

INFO
01/03
0805

snowflake

December 19, 2001 2:00 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Invite from Sweden

Sweden

Here is a request from the Swede to come see me. I am inclined to be too busy. I don't find him very stimulating, and I have too much to do to be seeing him.

We could offer up Wolfowitz.

Thanks.

Attach
12/18/01 Memo from Swedish Defense Minister

DHR:dh
121991-1

19 Dec 01

U 151 15 02



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Promemoria

2001-12-18

Försvarsdepartementet

Inför SR IV samtal med Rumsfeld i samband med EAPR:s försvarsministermöte den 19 december 2001

Enheten för säkerhetspolitiska och internationella frågor

Ditte Christensen

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Förslag till talepunkter inför SR besök i Washington våren 2002

- My staff is currently looking i&o the possibilities for a visit in Washington next spring. A possible opportunity could be in connection with the signature of the Declaration of Principles document (DoP) in May-June. This would also be an interesting time for discussions on the NATO enlargement.
- The visit would also give us the opportunity to discuss our bilateral relations. Within the Ministry, we are currently reviewing our co-operation with the United States in several defence related areas. I would of course be happy to have a dialogue on this work with you.

*Björn von Sydow
Sweden*

snowflake

INFO
01/03
03/08

December 19, 2001 2:15 PM

TO: Ian Brzezinski
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes

NATO 002

Here are the notes I used for my luncheon talking points on NATO in 20.

Thanks.

Attach
Note cards

*AMB. Burns should do
a cable*

DHR:dh
121901-4

19 Dec 01

U15117 02

SUGGESTED POINTS FOR WORKING LUNCH

What we want *look back to -*

- NATO-Russia cooperation based on practical, concrete and mutually beneficial initiatives.
- Alliance consensus "at 19" *agreement to* before working any specific issue "at 20". *not on*
- Consensus "at 19" required to work an issue "at 20" (i.e., any Ally can pull any issue back to "at 19" any time.) *because Britain - Skelton has cancelled that it is an app type*
- We want to reinvigorate and repackage - but not restructure - NATO-Russia institutions. *Interest*

What we do not want *ought to avoid*

- No meetings "at 20" with Russia without prior NATO consensus. *on the topic -*
- No Russian veto in any Alliance decision-making.
- We should *avoid situation* not facilitate Russian wedge-driving among Allies.
- We will not elevate relations with Russia above those with other Allies.
- No pre-agreed lists of issues for NATO-Russia joint cooperation and decision. *clearly on the table*
- We must not discourage and/or marginalize other Partners.

NAC must retain oversight over ~~Secretary General~~ *NATO* International Staff contacts with Russian Presidency.

Prepared by Ian Brzezinski
DASD(EUR/NATO), 614-5249
December 13, 2001 7:11 PM

*Parade in early September
avoid unnecessary precedents
or expectations that NAC might not
be ready to*

snowflake

December 19, 2001 2:15 PM

INFO
8/10
6289

TO: Ian Brzezinski
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Ivanov

Russia

Here are the notes I used in my statement in the meeting of the 20 in response to Ivanov.

Thanks.

Attach
Notes

DHR:dh
121901-5

19 Dec 01

U15118 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5033

Points to Make -- to
Respond to Ivanov

- ① U.S. + allies want a new start with Russia, per Bush-Putin;
- ② suggest we start with practical, modest, issues;
- Need early success;
- ③ Also need see true spirit of cooperation for this new effort - better than in PSC
- ④ New structure won't make a difference without a new attitude of better cooperation;
- ⑤ Example: get our Militaries work together →

⑥ However, you will understand that NATO will need to continue work at 19 on full range of issues and preserve our decision-making flexibility + independence

December 19, 2001 7:30 PM

01/03
1510 ds

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Budget SVTC w/CINCs

me (01/02)

110.0

The SVTC we had with the CINCs was not useful. They all used different formats. I didn't have a book to guide me as to what they were talking about. I didn't know the acronyms. When they were talking numbers, I couldn't tell whether they were talking '03 or the FYDP.

I have to get briefed on what they were saying. Please set up a meeting for someone to explain it to me. Hopefully, this time I will understand what it is about.

Thanks.

1/2

DHR:dh
121901-16

SECRET -

Attached is a summary of the issues the CINCs raised, together with the status of funding.

(★)

I do not believe you need additional briefings on this. Dov has responded to many of their concerns and few, if any, are of sufficient weight for your attention.

19 Dec 01

CINCEUCOM

#1 Theater C4 Modernization:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for C4 modernization and increased connectivity at 25 USAREUR sites. Particularly concerned with communication infrastructure from gates to buildings.

Issue Status

***Some funding added.**

***Remaining requirement funded with our “cost of war” request for additional topline.**

CINC NORAD/SPACECOM

#1 NORAD Battle Control System:

- CINC POSITION: Current system cannot meet requirements for increased Homeland Defense Mission. Requests additional funding to integrate FAA tracking information into NORAD system.

#2 NORAD C2 Out-Year Tails:

- CINC POSITION: Emergency supplemental provided \$25M for C2 improvements. Fund out -year tails.

<u>Issue Status</u>
*Funded.
*Funded.

CINCNORAD/SPACECOM

#1 SPACECOM Information Operations:

- CINC POSITION: New mission areas require additional manpower.

#2 SPACECOM Space Control:

- CINC POSITION: Funding insufficient to satisfy Space Control Capstone Requirements Document.

#3 SPACECOM Space-Based Radar:

- CINC POSITION: Requests funding in FY03 to look at alternatives. Leave options open for an FY10 launch/FY13 IOC.

<u>Issue Status</u>
*Funded.
● Funded.
*Funded.

CINCPACOM

1 Preferred Munitions:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for JDAM and LGB.
- Emergency supplemental provided funds to increase production capacity.

#2 Force Protection:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional manpower and funding for force protection.

#3 JTF Wamet:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for WARNET. Considers WARNET critical to ensure interoperability in communications, databases, and messaging for JTFs.

Issue Status

• **Significant funding added.**

* **Remaining requirement funded with our “cost of war” request for additional topline.**

● **Priority CINC requests funded.**

● **WARNET - Sent to JROC to validate requirement.**

CINCPACOM

#4 Theater C4 Infrastructure (NMCI):

– CINC POSITION: PACOM NMCI contract is underfunded.

#5 Theater C4 Infrastructure (Army):

– CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for C4 modernization and increased connectivity.

#6 Airborne SIGINT:

– CINC POSITION: Requires the capability to access, locate and decipher Low-Probability-of-Intercept (LPI) communications (reinstate JSAF or develop follow-on program).

Issue Status

*Funded.

•Some funding added.

● Remaining requirement funded with our “cost of war” request for additional topline.

*Restructured program being developed.

CINCSTRATCOM

#1 Trident D-5 Production:

– CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding to avoid break in missile production.

#2 Trident D-5 Guidance & Electronics:

– CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for guidance and electronics subsystems.

#3 Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF):

– CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding to support AEHF FOC in 2010.

Issue Status

***Funded.**

***Funded.**

● **Funded.**

TRANSCOM

#1 C-17:

- CINC POSITION: Requests funding for Boeing's multi-year procurement proposal.

Issue Status

***Funded.**

USCENTCOM

#1 Deployable Headquarters Command Post (DHCP):

- CINC POSITION: Terrorism emergency supplemental funded \$30M of \$43M requested. Requests the remaining \$13M be funded in FY02.

#2 HQ C4 and Theater Infrastructure C4 Requirements:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for C4 modernization and increased connectivity.

Issue Status

•Funded with other emergency supplemental funds. Will backfill cuts in second supplemental.

*Some funding added.

- Remaining requirement funded with our “cost of war” request for additional topline.

USCENTCOM

#3 Force Protection:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional manpower and funding for force protection.

#4 Prepositioning

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for Air Force and Army prepositioned war reserve equipment. Some of this equipment has been depleted by the war effort.

Issue Status

•**Priority CINC requests funded.**

•**Air Force issue funded.**

•**Army repositioning assets.**



#1 Joint Experimentation:

- CINC POSITION: Mandated every other year major field exercise is unfunded and odd year concept development is underfunded for level of effort necessary for major joint exercises.

#2 Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) Manning:

- CINC POSITION: JWAC cannot provide the required level of effort without an additional 13 1 billets.

Issue Status

● Funded FY03
& FY04.

•Funded 1/2 of
request.

CINCSOCOM

#1 MH-53 Extension:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for MH-53 helicopters to accommodate the slip in CV-22 production.

#2 cv-22:

- CINC POSITION: Emphasized his support for the CV-22 program.

#3 Aircraft Survivability Equipment:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding to modernize outdated on-board aircraft defensive systems.

Issue Status

● Funded.

● ATKL is restructuring.

*Funded.

CINCSOCOM

#4 Flight Readiness:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional funding for flying hours program.

#5 Advanced Gunship design:

- CINC POSITION: Supports an ACTD & AOA with USAF sponsorship for an Advanced Gunship design.

#6 Psychological Operations:

- CINC POSITION: CINC requests additional funding for psychological operations capability including modernization of Commando Solo aircraft and communications suites.

Issue Status

● **Funded.**

● **Funded.**

● **Funded.**

CINCSOUTHCOM

#1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR):

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional airborne reconnaissance assets, SIGINT, and HUMINT to support on going operations.

#2 Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities:

- CINC POSITION: CINC requests additional funding for various assets used in support of the counterdrug mission.

#3 SOUTHCOM Headquarters Building:

- CINC POSITION: Miami is the best location for the USSOUTHCOM headquarters. Purchase of the building and associated land is cost-effective.

#4 Facilities and Infrastructure:

- CINC POSITION: Requests additional real property maintenance (RPM) and MILCON funding to ensure operational capabilities of USSOUTHCOM components and subordinate commands.

Issue Status

***Dedicated drug ISR is not supported.**

***Drug mission is being reduced.**

● **Plan to work Hill for FY04 budget.**

***Drug mission is being reduced.**

snowflake

ACTION
AS 01/03
1330

December 19, 2001 5:45 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rowan Scarborough

000.5

I don't know Scarborough, but I noticed this article by him, and it reminded me of my guidelines. Do you think it might be smart to sit down and show him these guidelines sometime?

Thanks.

Attach
11/06/01SecDef memo

DHR.dh
121901-20

19 Dec 01

U15124 02

The Washington Times

www.washtimes.com

SECDEF HAS C.,

DEC 19 2001

Doctrines must be updated to fit new war on terrorism

Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Published 11/5/2001

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine that influenced presidents on when and how to use American military power for nearly two decades has given way to the unchartered war on terrorism.

Named after former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the doctrine's major tenet is to use decisive, or overwhelming, force to achieve a clear objective.

That convention is out the window in the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan and the broader war against global terrorism. Targeted action, not decisive force, is what is needed to uproot shadowy terror networks, U.S. officials say.

President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are trying to achieve with limited arms (air assaults, special operations and CIA covert action) what overwhelming force is designed to attain — namely, the destruction of an enemy, Osama bin Laden, and ousting of a belligerent government, Afghanistan's Taliban.

But the exact "Bush-Rumsfeld" doctrine that would stand alongside the Weinberger-Powell principles is still to be written, military analysts say. It takes a significant military event, such as the Vietnam War or the nascent war on terrorism, to spur strategists to starting thinking about what it all means.

"All you've got right now are a series of disconnected policy musings that are the most immediate response to the challenge we are currently facing," says retired Army Col. Kenneth Allard, a TV military analyst who has written books on military strategy.

Analysts predict this century's first war against so-called asymmetrical threats — in this case terrorism — will produce a military doctrine like no other.

"We need a new vocabulary," Mr. Rumsfeld said shortly after the air war began Oct. 7. "We need to get rid of 'old think' and start thinking about this thing the way it really is."

"New think" is actually what Mr. Weinberger aimed to do in 1984. Then, in the early days of the Reagan military buildup, the defense secretary wanted to set down principles for deploying forces that would prevent another Vietnam. Mr. Powell, former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, later amended the Weinberger doctrine to also call for using "decisive force."

In a Nov. 28, 1984, speech to the National Press Club, Mr. Weinberger said U.S. armed force would be used only to protect "vital interests of the U.S. or its allies." He said the action must have "clearly defined political and military objectives" and come with "reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress."

Analysts say Mr. Bush is meeting those criteria. Congress and the American people are overwhelmingly backing military action. Mr. Rumsfeld has stated the objective: ousting the ruling Taliban, and eliminating bin Laden and his al Qaeda terror network. The United States holds bin Laden responsible for the September 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

But Mr. Powell himself agrees his principle of decisive force does not fit in Afghanistan.

"I've always talked about decisive force, meaning you go to the point of decision and that's where

you apply decisive force," Mr. Powell told NBC shortly before the air assault began Oct. 7. "In the Persian Gulf war 10 years ago, you had an army sitting out there easily identifiable . . . and we applied decisive force against the Iraqi army. It's different this time. . . . I can assure you that our military will have plans that will go against their weaknesses and not get trapped in ways that previous armies have gotten trapped in Afghanistan."

One major objective in Afghanistan is not only to destroy the enemy but to simultaneously befriend the Afghan people as the United States works to form a post-Taliban democracy.

Michael O'Hanlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, says that if Mr. Bush's current strategy is successful, then local politics may be part of a new doctrine.

"Things that were an anathema to Powell and Weinberger and were partly a reaction to Vietnam are now correctly recommended as necessary to this kind of war," Mr. O'Hanlon said. "In cases where you really have to worry about the hearts and minds, and not just battlefield success, politics are an inherent part of the operations, especially when you are trying to convince people not to fight you and to change sides. So the concept of overwhelming force is not really applicable."

James Webb, a decorated Marine Corps officer in Vietnam and former secretary of the Navy, says the Powell doctrine never fit every conflict anyway.

"There are times when a nation must fight even though it is unable to amass overwhelming force. Think of the early battles of World War II," Mr. Webb said. "And there are times when overwhelming force is irrelevant, because its application does not meet the threat, which is where we are today. What is important here — to use the phrase I used in my speech at the Naval Institute — is 'specific lethality.' That means finding the 'point targets' in this kind of war and then obliterating them."

If the new war on terrorism gives birth to a Bush-Rumsfeld doctrine, clues to its content might be found in a series of policy pronouncements.

Mr. Bush's most significant new policy is his edict that governments that host and protect international terrorists will be treated as if they are the perpetrators themselves. In another stark marker, the president has said that foreign governments are either "with us or against us" in this war.

Mr. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, repeatedly say, "it's a different kind of conflict" — making it hard to pin down any new doctrine.

"If you try to quantify what we're doing today in terms of previous conventional wars, you're making a huge mistake," Gen. Myers told reporters. "That is 'old think' and that will not help you analyze what we're doing."

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[Return to the article](#)

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is the action necessary?

- **A Good Reason:** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, as they will be, whatever we do must be in our national interest. If people could be killed, we better have a damn good reason.
- **Legal Basis:** In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later as their invalidity is exposed.
- **Diplomacy:** ^{Normally} All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once force is engaged.

Is it doable?

- **Achievable:** When the U.S. commits forces, the task should be achievable-at reasonable risk-something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to know our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply doesn't know how to do well.
- **Clear Goals:** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved those goals and can honestly exit or turn the task over to others.
- **Command Structure:** The command structure should be clear, unambiguous and one the U.S. can accept-not UN control or a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, we should insist on prior agreement from the coalition partners that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission must determine the coalition; never allow the coalition to determine the mission.

Is it worth it?

- **Lives at Risk:** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S., and our coalition partners, if any, must be willing to put lives at risk.
- **Resources:** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

- **Public Support:** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time is required. If there is a risk of casualties, we should acknowledge that at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe the engagement can be done antiseptically, on the cheap, with zero casualties.
- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world if we prevail; if we fail; and if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the deterrent and U.S. influence. We need to ask what kind of precedent a proposed action would establish.

If so--

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should be willing to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully early, during the pre-crisis period, to alter the behavior of others and to try to prevent the conflict. If that fails, we need to be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail.
- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things-not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy will simply wait us out.

Finally--

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners and not make the task sound even slightly easier or slightly less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less than we believe we can deliver, since it is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

Note:

Guidelines, Not Rules: Finally, while these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules or a simple formula to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. does engage, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. The future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the manner in which it is applied.

Decisions on engagement will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. Guidelines will be most effective not in providing answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld

Bergeron, says it has "languished for decades." In 1996 Congress told the ins to set up a computer system to track those who come into the U.S. on student visas; but with some 600,000 such people in a country with more than 22,000 educational institutions, the system is not yet up and running. Only one of the 19 hijackers entered on a student visa. Can screenings in foreign countries be tightened? Maybe, but all 19 were run through a computerized "watch list" of suspected terrorists when they applied for visas (at least six were interviewed personally). Nothing turned up. In any event, as Kathleen Newland, co-director of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, says, "The facts remain the same." Globalization will continue to spin people around the world. The U.S. will continue to have two enormous land borders with peaceful neighbors: we're never going to see watch towers along the 49th parallel. Each year, says Newland, there are 489 million border crossings into the U.S., involving 127 million passenger vehicles; each year, 820,000 planes and 250,000 ships enter U.S. airspace or waters. However terrorism is beaten, it won't be by American border controls.

Will it be by war? In the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, there was a hope that police work might be able to rid the world of al-Qaeda and its associates. But the more we know of bin Laden's group, the less that seems likely, and not just because its operatives are ruthlessly fanatic.

Perhaps the single most important truth learned in seven weeks is the existence of a creepy camaraderie, an international bond among terrorists. Those ties are forged in Afghanistan. "The one thing that absolutely everyone involved in terrorist groups has in common," says a European official, "is passage through the al-Qaeda camps. When leaders are sent from Afghanistan to start organizing people, there are no questions asked: the camp experience allows everyone to recognize the bona fides of jihad." The B-52s pounding away from 40,000 ft. may not look like sleuths and cops. But

if al-Qaeda's sinister appeal and global reach are ever to be broken, the bombers too must play their part.

Reported by Bruce Crumley/Paris, Helen Gibson and James L. Graff/London, Scott MacLeod/Cairo and Viveca Novak/Washington, with other bureaus

Washington Times
November 5, 2001
Pg. 1

Analysis **42. Doctrine Must Be Updated To Fit New War On Terrorism**

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine that influenced presidents on when and how to use American military power for nearly two decades has given way to the unchartered war on terrorism.

Named after former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the doctrine's major tenet is to use decisive, or overwhelming, force to achieve a clear objective.

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President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are trying to achieve with limited arms (air assaults, special operations and CIA covert action) what overwhelming force is designed to attain — namely, the destruction of an enemy, Osama bin Laden, and ousting of a belligerent government, Afghanistan's Taliban.

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"We need a new vocabulary," Mr. Rumsfeld said shortly after the air war began Oct. 7. "We need to get rid of 'old think' and start thinking about this thing the way it really is."

"New think" is actually what Mr. Weinberger aimed to do in 1984. Then, in the early days of the Reagan military buildup, the defense secretary wanted to set down principles for deploying forces that would prevent another Vietnam. Mr. Powell, former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, later amended the Weinberger doctrine to also call for using "decisive force."

In a Nov. 28, 1984, speech to the National Press Club, Mr. Weinberger said U.S. armed force would be used only to protect "vital interests of the U.S. or its allies." He said the action must have "clearly defined political and military objectives" and come with "reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress."

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shortly before the air assault began Oct. 7. "In the Persian Gulf war 10 years ago, you had an army sitting out there easily identifiable . . . and we applied decisive force against the Iraqi army. It's different this time. . . . I can assure you that our military will have plans that will go against their weaknesses and not get trapped in ways that previous armies have gotten trapped in Afghanistan."

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"There are times when a nation must fight even though it is unable to amass overwhelming force. Think of the early battles of World War II," Mr. Webb said. "And there are times when overwhelming force is irrelevant, because its application does not meet the threat, which is where we are today. What is important here — to use the phrase I used in my speech at the Naval Institute — is 'specific lethality.' That means finding the 'point targets' in this kind of war and then obliterating them."

If the new war on terrorism gives birth to a Bush-Rumsfeld doctrine, clues to its

snoflake

ACTION
as 01/03
1330

December 19, 2001 5:55 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Process

310.1

Please take a look at this memo from Dov Zakheim, and then let's set a meeting and discuss it. See if you can come up with a list of things we might want to do this for, and a list of people who might be the right folks to do it.

Thanks.

Attach
10/21/01USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
121901-22

19 Dec 01

U15125 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5057

Mr. Secretary—

DEC 18 2001

I have given a lot of thought to your very frustrated memo to us of last week. I had thought that the memo would be discussed at least Tuesday's staff meeting (I missed Friday's because I was with (b)(6), but it wasn't.

I have a generic response: it seems to me that for each major area of concern to you, you should create a streamlined process with a designated hitter in charge.

I believe you have done that on the operational military side; though that is not my bailiwick. I know that it is equally do-able in other areas that you might address: the war gives you the ability to cut back and streamline bureaucratic processes, though those who are not in charge, or are cut out entirely, will cry "foul."

I base my recommendation on my own experience as Cap Weinberger's coordinator of supplies for the British during the Falklands War, when I was only a special assistant to an Assistant Secretary (Richard Perle). I was given the authority to deal directly with four-stars; cut deals with the British, and prepare memos directly to Cap through Fred Ikle, who was Under Secretary.

Pick the people you want, and put them in charge-not just folks near the top, as you have with Tom White on homeland defense, but people further down the chain if they show real promise.

As things stand now, for issues that are not your primary focus, the bureaucracy continues to attach highest priority to attending meetings, and “chopping” on memos, rather than doing anything creative.

We’ll be hamstrung in some areas requiring interagency cooperation-for example, when it comes to getting OMB to release significant funding, I simply am unsuccessful-they nickel and dime us as if we were not in a real war, only a bureaucratic tussle.

But in other areas, whether in health matters;
or ramping up defense production;
or determining what to do in future to ensure greater prominence and capability for special operating forces;
or accelerating transformation;
or merging defense agencies as you have intended for so long,
or other areas that preoccupied you before September 11th, you can either anoint the designated official as czar, as you have done with Ray Dubois, or reach deeper into our personnel structure, or even cross nominal jurisdictional lines, since so many people around you have multiple competencies beyond their job descriptions. You could then look to energized people to implement your priorities without being hampered by the usual bureaucratic barnacles.

I hope this memo is not too presumptuous.

Dov

snowflake

December 21, 2001 1:45 PM

ACTION
@/02
1355

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CIA and the NSC

04001A

It is interesting that every department of Government coordinates through the National Security Council except for the CIA.

That is to say, the NSC reviews what State is thinking of doing and DoD as well, but we don't seem to review anything CIA does in terms of the allocations of assets to different regions, philosophies, or approaches.

Why don't you draft a memo from me to the President or Condi with respect to that, and I will see if I can't figure out what might be done about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122101-19

.....
Please respond by _____

21 Dec 01

U15128 02

snowflake

December 21, 2001 11:47 AM

Action
5/10/02
1255

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reuters Story

Done
9/10/02
1255

0007

Here is this Reuters article. I would like to make sure we get that corrected. I am worried about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/19/01 Reuters article on German official

DHR:dh
122101-17

.....
Please respond by _____

21 Dec 01

U15131 02

2/27/16

Larry Di Rita
1/2

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Totie
DATE: December 27, 2001
SUBJECT: Reuters Story

You addressed this matter in your pre-Christmas briefing, and I addressed it in two morning media updates. I think this one is behind us.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**SIRO PRESS REVIEW - THURSDAY, 20 DECEMBER 2001**

This SIRO Press Review was compiled in the National Security Agency's National Security Operations Center (NSOC) by the Senior Information Resources Officer (SIRO) for use as background information by analysts and to serve as an indicator of significant worldwide events which may be reflected in SIGINT.

THURSDAY, 20 DECEMBER 2001

HIGHLIGHTS

1. **(AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN)** Pakistani troops mounted a huge manhunt on Thursday to try to recapture at least 20 al-Qa'ida fighters who escaped a day earlier after a gunbattle with their guards in which eight al-Qa'ida fighters and six Pakistanis were killed. Dozens of prisoners, arrested after fleeing from Afghanistan, had initially managed to escape. Twenty-one of the escapees were subsequently recaptured. Elsewhere, a sweep of snow-laden cave hideouts by Afghan fighters yielded more prisoners and documents, and U.S. helicopters flew night missions through the mountain valleys. Britain announced it had offered to lead a multinational peacekeeping force and to commit 1,500 troops, adding that in any conflict with the U.S. military, the Americans would be in charge. A German official had said earlier that German troops and other international forces must not come under the command of the U.S., insisting there be a clear separation between the peacekeeping force and the U.S. campaign. Britain said the exact composition of the force, which could number 3,000-5,000, would be resolved in the coming days and that a vanguard of 200 British soldiers could move from Bagram airport to Kabul in time for Saturday's inauguration. Key UN Security Council members have completed a resolution that authorizes a peacekeeping force, and a full Security Council vote could come Thursday. Meanwhile, at Camp Rhino, FBI agents questioned 15 al-Qa'ida and Taliban captives, none of whom are among the 22 on the U.S. list of most-wanted terrorists. Finally, Canada on Wednesday revealed elements of its elite Joint Task Force 2 commando unit are in Afghanistan taking part in operations to crush pockets of Taliban and al-Qa'ida resistance. -AP/REUTERS, 19/20 DEC 01-

2. **(MIDDLE EAST)** The Palestinian Authority (PA) arrested 12 of its own security men from Gaza Wednesday in an effort to rein in anti-Israeli militants, charging them with violating the cease-fire orders. Also, a Hamas leader in the West Bank, Hassan Youssef, said consideration was being given to suspending suicide attacks. Meanwhile, Israel offered to loosen its military grip on the West Bank city of Nablus as incentive for Arafat to crack down on militants. In addition, Israel resumed security contacts with the PA; Palestinian sources said later the first meeting was a failure. Arab states are expected to propose a resolution at a UN emergency session on Thursday calling for an end to the violence and affirming that the PA is essential to any peace efforts. -AP/REUTERS, 19/20 DEC 01-

3. **(INDIA/PAKISTAN)** A New Delhi newspaper reported Thursday that scores of battle-ready Indian army units, including tanks and mechanized infantry formations, have been deployed along the Punjab-Pakistani border. Although ominous, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee has said he would first use diplomatic means to convince Pakistan to close down the two groups India claims carried out the attack on the its parliament. -FBIS/REUTERS, 19/20 DEC 01-

CAPSULES

1. (U.S./TERRORISM) Zacarias Moussaoui, the first man indicted in the 11 September attacks, was ordered held without bail Wednesday in a brief appearance in a Virginia courtroom. -AP, 19 DEC 01-

2. (COMPUTER WORM) A new computer worm, disguised as a holiday greeting, has popped up in the U.S. and Europe that could destroy personal computers, experts said Wednesday. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01-

3. (COLOMBIA) The ELN has broken a Christmas-season truce it announced just two days ago by kidnapping civilians and raiding an Indian village, the army said on Wednesday. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01-

4. (ARGENTINA) Four Argentines were killed during rioting and looting Wednesday, as the government declared a 30-day state of siege to contain the worst civil unrest in a decade. Demonstrations continue on Thursday, according to a government-owned news agency, and the economic minister and rest of the cabinet resigned. -FBIS/REUTERS, 19/20 DEC 01-

5. (UK/AFGHANISTAN) Britain will resume diplomatic relations with Afghanistan on 22 December. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01-

6. (RUSSIA) Parliamentarians on Wednesday prepared to scrap labor laws brought in 30 years ago in favor of a new code allowing private companies to hire and fire workers. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01-

7. (BALKANS) Three ethnic Albanians accused of involvement in a bus bombing that killed 11 Serbs were freed Wednesday by Kosovo's supreme court after nine months behind bars. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01- SECDEF HAS SEEN

8. (JORDAN) A former member of the Jordanian parliament, Sheik Dib Aneef Shihadeh, is being held without bond in a Chicago jail for alleged visa violations, officials said. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01- DEC 21 2001

9. (IRAN) The U.S. disputed an Iranian claim Wednesday that U.S. naval forces in the Gulf attacked an oil tanker bound for an Iranian port, saying the vessel was a Belize-flagged tanker suspected of violating sanctions against Iraq. -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01- (V)

10. (SOMALIA) U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said Wednesday that a senior German official's earlier remarks saying the U.S. is likely to strike Somalia next in its war against Usama bin Laden, were "flat wrong." -REUTERS, 19 DEC 01

11. (INDONESIA) An Indonesian army transport plane carrying 90 soldiers crash landed at an airport in northeastern Aceh on Thursday, injuring several personnel on board. There are conflicting reports as to whether rebel fire or faulty brakes were to blame for the accident. -AP/REUTERS, 20 DEC 01-

TRAVEL

1. PAKISTANI PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF arrived in China on 20 Dec.

2. ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT ROBERT MUGABE arrived in Libya on 19 Dec.

PREPARED BY BOB WALTON, NSOC SIRO, TEAM 2

snowflake

December 26, 2001 12:16 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Policy

*2/13
0652 ds
Done*

000.7

Please look at this article here about the press. There ought to be some way we can do something like that. What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/2 VO 1 *Early Bird* article #46

DHR:dh
122601-6

Please respond by _____

*2/11
response attached
D.H.H.*

26 Dec 01

U15133 02

Marines have moved into Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban. Every day millions of Americans must think to themselves how proud they are of these warriors. And yet hardly an American can name one of them -- and probably won't well into the future.

Instead, Americans stand in jeopardy of remembering Geraldo Rivera, Christiane Amanpour or Ashleigh Banfield as the heroes of the Afghan War. Relentlessly narcissistic and buoyed by cloying network anchors at home, reporters such as these have used dramatic license to heighten the sense of personal danger to themselves and thus tacitly direct their reporting towards the inevitable conclusion -- "ain't I a hero?"

As the viewing public, we're likely to take them at face value, in part because we know no other Americans who can capture our imagination or inspire us to sacrifices of our own in the war on terrorism. As a consequence we pass our affections on to the millionaire celebrity reporters rather than to the \$35,000-a-year Delta Force sergeant crawling around Tora Bora.

It is not the media's fault. It is the military's. Since Vietnam, where the military's adversarial relationship with the press was cemented, the Pentagon has had a mistrustful and ham-handed way of handling the press and any attention that it cannot control. Some services are better than others, but in general the Pentagon's wartime policy is "no pictures and no names, please."

Compounding this is the fact that the military is implacably egalitarian when it comes to individual attention -- "all the brothers are equally brave," a commander once told me. It's a bit like the Penn State football teams that never have individual names on the backs of jerseys, except the Pentagon won't even put names in the press guide.

Granted, the current campaign, dominated by Special Operations troops, needs to preserve secrecy. But the Pentagon has eschewed publicity for individual heroes in every conflict since Vietnam, even well after the need for opera-

tional secrecy faded. For instance, in the Gulf War one American reconnaissance unit fought a hotly contested battle against the Iraqi Republican Guard on the second day of the ground war. In that fight, known as The Battle of the 73 Easting, one officer in particular, Capt. H.R. McMaster, distinguished himself as a battle leader squarely in the tradition of America's greatest fighting men.

In that battle, in which I participated, Capt. McMaster's scouts surprised a full strength Republican Guard tank battalion dug in for an ambush of the American advance. While other units in his regiment stopped after initial resistance from the Iraqis, Capt. McMaster personally took the lead in his tank and assaulted into and through the Iraqi forces in a hail of tank fire -- destroying the equivalent of an enemy brigade by battle's end.

The battle received a fair amount of press, prestigious medals were awarded, Tom Clancy featured it prominently in a nonfiction book, and movie rights were quickly sold. Mr. McMaster became a legend in the shrinking and increasingly insular circles of our professional army.

But ask an American today (or in 1992 for that matter) to name an on-the-ground hero of the Gulf War and you are far more likely to hear about Arthur Kent, the "Scud stud," or even Peter Arnett, who heroically manned a hotel room in Baghdad.

In fact, Mr. McMaster is probably better known for a well-received military history book he wrote while a West Point professor than he is for his extraordinary battlefield leadership. The movie of his battle has never been made and instead Hollywood has given us two wholly fictional Gulf War movies -- "Courage Under Fire" and "Three Kings."

As for the official record, in 1991 the army was so paranoid about having a possible failure recorded that it refused to let reporters (even army reporters) advance with the front-line troops and as a result there is hardly a single frame of battle footage from the ground war in the Gulf avail-

able and almost no first-hand accounts from reporters or historians who were actually there. Ironically in the information age our wars are being unrecorded and our heroes lost.

This was not always the case with the military. In earlier wars, the armed forces thrust their heroes into the spotlight and put them on tour in order to inspire the American public and cement the message that these soldiers were one with them. Sergeant York, Audie Murphy, and the crew of the Memphis Belle were just some of those that were paraded as an example of what the everyman can accomplish when fighting for America.

The U.S. needs a similar policy today, especially now that for the first time in history we have a small professional force serving a large (and non-participatory) citizenry. While the American public greatly admires its military and respects it more than any other institution in the country, it is the respect of a voyeur. Fewer and fewer Americans serve in a smaller force these days and as a result public contact of any sort with the people on the ground in the military is rare.

To help reconnect the public with the military that defends it, Americans should be exposed to soldiers like Jason Amerine, the wounded Green Beret captain whose exploits in helping to capture Kandahar were dramatically detailed in the Washington Post. Rather than restricting Capt. Amerine to one newspaper interview, he should be on Oprah, the morning news shows, Jay Leno, talking to high-school and campus audiences, and in a movie playing himself in the war against terrorism. It's a shame that more Americans now know of Kelly Flinn, the philandering and lying B-52 pilot, than Capt. Amerine.

Like Mr. McMaster, another self-effacing soldier, Capt. Amerine might be uncomfortable with the publicity, but it serves a much greater good. Without knowing the heroes of our professional military, how can our children be inspired to become like them, rather than like Geraldo?

Mr. Hillen, a former army officer and decorated combat veteran of the Gulf War, is chief operating officer of Island ECN.

Washington Post
December 21, 2001

Pg. 44

47. A Modern Tanker Fleet For The Air Force

Robert Novak's Dec. 16 op-ed column, "Boeing Boondoggle," wrongly implied that the Air Force doesn't have a position on leasing Boeing 767s for use as tanker aircraft. Our position, previously explained to Mr. Novak, is that we need to modernize our aging tanker fleet, and we are considering all reasonable options, including leasing or buying 767s.

In our global war on terrorism, the air refueling mission is mostly done with an aircraft designed and first built during the Eisenhower administration. We have flown more than 3,500 refueling sorties in Operation Enduring Freedom and more than 2,700 refueling sorties in support of air patrols over American cities since the Sept. 11 attacks. These operations, along with a mission focus on homeland security, are forcing the Air Force to assess accelerating replacement options.

Incorporating new 767 aircraft into our fleet will improve our aerial refueling capability dramatically. Benefits include increased fuel offload, near-term aircraft availability and mission reliability -- all with far lower support costs.

Should Congress approve a leasing option to put new tankers in service, we will analyze business conditions and determine the most cost-effective modernization path available. Leasing may enable the Air Force to avoid significant up-front acquisition cash outlays, and it could allow us to accelerate retirement of the oldest, least-reliable tankers in the fleet, saving more than \$3 billion in repair and maintenance costs.

If a cost-benefit analysis favors another approach, we will pursue that alternative.

February 1, 2002

TO: SECDEF
FROM: TORIE CLARKE
SUBJECT: Press Policy - John Hillen

Agree with John Hillen's point. We have facilitated some of the "connection" between the U.S. military and the American people, but we need to do much more. Plus, we need to look beyond just the news media as a vehicle. Most important to success is a cultural change, one that seeks and exploits opportunities to tell stories like Captain Amerine's rather than shunning them.

Note: Many in the military take your strong public statements about leaks and your private ones about the media as a signal that you want to shut the media down whenever possible. Their perception of the intent behind your comments has had a chilling effect on the very outputs you state you desire in your snowflake.

Things n e

- Scores of media embeds with carriers, bombers, AWACs, CAPS, as well as with troops in the region when large numbers went in on the ground.
- Individual media embeds with 6 SOF teams.
- Release of combat camera footage of (first) October 19 SOF raid in Afghanistan.
- Interviews with SOF members injured in friendly fire incident and the crew of the B-1 that crashed in the Indian Ocean.
- Development of **DefendAmerica website** (direct communication with the American people)
- Premier of Ocean's 11 at Incirlik; Magazine cover story on troops and celebrities.
- MTV (music television -- cable show) program from Ramstein Air Force base. Reach over one million people, domestically.
- Compaq Computers national campaign allowing the general public to email messages to the troops.
- Sony and Circuit City campaign allowing the general public to digitally record messages to the troops.
- Establishment of the "Messages to the Troops" email program.

- AOL online chats and promotion of our website, **DefendAmerica**
- Helped form United We Stand, Inc., a group of volunteers who have developed campaigns to keep Americans engaged in the war effort. This group designed the United We Stand bracelets. (Net proceeds are donated to the military societies).
- NFL cooperation resulting in several half-time tributes; players' salutes to troops aired every Sunday during games.
- Special tributes to the troops on Leno and Letterman.

Upcoming::

- Fox special on Super Bowl Sunday; profiling troops in Kabul/Kandahar during the Super Bowl.
- SECDEF messages on Super Bowl.
- Nickelodeon Children's Cable Program (Nick News broadcast from Afghanistan)

Activities Underway

- Camera crews will travel to the region compiling footage for **PSAs**, news trailers for movie theaters, as well as for a VH-1 special.
- Business News TV crew in Afghanistan. A documentary team filming segments for PBS, Nickelodeon, BBC, and Hi-definition TV.
- VH-1 (Music cable station) taping "Special Music Requests" with troops in Afghanistan.

snowflake

December 26, 2001 12:23 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Recognition of Commentators

Done
1/10/02
0145

800.7

There are a lot of commentators on television who are good and a lot who are not. When this thing is over, we ought to write the ones who are good.

For example, Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, retired USMC, is doing a good job on Fox News. A fellow named Shepherd is doing a good job, as is Wes Clarke.

Why don't we tickle a note for March/April for me to dictate a note and send it to the ones who have done a good job and have shown thoughtfulness and balance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122601-7

.....
Please respond by _____

1/3

Torie's Response attached.

We'll look at it in March/April and see what we think about it then.

26 Dec 01

U15134 02

D. Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/5069

Larry Di Rita

TO: SECDEF
FROM: 
DATE: December 27, 2001
cc: DiRita
SUBJECT: Recognition of Commentators

I recommend you don't send them any written commendations. Most of the commentators, good and bad, get paid for their work, and I would hate for any correspondence by you to make it into the public eye. Shepard and Clark check in with us fairly regularly and have not exploited those communications for personal gain.

snowflake

December 26, 2001 5:09 PM

Action
01/03
1410

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.
SUBJECT: Security

380.01

I would like to talk about who gets security in the building. At the present time, it apparently is the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Secretary of each of the Services, the Chief of Staff of each Service and the Vice Chief of Staff of each Service, and the Commandant of the Marines.

I think it is excessive. Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DJR:dh
122601-20

.....
Please respond by _____

26 Dec 01

U 151 35 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5071

snowflake

December 27, 2001 9:35 AM

ACTON
a 153
1-735
B

TO: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tony Dolan Memo

350.001

Tony Dolan's 12/14/01 memo here is first-rate. You both ought to read it carefully, and then we ought to figure out how we fix it.

Let's have a meeting and talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/01 Dolan memo to SecDef re: Specches

DHR:dh
122701-22



Please respond by _____

27 Dec 01

U15137 02

12/21

~~SECRET~~ -

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 27 2001

Dec. 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM
To: Secretary Rumsfeld
Fr: Anthony R. Dolan
Re: Speeches

Tony has some good thoughts in here. The first ~~two~~ ^{three} pages are about people/process. It's more my and Torie's problem(s) than yours, but Tony wants you to see.

D, Rita

I THE PERSONAL, TOUCH

(A) The Wall St. Journal was most enthusiastic about the Pearl Harbor piece because of the personal information -- thanks for the time on the plane to Tampa.

(B) And your get-together with the speechwriters a while back led to both the Keeper-of-the-Flame address and a statement that was a ten-strike in the briefing room the next day. (The thoughts you called down were about smoke still coming out of the WTC ruins and how wars take time.)

So, is this is a lead-in to a request for more face time with you?

Such things should take care of themselves. Just **kinda** happen. A single writer chatting with you for two to three minutes the afternoon before a briefing?

Anyway, just the observation that seeing the writers saves time because it (a) exponentially increases the chances of getting it right in the first draft (b) provides your quick word or line that can be a mustard seed (c) assists in your own engine-revving (d) contributes to the creative culture and the movement towards a day-to-day excellence that is the ultimate objective of speechwriting and (e) raises consciousness about the importance of speechwriting to the Secdef process.

On this last point speechwriting is sometimes the last to know; for example, for the Dec. 11 memorial event the writer had 24 hours and warning for this week's Thursday briefing warning was a few hours. Meeting in Torie's office Friday may have solved this problem.

Be assured your briefing room and TV appearances are watched and scrutinized and learned from by writers.

II GENERAL,: SITUATION

Running speechwriting is about brokering drafts but, above all,

12/21
1520
DH

developing writers by getting everybody in the rotation -- makin' em stars. (Helps the chief writers' writing too.)

Marc Thiessen doing this now.

You may have noticed the variegation: Terri Lukach now has done memorial remarks as well as numerous briefing statements and tapings, about which you were kind enough to compliment her. So, her confidence grows. Fleming Saunders – slated soon for starting pitcher role -- did Great Lakes naval and Tuesday's statement. Major Ann Skelly kept very busy by deputy (this has left a gap here) but we hope, if she gets a breather, to work her into your rotation.

There is movement towards the right culture, one where writers stop by each other's offices, hand drafts back and forth – don't just take edits but actively seek them from colleagues. And less up-tightness. Takes time. (But great things can happen when a creative atmosphere is established and writers can prosper. GWB got that unforgettable speech to Congress because of such a culture -- the writers interact, Gerson's management is skillful, the president is protective and the talent is there.)

Writers also working to develop strengths and gain some awareness of quirks or weaknesses. Incidentally -- and this may interest you -- one obstacle being overcome is everybody's capitol hill experience. The writers chide and deride me for saying this (young people today lack my own generation's sense of servility) but writing floor statements or testimony in a place where other senators don't pay attention and the press gallery picks up the written text later means there isn't enough training in establishing a connection to a live audience. You know -- chitchat, one-liners, common interests -- the sense of theater and audience that you have. Instead, everybody wants to fine tune the polemic -- get right to the forensic point. Never mind the charm or to-ing and fro-ing. There is an absence of set-up; and, in speechwriting, set-up is everything, just everything.

III. TWO PROBLEMS PRESENTLY KEEPING US (OR AT LEAST ME) UP AT NIGHT (BUT CLOSE TO BEING SOLVED).

(A) RESEARCH -- We are close now to solving this but here is showstopper: We have no researchers.

I've never seen this before. First, writers don't get a set-up memo with useful information, points of contact, reference material for an event. Currently the writers do this by themselves – which can take hours – sometimes days. (Writer spent almost a full day on the phone getting details for Ft Bragg visit.)

Besides the fatigue factor, the writer doesn't have a fresh approach to the data. This risks reducing quality. Moreover, great speeches are usually the result of research -- the quintessential quote or datum or person.

Second, before things go to you, there is no formal system for proofing drafts. (So you get a Wall St Journal piece with transposed pages, for which, again, I apologize.)

But, third, and most terrifying of all -- no real fact-checking. Marc told me about the Hanseatic League. And you should have seen the scurrying around down here when we were trying to verify that 1.5 million Afghans died in last decade. And then there was the Yamamoto quote. Apparently, the sole source was a Hollywood screenwriter. Had we gone with this one -- you would still be explaining yourself. And we would be explaining ourselves -- to you.

This sort of thing terrifies me, having worked in a newsroom and seen how easily a factual error can be made even by experienced reporters and editors and how awful the consequences can be.

Anyway, two experienced researchers are interested (your stardom keeps upping the applicant pool). Marc will try to move this through the bureaucracy.

Besides institutionalizing a sense of caring about accuracy, having researchers on board means they will also get familiar with and have handy for the writers the Rumsfeld archives which Marc organized and recently brought upstairs. They will be available if you have a personal research project.

(B) YOUR CARDS OR HALF SHEETS -- Right now writers are responsible for your cards or large-type text. Which is crazy. They shouldn't be doing the typing but looking it over -- making sure text is right and changes incorporated. (Particularly since you rework right up to delivery.) If and when researchers get here we will establish a process.

And, by the way, somebody with you -- security or staff-should have a spare set of cards or sheets just in case. Always.

IV. SUMMARY

So some progress made. And more, we hope, on way.

DOLAN'S GUIDE TO SPEECHES
(In spirit of Rumsfeld's Rules)

Very few things are more important to the principal than knowing speech drafts will come in on time and be in reasonable shape. The comfort level here must be high. Higher. Highest.

Principals get the draft WHEN they want it. End of discussion.

Principals get the draft HOW they want it. End of discussion

Principals have a staff because they have achieved something. And they need a speechwriter because they have something to say. So principals should be the principal origin of speechwriting material as well as source of its success.

Good speechwriting is asking the right questions and taking good dictation.

Access is everything

Principals who do not give their writers access are either (a) costing themselves time because the work must be redone or (b) forcing themselves to accept an inferior product that won't sound like them.

If a principal asks "Gonna make me sound like Kennedy? Gonna make me sound like Reagan?" the smart speechwriter responds: "No I'm going to do better than that. I'm gonna make you sound like you."

Little is of more importance to a public official's discharge of duty in a democracy than his or her report to the people on the work being done, which means message, which means speeches.

Message or speeches are not the tail end of a strategy since strategy is, after all, nothing more than its formulation and in public life, that usually happens in the speechwriting stage.

Real change is not about process but about ideas and the words that convey them – the speeches.

Speeches – the words are largely what history remembers presidents for. And a few presidents-- Kennedy, Reagan -- knew this. And knew that speechwriting was, arguably, their most important department.

So, one of Washington's favorite truisms: words vs. action poses a false dichotomy. Because words are action -- the first action. And oftentimes the most important action. The Declaration of Independence did as much as any battle to win the American Revolution --by bringing France in. The Emancipation Proclamation did as much as any battle to win the Civil War -by keeping Britain out.

The amount of attention principals pays to speeches depends on which of two kinds of statesmen they aspire to be: "problem solver" or "world changer". Problem solvers think the stuff of history is clever maneuvers by high-level people like themselves. (They end up making changes at the margin.) World changers believe the stuff of history is great ideas and the words that enunciate them -- and the faith, hope and love those ideas and words evoke in ordinary people. (They end up accomplishing enduring change.)

The problem solver -- impressed by who has the biggest battalion and largest GNP -- tends to leave most things be. The world changer -- impressed by who is telling the truth and cares the most about it and understanding truth has ontological power and moral force is the greatest power in the world -- tends to think all things are possible.

Great change requires great ideas. Great ideas require great words. Great words require great speeches.

Great speeches require "the Casablanca effect". Nobody knows how or why such a good movie got made; nobody knows who came up with the great lines or ideas. The studio just made a habit of getting good writers and directors together and lettin' em mix. Planned serendipity. Habits of excellence. "Luck is the residue of design," as the man says.

The government culture is not just opposed to the kind of culture that a good speechwriting department needs to prosper. It is hostile, deeply hostile. In fact, it wages implacable, unrelenting war on any prospect or hint of such a creative culture.

Speechwriters should not be surprised by obstacles. Bureaucracy, while necessary and useful, also has its downside - it hates anything that stands out.

Which is another way of saying bureaucracy is opposed to and relentlessly seeks to stamp out or suffocate excellence. So, unless speechwriters are lucky enough to have a principal who protects them (rare), they must expect to try and

survive in an atmosphere that is punitive, coercive and intent on thwarting all their best work.

When staff types or administrators are punitive, coercive and attempt to thwart their best work, speechwriters should not feel singled out. The military bureaucrats, after all, sought to arrest Grant for trying to take Vicksburg, drove Billy Mitchell out of the army for seeing the possibilities of air power, drummed Rochefort out of the Navy shortly after his code breakers helped win possibly the most decisive naval battle in history at Midway, and did everything to stop Hyman Rickover from coming up with a weapon system (saved by Congress) crucial to preventing nuclear war and winning the Cold War.

Which isn't to mention the church bureaucrats. They banned the works of Thomas Aquinas -- a doctor of the church, harassed and chased all over Europe Ignatius Loyola -- founder of a great religious order, and incinerated Jean D'Arc -- a most conspicuously holy saint.

For staff types, going to meetings, talking on the phone, dictating memos, issuing orders and making sure the principal listens to their brilliant advice is the priority stuff. Speeches are something the principal also does. When time permits.

Staff types -- who would never do it themselves -- cannot be expected to comprehend a job that requires someone to sit at a computer for up to eight or nine hours a day for sometimes three, four, five, or six days running. (A good speech usually demands 20 to 40 man-hours.)

A good many staff types care about speechwriting when it will make them look good. Or when it will make them look bad. No other time

A good many staff types will shut off access to the principal but give the writers no guidance. They will make sure speechwriters are the last to know about a speech but demand the draft early. They will take credit if the speechwriters does come up with something but will demand to know why their instructions weren't followed if the writer is dry.

Speechwriters just need to know there will always be "staff officers from Crecy" -- wearing shiny uniforms and swagger stick in hand, they show up on the front lines, look down on the combat soldiers in the trenches who have been holding off the enemy and criticize them for the unshined appearance of their boots.

Government is simply ill equipped to reward or make room for work that requires a magical mix of ambiguity and precision and countless hours of draining,

lonely, thankless application of seats of pants to seat of chair.

Government administrators are ill equipped to understand that speechwriting is not like attending meetings or talking on the phone -- which is what government administrators do. They cannot be expected to know that writing is bleeding, that there are limits, -- and a need for restoration

In the private sector, the equivalent to the way government usually does speechwriting is this: The CEO of a pharmaceutical firm has his drug researchers and scientists report through and explain themselves to his sales, marketing, financial, security, maintenance and motor-pool divisions.

But business too -- failing business -- can wage war on creativity. Visit any struggling company and the one division that is making money will be the subject of the most constant and severe criticism and the agreed-on source of the company's problems. Vice presidents of divisions not making money will be giggering and threatening and attempting to cut back the size of money-making division even as they try to add more staff to their own failing empires.

Usually though, the private sector is usually quite different from government. There is a bottom line -- money is at stake. So appreciation and compensation and advancement for creative types exists. In television and movies, creative types especially writers get paid mind-boggling amounts and have chance to go on to be directors and ruin their own scripts. In the news business, creative types get airtime or bylines and become international celebrities. On Madison Avenue they not only get paid well, they frequently end up ad company CEOs

"Are creative types important to your business?" someone once asked Phil Geir, the head of Interpublic, world's largest 'pr' conglomerate. "Important to my business?" Geir asked back with incredulity, "They are my business."

For years, Peter Dailey of Dailey Associates, California's biggest ad agency, paid his creative director more than he paid himself.

The private sector has a way of preventing a trauma public officials often have to endure: waking up one day to find their writer-types have drifted off and silently gone away and left them with a problem of indescribable size.

Speechwriters are your marines; if your marines don't have attitude, who's going to have attitude?

Speechwriters are like jet pilots and surgeons-they better have confidence.

The only thing worse than a department of troublemaking speechwriters is a department of non-trouble-making speechwriters. (As I used to say to Don Regan.)

So speechwriters are nature's noblemen and noblewomen. They are also giant pains in the neck.

NEXT INSTALLMENT – guide to avoiding speechwriter and chief speechwriter foibles and infirmities.

snowflake

INFO
01/02
1000

December 29, 2001 11:43 AM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: George Shultz Speech

350.001

Attached is an interesting speech that our mutual friend, George Shultz gave. I thought you might like to see it.

Respectfully,

Attach
1/05/01 George Shultz Speech to Institute of United States Studies

DHR:dh
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AMORE ACCOUNTABLE WORLD?

George P. Shultz

Institute of United States Studies
James Bryce Lecture on the American Commonwealth

London: November 5, 2001

You honor me greatly, Lady Thatcher, by your presence here tonight and by introducing me in your own country. You and Ronald Reagan produced a revolution by the power of your ideas and by your ability to put those ideas into operation. You ended the Cold War, you led the way to the elevation of freedom as an organizing principle in political and economic life, you changed the world and so very much for the better.

In doing so, you also became the symbol of the greatest national partnership in history: Britain and America. Our steadfast relationship once again, at this very moment, is fighting on a far-off frontier for freedom and security – for ourselves and for all decent people.

James Bryce, whom we honor through this lectureship, explained the strength of the Anglo-American bond: how our common heritage, developed in different styles, laid the foundation for democracy, progress, and the rule of law around the world.

Bryce's remarkable work, *The American Commonwealth*, gave Americans a gift we could not have given ourselves. As President William Howard Taft said, "He knew us better than we know ourselves."

As a Californian, I should also note that James Bryce was the first British Ambassador to the United States to visit the West Coast. A man whose intellectual

energy produced a ceaseless flow of written observations on his travels fell utterly silent during his stay in San Francisco. We have nothing whatsoever on record from him then. The new mansions on Nob Hill built by the rail and gold rush millionaires, **the Golden Gate** (even before the bridge), the squalid and **violent** Tenderloin, the flood of immigrant **Chinese** workers must have presented such an amazing sight that even the great **Bryce** could find no words for it.

* * * * *

Recently, I have been working on the question of accountability, the **importance** of holding people and institutions, public and private, accountable for **their** actions. Without accountability, without a sense of **consequence, a mentality takes over that** says, "I can get away with it." That is **true** whether you are talking about individual behavior or corporate or national reactions to bailouts, acts of genocide, and much more. Right now the issue is terrorism. So this evening, **I** want to look at terrorism through **the** lens of accountability.

The monstrous acts of Al Qaeda have now made **the principle of state** accountability the law of nations. **After the** bombings of our **embassies** in 1998, **the** Security Council stressed **“that every** Member State **has the duty to refrain from** organizing instigating, assisting or participating in **terrorist** acts in another State or acquiescing **in organized** activities within its territory **directed** towards the commission of

such acts. . . .” [Res. 1189] On December 29, 2000, **the** Council strongly condemned **“the continuing use** of the **arcas** of Afghanistan under **the** control of the **Afghan** faction known as Taliban. . . for **the** sheltering and training **of terrorists** and planning of **terrorist** acts. . . . [Res. 1333] **Then, after** September 11, 2001, the Council accepted **the** position pressed by the United States and Great Britain recognizing the **inherent** right of self-defense, **stressing** “that those **responsible for** aiding, supporting or harboring **the** perpetrators, **organizers** and **sponsors of these** acts will be held **accountable**,” reaffirming that every **State** is duty-bound to refrain **from** assisting **terrorists** or acquiescing **in their** activities. [Res. 1368 & 1373]

The legal basis for **the** principle of state accountability is now clear, and **the right** of self-defense is acknowledged as an appropriate basis for its enforcement. **And our** actions now must **make** that principle a reality.

