible. We believe it would be best to create a new subfunction for accrual within the National Security 050 account. This is a matter of \$8 to \$14 billion, so it is of considerable importance to us.
- Finally, I want to **emphasize** that we strongly oppose expanding the accrual charge to all federal agencies for all employees. To do so would add a major burden to **DoD** if it had to provide resources for an accrual charge for **DoD** civilians, as well as for military retirees under 65.

DR:dh  
080601-13.2

CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/4738

**CLOSE HOLD - SENSITIVE**

August 6, 2001 1:31 PM

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Baseline

In order that there be no more misunderstandings, I want to be absolutely certain that we are in complete agreement regarding the following points as they affect our discussion of what "baseline plus inflation plus \$10 billion" for each of the next five fiscal years might mean. As we understand it:

- "Baseline" means not less than \$328.9 billion, even if the Congress reduces that figure in its action on our budget submission.
- In the less than likely event that Congress increases our budget, the new higher level would become the new DoD baseline, so as to accommodate the impact on the DoD program of the changes the Congress makes.
- "Inflation" for DoD will be the standard OMB "inflation" factors, but using realistic inflation factors for health care, which experience shows have been higher than OMB estimates. Current estimates are that health care increases in FY 2003 will be 12% unless realistic estimates are used by OMB in the inflation calculations, the increased cost of health care could consume virtually the entire \$10 billion increase for DoD, depending on how the actuaries come out in their estimates of the contributions DoD will be required to make. Currently the estimate is \$8 to \$14 billion.

Next, we need to end the unacceptable situation whereby DoD as employer contributes to Medicare and military personnel contribute to Medicare and yet we get no reimbursement from Medicare for services DoD provides in military hospitals.

Further, we have to find a way to move the new accrual charge out of the Defense topline. Moreover, the size of the accrual has no effect whatsoever on overall federal outlays since it is paid by DoD and shows up as a receipt to the over-65 medical care trust fund.

DR:dh  
080601-13

110.01

6 Aug 01

8/10

snoflake

August 6, 2001 2:33 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Overlap

020 DOD

- How many defense agencies are there?
- How many health care activities and surgeons general are there?
- How many IGs are there in the entire Department?
- How many separate legal functions are there?
- How many separate Congressional relations functions?
- How many separate public affairs functions?

Thanks.

8/7

To Exec Sec -

DHR:dh  
080601-23

*Copy BTM  
done - [unclear]*

Please talk to  
PA's for as much of  
this as the analysts there  
may be able to provide.

Doc Cooke, too, may have

info

D. Rita

6 Aug 01



INFO MEMO

August 20, 2001, 3:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David O. Cooke, Director, Administration and Management, -1, -2

SUBJECT: Response to "Overlap" Questions

This memo responds to the questions you asked Mr. DiRita in your August 6, 2001 memo. (TAB B)

- How many defense agencies are there? There are 15 DoD Components formally designated as Defense Agencies. In addition, there are 8 DoD Field Activities and 3 organizational entities that operate much like Defense Agencies, but are not formally designated as such. (TAB A)
- How many health care activities and surgeons general are there? Title 10 U.S.C. provides for 3, one in each Military Department. The ASD(HA) as one of the six statutory, but undesignated ASD's, exercises authority, direction, and control over all DoD medical resources. There are 80 hospitals and 514 clinics that serve Military Health System beneficiaries worldwide. These health care activities are managed:
  - In the Army, by 1 medical command and 6 regional medical commands.
  - In the Navy, by 1 medical command and 3 regional healthcare support offices.
  - In the Air Force, by the line commanders of the 9 Major Commands with advice from the Command Surgeon assigned to each command.
  - At DoD level, by the TRICARE Management Activity, a DoD Field Activity, which manages TRICARE and manages and executes the DoD Unified Medical Program.
- How many IGs are there in the entire Department? Title 10 U.S.C. provides for 4, the DoD Inspector General and one Inspector General in each Military Department. Approximately 2,508 personnel are assigned to IG duties at various organizational levels throughout DoD, e.g., JCS, defense agencies, commands, and installations.
- How many separate legal functions are there? Title 10 U.S.C. provides for 4, the DoD General Counsel and one General Counsel in each Military Department. The law also provides for a Judge Advocate General on the Service Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commandant also has a Legal Counsel as does the Chairman, JCS. Further, the DoD General Counsel is dual-hatted as Director, Defense Legal Services

020 00A

20 AUG 01

U14424 /01

Agency, which includes the legal support staffs of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities.

- How many separate Congressional relations functions? Title 10, U.S.C. provides for 1, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Title 10, U.S.C. assigns the legislative affairs function to the Office of the Secretary of each Military Department, but the law does not designate officials at the Service level. Accordingly, there are 5 other principal legislative affairs officials in DoD under various titles, 1 in each Military Department, 1 in the Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and 1 in the Office of the Chairman, JCS. Additionally, 11 of the defense organizations at TAB A have designated personnel to assist agency heads with legislative affairs.
- How many separate public affairs functions? Title 10 U.S.C. assigns the public affairs function to the Office of the Secretary of each Military Department, but the law does not designate officials. There are 6 principal public affairs officials in DoD, the ASD(PA) and public affairs officials under various titles in each Military Department, HQ Marine Corps, and the Office of the Chairman, JCS. The ASD(PA) also oversees the American Forces Information Service, a defense agency, which directs the operations of a dozen public affairs activities, e.g., Armed Forces Radio and Television Service and the European and Pacific Stars and Stripes Newspaper.

Additionally, 10 of the defense organizations at TAB A have public affairs officials assigned. Public affairs officials are also assigned at various levels throughout the Department, e.g., commands, communities, and installations.

Please advise if additional detail is desired. Also, we understand that Victoria Clarke is conducting an in-depth review of public affairs functions and activities throughout DoD to determine whether the right missions are being performed, the right resources are in place, and the right technology is being used. Her approach may serve as an appropriate model for looking at other functions such as IG, legal, and Congressional liaison as well.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Bob Menig,

(b)(6)

**Defense Agencies**

**Combat Support Defense Agencies.** Those agencies with wartime support missions are designated Combat Support Agencies.

| Agency  | OSD Proponent: |
|---|----------------|
| Defense Logistics Agency                      | USD(AT&L)      |
| Defense Contract Management Agency            | USD(AT&L)      |
| Defense Threat Reduction Agency               | USD(AT&L)      |
| Defense Information Systems Agency            | ASD(C3I)       |
| Defense Intelligence Agency                   | ASD(C3I)       |
| National Imagery & Mapping Agency             | ASD(C3I)       |
| National Security Agency/Central Security Svc | ASD(C3I)       |

**Other Defense Agencies**

| Agency                                    | OSD Proponent |
|---|---------------|
| Ballistic Missile Defense Organization    | USD(AT&L)     |
| Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | USD(AT&L)     |
| Defense Commissary Agency                 | USD(AT&L)     |
| Defense Contract Audit Agency             | USD(C)        |
| Defense Finance & Accounting Agency       | USD(C)        |
| Defense Legal Services Agency             | GC            |
| Defense Security Cooperation Agency       | USD(P)        |
| Defense Security Service                  | ASD(C3I)      |

**DoD Field Activities**

| DoD Field Activity                              | OSD Proponent |
|---|---------------|
| Armed Forces Information Service                | ASD(PA)       |
| Defense POW/MIA Office                          | USD(P)        |
| DoD Education Activity                          | USD(P&R)      |
| DoD Human Resources Activity                    | USD(P&R)      |
| TRICARE Management Activity                     | USD(P&R)      |
| Office of Economic Adjustment                   | USD(AT&L)     |
| Washington Headquarters Services                | DA&M          |
| Counterintelligence Field Activity <sup>1</sup> | ASD(C3I)      |

**Organizational Entities Similar to Defense Agencies**

| Organization                                    | OSD Proponent |
|---|---------------|
| National Reconnaissance Office                  | ASD(C3I)      |
| Uniformed Services Univ. of the Health Sciences | USD(P)        |
| DoD Inspector General                           | None          |

<sup>1</sup> Approved by DepSecDef on 5/11/01; will become fully operational on 10/1/01

INFO MEMO

August 10, 2001 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 16 Aug 01*

SUBJECT: DoD Costs If All Forces Were Eliminated

- You asked, hypothetically, what would be the continuing cost to the Department of Defense if all forces were eliminated.
- There would still be an annual residual cost to the Department of Defense even if the entire military establishment is disestablished. The DoD would continue to be responsible for the health care costs of military retirees who are under 65 years of age. The estimated cost is about \$6B annually.
- Costs accrue beyond the Defense Department, however. Some entitlements are the responsibility of the U.S. Treasury. These additional entitlements include:
  - Health care costs of military retirees aged 65 and over at about \$10B per year;
  - Retirement payments for military personnel, estimated at \$32B per year;
  - Retirement payments for civilians estimated at \$4B per year.
- The total residual cost to the government is, therefore,
 

$\$6B + \$10B + \$32B + \$4B = \$52B$  per year.
- This "residual defense" cost to the U.S. Government (\$52B) is higher than the entire defense budgets of the top five countries outside the United States (see table below). Note, however, that there is no reliable estimate of the Peoples Republic of China's defense budget. Estimates range from less than Saudi Arabia's to as high as \$50-100B.

|              | Defense budget in 2000 (US\$B) |
|--------------|--------------------------------|
| Japan        | 45                             |
| UK           | 35                             |
| France       | 27                             |
| Germany      | 23                             |
| Saudi Arabia | 19                             |

Prepared By: David L. McNicol, (b)(6)

INFO MEMO

August 13, 2001, 4:25 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Budget Changes

- The Congress changes only a relatively small percentage of the defense budget request. The following table is based on the dollar adjustments made by the Congress and shows the percentages of total congressional adds, reductions and the net appropriation changes made to the President's request.

---

|   | <u>FY 98</u> | <u>FY 99</u> | <u>FY 00</u> | <u>FY 01</u> | <u>01 Sup.</u> |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|
| Percent total adds <u>1/</u>                | 5.7%         | 4.0%         | 6.9%         | 4.9%         | 11.2%          |
| Percent total reductions <u>1/</u>          | -3.8%        | -3.9%        | -4.5%        | -3.5%        | -11.2%         |
| Percent net appropriation changes <u>1/</u> | +2.0%        | -            | +2.4%        | +1.4%        | -              |

1/ The percentage of congressional adds and reductions reflected in the Authorization Bill are slightly less than those above and do not change the funding available to the Department.

- 
- Percentage changes based on dollar adjustments are relatively small because Congress usually makes only minor changes in the Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance accounts – over 60 percent of the total budget.
  - There are other ways to categorize congressional adjustments to the Defense budget. For example, over the last several years, Congress has made adjustments in about 53 percent of all RDT&E line items and 30 percent of all procurement line items, but these many changes resulted in relatively small dollar changes.
  - Details of congressional action on the FY 02 amended budget request are not yet available.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Kirk Griffin (b)(6)

July 25, 2001 8:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget Changes

I want to have the percentage of the budget that Congress changed in the final bill in the last three years, both authorization and appropriation from what the President proposed. Then I want to see what is happening thus far on our authorization supplemental for '01, then the budget amendment.

It seems to me that if they keep changing major portions of the bill up there, they have to accept responsibility for the sad state of the Pentagon, because they are moving things from one category to another.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072501-7

*Done*  
*Copy BDM*  
*x 1 week*

*Exec Sec -*  
*Please task to*  
*USD(c) for quick turnaround.*

*D. Rita*  
*8/1*



COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECRET  
2001 AUG 15 01 3 25

### INFORMATION MEMO

August 15, 2001 2:57 PM

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: LINTON WELLS II, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASD(C3) *Linton Wells II 8/15*

SUBJECT: Periodic Reinvestigation Intervals for TOP SECRET/SCI

This responds to your question about the possible benefits of adopting a 6 versus 5-year periodic reinvestigation (PR) interval for those in DoD with TS/SCI access:

- The current investigative guidelines for access to classified information, including the 5-year interval for TS/SCI, were promulgated in March 1997 by the National Security Advisor pursuant to E.O. 12968, dated August 2, 1995;
- Changing these national standards would be a difficult and lengthy process and probably would not be supported by the Intelligence Community or the rest of the Executive Branch;
  - If the interval was changed unilaterally to 6 years by DoD, TS/SCI clearances and accesses might not be reciprocally accepted by other Executive Branch agencies;
  - Such a move also could increase DoD's use of interim TS/SCI clearances, which would violate a commitment made by the prior DEPSECDEF to the DCI;
- Adopting a 6-year interval also could subject DoD to criticism for increasing security risks, even as the Department is making good progress on resolving the PR backlog problem ahead of the September 2002 schedule (the backlog is dropping by about 8,000 cases per week). Current projections suggest the military and civilian PR backlog will be eliminated by the end of CYO 1, if not sooner, with Defense industry following in FY02;
- There are other initiatives underway which could be undercut by a unilateral DoD move to a 6-year interval:



11-L-0559/OSD/4747

U13999m/01

- Based on recent research on the results of previous investigations, DoD is pursuing support for a “Phased PR” concept which could cut the cost (and time) of the PR by up to 70%. A pilot will be initiated in September 2001 and conclude in January 2002 with possible implementation by FY03;
- We are seeking Intelligence Community support for this concept which we intend to “tee” up for the SECDEF in FY02 to address with the DCI. Given the conservative nature of the intelligence security community, they would be less likely to support this if they felt we were “cutting corners” elsewhere to address the backlog;
- C3I is also supporting research into an aperiodic, datamining PR which would reinvest savings from the “Phased PR” into annual database checks of personnel with particularly sensitive accesses (TS/SCI or multiple Special Access Programs, for example), thereby providing greater security assurance and unpredictability. A test of this system will be initiated in December 2001 by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) which works for DoD.

RECOMMENDATION: That DoD retain the 5-year PR interval until FY02 when we will be ready to propose to the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council implementation of the more security effective and lower cost data mining effort and “Phased PR.”

COORDINATION: None

snowflake

May 25, 2001 9:09 AM

RUSSIA

TO: Pete Aldridge  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz *AW*  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Chemicals

I notice the Russians are having the same problem getting rid of their chemicals. I wonder if we ought to delay the timing and try to cooperate with the Russians to figure out how we can each do it.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh  
 052501-4

*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

*8/17*

*8/17*

*SP3 8/17*

25 MAY 01

*8/17  
 183  
 DR*

11-L-0559/OSD/4749

U14141 /01

snowflake

August 20, 2001 4:01 PM

TO: Honorable Mitchell Daniels  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Military Health Care

**FAXED**

8/21 0745 DH

701

When you have an opportunity, I would appreciate some clarifications as indicated in my letter to you of August 14.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/14/01 SecDef ltr to OMB

DHR:dh  
082001-56

20 Aug 01

11-L-0559/OSD/4750

U14165 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



AUG 14 2001

The Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
EEOB, Room 252  
Washington, DC 20503

701

Dear Mitch,

Thanks for your letter of August 7 and for responding so **promptly** to the first of our concerns regarding military health care. I appreciate your conclusions that **DoD** will be held harmless for any costs related to the introduction of the **accruals** for the **financing** of health benefits, whether for those over 65, as the law now requires, or for any future similar change,

We are not clear as to the specific intent of your **last** paragraph. We hope you can clarify this for us.

We recognize that Medicare reimbursement for care provided in the Military Treatment Facilities is a more complicated issue, but hope you will bring a satisfactory resolution to this issue before we must submit the FY 2003 President's budget request to the Congress,

Thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Enclosure  
8/7/01 OMB ltr to SecDef

14AUG01



U13901 /01

snowflake

AUG 17 2001

010004/01

August 17, 2001 9:01 AM

PLEASE SEE  
USDP NOTE

ASD-ISA

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *AL*  
SUBJECT: Peter Rodman

Condi tells me that Peter Rodman is involved in writing the National Security Strategy for her. I am also told that Peter Rodman was Colin Powell's speechwriter. !

I wonder if we ought to be using him to work on some speeches and things for me,

Thanks.

*8/17/01*  
→ PWR  
Huh?  
DJF

*350,001 50*

*17 Aug 01*

DHR.dh  
081701-6

800 453 4 / 01  
000 000 00 00 00 24

**INFO MEMO**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

August 23, 2001

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 08/28/01*

SUBJECT: DoD Costs If All Forces Were Eliminated

- You asked, hypothetically, what would be the continuing cost to the Department of Defense if all forces were eliminated.
- There would still be an annual residual cost even if the entire military establishment is dismantled. The table below shows costs for items that currently reside in the DoD budget. (See notes at Tab A.)

|  | <b>Total Liability</b> | <b>Length of liability</b> | <b>Annual Expense</b> |
|--|------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Under 65 Health Care                                     |                        | Maximum of 27 yrs          | \$6,000M              |
| BRAC Cleanup   | \$2.3B                 | 15 yrs                     | \$153M                |
| Cleanup of Active Bases                                  | \$28.5B                | 15 yrs                     | \$1,900M              |
| Formerly Used Defense Sites                              | \$6.9B                 | 15 yrs                     | \$460M                |
| CounterDrug  |                        |                            | \$833M                |
| Cooperative Threat Reduction                             |                        |                            | \$416M                |
| Youth programs   |                        |                            | \$76M                 |
| Nuclear Reactor disposal                                 | \$12B                  | 12yrs                      | \$1,000M              |
| Nuclear Weapons disposal                                 | U n k n o w n          |                            | Unknown               |
| Other non-core   |                        |                            | \$187M                |
| Leases and contract termination costs and legal expenses | Unknown                |                            | Unknown               |
| <b>DoD TOTAL</b>   |                        |                            | <b>\$11B+</b>         |

- Costs accrue beyond the Defense Department, however. Some entitlements are the responsibility of the U.S. Treasury. These additional entitlements include:

|                        | <b>Annual Expense</b> |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Over 65 Health Benefit | \$10B                 |
| Military Retirement    | \$32B                 |
| Civilian Retirement    | \$4B                  |
| <b>Non- DoD TOTAL</b>  | <b>\$46B</b>          |

- The total residual cost to the government (DoD and elsewhere) is, therefore,

|                    | <b>Annual Expense</b> |
|--------------------|-----------------------|
| DoD Total          | \$11B                 |
| Non-DoD Total      | \$46B                 |
| <b>Grand Total</b> | <b>\$57B</b>          |

- This residual defense cost to the U.S. Government (\$57) is higher than the entire defense budgets of the top five countries outside the United States (see table below). (Note, however, that there is no reliable estimate of the Peoples Republic of China's defense budget. Estimates range from less than Saudi Arabia's to as high as \$50-100B.)

|              | Defense budget in 2000 (US\$B) |
|--------------|--------------------------------|
| Japan        | 45                             |
| UK           | 35                             |
| France       | 27                             |
| Germany      | 23                             |
| Saudi Arabia | 19                             |

Prepared By: David L. McNicol, (b)(6)

## Tab A

If the Department of Defense were abolished the following programs would likely continue. This estimate does not include the residual value of defense assets. Disposal of DoD assets would provide for a significant portion of the funding for these liabilities.

### Under 65 Health Care

The DoD would continue to be responsible for the health care costs of military retirees who are under 65 years of age. The estimated cost is about \$6B annually.

### Environmental Remediation

Environmental remediation of all defense bases would still be required. We assume an annual liability spread evenly across 15 years.

- \$2.3B for BRAC bases
- \$28.5B for cleanup of active bases
- \$6.9B for formerly used defense sites

### CounterDrug

DoD spends about \$833M per year on Counterdrug programs each year.

### Cooperative Threat Reduction

DoD spends \$416M per year on threat reduction.

### Nuclear Reactor Disposal

Disposal of nuclear reactors from Navy vessels is estimated at \$500M per aircraft carrier and \$100M per submarine. We assumed a 12 year liability. (This is not a detailed estimate.)

### Nuclear Weapons Disposal

We have no data on these costs.

### Other non-core

In an uncoordinated draft memorandum dated August 17<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the Comptroller identified \$187M in other programs that are not core national defense programs.

### Leases and Long-term Contracts

We do not have data on this. We believe this to be small because DoD is required to write contracts that can be canceled at the convenience of the government. The legal costs associated with these cancellations may be significant, however.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

AUG 31 2001

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: D. O. Cooke, Director, Administration and Management *Doc*

SUBJECT: OSD Manning Levels

- Larry DiRita has asked that we respond to your request for on-board personnel data (Tab G). This was a follow-up to your earlier request for OSD and DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) employment levels (Tab H).
- Tab A shows the "top line" authorized strength for OSD (2,045 military and civilian personnel). Of these 1,927 are funded in the FY 01 Budget. OSD on-board strength as of the end of July was 1,876 personnel.
- Section 143 of Title 10 USC limits the combined number of personnel assigned to, or employed in, OSD and WHS to a total of 3,767. Accordingly, Tab A also includes the "top line" strength figures for WHS. The combined authorized staffing level for OSD and WHS is currently 51 below the statutory ceiling; the on-board figure is 168 below the ceiling.
- Linking OSD and WHS to a combined ceiling reflects a wide-spread misconception that WHS is simply an extension of OSD. In fact, WHS is an entirely separate organization that manages DoD-wide programs (Tab B) and provides administrative support to a wide range of DoD Components (Tab C).
- Tab D shows the internal distribution of OSD personnel.
- Tab E shows the internal distribution of WHS personnel.
- Tab F shows authorized strength of the DoD IG (1,212 military and civilian personnel) and the on-board strength as of the end of July (1,219 personnel). It should be emphasized that the DoD IG staff is not part of the OSD. It is a separate DoD Component, similar to, but not designated as, a Defense Agency.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Terry Judd, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4757

U14641 /01

**TAB**

**A**

**OSD/WHS**  
**MANPOWER STATUS REPORT**  
**JULY 2001**

|              | <b><u>Statutory</u></b><br><b><u>Ceiling</u></b> | <b><u>Authorized</u></b><br><b><u>Staffing Level</u></b> | <b><u>Funded</u></b><br><b><u>Strength</u></b> | <b><u>On-Board</u></b><br><b><u>Strength</u></b> |
|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| <b>OSD</b>   | x x  | 2045   | 1927   | 1876   |
| <b>WHS</b>   | x x  | 1671   | 1621   | <u>1723</u>                                      |
| <b>Total</b> | 3767   | 3716   | 3548   | 3599   |

**Notes.**

- 1) Statutory Ceiling -- Maximum number of civilian and military personnel which can be employed by OSD and WHS per 10 U.S.C. 143.
- 2) Authorized Staffing Level -- The maximum number of full time permanent civilian and military personnel that can be on an organization's rolls at any given time.
- 3) Funded Strength -- Budgeted workyears for civilian pay and budgeted military positions.
- 4) On-Board Strength -- Actual number of authorized personnel employed in an organization.

**TAB**

**B**

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
DOD-WIDE PROGRAMS

PROGRAM

CUSTOMERS

**FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE:** This involves administering the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and the Federal responsibilities of the National Voter Registration Act designating Armed Forces Recruitment Offices as voter registration agencies.

Uniformed Service personnel of all DoD components, their family members, and other U.S. citizens overseas.

**DOD-WIDE REPORTS, FORMS, AND REGULATORY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT:** Reports Management involves information DoD collects internally and externally from other Federal agencies and the public. Forms Management involves the review, design, approval, and dissemination of electronic DoD forms world-wide. The DoD Regulatory Program involves management and preparation of the DoD Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan sent to the Office of Management and Budget.

All DoD components, the Congress, and the public.

**DEFENSE PRIVACY:** This involves overseeing the administration of the Defense Privacy Program DOD-wide, which implements the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended.

All DoD components, their employees, other U.S. citizens, and aliens admitted for permanent residence are potentially impacted.

**INFORMATION RELEASE PROGRAMS:** This involves implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) provisions of Executive Order 12958 for all of DoD. Also includes reviewing of information proposed for release to the public and the Congress submitted by all DoD components and processing FOIA, MDR, and the access portions of Privacy Act cases for OSD/JS received from the general public.

All DoD components and the general public.

**DOD-WIDE STATISTICAL REPORTING:** This involves the application of information technology strategies to meet DoD statutory and other reporting and information dissemination requirements in the areas of procurement and personnel, (military and civilian workforce in DoD)

All DoD components, the Congress, and the public.

**NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW OF REFERRED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION:** This involves identifying in OSD files all information originally classified by other DoD components or Executive Branch Agencies and notifying the originators to review it for possible declassification. It also involves reviewing information originally classified by OSD components and referred to us by the external entities holding it. Both processes are required by Executive Order 12958

All DoD Components, all Executive Branch Agencies, National Archives and Records Administration, and the general public.

PROGRAM

**DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM:** This involves maintaining an information technology document database to archive, track, and retrieve the official records of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding official Department of Defense business. This service provides to the customers a general reference, a legal response to Executive, Legislative, and Judicial requests for documents, and a reproduction and distribution service.

**DOD DIRECTIVES SYSTEM MANAGEMENT:** This involves a wide range of managerial and advisory services for the preparation, internal review, coordination, approval, publication, and distribution of DoD Directives, Instructions, and Publications, and changes thereto.

**FEDERAL REGISTER SYSTEM MANAGEMENT:** This includes managing the preparation, coordination, review, and submission for publication in the Federal Register rules and notices relating to a broad array of DOD-related subjects.

CUSTOMERS

All DoD Components, White House, Congress, Cabinet-level Agencies, and the general public.

All DoD Components and the general public

All DoD Components and the general public

**TAB**

**C**

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

| <u>SUPPORT SERVICE</u>   | <u>OSD</u>     | <u>CUSTOMERS<br/>OTHER</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|--|----------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| <p>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: This includes activities related to civilian personnel staffing, human resource development, labor management and employee relations, position classification, employee benefits administration, senior executive program management, and other Federal Human Resources Management activities</p>  |                |                            |              |
| Population Served:   | 1563<br>(14%)  | 9463<br>(86%)              | 11,026       |
| <p>MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT : This includes managing the military assignment system for serviced activities, as well as providing pay support, administration of the military awards program, and assuring compliance with Acquisition Corps requirements.</p>  |                |                            |              |
| Population Served:   | 482<br>(26%)   | 1,372<br>(74%)             | 1,854        |
| <p>EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: This includes managing and administering the Dispute Resolution of Complaints of Discrimination, Workforce Diversity, Affirmative Employment, Partnership-in-Education, Special Emphasis, Alternative Dispute Resolution, and Military Equal Opportunity Programs for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and activities serviced by WHS. Also serves as Defense Agency liaison coordinating EEO activities on behalf of the Director, Administration and Management</p> |                |                            |              |
| Population Served:   | 1,997<br>(32%) | 4,259<br>(68%)             | 6256         |
| <p>PERSONNEL SECURITY ADJUDICATION: This involves the review, evaluation, and adjudication of personnel security investigations, counterintelligence reports, and criminal investigations in order to make determinations concerning access to classified information. Also involves maintenance of the Defense Central Index of Investigations on serviced population.</p>  |                |                            |              |
| Population Served (including Congressional staffs):  | 1,563<br>(2%)  | 93,487<br>(98%)            | 95,050       |
| <p>PROTECTIVE SERVICES: This encompasses a broad range of physical security and law enforcement services, to include security guards, antiterrorism and force protection, and security systems installation, maintenance, monitoring, and response.</p>  |                |                            |              |
| Population Served:   | 1,997<br>(2%)  | 97,976<br>(98%)            | 99,973       |

SUPPORT SERVICE

OSD                      CUSTOMERS  
OTHER                      TOTAL

MASS TRANSIT FRINGE BENEFIT PROGRAM: This involves administering Executive Order 13 150, "Federal Workforce Transportation in the NCR," for DoD employees in the National Capital Region, whereby participating employees receive, in addition to their current compensation, "transit passes" in amounts equal to their personal commuting costs, with a not to exceed cap.

|                      |      |        |        |
|----------------------|------|--------|--------|
| Population Serviced: | 907  | 22,093 | 23,000 |
|                      | (4%) | (96%)  |        |

REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: This includes day-to-day operation of the Pentagon Reservation and over 140 other DoD/WHs controlled federally owned and leased buildings within the National Capitol Region

|  |       |       |     |
|--|-------|-------|-----|
| Floor Space Serviced (square footage): | 2M    | 15M   | 17M |
|  | (12%) | (88%) |     |

**TAB**

**D**

**OSD WORKFORCE SUMMARY**  
(As of 31 July 2001)

| <u>Organization</u>  | <u>Authorized Staffing Levels</u> |            |              | <u>On-Board Strength</u> <sup>***</sup> |            |              |
|--|-----------------------------------|------------|--------------|---|------------|--------------|
|  | <u>Civ</u>                        | <u>Mil</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Civ</u>                              | <u>Mil</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| Immediate Office SecDef  | 27                                | 29         | 56           | 24                                      | <b>32</b>  | <b>56</b>    |
| USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)                            | 401                               | 80         | 481          | 355                                     | <b>79</b>  | <b>434</b>   |
| USD (Policy)   | 284                               | 127        | 411          | 253                                     | 121        | <b>374</b>   |
| USD (Comptroller)  | 161                               | 5          | 166          | 159                                     | 5          | 164          |
| Dir, Program Analysis & Evaluation                                   | 120                               | 37         | 157          | 109                                     | 37         | 146          |
| USD (Personnel & Readiness)  | 135                               | 85         | 220          | 116                                     | 70         | 186          |
| ASD (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence) <sup>(2)</sup> | 181                               | 53         | 234          | 162                                     | 51         | 213          |
| C <sup>4</sup> I Integration Support Activity (CISA) <sup>(2)</sup>  | 48                                | 0          | 48           | 48                                      | <b>0</b>   | 48           |
| ASD (Legislative Affairs)  | 18                                | 12         | 30           | 14                                      | 12         | 26           |
| ASD (Public Affairs)   | 46                                | 30         | 76           | 41                                      | 30         | 71           |
| General Counsel  | 55                                | 4          | <b>59</b>    | 49                                      | 4          | 53           |
| Dir, Operational Test and Evaluation                                 | 33                                | 15         | 48           | 29                                      | 16         | 45           |
| ATSD (Intelligence Oversight)  | 9                                 | 0          | <b>9</b>     | 8                                       | <b>0</b>   | 8            |
| Dir Administration & Management                                      | 23                                | 0          | 23           | 22                                      | <b>0</b>   | 22           |
| Consultants <sup>(3)</sup>   | 14                                | 0          | 14           | 18                                      | <b>0</b>   | 18           |
| Dir Net Assessment   | <u>8</u>                          | <u>5</u>   | <u>13</u>    | <u>7</u>                                | <u>5</u>   | <u>12</u>    |
| <b>Total</b>   | 1563                              | 482        | 2045         | <b>1414</b>                             | 462        | <b>1876</b>  |

**Notes.**

- (1) Includes authorized full-time permanent, temporary augmentations, and overlaps.
- (2) Previously a Defense Support Activity in DIA, which was disestablished by the Defense Reform Initiative and transferred into ASD(C3I). Former CISA personnel are working in ASD(C3I), however, due to Title 10 Excepted Service restrictions, 48 remain on DIA rolls. Legislation has been enacted that will enable them to be transferred to ASD(C3I) rolls in FY 02. In the meantime, consistent with 10 U.S.C. 143, they are counted in the OSD ceiling.
- (3) Consultants: funded FTEs to support paid consultants who work NTE 130 days per year.

**TAB**

**E**

**WHS WORKFORCE SUMMARY**  
(As of 31 July 2001)

| <u>Directorates</u>                                      | <u>Authorized Staffing Levels</u> |            |              | <u>On-Board Strength</u> |            |              |
|--|-----------------------------------|------------|--------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------|
|  | <u>Civ</u>                        | <u>Mil</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Civ</u>               | <u>Mil</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| Budget and Finance                                       | 43                                | 0          | 43           | 35                       | 0          | 35           |
| Communications and Directives                            | 41                                | 29         | 70           | 37                       | 30         | 67           |
| Defense Privacy Office                                   | 4                                 | 1          | 5            | 3                        | 0          | 3            |
| Federal Voting Assistance Program                        | 13                                | 0          | 13           | 13                       | 0          | 13           |
| Information and Operations Reports                       | 43                                | 0          | 43           | 41                       | 0          | 41           |
| Freedom of Information and Security Review               | 18                                | 10         | 28           | 17                       | 11         | 28           |
| Personnel and Security                                   | 188                               | 18         | 206          | 193                      | 21         | 214          |
| Real Estate and Facilities                               | 950                               | 11         | 961          | 979                      | 10         | 989          |
| Office of the General Counsel                            | 14                                | 0          | 14           | 14                       | 0          | 14           |
| Miscellaneous Activities/Special Programs <sup>(2)</sup> | <u>188</u>                        | <u>100</u> | 288          | <u>213</u>               | <u>106</u> | <u>319</u>   |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>1502</b>                       | <b>169</b> | <b>1671</b>  | 1545                     | <b>178</b> | 1723         |

**Notes**

(1) Includes authorized full-time permanent, temporary augmentations, and overlaps.

(2) Includes but not limited to: mess stewards, White House Support Group, Pentagon Renovation Staff, Summer Hires, State/Defense Exchange Program, and support for temporary Boards and Commissions.

**TAB**

**F**

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

| <b><u>Organization</u></b>                            | <b><u>Authorized Staffing Levels</u></b> |                   |                     | <b><u>On-Board Strength</u></b> |                   |                     |
|---|--|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
|   | <b><u>Civ</u></b>                        | <b><u>Mil</u></b> | <b><u>Total</u></b> | <b><u>Civ</u></b>               | <b><u>Mil</u></b> | <b><u>Total</u></b> |
| Immediate Office                                      | 10                                       | 1                 | 11                  | 11                              | 1                 | 12                  |
| Auditing  | 607                                      | 15                | 622                 | 633                             | 15                | 648                 |
| Investigations/Defense Criminal Investigative Service | 412                                      | 3                 | 415                 | 405                             | 3                 | 408                 |
| Intelligence Review                                   | 16                                       | 6                 | 22                  | 13                              | 6                 | 19                  |
| Department of Inquiries                               | 31                                       | 3                 | 34                  | 30                              | 3                 | 33                  |
| Admin & Info Mgmt                                     | <u>107</u>                               | <u>1</u>          | <u>108</u>          | <u>98</u>                       | <u>1</u>          | <u>99</u>           |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>1183</b>                              | <b>29</b>         | <b>1212</b>         | <b>1190</b>                     | <b>29</b>         | <b>1219</b>         |

**TAB**

**G**

snowflake

August 8, 2001 10:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>3</sup>/<sub>1</sub>  
SUBJECT: Manning

This paper from Dov tells the authorized-it doesn't tell how many people are in those authorized jobs.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/31/01 memos on OSD Manning

DHR:dh  
080801-20

Copy RDM  
done - 8/17  
Si

To: Doc Cooke -

Can you provide the  
additional info Sec. Def  
seeks? Thanks.

Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/4773

**Office of the Secretary of Defense 7-26-01**

**Authorized Positions**

|                      | <b>Civilian</b> | <b>Military</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <b>Total SecDef</b>  | 27              | 29              | 56           |
| <b>Total USD(P)</b>  | 284             | 127             | 411          |
| <b>Total A&amp;T</b> | 401             | 80              | 481          |
| <b>Total USD(C)</b>  | 281             | 42              | 323          |
| <b>Total P&amp;R</b> | 135             | 85              | 220          |
| <b>Total OSD</b>     | 1515            | 482             | 1997         |

**Other Activities 7-16-01**

**Authorized Positions**

|  | <b>Civilian</b> | <b>Military</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| American Forces Information Service        | 299             | 347             | 646          |
| Office of Economic Adjustment              | 35              | 3               | 38           |
| U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces | 59              | 0               | 59           |
| Defense Legal Services Agency              | 104             | 9               | 113          |
| Washington Headquarters Services           | 1502            | 169             | 1671         |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>1999</b>     | <b>528</b>      | <b>2527</b>  |

**Washington Headquarters Services 7-16-01**

**Authorized Positions/Full Time Equivalents**

| <b>Org (funding)</b>  | <b>Civilian</b> | <b>Military</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Correspondence & Directives (o&m)   | 41              | 29              | 70           |
| Budget & Finance (o&m)  | 43              | 0               | 43           |
| Real Estate & Facilities (o&m)  | 144             | 9               | 153          |
| Real Estate & Facilities (rev funds)  | 736             | 1               | 737          |
| Real Estate & Facilities (bldg mgmt)  | 70              | 1               | 71           |
| Personnel & Security (o&m)  | 188             | 18              | 206          |
| Federal Voting Association Program (o&m)  | 13              | 0               | 13           |
| Director for Information Operations and Reports (o&m)   | 43              | 0               | 43           |
| General Counsel (o&m)   | 14              | 0               | 14           |
| Freedom of Information and Security Review (o&m)  | 18              | 10              | 28           |
| Defense Privacy Office (o&m)  | 4               | 1               | 5            |
| Miscellaneous/Special Programs (o&m)<br>(to include but not limited to: mess stewards, White House communications agency,<br>Petagon Reservation managers, Summer Hires, State/Defense Program, Commission<br>Support and Receptionists in support of SecDef , DepSecDef and Senior Staff [floaters]) | 188             | 100             | 288          |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>1502</b>     | <b>169</b>      | <b>1671</b>  |

## Auditors, Investigators, and Inspectors within DoD

| <i>Component</i>                                | <i>Non-DCIO</i> |                               |                              |                                   | <i>Inspectors</i><br>(Note 1) | <i>Other</i><br>(Note 2) | <i>Total</i> |
|---|-----------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
|   | <i>Auditors</i> | <i>Criminal Investigators</i> | <i>Criminal Investigator</i> | <i>Non-Criminal Investigators</i> |                               |                          |              |
| <b>Army</b>                                     |                 |                               | 46                           |                                   | 1613                          |                          | 1659         |
| U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command        |                 | 644                           |                              |                                   | (Note 3)                      | 839                      | 1483         |
| Army Audit Agency                               | 541             |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 541          |
| Internal review                                 | 825             |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 825          |
| <b>Navy</b>                                     |                 |                               | 14                           |                                   | 259                           |                          | 273          |
| Naval Criminal Investigation Service            |                 | 928                           |                              | 13                                |                               | 721                      | 1662         |
| Naval Audit Service                             | 259             |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 259          |
| Marine Corp Non Appropriated Fund Audit Service | 86              |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 86           |
| Other   | 31              |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 31           |
| <b>Air Force</b>                                |                 |                               | 28                           |                                   | 636                           |                          | 664          |
| Air Force Office of Special Investigations      |                 | 1373                          |                              | 2                                 |                               | 554                      | 1929         |
| Air Force Audit Agency                          | 713             |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 713          |
| <b>Inspector General, DoD</b>                   | 524             | 239                           |                              | 75                                |                               | 346                      | 1184         |
| <b>OSD</b>                                      |                 |                               | 39                           |                                   |                               |                          | 39           |
| Defense Contract Audit Agency                   | 3546            |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 3546         |
| Agencies/Activities                             | 294             |                               |                              |                                   |                               |                          | 294          |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                    | 6819            | 3184                          | 127                          | 90                                | 2508                          | 2460                     | 15188        |

**NOTES:**

1. Active duty military & civilians assigned to IG positions.
2. Includes management, technical, administrative and support, policy and oversight, and followup personnel.
3. Includes HQDA, MDW, INSCOM and AMC, as well as 1400 (estimated) in Total Army IG offices.