The Basic Anti-Terrorist Ideas

The attacks of September 11, 2001, are a grotesque reminder that **freedom** **remains** vulnerable to authoritarian ideologies. Democracies continue **to** face the **threat** **of terror from those** who **refuse to** accept the principles **of tolerance** and equality for all **human beings**. We have learned what WC must do to prevail.

Then Prime **Minister** Margaret Thatcher, **after** a **terrorist** attempt on her **life** in ‘Brighton’s Grand Hotel on October 12, 1984, spoke about terrorism **with** characteristic strength and candor: “The **bomb** attack on **the Grand** Hotel early this morning was first and foremost an inhuman, **undiscriminating** attempt to massacre innocent, **unsuspecting** men and **women**. . . . The bomb attack , , . **was** an attempt to cripple Her **Majesty’s**

democratically elected **Government**. That is the scale of the outrage in which we have **all shared**; and the fact that we **are** gathered **here** now → shocked, but composed and determined – is a **sign** not only that this attack has failed, but that **all attempts** to destroy **democracy** by terrorism will fail.”

Speaking two weeks later in reaction to **Brighton** and other acts of terror, I developed her themes: “**We cannot allow** ourselves to **become** the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to **respond**. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or **pleasant** contest, but we have no choice. . . . We must reach a consensus in this country that our **responses** should go beyond passive **defense** to consider **means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts.**”

The Heads **of the** Group of Seven major industrial democracies **meeting** in Tokyo on **May 5, 1986** stated that we “*strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices and of those. including governments, who sponsor or support it. **Terrorism has no justification**”

This unprecedented international manifesto came about **through the toughness and determination of** Margaret Thatcher **and** Ronald Reagan, but **the other leaders were fully** on board.

These statements from the past show **that terrorism** is a weapon with a long history, used by states and groups hostile to **free** societies and **operating in ways** designed to make it hard to know who has committed an atrocity. They also **contain the** key ideas necessary for **success** in **the fight** against **the** terrorists and **their state** sponsors.

Admiral **Yamamoto**, who **led** the **Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor**, **knew something** about the United States. **After** the attack he warned, "**We have** awakened a sleeping giant and instilled in it a **terrible** resolve." Well, **Osama bin Laden** and his cohorts do not know **much** about the **United States**, but he will know **that his attacks on Americans on American soil** have awakened a **giant**. **His** band of killers **has** instilled in us a **deep** resolve to stamp out **terrorism**. And **we** have mobilized powerful support around the globe, most dramatically from **the** government and people of Great Britain, a nation **that is** all too familiar with terrorism. **Your Prime Minister was applauded** throughout the **United States**, as well as in **Congress**, when he appeared **with** Laura Bush at that dramatic **joint session** in **September**.

Yes, **we** have had **terrorists before** and **the** fundamental ideas are there. But the sense **of** urgency and the scale of **effort** underway today far exceed what has come before. **The prospects for** success therefore are **far** greater.

And now, as before, **we are lucky enough** to **find** real **leadership**, **people** rising to the challenge. In America, we have a president who is decisive and inspirational and determined. He **is** candid with us about the **nature of the threat we** face and about what we **need** to do **about** it. He has an impressive team working with him. I know **these** people well. They are experienced. **They** are open-minded and tough-minded. **They** know what must **be** done and they know how to do it. **As** my wife put it **the other day**, "**Aren't we** lucky that the adults are in charge?"

I have noticed **that** since **the** campaign was joined in Afghanistan only four **weeks ago**, **there** has been a **growing unease in the European media**. Won't **innocents** get hurt? Yes, war hurts innocents, especially when terrorist **forces** try to use **them** as shields, but

our effort is to **keep** this to a minimum. Won't there be far-reaching **consequences**? Yes, and for the better. Isn't this dangerous'? **Yes**, but **even** more **so** if we **fail** to act. We **cannot** allow the effort **needed** for a just cause to **undermine our will**. As a **British Prime Minister** once said, "This is no time **to go** wobbly."

President Bush's Winning Strategy

I have listened carefully to the many **powerful statements, formal and conversational**, made by President Bush since September 11. Here is how **I** understand his strategy.

The conceptual heart of **the** president's approach is contained in four big ideas.

✓ First is this: we are at war, and we are at war with terrorism. That's a big change **from** the way our government **has** looked **at** this in the past, as a **matter for** law enforcement – catch each criminal **terrorist and** bring him before a court. That is not war. **A** war is fought against an enemy bent on the **defeat** of your country. The object of war **is** to use all necessary means to **eliminate the enemy's** capacity to achieve his goal. So a big, important difference in concept is at work when you go to war.

✓ **The** second big idea is that our enemies are **not** just the **terrorists, but also any state that supports or** harbors them. Terrorists **don't** exist in a vacuum. They can't do the things **that** they aspire to do unless they have a place where they can train, where **they** can plan, where **they can** assemble equipment and their deadly weapons, where they can gather their intelligence and arrange their finances. They have to **have a place, they have** to be sheltered and **helped** by a state. So **the President** has been saying to everybody, Watch out. We are **not only after** the terrorists, but also the countries that **hide** them, or protect them. or encourage them. The President seeks to make any state that harbors

terrorists accountable **and therefore** so uncomfortable that they will want to get rid of them. So in the end, the **terrorists** will **have no** place to hide.

✓ **The third big** idea is to **get rid of moral confusion, any confusion** between the terrorists and the political goals the **terrorists** claim to seek, **Their** goals may or may not be legitimate, but legitimate **causes can** never justify terrorism. Terrorists' means discredit **their** ends. Terrorism is an attack **on the idea** and the practice **of** democracy. Terrorism for any cause is the enemy of freedom. So let us have **no** moral confusion in this war on terrorism. As long **as** terrorism **exists**, civilization is in jeopardy. Terrorism must be suppressed and, **ultimately, eliminated.**

President Bush's **fourth** big idea **parallels** what Ronald Reagan, **when** a **presidential** candidate, **said** in **an** address on August 18, 1980, **written** out in his own hand:

✓ **"We** must take **a** stand against terrorism in the world and combat it with **firmness**, for it is **3** most cowardly and savage violation of peace.

'There is **something** else. We must remember **our** heritage, who we are and what we are, and how this nation, this island **of freedom**, came into being. And we **must make** it unmistakably plain to all **the** world that we have no intention of compromising our principles, our beliefs or our **freedom**. That we **have the** will and the determination to do as a young president said in **his** inaugural address twenty years ago. 'Bear any burden, pay any price.' Our reward will be world peace; **there is no other way** to have it.'

War. No **place to** hide. Moral clarity. Freedom. There are all **sorts of words** that go with this grand strategy: determined, realistic, patient, tough, **and don't forget** smart.

Americans are smart and so are our **principal** partners, the British. We have to work at this not just with our massive capabilities, but with those goat national **characteristics** by which our peoples traditionally are known. Yankee ingenuity is an old phrase. And the British, as the names of Royal Navy warships tell us, are **Indefatigable, Intrepid, and Indomitable**. We do unexpected things. And we never give in.

The American **people** get it. All of a sudden, the American people understand that **here** is this phenomenon that is dangerous to us -- to our way of life -- and we are going after it. No doubt **success** will take time. No doubt there will be bumps and potholes along the road. But we **will** be determined. And we will **remember** who we **are** and **we** will live our lives as they should be lived. As Margaret Thatcher put it in 1984, “**shocked, but composed** and determined.”

Time for Action

A strong defense is **essential**. But the best defense is a terrific **offense**. Both need extraordinary intelligence. **And the universality** of the cause **needs** the support of a skillful **professional** diplomacy and **an** energetic, public diplomacy. That is an outline of **the** action program.

I hear almost **constant** reference to a **coalition**. Of **course, we need** to build as broad a base of support as possible. But we will need a dazzling array of coalitions **depending** on the subject, the **time**, and the **place**. You need different **arrangements for** over-flight **rights**, for **forward** basing, for drying up means of finance, for intelligence, **and** more. Each will require its **own** approach. The diplomatic **effort involved** is

immense. The objectives **will shift as activities** develop. So coalition building is a **job** that **keeps** changing and **never ends**.

Intelligence, in the first instance, means what we -- **Americans** and British -- do ourselves. Historically, both our countries have been good at this. But now we must build **up** our **neglected** ability to interact with people all over **the** world who know something. There will be all kinds of **people**, sometimes not so lovely. We will have to sup with devils, sometimes with a pretty **short** spoon. The question is whether **they** know something **worthwhile** and whether WC can **locate** what **matters within** a massive **flow** of data. **And** can we **find** the **patterns** that **enable us to piece together a basis for action?**

Preemption is the key. There has been more success than is realized at aborting **terrorist plans** through superior intelligence. We must retaliate against **the terrorists**, but **much more important is** to disrupt, deter and prevent their evil acts in the first **place**. **WC** must act **so** that they cannot.

When it **comes** to military action, much **of it** will be **undertaken** by the United States, with our great friends, you **British, who** always come through in the **clutch** -- I repeat: who always **come** through in the clutch. **We'll** have **relatively** few partners when it comes to military action because the targets **are** so elusive. You look for them -- you **find** them -- they're there and then they evaporate. **I've** sat in targeting **meetings** in the past, and **I** have a **feel** for what they're going through right now. You look **at information, you evaluate it from many angles, and then you have to decide and act**. In a **war like this, there is** not a lot of **time to consult** with members of a large coalition. Action **must** be quick, without warning, and without leaking.

As governments around the world see that we are serious, competent and determined to win this war against terrorism, we will have more friends and the terrorists will have fewer states who volunteer to harbor them or to be identified with that weapon of evil. I recall President Kennedy's remark after the Bay of Pigs disaster: "Success has many fathers; failure is an orphan." Well, we will see a parade of fathers. In fact, we may – just may – already be seeing the pendulum start to swing. The IRA may be coming to the realization that it does not want the terrorist label. Yassir Arafat's Palestinian Authority has recently appointed a representative who speaks openly about Israel's right to exist. Small signs, yes, and there are others at least pointing in the right direction. One thing we have learned for sure over the years is that when signs of progress toward peace start to appear, the terrorists step up their attacks. We will have to fight fiercely against terrorism even as we respond cautiously to any signs of change.

This is a two-front war. American now faces the need for Homeland Defense. For most of two centuries, we in the United States have not had to concern ourselves with this. But now we must, The Congress has passed a comprehensive anti-terrorism bill that will give us some tools to deal with the threat. This effort will be monitored with great care to ensure that as we safeguard the American people, we also continue to safeguard their constitutional rights.

The President has created an office for Homeland Defense and persuaded an outstanding man, Pennsylvania's Governor Tom Ridge, to take charge. He will have to make his way through the classic bureaucratic thickets to find the key decision points that will make him effective. He will find, I believe, that we are better prepared than we think we are.

Talented and experienced people **have** worked on this problem, sometimes **in** formal commissions, **sometimes** as individuals or as **self-motivated** groups. **They** have thought about structure. They have thought about threats. They have thought about **responses**. **Our country is full of immense talent**. For **example**, between university laboratories, medical **practitioners**, and the pharmaceutical industry, we can assemble **the talent** needed to help think through **and develop means to deal with biological threats**. The threats **are all too real and sobering**. **Understandable** fear will give way, however, to candor and **hard professional work**. **Action will speak louder than words**.

I have a suggestion to allow quick recruitment of talent to take on urgent bursts of work: create an Emergency Service Corps as **a vehicle to** put people to work for **short** periods without the endless **clearance process** in place for regular appointments. Our Director of Homeland Defense needs **the** ability to reach out into that vast pool of talent that **fuels** our creative and dynamic economy and put **the best people, whether in government** or out, to work on the job.

Let's look at **the** economic side. What has this attack done to us? The most serious and tragic loss by far is that of human lives. We mourn many victims and we **honor many** heroes. On **a material scale**, infrastructure **has been damaged in New York** and Washington. There is **cleaning** up to **be** done, building to be done. We are awakened **to the fact** that our **armed forces** must be strengthened, so **defense expenditures** will increase. Federal expenditures must also go to **harden** potential **targets and put in place better** defenses **against** biological and **chemical** attacks and additional support **for medical**

research on prevention, control and cures. So there is no need to invent ways to **spend** money. We need to spend on the things that **are** worthwhile **and** there are **plenty** of them.

Meantime, with an economy having come down sharply from a speculative boom, a number **of** quick steps had already been taken to loosen **monetary policy**- **After** September 11, **Alan Greenspan** and his colleagues in the Federal Reserve immediately **injected** into the system **massive** liquidity – massive liquidity – on a scale **beyond** what has **ever been done** in such a **short time**. And **history** shows that **monetary policy** works. **But effectiveness** will depend on **how well we** deal with uncertainty.

Because the second big thing that happened to the U.S. economy as a **result** of these attacks is the **creation of uncertainty**, a concern about our vulnerability. **As financial** people, students of economics, **business** people, we understand about risk: how to discount, how to hedge. We work with the idea of risk all the time as we make investments. You face choices: risky, big gain, **maybe**; less risky, less **gain**. Uncertainty, **however, is something** else. Uncertainty is disturbing in a way very **different** from risk. So a big **part of restoring** economic growth will stem from the **actions that our government** is taking to **give a sense** that we are getting hold of the threats at home and that our **war** effort abroad is in **powerful** motion. In this way, we will reduce **uncertainty** and replace it with confidence **that** we are going to be OK. Again, actions **will speak much louder than** words. We have work to do, but we are getting there. **A good** job on homeland **security is a crucial ingredient for return to a healthy** economy.

Accountability for Terrorism

The President has declared war on terrorists **and the** states that harbor them. No place to hide. This idea underlines the importance **of the sovereign** nation state, an entity with the capacity **to** govern and therefore to be **responsible for** what **takes** place within its borders. That is one reason for **the** emphasis on helping **countries** – Afghanistan right **now** – learn to **create** for **themselves** a stable **government, remembering their history,** developing their own pattern of representation, and giving hope to people **that the** future can be better than **the past**. But we must remember **that,** when a state ceases to function, chaos is **given** license.

But **the** war to hold terrorists accountable **for** their **evil acts** and to hold states accountable for acts of terror **that** originate **within** their borders, compels us to look closely at the foundation of order and **progress** in the world.

We **live** in an international **system of** states, a **system** that originated **over** three hundred years **ago**. The idea of the **state** won out over other ideas about how to organize political life because the **state gave people a sense of identity,** because it **provided a framework** for individual freedom and economic **progress, and** because states **over time** proved able to cooperate **with each** other **for peace and** mutual **benefit**.

The state has **made** its way **in** the world by beating back **one** challenge **after** another. **In the nineteenth** century, the idea of nationalism tried to **take** over the state and **turn it into an** instrument **of aggressive** power.

In the twentieth century, communism **in** Russia created a monstrous totalitarian **tyranny**.

The Nazis took power in **a state, convinced they** could transform **it** into a “Thousand-Year Reich,” **an** empire based on pre-state **fantasies of** racial purity.

In our time, the state has been challenged by global currents that have eroded its authority. Information, money and **migrants** move across borders in ways **far beyond** the **traditional means** of state control. Non-state **entities** encroach upon state **responsibilities from** below while **international** organizations draw **sovereign** state powers **from above**.

As states have **appeared weaker, terrorists have** moved **in** on **them**. Many states in response, and in the false hope of buying **time** or **protection, have** taken damaging actions **that** only further diminish their own authority and legitimacy. States in **every** part of the world **have avoided** accountability when it comes to **terrorism** and now we are paying a **heavy** price.

Some **states** have made **tacit deals with** foreign **terrorists, allowing** them **offices** in their **cities in return** for a pledge of immunity.

Some **states have tolerated, subsidized and facilitated** homegrown terrorist **groups** on **the** understanding that they will not **attempt** to overthrow national leaders, **creating a** kind of grotesque protection racket.

Some states pump out **huge** volumes of propaganda against other states, in order **to direct terrorists** within **their** borders toward external targets.

Some states, in a desperate search for legitimacy, **have invited** religions that **foster** terrorists to take **over** substantial sectors of governmental activity on condition **that some functions, like foreign affairs** and defense policy will be **left** alone.

And some states secretly, but undeniably, support terrorism directly as a matter of state policy.

Every one of these **deals** between **states and terrorists** is an abdication of **state** accountability to its citizens. **If these deals are not reversed, the states that make them** and ultimately **the international system of states** will not survive. That is **why the war on terrorism** is of unsurpassed importance.

For all the realities of globalization that have **drained authority from the state, no other** basic entity of **international life** can replace it. **The state** is all we have as a means of ordering our international existence. Other forms may challenge but none can replace it in its most important **function: the state** is the indispensable institution for achieving **representative** government and for protecting individual rights.

If we falter in **the** war on terrorism, more **and more states** will make ✓
accommodations with terrorism. Ultimately, **the** consequences **for** world peace, security, and progress will **be** catastrophic.

But if we are creative and **resolute**, more and more leaders and citizens will regard our determination as an **opportunity to** clean up and liberate their own **societies** and to **reconstitute** the principle of accountability in **their** states.

Right here, in this hall, **we sense** the **heritage of freedom** and **courage that** is ours to uphold. We have the **examples** of **Baroness Thatcher** and **President Reagan, of the** Prime Minister and President today, and of the great **leaders and valiant** people of our countries in centuries **past**.


With this inspiration, we will surely succeed.

snowflake

September 12, 2001 4:23 PM

TO: Pentagon Senior Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



461

This is worth re-reading.

Attach.

Foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

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FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a **supremely ordinary** blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, **nor a** Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung **military** and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we *were* **caught** napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was **not** our warning **that was most** at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves **that we** neglected to hedge against **the** choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not **all that** improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the **attack** hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to **confuse** the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought **improbable**; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake--one we may have come

close to repeating in **the 1950's**—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets **lost**. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, **like a** string of pearls too precious to wear, is **too** sensitive to give to **those who** need it. It includes the alarm that fails to **work**, but **also the** alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the **unafert** watchman, but also the one who knows **he'll** be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also **those that** everyone assumes somebody else **is** taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to **the occasion until** they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is **usually** too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise **may** include some measure of genuine novelty introduced **by the** enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at **the** Berlin Wall, surprise **is everything** involved in a government's (or in **an** alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book *is* a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into **the** rut in which **the** Japanese found us, it can only **remind** us how likely it is that we **are** in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not **that we shall read the** signals and indicators **with** too little skill; **the** danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few **dangers that may** be familiar rather **than** likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, **and public** discussion **all** seem **to** need to **focus** on a few **vivid** and oversimplified dangers. The planner **should** think in subtler and **more** variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This **is a genuine** dilemma of government. Some of its **consequences** are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

snowflake

September 12, 2001 4:09 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Chairman Carl Levin
Senator John Warner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Gentlemen,

Thanks so much for coming to the Pentagon yesterday. You were terrific to do it.

Attached is the foreword to the Pearl Harbor book, which I mentioned to you. I think you will find it is right on the mark.

DHR:dh
091201-6

461

12 SEP 01

U15219 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/5101

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese **moves** that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still **have** been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. **There** is a tendency in our planning to **confuse** the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we **have not considered** seriously **looks** strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake--one we **may** have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It **includes** neglect of responsibility, **but** also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is **too** sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur **to** no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward **procrastina-**tion, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion **until** they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just *in* terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only **remind** us how likely it is that we **are** in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, **inter-**service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and **more** variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, **inter-**service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

September 10, 2001 9:08 AM

334

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Jim Kimsey

Please have someone look at Jim Kimsey and see if we think he is the right person for the Policy Board.

Here is his card.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business Card

To: Jaymie Durran.

*Please wash by
Michael Beyer. TX.*

DHR:dh
091001-10



JAMES V. KIMSEY
FOUNDING CEO & CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
AMERICA ONLINE INC.

Larry

1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. NW SUITE 900 WASHINGTON, DC 20006
INTERNET: JKIMSEY@AOL.COM

(b)(6)

September 19, 2001 3:13 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Following are some concepts that I offer for consideration as elements of speeches, press briefings and talking points, internally and externally. It is always helpful if we are all working off the same sheet of music.

1. **Terrorist Attack.** The September 11th terrorist attack on the U.S. was carefully planned. There may well be more attack plans in place, and we must recognize that. It is likely that the terrorists planned not only the September 11th attack and future attacks, but that they planned how they would hide and what evidence they wished to leave behind for us to find to confuse our search. Therefore, it will take a sustained effort to root them out.
2. **Expectations.** The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as the Al-Qaida network, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. We recognize that it will take time and pressure on the countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to be successful. Therefore, the fact that the first, second, or third wave of our efforts does not produce specific people should not come as a surprise. We are patient and determined.
3. **Worldwide Support.** The legitimacy of our actions does not depend on how many countries support us. More nearly the opposite is true: the legitimacy of other countries' opinions should be judged by their attitude toward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life.
4. **Coalitions.** The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concerned about terrorism, and properly so, each country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not. Which group any country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity. We recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay their cooperation with us. That needs to be understood and accepted.

5. **Fear.** We understand that people have fears-fear for themselves, their families and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact. However, we need people's help and any information they can provide that will assist us. A number of countries are helping quietly and we appreciate that. Indeed, we ask people across the globe to provide us any information they have that can help in rooting out terrorists and their networks.
6. **Against Terrorism, Not the People.** We are after terrorists and the regimes that support them. This is not a war against the people of any country, The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to make it safe for them to do so.
7. **Not Against Islam.** This is not a war against Islam or any other religion. The Al-Qaida terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world's Muslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle.
8. **Secondary Effects.** Finally, there will be secondary effects. We recognize that as we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will have effects in a number of countries. We have to accept that, given the importance of the cause. As a result, relationships and alliances will likely be rearranged over the coming years.

DHR:dh
091901-o

snowflake

September 18, 2001 1:31 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Information

I just received this, and I think you ought to have a copy.

Thanks.

Attach.  9/16/01 ltr w/enclosure to SecDef re: Potential "Heads-Up" from the Philippines

DIR:dh
091801-13

000.5

185-epo01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

September 16, 2001

The Honorable
Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301

VIA FACSIMILE

Re: Potential "Heads-Up" from the Philippines.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

DM

*SEC DEF -
F-11. I've
forwarded to Haver and
DS-2, too. (Jacoby)
D. Pata*

Do not wish to burden you in these hours of **crisis**, however, just received **the** attached F-mail from an individual in the Philippines, which I thought should be brought to your attention, based upon events of **the last several** days.

I only know this person through E-mails: regarding manufacturing aircraft models, therefore cannot vouch for his "bona fides"!

I wish you to know that your **many friends out here on the Frontier support you**, and your **efforts** in this tragic period, in every way.

(b)(6) and I wish you and Joyce the very best, in these trying times.

Most Respectfully,

(b)(6)

P.S. P.X. Kelley tells me that he his **ready** for the discussion you suggested, at any time, at your convenience!

3 PAGES

Subj: Fw: **Project Bojinka**
Date: 09/16/2001 10:10:49 AM Mountain Daylight Time
From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6)

--- Original Message ---

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2001 8:33 PM
Subject: Project Bojinka

> (b)(6)
>
> Subject: Project Bojinka
>
> Sometime in January 1995, when Philippine Police authorities
> captured Ramsey Youssef in Manila, I was asked, because of my
> affiliation with the NBI, to help decode and decipher the hard drives
> of the computers found in Youssefs possession. This is where we
> found most of the evidence of the projects that were being funded by
> **Osama Bin Laden** in the Philippines.
>
> The first plan was to assassinate
> Pope John Paul II who was then scheduled to visit the Philippines.
>
> The second **was** Project Bojinka, which called for the hijacking of US
> bound commercial airliners from the Philippines, Korea, Thailand,
> Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore and then crash them into key
> structures in the United States. The World Trade Center, the White
> House, the Pentagon, the Transamerica Tower, and the Sears Tower were
> among prominent structures that had been identified in the plans that
> we had decoded. A dry-run was **even** conducted on a Tokyo bound
> Philippine Airlines flight, which fortunately was aborted by our
> security personnel. It was also from these computers that we found
> the plans for the first bombing of the World Trade Center in February
> 1993.
> This evidence was eventually used to convict Ramsey Youssef,
> Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan for the WTC bombing. Obviously, the
> original Project Bojinka was modified to give it more significant
> impact on the USA. By hijacking planes that originated from within
> the United States instead of Asia, they made sure that AMERICANS
> would be killed in the hijacking instead of Asians, which obviously
> would elicit a stronger reaction from the Americans. And
> transcontinental flights (East Coast to West Coast) would have more
> fuel for most of the targets which were on the East Coast. Abdul
> Hakim Murad admitted that they had been taking flying lessons in the
> Philippines for Project Bojinka. Obviously, after they were caught
> and convicted, a new set of terrorists were trained in the United
> States (Venice, Florida) for the modified Bojinka.
>
> The Philippines has been having a lot of problems lately because Osama
Bin
> Laden has
> been funding the activities of the Abu Sayyaf through his
> brother-in-law, Khalifa Janjalani. The success of these recent

> ferocious(sic) ads in the United States will embolden Commander Robot
> and Commander Sabaya, both of the Abu Sayyaf, to wreak more havoc in
> our part of the world. What is strange is that the United States
> agencies that took possession of the evidence that we gathered,
> obviously did not take Project Bojinka seriously. I would have
> thought that intelligence operatives would have analysed all the
> evidence and worked out various scenarios that could have included
> the modified Eojinka plan. If they had done so, the US would have
> been prepared for this attack.

>
> Let us thank God that many of our
> friends were spared from the horrors of the other day. I have been
> stuck in Minneapolis for the last two days after attending the
> reunion of the East Coast Fried Eagles in Washington DC. I am irritated
> that I am unable to travel but I am gratified that I am still alive
> enough to be irritated!

>
> (b)(6)

>
>
> Téléchargez MSN Explorer gratuitement à l'adresse
> <http://explorer.msn.fr/intl.asp>

>
>
> This message has been cleaned by MessageCleaner.exe v2.15
> <http://www.RoundhillSoftware.com/MessageCleaner?uORqtRo>

2001 SEP 24 12:29

snowflake

September 24, 2001 12:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: MoD Singh

[Handwritten signature]
INDIA
[Handwritten signature]
Draftnote

Here is a memo relating to Minister Singh of India. Please craft a very appreciative note to him in response to his conversation with Paul Wolfowitz. This is a very fine, impressive individual.

Thanks.

[Handwritten notes]
Expect
Paper task
this out from
C.D.
Draft

Attach.
9/22/01 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re phonecon w/MoD Singh

DHR:dh
092401-20

→ To: Peter
F. Lowry
PDASD/ISA
As discussed -
Draft for key/ Lowry
Sig nature
9/25
Larry Di Rita

24 SEP 01

R+K

30 July 2001

MEMO FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD 22 September 2001

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WOLFOWITZ

SUBJECT: Phonecon with Indian MoD Jaswant Singh 22
September 2001 (1000 EDT)

Don,

Details of my conversation with Singh next under. He was genuinely impressed by your leadership in this crisis and clearly feels that he formed a strong personal tie with you during your meeting here earlier this year.



MEMO FOR THE RECORD

22 September 2001

FROM MA DSD


SUBJECT: DSD Phonecon with Indian MoD Jaswant Singh 22 September 2001 (1000 EDT)

MAJOR POINTS:

1. MoD Singh called and wanted “to sincerely convey from one soldier and Minister to another that he was most impressed and moved” by Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership and actions during the crisis. He was particularly impressed by Secretary Rumsfeld’s remaining in the Pentagon after the attack and his movement to the impact site to help evacuate wounded.
2. The Indian government “understood the logic of what is being done” (re Pakistan). “Be assured – we are keeping our priorities straight in this matter.” “The Indian government truly appreciates what the US is doing in the fight against terrorism.”
3. India is a big democracy where people express all kinds of opinions. Singh himself has been speaking out in support of U.S. policy. After President Bush’s speech, Singh went to the press and reported that the reaction of the Indian government was that “it was extremely well received.”

Semper fi,

LtCol Davis



snowflake

TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

INFO

September 25, 2001 10:22 AM

TO: General Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Papers

Here are the two papers-the one I sent you first and then the one that memorializes our meeting with George Tenet. I would like you to feed them into the Joint Staff so they know precisely what it is I am looking for.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/19/01 SecDef memo to CJCS, 9/24/01 SecDef memo to DCI

DHR:dh
092501-5

*Alert to the CincSec before we need
input from*

334 NSC DEP

258/101

TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5118

U16194 /02

130

snowflake

October 31, 2001 12:18 PM

381

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Pete Aldridge
 John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bletchley Park

We need a Bletchley Park. Why don't we do it? We would be pleased ten years from now. It is needed.

We have the money. We have the time. We have the authority.

Why don't we pick out a big subject and get a group of brains on it, like they had at Bletchley Park.

Now is the time, We have the chance to do something really useful that will help America for 5, 10, 15 or 20 years. Let's do it.

The crash in the Internet world has dumped a whole bunch of these brilliant young people out into the marketplace. We should grab them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103101-24

.....

Please respond by _____

31 OCT 01

September 26, 2001 11:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Rohrabacher

Afghanistan

I suppose someone ought to answer this letter from Dana Rohrabacher. He handed it to me out front.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/26/01 Rohrabacher ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
092601-7

9/28

SecDef -

We've met with Rohrabacher's contacts to get the info he wanted us to have. We'll do a response to him.

Dilith

26 Sept 01

DANA ROHRBACHER

45th District, California

Committees

SCIENCE

Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee on Energy

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

VICE Chairman,
Subcommittee on
East Asia and Pacific
Subcommittee on
Middle East and South Asia



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

September 26, 2001

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

2336 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-0545

(b)(6)

DISTRICT OFFICE:

101 Main Street, Suite 360
Huntington Beach, CA 92646-9118

(b)(6)

<http://www.house.gov/rohrbacher/>

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to call your attention to the current tactical situation inside of Afghanistan. As you are aware, my National Security Advisor Al Santoli has been in daily contact with Afghan Northern Alliance Commander. The news he received this morning was troubling and demonstrates the need for me U.S. to send in ammunition and other supplies, as well as begin providing air cover for the Afghan resistance forces.

The command staff of General Dostum in the mountains 20 miles south of the strategic town of Mazar-i-Sharif near the Uzbekistan border reports that during the past 24 hours, while the resistance forces are **running** out of ammunition, the Taliban have been resupplied and are pressing a counter-attack. In addition, they are now using more jet aircraft to provide **close-air** support to their fighters on the ground.

The resistance claims the Taliban's morale is up, now that they have heard statements by officials in the Bush Administration that the goal may not be to remove the Taliban and an accommodation may be worked out.

U.S. assistance to the Northern Alliance should not be perceived "nation building." Instead, it is the Afghans who are best able to clear the **Taliban/bin Laden** forces out of the rugged mountains of Afghanistan. They will prevent American casualties. We should support a moderate government that will prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan as a base. If the United States does not assist the Northern Alliance and we leave the Taliban in power, we do so at our own peril.

Enclosed is a list of satellite telephone numbers of Northern Alliance commanders. It is imperative that our military people get in touch with them ASAP.

Sincerely,

Dana Rohrabacher
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/OSD/5121

snowflake

October 10, 2001 12:23 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: QDR

Attached is the QDR. I am delighted the President got you interested!

Thanks.

Attach.
2001 QDR

DHR:dh
101001-10

310.1

10 OCT 01

snowflake

October 15, 2001 11:47 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rock Formation

Here is an e-mail from Richard Perle about the rock formation behind bin Laden.
Someone thinks they recognize it.

Just a thought, my **friend**.

Attach.
10/12/01 e-mail

DHR:dh
101501-32

Afghanistan

15 OCT 01

U17318 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/5124

Richard Perle

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2001 4:43 PM
To: Richard N Perle
Subject: Targets
importance: High

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2001

Richard,

(b)(6) is an academic and specialist on Afghanistan's gems and minerals. She has traveled extensively there.

When she saw the video and pictures of Bin Laden she recognized the types of rock formations behind him.

The letter to me (below) explains her initial evaluation. She will have more information soon.

While it is true that Bin Laden moves around a lot, the fact that she would put the video scene southwest of Kabul seems to me very important. In the context of the current strikes against the Al Quaida and Taliban, this information may help our "targeteers" do a better job.

As soon as I get even more specific information (informally I may be able to pin it down to the very cave), I will give that information to you.

Can you get this info into the right hands as soon as possible?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 12, 2001 10:54 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

(b)(6) suggested that I write to you regarding my ideas on the possible location of Bin Laden.

I have trekked over Afghanistan many times, documenting gems and mineral deposits for my book, Gemstones of Afghanistan. As a result of this extensive work, I have intimate knowledge of the country especially the northeastern part which has been held by the Northern Alliance. However, my research has also

taken me to the mineral deposits of Central Afghanistan, the Kundar Urgan, **Helmand**, Tirpul and Karakum Basins. In this book I documented 1,407 coordinates of occurrences of gems and minerals in the country, including solid combustible minerals, metallic and non-metallic minerals, rare metals, radioactive elements, precious metals and gemstones, salt and industrial minerals,

I have attached the photos I am referring to to this **email**. The formations in the background appear to be metamorphic and Afghanistan has one of the largest pegmatite fields in the world. I would guess that this is in the province of Oruzgan, south west of Kabul. I am expecting more information from my guide, and will get back to you shortly if I have any more information.

My contacts in Afghanistan and Pakistan also told me on October 10 that rumors in Islamabad and Peshawar are that Musharraf had been removed. There was a hurriedly called meeting of the cabinet and many generals were removed or sent packing. All the religious parties have called for a collective strike on 16th Oct.

(b)(6)

SECRET

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action: _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I)



SUBJECT: Spectrum

In response to your memo, we have made significant progress in protecting DoD's spectrum.

- Third generation (3G) wireless
 - A major portion of the DoD band, 1770- 1850 MHz is out of consideration at the 2004 3G auction.
 - The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), NSC, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have agreed that the viability assessment plan will only cover the 1710- 1770 MHz band. (1755- 1770 MHz portion is exclusive Federal government spectrum crucial to DoD operations, while the 1710-1755 MHz is commercial spectrum given to the FCC, except for 16 protected sites.)
 - I believe the assessment will show we cannot move or share until 20 15, which will force a confrontation with the FCC. In such a case, if they override us, we will insist, as the law states, that we be allocated comparable spectrum and time to transition.
- Ultra wideband (UWB)
 - This is a spectrum interference issue that I would hope will be rejected by the FCC. We are participating in the debate to show that interference is unacceptable in our bands. Here is a case where if the FCC is going to allow such interference, we should insist it be only available to DoD.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: CAPT Hanson, C3I, (b)(6)

snowflake

October 15, 2001 1:20 PM

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Spectrum

How are we doing on spectrum? I sure hope we don't lose it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-37

11-L-0559/OSD/5128

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2004 OCT 16 11:40:00

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action: _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I) *ASD(C3I) 2*

SUBJECT: Spectrum

In response to your memo, we have made significant progress in protecting DoD's spectrum.

- Third generation (3G) wireless
 - A major portion of the DoD band, 1770-1850 MHz is out of consideration for the 2004 3G auction (the DoD band covers 1755-1850 MHz).
 - We, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, National Security Council, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are conducting a viability assessment plan to determine whether a portion of the band can be shared or made available to 3G applications, provided comparable spectrum is identified for incumbent Federal systems.
 - All parties have agreed that the viability assessment plan will only cover the 1710-1770 MHz band. (1755-1770 MHz portion is exclusive Federal government spectrum crucial to DoD operations, while the 1710-1755 MHz is commercial spectrum given to the FCC, except for 16 protected sites.)
 - I believe the assessment will show we cannot move or share the 1755-1770 MHz portion of the band until 2015, which will force a confrontation with FCC. In such a case, if they override us, we will insist, as the law states, that we be allocated comparable spectrum and time to transition.
- Ultra wideband (UWB)
 - UWB applications will overlap with restricted government spectrum, potentially causing harmful interference in the global positioning system band. This is a spectrum interference issue I hope will be rejected by FCC. We are participating in the debate to show that interference is unacceptable in our bands. Here is a case where if the FCC allows such interference, we should insist that the application of UWB be available only to DoD.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: CAPT Hanson, C3I, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/5129

U17486 / 01

17 OCT 2001

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET 10/17
2001 OCT 17 11 45 A
10/17

*10 Stenbit
FM D. Hanson*

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action: _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I) *JP 4*

SUBJECT: Spectrum

AWAITING ORIGINALS

In response to your memo, we have made significant progress in protecting DoD's spectrum.

• Third generation (3G) wireless

- A major portion of the DoD band, 1770-1850 MHz is out of consideration at the 2004 3G auction.
- The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), NSC, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ~~has~~ agreed that the viability assessment plan will only cover the 1710-1770 MHz band. (1755-1770 MHz portion is exclusive Federal government spectrum crucial to DoD operations, while the 1710-1755 MHz is commercial spectrum given to the FCC, except for 16 protected sites.)
- I believe the assessment will show we cannot move or share until 2015, which will force a confrontation with the FCC. In such a case, if they override us, we will insist, as the law states, that we be allocated comparable spectrum and time to transition.

Are conducting a viability assessment plan to determine if all points have

What is the plan?

• Ultra wideband (UWB)

- This is a spectrum interference issue that I would hope will be rejected by the FCC. We are participating in the debate to show that interference is unacceptable in our bands. Here is a case where if the FCC is going to allow such interference, we should insist it be only available to DoD.

Clarify: Is this the 55-70 07 70-1850? Clarify

COORDINATION: None

The DoD band covers 1755-1850 MHz.

Prepared by: CAPT Hanson, C3I, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/5130

U17411 / 01

(D.D)

snowflake

October **15, 2001 1:20** PM

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Spectrum

How are we doing on spectrum? I sure hope we don't **lose it**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-37

11-L-0559/OSD/5131

INFO MEMO

October 18, 2001, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Costs of Campaign OCT 22 2001

- The current estimate for Operation Enduring Freedom is approximately \$15 billion.
 - This includes an estimate of \$2.3 billion for "known" deployments (through October 10, 2001) for 1 year (deployment/redeployment costs, \$1.2 billion; sustainment costs, \$1.1 billion).
 - It includes an estimate of \$0.2 billion to airdrop DoD's entire stockpile of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs). However, there is potential for additional humanitarian missions to include: set up of refugee camps in Pakistan, strategic/tactical airlift, or protection for humanitarian convoys.
 - Also included is an estimate for critical programs that are not specifically addressed in deployment orders, but are essential to the campaign. These include costs for command and control, information operations, depot maintenance, spares, munitions, and offensive counterterrorism plus an estimate for increased operations beyond the current level.
- The costs for Operation Enduring Freedom will be paid from current supplemental funds, allied contributions, or included in any future supplemental.
- Attached is a summary of preliminary requirements totaling \$68 billion for DoD to combat terrorism worldwide. The Office of Management and Budget intends to provide DoD with \$21 billion of the current \$40 billion supplemental. The remaining \$47 billion of deferred requirements will be reviewed during the upcoming Program/Budget Review for possible inclusion in a future FY 2002 combating terrorism supplemental or the FY 2003 budget.
- We will continue to work ^{closely!!} with the Joint Staff to cost deployment orders and provide periodic updates to you. ^

COORDINATION: See attached.

Attachment

As stated

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)
11-L-0559/OSD/5132

U17682 /01

~~DRAFT - CLOSE HOLD~~
PREDECISIONAL - FOR CONSIDERATION ONLY
SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

	<u>Total Ramt</u>	<u>First Release</u>	<u>Second Release</u>	<u>Future Supp</u>	<u>Total Supp</u>	<u>A r m v</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DW</u>	<u>Defer</u>
1. Increased Situational Awareness	16,680	1,152	124	4,996	6,272	442	530	3,109	2,191	10,408
2. Enhanced Force Protection	10,447	522	218	1,630	2,370	673	820	572	305	8,077
3. Improved Command & Control	7,074	140	325	1,071	1,536	303	237	339	657	5,538
4. Increased Worldwide Posture	16,718	196	644	6,038	6,878	370	282	143	6,083	9,840
5. Offensive Counterterrorism	7,665	37	215	1,752	2,004	43	1,091	440	430	5,661
6. Procurement	4,753	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,753
7. Initial Crisis Response	1,506	301	217	225	743	52	62	51	578	763
8. Pentagon Repair / Upgrade	1,510	100	-	1,155	1,255	108	47	-	1,100	255
9. Other Requirements	1,219	100	-	5	105	-	-	-	105	1,114
Total DoD	67,572	2,548	1,743	16,872	21,163	1,991	3,069	4,654	11,449	46,409
10. Airport Security	204	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	204
Percentage of Total Supp						9%	15%	22%	54%	

October 10, 2001 8:41 AM

TO: Dov **Zakheim**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld⁷₃
SUBJECT: Costs of Campaign

At some point we are going to have to figure out what all this is costing us and how we are going to pay for it. We need to determine how it will affect other things and what we need to do in advance so we don't get stuck in a hole.

Please think it through, talk to Paul and come back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101001-8

Coordination Page

Acting Division Chief, Program & Budget
Analysis Division, J-S

Captain D. Brisel

Oct.17, 2001

snowflake

October 23, 2001 8:14 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Bahrain

We met with Prince Abdullah, Crown Prince of Bahrain, yesterday. Among other things, he pointed out that he had offered the U.S. a location for your headquarters in the event you were to move. I did not ask if he meant permanently or temporarily. I am sure you are aware of this, but in case you were not, I thought you would want to know it.

He also made a number of the comments on the attached sheet, which are things we ought to be using.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 0/23/01 SecDef notes on mtg w/Prince Abdullah

DHR:dh
102301-7

BAHRAIN

2300701

11-L-0559/OSD/5136

U17800 /01

~~snoflake~~

October 23, 2001 7:28 AM

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prince Abdullah, Crown Prince of Bahrain

He recommends we get some experts from Harvard to come down and talk about Islam.

Specifically, he pointed out in answer to my question about Ramadan, the terrorists won't stop because of Ramadan.

The Iran-Iraq war was fought through Ramadan for years.

If one is at war, you are absolved of the requirements of Ramadan. Islam allows a war to continue during Ramadan.

He said these people and bin Laden have hijacked Islam.

We should talk about the number of Muslims who died in the World Trade Center.

Only states can declare a jihad, and Taliban is not a state nor is Usama bin Laden.

The Afghan people are hostages to Taliban.

Bin Laden and his crowd have broken many of the laws of Islam.

The Muslim world was always the most tolerant. It protected Jews and Christians.

He said females cannot see a male doctor under the Taliban rules, and they cannot go to school. That means there will be no doctors for females.

DHR:dh
102301-6

11-L-0559/OSD/5137

snowflake

September 27, 2001 7:58 AM

452B

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

Please get this letter from (b)(6) answered. I have kept the paper to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/10/01 (b)(6) letter

DHR:dh
092701-3

Exec Sec => SWT

9/23

To SWT-

Please draft response.

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

27SEP01

(b)(6)

September 10, 2001

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have met, the last time when my wife and I were guests of Harold Brown at a Rand Director's dinner, but we have had little personal contact. Anecdotically, with the recommendations of Albert Wohlstetter and Andy Marshall, I hired Jim Roche to head the Northrop Analysis Center, when you also were considering him. And, my wife and I had your seats at the Gala during President Reagan's first Inaugural when you were unable to attend (thank you). Tom Korologos was able to work through the chaotic reservation situation.

To give you a feeling for my background, with the exception of the years spent at the University of California at Berkeley receiving my PhD in Nuclear Physics, I have been involved in defense related activities since I was an Army First Lieutenant during World War II. I have had technical and management roles at Boeing and Northrop, served as a Director on the board of three Defense Companies, and chaired or served on Task Forces of the Defense Science Board for the last thirty years. I also have and continue to serve on advisory panels for the National Laboratories. And, most importantly to me, I served during the second Reagan Administration as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

I only present my background since it is the foundation for my enclosed commentary "Beyond Mad: Toward a Seamless Deterrent". I hope you will find the paper useful. I believe that it is consistent with the statements made by both you and President Bush and expresses the issue of deterrent in an important way. It strongly supports the purchase of additional B-2C bombers.

11-L-0559/OSD/5139

Many of us are totally supportive of this Administration's position that a major change is required in our military services if we are to be prepared for future threats - so different from that of the Cold War. At the same time those of us with Washington experience recognize the difficult task you face in dealing with the super sand boxes of Congress, the Military Services, and the Defense Industry. Many of these supported systems are really social welfare programs that bring jobs and votes. The real hope for the necessary change is for an increase in the Defense budget. As you know the defense budget percentage of the GDP has gone from 6% when I was USDRE in 1986 to the present 2.9%. Yet, Defense is the one governmental responsibility that only the Federal Government supports.

Recognizing that you have to deal with your share of megalomaniacs, I am somewhat embarrassed, since I'm not of that ilk, to relate the following success while I was Under Secretary. However, it makes a point that I trust will be helpful to you.

I began to develop the technical capability in Stealth at Northrop during the Sixties and continue to believe in its great importance. In that period before I left Northrop to become USDRE, I focused on the B-2 bomber and paid little attention to our efforts in the competition that resulted in the F-22 fighter. However, when I went into the Department in the late summer of 1985, I had to focus on that program since the proposals were due in about one month. I was astonished to find that the requirements for stealth were completely inadequate. Since it was clear technically that it could be a stealthy fighter, what had happened? Those in the Air Force without the necessary knowledge had had experience with the F-117 fighter that, while stealthy, had poor aerodynamic characteristics. They wanted a high performance fighter. But the B-2 bomber incorporating a new generation of stealth technology had proved that an aircraft could be both stealthy and efficient.

As a result I forced a four-month delay in the competition and changed the specifications to require a stealthy fighter. The reaction was world class. All of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Air Force castigated me. Those in the Congress with the proper access demanded an explanation, and those companies in competition with Northrop accused me of conflict of interest because of Northrop's experience with Stealth. As you know from your own experience, I had made a great financial sacrifice in coming into government and had no financial ties to that company. Only the program's classification prevented a front-page attack in the New York Times or the Washington Post.

But I held firm. No one could justify building a non-stealthy fighter when we had F-15s and F-16's. As you are well aware, the Air Force now is using the F-22's stealth as an argument against the group calling for its cancellation. (Note that from an acquisition stand point the first development contract for the F-22 was signed in 1986.) General Joe Ralston, then a colonel, can confirm my actions.

Surprisingly, when the dust had settled, I received a visit from the Vice Chief of Staff - representing the Air Force - who commended me for my action.

I bring this issue up because I believe that the Air Force is just as remiss in understanding the importance of long-range force projection and a stealthy bomber-centric force. I believe that the arguments in my paper are valid, and that the Senior Leadership and their consultants are just as incorrect as those in my time. I have known, supported, and admired Jim Roche and Larry Welch for twenty years, but they are missing the point as badly as the Air Force did sixteen years ago.

You have pointed out that major military impacts can be made with a small percentage change of the force. I fully believe that proceeding with the purchase of the B-2C will give that impact. The Navy and the Army have much to do to meet the new requirements, but the Air Force should have a major role in the deterrent force.

We have seen the last ten years pass with little effort to change our military force to meet the new requirements. It would be a tragedy for the Nation's future if the Clinton Drift were allowed to continue through this Administration.

Sincerely yours,

(b)(6)

The stealth capability of the B-2C is sometimes questioned. Drs. John Foster & Bill Perry were the original chairmen of the Red Team concerned with this issue. Dr. Foster recently has been thoroughly briefed on this subject and would be an excellent reference if you were concerned.

(b)(6)

snowflake

October 26, 2001 6:39 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
cc: *HONORABLE CONDOOLEZZA RICE*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schedule

334 USC

It isn't possible to have a 7:15 a.m. phone call, an NSC meeting and then two PC meetings in one day. That takes most of the day.

I need time with my staff. Let's try to figure out a different way to do our business.

If we are going to have an NSC meeting in the morning, I suggest we have a secure phone call for the PC, not a video teleconference at the end of the day, and skip the 7:15 a.m. phone call.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh
102501-36

U17907 /01

26 OCT 01

October 26, 2001 6:36 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
cc: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Richard Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DoD Presence at Afghan Opposition Meetings

Afghanistan

It is probably important that DoD, possibly OSD as well as the military, be represented at meetings of Afghan opposition forces. I saw that there was an event on October 24 and 25 in Peshawar and that one is scheduled for October 28 and 29 in Ankara.

Anything you can do to help see that we are connected to future meetings would be appreciated. Even if the U.S. is not invited, I think we should have people there on the margins to gather information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102601-24

26 Oct 01

August 16, 2001 11:27 AM

TO: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Honduras

I notice that there are some 565 U.S. DoD personnel deployed to Honduras for JTF Bravo.

Please have someone take a look at that and see if there is some way to reduce the size of that group.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081601-18

Honduras

15 Aug 01

SECRET

2001 OCT 31 PM 2: 21

October 15, 2001 11:16 AM

snowflake

TO: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↗
 SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

Did you ever figure out why Wald apparently arrived without getting Sultan's clearance to go in and add capability? It may not be true, but that is what Sultan told me.

We want to make sure we do things in a gracious way with everybody, but particularly with the Saudis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 101501-27

Saudi Arabia

15 Oct 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5146

U18038^W/01

01 OCT 16 09 59 A

10/26/01
10:00

October 25, 2001 12:50 PM

snowflake

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Disposition of Anthrax

Please **find** out what the United States did with **the** anthrax we had **before** we discontinued work on it back in 1969,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102501-27

.....
Please respond by 10/29

720

28 OCT 01

snowflake

TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
UMBRA

Acron
10/16/01

October 13, 2001 1:19 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Rich Haver Memo

350.09

Please take a look at this memo from Rich Haver. I would like you to come back with a proposal as to what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 O/1 0/0 1 Haver memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
101301-14

13040

UMBRA
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5148

615043-01

snowflake

July 16, 2001 7:12 PM
SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 19 2001

TO: VADM Giambastiani (VADM Holcomb on leave for 2 weeks)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Promotion to 4-Stars

210 (244)

① I don't want to sign these General Officer promotions until I know that you have seen them and the Service Secretaries have seen them and, in addition, my instinct is, in the case of the Air Force, to hold them until the new Chief of Staff sees them. ②

I don't think it is fair to fill a whole bunch of general officer appointments the week before the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force comes in. It looks like the bum's rush to me.

Let's hold them up.

I'M ANSWERING FOR STASER. 7/19
① STASER RECOMMENDS APPROVAL FOR THESE 2 ~~NOMS~~ NOMINATIONS
② SERVICE SECRETARY LETTERS OF RECOMMENDATION ARE AT RED TABS
③ I HAVE PERSONALLY TALKED WITH GEN. JUMPER AND HE AGREES WITH BOTH OF THESE ASSIGNMENTS. HE'D LIKE THEM TO PROCEED.

DHR:dh
071601-75

SECRETARY ROCHE SPENT PART OF YESTERDAY WORKING WITH GEN. JUMPER ON GEN OFFICER DETAILING FOR USAF. NO NOMINATIONS WILL COME TO YOU UNLESS THEY HAVE BOTH WORKED. V/R E.D.

11-8046 / 01
0130

11-L-035970SD/5150

snowflake

TO: Admiral G

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

8/6/12

DATE: June 9, 2001

Someone give me the information about the Ft. Levenworth Hall of Heroes and tell me how many successful people have gone through that training program who end up as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in their country.

SECDEF -

COPY OF MY PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED ANSWER IS ATTACHED. GOOD SPEECH MAT'L AS YOU'VE STATED.

350.2

Get name of country of the lowest ore

V/R Ed 8/5

DHR/azn
060901.18

9 Jun 01

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 12, 2001 7:38 PM

FROM: COL WHITMORE

SUBJECT: Information on International Hall of Fame, Fort Leavenworth and
Naval Command College, Newport, Rhode Island

- International Hall of Fame: dedicated in 1973 to recognize International Officer Graduates who have attained, through military merit, the highest positions in their nation's armed forces, or who have held an equivalent position by rank or responsibility in a multi-national military organization.