**TAB**

**H**

July 26, 2001 12:28 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: OSD Manning

Please get me a piece of paper that shows me how many people work in each one of the OSD activities. I was told today there are 1,200 people in the OSD Inspector General's office.

I need a piece of paper that shows it across the board.

If you are the wrong person, ask David Chu to get it. He may be the right one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072601-19

→ To: USDC -  
I'll forward, but  
I told SecDef we'd get  
him a second version that  
had the abbreviations  
spelled out. He won't know  
the jargon. Please have  
someone quickly re-do.

Larry Diller  
7/27

1/2  
0800

snowflake

11/2/01  
1835

November 1, 2001 11:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Audiotapes

DR

Sec Model

0003

Someone sent me these tapes concerning Muslims. I think someone ought to listen to them and see if there is anything good we ought to use in there.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Three audiotapes

DFR:dh  
110101-2

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/30

SecDef -

FYI, note the attached info.

D. Rumsfeld

1 Nov 01

U14654 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4779



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

INFO MEMO

I-01/014638

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Director, Office of Strategic Influence, Brig Gen Worden *29 Nov 01* *1625*

SUBJECT: Muslim Audio tapes

- The SECDEF asked that someone listen to three audio tapes concerning Muslims to determine their value in our ongoing overseas influence offensive (attached).
- The tapes were reviewed by State Department's regional bureau and found to be of value for general background information. Since the tapes focus on Muslims in America, the tapes will be provided to OSD public affairs for possible follow up with domestic media.

Prepared by: Tom Timmes, OASD(SO/LIC)OSI, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4780

snowflake

D Action 11/1/01

November 1, 2001 3:44 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Russia

Russia

Condi and Colin called. They want to know where we stand on the fossil fuel to plutonium issue and the chemical issue, in Russia. Apparently, DoD is disagreeing with the interagency people.

Please get to me orally and fill me in on what that is so I can get back to them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110101-19

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

1 Nov 01

U14657 02

snowflake

Acad 01/5  
1359

November 1, 2001 4:19 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: SR-7 1

Please take a look at whether you think the SR-71 should be used for Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110101-23

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

452R

Nov 01

U14658 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4782

snowflake

TO: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: Aircraft

*DR*

*ACK  
11/15/01*

311

I think we have got to do something to get the secure voice communications and secure faxes in the various SecDef aircrafts so they work. It is almost always difficult to accomplish anything. Why don't you look into it and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

DHR/azn  
110501.19

5 Nov 01

U14665 02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita  
cc: Trip Coordinators  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: Support in Meetings

*Noted*  
*Answer*  
*11/7/01*  
*12/15*

337

Next time we go overseas we want to make sure that someone is assigned for each meeting, who is going to do the notes and someone assigned to do the cable, when they get out.

If it is a small meeting and only Doug Feith is in the meeting and there are several of them the cables never get done. We have to not have him be in all the meetings when there is only one person. Let's rotate people.

Thanks.

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

5 Nov 01

DHR/azn  
110501.22

U14666 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4784

snowflake

INFO Duff  
12/01  
File copy in Penn

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Taliban Brutality**

Here's this paper on Taliban brutality. Seems to me what we ought to do is have a press briefing, pass out this type of information and at the podium state that each day I received questions as to whether or not something the Taliban said is true. In each instance I point out the truth, that they have a pattern of lying, that they have not killed Americans, they have not shot down helicopters, they have not shot down Predators, and that they are using Mosques and schools and hospitals for ammunition storage and meeting places, that they are placing tanks, anti-aircraft batteries and other military equipment in close proximities to schools, hospitals and residential areas.

Afghanistan

In the future, when questions are asked with respect to Taliban claims, it would be useful for all of us to keep in mind the following... Then list a series of these things, and then state that the complete paper is available and say that these are the kinds of people that we are dealing with. This is the pattern of behavior that they have engaged in, and one would think that when that discredited, vicious regime makes charges of civilian deaths and casualties, that people would at least have a question in their mind as to whether or not they are true. Overwhelmingly, they're not!

Thanks.

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

5 Nov 01

DHR/azn  
110501.28

Attach: *The Taliban: A Well-Documented Legacy of Brutality* 10/31/01 U18032

## The Taliban: A Well-Documented Legacy of Brutality

The Taliban's brutal disregard for human life, employment of scorched earth policies against its enemies, intolerance of other religious, ethnic or cultural differences, enforcement of an extreme version of Islam and potential war crimes, combine to create a "human rights catastrophe" in Afghanistan. Specific examples of these behaviors include:

### **Treatment of Woman and Girls**

Afghan woman and girls are subjected to rape, kidnapping and forced marriage. Taliban restrictions are widespread, institutionally sanctioned, and systemic. Taliban edicts enforce strict dress codes, prohibit women from working outside the home, or attending school, among other restrictions.

- Taliban reportedly abducted women from the Taloqan area during the fighting from June – October 2000. In August 1999, Taliban reportedly abducted women near Shomali plains and possibly trafficked them in Pakistan for prostitution. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*
- Taliban religious police beat individuals on the streets for infractions of rules on dress, or the prohibition of women being with unrelated men. According to one report, a woman struggling with her two small children and groceries was beaten with a car antenna because her face covering slipped. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001; US Department of State March 1998 Report on Women and Girls in Afghanistan*
- Prohibiting women from working outside their home is particularly hard on the 30,000 widows from the civil war. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*
- Taliban restrictions on woman's medical care have left Afghan women with little or no access to health care. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

### **Massacres Against Civilians**

The Taliban massacred hundreds of Afghan civilians, many of the victims were targeted because of their ethnic or religious identity.

- In January 2001, Taliban forces captured the town of Yakaolang and executed at least 170 civilians. On 19 January, 2001, UN SecGen Kofi Annan issued a statement expressing concern about "numerous credible reports" that civilians were deliberately killed in Yakaolang and demanded a "prompt investigation". *The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Feb 01; Human Rights Watch*

- In May 2000, the Taliban systematically executed as many as 100 ethnic Uzbek prisoners in Samagan province. *The U.N. Commission on Human Rights February, 01; Human Rights Watch*
- In the August 1998 fight for Mazar-I-Sharif, Taliban forces summarily executed ethnic Hazara, Jajik, and Uzbek civilians. There are also reports that women and girls were raped and abducted. *Human Rights Watch*

### **Massacre at a Muslim Mosque**

- In the January 2001 attack on Yakaolang, eyewitnesses reported rocket attacks on a mosque where women, children and elderly had taken shelter. Dozens were killed in the mosque. *Amnesty International*

### **Attacks on Humanitarian Aid**

- Taliban attacks on humanitarian relief agencies are increasing as they steal equipment, supplies, and vehicles. These assaults are directly contributing the starvation of Afghani people. *18 October, Human Rights Watch*
- 16 October, the Taliban seized control of two U.N. warehouses containing more than half the World Food Program's wheat supply for Afghanistan. *17 October U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet*

### **Scorched Earth Policy**

- In its fight with the Northern Alliance, the Taliban have indiscriminately shelled and bombed civilians. Taliban have burned homes, killed livestock, uprooted orchards and destroyed irrigation systems.
- In August 1999, the Taliban's scorched earth operation displaced up to 100,000 people north of Kabul. *30 August Iranian News Agency; 26 August Hindustan Times in India*
- In August-September 2000, Taliban's indiscriminate bombardment of the town of Taloqan forced tens of thousand of civilians to flee their homes. Reportedly, during the fighting the Taliban bombarded a nearby village, burned all the houses and killed some of the villagers. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

### **Targeted Assassinations**

- From 1998-2000 alone, Amnesty International suspects the Taliban was responsible for making dozens of death threats against Afghans living in Pakistan, several of whom were subsequently killed. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

- Summary executions of opponents is common, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has received numerous reports of prisoners' executions in Taliban-held areas. *U.N. Press Release, 24 October 2001*

### **Torture**

- The U.N. Commission on Human Rights reported that former Taliban prisoners have provided "harrowing accounts of torture." *U.N. Press Release, 24 October 2001*

### **Religious Persecution and Intolerance**

- Taliban continue to hold Shelter Now International detainees for preaching Christianity. Under the Taliban, conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001; Reuters*
- In May 2001, Taliban decreed (but have not yet enforced) Hindus wearing distinguishing identification on their clothing. In September 1999, the Taliban forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship. *Human Rights Watch May 2001*
- Supreme Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar issued an edict in August 2001 against un-Islamic graven images. The Taliban quickly began the destruction of all ancient sculptures to include the two centuries old colossal Buddhist statues in Bamiyan. *USA Today 13 August 2001*

### **Narcotics Trafficking**

- Afghanistan is one of the world's largest opium producers and accounted for more than 70% of the world's illicit opium supply in 2000. The Taliban control most of the country's poppy cultivation and use funds from opium sales to finance its military. *U.S. Department of State, Afghan Country Study 2000*

*Handwritten initials and date: "D.H." and "12/2"*

November 5, 2001

MEMORANDUM

To: Secretary Colin Powell

CC: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

From: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Subject: **Middle East Speech**

*Middle East*

Colin, I still have some reservations about the timing of the Middle East speech, as well as the substance. Let's assume that a push to the Israelis and the Palestinians might possibly do some good, which is doubtful. Even so, given the September 11 attack, and bin Laden's claim that he is acting to highlight the Palestinian cause, the US now should probably refrain from making such a push. The strategic downside to appearing to vindicate bin Laden outweighs, I think, the usefulness of another US Middle East peace activity.

There is no question but that a halt to the violence would give some political relief to our friends throughout the Middle East. But I don't think the speech will help end the violence.

Nor do I think a new pro-Palestinian nuance in our policy will win the US any significant, let alone durable, improvement in our relations in the Arab or Moslem worlds. By separate memo, I may send some ideas about how we address the requirement to manage those relations in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence and the very real difficulties they cause for the war against terrorism.

I sense a danger in fostering "moral equivalency" as between Israel and the terrorists that Israel has to fight. To use Churchill's phrase, it isn't right to be "indifferent between the fire brigade and the fire." And it's not right, in my view, to equate the Israeli kids purposefully targeted and killed in a downtown pizzeria with the Palestinian kids victimized by Palestinian grown-ups who send them to throw rocks at Israelis in the areas between armed Israeli soldiers and armed Palestinian security forces.

*5 Nov 01*

U14671 02

As you know well, one of our most powerful instruments of national power in the war on terrorism is our principle. If we suggest moral equivalency in this case, if we buy into the notion that one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist, if we treat anti-Israel terrorism tactically and not as a matter of principle, we could be hurting our chances of sustaining domestic and international support for our war. Our strongest argument is that:

- terrorism is unacceptable whatever the cause,
- terrorism should not be encouraged by being rewarded,
- those who fight terrorists have a just cause.

Just some thoughts. I wish I had a perfect solution, but I don't.

Good luck:

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a long horizontal line with a loop at the end, and a large, stylized letter 'D' below it.

DHR/azn

snowflake

D 11/8  
1229 Ago  
November 7, 2001 1150 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intelligence

*Response 11/29, 11/30/01  
Memo from Dr Cambone*

*350.09*

Why don't we finish on the intelligence side-get some motion, wind this up, reorganize, and get it the way we want it.

Also, we ought to think through how we deal with the Scowcroft issue. I don't think that dog is dead.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110701-6



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*7 Nov 01*

U14674 02

snowflake

*INFO D 0651  
11/8*

November 8, 2001 9:09 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Pakistan

Why doesn't Pakistan sever its relationship with Taliban?

*Pakistan*

DHR:dh  
110801-5

*8 Nov 01*

U14675 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4792

snowflake

November 8, 2001 9:19 AM

Sent 6:45 pm SIA Copy  
- Tickler/epb/d  
D/110  
1428

TO: ~~Jim Roche~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: KC-135

4512R

I was up on the Hill, and I think it was Senator Kent Conrad who told me that General Jumper has been up there asking for money for more KC-135s. What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110801-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ 11/9/01

Boss,

Not true - Various Senators are asking us about our desire to transfer our ISR and Tanker fleets away from 707's toward new 767's. There is a unique opportunity now given Boeing's excess capacity, 767 "white tail" inventory, etc. We have been trying to work a lease deal (Don + Pat are helping) to get us started earlier. So, most questions have dealt with "buy or lease."

8 Nov 01

*11/9/01 Jim*

11-L-0559/OSD/4793

U14676 02

snowflake

*Info  
0652  
4/19*

November 8, 2001 9:24 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Saudi Television

*Saudi Arabia*

Are we working on trying to get Saudi state-run television to stop harming America?

DHR:dh  
110801-12

*8 Nov 01*

U14677 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4794

snowflake

November 8, 2001 11:49 AM

Ag  
D  
2657

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Congressional Outreach

↖

032

Do you think we ought bring in a handful of the best bipartisan supporters from the Senate and House (separately) for a breakfast?

I am thinking of people like Sessions, Hagel, Mark Dayton-some of the really nice, serious people who are interested.

Please come up with a list and let me look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110801-27

.....  
Please respond by 11/12

8 Nov 01

U14679 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4795

snowflake

DAVID  
11B

November 8, 2001 5:47 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Scowcroft Commission

*Respond to*

334

I think you need to find out the following things:

1. How many meetings did the Scowcroft panel **have**?
2. What was the attendance by the panel **members** at those meetings?
3. How many outside witnesses did they **consult**?
4. How many times did they meet with **the** principal players involved-the Secretary of Defense and the **Director** of Central Intelligence?

You could come up with about five **or six** other questions. Why don't you do it and then let's submit that to the NSC **as the** sponsor of this commission. We will find that it was an inside, private **deal going on**.

I am disappointed that you **have kind of walked** us toward a half-day meeting with their commission, because **I think** it was most beneficial that they never even asked to see us or discuss with us. I'll be darned if I want to put our ideas into the **Scowcroft Commission**. I would like to see it left discredited. I wish you would get out of it, **and stop doing what you are doing on that**. It is a big mistake you are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110801-31

8 Nov 01

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U14681 02

snowflake

*Info 11/14/01*

November 9, 2001 11:48 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Requests for MilAir

*AS*

I have been talking with Larry Di Rita about the problem of the growing number of requests for military aircraft. It has been on an up tick. We are going to have to find a way to tap it down.

It is not possible to keep flying around all these special advisors-Dobbins, Danforth or the AID director. There has to be a limit. It is enormously expensive. Apart from that, the disruption to what we are trying to do is not trivial.

Most of those people are going places where commercial aircraft go. When I was special envoy for the Middle East, I usually flew commercial, unless I was going into a combat zone.

Thanks for your help.

DHR:dh  
110901-2

*10 Nov 01*

U14682 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4797

snowflake

Arnold 11/14  
1056

November 9, 2001 8:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Hat to Mrs. (b)(6)

335 SD

Please send a Secretary of Defense hat to Mrs. (b)(6) the woman in New Jersey whose husband said, "Let's roll." Joyce sat next to her at the President's speech to the Joint Session of Congress.

Please include a note saying it is from Joyce and me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110901-5

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

9 Nov 01

U14683 02

snoflake

November 9, 2001 2:52 PM

AW  
Dilla  
1105

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Terrorism

000.5

A couple of other thoughts on this definition of terrorism: To terrorize, you do not have to hit. You can just threaten to hit, and that terrorizes.

Second, nowhere in the definition does it talk about killing people. Why don't we try to polish this definition and see if we can improve it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/01/01 SecDef memo, Terrorism [110101-17]

DHR:dh  
110901-14

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

10 Nov 01

U14684 02

November 9, 2001 6:07 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meetings Next Week

*Complete  
11/13  
All Sked*

334 NSC

The President said he would like to meet again with Tommy Franks, either on a video or in person-a video as far as I'm concerned is fine. Before that, he wants to have a PC to discuss Tommy's proposals.

Please see if you can get the PC set for Wednesday, and the NSC set for Thursday. If you cannot, it will have to be the PC on Thursday and the NSC on Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110901-20

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

9 Nov 01

U14685 02

*Trump* 1:22 PM  
*11/14*  
*11/10/08*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 12, 200 1  
SUBJECT: **Authorization Bill**

Paul Wolfowitz and Powell Moore are going to get me a piece of paper on BRAC that shows how the Department would fare if the President vetoed the authorization bill and we had to live on the appropriation bill.

Vice President called today and said that the President is ready for a strong veto signal, and he will back me up if I send it. Wolfowitz supposedly has a letter coming. You and Powell should figure out when we want to issue the veto threat, if in fact that's what we end up doing.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
01001.11

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

110.01

12 Nov 01

U14686 02

snowflake

November 13, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Secretary White

Please set me up for 10 minutes with Secretary White-don't tell him, but give me a note that I want to talk to him about Em-on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111001-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.715D

13 Nov 01

U14687 02

snowflake

2:05 PM

*Retired  
W 11/12  
E 937*

TO: Doug Feith  
Powell Moore  
  
CC: Dick Myers  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
DATE: November 12, 2001  
  
SUBJECT: **Coalition**

*Alghamishan*

I spoke to Tommy Franks and told him that we need to connect the political side with respect to the coalition he is forming for Mazar with the liaison people. He said he would see that that got done.

Thank you.

*DHR/azn  
01001.07*  
*11/20/01*

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*12 Nov 01*

U14693 02

11/21  
1045

snowflake

11/12  
1015

November 12, 2001 4:51 PM

*Larry Di Rita*  
*11/21*  
TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Digital System Resources, Inc.

SECRET

004

There is a company, Digital System Resources, Inc., that is doing new systems every 18 months. Apparently (b)(6), who runs it, is a pretty smart fellow.

You might want to ask someone to talk to him and see if they can come up with anything that would be helpful to us.

Thanks.

*11/20/01*  
*Don —*  
*will do. I will have*  
*Ron Sega contact him*  
*Pete*

DHR:db  
11 1201-08

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12 Nov 01

U14697 02

snowflake

ACTION  
12/27/01  
1700 45

November 13, 2001 9:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Fort Sam Houston

12/17

323.3 Army

I was with a friend, (b)(6) yesterday. She suggested we sell off lots and houses at Fort Sam Houston to military people who want to retire. She says she thinks we could make a fortune.

Why don't you have someone look into it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111301-4

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12/17

See below -

I have Ray Du Bois thinking this through. With the BRAC fight behind us, he'll be coordinating the Department's activities as we begin the process.

13 NOV 01

11-L-0559/OSD 4806 014703 02

D. Rita

snowflake

November 13, 2001 10:42 AM

*INFD*  
*11/14*  
*1441*

333

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Crouch to Crawford

Condi said she would be happy to have Joseph and Crouch go to Crawford, but thinks there is not going to be anything happening. She thinks all the work will be done beforehand.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111301-13

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3 NOV 01

U14705 02

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*  
DATE: November 12, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Crawford, Texas**

I think that Dr. J.D. Crouch probably ought to be part of the Crawford contingent in case any of our defense subjects come up. Could you please see that that gets arranged?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
01001.10

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

bc: J.D. Crouch

Faxed  
2:05 pm  
11/12/01  
asm

1/5  
0930

snowflake

November 14, 2001 8:39 AM

332.1

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Flag

*Response below*

Someday I would like to buy one of the flags that flies over the Pentagon on the front flag pole. Please find out first what the size is-I want to see if it is too big for my place in Taos.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111401-5



Please respond by 11/30 *NEW*

*Sec Def -*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

*We fly 5' x 9' flags out front. The next size generally available -- which we don't regularly fly out front -- is 3' x 5'. We often run those up at the request of citizens who buy the flag.*

*[Handwritten signature]*

Larry Di Rita  
11/19

14NOV01

U14707 02

L-0559/03D/4809

August 20, 2001 12:54 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: OSD IT Networks

Please prepare this memo from Stenbit to me the attachment to go to all the senior people in the Pentagon, so that they will be aware of how bad it is.

I have signed the memo to Stenbit.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/17/01 Stenbit memo to SecDef re: OSD IT Networks

*413.51*

DHR:dh  
082001-36

*Copy 85M  
C. D. S. 8/20*

*Exec Sec -*

*Please draft*

*Cover memo from me  
to Agencies/Components/  
Military Departments  
promulgating the  
memo.*

*20 Aug 01*

*TRK  
Di Rita 8/22*

August 17, 2001 ~~4:10 PM~~

FOR: Secretary of Defense

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FROM: John Stenbit *for Lyn Wells 8/17/01*

*g*  
*8/17*

AUG 20 2001

SUBJECT: OSD IT Networks (INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY)

Attached is a summary of OSD IT networks. The present fragmented approach has significant weaknesses, both in effectiveness and security. There is a lot of history here, and plenty of blame to go around, but the fact remains that little change has been effected through the present approach.

We have been working with the components on a way ahead, but I have also attached a memo for you to direct the CIO to present you with recommendations by mid-September.

SECDEF - THIS IS THE PACKAGE ON IT  
I ASK PROMISED YOU. LYN WELLS HAS  
WORKED THIS FOR JOHN STENBIT.

RECOMMEND YOU SIGN ATTACHED  
ACTION MEMO.

August 17, 2001

Information Technology Support in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

- The Army maintains the Pentagon IT backbone, which includes OSD networks. Each OSD component (list attached) operates its own sub-net.
  - There is no centrally managed configuration control board. Components may erect their own firewalls and other security devices as they see fit.
- Each component provides its own IT support staff. According to Comptroller figures, OSD has 605 IT staff supporting 6,980 computer users. (One IT person for every 11.5 workers). The federal agency average is 40.6.
- The FY02 OSD IT Budget proposal is \$63.2 million. Of that, \$46.7 million (almost 75%) is dedicated to funding stovepiped systems that support only one component. Moreover, it probably is understated since components can add money from their internal funds.
  - This is at least \$9,054 per person. Gartner Group estimates IT spending per federal employee at \$6,658 in 2001. However, the financial services sector (with security requirements comparable to DoD's) spends an average of \$23,639 per employee.
- IT management with OSD is split:
  - The Information Technology Advisory Group (ITAG) is a consensus-based forum consisting of the IT managers from each OSD component.
  - The Information Technology Directorate (ITD) resides in C3I and has the responsibility to oversee "enterprise initiatives" yet has no budget authority.
  - The Information Technology Executive Committee (ITEC) consists of mid-grade SESs who provide direction and adjudicate issues that cannot be resolved at the ITAG level.
- In sum, the management structure for information technology issues within OSD is a group with no coercive power (the ITAG) reporting through a directorate with no budget authority (the ITD) to a committee that is neither low enough to see issues in detail nor high enough to effect real change (the ITEC). This split approach also has sub-optimized security within OSD networks, as evidenced by disappointing results on "red team" assessments.
- Due to the level of level of frustration with OSD IT in many quarters, the CIO chartered a Rapid Improvement Team in March 2001 to identify alternate management approaches for managing OSD IT. The team plans to report to the Deputy Secretary later this month.

## **OSD Components**

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  
C3I  
Comptroller  
Director, Administration and Management  
Executive Secretariat  
General Counsel  
Gulf War Illness, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployment  
Health Affairs  
Immediate Office of the SecDef  
Legislative Affairs  
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation  
Personnel and Readiness  
Policy  
Program Analysis & Evaluation  
Public Affairs  
Reserve Affairs  
Washington Headquarters Service

snowflake

Approved  
11/17  
1238

November 15, 2001 8:16 AM

TO: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Comms in Aircraft

311

I saw your memo of November 8 (attached). I do not think it is necessary to have 40 aircraft upgraded.

The only two people in the chain of command are the President and the Secretary of Defense. From there it goes directly to the CINC's. So the CINC's need to be in touch, SecDef needs to be in touch and the President needs to be in touch. That is about it.

Most of the rest of the aircraft are not in the position of having to be in continuous communication. Certainly the Chairman, for military advice, is appropriate, but beyond that I think it starts getting down pretty fast. If I were you, I would thin it out and get the right priorities.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1 1/08/01 ASD(C3I) memo to SecDef re: Aircraft [U18306/01]

DHR:dh  
111501-1



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 NOV 01

U14708 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4814

1720



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 NOV -8 PM 2:10

INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE

November 8, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I)

*JPS*

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
NOV 15 2001

SUBJECT: Aircraft

Getting the secure voice communications, secure faxes and video to work in the various SECDEF aircraft is being addressed and these efforts have been accelerated as a part of the counter terrorism supplemental or current budget review. This is what I see our doing:

- In the immediate timeframe, several steps are being taken to upgrade the computer and communications technology on the fleet of executive aircraft.
- However, the **crux** of the matter seems to be getting a handle on the entire leadership fleet of 40 aircraft, and managing them as an entity to upgrade and standardize their data and voice technology. The management approach would have to include:
  - Consolidating the efforts of a wide array of executive agents,
  - Coordinating with the Air Force program offices to ensure capabilities are successfully and effectively integrated,
  - Identifying contacts in the White House, State Department and other stakeholder Agencies, and
  - Working the budget and the politics of the budget.
- Consequently, I have had conversations with your front office communications center staff and alerted my key personnel that we will move quickly on this. I would look forward to pulling such an integrated program together ~~immediately~~.

*C3I WILL BE PROVIDING PLANS TO ACCELERATE CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENTS*

COORDINATION: None

|                       |       |
|-----------------------|-------|
| SEC ASSISTANT DI RITA | 11/13 |
| SR MA GIAMBASTIANI    | 11/13 |
| MA BUCCI              | 11/13 |
| EXECSEC WHITMORE      | 11/13 |

Prepared by: CAPT Craig Hanson, C3I, (b)(6)

snowflake

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: November 5, 2001

SUBJECT: **Aircraft**

I think we have got to do something to get the secure voice communications and secure faxes in the various SecDef aircrafts so they work. It is almost always difficult to accomplish anything. Why don't you look into it and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

11/13

*Response Attached*

**Larry Di Rita**

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

DHR/azn  
110501.19

11-L-0559/OSD/4816

snowflake

November 15, 2001 8:58 AM

12/14/2001

Afghanistan

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PR Person on the Ground

*COMPLETE*

*XAC*  
We ought to think about whether we need a PR person in with the Special Forces in Afghanistan and Kabul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111501-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U14710 02

15 Nov 01

12/4  
1300

Larry Di Rita  
12/4

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: TORIE  
DATE: December 3, 2001  
SUBJECT: PR Person on the Ground

We now have pool media (about 12) being rotated in with the USMC element near Kandahar. The coordination teams for the Coalition Press Information Centers (CPICs) in Bagram and Mazar are coming along (in fact, we have personnel on the ground in Bagram and will soon have some in Mazar).

Each of these things will facilitate more access to US Forces in-country. Special Forces continues to be a challenge, but we will continue to work it and are actively pursuing the notion you and GEN Franks discussed last week.

snowflake

11/17  
1758

November 15, 2001 9:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Commitments

I notice Dick Myers said we would supply military support for the World Cup in Korea and so forth, as we always have.

I think we better get a memo out to the defense establishment telling them they have to ratchet back all this extra support for everything and establish a new precedent at a lower level. We are just too stretched out around the world. We can't keep doing all that.

Please get something drafted up to that effect, and then I will talk to Myers about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111501-11

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

353.8

15 Nov 01

U14711 02

Armitage 11/20/01

November 16, 2001 8:56 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meetings with MoD of Korea

At the end of the meeting with the MoD of Korea, he said he had talked to Armitage about the F-I 5, and Armitage knew the details.

Specifically, it is very important to interoperability, and we benefit there.

The French are the closest competitors, and they want it very badly and are pressing hard.

There are three big issues:

- 1. Price competition.
- 2. Government guarantee that lines will be open for parts for 20 years .
- 3. Technology transfer.

Please follow up on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111601-2

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U14713 02

11/16  
1,200

Nov. 16, 2001  
MEMORANDUM  
To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Fr: Anthony R. Dolan  
Re: Adams quote

*AD*  
LARRY DI RITA  
11/16

SF 11/20/01-9

461

Per your request.

I never thought I had the time or interest in the McCullough book -- despite the fact so many recommended it. Reading it though has been rewarded many times over.

16 Nov 01

U14715 02

progress at school. "Can't you keep a steadier hand?" he admonished John Quincy in response to a hurried scrawl from the boy listing his course of study. It was essential to learn to write well, Adams lectured. When another letter from John Quincy arrived, this beautifully executed on lightly penciled guide lines, Adams wrote at *once* to praise him and how pleased he was. But unable to resist giving further advice, he urged him to waste no time learning to do flourishes with his pen. "Ornaments of this kind, if not done with great skill, are worse than none," declared Adams in his notably plain hand.

Living at the center of Paris, he was able to see more of the city than ever before. The busy Rue de Richelieu was one of the most fashionable streets and the Hôtel de Valois, at 17 Rue de Richelieu, a grand residence. John Quincy would remember it as "magnificent." Other sights were the gardens of the Palais Royal and the Tuileries, which, with their statues, Adams thought beautiful beyond compare. On days when his boys could be with him, they walked the gardens and much of the city. He took them on his rounds of the bookshops on the Left Bank and he toured the Jardin du Roi, with its celebrated natural history collections. ~~How long would it take Adams to visit, before America had seen such~~

"There is everything here that can inform understanding, enrich the taste, and indeed one would think that could purify the heart," wrote Adams of Paris to Abigail. Yet there were temptations. "Yet it must be remembered there is everything here, too, which can seduce, betray, corrupt and debauch," and in order to see to his duties, he must guard himself.

The conflict between the appeal of the arts and the sense of duty were the product of a luxury-loving (and thus corrupt) foreign society. It played heavily on his mind. Delightful as it was to stroll through the streets of Paris, enticing as were science and the arts, he, John Adams, had a duty to do, a public trust to uphold. The science of government was the art of negotiation must take precedence.

Then, in a prophetic paragraph that would be quoted for generations within the Adams family and beyond, he wrote:

I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics

mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture in order to give their children a right to study paintings, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry, and porcelain.

How Americans deported themselves in Europe was a serious matter, Adams's convictions stemming more from patriotism than prudishness. Much more was at stake than one's own pleasure.

When a young New England merchant named Elkanah Watson, the son of a friend, wrote to inquire what sort of manners he should cultivate in anticipation of touring Europe, Adams's answer went far to explain his own conduct under the circumstances and the kind of guidance he was giving his sons.

You tell me, sir, you wish to cultivate your manners before you begin your travels . . . permit me to take the liberty of advising you to cultivate the manners of your own country, not those of Europe. I do not mean by this that you should put on a long face, never dance with the ladies, go to a play, or take a game of cards. But you may depend upon this, that the more decisively you adhere to a manly simplicity in your dress, equipage, and behavior, the more you devote yourself to business and study, and the less to dissipation and pleasure, the more you will recommend yourself to every man and woman in this country whose friendship or acquaintance is worth having or wishing. There is an urbanity without ostentation or elegance which will succeed everywhere and at all times. You may abuse this freedom, on account of my friendship for your father and consequently for you, and because I know that some young gentlemen have come to Europe with different sentiments and have consequently injured the character of their country as well as their own both here [and at home].

When the boys were getting on splendidly, he assured their mother. Her son Charles was "hardy as flint," "speaks French like a hero." "The delightful little fellow. I love him too much."

As before, Adams remained reluctant to profess his love for her, though it was from the heart that he wrote:

David McCullough

*Unconquered*

*Simon & Schuster*

NEW YORK LONDON TORONTO

SYDNEY SINGAPORE

snowflake

*Alan Dilke*  
0712

November 19, 2001 10:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
cc: Tony Dolan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outreach

*000.7*

I would like to spend a couple of hours with Daily and Joanou. Why don't you see who else ought to be involved, and let's get it set up through Tony Dolan.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/14/01 Dolan memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
111901-S

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*19 Nov 01*

U14719 02

Nov. 14, 2001

MEMORANDUM

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

Fr: Anthony R. Dolan



Nowhere is your collegial management style or tendency to roundtable issues with smart people more important than to your message strategy. Your liking for the outreach encounters – “the Dubertstein group etc” -- indicates your own sense of this.

At the invitation of <sup>Torje</sup>~~ASPIA~~, Peter Dailey and Phil Joanou spent three days here several weeks back and met with a cross section of public affairs, public diplomacy and policy officials.

They were impressed by what they encountered. And they, in turn, deeply impressed people here. I won't attempt a briefing on the meetings but, looking back, I do see how quickly they were to jump on stuff that others of us saw only weeks later. In any case, to see them interact was to marvel. They are among the few who can bridge the world of communications and politics and diplomacy.

Since their departure Richard Perle, Powell Moore and Ken DeGraffenried (among others) have made inquiries about their return and sought to emphasize the urgent need to involve them in a long range planning and the administration effort to present its global message.

Anyway, while it's fine you have lots of us staff geniuses around offering up advice, I just think it important you have a chance to do relaxed, long-range cogitations with people who have something of your accomplishments and breath of experience and maturity of outlook. And who, in talking to mass audiences, are unrivalled.

(Dailey's and Joanou's trans-cultural abilities come as no surprise. Besides organizing the November groups in 72 and 80 and, then, reorganizing major companies like Memorex, Dailey was, as you know, ambassador to Ireland, special ambassador for public diplomacy on the cruise-Pershing missiles and Bill Casey's chief troubleshooter for 3 years. Casey swore by him. And, of course, I remember the first talk between you and Dailey in 96 at the Chinese place on Pennsylvania near Georgetown. Similarly, Joanou was one of the most prized CEOs of the Inter-public companies for a reason; I have never seen the like of his ability to go right to the nerve center of a dispute, or find an adversary's jugular. or just to question someone he is trying to help until he draws out what they are really trying to communicate. )

Having these two back for a day or two and then meeting with them might be useful. And in the back of your mind you might consider this a possible start to a small group of your favorite message-presbyters who meet with you occasionally.

11-L-0559/OSD/4826

snowflake

*Handwritten:* 11/20/19 21

November 19, 2001 11:49 AM

000000

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Agencies

I am terribly disappointed that we are not addressing the Defense agencies the way we should.

It is clear that Aldridge, Dov and Paul Wolfowitz are not going to do it. I simply must do it. You have to take the lead and get it done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/14/01 Krieg memo to DepSecDef

DHR:dh  
111901-16

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

1906161

U14720 02

November 14, 2001

LARRY,  
FYI  
KJK

Note to the Deputy Secretary

From: Ken Krieg

Subject: Defense Agencies

Heard the Secretary was asking about defense agencies today. A lot is going on even before the in depth reviews begin.

Just a few notes attached.

In Aldridge's world (briefed last month at the SEC meeting)

- Meeting 15% management headquarters reduction
- Continuing to drive down workforce size in Defense Contract Management Agency
- DLA net savings over POM of \$672MM
- Cost and inventory levels continue to drop while supply availability rises.

SEC will be launching in depth review of DISA, DLA and DFAS in the next 45 days. ~~Structure of review process attached.~~ Now getting contractor support lined up to be able to drive the detailed reviews.

Need more. let me know.

11/15

SecDef-

Just FYI. The

large agencies (DLA, Def Contract Agency, etc.)

Under Aldridge review are

moving down. So are those

under Eschheim authority. No one

at the budget meeting the other day knew about the address in detail. D/K/K

11-E-055970-SD74828

snowflake

November 19, 2001 12:08 PM

OBE  
11/15/01

Afghanistan

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Maps

I don't know what to do with this material from Bill Thompson. Why don't you have someone in the Pentagon take a look at it and tell me what they think of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 1/15/01 fax and maps

DHR:dh  
111901-19

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

190001

U14722 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4829

To: (b)(6)

PH 61-7-55922843. We are 15 hrs + your time.  
From: Bill Thompson  
US Geological Survey  
Reston VA 20192

Date: November 15, 2001

If possible, please send me your phone number, as I would like to speak with you about your work and, specifically, your Rumsfeld

Reply by email to: (b)(6)

COPY TO  
GEN. FRANKS

COPY ALSO  
SENT BY  
AUTHOR TO  
GEORGE  
TENET

TO BILL THOMPSON.

Nice to hear from you. I am sending more maps + up dates. Bin Laden + Mullah Omar are in the same tunnel T2. an air field is near, by he could make a dash. I trust this info will help get him far you.

(b)(6)

Nov. 15 2001 07:59AM P2


PHONE NO. :

FROM : Panasonic FAX SYSTEM

16-11-01

MULLAH OMAR  
+ BIN LADEN  
ARE HERE.

OMAR IS ILL + MAY  
TRY A MOVE IN 2 DAYS  
OR 5644X4.



AIR FIELD

DR AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI  
IS HERE  
THIS MAN  
PLANS TO STAY

TO MCD. RUMSFIELD  
S60 OF D GREENCE

SENDER PETER TANG  
YA 61 7 55922843

FAX NO (b)(6)

28


3

11-L-0559/OSD/4831

Nov. 16 2001 09:02PM PS

PHONE NO. :

FROM : Panasonic FAX SYSTEM



29

4

11-L-0559/OSD/4832

TO 25-10-04  
MR G. TENET  
or MR DRUMSFELD  
RE: AXON 16

1/13



30

(b)(6)

OSAMA BIN LADEN  
DESTINATION PLOT  
FOR THE LAST 7 DAYS.  
HE TRAVELING BY ROAD.

(b)(6)

138 ZFI HAD A  
MAP I COULD  
Central Asia  
TUNNEL.  
I CAN DETEC  
IN MOUNTAIN.


5

(b)(6)

E NO. :

TO SEC OF DEFENCE.  
MR DONALD RUMFELD.

MAP 4.



November 19, 2001 7:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Relationships

*Y 11/19*

*BUCCI SP3 12*

*MEWBOURNE DA  
ANY THOUGHTS*

*092*

I have made requests of people in the countries I have visited. I am now seeing cables come in saying that the ambassadors are following up, and that requests we have made are being granted. Uzbekistan just agreed, for example, to open the land bridge.

*ON HOW TO TICKLE TO*

*MAKE SURE FEITH*

It strikes me that it would be a nice, wise, thoughtful forward-looking thing to do to send letters or cables to those people I met with thanking them for following up and moving forward on things that are helping us. We are going to have other things we will need, and the time to knit those relationships is when you don't need it.

*DOES!*

Thanks. *Feith has not done so well with his letters. (I'm sure he's not the only one who hasn't)*  
*He's not really sending letters.*

DHR:dh  
111901-1

*DR 11/20*

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U14723 02

*11/20/01*

snowflake

Answer  
11/20  
10:46

November 20, 2001 8:19 AM

350.09

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kasich Group

What do we do about John Kasich's group? We have to get a connection, both the financial and the technical side.

We cannot invite people like that to come from all across the country down here and not have some follow-on plan for them. It isn't fair. It isn't smart.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112001-4

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U14724 02

10 Nov 01

snawflake

Ⓟ Action  
11/27  
0656

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DH*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

I noticed that the State Department has received 22,000 pieces of information on the whereabouts of UBL.

You need to set up a connection between the DoD and the State Dept. so that we get all that information and we have people who can process it. We don't want to have it just sit over State, nor do we want it to go exclusively to the Agency, which may or may not have the resources to deal with it and they may or may not have the people to do something about it if they do deal with it.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.02

~~Attach:~~

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

000.5

2310001

U14730 02

snowflake

~~SECRET~~

November 13, 2001 10:34 AM

Agan  
12/12  
1441

Done  
OBE 2/2  
1500 05

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Emergency Destruction Procedures

452 P

Here is what I asked be done to make sure we have the emergency destruction capability required if an EP-3 goes down.

This is a great big, thick file. It doesn't help me at all. My impression is they are studying the dickens out of this, then they are going to stick it into the requirements process and then no one will ever fund it, because it is not sexy enough for them.

I want you to tickle this for whenever it is appropriate several months from now and make sure we get it into the budget process.

Ticket  
See SRD  
File

Thanks.

Attach.

08/03/01 CJCS Memo to SecDef, CM-1276-01, Emergency Destruction Procedures  
06/19/01 CJCS Memo to SecDef, CM-1226-01, Classified Material Destruction [U11172/01]

DHR:dh  
111301-10

13 Nov 01

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U14740 02

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT:  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/4838

snowflake

December 5, 2001 7:19 AM

7/6  
12/13  
2320

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Help from (b)(6)

COMPLETE 12/13

231.2

I saw (b)(6) last night. He is a very smart, able guy and a good friend of mine.

He offered to help you in any way he could privately and, needless to say, without compensation. You might keep that in mind. He is a good one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120501-S

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

S Dec 01

U14745 02

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Tdrie  
DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Help from (b)(6)

I've scheduled a meeting with (b)(6) just after the first of the year. I hope to use his talent for the duration of the war. You're right, he's a good one.

12/11

SecDef -

We have him coming over for lunch sometime in next couple weeks. Should Tavis ; Powell join ?

J. White

snowflake

December 4, 2001 5:40 PM

ATTN  
12/5  
1742

PAKISTAN

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Talking Points

*COMPLETE*  
*Phone call @ 1040*  
*5 Dec 01*

Please make sure you get me the talking points and set an appointment for the phone call with President Musharref of Pakistan as soon as it is possible to do it. The subject is our support of enforcing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120401-g

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

4 Dec 01

U14747 02

2/5  
12/30

snowflake

8:05 AM

ACM on  
12/7  
1086

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: December 4, 2001  
SUBJECT: CIA

Afghanistan

I told Tenet I needed to get filled in on what they have working by way of going forward in Afghanistan by way of a "Way Ahead" plan. He said they would get Hank and they would brief me.

Thank you.

12/6 *[Signature]*

*[Signature]* Cathy M-

Let's schedule this.  
Work with Tenet  
scheduler. Don't

DHR/azn  
120401.06

Please respond by: 5:45 pm 12/6/01

*cc  
[unclear]*

Think this  
is what the  
lunch 12/7 is about.

Di Rita

4 Dec 01

U14749 02

snowflake

December 4, 2001 12:43 PM

INFO  
JS 12/4  
19/2

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/Cambone

000.7150

Please have Steve Cambone see me-and give me this paper for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/04/01 SecDef notes

DHR:dh  
120401-6

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

4 Dec 01

U14750 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4844

12/9/01 Stebit-

C3 & I need to be together -  
Last Admin tried & changed mind & went back

Cont letter Letter should have been 1 hour + Stebit

Remind other from ~~the~~ person -

- Stebit not in loop - Need hear  
my concerns on intel -

Stebit is Joci's counterpart. Let be it not  
in meeting

Talk to Hines & S.C. on Stebit -

- ① Synergy between C3 & I -
- ② Must include Intel
- ③ Stebit can put people in A-1s in Phil -  
fact.
- ④ Admin for Austria + P I dumb -  
real problem is we only culture they have at  
DOD, ATTN - They receive org -  
Culture get mad if not well served - but also  
help to their return better  
CIA want money who culture come!  
Intel has all Austria in world - but feel DOD  
needs to 34-L-0559/OSD/4845

snowflake

Action  
to 12/19  
1919

December 3, 2001 2:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Humanitarian Delivery

Afghanistan

Please screw your head into the Afghan children's fund. Apparently Condi is all excited about getting DoD to send an airplane filled with blankets and food purchased with money from the children's fund.

Please get back to me later today and tell me what kind of rules and procedures we have and whether it breaks precedent. It seems to me like a reasonable thing for us to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120301-46

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

3 Dec 01

U14756 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4846

snoflake

December 3, 2001 12:33 PM

1/1/01  
12/1/01  
1755

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ahmed Abdul Rahman

Here is a letter from Ramsey Clark. He can't even spell my name right.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 1/30/01 Jabara/Stewart/Clark ltr to SecDef re: Ahmed Abdul Rahman

*001.5*

DHR:dh  
120301-35

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*3 Dec 01*

U14758 02

SECDEF HASSEEN

*12/1*

RAMSEY CLARK

DEC 03 2001

LAWRENCE: W. SCHILLING

LAW OFFICES

36 EAST 12TH STREET  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

(b)(6)

FAX (b)(6)

November 30, 2001

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

BY FAX (b)(6)  
FEDERAL EXPRESS

Re: Ahmed Abdul Rahman  
son of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman

De&r Mr. Secretary:

The undersigned have been authorized by the family at the request of Ahmed Abdul Rahman to consult with and act as his lawyers if he is to be interrogated, or taken in custody by the united States. The media reports Ahmed Abdul Rahman has been taken in custody by an unidentified group of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

If the United-states government through any of its agencies, directly, or indirectly, seeks to interview Ahmed Abdul Rahman, or takes him into custody, we ask you to notify us immediately and to withhold any communication with, or interrogation of Ahmed Abdul Rahman until arrangements can be made for one, or more, of us to be present.

Our names, office, home and fax numbers are:

Lynne Stewart: Off. (b)(6) : Home, (b)(6) Fax, (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Abdeen Yabara: Off. (b)(6) Home, (b)(6) fax: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Ramsey Clark: Office phone and fax are on this letterhead, home phone: (b)(6)

Sincerely,

*Abdeen Yabara* / *Lynne Stewart* / *Ramsey Clark*  
Abdeen Yabara / Lynne Stewart / Ramsey Clark

12/4/01

snowflake

Copy Done 12/7/01

December 3, 2001 9:41 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Scientific Expertise

Copy order all below

Here is a note from Rich Haver. What ought we to be doing about this?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/12/01 Haver memo to SecDef re: University Researchers

DHR:dh  
12030147

Copy to Pete Aldridge  
Larry Di Rita  
12/7

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Sir -

I agree that we do not make the use of our scientific talent the way others did in the past. There are some things we can do immediately.

- Focus the Defense Science Board (Schweitzer) on repairing the links
- Ask Pete Aldridge to bring scientific & engineering leaders into his R&D deliberations.
- Ask Ron Deja (DDR+E) to do likewise
- Sponsor a program for S&T fellows at major universities.

Over the long term, revitalizing the President's Scientific Advisory Board would be helpful. Let me know what I can do to help.

400.112

3 Dec 01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Rich Haver *RH*

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH LEADING UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS AND RESEARCHERS

1. Admiral Bobby Ray Inman also raised a conversation he had last week with Don Evans. Inman asked Mr. Evans to consider recommending to the President a meeting with the 52 major research Universities.
2. He noted that there was no Vandever Bush or Albert Einstein for the President to seek for scientific expertise. He noted the vacancy in the White House and the apparent lack of a long-term scientific element to the war on terrorism. He suggests that the heads of these major centers of scientific research and teaching be asked to pool their talents to combat terrorism.
3. He said he suggested chemical and biological war solutions could lead the list of issues, but they might also include information management and a number of other issues. Inman believed that such a meeting would send strong signals to the citizens that the administration was taking a very long-term look at the war and solutions to terrorism.
4. He also noted that the scientific community believed that the new administration did not start out with a strong position on technology. Only the controversial ballistic missile defense effort appeared to place science and technology at the forefront. A meeting with the most important scientific segments of the nation would change that atmosphere and charge the universities with taking a leading role in the war on terrorism.
5. I asked if I could, report this conversation to the Secretary and his response was that what he had in mind when he dialed my number.

December 6, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense  
Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Presidential Meeting with University Presidents

You received the attached note from Rich Haver concerning a conversation he had with Adm. Bob Inman. Bob suggests that the President meet with 52 Presidents of major research universities to discuss a long-term research effort on combating terrorism. You asked Steve Cambone and I "what we ought to be doing about this?"

I spoke with Bob Inman today to ensure that I understood the proposition.

I think this is a good idea and fits into what we have already started with the Broad Area Announcement (BAA) soliciting ideas on combating terrorism. We now have in place a mechanism, under the leadership of DDR&E, for vetting the ideas that are developed by the public, universities and private industry.

With the President's leadership, the universities might be willing structure new research efforts, encourage seminars and modify course content to address this issue. All of these would be helpful to marshal the talents of the universities in our interests.

ACTION: If asked, my recommendation is for you to support the idea.

11-L-0559/OSD/4851

Q

SECDEF HAS S  
November 12, 2001

DEC 03 2001

g 11/12

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Rich Haver *RH*

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH LEADING UNIVERSITY  
PRESIDENTS AND RESEARCHERS

1. Admiral Bobby Ray Inman also raised a conversation he had last week with Don Evans. Inman asked Mr. Evans to consider recommending to the President a meeting with the 52 major research Universities.
2. He noted that there was no Vandever Bush or Albert Einstein for the President to seek for scientific expertise. He noted the vacancy in the White House and the apparent lack of a long-term scientific element to the war on terrorism. He suggests that the heads of these major centers of scientific research and teaching be asked to pool their talents to combat terrorism.
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5. I asked if I could report this conversation to the Secretary and his response was that what he had in mind when he dialed my number.

snowflake

August 14, 2001 4:07 PM

SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
10  
/01

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

110

Why don't we go for inflation-adjusted numbers? They are higher and, they give us more flexibility.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/10/01 Comptroller info memo to SecDef re: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

DHR:dh  
081401-3

108044

August 7, 2001 11:23 AM

snowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

I read your memo on prior notification reprogrammings. What would the actual numbers be if you just went up by inflation?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/27/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 15 2001

*8/13*

DHR:dh  
080701-13

*Response Next Under  
D.Hite*

11-L-0559/OSD/4854

*8/14  
1457*

INFO MEMO

August 10, 2001, 10:00 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 15 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

- Recently, I provided you a memo outlining my intentions to try and get reprogramming thresholds increased (I have attached the memo). These thresholds have not been raised/adjusted in twenty years, even for inflation.
- If we just increased the reprogramming thresholds for inflation, the new limits are shown below:

|                               | <u>CURRENT THRESHOLDS</u> | (As of FY 01)<br><u>INFLATED THRESHOLDS</u> |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| - Procurement:                | \$10M                     | \$18M                                       |
| - RDT&E:                      | \$4M                      | \$7M  |
| - Military Personnel:         | \$10M                     | \$23M                                       |
| - Operations and Maintenance: | \$15M                     | \$20M                                       |

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Larry Lanzillotta

(b)(6)

INFO MEMO

July 27, 2001, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

- I am working on a strategy to approach the Congressional Oversight Committees to raise threshold reprogramming limits, for transfer of funds between appropriations titles, after FY 2002 authorization and appropriation action is completed (current thresholds attached).
- Increasing these thresholds will provide the Department additional flexibility in executing its programs. These thresholds have not been raised/adjusted in twenty years, not even for inflation.
- I would try to get the limits as high as possible (ideally 20% of the program amount), but, in any event, to increase them to cover twenty years of inflation. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement reprogramming limits need to be increased by at least a factor of two to account for inflation. I also believe that for the Operations and Maintenance and Military Pay accounts higher limits will have a positive effect on readiness by enabling the Department to meet requirements in a more timely manner.
- The average reprogramming request takes approximately 90 days to process and gain congressional approval.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Wayne A. Schroeder, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4856

CURRENT  
REPROGRAMMING THRESHOLDS

- Procurement: \$10M
- Research, Development, Test and Evaluation: \$4M
- Military Personnel: \$10M
- Operations and Maintenance: \$15M

snowflake

August 16, 2001 1:58 PM

NOT SEEN  
10/10/01

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information Assurance Annual Report

Please take a look at this note from Lin Wells and the requirement to do the report.  
Do you think the cost figures are correct? Is it total costs?  
Do you think we ought to try to get out of producing the report?  
Thanks.

Attach.  
7/3 1/01 Wells info memo to **SecDef** re: Information Assurance Annual Report

DHR:dh  
081601-27

413.51

16 AUG 30



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE

July 31, 2001, 11:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*[Handwritten initials]*

*g8/1*

FROM: LINTON WELLS II, ACTING A8D(C3I)

*[Handwritten signature]*

*D. Rita*

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Information Assurance Annual Report

- You asked how much it costs to print the Information Assurance Annual Report.
  - There were no direct costs for printing the report or cutting compact discs. The National Security Agency provided these services at no direct cost as it already owned the equipment and employed the people involved in the production process.
  - Commercial color printing costs approximately seven cents per page. At that rate, the cost of printing the report would be \$18.48 per copy or \$11,088 for the 600 copy run.
  - Commercial black & white printing costs approximately three cents per page. Had the report been produced in black & white the cost would have been \$7.92 per copy or \$4,752 for the 600 copy run.
  - Normally C3I produces its reports in black & white. However, since the Information Assurance document would eventually be distributed beyond Congress to the Information Assurance Community and the public at large, we produced the report in color.
- For comparison, the annual Information Technology Congressional Justification Book (CJB), a black & white document, costs \$12,000 to prepare and distribute, this includes 45 hard copy sets and 270 CDs.
- In the future, and unless otherwise directed, we will produce the Information Assurance documents, and other similar reports, in black & white and will continue to publish them to the web when appropriate.

*LIKE CIA,  
THEY HAVE  
THEIR OWN  
PRINTING  
FACILITY*

Prepared by Jeffrey Gaynor, (b)(6)



*16  
123*

snowflake

August 7, 2001 11:23 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

~~SECRET~~ HAS BEEN

SEP 7 2001

118

I read your memo on prior notification reprogrammings. What would the actual numbers be if you just went up by inflation?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/27/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080701-13

7 AUG 30

INFO MEMO

July 27, 2001, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Prior Notification Reprogrammings

- I am working on a strategy to approach the Congressional Oversight Committees to raise threshold reprogramming limits, for transfer of funds between appropriations titles, after FY 2002 authorization and appropriation action is completed (current thresholds attached).
- Increasing these thresholds will provide the Department additional flexibility in executing its programs. These thresholds have not been raised/adjusted in twenty years, not even for inflation.
- I would try to get the limits as high as possible (ideally 20% of the program amount), but, in any event, to increase them to cover twenty years of inflation. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement reprogramming limits need to be increased by at least a factor of two to account for inflation. I also believe that for the Operations and Maintenance and Military Pay accounts higher limits will have a positive effect on readiness by enabling the Department to meet requirements in a more timely manner,
- The average reprogramming request takes approximately 90 days to process and gain congressional approval.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Wayne A. Schroeder (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/4861

CURRENT  
REPROGRAMMING THRESHOLDS

- Procurement: \$ 10M
- Research, Development, Test and Evaluation: \$4M
- Military Personnel: \$1 OM
- Operations and Maintenance: \$15M

snowflake

Action  
12/1  
1710

December 1, 2001 9:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Minister Hoon Conversation

Afghanistan

Please let me see the memo on my conversation with Minister Hoon. I take it there was someone on the line in Cables listening in.

The discussion involved:

1. Uzbekistan
2. A possibility of security in Kabul, and that I would talk to Tommy Franks about it.
3. The issue of how to use the British forces, whether or not the Royal Marines could be used in Camp Rhino, for example.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120101-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

1 Dec 01

U14783 02

snowflake

December 1, 2001 9:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 cc: Ray Du Bois  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>3</sup> A  
 SUBJECT: Outplacement Service

COMPLETE

12/27  
16/15

230.02

230.02

When I was at Searle and General Instrument, I used an outplacement service anytime I had to reduce people.

Why don't we do that with respect to BRACs—if people have to be laid off. why don't we use an outplacement service? It is humane, rational, helpful and not terribly expensive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120101-7

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12/27

Response Attached.  
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

1 Dec 01

U14785 02



Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installations & Environment)

TO: Secretary of Defense

THROUGH: E.C. Aldridge

*12/21/01*

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.

*Ray DuBois* 12.20.01

*12/27*

DATE: December 20, 2001

*DRITA*

SUBJECT: "Outplacement Service" Snow Flake

- The Department has previously contracted for outplacement services at the installation level to assist individuals affected by civilian personnel reductions. We may want to use outplacement services in the upcoming BRAC round, especially if we execute closure on an expedited basis.
- The only restriction on authorized activity was a limitation on contractors prohibiting the charging of "finder fees" for successful placements. That limitation is contained in a 1991 policy memorandum signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).
- During previous BRAC efforts, the Department utilized voluntary buy-outs and the Priority Placement Program, which placed appropriately qualified individuals in available positions elsewhere within the Department. The Department also partnered with other Federal agencies, principally the Departments of Labor and Education, to provide job retraining and placement services.
- Congress also provided relief to authorize lump sum severance pay, continuation of health insurance coverage, and annual leave restoration, among other initiatives, to assist displaced members of the civilian workforce.
- The combined effects of these efforts, and the longer transition period to separation compared to private sector personnel reductions, reduced the requirement for directly contracting for outplacement services during prior BRAC rounds.

snowflake

SET 12/11/01 0700  
December 1, 2001 9:16 AM

12/12/01  
0900

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Press Rules

008.7

What do you say we work up a list of "Pentagon Press Room Rules," voluntarily subscribed to, and then describe what a question is, what a follow-up question is and the like.

Thanks.

COMPLETE

DHR:dh  
120101-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

12/12

1 Dec 01

U14787 02

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Tofie  
DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Press Rules

With great appreciation for the intent of your suggestions, I think such rules are unnecessary at this time.

Most of the reporters in our Briefing Room work pretty hard to be efficient and respectful.

As was the case today with Bob Franken, CNN, there are notable exceptions.

snowflake

November 30, 2001 7:56 AM

INFO  
12/1/01  
1602

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Plans for NATO Trip

333 SID

When I go to NATO, let's plan on laying the groundwork a bit for the worldwide campaign on terrorism and talk about terrorist states and networks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
113001-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

30 Nov 01

U14789 02

11/30  
1515

snowflake

11/30  
Larry Di Rita

Di Rita  
12/2

November 29, 2001 3: 19 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (1)  
SUBJECT: Intel

350.09

Before you go forward organizationally on the intel matter we discussed, I think we ought to talk to the Chiefs about it and make sure the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the individual Chiefs have a sense of what we are thinking about doing. We don't want to get too far ahead of them.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
112901-21

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Larry Di Rita

Sir -

I am scheduled to see the C/CS tomorrow (12/1).

I will approach each of the Chiefs.

I've asked Haver to approach Scooter Libby uniformly so that he is aware of the reason for the letter to the Hill requesting the Undersecretary slot.

You are scheduled to see Tenet on 7 Dec.

I'll have a full report for you by 6 Dec of where everyone stands.

SC  
11/30

29 Nov 01

snowflake

Actual R 11/30  
1A07

November 29, 2001 3:17 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Dutch

I guess you are going to get back to me with a piece of paper as to what I should do with the Dutch MoD on the Joint Strike Fighter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112901-20

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*NETHERLANDS*

*29 NOV 01*

U14792 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4871

snowflake

D 12/4  
09/12

November 29, 2001 11:35 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Life Expectancy

DR  
*(Handwritten signature/initials)*

*See response attached*

I am told the life expectancy for women in Afghanistan is lower than for men and that it is probably the only country in the world where women are expected to live fewer years than men.

Please see if that is true. Apparently it is on the Internet. I don't know that that makes it true, however.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112901-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*At 11:35 AM 12/1/01*

U14798 02

November 30, 2001 7:00 PM

**TO:** SecDef  
**FROM:** Torie Clarke  
**SUBJECT:** Life Expectancy

Following up on your note asking for confirmation of the information about the life expectancy of Afghan women. Recent State Department fact sheet estimated the life expectancy is 45.1 years for women, 46.6 years for men. World Health Organization says that death rate from pregnancy-related causes is second highest in world (just behind Sierra Leone) due to religious rule (male doctors cannot examine women) and lack of adequate alternative health care systems and training.

11-L-0559/OSD/4873

snowflake

November 29, 2001 11:27 AM

*OK  
11/29  
1231*

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: List of Casualties for Media

*See attached*

Let's get a list (not with names) of those who have died, with a brief description as to the circumstances-like the two people killed in the helicopter in Pakistan and the sailor who fell overboard. We also need the number of wounded with the event and the nature of the wound-fragmentation, broken bones from parachuting, etc.

We ought to have a good list. At some point, we are going to be asked, and to not know is to not care-and we do care.

*1/20/01*

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/29/01 USA Today article

DHR:dh  
112901-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*10077001*

U14799 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4874

ic of the Taliban reaction to other strikes and suggests to us that some important people had been inside," one official said.

According to U.S. intelligence officials, at least seven senior bin Laden aides and several hundred of his most loyal fighters have been killed in the war in Afghanistan so far.

The most significant terrorist leader reported killed so far was Mohammed Atef, considered bin Laden's principal operational planner. He is said to have died in a U.S. airstrike on a house outside Kabul in mid-November.

Two others ranked among the terrorist network's top 20 members -- Mohammed Salah and Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad -- are believed to have died in a U.S. bombing attack near Khowst in early November.

*Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.*

USA Today  
November 29, 2001

Pg. 8

### 9. Casualty Numbers May Start To Climb

By Andrea Stone, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Perhaps as unusual as the CIA's acknowledgment Wednesday that it lost one of its covert agents is that the civilian officer was the first acknowledged U.S. combat death in Afghanistan. After nearly 8 weeks of airstrikes and clandestine special operations on the ground, not a single member or the U.S. military is known to have died in hostile action inside Afghanistan. Yet, with the landing this week of more than 1,000 Marines at an airstrip near Kandahar, officials are warning that the war has entered a more dangerous phase and more casualties could be coming.

U.S. forces and their allies seeking to topple remaining Taliban strongholds will confront adversaries "who are perfectly willing to tie grenades around their bodies, blow up themselves and whoever else happens to be standing around," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in

Tampa on Tuesday. "We have to recognize that it's not over, it's going to take some time, it's going to be difficult, it's going to be dangerous."

If military casualties have been relatively few, the same cannot be said for the press corps covering the war. Eight foreign journalists have been killed, more than died in the longer Kosovo conflict. News organizations, concerned that the Taliban's collapse is plunging the country into lawlessness, are pulling journalists out.

"Afghanistan is not a pacified country. Everybody's got a gun, and there are bandits around," said Michael Vickers, a former CIA officer and retired Army Green Beret who is a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "Journalists are about as plump a target as you can get. They're unarmed, and they've got money and hi-tech equipment."

During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 148 U.S. servicemembers died in battle. In non-hostile action, 151 died and 467 were wounded.

Retired Army general Wesley Clark is not surprised there are so few casualties in the war so far.

"This is modern war. It's not like Desert Storm," said Clark, who was a NATO commander and oversaw the 1999 Kosovo War in which there were no combat casualties in 78 days of airstrikes. "You go into it with your nose first, slowly. You get your grip. You get others to fight for you. And you use airpower as much as you can and stay as high as you can."

The closest call so far may have been this week during the fierce battle to quell an uprising by Taliban prisoners near Mazar-e-Sharif. Five US soldiers were injured, one seriously, by a misfired US bomb, according to the Defense Department. The five are at a US military hospital in Germany.

The only known deaths associated with combat operations occurred Oct. 19, when two Army Rangers were killed when their Blackhawk helicopter crashed in Pakistan while flying in support of a commando raid inside Afghanistan.

*Keep it Bold and Del*  
Among the commandos, two suffered broken bones and 23 others suffered "very minor jump injuries" when they parachuted onto an airfield near Kandahar, the Pentagon said.

Other casualties since the military campaign started Oct. 7:

An Air Force master sergeant became the first death of Operation Enduring Freedom on Oct. 10 when he was killed in a forklift accident in the Persian Gulf emirate of Qatar.

Four crewmembers were injured Nov. 2 when their helicopter crash-landed inside Afghanistan as they were attempting to rescue a sick U.S. soldier. An accompanying helicopter rescued the injured crewmen.

A sailor on the USS Kitty Hawk in the Arabian Sea fell overboard earlier this month and was declared dead.

New York Times  
November 29, 2001

### 10. Newer Technology Is Shielding Pilots

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 — Each day in Afghanistan, American commandos spot enemy targets miles away using binoculars equipped with laser range-finders. They relay the coordinates by satellite phones or laptop computers to warplanes circling high overhead. Then they get back on their horses to ride to the next target.

The air war, now seven weeks old, has been waged using a pastiche of Civil War and Star Wars techniques. But more than anything, senior Pentagon officials said, the war has proven that advances in technology since the Persian Gulf war and the Kosovo campaign of 1999 have made it more possible than ever to strike an enemy from relative safety miles above the ground.

The 2,000-pound bombs guided by lasers and Global Positioning Systems are more accurate than those of the past and are being dropped from more types of aircraft. The targeting instruments that enable Special Operations forces to pinpoint enemy positions are more portable and precise. And

pilotless aircraft are providing sharp video images of moving targets within milliseconds to command centers thousands of miles away.

Most important, senior military officials said, a constellation of sensors that is almost constantly aloft over Afghanistan — from Boeing 707's carrying ground-target radars, to unmanned Predators and Global Hawks with long-range camera lenses, to reconnaissance satellites high above the earth — have provided a sharper, more continuous picture of the battlefield than any commander has ever had.

From the Pentagon's point of view, the result is a more antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo, where only one American aircraft was shot down. In Afghanistan, American pilots have rarely needed to fly within range of enemy antiaircraft fire. It has also meant fewer civilian casualties, the Pentagon said, although there have been reports of bombs hitting Afghan hospitals, relief depots, homes and a mosque. And it has reduced the need for American combat troops, so far.

But already, there are signs that this war will end up being fought on the ground, where Special Operations forces, marines and some Army infantry have been joining the hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters across rugged, inaccessible, cave-riddled terrain.

"Air power can play an important role in finishing this off," said Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a military policy group. "But the job gets more difficult now, because air power is at its finest when you are talking about large targets in the open or at fixed points. And that is not what we are likely to see in the weeks ahead."

The limitations of air power were underscored by two events this week. First, nearly 1,000 marines landed in southern Afghanistan to assist in the hunt for Mr. bin Laden and the Taliban leadership. Second, Pentagon officials have reported that as many as

4/30 /  
1717

TO: SECDEF

FROM:  Tone Clarke

SUBJECT: Casualties

Attached please find a brief description of known deaths and injuries of U.S. government personnel as well as 'known' civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

Five U.S. government deaths; 4 military, one CIA.

11-L-0559/OSD/4876

## U.S. Casualties

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Description</u>  |
|-------------|---|
| 11/26       | <b>Five U.S. service members</b> injured when a U.S. attack aircraft dropped a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) near friendly forces while conducting close air support against Taliban positions near Mazar-e-Sharif.   |
| 11/25       | <b>CIA officer Johnny “Mike” Spann</b> killed during a prison uprising in Mazar-I-Sharif.   |
| 11/20       | <b>Four U.S. crewmembers</b> were injured when their helicopter experienced a hard landing in Afghanistan. The cause is unknown, but it was not the result of hostile fire. The landing damaged the helicopter, which was later removed from Afghan territory.                                      |
| 11/7        | <b>Fireman Apprentice Bryant L. Davis, 20, of Chicago, Ill,</b> fell overboard from the USS Kitty Hawk while in support of OEF.   |
| 11/2        | <b>Four U.S. crewmembers</b> were injured when their helicopter crash-landed in Afghanistan. The landing severely damaged the helicopter. U.S. aircraft later destroyed the damaged helicopter.   |
| 10/19       | <b>Two U.S. military personnel</b> suffered broken feet when they parachuted into Afghanistan during a special forces raid. There were about <b>23 minor jump injuries</b> during the operation. There were <b>five people who had fragmentation wounds of various types and one broken finger.</b> |
| 10/19       | <b>Spc. Jonn J. Edmunds, 20, of Cheyenne, Wyo. and Pfc. Kristofor T. Stonesifer, 28, of Missoula, Mont.</b> were killed and three were injured as a result of a helicopter accident in Pakistan. The crash occurred as a result of an aircraft mishap.  |

10/10 **MSGT Evander Earl Andrews**, assigned to the 366th Civil Engineer Squadron at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, was killed in a heavy equipment accident in support of Enduring Freedom at a deployed location.

**Civilian casualties and collateral damage**

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Description</u>  |
|-------------|---|
| 11/27       | An <b>Afghan woman was killed</b> when bundles from a humanitarian container delivery system hit a house 120 miles northeast of Mazar-e-Sharif. The container carried wheat, blankets and cold weather equipment.   |
| 11/16       | Two USAF aircraft dropped three laser-guided GBU-12 500-pound bombs on a building complex in Khowst, Afghanistan. Two of the bombs struck a known Al Qaeda facility. The third bomb suffered a guidance malfunction and missed the facility. The resulting explosion damaged a mosque. <b>We are unaware of any injuries</b> as a result of the errant bomb.  |
| 10/26       | In separate attacks over two periods, Navy F/A-18s and Air Force B-52s dropped bombs on warehouses used by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kabul. In addition, an F/A- 18 intending to strike the warehouses inadvertently dropped a bomb in a residential area about 700 feet south of the warehouses. Preliminary indications are that the warehouses were struck due to a human error in the targeting process. There were <b>no reported injuries</b> . Two of the six warehouses that were hit had been inadvertently struck by U.S. aircraft on Oct. 16. |

- 10/21 A U.S. Navy FA-18 Hornet missed its intended target and inadvertently dropped a 1,000-pound bomb in an open field -- an open area near a senior citizens' home outside Herat. The intended target was a vehicle-storage building at the Herat army barracks, approximately 300 feet from the facility. **Unknown number of deaths/injuries.**
- 10/20 A U.S. Navy F-14 missed its intended target and inadvertently dropped two 500-pound bombs in a residential area northwest of Kabul. The intended targets were military vehicles parked in an area approximately one half-mile away. **Civilian casualties unknown.**
- 10/16 A U.S. Navy F/A- 18 Hornet inadvertently struck one or more warehouses used by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in northern Kabul. Reports from the ICRC indicate that wheat and other humanitarian supplies stored in the warehouses were destroyed, and an **Afghan security guard was injured.**
- 10/12 A U.S. Navy F/A-1 8 Hornet missed its intended target and inadvertently dropped a 2000-pound GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) in a residential area near Kabul Airport. The intended target was a military helicopter at Kabul Airport, approximately one mile from the residential area. We have no accurate way of estimating the number of casualties, but reports from the ground indicate there may have been **four deaths and eight injured.** Indications are that the accident occurred from a targeting process error.
- 10/11 There were unconfirmed reports of potential collateral damage at Karam. Indications are that the collateral damage resulted not from the U.S. strike, but from secondary explosions within a cave where munitions were stored. **Civilian casualties unknown.**
- 10/8 **Four security guards** working for a U.N. agency in Afghanistan were reportedly killed as a result of strikes.

snowflake

*Infile P 11/30/01 1448*

November 29, 2001 10:45 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fort Bragg

I promised the folks down at Fort Bragg that the President would visit there in the year 2002. He will absolutely love the trip! These folks are doing a great job for the country.

You really ought to think about getting that on your calendar for the first quarter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112901-5

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*DR*

*24 Nov 01*

U 14803 02

snowflake

INFO D 11/28  
1829

November 28, 2001 8:28 AM

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Article

020 JCS

Here is your paper. I looked it over. It looks fine to me. I have made a few suggestions, which may or may not be appropriate.

Regards.

Attach.  
Draft article

DHR:dh  
112801-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/28/01

U14804 02

# Choosing a Chairman

Vice Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, US Navy (Retired)

*Need to do well*

Returning to the Pentagon in January 2001 for a second tour as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld set about doing the two things that CEOs do best: developing and establishing a vision for the organization and building the team of senior people to help him achieve his goals.

He ~~recognized~~ <sup>understood President's</sup> the "imperative—a dozen years after the end of the Cold War—for transformation of processes, organization and force structure if the United States was to adapt to the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. His approach to defining a new vision was to ~~launch a score of study panels, each tasked to~~ <sup>launch a</sup> ~~examine a different aspect of~~ <sup>several</sup> Defense policy, forces, and plans. Program formulation and budget decisions awaited the output of these ~~panels~~ <sup>efforts</sup>. ~~all due to report back within three or four months.~~

*first informally through study groups were formed, then through the flow of the progressively updated quadrennial Defense Review.*

While that was going on, a Transition Team was hard at work recruiting candidates to fill the 45 key DoD positions that required Senate confirmation, plus the nearly 70 supporting positions that required Presidential approval. These 110-plus civilians would comprise the bulk of Rumsfeld's leadership team.

Looking ahead, choosing the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the next Vice Chairman (VCJCS) loomed large. General Henry H. Shelton, US Army, would soon finish his fourth year as CJCS and retire on October 1<sup>st</sup>. Nomination of his successor would need to reach the Senate well ahead of that date for an orderly transition.

Having served as Rumsfeld's senior military assistant the first time around in 1976, I was not totally surprised to be called upon to help with the process of picking the new CJCS and VCJCS. Few people in the Secretary's immediate office had the right background for that undertaking. When I came aboard as a consultant in mid-April, only two confirmed civilians--the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary--were in place; working relationships with "acting" officials in OSD and with the Joint Staff were still being forged. Thus, even though it had been 20 years since my last Pentagon tour, it fell to me to give some structure to the selection process.

Title 10, US Code is quite specific about filling the position of CJCS, the officer who outranks all others in the US armed forces. The President may appoint only a Regular Component officer to the position, ~~and he must~~ <sup>The officer</sup> first have served as Vice Chairman, or as a Service Chief, or as the commander of a Combatant Command (normally, one of the CINCs) as defined in the Unified Command Plan. The CJCS serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years, renewable for up to two additional terms, subject to age limitations. Appointment to the CJCS position requires the advice and consent of the Senate.

In the spring of 2001, fifteen officers met these "statutory" requirements.

*these "statutory" requirements?*

The law relative to appointment of the VCJCS, the second ranking US officer, is similarly explicit: the nominee must be a Regular officer, one who has the "joint specialty" and who has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a general or flag officer. The CJCS and the VCJCS may not be members of the same armed force.

Unless waived?