Total Inductees: 200

14: Presidents:

148: Commander/Chief of Staff of Armed Forces

38: Minister/Ambassador/Legislature:

46 are currently in leadership positions today

- Naval Command College: assist specially selected senior naval officers from other countries prepare for higher command responsibility in their own navies, and to familiarize them with United States Navy methods, practices, and doctrine. *(ARLEIGH BURKE STARTED THIS*

Total Graduates: 1400 (All foreign officer graduates since 1956)

755: Flag Officers

143: Chiefs of Service

13 are currently in leadership positions today

(COURSE)

CGSC International Hall of Fame

Codes:

P = President

C = Commander of Armed Forces/Chief of Staff, Armed Forces

M = Minister, Ambassador, Legislator

ARGENTINA

CARIDI, JOSE S. D. LTG C C/S ARGENTINE ARMY

BAHRAIN

AL-KHALIFA, HAMED GEN P EMIR (Effective MAR 99)

BELGIUM

MERTENS, GUY LTG C CHIEF KING'S MIL HOUSEHOLD

SCHOUPS, JOZEF J. LTG C CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE

BOLZVA

ARREDONDO MILLAN, GONZALO LTG C COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
BOLIVIAN ARMY

BOTSWANA

FISHER, LOUIS MATSHWENYEGO LTG C COMMANDER, BOTSWANA DEFENCE
FORCES

BRAZIL

MARTINS, WALDIR GEN C C/S BRAZILIAN ARMY

COLOMBIA

ARIAS, ARMANDO CABRALES GEN C CDR COLOMBIAN ARMY

FORERO MORENO, RAFAEL GEN C CG MILITARY FORCES

DENMARK

HELISO, HANS JESPER MG C CDR DANISH ARMY OPERATIONAL
COMMAND

SCHEIBYE, ULF MG C COMMANDING GENERAL, DANISH
HOME GUARD

FINLAND

HAGGLUND, GUSTAV GEN C CHIEF FINNISH DEF FORCES

GEORGIA

TEVZADZE Sr., David D. LTG M MINISTER OF DEFENSE

GERMANY

REINHARDT, KLAUS GEN C CDR NATO LAND FORCES CENTRAL

CGSC International Hall of Fame

EUROPE

GREECE

PARAGIOUDAKIS, MANOUSOS K. LTG C CHIEF OF HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF

GUATEMALA

LOPEZ FUENTES, HECTOR BG M AMBASSADOR

HONDURAS

CANTARERO, ARNULFO BG C CG HONDURAN NAVAL FORCE

INDONESIA

HARTONO, RADEN GEN C C/S INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMY

ITALY

PUCCI, CESARE GEN C CDR ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE

SIRACUSA, SERGIO GEN C CG, CARABINIERI CORPS (OPERATIONAL COMBINED COMMAND)

JAPAN

FUJINAWA, YUJI GEN C CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JSC)

KENYA

CHERUIYOT, A. K. ARAP LTG C CDR KENYA ARMY (Eff 6 JUL 94)

LEBANON

GHANEM, ISKANDAR MG M MINISTER OF DEFENSE

LIBERIA

WASHINGTON, GEORGE T. LTG M AMBASSADOR

MALAWI

CHIMBAYO, JOSEPH G. GEN C ARMY COMMANDER, MALAWI ARMY

MALAYSIA

HASHIM BIN HUSSEIN, Dato' Seri Md GEN C CHIEF OF MALAYSIAN ARMY

NEPAL

RANA, ARJUN NARSINGH GEN M AMBASSADOR

NORWAY

BREIDLID, OLAV MG C C/S NORWEGIAN ARMY

PAKISTAN

JEHANGIR, KARAMAT GEN C CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF

CGSC International Hall of Fame

RAHIM UDDIN KHAN <i>PERU</i>	GEN	C	CHAIRMAN JOINT C/S
ZEGARRA DELGADO, JORGE	GEN	C	CG PERUVIAN ARMY
<i>PHILIPPINES</i>			
GAZMIN, VOLTAIRE T.	LTG	C	COMMANDER OF PHILIPPINE ARMY
NAZARENO, CESAR P.	MG	L	CDR PHIL NATIONAL POLICE
SARMIENTO, RECAREDO A., II	D/GEN	C	DIR GEN PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
SORIANO, ORLANDO DE VERA	LTG	C	CG PHILIPPINE ARMY
<i>SENEGAL</i>			
CISSE, LAMINE	LTG	C	CHIEF OF STAFF, SENEGAL ARMED FORCES
<i>SPAZN</i>			
PARDO DE SANTAYANA, ALFONSO	GEN	C	CHIEF OF STAFF
<i>THAILAND</i>			
CHAVALIT YONGCHAIYUDH	GEN	M	SENATOR
PRAYUDH CHARUMANI	GEN	M	SENATOR
SURAYUD CHULANONT	GEN	C	CINC ROYAL THAI ARMY
WATANACHAI WOOTISIRI	GEN	C	SUPREME CDR ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES
<i>TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</i>			
ALFONSO, CARL A.	BG	C	CH DEF STAFF T&T DEFENCE FORCE
<i>TUNISIA</i>			
ESCHEIKH, ABELHAMID	MG	M	MIN OF YOUTH & SPORTS
<i>VENEZUELA</i>			
ALCALDE, HUMBERTO	MG	C	MINISTER OF DEFENSE
SALAZAR RODRIGUEZ, RAUL A.	MG	C	MINISTER OF DEFENSE, VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES
<i>YUGOSLAVIA</i>			
KADJEVIC, VELJKO	GEN	C	FED SECRETARY OF NAT'L DEF

Naval Command College Graduates

Chief of Naval Operations:

Denmark: RADM Tim Joergensen
Finland: VADM Esko Antero III
Ireland: COMO John Kavanagh
Israel: VADM Yedidia Ya'ari
Jordan: BGEN Hussein Ali Mahmoud Al Khasaw
Liberia: CAPT Patrick Wallace
Mexico: ADM Jose Ramon Lorenzo Franco
Portugal: ADM Nuno Goncalo Viera Matias
Singapore: RADM Lui Tuck Yew
Turkey: ADM Ilhami Erdil

Presidents:

Lebenon: BGEN Emile

snowflake

Handwritten notes: "JTS set m.t.b." with an arrow pointing to the TO field, and "Jr MTG" with an arrow pointing to the FROM field.

April 23, 2001 2:28 PM

TO: (b)(6)
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
RDML Quinn
Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Security

Handwritten note: "380.01"

We have been somewhat successful in calibrating down the amount and visibility of security in the Pentagon and around me. We have it about halfway to where I want it.

Thus far, we have been able to:

- Completely dismiss the internal security for me in the building. I now proceed through the building without one of the internal security people following me everywhere.
- Not have SFC (b)(6) meet me every morning at the front steps and salute, walk with me to see me off every evening at the front steps with a salute.
- Get Major Damiano to stop escorting me throughout the building everywhere I went. I now walk throughout the building without an escort.
- Shift my car from a Cadillac to a 4-wheel drive *SW*.

Now we need to cut it back some more. The way I want to do it is as follows:

- Unless there is a very good reason, I don't want security people to call ahead to announce when I am arriving someplace. That includes the Pentagon, a dinner party, an official event or a social engagement. I don't like the feeling of having people waiting for me out in front as though I need a welcoming committee. I am happy to fend for myself. The only time it may be appropriate is to get the White House or Blair House guards ready to open the gates, so I can get in for meetings without a long wait. I don't want it done when we arrive at the

Handwritten note: "23 Apr 01"

Pentagon. I want to see how other people coming to the Pentagon are treated. Therefore, I don't want my arrival announced to the Pentagon gate guards or to the guards at the entrances I go in. Nor do I want guards told which entrance I am going into. I want to be able to move around and get a sense of how the building works without people being on notice that the SecDef is coming.

- Second, when I am going to a social event or some event outside that is not a major official event, I do not want the cars that take or escort me to pull up to the front, park in the front or be in the front when I come out. The effect of that is that everybody else is blocked and waiting for me to arrive or come out. I don't like to feel that I am putting everyone else out. If I am going to church or some event, have the car drop me off a little away from the front door, out of people's way so we don't block everything, and then pick me up away or around the corner so my arrival or departure is not a big deal.
- Third, I want to discontinue the chase car. I need to be in communication at all times, however, I don't need a chase car. If I miss a meeting someday or we have to call for help because the car breaks down, we will do it. I consider the security and communications function to be basically a communications and location function. The reason I have people with me is not only for security but it is so that anyone who needs to get me will always have the ability to get me by telephone on a secure phone. The communications function is critical, since I need to be available to the President, the other members of the national security team and the Pentagon.
- The security function, in my view, is something that can be a part of that and is appreciated, but I think it is more of a deterrent. Anyone who really wants to get a public figure, can do it, notwithstanding how many security people he has, as long as that person is willing to be caught.

As a citizen and a taxpayer, I don't like to see a lot of money wasted on things I think are not necessary. And, as a citizen and taxpayer, I don't like to feel that when a some person is waiting for an elevator, the elevator is blocked because some so-called public servant is going to arrive in five minutes to go up or down the elevator. I don't like the feeling that, as a taxpayer or a citizen, when you want to get in or out of your car or in or out of a building that the doors are blocked or cars are blocking the way because some public servant is going to arrive or leave.

The long and the short of it is that I want things connected to me done in as low a key as possible, in as invisible a way as possible. It is important that I always have communications. It is also important that we not act like the Secretary of

Defense is so important that everybody else in this country has to wait and stand back while he arrives, departs or does his thing.

After you have thought this through, please fashion a new plan for us and come in to discuss it with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042301-5

Let's discuss - L : and your earlier
memo attached -

DR

22 MAR 01 (1500 HRS)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

THRU: RDML QUINN

SUBJECT: SECURITY FOLLOW VEHICLE (CHASE CAR)

Sir,

The security follow vehicle is employed for the following reasons:

- It serves as “eyes and ears” of your motorcade movements; they are talking to advance personnel on site, monitoring traffic chokepoints and other potential hazards and dangers
- It protects your vehicle from any reckless movements from the rear or blindside areas, intentional or otherwise
- In the event of breakdown, it would serve as your primary transport; in the event of an attack, it would serve as your emergency evacuation vehicle
- In the event of an emergency or exigent circumstance, it would provide additional manpower
- Our entire security package is geared and trained toward the presence of a follow vehicle / additional manpower as the focal point for reaction to emergencies

In deference to your desire for lower visibility, we had already taken the following measures with regards to the follow vehicle:

- Removed the overhead lightbar
- Directed less visibility on arrivals and departures from functions, particularly for private, low key events or controlled environments
- Directed a loose follow procedure with no blocking or aggressive maneuvers in order to establish a lower profile, yet able to still react to an emergency

We feel that further degradation of your security posture would make you a “softer” and more lucrative target to a surveillant or terrorist threat and potentially jeopardize your safety and/or that of your family.

Strongly recommend that the follow vehicle be retained for your movements within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

V/R

Rick Kisling



SIR,

I BELIEVE THIS IS ONE
OF THOSE THINGS YOU ARE
GOING TO HAVE TO LIVE WITH.
IT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO. IN THE...

11-L-0559/OSD/5160

snowflake

April 20, 2001 6:44 PM

TO: RADM Quigley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Talking Points

I would get these talking points on surveillance and reconnaissance over to the State Department, the National Security Council and Ari Fleischer, in addition to your having them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
04200 1-24

350.09

✓ Done
Copy to VADM G
Done 7/18
D.H.

20 Apr 01

TALKING POINTS: SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS (SRO)

Purpose: Respond to SECDEF request to prepare talking points on value of SRO.

Suggested Talking Points:

- Surveillance and reconnaissance flights help protect the peace. They improve awareness of what other countries are doing and help contribute to regional stability through greater transparency.
- It has been a long-accepted tenet of arms control policy and international legal discussion that greater transparency leads to greater stability. Reconnaissance and surveillance assist in providing transparency.
- We gather information and monitor events in a continuing effort to reduce surprises that could threaten U.S. security interests, or the interests of our allies, friends and deployed forces.
- The U.S. needs to know if there are hostile threats to our men and women, to our servicemen and to our allies.
- We are one of the many nations that engage in SRO flights around the world. The PRC, Taiwan, Japan, and many others regularly engage in surveillance and reconnaissance flights, to help to protect the peace.
- These flights are over international waters and international airspace, and are in accord with international law.
- The U.S. has never challenged the right of other countries to engage in the same types of reconnaissance and surveillance flights in U.S. littoral waters or in international waters.
- Finally, these are not spy flights. They are not done in secret. They do not invade other nation's air space. They are overt, not covert. They are not done in dark glasses and trench coats as some in the press would have you believe – they are in the open, with “U.S. Navy” emblazoned on the aircraft and the aircraft are totally unarmed.

Countries who have Airborne Intelligence Collection Capabilities

Version 3, 2135L 8 April, 2001

The following is an unclassified list of nations who possess intelligence collection capable aircraft and conduct intelligence collection missions. The Open Skies Treaty signatories were included in this list, they are listed separately and may be duplicated in the first listing.

Nations who have Airborne Intelligence Collection Capabilities				
Australia	Algeria	Argentina	Brazil	Bulgaria
China (PRC)	Chile	Cuba	Egypt	France
Germany	India	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq
Israel	Italy	Japan	Libya	Peru
Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam	French Polynesia	New Guinea
Romania	Russia	Singapore	South Africa	South Korea
Sweden	Switzerland	Syria	Taiwan	Ukraine
United Kingdom	USA	Burma	Malaysia	New Zealand
Tonga	Pakistan	Sri Lanka		
Open Skies Treaty Signatory Countries				
Belgium	Belarus	Canada	Czech Republic	Denmark
France	Georgia	Germany	Greece	Hungary
Iceland	Ireland	Italy	Kyrgyzstan	Luxembourg
The Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Romania
Russia	Slovak Republic	Spain	Turkey	Ukraine
United Kingdom	USA			

April 19, 2001 10:18 AM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Foreign Views

DR

For every meeting I have with a foreigner from now on, I would like a report as to where they stood on the Chinese taking our airplane and our crew and what their government said on the matter at that time. I may wish to bring that subject up in my meetings.

]

China

I like to know who our friends are, and friends are those who stand up when you need it.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/18/01 *Washington Post* op-ed, "With Friends Like These . . ."

DHR:dh
041901-3

*Done. / every foreigner
brief*

19 Apr 01

Washington Post
April 18, 2001
Pg. 21

With Friends Like These. . .

Where were our Asian allies during the China standoff?

By Ted Galen Carpenter

Critics of the Bush administration's diplomatic compromise with China over the spy plane incident worry that Washington conveyed weakness and damaged its credibility with East Asian friends and allies. But if anything, it is the credibility of those countries as friends and allies that has been damaged, given the statements and actions of East Asian leaders in response to the crisis.

Vocal support for the U.S. position was notably absent. Even Washington's treaty allies in the region -- including Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines -- declined to say that a U.S. apology to Beijing was unwarranted. Only Singapore's elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew unequivocally supported the U.S. position.

Japan's tepid, ambiguous stance epitomized the reaction of America's so-called friends and allies. Kazuhiko Koshikawa, a spokesman for Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, said, "We strongly hope this case will be settled in an appropriate and acceptable manner." Beijing could take as much comfort as Washington from such a comment.

This is not the first time America's East Asian allies have abandoned the United States in the midst of a crisis. Indeed, that sort of behavior has become a pattern. The motto of the East Asian governments appears to be that they will always stand behind the United States -- about as far behind as they can get.

Their behavior in this episode is disturbingly reminiscent of their actions during the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait. As China conducted provocative missile tests in the strait, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan. The reactions of the allies were most revealing. South Korea and the Philippines emphasized that their mutual security treaties with the United States did not cover contingencies involving Taiwan. Other countries contented themselves with the banal response of urging restraint on both sides. Japan went no further than to express "understanding" of the reasons for the naval deployment.

The incidents underscore a potentially dangerous flaw in U.S. East Asia strategy. Throughout the Cold War, Washington could operate with confidence that its security clients would not form close economic ties with America's strategic adversaries. In other words, there would be no serious tension between the economic interests of those allies and their security relationship with the United States.

The situation today is much more ambiguous. A chilly relationship (to say nothing of an armed confrontation) between the United States and China would put the East Asian countries in a difficult position. Most of them have extensive investments in China and maintain lucrative trade ties.

That accounts for their repeated ambivalence. In essence, the East Asian allies seek the best of both worlds. They view the United States as an insurance policy to protect them from Chinese aggression or intimidation, if that problem should arise. But they don't want to incur Beijing's wrath -- or even jeopardize



their commerce with China -- by endorsing a hard-line U.S. policy on any issue.

That may be a smart (albeit cynical) strategy for them, but it puts the United States in a most unappealing position. As East Asia's protector, the United States might find itself involved someday in a perilous military confrontation with China over Taiwan or some other issue. Even worse, it might have to wage the ensuing struggle virtually alone. American leaders would be wise to rethink a strategy that puts all the burdens and obligations for East Asia's security on the United States while the countries that benefit from U.S. protection seem inclined to stand on the sidelines whenever a crisis erupts.

The writer is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

March 2, 2001 11:56 AM

To RvdL
Mose
DR



TO: The Honorable Rudy de Leon
CC: De. WOLFOWITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Would you pull -together a proposal for the Department to go to Congress to ask for the elimination of all of these reports that neither Congress nor the Department benefit from? This memo suggests there are at least 86 reports that are of no value to either the Department or Congress.

Let's also suggest that in the future they consider putting in a sunset provision whenever a report is required, so that if it the sunset is one, three or five years,

This will at least get something started. Then we will do a more careful review after that.

Before we send up the list of reports, somebody ought to check it to make sure we still agree with the list.

If you have a better suggestion, let me know what it is. Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
030201-8

File

032

2 Mar 01



SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 2 2001



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY *SC 2/28*

FROM PAUL GEBHART *PG 2/27*

SUBJECT: Congressional reporting requirements

This memorandum responds to your request (Tab A) for someone to look into the many Congressionally mandated reports in 2001. You asked:

1. What does all this cost?

- Congress currently requires 374 recurring reports from the Department. Some of these reports are quite long, such as the Annual Report, and other requirements can be satisfied with one-page notifications. In 1999, the Department reviewed all the reports required and estimated the cost for a sample of 45 reports. Extrapolating from this data, we estimate that the cost for completing all 374 reports is approximately \$12 m each year.

2. Which Committees are requiring these reports?

- The vast majority of the reports are requested by the Authorizing Committees either in legislation or more often through committee reports. The Appropriators request some reports and a few requirements flow from the Intelligence Committees.

3. Which Individuals are requesting the reports?

- We have not been able to do a legislative history on each of the reports.

4. Are there some of the reports that can be reasonably eliminated completely?

- Yes. In 1999, the Department reviewed the 374 reports then required by Congress and determined that 168 were of no value to the Department. Department officials assessed that 105 reports were of no value to the Congress. There is an overlapping list of 86 reports that may be of no value to either the Department or the Congress. The Department estimates that these 86 reports cost approximately \$2.5 million each year to complete.



5. Are there some reports that can be combined?

- Yes, but the yield may be very low. In 1996, the Department reviewed all Congressionally mandated reports and was able to combine only two reports.

6. Is it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunset clauses on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?

- Yes, we certainly could encourage the Congress to insert sunset clauses. Currently, four of the reports have expiration dates and five have sunset clauses. This leaves 365 recurring reports, one for each day of the year.

7. Does someone have the due dates?

- At the beginning of each fiscal year, the OSD Office of Legislative Affairs informs each DoD component of the reports for which they are responsible. There is no central repository of the due dates required for all reports.

8. Is this something we should be talking to the key members of Congress about and see if we can't calm it down?

- Yes.

9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be?

- Yes, and this is already done. In many cases, the legislation specifies the Secretary of Defense as the party responsible for providing the report. In other cases, the legislation or committee report requests a report from the Department of Defense. In both cases, it is a judgement call by the Secretary as to who should sign out the report.

Discussion

Convincing Congress to repeal all or some significant portion of these recurring reports would be an important victory. In previous efforts, the Department has been able to eliminate no more than about 10% of the required reports. If immediate elimination was unacceptable to the Congressional Committees, we could press for a rule that all reporting requirements were annual. Should you want to reduce or eliminate these reporting requirements, such an effort could be made part of your reform initiatives and presented as part of a larger reform package this Spring or Summer.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 14, 2001 1:19 PM

TO: Mr. John Veroneau, Legislative Affairs

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Attached is a report that indicates the Congressional reporting requirements for 2001.

I am absolutely amazed. I have not **seen anything** like this.

I have these thoughts:

1. What does all this **cost**?
2. Which committees are requiring these reports?
3. Which individuals are requesting the reports?
4. Are there some that can be reasonably eliminated completely?
5. Are there some that can be combined?
6. **Is** it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunsets on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?
7. Does someone have the due dates?
8. Is this something we should be talking to the key members **of** Congress about and see if we **can't** calm it down?
9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be? For example, the ones for the President being reduced to me and the ones for me being reduced down to lower levels.
10. Any thoughts **from** anyone?

cc:

Dr. William Schneider

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz

Dr. Dov Zakheim

Attachment

DR:dh

020501-7

2001 NOV -1 10 7: 54 **October 31, 2001 9:38 AM**

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld_a

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

I think you ought to think about getting Newt Gingrich in as a consultant to help on the influence campaign and the culture side of this thing. He is interested, he has been involved in it and he knows some good people.

I find him very stimulating, and I think he would be a big help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103101-13

231.2

31 Oct 01

snovflake

SECRET

2001 NOV -1 AM 7: 55

October 31, 2001 9:38 AM

TO: Governor Tom Ridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

230.02

Recently, (b)(6) died. His widow, (b)(6) is a good friend of Joyce's and mine. She indicated to Joyce that she would very much like to volunteer her services to help the country.

She is smart, enormously well connected, has a lot of energy, is recently widowed and has time. (b)(6) was a Marine, and it was one of the proudest aspects of his life.

(b)(6) would like to contribute to the war effort. I know you are looking for detailees-here is one who is free, and I will vouch for her!

Regards,

P.S. My wife, Joyce, has her home phone number if you can't find it. If someone calls her to get her into your office for whatever purpose-answering phones, connecting things, organizing-you are welcome to use my name.

DHR:dh
103101-14

31 Oct 01

U18071-01

11-L-0559/OSD/5172

snowflake

SECRET

2001 NOV -1 11 7: 52

October 31, 2001 10:32 AM

TO: Attorney General John Ashcroft
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Justice

383.4

Joyce and I were in Florida one time walking along the beach. There is a plaque. The quotation on the plaque reads:

“On June 13, 1942, eight trained saboteurs paddled ashore on rafts from Nazi submarines in Florida and Long Island. Carrying fake IDs, explosives and \$175,000 in cash, Hitler’s agents had come on a mission: Blend into American society and blow up U.S. factories. On Long Island, four were spotted. Two defected and betrayed their comrades. FDR ordered all eight to be tried by military tribunal. On August 8, 1942, six were executed in a D.C. jail, buried in unmarked graves.”

We were standing at the spot where the saboteurs first arrived ashore in Florida. It is interesting that from the day they landed in Florida to the day they were executed, it was plus or minus 57 days.

Regards,

DHR:dh
103101-15

31 Oct 0

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 27, 2001
SUBJECT: **Taliban Treatment of Women**

Have one of your geniuses take this memo on Women and the Taliban and put it into one or two pages with bullet points with the most egregious wrongs against women, and then give me back the original memo as well.

Thanks very much.

DHR/azn
102701.01

Attach: Information Memo: Taliban's Treatment of Women

8:27 AM

Afghanistan

27 Oct 01

Philbin/Heilsnis OSD(PA)
703-697-5737

□ INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: The Taliban's Treatment of Women

Summary: There are many good independent sources of information about the mistreatment of women and girls in Afghanistan. Reports from organizations such as Amnesty International, the National Organization for Women, Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights, which are not shy about criticizing the U.S. Government on occasion, may be especially credible citations. This report also includes information from the Journal of the American Medical Association, the United Nations, and the U.S. Department of State.

1. Amnesty International and its U.S. Affiliate

Since the Taliban's takeover of most of Afghanistan, Amnesty International has prepared several reports on human rights abuses against women there. Here are three examples.

In an October 2001 "Issues Brief," Amnesty USA stated:

- "The **Taleban** imposed harsh restrictions on personal conduct and behavior to enforce its particular interpretation of Islamic law and were responsible for numerous and widespread human rights abuses, particularly against women. . . . **The Taleban's severe restrictions on women's rights constitute a policy of "gender apartheid" unlike anywhere in the world** (emphasis added); their policies deny many of the most basic and fundamental rights. Women are effectively denied education, employment, medical treatment, and **freedom** of movement. They are obligated to wear an all-enveloping "**burqa**" robe, to block their windows to prevent being seen from the street, and to be accompanied by a male relative if they appear in public. Those women deemed to have disobeyed the regime's rules, enforced by the Ministry of Preventing Vice and Fostering Virtue, are subject to **severe beating, amputation, and even death by stoning**, depending on the alleged offense. Women suffer extreme repression and effectively live under house arrest. Many are widows and unable to care for their children. **Severe depression and desperation** is rampant."

In a March 1999 Statement, the British headquarters of Amnesty International noted:

- "Tens of thousands of women **remain restricted to their homes** under **Taleban** edicts banning them from seeking employment, education or leaving home unaccompanied by a male relative. Other measures restricting women include the closure of women's hammams (public baths). Women are also barred from the streets for certain periods during the fasting month of Ramadan. These restrictions have been enforced through the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments and ill-treatment including the beating of women by **Taleban** guards in detention centres or in public places."

In January 1999, Amnesty International headquarters issued a report entitled, *Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in men's power struggles.* Among other points was this:

- **“Literacy rates are extremely low and are estimated to have dropped to as low as four percent for women. Afghanistan is ranked . . . bottom of the UN gender development index.”**

2. National Organization for Women (NOW)

A recent “Action Alert” on NOW’s web site notes:

- **Afghan women who fled the ruling Taliban’s oppressive regime comprise more than 70 percent of those in refugee camps; many are already starving. Before 1996, women were 70 percent of the school teachers, 40 percent of the doctors, 50 percent of government workers and 50 percent of the college students in Afghanistan. They were scientists, professors, of parliament and university professors.”**

Note: Another NOW “Action Alert” calls on members to contact the President and Secretary of State to ensure that women are part of any new Afghan government:

- **“We need your help to demand that the U.S. include Afghan women leaders, many living in exile or under virtual house arrest, in rebuilding a democratic government in Afghanistan. The U.S. must not lend credence to the human rights abuses suffered by Afghan women and girls by allowing members of the Taliban to participate in reconstructing the country. Afghan women leaders – not Taliban extremists – must be at the table.**

3. Human Rights Watch

FYI: Human Rights Watch started in 1978 as Helsinki Watch, to monitor the compliance of Soviet bloc countries with the human rights provisions of the landmark Helsinki Accords. In the 1980’s, Americas Watch was set up to counter the notion that human rights abuses by one side in the war in Central America were somehow more tolerable than abuses by the other side. The organization grew to cover other regions of the world, until all the “Watch” committees were united in 1988 to form Human Rights Watch.”

Here are excerpts from the organization’s 2001 Women’s Human Rights report:

- **“ . . . the Taliban administration in Afghanistan shrouded its denial of women’s rights in the rhetoric of protection but its forces raped ethnic Hazara and Tajik women with impunity . . . ”**
- **“In Afghanistan, as the twenty-year civil war continued, the Taliban, which controlled 90 percent of the country, continued to violate women’s rights with unabated severity. In addition to severe restrictions on women’s access to paid work, health care, and secondary and higher education, the U.N.’s rapporteur for Afghanistan reported that Taliban members had abducted and raped ethnic Hazara and Tajik women with impunity. Such sexual violence by the Taliban**

undermined its leaders' claim that their policies toward women were intended to protect them from violence and abuse."

4. Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)

This sober publication's August 5th, 1998, edition included an article entitled, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan*. Its "conclusion" section read as follows:

- "The current health and human rights status of women described in this report suggests that the combined effects of war-related trauma and human rights abuses by Taliban officials have had a profound effect on Afghan women's health. Moreover, support for women's human rights by Afghan women suggests that Taliban policies regarding women are incommensurate with the interests, needs, and health of Afghan women."

5. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)

FYI: Founded in 1986, this group was one of the original steering committee members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and, as such, shared the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. PHR is coordinator of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines.

In the Executive Summary of its 2001 report, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan: A Population-Based Assessment* this group stated:

- "The Taliban regime's restrictions on women's human rights represent some of the most deliberate forms of discrimination against women in recent history. They have compounded profound suffering due to more than 20 years of war, extreme poverty, periodic drought, lack of infrastructure and economic stagnation in Afghanistan."

6. United Nations

Following a November 1997 visit to Afghanistan, the UN Special adviser on Gender Issues (Angela King) noted,

- "... the situation for women and girls remained very dire. After her mission, which had spanned two weeks, Ms. King reported that Afghan women and girls were not free to enjoy even the basic human rights protected by international law."
- "Women in Afghanistan were the lowest on the UNDP gender development index, which listed 130 countries, she said. **The maternal mortality rate** in Afghanistan was **the world's second highest**, and only 4 per cent of girls in the country were literate. Women's access to health care was very limited.. ."

7. Department of State Information

An October 17th Office of Information Programs fact sheet entitled, *The Taliban's Betrayal of the Afghan People* includes the following section about abuses against women and girls:

- Taliban rule has been particularly harsh for Afghan women and girls. Taliban restrictions against women and girls are widespread, institutionally sanctioned, and systematic in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan.
 - o **Girls are formally prohibited from attending school.**
 - o **Women are prohibited**, with very few exceptions, **from working outside the home**, and are **forbidden to leave their homes** except in the company of a male relative. These restrictions are devastating for the thousands of Afghan war widows, who have reportedly been reduced to selling their possessions or begging to feed their families.
 - o The Taliban have significantly reduced women's access to health care, by decreeing that women can only be treated by women doctors.
 - o The Taliban threaten and beat women to enforce the Taliban's dress code for women.

The latest *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* for Afghanistan notes:

- "The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and girls were **subjected to rape, kidnapping, and forced marriage**. Taliban restrictions against women and girls remained widespread, institutionally sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict dress codes and prohibited women from working outside the home except in limited circumstances in the health care field and in some humanitarian assistance projects. Despite these formal restrictions, the treatment of women and girls in Taliban-controlled areas improved slightly for the second year in a row, mainly due to lack of enforcement. Although girls were prohibited formally from attending school, several organizations were able to run elementary schools and home schools with girls in attendance despite the formal prohibition. Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely accepted societal discrimination against women and girls throughout the country."

snowflake

November 2, 2001 9:03 AM

TO: Governor Tom Ridge
Homeland Security Council

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

I did not have (b)(6) address when I sent that note a couple of days ago, but her address is (b)(6)

She is first-rate. I hope you will have someone give her a call and get her in for an interview as a volunteer. You will recall her husband was (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110201-6

231.2

2 Nov 01

snowflake

11/6/01 0700
~~November 1, 2001 6:38 AM~~

TO: DIRECTOR, DIA
ASD(C3I)
DIRECTOR, NSA
cc: DCI
Director, FBI

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Sharing Threat Information

We need to share threat information based on sensitive intelligence with U.S. police and law enforcement organizations. Existing policies and procedures for sanitizing intelligence information are too cumbersome. As a result, U.S. police forces do not get the critical intelligence information that we receive.

We have to protect intelligence sources and methods, but we also have to give the law enforcement community the information they need.

Please figure out how to get this done.

DHR:dh

008.5

10 Nov 01

snowflake

TO: George Tenet
Gen. Tommy Franks
Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: November 5, 2001

SUBJECT: **Taliban Brutality**

Attached is an email I received. I don't know who (b)(6) is, but I thought it was interesting.

Thanks.

Please respond by: _____

DHR/azn
110501.30
Attach: Email dated 10/13/01

Afghanistan

5 Nov 01

(b)(6) I thought you might be interested in this, my friend (b)(6) sent it to me; he does not know (b)(6) but had received it from a friend of his. (b)(6)

(b)(6) Received 10/08/01

Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan.

I was first there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees

along the Tajik border; and in this capacity, I have traveled all along the border region between the two countries.

In 1998 and 1999, I was the (b)(6) for the U.N.'s mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country, with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this latter capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines, and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs," even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country and, because of this, I had the opportunity to travel extensively, without too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.

I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but, quite frankly, I have been a bit too popular in D.C. this past week and have not had time. (b)(6) comments were excellent, and I would like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about our "enemy."

Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live day-to-day, hand to mouth, in object conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less.

The country is exhausted and desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left—nothing, that is, except their pride.

Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs," and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our own government.

OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujahideen. Over time, this military support, along with financial support, has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is The "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces. His bodyguards protect senior Taliban leaders, and he has built a system of deep

bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

His high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher.

It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any U.S. action, were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan - defeat and dismemberment.

During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time, and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan bottle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that, no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, tiring from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done). Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujahideen fighting the Russians.

It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujahideen group, another group - supposedly on the same side - attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige. Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or overmatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all involved.

As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense, and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans. So, why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history, the only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units.

The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair generals-around November 1, most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed, and air movement will be problematic at best).

Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the U.S. has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed, after the absolutely insane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who would not risk one life in face-to-face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others of the not-so-recent past have reinforced the perception that the U.S. does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually corrupt.

Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles and their lack of external support. More importantly, though, we have to take steps not to play to their strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys.

I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second-guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.

- * First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash, so they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter.
- * Second, also with this cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord.
- * Third, I would support the Northern Alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to

undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.

* Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live, rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the infidel.

. Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports), again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace.

. Sixth, I would consider very carefully putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class, but within that culture, a man who allows a woman to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women.

* I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the near term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissures around the Taliban that were already developing.

I expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on CRL. We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do pick up the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I would never want to advocate American casualties, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will engage and destroy the enemy in close combat. As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve, and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the U.S. must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.

While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange. During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya, where similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way. Sometime during this war, I expect that we will see videos of U.S. prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to sack wholesale revenge against civilian populations and to turn this into the world wide religious war that they desperately want. This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further corroboration of this type of activity, please read Kipling.)

This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and, somewhat conversely, of compassion and character. Toward our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies, we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic.

For anyone who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner.

Thanks, (b)(6)

(b)(6) thought you might be interested in this, my friend (b)(6) sent it to me; he does not know (b)(6) but had received it from a friend of his. (b)(6)

October 12, 2001 8:47 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

You were going to get back to me with some ideas on how we could rearrange our forces so we will have fewer forces in Saudi Arabia when this is over. I would like to see the plan, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101201-7

12 Oct 01

Tab

U18304 /01



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

11-08-2001 11:21:10

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

INFO MEMO

November 8, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I) *JPS*

311

SUBJECT: Aircraft

Getting the secure voice communications, secure faxes and video to work in the various SECDEF aircraft is being addressed and these efforts have been accelerated as a part of the counter terrorism supplemental or current budget review. This is what I see our doing:

- In the immediate timeframe, several steps are being taken to upgrade the computer and communications technology on the fleet of executive aircraft.
- However, the crux of the matter seems to be getting a handle on the entire leadership fleet of 40 aircraft, and managing them as an entity to upgrade and standardize their data and voice technology. The management approach would have to include:
 - Consolidating the efforts of a wide array of executive agents,
 - Coordinating with the Air Force program offices to ensure capabilities are successfully and effectively integrated,
 - Identifying contacts in the White House, State Department and other stakeholder Agencies, and
 - Working the budget and the politics of the budget.
- Consequently, I have had conversations with your front office communications center staff and alerted my key personnel that we will move quickly on this. I would look forward to pulling such an integrated program together if so enabled.

COORDINATION: None

8 Nov 01

Prepared by: CAPT Craig Hanson, C3I (b)(6)

U18306 111

snowflake

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT: **Aircraft**

I think we have got to do something to get the secure voice communications and secure faxes in the various SecDef aircrafts so they work. It is almost always difficult to accomplish anything. Why don't you look into it and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Please respond by: _____

DHR/azn
110501.19

11-L-0559/OSD/5187

October 29, 2001 10:11 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Middle East Concerns

Middle East

Have you come up with 10 or 15 ways we can show our concern about the Middle East problem without doing in Israel?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102901-6

.....
Please respond by _____

29 Oct 01

snoflake

November 8, 2001 10:45 AM

To: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PSYOPS

*Karen Huston has
a team
CIC*

Who in the government is in charge of psychological warfare, public relations and the influence campaign?

091.412

DR:dh
110801-23

10NOV01

snoflake

November 19, 2001 12:36 PM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Freezing Accounts

000.5

Are you comfortable with the pace at which other countries are cooperating in freezing accounts? My impression is that it is a relatively small amount of money so far.

If they are not cooperating, why don't we get the State Department to do some major demarching to those countries that aren't doing what they ought to do.

The other thing we can do is start mentioning publicly that countries need to cooperate more fully, but without specifying which countries.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111901-27



Please respond by _____

19 Nov 01

snowflake

November 20, 2001 7:36 AM

TO: Honorable Colin L. Powell
Honorable Paul H. O'Neill
Honorable John D. Ashcroft
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: de Soto Article

Attached is an article by Hernando de Soto. He is a thoughtful fellow who has some thoughts on how to address the terrorism problem through legal and economic reforms.

We might want to get some people to talk with him.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 O/I 5/0 1 *New York Times*, Hernando de Soto op-ed, "The Constituency of Terror"

DHR:dh
111601-5

006.5

20 Nov 01

SECDEF HAS SEEN
NOV 20 2001

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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The New York Times

October 15, 2001, Monday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 19; Column 2; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 998 words

HEADLINE: The Constituency of Terror

BYLINE: By Hernando de Soto; Hernando de Soto is author of "The Mystery of Capital" and founder of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy in Lima, Peru.

DATELINE: LIMA, Peru

BODY:

Newspaper headlines and television anchors across the United States ask, "Who are these people who hate us so much?" We who live in the Third World and the former Soviet nations know terrorism well. The 21st century terrorists we confront are ruthless politicians with domestic ambitions. Killing innocents is but a means to an end: taking control of political power in their own countries.

But these terrorist politicians have a common problem. They are small minorities in their own countries. To take power, they need to swell their ranks, and in the developing world, the overwhelming majority of people are poor. The difficulty is that for the past 30 years the poor in most places have been more interested in becoming entrepreneurs than revolutionaries. To improve their lives, they have migrated by the millions to the cities. You can see these migrants in the streets of the Middle East or Asia, selling what they manufacture in their shanties, from carpets and books to tools and engines.

They have worked harder than most people in the West realize. In Mexico alone, according to our research, the poor today own assets worth \$315 billion, seven times the value of Pemex, the nation's oil monopoly. In Egypt, the poor control some \$245 billion of goods -- 55 times the total foreign investment made in Egypt over the last 150 years. All over the developing world, the poor are inching toward a market society.

What is a terrorist to do to divert the poor from economics to politics? He must try to create an irresistible emotional shock that focuses people on their differences with the West rather than their aspirations to resemble it.

To polarize people in this way, you do something as atrocious as possible and hope that the enemy will retaliate even more violently and indiscriminately, killing more innocent people and creating legions of refugees. The terrorist politicians hope then to sit back and wait for the poor, and those whose hearts go out to the poor, to rally around their leadership.

The recent attacks on New York and Washington are a gigantic political trap. They were intended to be a shock that would polarize the world's hundreds of millions of Muslims. But by hitting such symbols of American wealth and power, the attacks may also be perceived as attacks on a political-economic system and an attempt to polarize the poor against the bastions of democratic capitalism. If terrorist politicians are to find any significant constituency, it will have to be by appealing to material rather than spiritual needs. That is where the battle will be fought, and now, sadly, the world is ripe for such conflicts.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall 12 years ago, most enthusiasts for the free market, including the international financial institutions, assumed that the benefits would trickle down to the working poor. Instead, small entrepreneurs

11-L-0559/OSD/5192

outside the West have experienced mainly economic suffering, tumbling incomes and high anxiety. Those who favor the market had forgotten that the only way capitalism can help the poor prosper is by bringing them into the capitalist system. But that has not happened. The poor often do not have clear legal title to their assets; buildings and land cannot be used to guarantee credit. The poor in the vast majority of nations cannot yet take advantage of legal structures that are central to the production of wealth.

Yet Americans in the past century proved that they know how to counteract polarization. After World War II, General Douglas MacArthur and the new Japanese government -- inspired by the writings of Wolf Ladejinsky, who was associated with the United States Department of Agriculture, and by Japanese technocrats -- deprived the feudal-military establishment of its constituents by replacing a feudal legal system with a property-based law that protected individuals, including the poor. That change was instrumental in making Japan's phenomenal economic growth possible. America likewise helped Taiwan create a new prosperity through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction and acted similarly in South Korea.

In my native Peru, we helped undermine the Shining Path terrorist movement in the 1990's by reforming laws to make it easier for the poor to gain legal title to their homes and small businesses. In my experience, the Shining Path and similar groups elsewhere have protected peasant land claims as part of their politics -- and once the state itself protects those claims through granting clear title, the terrorists lose their political hold. This strategy was actually first used by the Prussians to rally their farmers to defeat Napoleon in the early 19th century.

To divert the poor from the siren call of terrorists, America and its allies must appeal to their entrepreneurial interests. It is not enough to appeal to the stomachs of the poor. One must appeal to their aspirations. This is, in a way, what the terrorists do. But their path leads only to destruction.

Up to now, the West's policies and economic incentives have concentrated on encouraging the rest of the world to follow good macroeconomics: to stabilize currencies, balance budgets and privatize public enterprises. The influence, power and glamor of the West are still so great that most countries have followed these prescriptions. The West did not get involved in the details; its beneficiaries have progressed (or failed) on the strength of their own imaginations and programs. It is now time for the West to create new policies that inspire governments to harness the entrepreneurial energy that is already humming among the poor and focus on development at a micro level, encouraging capitalism from below.

The long-term fight against terrorism needs to offer millions of potential warriors a formal stake in the economic system they are striving to join. Any campaign that does not drive a political and economic wedge between terrorists and the poor is likely to be short-lived.

<http://www.nytimes.com>

LOAD-DATE: October 15, 2001

snowflake

November 12, 2001 4:08 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kaplan Piece

Afg banish am

After you have read this Kaplan piece, let's talk about it someday.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/12/01 *The New Republic*, Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Ours to Lose"

DHR:dh
111201-10

.....

Please respond by _____

21 Nov 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5194

01 NOV 15 15:28

U18748 /01

SECRET

2001 NOV 26 AM 9:05

October 31, 2001 3:19 PM

1/2-1
00

snowflake

1/2-1
00

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{al}
SUBJECT: Letter from (b)(6)

Here is a letter I received from one of the people who came to that Labor meeting. Someone ought to read it, think about it and get him an answer.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/31/01 (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
103101-35

.....
Please respond by 11/5

160

31 Oct 01



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000
INFO MEMO

11 NOV 2001 17:27

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

November 28, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action: _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I) *JPS*

SUBJECT: Future Planning

- We have moved out and continue to make progress on all of the activities in our jurisdiction. Due dates and milestones are on track.
- I appreciate your offer of support and won't be shy about asking.
- Regarding aircraft communications for the National Command Authority, do you still envision **C3I** having an oversight or management role? We are standing by.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: CAPT Craig Hanson, C3I, (b)(6)

SECRET

11/27 3:00pm

November 26, 2001 5:41 PM

snowflake

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Future Planning

I looked at your future planning memo. It is good and helpful.

What do we do to get things going? What should I do to be helpful?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/5/01 ASD(C3I) memo to SecDef re: Bletchley Park

- FER COL BUCCI - REMOVE BLETCHLEY PARK MEMO AND ADD THE FUTURE PLANNING MEMO WHICH THIS ACTUALLY REFERS TO (11/29/01 0715) *CRB*

DHR:dh
112601-22

.....
Please respond by _____

*Stat > Rpt
Bletchley Park*

SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5197



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



INFO MEMO

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

July 31, 2001, 5:00 PM

For SecDef

Sir, FYI (cc: B. ...)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells *Lin Wells 7/31/01*

SUBJECT: Recent Comments on Transformation by Bill Owens and Art Cebrowski;
Background for Upcoming SECDEF Meeting

You are meeting on August 1 with Bill Owens and Art Cebrowski. Both attended a recent meeting on "Transformation and DoD," where their off-the-record comments provoked thoughtful discussion. Key points are summarized below.

- Bill Owens said DoD is talking about transformation and not doing it. He felt we could never re-capitalize the current force and bluntly assessed mismanagement across DoD as a longstanding problem. Given the information potentially available, he equated friendly-fire personnel losses to "white collar crime," and said accepting it as collateral damage was unacceptable.
- He challenged DoD to apply system-of-systems approaches and said we need to stop experimenting with jointness, and start operating jointly 365 days a year, incrementally standing up joint forces. DoD should set a three-year goal for achieving the ability to see a battlefield the size of Iraq, 24 hours a day, with 30-second latency and accuracy of 10 centimeters. He recommended managing DoD as a business with SecDef as the CEO.
- Art Cebrowski proposed reducing overlapping support functions by giving one function to each Service. He saw transformation objectives as: (1) Broadening the coverage of military forces over space and time, (2) leveraging the great advantages of American industry, and (3) responding to Information Age realities. New capabilities can be generated by changing only a small percentage of force, say 10%.
 - He cited an urgent need for new warfare analysis tools, and disagreed with Bill Owens on the adequacy of re-capitalization funds, suggesting that doing things differently could alleviate this problem. He agreed with him that the bureaucracy in management must be changed, but preferred many small organizations to a well-managed large one.

581

3
Jan 1 01

The transformation discussions were held at a session of the Highlands Forum which provides a valuable, cross-disciplinary venue for Nobel and Pulitzer Prize winners, business leaders, scientists, academics, and journalists to share their ideas with senior DoD leaders. Phil Condit and Goran Lindahl were among the other attendees.

Prepared By: Mike Yoemans, (b)(6)



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11-L-0559/OSD/5198

U19198 /01

12/10/01

snowflake

December 7, 2001 2:12 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ~~M~~
SUBJECT: Senator Voinovich

020 DAD

I briefed the Senate yesterday, and Senator Voinovich of Ohio indicated a desire to get a sense of what the Pentagon is doing on the personnel business. He has some ideas, and I think it would be a good idea if you talked to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120701-4

.....
Please respond by _____

7 Dec 01

11/24/01
snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 23, 2001

RE:

Find out who this (b)(6) is. Read this paper. I think there is something useful in there, but I am having trouble crystallizing it and digging it out. See if you can get some smart person to sit down and figure out what in here is of value, and what we might do, and get back to me no later than Tuesday.

Afghanistan

Thanks.

*One page to the point
Toni
Jarry*

*VADM Cebrowski -
I would be
very interested in
your views of the attached
article for the
Edley. Is it
relevant to the
campaign now?*

DHR/azn
112301.23

Attach: A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban - 11/5/01 (b)(6)

Respond by: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 2001

*Dislike
VADM Cebrowski
Larry Di Rita
12/13
Co Joint Staff
Turn this around with
one page summary?
Jarry
12/10
Larry Di Rita*

23 NOV 01

11-L-0559/GSD/5200 **U19423 /01**

(b)(6)

5 November 2001

A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks

An Open Letter to Family and Friends:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure **the** tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, **untrustworthy** allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seat at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.”

From Winston Churchill’s 1930 memoir, “**My** Early Life.”

Ugly Surprises

On Wednesday 24 October, a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he was “surprised” by the tenacity of the Taliban. On Friday 26 October, **the** Taliban scored an ugly surprise victory with the capture and execution of opposition figure Abdul Haq. **Haq**, an ethnic Pushtun, had infiltrated Afghanistan **from** Pakistan several days earlier in an effort to encourage other Pushtun leaders to desert the Taliban. If former National Security Advisor Bud McFarland is to be believed, and I do, this was a significant blow to the US war effort.

When we start surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda more than they are surprising us, we’ll know that we’re winning this first phase of a long war with many unknown and known fronts. **When** we see a local Afghan government capturing members of **the** Taliban and Al Qaeda, we’ll know that victory is close at hand. As mentioned in the **first** letter, we are up against a smart and ruthless foe that fully intends to win this war. Why have we yet to see large defections **from** the Taliban **in** Afghanistan? One major reason is simple and obvious: few on the ground in Afghanistan believe that the US is winning. The current diplomatic and military strategy is inadequate. A new approach is called for. This letter describes an approach that can better destabilize the Taliban and Al Qaeda by adding a necessary and unpredictable (dare I say “**non-linear**” approach) to war that quickly makes **believers** of friends and enemies alike. Let’s call it the *Hunter Network*.

11-L-0559/OSD/5201

A Great Task For A Great Nation

We need to **find** a winning blend of five elements: policy; diplomacy; intelligence; an outward focused, event driven military force; and an effective local Afghan government (not a stooge for **the Americans**). **This is** a great task – suitable **only for a great nation**.

This letter presents the Hunter Network as a candidate to achieve **that** winning blend, explaining the practical experiences and conceptual **framework** that shape it. The letter has three sections. Drawing **from** the experiences of US special envoy Robert Oakley (and some of my own), Section I explores the positive and negative lessons of the US in Somalia **from** 1992-1994. Al Qaeda has not overlooked these experiences. Lessons of Somalia help form an indispensable part of the Hunter Network strategy in Afghanistan. Section II introduces John Boyd's thoughts **about** a counter-guerrilla campaign. During **Vietnam** the US pursued an "attrition" war (whose metrics include body counts and target sets). The Viet Cong effectively countered and won by pursuing a strategy built around **guerilla** warfare. Al Qaeda has not overlooked this lesson either. Section III lays out how the US could rapidly build several forward-deployed cells -- that include diplomatic-military-Afghani members -- capable of destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda within Afghanistan, while protecting and perhaps even nurturing an effective alternative form of **Afghani government**.

I: A Hunter Network in Somalia – A Pattern for Winning and Losing

I first met US Ambassador Robert Oakley in New York City in 1995. Business Executives for National Security, **BENS**, featuring Oakley as guest speaker and I was one of four military officers addressing The Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "**America's** Role in the New World Disorder." Oakley understands the importance of military agility: the ability to rapidly and unpredictably transition back **and** forth between military mass and precision as required by events on the battlefield. Let me preface Oakley's remarks about his experiences in Somalia with my own remarks about Bosnia in 1994, which created the first element of a Hunter Network.

Using John Boyd's ideas my squadron, **VFA-81**, created an informal first generation "Hunter Cell" composed of shooters and spooks (intelligence specialists). Under **combat** conditions, these shooters and spooks improved the air-to-ground combat effectiveness of the air wing, carrier battle group, and theater air against small, elusive targets in Bosnia by several orders of magnitude. A single Hunter Cell quickly evolved a method capable of making appropriate killing decisions measured in minutes and in case, seconds as compared to the usual bureaucratic surveillance network (**BSN**) decision cycle measured in weeks, months, and in times of crisis -- incapable of rendering any decision at all. When I briefed the USAF three star in charge of theater operations, he immediately directed that we teach every US squadron in theater how to develop their own Hunter Cell, ("Bosnia, Tanks and . . . From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1994. pp. 42-45.).

While a member of the Joint Staff from 1999 to 2000, I initiated and was subsequently asked to head a Department of Defense effort tasked to develop a road map for improving U.S. combat

effectiveness in urban combat operations. This involved extensive discussions and workshops with Oakley, **US Ambassador** to Somalia between November 1992 and May 1993. Chosen as a Special Presidential Envoy by Bush the Elder in November 1992, Oakley and US Marines were intimately involved in the first phase of military intervention-offering security for humanitarian relief operations. During the second phase, a UN force replaced the Marines and Oakley too. The situation deteriorated during the second phase and completely fell apart on 3 and 4 October 1993, when 18 Army Rangers were killed and 73 other Americans were wounded. Over 500 Somalis were killed and more than a thousand were wounded as well. Clinton hastily called Oakley back into government service as a Special Presidential Envoy, returning him to Somalia in October 1993 where he successfully negotiated a truce with **Aidid**, a Somali warlord, to secure the release of captured US Ranger Michael **Durant** and a Nigerian officer.

The approach developed by Oakley and the US Marines during the first phase is useful in developing a plausible approach for progress in this war. During this phase, much of the local population welcomed the U.S. forces, viewing them as saviors for trying to help reduce the effects of a terrible famine. In Oakley's own words:

“The environment in Somalia was always tense, because the Somalis are very **xenophobic**, aggressive people. So the trick that we discovered--at least during our period--was to maximize communication **with** them. To show firmness. But at the same time . . . to demonstrate that our humanitarian programs were beneficial, that we weren't there to dictate to them, (but) to give them a certain amount of latitude. On the other hand, if they stepped out of line and challenged us militarily, then we had to hit back . . . hard, swiftly, and then immediately resume the dialogue.

We met with **Ali Mahdi** and **Aidid's** political military leadership every day for the entire time we were there. We made sure we did that even after the military incident We'd resume the dialogue and say 'Let's treat this as a passing event, not **as** the beginning of a whole sequence of escalating events.' We understood the need of this--we had a radio station, we had a newspaper [in the] Somalia **language**. These things disappeared when the UN came in and [they] didn't really understand the need to maintain the dialogue, to maintain the communications and it was slowly degenerating into hostility.”

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html>

It's worth taking time to read the entire interview with Oakley. It gives us a feel for how a combat diplomat thinks and what he can accomplish.

During the second phase in Somalia, the situation deteriorated as a UN force less familiar with the local culture replaced Oakley and the Marines. Violence on both sides escalated as US policy began to wander. A valiant US military force replaced the Marines and became **part** of a new UN force lacking the in-depth knowledge of the local culture and leadership developed by Oakley and the Marines. They found themselves increasingly adrift in a society that was growing increasingly hostile. Bullets began to fill the void left by a lack of policy and

diplomacy. One attack was particularly disastrous setting up the killing spree that occurred on 3-4 October 1993. This attack was supposed to wipe out the warlords in one quick stroke. It completely backfired and ended up killing innocents rather than the warlords. This was the final nail in the **coffin** of what had started out as a well-intentioned humanitarian mission. The local populace was now 100% hostile. The wheels came off during the battle on 3-4 October 1993 as described in Mark **Bowden's** excellent book, [Black Hawk Down](#) and the related web site:

<http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp>

Lack of heroism wasn't the problem. Lack of firepower wasn't the problem. The problem was a lack of policy, intelligence, and diplomacy while military forces were **left** in the field. A BSN approach to war began to lock up. Consumed by internal disputes and inexperience with war, national and international decision makers focused inward rather than on the enemy. America and others were **adrift** in a combat environment. So, the US military hammered away with the only tool **left** to them -- firepower. What should shake us in our boots is the Al Qaeda fingerprint in 1993 Somalia. Yes, unbeknownst to the US at the time, the nascent Al Qaeda organization was clandestinely orchestrating and escalating an uncertain and disorienting Somali combat environment.

Eight years later to the day (4 October 2001), British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Osama and Al Qaeda had been responsible for a number of terrorist outrages over the past decade, including "the attack in 1993 on US military personnel serving in Somalia – 18 US military personnel killed."

<http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2683>

Osama and Al Qaeda used Somalia as a test drive for their latest generation of **guerrilla** attacks against the US. Hardly anyone has noticed that **Al Qaeda** has used every military encounter with the US to upgrade their guerrilla attacks and to probe the US methodically in assessing America's military strengths and weaknesses throughout. Hardly anyone has noticed that **Al Qaeda** entered Somalia and opened a terrorist schoolhouse *on* how to drive the Americans, on a humanitarian mission, out of a country. To this day, Al Qaeda is the only military organization that fully appreciates the rich lessons of Somalia.

The **front** page of the 4 November 2001 *Washington Post* describes how Osama and cohorts may be planning a hasty retreat into Somalia, Malaysia, or the Philippines. The article also reports that Rumsfeld had requested that his commanders draw up plans for finding Osama should he flee Afghanistan: "Rumsfeld reviewed the commander's responses last month and rejected most of them as **narrow and** unimaginative. The concept paper submitted by the Central Command, which **oversees** US military operations in the Mideast, Central Asia, and Northeastern Africa – a territory that includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia – was among those that got negative reviews, officials said" (pp. A1, A-22).

As the senior Navy line officer attached to the Marine Corps **Warfighting** Lab in 1998, I was reminded by a highly respected combat Marine, Paddy Collins, to never forget that "terrain neutralizes technology." This lesson has-never been lost on our enemies. Make no mistake --

there are increasing indications that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are already setting up a killing school house for the Americans in **Kandahar** with every intention of **turning** it into a 21st Mogadishu for the US just as they did for **the** Russians in Grony, Chechnya.

As this letter is written, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have melted into the local Afghan population and retreated into buildings and universities. They are preparing for yet another generation and field test of guerrilla warfare against the US. They have blurred their external personal signatures and are rapidly disappearing into extremely **complex** terrain: **cultural**, religious, mountainous, and urban. A few bad fish have blended in with a school of local innocent fish confident that technology alone will not be able to distinguish them from the innocents. They hope to present us with the losing dilemma of having to kill the entire school of fish in order to save it. Only those that know how to see the blackness of Taliban hearts **will** be able to detect, identify, and target them.

There were no Afghan hijackers on 11 September. They were mostly Saudis. Yet, the US is attacking and killing Afghans. Welcome to 21st century war.

Some takeaways from the Somali experience: First and foremost, war is about people. People, not machines, win wars. 21st century war is also about populations and non-linear complexity. We instinctively understand non-linear complexity but I've witnessed multiple instances where this new science has not penetrated military thinking that seeks a methodical and predictable one plus one equals two approach to war. Instead of one plus one equaling two, one plus one can **equal** a hundred thousand or even two hundred million in non-linear complexity. In Mogadishu, a single US military attack transformed the **local** Somali population **from** neutral to hostile. In New York, DC, and aboard United Flight 93 over Pennsylvania, four attacks turned a national population **from** neutral/concerned to hostile. Does the US have any way of effectively assessing the effects on Islamic populations. Have we thought about it? A recent **DoD** request for technology was surreal -- if we can only get the right technology, we'll win this damn thing. Business-as-usual has a **powerful** inertia, which apparently prevents us from taking to heart and acting on the lessons of guerilla and urban **warfare**.

War is about making friends faster than making enemies. 21st century military actions cannot be viewed in isolation as visual information instantly reverberates through **friends** and enemies alike. **Osama** and the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been making piles of friends in the Islamic while the US efforts appear to struggle. Abdul Haq's **capture** and execution sent a clear message to potential enemies and **friends** alike: To date, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are able to detect, identify, and eliminate their mortal enemies more effectively than the US has been able to destroy their nemeses. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have sent a clear message: "This old fool Abdul **Haq** (who was 43), the late Lion of Peshawar, **thought** he could simply walk back into our country and overthrow us. The Americans were unwilling or unable to risk American lives for an **Afghan** inciting rebellion against the Taliban. Opponents of the Taliban, if you get in trouble expect the fate of Abdul Haq, when we come to kill you, expect the Americans to send an unmanned plane with **two** bombs. And even that will **arrive** too late -- as we've already got you. You're on the way to be hung." Business as usual. . .

Fortunately, it appears that the expensive lesson of Abdul Haq did in fact wake some people up. On 1 November the media reported that US Navy fighter-bombers fired on Taliban forces attempting to capture Hamid Karzai, a prominent Afghan tribal leader from the Pashtun ethnic group. This outward countering must be sustained and enlarged.

11: A Hunter Network – A Counter-Guerrilla Campaign

Like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz before him, John Boyd has recently become the most quoted and least read military genius. During the last twenty years of his life, Colonel John Boyd, USAF put his thoughts about war together in a presentation entitled “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” It consisted of over 200 briefing slides. In February 1993, Boyd spent three half days presenting his “Discourse” to the F/A-18 pilots at NAS Cecil Field, Florida. Part of this presentation included his “Patterns of Conflict” and was Boyd’s monumental look at what makes any organization competitive. Encompassing 2,500 years of the history of conflict, this briefing introduces his famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act “OODA loop” concept and is available to download on PDF format at:

http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/boyd.htm#discourse

Boyd’s thoughts about guerrilla warfare and a counter-guerrilla campaign have immediate relevance to this war as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are highly intelligent, adaptive, and lethal guerrilla networks. The Taliban hijacked the government of Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda seeks to hijack the Islamic religion. Along the way, they fully intend to drive the US into a bunker mentality and finally into a full retreat from the world scene.

In “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd made the following observations about guerrilla war: “Popular support is critical for guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Without the support of the people, the guerrillas (or counter-guerrillas) have neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security apparatus that permits them to ‘see’ into adversary operations yet ‘blinds’ the adversary to their own operations.” (See slide 109.) Boyd also sketched how to mount a counter-guerrilla campaign. Keep in mind what happened to the captured and executed Abdul Haq, while considering the following eleven points:

++ Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve the needs of the people – rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.

++ Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal, Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.

++ Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.

++ Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions **with** the outside world.

++ Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to inhibit **guerrilla** communication, coordination and movement; reduce guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.

++ Exploit presence of above teams to **build-up local** government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect people **from** the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.

++ Use special teams in a complimentary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ guerrillas own tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and **disrupt communication** with the outside world.

++ Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.

++ Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of the **people**, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

++ Break guerrillas' moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that **demonstrates moral legitimacy** and **vitality** of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize **stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action** and **cohesion** of overall effort.

(From Patterns of Conflict: Slide 108).

III: A Hunter Network-Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks

Oakley and the US Marines put together an effective forward-deployed **diplomatic-military** team in Somalia. Boyd sketched out key elements of a counter-guerrilla campaign. Coupling Oakley's practical experience with Boyd's conceptual **framework**, we have looked in detail at two of the three components needed to construct the Hunter Network strategy. The third element, touched on earlier, is the Hunter Cell. In 1996 the Association of Naval Aviation and U.S. Naval Institute awarded their Annual Naval Aviation **Article** Writing Award to "Hunters from the Sea," calling it "the best article on Naval Aviation in any publication or periodical" (COL Mike Wyly and I co-authored the article in Proceedings, December 1995, pp. 31-33). The Commandant of the Marine Corps personally supported a series of experiments at the Marine Corps **Warfighting Lab** from 1997 to 1999 designed to mature our understanding of this Hunter concept and VFA-81's Hunter Cell that improved air-to-ground effectiveness in Bosnia by **10 to 100** times. These new understandings were briefed to the Navy's Director, Air Warfare and Assistant Secretary of

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition and are summarized in: "The Carriers Pack the Airborne Cavalry," (Proceedings, August 2000, pp. 28 – 32 that I co-authored with Major Chris Yunker, USMC):

<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/promoore.htm>

See also: Spirit Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century (Major Don Vandergriff, USA ed., Presidio Press, 2001)

Thus, the lessons of Oakley and Boyd -- coupled with the detailed military understandings developed through the experiments at the Marine Corps **Warfighting** Lab -- give us the opportunity to create a unique and important Hunter Network comprised of multiple Hunter Cells. These highly evolutionary cells – diplomatic-military-Afghani – are capable of using stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity and cohesion to relentlessly attack and destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks.

A **Hunter** Network focuses outward, on the enemy. It drives events on the battlefield rather than being driven by a schedule. There is no "air" war or "ground" war. There is only one war with a simple mission – to destroy the **Taliban** and Al Qaeda networks and help establish the conditions necessary for an effective Afghan government. A Hunter Network should initially involve less than a 100 people and function as an experimental compliment to our existing military structure. It would notionally start with eight cells – one for a variety of cities in Afghanistan (perhaps **Kandahar**, Kabul, Jalalabad, **Herat**, **Mazar-I-Sharif**, **Kunduz**, **Zaranj**, Qalat). They should be forward deployed, as close to the battle and their specific cities as possible. Broad discretion and significant resources -- intelligence, military, diplomatic, financial -- should be given to each cell. A competition should be set up between the cells measuring how effective each cell is in achieving disrupting, surprising and destroying the *enemy*. Cells would combine or split as necessary to fit the situation on the battlefield. Initial measures of effectiveness should include:

++ Repeatedly surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks. Surprising an enemy involves discerning and understanding his patterns. Our enemies know our patterns and have anticipated many of our responses. It's time to return the favor.

++ **Increasing** numbers of **Taliban/Al Qaeda** defectors willing to risk their lives to achieve the mission.

++ Significantly reduced response times from the ground perspective -- measured in **seconds**-minutes rather than hours-weeks-months – capable of exploiting fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

Success – as increasingly defined by the Hunter Network – would be rewarded by a significant increase in resources.

The starting composition of each cell would consist of eleven people: 88 people total. The remaining twelve people constitute a command element. With the exception of the command cell, the age of the people in these cells should be young -- 35 years or less. The cells should

evolve based on feedback from the battlefield. The starting composition each cell could consist of:

** Two American **Afghanis** preferably from each of the **eight Afghani** cities: 16 total. Personal knowledge of Afghanistan is essential and initially may require people older than 35.

** One intelligence officer and two enlisted intelligence specialists: 24 total. (O4 or below.)

** Four Military: two officers, two enlisted: 32 total. Each officer and enlisted would form a team that would alternate with the other team-- one week in the field, one week with the cell. (O4 and E6 or below.)

** Two Foreign Service Officers: 16 total. (GS-14 or below.)

A Hunter Network: Using A Naval Culture to Destroy a Terrorist Culture

Sailors and Marines have grown up in a culture well adapted to expeditionary combat. "From the Halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli. . ." This culture has assimilated and refined the hundreds of years of experience against unpredictable foes with obscure signatures operating in fluid, chaotic environments and cultures. Naval forces – much smaller than an **Army** or **Air Force** yet significantly bigger than a Special Operations Force (~45,000) have a culture bias designed to fill in the important area between the hundreds of thousands of people on the ground in theater and a few hundred "snake eaters" on the ground (special operations).

Naval forces have also developed highly evolved methods for searching out and destroy relatively **small** enemies hiding in fluid and **highly** complex environments. Presently, our anti-submarine warfare experts have the most effective understanding of how to look for patterns of where the enemy is and is not. A Hunter Network, focused on the enemy is capable of surprising him because it discerns his patterns of behavior and then anticipates his next move. A Hunter Cell does not supplant a bureaucratic surveillance network (**BSN**) but complements it in attacking the enemy with agility, mass, and precision from every available dimension to include time, sea, air, land, diplomatic.

A Hunter Network complements and expands the capability of a bureaucratic network built upon surveillance and reaction. This BSN is fundamentally different than a Hunter Network. A BSN is designed to perform in an environment of certainty and usually lock up when **confronted** uncertainty (unexpected events). A BSN requires a significant distance from the enemy so that the BSN has sufficient time **to** react. A BSN looks exclusively for positive indicators – a missile plume, a rocket launcher – and then reacts. By definition, it is always a step behind the enemy and compensates for this with massive firepower. Instead of a bullet to an enemy's head, it blows up the entire building, levels an entire neighborhood, or even an entire **city**.

In contrast Naval culture has developed an instinctive understanding of close combat: it's too late if the CO of a submarine or a ship waits to react to an inbound torpedo. There are many cases where we can reacquaint ourselves with the rich combat lessons from naval history built upon decentralized leadership and judgment against obscure foes. Sustaining these qualities has

become difficult during a period of apparent peace and in the face of significant budgetary pressures aggressively pursuing a BSN culture. The terrorist bombing of the USS Cole has reawakened us to the need for combat force in port as well as at sea. Port calls to foreign countries bring naval forces in close contact with friends and enemies alike. Naval forces have always had a strong link to diplomats and have a significant number of people used to searching for an elusive and well-disguised enemy hiding in local cultures.

The mass of the bureaucratic surveillance network is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. The precision of a special operations force is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. **A** Hunter Network comprised of members **from** all services and Allies brings agility to our mass and precision. **Built** upon centuries of combat experience with a cultural bias towards decentralized warfare, naval forces can help a President ruthlessly and relentlessly search out **and** destroy an elusive and fanatical foe with agility, precision, and mass.

Love to all,

(b)(6)

December 13, 2001 7:39 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article on Boyce

SECDEF HAS SEEN
DEC 14 2001

Afghanistan

Please find out who wrote this piece that you say is not a correct interpretation of what Boyce said.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/01 Early Bird

DHR:dh
121301-4

Please respond by _____ *SecDef*

12/14

CTCS -

Patrick Tyler. I believe he is the State Department correspondent for the New York Times.

No action required.

D. Rita

Just wanted you to be aware of this exchange regarding the Boyce article between me & SecDef.

13 Dec 01

U19461 /01

To that end, he said, "we've indicated in principle our willingness to play a leading role in any U.N. mandated force to provide stability in Afghanistan."

Mr. Blair said time was short, yet he was unable to say whether a British-led force could deploy in Afghanistan by Dec. 22, the date the interim Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai will set itself up in Kabul and take political control of the country. The multinational force will operate independently from United States forces, which will continue their military campaign to crush the remnants of the Taliban and hunt for Osama bin Laden.

"It is obvious that any force that is going to be significant," Mr. Blair said, "will take some time to 'build out,' and therefore 'this is an issue that has to be decided relatively quickly' so such a force could deploy quickly and begin providing 'the stability that people expect.'"

Other countries that have offered to take part in the force include Germany, France, Turkey, Jordan, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

Mr. Blair said "no formal decisions have been taken yet" among the allies. And there are an "immense" number of political and logistical issues being worked out in intense discussions between London, Washington and the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Blair's comments today were the first public acknowledgment of Britain's desire to take the leading role in forming and deploying an international force. The peacekeepers could help ensure the chances for success of the interim Afghan administration by mobilizing the relief program within the country and providing security until police forces can take over.

Until this week, it seemed that Germany, too, was interested in leading such an expedition. But on Monday in Berlin, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said Germany's military was not well suited to command the planned force. Mr. Schröder said Germany had 8,000 soldiers deployed in the Balkans on peacekeeping

missions, but was still willing to take part in an Afghan force.

Mr. Blair — with strong agreement in Europe — has been the leading voice in urging the United States to move more swiftly on the aid front. But the commander of United States forces in the war zone, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, has blocked deployments of peacekeeping forces from other nations, fearing that they would confuse the battlefield.

Last month British commanders sought unsuccessfully to land British troops at Kabul's main air base to pave the way for relief efforts. A deployment by French forces holding in Uzbekistan has also been delayed while the United States focused on prosecuting the war.

Secretary Powell arrived here today just as a rare rebuke of United States policy was reverberating in the form of a speech by the top British military commander, Adm. Sir Michael Boyce.

In remarks to the Royal United Services Institute, he criticized the United States for pursuing the Afghan campaign in only one dimension. He warned that a "single-minded aim" of destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda with a "high-tech, Wild West" operation was not enough to win the "hearts and minds" campaign across the Arab world and to dry up the conflicts that are the breeding ground of terrorism.

Arab opinion will be radicalized against Washington, he said, if the United States wages war in a manner that appears disproportionate or ignores the sources of terrorism and as well as the sources of Arab grievance, most importantly the failure of the peace process to deliver statehood for the Palestinian people.

Secretary Powell declined to comment, saying he had not read Admiral Boyce's remarks.

Mr. Blair sidestepped the issue, saying, "I don't think there are any differences in terms of strategy at all."

London Financial Times
December 12, 2001

Pg. 8
12. Germany Set To Contribute Up To 1,000 Troops
By Carola Hoyos, Alexander Nicoll and Hugh Williamson

BERLIN, NEW YORK and LONDON -- Germany is ready to contribute up to 1,000 troops to an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, officials in Berlin said yesterday amid intense discussions about the force's mission and make-up.

Underlining the difficulties, Mohammad Fahim, Afghanistan's interim defence minister, said it should be limited to 1,000 troops - far fewer than being discussed in London and Washington.

In what appeared to be a setback for the peace process, Mr Fahim said Northern Alliance troops would remain in Kabul despite having promised in last week's Bonn agreement that they would be withdrawn.

The reversal threatened to complicate the arrival of the new interim government, which includes non-Northern Alliance members who had expressed significant concerns over their safety and insisted on a robust peacekeeping force at the discussions in Bonn.

Military officers from countries offering to contribute to an initial peacekeeping force are expected to meet in London on Friday to thrash out some of the issues. The force is expected to be led by Britain with contributions from France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Turkey. Representatives from the US and the UN are also likely to attend.

Potential troop contributors estimate it would take at least 4,000 troops to secure Kabul, with more expected to be added if the force expands into a longer-term operation.

Britain is set to be the leader because it has rapidly deployable headquarters troops, and because it has military officers closely bound up in the continuing US-led campaign against al-Qaeda leaders and Taliban remnants. Close liaison will be necessary because of this, and because the peacekeepers will depend

heavily on US logistical support.

Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, said the lead country would work closely with Central Command in Florida - from where the Afghan war is being run - to determine the number of troops. The aim is to have some troops in place next week in time to protect members of the interim government who take office on December 22. But British officials said much remained to be decided.

Los Angeles Times
December 12, 2001

13. Maligned B-1 Bomber Now Proving Its Worth
Military: Plane's successes in war have quieted critics in Pentagon--for now.
By Peter Pae, Times Staff Writer

No aircraft in recent history has been maligned as much as the B-1 bomber, considered an albatross by the Air Force the day it rolled off the Palmdale production line, labeled a flying Edsel of the U.S. arsenal and later derided as a relic of the Cold War.

For critics of defense spending, the B-1 became a symbol of a military industrial complex gone berserk, a massive \$28-billion boondoggle bolstered by a vast political lobbying machine that was enamored by the 60,000 jobs it created in Southern California and elsewhere.

But in an odd twist of fate, the B-1 has become the workhorse of the air campaign in Afghanistan, credited with knocking out key Taliban and Al Qaeda forces with devastating precision and helping to hasten U.S. military operations in the Central Asian country.

After more than three decades of unrelenting controversy, the B-1 is finally redeeming itself.

"It's finally getting the opportunity to prove its capabilities, which we knew it had when we built it," said Charles "Bill" Bright, who was the flight test manager for the B-1. Bright spent 15 years on the program before retiring in 1992. "It's been a pleasure to see them use it."

Who Wrote This

SECRET HAS BEEN
DECLASSIFIED
DEC 13 2004

This is a gross misrepresentation of the... They're actually...
of the...
D.D.T.

Royal United Services Institute

RUSI SPEECH

UK STRATEGIC CHOICES FOLLOWING SDR & THE 11TH

SEPTEMBER

My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen

I had intended to give you a tour d'horizon, the view from the top, and some personal thoughts, but given where we have and haven't moved to since the events of September 11th, I thought something more pertinent on that line would be in order and then return to some of the other stuff.

So, let me start by saying that the thinking behind the 1998 **Strategic Defence Review**, and the **conceptual** work that formed its basis, have been reinforced rather than, as some have suggested, **invalidated** by what has happened. **True** that expeditionary operations stretch us a lot; true that many of the enablers for SDR have been late in coming and **in** some cases are still awaited; true that we find ourselves committed to more operations than originally intended; and true that parts of the system have not yet adjusted to new approaches. I am sure that you will have your own views and that some of you may have discussed the perceived inadequacies or shortfalls at **length**, but the SDR process never could have been a "big bang" - and thinking still develops. SDR was a datum, a start point from which to progress and we have not done badly since then. - We

validated the JRRF concept (very much the jewel in the SDR crown), warts and all on exercise SAIF SAKEEA 2 - and - without pre-empting the lessons identified (or learned), I can say that we have a fairly accurate and encouraging view of just what the JRRF can achieve in expeditionary operations. Thus we now have a much clearer idea of where we will have problems, where the weaknesses in our structure and procedures may be, and where we can play to our strengths. Also, we have some ground truth on our capabilities, so we can take an essentially pragmatic view on the conceptual developments that have occurred since 1998, - and this springboard will aid us enormously as we start developing "the Next Chapter" that has been prompted by the events of 11th September. I'll talk more about this 'Next Chapter' in a moment, but as background, it would be as well to give you an idea of how current strategic thinking has been affected by the fallout from 11th September, OP VERITAS (the UK contribution), and ENDURING FREEDOM.

From the outset, the United Kingdom, in addition to diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and political contributions, has provided military support - nuclear attack submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles, tanker, reconnaissance and other support aircraft, and the use of Diego Garcia. This support has played an important role in the military operation to date. At the end of October we decided that a larger, balanced, maritime force - including an aircraft carrier (LPH configured) and amphibious forces - would remain in the region, ready to play a

part in a range of contingency operations as required. Since then, the rapidly unfolding events in Afghanistan have enabled us to place an enabling force on the ground at **Bagram** primarily to support the political process and to enable humanitarian aid, And the United States are now looking seriously at **Bagram** as an **APOD** and a major support node for future operations.

The UK deployments need to be placed against the immediate objectives set out by the government which were:

to bring UBL and AQ to justice

to prevent UBL and AQ from posing a continued terrorist threat.

to ensure Afghanistan ceases to **harbour** terrorists, or **sustain** terrorism.

following Mohammed Omar's refusal to negotiate, to bring about sufficient change of leadership to break Afghanistan's links with terrorism.

I could give you a litany of sorties flown, **TLAMs** fired and the like but, in general, I can say that we have made progress in regime change, - but work is not yet complete. One thing that has become clear is that military actions have had a

beneficial effect on the behaviour of potential sponsor states such as Yemen, Sudan and Syria.

But we should be careful, - the rapidly unfolding events on the ground that led to the fall of Masar e Sharif, Herat, Kabul, Jallalabad, **Konduz** and Kandahar give the appearance of success. Media and politicians focus on maps on the wall showing the inroads made by the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces. But the ground truth can be very much different. The riot, or counter-attack (depending on your viewpoint) at Masar e Sharif shows just how tenuous the situation is. And changing sides for advantage is a **noble** practice in Afghanistan '[there is a saying (rent not buy!)]' and simple victory over the **Taleban** is not the end-state we seek. We must continue to focus on the enemy rather than on the ground taken; and we must be doubly careful not to identify our enemy just in the human form of UBL - this is not a high tech 21st century posse in the new Wild West. The immediate enemy is AQ with its cells around the world, and its current capability. Through operations in Afghanistan we may - indeed, trust we will - disrupt and deter aq from prosecuting its medium and long-term terrorist programme; but in the short term AQ remains a fielded, **resourced**, dedicated and essentially autonomous terrorist force, quite capable of atrocity on a comparable scale to what happened at the WTC and Pentagon. And we should contemplate what might be the effect of such another attack - especially on coalition



perceptions, and heightened concerns on the most appropriate use for military force against terrorism:

Firstly, another attack could cause wobbles, playing to the - “if only we hadn’t responded militarily” lobby - in effect capitulating to terror

Or, secondly,

The desire to use greater force with less constraint, less distinction, and less **proportionality** - something that strikes at the acceptable laws of armed conflict, and exposes our strategic centre of gravity (our will) by **radicalising** the opinion of the Islamic world in **favour** of AQ.

It will not be either/or, for you can be sure that some states will wobble, and others will harden their resolve. These stances strike against the coalition’s will and cohesion - which is why the United States are considering “agile partnerships”



But it will give all countries problems - they will be forced to make strategic choices - dictated by national self-interest, rather than altruism.

So where does that leave us with Afghanistan? At the global strategic level, the world cannot afford non-states, black hole states or failed states, because such

states breed **terrorism**. Therefore we have to attack the causes, not the symptoms of terrorism. To do this, we need to isolate the terrorist by making it more attractive for his supporters to seek peace. We need to address the hearts and minds of the population, offer effective humanitarian assistance, run efficient information and support operations, gain intelligence, set the framework as we did in Kosovo, and conduct deep operations to strike the terrorist by attritional or other means. We have done much of this already, and are now moving from operations against UBL and AQ (which will still remain concurrent activity) towards a focus on restructuring and reintegrating Afghanistan - so the campaign in Afghanistan is in transition to a new phase. And this fits with the UK's wider objectives which are:

To do everything **possible** to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism.

To deter states from harbouring, supporting or acting complicity with international terrorists.

To **reintegrate** Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community.

Following the political process in Bonn, and the decision by **Brahimi** and the interim administration to start in Kabul later in December, and - **with** the undoubted requirement for further development over the next months **against** a **background** of continuing action, humanitarian assistance, and **fragile** international support, we will have to look carefully at the UK's strategic choices, **and** ways of **prosecuting** operations that we may find contradict national policy. **Both** the UK and United States wish to promote regional stability, but our perspectives of **global** and regional stability have been distorted by the focus on fighting terrorism. We have to consider whether we wish to follow the United States single minded aim to finish UBL and AQ; and / or to involve ourselves in creating the **conditions** for nation-building or **reconstruction** as well. It is clear at the moment that the United States see the precondition to a stable post conflict environment for political development as ridding the country of UBL and AQ for good. And they see national assistance for Afghanistan as a general long-term goal, rather than short term goal, but it is also clear that they **recognise** the UK's particular **strengths** in facilitating the nation building process, and increasingly **favour** our lead in that **area**. We may have to decide whether to play to the strengths of **our armed** forces (and our corresponding value to the United States) in our ability and readiness to **deploy** highly capable **forces quickly** for offensive operations; or to commit to **longer** term nation building tasks that might **reasonably** be taken on by other, less **capable**, nations - **or** both. But without being cynical, our **experience** in **Malaya** and **Northern Ireland** teaches us that concentrating on the hearts and minds side of

the campaign enables us to gain information, to isolate the terrorist and to **strike** him.

This is an approach that has proved successful in counter terrorist **campaigns** the world over - and it may be the approach that is needed now. But we cannot **dodge** the UK's strategic choices. In simple terms we have a number of things to consider:

We have to **realise** that broader operations into regions that threaten UK policy **goals** will force us to choose between unconditional support to the coalition, conditional support, and "red lines" or selective support - or indeed lack of support.

I have **already** mentioned nation building, but we have to decide whether we do that at all, whether we do that in parallel to other operations, or whether we do that instead of other operations.

We will have to face the fact that our ability to run concurrent operations will be affected. Something will have to give. And within OP VERITAS/ENDURING FREEDOM, we are constrained by ISTAR assets and availability and by the bandwidth available, so we will have to concentrate our efforts and **flex** them appropriately or risk spreading them

too thinly, and thus dissipating their effect. Quite simply, we cannot be “all seeing” all the time - we simply do not have the resources.

We will have to look at the UK's capability and contribution outside Afghanistan and the VERITAS JOA. Will we be able to consider concurrent operations, or will we be forced into sequential operations; or into backfilling for the United States, just as other nations are backfilling for us in other theatres?

We will have to consider how we use or work with established security bodies such as the UN /NATO, or the fledgling EU organisations.

Altogether, that there will be some slight difference in emphasis in the approach between the United States and UK is clear - but with a previously isolationist single super power background and a global capability, the United States has less need of consensus than we do. They are still seared by their experiences with NATO at 19 during the Kosovo conflict. Their current requirement for high tempo operations is likely to put them outside the maximum capability capacity and potential of an institution such as NATO - which was never designed for global operations. The United States, on the other hand, developed a global capability to support its policy in Western Europe and elsewhere during the Cold War.

Thus the USA's need to protect its own interests will possibly push it more towards seeking political, rather than material support **from** these **organisations**. Also, in the absence of a clear UN mandate, Article 51 has proved sufficient justification for current operations - but widening the campaign will cause problems, and is certain to **radicalise** some states, thereby reducing the number of nations who are willing to share the political risk. But we need these states and institutions to sustain the political will on a multilateral basis in order to achieve the political end state - which must be the rehabilitation of Afghanistan as an internationally acceptable nation with acceptable governance.

And what about WMD? Should we focus on WMD and active methods to reduce them? Or should we accept that there is likely to be an internationally acceptable level of WMD threat that the world can live with? - Incidentally the same goes for terrorism. Should we accept **that** this mismatch in ideals exists and that a long term pragmatic view should prevail; or is now the time to go out and do something about it? The threshold for terrorist atrocity may have changed for ever, but on the other hand, it may subside to close to its historical norm.

Whatever the choices we make, and for whatever reason, we must ensure that those **decisions** maintain our freedom of strategic choice; but we will have to

decide soon whether we make a commitment to a broader campaign (widening the war), or make a longer **term** commitment to Afghanistan. Recent military success must be capitalised upon, so it is not a question of whether we will trap our hand in the mangle; but **of which** mangle we trap it in: Mv aim, incidentally, is not to get fixed in Afghanistan, - but - if I have to address the causes of terrorism, I may have to. But the strategic risks are obvious: - a UK military footprint might broaden the pan-Islamic perception of invasion; variations in loss of consent between traditionally bellicose factions might lead to mission creep and the dangers of peace enforcement, loss of impartiality and perceived clientism; resources might be diverted from priority missions; we might have a reticent and inadequate transition by the UN, leading to an unattainable exit strategy or end state - and all of this added together resulting in inevitable strategic failure and all that that might entail.

That is just one [gloomy] set of variations on a general theme, but notwithstanding any such gloom mongers views, the British Armed Forces are still meant to be a "Force for Good", so, if we were required to trap our hands in the mangle in Afghanistan in order to facilitate the political process, what sort of mission could we consider being involved in?

Well, at the lower end of the spectrum, we could be looking at an amplified version of military close protection to the British **Office** in Kabul and the 29

delegates of the interim administration. And at the top end, we could be looking at a multi-national **stabilisation** force for Afghanistan and all that that entails. - and by that I mean we should remember that Bosnia took 65,000 troops - and we're not out of there yet!

But judging **from** the outcome of Bonn last week, the Afghans indicated that they do not want anything that looks like an occupation army, - but **they** do want enough of a military presence to reassure both the interim **administration** and their political constituency that the international community does care, and that it can help to **stabilise** the country.

I also think that any international security force that goes into Afghanistan would have to focus on Kabul, - the seat of the political process. - and provide military reassurance, which involves maintaining the peace. That requires a UN mandate, the requisite **level** of consent, and effective liaison with the involved factions. **And** given that the peace is kept, the interim administration and transitional authority could be advised on military and security matters, such as military reconstruction **and** redesign; Afghan troops could be trained in specialist skills (particularly mine awareness and clearance); and infrastructure survey prior to reconstruction could be conducted in areas where NGOs and UN agencies are unable to operate.

Much of course, would have to be considered in parallel - the scale of the deployment; its timing and duration; the logistic concerns - which are considerable; how the force might work with the coalition; and what, if anything, might need to follow on from the force.

That is all in the immediate future of course. - and very Afghanistan focussed.

But, what about the next steps at a global level? Well, if we are not to get trapped, we will have to be light on our feet, - and we will have to get used to what are now being called "agile partnerships" - in essence flexible, conditional arrangements that balance coalition needs, the common good, and national interest. We will need to plan and act concurrently across the political, diplomatic, economic, military, legal and information spectrum. We will need to re-examine what we require to achieve, develop key capabilities, and understand our strategic limits. In doing this we have to wrest the initiative back from the terrorist, - We have to negate his advantage in striking at the place and time of his choosing, by restricting his space through legislation, military action; surveillance, diplomacy and deterrence, which will also impact his timing and tempo of operations - we should bear in mind every terrorist organisation has its constituency - and an inability to prosecute its war aims reduces its appeal to its supporters. So information operations designed to support and influence are

terribly important here. Above all, what we do must be legal, or otherwise we jeopardise our legitimacy, - but we must also beware of exporting the terrorist problem. It's a bit like sitting on a partially filled waterbed. - if you bear down too heavily on one part, then another part comes up. - This has been the US experience in Colombia where successful investment in counter-terrorist activities at all levels has forced the FARC - and therefore the problem - into Mexico and Guatemala. Fleeing AQ returning to the Yemen or Palestine (amongst others) will cause similar problems.

As for the key capabilities we require - well: we could have a lengthy discussion *on* each as subjects in their own right.

But let me briefly mention some: precision guided munitions (PGMs) allow the focused application of combat power. It has been interesting to watch their use in asymmetric war, - and it is clear that the United States have learned **from** the less effective use of air power in Kosovo. At first it appeared that this essentially kinetic form of warfare was merely turning big rocks into smaller rocks. And there were all the normal targeting problems. However, the volume of kinetic **targeting** against the AQ / **Taliban** (effectively non-state actors) appears to have helped deliver strategic success in providing the Northern Alliance and opposition forces with the tactical mass required to overwhelm, or at least **turn** the **Taliban**. I acknowledge that this **really** only applies against the conventional elements of the

Taliban and AQ, but a study on the coercive effects of air power in the campaign so far will make a worthy project for those air power gurus in the audience.

Strategic communications and force projection capabilities will also be vital, - particularly strategic lift and expeditionary infrastructure. We will also have to concentrate on the establishment of secure lines of communication, basing and overflight rights. And, of course, special forces are crucial - but they are at a premium at the moment, and we will need to ascertain how best to employ them. They have great use in direct action, but there is an attrition bill in that. But what about support and influence operations? We only have to look at UK experience in Maiaya and the Dhofar to see how effective these operations can be.

Intelligence assets and the move towards the use of information in the battlespace; sensor to decision maker to shooter cycles; increasing the tempo of operations - all of these also are of vital importance and are key capabilities that we will need to expand, - but we must always bear in mind the relative tempo of the political decision making cycle and the political requirement. What is the point of delivering the illusion of victory and a 'gone to ground' Taliban / AQ, if "the peace" holds more threats?

Incidentally, I do think it is important to remember that capabilities are not just bits of kit or troops, not just PGMs, ships or battalions, but the combination of

those means, - with the ways in which to employ them to achieve the appropriate ends, plus the military, and more **importantly**, political will to use them effectively. Furthermore, those capabilities must be available, timely, and capable of integration into a particular operation.

I have spoken only broadly about the strategic considerations in the current campaign against terrorism, but I hope I've left you with the idea that we have choices to make in **all** sorts of areas. But from the UK's point of view, this has not only been dictated by what has happened since 11 September, but **also** by what else has been going on around the world, where I can assure you that. nothing has stopped - it is very much business as usual.

So, we find our armed forces are deployed on or beneath most of the world's oceans and in all continents - either on operations, exercises or in smaller training teams, in our overseas commands, in coalitions, with the UN, or by ourselves.

in addition to garrisons in FI, Cyprus, **Gib**

Row! Naw 41 combat units and support outside UK home waters today - personnel (just over 17%) (inc v-boat on permanent patrol) - 37 yrs

Of the trained army 20% deployed / 27% committed to ops

- NI: 13K / Balkans: 4.7K / SL: 400/ VERITAS.

RAF 6.6% deployed / 1 K on OP RESINATE / VERITAS/ORACLE / FI /

elsewhere.

- TTs & MMs - Nepal, Bangladesh, Bermuda & Antarctic.

UN operations: in Cyprus, Georgia, E Timor, DRC, Kuwait, Sierra Leone.

So, we are busy, even before we think about the 4500 currently committed to the Afghan campaign who will not be sitting around their Xmas trees in 2 weeks - and that's assuming no more are committed.

What can we draw from this? Well, the thinking embodied in SDR, added to our experience of these and previous operations around the world, has led us to address what we think the likely shape, form and conduct of future warfare will be, and what we think the British approach to military operations is.

At the heart of this approach, to remind you, we see our warfighting ethos (very much embodying being fit to fight), as central, and ready to be applied if the

circumstances **demand** it. In **PSOs**, for example, it is what gives the UK's armed forces the ability to establish a base of influence **from** which both they and other agencies can operate. Joint, integrated and multinational operations are the means by which the UK's full range of capabilities and attributes are brought to bear. Our armed forces **operate** together as a coherent entity to **maximise** their ability to deliver **operational** effect, and in doing this they are guided by the principles of war which are as applicable **at** the strategic level as they are at the tactical; - and also which are as **relevant** in **PSOs** as they are to warfighting. The intelligent application of the principles of war is a **fundamental** element of the **manoeuvrist** approach, which **in** turn results in commanders being allowed, and encouraged, to prosecute their objectives using methods of their own choosing **through** a flexible and pragmatic state of mind. To do this they need the necessary means. By this is meant not *only* the physical **means** - men, equipment and other tangible resources - but *also* the **conditions inherent in** mission command that are conducive to seizing the initiative, **obtaining** the advantage of tempo and achieving surprise. These themes represent the core of the British approach to operations.

So, if we put current strategy through that rather doctrinal prism, we can see what and **how** the British military are likely to be addressing current events **and** where this is leading us in our **developing** thinking on SDR – in other words “the Next Chapter”.

One of the main things we have done is to expand definition of asymmetric warfare - which I must stress, is not just international terrorism - to cover:

Firstly, dissuading, and if necessary, preventing terrorists from using force - particularly mass effect - to achieve change in international affairs.

Secondly, coercing states from launching asymmetric attacks; or acting in support of, or complicity with, terrorists - (whilst we take trouble to reinforcing those combating terrorism).

And thirdly, contributing to the **defence** of the UK base and overseas territories **from** such attacks.

It is very early days at the moment, and there is much to do, but we have set ourselves a number of tasks:

To stop and assess if 11 September represented a fundamental change in the strategic context, and if so, how serious a change.

To ensure that our examination attempts to understand the causes of terrorism and the thinking of the terrorist.

To consider the extent to which we can continue to rely on specific intelligence of threats.

To strike the right balance between the contribution the armed forces make to home defence; and to countering threats abroad.

To understanding the roles of key international organisations in the new environment .

The approaches which the armed forces are considering include:

Preventing the conditions that allow international terrorist organisations to operate, by helping less capable states build better capabilities to counter terrorism themselves through our conflict prevention and defence diplomacy activities.

Deterring would be attackers by making sure that international terrorist groups, and those regimes that actively sponsor or harbour them, are aware of our range of military options and readiness and willingness to use them if provoked.

Coercing regimes and states which **harbour** or support international terrorism with the **threat** and, ultimately, the use of, military force in the event that diplomatic and other means fail.

Actively disrupting the activities that support international terrorist groups, by targeting their sources and flows of materiel, finance, and freedom of movement. Our **armed** forces may need to develop a more active role in stop and search missions on land, at sea, or in conducting search and destroy **raids** on key terrorist facilities.

Acting to destroy terrorist cells **with** military action; and perhaps, in the last instance, acting **against those regimes, - such as the Taliban, -** which support, protect, nurture and direct terrorism.

We will also need to look carefully at the arrangements or agreements we may want in place **in** the areas where we **wish** to operate. **Where** forward deployment on land in a crisis is not possible, alternative basing arrangements will be required. In this context, the flexibility of the two new aircraft carriers we have planned is particularly important

We need to give **due** attention to the requirements of home **defence** and security. We will review the arrangements and level of co-ordination between **civil**

authorities and the armed forces in order to **maximise** the utility and suitability of responses to any future requests.

i have aimed to give you an idea of where we have got to over the last **3 months** or so. If 11 September **did** anything to our views, it was to confirm that the direction we took **with SDR** was the right one. Our intent now to move beyond SDR has been reinforced by our experiences around the world since 1998 and on **VERITAS / ENDURING FREEDOM**. As we develop, we will have to stay in balance; we cannot afford to take risks with capabilities and enablers; but we must be lighter, more **focused** / precise and more flexible; and leave behind the inertia of the Cold War for good. **There** is a lot of room for new thinking - and for the reconsideration of 'old' thought in world affairs at present, but **if we** can concentrate on those aspects that the British Armed Forces are and should be good at:

Command and mission command;

Information and intelligence;

"fightability";

Sustainability;

Trainability;

A flair / penchant for coalition operations

And sound doctrine - what I like to call "the interoperability of the mind" -
then, although we might not get it completely right, - we won't be far
wrong.

Thank you very much.

12/7
: 1330

snowflake

December 7, 2001 7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Historic Properties

A high school friend of mine sent me this material. Why don't you figure out what ought to be done with it, and see if you can get someone working on it. She may have a decent idea.

601

Thanks.

Attach.
12/05/01 (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
120701-1

.....
Please respond by _____

*Copy BSM
done - 12/12/01*

*Ray Dubois -
Could you
please check in
with her and
let me/SecDef know
what you think? Tnx.*

4 Dec 01

11-L-0559/OSD 5236 /01

*Larry Di Rita
12/7*

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Consultant

(b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)



NATIONAL TRUST for HISTORIC PRESERVATION

Recapitalizing the Army's Historic Properties

Presented to:

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)

NOVEMBER 2001

Introduction

To obtain greater economic value from its portfolio of older buildings and fulfill its federal stewardship responsibilities, the Army created the Historic Properties Redevelopment Initiative. As part of this program's work, the **Army** asked the National Trust for Historic Preservation to examine the barriers to and opportunities for recapitalization and redevelopment of the Army's historic properties and to use its knowledge of historic preservation management and preservation finance in the private sector to recommend progressive, efficient strategies for the economically feasible use and management of Army historic properties. This report sets forth the National Trust's recommendations to the Army for redevelopment and recapitalization of Army historic properties.

RECDEF HAS
DEC 07 2001

TO: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: (b)(6)

DATE: December 5, 2001

RE: Recapitalizing the Army's Historic Properties - Executive Summary of the National Trust for Historic Preservation/Army Project

For the past two years, the National Trust has been working with the Army to address the perceived and real **financial** burden of maintaining historic properties on Army installations. The grant came through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment to the Trust which, in turn, retained an excellent consulting team of which I was a member. I note that the team is not mentioned in the Executive Summary but it represented some of the brightest developers, lawyers, and preservationists in the country. The progress on the project was painfully slow despite the fact that we were in an election cycle and believed that our recommendations would be of interest to both parties prior to and **after** the election.

I am certain that I was put on the team as a result of the 25 years of congressional lobbying experience I had gained while president of Preservation Action, the national grassroots lobby for historic preservation. It surprised me that the congressional liaison office of the Army forbid any of us to go to the Hill during the process. My experience has been that constant contact with key Hill members and staff on a subject with the high interest that this has is a good thing and is not lobbying in the pure sense. It invites discussion of and reaction to various proposals and lays the groundwork for legislative support needed later to advance the recommendations.

The National Trust worked closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army and the **Office** of Historic Properties. The **final** report **is** nearing completion (though I do not have a date for its **release**) and **will be presented then to the Secretary of the Army. The full report includes** excellent backup information as well as more detailed explanation about the proposed initiatives. ~~It further proposes eight demonstration projects, some of which are **ready underway.**~~

I do believe there are some excellent recommendations that should be attractive to the entire Department of Defense as you addresses policy change in the Pentagon. I will let you know when the final report is released and when it will be presented to the Secretary of the Army. If I can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to call

Again, thank you for wonderful work on behalf of the nation.

(b)(6)

Historic Preservation Consultant
5202 **Carlton** Street
Bethesda, MD 20816

(b)(6)

Recapitalizing the Army's Historic Properties

NOVEMBER 2001

Preface

1. This document is a product of a Cooperative Agreement between the Department of the Army and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, award number DAMD 17-99-2-9039.
2. The U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, 820 Chandler Street, Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5014 is the awarding and administering acquisition office.
3. This document does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the government, and no official endorsement should be inferred.

Recapitalizing the Army's Historic Properties

NOVEMBER 2001

Executive Summary

In fulfilling its mission to fight and win wars, the Army relies on a strong *esprit de corps* – and few things inculcate a stronger sense of institutional identity or embody a shared legacy more effectively than a historic place. Mahlon Apgar IV, former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, once described the Army's historic buildings by saying, "These properties are a significant part of our national heritage, telling the story of America one Army post at a time. They help the Army to recall the rich legacy of our great nation, and we must spare no measure to ensure they are preserved to inspire tomorrow's generations."

But, the Army's heritage – as embodied in its architectural legacy – requires a new approach in order to survive.

The Army's current real estate inventory includes approximately 12,000 historic buildings – about 90 million square feet of space. Some of these historic buildings are vacant; most are in active use. But, almost all are undercapitalized and threatened with physical deterioration and obsolescence. And, within the next 30 years, approximately 50,000 additional Army buildings will be 50 years of age or older, of which an estimated 7,400 are likely to be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places – increasing dramatically the Army's historic properties management challenge.

A number of specialized financial and management tools are available to private-sector developers of historic properties (such as the federal rehabilitation income tax credit). Many of the tools and incentives which attract private capital to historic rehabilitation projects in the private sector are available to the Army, as well, and, with some modifications, many others could be available to the Army. But a number of obstacles prevent the Army from using these tools and incentives effectively, resulting in undercapitalization and deferred maintenance, which ultimately means higher repair and maintenance costs, deteriorating building stock – and frustration for installation commanders. These obstacles include:

- *The Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) real property maintenance budgeting process.* The Army has received an average of only 60 percent of the minimum requirements for maintenance and repair of all buildings, including its historic buildings. For Army historic buildings, this means an annual shortfall of \$2.50-\$3.50 per square foot, or \$225-315 million annually for 90 million square feet of historic buildings. This results in deferred maintenance, which increases repair costs and exacerbates deterioration.

Leasing restrictions. Several restrictions make redevelopment of Army historic properties problematic for private-sector developers. For example, the opportunity for a developer to acquire, redevelop, and then lease back a redeveloped historic Army property to the Army is virtually precluded under current regulations. Even if that difficulty can be overcome, tax code restrictions force a developer to give up much of the otherwise available federal rehabilitation tax credit if the Army occupies more than 35 percent of the redeveloped property. Also, a number of Army regulations restrict the number of years the Army can lease property to private-sector developers, making it extremely difficult for developers to lease property for the **40-year** minimum required in order to obtain federal rehabilitation tax credits. While longer-term leases are allowed by 10 U.S.C. §2667, the process of executing them is administratively cumbersome.

Installation-level access to tools and information. At the installation level, the process of assembling the information and accessing the tools and resources needed to effectively assess and act on redevelopment opportunities is haphazard and cumbersome. While it is very difficult for a post commander to implement and complete property development projects within his or her typical two-year term of command on an installation, the lack of installation-level information about redeveloping historic Army properties in particular makes the process and **timeline** unusually frustrating, discouraging initiative that might otherwise exist for redevelopment projects.

Army budgeting and management processes. Current budget allocations and design processes encourage construction of new buildings rather than redevelopment of historic buildings, even though the historic buildings' longer life cycles, ability to attract private capital, and other characteristics often make them a more fiscally attractive option.

In spite of the challenges that exist, redevelopment of the Army's historic buildings is an economically advantageous option for the Army and represents a substantial potential fiscal benefit:

Cost savings and cost avoidance: The cost to the Army of *not* redeveloping its historic buildings is significant. For example, simply demolishing its 12,000 historic buildings would cost the Army \$1 billion. And if the Army demolished its historic buildings and therefore needed to rent space elsewhere for the functions currently housed within Army historic buildings in "green" condition alone, the annual cost to the Army would be between **\$155-\$210** million. If it were a real estate holding company, rather than the Army, that held title to these 12,000 historic buildings, the estimated market value of those properties would be **\$5.5-\$5.9** billion in a rehabilitated state, with a net value (market value less required rehabilitation costs) of between **\$1.3-\$1.7** billion.

- *Leases and income production:* In addition to the cost savings realized by use of the Army's historic buildings, significant income opportunities also exist for the Army's

historic buildings – opportunities that are not currently being realized. For example, the approximately \$810 million spent by the Department of Defense to lease space off post in FY2000 would, on an annualized basis, be more than enough to support the operating expenses, return of investment, and adequate replacement reserves for a significant amount of the Army's historic property inventory.

- *Significantly longer* life-cycle: Many of the Army's historic buildings (particularly those from its pre-World War II inventory) were constructed using materials and techniques which offer a significantly longer life-cycle than those of most newer buildings – typically a 50-80 year life cycle, versus the much shorter useful life of most buildings now being built on Army installations. The historic stone buildings in the Army's inventory of historic properties, for example, have already survived five 20-year life cycles and offer physical evidence of the life-cycle benefit of many of the Army's historic buildings.

In brief, self-funded historic Army buildings offer the dual benefits of freeing up other financial resources and inculcating pride, reinforcing the Army's mission. In order to tap this latent economic value and avoid future costs, investment needs to occur. Without reinvestment in and expert management of the redevelopment of its historic properties, the Army cannot achieve substantial levels of recapitalization and cost avoidance.

We have concluded that the most achievable and cost-effective solution for the Army lies not in a *single* tool or a *single* program but, instead, in the refinement, strategic deployment, and specialized management of a collection of tools - almost all of which already exist. This is the case with many aspects of economically viable preservation projects. In the National Trust for Historic Preservation's Main Street Program, for example – arguably the nation's most economically successful preservation strategy and a useful analog for the challenge of redeveloping the Army's historic properties – a skilled management program draws on a wide range of organizational strategies, financial resources, marketing strategies and regulatory tools to attract new capital and market activity to historic commercial districts.

In order to effectively recapitalize, manage, and make cost-effective use of its inventory of historic properties, we recommend the Army take these actions:

1. **Empower installation personnel to implement redevelopment projects:** Many of the tools needed to redevelop Army historic properties are already in place. But many of these tools are difficult to access or require specialized knowledge to use effectively, and many are most appropriate and effective when used to leverage other tools and resources, which requires skilled coordination.

Through the process of conducting pilot feasibility assessments of historic properties on five Army installations¹, we developed a *Feasibility Assessment Manual* and a

¹ Pilot feasibility assessments were conducted of historic buildings at Fort McPherson, in Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Shafter in Honolulu, Hawaii; Rock Island Arsenal, in Rock Island, Illinois; Fort Sam Houston, in San

Matrix of Redevelopment Alternatives. The *Feasibility Assessment Manual* provides a step-by-step process by which installation personnel can identify redevelopment opportunities. The *Matrix of Redevelopment Alternatives* provides installation personnel with a structure for evaluating different redevelopment options and for easily accessing case studies and information on authorities, financing sources, and other tools. The matrix provides information for 18 different development scenarios. These include three potential development options (the Army retains title and assumes development and funding responsibility; the Army retains title and shares development and funding responsibility; or the Army disposes of the property), with six potential users for each of these three scenarios (the Army; other Department of Defense entities; other Federal agencies; state or local government; a nonprofit organization; or a private developer).

We recommend that the Army institutionalize the use of the *Feasibility Assessment Manual* and the *Matrix of Redevelopment Alternatives*. We also recommend that the Army continue to conduct on-site feasibility assessments of Army installations to provide ongoing guidance to installation personnel on the redevelopment of specific historic properties on their installations.

- 2. Dedicate proceeds from leases of Army historic buildings for the redevelopment of historic buildings:** 10 U.S.C. 2667 currently directs 50 percent of the proceeds from leases of all non-excess military property to non-military entities back to the installation where the leased property is located –but the remaining 50 percent rolls into an account for department-level for building repair and maintenance. We recommend that the Army seek a change to 10 U.S.C. 2667 so that, for leases involving historic buildings, this latter 50 percent would (a) be dedicated to the repair, maintenance and management of historic buildings, and (b) would be directly and immediately accessible to the Army and other Department of Defense agencies for the benefit of their respective historic building inventories.

In addition to the leasing authority contained in 10 U.S.C. 2667, Section 111 of the National Historic Preservation Act also authorizes agencies to reinvest the proceeds of leases of historic buildings that are listed on the National Register of Historic Places. This authority is, however, rarely used. We recommend that the Army pursue a program to implement this authority.

- 3. Create an Army Historic Properties Reinvestment Fund:** One of the most significant obstacles to redevelopment of Army historic properties is the lack of up-front development capital. We therefore recommend that the Army develop a new, specialized source of financing to raise redevelopment capital for Army historic

Antonio, Texas; and Fort Monroe, in Hampton, Virginia. In addition to providing specific guidance to these installations on the redevelopment of their historic properties, the pilot feasibility assessments provided valuable information to the National Trust and its project consultants on the opportunities and constraints that exist for the redevelopment of Army historic properties.

properties. The Army Historic Properties Reinvestment Fund would function as a revolving fund, capitalized by proceeds from a combination of direct appropriations, bond proceeds, equity investments, the sale of historic properties and from the 50 percent of lease proceeds from historic buildings which, under 10 U.S.C. S2667, are not retained by the installation where lease revenues are generated (see *Recommendation #2, above*). Proceeds would be used to further develop the Army's historic property management initiative and to provide general rehabilitation and operating income for Army historic properties. In addition, the Fund could contain any or all of the following three components:

- *An appropriated version (Army Historic Properties Reinvestment Fund-A, or AHPRF-A)*, capitalized by direct Congressional appropriations, against which garrison commanders can borrow when the rehabilitated property will be used by a Federal, state, or local government entity.
- *A bonded version (AHPRF-B)*, capitalized by the sale of tax-exempt Army Heritage Bonds. Like AHPRF-A, garrison commanders could use this fund when the rehabilitated property will be used by a Federal, state, or local government entity.
- *An equity version (AHPRF-E)*, which would provide private-sector equity for properties developed under long-term leases by operating as a blind-pool fund for investors interested in taking advantage of the Federal rehabilitation tax credit. Rehabilitated properties could be leased by public- or private-sector entities.

No exact prototype for this proposed fund currently exists, although the Federal Buildings Fund provides some useful experiences and examples. In addition, the Residential Communities Initiative's use of the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to provide an income stream might provide an analog for the redevelopment of historic Army properties, with Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) allowances for the maintenance of real property providing some operating cash for a developer's use. There are limitations in this parallel, however, as SRM would not provide a proportionately comparable income stream and is therefore unlikely to be a sufficient inducement for a private-sector developer to redevelop Army historic properties.

We estimate that appropriations of \$100 million annually for ten years could leverage an additional \$300 million annually from sources other than the Fund itself.

4. Make technical changes to tax laws which currently restrict the redevelopment of Army historic properties:

- (a) *The "Pickle Amendment"*: Section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code currently makes it difficult for developers using the federal rehabilitation income tax credit to lease back rehabilitated property to the Army or other Federal agency. The

military's inclusion in this definition currently restricts developers from leasing back more than 35 percent of a redeveloped property to the military while still being able to fully utilize the federal rehabilitation tax credits, as well as restricting certain other lease terms. We recommend that the Army seek an amendment which would exclude the Federal government and the armed services from the definition of a "tax-exempt entity."

- (b) *Length of leases:* In order to capture the Federal rehabilitation tax credit, a developer must lease a property for a minimum of 40 years. Although 10 U.S.C. § 2667 currently allows the Secretary of the Army to approve leases of this length for private-sector developers, it does so as an exception to the authority's general lease limit of 'no more than five years,' which makes the process of executing leases of historic buildings attractive to private-sector developers a cumbersome one. We therefore recommend that the Army seek an amendments to S2667 which would make it possible for the Army to streamline leases of historic properties to private-sector developers for 40 years or more.

5. Streamline the process of accepting gifts for the rehabilitation of Army historic properties and encourage private-sector contributions for historic property redevelopment:

- *Increase gift levels:* Under existing statute, individual installations may accept direct gifts only up to a \$20,000 limit. We recommend that the Army substantially raise or remove altogether the upper limit of gift allowances to installations for purposes of rehabilitating and maintaining historic buildings on Army installations.*
- *Encourage creation of 'friends' groups for the redevelopment of specific historic properties:* Several 'friends' groups have been successful in attracting private-sector contributions for the redevelopment of specific Army historic buildings,³ working in tandem with the respective installations We recommend that the Army work with installations to help create and provide technical support and information to 'friends' groups for this purpose.
- *Create a charitable gift fund:* A gift fund or an Army-affiliated, nonprofit organization could solicit donations from the private sector and either transfer the

² Precedence exists for increasing the gift level for historic properties: the Secretary of the Army, pursuant to authority under Public Law 97-252 § 1133, raised the gift acceptance level of West Point U.S. Military Academy to \$500,000.