It is important to note that Title 10 empowers the President to waive most of the specific criteria relative to appointment as CJCS or VCJCS if he determines such action to be necessary in the national interest. In effect, this widened the search for CJCS by another 18 active duty four-star officers, and raised the possibility of dipping into more junior flag and general officers or even recalling a retired officer., ~~as was done~~ <sup>This</sup> once before in the case of General Maxwell D. Taylor in 1962.

pool of prospective Chairmen

The search began, following a model common in the business world, by drawing up a list of characteristics desired in the next Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal hand in drafting these, <sup>and</sup> circulating them for comment, <sup>after</sup> discussing them in detail with the President, <sup>he</sup> and <sup>ed</sup> formally adopting them as the search criteria.

Twice? - Vesley

By statute, CJCS is the officer charged with providing the best possible military advice to the National Command Authorities-the President and the Secretary of Defense. No surprise, then, that the Capacity for doing just that was at the top of the list. e in no particular order,

I think I did the first draft?

Broad operational background-both combat and experience in major contingencies, and senior command overseas

Intellect and innovativeness

Candor and forthrightness . . . willingness to disagree, then support decisions effectively once made

Experience and understanding of "Washington"

Leadership, both conceptual and managerial, in change and transformation

Practical experience with how the roles of Service Chiefs, Joint Staff, and CINCs differ in our system

Credibility with the public, the Congress, the press

Strong sense of ethics and trustworthiness

Support of the principle of civilian control of the military

Compatibility with the Secretary, the President, the Vice President

Given these criteria, some of which were understandably more subjective than others, research began into the populations of interest: officers on the "statutory" list, officers for whom a Presidential waiver would be required, three-star officers in all the services, and four-star officers on the retired list. Perhaps 150 officers in all, half of whom were interviewed ~~by me~~, were evaluated against the "template" of desired characteristics. It was fascinating to observe significant differences in the way the separate Services had groomed flag and general officers for higher command.

In a series of sessions with the Secretary, the list was narrowed to ~~the~~ smaller number with whom he talked with personally. As the search progressed, the ever-narrower list was tried out on about 40 old hands--active and retired, civilian and military--whose judgment the Secretary respected and whose input he wanted.

As this process worked through, the <sup>notion</sup> ~~desirability~~ of either dipping deep into the three-star population or bringing back to active duty a retired officer faded, and the search focused on the "statutory" and "waiver required" pools.

By mid-June, the Secretary was ready to discuss a short list in a meeting at the White House with the ~~national security team~~, the President, the Vice President, ~~the National Security Advisor, and Chief of Staff~~. A series of interviews with the President followed, aimed at selecting the new Chairman from a list of five or six exceptionally qualified officers, and pairing the selectee off with a compatible Vice Chairman whose strengths would be complementary. *I should note that on a parallel track and as the result of the same process, the Secretary and President also selected the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, whose nomination was announced in mid-July.*

*for Chairman and Vice Chairman*

*candidate*

*amb*

*his*

President Bush, who had been extensively involved in the process from the beginning, opted to announce his choice, from the ranch in Crawford, Texas, on August 24<sup>th</sup>, just before the Senate returned after the Summer Recess. Both nominees--for CJCS, General Dick Myers, USAF (then serving as VCJCS), and for VCJCS, General Peter Pace, USMC (then CINC Southern Command)--and their wives were on hand to be introduced by the President & the Secretary of Defense.

In the end, these announcements represented two firsts: the first time a VCJCS had flected up to become CJCS, and the first time a Marine officer had been picked for either of the top two jobs.

The process followed in choosing a new Chairman and Vice Chairman gave both the President and the Secretary confidence that a wide and thorough search had resulted in picking the best of the best.

---

*Admiral Holcomb retired from the Navy in 1985, having been Military Assistant to Secretaries Ramsfeld and Brown in 1976-77. After eleven years as a senior executive at USAA, he retired to the Seattle area where he had been for four years when he was called to serve as assistant to the Secretary of Defense from mid-April through October of 2001.*

snowflake

TO: Secretary Colin Powell  
CC: Vice President Richard Cheney  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Iraq**

We simply must get a policy for Iraq settled fast.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
090501.12

*Iraq*


*5 Sep 01*

snowflake

Agree 11/29  
0757

November 28, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper



George Tenet said today to Dick Myers and me that an NSA or DIA paper was put out on force protection in Afghanistan, which is very, very good. I have not seen it. Why would everyone else have seen it, and I have not?

Please get it to me fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112301-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

AFGHANISTAN

23 Nov 01

U14808 02

snoflake

*Info 11/29  
0758*

November 28, 2001 3:01 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo from DepSec

I have been over the memo that Paul Wolfowitz and our folks over here drafted up. I agree with it completely. I would appreciate it if you do decide to take the issue to the President that our memo is part of the package for him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112801-14

*0001*

*28 Nov 01*

U14809 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4887

Di Rita  
02/24/01  
Agenda

snowflake

November 28, 2001 3:08 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Call

Please set up a conference call with Denny Blair, Dick Myers and me on the USS BOWDITCH.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112801-18

Caplitz  
11/30/01  
800-1830

SD/2

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

28 11/01

U14813 02

snowflake

APR 11/22  
1832

November 28, 2001 7:26 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Congressional Hearing on Military Tribunals

015

Apparently Senator Schumer is going to have a hearing on military tribunals. You might want to find a way through Powell Moore to slip in (through the minority side) the names of some of the people you are talking to as possible witnesses.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112801-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

28 Nov 01

U14824 02

snowflake

Agreed  
11/28  
1829

November 27, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting on NATO

Let's get that meeting on NATO set before Colin Powell and I go to Europe, so we nail down hard how we deal with Russia and NATO.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
112701-15

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

NATO 337

27 NOV 01

U14825 02

snowflake

Accepted 11/16/01

November 26, 2001 4:44 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: China

I am told the Policy shop has a defense guidance paper on U.S.-China relations dated April 4, 1997, and that it is in the process of being updated. Why don't we get it finished?

Let's shove it through this place, and let me look at it and get it out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112601-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/30

China

26 Nov 01

U14826 02

12/10  
1800

snowflake

November 26, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Travel Schedule

*COMPLETE 12/10  
2001*

Colin called. I told him we were thinking of going to Kazakhstan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. He said, well then he thinks he is going to go to Moscow, Brussels, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

*333 SD*

So I think it is pretty well set. Let's talk about the calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112601-18

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*(Signature)*

Larry Di Rita  
12/10

*26 Nov 01*

U14827 02

snowflake

TO: Admiral Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *TJA*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE: Predator

*12/11 15  
0713 ACTION  
COMPLETE*

*DOD THROUGH THE NOW DEFUNCT  
DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONN. OFFICE  
(DARO)*

Find out who developed the Predator. Was it CIA or the Air Force. Whose money was it? Which entity did it?

*NEITHER  
↑  
DOD*

Thanks.

*SECDEF--SEE ATTACHED ANSWER.  
SECDEF HAS SEEN FOR MORE DETAIL.*

*452R*

DHR/azn  
112301.26

*DEC 1 2001*

*W/R  
Ed 12/10*

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*11/29*

*23 NOV 01*

U14832 02

snowflake

R/26

Agree 11/30  
12/10

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld DR  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE: **Pentagon Website**

~~see Attached 11/30~~

41351

Take a look at the Pentagon website. There is an article in here that says in *Inside Magazine* on December 10<sup>th</sup>, the cover story, it makes a reference to the Pentagon website, [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil) that talks about Native American Heritage Month mixed in with Operation Enduring Freedom and foods from Indian tribes, the implication being that we've got a "Politically correct" website. Someone ought to take a look at it and think about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.24

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

1  
L

23 Nov 01

U14833 02

November 30, 2001 9:00 A.M.

TO: SECDEF   
FROM: TORIE CLARKE  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Website


We have taken a hard look at the Pentagon website and will continue to take steps to improve it.

Short term: exercise more editorial control over its content.

Long term: morph the website into our new site www.defendamerica.mil a much more user-friendly and appropriate website.

Attachments:  
Pages from defendamerica.mil

mct  
112301-24



Very good  
D. M. K.

Larry Di Rita  
11/30



# Defend AMERICA

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
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*WILD BLUE YONDER --A U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber takes off for a combat mission. Photo by Staff Sgt. Shane Cuomo, USAF*

## Historic NATO Assign Helping Protect Units

An attack on one NATO member when terrorists hit the U.S. on Sep 13 different countries. "This is the to come over here and help the A 28-year-old sergeant from Germa because a lot of European countr and democracy to the Amencans.

## Marine Expeditionary Ready for Air, Land a

Fast-moving, self-sufficient and to Expeditionary Units are trained to challenge arises. Last weekend th forward base in Afghanistan. You about them. [Story](#)

## AFGHANISTAN

# Taliban Forces 'Fractured' As U.S., Opposition Tighten Noose

By Jim Garamone / American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON — The Taliban's control of its troops in Afghanistan is "fractured," said a top Pentagon official.

U.S. Navy Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem said the situation varied in different parts of the country. Some of the terrorist regime's commanders still have forces with them, and appear to control them. But he said it was questionable how much longer that will be true because some of those commanders are negotiating for surrender of their forces.

Stufflebeem said some troops may follow Taliban leader Mullah Muhammed Omar's order to dig in and fight to the death. "But," he added, "there are other units that are severed from competent or legitimate leadership that they would look to." He said some of those units are "dropping their weapons and trying to blend back into the countryside." Already some senior Taliban officials have defected and been questioned by U.S. intelligence operatives.

The latest coalition air attacks focused on cave and tunnel complexes where Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists are believed to be hiding. About 120 strike aircraft hit targets around Kandahar and south of Jalalabad. In southern Afghanistan, slightly more than 1,000 Marines are now in position at a forward operating base.

The humanitarian relief effort in Afghanistan continued as two C-17s dropped more than 34,000 humanitarian daily ration packets, bringing the total deliveries to nearly 2 million packets. Additional parachute drops have been suspended, however, following the death of an Afghan woman. The woman died and a child was injured when bundles containing wheat blankets and



*WELCOME- Airmen arrive i ; forward operating location in S ; Enduring Freedom. Photo by ; Gaddis, USAF*

## Army Mountain Warf Reduces Afghan We:

In winter warfare, the weather car threat as the enemy. The Mounta Vermont teaches U.S. troops eve hazards to cliff evacuation. Says ; train soldiers to be able to take ca [Story](#)

cold weather equipment hit her house northeast of Mazar-e-Sharif. A Pentagon spokeswoman said, "We deeply regret the loss of life." Coalition forces have been preparing Afghan airfields so they can be used for humanitarian relief. [Story](#)

[CIA Officer Killed in Afghanistan](#) [Statement](#)

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Dear Service A

The traditional holiday letter-writing men and women serving in the be suspended this year because about mail delivery. But now they can contact them. Send your electronic greeting or message of support <http://navyservicemember.navy.mil> be sent to any branch of the U.S. Navy.

AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Years of drought and internal conflict caused widespread suffering in Afghanistan, which leads the United States, which leads the humanitarian relief to the Afghan delivered about 1.9 million humanitarian Rations since Oct. 8.

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Americans Working

Oregonians Patrol From Canada to



On Homeland Security

"Tupac," a 27-year-old Air National Guard pilot is flying combat air patrols in Oregon, a powerful F-15 Eagle exactly what he expected. "I'm flying close to home," he explains. "I thought I'd be flying missions over state — my own country." [Story](#)

UNCLE SAM NEEDS



Got a great idea for combat terrorism? Help the government in a range of services.

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A Helping Hand (7 photos)



*U.S. medical technicians provided care to Djiboutians during a weeklong humanitarian mission in the city of Hal-Hal, Djibouti, in eastern Africa. Here, a medical technician checks the blood pressure of a Djiboutian soldier at the clinic. Photo by Lance Cpl. Matthew J. Decker, USMC*



locating face:  
developing a  
weapons of n  
you have son  
**Story**

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**ANTHRA**

Although the risk of coming i  
anthrax is remote, the Cente  
Control offers advice about v  
receive a suspicious letter 01  
**Advisory**

*From the Secretary*

*"The best, indeed the only, def  
terrorists is offense. We simply  
to them and find them where th  
them. That is precisely what G  
and his very fine team are doi  
appreciate it."*

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snowflake

ACTION  
11/28  
1806 AS

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DH*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

0005

Find out who this Capt. Dan Moore is. Read this paper. I think there is something useful in there, but I am having trouble crystallizing it and digging it out. See if you can get some smart person to sit down and figure out what in here is of value, and what we might do, and get back to me no later than Tuesday.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.23

Attach: A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban - 11/5/01 by Capt. Moore

Respond by: **TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 2001**

*VADM G*

*Can Joint Staff  
turn this around with  
one page summary?*

23 NOV 02

*TRX*

*Larry*  
Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/48935 02

12/10

Captain Dan Moore, Jr., USN  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Operational Test and Evaluation  
1700 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1700

(b)(6)

5 November 2001

## **A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks**

An Open Letter to Family and Friends:

"Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seat at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance."

From Winston Churchill's 1930 memoir, "My Early Life."

### **Ugly Surprises**

On Wednesday 24 October, a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he was "surprised" by the Tenacity of the Taliban. On Friday 26 October, the Taliban scored an ugly surprise victory with the capture and execution of opposition figure Abdul Haq. Haq, an ethnic Pushtun, had infiltrated Afghanistan from Pakistan several days earlier in an effort to encourage other Pushtun leaders to desert the Taliban. If former National Security Advisor Bud McFarland is to be believed, and I do, this was a significant blow to the US war effort.

When we start surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda more than they are surprising us, we'll know that we're winning this first phase of a long war with many unknown and known fronts. When we see a local Afghan government capturing members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, we'll know that victory is close at hand. As mentioned in the first letter, we are up against a smart and ruthless foe that fully intends to win this war. Why have we yet to see large defections from the Taliban in Afghanistan? One major reason is simple and obvious: few on the ground in Afghanistan believe that the US is winning. The current diplomatic and military strategy is inadequate. A new approach is called for. This letter describes an approach that can better destabilize the Taliban and Al Qaeda by adding a necessary and unpredictable (dare I say "non-linear" approach) to war that quickly makes believers of friends and enemies alike. Let's call it the *Hunter Network*.

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## **A Great Task For A Great Nation**

We need to find a winning blend of five elements: policy; diplomacy; intelligence; an outward focused, event driven military force; and an effective local Afghan government (not a stooge for the Americans). This is a great task -- suitable only for a great nation.

This letter presents the Hunter Network as a candidate to achieve that winning blend, explaining the practical experiences and conceptual **framework** that shape it. The letter has three sections. Drawing **from** the experiences of US special envoy Robert Oakley (and some of my own), Section I explores the positive and negative lessons of the US in Somalia from 1992-1994. Al Qaeda has not overlooked these experiences. Lessons of Somalia help form an indispensable **part** of the Hunter Network strategy in **Afghanistan**. Section **II** introduces John Boyd's thoughts about a counter-guerrilla campaign. During Vietnam the US pursued an "attrition" war (whose metrics include body counts and target sets), The Viet Cong effectively countered and won by pursuing a strategy built around guerilla warfare. Al Qaeda has not overlooked this lesson either. Section III lays out how the US could rapidly build several forward-deployed cells -- that include diplomatic-military-Afghani members -- capable of destroying the **Taliban** and Al Qaeda within Afghanistan, while protecting and perhaps even nurturing an effective alternative form of **Afghani** government.

### **I: A Hunter Network in Somalia -- A Pattern for Winning and Losing**

I first met US Ambassador Robert Oakley in New York City in 1995. Business Executives for National Security, BENS, featuring Oakley as guest speaker and I was one of four military officers addressing The Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "'America's Role in the New World Disorder.'" Oakley understands the importance of military agility: the ability to rapidly and unpredictably transition back and forth between military mass and precision as required by events on the battlefield. Let me preface Oakley's remarks about his experiences in Somalia with my own remarks about Bosnia in 1994, which created the first **element** of a Hunter Network.

Using John Boyd's ideas my squadron, VFA-8 I, created an informal first generation "Hunter Cell" composed of shooters and spooks (intelligence specialists). Under combat conditions, these shooters and spooks improved the air-to-ground combat effectiveness of the air wing, **carrier** battle group, and theater air against small, elusive targets in Bosnia by several orders of magnitude. A single Hunter Cell quickly evolved a method capable of making appropriate killing decisions measured in minutes and in case, seconds as compared to the usual bureaucratic **surveillance network (BSN)** decision cycle measured in weeks, months, and in times of crisis -- incapable of rendering any decision at all. When I briefed the USAF three star in charge of theater operations, he immediately directed that we teach every US squadron in theater how to develop their own Hunter Cell. ("Bosnia, Tanks and . . . From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1994, pp. 42-45.) .

While a member of the Joint Staff from 1999 to 2000, I initiated and was subsequently asked to head a Department of **Defense** effort tasked to develop a road map for improving U.S. combat

**effectiveness** in urban combat operations. This involved extensive discussions and workshops with Oakley, US Ambassador to Somalia between November 1992 and May 1993. Chosen as a Special Presidential Envoy by Bush the Elder in November 1992, Oakley and US Marines were intimately involved in the first phase of military intervention-offering security for humanitarian relief operations. During the second phase, a UN force replaced the Marines and Oakley too. The situation deteriorated during the second phase and completely fell apart on 3 and 4 October 1993, when 18 Army Rangers were killed and 73 other Americans were wounded. Over 500 Somalis were killed and more than a thousand were wounded as well. Clinton hastily called Oakley back into government service as a Special Presidential Envoy, returning him to Somalia in October 1993 where he successfully negotiated a truce with **Aidid**, a Somali warlord, to secure the release of captured US Ranger Michael **Durant** and a Nigerian officer.

The approach developed by Oakley and the US Marines during the first phase is useful in developing a plausible approach for progress in this war. During this phase, much of the local population welcomed the U.S. forces, viewing them as saviors for trying to **hclp** reduce the effects of a terrible famine. In Oakley's own words:

"The environment in Somalia was always tense, because the Somalis are very **xenophobic**, aggressive people. So the trick that we discovered--at **least** during our period--was to maximize communication with them. To show firmness. But at the same time . . . to demonstrate that our humanitarian programs were **beneficial**, that we weren't there to dictate to them, (but] to give them a certain amount of latitude. On the other hand, if they stepped out of line and challenged us militarily, then we had to hit back . . . hard, swiftly, and then immediately resume the dialogue.

We met with **Ali Mahdi** and **Aidid's** political military leadership every day for the entire time we were there. We made sure we did that even **after** the military incident. We'd resume the dialogue and say 'Let's treat this as a passing event, not as the beginning of a whole sequence of escalating events.' We understood the need of this--we had a radio station, we had a newspaper [in the] Somalia language. These things disappeared when the UN came in and [they] didn't really understand the need to maintain the dialogue, to maintain the communications and it was slowly degenerating into hostility."

<http://www.pbs.org/webb/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html>

It's worth taking time to read the entire interview with Oakley. It gives us a feel for how a combat diplomat thinks and what he can accomplish.

During the second phase in Somalia, the situation deteriorated as a UN force less familiar with the local **culture** replaced Oakley and the Marines. Violence on both sides escalated as US policy began to wander. A valiant US military force replaced the Marines and became part of a new UN force lacking the in-depth knowledge of the local culture and leadership developed by Oakley and the Marines. They found themselves increasingly adrift in a society that was growing increasingly hostile. Bullets **began** to fill the void left by a lack of policy and

diplomacy. One attack was particularly disastrous setting up the killing spree that occurred on 3-4 October 1993. This attack was supposed to wipe out the warlords in one quick stroke. It completely backfired and ended up killing innocents rather than the warlords. This was the final nail in the coffin of what had started out as a well-intentioned humanitarian mission. The local populace was now 100% hostile. The wheels came off during the battle on 3-4 October 1993 as described in Mark Bowden's excellent book, Black Hawk Down and the related web site:

<http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp>

Lack of heroism wasn't the problem. Lack of firepower wasn't the problem. The problem was a lack of policy, intelligence, and diplomacy while military forces were left in the field. A BSN approach to war began to lock up. Consumed by internal disputes and inexperience with war, national and international decision makers focused inward rather than on the enemy. America and others were **adrift** in a combat environment. So, the US military hammered away with the only tool **left** to them -- firepower. What should shake us in our boots is the Al Qaeda fingerprint in 1993 Somalia. Yes, unbeknownst to the US at the time, the nascent Al Qaeda organization was clandestinely orchestrating and escalating an uncertain and disorienting Somali combat environment.

Eight years later to the day (4 October 2001), British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Osama and Al Qaeda had been responsible for a number of terrorist outrages over the past decade, including "the attack in 1993 on US military personnel serving in Somalia -- 18 US military personnel killed."

<http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2683>

Osama and Al Qaeda used Somalia as a test drive for their latest generation of guerrilla attacks against the US. Hardly anyone has noticed that Al Qaeda has used every military encounter with the US to upgrade their guerrilla attacks and to probe the US methodically in assessing America's military strengths and weaknesses throughout. Hardly anyone has noticed that Al Qaeda entered Somalia and opened a terrorist schoolhouse on how to **drive** the **Americans**, on a humanitarian mission, out of a country. To this day, Al Qaeda is the only military organization that fully appreciates the rich lessons of Somalia.

The **front** page of the 4 November 2001 *Washington Post* describes how Osama and cohorts may be planning a hasty retreat into Somalia, Malaysia, or the Philippines. The article also reports that Rumsfeld had requested that his commanders draw up plans for finding Osama should he flee Afghanistan: "Rumsfeld reviewed the commander's responses last month and rejected *most* of them as narrow and unimaginative. The concept paper submitted by the Central Command, which oversees US military operations in the Mideast, Central Asia, and Northeastern Africa -- a territory that includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia -- was among those that got negative reviews, officials said" (pp. A1, A-22).

As the senior Navy line officer attached to the Marine Corps **Warfighting** Lab in 1998, I was reminded by a highly respected combat Marine, Paddy Collins, to never forget that "terrain neutralizes technology." This lesson has never been lost on our enemies. Make no mistake --

there are increasing indications that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are already setting up a killing school house for the Americans in **Kandahar** with every intention of turning it into a 21<sup>st</sup> Mogadishu for the US *just* as they did for the Russians in Grozny, **Chechnya**.

As this letter is written, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have melted into the local Afghan population and retreated into buildings and universities. They are preparing for yet another generation and field test of guerrilla warfare against the US. They have blurred their external personal signatures and are rapidly disappearing into extremely complex terrain: cultural, religious, mountainous, and urban. A few bad fish have blended in with a school of local innocent fish confident that technology alone will not be able to distinguish them from the innocents. They hope to present us with the losing dilemma of having to kill the entire school of fish in order to save it. Only those that know how to see the blackness of Taliban hearts will be able to detect, identify, and target them.

There were no **Afghan** hijackers on 11 September. They were mostly Saudis. Yet, the US is attacking and killing Afghans. Welcome to 21<sup>st</sup> century war.

Some takeaways from the Somali experience: First and foremost, war is about people. People, not machines, win wars. 21<sup>st</sup> century war is also about populations and non-linear complexity. We instinctively understand non-linear complexity but I've witnessed multiple instances where this new science has not penetrated military thinking that seeks a methodical and predictable one plus one equals **two** approach to war. Instead of one plus one equaling two, one plus one can equal a hundred thousand or even two hundred million in non-linear complexity. In Mogadishu, a single US military attack transformed the local Somali population **from** neutral to hostile. In New York, DC, and aboard United Flight 93 over Pennsylvania, four attacks turned a national population **from** neutral/concerned to hostile. Does the US have any way of effectively assessing the effects *on* Islamic populations. Have we thought about it? A recent DoD request for technology was surreal -- if we can only get the right technology, we'll win this damn thing. Business-as-usual has a powerful inertia, which apparently prevents us from taking to heart and acting on the lessons of **guerrilla** and urban **warfare**.

War is about making friends faster than making enemies. 21<sup>st</sup> century military actions cannot be viewed in isolation as visual information instantly reverberates through **friends** and enemies alike. Osama and the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been making piles of **friends** in the Islamic while the US efforts appear to struggle. Abdul Haq's capture and execution sent a clear message to potential enemies and friends alike: To date, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are able to detect, identify, and eliminate their mortal enemies more effectively than the US has been able to destroy their nemeses. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have sent a clear message: "This old fool Abdul Haq (who was 43), the late *Lion of Peshawar*, thought he could simply walk back into *our* country and overthrow us. The Americans were unwilling or unable to risk American lives for an Afghan inciting rebellion against the Taliban. Opponents of the Taliban, if you get in trouble expect the fate of Abdul Haq, when **we** come to kill you, expect the Americans to send an unmanned plane with two bombs. And even that will arrive too late -- as we've already got you. You're on the way to be hung." Business as usual. . .

Fortunately, it appears that the expensive lesson of Abdul Haq did in fact wake some people up. On 1 November the media reported that US Navy fighter-bombers fired on Taliban forces attempting to capture Hamid Karzai, a prominent Afghan tribal leader from the Pashtun ethnic group. This outward countering must be sustained and enlarged.

### **11: A Hunter Network – A Counter-Guerrilla Campaign**

Like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz before him, John Boyd has recently become the most quoted and least read military genius. During the last twenty years of his life, Colonel John Boyd, USAF put his thoughts about war together in a presentation entitled “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” It consisted of over 200 briefing slides. In February 1993, Boyd spent three half days presenting his “Discourse” to the F/A-18 pilots at NAS Cecil Field, Florida. Part of this presentation included his “Patterns of Conflict” and was Boyd’s monumental look at what makes any organization competitive. Encompassing 2,500 years of the history of conflict, this briefing introduces his famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act “OODA loop” concept and is available to download on PDF format at:

[http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS\\_Folder/boyd.htm#discourse](http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/boyd.htm#discourse)

Boyd’s thoughts about guerrilla warfare and a counter-guerrilla campaign have immediate **relevancc** to this war as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are highly intelligent, adaptive, and lethal guerrilla networks. The Taliban highjacked the government of Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda seeks to **highjack** the Islamic religion. Along the way, they fully intend to drive the US into a bunker mentality and finally into a full retreat from the **world** scene.

In “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd made the following observations about guerrilla war: “Popular support is critical for guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Without the support of the people, the guerrillas (or counter-guerrillas) have neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security apparatus that permits them to ‘see’ into adversary operations yet ‘blinds’ the adversary to their own operations.” (See slide 109.) Boyd also sketched how to mount a **counter-guerrilla** campaign. Keep in mind what happened to the captured and executed Abdul Haq, while considering the following eleven points:

++ Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve the needs of the people – rather than exploit and impoverish them for the **benefit** of a greedy elite.

++ Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate **grievances** and connect government with grass roots.

++ Infiltrate **guerilla** movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.

++ Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with the outside world.

++ Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement; reduce guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.

++ Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.

+† Use special teams in a complimentary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ guerrillas own tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication with the outside world.

++ Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.

++ Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of the people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

++ Break guerrillas' moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

(From Patterns of Conflict: Slide 108).

### **III: A Hunter Network — Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks**

Oakley and the US Marines put together an effective forward-deployed diplomatic-military team in Somalia Boyd sketched out key elements of a counter-guerrilla campaign. Coupling Oakley's practical experience with Boyd's conceptual framework, we have looked in detail at two of the three components needed to construct the Hunter Network strategy. The third element, touched on earlier, is the Hunter Cell. In 1996 the Association of Naval Aviation and U.S. Naval Institute awarded their Annual Naval Aviation Article Writing Award to "Hunters from the Sea," calling it "the best article on Naval Aviation in any publication or periodical" (COL Mike Wyly and I co-authored the article in Proceedings, December 1995, pp. 31-33). The Commandant of the Marine Corps personally supported a series of experiments at the Maxine Corps Warfighting Lab from 1997 to 1999 designed to mature our understanding of this Hunter concept and VFA-81's Hunter Cell that improved air-to-ground effectiveness in Bosnia by 10 to 100 times. These new understandings were briefed to the Navy's Director, Air Warfare and Assistant Secretary of

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition and are summarized in: "The Carriers Pack the Airborne Cavalry," (Proceedings, August 2000, pp. 28 – 32 that I co-authored with Major Chris Yunker, USMC):

<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/promoore.htm>

See also: Spirit Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Major Don Vandergriff, USA ed., Presidio Press, 2001)

Thus, the lessons of Oakley and Boyd -- coupled with the detailed military understandings developed through the experiments at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab -- give us the opportunity to create a unique and important Hunter Network comprised of multiple Hunter Cells. These highly evolutionary cells – diplomatic-military-Afghani – are capable of using stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity and cohesion to relentlessly attack and destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks.

A Hunter Network focuses outward, on the enemy. It drives events on the battlefield rather than being driven by a schedule. There is no "air" war or "ground" war. There is only one war with a simple mission – to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks and help establish the conditions necessary for an effective Afghan government. A Hunter Network should initially involve less than a 100 people and function as an experimental compliment to our existing military structure. It would notionally start with eight cells – one for a variety of cities in Afghanistan (perhaps **Kandahar**, Kabul, Jalalabad, **Herat**, **Mazar-I-Sharif**, **Kunduz**, **Zaranj**, Qalat). They should be forward deployed, as close to the battle and their specific cities as possible. Broad discretion and significant resources -- intelligence, military, diplomatic, financial -- should be given to each cell. A competition should be set up between the cells measuring how effective each cell is in achieving disrupting, surprising and destroying the enemy. Cells would combine or split as necessary to fit the situation on the **battlefield**. Initial measures of effectiveness should include:

++ Repeatedly surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks. Surprising an enemy involves discerning and understanding his patterns. Our enemies know our patterns and have anticipated many of our responses. It's time to return the favor.

++ Increasing numbers of Taliban/Al Qaeda defectors willing to risk their lives to achieve the mission.

++ Significantly reduced response times from the ground perspective -- measured in **seconds**-minutes rather than hours-weeks-months – capable of exploiting fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

Success ~ as increasingly defined by the Hunter Network – would be rewarded by a significant increase in resources.

The starting composition of each cell would consist of eleven people: 88 people total. The remaining twelve people constitute a command element. With the exception of the command cell, the age of the people in these cells should be young -- 35 years or less. The cells should

evolve based on feedback from the battlefield. The starting composition each cell could consist of:

\*\* Two American Afghans preferably from each of the eight Afghani cities: 16 total. Personal knowledge of Afghanistan is essential and initially may require people older than 35.

\*\* One intelligence officer and two enlisted intelligence specialists: 24 total. (04 or below.)

\*\* Four Military: two officers, two enlisted: 32 total. Each officer and enlisted would form a team that would alternate with the other team-- one week in the field, one week with the cell. (04 and E6 or below.)

\*\* Two Foreign Service Officers: 16 total. (GS-14 or below.)

### A Hunter Network: Using A Naval Culture to Destroy a Terrorist Culture

Sailors and Marines have grown up in a culture well adapted to expeditionary combat. "From the Halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli. . ." This culture has assimilated and refined the hundreds of years of experience against unpredictable foes with obscure signatures operating in fluid, chaotic environments and cultures. Naval forces – much smaller than an Army or Air Force yet significantly bigger than a Special Operations Force (-45,000) have a culture bias designed to fill in the important area between the hundreds of thousands of people on the ground in theater and a few hundred "snake eaters" on the ground (special operations).

Naval forces have also developed highly evolved methods for searching out and destroy relatively small enemies hiding in fluid and highly complex environments. Presently, our anti-submarine warfare experts have the most effective understanding of how to look for patterns of where the enemy is and is not. A Hunter Network, focused on the enemy is capable of surprising him because it discerns his patterns of behavior and then anticipates his next move. A Hunter Cell does not supplant a bureaucratic surveillance network (BSN) but complements it in attacking the enemy with agility, *mass*, and precision from every available dimension to include time, sea, air, land, diplomatic.

A Hunter Network complements and expands the capability of a bureaucratic network built upon surveillance and reaction. This BSN is fundamentally different than a Hunter Network. A BSN is designed to perform in an environment of certainty and usually lock up when confronted uncertainty (unexpected events). A BSN requires a significant distance from the enemy so that the BSN has sufficient time to react. A BSN looks exclusively for positive indicators – a missile plume, a rocket launcher – and then reacts. By definition, it is always a step behind the enemy and compensates for this with massive firepower. Instead of a bullet to an enemy's head, it blows up the entire building, levels an entire neighborhood, or even an entire city.

In contrast Naval culture has developed an instinctive understanding of close combat: it's too late if the CO of a submarine or a ship waits to react to an inbound torpedo. There are many cases where we can reacquaint ourselves with the rich combat lessons from naval history built upon decentralized leadership and judgment against obscure foes. Sustaining these qualities has

become difficult during a period of apparent peace and in the face of significant budgetary pressures aggressively pursuing a BSN culture. The terrorist bombing of the USS Cole has reawakened us to the need for combat force in port as well as at sea.. Port calls to foreign countries bring naval forces in close contact with friends and enemies alike. Naval forces have always had a strong link to diplomats and have a significant number of people used to searching for an elusive and well-disguised enemy hiding in local cultures.

The mass of the bureaucratic surveillance network is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. The precision of a special operations force is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. A Hunter Network comprised of members from all services and Allies brings agility to our mass and precision. Built upon centuries of combat experience with a cultural bias towards decentralized warfare, naval forces can help a President ruthlessly and relentlessly search out and destroy an elusive and fanatical foe with agility, precision, and mass.

Love to all,

Dan

11/2  
200

JUL 13 2001 107-

snowflake

July 13, 2001 8:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld<sup>5</sup>  
SUBJECT: "Armitage Report"<sup>3</sup>

One of the reports talks about something called the "Armitage Report" about how to cut U.S. forces in Japan. We ought to dig that out and see what it says.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071301-9

Japan

7/12

~~Col W -  
Please have Policy  
get me a copy for  
review.  
Larry~~

→ USD(P) Feitz  
To: ~~Di Rita~~  
P41. Thought  
you should know that  
SecDef expressed an  
interest. I haven't  
sent this to him.  
D. Rita

1350101

U14863 /01

# INSS Special Report

Institute for National Strategic Studies  
National Defense University

October 11, 2000

## The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership

### About this report

The following report presents a consensus view of the members of a bipartisan study group on the U.S.-Japan partnership. It is not a political document and reflects the views of the study group members only. This is solely an attempt by the group to inject consistency and strategic direction into what it believes is our essential Asian relationship.

The study group consisted of Richard L. Armitage, Armitage and Associates; Dan E. Bob, Office of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.; Kurt M. Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group LLC; Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; James A. Kelly, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Edward J. Lincoln, Brookings Institution; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; Kevin, G. Nealer, Scowcroft Group; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Torkel L. Patterson, GeonSight; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Robin H. Sakoda, Sakoda Associates; Barbara P. Wanner, French and Company; and Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency or nongovernment organization.

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world's population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly \$600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear.

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region

hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment's notice

features some of the world's largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment's notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances

that remain the region's de facto security architecture.

In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world's second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America's global security strategy.

Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration.

The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and

SPECIAL REPORT 1

11-L-0559/OSD/4911

build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region.

Japan's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the

## Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence

early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new "Plus Three" grouping are further testimony to Tokyo's increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan's alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order.

We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Post-Cold War Drift

As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence—notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners.

## this lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries

Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well-intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties.

This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan

have been drawn to the notion of "Asianization" and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities.

The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis.

Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact,

## neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance

both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident—captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance.

The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination.

The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.-Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed,

Japan's prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials.

In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others' economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization.

It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing's hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership.

Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and to a lesser extent Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy.

In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang.

This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the

same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the

## the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance

prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia—all pose shared challenges.

For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s.

### Politics

Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern-

## the Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change

ment stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through.

Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking

apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change.

Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership.

It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound.

A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual—are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions.

But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs.

If the United States can exercise leadership—that is to say, excellence without arrogance—in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come.

## the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role

### Security

Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning.

Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.

We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model

for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements:

- Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands.

- Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation.

- Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities.

- Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations.

- Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement.

- Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies.

- Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation.

There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government

## OKINAWA

A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent—are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour's flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression.

But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country.

For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified.

In 1996, the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma.

We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal—diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden-sharing to evolve into power-sharing

it is time for burden-sharing to evolve into power-sharing

and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being.

## Intelligence

The changing nature of the potential threats and the evident dangers for both the United States and Japan in East Asia require greater cooperation and integration of intelligence capabilities between the two allies. Despite the importance of the bilateral alliance, intelligence sharing with Japan contrasts sharply with the increasingly close relationships we have enjoyed with our NATO partners in this area. While global developments have driven that trend, so, too, has the recognition

that declining resources and such new missions as peacekeeping and peacemaking require greater cooperation and integration of allied intelligence capabilities.

Ironically, with the end of the Cold War, the ambiguous nature of threats and the often more complex policy choices have sharpened

## new missions such as peacekeeping and peacemaking require greater cooperation and integration of allied intelligence capabilities

the need to cooperate in analyzing and collecting vital information on shared security threats around the world. Tokyo has made it clear that existing U.S.-Japan intelligence ties do not meet its needs.

For the United States, the potential for greater cooperation with Japan is obvious. Allies need to articulate their differences as well as reach agreement on policy actions based on comparative and competitive analysis. Shared intelligence represents the road to that goal. Moreover, a division of labor-apportioning analytical tasks according to the comparative advantages of each partner—offers gains for a resource-strapped intelligence community. Japan has the capacity to bring valuable information and insights to a strategic intelligence dialogue because of its global engagement.

Perhaps more important, a strategic vision of intelligence cooperation with Japan is long overdue. Failure to strengthen U.S.-Japan intelligence ties only raises the risks that our perception and possibly our policies will diverge when challenges demand common understanding and action within the alliance.

Improved intelligence cooperation is no less important for Japan. The path to a greater international contribution by Japan requires both a stronger indigenous Japanese intelligence capability and greater cooperation with the United States.

Strengthened intelligence cooperation will help Japan to improve its own policymaking, crisis management, and decisionmaking processes. In addition, both within and beyond Asia, Japan faces more diverse threats and more complex international responsibilities, which call for intelligence that provides a better understanding of its national security needs.

Intelligence cooperation also will strengthen Japan's role in the bilateral alliance. Given the disparity in size between the U.S. and Japanese intelligence communities, more balanced sharing inevitably will take time. But the long-term result—improved information on potential threats, competitive analytical products, and complementary perspectives—will enrich cooperation as well as better inform both allies.

As a national-level issue in both countries, U.S.-Japan intelligence cooperation needs national-level management. Cooperation needs to take new forms and to expand existing relationships.

It is incumbent on Washington to do the following:

- The National Security Advisor must make strengthened intelligence cooperation a policy and intelligence priority.
- In coordination with U.S. policymakers, the Director of Central Intelligence must work with Japan to broaden cooperation in a way that fits with

## transnational issues, such as illegal immigration, international crime, and terrorism all require coordinated interagency programs in both countries

Japan's national security priorities. Transnational issues, such as illegal immigration, international crime, and terrorism all require coordinated interagency programs in both countries.

- The United States should support Japan's reasonable desire to develop an independent intelligence capability, including its own satellites. Improving the quality of sharing requires immediate attention.

■ U.S. policy should give priority to joint staffing of analytical centers, reciprocal educational programs, and similar elbow-to-elbow initiatives to enrich the intelligence network.

An enhanced intelligence relationship between the United States and Japan also needs political support in both countries. In this regard, Tokyo needs to take several basic steps:

- Japanese leaders need to win public and political support for a new law to protect classified information.
- While improved intelligence capabilities will offer improved support to Japanese policymaking,

leaders in Tokyo need to address their own decision-making processes as well. Intelligence sharing must occur within the Japanese Government as well as between the United States and Japan.

## experience argues strongly for a dialogue on how to include the Diet in the intelligence process

- Experience argues strongly for a dialogue on how to include the Diet in the intelligence process. Oversight of intelligence in democracies is a critically important component in sustaining political support.

In short, as Japan addresses its future defense needs and reorganizes its government, the time has come to bring our intelligence cooperation out of the closet.

## Economic Relations

An economically healthy Japan is essential to a thriving bilateral partnership. Indeed, U.S. interests in all of Asia benefit from having a prosperous, growing, and robust Japanese economy. Japan remains the third-largest customer for U.S. goods, and its continued frailty has meant lost opportunities for American workers and businesses. A weak Japan contributes to volatility and uncertainty in global capital flows. In addition, an inward-looking, frustrated, insecure Japanese populace will be less willing or able to play a larger role in the alliance.

## an economically healthy Japan is essential to a thriving bilateral partnership

Unfortunately, Japan has experienced a disappointing decade of economic stagnation and recession. From 1992 through 1999, average annual real economic growth was only 1 percent. The decade ended with a recession in 1997 to 1998, and again in the second half of 1999.

The restoration of sustained economic growth in Japan will depend in large measure on opening markets and recognizing that the key to economic recovery rests in allowing the

private sector to respond to the forces of globalization. This will involve continued deregulation and the reduction of trade barriers, as well as the development of stronger rules and institutions to support more open markets.

This is a fact understood by some Japanese policy elites and documented in a host of

## the key to economic recovery rests in allowing the private sector to respond to the forces of globalization

official commentaries, beginning with the Maekawa Report of 1986. Since the mid-1970s, foreigners have attempted to encourage Japanese policymakers to take steps to increase the transparency and openness of the economy. With mounting frustration, successive U.S. administrations have tried to prod Tokyo to adopt a range of invented and reinvented trade and economic policy options.

Barriers to reform are significant. Mature workers (including the 20–30 percent who still enjoy the cozy sanctuary of lifetime employment), protected industries, and bureaucrats long accustomed to calling the shots for various industries continue to protect the status quo. Moreover, the Japanese tend to be averse to radical change, except in circumstances where no other options exist. And some in Japan argue that the nation's economic problems have yet to reach crisis proportions. The lack of a sense of urgency, and a national character resistant to abrupt shifts in established practices, impede adoption of necessary restructuring measures that are politically and psychologically painful.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that Japan has made some progress in addressing its economic problems. For example, many Western economists have given high marks to Tokyo's so-called Big Bang financial sector deregulation package and the banking bailout of 1998. Foreign direct investment has increased dramatically (though it remains lower than in any other major industrialized economy). These developments have introduced greater competition and new business models. Businesses have begun to place greater emphasis on profitability over relationships, a shift that has weakened the increasingly archaic

*keiretsu* system. Entrepreneurship is on the rise, and the venture capital market is growing.

The information technology (IT) sector is growing rapidly. New firms are starting up, and the potential benefits across many sectors of the economy are substantial. Yet economists remain divided as to whether IT sector growth will be sufficient to rescue the economy from the stagnation of the past decade. Regulatory barriers have constrained growth and slowed the adoption of IT technologies in other industries. The potential importance of this sector for the economy, therefore, reinforces the need for additional reform and deregulation of the economic system as part of ensuring a positive future for the economy. Perhaps the most important contribution IT can make is to provide the thin wedge to encourage deregulation and greater flexibility of business models in the broader Japanese economy.

Yet obstacles to recovery continue to exist. In particular, banking problems have yet to be addressed adequately, and fiscal stimulus has relied too heavily on pork-barrel public works projects with little if any potential for fostering long-term growth. This flawed fiscal approach

## banking problems have yet to be addressed adequately

has produced a ratio of debt to gross domestic product of at least 1.2:1, far higher than in the rest of the world's major developed economies.

A more innovative approach that uses private sector dynamism to drive economic change is now in order. For Japan, the price still will be high. Restoring the long-term health of the Japanese economy will require some short-term costs that Japanese politicians so far have refused to incur. The United States should urge Japan to develop policies along the following lines:

- Further systemic reform of the Japanese economy. Greater reliance on markets that are open to all players—both domestic and foreign—is critical to a sustained economic recovery:
- Continued short-term fiscal and monetary stimulus. Despite Japan's growing debt problems, Tokyo should focus on areas that promise to foster future growth. The era of building bridges, tunnels, and high-speed rail links to nowhere must end.
- There must be greater transparency in accounting, business practices, and rule making. The quality of Japanese economic statistics should

be improved, and financial institutions and local governments should be required to give a full accounting of their true financial condition. The government has a similar need to be more open in its disclosure of government information.

- Deregulation should be accelerated, particularly in sectors with the greatest potential to benefit the economy, such as telecommunications.

- A free trade agreement between Japan and Singapore should be encouraged as a test case for

## greater reliance on markets that are open to all players—both domestic and foreign—is critical to a sustained economic recovery

similar agreements with South Korea, Canada, the United States, and other interested countries.

The ability of American government initiatives to open Japanese markets and to drive structural change is diminishing. The United States does have legitimate interests when the lack of reform affects U.S. firms or endangers the global economy. In these areas, including the creation of corporate good-governance standards and greater transparency in business practices, U.S. Government attention and action continue to matter.

The U.S. should pursue several key goals in the years ahead that will foster an improved bilateral partnership:

- American economic interests must be expressed in one voice. Washington must have its priorities straight in order to deal effectively with the systemic change Japan is undergoing. In this regard, the next administration must gain the support of the American people for a focused economic agenda
- Washington should start a dialogue on enhancing foreign direct investment in Japan. Foreign firms bring new technologies and new business models that help the economy both directly and through their competitive impact on Japanese firms.
- The new administration must make a new round of global trade negotiations one of its highest priorities. American leadership is vital to this initiative. In this endeavor, the United States and its partners should seek the elimination of industrial tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and barriers to trade in financial services, and should pursue the negotiation of internationally accepted accounting Standards, particularly for financial institutions.
- Because of the importance of U.S.-Japan economic relations, bilateral trade negotiations

remain an essential tool, even as the United States and Japan turn to the World Trade Organization to resolve disputes and open new doors to cooperation.

■ The United States should encourage the fledgling economic coordination underway between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

the United States has encouraged Japan to play a larger international role

## Diplomacy

Traditionally, the United States has encouraged Japan to play a larger international role. The overlooked reality is that Japan has responded to that encouragement, particularly in humanitarian efforts and other nontraditional areas of security, often in cooperation with the United States. Japan is either the leading or the second-largest contributor to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Asian Development Bank, as well as being a leading contributor to all the major multilateral institutions. It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors.

There should be no surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has brought Japan belatedly

it is past time for the United States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook diplomacy

into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when policymaking-by-after-thought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking beyond its traditional donor's role.

U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by

Tokyo, Washington must recognize that multilateral efforts are important to Tokyo. The Japanese Government regards such initiatives as expressions of national identity, not as attempts to undermine U.S. leadership. Quiet, behind-the-scenes coordination of strategies often is more effective than theatrical pronouncements of partnership thrown together at the last moment as an outcome of bilateral summits.

The search for an independent Japanese identity in foreign affairs is not in conflict with American diplomacy. Indeed, the United States

the search for an independent Japanese identity in foreign affairs is not in conflict with American diplomacy

and Japan largely share the same overall diplomatic goals. The two countries have many common interests.

■ Maintaining an engaged, forward-deployed American presence in Asia.

■ Reforming the United Nations as an institution to deal more effectively with conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking activities. The U.S. should continue to support Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council. However, there are obvious obligations of collective security with which Japan must come to grips.

■ Encouraging the People's Republic of China to become a positive force in regional political and economic affairs. The United States and Japan should engage in an ongoing strategic dialogue on this subject.

■ Fostering reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. Washington and Tokyo should continue to support the Trilateral Coordination Group (South Korea, Japan, and the United States) to deal with issues related to the peninsula, while looking for opportunities to broaden their cooperation.

■ Supporting Russian stability in the Far East and facilitating the development of the vast Russian store of natural resources. The United States and Japan should more effectively coordinate their policies toward Russia.

■ Encouraging an activist, independent, democratic, and prosperous Association of Southeast Asian Nations even as the United States and Japan have divergent policies toward individual ASEAN members.

■ Coordinating our efforts to support territorial integrity and revival of Indonesia

Japan, with the world's second-largest economy, should not allow its economic problems to become an excuse to reverse the evolution of its foreign aid policy away from one that focuses on benefiting the recipient rather than the donor. Japan's policies should further economic growth and openness in Asia. Tokyo's proposals for internationalization of the yen will only succeed if Japanese financial markets are transparent.

## Conclusion

Since the arrival of Commodore Perry's Black Ships in Tokyo Bay nearly 150 years ago, U.S.-Japan relations have shaped the history of Japan and Asia—for better or for worse. At the dawn of the new millennium, the inescapable forces of globalization and the dynamics of the post-Cold War Asian security setting pose new and complex challenges to the United States and Japan. How the two countries respond, individually and as alliance partners, will define significantly the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific as well as the possibilities of the new century—much as their interaction has affected the economic, political, and strategic contours of the past.

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snowflake

August 20, 2001 1:02 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Rep to OSCE

We don't need someone representing us to the OSCE, do we?  
Let's talk about this before we put someone there. It sounds crazy to me.  
Thanks.

334

Attach.  
8/7/01 WHLO action memo to SecDef re: Candidate Approval Submission to White House

DHR:dh  
082001-38

→ To: USD(P)

I think you'll need  
to convince SecDef of  
this. Please advise.

D. Rita

20 Aug 01

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

E PENTAGON  
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SECDEF HAS SEEN

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT

8/16

SecDef -

FO

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SU

This is someone  
Herbits mentioned to  
you in May. His  
package is finally ready  
and Feith, Crouch and  
~~Andrew~~ DepSec met with  
him a couple weeks back.  
The position in Vienna is  
mostly a "do-no-harm"  
one and he has no substantive  
background. Diligent

MEMO

August 7, 2001, 1600

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
AND WHITE HOUSE LIAISON *John 8/1/01*

Recommendation to White House -- NICHOLAS

Recommendation to permit David Nicholas to WH Personnel  
Department of Defense Representative  
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Reviewed and approved by the Deputy  
Secretary, Mr. Feith, Mr. Cambone, Mr. Crouch, and myself. Informal  
liaison indicates WH Personnel supports his candidacy.

- Resume is attached.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve forwarding candidate to the White House.

SecDef Approval: \_\_\_\_\_

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Susan Bernabucci, (b)(6)

Attachment:  
As stated



8/17

6/17  
14/15  
DIX

**DAVID NICHOLAS FOR THE SECDEF REP TO THE  
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE**

**Summary comments from interviews**

J. D Crouch: Mr. Nicholas would an excellent OSCE representative for the department.

Doug Feith: He is sufficiently qualified for the position and would make a fine representative.

Note from the White House: Mr. Nicholas is a friend of the Vice President

## **SECRETARY OF-DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE (SEC DEF REP) TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**

Serves as the Secretary of Defense Representative (Sec Def Rep) to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC); the Joint Consultative Group (JCG); and the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). He reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).

- Posted in Vienna, Austria
- Principal Advisor to the **ASD(ISP)** on matters relating to European/Eurasian regional security in the OSCE Permanent Council
- Coordinates with the **DASD/RUE** on all issues relating to Russia
- Coordinates with the **DASD/TRP** on matters relating to CFE, Open Skies and the Vienna Document
- Negotiator of new arms control and confidence-building measures in the FSC

**POSITION DESCRIPTION** (Please Read Instructions on the Back)

1. Agency Position No.  
**DDES 1979**

|  |   |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| 2. Reason for Submission<br><input type="checkbox"/> Redescription <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New<br><input type="checkbox"/> Reestablishment <input type="checkbox"/> Other                                  | 3. Service<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Military <input type="checkbox"/> Civil | 4. Employing Office Location<br><b>ARLINGTON VA</b>  | 5. Duty Station<br><b>Vienna, Austria</b>   | 6. OPM Certification No.   |
| 7. Fair Labor Standards Act<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Exempt <input type="checkbox"/> Nonexempt   |   | 8. Financial Statements Required<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure <input type="checkbox"/> Employment and Financial Interests |   | 9. Subject to IA Action<br><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
| 10. Position Status<br><input type="checkbox"/> Competitive<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Excepted (Specify in Remarks)<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SES (Gen.) <input type="checkbox"/> SES (Spec) |   | 11. Position IC:<br><input type="checkbox"/> Supervisory<br><input type="checkbox"/> Managerial<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Skilled                               | 12. Sensitivity<br><input type="checkbox"/> 1-None<br><input type="checkbox"/> 2-Minimal<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3-Substantial<br><input type="checkbox"/> 4-Serious | 13. Competitive Level Code   |
| 14. Agency Use   |   |  |   |  |

|   |  |           |                   |           |            |                 |
|---|--|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------|-----------------|
| 15. Classified/Graded by                          | Official Title of Position               | Pay Plan  | Occupational Code | Grade     | Initials   | Date            |
| a. U.S. Office of Personnel Management            |  |           |                   |           |            |                 |
| b. Department, Agency or Establishment            | <b>SECDEF REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OSCE</b> | <b>ES</b> | <b>0301</b>       | <b>00</b> | <b>luc</b> | <b>08-18-99</b> |
| c. Second Level Review                            |  |           |                   |           |            |                 |
| d. First Level Review                             |  |           |                   |           |            |                 |
| e. Recommended by Supervisor or Initiating Office |  |           |                   |           |            |                 |

16. Organizational Title of Position if different from official title

17. Name of Employee if vacant, specify  
**SAMUEL POOLE**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| 18. Department, Agency, or Establishment<br><b>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</b> | e. Third Subdivision<br><b>OASD (S&amp;TR)</b> |
| a. First Subdivision<br><b>OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</b>        | d. Fourth Subdivision                          |
| b. Second Subdivision<br><b>OUSD(P)</b>                                  | c. Fifth Subdivision                           |

19. Employee Review: This is an accurate description of the major duties and responsibilities of my position.

Signature of Employee (Optional)

20. Supervisory Certification. I certify that this is an accurate statement of the major duties and responsibilities of this position and its organizational relationships, and that the position is necessary to carry out Government functions for which I am responsible. This certification is made with the knowledge that this information is to be used for statutory purposes relating to appointment and payment of public funds, and that false or misleading statements may constitute violations of such statutes or their implementing regulations.

|   |  |
|---|--|
| a. Typed Name and Title of Immediate Supervisor<br><b>EDWARD L WARNER, III<br/>ASD S&amp;TR</b> | b. Typed Name and Title of Higher-Level Supervisor or Manager (Optional) |
| Signature<br><i>Edward L Warner III</i>   | Signature  |
| Date  | Date   |

21. Classification/Job Grading Certification. I certify that this person has been classified/graded as required by Title 5, U.S. Code, in conformance with standards published by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management or, if no published standards apply directly, consistently with the most applicable published standards.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Typed Name and Title of Official Taking Action<br><b>Lynne W. Capps<br/>Personnel Management Specialist</b>  | 22. Position Classification Standards Used in Classifying/Grading Position |
| Signature<br><i>Lynne W. Capps</i>   | Date<br><b>08-18-99</b>  |
| Information for Employees: The standards and information on their application, are available in the personnel office. The classification of the position may be reviewed and corrected by the agency or the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Information on classification/job grading appeals, and complaints on a suspension from FLSA, is available from the personnel office or the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. |  |

|                        |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
|------------------------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|------|
| 23. Position Review    | Initials | Date |
| a. Employee (Optional) |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
| b. Supervisor          |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
| c. Classifier          |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |

24. Remarks  
**Per Action 00DG00000863**

Certified/Approved: *Janet Thompson*  
**Director, Personnel and Security**

Date: **9-24-99**

25. Description of Major Duties and Responsibilities (See Attached)

## POSITION DESCRIPTION

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE (SEC DEF REP) TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY **AND** COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The incumbent **in** this position serves as the Representative of the Secretary of Defense (See Def Rep) to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (**FSC**); the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) established by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; and the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) established by the Open Skies Treaty. The incumbent reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for **Strategy** and **Threat** Reduction (**ASD/S&TR**).

#### NATURE AND PURPOSE OF WORK

##### A. INTRODUCTION

-- As OSD representative to the U.S. OSCE, FSC, and JCG delegations in Vienna, Austria, the incumbent serves as the principal Vienna advisor to the **ASD/S&TR** on matters related to the entire range of OSCE, FSC, and JCG activities, including but not limited to OSCE deliberations on European/Eurasian regional security in the OSCE Permanent Council, CFE adaptation negotiations in the JCG, and the negotiation of new arms control and confidence-building measures in the FSC.

-- As OSD representative to the U.S. OSCE delegation, the incumbent will coordinate with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia (**DASD/RUE**) on all issues related to Russia and the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. As OSD representative to the JCG, FSC, and OSCC, the incumbent will coordinate with the Deputy Assistant **Secretary** of Defense for Threat Reduction Policy (**DASD/TRP**) on matters related to the implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Open **Skies** Treaty, and the Vienna Document. The incumbent will also coordinate with the **DASD/TRP** on matters related to CFE Treaty adaptation and the negotiation of new arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in the FSC. Recognizing that OSCE issues cut across the OSD Policy organization, the incumbent will coordinate with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy (**DASD/STRAT**), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO (**DASD/EUR&NATO**), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs (**DASD/PK&HA**) and the Director of the Bosnia Task Force (**DIR/BTF**) on policy issues that impact these organizations.

##### B. DUTIES

-- The incumbent exercises **very** broad initiative in **analyzing**, developing, recommending, **and** implementing policy approaches and specific negotiating steps related to the OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCC. The incumbent must **be** able to make

accurate assessments of the political and military implications of a variety of European/Eurasian regional security activities and to bring these implications to the attention of the **ASD/S&TR**, the relevant DASDs, and other senior officials. The incumbent also analyzes and develops Policy options on arms control issues, specifically concerning **CFE** Treaty adaptation and deliberations in the FSC. The incumbent will bring relevant **arms** control issues to the attention of the **ASD/S&TR** and the **DASD/TRP**.

-- At own initiative or as **instructed** by **Washington**, the incumbent develops and coordinates OSD Policy input for U.S. participation in OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCE deliberations. Incumbent has broad responsibility to initiate policy analysis and develop alternate policies, recommendations, and **actions**.

-- The incumbent advises the **ASD/S&TR** and relevant DASDs on the national security aspects and, more specifically, the **implications** for the interests and **resources** of the Department of Defense for the issues noted above.

-- The incumbent must be able to produce issue and decision papers quickly, including recommendations **concerning** U.S. regional security and **arms** control policy, and communicate these recommendations to the **ASD/S&TR** and relevant DASDs.

-- The incumbent will stay **informed** on NATO issues and will develop an appropriate working relationship with OSD Policy representatives at the U.S. Mission to NATO.

-- The incumbent **will** serve as Senior OSD Advisor to the Head of the U.S. OSCE Delegation. The incumbent will also serve, as directed, as the primary U.S. representative to specific OSCE, JCG, and FSC deliberations. For example, incumbent may be required to represent the U.S. at CFE adaptation or FSC Working Group sessions. Incumbent may also serve, as directed, as OSCE **Chairman** or **Coordinator** for specific regional security or arms control discussions.

-- The incumbent will, as directed, brief members of Congress and their staff, members of **the NSC staff**, and officials of other governments on issues related to the OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCE.

-- Incumbent participates and represents the **Secretary** of Defense, as appropriate, at international/professional meetings and conferences.

-- The incumbent is responsible for the administrative and **financial** issues surrounding the operation of the OSD office at the U.S. OSCE Mission in Vienna, **Austria**.

## C. FACTORS

### FACTOR 1. KNOWLEDGE

-- The duties of this position are concerned with U.S. national **security** policy and require an individual with great perceptiveness, originality, ingenuity, tact, diplomacy and perseverance. Previous experience in European and **NIS** regional security issues, experience as an arms control negotiator or **service** at a senior level in a diplomatic establishment within the OSCE area is highly desirable.

-- A primary requirement is the ability to perceive, grasp, and reflect the policies of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the **Chairman**, Joint Chiefs of Staff and to **maintain** a continuous and effective liaison with equivalent echelons of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and outside the federal government as needed and authorized. Incumbent should have demonstrated experience in directing **an OSD/JCS** office or affiliated organization.

-- Effective performance-of the duties outlined requires a background of education and work experience within the national security bureaucracy which has provided a base of professional competence for dealing with a variety of national security policy questions. Specifically, experience at a senior level **in** Eurasian security issues and the multilateral negotiation of arms control and confidence-building measures is highly desirable.

-- Incumbent must be a highly experienced, effective manager, planner, and analyst and must have current knowledge of U.S. foreign policy and national security issues, particularly in the area of **European/Eurasian** conflict prevention, crisis management, post-crisis rehabilitation, transatlantic organizations and security architecture, and conventional arms control. Incumbent should be familiar with issues under discussion in the OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCC.

-- Incumbent must have a thorough knowledge of U.S. political and military policies, objectives and capabilities; must have a demonstrated capability to formulate and conduct studies of regional security and conventional arms control issues related to U.S. forces; and must fully understand the ramifications of proposals or actions on **DoD** interests and be able to relate **OSD concerns** to the OSCE Head of Mission, the interagency, and the international **community**.

-- Incumbent must understand U.S. foreign policy and security policy-making architecture and coordination processes and have proven capability to operate effectively within them to implement approved national security strategies.

-- The Representative of the Secretary of Defense directs and **manages** the work of OSD arms control and foreign affairs specialists and other **staff while** in Vienna who participate in OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCC activities. **Incumbent** should have previous experience in the management of staffs or organizations in related fields.

-- While a focus of primary effort is to explore and support **ways** for the OSCE collectively to further U.S. national security and military strategy for Europe, effective exercise of duties will depend to a large extent on the incumbent's ability to understand, relate to, and convince individual counterparts from participating OSCE delegations. Experience in diplomatic and/or **military** cooperation with NATO allies and former Soviet states, especially Russia., is highly desirable.

-- Ability to explain to foreign dignitaries, members of Congress and their **staffs**, members of the media, and public interest groups policies within area of responsibility.

#### FACTOR 2. SUPERVISORY CONTROLS

-- The incumbent operates with a high **degree of** independence under the general guidance of the **ASD/S&TR**, who provides guidance **from** the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. Incumbent has broad latitude in the exercise of individual initiative and judgment. At post in Vienna, incumbent's activities will be subject to **day-to-day** supervision by the Head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE.

#### FACTOR 3. GUIDELINES

-- Duties are performed in accordance with overall policies and objectives of the **DoD** and U.S. national policy applicable to the programs and projects within the incumbent's area of responsibility.

#### FACTOR 4. COMPLEXITY

-- The work is highly complex, having a significant impact on the success of U.S. regional security and arms control policy. Incumbent's efforts will be critical to advancing the USG and **DoD** relationship with **all** OSCE members to include the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Incumbent must have the demonstrated ability to formulate and conduct analyses on regional security and arms control issues. Incumbent must understand foreign policy and security policy-making machinery of the USG. Incumbent must be able to reconcile-and often negotiate compromises **for--** divergent interests and positions within the USG and international arenas.

#### FACTOR 5. SCOPE AND EFFECT

-- The efforts of the incumbent **will have** a direct and-significant impact upon the successful conduct of the discussions within the OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCC. The incumbent's performance is key to the development, negotiation, and implementation of USG regional security and **arms** control policies. Effective and timely performance of the duties outlined constitute a major contribution to defense policy, foreign policy, and national security.

#### FACTOR 6. PERSONAL CONTACTS

-- Usually at the DASD level (or its equivalent in other agencies), the incumbent should maintain woperative working relationships with senior **OSD** officials at levels as indicated. Incumbent requires similar contacts with **counterparts** (both military and civilian) at the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, the Department of Energy, the intelligence agencies, and foreign governments.

#### FACTOR 7. PURPOSE OF CONTACTS

-- To develop, coordinate, and promulgate OSD policy positions within the interagency and USG positions in high-level international deliberations. Through frequent formal and **informal** contacts, to keep informed of changes in plans and negotiating strategies of other agencies or of other OSCE, JCG, FSC, and OSCC participants. In like manner, keep **contacts** informed of changes in OSD and USG Policies, plans, and program emphasis to insure consideration of Defense interests and responsibilities in the interagency and international **fora**. In the case of foreign contacts, purpose is to explain/defend USG policies.

#### FACTOR 8. PHYSICAL DEMANDS

-- No special physical demands are required to perform the duties of this Position; however, physical stamina and mental agility are required to **cope** with the hours, deadlines, travel, and **rapidly** shifting demands of the duties involved,

#### FACTOR 9. WORK ENVIRONMENT

Work is performed in a typical office setting; however, incumbent must be prepared for extended travel throughout the continental United States and overseas, frequently on short notice. It is expected that the incumbent **will** return to the U.S. regularly for **consultations** with relevant **DoD** and **other USG** officials.

**DAVID R. NICHOLAS**

**PERSONAL**

Place and Date of Birth:

(b)(6)

Address:

Office

170 North Fifth Street  
Laramie, Wyoming 82070

Phone (b)(6)

Fax (b)(6)

E Mail (b)(6)

Home

(b)(6)

Family:

Wife

(b)(6)

Children

(b)(6)

**EDUCATION**

Natrona County High School, Casper, Wyoming (Class of 1959);  
Junior Class President; Student Body President; American Legion Boys' Nation

Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, AB (Class of 1963, 1967); Government  
major; Staff writer, *Broadcasting* magazine, Washington, D.C., 196 1-62

University of Wyoming, College of Law, Laramie, Wyoming, J.D. (1966);  
Chancellor, Potter Law Club; ODK; Board of Editors, *Land and Water Law  
Review*

U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, (1967-1968)  
Basic Course; Procurement Course; Military Judge Course

National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada, Basic Courses (1970 and 1974)

### **BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL**

David R. Nicholas, sole private law practice, 1971 - 1972  
203 Grand Avenue  
Laramie, Wyoming 82070

Corthell and King, Attorneys, partner, 1972-1989  
221 South Second Street  
Laramie, Wyoming 82070

Anthony, Nicholas, Goodrich & Tangeman, LLC (formerly Nicholas Law Offices),  
member, 1993-present  
170 North Fifth Street  
Laramie, Wyoming 82072

Rocky Mountain Radio Corp., co-owner, 1983-1988  
Radio Stations KLDI and KRQU-FM, Laramie, Wyoming

U.S. Mission to NATO, Defense Advisor, 1989-1993 (activities described below)

Russia program, 1993-present (described below)

### **MILITARY AND FEDERAL SERVICE**

United States Army  
Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 1967-1971; Independent Military  
Judge, 1969-1971; Army Commendation Medal; Honorable discharge

United States Army Reserve, Military Judge Mobilization Designee, 1971 - 1979

Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, 1984-1989

Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO and Senior Representative of the  
Secretary of Defense in Europe, Brussels, Belgium, 1989-1993; Distinguished  
Public Service Award; Top Secret security clearance

### **TEACHING AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPERIENCE**

Adjunct Professor of Political Science, College of A&S, University of Wyoming

Law Enforcement, **1977- 1978**

Constitutional Government, 1983-1 984

Global Business, 1999-2000

Lecturer, Various colleges of the University of Wyoming, including the College of Arts and Sciences, the College of Business, and the Law School, **1971-present**, most recently primarily in the following areas:

International Law; Foreign Affairs; Business Law; Agricultural Economics; Constitutional Law; Government; Journalism; Global Business; World Community Organizations

Lecturer, Saratov State University, **1993-present**, on business and international relations; honored as Honorary Professor (1998)

Arbitrator, labor negotiations, occasional, 1970's and 1980's

Lou **Whittaker** Ice and Snow Climbing School, Mt. Rainier, Washington (1971)

Exum School of American Mountaineering, Teton National Park, Wyoming (1984)

Private Pilot

### **LANGUAGES**

English, plus working knowledge of French and Spanish; fundamental knowledge of Russian, German, and Chinese.

### **PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

Member, Wyoming State Bar, **1967-present** (Committees on Resolution of Fee Disputes and on Legislation); Albany County Bar Association, (President, 1975); American Bar Association, 197 1-1 989

Admitted to Practice in Wyoming (1967) and before the U.S. District Court and 9th and 10th Circuits Courts of Appeals (1967), and the United States Court of Military Appeals (1967); licensed to consult in Russia (1996)

### **POLITICAL ACTIVITIES**

Wyoming State Senator, 1979-1 986

Republican State Committeeman, 1977-1 978  
Republican State Convention, delegate, almost every convention until 1989, 1996  
Republican State Platform Committee, 198 1; Resolutions Committee, 1996  
Republican National Convention, delegate, 1986  
Republican Precinct Committeeman, 1974-1 988  
Republican National Policy Forum, 1993-present  
Chair, Albany County Republican Convention, 1998  
Permanent Chair, Wyoming State Republican Convention, 1998

## **OFFICES**

Wyoming State Senate, 1979-1986  
    Judiciary Committee  
        Minor Courts Subcommittee  
        Lien Law Subcommittee  
        Criminal Code Subcommittee  
    Select Committee on General Fund Revenue Projections  
    Select Committee on Corrections  
    Chairman, Senate and Joint Interim Travel, Recreation and Wildlife Committees

Justice of the Peace, Albany County, Wyoming, 1974-1 975

Hearing Officer, various hearings involving teacher termination and public employee disputes, occasional, 1970's and 1980's

Special City Attorney, City of Laramie, occasional, 1971-1 988

Laramie City Attorney, 1988-1989

## **RUSSIA PROGRAM** (Additional details will be provided upon request)

Working with people in the U.S. and in Saratov, Russian Federation, I designed and am in the process of implementing a business and infrastructure development program to support systemic reform: Exchange programs among U.S. and Russian business people and professionals, representing individuals and companies in establishing businesses and non governmental organizations; consulting with respect to judicial and legislative reform; assisting in implementing "rule of law" and "Federalism" programs. This initiative involves many persons and entities, including members of Rotary District 5440, the State of Wyoming, the University of Wyoming, Saratov Sate University, and the Saratov Oblast Administration. The University of Wyoming has a tandem program, and many of our activities (denominated the Wyoming/Saratov Initiative) are shared.

Partial list of accomplishments of this initiative:

Business and professional exchanges and arranging joint ventures  
Legislative exchanges  
Judicial exchanges including seminars and colloquia on due process, juries, and the adversarial system  
Administrative branch exchanges including Governors  
Cultural exchanges  
Art exchange  
Consultations concerning business, infrastructure, legislation, agriculture, taxation, administrative and judicial procedures, due process, banking, and mutual funds, etc., including arranging joint venture partners and drafting business plans and organizational documents for new businesses  
Student and Faculty exchanges (University of Wyoming-Saratov State University programs)  
Agriculture exchanges  
Implementation of a program on Federalism (Co-administrator)  
Youth exchanges (agriculture, tourism, banking, and accounting internships)  
Establishing a Rotary Club and a Rotary youth (Rotaract) organization  
Micro banking program  
Establishing sister state and sister university relationships  
Development of a program for providing and funding rural health care, including facilities, and endowing their operation and maintenance

### **CONSULTATIONS and INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**Russia. (1993-present):** Consultations with individuals, businesses, elected and appointed officials, and trial and appellate judges, students, farmers, and educators, primarily in Saratov, Russian Federation, concerning forms of business associations, economic development, non governmental organizations, legislative drafting, legislative procedures, administrative law, constitutional law, judicial procedures (including jury trials, use of experts, and the adversarial system), real property reform, condominiums, privatization, marketing, **financing**, banking, contracts, torts, due process, corporate law, city planning, sewage and water treatment, oil and gas development, environmental remediation, infrastructure planning, housing, taxation, bonding, political organizations including campaigns, world community organizations, and exchange programs. Drafted and promoted sister state resolutions for both Wyoming and Saratov Oblast, which have been endorsed by the governors and legislatures of the states of both nations, Former legal counsel for a Canadian/American/Russian oil company in Dagestan, Russian Federation (spent the summer of 1998 in Makhachkala, Dagestan). Consultations with the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and numerous other international financing institutions. Designed and in the process of implementing a rural health care program for Saratov Oblast, including work on a regional medical plan (a first for Russia) to establish remote facilities for providing primary care, training **para** professionals, providing telemedicine capabilities and ambulance service, and improving conditions at a regional medical facility. Honored by being named Honorary Professor at Saratov State University.

**China** (1997 and 2001): Planning and participation in a series of “rule of law” presentations to judges, lawyers, students, and faculty in Beijing, Harbin, Daqing, Qiqihar, and Shanghai, China, together with a Wyoming Supreme Court Justice, two trial judges, the law dean and several faculty from the University of Wyoming; hosting Chinese judges in the U.S.; funded by USIA.

**Europe** (1989- 1993): Official consultations and negotiations with and among high level U.S. and foreign governmental officials, NATO officials, and military commanders among our allies and from central and eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union; problem solving, conceiving, drafting, and shepherding through the domestic interagency process, support with respect to the negotiation and implementation of international understandings, including, but not limited to, the new NATO Strategic Concept, the conventional forces treaty including accession to it and allocation of treaty limited personnel and equipment among the parties, implementation of armaments reductions by the nations of the CSCE (now OSCE), and burden sharing. Duties included supervising 50 plus U.S. Department of Defense personnel, civilian and military, at NATO and all committee work dealing with defense planning, procurement, operations, standardization and **interoperability**, and integration, and serving as the representative of the United States on NATO’s Executive Working Group and High Level Task Force. These functions required and utilized knowledge of law, including international law and European Community law, defense matters including force planning, knowledge of international community organizations and procedures, as well as negotiating and drafting skills in a multi cultural, multi lingual forum. The U.S. Mission was also responsible for planning, logistics, preparing briefing papers, talking points, and participation, for numerous ministerial meetings, several summits among our allies, and on a couple of occasions among the **54+** nations of the OSCE.

**Taiwan** (1986-1 989): Consultations with American concerns doing business with Taiwan and with Taiwan enterprises doing business in the U.S. concerning environmental cleanup, mining, refining, manufacturing and distribution, comparative law and conflicts of laws, corporate/joint venture law, taxation, arbitration; co-organized a University of Wyoming/Taiwan Symposium attended by our (Wyoming’s) Governor and our United States Senators; helped establish a Wyoming trade office in Taipei; cosponsored a sister state resolution adopted by the Wyoming and Taiwan Legislatures; honored with the key to the City of Kaosiung, ROC.