³ For example, the Society for the Preservation of Historic Fort Sam Houston was established in the mid-1980s to support and assist the Commander of Fort Sam Houston in programs that preserve, enhance, and record the history of the Fort. A major early activity for The Society was to raise money and provide volunteer services for the rehabilitation of the Stilwell House, a historic property on the installation. The Society leased the property from the Army, managed the rehabilitation process for the structure, and continues to provide maintenance and support services for the building.

funds to the Army for rehabilitation of specific historic properties or, in the form of matching grants, to local 'friends' groups which would redevelop specific Army historic properties.

6. **Use inter-service agreements to charge rent levels to other Department of Defense and Federal tenants sufficient to cover full costs of occupancy:** The rent levels currently charged to Department of Defense and other Federal entities are not sufficient to cover the true costs of owning and maintaining the properties. We recommend that the Army begin using inter-service agreements to charge rent levels adequate to cover all operating expenses, fixed expenses, adequate capital replacement reserves and, when borrowed funds are involved, debt repayment and return of investment.

7. **Actively encourage Department of Defense entities to locate in historic buildings:** We recommend that the Army encourage Department of Defense agencies to lease space in Army historic buildings whenever possible rather than renting space off post. In FY2000, Department of Defense entities spent approximately \$810 million in off post leases -which, on an annualized basis, would be more than enough to support the operating expenses, return of investment, and replacement costs for a significant amount of the Army's 90 million square feet of historic building space.

To accomplish this, the Army might consider seeking a Federal Executive Order which would direct Department of Defense entities to give preference to locating in historic buildings on Army and other service installations, rather than leasing space outside installations. Federal Executive Order 13006 (now codified in P.L. 106-208), which directs Federal entities to give preference to locating in historic buildings in older commercial districts whenever feasible, provides a useful example.

8. **Include underutilized historic buildings in the Residential Communities Initiative and adaptively reuse them for housing:** We recommend that, when possible, historic buildings not originally built for housing (such as warehouses or industrial buildings) be included in the Army's Residential Communities Initiative for the possible adaptive reuse for housing or other uses compatible with RCI developments.

9. **Pursue several recapitalization leasing models:** The National Trust and its consultant team investigated a number of possible recapitalization leasing models. Of these, those which merit greatest attention are:
 - In-kind leases:* In this recapitalization model, a private-sector developer renovates Army historic properties and has the right to lease Army historic properties to

outside parties, with the lease term determined by the value of the improvements made and in-kind services provided to the installation.

Third-party leases: In this recapitalization model a private-sector developer renovates Army historic property, finds tenants, shares profits with the Army, and carries out typical landlord responsibilities. The developer would need a minimum 40-year lease in order to be able to utilize the Federal rehabilitation tax credits.

Bundling of financial assets: In this recapitalization model, the Army assembles a portfolio of unimproved historic buildings and land for long-term lease to a private-sector developer for redevelopment; the developer leases back the redeveloped property to the Army and/or another Federal user. Redevelopment would need to meet the Secretary of the Interior's Standards for Rehabilitation in order to qualify for the Federal rehabilitation tax credit. It would require an estimated minimum of \$50 million in debt for this model to be financially feasible – the larger the portfolio, the more efficient the investment. This model's potential viability is diminished significantly by the fact that the Army's historic properties are, with a few exceptions, geographically dispersed, making it difficult for a developer to efficiently assemble and redevelop a large collection of properties.

Section 2812 lease-purchase authorities: The authority provided in 10 U.S.C. § 2812 allows the Army to lease back newly constructed buildings. We recommend that the Army explore the potential of amending the authority contained in Section 2812 for lease-purchase of improvements to Army historic properties. This authority makes it possible for a private-sector developer to renovate a building on an Army installation and lease it to the Army, with the property's ownership reverting to the Army at the end of the lease period. The lease term should be at least 40 years, in order to allow a developer to utilize the Federal rehabilitation tax credits. The developer would need special authority to utilize the tax credits and for depreciation because a Federal entity would be using the building.

10. **Create an Office of Historic Property Management to implement the historic property redevelopment program and guide the recapitalization process:** Cost-effective redevelopment of historic properties requires specialized management, with expertise in historic preservation finance and public-private partnerships, to guide the recapitalization process. We therefore recommend that the Army create an Office of Historic Property Management to carry out the historic property redevelopment program. This office would incorporate and expand on the responsibilities of the Army's current Office of Historic Properties. The Office of Historic Property Management's major responsibilities would include:

- Expanding, managing and refining the inventory of the Army's historic properties in order to prioritize the most significant buildings and to identify categorical and individual opportunities for redevelopment.
- Seeking partnerships with private-sector developers and investors.
- Serving as a technical resource for installation staff in the redevelopment of historic buildings.
- Providing policy guidance to installations and to the Army Corps of Engineers on rehabilitation opportunities for Army historic properties.
- Managing the Army Historic Properties Reinvestment Fund and the Charitable Trust Fund.
- Providing guidance to 'friends of the Army' organizations involved in historic properties redevelopment projects.

11. Develop a comprehensive, Army-wide policy for classification and management of Cold War-era buildings: The Army – like other Department of Defense entities and Federal agencies which experienced growth in the Cold War era years of the 1950s and 1960s – will soon be faced with the time-intensive task of evaluating tens of thousands of buildings which will become 50 years old within the next decade.

We recommend that the Army work with the National Park Service, National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to negotiate an agreement through which the proposed Army **Office** of Historic Property Management would be empowered, using agreed upon criteria, to make determinations of eligibility and non-eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places and to **fulfill** certain other duties typically **fulfilled** by a state historic preservation office.

Integral to developing such an agreement is that the Army, in collaboration with the other armed services, the National Park Service, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, develop a comprehensive policy for dealing categorically, rather than individually, with Cold War-era buildings. The policy should consider the need to preserve or document a representative sample of Cold War-era buildings, with a variety of functions, but should not inhibit the redevelopment, replacement or demolition of Cold War-era buildings which have been significantly altered or which are redundant in their architectural or historic importance.

12. Expand, manage and refine the Army's inventory records of historic properties: In order to attract private-sector capital to Army historic building redevelopment

projects, the Army must be able to provide a thorough, detailed and reliable inventory of the Army's historic properties, including information on life-cycle costs for individual historic buildings and for categories of historic buildings. Expanding, managing and refining its inventory records must be a top priority of the Army's historic building redevelopment program.

13. Test the ARMS model in a pilot site: The Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support program (ARMS) has been successful in using targeted incentives, facilities use contracts, government-backed loan guarantees, and streamlined regulatory processes to attract private operators for Army industrial facilities. The National Trust's consulting team has investigated the potential of adapting the ARMS model for the redevelopment of historic buildings, with revenues generated through facilities use contracts being used to offset the cost of redeveloping Army historic buildings (along with non-historic buildings) included in the scope of the contracts. We recommend that the Army test this adaptation of the ARMS model for historic property redevelopment in a pilot site and, if successful and cost-effective, expand its use to other sites.

In prioritizing these 13 actions and sequencing the implementation of its historic properties redevelopment program, we recommend that the Army use the following guidelines:

- Focus primary efforts on the maintenance of the most historically and architecturally significant properties.
- When feasible, adapt non-residential buildings for housing and include them in the Residential Communities Initiative.
- Generate adequate lease income from historic properties already in use, particularly those buildings used by other Federal agencies under inter-service agreements.
- Where appropriate, require Army and other Department of Defense entities currently leasing off post to relocate into historic buildings within Army installations.
- Explore private-sector uses and development partnerships, within the context of the Army's mission and needs.
- If the property is not among the most historically or architecturally significant, consider the possibility of de-accession or disposal or, if no use or development scenario is feasible now, a systematic program of stabilization and "mothballing" for the intermediate term. If no use or development scenario is feasible in the foreseeable future, consider demolition only as a last resort.

The fiscal benefits of these recommendations are significant: by investing relatively modest amounts to stimulate private-sector investment in the redevelopment of historic

properties, the Army can leverage scarce resources and thereby recapitalize a significant number of its historic properties. Such investments could:

- . Recapture much or all of the \$810 million currently spent by the Department of Defense annually in rents for space leased off base.
- . Avoid \$1 billion in estimated demolition costs.
- . Streamline redevelopment procedures for installation personnel, making multi-year redevelopment projects more easily achievable.
- Reposition the inventory of historic buildings as Army assets rather than as perceived liabilities.
- . Attract private-sector capital investment into buildings for which the Army has no current need and/or for which it does not have adequate annual funding for redevelopment.

And, in the process of becoming more fiscally fit, the Army will also preserve its most tangible physical manifestation of Army heritage, tradition and history – its historic properties.

11/2
0800
snowflake

11/2 07:30
October 31, 2001 6:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

231.2

(b)(6) is a very able fellow. He could be helpful on the biotechnology thing, I think.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/01 (b)(6) letter to SecDef

DHR:dh
103101-40

.....
Please respond by _____

Pete Aldridge -

*Can he be added to
DSB consultants list
for Biotech? Please
advise.*

2 Nov 01


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done 12/7*

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

12/7

11-L-0559/OSD/E252
019572/01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your letter, your offer of assistance and your fine support. I do appreciate it a great deal.

I have asked my Special Assistant, Larry Di Rita, to see that your letter and the information gets plugged into the folks who are involved in things relating to the pharmaceutical industry. He or one of his associates will be back in touch with you.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

Kick /



2001 OCT 12 AM 10:15



DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company

October 10, 2001

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
Fax: 703-693-0100

Dear Don:

I obtained your number from (b)(6) with whom I consulted prior to faxing this letter. Recognizing how extraordinarily busy you are at this unprecedented time in the nation's history, I don't wish to waste your time. I cannot imagine what you must have gone through over the past month. (b)(6) however, encouraged me to volunteer what follows. In the interest of keeping this communiqué short, I'll be very forthcoming and to the point.

As background, I have just completed a more than one year assignment with the DuPont company in selling the pharmaceutical company to Bristol-Myers Squibb. As of close of transaction last week, I have taken up full time residence in Chicago once again. I have formally resigned from any pharmaceutical participation at both companies and I am not currently affiliated in any management capacity with any other pharmaceutical enterprise.

My purpose in writing is to offer my services for assessing two different channels which might be of interest to you:

- As a contact point for your office to the American and international pharmaceutical industry. Resulting from my serving on the PhRMA Board for years and my extensive business development network, I know most of the CEOs of important global pharmaceutical companies. It seems likely that the Department of Defense will seek to collaborate with pharma companies in the uncertain times ahead. While the DOD certainly has extensive contacts with the industry, there may be occasions when you or other DOD officials may seek CEO audiences and outside opinions on matters under consideration. I would be pleased to serve as your personal emissary in this capacity and have no conflict of interest in doing so.
- As a conduit to the DuPont company, DuPont is the manufacturer of Kelvar, a material that might be expected to play an increasingly important role in building hardening and personnel protection. The company also commands an impressive array of technology and would be anxious to cooperate as a good citizen in the current emergency. Chad Holliday, DuPont CEO and a member of the Business Roundtable, is a friend and he has told me he is prepared to meet with you on short notice if you think such a meeting would serve any purpose. I would be happy to arrange such a meeting and participate if you wish.

(b)(6)

U 17155 / 01

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
October 10, 2001
Page 2

As an additional point of information, I have a very good **business relationship** with Yury Kalinin, head of the Russian company, Biopreparat. Dr. Kalinin was **head of Russia's biologicals weapons program** during much of the cold war. Most of that **production** was diverted into pharmaceutical manufacturing with collapse of the former Soviet **Union** and **D. Searle** formed a joint venture with **Biopreparat** resulting in construction and **operation of the first** pharmaceutical plant in Russia meeting GMP standards. As **heads of the JV** company, Dr. Kalinin and I forged a warm personal relationship and I **visited him many times** in Moscow. This was the basis for my participation on the U.S. Russian **Business Council** upon which both of us served. I can't imagine if such a contact might be **useful to the DOD** but I would feel comfortable in making any reasonable request of Dr. Kalinin. **He would clearly** view me differently from any more formal approaches from the U.S. **government**.

In making these suggestions, please be assured I will in no way **be offended** if you choose to ignore any or all of them. My motives are to simply offer them as options at **your total discretion**,

In event of follow-up, my primary contact points and numbers in **Chicago** are

Home phone

(b)(6)

Direct fax

Cell phone

Home Address

Administrative Assistant

The thoughts of your many Chicago friends are with you. God bless you, **th** many with whom you're connected and God bless America.

(b)(6)



DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 DEC 27 11 09:55

December 26, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Mr. (b)(6)

231.2

I am responding to your note to Mr. Aldridge regarding Mr. (b)(6) letter to Secretary Rumsfeld offering his services to the Department. You asked Mr. Aldridge if Mr. (b)(6) could be added to the DSB consultants list for future biotech initiatives.

The DSB is preparing to address two biotechnology efforts in the near future. Please be assured that Mr. (b)(6) name will be given to the DSB Chairman, Dr. Schneider, as well as the chairmen of these two efforts for consideration as a prospective study candidate.

John V. Ello
John V. Ello
Executive Director

26 DEC 01

U19819 /01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



INFORMATION MEMO

December 18, 2001, 1640

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

Art Cebrowski 18 Dec

SUBJECT: Review of (b)(6) Paper entitled
Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban and Al Oaeda Networks

AFGHANISTAN

(b)(6) is a prolific and energetic advocate of maneuver warfare theory applied to Naval Aviation. An enthusiastic disciple of the late John Boyd, he is a proponent of organizational/doctrinal innovation and "low" technology solutions to asymmetrical opponents.

(b)(6) core thesis is that success in war against an asymmetric opponent such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, operating in complex terrain, will be a function of organizational adaptation and doctrinal innovation vice high technology. Without specificity, he outlines a stealthy, highly adaptive network of small cells-ideally naval forces operating from the sea - that integrate military, political and diplomatic efforts while shortening the command/decision cycle to "make appropriate killing decisions measured in minutes and (in some cases) seconds" as well as making U.S. forces less predictable.

The approach has merit because it reduces command and control delay time, the major cause of lost firing opportunities. It also presents a determined opponent with the constant dilemma of dealing not only with one single commander, but rather with a series of decision makers able to operate aggressively and unpredictably, either independently or in self-organizing groups. The Hunter Network would focus outward, seeking to drive events rather than be driven by them. Wholesale change in theater command and control would probably be required to fully exploit the benefits of this "Hunter Network" concept.

His idea expands on the Sea Dragon concept explored by the Marines during the HUNETR WARRIOR experiment in 1997 at the CMC Warfighting Lab at Quantico. By integrating the political and diplomatic dimensions with the concept of a small footprint, low signature, agile, "brilliant sensor" (e.g., a team that can rapidly bring precision effects to bear), he addresses the political complexity and asymmetric challenges inherent in a guerilla conflict. While his construct appears to be similar to much of what SOF and other agencies are already doing in Afghanistan, it merits consideration as we tease out the implications for transformation.

18 DEC 01



14
snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 23, 2001

RE:

Find out who this (b)(6) is. Read this paper. I think there is something useful in there, but I am having trouble crystallizing it and digging it out. See if you can get some smart person to sit down and figure out what in here is of value, and what we might do, and get back to me no later than Tuesday.

Thanks.

One page to the point

Just Larry

VADM Cebrowski

I would be very interested in your view of the attached article for the Eclat. Is it relevant to the campaign now?

DHR/azn
112301.23

Attach: A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban - 11/5/01 b (b)(6)

Respond by: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 2001

*Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
12/13*

*Joint Staff
Turn this around with one page summary?*

JDR - Larry

11-L-0559/05258

019423 / 01

Larry Di Rita

12/10

(b)(6)

5 November 2001

A Hunter Network: Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks

An Open Letter to Family and Friends:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage **can** measure **the** tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, **awful** miscalculations all take their seat at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.”

From Winston Churchill’s 1930 memoir, ‘My Early Life.’”

Ugly Surprises

On Wednesday 24 October, a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he was “surprised” by the tenacity of the Taliban. On Friday 26 October, the Taliban scored an ugly surprise victory with the capture and execution of opposition figure Abdul Haq. **Haq**, an ethnic Pushtun, had infiltrated Afghanistan from Pakistan several days earlier in an effort to encourage other Pushtun leaders to desert the Taliban. If former National Security Advisor Bud McFarland is to be believed, and **I** do, this was a significant blow to the US war effort.

When we start surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda more than they are surprising **us**, we’ll know that we’re winning this first phase of a long war with many unknown and known fronts. When we see a local Afghan government capturing members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, we’ll know that victory is close at hand. **As** mentioned in the first letter, we are up against a **smart** and ruthless foe that **fully** intends to win this war. **Why have** we yet to see large defections **from** the Taliban in Afghanistan? One major reason is simple and obvious: few on the ground in **Afghanistan** believe that the US is winning. The current diplomatic and military strategy is inadequate. A new approach is called for. This letter describes an approach that can better destabilize the **Taliban** and Al Qaeda by adding a necessary and unpredictable (dare **I** say “non-linear” approach) to war that quickly makes believers of **friends** and enemies alike. Let’s call it the *Hunter Network*.

11-L-0559/OSD/5259

A Great Task For A Great Nation

We need to find a winning blend of five elements: policy; diplomacy; intelligence; an outward focused, event driven military force; and an effective local Afghan government (not a stooge for the Americans). This is a great task – suitable only for a great nation.

This letter presents the Hunter Network as a candidate to achieve **that** winning blend, explaining the practical experiences and conceptual framework that shape it. The letter has three sections. Drawing from the experiences of US special envoy Robert Oakley (and some of **my** own), Section I explores the positive and negative lessons of the US in Somalia from 1992-1994. Al Qaeda has not overlooked these experiences. Lessons of Somalia help form an indispensable part of the Hunter Network strategy in Afghanistan. Section II introduces John Boyd's thoughts **about** a counter-guerrilla campaign. **During** Vietnam the US pursued an "attrition" war (whose metrics include body counts and target sets). The Viet Cong effectively countered and won by pursuing a strategy built around **guerilla** warfare. Al Qaeda has not overlooked this lesson either. Section III lays out how the US could rapidly build several forward-deployed cells -- that include diplomatic-military-Afghani members -- **capable** of destroying the **Taliban** and Al Qaeda within Afghanistan, while protecting and perhaps *even nurturing an* effective alternative form of **Afghani** government.

I: A Hunter Network in Somalia – A Pattern for Winning and Losing

I first met US Ambassador Robert Oakley in New York City in 1995. Business Executives for National Security, BENS, featuring Oakley as guest speaker and I was one of four military officers addressing The Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "America's Role in the New World Disorder." Oakley understands the importance of military agility: the ability to rapidly and unpredictably transition back and forth between **military** mass and precision as required by events on the battlefield. Let me preface Oakley's remarks about his experiences in Somalia with my own remarks about Bosnia in 1994, which created the first element of a Hunter Network.

Using John Boyd's ideas my squadron, **VFA-81**, created an informal first generation "Hunter Cell" composed of shooters **and** spooks (intelligence specialists). Under combat conditions, these shooters and spooks improved the air-to-ground combat effectiveness of the **air** wing, **carrier** battle group, and theater air against small, elusive targets in Bosnia by several orders of magnitude. A single Hunter Cell quickly evolved a method **capable** of making appropriate killing decisions measured in minutes and in case, seconds as compared to the usual bureaucratic surveillance network (**BSN**) decision cycle measured in weeks, months, and in times of crisis -- **incapable** of rendering any decision at all. When I briefed the USAF three star in charge of theater operations, he immediately directed that we teach every US squadron in theater how to develop their own Hunter Cell. ("Bosnia, Tanks and . . . From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1994, pp. 42-45.)

While a member of the Joint Staff from 1999 to 2000, I initiated and was subsequently asked to head a Department of Defense effort tasked to develop a road map for improving U.S. combat

effectiveness in urban combat operations. This involved extensive discussions and workshops with Oakley, US Ambassador to Somalia between November 1992 and May 1993. Chosen as a Special Presidential Envoy by Bush the Elder in November 1992, Oakley and US Marines were intimately involved in the **first** phase of military intervention-offering **security** for humanitarian relief operations. During the second phase, a UN force replaced the Marines and Oakley too. The situation deteriorated during the second phase and completely fell apart on 3 and 4 October 1993, when 18 **Army** Rangers were killed and 73 other Americans were wounded. Over 500 **Somalis** were killed and more than a thousand were wounded as well. Clinton hastily called Oakley back into government service as a Special Presidential Envoy, returning him to Somalia in October 1993 where he successfully negotiated a truce with **Aidid**, a Somali warlord, to secure the release of **captured** US Ranger Michael **Durant** and a Nigerian officer.

The approach developed by Oakley and the US Marines during the first phase is useful in developing a plausible approach for progress in this war. During this phase, much of the local population welcomed the U.S. forces, viewing them as saviors for trying to help reduce the effects of a terrible famine. In Oakley's own words:

“The environment in Somalia was always tense, because the Somalis are very **xenophobic**, aggressive people. So the trick that we discovered--at least during our period--was to maximize communication with them. To show **firmness**. But at the same time . . . to demonstrate that our humanitarian programs were beneficial, that we weren't there to dictate to them, (but) to give them a certain amount of latitude. On the other hand, if they stepped out of line and challenged us militarily, then we had to hit back . . . hard, swiftly, and then **immediately** resume the dialogue.

We met with **Ali Mahdi** and **Aidid's** political military leadership every day for the entire time we were there. We made sure we did that even after the military incident. We'd resume the dialogue and say 'Let's treat this as a passing event, not as the beginning of a whole sequence of escalating events.' We understood the need of this--we had a radio station, we had a newspaper [in the] Somalia language. These things disappeared when the UN came in and [they] didn't really understand the need to maintain the dialogue, to maintain the communications and it was slowly degenerating into hostility.”

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html>

It's worth taking time to read the entire interview with Oakley. It gives us a feel for how a combat diplomat thinks and what he can accomplish.

During the second phase in Somalia, the situation deteriorated as a UN force less familiar with the local culture replaced Oakley and the Marines. Violence on both sides escalated as US policy began to wander. A valiant US military force replaced the Marines and became part of a new UN force lacking the in-depth knowledge of the local culture and leadership developed by Oakley and the Marines. They found themselves increasingly adrift in a society that was growing increasingly hostile. Bullets began to fill the void left by a lack of policy and

diplomacy. One attack was particularly disastrous setting up the killing spree that occurred on 3-4 October 1993. This attack was supposed to wipe out the warlords in one quick stroke. It completely backfired and ended up killing innocents rather than the warlords. This was the final nail in the coffin of what had started out as a well-intentioned humanitarian mission. The local populace was now 100% hostile. The wheels came off during the battle on 34 October 1993 as described in Mark Bowden's excellent book, Black Hawk Down and the related web site:

<http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp>

Lack of heroism **wasn't** the problem. Lack of firepower wasn't the problem. The problem was a lack of policy, intelligence, and diplomacy while military forces were left in the field. A BSN approach to war began to lock up. Consumed by internal disputes and inexperience with war, national and international decision makers focused inward rather than on the enemy. America and others were adrift in a combat environment. So, the US military hammered away with the only tool left to them -- firepower. What should shake us in our boots is the Al Qaeda fingerprint in 1993 Somalia. Yes, unbeknownst to the US at the time, the nascent Al Qaeda organization was clandestinely orchestrating and escalating an uncertain and disorienting Somali combat environment.

Eight years later to the day (4 October 2001), British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Osama and Al Qaeda had been responsible for a number of terrorist outrages over the past decade, including "the attack in 1993 on US military personnel serving in Somalia – 18 US military personnel killed."

, <http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2683>

Osama and Al Qaeda used Somalia as a test drive for their latest generation of guerrilla attacks against the US. Hardly anyone has noticed that Al Qaeda has used every military encounter with the US to upgrade their guerrilla attacks and to probe the US methodically in assessing America's military strengths and weaknesses throughout. Hardly anyone has noticed that Al Qaeda entered Somalia and opened a terrorist schoolhouse on how to drive the Americans, on a humanitarian mission, out of a country. To this day, Al Qaeda is the only military organization that fully appreciates the rich lessons of Somalia.

The front page of the 4 November 2001 *Washington Post* describes how Osama and cohorts may be planning a hasty retreat into Somalia, Malaysia, or the Philippines. The article also reports that Rumsfeld had requested that his commanders draw up plans for finding Osama should he flee Afghanistan: "Rumsfeld reviewed the commander's responses last month and rejected most of them as narrow and unimaginative. The concept paper submitted by the *Central* Command, which oversees US military operations in the Mideast, Central Asia, and Northeastern Africa – a territory that includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia – was among those that got negative reviews, officials said" (pp. A1, A-22).

As the senior Navy line officer attached to the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in 1998, I was reminded by a highly respected combat Marine, Paddy Collins, to never forget that "terrain neutralizes technology." This lesson has never been lost on our enemies. Make no mistake --

there are increasing indications that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are already setting up a killing school house for the Americans in **Kandahar** with every intention of turning it into a 21st Mogadishu for the US just as they did for the Russians in **Grozny**, Chechnya.

As this letter is written, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have melted into the local Afghan population and retreated into buildings and universities. They are preparing for yet another generation and field test of guerrilla warfare against the US. They have blurred their external personal signatures and are rapidly disappearing into extremely **complex** terrain: cultural, religious, mountainous, and urban. A few bad fish have blended in with a school of local innocent fish confident that technology alone will not be able to distinguish them from the innocents. They hope to present us with the losing dilemma of having to kill the entire school of fish in order to save it. Only those that know how to see the blackness of Taliban hearts will be able to detect, identify, and target them.

There were no **Afghan** hijackers on 11 September. They were mostly Saudis. Yet, the US is attacking and killing Afghans. Welcome to 21st century war.

Some **takeaways** from the Somali experience: First and foremost, war is about people. People, not machines, win wars. 21st century war is also about populations and non-linear complexity. We instinctively understand non-linear complexity but I've witnessed multiple instances where this new science has not penetrated military thinking that seeks a methodical and predictable one plus one equals two approach to war. Instead of one plus one equaling two, one plus one can equal a hundred thousand or even two hundred million in non-linear complexity. In Mogadishu, a single US military attack transformed the local Somali population from neutral to hostile. In New York, DC, and aboard United Flight 93 over Pennsylvania, four attacks turned a national population from neutral/concerned to hostile. Does the US have any way of effectively assessing the effects on Islamic populations. Have we thought about it? A recent **DoD** request for technology was surreal -- if we can only get the right technology, we'll win this **damn** thing. Business-as-usual has a powerful inertia, which apparently prevents us from taking to heart and acting on the lessons of **guerilla** and urban **warfare**.

War is about making friends faster than making enemies. 21st century military actions cannot be viewed in isolation as visual information instantly reverberates through **friends** and enemies **alike**. Osama and the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been making piles of friends in the Islamic while the US efforts appear to struggle. Abdul Haq's capture and execution sent a clear message to potential enemies and friends alike: To date, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are able to detect, identify, and eliminate their mortal enemies more effectively than the US has been able to destroy their nemeses. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have sent a clear message: "This old fool Abdul Haq (**who** was 43), the late Lion of **Peshawar**, thought he could simply walk back into our country and overthrow us. The Americans were unwilling or unable to risk American lives for an **Afghan** inciting rebellion against the Taliban. Opponents of the Taliban, if you get in trouble expect the fate of Abdul Haq, when **we** come to kill you, expect the Americans to send an unmanned plane with **two** bombs. **And** even that will arrive too late -- as we've already got you. You're on the way to be hung." Business as usual. . .

Fortunately, it appears that the expensive lesson of Abdul Haq did in fact wake some people up. On 1 November the media reported that US Navy fighter-bombers fired on Taliban forces attempting to capture Hamid Karzai, a prominent Afghan tribal leader from the Pashtun ethnic group. This outward countering must be sustained and enlarged.

II: A Hunter Network – A Counter-Guerrilla Campaign

Like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz before him, John Boyd has recently become the most quoted and least read military genius. During the last twenty years of his life, Colonel John Boyd, USAF put his thoughts about war together in a presentation entitled “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” It consisted of over 200 briefing slides. In February 1993, Boyd spent three half days presenting his “Discourse” to the F/A-2 8 pilots at NAS Cecil Field, Florida. Part of this presentation included his “Patterns of Conflict” and was Boyd’s monumental look at what makes any organization competitive. Encompassing 2,500 years of the history of conflict, this briefing introduces his famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act “OODA loop” concept and is available to download on PDF format at:

http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/boyd.htm#discourse

Boyd’s thoughts about guerrilla warfare and a counter-guerrilla campaign have immediate relevance to this war as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are highly intelligent, adaptive, and lethal guerrilla networks. The Taliban hijacked the government of Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda seeks to hijack the Islamic religion. Along the way, they fully intend to drive the US into a bunker mentality and finally into a full retreat from the world scene.

In “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd made the following observations about guerrilla war: “Popular support is critical for guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Without the support of the people, the guerrillas (or counter-guerrillas) have neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security apparatus that permits them to ‘see’ into adversary operations yet ‘blinds’ the adversary to their own operations.” (See slide 109.) Boyd also sketched how to mount a counter-guerrilla campaign. Keep in mind what happened to the captured and executed Abdul Haq, while considering the following eleven points:

++ Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve the needs of the people – rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.

++ Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.

++ Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.

++ Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with the outside world.

++ Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement; reduce guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling **cadres**; and destroy their infrastructure.

++ Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the **guerrilla** cadres and their fighting units.

++ Use special teams in a complimentary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ guerrillas own tactics of *reconnaissance*, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to **keep** roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication with the outside world.

++ Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.

++ Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of the people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

++ Break guerrillas' moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that **demonstrates moral legitimacy** and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

(From Patterns of Conflict: Slide 108).

III: A Hunter Network — Destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda Networks

Oakley and the US Marines put together an effective forward-deployed diplomatic-military team in Somalia. Boyd sketched out key elements of a counter-guerrilla campaign. Coupling Oakley's practical experience with Boyd's conceptual framework, we have looked in detail at two of the three components needed to construct the Hunter Network strategy. The third element, touched on earlier, is the Hunter Cell. In 1996 the Association of Naval Aviation and U.S. Naval Institute awarded their Annual Naval Aviation Article Writing Award to "Hunters **from** the Sea," calling it "the best article on Naval Aviation in any publication or periodical" (COL Mike Wyly and I co-authored the article in Proceedings, December 1995, pp. 31-33). The Commandant of the Marine Corps personally supported a series of experiments at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab *from* 1997 to 1999 designed to **mature** our understanding of this Hunter concept and **VFA-81's Hunter Cell** that improved air-to-ground effectiveness in Bosnia by 10 to 100 times. These new understandings were briefed to the Navy's Director, Air Warfare and Assistant Secretary of

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition and are summarized in: "The Carriers Pack the Airborne Cavalry," (Proceedings, August 2000, pp. 28 – 32 that I co-authored with Major Chris Yunker, USMC):

<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/promoore.htm>

See also: Spirit Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century (Major Don Vandergriff, USA ed., Presidio Press, 2001)

Thus, the lessons of Oakley and Boyd -- coupled with the detailed military understandings developed through the experiments at the Marine Corps **Warfighting** Lab -- give us the opportunity to create a unique and important Hunter Network comprised of **multiple** Hunter Cells. These highly evolutionary cells -- diplomatic-military-Afghani -- are capable of using **stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity** and cohesion to relentlessly attack and destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks.

A Hunter Network focuses outward, on the enemy. It drives events on the battlefield rather than being driven by a schedule. There is no "air" war or "ground" war. There is only one war with a simple mission -- to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks and help establish the conditions necessary for an effective Afghan government. A Hunter Network should initially involve less than a 100 people and function as an experimental compliment to our existing **military** structure. It would notionally start with eight cells -- one for a variety of cities in Afghanistan (perhaps **Kandahar, Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-I-Sharif, Kunduz, Zaranj, Qalat**). They should be forward deployed, as close to the battle and their specific cities as possible. Broad discretion and significant resources -- intelligence, military, diplomatic, financial -- should be given to each cell. A competition should be set up between the cells measuring how effective each cell is in achieving disrupting, surprising and destroying the enemy. Cells would combine or split as necessary to fit the situation on the battlefield. Initial measures of effectiveness should include:

++ Repeatedly surprising the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks. Surprising **an** enemy involves discerning and understanding his patterns. Our enemies know our patterns and have anticipated many of our responses. It's time to **return** the favor.

++ **Increasing** numbers of Taliban/Al Qaeda defectors willing to risk their lives to achieve the mission.

++ Significantly reduced response times **from** the ground perspective -- measured in **seconds-minutes** rather than hours-weeks-months -- capable of **exploiting** fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

Success -- as increasingly defined by the Hunter Network -- would be rewarded by a significant increase in resources.

The starting composition of each cell would consist of eleven people: 88 people total. The remaining twelve people constitute a command element. With the exception of the command cell, the age of the people in these cells should be young -- 35 years or less. The cells should

evolve based on feedback from the battlefield. The starting composition each cell could consist of

** Two American **Afghanis** preferably from each of the eight **Afghani** cities: 16 total. Personal knowledge of **Afghanistan** is essential and initially may require people older than 35.

** One intelligence officer and two enlisted intelligence specialists: 24 total. (O4 or below.)

** Four Military: two officers, two enlisted: 32 total. Each officer and enlisted would form a **team** that would alternate with the other **team**-- one week in the field, one week with the cell. (O4 and E6 or below.)

** Two Foreign Service Officers: 16 total. (GS-14 or below.)

A Hunter Network: Using A Naval Culture to Destroy a Terrorist Culture

Sailors and Marines have grown up in a culture well adapted to expeditionary combat. "From the Halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli. . . ." This culture has assimilated and refined the hundreds of years of experience against unpredictable foes with obscure signatures operating in fluid, chaotic environments and cultures. Naval forces – much **smaller** than an Army or Air Force yet significantly bigger than a Special Operations Force (-45,000) have a culture bias designed to fill in the important area between the hundreds of thousands of people **on the ground** in theater and a few hundred "snake eaters" on the ground (special operations).

Naval forces have also developed highly evolved methods for searching out and destroy relatively **small** enemies hiding in fluid and highly complex environments. Presently, our anti-submarine warfare experts have the most effective understanding of how to look for patterns of where the enemy is and is not. A Hunter Network, focused on the enemy is capable of surprising him because it discerns his patterns of behavior and then anticipates his next move. A Hunter Cell does not supplant a bureaucratic **surveillance** network (**BSN**) but complements it in attacking the enemy with agility, mass, and precision **from** every available dimension to include time, sea, air, land, diplomatic, ,

A Hunter Network complements and expands the capability of a bureaucratic network built upon surveillance and reaction. This BSN is fundamentally different than a Hunter Network. A BSN is designed to perform in an environment of certainty and usually lock up when confronted uncertainty (unexpected events). A BSN requires a significant distance horn the enemy so that the BSN has sufficient time to react. A BSN looks exclusively for positive indicators – a missile plume, a rocket launcher – and then reacts. By definition, it is always a step behind the enemy and compensates for this with massive firepower. Instead of a bullet to an enemy's head, it blows up the entire building, levels an entire neighborhood, or even an entire city.

In contrast Naval culture has developed an instinctive understanding of close combat: it's too late if the CO of a submarine or a ship waits to react to **an** inbound torpedo. There are many cases where we can reacquaint ourselves with the rich combat lessons from **naval** history built upon decentralized leadership and judgment against obscure foes. Sustaining these qualities has

become difficult during a period of apparent peace and in the face of significant budgetary pressures aggressively pursuing a BSN culture. The terrorist bombing of the USS Cole has reawakened us to the need for combat force in port as well as at sea. Port calls to foreign countries bring naval forces in close contact with friends and enemies alike. Naval forces have always had a strong link to diplomats and have a significant number of people used to searching for an elusive and well-disguised enemy hiding in local cultures.

The mass of the bureaucratic surveillance network is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. The precision of a special operations force is necessary but not sufficient to win this war. A Hunter Network comprised of members from all services and Allies brings agility to our mass and precision. Built upon centuries of combat experience with a cultural bias towards decentralized warfare, naval forces can help a President ruthlessly and relentlessly search out and destroy an elusive and fanatical foe with agility, precision, and mass.

Love to all,

(b)(6)



DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEC 27 11 9:55

December 26, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Mr. (b)(6)

231.2

I am responding to your note to Mr. Aldridge regarding Mr. (b)(6) letter to Secretary Rumsfeld offering his services to the Department. You asked Mr. Aldridge if Mr. (b)(6) could be added to the DSB consultants list for future biotech initiatives.

The DSB is preparing to address two biotechnology efforts in the near future. Please be assured that (b)(6) name will be given to the DSB Chairman, Dr. Schneider, as well as the chairmen of these two efforts for consideration as a prospective study candidate.

John V. Ello
John V. Ello
Executive Director

26 DEC 01

U19819 /01



snowflake

11/2 0700
October 31, 2001 6:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

(b)(6) is a very able fellow. He could be helpful on the biotechnology thing, I think.

Thanks.

Attach. (b)(6) letter to SecDef
10/10/01

DHR:dh
103101-40

.....
Please respond by _____


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*Pete Aldridge -
Can he be added to
DSB consultants list
for biotech? Please
advise.*

Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/5270
019572 / 01

Larry Di Rita
12/7



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(b)(6)

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for your letter, your offer of assistance and your fine support. I do appreciate it a great deal.

I have asked my Special Assistant, Larry Di Rita, to see that your letter and the information gets plugged into the folks who are involved in things relating to the pharmaceutical industry. He or one of his associates will be back in touch with you.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

Rick

11-L-0559/OSD/5271



2001 OCT 12 AM 10:15



DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company

October 10, 2001

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear Don:

I obtained your number from (b)(6) with whom I consulted prior to faxing this letter. Recognizing how extraordinarily busy you are at this unprecedented time in the nation's history, I don't wish to waste your time. I cannot imagine what you must have gone through over the past month. (b)(6), however, encouraged me to volunteer what follows. In the interest of keeping this communiqué short, I'll be very forthcoming and to the point.

In the interest of

As background, I have just completed a more than one year assignment with the DuPont company in selling the pharmaceutical company to Bristol-Myers Squibb. As a result of the transaction last week, I have taken up full time residence in Chicago once again. I have formally resigned from any pharmaceutical participation at both companies and I am not currently affiliated in any management capacity with any other pharmaceutical enterprise.

the DuPont of close of

My purpose in writing is to offer my services for assessing two different channels which might be of interest to you:

els which might be

- As a contact point for your office to the American and International pharmaceutical industry. Resulting from my serving on the PhRMA Board for years and my extensive business development network, I know most of the CEOs of important global pharmaceutical companies. It seems likely that the Department of Defense will seek to collaborate with pharma companies in the uncertain times ahead. While the DOD certainly has extensive contacts with the industry, there may be occasions when you or other DOD officials may seek CEO audiences and outside opinions on matters under consideration. I would be pleased to serve as your personal emissary in this capacity and have no conflict of interest in doing so.
- As a conduit to the DuPont company. DuPont is the manufacturer of Kevlar, a material that might be expected to play an increasingly important role in building hardening and personnel protection. The company also commands an impressive array of technology and would be anxious to cooperate as a good citizen in the current emergency. Chad Holliday, DuPont CEO and a member of the Business Roundtable, is a friend and he has told me he is prepared to meet with you on short notice if you think such a meeting would serve any purpose. I would be happy to arrange such a meeting and participate if you wish.

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u17155 /01

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
October 10, 2001
Page 2

As an additional point of information, I have a very good **business relationship** with Yury Kalinin, head of the Russian company, Biopreparat. Dr. Kalinin was **head of Russia's biologicals weapons program** during much of the cold war. Most of that **production was diverted** into pharmaceutical manufacturing with collapse of the former Soviet **Union** and **G.D. Searle** formed a joint venture with Biopreparat resulting in construction and **operation of the first** pharmaceutical plant in Russia meeting GMP standards. As **heads of the JV company**, Dr. Kalinin and I forged a warm personal relationship and I visited **him many times** in Moscow. This was the basis for my participation on the U.S. Russian **Business Council** upon which both of us served. I can't imagine if such a contact might be useful to the DOD **but I would** feel comfortable in making any reasonable request of Dr. Kalinin. **He would** clearly view me differently from any more formal approaches from the U.S. government.

In making these suggestions, please be assured I will in no way **be offended** if you choose to ignore any or all of them. My motives are to simply offer them as Options at **your total discretion**.

In event of follow-up, my primary contact points and numbers in Chicago are

Home phone

Direct fax

Cell phone

Home Address

Administrative Assistant

(b)(6)

The thoughts of your many Chicago friends are with you. God **bles** you, **to** many with whom you're connected and God bless America.

(b)(6)

Original in
Special Encls.

TED STEVENS
ALASKA



UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

January 31, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
United State Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

One of the great experiences I've had was the time that I was designated as President Reagan's Representative to the Paris Air Show. It is my great hope that you will favorably consider asking President Bush to give the honor to me again this year.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ted Stevens".

Ted Stevens

snowflake

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

110.01

February 23, 2001

From: Donald Rumsfeld

To: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
The Honorable Condoleeza Rice
The Honorable Mitch Daniels
Mr. Andrew Card

FYI

W00182 01

23 Feb 01

SECDEF-
Worth reading
v/h
Craig

National Journal
February 24, 2001

Bush's Texas-Size Defense Challenges

'The bad news is, we're not getting as much for defense as we thought.'

By George C. Wilson

Imagine President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and budget chief Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. sitting around a table at the White House, talking about how to make good on Bush's campaign promise to strengthen national defense. Imagine also that their "horseholders" (eager-beaver aides) are holding thick notebooks on their laps and are sitting-but never squirming-in hard chairs behind their bosses. The conversation might well go something like this (the dialogue is fanciful but the numbers and issues are real):

Bush: OK, Dick. Give us the good news and the bad news.

Cheney: Mr. President, the good news is that everybody agrees we need to raise military pay, improve housing and health benefits, buy more new weapons, and step up research. The bad news is that we're not going to have as much money for defense as we thought,

Bush: How can that be? We've got a \$5.6 trillion surplus out there. Isn't that enough to outdo Clinton on defense?

Cheney: It is and it isn't, Mr. President. The Congressional Budget Office has indeed forecast a \$5.6 trillion surplus over the next 10 years. But about half of that amount will be in the Social Security fund, which we can't touch. So we're down to around \$3 trillion. Subtracting from that the \$400 billion surplus generated by the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, another untouchable, leaves us with \$2.5 trillion.

Bush: Still a helluva lot of money, Dick.

Cheney: Again you're right, Mr. President. But your \$1.6 trillion tax cut, together with tax credits already on the books, will pretty much eat up the surplus. We can't raise Clinton's \$3 10 billion defense budget much without going into the red, especially if inflation goes up.

Bush: Hell, you mean I won't have a dime of that \$5.6 trillion to spend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps while I'm their commander in chief?

Cheney: That's pretty much the case, Mr. President, unless we cut some programs.

Bush: Is Dick right, Mitch?

Daniels: Dick could be off a little on his numbers, depending on the economy, Mr. President, But this is roughly where we are, sir. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a pretty good private outfit not under the thumb of the defense contractors, ran numbers that are close to our own. It concluded that we'll be lucky if we can increase the defense budget by 1 percent a year, after allowing for inflation.

Bush: Damn! Then what do we cut to get money for my boys? You know, they really love me out there. I got more hoo-ahs from them last week than Clinton got in his whole life. And don't tell me to cut education or Social Security or to give up my tax cut.

Horseholder: Our latest polls, Mr. President, show that people outside the Beltway are much more concerned about money for education and Social Security than they are about national defense.

Bush: I know, I know. But help me. Find me some more money for the military. And don't forget we've got to build a missile defense system, too.

Powell: Why not yank some of those nuclear missiles out of the ground? The Air Force boys have been silent silo-sitters long enough. The MX missile would come down under START II, anyhow, and it's costing us millions to keep all those Minuteman missiles from rotting. We've got plenty of nukes in submarines; we still have plenty for bombers. Our new precision-guided weapons can take out anything we want to without using nukes.

Rumsfeld: Careful, Colin. We don't want to give the Russians ideas or panic the Europeans

Powell: Where are they going to go? The Russians have to take down their nukes-they can't afford to keep them. The Europeans shouldn't be telling us what to do, anyway; they're not spending any real money on defense. They can't even hold up their end on simple bombing raids. They were pathetic during Desert Storm and Kosovo.

Cheney: We could, and probably should, reduce our nuclear forces, Colin. Taking them off alert would take some strain off the Air Force and make the world breathe easier. And you're right. We don't need all those 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads out there. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff have signed off on going down to the START III limit of 2,500 to 3,000.

Horseholder: Yes, Mr. Vice President, but Congress in the fiscal 2001 defense authorization forbade us from going below the START I level of 6,000 strategic warheads until Russia approved START II, a treaty that would take us down to no more than 3,500 warheads on each side. Our Senate ratified START II in 1996. The Russians finally approved START II in April, but they attached strings. The strings have hung up START II. So, Mr. President, technically you can't get rid of our excess warheads without breaking the law.

Bush: That's crazy. Let's get some people from the Hill down here and get rid of that restriction.

Cheney: We'll do that, Mr. President. It should be easy. It was really just anti-Clinton language. But I have to warn you, sir, that getting rid of some nukes-even though it's the right thing to do at this time-won't gain us much spending money. The nukes are already paid for. We need to cut something big that hasn't been paid for.

Powell: How about your old favorite target, Mr. Vice President, the Marines' V-22 Osprey? That thing is going to bankrupt the Corps. Tell 'em to buy Blackhawk helicopters for one-fourth the price.

Cheney: Been there, tried that, Colin. So did Harold Brown when he had Rummy's job. The Marines rolled both of us. Getting the Osprey has become a test of their manhood.

Powell: But how about confronting the Marines with a choice: "You can have either the Osprey or the Joint Strike Fighter, but not both"?

Bush: How much money we talking about here?

Cheney: The Osprey, including what we've already put in it, is going to cost us about \$38 billion for 458 aircraft, or \$83 million each. The Joint Strike Fighter program could run \$200 billion if we did what Clinton planned to do, and that was to buy 3,000 of them.

Bush: Holy cow! Two hundred billion? Now there's some real money we can put in pay, housing, readiness, and hardware.

Horscholder: We hear the Joint Strike Fighter is running way above original cost estimates, something like \$4 billion over.

Cheney: Sounds like the Navy A-12 I canceled in 1991 because nobody could tell me what it would end up costing.

Bush: So why not cancel the Joint Strike Fighter?

Rumsfeld: The Marines would go ballistic, Mr. President. They refused to buy the Navy F/A-18 E and F, for fear of losing their own Marine air force to the Navy. They've been counting on the Joint Strike Fighter.

Bush: Well, hell, Don. Everybody can't get everything they want. Give them the Osprey and tell them to make do with the Navy's new F-18 instead of the Joint Strike Fighter.

Rumsfeld: I could do that, Mr. President, but we have only two companies left that can build an airplane from scratch: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. With no JSF, Lockheed might go under. Then we've got no competition.

Bush: Wait a minute, now. Lockheed has the F-22, the C-130, and it still builds the F-16 in Fort Worth. Boeing has a lot of transport orders, including the C-17.

Horscholder: I think the worry is that we won't have competing fighter designs, Mr. President. Also, remember that some of our European friends have put money in the Joint Strike Fighter.

Powell: You could save big bucks if you canceled the Air Force F-22 fighter and stopped building those \$2 billion attack submarines, Mr. President. The modernized F-16 is plenty good enough for anything it would be up against. And because the Russians nowadays don't have many subs at sea, our attack subs aren't kept all that busy. So why keep buying them for \$2 billion apiece?

Cheney: We're pretty far down the road on the F-22, Colin. And the theater commanders keep asking for more attack subs to listen in on the bad guys.

Bush: What's the F-22 going to cost us?

Horscholder: About \$62 billion for 341 airplanes.

Powell: That makes it almost \$200 million a fighter. Who's out there to challenge us? Nobody. And what about the Army? If you want to transform it into something lighter and better, you have to give it more money.

Rumsfeld: We could buy fewer F-22s. Treat them as silver bullets to be saved for special occasions, as we're doing with the F-117 Stealth bomber.

Cheney: That's what Clinton did-just cut down on the number of F-22s you buy.

Bush: Can't do that, then. Well, I guess we could. If I stop building subs, I'll have [Sen.] John Warner on my neck. My Dad told me Warner worked out a deal to have half the subs built in his home state, at Newport News, Va., rather than building all of them at Electric Boat in Connecticut. Wouldn't mind stiffing Connecticut and Joe Lieberman, though. Give me a paper on what I'd save by cutting back on the F-22 and new subs.

Cheney: We haven't talked about how to pay for national missile defense, Mr. President, when we have to pay big bucks to actually deploy it.

Bush: Why not trade the Joint Strike Fighter for NMD? Give me a paper on that, too.

Cheney: We haven't talked about the big death spiral we're in, either, Mr. President. It's costing us more to keep old planes flying than we paid for them in the first place. Yet the new planes cost so much, that we can't afford to replace the old ones one-for-one. Unless we find a lot more money, the only way out is to make the Air Force and Navy air forces smaller so that they won't need so many planes and pilots. We could end up with not enough Navy planes to put on all our carriers, though.

Rumsfeld: The same thing is happening in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, Mr. President.

Horseholder: The Army is bloated with headquarters staff. It would be better off if we ordered another downsizing. Wouldn't hurt them to cancel the Crusader artillery rig, too. It's too heavy to get anywhere in a hurry-and will cost some \$4 billion. We could save the Navy money if we slowed up the electric drive DD-21 destroyer. The admirals are fighting the idea of manning it with only 95 people anyhow; they say you need more sailors aboard to win a battle.

Bush: So you want me to pull a Clinton and downsize, do you? Well, hell, if that's the right way to go, give me a paper on it. I told 'em I'd make the military leaner and meaner. Next meeting, we'll talk about bringing more of our troops home. You say I can't pull troops out of the Balkans without panicking the Europeans, but how about from Korea? Do we still need 37,000 troops there, after all this time? I want to surprise everybody by shaking up the military. Hey, they can't fire me for four years. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't like it, I'll remind them we still have civilian control of the military in this country. Now, everybody get out of here. I need to pump some iron.

stowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

March 12, 2001

FAX TRANSMISSION

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Margaret Thatcher Speech

350.001

Mr. President, attached are some remarks by Margaret Thatcher, given earlier this month, which I found to be on the mark. I thought you might enjoy reading them.

Attach.

DHR:dh
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PROJECT FORT H E

NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

Speech To The Royal United Services Institute
On Receiving the **Chesney Gold Medal**

Margaret Thatcher
March 1, 2001

In peacetime, war is regarded by many as too remote a possibility to merit much consideration. During such periods, the case for defense-preparedness is more **difficult** but it has to be made. Today, there is an additional factor: the public is encouraged in its sense of security by a body of expert opinion which suggests that political and economic change make future wars unlikely, even impossible. In the Global Village, peace will reign between the **neighbors**. Or so we're told.

Such factors help explain the low levels of defense expenditure in many **European** countries. They also account for the lack of realism in much of the debate about security **issues**. But let me **turn** to current threats.

Iraq

Recently, British airmen have been engaged over Iraq. I strongly support that U.S.-British action. Saddam Hussein counts as unfinished business. He is neither manageable nor, in the long term, containable. He has to be removed. It is because he himself knows this that Saddam will never ease up his pressure on us. We for our part can hardly expect otherwise. Saddam knows **the score** - - even if some of our more faint-hearted allies don't.

Not to have responded to Saddam's attacks on our aircraft would have been seen by him as a sign of weakness. Failure to act would almost certainly have been followed by further provocation. Like all political strongmen **who** rule by force and fear, he must **constantly** demonstrate his strength -- or perish.

Having just attended the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait, and having heard the latest information, I am convinced that present policies should not be weakened. On the **contrary**, they must be strengthened. Let's remember that Saddam has only recently renewed his spurious claim to Kuwait. And let's not forget either **how** much mischief he can do in that **strategically vital** but politically fragile region

Missile Defense

The perceived erosion, over the last few years, of international cooperation to control Saddam may well have encouraged others to think that the West can be defied, even by a defeated minor power. At the same time, **the ability** of such powers to acquire the technology to build weapons of mass destruction, and to target them by ballistic **missiles** against our **forces**, our allies, and even our cities, has grown alarmingly. That is **why** the creation of a system of global missile defense is a matter of urgent necessity.

As you will have gathered, I do not share the widespread nostalgia for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Far from regarding it as a cornerstone of stability -- to use the **well-**

-2-

worn cliché -- I view it as an outmoded relic. Its principal architect, Henry Kissinger, has acknowledged as much.

On this side of the Atlantic, there is a tendency to suggest that the problem of proliferation can be solved by diplomatic means and by control regimes designed to halt the flow of military technology. The possibilities of controlling proliferation by such means were always much slimmer than the optimists thought. Now they are all but a dead letter.

To me, it is strange that European states have so enthusiastically lined up with Russia and China in opposing America's plans for a system of missile defense -- plans which would increase our safety. We should, in fact, be particularly keen to see ourselves included within a truly global system.

The last U.S. Administration's plans did not offer that, and would have therefore left us exposed. So I applaud the vision of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld in seeking to create a missile shield which would protect America's allies and our deployed forces, as well as the American homeland. I hope that America's European allies can now jolt themselves from their

NATO & EU

This brings me to a further area of concern: the plans for a European Rapid Reaction Force. This is a matter, I know, on which friends may differ. But it is surely cause for concern that the understanding of what is proposed varies so enormously. Indeed, the public could be forgiven for thinking that there are two plans: one for strengthening NATO, and one for creating a rival organization to it.

My own view is that if the Europeans truly wish to improve their NATO contribution they can show it simply enough. They can increase defense expenditure. They can move more swiftly to establish professional armed forces like those of the United Kingdom. And they can acquire more advanced technology. Indeed, unless that happens soon, the gulf between European and U.S. capabilities will yawn so wide that it will not be possible to share the same battlefield.

Conclusion

I conclude where I began: in peacetime it is difficult for the nation to imagine our likely needs in war. At such times, there is a tendency for defense spending to fall to dangerously low levels; for strategic thinking to remain in a time-warp; and for unrealistic ideas about how armed forces should be organized to take root. All these temptations must be resisted.

snowflake

March 18, 2001 2:07 PM

TO: Honorable John Di Iulio
Assistant to the President and Director,
Community Faith-Based Initiatives

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Challenge Matching Grants

John, I received this letter in the mail, which falls in your area of responsibility. I know nothing more than what the letter says, so I will leave it in your capable hands.

I hope we have a chance to visit soon.

Regards.

Enclosure

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11-L-0559/OSD/5294

March 9, 2001

Dear ~~Donald~~, *Don*

First congratulations, from both (b)(6) and me-the only problem we see in your appointment is that you probably will not be spending much time in New Mexico.

As you might suspect, I have ~~begin~~ to 'work with the New Mexico Community Foundation and its dynamic Executive Director, Father Robert Stark. I am writing you as the only person I know in the Bush Administration with an idea that Father Stark and I have developed relating to the President's Faith-Based Initiative.

As you may know, when I was at the Trust, I established a very successful program with suburban Churches utilizing their benevolent support of non-religious inner-city social services to establish Church endowment funds at the Trust, while at the same time, providing current support to the intended inner-city needs

Without boring you with the details, the program works **as** follows:

- If Church X had \$40,000 to give to five inner-city social service agencies, it would instead give the funds to a new Church Endowment Fund at the Trust.
- The new Endowment Fund would be a "donor advised" fund with the Church X members as **advisors** to be used in perpetuity for inner-city non-religious purposes.
- In return, the Trust would give each of the five designated agencies, 1 ½ times what the Church X had intended (a total of \$60,000)

A Win-Win situation for all: the Church X **not** only is responsible for helping the agencies, but establishes an endowment for future support; the agencies got 50% more than what they **otherwise** would have gotten; and the Trust supports agencies that, it was created to support.

Well, what Father Stark and I have done is apply this concept in a somewhat broader manner, utilizing both private and federal government funds in a way **that both** supports agencies and creates specific endowments for their future support. We believe a pilot effort under the President's Initiative could be quite worthwhile and meet many, if not all his objectives. Thus this letter is asking for your help in getting to the right-person in the right way.

I am enclosing a memo from Father Stark and me further outlining this effort. We were wondering what you might suggest about sending this material to Senator Domenici, who **often** attends Father Stark's parish and of **course** has an interest in human services in New Mexico.

I very much appreciate any help you can give. Our very ~~best~~ to Joyce,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OS/D/5295

MEMO: February 9, 2001

RE: Challenge Matching Grants to Faith-Based Communities for Building Endowments to Sustain Charitable Works Ministries.

From its inception, the New Mexico Community Foundation (NMCF) has been involved with Faith-Based Communities (e.g. NMCF's first initiative was the Cornerstones Project which helped communities develop around the renovation of their places of worship). In the past year, two Protestant ministers were elected to NMCF's Board of Directors and they have expressed interest in NMCF supporting Faith-Based philanthropy.

This interest has been further stimulated by President Bush's recent Executive Order creating a White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and establishing Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in five Federal agencies "to ensure greater cooperation between the government and independent sector." It has also been reported that the Bush Administration plans to set up a Compassion Capital Fund, a public-private partnership that will match federal funds with private money to pay for increased management assistance to help small community and Faith-Based groups "increase their capacity, improve their competence, and expand their programs."

NMCF is currently concentrating on helping communities sustain their good works by building permanent or endowment funds. Fortunately for NMCF, there exists a remarkably successful precedent in Chicago of a community foundation assisting Faith-Based communities in building endowments by providing the incentive of matching funds. The Chicago experience has inspired NMCF to consider the following:

- NMCF would apply to a national foundation (e.g. the Lilly Foundation) for a substantial grant (e.g. \$500,000) in order to be able to provide challenge/matching grants to Faith-Based Communities. Once this grant was secured,
- NMCF would approach Faith-Based Communities who had specific programs addressing the needs of low-income communities which might be interested in applying for federal monies under the Bush Administration's new initiatives (e.g. The New Mexico Conference on Churches-NMCC Storehouse and the Catholic Diocese St. Vincent De Paul Societies which serve the indigent and low-income persons in need of emergency housing, food and transportation).
- If these communities were going to become involved in the Bush Initiatives, NMCF would offer them a special incentive package that would build both their management capacity and their long-term sustainability by:
 - a) offering to match every dollar that Faith-Based community donors give to a permanent (endowment) fund in NMCF to sustain their respective charitable works (e.g. an endowment fund to support the NMCC Storehouse).
 - b) offering additional monies for specialized technical assistance to help the Faith-Based Communities enhance their financial infrastructure for the complex accurate accounting needed to meet Federal auditing requirements which accompany most Federal funding.

These matching funds would thus a) increase the management capacity, b) build towards long-term sustainability, and c) help prevent dependency on Federal funding by providing a growing option of endowment support for future funding.

"El Componente Militar Latino Americano y la Seguridad Hemisférica"



PRESENTATION

Under a solidary and brotherly Hemisphere, we take advantage of this opportunity to present to all the gentlemen Ministers of Defense of the Americas and other Delegation members, our most cordial regards. At the same time, we wish to convey the purpose of our country, and mostly of our Armed Forces, that is, to contribute to the study of conjunctural problems and phenomena that affect our historical space and time in regards to the hemispheric security issue, within a global common interest that was assertively outlined for this encounter.

“The Latin American Military Component and the Hemispheric Security”, is the issue that we are going to deal with in this Conference, we address this matter in order to analyze the political, military, social, economic and environmental variables presently in our context, which by no means disregard the most outstanding events occurred in the nineties. They were especially marked by the “Unipolar Moment” in the military strategic field and by the region’s necessity to adopt a new Hemispheric Security Agenda, Without irrational confrontations and always pointing towards a common goal of well-being, this Agenda will provide dignity, sovereignty, self-determination and independence to all our countries, under the slogan “Attain Peace without doing War”.



ISMAEL ELIÉZER HURTADO SOUCRE
Major General
Minister of Defense


Consequently, and along with a previous analysis of the Mutual Assistance Interamerican Treaty, and hence, due to its incapacity to give an adequate response regarding

the security issues in the region, we wish to respectfully state in front of this distinguished Assembly, an analogous proposal in order to create a security system in the region, established upon the regional autonomous integration and state security.

All the above mentioned requires the conjunction of great shared efforts in the international political and military area, so as to find immediate, just and viable solutions for the region.

We are sure to find echo to our thoughts in this Assembly, wherein all its participants are motivated in reaching the goals demanded, at this moment, by the hemisphere, and to conquer the challenges it generates in our countries.

We wish to reaffirm our solidarity and also to express our highest personal esteem. We are Sure that the Delegation of our country, Venezuela, will be in the alert so as to work together for a shared hemispheric cause that can be translated into well-being, peace and development for our peoples and nations.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournes", written over a faint, illegible typed name. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, rounded initial 'R'.

THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY COMPONENT AND THE HEMISPHERE SECURITY

Introduction:


As a result of the development of historical events that have occurred since 1980, the international political system is experimenting, presently, the so called "Unipolar Moment" in the military strategic camp, which generates favorable conditions because it means that only one global power may implement the use of force with almost absolute autonomy. However, this fact jeopardizes the world because it affects the military security of the states, and therefore, the governments of Latin American whose armed components are called upon to propose a rational answer so as to provide a "relative security" for the countries in the region. This is notably different from the heterodox and ambiguous military security that has prevailed in the region since the beginning of the Cold War but, by no means, should it be considered as an affront or as an exclusion.

The predominant unipolar moment in the system implies changes in the institutions, processes, systems as well as in the strategies to give power to the security because the state-nations, in an absolute strategic sense, have the obligation to create new conceptions in order to obtain security, and also peace and development required by their people.

The regional events, according to the situational and historical analysis, require that the Latinamerican leaders make decisions in order to deal with the complexities and changes that, after the Cold War, have evolved in the strategic sphere and that have had an impact on the geopolitical, geo-economical and military issues that affect the regional security.

Security, collective or not, cooperative or hegemonic, agreed upon or forced, multipolar or unipolar, has become a great concern among the complex issues that presently are attended by the leaders of the nation-states. They have realized that the present international situation is distinguished by a new strategic political realism that demands intense studies. Moreover, delicate processes of decision-making are required to grant state security. Up to now, and due to their interdependence, leaders have to comply with much wider and sensitive security issues than in the past.

Latin America, according to the above-mentioned reality, is compelled to define a new concept of Hemispheric Security. Within that concept, regional mechanisms are required in order to facilitate a cooperation to pursue, not only joint interests but also to understand the nation-states as units with an international political equality in the region and to establish rules of behavior, so as to encourage a permanent, solidary and continuous assistance among themselves.



ARV BE - 11 BUQUE ESCUELA "SIMON BOLIVAR" AMBASSADOR OF THE SEAS.

Latin America, as a region, has the commitment to build a new security system. It is a latent debt owned in the zone because of the pragmatism that the United States has had in handling the hemispheric security issue, which confirms the inoperative and obsolete Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (MAIT), thus proving the need to evaluate the so called interamerican security subsystem.

Traditional thinkers, as well as modern ones, agree in granting the security concept a vital importance, especially in regards to the Security System.

Stephen Krasner¹ confirms that *"a security regime involves those principals, rules, norms and decision-making processes that lead the nations to limit their behaviour in an atmosphere of mutual trust"*, and therefore, placing beforehand the collective interest over the national interest, and respecting the principle of self-determination and sovereignty of the nation-states.

Latin America, according to the above-mentioned reality, is compelled to define a new concept of Hemispheric Security. Within that concept, regional mechanisms are required in order to facilitate a cooperation to pursue, not only joint interests but also to understand the nation-states as units with an international political equality in the region and to establish rules of behavior, so as to encourage a permanent, solidary and continuous assistance among themselves. The Latin American countries should assume this challenge as a formula in order to not arrive late and unprotected again while facing the great changes of the post-modern era. The security, and therefore the supporting security system, not only has to

¹KRASNER, Stephen D. 'Structural Conflict. The Third World against global liberalism'. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, Page 4.

deal with the military as it was traditionally considered to do, but also with the political, economic, environmental and social areas. It must be additionally endowed with a vision of the future whereupon the leading class may be capable of directing the necessary actions to obtain welfare, peace and the development of its peoples.

In this **context**, a competent proposal should be oriented towards the adoption of a new security agenda in the Hemisphere. This would help to reach a decision in agreement to the issues considered, **that is**, the strategic-political reality that reflects the obsolescence of the MAIT as a security system treaty, the new facts arisen after the Cold War and the voluntary desire to form a regional integration. It should also take into account the effects of these variables in the structure of a new Security System and should consider the subregional characteristics. It should promote, in a sole dimension, the necessary mechanisms and instruments for the security and defense of Latin America as a region.

Political-Strategic Transformations and Hemispheric Security

At present, due to the intra and interstate faults in the security system, the International Political System has had to face complex conflicts in the Balkans², Sierra Leona, Phillipines, Colombia or Chiapas, all of which reflect a security fragility and, consequently, demonstrates the importance it has for the nation-states and for the International Community.

The International Political System has not been able to cope with the difficult issues; it has been inadequate and very distressful in many different ways and in such diverse regions in the world. On the one hand, it has not been able to create suitable political-institutional answers to avoid the use of force; and, on the other hand, experience **has** shown that, contrary to the desires of the International Community, force has been used to compensate, on numerous occasions, the enormous international political sense of void. The relationship between the use of force and the international crises of security gets increasingly narrower This can be shown through the usage of armed components in operations of difficult implementation, such as, Peace Making, Peace Keeping or Peace Enforcement, or in those circumstances linked to the Promotion of Environmental Security. This situation demonstrates that the International Political System has severe limitations in complying with its vital function of maintaining peace and society values³; the System has been indefinite in regards to some of its political objectives and has had difficulty to implement them.

The incompetency of the International Political System is analyzed by international thinkers such as: Charles Krauthammer who, regarding the insecurity sensation, questions the capacity of the United Nations as the organism that guarantees the security and the international order. He

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points out the fact that "The *United Nations do not guarantee anything because if multilateralism really existed, there would be a genuine coalition of equivalent partners comparable in size and strength.*"⁴ As a result, the interpretations that exist on security and order, among other issues, are the product of privileges that exist among the permanent members of the Security Council, who have comparative advantages and are significantly superior to those who are not, and are in favor of the consecution of its national interests. Hence, experience has shown that the political, ethnic, religious, historical and economic conflicts that undermine the security within the convulsive present system, cannot be managed under the concept of the traditional security agenda; its enforcement, far from solving the issues, has generated a deep void that is reflected, likewise, on the American continent level, mostly due to the absence of its own security system adjusted to the recent and latent political changes experienced in some nations within the region.


Profile of Changes

The second half of the eighties surprised the world with many events, such as, the Perestroika implementation and the downfall of the Berlin Wall, thus disappearing the serious East-West ideological confrontation. The reunification of Germany emerged as an evidence of the changes occurring around the world, and subtracting the viability of the international security existing at that time. Analogous to the end of the Cold War, two phenomena happened in the world: an extraordinary technological development and a prevailing free trade market. It had sustained effects on the international political system, but no established answers to face the multiple and complex changes arising so quickly, and which apparently, the present system cannot seem to manage.

The conflicts have multiplied and diversified in an assymetric and chronic form, creating tensions, crises and wars; hence, the security issue has become one of the priorities of the nation-states. These countries, in the presence of such disorders, have the tendency to perform in a traditional manner, that is, by employing their armed forces as a via to recover stability, even if the causes affecting the security are not in the military order.

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⁴ KRAUTHAMMER, Charles "The Unipolar moment", page 297 in Rethinking America's Security.



ARV T-62 ESEQUIBO BOARDING PEOPLE DECEMBER 15 th 1999 AFTER THE VARGAS STATE TRAGEDY.

security unbalance, independently from the profile or reasons of change or of the developing crisis.

At times, the new international system, as regards to its security, is fately considered unipolar in the military strategic field, and because of the unusual utilization of the military capacity with its processes, adapt&ions and rearrangements, it tends to constrain its typical security unbalances. As a consequence of this process, the nation-states must be aware of the necessity to clearly understand the present phenomenom and compare it with other tendencies, in order to find solutions in regards to the strategic-military complexity and to the insecurity perceived at the moment.

The unipolar moment, defined as the unique capacity of autonomy that the United States of North America has to concentrate, coordinate and execute military operations in any scale and in any part of the world, and capable of obtaining a military victory, is in reality and at present, facing a contraposition: the virtual hegemony in the appliance of military power, the old fighting forms that have arisen even more sophisticated than before, the appearance of new forms of battle, such as the cibernetic or information wars, that use assymetric capacities and chronic spectrums. On top of all this, it calls to attention that in recent dates, despite obtaining forceful military victories, strategic objectives seem impossible to reach, so conflicts tend to remain latent, notwithstanding the tactical victories, which reaffirms what Carl Von Clausewitz sustains: *"In the war the results are never final"*⁵. Consequently, the state-nations have an urge to emphasize the search for a new security system model so as to guarantee its territorial defense, its self-determination capacity and a rational exercise of its sovereignty.

On top of all this, it calls to attention that in recent dates, despite obtaining forceful military viatories, strategic objectives seem impossible to reach, so conflicts tend to remain latent, notwithstanding the tactical viatories, which reaffirms what Carl Von Clausewitz sustains: 'In the war the results are never final'⁵.

The New Agenda for Hemispheric Security will no longer be affected by the rivalry between two superpowers, so ideologically different, and within the frame of a latent nuclear threat and having to face the ideological competition between capitalism and socialism.

This time, the Latin American military and political leadership, with creative genius, takes into consideration the conception of geographical regions with similar historic, ethnic and cultural identities, and also considers its geopolitical perceptions and shared interests (what Barry Buzan calls "*Regional International Sub-systems*"⁶). It acknowledges great importance to the cooperation with other relevant parties that form part of the global, continental and regional system; it has the obligation to build its own system in order to reach security and to successfully cope with the unbalances that it reflects at the present time. This articulation¹ that has already been functioning in the world for fifteen years, with perverse affects on the Interamerican System demands, leads necessarily to the proposal of long term political strategic solutions.

Strategies of the Unipolar Moment

The acknowledged strategies within the Hemispheric Security system implemented, primarily, by the United States, seem to have derived from its Foreign Policies held since 1823 along with the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine⁷. Since then, in Latin America it is possible to identify the predominion of the North American military power by means of an imperialist foreign policy⁸, of territorial expansion, military conquest and the construction of an American community under its optic. This policy afterwards became the "Good Neighbor Thesis" held by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And, later on, with the connotations of the Cold War until the end of the latter, and due to the failure and division of the old U.S.S.R., the sole hegemony of the United States arises and a new stage introduces itself, known as the Post Cold War, wherein it seemed obligatory to elaborate a New Agenda for the Hemispheric Security as an alternative to contra attack its effects.

The New Agenda, then, seems to be the great historical opportunity that international realism imposes upon the Latin American state-nations for the definition of the New Security System for the Hemispheric. The New Agenda for Hemispheric Security that the state-nations of this continent must build should have a strategic form and contents designed according to the new global relationships among the Latin American countries and the world. Thus, the integration experiences of Europe, Asia and Africa, besides having a definitive regional political integration will, it must play a fundamental role in the decision-making so as to obtain immediate and necessary definitions for the Hemispheric Security.

The New Agenda for Hemispheric Security will no longer be affected by the rivalry between two superpowers, so ideologically different, and within the frame of a latent nuclear threat and having to face the ideological competition between capitalism and socialism. Neither will it have to face a world with such wide and well established opposing fields charged

⁶BUZAN, Barry. "People, State & Fear". Lynne Reinner Publishers. Bouldon, Colorado. Chapter 5.

⁷ AGUIRRE, Indalecio Lievano. "Bolivarismo y Monroismo". Biblioteca Venezolana de la Historia. Caracas, 1971.

⁸SMITH, Peter "Talons of the Eagle. N.Y. Oxford University Press. 2000. Pages 14-22.

with so much aggressiveness, and much less to cope with the possibility of an immediate or mediate use of mutual nuclear capacities, not even under the risk of a great conventional war. The situation has been completely modified and the military science and art on Hemispheric Security have changed considerably. This fact demands the adoption of a New Agenda for the Security of the Latin American Hemisphere, **that** without any doubt, should be used as "*a unique strategic opportunity*"⁹ for the continent and Latin American states.

The Hemispheric Security in the Security Regime (MAIT):

The regional Hemispheric Security continues, as of this date, to consider the Mutual Assistance Interamerican Treaty (MAIT), despite its evident obsolescence. In such manner, the fundamental antologic and strategic principle of MAIT is based upon the Monroe Doctrine born in 1947, which coincides with the beginning of the Cold War. In its structure, **this** instrument intends to be "*a treaty destined to prevent and repress the threats and acts of aggression against any country of America*"¹⁰, which involves the usage of armed components to liberate wars against foreign enemies, assuming as conflict model the II World War, wherein the nuclear escalation had **not** even started yet. It was the ideological moment having the East-West face to face, where Capitalism opposed Socialism and the uselessness of the nuclear capacity was not even considered yet.

All along its contents, the MAIT exhorts the cooperation of the Hemisphere. Its articles 1 and 6 expressly forbid threat recurrence and the use of force, implying the territory inviolability, territory integrity, the sovereign and political independence of all the states within the American Continent. Based upon these considerations, the MAIT, as the Security Regime for the Hemisphere, should have functioned as an international regime, in which all the states of **the** continent had the obligation to comply with and observe the principles, norms and collective decisions, since the interests of all the American nations agreed on this system. However, the reality has been quite different. In spite of the governments leadership and the fact that MAIT forced them to be linked and united in an indissoluble way in order to comply with the norms and principles of the system, this has not happened, and if it has, its application has been bevelled.

Instead of the the United States understanding the MAIT more as an international security system, it **has** rather interpreted the Treaty as a group of joint norms that had to be modified according to its own interpretation, to its own interests at the time and to its power capacity. Therefore, the United States has generated changes in the norms and in the decision making process, modifying the MAIT Security System for the Hemisphere, as many times as it



NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS DURING A CIVIC ACTION WITH THE ABORIGINES FROM THE ETHNICAL GROUP YEKUANA, "LA ESMERALDA" AMAZONAS STATE

11-L-0559/OSD/5314

felt its interests threatened or when there existed a determined perception or "*mistaken perception*"¹¹, in relation to a political or strategic fact in the Hemisphere. As a consequence, its structure as a security system differs from the opinion that some authors have on this matter, such as, Stephen D. Krasner and Robert Jervis, for whom this concept implies not only the norms and expectations to facilitate cooperation, but rather as a guide towards a regional interest rather than a national one. These changes have been altering the Security System and, therefore, have weakened it, so it is not consistent with its contents, and a great difference is shown between the System per se and the behavior performed by its parties.

Perversions of the MAIT as a Security System

The obsolescence of the MAIT as a Security System derives, not only from the changes experienced in regards to the principals that lead to its creation, but also in the profound transformations that have characterized the international and regional atmosphere, especially in the last few years, which differ, considerably, from those principals that at first encouraged its application.

In its condition as a superpower, the MAIT should have been understood by the United States, and therefore, as the hegemonic nation of the hemisphere, it should have been considered it as a priority, moreover, because it could have regulated the general environment as well as the particular one, and would have legitimized the status-quo established in its articles. However, the reality turned out to be quite another. The decisions made by the United States devaluated the MAIT, and nowadays it is no longer conceived as a viable system. Besides, the United States has perceived this and, in consequence, has taken actions, based upon the fact that its security will be greater the more its presence extends and dominates the Latin American sphere. This belief goes along with the unceasing search for a transculturalization and economic imposition in order to obtain the exploitation and production of resources of their own interest, and to have cheap labor or to export industries that cause great pollution in the ecosystems. In its performance, mutual assistance does not exist in the MAIT. Cooperation is forced upon and the priorities respond only to the of the United States; then, it is obvious that this system tends to die and on top of all, there is the passivity that the nations of the region have assumed while facing this situation.

A typical example of lack of reciprocity, cooperation and interpretation of priorities for the Security System, is noticeable in the conditioning of policies and also in the contempt shown by the United States in the enforcement of its functions to face the problems of hemispheric security: This behavior has reinforced the traditional North American position of trying to maintain the regional security at a minimum cost, implementing transitoral steps, many of which violated the international law or were an attempt against the sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples and even more so, against human rights, so as to have more attention over its other global priorities.

Since then, the United States, who had seriously compromised Latin American as a regional hemisphere during the Cold War, stopped to observe it as a center of ideological affront between the East and West. This situation leads Latin America and the United States to impose the construction of a New Regime for the Hemispheric Security, that necessarily must

¹¹ JERVITS, Robert. "International Regimes". Cornell University Press. London. 1986. Pages 173-176.

surpass the MAIT.

A New System for the Hemispheric Security must consider the transitorial interdependency, in the frame of mind that the security should not exclusively involve the military aspect, but rather it should converge diverse issues, such as, technology, investments, identity of the nations, a balance of the development of the nation-states of Latin America and a reinterpretation of the military components, redefining its dimension and visualization. It is not risky to confirm, at present, that uncertainty prevails in regards to the Security of the Hemisphere. No common codes exist in relation to mutual behavior in the security system in general, although substantial goals have been obtained in the bilateral fields. Perhaps, what seems to appear and take shape in this complex issue regarding the necessity of a New System for the Hemispheric Security, is the voluntary feeling of integration that the Latin American political class has, shown through concrete facts, such as, the creation of institutions, agreements and permanent forums (Contadora Group, Group of Eight, SELA, the Summit of Latin American Presidents and periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense of Latin America, among others). This will help, with no doubt at all, in the construction of the Security System and, besides, it will allow to establish the strategic limits in regards to the Latinamerican and regional hemispheric security. As of now, it can be confirmed that the Latin American military component needs to keep a sharp lookout over the complex work regarding military diplomacy.

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The Hemispheric Security and Integration in Latin America

First of all, the Hemispheric Security has to do with the integration of Latin America, it forms part of it and requires a new military strategic agenda on the security issue for the XXI century. The cooperation and integration are fundamental in order **that** the regional interests prevail over the national ones and may become an unavoidable strategic reality .

In the Letter of Jamaica of the year 1815, Simon Bolivar, with his clear conception of the political space that Latin America occupied, proposed the integration of all these nation-states in order to create a sole new nation. Since then, the unification issue has raised again as a challenge, as a means of rescuing the deviated political objective. It is the opportunity to counter-attack the external pressures, the internal pettiness and the occasion arises to understand the historical demands, aspiring towards an appropriate philosophy, institutions, procedures and adequate structures, so that the political integration, even with all its imperfections, give way to a sole new actor in the role of International Security, having Latin America integrated as a region.

It can be confirmed that the Latin American integration is the

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS



renaissance of old ideas, but the fact that they are being renewed by the representatives of the Latin American military bases, generates a great institutional and political responsibility. This means to construct an strategic conceptualization and to know how to interpret the complexity of this international moment, but also, to accept the process and understands the integration condition as the means to adopt permanent regulations in the tactic and strategic employment of statal military abilities in the region. In addition, this responsibility implies the fact of giving up the use of violence in a unilateral way, giving priviledge to the establishment of centralized organisms so as to coordinate the actions to be taken and favoring the execution of combined operations, according to a new regional strategic concept. As of this moment, the integration extended to the mi-litary component will cope with the regional threats and will avoid the interregional or intrastate conflicts. That regional military component will acquire aptitudes and attitudes that will help to grant priority to the regional interests over the national ones. The regional integration and the hemisferic security will have a mutual reinforcement so as to neutralize the concept of *"reserved dominion"*¹² that, up to now, have branded upon the Latin Americans and that some international political actors have used and exercised, obtaining their



MIRAGE 50 TAKE OFF FROM THE AIR BASE LIBERTADOR

¹² PUIG, Juan Carlos. "Integración Latinoamericana y Región Internacional". Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas, 1987. Págs. 390-391.

legitimization in the United Nations, despite the concept of justice that rules the letter of the United Nations.¹³

The heterodox Hemispheric Security imposed in a hegemonic manner and suffered by the Latin American nation-states for so many years, would lead to a new conception that would enable the autonomic integration of the region, that is, by via of shared values, even in the military area, and with the necessary alliances, an Hemispheric Security could be reached, including the Military Security. This means, that even if the differences and asimetrics regarding military capacity among states do matter, historical values, sovereignty, legitimacy, the attachment to democratic values and the south-south cooperation, would lead us at the end to give up the statal individual military performance in favor of a sole strategic regional military performance and with a sense of permanency.

The autonomous regional integration would demand the reevaluation of the military components in the region. In this manner, it means to employ the intensity of the autonomous characteristics of the states and the commitment of its military forces in order to reach the integrationism goal. The integration established as such, through the regional autonomy, would lead to a strategic confrontation, similar to the one lived in Europe at the moment, but this defiance would be compensated through alliances so that misgivings and deprivations, existing up to now in the region, could be duly solved.

The autonomous integration could make little progress in regards to the authoritative capacities established by the International Political System, since it would mean the use of relative power also of objective-power that Latin America has today in its integration. Therefore, the value would not lie in the weaknesses of the nation-states nor in the asimetries of the powers, but in the union that generates strength in the more impoverished or relatively less developed states. Besides, the Latin American integration would be strengthened by the acknowledgment of the international system according to the legal regulations point of view and to the resolutions from the General Assembly of the United Nations that refer to the inviolability of independence and sovereignty, and those related to friendly relationships and cooperation among the states according to the Letter of the United Nations.

The autonomous integration would deliver a new perspective on the limiting issue that have not been resolved as yet, or on other Carolingian problems,¹⁴ in which the military component tends to have preponderance because it is a resource used by the State for the protection of its sovereignty in the interstatal relationship of the region. Until now, the performance of the military component corresponds to the hypothesis of conflicts, ven deriving into armed conflicts; however, in the context of the autonomous

Besides the Latin American integration would be strengthened by the acknowledgment of the international system according to the legal regulations point of view and to the resolutions¹ from the General Assembly of the United Nations that refer to the inviolability of independence and sovereignty, and those related to friendly relationships and cooperation among the states according to the Letter of the United Nations.

¹³ UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. "United Nations Letter and Declaration of the International Court of Justice. United Nations." New York, U.S.A.
¹⁴ NWEIHET, Kaldone G. "Frontera y Limite an su marco mundial: Una aproximación a la fronterología". 1992. PBg.5.

Likewise, it is based upon the premises that in the region and in the interstate relationships the armed forces will exist in order to maintain peace and avoid the war.

As a consequence, the defense, as a multidimensional phenomenon, will extend itself to cover the interests of the region as a unique geopolitical unity, new and independently integrated.

integration, it points out and calls up to the interstate cooperation, projecting itself into a new geostrategic phenomenon: the regional assistance and, as a consequence, the search for agreeable solutions of multiple nature as the answer to the historic territorial complexity in the region. The regional military assistance is born from a new ontological concept on the armed component in which the use of force shall be subordinated, encouraging on the long run, the military integration of the region, since the regional interests shall prevail in order to activate a general defensive strategic answer. Likewise, it is based upon the premises that in the region and in the interstate relationships the armed forces will exist in order to maintain peace and avoid the war. As a consequence, the defense, as a multidimensional phenomenon, will extend itself to cover the interests of the region as a unique geopolitical unity, new and independently integrated.

Then the regional military assistance becomes the patronage mechanism to block interstate conflicts, but even more important is that it will ensure competent solutions to counterattack the threats against the region. This cooperation will provide military capacity to withhold conflicts and operative capacity to neutralize and decrease the actions of variables or criptofactors that enforce the use of force.


Once the integration is obtained, it is necessary, then, to agree upon the characteristics of the new Security System in the American continent, a regime that by all means and without being exclusive, takes into account the Latin American nations as a "niche" and while accepting with a strategic sense the confrontation that it would produce, resolve the obsolescence of the MAIT, according to a new and rational post-modern concept; a regime that guarantees the security of the Latin American state-nations in another way completely different from the one used by MAIT since 1947, tied up since its birth to the hegemony of one of its members.

The New Hemispheric Security System

The complex changes developed in the last twenty



ARMOR VEHICAL DRAGON, ON PATROL OPERATIONS.



years compel the nation-states to cope with them under a new perspective regarding security. Authors, such as Barry Buzan, Joseph Nye, Stephen Krasner, Robert Jervis, Juan Guaribe and Juan Carlos Puig, among others, have stated in expanded studies that the Post Cold War world demands a new security regime that should take into consideration the realities of the local, regional and global spheres. Stephen D. Krasner defines the Security System as *"a group of principles, rules, norms and decision-making processes that lead the nations within a region to limit their behavior in a mutual trustworthy atmosphere; it is understood that when referring to principles it means a group of coherent theoretic ideas that have to do with the manner in which the world functions; when mentioning norms, it means the general standards of behavior; and when referring to rules and decision-making processes, it means the specific prescriptions for behaviors in clearly defined areas"*¹⁵. This concept not only ratifies the norms and principles existing in a region, but also gives great value to mutual assistance and to common expectations, whereas the sense of cooperation is implicit for the states as interpeer actors.

The states restrict or limit their behaviors so as not to take advantage of their own and immediate interests, so that the system may last, have continuity and, above all, maintain a strategic political atmosphere in order to recede the actors from the primitive but very frequent model known in the theory of games as *"the prisoner's dilemma"*, that gives a very clear example of the consequences that happen when acting in a unilateral manner.

The Security Systems, defined as such, in the majority of times, refer to the way the human activities are interrelated through threats and vulnerabilities. The systems, therefore, should be understood as arrangements on the basis of common interests and not based on impositions as opposed to what has happened in Latin America. However, when referring to security systems, this statement becomes even more delicate, since the term of security has a vital significance for each state-nation and it is linked to its territory, to its self-determination and to its sovereignty within the region.

All the states are immersed in a net of security interdependency, and because the majority of threats run easier along short distances than long ones, the perception of insecurity is often associated with nearness. Thus, the security interdependency is much more notable among the states that are within a geographic complex and that can, by all means, be trans-



SNIPERS IN TRAINING FOR ANTINARCOTIC OPERATIONS

formed into a local or regional security system, formed either by the distribution of power or by historical relationships of friendship. The security regime that is politically built will allow its actors to manage themselves under the concept of equality, becoming a system that provides a sensation of security generating harmony and facilitate the development of its members in the international political and strategic areas where the military power will be managed according to a political purpose.

A regional security system is formed by a group of states whose perceptions and main concerns on security are interrelated and their features are lasting although not necessarily permanent. Among these considerations, theory states that in an international system geographically diverse, the regional security complexities are considered normal and expected. Its principal components being: the disposition of the states and the differences among them, the models of friendship and the distribution of power. In the specific case of the region, the establishment of a security system must be based upon the friendly relationships and common threats, reinforced by the facts which, presently limit the use of force, that is, the fear at considerable costs, interdependency, the extension of liberal democratic precepts and the sensitivity in front of the casualties caused by its usage. In this context, the regional security systems are 'viewed as empiric phenomena with historical and geopolitical roots; they are the product of interactions among individual states that emphasize the need for interdependency based upon shared interests. Therefore, a security system for the region would be framed within the concept given by Richard N. Haas, who states that "Regionalism is *the* best option for a Security System"¹⁶. This is understood as the construction of consensus and abilities in the regional sphere that, while respecting the mutual assistance and self-determination principals, induce the countries of that region to assume the responsibilities and costs inherent to security. This concept is opposed to the traditional position that implies the dominion of a sole and hegemonic acting party, who determines the tasks that must be complied with in order to promote the regional order accor-

¹⁶ HAAS, Richard N. "What to do with American Primacy". Foreign Affairs. Volume 76. No.5 September-October 1999. Page 44.



MIRAGE 50 PLANE DURING THE LAUNCHING OF FLARE.

ding to its own concepts and interests; this thesis is stated by Samuel P. Huntington who sustains that security depends upon regional powers, called "pivot states".

Since in the present international system the weaker countries, often with unstable social-political structures, have more vulnerabilities and face security problems that are different and more complicated than the ones faced by the stronger nations, a solid and coherent regional security dynamic is called for, not only to control and moderate the intervention of external powers within the region, but also to become a competent channel so as to regulate and rationalize its accessibility.

In this context, the new security system, open to multilateralism and therefore, not exclusive, could promote the political order, the economic development and the adequate use of the regional military components, under the terms agreed upon by its members, and based upon such principals as peace and justice. The security system demanded by the region cannot be ambiguous, nor unbalanced, nor differing; it must be unique, as the hemispheric reality demands and with the particular characteristics proper to the region, that fills up the void derived from the lack of a regime and it must provide its components with a real sensation of security.

Now then, the constitution of a security system, in this regional case, must be integral; its beliefs will be intimately linked to the political, military, social, economic and environmental dimensions of that security. Thus, the emphasis on the more relevant issues of each dimension.

It stands out, in the political dimension, the willingness expressed by

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the Chiefs of States as regard to peace keeping, to reject the use of violence as a solution to bordering problems and the existence of the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, wherein the region is ordained as a "Zone *Free of Atomic Weapons*"; Likewise, the nations to intend to conform a regional dynamism, must comply with the principals that presently regulate the global system, in its just dimension, obviously. Thus, even if the United Nations (U.N.) represent the international order, established upon such principals and norms as sovereign equality, non-intervention, human rights, non-hegemony, self-determination and equal race, the legitimacy of actions taken by any system whatsoever should not respond to interests that are different from those strictly established by the organism,

In the military, dimension, due to the dynamic security settings framed within friendly and mutual assistance relationships, contrary to the traditional ideas of enmity and distrust, and due to the United States lack of goodwill to assume the expenses and undertake the risks involving the use of military power in contingencies that do not sensitively affect their interests, the military sector plays an important primary role in the security system establishment and in the maintenance of the security system, in the wide range, (political, economic, social and environmental security). However, given the characteristics of the region, the social, economic and environmental sectors are intimately integrated, thus enforces them to establish the concept of "*Aggregated Security*" with general characteristics for all the region, but additionally provided with the specifications that identify the security concerns of each nation-state member. It seems that the goal in this dimension is to operate in the region with a "*Non offensive Defense*"¹⁷ resulting from interdependence and the search for a security system in common and according to the point of view that all nations involved have the right to not feel threatened by the military capabilities of the others; thus, reducing the perception that security can only be obtained through offensive military actions, but admitting the usefulness that those means have to obtain security.

As for the social dimension, the weak structural conditions of our systems favor the appearance of primary threats, for instance, unemployment, poverty and crime that attempt against society and become a demand for security. Some aspects resulting from this structural weakness affect the human and food security and the lack of ability to neutralize trends such as transculturization and ethnic segregation, which affect the national identity in a negative way.

In the economic dimension, highly globalized, certain problems occur while maintaining the political and economic stability, that go along with the persistent the gap trend among rich and poor countries. Hence, the economic security fixes its attention on the instability and inequality issues, and tends to characterize unemployment and unindustrialization is a menace for well-being and sovereignty. In this instance, the most obvious response to globalization is regionalization. Here, the regional group develops a stronger platform to operate and negotiate in the global economy and it can be used as a rapid via to improve relationships among neighbors, whose social-cultural compatibility function in favor of trade models and investment. For instance, an option in the economic sector could be the promotion of an energetic integration in the regional area, with the objective of reaching more security and ability to negotiate at an international scale. Thus, the integration process, besides strengthening the regional platform, will encourage it. The national economies will be obliged to implement adaptable processes to prevent dissimilarities and even a potential deterioration of the natio-

¹⁷BUZAN, Barry and HERRING, Eric. "The Arms Dynamics in World Politics". Lynne, Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado. 1998. Chapter 14. Page 23

nal economies, in view of the pre-ssures exercised by the foreign debt, lack of investments and instability.

As for the environmental dimension, as well as for the economic one, the globalization influence tends to condition the ability of the nations-states to respond by impairing their own sovereignty. The highly interdependent environmental agenda includes multiple aspects, such as, the destruction of ecosystems, population problems, food scarcity, rival economic and civil issues, among others- The menace on the environmental security can be observed in these aspects, which may become transnational or even transregional. They can be divided, basically, into those that affect the human civilization (caused by itself or not) and, in the long run, threaten the population, and those that are caused by human activity and have an impact on the natural systems, without having, apparently, an immediate affect on the civilization. In any case, the environment seems to demand a change in lifestyle in order to reach an environmental security; this would help nature to avoid going beyond its means. A useful beginning to conceptualize the regional security systems in the environmental aspect, are the natural disasters scenes, adding to this, the environmental factors of degradation, erosion, desert wasteland, distribution and preservation of hydrographic rivers, economic exploitation and pollution.

As it can be noticed, despite the fact that the political, economic and military dimensions in the region tend to be the dominant ones, the more involved it gets with the rest of the dimensions, as if it were in an intersectorial crossover, the more possibilities it has to obtain congruent and powerful configurations and, therefore, to reach what is considered as aggregated security, whose ultimate objective is the search for general well-being. Besides, this aggregated security in the regional area would be encouraged by the fact that we are formed by a homogenic group of nation-states, situated in a geographical zone with shared characteristics and concerns. The viability of having a regional security system would be discussed through the Theory of Regionalization by Richard Hass and the studies on Security by Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Michal C.Desh, Jorge I.Dominguez and Andrés Servin, among others Accordingly, this new system would complement the performance of the United States in the context of the



AMX-13 TANK WITH 90 mm CANNON
11-L-0559/OSD/5324

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Hemispheric Security System. At the same time, this sub-system would assume the costs and responsibilities inherent to the regional security context, In this way, it would compensate the relative resources limitation and the lack of domestic encouragement in some of the international' political aspects which,at present, exist in the United States society when assuming their responsibilities as the hegemonic power of the Hemisphere.

A Security System for South America


For Barry Buzan, in his book *People, States and Fear*, it is difficult to name the security characteristics of both Americas, in view of the overwhelming power of the United States. Its presence converts the continent in a mixture of security communities and, at the same time, in a hegemonic complex. For this author, the upsurgence of any independent security dynamics will be influenced by the amount of impositions that the United States exercises over the region. In this case, for Buzan *"South America also falls under the shadow of the United States, but much less than Central America and if may decrease so long as the interregional powers consolidate themselves"*¹⁸. On the other hand, the existence in Central America as well as in the Caribbean of subregional security mechanisms appropriate for t/heir geographical and particular realities, guarantees the possibility of South America to assume the responsibility of its own security, This is &stained by the effectiveness resulting from the use of their own resources to cope with prevalent threats.

In spite of the capability inconsistencies, of the diverse priorities and objectives, of the individual differences or the parties potential to integrate the sub-region, and despite the historical confrontations among some of them, derived from territorial arguments inherited from the past colonial



NATIONAL GUARD RIVER BOAT TRANSPORTING ABORIGINES ALONG THE ORINOCO RIVER

¹⁸ BUZAN, Barry. "People, State and Fear" Lynne, Rienner Publishers. Boulder, Colorado. 1991. Chapter 5, page 206.



ARV GC-11 COAST GUARD ON PATROL OPERATIONS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

times, despite certain power rivalries or differences regarding positions assumed in front of the international scene, there are, nevertheless, many coincidences and shared interests which merit an effort in considering a regional security system as the only response to those external, regional and local challenges that demand collective action. This process means that we have to overcome the barriers that separate us, to identify the values and goals in common and to encourage the regional identity, supported by the experience of sharing a history that is common to all, in sharing our concerns around the existing sociocultural, political, economic and military links that distinguish us and, in the goals obtained by several organisms that were created to manage collective issues.

The characterization of South America as a non-nuclear zone, as well as the rest of Latin America and The Caribbean, under the Tlatelolco Treaty, constitutes in itself, a base of security for the formulation of a system that must extend into other kinds of weapons, such as chemical, biological and toxic ones, which are dangerous as well, but worse even due to the easiness in which they are developed and transferred,

The nations of the region should design cooperative initiatives in order to cope with their own threats that, presently and in their majority, are the result of actions taken by parties not belonging to the state-nations, but due to their transnational condition, the nation-states have much difficulty in controlling them, even if they are eminently of domestic origin. Hence, the involved states must define a regional security agenda wherein certain aspects must be taken into account, such as, the democratic stability, the observance of human rights, the environmental protection, mutual assistance in case of disaster, development motivation, peace keeping, the viability of a regional integration, the energetic security, the collective coexistence, the overcome of particular social-economic problems and the minimization of domestic conflicts, among others.

Likewise, in regards to the establishment of a regional security agenda, the spaces, objectives, forms of participation and the interaction of the regional parties must be defined, as well as the degree of their commitment, the resources to be used, the role of the different parties and even the possibilities of joining efforts with extraregional parties. All this, with the conviction that a regionalization process demands a real political goodwill, that implies the intention of providing particular prerogatives according to common goals in the security area. This has to

The proposal for a military system for defense denies the great emphasis and burden given to the employment of armed components for regional security. The proposal of a military system for the hemispheric defense must be outlined acknowledging the fact that the regional security issue demands an armed component, capable of interpreting and making differences between the regional and collective security and the hemispheric one and, must precise the usage of military components which is linked to the complex political security issue in the region.

be conceived from the social well-being point of view, as well as the performance of the citizens expectations and interests of each and every nation of ours, all which seem to be intimately linked to the attainment of peace in the region.


The Military System for Regional Defense

The proposal of a real and efficient military system for the hemispheric defense lies within the security system and having the clear conception that military security issue in this context does not depend on the military capacity or power of the region, and much less that its viability will depend on the use of military power. In principle, the proposal for a military system for defense denies the great emphasis and burden given to the employment of armed components for regional security. The proposal of a military system for the hemispheric defense must be outlined acknowledging the fact that the regional security issue demands an armed component, capable of interpreting and making differences between the regional and collective security and the hemispheric one and, must precise the usage of military components which is linked to the complex political security issue in the region.

A military component with common characteristics for the defense of the region must accept the fact that as of 1970, analogous to the great technological jump and the massive acceptance of the free trade economy, the problems acquired highly interdependent multidimensional characteristics. The proposal, therefore, intends to precise accurately, within the hemisphere, the employment of armed components in the regional security, as a proactive element that helps to strengthen the aptitude by means of a defense on behalf of a regional development and based upon a political integration.



"GENERAL SALOM" ARV-F-25 MISILISTIC FRIGATE LAUNCHING AN OTOMAT MKII MISIL



The Military System for Regional Defense, as a proposal, acknowledges that military security is proportional to interdependency, and that, likewise, it has to avoid ambiguity; that, although it is military, it cannot be based upon a militarist conception; its strength will depend on the technological development of the region, on the solidity of its democracies and on the employment of strategic resources, taking into account the zone capabilities and realities. The understanding of the military system will decrease the vulnerabilities of the region and will lead to an efficient and effective reaction in front of any violation against the security system, while converting the weaknesses and differences of the individualized state-nations into strengths within a group of nations, since this would mean an impressive instrument for international relationships, with a wide range of action and relevant effects. The military system could function as an early alert mechanism to correct weaknesses and to act in a proactive way in coping with menaces, disarticulating them instead of confronting them, since it will be provided with well controlled and concerted processes that will help to comply with the determined goal of using, in an efficient manner, the military organization.

The hemispheric defense system would have a strategic rank and range of action that would involve certain aspects, such as, security on behalf of development, security over natural disasters, the state individual security, the environmental threat, the military menaces and the annulment of criptofactual threats in the region. In this manner, the defense system maintains its original concept, that is, the hemispheric security is much more important than the military projection. Likewise, the defense system will reinforce the regional integrity and integration, from the very first moment that it acquires all the preventive-operational mechanisms and regional coordination processes to act accordingly. The system will act upon the Theory of Regional Security, considering it as the instrument used to guarantee peace and security. It will comprise the air, land and maritime

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ARV 0309 HELICOPTER LANDING ON THE ARV-F25 FRIGATE GENERAL SALOM DECK

spaces, integrating its capabilities with other security instruments, thus giving a step towards multilateralism. The defense system will have to be conceptualized as an instrument in agreement with the international relationships of the new century and must sustain itself upon the basis of a regional security system. In addition, it will be supported by a new regional strategic concept, within a modern military organization, integrated by highly qualified and versatile professional human resources.

The Defense System and the Rationalization of the National Military Component:

The military defense system will respond to the postmodern tendency of strengthening international organizations and structures in contraposition to the of the state unit weakness. As a consequence, this proposal cannot be considered as a guideline to demilitarize the region, but rather, on the contrary, it must be identified with what Samuel P. Huntington defines as the "*professionalism maximization*"¹⁹, which demands a great *statal responsibility* in regards to the technological development and control over the military equipment and weapons system. The defense system is contrary to the application and imposition of actions that *only* cause regional enemies so as to weaken the mutual assistance among the state-nations *that* belong to the region. Besides, the defense system understands the necessity to have available a military component according to the circumstances and in agreement with the capabilities of each nation-state. The old proverb is regarded as theirs: "*the states do not have permanent friends or enemies but rather tempora y alianzas*". The defense system will strengthen the importance of the military component because of two main reasons at present:

¹⁹ HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. "El Soldado y el Estado". Circulo Militar de Buenos Aires. PBq.1986.

- The existence of internal battles of social and political nature that intend to threaten the integrity of the state.
- Mutual assistance as the vital principle so as to avoid the imposition of the periphereic concept, traditionally applied in Latin America.

The System for Regional Defense, because of its political military constitution' will play a more political role, taking into account the fact that the international and interamerican organizations provide, at present, a big burden to a united region. So, the system will have to accept the new interamerican architecture as a new political international structure, which will generate more synergy in the region, without putting aside the strategic bordering. The system of defense has to be a new institution and has to develop as such, wherein the states of the region and its military components will acquire certain responsibilities so as to concrete the political purposes of the region.

The Regional Defense System as a Security Institution

When the MAIT disappears, because of a dismantelling process due to its obsolescence and to the end of the Cold War, we will be facing an institutional change of great significance. In this context, the regional military defense system will appear as an emerging institution that will oblige the regional leadership to dimension the present period of profound transformations in the military strategic field and in the new security concept.

The defense system will encourage the regional security integration and interdependence and it will create multilateral mechanisms so as to incorporate other parties who show affinity, relationship and interest sharing with the region. Likewise, the system will propel mutual assistance among similar organisms and, basically, it would promote the South-South assistance, providing its due importance to the United States, but without disregarding joint performances, and giving place to the attainment of shared interests and the confirmation of a



NAVAL POST "LOS MONJES" WITH THE MISILISTIC PATROL SHIP ARV PC-12 ARV PC-13
AND ARV S-32 "CARIBE" SUBMARINE



FIGHTING FALCON F-16 AIRPLANE IN SIDEWINDER CONFIGURATION

new military strategic arrangement in the Hemisphere.

The Defense System as a regional strategic political institution will reaffirm the concept of "*Regionalized Security*" stated by Richard N. Haas and ratified by Galen Carpenter, who indicates the increasing incompetence and ineptitude of the United States to support regional alliances. Consequently, the performance of this nation as a military power would complement the responsibility, efforts and expenses assumed by the region in regards to security. Additionally, the traditional pragmatism that the United States has always had towards foreign policy, which has led this nation to not acquire formal commitments on security matters, due to the relevancy that they give to their own priorities, will finally favor the region because of its increasing attitude in assuming the responsibility on this particular issue.

The Regional Military Strategic Concept

The Regional Defense System will have its foundations on the definition of a new strategic concept for the region, the conformation of a new military structure and the definition of a program to be implemented by stages.

It is evident that the Hemisphere, with the exception of the United States, will continue to be established on the strategic direction of employing conventional weapons. The concept will define the performance stages and will set the responsibilities in each area through task assignments for the military components.

The strategic concept will foresee the incorporation of new members, besides the possible interconnections with other multilateral systems. Also, it will formulate the kind of forces and performance environments in each region according to the regional demands. The strategic concept will give special importance to the domestic **descentralization** factors; that affect some of the states in the region, and will propose the presence of negotiation and **intermediary** structures with the intention of resolving any conflict in a practical way.

The strategic concept will be an instrument held to attain the political goals and will promote lines of direction to resolve regional strategic issues, but also, it will encourage the political action of alliance in the region. It is noteworthy to mention that the basic function of the strategic concept will be to outline the possible capabilities employment of the region to guarantee its political purpose.

The Military Structure of the Defense System

The New Combined Military Structure, framed within a new Security System, will originate from a political-diplomatic agreement and it will develop accordingly to the number of integrated countries. The Action Plan for its development will be executed gradually, in accordance with the necessities and possibilities of the members involved.

For the attainment of the New Regional Military Structure, a plan of coordinated development will be required, taking into account the capabilities and peculiarities of each country. Likewise, it will have a timetable for the attainment of goals and objectives that will allow to reach the desired structure in future.

In its design, diverse propositions may be incorporated, such as:

- A regional assistance system in case of natural disasters and catastrophes.
- A regional education and training center on military affairs.
- A regional defense and maintenance system for the environment.
- A security information center.
- Definition of processes for the planning and execution of intraregional combined operations.
- An increase in the promotion of mutual trust guidelines .



AB-212 ASW HELICOPTER (ANTI SUBMARINE)
11-L-0559/OSD/5332



B-412 HELICOPTER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD DURING ANTINARCOTIC OPERATIONS

- A regional conference on defense as a forum to discuss matters that are linked to the security issue.

The attainment of this kind of structure will allow the rationalization of military expenses along with the national and regional security expansion. This structure, likewise, will enable the regional countries to assume part of the responsibility of their own defense complemented, if necessary, with the participation of other parties that have to do, with the hemispheric development as in the case of the United States. In this way, there would be a reduction in the potential impact that could occur as a consequence of the "Theory of Inconsistency in the North American Foreign Policy", that has limited this nation to acquire fixed commitments in Security affairs.

Conclusion

The Latin American region in the XXI century is obliged to design a political strategic response for the interamerican international political system. In its design, it has to have a new geopolitical unity, with its own Theory of Regional Security, that will substitute the present heterodox military security for a regional collective security. This complex regional decision expects, within the postmodern changes, to reduce injustice as well as the ambivalence and conflicts of the military security, by implementing a more just, expanded, transparent system in favor of peace, so necessary for the development of the region.

This complex process encourages the construction of concrete policies, new processes and institutions (some of them already on going), and along with the contribution of the military leadership in military diplomatic functions, it may facilitate the approximation guidelines to obtain the military components cooperation within the South-South. Also, to accelerate the transformation of the complicated geopolitical state of the national military security in order to achieve an internationalization state of the regional military security, The region, in the military aspect, will acquire, in a medium course of time, new institutions, like the Regional Defense

System, which is a mixed consulting and decision-making military-political organism. It will also have coordination structures for the operations performance, besides the implementation of new strategic criteria holding the existence of appointed national units, that will constitute the nucleus of the operating units for regional defense.

The regional military security planning will tend to centralize and to be alongside the political power, so as to give privilege to the regional interests over the national ones. All the regional military performance, through the Defense System, will enable the South-South cooperation, and thus, the conflicts not yet resolved will find postmodern guidelines for their approximation through diplomatic fields.

The Theory of State Security, defined as the "Autonomous Integration " will enable to have a new military strategy supported by a modern military component. It will respond to the necessities of the nation-states of the region with a collective security system, founded upon the defense issue and it will favor the necessary conditions so that the military component may operate accordingly to the regional political purposes. Hence, the integration will be permanently feed-backed by the new regional military defense system and the state-nations will perceive the growing autonomous capabilities, thus increasing their freedom to implement their political will power.

Finally, understanding the regional military security as such, will be a potential factor for its strengthening and perfect accomplishment and will act, since the very beginning, as an intrastatal political accelerator for the execution of the autonomous regional integration process.

Proposals

History has shown us that challenges, such as the creation of a new regional: security system depends upon multidimensional actions, for instance: The regional autonomous inte-



ANTINARCOTIC SQUAD FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD, DURING THE DETENTION OF AN AIRCRAFT WITH ALLEGED DRUG DEALERS

11-L-0559/OSD/5334

gration, the creation of a new interamerican security system, and the premise of a Theory of State Security. All this implies the development of a whole series of strategies that merit great efforts to be performed. Likewise, it demands permanent motivation and the correct understanding of the internationalization concept. It must also provide special emphasis on the visual projection of regional capabilities, without false pretensions, that is, it requires realistic principles. It is evident that the modern conditions of our components are well behind the times, but this reality will help to promote and encourage us in the attainment of goals that are demanded by the present international conjunction, in terms of using our military capabilities on behalf of the political purposes of the region. Therefore, the present challenges oblige the proposal of the following planned actions according to time and objectives:

In the international political field:

- To hand in, discuss and enrich the present propositions in all the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in each and all the Latin American countries.
- To inform immediately the results of this Summit to the Commission on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) and to the Group of Rio, in their respective headquarters.
- To write down and file this speech and its different discussions in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, as a preliminary document for the development of the new conception of hemispheric security.

In the military field:

- To elect in this Summit a Committee for the military strategic analysis, formed by experts, in order to perfectly accomplish the studies and conclusions approved in this Summit regarding Hemispheric Security, and to inform all the Ministers of Defense of the countries in the region.
- To perform seminars on the *"Integration and Latin American Military Post Modernity"*, which have to be conducted as of the year 2001, extended to the highest academic and planning level of the Latin American nations.
- To appoint in this Summit a permanent military technical commission for a two year period in order to prepare the Agenda for the Summit of the Ministers of Defense of Latin America and to follow-up the proposals linked to this organism.