**PUBLIC AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS** (some dates are approximate)

- Cathedral Home for Children, Laramie, Wyoming, Board of Directors,  
1975-1989
- Albany County Public Library, Board of Trustees, 1980- 198 1
- Albany County Senior Citizens Board, 1975-1989
- University of Wyoming, College of Arts and Sciences, Board of Visitors,  
1986-present
- University of Wyoming Art Museum, National Board of Visitors,  
1985-present

University of Wyoming, International Programs Board of Advisors, 1999- present  
 Boys' and Girls' State Staffs, 1970's and 1980's  
 Attorney's Liability Protection Society. Investment Committee, 1986  
 Laramie Area Chamber of Commerce Board, 1970's  
 Laramie Child Protection Team. Charter Member, 1970's and early 80's  
 Laramie Head Start Board, 1970's  
 Salvation Army Advisory Board, 1970's  
 United Way Advisory Board, 1970's  
 American Legion, 1971 -present  
 Barbershop Chorus, 1970's and early 80's  
 Rotary, **1975-present**, past president. Paul Harris Fellow: District 5440 Rotarian of the  
     Year, **1995/1996**: Assistant District Governor, District 5440, **1997/1998**  
 Selective Service System Advisor, 1970's  
 Laramie Institute for Family Education, legal advisor, 1970's and early 80's  
 Wyoming Council for the Humanities 1986-1988  
 Advisory Council on Public Assistance and Social Services, 1970's  
 Energy Conservation Advisory Committee, 1970's  
 Wyoming Outdoor Council Board, 1980's  
 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, **1980-present**  
 National Science Foundation, Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research  
     (**EPSCoR**), Wyoming *Ad hoc* Committee, 1980's  
 National Engineers Hall of Fame, Honorary Life Board Member, **1988-present**  
 Harvard and Radcliffe Admissions Alumni, Schools and Scholarships Committee,  
     **1975-present** (chairman until 1989)  
 Harvard Alumni Career Advisory Service, advisor, **1975-present**  
 Sigma Alpha Epsilon, social fraternity, 1961 -present  
 Omicron Delta Kappa, honorary fraternity, **1964-present**  
 Delta Theta Phi, honorary law fraternity, **1986-present**  
 United Nations Day, Wyoming State Chmn.. 1995 and 1997: United Nations Assn.USA  
*Ad hoc* Committee of the International Agriculture Section of the National Association of  
     State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges preparing an "Agenda for  
     "Globalizing Agricultural Science and Education Programs for America," 1998

### **REPRESENTATIVE OTHER ACTIVITIES**

During the past few years: Keynote speaker at the RAND Istituto Affari Internazionali  
 Conference in Rome, Italy; Convention of the Jewish War Veterans in Atlanta, Georgia; Atlantic  
 Assembly in Antalya, Turkey; Wyoming State Bar convention at Casper, Wyoming; J.L. Kellogg  
 Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University in Lucerne, Switzerland; Centre  
 d'Etude et de Prospectif Strategique in Paris, France; Peace Through NATO Fringe Meeting at  
 the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton, England; NATO school at Oberammergau,  
 Germany; Commanders' conferences at **Greenham** Common, England and Lake Chemsee,  
 Germany; Wyoming National Guard dining out; Enhanced Oil Recovery Institute Symposium;  
 Laramie County Republican Women's Lincoln Day Dinner Keynote, Cheyenne, Wyoming; DAR

convention; University classes in the U.S. and in Russia; dozens of Rotary, Lions, and Kiwanis Clubs in the Rocky Mountain Region; Rotary Far West Institute, Phoenix, Arizona; President's Peace Conference, St. Petersburg, Russia; Governor's Roundtable, Saratov, Russia; American Association of Slavic Studies, Central Slavic Conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Rotary Youth Leadership Awards Conference, Estes Park, Colorado; several grade school and high school classes and commencements in our region, and numerous other symposia, colloquia, workshops, and round tables, civic and social groups. The underlying themes are essentially the same: Foreign policy, security policy, constitutional government, rule of law, world community organizations, global business, and the institutions of Democracy. I devote more than half of my time to pro bono activities. Recently, in addition to my activities in Russia, I provided free legal services for the Laramie Soup Kitchen, Lariat (internet provider), and the Environmental Education Center.

### **REFERENCES**

References, in addition to Wyoming friends, clients, colleagues, and associates, include numerous persons involved in our Russia initiative, farmers and ranchers, politicians, and former students, as well as academicians from the University of Wyoming and Saratov State University. The list also includes former colleagues who represented the various European allies at NATO and colleagues who were with the former Bush administration, some of whom are still with the government: Vice-President Richard B. Cheney, Hon. Alan Simpson (former U.S. Senator), Hon. William H. Taft IV (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO), Hon. Alexander Vershbow (Ambassador to NATO and Ambassador designate to Russia), Hon. Reginald Bartholomew (former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, NATO, and Italy), Hon. John Komblum (former U.S. Ambassador to Germany), Hon. Steve Hadley (former Assistant Secretary of Defense).

• snowflake

C & D copy

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 4, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Close Bases, Strengthen Our Military**

Don't you think this David Jeremiah article (attached) ought to be sent around to all the members of Congress?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
090401.39

Attach: *Close Bases, Strengthen Our Military by David Jeremiah and Richard Hearney*

323.3

4 Sep 01

**Close Bases, Strengthen Our Military**  
by David Jeremiah and Richard Hearney

Imagine this. A CEO of a Fortune 500 company blindly throws good money after bad year after year. He knows the global environment demands a lean and agile firm. Yet he ignores the most basic of business practices, continuing to lose millions of dollars by operating old, unneeded facilities that no longer fit his strategic plan. As a result, he fails to fund operations that are crucial to staying ahead of the competition.

That CEO wouldn't last another day. Stockholders wouldn't allow it. Yet that exact situation has been perpetuated for years at the Pentagon, which continues to operate bases and facilities that study after study says it doesn't need. Only in this case the cost isn't lost profit. The cost is billions of dollars spent on unneeded facilities instead of improving quality of life, readiness and modernization of America's military. As American citizens - stockholders in the military in which our sons and daughters serve - we have a right to demand more.

Base closures mean real savings. Even with the president's proposed increase in defense spending, simple math tells us there still isn't enough money in the defense budget to maintain readiness and continue modernizing the force to the faster, lighter and more mobile military we need today. Common sense tells us that eliminating unnecessary bases is one source of savings to achieve this. The same can be true of base realignments, which offer the opportunity to put a base to more productive use - by bringing together the same functions from different Services and getting rid of unneeded real estate. Congress has also given the Pentagon expanded authority to form public/private partnerships to lease underused facilities or undeveloped portions of the base. Such an approach has worked well for Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey.

The 97 bases that have been closed to date and the hundreds of activities that have been realigned will save \$25 billion through 2003 and \$5.6 billion per year thereafter. Additional closures and realignments could save \$20 billion by 2015 and \$3 billion a year thereafter. And every billion saved is a billion that can be redirected to our men and women in uniform.

Base closures also mean real opportunity for communities. Contrary to what many fear, and notwithstanding some problems in a few cases, the record is clear. The end of a military base can mean the beginning of economic growth and job creation. Newly energized communities from Orlando, Florida to Alexandria, Louisiana to northern California are proving that an old base can become a new engine of prosperity. At the former England Air Force Base in Alexandria over 60 businesses have created 1,800 new jobs - more than double the civilian employment at the time of closure.

Only the Congress can enable the Pentagon to close more bases and rid itself of the burden of carrying 20-25 percent in excess capacity. And Congress now has the opportunity to restart the process with a clean slate, learning from the past and

approaching the **issue** on a nonpartisan, objective basis. Experience **has** shown **that the** model used in the past - now reflected in legislation sponsored by Senators John **McCain** and Carl **Levin** - **can be fair and effective**.

Sadly, similar legislation has **often** died after a head-on collision with the brick wall of political reality. Members of Congress with bases in their states or districts understandably are reluctant to cast the vote that may - even if only temporarily - cause economic upheaval or cost jobs back home.

Yet elected **officials** focused on serving their constituents ought to be mindful of another set of the constituents as well - the men and women from their districts who wear the uniform, and their families. In every state and congressional district there are military families who rely on their representatives in Washington to do what is right for their **fathers**, mothers, sons and daughters.

**For** their sake, and for the sake of the national security, Congress now has the opportunity to do the right and responsible thing - close bases to strengthen our military.

*Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is president of Technology Strategies and Alliance Corporation. He recently headed the quality of life study for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. General Richard Hearney, USMC (Ret.), former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, is president of Business Executives, for National Security.*

snowflake

Demom  
12/5  
1732  
B

December 5, 2001 11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Franks  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan Airlines

Have you given any more thought as to how we might use Uzbekistan Airline? I really think we ought to try to help those folks, and if we can get other countries or whoever to use that airline, it would sure be a help to them. It has been pounded because of the conflict.

UZBEKISTAN

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120501-22

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

S Dec 01

U14997 02


snowflake

INFO  
SA  
12/5  
12/10

December 5, 2001 11:35 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Event

Thanks for the nice thought on December 22. Unfortunately, Joyce will already be in Taos, and I will be leaving that day for Taos if things go according to plan. If not, and I am stuck here in town, I may give you a call and see if I can still stop by.



Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120501-17

001SD

S Dec 01

U14998 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4940

snowflake

December 5, 2001 7:45 AM

12/12  
2/12  
0932

R/b

TO : Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Press Attention

*Dave*

373.24

It is interesting that we had a successful ballistic missile test on Monday night, but at the Tuesday press briefing the subject never came up. I wonder if it would have come up if it had been a failure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120501-13

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

12/12

5 Dec 01

U14999 02

11-L-0559/OSD/4941

TO: SECDEF

FROM: oTone 

DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Press Attention

Interesting, yes, but I am not concerned about the lack of interest in the success of the missile defense test.

As I've said all along, I think missile defense's appropriate "position" is as one piece of a broader deterrent strategy.

snowflake

TO: David Chu  
cc: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
DATE: September 7, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Weldon's Tour**

322

Here's some material that Congressman Curt **Weldon** gave me. I am certainly interested in the privatization approach, and I hope you are pushing hard on it. I think we ought to make a splash on it so that people who conceivably would be interested in building them would be aware that we are trying to do it, and we think it is important.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090701.19

Attach. Chairman's Readiness Assessment & Base Tour Press

*9/10*  
*→ To: Roy DuBois*  
*DUSD (Installations)*  
*D. Rita*

75sep01

Chairman Curt Weldon's  
Readiness Assessment Tour

Westover Air Reserve Base:

One cannibalization per launch of C-5A Aircraft

McGuire AFB:

½ of entire vehicle fleet (1,000 total) needs immediate replacement

Airfield lighting system inadequate

Underground Heat and Air Conditioning infrastructure problems

Naval Air Station Oceana:

Encroachment from local communities

Fighter Wing command offices in temporary buildings

Naval Station Norfolk:

Majority of piers built during WWII

A pier collapsed recently

GOOD NEWS: Two new start of the art piers going in

Naval Air Station Norfolk:

Nine World War II Hangars still in use, all have serious deficiencies

GOOD NEWS: Two **new** hangars under construction, one more next year

NAS Norfolk does meet DOD/anti-terrorism/force protection standards

Most barracks do not meet ODD 1+1 standard

Fort Riley:

Old, inadequate, small motor pools. Cannot **change** engines inside

Historic Preservation issues

Fort Lewis:

60% of barracks rated as not up to standards

Spare parts problems for heavy equipment

Urban Encroachment issues

Army Reserve spare parts for helicopters problems

Whidbey Island:

Earthquake damage to flight simulator building/other buildings

No hot refueling capabilities

No wash rack for P-3 aircraft, must be done outside

Nearly 50 year old control tower, does not have view of all runways

**Mt. Home AFB:**

B-1 mechanic works 4 days in a row to get B-1 flying due to cannibalizations

B-1 parts on order for over 365 days  
F-15 "Can-Bird" on the ground for 43 days

**Edwards AFB:**

Loss of frequency Spectrum  
Aging (oldest) fleet of aircraft for test purposes  
Engineer retention issues  
Crumbling runways  
Water problems in Housing Area.. Brown Water out of tap

**MCAS Miramar:**

Severe shortage of available housing  
Parts shortages for CH-46  
Air Space encroachment issues

**Camp Pendleton:**

Environmental Encroachment (can not use 60% of Red Beach Landing Zone)  
40% of buildings built during 40's and 50's  
Utility systems grossly outdated and marginally capable to meet current demands  
GOOD NEWS: New privatized housing area under construction  
Water supply problems.. . Brown Water comes out of tap

**Fort Bliss:**

Barracks below standards, inadequate  
Advanced training facilities rated as unacceptable  
Two new water towers needed.. low water pressure  
Hospital and medical facilities rated as unacceptable

**Fort Sill:**

Motor Pools too small for modern equipment  
Roof collapsed in supply building  
15 year old barracks (Starships) falling apart, leaking roof, walls  
Sewage back-flows into showers

**Kelly AFB:**

71% fully mission capable rate for F-16 aircraft  
Parts shortages F-16/C-5A aircraft

**Lackland AFB:**

Sewage leak under barracks

One Technical Training Dorm has been evacuated due to aging conditions  
HVAC systems old and breaking.. Portable chillers moved from problem  
to problem

**Fort Hood:**

One female re-tiled the bathroom on her own.

GOOD NEWS: Construction of new railhead for troop deployments

**Hunter AAF:**

Inadequate Motor Pools, too small for equipment

All housing facilities are rated as unacceptable

Inadequate sewage treatment plant

Urban Encroachment issues

**Fort Bragg:**

Limited training ranges, has only 60% of needed space

600,000 sq feet shortage of vehicle maintenance facilities

Supply and storage facilities in WWII wood buildings

Largest barracks deficiency in the Army

Encroachment Issues

## 2001 Weldon Base Tour Press

### Print Press

Los Angeles Times  
Los Angeles Daily News  
San Diego Union Tribune  
Associated Press  
Savannah Morning News  
El Paso Times  
Fayetteville (NC) Observer  
Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City)  
Army Times \*  
Defense Daily  
Antelope Valley Press  
North County Times  
The **Lawton** Constitution  
Daily Hampshire Gazette  
The Daily Union  
Mercury  
USA Today\* \*

### TV

WAVY Norfolk  
WWLP Springfield, MA  
KOMO Seattle  
KING Seattle  
KGTV San Diego  
KBCI Boise  
KTVB Boise  
KSWO **Lawton, OK**  
KTBS **Shreveport, LA**  
KTAL Shreveport, LA  
KSLA Shreveport, LA

### Radio

NPR -- All Things Considered (transcript)  
KMAN -- Kansas City, KS  
WHYN -- **Springfield, MA**  
WOAI -- San Antonio, TX

\* **Three** page special report to be released on **the** week of September **10**

\*\* USA Today article to appear in the September 6<sup>th</sup> edition

## Visiting Congressional Panel Hears Pleas to Keep Bases Open

*Armed Forces: Officials worried about possibility of more closures lobby lawmakers in San Diego on fact-finding tour.*

By Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer

CORONADO -- Aboard four Huey helicopter gunships, five congressmen arrived at North Island Naval Air Station here Thursday on a mission to search out maintenance problems that the military says it lacks the money to fix.

But once on the ground, the congressmen were asked not just about finding money for the nation's military bases, but also about the Bush administration's desire to close perhaps 25% of them.

Nowhere does the fear of base closures run deeper than in San Diego County, home to the nation's largest complex of military installations, providing \$10 billion annually to the local economy and employing 103,000 uniformed personnel and 30,000 civilians. With that in mind, first-term Rep. Susan Davis (D-San Diego) was at the tarmac to meet her touring colleagues from the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on readiness.

"In San Diego, we protect the Pacific Rim," Davis said. "We need all the military operations we have here. Possibly there could be small changes but we're very tight already, very economical."

Although another round of closures is not assured, local officials and California are preparing for the battle ahead.

Of the 98 bases closed in the 1990s, 29 were in California, including the Naval Training Center and the "Top Gun"-famous Miramar Naval Air Station, both in San Diego.

"The feeling in this region is that we have to prepare for the unexpected," said Mitch Mitchell, vice president for public policy with the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce. "We believe if we wait to get ready, there could be a disaster and we could wake up without one of our bases."

In Sacramento, the California Defense Retention and Conversion Council is accepting grant applications from communities eager to hire economic consultants and lawyers to make the case that their base is essential both to national security and the local economy.

The council was created by the Legislature in 1999 to avoid a repeat of what many legislators believed was an unfair targeting of California during base closure decisions.

"We're preparing for a political fight so that California is not used again as an easy target by Washington politicians to strengthen the bases in their districts," said council member **Vince** Hall, a consultant to a Sacramento-based technology **firm** and former staff director for Gov. Gray Davis.

Although California is no longer the military mecca it once was, there are still Air Force bases in Sacramento and Los Angeles, Army bases in the high desert and Navy installations throughout the state.

Ventura County politicians are lobbying aggressively to protect bases at Point Mugu and Port Hueneme. Earlier efforts helped Point Mugu stay open in 1995, when it was on a tentative closure list.

"We want to be as prepared as we can," said county Supervisor Frank Schillo, co-chairman of the local Regional Defense Partnership.

Not everyone is fearful of base closures. In Orange County, where two Marine Corps bases were closed, supporters of building a civilian airport at the closed El Toro base believe more closures would lead to a quicker turnover of the 4,700-acre site to the county.

Led by subcommittee Chairman Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), the delegation was on the third day of a four-day visit to 21 military bases in 12 states.

Weldon organized the trip to gather information on what he called the "crisis" afflicting military maintenance.

Among the problems found at numerous bases were substandard housing for enlisted personnel, potholes on runways, and leaky World War II-era warehouses meant to shelter hundreds of millions of dollars in space-age equipment. At North Island, where the Navy does 40% of its air crew training, the unfunded backlog of maintenance needs is \$225 million and growing.

Still, Weldon said that at nearly each base the delegation visited, local officials and reporters wanted to talk about base closures.

Weldon and others said they are not convinced that another round of closures is warranted or that the process of converting military bases to civilian uses has been a success.

"I don't think the House Armed Services Committee members have the stomach for more closures, not after all we've been through in recent years [with base closures] and with what we've seen as we've toured bases these past few days," said Rep. Edward Schrock (R-Va.).

With talk of base closures in the air, the services are not being shy about explaining to the public and the politicians the importance of their installations.

As the helicopters ferried the delegation from Camp Pendleton to North Island, the congressmen were briefed by Marines on why the Marine Recruit Depot in San Diego should not be relocated to Camp Pendleton, an idea long floated to cut the budget.

When the helicopters were late arriving at North Island, a joke ran through the assemblage of reporters and Navy officials that the Marines were taking full advantage of a captive audience of VIPs.

"I think they made an excellent case," said Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Texas) of the Marines' view about not relocating the recruit depot. "One of the ironies of being at peace is that people take defense for granted and forget that training is important and costs money."

*Times staff writers Jean Pasco and Matt Surman contributed to this report.*

# Base potholes command attention

## House panelists note installation needs

By Jeanette Steele  
STAFF WRITER

The Pennsylvania congressman pointed to the inches-deep potholes marring the North Island runway where Navy jets land.

"Would this be accepted at a public airport?" Rep. Curt Weldon asked.

Capt. David Landon answered with a rueful laugh.

"They'd fix it," said Landon, commanding officer of Naval Base Coronado.

According to Weldon and other members of the House Armed Services Committee visiting here yesterday, this scene could have been found at any American military base.

The bipartisan group of five members of the Subcommittee on Readiness toured 23 bases nationwide this week, including three in San Diego County — Camp Pendleton, Miramar Marine Corps Air Station and North Island Naval Air Station.

Their roadshow was meant to call attention to tattered conditions in hopes of rallying support for fix-it dollars.

"The public doesn't understand. We're in crisis," said Weldon, a Republican.

"You wouldn't put your worst enemy in these housing units," he said, referring to barracks and family homes he saw at Camp Pendleton and other bases.

Weldon and his colleagues said they need to convince others in Congress that basic maintenance at bases is vital to military readiness and should be the highest priority for funding.

They said unfunded humanitarian missions in recent years have sucked up money meant for upkeep, leaving bases in desperate shape.

At the Navy's Coronado facilities, for instance, the maintenance backlog

stands at \$225 million — none of it funded.

"It's been the problem of Democrats and Republicans in Congress asking our military to do more with less," Weldon said.

Several members said the public is more interested in tax cuts and social programs than military needs. But ignoring the fighting forces is perilous, said Rep. Solomon Ortiz, a Texas Democrat.

"If we're not ready to fight, my friends, nothing else matters," Ortiz said.

The group is operating in an uncertain political atmosphere. Resident Bush campaigned on military readiness but now faces an economic slowdown and a diminishing federal budget surplus. Some in Congress may there's not enough money for his proposed \$18.4 billion increase in military spending.

Bush also is pushing a missile defense program that could sap funding for base maintenance, said Rep. Susan Davis, D-San Diego, who also sits on the subcommittee and participated in the North Island tour.

"We can't do both at once in this budget," Davis said. "We need to focus on these basics first."

Other sights the delegation saw at North Island:

- An aging hangar that was evacuated last year after chunks of concrete from the ceiling began falling on aircraft maintenance worker &

- A 1950s-era warehouse with a leaky roof that houses \$430 million in aircraft spare parts.

- Sheds built in 1977 as temporary buildings that still house

maintenance shops. Chicken wire covers wall holes to keep out animals, and panels in the acoustic ceiling sag with age.

- Hulking shells of two CH-46 helicopters that were cannibalized so their parts could be used to keep other choppers running.

"You couldn't run a business out of a place like this," Weldon said.

The delegation also focused on so-called "encroachment" on the military's ability to use its bases in the form of restrictions to protect endangered and threatened animals and plants.

At Camp Pendleton's Red Beach, for example, 60 percent of the beach is reserved for species protection, curtailing the Marines' ability to practice beach assaults.

Also, Navy SEALs who train on the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado can only use established paths across the beach during the nesting season of the California least tern.

"It's out of control," Weldon said.

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SEE VISIT, B3



Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., spoke yesterday at a news briefing at North Island. With him was Vice Adm. Timothy LaFleur. John Costello / Union-Tribune

(b)(6)

**VISIT**  
CONTINUED FROM PAGE B1  
**Congressmen seek funding for military bases**

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Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, shook hands yesterday at North Island with Jose Ortega. *John Gastaldo / Union-Tribune photo*

increase in military spending.

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(b)(6)

Los Angeles Daily News  
August 29, 2001  
Pg. AV1

## Readiness Panel To Tour Edwards

By Charles F. Bostwick, Staff Writer

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE - Five House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee members will take a bus tour of Edwards Air Force Base today as part of a four-day trip to assess military readiness.

The congressional officials are touring 22 military bases from Massachusetts to Washington to Texas, asking base commanders to show them their most pressing needs.

"By touring this number of facilities in this short period of time, it kind of presents a snapshot of military readiness," said Ryan Vaart, press secretary to the House Armed Services Committee.

Spare parts shortages, personnel shortages and other readiness problems arose in the post-Vietnam, pre-Ronald Reagan military, then reappeared as an issue during the 2000 presidential campaign.

George W. Bush and Al Gore's campaigns traded assertions about whether some Army divisions were unfit to go to war and if aircraft mechanics had to pull parts off planes to keep others flying.

Congressional officials say the parts shortage and other concerns seem to be resolving themselves, but military commanders still face problems from aging facilities to shortages of personnel and equipment.

"You can only fix an old car for so long," said Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson, commander of the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, who will narrate the congressional bus tour.

Edwards' main runway is some 50 years old and eventually must be replaced - perhaps in seven to 10 years, Pearson said.

Water lines and electrical systems are also about 50 years old, as is much of the base's housing, although renovation and replacement projects have gone on for a number of years.

FORT RILEY, Kan. (AP) — Four lawmakers touring U.S. military bases say they want to make life better for the country's troops.

While at Fort Riley on Tuesday, Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., said that for the last 10 years, the White House and Congress have not provided adequate support of the military but have increased military obligations overseas.

"President George W. Bush has promised to shore up military funding," Weldon said. "We are here to say we are going to hold the administration's feet to the fire."

Four members of the House Armed Forces Committee are touring 23 military installations in 15 states during a four-day trip.

Weldon said he had his colleagues had toured "military housing we wouldn't want our kids to stay in."

The four congressmen stressed that their tour was not in preparation for another round of base closures. After they have seen all the bases, they plan to draft a document detailing their findings.

AP-CS-08-30-01 0723EDT

:SUBJECT: NE

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Received by NewsEdge Insight: 08/30/2001 07:21:34

EXPAND STORY

### EC-TX--Base Tour, Bjt,390



Members of House Armed Services Committee tour Fort Bliss

AP Photos

crmac

By CHRIS ROBERTS=

Associated Press Writer=

EL PASO, Texas (AP) Members of the House Armed Services Committee got an eyeful of peeling paint, broken windows, leaky roofs and asbestos-laced tile at the Fort Bliss Army post Thursday afternoon.

The contingent of five congressmen, Republicans and Democrats, were on a four-day 21-base tour to assess the state of readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces. The group was in the third day of the whirlwind trip.

"We're appalled," U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said before the Fort Bliss tour. "What we've seen is unbelievable. It's outrageous. It's disturbing."

Weldon said he blames "the White House, the Congress and both political parties" for conditions at the nation's military bases that include heavily used runways filled with potholes, soldiers working in buildings without electricity and military daycares with mold growing in the walls and ceilings.

"We're going to embarrass this country into doing something about the military," he said, adding that the country will have to spend more money to ensure its military is prepared to fight a war.

At Fort Bliss, he got more of the same.

On a bus tour, Gen. Stan Green, Fort Bliss commander, showed the group rundown buildings from World War II that need to be demolished, buildings from the early 1900s that sit abandoned because they are historic landmarks and the post doesn't have the money to maintain them, inadequate garages used to maintain Patriot missile launchers, and barracks built in 1951 that are still in use.

"The intent I want to get across is that quality of life is not merely a matter of pay or of housing, it's a matter of where you work," Green said in an interview before the tour.

Green said the post is like a Hollywood movie set laid on its side. He said the facade looks good in places, but the underpinnings are rotting away. He said that if repairs aren't made soon, it will take a massive investment to bring the post back to a reasonable standard.

Green also said all his units need more soldiers.

Addressing the congressmen, Green said, "You asked, 'Are we manned at our go-to-war-strength?' and the answer is no."

AP-WS-08-30-01 2059EDT

:SUBJECT: TX

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Received by NewsEdge Insight: 08/30/2001 20:58:39

# Congressmen tour bases to assess military spending

*Delegation says rundown buildings similar to those at Hunter are common at most installations.*

By Noelle Phillips  
Savannah Morning News

Four days.  
Twelve states.  
Twenty military bases.

A demand for at least \$5 billion.

That's a quick summary of a whirlwind tour taken this week by three members of the House Armed Services Committee trying to get a picture of just how bad conditions are on some of the country's military bases.

The group landed at Hunter Army Airfield Friday night and spent an hour touring hangars and listening to commanders talk about problems.

They saw 50-year-old hangars where the dim lights force soldiers to repair helicopters by holding flashlights in their teeth. They saw four M1A1

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What these congressmen heard was that Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield have a \$220 million backlog of building maintenance and repairs.

It's the same story across the country, said U.S. Rep. Kurt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the armed services committee's readiness subcommittee.

"Because we've taken money away from bases and spent it on deployments, our bases are falling apart," he said.

Weldon and U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, and U.S. Rep. Edward Schrock, R-Va., said they hear such examples during congressional testimony, but added that it makes a world of difference to see it. That's why they



Kurt Weldon

R-Pa.  
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see MILITARY, page 10A

## Military

Continued from page 1A

organized the trip to assess readiness for all four military branches. Their assessment: 10 years of shrinking funding and increasing deployment nights have taken their toll.

"This is a fault of a White House and a Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, who have underfunded our military," Weldon said.

The three lawmakers also spent time on the trip in front of the media, lobbying for a "one-shot infusion" of money for military funding. Weldon estimates it would take, \$5 billion to \$6 billion to fix immediate problems.

Even though recent reports indicate that the nation's financial surplus is almost spent, Weldon believes Congress can come up with the money. He wants it now.

"It's absolutely a national disgrace that we've allowed it to happen," he said.

Fort Stewart and Hunter commanders whisked the delegation around the airfield in a tour bus, narrating problems over an intercom as they drove. The group got out to look at a storage building for the tanks and Bradleys and to see the hangar where Hunter's Apache helicopter unit repairs its \$24 million machines. There, Lt. Col. Mark Jones, the battalion commander, showed them a window air conditioner that a staff sergeant bought with his own money so soldiers could have one cool room inside the hangar.

Col. Greg Stanley, the public works director, also told them that only six of Hunter's 488 family housing units had "acceptable" living conditions.

"They're that pathetic," he said.

The visit pleased Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield commanders, who desperately want to repair build-

ings that went up some time around World War II. They believe the congressional visit will put them ahead of the pack for funding requests.

The lawmakers had two more stops - both at bases in North Carolina - after their Hunter tour.

The delegation's plane landed an hour late, and then a looming thunderstorm forced them to flee to the airplane before the tour was complete. Army commanders already had given the group information sheets to read before landing. But they scrambled to shuffle the schedule, trying to cram as much into the visit as they possible could.

Still, Stanley thought the quick stop made an impression.

"I'm so glad that group came," Stanley said.

Military reporter Noelle Phillips can be reached at 652-8386 or at [Phillips@sevanahnews.com](mailto:Phillips@sevanahnews.com).



## Congressmen Call For More Money As They Tour Military Bases

*Delegation stops by Hunter to see rundown buildings.*

By Noelle Phillips, Savannah Morning News

Four days. Twelve states. Twenty military bases. A demand for at least \$5 billion.

That's a quick summary of a whirlwind tour taken this week by three members of the House Armed Services Committee trying to get a picture of just how bad conditions are on some of the country's military bases.

The group landed at Hunter Army Airfield Friday night and spent an hour touring hangars and listening to commanders talk about problems.

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El Paso Times  
August 31, 2001



## Lawmakers Tour Bliss, Vow Help For Military

By Diana Washington Valdez, El Paso Times

Fort Bliss got a chance Thursday to show its ailing water delivery system, deteriorating training classrooms and inadequate Patriot maintenance buildings to a sympathetic congressional delegation that's reviewing military installations across the nation.

U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., did not mince words when he described what the members of the House Armed Services Committee had seen since their tour began Tuesday.

"What we've seen . . . it's outrageous, it's disgusting," Weldon said after stepping off a plane at Biggs Army Airfield. "We're going to embarrass the country into doing something. Our Number One requirement is to raise money for national defense, and we're not doing a good job. The ones who are suffering are the men and women in uniform."

Three other congressmen -- Silvestre Reyes and Solomon Ortiz, both D-Texas, and Edward Schrock, R-Va. -- were part of the delegation that Weldon wants to get "a firsthand look at the state of readiness of our military, and so we can come to understand why the military needs our immediate attention."

The visits, which had already included installations in California, Connecticut and Washington state, are intended to help the lawmakers assess the state of readiness, infrastructure and urban encroachment at bases and posts.

Fort Bliss officials said encroachment is not a problem for the post. At other installations, the lawmakers said, they found day-care centers with mold, parts being cannibalized and a backlog in Army-wide maintenance that's reached \$18 billion.

Reyes agreed with Fort Bliss commander Maj. Gen. Stanley Green that one of the pressing problems at the Army post is its outdated water delivery system.

"They have water pressure problems, they have outdated water distribution and electrical systems, roads that need to be replaced, and they need new Patriot missile maintenance facilities," Reyes said.

Green told the delegation that the post water tower -- a landmark visible from many parts of the city -- was built in 1905 and is still in use. The cost to build an adequate replacement structure is estimated at \$16.5 million.

"We need to change the way we do business when it comes to funding the military," Ortiz said.

Thursday's tour included a stop at one of the Patriot missile maintenance shops on the main post.

Green said the buildings used for missile maintenance were built long ago and are not big enough to accommodate the Patriots. "The work on them has to be done outside all year round," he said.

The post needs seven new maintenance buildings for the missiles, and each would cost about \$17 million,

he said.

Patriot units distinguished themselves during the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and the missile was considered one of the key weapons that helped win the war in a short time. Since then, Patriot units from Fort Bliss have continued to serve in temporary deployments in the Middle East.

"The troops are over-deployed, and that's another issue," Reyes said.

Units that are deployed too often and for too long to support missions around the world, such as in Bosnia, have contributed to poor troop morale, the lawmakers said.

At Building 60, a training facility, the delegation got a look at loose ceiling tiles, a fire-suppression system that was ruled unsafe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and water leaks from swamp coolers.

"We knew from the beginning that we were going to see something like this," Ortiz said.

Officials said some of the worst classrooms have to be used whenever the post receives a large number of military attending Advanced Individual Training. Fort Bliss also trains military students from 17 other countries.

In response to questions about whether the post was being considered for reduction, consolidation or closure in the future, **Weldon** and **Reyes** stressed that Fort Bliss and White Sands are unique installations that play critical roles in the nation's air defense system.

Officials said no other post in the free world has as large an area to test missiles as does Fort Bliss. Four years ago, Fort Bliss officials said the only Army branch with which air defense might logically be consolidated in some way would be field artillery, the **forerunner** of Army air defense.

Army field artillery units have to come to Fort Bliss from their training post at Fort Sill, Okla., to fire surface-to-surface rockets. The implication was that if there's any consolidation, Fort Bliss might be the beneficiary.

According to information prepared by the Fort Bliss command staff, the Army post in El Paso can accommodate more units.

The post also houses the Sergeants Major Academy and Joint Task Force-6, is host to the Roving Sands air and missile exercise, and with White Sands and McGregor Range can provide the largest block of Defense Department-controlled airspace in the world.

The congressmen later visited Fort Sill, Okla., and **Lackland** Air Force Base, Texas. They said they will brief President Bush on their findings after the four-day tour of 23 installations this week.

"This is not a Republican or Democrat issue. This is an **American** issue," **Weldon** said.

Fayetteville (NC) Observer  
September 1, 2001

## Leaders Tour Fort Bragg

By Rebecca Logan, Staff writer

Just before 10 p.m. Friday, congressmen, military leaders and others gathered in a 1940s dining facility on Fort Bragg.

They were hearing about how the circuits blow if anyone tries to plug in the hot and cold side of the food server at the same time.

This was the tail-end of a whirlwind, four day tour of Army, Air Force, and Navy/Marine Corps installations across the country. Along for the ride were members of the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives.

"What we've seen . . . has been an absolute embarrassment," said Rep. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, who is chairman of the readiness subcommittee.

He talked about meeting a soldier at one stop who bought caulking for her barracks. Another he met bought an air-conditioning unit so he could stand the heat where soldiers repair helicopters.

"I've seen better conditions in public housing in the cities," he said. "We ask these men and women to fight for us and we can't even give them a decent place to sleep or . . . to eat."

A plan is under way to move the functions the group saw to a different location.

Weldon said citizens should demand more of politicians when it comes to installation spending.

He made sure to note U.S. Rep. Robin Hayes' "tireless efforts" for Fort Bragg. Hayes was along on the tour, although he waited on the bus between stops. He is still recovering from a hip replacement, but said he felt it important to show his support.

Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill, commander of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps and Col. Tad Davis, garrison commander of Fort Bragg talked to the group about some of the financial challenges the post has faced.

# THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN

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Date 31 Aug 01 Page 1

## Congressmen criticize condition of Fort Sill

*By Ron Jackson*  
Lawton Bureau

FORT SILL -- U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., the House Armed Service Committee chairman, and three fellow congressional members conducted a whirlwind tour of Fort Sill on Thursday night to determine the historic post's combat readiness.

The foursome left Fort Sill stunned and outraged by its abundance of dilapidated structures.

"This is a train wreck," Weldon said. "What we have seen can only be described as outrageous. This looks like something you would expect to see in a Third World country."

Fort Sill, founded in 1869, is one of 21 Army, Navy and Marine installations selected nationwide to be scrutinized by the committee. The sites were selected based on a study of reports which marked the ones most in need of work.

Weldon stood beneath a shattered wooden beam in a maintenance warehouse built in 1942. The roof was held by large metal jacks.

Flanked by a bipartisan team that included Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, Rep. Silvestere Reyez, D-Texas, and Rep. Ed Schrock, R-Va., Weldon gave a verbal lashing to the Clinton administration and previous Congresses.

"This is something we've seen across the board," Weldon said, "This isn't a partisan issue. Not at all. We figure it's going to take somewhere around \$5 billion just to play catch-up."

Fort Sill's Maj. Gen Michael D. Maples welcomed the committee with open arms.

"We can't send troops into combat if we can't train them in proper facilities," Maples said,

Maples said Fort Sill is in need of \$260 million in repairs.

The general tried to illustrate his point in a 41-page, glossy package stuffed with colored photographs of Fort Sill's structural problem. The package, which shows Fort Sill received \$223 million in 1987 and \$110 million this year, was presented to each congressman.

The congressmen landed at Fort Sill's Henry POSE Army Airfield at 7:45 p.m., and were whisked away to view post locations in dire need of rehabilitation. Their hourlong tour was their fifth stop of the day, which they began in California.

Weldon and his colleagues saw state-of-the-art howitzers parked in cramped, dingy maintenance buildings with no ventilation

## **Congressmen criticize condition of Fort Sill...2**

"As you can see, our troops have very **little room** to work," said Col. Rob Cline, Fort Sill's chief of **staff**. "So, **invariably, our troops** end up working outside in the elements."

**Post** officials also escorted the weary congressmen to a training facility where leaks in a shower room have caused roof and electrical damage.

**Young soldiers** snapped to **attention** when they **realized** they were *being* asked questions **by members** of Congress.

"I want you to know **we're** going to **fix** these problems," **Weldon** said,

The trainees **cheered**.

**Weldon** and his colleagues will conclude their **four-day tour** today. **After** their visit to Fort Sill, the **congressmen** were flown to San **Antonio** where they were to tour **Lackland** and **Kelly** Air Force bases.

"We want you to know," **Weldon** told the general, "**we're** going to fight for you,"

**-30-**

Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City)  
September 1, 2001

## Congressmen Shown Fort Sill Repair Problems

By Ron Jackson, Lawton Bureau

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Weldon and his colleagues concluded their four-day tour Friday in San Antonio where they were to tour Lackland and Kelly Air Force bases.

"We want you to know," Weldon told the general, "we're going to fight for you."

# Lawmakers: Budget boost won't fix all readiness woes

## Report challenges claims aging equipment significantly affects military upkeep costs

By Rick Maze  
Times Staff Writer  
A \$7.5 billion increase for operations and maintenance in 2002 is supposed to take care of the military's most pressing readiness problems. But that doesn't mean everything will be rosy.