CIVIC ACTION ON THE PERIJA SIERRA.

snowflake

March 31, 2001 1:19 PM

TO: Honorable Clay Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Tom Korologos

I think Tom Korologos would do a good job as a NATO ambassador, the more I think about it,

How are you coming on that project?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
033 101-x

Nato 230

31 Mar 01

W00392 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5340

snowflake

April 4, 2001 7:01 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to the Families of the EP-3 Crew

Attached for your information.

Attach.

DHR:dh
040401-1

China

W00411 01

2APR01

11-L-0559/OSD/5341

UNCLASSIFIED

4 April 2001

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE FAMILIES OF THE EP-3 CREW

1. Purpose.

To provide information detailing the efforts by the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marines and the parent units to assist the families of the EP-3 crew currently being held by the PRC on Hainan Island.

2. Key Points.

The EP-3 carried 13 U.S. Navy crewmembers from the parent EP-3 Squadron, VQ- 1, Whidbey Island, WA and 11 personnel from the Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA), Misawa, Japan (9 USN, 1 USAF and 1 USMC). Each service notified crewmembers Next of Kin (NOK) in accordance with standard operating procedures. Continuing support to the crewmembers' families is detailed below:

Overall Navy support:

The Navy has ensured that all Navy families have been provided with the following:

- Offered services of a Casualty Assistance Call Officer (CACO). Nine families have requested information and have been assigned a CACO.
- Established Assistance Hot Line for families (1-877-48 1-3789) manned 24-hours a day

VQ-1 provided the following family support:

- Contacted every primary and secondary NOK either in person or by phone. Commanding Officer, VQ- 1 communicated personal message to family members:
 - First concern is safe prompt return of crew-has full backing of USG and chain of command-aircraft standing by for pick-up
 - Crew did nothing wrong-demonstrated professionalism and

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/5342

UNCLASSIFIED

presence of mind to land aircraft without injury

- All crew members are safe and well
- Unit is working plans for NOK reunion at Widbey Island upon crew return
- Each family assigned an officer or senior enlisted assistance officer who calls at least once daily. Commander meets with these "sponsors" at 0900 and 1300 daily to pass accurate information for distribution to families.
- Briefed each family on BG Sealock's meeting with the crew

The Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan has provided family support:

- All immediate family members contacted personally by unit XC VIA phone, except for one family on leave in San Diego
- Family members in San Diego contacted by NSGA, San Diego
- All families provided a situation update at least once daily
- All families provided a command E-7 point of contact
- Two families requested "in-person" support. Support has been provided
- Command has established a 24-Hour Hot Line for family support

Air Force Family Support:

- The Air Force crewmember's family has been contacted by the commanding officer of the parent Wing, the 67th Intelligence Wing. A call to the crewmember's mother is made twice daily.

Marine Corps Family Support:

- The Marine crewmember's Company Commander has contacted the Marine crewmember's family at least once daily by phone & Email.

Prepared by: DONIGAN, H. J., COLONEL, USMC
JSAC J-33 JOD REP, J-3 [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5343

snwflake

April 4, 2001 7:01 AM |

TO: President George W. Bush

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to the Families of the EP-3 Crew

Attached for your information.

A t t a c h .

DHR:dh
04040 f-1

11-L-0559/OSD/5344

UNCLASSIFIED

4 April 2001

INFORMATION PAPER

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- Crew did nothing wrong-demonstrated professionalism and

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5345

UNCLASSIFIED

presence of mind to land aircraft without injury

- All crew members are safe and well
- Unit is working plans for NOK reunion at Widbey Island upon crew return

a Each family assigned an officer or senior enlisted assistance officer who calls at least once daily. Commander meets with these "sponsors" at 0900 and 1300 daily to pass accurate information for distribution to families.

- Briefed each family on BG Sealock's meeting with the crew

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Prepared by: DONIGAN, H.J., COLONEL, USMC
JSAC J-33 JOD REP, J-3, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5346

snowflake

April 9, 2001 6:53 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Comments by Senator Stevens

Please see the attached. As we discussed, Senator Stevens is interested.

Attach.


4/6/01 Senator Stevens Comments on National Missile Defense

DHR:dh
040901-60

373.21

9 April 01

*Cables taken & confirmed
receipt @ 10:07 9 April.*



W00437-01

11-L-0559/OSD/5351

W00437-01

Q: Hear anything about missile defense lately?

A: Unfortunately we're hearing more and more. I don't think I've spoken publicly about this before, but there's a sizeable group of people now who feel that the Navy should go forward with its area and theater defense concepts to the detriment of funding the currently planned National Missile Defense system. And, if they succeed they would try to evolve a theater-wide system into a national defense system at a later date. Their primary concern is to try and increase the protection of our naval vessels at sea and their deployments as task forces- which we support. I don't think they're inconsistent with what we're doing at all. But to put all of our federal resources into accelerating those defensive concepts for area and theater missile defense to the detriment of planning for a national defense system, I think is a step backwards. And what they're really saying- in my opinion is: We can defend the 48 states, that the two Senators from Hawaii and Alaska were not right in insisting that this be a National Missile Defense system. It's going to get very personal I think before we're through, but I'm worried very much about what's happened.

Q: It sounds like they're taking some initial steps toward a boost phase type of a missile defense?

A: I don't think it's a question of what phase they're into- It's what area they believe is the primary area that must be protected first. We have always tried to protect our forces in the field. As a matter of fact, it was Senator Inouye and I who suggested turning the Patriot from a defensive system against air breathing aircraft into a defense against missiles and we've taken it now into the third generation of the Patriot, which is now very effective and will be deployed around the world to defend our forces and our allies. Now that is local area protection concept and it's fairly small-, but it's very effective! In that they've had some recent tests now that prove that PAC-3, third version of the Patriot, is extremely successful. But that's not what they're thinking about doing with the Navy now, they're not thinking about deploying Patriots. They're talking developing an entirely new system. As a matter of fact the missile is not even been perfected or even designed yet and the system has not even been designed. The National Missile Defense system is designed. The Boeing systems integrator have designed a system and it has been proven and

tested by several different computer systems as being most effective and theoretically capable defense system. It's the integration of the system by man that still has to be perfected, a costly thing. But I'm very worried about what I've just heard. It's not been announced yet that I know of. But we're hearing more and more about it. And the law is there that says, the last President signed the law reluctantly, but he did, that we must go forward with a National Missile Defense system. And yet there are portions of the Department of Defense that are side-tracking that and going ahead with another system. At least they want to.

Q: Would a sea-based system like that still require the Shemya radar or not?

A: The suggestions that we heard is that a portion of the system could be on Shemya, but another portion would be afloat, would you believe. They're considering a moveable generating capacity. But it's getting to a turf battle between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. It will be a very difficult problem for the Administration if this keeps up. I hope they get on top of it and straighten it out quickly.

Q: You're going to have a hearing about this at some point aren't you? I mean, you postponed a hearing that you were going to have I believe on missile defense.

A: We postponed it because we wanted to give Secretary Rumsfeld a chance to complete his review and we wanted to give the new Administration a chance to get in place. I think we've got the best team we've ever had with Condi Rice in National Security and Colin Powell at the State and Rumsfeld at Defense and Vice President Cheney being a coordinator of the three for the President. I think that's a tremendous team. And by the way, I have no indication that the team has approved this. This is coming from the Navy, what I'm talking about. The Navy people are coming up with this plan and trying to lobby people here on the Hill to change the system, to go back and develop and emphasize the Navy system first. The National Guard would have the National Missile Defense System. It would be basically an Army system, integrated to some extent with the Air Force, but it would not be a Navy system at all.

Q: Is DoD lobbying as hard for the land-based system?

A: We have not heard from them yet. It's not classified, I'm not sure that they'll be too happy that I'm talking publicly about what they're saying up here. But the Navy needs to be reigned in.

snowflake

April 30, 2001 6:54 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Cox

I talked to Chris Cox. He was disappointed. I told him you were still thinking about the situation, and that we might be back in touch with him. He would like that.

DHR:dh
04300 1-60

032

30 Apr 01

W00569 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5367

snowflake

May 15, 2001 7:26 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strategy Review

Thanks so much for your comments on the paper. They are very helpful.

DHR:dh
051501-7

381

15 May 01

W00645 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5370

May 15, 2001 4:50 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq No-Fly Zone


Attached is an article on the no-fly zones, which is worrisome.

Attach,
5/15/01 1 *Chicago Sun Times* editorial: "Saddam Exploiting U.S.-U.K. Split on No-Fly Zone"

DHR:dh
051501-22

TEAR

15 May 01



Saddam exploiting U.S.-U.K. split on no-fly zone

The Bush administration's hesitation on Iraqi policy is causing friction with the Brits, the United States' best ally in dealing with Saddam Hussein—and it is enabling Saddam to score propaganda points. At the moment, Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Department doesn't know what it wants to do about maintaining the no-fly zones that protect the Kurds in the north of Iraq and the Shiite Arabs in the south. Pentagon generals are nervous that the Iraqis, who have been getting help from the Rus-

sians and Chinese, might at last manage to bring down one of the patrol aircraft, so they want cutbacks in the patrols. The British military, made of sterner stuff, is letting it be known they intend to maintain the present level of patrols. And Saddam is boasting that all the anti-aircraft fire the Iraqis have been putting up is working—even if it hasn't touched a single plane. The Iraqis are saying what is obvious: The Pentagon is afraid of endangering its pilots.

Men on horses charging civilians, sabers flashing, knouts flailing. That was the old image of Cossacks carrying out a pogrom. These days when Cossacks at-



Donald Rumsfeld
Uncertain Iraq policy

tack people, they arrive in buses and carry batons and gas pistols. Their current targets are Meshkheti, a people originally from Meshkhetia in Georgia near Turkey who Stalin brutally deported and who ended up scattered around the former Soviet Union. After an

elderly Slavic Russian was beaten up in a village near the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, four busloads of Kuban Cossacks arrived in his village. Although the local Meshkheti leaders protested they weren't the assailants, the Cossacks rounded up all the "Turk" men they could find and took them away in the buses. Eventually the local police were persuaded to intervene, and the Cossacks released six men who

D.C. INSIDER

had been beaten.

Hit 'em where it hurts. That's what the Bush administration is planning to do to terrorist organizations. Not by sending SWAT teams into Afghanistan to dispose of Osama bin Laden, but by blocking access to money. Hence the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, which the Treasury Department is working with other government departments on setting up. Richard Newcomb, director of Treasury's office of foreign assets control, told the Senate that the center will aim to deny terrorist groups' access to the international financial system, impair their fund-raising abilities and block their financial transactions.

United Press International

snowflake

May 19, 2001 1:31 PM

TO: Karl Rove

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreword

Attached is the foreword from the book, *Pearl Harbor*, which I think you will find interesting.

Attach.
Thomas Schelling's foreword

DHR:dh
051901-16

461

19 May 01

WOO661 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5373

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely ordinary blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unslept watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind us how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

snowflake

July 5, 2001 11:20 AM

TO: Colin Powell
Condi Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Article by Keith Payne

Russia

Attached is an interesting piece by Keith Payne. We may want to discuss it at our next lunch.

Cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Dr. Cambone

DHR:cd
070501-12

5 Jul 01

W00904 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/5389

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Exiting MAD With Russia: What Does It Mean?

By Keith B. Payne

Introduction

By the **late** 1960s the U.S.-Soviet strategic **relationship** was characterized by mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation. This condition became **the** central focus of U.S. Cold War deterrence theory and policy. From **the 1960s** to the present, mutual vulnerability **came** to be regarded widely as the basis for "stable" mutual deterrence.

Mutual vulnerability, however, has been more than an objective condition. U.S. policy has consciously sought to promote and codify vulnerability **through the** adoption of offensive nuclear "**parity**" and the avoidance of BMD. (In Washington, the 1972 **ABM** Treaty was **intended** to codify **the** condition of mutual vulnerability for **the** purpose of preserving "stability"). This U.S. "**nuclear** doctrine" popularly came to be called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The definition of what constitutes an effective "'assured destruction" threat evolved, but "stable" mutual deterrence remained the objective.

The **potential** to move away from MAD as **the** foundation of U.S.-Russian relations **was** a topic of limited bilateral interest immediately following **the** Soviet Union's demise. The 1992 Ross-Mamedov Talks involved some initial reconsideration of the basic MAD **framework**. The Clinton Administration chose to discontinue the Talks in 1993 **and** reembraced **the** **ABM Treaty** and MAD.

President Bush has called for a new strategic "**framework**" that is not based on MAD, **and** has indicated his **desire** for cooperation with Russia in **mating this new framework**.

Issues

What would it mean to move away from MAD?

Why is moving **away** from MAD the **preferred** direction?

What might it mean for Moscow?

How might OSD facilitate such movement in Moscow?

Discussion

Moving away from a MAD policy has several potential meanings. For example, exiting MAD unilaterally, in competition with Russia, is a route **that** can be **&**scribed in principle. It would likely **require** the establishment and maintenance of U.S. strategic offensive and defensive capabilities sufficient to **preclude** a Russian "assured destruction" (however **defined**) capability against **the** United States.

This approach to ending MAD unilaterally would entail the **re-establishment of** meaningful U.S. strategic nuclear superiority, and would provoke Moscow's most **competitive** efforts to retain a survivable retaliatory nuclear threat. Whether this route is **feasible in** practice

is **an** open question. Feasible or not, it does **not** appear to be the route envisioned by President Bush.

Attempting to end MAD with Russia in this fashion is not of interest. Nevertheless, the United States should not permit the condition of mutual vulnerability to be established with the **Rogues** or China. Because **MAD** cannot provide reliable, predictable protection against severe **threats** or attacks, U.S. **vulnerability** is **an** unnecessary risk **vis-à-vis** hostile countries if it is possible to deny them a retaliatory capability. Consequently, a policy of **MAD vis-à-vis** the Rogues and China is inappropriate.

Preventing a condition of mutual vulnerability from emerging with the Rogues, or **being** developed by China, may require the meaningful offensive and defensive strategic superiority described above.

Exiting MAD in cooperation with Moscow, President Bush's expressed goal, would **involve** a completely different set of considerations than moving unilaterally as described above. Cooperation in this transition would not be foremost a question of changing force structure, but of changing the political relations that drive force structure.

President Bush has stated that Russia is not **an** enemy or an **adversary**, and that the United States wants "**Russia** to be a **partner** and an ally." Consequently, maintaining a MAD policy framework with regard to Moscow is inappropriate. A MAD policy precludes **the** establishment of amicable political relations because it sets **the** maintenance of mutual nuclear threats as the **centerpiece** of relations. It contributes to the perpetuation of severe threat perceptions and political **enmity**.¹

MAD should not be viewed as a matter of capabilities **alone**. U.S. strategic relations with **the** U.K. and France are not based on MAD, despite the **fact** that a level of **mutual vulnerability** is an objective condition of those relations. Because MAD as a policy is **first** a **function** of political relations, it has pertained only to Russia, not to France and Britain. MAD must be **understood** to be more than respective capabilities for retaliation: it is a policy driven by the political character of a relationship. It involves mutual perceptions of threat, and **the** establishment of dedicated nuclear retaliatory requirements driven by those threat perceptions. This distinction between MAD as a policy framework, and mutual vulnerability as an objective condition is crucial to identifying the meaning of moving beyond **MAD cooperatively** with Russia.

U.S.-Russian strategic relations need not be **defined** by a MAD policy, despite the likely continuation of mutual capabilities for retaliation, any more than is the U.S.-French strategic relationship. The United States and Russia undoubtedly will retain strategic nuclear capabilities for **the** deterrence and coercion of other hostile states, and some level of U.S.-Russian mutual vulnerability will continue to be an objective reality for an indeterminate period.

Eliminating MAD can be compatible with U.S. and Russian strategic capabilities, but would **require** a reorientation of political relations, a process that is likely to be shaped by the entire scope of U.S.-Russian relations.

¹The Clinton Administration declared Russia to be a **strategic partner** but continued to **embrace** a MAD policy predicated on the **perpetuation** of **severe** mutual nuclear threats and threat perceptions. This **inconsistency** rightly generated enormous Russian suspicion.

The necessary change in political relations would involve lowered mutual threat perceptions and the force structure implications of that change: an ending to policies designed to maintain dedicated, widespread nuclear targeting of one **another**, and the removal of this focus **as** the organizing goal **of arms** control negotiations.

Active defenses such as BMD could play an important role in this transition: defenses could facilitate the prudent reduction of U.S. targeting requirements devoted to **damage-** limitation goals, while also contributing to the denial of strategic capabilities to **Rogues** and China.

The Russian Challenge

The foremost challenge to ending MAD **cooperatively** is the high value Russian **leaders** continue to place on a dedicated, **severe** nuclear retaliatory threat to the United States.

Despite attempted U.S. tutorials, the Soviet Union **never adopted MAD as** its own policy orientation; it never accepted the notion of promoting its **own** vulnerability (it endorsed the ABM Treaty for other reasons). Nevertheless, Russia now seeks to retain a nuclear retaliatory threat **vis-à-vis** the United States, and employs MAD-based “stability” rhetoric in doing so.

While **the** United States appears ready to move away from MAD policies on the basis of a significantly changed political relationship and outlook, Russia generally continues to identify the United States as its premier **security** threat, **and** appears unready for **the** type of transition identified above. Moscow’s current clear preference is to avoid risking the status and security benefits derived from the ABM **Treaty** and the **related** preservation of U.S. vulnerability.

Russia has international and domestic political motives for perpetuating a Cold War-type strategic relationship. Crude Russian nationalism and anti-Americanism are increasingly exploited as **a** basis for domestic political legitimacy, and Moscow’s general mistrust of Washington continues.

Perpetuating the Cold War relationship is viewed in **Moscow** as a vehicle for preserving Russian leverage **vis-à-vis** Washington, limiting U.S. **freedom** of action, and exploiting Russian **nationalism** (and anti-Americanism) for domestic political purposes. Russians focus on the ABM Treaty as **the** premier symbolic and practical constraint on the U.S. capacity to breakout of that Cold War relationship.

A Potential OSD Initiative: A High-Level Exchange Series on Exiting MAD

Exiting MAD with Russia cooperatively may not be feasible given the **political** context described above. The unprecedented cooperation of the early **1990s**, however, suggests the potential for success.²

Because Russian policy formulation remains a **fairly** rigid top-down process in this **area**, dramatic change is possible following the acceptance of “new thinking” by a relatively small leadership group.

²Former **Russian** Foreign Minister **Andrey Kozyrev** responded positively to Resident **Bush’s** May 1 **speech**. **Kozyrev** emphasized the value for Russia of **returning** to the type of cooperation evident in the Ross-Matnedov Talks. See the long commentary by former Foreign Minister **Andrey Kozyrev** in, “ABM-This is Our Chance,” *Moscow Moskovskiy Novosti*, No. 18 [1092], May 1-14, 2001, p. 5.

There is considerable potential for the new U.S. administration to encourage **new** thinking in the relatively pragmatic, insecure, and young **Putin** leadership.

OSD could **help** facilitate **this** process by showcasing, through a series of facet&ace, high-level exchanges, the reality of Washington's intent to move away from a MAD policy, what **this** means in practice, and the significant security and other benefits to Russia of doing so in parallel.

A variety of factors could benefit the establishment of OSD-MOD exchanges on this subject:

- The **Putin** government is reasonably pragmatic and understands Russian **limitations**;
- Vladimir **Putin has** given conditional personal support for a search for new **openings in** bilateral relations;
- **Putin** remains politically vulnerable in many areas where outside help **may** be important: dealing with sluggish economy, internal security challenges, withstanding regional pressures, etc;
- **There** is significant **aversion** in Moscow to very close relations with China, let alone **with** the Rogues. A pro-Western stance is considered by some to be the preferred alternative to such relations; prominent individuals advocating this alternative continue to play a visible role in Russian policymaking.
- Moscow has signaled its preference for initial debates/negotiations as a prelude to a changed **relationship**;
- Though the probable Russian goal **for** the above negotiations is to delay real changes in bilateral strategic relations, Russians officials, military and civilian, would strongly appreciate being involved personally in contacts with OSD, provided they are **financed** out of U.S. sources and confer status on the participants (i.e., they involve senior U.S. participants);
- Involved **Russians tend** to support institutionalization of bilateral forums into **more** permanent structures;
- Establishing such high-level exchanges **for** this purpose could demonstrate to **U.S.** allies and interested domestic audiences U.S. good faith **in** seeking more amicable relations **with** Russia.

Whether the initiative described above is deemed worthy of exploration, it is clear that much more thought needs to be devoted to **the** questions addressed above. Additional significant related issues include: Why is leaving MAD advantageous for the United States?; What follows after MAD policies?; How might U.S. force structure changes contribute to **shifting** Russian Cold War **views**? And, **what** are the alternatives to MAD policies **vis-à-vis** China and the Rogues?

snowflake

July 13, 2001 8:05 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PFIAB

Please send me over the list of people who are going to be on PFIAB.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
0713014

334 PFIAB

135010

snowflake

July 16, 2001 5:09 PM

TO: Secretary Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld_a

SUBJECT: Test Failures

Attached is a paragraph that shows the number of times major weapons systems have failed. I think it is helpful to have that in mind.

Attach.
7/12/01 Testimony of Honorable Paul Wolfowitz before SASC

DHR:dh
071601-48

W00953 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/5465

But in fact, both the Russians and the Chinese -- and I think this is very important -- will be able to see that we are reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially and there is no need for them to build up theirs. In this budget proposal alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1 reductions, we will be reducing START countable warheads by well over 1,000. We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what Russia decides to do, but we believe it is in their best interest, and we think sooner rather than later they will recognize that it is in their best interest, to follow the same path.

This is not a scarecrow defense. We intend to build and deploy defenses that will grow more and more effective over time; the more capable the better, but defenses don't have to be perfect to, save lives and reduce casualties. No defense is 100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions we spend on counterterrorism, and should be spending on counterterrorism, we did not stop terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers or on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania or on the World Trade Center. Yet no one would suggest that we stop spending money on counterterrorism because we have no perfect defense.

Moreover, defenses don't need to be a hundred percent effective to make a significant contribution to deterrence.

I've heard some astronomical figures attached to this program, Mr. Chairman, but we are not planning to spend hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. The money we propose to spend is comparable to other major defense development programs and comparable to other elements of our security strategy. We are proposing \$8.3 billion for missile defense in 2002. That is still a large amount, but the consequences of failure could be larger still.

And finally, I do not believe it diverts attention and resources from other more pressing threats. Some have argued that we should not spend any money on missile defense because the real threat comes from terrorists using suitcase bombs. No question that that terrorist threat is a real one and we should be addressing it. But we should not argue that -- we shouldn't lock our front door because a burglar might break through the window; we should address both problems.

As we move forward with accelerated testing and development, there are going to be test failures. There isn't a single major technological development in human history that didn't proceed with a process of trial and error, including many of our most successful weapons systems. Let me just mention six. The Corona satellite program, which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites, suffered 11 -- 11 straight test failures at the beginning of the program. The Thor Able (sp) and Thor Agena (sp) launch programs failed four out of five times. The Atlas Agena (sp) failed five out of eight times. The Scout launches failed four out of six times. The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries. The Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 test flights. Yet from these failures and from the successes came some of the most effective capabilities we have ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If a program never suffers test failures, it probably means we're not pushing the envelope hard enough.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began: this threat is not fictional, it is not limited, it is not remote, and it won't disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears. And this is not a partisan issue. We do not know whether the president who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking Los Angeles or Detroit or New York with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat, but we do know that individual will be an American. And that is how we must proceed: not as Republicans or

Democrats, but as Americans. Let future generations who look back at this period see statesmen who rose above party to make sure that America and its allies and its deployed forces were protected against this

snowflake

July 24, 2001 9:09 AM

TO: Steve Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meetings w/Ivanov

You might let Condi know that I have already worked out my dates with Ivanov. I had a visit with him on the phone that Doug Feith can fill you in on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072401-2

Russia

24 Jul 01

W00993-01

11-L-0559/OSD/5467

snoflake

September 19, 2001 7:33 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Feedback

312

I send things over to the President, but I never have any idea whether or not he gets them or sees them.

Is there some way I could get feedback acknowledging he saw something?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091901-2

9 Sep 01

W01191 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/5489

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 19, 2001

From:

(b)(6)

MEMO FOR

TO:

Cables/C&D *Hann 9/20*

THRU:

ExecSec *AS Yo*

Cables:

Please fax attached **SecDef** memos:

to Hon. George Tenet, **DCI**

Hon. Andrew Card, **OP** W01191-01

C&D:

1. DepSecDef copy has already been delivered—please DO NOT deliver.
2. Please control a file copy. *← ueb*

No further action or coordination is required at this time.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

W01191-01

snowflake

September 27, 2001 6:13 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Attached are a couple of papers on Afghanistan that might be worth reading. I found them interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

Edwards and Miakhel: "Enlisting Afghan Aid", Edwards: "Outwitting Osama"

DHR:dh
092701-2

W012411/01

29 Sep 01

11-L-0559/OSD/5492

Enlisting Afghan Aid

David B. Edwards & Shahmahmood Miakhel

Osama Bin Laden is waiting for George Bush to declare a jihad against Afghanistan. It is the response he **expects**, and he can't wait. For him, this is a holy war, a clash of civilizations, and he has no compunction about using Afghans as kindling to start a conflagration that would involve the entire Muslim world. One hopes the **policymakers** in Washington realize where Bin Laden's strategy leads and will think carefully about how to avoid his **trap**.

To develop a strategy that confounds Bin Laden's **plans**, we must begin by thinking of Afghans not as **enemies** but as potential allies. It is no coincidence **that** none of the names so far identified in the list of hijackers are Afghans. Bin Laden and his Arab followers **live** in restricted enclaves, **and** few Afghans, outside the Taliban regime itself, harbor any sympathies for his cause. Afghanistan now, no less than during the decade of Soviet control, is an occupied nation, and we **must** enlist in our struggle the **many** Afghans inside the **country** and out who would welcome the **opportunity** to unseat the Taliban and get rid of the Arab interlopers in their country. Two steps must be taken to draw these people into **the** international community in its attack on Bin Laden and his supporters.

First, the international community must assemble experienced Afghan leaders **to** provide **the** nucleus of an interim government. This group should include exiled moderates who were forced out of the political picture **first** by **the** extremist resistance parties in **Peshawar** back in the 1980s and then by the Taliban. They must be joined by the handful of moderate **commanders** forced into exile by the Taliban who **Afghans** still

trust. The number of recognized Afghan **leaders** who have managed to both **survive and** maintain their reputation in the polarized politics of the last two decades is small, but they exist and must be persuaded to put aside their partisan disputes and participate in a **transitional** coalition to **govern** Afghanistan until democratic elections **can** be held. As this group is brought together, Afghans generally must be convinced that these leaders will not be **puppets** of the United States or any other foreign power. Similarly, Afghanistan's neighbors must **understand** that the interim government will avoid foreign entanglements and dedicate itself to the immediate goals of reestablishing the **foundations** of government, helping the Afghan people become economically self-sufficient, and preparing the ground for general elections.

The second step is an international commitment made up front to provide **a** massive influx of development assistance to reconstruct the economic and social infrastructure of Afghan society. After 23 years **of foreign** occupation and civil war, the country's roads, irrigation systems, and electrical grid are in a state of ruin, and Afghanistan now is **in** the grip of a drought that has **turned** much of the region into a desert. Afghans remember well that the international community largely forgot about them **after** the Soviets withdrew from their country, and **they** must be assured that **this** **will** not happen again and that we will work with them to rebuild the once vibrant and modernizing society that existed prior to the Marxist revolution of 1978. Without such commitments, Afghans will find little reason **to** take the risks that opposing Bin Laden and the **Taliban** will entail. On **the** other hand, the promise of sustained international support for Afghanistan will send a message not only to Afghans, but to Muslims **generally** that the West is committed to their welfare rather than their destruction,

No group has suffered more in the last quarter century than the Afghans, but they are a resilient people and will be a formidable foe again if they believe themselves to be under invasion **from** a foreign enemy. We must frame our response to the terrorist outrage not as **an** assault but as a liberation-from oppressive rulers, unwanted guests, and the economic calamity that is their everyday reality. Respected **Afghan** leaders must be **at** the forefront of our efforts, **and** it must be clear that our **intentions are to help** rebuild rather than to destroy. Those *of us* who have enjoyed the prosperity of the **last** two decades must **recognize** that terrorism is born of political and economic despair. If we fail to take into account **Afghanistan's future**, as well as its past and present, Afghanistan will **remain** a place where terrorists can find safe haven, and **all** the military might in the world won't make us safe again,


David B. Edwards is Professor of Anthropology at Williams College and the director of the **Williams** Afghan Media Project. He is also the author of *Children of History: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad* (forthcoming, Univ. of California Press) and other books and articles on **the Afghan conflict**.

Shahm Mahmood Miakhel was a reporter for the Voice of America in Pakistan and the director of the **Belgian** relief organization for Afghan refugees. In the early **1990s**, he was **senior** liaison **officer** in the United Nations Development Program in Afghanistan. He is presently a taxi driver in Washington, D.C.

Contact Information:

For David Edwards: dedwards@williams.edu. P

For **Shahm Mahmood** Miakhel: miakhel@erols.com



Outwitting Osama
David B. Edwards, William5 College

America needs to drop "**smart** bombs" on Afghanistan. I don't mean by this the bombs we used against Saddam Hussein, the ones that go down **smokestacks** to reach their target. I mean the kind that tear the **heart** out of a terrorist movement by denying it **the** support of the people it needs to spread its message of-hatred and fear. The bomber we need to mobilize for this mission is not the B-1 or the B-52. It is the **C-5A** cargo plane, and the bombs our aircraft should drop are shipments of food, blankets, and medicine to help the starving **people** of Afghanistan get through the coming winter. The international recognition that would come our way as a result of this humanitarian gesture would stop bin Laden in his tracks. It's the response **from** us he least expects, and that is why is it the response that just might **succeed**.

To understand why this is the right strategy, two facts need to be recognized. First, Afghanistan is an occupied nation. The Taliban regime was imposed on the Afghan people after nearly two decades of foreign invasion and **civil** war. They are a regime that tore power away **from** squabbling warlords with the promise of offering the people a respite from violence, but that then promptly **turned** the people into instruments for their own extremist policies. The Afghans endure a second occupier as well, in **the** form of **Osama** bin Laden and other foreign radicals who came to **Afghanistan** under the guise of helping the people in their struggle against the Soviet Union, but then stayed on **after the** Soviets withdrawal in order to pursue a holy war against America and her western allies. It is no coincidence that Afghans have not been listed among the hijackers. The majority of Afghans support neither the Taliban rulers **nor** the foreign radicals who have set up bases in their **country**, and we must realize that it is still possible to enlist the people of Afghanistan as allies in our struggle to **get** rid of these occupation forces,

The second fact is that Afghanistan is a nation of subsistence farmers in the grip of a three-year drought that, following on the heels of a two-decade long war, has left the country **in** desperate straits. Chris Buckley, a Christian Aid worker recently forced to leave Afghanistan, sent out an e-mail message in which he estimated that over five million people are in danger **of starvation** this winter. "In a few weeks **the** winter snows will come," Buckley noted, "**cutting** off the hundreds of isolated villages whose only links to the outside world are rutted dirt tracks. Without **seeds** they will be unable to **replant** for next year. Without food aid now, thousands could be dead before **the** spring."

The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan **affords an** opportunity to bring Afghans and other Muslim nations into our coalition against terrorism. By **mounting** a massive airlift of food and supplies to Afghanistan's people, and making sure that **our** efforts are **well-**publicized throughout the Middle **East**, **we will** neutralize bin Laden's campaign against the United States and build upon **the** unprecedented sympathy we currently enjoy around the world because of the acts of terror inflicted upon us.

An airlift of **the** sort envisioned here was mounted **successfully** once before in 1948, when **the** United States and Great Britain began the Berlin **Airlift** that became one of the

defining moments of the Cold War. America and Great Britain responded at that time to the Soviet blockade of the western sector of Berlin not with violence, but by sending our pilots on humanitarian missions to provide food for a hungry people. The Airlift did not prevent the Cold War, nor forestall the division of Germany by the Soviet Union. But it ensured that a part of **Berlin** remained open and free, and just **as** importantly kept hope alive for the German people. **Our** actions at that time also won for America and Great Britain the abiding respect of millions of Germans, who had until recently perceived us as enemies but who from that point on and ever since have seen us **as** friends and allies. The present crisis offers us a similar opportunity to confound our enemies and win over not only Afghans, but millions of other Muslims who will see that, in the face of terror, America retaliates with hope.

It might be argued that the United States provided \$123 million in humanitarian aid for Afghanistan last year, which hasn't seemed to help us any in gaining the trust of the Afghan people. Why would this operation be any different? It is the case that we have been consistently the largest humanitarian donor to Afghanistan, but the vast majority of our assistance has been funneled through UN agencies like the World Food Program, and few Afghans have **any idea where** this aid **originally** came from. This time, however, each of our **"smart bombs"** should proudly display on **its** side an American flag, and **our** packages should contain a message in the native languages of Afghanistan telling the people that we will support them in their **efforts** to rebuild their society and to institute free elections.

When we commence our airlift, our government should also **announce** that, in light of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Afghanistan, we **will** temporarily hold off on military operations against Afghanistan. During this moratorium, the United States will provide the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to decide on a strategy for dealing with the terrorist bases on their soil, recognizing that the elimination of these bases is a non-negotiable requirement. Our government should also announce that, while the airlift continues, we will stand ready to assist moderate **political** and religious leaders inside Afghanistan and in exile who want to help resolve this **crisis** by ridding their country of the terrorists who operate there.

There is, of course, no guarantee that this plan of action will work, but it would cost us little to try and would be of inestimable benefit to us if it were to succeed. At this point in time, we have lost the element of strategic surprise, but what is suggested **here** is a "surprise attack" of a different kind, one that would catch bin Laden and his followers entirely off-guard. They expect revenge from us rather than compassion, and they are undoubtedly ready to broadcast to the Muslim world pictures of the Afghan civilian casualties that would inevitably result from **U.S.** military strikes. How much better it would be for us to show the world a **different** sort of picture, a picture of Americans providing assistance to a people in need. No action on our part would more effectively reveal the falseness of bin Laden's claim to be the defender of Islam or demonstrate more clearly to the **world** the **true** nature of American justice.

snowflake

October 25, 2001 9:57 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: President Putin

Attached is an interesting piece on President **Putin** that Andy Marshall sent to me and suggested I read. I have done so, and I think you might find it worthwhile.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/29/01 paper. "A Political Portrait of Vladimir **Putin**: Between Nationalist Ideology and Personal Interests"

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RUSSIA

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OCT 25 2001

AUG 29 2001

A political portrait of Vladimir Putin: Between nationalist ideology and personal interests

Vladimir Shlapentokh

Paradoxically, post-Soviet Russian leaders have had more decision-making power than the leaders of the Soviet past. In the USSR, the masters of the Kremlin, though seemingly endowed with limitless command over the country, had to confer with the members of the Politburo about their major decisions. For instance, the resolutions to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 were made only after serious debates in the Kremlin. Though their real authority over Russia has been less efficient, and their control over the economy and social processes has been smaller in scope, post-Soviet leaders have had more freedom in making political decisions, particularly in the areas of foreign policy and the military, than the general secretaries.

With his nearly boundless power, Boris Yeltsin made extravagant decisions. In response to his possible impeachment in March 1993, he was one step away from gassing the deputies of the Russian parliament in order to expel them from the parliament building. As it turned out, the parliament came up seven votes short of impeachment and Yeltsin remained in office. Later, in October 1993, when the parliament did indeed rebel, Yeltsin shelled the parliament building in order to maintain his power. Among other "monarchic decisions," Yeltsin appointed an **unknown** KGB operator as his successor-Vladimir **Putin** would become the guardian of Yeltsin's personal security and wealth after his departure from office.

Though Yeltsin's personal power was certainly much greater than any democratic leader, it did have limits. To some degree, he adjusted his behavior to the position of the State Duma and the Federation Council. He also paid close attention to the media, which regularly criticized his decisions.

Today, President Vladimir **Putin** is almost completely free **from** external control by any political institution. He has converted the State Duma, the Federation Council and the new State Council into puppet bodies that react dutifully to the slightest **flexion** of his will. None of the respected Russian politicians-besides Grigorii Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberal democratic party "Yabloko," and Sergei Kovalev, a current deputy of the State Duma and former head of the Durna's committee on human rights-dare to criticize the president publicly. Even the bold and open-minded Mikhail Gorbachev refrains from harshly criticizing the **Putin** administration. The independence of the media has been downgraded significantly in comparison with its status during the Yeltsin regime. Russian television and radio stations as well as most newspapers stopped producing critical reports about the president. There are only a few newspapers with low circulations that **publish** articles containing aspersions against **Putin**. With the evaporation of democracy in Russia, the activity of the political police is now more visible. For instance, fear of foreign spies and their Russian agents has returned to the political landscape, and self-censorship has crept back into the minds of many Russians, particularly those who work for the state, or depend on its privileges.

As a long-term goal, **Putin** wants to rebuild the strong state and restore the country's geopolitical status. His numerous statements to this effect should be taken seriously. With his commitment to Russian nationalism and its imperial past, **Putin** has demonstrated his deep respect for Stalin on several occasions. He treats Stalin as the great leader who won the war against Germany and gave mother Russia her superpower status. In 1999, with evident pleasure **Putin** joined Gennadii Ziuganov, the leader of the Russian Communist Party, in a toast to the memory of Stalin on his birthday (December 21). **Putin** supports the Communist-led campaign to keep the Lenin Mausoleum in its current location on Red Square, in spite of the Russian democrats' attempts to have it removed. **Putin** also speaks fondly of former KGB chiefs Felix Dzerzhinsky and Yuri Andropov and maintains contact with Vladimir Kriuchkov, the former head of the KGB and the leader of the aborted antidemocratic coup in August 1991.

However, many of the president's practical deeds have gone against his goal of creating a

strong state. **Putin** belongs to that category of the leaders who are obsessed with personal power and ready to sacrifice the country's national interests for the sake of their political juggernaut. Stalin and Yeltsin were examples of this type of leader, while Gorbachev was not. Like any other leader, **Putin** is quite pleased when his country prospers in any possible way, but only on the condition that it does not put his power at risk.

In spite of his much-publicized promises to enforce law and order, which is coveted by ordinary people and foreign investors, he has avoided the risky fight against corruption, seemingly wary of upsetting the **oligarches**, whose support will be needed for the 2004 election. Like Yeltsin, who opened the gates for the criminalization of society, **Putin** did not allow any corrupt high official to be prosecuted. What is more, he completely ignores media reports about the dark past of many of his aides, including his prime minister and the head of his administration. His true interest in advancing a major anticrime campaign was typified by his recent appointment of the new minister of internal affairs. This position is crucial for suppressing crime and corruption in the country, yet **Putin** has appointed a third-rank official, Boris Gryzlov, who belongs to the "Petersburg gang," the president's reservoir for cadres, all of whom studied or worked with him in Leningrad/Petersburg, **Putin's** other government appointees include many former KGB people who lack experience as managers. Instead, they have brought the manners of the political police to the highest echelons of the political establishment. Never in Russian history, including the Soviet period, has a leader been so influenced by members of the political police.

Probably the most important factor in assessing the difference between **Putin's** concern for Russia and his personal goals is the fact that he sacrificed democracy for the latter. In order to solidify his monopoly on political power and guarantee his **reelection** in 2004, he has discredited Russia's democratic institutions with various insinuations. He claims that these institutions undermine "the responsibility of the people before the state," "order in society" and "the security of the state" (just a few of the president's beloved expressions). In a telling gesture, **Putin** ignored the August celebration of the tenth anniversary of the aborted coup against Gorbachev's

democratic reforms. His refusal to utter even a single positive remark about this historical event revealed his true feelings about democracy.

Though Putin has successfully downgraded the country's democratic institutions and now has the power to prevent the emergence of a popular alternative candidate in the next election, he cannot afford to lose his legitimacy-inside and outside the country-as a democratically elected president. A blatant manipulation of the 2004 election would undermine the prestige of his office. For this reason, Putin is fixated on his rating and lavishly finances the public opinion firm that monitors it.

To sustain his high rating, the Kremlin has been actively building Putin's "cult of personality." Recently, the Kremlin operators created a special youth movement called "Moving Together," which has only one purpose: to praise the leader. Putin's image-makers try to persuade the masses that there are no other suitable candidates for the presidency. They highlight Putin's "normalcy" as president in comparison with Yeltsin's almost pathological behavior. In fact, the president is his own best image-maker. Appearing at least three to four times during every television news program in Russia, Putin successfully projects himself as a knowledgeable and balanced administrator. He publically dispenses specific instructions to his ministers about what to do in each area of life, a clear rebuke to Yeltsin who was conspicuously far from Russian reality. He takes great pains to show the country that he is a caring person, deeply involved in the everyday lives of the people, and that he is healthy, physically fit, and active in the nation's popular sports and athletic events (a stark contrast to the ailing Yeltsin). Putin's sentimental love for Petersburg, his native city, has been used by his PR agents to embellish his image. While preserving his reputation as a highly educated individual (besides Lenin, he is the first Russian leader who speaks foreign languages), Putin tries to maintain his image as someone close to the people: For the same reason, he has demonstrated his religiosity by using the great sign of the cross in public. At the same time, he operates with rude language and criminal jargon in his speeches. As a result, 70 percent of the Russians endorse Putin's performance as president. They believe the popular Moscow locution that Putin is "a leader to whom Russians have no

alternative.”

As noted by some experts, **Putin** has been encouraged by the polling data and has seemingly persuaded even himself that he is an effective leader who has been foreordained to save the country from disintegration and restore its international status. While he claims that his KGB past has prepared him for his new job, he remains quiet on the issue of his limited experience in actual governing (he worked for a few years as vice mayor of Petersburg and one year as the chief of the Federal Security Service, FSB), especially by comparison to the Russian leaders of the last two centuries.

For the sake of maintaining his power, **Putin** is ready to bend his governing principles, even if it damages his proclaimed goal of creating a strong state. **Putin's** ambivalent behavior is unprecedented in Russian history. He praises the achievements of the Communist past and denounces the Communist system. He supports private property rights, but unceremoniously intervenes in private businesses. Deciding on the national anthem and flag, **Putin** endorsed the music **from** the old Soviet hymn, coupled with rather anti-Communist lyrics, the official state banner with the symbol of tsarist Russia and the red pennant for the army. While maintaining a good relationship with Alexander Prokhanov, the editor of the antisemitic weekly *Zavtra*, he attended the Jewish celebration of Hanukkah. He demonstrates his deference to both Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Egor Gaidar, the former of which declared the latter “the destroyer of Russia.” Likewise, he declares his high esteem for President Bush, while **buddying** up to Fidel Castro and sending his emissaries to meet with dictators and promoters of terrorism, such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar **Khadafy**. In August, **Putin's** most hospitable reception for Kim Jong Il, a man with obvious paranoid tendencies, became the butt of jokes and general amusement in Russia. As explained by Russian journalists, in preparation for the leader's visit on August 3, the Yaroslavl railroad station, while awaiting the leader's train (which had been equipped with twenty-one armored cars and spent seven days on route **from** the Russian-Korean border), had been “shampooed” for the first time in a century.

For better or worse, **Putin's** unprecedented political power and his yearning to keep this

power is combined with a reluctance to make resolute decisions. Thinking retrospectively, it would be hard to imagine that Yeltsin, whose major preoccupation since 1996 had been the search for a pliable heir, would choose a strong-willed individual who could prosecute him for his dubious deeds.

Several Russian experts have linked **Putin's** irresoluteness as president to the still unclear circumstances of his arrival to power. They have insinuated that the president may be vulnerable to blackmail by Yeltsin and those who brought him to power. Some Moscow authors have ascribed the September 1999 bombings of three residential buildings (two in Moscow and one in a provincial city, causing 200 deaths) to the **FSB**, which **Putin** headed between July 1998 and August 1999. They pointed out that the blasts occurred just one month after **Putin's** appointment as prime minister and only a few months before he was declared Yeltsin's heir. Strengthening the argument about the FSB origin of the bombings, former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, now a political refugee in England, wrote the book, *The FSB Blasts Russia*, in collaboration with an American historian. Marking an unprecedented event in the history of the printed media, *Novaia Gazeta* devoted an entire issue (August 27, 2001) to this book, which implicated the FSB in the September explosions.

At the time of the incident, an outraged public, under the influence of the official propaganda, blamed these attacks on Chechen terrorists. With a wave of nationalist feelings sweeping across Russia, Vladimir **Putin** emerged in the public eye as a national hero who would, by all means, punish the "perfidious Chechens." The perpetrators of these heinous crimes are still unknown to the public.

Some journalists have ascribed **Putin's** indecisiveness to his alleged involvement in corrupt activities and possible connections to Russian mafia when he served as an aide to Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak in 1990-1996. Sobchak had a reputation as a corrupt official. He avoided being arrested only by leaving the country illegally; **Putin** (then the head of the KGB) assisted Sobchak in his escape. As an explanation for **Putin's** reluctance to make resolute decisions, the "corruption theory" has fewer supporters than the "explosion theory." However, a

recent investigation conducted by *Newsweek* (the results were published in August 2001), provided the advocates of the “corruption theory” with new facts.

Whatever the cause of **Putin’s** weak political will, it began to show early in his presidency. Contrary to the practice of almost all Russian leaders of the past, he has retained several officials from the previous regime, including the head of the Kremlin administration..

Putin’s reaction to the Kursk catastrophe was another indicator of his ambivalence. Though it was quite clear that the navy commanders botched the rescue operations, **Putin** was apparently **afraid** to punish anyone involved in that effort. Such mild conduct was a vivid contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reaction to the famous case of a German youth who landed a Cessna on Red Square in 1987. Gorbachev, who had also been known for having a weak political will, dismissed several highly ranked army commanders, including Minister of Defense Sergei Sokolov, along with all of his deputies, the head of the general staff and two of his deputies, and the commander and head of the troops of the Warsaw military pact.

Over the last year, the presidential administration has been torn by infighting on various prominent issues. For instance, last year **Putin** was unable to assuage the acrimonious public debates between the Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev and the Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin. The men had stormily disagreed about military doctrine. The rift between these top military officials humiliated the army. The Kremlin further manifested its disarray last July when it changed its position on the cruel behavior of Russian troops toward civilians in three Chechen villages, oscillating between condemnation and justification of the army’s conduct.

In January 2001, **Putin** revealed his inability to behave as a resolute leader when Pavel Borodin was arrested in New York. Borodin, a corrupt official and former aide to Yeltsin, once served as **Putin’s** boss. He is currently a member of the government. **Putin** was evidently troubled by the arrest of a man who was privy to the highest secrets in Moscow. He did not take a clear position on this issue.

In the same evasive style, **Putin** has remained quiet on the subject of Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko, who is known as a cruel dictator. Suspected of several murders

in 2000-2001, Lukashenko has been ostracized by the international community. Likewise, Putin refused to take a public stance in relation to Slobodan Milosevic's transfer to the Hague's international court.

Putin's treatment of the regional barons, governors and presidents is also quite ambivalent. On one hand, he proclaimed his determination to restore the unity of the country, which had been shattered by Yeltsin. He created an institution of regional representatives to supervise the seven inter-regional districts. On the other hand, it became clear that Putin failed to support these supervisors when they tried to challenge the authority of leading governors, such as Eduard Rossel in Yekaterinburg, Vladimir Yakovlev in Petersburg, and the presidents of national republics, such as Mintirniir Shamiev in Tatarstan and Murtaza Rakhimov in Bashkortostan. Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko of the Far East region was the symbol of corruption. After being pressured out of office by an interregional supervisor and public protests, Putin made him a member of the federal government, to the great stupefaction of the Russian people.

Putin's reluctance to make risky decisions, his desire to present himself as a "democrat" as well as his drive to please everybody have often resulted in blatant lies. He bluntly denied suggestions about Russia's authoritarian character and refused to recognize the all-out corruption in his bureaucracy as a serious problem. Straight-faced, he claimed that corruption in the Russian bureaucracy is "no worse than in the bureaucracies of European or North American countries." The president denied allegations that the Kremlin arrested media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky in May 2000 in response to his television company's critical treatment of the Putin administration. Putin, along with top military officials, deceived the Russian public in July 2000 during the Kursk submarine tragedy. He continues to claim that the navy commanders had been ready to accept foreign aid immediately, when in fact they accepted this aid a few days later, after all of the sailors had perished. He also lied about this issue in an interview with Larry King in September 2000. His claim that Chechnia is "occupied by foreign hirelings who impose an alien version of Islam" is another stark fabrication. The Soviet leaders of the past made similar false contentions, but none of them, besides Stalin, lied on issues that could be easily checked by

journalists and refuted by the public.

Putin's personal qualities do not seem to affect his sober analysis of reality. He worked for seventeen years as a KGB agent and can easily separate "truth for me" and "lies for others." Neither opinionated nor trigger-happy, **Putin** is more inclined to simply absorb information about the world around him. In his first year in office, his analysis of Russia was quite objective, in part because he could blame the previous regime for the country's current problems.

Putin understands the economy's major flaws. He realizes that by the size of its GNP, the economy places thirteenth in the world, behind South Korea and the Netherlands. He seemingly does not overestimate the importance of Russian economic growth in the last three years. As **Putin** understands, even if it continues, the rate of growth, which is mostly based on the export of oil and gas, will not have a major impact on the country's economic status in the world in the next decades. Despite his adoration of authoritarianism, he realizes that it is impossible to restore the command economy with his corrupt and financially weak state. For this reason, he supports a liberal economy.

Putin is also well informed about the status of the army. He knows that it lacks basic resources, and that the battle with Chechen separatists has involved almost all of the elite units of the Russian army, the minister of internal affairs, and the Federal Security Service.

While doing everything he can to sustain his popularity, **Putin** seems aware of the vulnerability of his status in the country. His fairytale ascension to power only adds to the unsteadiness of his character. He cannot escape the thought that the power that came so easily could likewise vanish, especially if "the criminal dimension" of his triumphant march to the presidency is true. He is no stranger to the biblical proverb, which is quite popular in Russia, "The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away." He recalls the wax and wane in popularity of such brilliant politicians as Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He understands that he cannot take his current rating for granted. As one of Moscow analysts said, **Putin** is "the president of hope." His continued popularity depends on the country's economic progress and the betterment of life for the majority of people. While most Russians support **Putin** as president, they deny that major

progress has been made in the key areas of life. According to a survey conducted by the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies (VTSIOM) in 2001, 67 percent of Russians thought that the material life in the country had either “not changed, or declined” over the last year; 73 percent said that the level of corruption “stayed the same, or grew worse.”

President Bush’s push for the National Missile Defense (NMD) system has been one of Putin’s greatest challenges as president to date. It relates directly to his chance of being reelected in 2004 and his ability to keep his power intact. The American initiative has forced him to reconsider his foreign and domestic policies. He now seems to have two basic options. One, with his nationalist ideology he could advance a **confrontational** policy toward the West; or two, he could foster **friendly** relations with Europe and accept, though reluctantly, the leading position of the U.S. in the world.

The first strategy would allow Putin to exploit the Russians’ yearning for high geopolitical status and their lingering anti-Americanism in order to solidify his role as the savior of Russia, a reputation that was particularly important to him in the beginning of his rule. In doing so, however, he would exacerbate international tensions, deteriorate Russia’s economic ties with the U.S., and squander the country’s limited resources on a military buildup. The second strategy would enhance the chances for some economic progress, but would damage his reputation as the champion of Russian greatness.

Weighing the strategies, Putin cannot ignore his personal and family concerns, which had certainly influenced Yeltsin’s decisions. If Putin confronts the United States, he will lose his position as an almost full-fledged member of the G-8, which he enjoys on a personal level. His travels to the West would be extremely unpleasant compared to the friendly visits he would enjoy with a pro Western stance. Considering the atrocities of the Russian troops in Chechnia, Milosevic’s fate should, as pointed out by a Russian nationalist newspaper, influence Putin’s thinking.

Without good relations with the West, the members of his family would be deprived of the usual benefits enjoyed by Russian elites. Western college educations would not be readily

available to his children. Western financial institutions, so important to the Yeltsin family, would also be excluded. Harsh anti-western policies would make it almost impossible for Putin to establish a safe haven for his family in the West in the case of an emergency—for instance, if extremists from the army or FSB came to power.

Putin's past behavior toward his family has demonstrated his positive attitude toward the West on a personal, even emotional level, in spite of his proclaimed adherence to Russian nationalism. When the family moved to Moscow in 1996, Putin sent his two teenage daughters to a school run by the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, a blatant violation of the code of Russian patriotism. According to Putin's first book, he and his wife Ludmila enjoyed living in East Germany, where Putin worked as a KGB agent in 1985-1990. They apparently preferred the style of life in G.D.R., which was closer to that of Western Europe, even if both the Soviet Union and G.D.R. were totalitarian states. In the last years, Putin has used many opportunities to underscore his respect for Western European culture.

Putin's reluctance to make risky decisions, his strong desire to stay in power, and "the family factor" have directed him toward a mixed strategy. In foreign policy, the Kremlin will ultimately accept Bush's NMD, the modification or abrogation of the ABM treaty, and the further extension of NATO to the East. At the same time, it may take actions periodically—some serious, some symbolic—to show the world and its own people that it still plays an important role in the international arena. For instance, the Kremlin will develop friendly relations with China—including the bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation signed on July 16—flirt with Europe as an antidote against the U.S., try to strengthen its influence over the former Soviet republics, and make friendly gestures toward rogues states. It may also continue some modest efforts to enhance the military, though it understands that gaining military parity with the U.S. is impossible. Inside Russia, Putin will try to keep the "greatness syndrome" and anti-American sentiments alive, but he will avoid using them in their most extreme forms. To ensure good relations with the U.S., the Kremlin will allow the publication of some positive articles about America.

In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) had played a decisive role in Gorbachev's decision to launch perestroika. With the blessing of the army and KGB, the initial purpose of perestroika was to bolster the country's economy and military capacity. Gorbachev's first campaign, suitably named "acceleration," was designed to "catch up" with American technology. When this and other economic reforms failed and hopes of staying on par with America dimmed, perestroika took its liberal course, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The sobering affect of Bush's NMD on the Moscow political establishment was similar to that of Regan's SDI, only the outcome was more immediate. Once again, the Kremlin faces a situation in which the U.S. is about to make a leap forward in military technology, whatever the real potential for the proposed system's implementation. By all accounts, **Putin** and the Russian political establishment are in the process of reconciling Russia with its veritable international status. Most likely, **Putin** will look for a new rapprochement with the United States. The potential Chinese threat, which is often discussed by Russians, is another potential stimulus for the Kremlin's propitiation with NMD and other American initiatives.