Boosting the budget for operations, training, repairs and routine maintenance to more than \$125 billion, or about one-third of the entire defense budget, still may not be enough, key lawmakers warn.

Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on readiness, said the budget requested by the Bush administration and approved Aug. 1 by the House Armed Services Committee addresses the worst of the most immediate problems but comes nowhere close to solving everything.

He noted, for example, that base operations funding would rise to \$20.7 billion next year, \$2.8 billion more than this year. But, he said, that still will leave critical problems at many bases, such as "housing you wouldn't want to live in, hospitals you

wouldn't want to be treated in and schools you wouldn't want your kids to attend."

The 2002 budget also includes increases of \$800 million for training and \$2.2 billion for aircraft operations. The Bush administration hopes the increases will end a cycle in which the services run short of money during the year and must seek extra funds from Congress.

Weldon called the increases "good news" because they show that the administration "has recognized there are serious problems."

But, he said, the White House also has fallen into the same trap as past administrations in assuming about \$1 billion in savings from management

changes that may never materialize. Weldon calls the assumptions "long on rhetoric and short on savings."

Adding a new wrinkle to the readiness debate is a report by the bipartisan Congressional Budget Office, the analytical arm of Congress. The report, released Aug. 15, finds that one of the main reasons the services claim to have readiness and budget

problems — aging equipment — is overblown.

The report, "The Effects of Aging on the Costs of Operating and Maintaining Military Equipment," says the cost of upkeep on military aircraft, for example, rises by 1 percent to 3 percent for each additional year of age. While that may sound significant, the report says the cost of maintaining an aging fleet of aircraft is not a significant factor in the military's budget problems.

Analysts calculate that the Air Force, with aircraft averaging slightly more than 20 years old, spends about \$90 million to \$230 million more a year on operations and maintenance than it would with newer aircraft. The Navy, with aircraft averaging 18 years old, pays an extra \$40 million to \$130 million a year because of the older aircraft. The report says these are small amounts in light of the services' total operations and maintenance budgets — about \$22 billion for the Air Force and \$23 billion for the Navy.

The report also raises the question of whether the average age of military equipment has really increased and if spending on upkeep of equipment is higher.

The analysis shows the average age of all military equipment other than aircraft has not increased over the past two decades and that upkeep costs, even counting aircraft, are not significantly higher after adjustment for inflation.

The report's findings directly conflict with service claims that it's the cost of maintaining aging

**Critical problems on military bases remain unaddressed, such as housing you wouldn't want to live in, hospitals you wouldn't want to be treated in and schools you wouldn't want your kids to attend.**

REP. CURT WELDON, R-PA.



An AV-8B Harrier jump jet takes off from the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp during Exercise Assured Alliance '01 on Aug. 14 off the coast of Camp Lejeune, N.C. A Congressional Budget Office report says the cost of military aircraft upkeep rises by 1 percent to 3 percent for each additional year of age, but the cost of maintaining an aging aircraft fleet is not a significant factor in budget problems.

equipment that is eating up the budget and leaving no money for weapons modernization. There may be other reasons why the military is short of

money, the CBO report says. The operations budget also includes money for health care and fuel prices, two areas of recent uncontrolled growth.

# Lawmaker hopes to lead others on tour of bases

By Rick Maze  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

The chairman of the House subcommittee responsible for military readiness issues plans to lead other lawmakers on a whirlwind tour of bases in August in hopes of bringing attention — and money — to decaying military facilities.

Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the House Armed Services military readiness subcommittee, complained July 26 that neither the Bush administration nor many of his colleagues seem to grasp the magnitude of the problems.

So he wants to show them, in a trip that will involve traveling 24 hours a day for four days to hit as many bases as possible.

"We want to see the worst of what there is to see," he said. "There are housing facilities in disrepair, hospitals in disrepair, a lot of other facilities in disrepair. The American people don't know we have problems. Even many members of Congress think everything in the military is OK."

The services are helping arrange the trip and suggesting places to visit. Weldon made it clear this is not a pleasure junket.

"We will be traveling around the clock, sleeping on the plane, so we can cover as much as possible," he said.



Rep. Curt Weldon

Weldon made the remarks as his panel approved a military operations and maintenance budget for 2002 that is \$7 billion above current spending, a level that signifies progress but is still insufficient, he said.

"The extra money goes to some of the accounts where there have been the greatest problems, such as depot maintenance, training center improvements, base operations and property maintenance," he said.

But it still won't cover "the \$30 billion in unfunded priorities listed by the service chiefs, and the prospects for getting any extra money are dim."

Weldon said he is "ashamed" that the services' requests are not funded.

"It is beyond my understanding how we can ask our military to be the best they can be and not fully consult with them on what they need to accomplish the task," he said.

ArmyTimes.com  
August 29, 2001

## VIPs Find Plenty To Fix

By Rick Maze, Times staff writer

A congressional delegation on a four-day, 23-base fact-finding mission has discovered plenty of evidence that all is not well in the military.

A tour of facilities has revealed weeping gymnasium walls, more than 700 hazardous trees and fuel storage tanks off their foundations.

Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's readiness panel and head of the delegation, said he isn't trying to embarrass anyone.

But he is in search of examples of the worst the military has to offer in hopes he can convince his congressional colleagues and the American public that the \$18.4 billion increase in defense spending proposed by President Bush won't come close to solving the services' many problems.

"I'm not pointing fingers because there is enough blame to go around for everyone," he said.

"The Clinton administration had inadequate defense budgets for eight straight years, but Congress approved the budgets and certainly had the opportunity to do more. And, many of the problems are self-inflicted by the services because they didn't ask for enough money in the first place or took the money we gave them for property maintenance and spent it on something else," he said.

Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Tex., another readiness subcommittee member accompanying Weldon on the trip, said every base seems to have unfunded needs for maintenance of facilities and equipment that are hurting morale and causing extra work for service members.

"The needs are everywhere, and we really must do something about it," Ortiz said. "We need to have a plan, maybe a formula of some kind, that will address the problem and address it soon."

The trip began Aug. 28 with visits to bases in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia and Kansas as the delegation worked its way west.

At Westover Air Reserve Base, Mass., base officials said a lack of money has prevented them from fixing a leaky wall in the gymnasium that has been moist for eight years. The wall is covered with plastic until money is found for repairs.

At Oceana Naval Air Station, Va., lawmakers saw a massive fuel storage tank sitting unused because it has slid off its foundation and there is no money for repairs.

Officials have found more than 770 trees that need to be removed, but at an estimated cost of \$1 million, they say that's just not possible. An assessment is being done to determine which trees pose the greatest hazard and need to be removed right away and which can wait, officials said.

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Tuesday, August 21, 2001

Vol. 211, Issue: 36

### Weldon Plans Tour of Bases to Observe Readiness Needs

By Frank Wolfe

Rep. Curt **Weldon** (R-Pa.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's readiness panel, has invited fellow members on a four-day tour of 21 bases around the country to highlight readiness shortfalls.

During the Aug. 28-31 trip, **Weldon** plans to examine why cannibalized aircraft are sitting idle on runways, why troops are training with obsolete equipment and why ships are understaffed when they deploy.

"We will come to understand why the military demands our immediate attention," **Weldon** wrote to members in an Aug. 1 "Dear Colleague" letter.

Installations on the trip schedule include Ft. Lewis, Wash., Ft. Hood, Texas, **McGuire** AFB, N.J., Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, Edwards AFB, Calif., Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, Calif., New London Navy Sub Base, Conn., and Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, Wash.

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**DOW JONES**



F U L L  
INSPECTION  
Congressman Curt  
Weldon, R-Pa.,  
chairman of the  
House Armed  
Services Readiness  
Subcommittee, and  
Congressman  
Edward L. Schrock,  
R-Va., are greeted  
at Edwards Air Force  
Base on Wednesday  
night by Maj. Gen.  
Doug Pearson.  
Weldon, Weldon,  
Schrock and two  
other congressmen,  
all subcommittee  
members, toured  
Edwards along with  
more than 20 other  
military bases to  
rate their military  
readiness.  
ROB LAYMAN  
Valley Press

DATE: August 31, 2001  
PAGE: A1 (1 of 2 Pages)

# Edwards' mission crumbles with time

## Lack of funding ravages base infrastructure

By ALLISON GATLIN

Valley Press Staff Writer

EDWARDS AFB — Disintegrating infrastructure, an aging runway and out-of-date aircraft are threatening the ability of the Air Force Flight Test Center to perform its mission of providing the Air Force with cutting-edge weapons technology.

That was the message Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson, center commander, had for a group of visiting congressmen Wednesday.

"The infrastructure is basically crumbling below us," Pearson said.

Much of that infrastructure dates to the base's beginnings 50 years ago and is suffering from the ravages of time, some to the point that it can no longer be repaired.

Edwards Air Force Base was but one stop on a whirlwind tour of bases across the country to collect a snapshot of military readiness.

Four members of the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee — Curt Weldon, R-Pa.; Solomon E. Ortiz, D-Texas; Silvestre Reyes, D-

"We've known there's been a massive train wreck coming and we're in that train wreck now."

— Congressman Curt Weldon

Texas; and Edward L. Schrock, R-Va. — were joined by other Department of Defense officials for briefings on the conditions at each base.

The congressional delegation was scheduled to take in more than 20 bases in four days, visiting 15 states.

"We've known there's been a massive train wreck coming and we're in that train wreck now," said Weldon, who chairs the subcommit-

tee.

"It's about the American people ask for the resources so our armed forces can do what they are asked to do," he said.

In past years of defense budget belt-tightening, maintenance and infrastructure needs have been sacrificed for the sake of mission readiness. We're hoping we don't have to choose between new weapons and housing," Weldon said. "It requires us to fund the military and we haven't been doing that. That should be egg on the face of both political parties."

The problems most directly affecting Edwards' flight test mission are its fleet of aging aircraft and runways that are crumbling.

The average age of the support aircraft at the flight test center is almost 30 years. Often, pilots are being trained in aircraft older than they are, said Sean Hamilton, a civilian flight test engineer with the 412th Test Wing.

The older aircraft often do not have the capability to keep up with the much newer aircraft that they are meant to support. For example, a

See EDWARDS on A8

From A1

1960s-era T-38 doesn't have the speed needed to chase the cutting-edge F-22.

"We have a paradox: we're testing the newest airplanes with the oldest airplanes," Hamilton said.

The cost of maintaining the aging fleet is also on the rise. Some of these planes are still flying thousands of hours beyond the point when operational aircraft are sent to the bone yard, Hamilton said.

"This is our cutting edge research and development facility and some of the aircraft are older than me," Weldon said. "It's an embarrassment."

The runways those aircraft use aren't faring much better. Of the three runways on base, two are completely unusable for the center's flight test missions. These runways at North and South Base — built in 1942 and 1949, respectively — are part of the original base infrastructure and have deteriorated beyond the point where it is feasible to repair them, Tech. Sgt. Daniel Landry of the 796th Civil Engineering Squadron said.

The main base runway, built in 1954, could face the same fate in eight to 10 years if steps aren't taken to repair it.

"If we don't, it will be beyond repair," Landry said.

Unfortunately, major runway repair would necessitate closing the runway, making flight test operations — and space shuttle landings — impossible.

To ensure continuing the center's mission, a parallel runway would need to be built.

The second runway could then be used while repairs are made to the existing one.

No less important is the disintegrating infrastructure of the entire base complex, particularly in the housing areas.

Most of the housing on base was built in the 1950s and 1960s. These buildings now have a host of problems, from outdated electrical systems that can't handle modern electrical needs to structural problems caused by tree roots, and water lines that are dissolving, leaving tap water a bright rust-red.

The homes are not equipped with air conditioning, only swamp coolers, because the electrical systems can't handle the extra load an air conditioner creates.

At best, the swamp coolers lower the inside temperature by about 20 to 25 degrees — not much relief on days that top the 100-degree mark, Pearson said.

## ANTELOPE VALLEY PRESS Lancaster/Palmdale, CA

DATE: August 31, 2001  
PAGE: A1 (2 of 2 Pages)

The delegation was taken through a house that has been condemned due to the extent of its structural and other problems. Repairs to these buildings are costly because they contain asbestos and lead paint that must be removed.

Efforts are under way to replace base housing, but it is a slow process.

Of the 1,760 housing units needed, about 460 have been replaced, Pearson said.

Dormitories for unmarried personnel suffer many of the same problems as the family housing; Two buildings, built in 1952 and renovated in 1979, were used to demonstrate the problems with these facilities.

As in the family housing, the dormitories' electrical systems aren't equipped to handle today's energy needs.

They also have similar problems with asbestos and leaking and broken pipes.

In addition, dormitory residents must contend with thin walls and a lack of temperature controls and fire suppression systems.

Housing is especially important on a base such as Edwards, Pearson said, where its relatively remote location leaves off-base housing unavailable.

"The things that we have seen are deplorable," Rep. Ortiz said. "I'm saddened to see the living conditions where our young men and women reside.

"We need to set our priorities straight," Ortiz said.

"To me, defense is a very high priority."

The challenges facing the flight test center are not only physical. The center is also concerned with testing limitations due to the increasingly crowded frequency spectrum.

Flight test depends on telemetry to broadcast data from the air to the ground and provide real-time

analysis, increasing the efficiency and safety of the tests.

As more and more people use cell phones and other wireless technologies, the frequency spectrum gets more and more crowded, leaving little room for military activities.

This limits the amount of flight test activity the center can perform.

"As we lose our spectrum ... that slows down the testing," Roger Crane, senior technical adviser for the 412th Test Wing, said.

As it stands now, some flight test activities do end up shutting down other operations.

For instance, a single mission of NASA's X-43 shuts down flight test at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Naval Air Weapons Center Point Mugu and the China Lake Naval Air Warfare station.

For that reason, those missions are scheduled on weekends to limit the disruption.

This problem is not unique to Edwards, but is an increasing concern throughout the military.

Pentagon leaders — including Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld — on Wednesday told members of Congress that relinquishing airwaves used by the Pentagon to make room for commercial use would jeopardize national security.



Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson, left, shows members of Congress around Edwards Air Force Base.

**DAILY NEWS**  
Antelope Valley Edition  
Los Angeles, CA

DATE: August 31, 2001  
PAGE: 1

# Base tour finds disrepair

## Congressmen see areas of need

By Charles F. Bostwick  
Staff Writer

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE — Edwards Air Force Base officials told four visiting congressmen the base's air- mains are getting old, its water way is cracking. Halfway through a four-day tour of 22 bases, the congress- Rep. Curt Weldon blamed inadequate defense spending on overseas deployments in places like Bosnia and 'Saudi Arabia' accompanied by Pentagon officials and staffers, flew into Edwards on a government jet from Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho, then 90 minutes later -flew off to Miramar Marine Corps Air Station near San Diego: On their arrival, Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson, commander of Flight Test Cen- some Army divisions were unfit ter, led the officials into a han- gar where base executives and craft mechanics had to pull airmen told them the prolifera- tion of cell phones is cutting

EAFB / From Page 1

into the radio frequencies needed for flight tests, showed them airplanes older than their pilots and handed out asphalt chunks from a runway taxiway.  
"Our fundamental problem is this base was built in the early 1950s," said Pearson, who took command at Edwards in June. "The infrastructure is basically crumbling below us."  
The congressmen were shown a T-39 trainer jet that was built in 1959 and a T-38 jet that was built in 1960.  
"Most of the pilots weren't

even born then," flight test engineer Sean Hamilton told the delegation.  
The base's oldest aircraft is a 46-year-old KG135 tanker, and its newest aircraft — other than those under test — is a 19-year-old F-15 fighter.  
Newer planes generally go to combat units, officials said.  
The main runway, built in 1954 and used for landing space shuttles, has cracks in it extending two to three inches below the pavement surface. Engineering estimates predict it could fail in eight to 10 years, the congressmen were told, and replacing it could cost \$90 million.  
The runway requires major

repairs, but that would require closing it, which Can't be done if Edwards is going to continue operations, officials said.  
Much of what the congressmen were told centered on living conditions. Without decent living conditions, Air Force personnel won't re-enlist, officials said.  
The congressman were taken by bus to a 1950s-era house rendered unlivable by elm tree roots that lifted up its concrete slab, warping the floor.  
Later they stepped into an airman's dormitory room in which exposed, asbestos-covered pipes hung beneath the ceiling.

In the dormitory's base: ment, a recreation room is closed because a leaking pipe brought down the ceiling tiles a week ago.  
Because the ceiling tiles are made of asbestos, which can injure lung, they remain lying broken on the floor, waiting for specialists to be hired to clean them, base officials said.  
The congressmen were shown jam of murky water from base faucets, and sections of old water mains with holes rusting through them.  
"The things we have seen are deplorable," said Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas.

# Lawmakers: Army under-funded

By JOE PARKER JR.

Casual Courier (Huntsville, Ala.) Staff Reporter

Three members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Friday evening, said they saw signs that the military is being underfunded and over-deployed during a four-day, coast-to-coast tour of 23 military facilities.

Much of their short visit to Hunter Army Air Field in Savannah was spent at a building designated for the Immediate Ready Company, which Deputy Garrison Commander Don LaRocque described as the "tip of the spear for the nation."

The IRC is on 22-hour notice to fly to any world trouble spot "and roll off the plane shooting," LaRocque said.

The congressmen zeroed in on deficiencies in rht buildings which support the IRC. They found them crowded, dark, inconvenient and difficult to work in.

The IRC has four M1A1 tanks and four Bradley fighting vehicles which are parked so closely together that

access is difficult.

Maintenance usually must be performed outdoors and several vehicles frequently have to be moved to get one out.

The shed housing the IRC has no overhead lift capacity and mobile lifting vehicles have to be used to move engines or other heavy parts.

Rep. Kurt Weldon, R-PA, chair-

man of the Readiness Subcommittee, said the tour of bases "has impressed me and reassured me. Our soldiers

See ARMY.....page 3

## Army

Continued from page 1

will be there for us when we need them."

He added, though, that the nation — citizens, Congress, presidents, all — had failed the men and women who were willing to fight for it.

Weldon said that in areas such as housing, schools, maintenance, providing spare parts, and upkeep, troops had been shortchanged.

"Because we've taken money away from bases and spent it on deployments, our bases are falling apart," Weldon said.

Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-TX, the senior Democrat on the subcommittee, said, "It seemed like in the '50s and '60s we were able to come up with the money needed, but since then that hasn't happened... I hope we can wakt up from this nightmare."

Ortiz has represented his south Texas district since 1982.

The other visiting congressman, Rep. Edward Schrock, R-VA, is a retired Navy officer.

He deplored conditions under which U.S. troops live and work and said every person in the military should write to their representative and senators to let them know how they feel.

"More members of Congress need to be engaged on this issue," he added.

The three will report to Pres. George Bush and Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld when they return to Washington and have asked to brief the executives in person.

One of their recommendations will be a \$5-6 billion one-shot infusion of funds for the military.

The group toured an avia-

tion battalion where the commander, Lt. Col. Mark Jones, showed them a room-type air conditioner which he said a staff sergeant had purchased with his own money so one small, windowless room in the hangar could be cooled.

The congressmen were surrounded by a group of staff aides making notes, taking photos and taping, but Weldon himself wrote down the staff sergeant's name and action.

Director of Public Works Col. Greg Stanley accompanied the group and described a few of Hunter's infrastructure and maintenance problems.

Stanley said only six of Hunter's 488 housing units provide acceptable living conditions.

As the tour bus folled, Stanley described Hunter's problems with leaks in the airfield

control tower, need for runway paving work, sewer system difficulties, salt water intrusion and other infrastructure weaknesses.

Fort Stewart and Hunter, Stanley told the group, have a \$220 million backlog in service, repair and maintenance work which needs to be performed.

As LaRocque and Stanley continued their briefing, the tour bus rushed the congressmen back to their plane to take off early before thunderstorms closed in.

Their schedule called for stops at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina before heading back to Washington about midnight. Rep. Jack Kingston, R-GA 1st, had tried to meet with his colleagues but had to leave when they were late.



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# MARINES

Continued from A-1

## Lawmakers hear military's needs: more money, housing, training

dersrand the need for extra funding. President Bush is proposing to boost defense spending by \$35 billion.

Weldon said he will ask to meet with Bush and push his colleagues for immediate relief to fund many basic needs the delegation is hearing from troops and base commanders. "We're going to come up with a major initiative for the president when we get back," he said.

He and three other members of the House Armed Services Committee and several defense officials and congressional staff members visited the Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, north of Oceanside and one of 21 military installations the group is visiting during a whirlwind four-day, cross-country tour.

During their 90-minute stop at the amphibious training base, the delegation spoke with several base officials about budget needs, housing for troops and their families and training obstacles.

Weldon was accompanied by U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, the panel's ranking Democrat. U.S. Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Vista, joined them at Camp Pendleton.

The group had arrived late Wednesday at Miramar Ma-

rine Corps Air Station. They spoke for two hours with a night crew of helicopter mechanics and ate breakfast with Miramar troops Thursday morning.

Weldon said he blames the military's current woes on inadequate funding that has postponed maintenance and repairs. "The result has been a train wreck," he said.

During their visits to Miramar and Pendleton, the delegation heard how:

■ Some aircraft don't fly because there's little money for spare parts and many delays in getting them. "They don't have the parts," Marine 1st Lt. Dave Wright, a CH-46E helicopter pilot at Miramar, said of his Sea Elk squadron mechanics. "They're frustrated. They're trying to get the birds up."

The squadron recently borrowed two helicopters from a reserve unit so it would have enough aircraft to train at the Marine Corps' desert base at Twentynine Palms next month, said Maj. Craig Kopel, squadron maintenance officer and Vista resident.

■ Job frustrations and civilian job opportunities cause many experienced Marines to leave, Marines said. Helicopter squadrons are short of qualified personnel to train younger troops in the highly technical work, they said.

■ More housing money is needed. Marine Col. David John, Camp Pendleton's facilities chief, said the base, with some 6,500 housing units, still needs 4,500 more homes for military families. Officials hope to build these units with

public-private agreements. The planned renovations of 16 barracks, at \$20 million each, won't be done until 2025 at best, he said.

The first public-private venture will build 202 new homes, renovate 200 existing homes and replace an additional 312 — replacing older, 1960s-style ranches with one- and two-story houses with cathedral ceilings and modern features. "We've been listening to the wives," John told the group.

■ Budget cuts hurt troops. The delegation heard that lack of funds are cutting tuition aid for Marines and making it harder to reduce a 700-space backlog in on-base child care. Recently, housing repairs were limited to fixes that affect safety and health, but a defense supplemental bill approved by Congress provided some relief. "We needed it. We needed it badly," Marine Lt. Col. Dave Houston said.

■ Local restrictions hurt combat readiness. Camp Pendleton officials have been leading an effort to get relief from federal air, water and conservation laws that restrict ground and air training. Mike Collier, who runs the training and operations department, briefed them on some of the problems.

Paul Mayberry, a Pentagon readiness official, asked if the restrictions are hurting combat-readiness ratings, which the military closely tracks.

"Yes, they are," Collier responded.

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# THELAWTON CONSTITUTION.

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Date 31 Aug 01 Page 1

## Congressmen tour Sill facilities

In the Directorate of Logistics maintenance area at Fort Sill, a big warehouse is starting to collapse. Heavy thunderstorms **in** May took off the part of the roof that was not reinforced. A roof truss **has** buckled, the ceiling is sagging. **Price** tag: \$1.6 million.

This was **only** one of many problem areas seen by four members of the **House** Armed Services **Committee's** Subcommittee on Readiness who toured Fort Sill Thursday — and Fort **Sill** is **only** one of 22 major military installations they will visit where years of neglect have taken their toll,

Standing inside **the** damaged warehouse, the subcommittee chairman laid the blame for deteriorating conditions squarely at the doorstep of **the** White House. U.S. Rep, Curt **Weldon**, R-Pa, said this is the result of a continuing decrease in spending for upkeep **while** increasing deployment.

"I can't describe it in any word except 'outrageous,'" **Weldon** said. This is what we would expect from some third-world **country**."

**Weldon** said the No. 1 priority is to provide for the national defense — and when housing and **equipment** can't be maintained **there** is something fundamentally wrong. He called for a one-shot **infusion** of dollars so that when young people are brought in to **train** they don't have to worry about equipment or housing **conditions**.

"We're **asking the** federal **government** to respond and the American people to respond with **us**. This is a critical situation," **Weldon** said.

The congressman had just come from a **basic training barracks** where **turning** on a third-floor shower flooded a laundry room **two** floors below. He and the **other** congressmen personally quizzed trainees about the conditions in their barracks and what **effect** it has on **them**. The trainees said there **is no air conditioning some** of the lime and the starship where they live needs a lot of work. **It** is less than 20 years old, but the contractor went bankrupt during **construction and the building has problems**.

"**We want** you to have a successful career **in the military**. We're going to take care of **you**," **Weldon** promised the trainees.

Col. Rob **Cline**, Fort Sill chief of staff, had plenty to bring to the congressmen's **attention** on a bus tow of the base:

n The basement of New Post Chapel is unusable due to fire codes.

n The old post theater north of New Post Chapel was built circa 1935 and remained in use until 1985. As a historical structure, it cannot be destroyed, but it would **take** somewhere around \$6 million to renovate it into something usable,

n Two **six-story** high-rises need \$3 million to install **fire** suppression systems.

n Snow Hall is cooled by three chillers. One is nonfunctional and the other two are barely hanging on. If **all three break** down, **all** education in that building comes *to* a stop, **Cline** said.

n Tiles are blowing off roofs, creating a hazard. It wouldn't be happening if the roofs had been **properly** maintained, **Cline** said.

n The motor pool facility, constructed in 1942 for World War II-sized equipment, is too small for today's Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers, so welding **has** to be done outside. It costs **\$22 million** to replace two motor pools, Fort Sill needs to replace 15, and at the present replacement rate it will take until 2030 to get the job done.

**Weldon was** accompanied on the tow by two Texas Democrats, U.S. Reps, Solomon **Ortiz** and Silvestre **Reyes**, and a Virginia Republican, Ed **Schrock**. They flew **into Henry** Post Airfield on Air Force Two **from** Fort Bliss, Texas, and had **two** more stops to make in San Antonio, Texas, **after leaving Fort Sill: Lackland AFB** and Kelly **AFB**.

# Neal, panel find some wear, tear at Westover

By MARY CAREY  
Staff Writer

Members of a congressional subcommittee on Armed Services Readiness stopped by Tuesday at Westover Air Reserve Base and came away favorably impressed, though not without noting areas that need more federal funding.

U.S. Rep. Richard Neal, D-Springfield, who met the traveling committee at the Chicopee base, said Congress will likely seek to increase traditional military funding as well as for President Bush's space shield defense program.

But critics of the space shield proposal fear that initiative will drain funding from traditional military programs.

Neal wondered how both could be achieved.

"They're (administration officials) going to want a missile shield, and they're going to want more money for defense, and I think this is where the president ought to tell people how he is going to pay for it," Neal said.

The Springfield Democrat said he used the opportunity to "reiterate my longtime position that this is precisely why we should have done the budget before the tax cut."

The committee, which spent two hours at Westover, is on a four-day tour of 20 military bases nationwide. Members' expectations were low going into the tour. "We will see first-hand our military's level of readiness and will come to understand why the military demands our immediate attention," subcommittee Chairman Curt Weldon wrote in a memo to Neal and to U.S. Rep. John Oliver, D-Amherst. "We are likely to witness cannibalized aircraft sitting idle on runways, troops training with obsolete equipment, and ships that are routinely put to sea understaffed."

While those conditions were not apparent at Westover, Neal said they did see some old-fashioned dormitories and a gymnasium that had seen better days, among other signs of wear and tear.

Gordon Newell, spokesman for Westover, said he found the congressional delegates well-informed. "They asked real good questions about quality of life issues and how it affects our readiness. They knew what they were looking for when they came here."

Daily Hampshire Gazette  
Northampton, MA.  
Page B1  
Aug. 29, 2001

During the week, 1,000 people keep Westover humming, with that number swelling to 3,000 three weekends a month when reserves train there. As many reserves as possible are housed there, but some often have to stay in area hotels, Newell said, adding, "That can be a nightmare, especially on 'Big E' weekends." Newell said the base's cinder-block dorms, with their "gang-style" showers, are not up to current Air Force standards and affect morale and retention. "People come down here after they get out of training and having been on active duty on nice crisp bases, and this is like back in the 1950s and 60s," he said.

Another shabby entry is the gymnasium, which services 4,000 to 5,000 people daily, Newell said. "It needs a lot of work here and there. It needs to be enlarged, and there are other structural problems we need to fix."

Neal, while acknowledging he's seen more up-to-date gyms, said the Westover activity area is actually better than the congressional gym in the basement of the Rayburn building. "The gym is old, the lockers are old, and the showers are really old," Neal said of the Washington facilities.



# Junket assesses readiness

*St. Onge talks -logic to congressional tour*



Daily Union Photo/David A. Collins

Maj. Gen. Robert J. St. Onge Jr., commanding general of Fort Riley and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), talks with congressmen at the 70th Engineer Battalion motor pool during a tour of the fort by members of the House Armed Services Committee.

By **DAVID A. COLLINS**  
Daily Union Staff Writer  
By the logic of Robert J. St. Onge Jr., commanding general of Fort Riley and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the future of Fort Riley is secure.

During a tour of the fort Tuesday, the post commander and several of his top subordinates shared their logic with six congressmen.

There is a political process that has to take place that is not always logical," St. Onge said. "We have to continue to talk logic."

Traveling on an Air Force 767 that usually transports Vice President Dick Cheney, members of the House Armed Services Committee landed at Manhattan Airport around 6 p.m. They visited Fort Riley during a four-day tour that will

Members of the House Armed Services Committee, from left, Rep. Jim Ryun, R-Topeka, Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pennsylvania, and Silvestre Reyes, R-Texas, listen Tuesday as soldiers of Fort Riley's 70th Engineer Battalion motor pool explain how they maintain retrofitted equipment to keep their unit ready to roll with tank battalions. The congressmen visited Fort Riley on the first day of a tour that will make 23 stops at military bases in 15 states.

Daily Union Photo/David A. Collins

See Junket, Page 10

# Junket

Continued from Page 1

take them to 23 military bases in 15 states.

Of the bases on the congressmen's itinerary, Fort Riley's needs are the most pressing "because they are the most taken for granted," said Rep. Curt Weldon, a Pennsylvania Republican who chairs the Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

After disembarking from the blue and white United States of America 757, congressmen assured reporters that their visit was not in preparation for another round of base realignments and closures.

Weldon said the White House and Congress have, for 10 years, provided inadequate support for the armed services while overextending U.S. military obligations overseas. President George W. Bush has promised to shore up military funding, Weldon

said.

"We are here to say we are going to hold the administration's feet to the fire," Weldon said.

The tour is intended to assess the readiness of U.S. forces, congressmen said. After inspecting bases to assess quality of life concerns and maintenance needs, the contingent plans to draft a document detailing their findings.

"We want to be sure we are going to make it attractive for young men and women in the military who could be doing something else," said Solomon Ortiz, a Texas Democrat who is the ranking minority member of the readiness subcommittee.

St. Onge and his staff told the congressmen Fort Riley offers some of the best family housing of any post in the Army, with 57 percent of the local military families housed in government-provided quarters. But barracks for some single or unaccompanied

soldiers are badly outdated, with some not scheduled for replacement until 2008.

At the 70th Engineer Battalion motor pool, Fort Riley soldiers explained how they use retrofitted equipment handed down from other units. Tracked vehicles are often repaired outdoors due to a lack of indoor facilities. A shortage of lifting equipment for replacing engines limits their ability to refit aging battle gear, soldiers said.

Kansas second district representative Jim Ryun, R-Topeka, who joined the contingent when they landed at Manhattan, said the visit let congressmen see first-hand "what the infrastructure needs are" at bases around the United States.

Others on the tour included Rep. Silvestre Reyes, R-Texas, Rep. Edward L. Schrock, R-Virginia, Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Virginia, four members of the Bush administration, military escorts and an Army Times reporter.

C Daily Union

29 AUG 01

P-1

# Rep. Ryun: Shine light on the post

Kathryn Combs  
Staff Writer

In an atmosphere of potential military cutbacks, Second District Rep. Jim Ryun said Monday that it's important to highlight the post's local — and national — importance.

"We feel that the brighter the light shines on Fort Riley, the better it looks," Ryun told participants at his quarterly luncheon at the Manhattan Holidome.

This evening Ryun will visit Fort Riley with a delegation of his fellow House Armed Services Committee members.

The delegation over four days will visit about 20 military facilities in Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, Washington, Idaho, California, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Georgia and North Carolina. The tour will be led by Rep. Curt Weldon, a Pennsylvania Republican, who chairs the committee's readi-

SEE NO. 7, BACK PAGE

## Ryun on post

NO. 7, FROM PAGE A1

ness subcommittee.

Ryun said the tour will work to Fort Riley's advantage.

"I'm pleased that my colleagues will have the chance to see the strengths of Fort Riley first-hand," he said.

Ryun also serves as vice-chairman of the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee.

Daniel Groves, chief of staff to Rep. Ernie Fletcher (R-Ky.), was the featured speaker at the luncheon. Fletcher is chairman of the policy subcommittee on Health. Groves spoke about the patients bill of rights and Fletcher's involvement in the bill.

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28 AUG 01

P.1

9/1/01 Weekend All Things Considered (Pg. Unavail. Online)

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Saturday, September 1, 2001

Analysis: Congressional panel completes four-day cross-country tour of military bases



LISA SIMEONE, host: Early this morning, a congressional panel wrapped up a four-day tour of the nation's military bases. Members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness visited 21 facilities to see the conditions on bases for themselves. President Bush campaign on a promise to improve combat readiness in all the services, but the administration is now considering other military priorities. From member station KPBS in San Diego, Russell Lewis reports.

RUSSELL LEWIS reporting:

The North Island Naval Air Station in Coronado is the birthplace of naval aviation. The base opened in 1917, when hardly anyone had thought to put the words 'Navy' and 'flier' together. Even now, more than 40 percent of the Navy's air crew training is conducted here.

(Soundbite of helicopter)

LEWIS: Flying in on four Hewey helicopters, five congressmen arrived at the base this week to learn about the facility's maintenance problems. The subcommittee's chairman, Curt **Weldon**, a Pennsylvania Republican, organized the coast-to-coast trip to gain ammunition for military spending battles in Congress this fall.

Representative **CURT WELDON** (Republican, Pennsylvania): We have a severe problem right now, a massive train wreck that we're in the midst of, and our goal is to not point fingers at the military because it's largely not been their problem. It's been the problem of Democrats and Republicans in the White House and the Congress asking our military to do more with less.

LEWIS: On a brief bus tour around the base, the congressional delegation was shown the sore spots. Stopping on one of the 7,000-foot runways, the panel got out to gape at potholes created by hundreds of thousands of jet landings. Picking up a piece of broken concrete, **Weldon** showed it to the base's commander, Captain Dave **Landon**(ph).

Rep. **WELDON**: Would this be acceptable at a public airport?

Captain DAVE **LONDON** (North Island Naval Air Station): They would find

it unacceptable.

LEWIS: **Landon** says his base's backlog of needed maintenance is \$225 million and growing. The panel was driven to crumbling hangars which house multimillion-dollar aircraft. They were shown Vietnam-era helicopters that had been grounded and cannibalized for parts so that other copters could fly. Virginia Congressman **Ed Schrock** was frustrated.

Representative **ED SCHROCK** (Virginia): The military's just flat been ignored by folks back in Washington, and we've just decided it's high time we put a stop to that stuff.

LEWIS: The congressional panel is hoping the media attention generated by the cross-country tour will sway public opinion on military readiness. But it faces a tougher sell on Capitol Hill. The subcommittee is competing with other spending priorities set by President Bush, including a missile defense system and other space-age weapons. The president is pledging to increase the defense budget by \$18 billion, a tall order at a time of shrinking federal revenues. And even if he did get it all, it wouldn't be enough to go around. **Chris Hellman(ph)** with the Washington-based Center for Defense Information says the president finds himself in a difficult situation, trying to make good on campaign promises to improve the military and find ways to pay for new priorities.

Mr. **CHRIS HELLMAN** (Center for Defense Information): The problem is when you talked about 535 members of Congress and three major military services and several thousand civilian bureaucrats over at the Pentagon, that's an awful lot of priorities. And each one of them feels that they are equally entitled to a slice of the new pie.

LEWIS: Congressman **Curt Weldon** said he'll fight for as much of the budget pie as he can because, he says, improving the military's existing bases is **what's** needed most.

Rep. **WELDON**: It's just disgusting. As an American, an elected official, I am outraged that our country and our people would allow the military to have to live and work and operate and raise their families in the kind of environment that we've not just seen here--it's the same all over.

LEWIS: Now the battle over what's needed most moves to Capitol Hill. For NPR News, I'm Russell Lewis in San Diego.

**SIMEONE**: This is **NPR**, National Public Radio.

---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

NEWS SUBJECT: **English** language content; Presidential Elections; **Political/General** News; General

#50

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*Aspen  
10/13/01*

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SENSITIVE~~

October 13, 2001 1:19 PM

~~UMBRA~~

*Afghanistan*

~~snowflake~~

TO: Gen. Myers  
cc: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Rich Haver Memo

Please take a look at this memo from Rich Haver. I would like you to come back with a proposal as to what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1 O/I 0/01 Haver memo to SecDef (*SECRET folder*)

DHR:dh  
101301-14

*13 Oct 01*

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*UMBRA*

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Q 11/A  
0659

November 7, 2001 4:40 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld )/A

SUBJECT: Review Briefing Slides

~~SECRET~~

337

Please take a look at this stack of briefings and tell me what I am supposed to do with it all and what happens next.

Thanks.

Attach.

- Avenging Eagle 09/26/01
- Defeating Terrorism in the USEUCOM AOR 10/10/01
- Combating Terrorism in the PACOM AOR, undated

*Over the By Rumsfeld - State has determined*

*But have some releases. Materials have been mostly suppressed by the CIA. Referring to the Manuals for a set of like ops*

DHR:dh  
110701-27

*Recommendation - Disregard these briefs and make focused on the plans which will be briefed shortly by the Joint Staff*

*Y 11/20*  
*For Buck*  
*11/20*

*7 Nov 01*

U15066 02

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/4986

snoflake

INFO  
AS 12/6/01

December 6, 2001 8:05 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Military Tribunals

015

Condi Rice points out that Justice and State have equities in the military tribunal issue. I gave her a report that you are consulting with outsiders, surfacing a series of issues and going to develop some criteria for each issue as to how they might be handled. I related that you are then going to take four or five illustrative examples of the kinds of people who might be assigned by the President to me for this purpose and test them against the various criteria for each of those key issues.

She said she thought that sometime after Colin gets back on December 10 and before I leave on December 14, it might be good to have a very small Principals meeting with Gonzales, Ashcroft, Powell, Rice and me and the Vice President. We would have you walk through those issues, the criteria we are thinking about for each of those issues and how various hypothetical examples might fit into them.

Why don't you get yourself prepared to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120601-g



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

6 Dec 01

12/6  
1200

15  
12/10  
1826

snowflake

December 6, 2001 9:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reward Information

000.5

*Complete*

I would like someone to tell me what the reward information is-how much money are we offering, and can it be paid to Americans?

There must be some rules for whoever is offering all these rewards. I would like to know more about it. I don't have any information, never have, and I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120601-10

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12/6

SECDEF -

SECDEF HAS SEEN

*I pulled this off the State Department website*

*I'll get you more info, but it looks like it's open to all comers. It's an existing program that ~~exists~~ pre-dates*

6 Dec 01

11-L-0589/OSD 4935 070 02 *Di Rita*



# Diplomatic Security Service U. S. Department of State

## Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program

### U.S. OFFERS UP TO \$25 MILLION FOR INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORISTS

The U.S. Department of State offers up to \$25 million for information preventing, frustrating, or favorably resolving acts of international terrorism against United States persons or property, or leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals responsible for such acts, those aiding or abetting in the commission of such acts, or those conspiring or attempting to commit such acts.

### PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP

In 1990, the State Department forged a unique public-private partnership with the Air Transport Association of America and the Air Line Pilots Association, International, in which each organization pledged up to \$1 million to supplement rewards paid by the U.S. Government for information that prevents a terrorist act against U.S. civil aviation, or leads to the arrest or conviction of any person who has committed such an act.

The U.S. Government's standing reward offer of up to \$25 million applies in all cases not addressed by the partnership agreement.

- We Can Give You 25 Million Reasons To Stop Terrorism.

---

### INTERAGENCY REWARDS COMMITTEE

The Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, or his/her designee, chairs an interagency committee which reviews reward candidates and then recommends rewards to the Secretary of State. This committee serves as the forum for discussion of many aspects of the Program. The Interagency Rewards Committee, depending upon the incident under review, is comprised of representatives from the White House National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service Witness Security Program, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and others as appropriate.

### EVERY GOVERNMENT AND EVERY CITIZEN

While the law governing the Rewards Program is aimed at terrorism directed against Americans, the

United States shares information with other nations whose citizens are at risk. Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing terrorists to justice and in preventing acts of terrorism.

Terrorists are violent criminals. They must be stopped.

#### Existing Rewards Campaigns

- On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners. Two of these were used to to attack the New York World Trade Center Twin Towers and one was used to attack the Pentagon. The fourth airliner crashed into a field near Shanksville, PA. The death toll on the four airliners was 266 people. The death toll at the Pentagon is approximately 189 military and civilian personnel and the death toll in New York is approximately 5,000 people. The first flight, American Airlines Flight 11, smashed into the north tower of the Twin Towers at 8:45a.m. The second flight, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the south tower at 9:05a.m. The Pentagon was hit by American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:39a.m. American Airlines Flight 93 crashed before it reached its intended target.
- On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by terrorist in the harbor at **Aden**, Yemen. This attack took the lives of 17 sailors and wounded 30 others.
- On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania tragically resulted in hundreds of deaths and the savage maiming of thousands; The majority of those murdered were Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens as well as U. S. Embassy personnel.
- On the morning of November 12, 1997, Ephraim C. Egbu, Joel B. Enlow, William L. Jennings, and Tracy L. Ritchie, employees of the Union Texas Petroleum Company (UTP) who were in Karachi on temporary assignment, were picked up from the Sheraton Hotel for a ride to UTP headquarters along the waterfront. As the station wagon in which they were traveling proceeded across the only bridge leading to the UTP office building, a red Honda Civic pulled in front and two gunmen jumped out. The gunmen fired into the UTP station wagon, brutally murdering the Pakistani driver, Anwar Mirza, and Messrs. Egbu, Enlow, Jennings and Ritchie.
- During the period December 1996 to Januarv 1997, sixteen letter bombs disguised as holiday greeting cards were delivered through the mail to recipients in the United States and the United Kingdom.
- On June 25, 1996, the brutal and cowardly terrorist attack on a multi-national peacekeeping force in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia left 19 dead and hundreds injured. These peacekeepers were enforcing United Nations sanctions and the dead and injured represent citizens from several nations. The Department of State is offering a reward of up to \$25 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of those responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing. Additionally, the Government of Saudi Arabia is offering a reward of \$3 million.
- On Julv 4, 1995, Dr. Donald Hutchings, a respected American medical professional, was abducted by unknown persons in the hill country of Kashmir. Please help us find Dr. Hutchings....
- On March 8, 1995 in Karachi, Pakistan, terrorists armed with automatic rifles murdered two American Consulate employees and wounded a third as they traveled in the Consulate shuttle bus.
- On January 6, 1995, a fire broke out in an apartment in Manila occupied by KHALED

SHAIKH MOHAMMAD. The information developed from an investigation revealed that in August 1994 through January 1995, in this apartment and elsewhere, KHALED SHAIKH MOHAMMAD unlawfully and willfully conspired to bomb U.S. civilian airliners by placing explosive devices on twelve airliners flying over the Pacific Ocean during a two-day period in January 1995.

- On February 26, 1993, terrorists bombed the New York World Trade Center, murdering six innocent people, injuring over 1,000 others and trapping terrified school children in a smoke-filled elevator for hours.
- On January 25, 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi murdered two persons and seriously injured three others, firing an AK-47 assault rifle into cars waiting at a stoplight in front of the CIA headquarters. He was captured in Pakistan. Kansi was convicted by a jury in Fairfax, Virginia for the murder of the two CIA employees on 10 November 1997.
- On April 14, 1988, at 8pm, a car bomb exploded in front of the USO Club in Naples, Italy. The explosion resulted in the death of five people, including a U.S. servicewoman. Additionally, fifteen people were injured, including four U.S. servicemen.
- On December 21, 1988, terrorists destroyed Pan American Flight 103. The terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 over Scotland points to the global impact of terrorism. The plane carried 259 citizens from 30 nations, including the United States, when it was destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland; another 11 persons perished on the ground.
- In April 1986, one of the youngest victims of terrorism, nine-month-old Demetra Stylian Klug, was killed in the terrorist bombing of TWA Flight 840.
- On June 13, 1985, terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847. During a violent rampage against passengers and crew, they beat Robert Stethem to death, then dumped his body onto the tarmac.
- On October 23, 1983, 243 U.S. Marines were murdered in a cowardly truck bomb attack, ending their mission to help establish peace for the people of Lebanon.
- During the 1980's, in conditions of the utmost cruelty and deprivation, kidnapped American citizens -- as many as nine at one time -- were held hostage in Lebanon. For long and painful years, they were chained in the dark, beaten, and denied medical care. Three were murdered during their captivity.
- In the past 22 years, terrorist actions in Greece have resulted in the deaths of four Americans: Richard Welch, George Tsantes, William Nordeen, and Ronald Stewart, injuries to 28 other Americans, and a rocket attack on the Embassy compound in February 1996.

#### **WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING**

On February 26, 1993, the phenomenon of terrorism struck home for Americans in New York. A large improvised explosive device, concealed in a vehicle, was detonated in the sub-ground garage of the 110-story World Trade Center complex. One of the terrorists responsible, when subsequently

captured, admitted the attackers sought to collapse one or both of the twin towers, killing tens of thousands of innocent people.

The terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center succeeded in murdering six innocent people, injuring 1,000 others, and trapping terrified school children in a smoke-filled elevator for hours.

Suspected terrorists Abdul Rahman Yasin and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef fled the United States following the bombing. Yasin is believed to be hiding in Iraq.

Immediately following the indictments of Yasin and Yousef, the U.S. launched a massive international manhunt for the two fugitives. Wanted posters offering rewards of up to \$25 million for information leading to their capture were distributed in a variety of languages. Multi-language leaflets containing the reward offers were also sent throughout the world. Even matchbooks containing photos of the fugitives have been distributed.

On February 8, 1995, based upon information provided through the Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was captured in Pakistan. Yousef was convicted by a jury in New York, New York for the bombing of the WTC on 12 November 1997.

---

#### **PUBLIC EFFORTS**

The State Department has an ongoing public campaign to promote awareness of the Rewards Program. Advertisements have been placed both to promote awareness of the Program and to reach those with information. Ads in English, Arabic, Spanish, French, German and Russian have appeared in publications as far-ranging as **The New York Times**, **Al Hayat**, **Paris Match**, **Die Welt**, and **Pravda**.

#### **For further information, contact:**

**Rewards for Justice**  
**P.O. Box 96781**  
**Washington, D.C. 20090-6781, USA**  
**Internet: [mail@dssrewards.net](mailto:mail@dssrewards.net)**  
**Voice: 1-800 437-6371**

***ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL***

[ [Return to Rewards Program](#) ]

[ [Return to Rewards for Justice Home Page](#) ]



# Diplomatic Security Service U. S. Department of State

## History of the Rewards for Justice Program

During the first four years of the Program, the State Department offered specific rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of those responsible for specific terrorist attacks. In December 1988, however, new emphasis was placed on provisions of the law which allowed for payment of rewards in cases where information led to the "prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of terrorist attacks against United States persons." Specific reward amounts for particular terrorist incidents were no longer announced. It was instead announced the Secretary of State is authorized to pay for information regarding any past, present, or planned future act of international terrorism directed against the United States government.

During the Persian Gulf War, a brave informant in an East Asian country came forward with **alarming** information about a series of terrorist attacks planned by a hostile foreign intelligence service.

The terrorists had already surveyed their intended targets and had acquired automatic weapons, grenades and high explosives. The attacks were beyond the planning stage and about to be carried out. One of the attacks, a planned terrorist bombing and strafing of airline ticket counters at a major airport was scheduled to be carried out within 48 hours.

This brave person provided the information which was essential in thwarting the planned terrorist attack and the terrorists were stopped by the U.S. and host nation authorities. Had the attacks been carried out, many innocent lives would have been needlessly lost.

The informant and the informant's family were relocated to a safe place by the Rewards Program and paid a significant reward.

**Rewards for Justice**  
**P.O. Box 96781**  
**Washington, D.C. 20090-6781, USA**  
**Internet: [mail@dssrewards.net](mailto:mail@dssrewards.net)**  
**Voice: 1-800 437-6371**

***ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL***

[ Return to Rewards Program ]

[ Return to Rewards for Justice Home Page ]

1  
snowflake

December 6, 2001 7:15 AM

INFO  
12/6  
16/19

OIS

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Habeas Corpus

Attached is a memoir I received from my friend, (b)(6) on *habeas corpus*.  
I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/05/01 (b)(6) fax to SecDef

DHR:dh  
120601-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

6 Dec 01



|                       |                |              |              |
|-----------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Post-it Fax Note 7671 |                | Date 12/5/01 | # of pages 1 |
| To Sec. Rumsfeld      | From (b)(6)    |              |              |
| Co./Dept. DOD         | Co.            |              |              |
| Phone # (b)(6)        | Phone # (b)(6) |              |              |
| Fax #                 | Fax #          |              |              |

December 5, 2001

Memo

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
 From: (b)(6)  
 Subject: James Madison' Views on Habeas Corpus


Shortly after the Constitutional Convention concluded, Madison sent a copy of the new Constitution to his close friend, Thomas Jefferson, who was then our Minister (ambassador) in Paris. Jefferson replied with considerable praise for the new plan of government but with some reservations and criticisms. His chief concern was the lack of a bill of rights.

The original Constitution had no bill of rights but it did have the habeas corpus clause, which reads as follows: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it" [Article I, sec.9, clause 2]). Jefferson complained about "the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly for . . . the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws [by which he meant, as he explained in a later letter, "no suspensions of the habeas corpus."] In short, Jefferson was proposing that the clause be amended to read, "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended" PERIOD

Madison replied, "I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided. The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public, and after repeated violations in extraordinary cases they will lose even their ordinary efficacy."

"Should a Rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the Government, and a suspension of the Hab. Corp. be dictated by the alarm, no written prohibitions on earth would prevent the measure."

The above is drawn from my book, *From Parchment to Power*, of which you have a copy; pp. 60-70 give a little more detail. But the above is the gist of it.



snowflake

December 7, 2001 3:16 AM

381

TO: General Franks  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jim Wade's Paper

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Here is the paper by Jim Wade that I menti

*DR*  
*Colucci*  
*Leave it to*  
*John to*  
*DR*

*DR*  
*12/7*

7 Dec 01

7 Dec 2001

## A. Concept for achieving Rapid Dominance through Shock and Awe

Executive Summary  
for

Gen Terry R. Fomas  
Commander in Chief  
United States Central Command  
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

Dr. James P. Wada Jr.  
Defense Group Inc  
107 Annacale Rd  
Suite 110  
Falls Church VA 22042-2400

(b)(6)

snowflake

ACTION  
13 12/30  
1728

December 7, 2001 2:09 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: UBL and Omar

000.5

Please give me a proposal on how we should handle Usama bin Laden and Omar.  
I think they should be military tribunals-what do you think?

Thanks,

DHR:dlh  
120701-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

7 Dec 01

U15075 02

snowflake

December 10, 2001 2:05 PM

ACTION  
ds 12/13  
1110

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detention Matrix

383.6

I gave the paper on the detention matrix to Gonzales, Rice, Hadley, Armitage, Myers, and Tenet.

I told them I had not read it, and that it did not represent Department policy, but that they ought to start thinking about it. I gave a couple of extra ones to Hadley to give to the Department of Justice and FBI.

It seems to me that you ought to start visiting with them and get their views. Then we will refine this thing and try to get closure sometime in the period ahead.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121001-24

..... ■■■  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

10 Dec 01

U15078 02

snowflake

INFO  
12/13  
1053

December 10, 2001 3:52 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lawyer for Walker

010

I am told that the lawyer for John Walker, Brosnahan, is kind of a scorched earth type who is looking to bring down conservative Republicans. We ought to keep that in mind. Apparently he tackled both Rhenquist and Laxalt over the years.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121001-28

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

10 Dec 01

U15082 02

snowflake

December 10, 2001 7:38 AM

12/24  
12/10 ds

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reporting on Burial in Arlington

*DR*

MSNBC reporting on Burlingame was just disgraceful. They said we would not let him be buried in Arlington, which is flat untrue. We told them he could be buried there.

It is disgracefully bad. Brian Williams ought to be ashamed of himself.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh  
12/10/01

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

*12/12*

*687*

*10 Dec 01*

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie

DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Reporting on Burial at Arlington

Talked to a producer at MSNBC and expressed our views. She seemed to take it seriously.

snowflake

Action  
15 12/10  
1745

December 10, 2001 9:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter

*Affirmations*

This letter is wild-why don't you get an interesting answer back to him, and let me sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/06/01 (b) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
121001-11

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*10 Dec 01*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

1-06-01

*R & L*

SECDEF HAS SEEM

DEC 10 2001

Secretary of Defense,

Dear Mr. Rumfeld:

PLEASE let me know if you get this or if somebody cans it as I am sincerely serious about this. If I could save somebody's son or husband I'd be blessed.

I Watch you on TV and think your'e the greatest. A real go-getter. Smoke 'em out and kill 'em. That's the way to get something done.

If you and General Patton could have run "my war" I'd have been home sooner than I was.

This is the way I'd handle the baddies in the caves and not lose a single GI.

Send squads of men to look for caves. Send squads of men to protect them. When you find a cave that looks like it could be used by the baddies seal up the entrance. Take a piece of sewer pipe with a 12" diameter hole in it and ten feet long. You could have pipes of varied length so as to fit the situation at hand.

Insert the pipe through the blockage of the entrance and make it next to airtight. Have a smoke machine like they use to make movies and fasten a piece of flexible tube same size or a tiny bit small that the sewer pipe. Hook up the smoker to the pipes and start blowing smoke into the cavern.

The smoke machine will put out black smoke like the smoke at the Twin Towers and fill the cave. Even with twists and turns in the cave and extra side rooms. Watch for smoke to begin popping out of other cave entrances or exits on the hillsides and as fast as you see the new smoke the squads can also seal them off. When smoke is coming out of only one hole keep pumping in the smoke. Then, like poking a ferret down a rabbit burrow, just stand there and when the rabbits pop out kill 'em. Save two or three of the "rabbits" so you can spread-eagle them standing up and hold the Zippo lighter under their balls until they answer all your questions.

Then shoot 'em.

I was in the Combat Infantry in WW 2 in the ETO and this is the way we'd solve your immediate problem. No American casualties as GI's are used to smoke from cigarettes anyway so this would be a push over.

Good Luck and keep up the good work. If you want to field test this idea you and I can go to Afghanistan and really give 'em hell. You sound to me like a buddy I'd like to have if I was still in the service. However, since you get an expense allowance, you'll have to handle my travel, food and quarters expenses.

*AR*

(b)(6)

*12/7*  
*SECRET -*  
*- You'll want to*  
*Read:*  
*- I don't think Al Qaeda*  
*knew what they were getting*  
*themselves into when they*  
*- 1 - started this.*  
*Dikita*

snowflake

December 10, 2001 11:05 AM

INFO  
12/10  
015  
1708

TO: Jim Haynes  
Larry Di Rita  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: Military Tribunals

*DR*

015

We are going to have to consult carefully with John Ashcroft on all of the tribunal issues we are working on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121001-15

.....\*

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

10 Dec 01

U15087 02

snowflake

Action  
25 12/24  
1030

December 10, 2001 1:00 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transformation Paper

*030 DOD*

Here is a paper Pete Aldridge started. Please get someone to redo it and reorder it in the right order. Please have them put things in the right categories and improve the English, then get it back to me sometime this week before I leave.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Aldridge, "Transformation within DoD"

DHR:dh  
121001-19

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*10 Dec 01*

U15089 02

## **TRANSFORMATION WITHIN DOD**

### Transformation With Added Emphasis and Direction in this Administration

Movement toward “air dominance”, essentially all-stealth fighter force (F-22 and JSF) for air-to-air and air-to-ground capability

Enhanced long-range strike capabilities with improvements in B-1, B-2 and B-52 platforms

Increase production of precision guided munitions for both long-range strike and tactical air forces

Acceleration of battle-proven UAVs and the acceleration of UCAVs

Increasing airlift capability with the expansion of the C-17 production and improvements to the older C-5s and C-130s

Acceleration of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)

### New Transformational Initiatives by this Administration

New defense strategy

New force sizing construct

Emphasize Homeland Defense as the highest national security priority

Established a different role and character of the strategic nuclear deterrent, significantly reducing the number of nuclear weapons

Introduced a new “Triad” concept of a balance between the three pillars of our military capability--nuclear, conventional and the command and control systems that make them work

Revised and expanded Ballistic Missile Defense, with new focus unconstrained by ABM treaty and revised management

Expanding the approach to “joint” operations by establishing joint “standing” commands

Established a new office of Force Transformation, reporting to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enhanced “information dominance” of U.S. and Allied forces, with global situation awareness, persistent coverage, adequate bandwidth communications and information denial

New start on concepts for enhanced long-range precision strike (from unmanned platforms to space systems)

Progress on reducing the “low density” part of “high demand” assets, such as expansion of NRO assets and initiating development of a Space Based Radar

Restructured U.S. Navy’s approach to future surface combatants to include technologies applicable to a family of new ships (cruisers, destroyers or smaller littoral ships)

Introduced of new munitions concepts (earth penetrators, new explosives and smaller, more accurate weapons for minimum collateral damage)

Expanded capabilities to deter, detect, mitigate and respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction

Implemented a change in the management approach to national security space systems, for better integration, planning and implementation of more capable and more survivable space systems

Transforming business practices-streamlining the acquisition process, properly pricing programs, changing our approach to logistics support, developing a “Board of Directors” type operation, and initiating a new financial system for the Department

Expanded funding on Science and Technology, stimulating innovation and forming a much improved base for future transformation

Transforming DoD’s “attitude” with regard to how we run DoD.

snowflake

Action  
JS 12/24  
1035

December 11, 2001 3:28 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RR*  
SUBJECT: Paper on Deterrence

381

*COMPLETE*

Please edit and return the attached paper.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/11/01 SecDef MFR on Deterrence

DHR:dh  
121101-7

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_  
0

11 Dec 01

U15090 02

December 11, 2001 3:28 PM

SUBJECT: How U.S. Deterrence Has Been Weakened

February 1993—First attack on the World Trade Center

April 1993—The assassination attempt against President George H.W. Bush went unpunished

Fall 1993—the pull-out after the Mogadishu difficulties

± 1995—attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia

1990s—U.S. softness in North Korea policy

1996—Abandonment of the Iraqi opposition in the North of Iraq

1998—attack on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya

1998—U.S. let Khaddafi off for responsibility in Pan Am 103

2000—Attack on the USS COLE in Yemen

1990s, weakness with respect to enforcing UN inspections and sanctions on Iraq

In short, for some eight years, the U.S. deterrent was weakened as a result of a series of actions that persuaded the world that the U.S. was “leaning back,” not “leaning forward.” For example, pulling a U.S. ship out of Haiti when it was fired on by rifles; pulling U.S. forces back three kilometers in KOSOVO, when three people were captured; treating the rescue of the pilot Grady in Bosnia as though it was a victory for the U.S.; and timidity in the Kosovo campaign, including ruling out the use of ground troops and flying at 15,000 feet, etc.

All of these things contributed to a weakened deterrent in that they told the world that the U.S., if tweaked, would flinch, thereby persuading hostile nations and actors that they can harm the U.S. without risk to themselves.

DHR:dh  
Deterrence

11-L-0559/OSD/5010

12/12  
1310

snowflake

December 12, 2001 8:17 AM

12/24  
12/21

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photos

*Done*

060

It seems to take our photo shop forever to produce photographs. Why don't you get them to do it on a 24-, 48-hour turnaround instead of as long as it seems to take them. What is going on?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121201-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*12/20*

*Larry Di Rita*


**Larry Di Rita**

~~12/12 -~~

*Torie Clarke -*

*Do you own those people? Open to your views.  
Di Rita*

12 Dec 01



TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Torie  
DATE: December 19, 2001  
SUBJECT: Photos

We only have two people who shoot many events for you, the Deputy and other senior staff. They also process their own film, print the photos, identify, caption, and display them. Faster turnaround will require more people.

snowflake

December 13, 2001 9:27 AM

ACK  
JS 12/17  
1123

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking People

000,5

We need a single point of contact in the Pentagon for who is going to track who the people are we are after, who has been killed or captured and the best information we have as to the location of the remainder.

I need that done this week. We need to coordinate it with the CIA, we need to keep it up to date, and we need to know what it is we are trying to do with each one of them.

We need to start working with Tom Franks on it. That is part of his job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121301-13

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

13 Dec 01

U15097 02

Revised  
12/17  
11:52

December 13, 2001 9:03 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Carl Levin and ABM Treaty

373.24

When I spoke to Carl Levin yesterday, he said there will be hearings on the ABM treaty and that there are two key questions.

First, he wants to know whether or not the U.S. offered modifications to the treaty. I didn't answer him, because I think it is a technical question. There is no question we offered lots of pieces of paper and proposals and offered to negotiate, but they were basically not willing to discuss details. As I recall, they wanted to approve each single test we wanted to run.

Let's get **Bolton** and **Crouch** to come up with a response to that, a page or two listing what we did by way of negotiations with the Russians, so we can get the testimony prepared now.

The second question is what is so urgent that we want to test that would violate the treaty. We need to get that piece of it done now, as well.

I would like to see a draft of testimony for hearings on this subject pretty soon, by next week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121301-10

13 Dec 01

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

snovflake

ACTOWS  
12/17  
1008

December 14, 2001 8:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Appropriations

110,01

Please have someone pull together what the earmarks are in the appropriations bill, the 4,000 that he mentioned. I think we ought to get some of the most egregious ones and go after them.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
121401-I

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

14 Dec 01

U15102 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5015

snowflake

December 14, 2001 8:25 AM

INFO  
12/17  
1107

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Remarks

350.001 SD

Here is some material that can be used on ABM treaty in my remarks for NATO.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated "Points for Use with Key Congressional Leaders"

DHR:dh  
121401-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 Dec 01

U15103 02

## Points for Use with Key Congressional Leaders

You have seen the press accounts reporting that the Administration will soon give Russia formal notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

We do intend to give notice soon. However, it is important not to come to premature conclusions about the expected Russian reaction.

The Russian Government has told us that it accepts the U.S. decision. While it will almost certainly express some disappointment, its overall reaction will be restrained.

President **Putin** indicated to Secretary Powell that our differences over the Treaty need not damage or slow our cooperation in other areas, including strategic arms reductions.

From our discussions, we (the United States) concluded that the Russians actually preferred a U.S. unilateral withdrawal to a negotiated U.S.-Russian mutual withdrawal, and that trying to amend the Treaty simply would not work.

The Russians have told us that they are committed to continuing work on building our new strategic relationship, irrespective of our decision to withdraw from the Treaty. We have agreed to work with Russia to find a way to give formal expression to this new relationship.

The President is planning to visit Moscow next spring to continue this work. Before then we expect to make substantial progress on strategic reductions and in all other areas.

For now, I would ask you to withhold comment about the prospect of a U.S. decision to withdraw, especially with respect to speculation about the Russian reaction. We think you may be pleasantly surprised.

snowflake

ACTION  
45 12/17  
1105

December 14, 2001 8:35 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Law of the Sea

801.2

What is the status of the Law of the Sea? Jesse Helms called me about it the other day and urged us not to do it. Do you know where we are?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121401-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 Dec 01

U15104 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5018

12/17  
11:00  
snowflake

December 14, 2001 10:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Newt Minow

*DR*  
*12/14*  
*1205*

231.2

Please see what the status is of this possibility of Newt Minow becoming a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. I would like to weigh in with whoever I have to weigh in with.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/01 SecDef memo to VP

DHR:dh  
121401.12

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*12/19*  
*→ SecDef -*

*I'm told the fix is in on some other candidates but have placed a call to Andy CARD to re-assert your strong ~~support~~ support that Mr Minow be appointed. We haven't spoken yet but I will persist today/tomorrow. Di Rita*

14 Dec 01

U15108 02  
11-L-0559/OSD/5010

vs ACTION  
12/24  
1621

snowflake

December 15, 2001 12:01 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PDB

337  
MH

I have been reading the President's Daily Brief, You have seen it. It clearly is no longer an intelligence community product, or at least it doesn't appear to be. It is just citing what the CIA is doing. "The CIA's Predator," "the CIA's representative talked somebody into something," etc. I find it strange.

I wonder if there ought to be a DoD report to the President on a daily basis, since the PDB is, currently either only reporting CIA actions, or they are reporting everything as though it is all being done by the CIA.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

*John was not*

Attach.  
Page from PDB brief

DHR:dh  
121501-t

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 Dec 01

U15109 02

snowflake

December 15, 2001 12:01 PM

Action  
12/15  
1300

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Construction in Pakistan

OBE  
11/17  
15/12

Pakistan

You were on the call this morning with DeLong. I asked him about all this construction work being done in Pakistan. He said, "No, no, nothing permanent, nothing big. Just a tent city."

Read this article. Then get him on the phone and make sure he reads the article and tell him that this idea of permanence there is nothing I have agreed to, and I am curious to know what is going on.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/14/01 *Early Bird* article, *Washington Post*, "U.S. Extended Presence Agreed to by Pakistan"

DHR dh  
121501-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

15 Dec 01

U151 10 0 2

11-L-0559/OSD/5022

snowflake

December 15, 2001 12:20 PM

De Mon B  
12/17  
12/2

TO: Torie Clarke  
cc: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT:

OK

You ought to take a look at this from the *London Daily Telegraph*. My impression is that everything we tell the Brits ends up in the London newspapers. Am I wrong?

*Comp*

Thanks.

Attach.

12/13/01 *Early Bird* article, *London Daily Telegraph*, "Britain Has Vital Role in Somalia Offensive"

DHR:db  
121501-4

..... ■■■ .....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*Action Items*

15 Dec 01

U15111 02

tacks coming. Keep listening.'

Edwards said the tape is conclusive evidence against bin Laden. "The fact that [he was] waiting for news of the first attack and, on hearing the news, saying to those with him that there were other attacks coming. . . . Secondly, he said that there were people on the mission, hijackers, who did not know the details of what was happening."

U.S. law enforcement officials have uncovered indications that some of the 19 hijackers aboard the four aircraft may not have realized they were participating in a suicide mission.

"He talks about his family being in the construction business," Edwards said, "and that they thought that from the heat of the jet fuel they would be able to bring down the building from the jet up, but were pleased and surprised about the rest of the building. That's obviously also evidence."

The existence of the tape was revealed by The Washington Post on Sunday, and confirmed that day by Vice President Cheney. Shelby said he received an intelligence briefing on the tape Monday morning and was given a private showing that evening.

"When you see Osama bin Laden in this context he was talking in, to the audience that he was sharing all this with, by his gestures and by his own words, I don't see how any rational person in the world could be in denial about his complicity in these events," Shelby said.

"You see the mannerisms of the man himself, and his audience," Shelby said. "It would be repulsive to you. To most people. And the cold cynicism that will come out of it, dealing even with his own people. I think some people in the Islamic world ought to see it. They'll be in denial, [but] maybe not all of them."

Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.

London Daily Telegraph  
December 13, 2001

### 38. Britain Has Vital Role In Somalia Offensive

By Ben Fenton in Washington

America is planning to attack al-Qa'eda fugitives in Somalia and has relied on Britain to persuade neighbouring Kenya to allow special forces to use bases there, American sources indicated last night.

Intensive studies of Somalia, where al-Qa'eda terrorists have been able to hide and train in the past, have shown the Pentagon that a broad military campaign as used in Afghanistan would not be necessary to destroy Osama bin Laden's limited network there.

The government of President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya fears that a large-scale assault would drive refugees by the hundreds of thousands across the Somali border to the already lawless north-eastern region of Kenya.

But in a low-key visit to Nairobi on Monday, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, reassured Mr Moi that an American intervention would be likely to be restricted to special forces operations rather than heavy bombing.

Sources in America have also said Britain's links with former colonies and current members of the Commonwealth would be vital in preparing for the next phase of the war on terrorism.

"One of Britain's most important roles as an ally for us is to use its enormous diplomatic and economic influence in parts of the world where it once had an empire," a senior member of the staff of Gen Tommy Franks, the military commander of the war, told The Telegraph.

He said this kind of influence was vital in obtaining permission from countries to overfly them or play host to the troops of America and other countries.

But there would be no need to obtain overflight rights for any operation in Somalia because it has a long coastline and America has numerous carrier-based aircraft to call on.

So it seems probable that Kenya would be needed as a land base for commando units going after al-Qa'eda members.

America is thought to be reluctant to involve Somalia's other neighbour, Ethiopia, as a base for attacks because of a fear that this would lead to the further destabilisation of a volatile region.

The most likely targets for commando attack in Somalia are near the Indian Ocean coast, between the Kenyan border and the capital Mogadishu.

American troops and CIA agents have already been inside Somalia conducting reconnaissance missions and have concluded that although al-Qa'eda has a presence there it is relatively small and unsophisticated.

There is also a strong possibility that supporters of bin Laden or even the terrorist leader himself will try to flee towards Somalia, one of the few countries without any effective government.

It is thought unlikely that Britain would join any such campaign because its resources would be stretched too thinly unless London abandoned plans to lead a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary-general, called on America not to expand its campaign on terror against other countries like Somalia. He said those responsible for the September 11 attacks were almost certainly in Afghanistan.

Philadelphia Inquirer  
December 13, 2001

### 39. U.S. Vows Vigilance Against Somalia Terror Threat

By Dina Kraft, Associated Press

PRETORIA, South Africa - The United States is concerned about possible terrorist activity in Somalia and is intent on ensuring the East African country does not become a haven for terrorists, Washington's top official on Africa said yesterday.

"The possibility of terror cells being in Somalia is real," visiting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner told reporters in Pretoria, the last stop on his four-nation tour that also took him

to Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe.

At the same news conference, a Somali faction leader opposed to that country's transitional government said fighters forced out of Afghanistan by the U.S. offensive wanted to set up a Taliban-style Islamic administration in the Horn of Africa state.

"The al-Itihaad and the al-Qaeda terrorists who escaped from Afghanistan are already trickling back into Somalia," Hussein Mohamed Aidid told reporters.

Aidid urged the United States to act against the followers of Osama bin Laden who were fleeing to the shattered African nation.

"These groups have unlimited funds which they receive from Islamic nongovernmental organizations and Arab states which they are using to woo poverty-stricken Somalis to their side," he said.

Aidid said, without elaborating, that 57 "terrorist leaders" had recently entered the country, and had concealed weapons.

Aidid is a member of the Ethiopian-backed Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, a group of faction leaders who oppose the transitional government of President Abdiqasim Salat Hassan and accuse it of having ties to Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya, a Muslim fundamentalist organization that appeared on a Bush administration list of 22 terrorist organizations issued Dec. 6.

Kansteiner did not comment about the U.S. delegation's trip to Somalia and did not say whether the United States was considering strikes against the African nation as part of the antiterror campaign.

Kansteiner said that Washington believed there were links between al-Qaeda and Al-Itihaad and that Washington wanted those links severed.

New York Times  
December 13, 2001

### 40. Al Qaeda's Leaders May Use Ships To Escape Capture, Intelligence Agencies Warn

By Philip Shenon

9/12/17

December 16, 2001 21:23

TO: SECDEF

FROM: ~~Torfe~~ <sup>?</sup> ~~Clarke~~

SUBJECT: Brits

I think you are right about the Brits eagerness to talk to the media a lot. On Karen Hughes' CIC calls, they push hard and often for the release of all sorts of information. They do take things into their own hands sometimes.

11-L-0559/OSD/5025

snoflake

December 17, 2001 1:00 PM

Action  
12/17  
1205

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Gifts

333 SD

Please make sure you give me the coins, hat, pennant and the various other things that were provided to us during the trip to Afghanistan and the other countries on this trip.

Thanks.

COMPLETE  
12/19  
1100

DHR dh  
121701-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

17 Dec 01

U15113 02

E6

19 December 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Gifts Presented to The Secretary of Defense during trip from 15-19 December 2001

PLS INDICATE WHICH ONES YOU WOULD LIKE IMMEDIATELY

| <u>Gift</u>                              | <u>Country</u>     | <u>Presenter.</u>          |
|--|--------------------|----------------------------|
| Ceremonial Sword                         | Azerbaijan         | President                  |
| Ceremonial Sword in glass case           | Azerbaijan         | MOD                        |
| Large carved wooden vase                 | Armenia            | MOD                        |
| Two boxes of Georgian Wine               | Georgia            | President                  |
| A wrapped Painting                       | Georgia            | President                  |
| A Photo of SecDef and Mr. Shevardnadze   | Georgia            | President                  |
| Large Painting of old Tbilisi            | Georgia            | MOD                        |
| Dagger from Afghani rifle dated 1903     | Special Forces/ODA | ODA Team                   |
| Afghani hat, scarf, coffee mug           | Special Forces     | COL Mulholland             |
| Special Forces painting on wood          | Special Forces     | COL Mulholland             |
| Middle Eastern Carpet                    | Afghanistan        | Mr. Fahim Kahn             |
| Small boxed Green Stone                  | Afghanistan        | Mr. Fahim Kahn             |
| Captured Taliban Flag                    | Afghanistan        | LtCol Hoss, Special Forces |
| Unit Scarf and Patch                     | C-17 crew          | MAJ Tom Griffin            |
| Small figurine dressed in native costume | Kazakhstan         | MOD                        |

1 To Hoss  
1 To T/OS

not in my office

put in my office  
put in my office

V/R  
Ed

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Prepared by: CDR Jim Settele, USN (b)(6)

- ① ✓ Ed - you need to  
 ' run there the protocol
- ② After they have seen them  
 I'll decide - I've marked
- ③ But put the office now  
 in my coin I was
- ④ When the coins I was  
 given wired 1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

COINS ARE IN THE PRO-  
 TOCOL FOOT LOCKER  
 WITH ALL OTHER  
 ITEMS IN THE CARGO  
 HOLD. THEY'LL BE PUT  
 IN YOUR OFFICE WITH  
 THE OTHER ITEMS YOU'VE  
 MARKED ASAP. AS ALWAYS,  
 ALL ITEMS GET PROCESSED  
 BY PROTOCOL