With that said, it is also important for the United States to use diplomacy in its relationship with Russia. The country's adjustment to its real place in the world should be made as painless as possible. A rise of extremist forces in the country-either as proponents or assailants of **Putin's** regime-should not be deemed implausible. American politicians should bear in mind that **Putin's** personality is flexible in many respects, but dogmatic when it comes to his primary objective: reelection in 2004. As long as **Putin** maintains his reputation as a great Russian leader, American officials can be confident that they have a president with whom they can work.

In the next years, the U.S. will be faced with a Russian leader whose behavior vacillates between several different types of foreign and domestic policies, some of them friendly toward America, some of them not. But one thing has become clear. Bush's NMD showed the Kremlin that a rational Russian politician has no choice but to acquiesce to the leading role of the U.S. in

the international arena.

Acknowledgment: *The author wishes to thank Joshua Woods for his editorial contribution to this article.*

snowflake

October 26, 2001 2:49 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Churchill

One of my associates sent me the attached material on Churchill, which you might find of interest.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
Churchill info

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Churchill has a wonderful quote in his memoir of WWI about how the collapse of Kaiser Germany caught everybody off guard. The same is true of extended battles. March 1943 saw the largest destruction of cross-Atlantic shipping by the U-boats. Churchill said it was the only thing that truly scared him. Some in the admiralty thought the war was close to being lost. But two months later, the allies did not lose a single ship, and the U-boats, taking impossible losses, withdrew from the North Atlantic.

Important events in war sometimes come incrementally-sometimes as a result of critical mass having been unexpectedly reached, sometimes as a result of serendipity. Nobody knows. And the key to winning wars is remembering what Clausewitz taught--confusion is prince of the battlefield. Getting some handle on controlling uncertain events comes from acknowledging the impossibility of doing so.

War is uncertain-a thing where surprises are routine. How wars end is usually just as surprising.

snowflake

October 31, 2001 10:35 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

CC: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Muslim Warfare During Ramadan

Attached is a paper on Muslim attitudes toward warfare during Ramadan.

Regards,

Attach.

1 0/27/01 Kraemer paper. University of Chicago, "On the Muslim Attitude to Warfare during Ramadan"

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OCT 31 2001

On the Muslim Attitude to Warfare during **Ramadan**

Prof. Joel L. Kraemer

27 October 2001

The University of Chicago

Muslim spokesmen in Indonesia and Pakistan have asserted recently that waging war against Muslims during the holy month of **Ramadan** is offensive to their religious sensibilities. While this may be so, and while it is true that **Ramadan** is a month of prayer, fasting, and study, this claim is disingenuous, as it is commendable for Muslims to wage *jihad* during **Ramadan**, and they have done so often in the past.

One of the reasons for the strategic surprise in the October war in 1973 was that the Egyptians and Syrians attacked on **10 Ramadan** (6 October).

(**Ramadan**, the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, falls at a different time each year, as the Muslim calendar is lunar, so that 12 lunar months = 354 days, 11 less than the solar year.)

An Egyptian code name for the October war was "**Badr**," a reference to the first victory of Muslim armies under the command of the Prophet Muhammad on Friday **17 Ramadan**, 2 A.H. (= 13 March 624 A.D.) at a place named **Badr** in Arabia. The Muslims regarded this first triumph as a vindication of their religion, a deliverance brought about by Allah.

Muslim armies initiated hostilities during the sacred month of **Ramadan** throughout history. The conquest of Mecca (called **al-Fath**, the Conquest par excellence) occurred on **19 Ramadan**, 8 A.H. (10 January, 630 A.D.). The victorious raid on Tabuk in 9 A.H./631 A.D. also took place in **Ramadan**. Muhammad commanded the Muslim forces on both occasions. The battle of 'Ayn Jalut, where the Mamluks defeated the Mongols, was on Friday **25 Ramadan 658/3 September 1260**.

The Egyptians in 1973 had these precedents in mind. Following the example of the Prophet assured success and raised morale. This was stressed in sermons, religious publications, and the daily press (*see Majallat al-Azhar*, vol



45 [December, 1973]; J. Jomier, in *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, 29 [1977]; 'Abd al-'Aziz Kamel, *al-Ahram*, 12 October 1973).

Islamic law expressly permits warfare during Ramadan and considers it meritorious. It is a month when the gates of paradise are said to be open. Those who fight in the *jihad* during Ramadan are given a dispensation from the obligation to fast. The Hanbali jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. Damascus, 1328 A.D.), the spiritual forefather of militant fundamentalist Islam, issued a *fatwa* to that effect, acclaiming the model of the Prophet Muhammad and the conquest of Mecca during Ramadan. See Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Fatawa al-kubra*, I, 367; IV, 459; *Majmu' al-fatawa*, XXV, 209; and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), *Bada'i' al-fawa'id*, IV, 846.

The claim that it is wrong for non-Muslim armies to wage war against Muslims on Ramadan is bizarre, as it is always wrong for non-Muslims, i.e. infidels, or unbelievers (*kafirun*), to wage war against Muslims. There is no symmetry or reciprocity here.

The only legitimate warfare according to Islamic law is *jihad*, which is a holy war, or religious war, sanctioned by Allah and fought for the sake of Allah, to enhance Islam and propagate the faith.

snowflake

November 5, 2001

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MEMORANDUM

TO: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

CC: VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD CHENEY
SECRETARY PAUL O'NEILL

FROM DONALD H. RUMSFELD



SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY DR. GARY S. BECKER

Attached is an article by Dr. Gary S. Becker, Gary is a Nobel Laureate in Economics, professor at University of Chicago and a good friend. I found it to be a distinctly different perspective than most of the writing about the problem of terrorism in the United States. I thought you might find the article of interest.

Dr. Becker is a person I think you would enjoy meeting on some occasion. I would be happy to arrange it if you thought it would be useful.

Very respectfully.



DHR/azn
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Attached: *Prosperity Will Rise Out of the Ashes*, by Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, Wall Street Journal, 10/29/01

SNOWFLAKE

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11-L-0559/OSD/5517

Prosperity Will Rise Out of the Ashes

By GARY S. BECKER
AND KEVIN M. MURPHY

In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill commented on the **rapidity** of economic recovery from national **disasters** and **wars**. He recognized that nations recover quickly as long as they **retain** their knowledge and skills, the prime **engines** of economic growth. **America** retains its vast supply of both, which suggests that, contrary to fears, the Sept. 11 attacks are **unlikely** to worsen the **medium- to long-term economic** outlook.

The effects of the earthquake that hit the Japanese city of Kobe in 1996 illustrate Mill's conclusion. This quake destroyed more than 100,000 buildings, badly damaged many others, and left hundreds of thousands homeless. Over 6,000 people died. Estimates place the total loss at about \$114 billion (more than 2% of Japanese GDP at the time). Yet it took only a little over a year before GDP in the Kobe region returned to near pre-quake levels.

Ongoing Threats

The **uncertainty** about the extent of future terrorist attacks may make the recovery from Sept. 11 different from those after Kobe and other shocks. But even ongoing threats usually have mostly temporary effects. For example, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis shocked the economy and awakened Americans to the possibility of nuclear attack. That crisis did significantly lower the growth of income for several months, but within a quarter or two, growth rates returned to pre-crisis levels, despite the continuing uncertainty.

While the primary losses from the terrorist attacks were on the ground, the airline industry, and related industries like tourism, have suffered the greatest impact. But such shocks are not unprecedented. The oil price shocks of the 1970s and early '80s also affected critical sectors of the economy, and forced substantial adjustments and reallocation of resources. Most economists agree that the oil shocks contributed to the poor performance of industrial economies in that period.

Yet history shows that economies adjust. The effect of the oil price increase fell greatly over time as the U.S. reduced its dependence on oil. Sectors of the economy that are less energy-dependent grew relative to those that are highly so, and consumers and producers conserved. As a result of these shifts, and the subsequent decline in oil prices, oil imports accounted for only about 0.7% of GDP in 1999, vs. 2.8% in 1980. More recent energy shocks have had a much smaller impact on the economy.

The effect of the terrorist threat is likely to follow a similar pattern. Even if the external threat remains fixed over time, our ability to deal with it in an effective and efficient manner will improve, perhaps greatly. The costs imposed on air travelers in terms of long lines and schedule disruptions will be reduced as we find more efficient ways to ensure security, and as potential travelers move toward video-conferencing and other means of communication. In the absence of further incidents, the psychological impact of the attacks will also wane. Already, air travel has recovered to about 60% of its pre-attack level, after falling to less than 50% in the first week after air travel resumed.

In justifying airline subsidies, some political leaders pointed to the disastrous effects on the economy of eliminating air

travel. But the relevant question is not what dire consequences would result from elimination, but what will be the damage from a higher effective price for air travel due to the terrorist threat? Air travel, taken in its entirety, may be an "indispensable" element of the economy, but marginal adjustments are much less costly.



William Brumhall

*Bad as Sept. 11 was,
we have recovered from
even worse shocks. The
longterm outlook for the
economy remains strong.*

This is one reason why the federal airline bailout was hasty and excessive.

Consumers have made a rational reaction to the uncertainty and ongoing threats. They cut back on purchases of big-ticket items as they husband resources and maintain flexibility to deal with contingencies. Similarly, businesses cut back on investment until they have a better idea of what is to come. But this reluctance to spend has hardly been universal or longterm. In fact, purchases of key staples like food and medicines initially increased, while consumption that required individuals to go out in public places, like restaurants and theaters, collapsed. However, publicly consumed goods have already rebounded strongly—attendance at Broadway, for instance, has returned to close to pre-attack levels.

Quantifying the impact of the attacks is instructive, even though estimates are imprecise. The destroyed World Trade Center was worth \$3 billion to \$4 billion. The lost assets of the building's tenants, and the cleanup cost, might add another \$10 billion. Including the damage to surrounding buildings and the Pentagon, the planes lost, and the lost productive capacity of those killed would raise the total economic loss to somewhere between \$25 billion and \$60 billion.

To put this in perspective, total physical assets in the U.S. are about \$30 trillion, and total productive assets that also include human capital are on the order of \$100 trillion. So even a \$60 billion loss is only 0.2% of physical assets and 0.06% of total productive assets. In contrast, the

\$114 billion of physical assets destroyed in* Kobe was four times as large when compared to the Japanese economy.

The impact of an ongoing threat is harder to quantify. It gains a feel for how large that might be, we use a pessimistic scenario—namely, that attacks will be attempted each year for the foreseeable future, but that security measures will reduce the likelihood of success.

The direct cost of increased airport security has been estimated at about \$4 per passenger per flight segment. We assume that flight delays and security checks will force travelers to spend an additional half-hour per flight segment. (However, bad policies could greatly raise waiting times; as when gasoline rationing caused long lines at gas stations in the 1970s.) If the average passenger values time at \$20 per hour, increased security would cost about \$10 billion per year.

We further assume that even with enhanced security, terrorists would destroy one plane each year, resulting in up to 100 deaths. With a generous value of \$10 million per life lost, this would add another \$1 billion to the annual perceived cost of flying. This gives a total added cost to the airline industry of about \$11 billion per year. Under this pessimistic scenario, the terrorist threat would add about 11% to the cost of air travel, and impose a cost on the economy of about 0.1% of GDP.

Continuing Attacks

Increased security would also reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on physical assets. But to err again on the high side, suppose the sustained annual loss from continuing attacks equals \$15 billion. That annual loss in assets would reduce net national product by about \$15 billion for a given capital stock, and the percentage point reduction in the net return to capital would be five basis points. The investment response to the lower return to capital would reduce long-run capital stock by about 0.8%, resulting in a loss of about 0.2% in long-run GDP. This is similar to our estimate of the direct impact of the costs imposed on air travel. Adding these two estimates gives a total impact of about 0.3% of GDP.

Note that the impact is small compared to the oil price shocks of 1974-5 and 1979-81. Overall energy costs increased in real terms by 53% and 67% respectively, and each shock increase raised the cost of oil imports by over 1% of GDP. Relative to the economy, the impact of either oil price shock was over four times as large as our estimated cost of future terrorism.

These calculations do not justify complacency because they assume that the U.S. will take more effective measures to reduce terrorism. Besides, had economic policies in response to the terrorist threat could easily magnify the damage. Nevertheless, the economic future of the U.S. is still highly promising. Its vast supplies of human and physical capital, and its innovative skills, should continue to propel the economy to new heights.

Mr. Becker, a Nobel laureate in economics, is a professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Murphy is a professor of economics at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.

*** COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (NOV. 7.2001 8:32AM) ***

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E-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION

November 5, 2001

MEMORANDUM

TO: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

CC: VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD CHENEY
SECRETARY PAUL O'NEILL

FROM DONALD H. RUMSFELD 

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY DR GARY S. BECKER

Attached is an article by Dr. Gary S. Becker. Gary is a Nobel Laureate in Economics, professor at University of Chicago and a good friend. I found it to be a distinctly different perspective than most of the writing about the problem of terrorism in the United States. I thought you might find the article of interest.

Dr. Becker is a person I think you would enjoy meeting on some occasion. I would be happy to arrange it if you thought it would be useful.

Very respectfully.



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snowflake

Q Agan
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November 1, 2001 12:54 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: I C C

615

We have to get some good arguments as to why it is important and why it is possible that we can keep ICC from being ratified by enough countries to put it into effect. At the moment, I think State has agreed to write the convening authority and tell them we are not going to adhere to it.

But, whether or not they want to put the pressure on to get other countries to not sign it, they think that is a lost cause. I am not sure it is. See if you can find out and let's get some push behind it.

Thanks.

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Please respond by _____

1 Nov 01

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snowflake

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT: **The Network of Terrorism**

Handwritten: Feith
11/17
11/27

Here's a brochure that the State Department is thinking about using. You might have your folks take a look at it.

Thanks.

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
Please respond by: _____

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THE
NETWORK
OF TERRORISM

11-L-0559/OSD/5533

AN ATTACK ON
THE CIVILIZED
WORLD



"**O**ne month ago today, innocent citizens from more than 80 nations were attacked and killed, without warning or provocation, in an act that horrified not only every American, but every person of every faith, and every nation that values human life.

The attack took place on American soil, but it was an attack on the heart and soul of the civilized world. And the world has come together to fight a new and different war, the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war against those governments that support or shelter them.

We're mounting a sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice....At the same time, we are showing the compassion of America by delivering food and medicine to the Afghan people who are, themselves, the victims of a repressive regime.

We're angry at the evil that was done to us, yet patient and just in our response....Our war on terrorism has nothing to do with differences in faith. It has everything to do with people of all faiths coming together to condemn hate and evil and murder and prejudice.

People often ask me, how long will this last? This particular battlefield will last as long as it takes to bring al Qaeda to justice. It may happen tomorrow; it may happen a month from now; it may take a year or two. But we will prevail."

President George W. Bush
October 11, 2001

THE
UNITED STATES
AND THE
INTERNATIONAL
CAMPAIGN
TO END
GLOBAL
TERRORISM

DEFEATING
TERROR



DEFENDING
FREEDOM

Today,
the United States,
joined by nations throughout the world,
is engaged in a sustained effort to identify and destroy
a global network of terrorists. With our abiding faith in human life
and freedom, we will prevail over those who, cynically exploiting the
fears of others, offer nothing but suffering and death.

"It would be a grave calamity when the followers of this phenomenon [terrorism] use religion as a camouflage, because true Islam stands innocent from all that. Its teachings stand aloft from people who believe in violence as a course of action and sabotage as a method and bloodshed as a way of reform."

— Sheikh Abdul-Rahman al-Sudais,
at the Grand Mosque, Mecca, Saudi Arabia

"Our war on terrorism has nothing to do with differences in faith," President Bush said. "It has everything to do with people of all faiths coming together to condemn hate and evil and murder and prejudice."

This worldwide campaign against terror has many faces, some highly visible, others not

- ↳ In Afghanistan, US forces, with coalition support, are conducting military operations to root out and destroy the al Qaeda terror network and its Taliban supporters
- ↳ International relief agencies, with U.S. assistance, are providing food, medicine, and shelter for Afghan refugees who have endured the humanitarian disaster over which the Taliban have presided.
- ↳ Law enforcement agencies are identifying and arresting suspected terrorists, and governments are freezing the financial assets of terrorists and their supporters
- ↳ In the United States and around the world, families gather to mourn for the dead of September 11, and to care for the families bereft of sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers.
- ↳ At the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, workers continue to clear wreckage and begin the process of rebuilding.

Yet out of this pain and loss, we can already see a renewed determination to find and destroy the perpetrators of these acts and to defend the values of humanity, diversity, and freedom that unite the world community

How did we reach this time of sorrow and resolve, pain and hope?

DAY OF BLOOD AND FIRE

In describing the events of September 11, 2001, it is easy to fall back on familiar, journalistic terms, and refer to attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as if the buildings were the chief victims. The reality, of course is much different: Within the space of two hours, more than 6,000 men, women, and children were terrorized, tortured, slashed with knives, burned to death, and crushed under tons of rubble in a premeditated act of mass murder. In addition, 4,000 or more children lost a parent that day in the terrorist attacks, according to the Twin Towers Orphan Fund

The basic facts: On the morning of September 11, terrorists operating in bands of four to six, hijacked four commercial jetliners departing from airports on the East Coast of the United States. Using (continued on page 6)

THE HIJACKINGS

The worst act of terrorism on U.S. soil was committed on September 11, 2001, when bands of four to six terrorists took control of four airliners, United Airlines Flights 93 and 175 and American Airlines Flights 11 and 77. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knows from witness accounts of cell-phone conversations with passengers on the hijacked airliners that the terrorists eluded security measures and used cardboard-box cutters and razors to take control of the four aircraft. Hijackers also smuggled other types of knives through airport security and turned off cockpit transponders to evade detection by air traffic controllers, investigators believe. Security experts say the hijackers almost certainly scouted their locations with care, choosing flights and airports that would give them the greatest chance of success.

The events aboard United Airlines Flight 93 are perhaps the best known. Bound from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, the Boeing 757 was loaded with more than enough fuel to carry it across the continent. The hijackers chose a busy metropolitan airport. They picked a plane that was making a nonstop flight, departing early on a Tuesday morning, a week after the Labor Day holiday — factors that almost guaranteed fewer passengers and, more important, less opposition. The terrorists also appear to have had help. Sources say the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received bomb threats for three or four other planes in the air that morning, creating a distraction that would give the hijacked planes extra time to change course without being noticed.

United Airlines Flight 93 was airborne by 8:44 a.m., according to radar logs, and headed west, flying apparently without incident until it reached Cleveland, Ohio, about 50 minutes later. Passengers reported that hijackers brandished cigarette lighters with hidden switchblades to take control of the jetliner once it was airborne. At 9:37 a.m., the plane turned south and headed back the way it came. Descriptions from people aboard Flight 93 indicate that there was pandemonium on the plane. Four men wearing red headbands and speaking with accents killed a passenger, rushed the cockpit, injured both pilots, and took over flying the aircraft. The remaining passengers and crew were split into two groups — a few were held in the first-class compartment but most were moved to the galley in the rear of the plane.

One of the hijackers — the one watching the passengers in the galley — had a small red box tied to his waist with a belt; he said the box was a bomb. CNN reported that it had obtained a partial transcript of cockpit chatter and talked with a source who had listened to the air-traffic control tape. The source said that a man had said in broken English: "This is the captain speaking. Remain in your seat. There is a bomb on board. Stay quiet. We are meeting with their demands. We are returning to the airport."

Passengers on cell phones learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center and formulated a plan to respond to the hijackers. After making a number of odd maneuvers in midair — indications of a struggle to gain control of the plane — Flight 93 slammed nose-first into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing everyone on board.

(continued on page 6)

(continued from page 3)

Similar stories abound from the other doomed flights of September 11. Hijackers told passengers that the planes flying from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, would be used as bombs and crash into New York City. A flight attendant on one of those planes — American Airlines Flight 11 — made a cellular phone call in which she said several Middle Eastern men had used knives to wound passengers. The cell-phone call sheds light on how a few men armed only with small knives or box cutters could quickly commandeer an airliner: they did not hesitate to draw blood.

On American Airlines Flight 77, a passenger described how several men with knives and box cutters had hustled passengers to the rear of the Boeing 757 aircraft after it had departed from Washington's Dulles International Airport en route to Los Angeles. About an hour after takeoff on Tuesday morning, Flight 77 became a massive missile aimed at the White House. The target changed suddenly as the unidentified pilot executed a pivot so tight it reminded observers of a fighter jet. The plane cut 270 degrees to the right to approach the Pentagon from the southwest; it fell below radar level and vanished from controllers' screens, the sources said. Aviation experts said the plane was flown with skill, making it highly likely that a trained pilot — possibly one of the hijackers — was at the helm.

If a plane's pilots were killed, forced out of the cockpit, or incapacitated, it would be relatively simple to steer a jumbo jet into the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, aviation and security experts said. We have to assume that the pilots were no longer a factor; they were either shot or killed somehow," said retired Air Force Colonel Dale Oderman.



Osama bin Laden (center), the prime suspect in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, with his top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahri of the Egyptian Jihad group (left), and an unidentified bodyguard.



Clockwise from above: Forever changed, the New York City skyline is awash in smoke for hours following the collapse of the World Trade Center after two hijacked airliners crashed into the twin 110-story towers;

firefighters make their way through the rubble of the World Trade Center on September 11; looking down at "ground zero," the site of the World Trade Center, one week after the attack.

11-L-0559/OSD/5536

(continued from page 2) knives and box cutters, the 19 hijackers transformed the planes into huge, fuel-laden missiles. The killers crashed two of them into New York's World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Passengers and crew heroically fought with the hijackers aboard the fourth plane, apparently headed toward another Washington target. The plane crashed in Pennsylvania, killing all aboard.

From frantic cell phone calls and other evidence, it is clear that the attacks inside the planes were brutal and calculated. In the inhuman words found in luggage left behind by one of the killers: "Let each find his blade for the prey to be slaughtered." The hijackers either killed or wounded the pilots, and stabbed and killed passengers. Reports indicate that, in several instances, flight attendants had their throats slashed with their arms helplessly bound behind them.

But the horror was only beginning. Along with the hundreds of passengers who died aboard the planes, more than 5,000 human beings died in the fire and wreckage of the World Trade Center. Many were trapped and killed immediately following the impact of the planes into the towers, some, forced by intense flames, fell or jumped from windows on high floors. And tragically, the intense flames weakened structures that survived the actual impact of the planes, in less than two hours from the first impact, both towers imploded, killing thousands, including the citizens of 80 countries and people of virtually every religious faith and ethnic group in the world today.

In Washington, 189 people died at the Pentagon, including those aboard the plane; 45 died aboard the fourth plane that crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

The terrorists may have thought that, in attacking the World Trade Center, they were attacking a "symbol of America." They weren't. Instead, they attacked an institution of international trade, prosperity, and economic opportunity. Along with government offices of Thailand, Chile, and Cote d'Ivoire, for example, the World Trade Center held offices of 430 companies from 28 countries.

In short, the terrorists attacked not just the United States, they attacked the world.

MURDEROUS DECLARATIONS

Although the investigation is continuing, the evidence that the September 11 atrocity is the



Clockwise from above: an emergency worker helps a woman who was injured in the attack on the World Trade Center; pedestrians scramble for safety as the first World Trade Center tower collapses; destruction and debris at the Pentagon, near Washington, D.C., after a hijacked jetliner crashed into the southwest side of the building on September 11, 2001; a person falls headfirst after jumping from the inferno of the World Trade Center following the crash of an airliner into the north tower. More than 6,000 people were killed in New York and Washington and in the crash of a fourth hijacked airliner in Pennsylvania.



“Attacking innocent people is not courageous; it is stupid and will be punished on the day of judgment. It’s not courageous to attack innocent children, women, and civilians. It is courageous to protect freedom; it is courageous to defend oneself and not to attack.”

— Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed al-Tantawi of Al-Azhar mosque and university, Cairo, Egypt



responsibility of the al Qaeda terrorist network, headed by Osama bin Laden, is compelling and conclusive. Among the specific pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigation to date

- ┆ Before September 11, bin Laden indicated that he was planning a attack on the United States.
- In August and September, bin Laden operatives around the world were warned to return to Afghanistan by September 10.
- One of bin Laden’s closest associates has been identified as conducting detailed planning for the September 11 attacks.
- Of the 19 hijackers, at least three have been identified as al Qaeda operatives.
- At least one hijacker is known to have been involved in the attack on the Navy ship USS Cole and the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
- In tracking the hijackers’ movements prior to September 11, investigators have found that many of them met with bin Laden operatives and regularly received money and support from the al Qaeda network.

More broadly, the planning, pattern, and character of the September attacks were similar to those of previous al Qaeda terrorist attacks. The September 11 operation involved long-term planning, coordinated actions, lack of warning, use of suicide attackers, and an effort to kill and maim as many people as possible, including Muslims and citizens of other nations.

The factual case documenting al Qaeda as a criminal conspiracy will inevitably mount in the months ahead. Some of the most damning evidence, however, comes from the mouth of bin Laden himself.

In his notorious, pm-taped statement released on October 7, bin Laden said, “God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America.” Taken as a whole, his words amount to a confession and acceptance of responsibility for the September 11 attacks — and falsely invoke the faith of Islam to justify mass killing. But this is only the latest in a series of bin Laden pronouncements.

- ┆ In his 1996 “Declaration of Jihad,” he urged coordinated efforts to kill Americans and encouraged others to attack the American “enemy.”
- ┆ In a 1998 statement published in the Arabic newspaper “al-Quds al-Arabi,” he stated that Muslims should kill Americans — including civilians — “anywhere in the world where they can be found.”

┆ In a 1999 interview on the Arabic-language al Jazeera television, bin Laden stated, “Our enemy ___ is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying taxes.”

┆ In two 1997 and 1998 television interviews, he specifically described the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 as role models and urged his followers to “take the fighting to America.”

HIJACKING THE WORLD

Al Qaeda’s record of death and destruction extends back long before September 11. In October 1993, operatives trained by al Qaeda killed 18 U.S. soldiers sewing with United Nations peacekeeping forces in Somalia. His organization bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, killing 223 and wounding more than 4,000 — the overwhelming majority of them Kenyans. And in

October 2000, bin Laden terrorists attacked the Navy ship USS Cole with a bomb-laden small boat, killing 17 American crew members.

Al Qaeda is closely tied to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist group that has conducted operations in Central Asia.

Al Qaeda doesn’t take credit for its failures, but it is implicated in mother terrorist conspiracies. In January 1995, Philippine authorities discovered a plan to blow up as many as 12 jetliners as they crossed the Pacific. In Jordan, authorities foiled the so-called millennium plot to attack Westerners across Jordan during the January 1, 2000, celebrations. A plan to bomb Los Angeles International Airport failed when customs officials at the Canadian border found bomb materials in a car. Authorities in Frankfurt, Germany, arrested members of a terrorist cell who were assembling bombs and had surveillance tapes of a crowded Christmas market in Strasbourg, France.

Muslim-American woman prays at the Islamic Society of Nevada on Friday, September 14, 2001, during a special service for the victims of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. President Bush declared that day a national day of remembrance and prayer.



THE TOLL IN THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN AFRICA

On August 7, 1998, terrorists associated with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden bombed American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The vast majority of those killed and injured in these bombings were Kenyans and Tanzanians.

Location	Killed	Wounded
Nairobi	212*	Over 4,000
Dar es Salaam	11**	72***

* includes 12 Americans, 31 Kenyans employed by the U.S. embassy

** includes 7 Tanzanians employed by the U.S. embassy

*** includes 2 Americans

Opposite page: Rescue workers carry an employee from the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, following a terrorist bombing on August 7, 1998. Bombs exploded minutes apart outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 213 people and injuring over 4,000. On October 18, 2001, four operatives of Osama bin Laden were sentenced in U.S. District Court in New York City to life in prison for their roles in the bloody plot.



Top: U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Prudence Bushnell is overcome with emotion after laying a wreath at the site of the embassy bombing in Nairobi a few days after the attack. Above: A Kenyan woman, who was an employee of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, speaks to the media after arriving for treatment at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany.

Al Qaeda is by no means the only terrorist band operating today. On October 10, the United States issued a "List of Most Wanted Terrorists." Along with al Qaeda suspects, the 22 names include suspects who hijacked a TWA jetliner in 1985 and killed an American passenger; detonated a tanker truck in 1996 at Khobar Towers, a military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and wounding 280; and bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, killing six and wounding hundreds.

4 Bombers Get Life Sentences

The Leaders of the 1998 Embassy Bombings

By Steven A. Thomas
 A federal judge in New York City has sentenced four men to life in prison for their roles in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The judge, Judge Richard A. Posner, said the four men were "the most dangerous and violent of the terrorists." The men were: Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; Ibrahim al-Muhsin al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; and Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia. The judge said the men were "the most dangerous and violent of the terrorists." The men were: Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; Ibrahim al-Muhsin al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia; and Abd al-Muhsin al-Sayid al-Sayid, 34, of Somalia.

THE TALIBAN CONNECTION

Since taking power in 1996, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has presided over a humanitarian catastrophe. Well before September, two million Afghans had fled the country as refugees, hundreds of thousands have been displaced inside Afghanistan itself.

The Taliban, operating one of the most repressive and abusive regimes in the world today, have systematically violated every basic norm of human rights. They have attacked and burned towns, summarily killed civilians, conscripted children into the military, and profited from heroin trafficking.

The regime's assault on women is unprecedented in modern times. Women are prevented from attending schools or conducting business, denied access to health care, and forbidden to leave their homes without male escorts. Widows or women without a male relative,



"If Islamists did it —
and most likely
it is Islamists because of
the nature of what
happened — then
they have fully
misunderstood
the teachings of Islam.
Even the most radical of
us have condemned this.
I am always considered
to be a radical
in the Islamic world,
and even I
condemn it."

— Sheikh Omar Bakri, Islamic leader,
London, England



with or without children, are essentially treated as non-persons by the state and often face starvation.

But these are not the reasons why the United States is now conducting military operations in Afghanistan. The United States is using military force because the Taliban, despite repeated warnings, have continued to provide support and shelter to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda terrorists.

More accurately, the evidence now indicates that the Taliban have been bought and paid for by bin Laden's money. Rather than describe the relationship as "state-supported terrorism," the Taliban can be characterized as a "terrorist-supported state." Al Qaeda has provided the Taliban with training, weapons, soldiers, and money — lots of it. The Taliban, in turn, provide safe haven and logistical facilities.

It is these malignant networks—the Taliban and al Qaeda—that the United States is targeting in its military campaign, not the Afghan people. The United States repeatedly warned the Taliban that they must either hand over bin Laden and his associates, or share their fate. They have chosen the latter, and forced the Afghan people to suffer as the al Qaeda network inside the country is methodically located and destroyed.

The civilian casualties suffered by the Afghan people during the air campaign are tragic, but inadvertent. But for Taliban authorities to denounce the air attacks for targeting civilians is both reprehensible and hypocritical. First, it is wrong. Unlike terrorists, the United States doesn't target civilians, it strives to protect them. It is the Taliban that chose to protect an organization whose declared purpose is the mass killing of civilians. By any moral calculation, the blood of Afghan civilians is upon their hands.

AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE

Afghanistan's immediate future will be difficult, but it can be one of hope, if only because the Taliban and al Qaeda will soon be consigned to the past.

On the humanitarian front, the United States and other nations, working as part of an international coalition with the U.N. World Food Program and other international relief organizations, continue to take steps to avert the human tragedy brought on by the Taliban. For the year-long period ending September 30, the United States donated \$184 million in humanitarian assistance, and President Bush recently announced that the United States will contribute (continued on page 16)

THE TALIBAN'S BETRAYAL OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

The Afghan people have been the primary victims of Taliban misrule, since the Taliban came to power in 1996. The Taliban have made them the unwilling hosts of foreign armed terrorists, who have exploited and endangered the Afghan people, and made Afghanistan a pariah in the world community. This fact sheet outlines documented atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the Taliban against the Afghan people.

Massacres: The Taliban have massacred hundreds of Afghan civilians, including women and children, in Yakaolang, Mazar-i-Sharif, Bamian, Qezelabad, and other towns. Many of the victims of these massacres were targeted because of their ethnic or religious identity.

Human Rights Abuses Against Women and Girls: Girls are formally prohibited from attending school. Women are prohibited, with very few exceptions, from working outside the home, and are forbidden to leave their homes except in the company of a male relative. The Taliban have significantly reduced women's access to health care, by decreeing that women can be treated only by women doctors.

The Taliban and the Humanitarian Situation: Twenty years of internal armed conflict and four years of devastating drought have contributed to a grim situation, but the Taliban have made the situation much worse, holding the Afghan people hostage to their political agenda. The Taliban do not share the hardships they have imposed on the Afghan people, and they have done nothing to alleviate these hardships. The Taliban have disrupted the efforts of international relief agencies to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies. On October 16, 2001, the Taliban seized control of two UN warehouses, containing more than half the World Food Program's wheat supply for Afghanistan.

The Taliban and Islam: The Taliban have used Islam as a cloak to practice ethnic cleansing in Afghanistan. Warning against "converting our countries into another Afghanistan," Saudi writer Turki Al Hamad, writing in *Al-Sherq Al Awwat*, put it this way: "...[under the Taliban], Islam would be relegated from a world religion with a global human and civilized mission to a Taliban-like dogma that bans pigeon breeding, long hair, kite flying, and listening to music."

Destruction of Afghan Culture: The Taliban have perverted Afghan customs, tradition, and religious practice for their own narrow political interests. They have looted and destroyed the historical and cultural patrimony of the Afghan people — the Kabul Museum, formerly one of the finest museums in the region, is largely empty; the centuries-old Buddhist statues in Bamian have been reduced to rubble.

Documenting Taliban Abuses: Several nongovernmental organizations maintain web sites documenting Taliban abuses. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (www.rawa.fancymarketing.net) maintains a gallery of still photos and video clips documenting massacres, beatings, and executions by the Taliban. Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) provide extensive documentation of human rights abuses by the Taliban and other factions in the Afghan conflict.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified these 19 individuals as the hijackers aboard the four airliners that crashed in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.

Osama bin Laden and 21 others comprise the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists" list.

Hasan al-Din was indicted for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1995 hijacking of a commercial airliner that resulted in the assault on passengers and crew and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

Imad Fayez was indicted in planning and participating in the 1995 hijacking of a commercial airliner that resulted in the assault on passengers and crew and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

Mustafa Mohamed Fadhi was indicted in New York on December 16, 1998, for his alleged involvement in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and conspiring to kill U.S. nationals.

Darrin bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, bin Laden is a suspect in other terror attacks throughout the world.

Ibrahim Salim al-Mohamed has been indicted in Virginia for the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Saudi Arabia.

Abdul Rahman Yasin is wanted for his alleged participation in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on February 26, 1993, which resulted in the deaths of numerous people and significant destruction of property.

Fahid Mohammed Ali was indicted in New York on December 16, 1998, for his alleged involvement in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and conspiring to kill U.S. nationals.

Ali al-Tawe was indicted in New York for his role in the 1995 hijacking of a commercial airliner that resulted in the assault on passengers and crew and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil has been indicted in Virginia for the June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Muhammad Nura al-Atwani is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Abu Nuhm bin Muhammad al-Nasser has been indicted in Virginia for the June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Ayman al-Zawahiri has been indicted in Virginia for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Sheikh Ahmad Salim al-Sayid was indicted in New York on December 16, 1998, for his alleged involvement in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and conspiring to kill U.S. nationals.

Saif al-Ade is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Muhammad al-Sayid has been indicted for his alleged involvement with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Al-Said bin Al-Moqrin has been indicted in Virginia for the June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

“Such attacks on such a grand scale — it’s very outrageous, it’s worth every condemnation. Whoever carried out the attack did not have a right to do it in the name of the religion, namely Islam.... Killing innocents to achieve a target has never been the heart of the religion.”

— Yusuf Muhammad,
Muslim cleric, Jakarta, Indonesia

(continued from page 12) another \$320 million in Afghan aid. U.S. planes have **airdropped** thousands of **individual rations** to needy areas inside the country. Approximately 85 percent of the more than 200,000 metric tons of **food aid** — either in **transit** or stored in Pakistan — comes from the United States.

Recently, the United States and its **international partners** announced a **five-point** strategy to meet Afghanistan’s **humanitarian crisis**:

- ↓ Reduce death rates by **opening every** possible pipeline to move food, seed, blankets, and health **kits** into the country before winter.
- ↓ **Minimize population movements** by moving as much food as possible to **villages** and rural **areas**.
- ↓ Lower and **stabilize** food prices by selling **significant amounts** of food to local merchants.
- ↓ Ensure that **aid** reaches the needy and prevent the **Taliban** from **looting** or **manipulating** aid.
- ↓ **Begin** developmental relief programs that will encourage Afghans to start **rebuilding** homes, villages, farms, and markets where possible.

Afghans, not **outsiders**, must **determine** the future of their country. Secretary of State **Colin Powell** said, “We want to see eventually **arise** a government that represents all the people of Afghanistan, that is **prepared** to take care of the need of its people, not repress its people. And so we are in touch with all of the **different factions** to **see** how such a government could **arise** if the **Taliban** were to collapse and go out of **power**.”

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION

The world community has confronted the threat **posed** by global terrorism with an **unprecedented** worldwide coalition that is **employing** every tool of national and **international** power at its **command**’ diplomacy, law enforcement, **intelligence**, **financial** investigation, **military action**, and humanitarian aid. Just as terrorism **constitutes** a fluid, elusive enemy, so the new **anti-terror alliance** has assumed new and flexible forms in which **different countries** assume **different** levels of action and **responsibility**.

Already, the war against global **terrorism** has achieved important successes. On the diplomatic front, for example, a U.N. Security **Council** resolution, adopted unanimously, obligates all **189** members to end all terrorist **activity** and **support**, and to bring the perpetrators of **terrorism** to justice.

BUILDING COALITIONS

These countries have pledged **military, maternal, intelligence, or logistical** support to the U.S. government in **fighting terrorism**.

Albania
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bosnia
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Egypt
Estonia
France
Germany
Great Britain
Iceland
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kuwait
New Zealand
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
South Korea
Spain
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan



A much broader group of countries have expressed support for U.S. actions against terrorists

Azerbaijan	Indonesia	Norway	Sudan
Bahrain	Kenya	Poland	Syria
Botswana	Kyrgyzstan	Portugal	Tanzania
Bulgaria	Latvia	Ostar	Turkmenistan
Cambodia	Liberia	Republic of Congo	Venezuela
Croatia	Libya	Russia	Vietnam
Cyprus	Mongolia	Senegal	Yugoslavia
Georgia	Mozambique	Slovakia	Zambia
Greece	The Netherlands	Slovenia	Zimbabwe
Hungary	Nigeria	South Africa	


Sources: Center for Defense Information and CNN

"We cannot overestimate the importance of that trailblazing resolution," said Secretary Powell. "No resources plus no refuge ultimately equals no escape."

Investigators throughout the world have arrested hundreds of individuals with possible ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. The threat of future attacks remains, but the sustained pressure of police work and intelligence gathering, coupled with military operations in Afghanistan, means that al Qaeda is on the run and its network is being dismantled cell by cell, cave by cave.

Killing and hate take money. Drying up the financial sources of terror is vital to end the terrorist threat. More than 60 nations have issued blocking orders and frozen assets used to finance terrorism, which have been found everywhere from bank accounts in the United States, relief organizations in Europe, and chains of honey shops in the Middle East. The 29-nation Financial Action Task Force has played a particularly active role in coordinating efforts to identify and stop financial flows to terrorist organizations.

Nations bring their own experiences, concerns, and even policy differences to this effort. That is inevitable, and positive, the diversity and flexible nature of this unprecedented coalition is one of its strengths. But the unity and commitment of the coalition remains deep as well. Everyone recognizes that, without concerted action, all nations remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks.



Above: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell (left) and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf speak to the press after their meeting in Islamabad on October 16, 2001. Left: Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (center) and Foreign Minister Farooq Singh Lohi with Secretary Powell at the prime minister's residence in New Delhi on October 17, 2001.

TERRORISM AND U.S. POLICY

The United States recognizes no such thing as "Islamic terrorism." The members of al Qaeda are simply terrorists and criminals, nothing more. They cynically seek to exploit Islam to disguise their murderous agenda, which is nothing less than an attack on the values of civilization and humanity itself.

Bin Laden and al Qaeda attempt to justify themselves by the words of Islam for the same reasons that they burrow into Afghan caves to escape the wrath of the international community for their savage acts of mass killing just as they hijacked airplanes: they now seek to hijack a world religion.

Muslim leaders and clerics throughout the world have condemned the terrorist attacks as a perversion and betrayal of Islam. As just one example, a panel of independent Muslim scholars, including the prominent Qatar-based cleric Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, condemned the terrorist attacks and said that it is the duty of Muslims to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Americans find the baseless charge that the United States is waging a war against Islam deeply offensive. This allegation, no matter how many times it is repeated, is not legitimate criticism of U.S. foreign policy, but a calculated lie. More than six million Americans are Muslims; freedom of speech and religion stand at the very core of America's identity. To suggest that the United States would attack another's religious faith is inconceivable in this anti-terrorist campaign, the United States and its partners are upholding the values of tolerance, diversity, and freedom of faith — and battling against the fanaticism and hatred of organizations seeking to destroy those values.

For its part, the United States can point to its long and tireless record of seeking peace with security and justice for Israel and the Palestinians. The United States can also cite its indisputable record in defending Muslim populations and nations from invasion and ethnic cleansing — from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf to Bosnia and Kosovo in the Balkans.

COURAGE AND HOPE

Bin Laden and his band of killers offer nothing but pain and suffering to a world where they have consigned the world's billions of non-Muslims as "infidels" and labeled the vast majority of Muslims who abhor their words and deeds as "heretics." They cause death, but create nothing, and offer no future except for a nightmare of violence and evil.

Al Qaeda's vision of the future is quite plain for all to see. Just think of the world as one large Afghanistan.

In the end, their monument will be as lasting as a footprint in the desert.

The United States, with its coalition partners, will fight the sustained, unrelenting, multifaceted battle necessary to defeat global terrorism. Together with the world community, we will prevail.

But the United States also will not allow the shadow of terrorism to hijack its efforts to address other foreign policy challenges of the 21st century. As America and the world rebuild from the ashes of September 2001, the United States will continue to offer leadership and a vision of hope, stability, freedom, economic opportunity for all peoples. □

"Islam, the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem and considers the attack against innocent human beings a grave sin.... I categorically go against a committed Muslim's embarking on such attacks. Islam never allows a Muslim to kill the innocent and the helpless."

— Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muslim scholar, Doha, Qatar



Condemned in His Own Words



Osama bin Laden speaking in the October 7 videotape

"God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America....I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him."

From videotaped statement broadcast by Al Jazeera, October 7, 2001

"We issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it....We — with God's help — call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it."

From World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998

Before These Remarks, Bin Laden Was Innocent. However, Now He Is Condemned

— Faisal Salman, *As-Safir*,
October 9, 2001

A Confession Is the Most Conclusive Piece of Evidence

— *Al-Rai*, Jordan
October 9, 2001

Misuse of the Palestinian Issue


— *Al-Ayyam West Bank*,
October 9, 2001

Bin Laden Disturbs Us; However, He Doesn't Convince Us

— *La Vie Economique*, Morocco,
October 12, 2001

Al Qaeda Is Not Authorized to Speak on Behalf of Muslims

— *Akhbar Al-Arab*, United Arab Emirates,
October 15, 2001



COUNTRIES WHERE AL QAEDA WAS OPERATED

- | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|------------|
| Egypt | Albania | Libya |
| France | Algeria | Malaysia |
| Germany | Afghanistan | Mauritania |
| India (Kashmir) | Azerbaijan | Qatar |
| Russia (Chechnya) | Bangladesh | Somalia |
| Pakistan | Bosnia | Sudan |
| Saudi Arabia | Canada | Tajikistan |
| The Philippines | Ecuador | Tanzania |
| The United States | Eritrea | Tunisia |
| Uzbekistan | Ethiopia | Uganda |
| | Great Britain | Uruguay |
| | Jordan | Yemen |
| | Kenya | |
| | Kosovo | |
| | Lebanon | |

Sources: Congressional
Research Service and
Washington Post

Source: Department of State

HUMANITARIAN AID TO AFGHANISTAN

The United States has led the international community's response to the suffering of the Afghan people. Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Taliban, it has long provided emergency assistance to the Afghan people.

Since 1979, the United States has contributed more than \$1,000 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan — more than it has provided to any other country.

The United States will contribute additional money. President George W. Bush has announced a \$320 million aid package, of which \$295 million will be provided through United Nations assistance agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental organizations, and through direct provision of food and relief supplies. The total includes \$25 million to address the potentially large number of refugees who are crossing from Afghanistan into surrounding countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Over the 12 months ending September 30, 2001, the United States provided \$184 million in assistance for the Afghan people, including food and disaster assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, refugee and demining aid from the U.S. Department of State, and polio eradication programs from the Centers for Disease Control.

The record of U.S. aid to Afghanistan has a long and sustained history. In 1999, U.S. economic assistance to the country totaled \$19.2 million, most in food aid. Between 1979 and 1999, economic assistance to Afghanistan totaled \$670.4 million.



Above: U.S. Air Force C-17 loadmasters inspect the aerial delivery system loaded with Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) en route to the drop zone. The C-17s carry some 37,000 prepackaged meals per day to Afghan refugees inside the borders of Afghanistan.



CURRENT U.S. FOOD SHIPMENTS TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

What is the level of crisis? Relief workers are expecting an Afghan exodus of 1.5 million people as a result of the U.S. strikes, on top of the 4 million refugees already displaced. A food deficit of nearly 2 million metric tons existed in early October 2001. Food supplies were expected to run out in some parts of the country and, according to an assessment team sent into the country in May 2001, famine has already started. About 12 million people, almost half of the country's inhabitants, have been affected by the drought. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the country will produce only 10,000 of the 400,000 metric tons of seed that it will need for next year's planting. Afghanistan currently ranks last among all nations in the calories consumed per person and first in the number of women who die in childbirth. Mass population movements have very high casualty rates, particularly during famines, of up to 50 percent of the people. Those individuals most vulnerable include small children, pregnant women, and

elderly people who don't have the energy to move long distances to refugee camps or to displaced camps.

What is the extent of the new U.S. aid effort? During the 12 months ending September 30, 2001, the U.S. government donated \$184 million in humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people. In addition, President Bush has announced new aid of \$320 million. The

Center: Pakistani and Afghan workers load a World Food Program (WFP) truck with wheat donated by the U.S. government at the WFP compound near Peshawar, Pakistan, on October 1, 2001. The trucks carried 1,000 tons of wheat to Kabul, Afghanistan. **Left:** Afghans in Kabul load food supplies from the WFP and the U.S. Agency for International Development onto a bicycle on October 2, 2001.

administration's goal is to get as much food as possible into the country as soon as possible, particularly to the mountain areas of the Hindu Kush. This means doubling or more the amount of tonnage going in from about 25,000 metric tons per month to 50,000 metric tons.

Is the kind of food aid appropriate for the Afghan people? The Afghan people are used to eating flat bread made from wheat flour so about 90 percent of the food going in is wheat. Of the remaining 10 percent, 7 percent is lentils or beans needed to provide protein and 3 percent is in vegetable oils necessary for amino acids for people to completely digest the food. Each of the ration packets air-dropped will provide approximately 2,200 calories and will have a shelf life of 18 to 24 months. To the extent possible, delivery will be by "wet feeding program" in which prepared food is distributed directly to beneficiaries, rather than uncooked or dry rations, because cooked food is heavier and harder to store, making it more difficult to steal and more likely that the intended beneficiaries will receive their rations.

How will food get to the Afghan people? The food will be dropped into Afghanistan by cargo planes, escorted by U.S. fighter planes. In addition, food will be moved by the World Food Program through every border of Afghanistan, through Iran, the Central Asian republics in the north, and Pakistan. To reduce the chances of looting and diversion of the food aid, little of it will be stored inside the country. Rather, it will be stored in secure areas in the bordering countries. Also, by moving as much food as possible to remote villages and towns, the United States hopes to discourage people from concentrating in refugee or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, where the risk of manipulation by the Taliban and their supporters is comparatively high. No more than two weeks' worth of food will be warehoused in areas the Taliban controls so as not to create targets for looting.

Will the Afghan people know the food aid comes from the United States? The Department of Agriculture is going to print "Gift of the People of the United States" in the two major languages of Afghanistan and a large U.S. flag on each bag of food. The United States also will implement a public information campaign so that the Afghan people know the aid is on the way. This will discourage further population movements and provide a check against diversion or manipulation of aid since people will know what they are supposed to receive. CJ

A LONG AND DETERMINED COMMITMENT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD RUMSFELD

"This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical and military. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition — not the other way around."



Clockwise from top: NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson (left), and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage address the press at NATO headquarters; flags of NATO's 19 member countries fly at half-mast; President Bush (right) shakes hands with King Abdullah II of Jordan at the White House; President Bush and China's President Jiang Zemin meet in Shanghai; British Prime Minister Tony Blair (left) and President Bush meet with the press at the White House; Uzbekistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Kamilov at the Pentagon for a meeting with U.S. officials.

"The global reaction to the attacks should give us courage and hope that we can succeed in this fight. The sight of people gathering in cities in every part of the world from every religion to mourn — and to express solidarity with the people of the United States — proves more eloquently than any words that terrorism is not an issue that divides humanity, but one that unites it. We are in a moral struggle to fight an evil that is anathema to all faiths. Every state and every people has a part to play. This was an attack on humanity, and humanity must respond to it as one."

KOFI ANNAN, SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
OCTOBER 1, 2001

"NATO Ambassadors this morning expressed their full support for the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom, which follow the appalling attacks perpetrated against the United States on 11 September 2001. The campaign to eradicate terrorism has reached a new stage. It will be pursued on many fronts with determination and with patience. The Alliance stands ready to play its role."

LORD ROBERTSON,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO,
OCTOBER 8, 2001

"Two weeks on from the attacks on the United States, it's clear to me that the coalition of support for firm action against those responsible is strengthening, not weakening. As the coalition builds and our preparations continue, the terrorists inside Afghanistan and the Taliban regime that harbors them should be in no doubt of the unity of the alliance built against them and our determination to do what is necessary to bring those responsible to account."

PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR OF GREAT BRITAIN,
SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

"China and the United States are two countries with significant influence in the world. As such, we share common responsibility and interest in maintaining peace and security in the Asia Pacific and the world at large, promoting regional and global economic growth and prosperity, and working together with the rest of the international community to combat terrorism."

PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN OF CHINA,
OCTOBER 19, 2001

"We have decided to be with the coalition in the fight against terrorism and whatever operation is going on in Afghanistan within the parameters — within the three parameters which have been enunciated — that is, the intelligence cooperation, use of air space, and logistical support. And to this extent we will certainly carry on cooperating as long as the operation lasts."

PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF OF PAKISTAN,
OCTOBER 16, 2001

"We continue to hold that September 11 was an assault on freedom, on civilization, on democracy, and India's stand against terrorism — not simply starting from September 11, even before that — has been unequivocal, and we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the international community and the United States of America in our battle against this global menace."


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER JASWANT SINGH OF INDIA,
OCTOBER 17, 2001

"It should be said that in the course of these three years, Uzbekistan has been witnessing the inhumane face of terror; therefore, we cannot afford standing aside, and we are taking part in this anti-terrorism operation that the international community called for"

PRESIDENT ISLAM KARIMOV OF UZBEKISTAN,
OCTOBER 5, 2001

"The message I brought was a message of reiterating our condolences and reiterating our solidarity—the solidarity of the Egyptian people, president, and government with the United States—and our determination to work together in the fight against terrorism."

FOREIGN MINISTER AHMED MAHER OF EGYPT,
SEPTEMBER 26, 2001



Produced by the
U.S. Department of State
<http://USinfo.state.gov>

11-L-0559/OSD/5547

snowflake

Approved
11/28
1726

NATO 337

TO: Lany Di Rita
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DH*
DATE: November 23, 2001
RE: **Secretary Powell's NATO Schedule**

Get me Colin Powell's schedule when he goes over the NATO meetings; what countries he is going to. We want to make sure we don't double him.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112301.09

Respond by: _____

23 NOV 01

U14727 02

FAO Te
L. R. W. - D

November 23, 2001 2:00 p.m.

From MEMO TO SECDEF

To ~~From~~ Di Rita

Subj: Follow-Up from our conversation Friday morning

1. Regarding the MSNBC report about Uzbekistan, the network has agreed to disassociate you from its report, I believe Torie has spoken with you about this by now.

The revised scroll, which I've seen, reads that senior officials at the Pentagon confirm that we are asking for the aircraft. The MSNBC report is apparently based on a Thursday New York Times piece on the matter. The relevant passage from the Times article is excerpted as follows:

At the Pentagon, a senior officer said the three AC-130 gunships operated by the Air Force's Special Forces could arrive in Uzbekistan within days, allowing intensified attacks on concentrations of enemy troops.

Six other AC-130's have been operating out of a base in Oman.

"It would be helpful for us to have AC-1305 up north, particularly when you have a situation like Kundtu, because that particular weapon systems can put off enormous amounts of ordinance with a great deal of precision, without a lot of collateral damage," Mr. Rumsfeld said.

Note: Your quote tracks with the transcript of what you said on the airplane on the way to Bragg. Obviously, juxtaposing your quote with a leak makes it appear you're confirming the leak. We should call them on it; I'll discuss with Torie.

2. Regarding Secretary Powell's travel, his people are telling me he'll be gone from Dec 3 to Dec 10. The itinerary is not firm and I'll work more details with his Chief of Staff on Monday. The plan right now is for Secretary Powell to be at NATO for the ministerial on 6-7 Dec, but include travel to Germany, Russia, and one or two of the 'Stans,' although which ones and when isn't firm. I'll follow up.

~~Test~~
The to

Larry - tell Powell's office where we are going & maybe then they will avoid our steps - Don't mention Algonquin...

SENSITIVE/FOUO

INFO 11/14
2001

snowflake

November 12, 2001 5:13 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Col. Cook

Here is the material Terry Cook left at that meeting on Saturday. Please take a look at it. I have not read it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated "History of State-DOD Differences over Afghanistan and Pakistan"

DHR:dh
111201-22

..... ■■■
Please respond by _____

Afghanistan

11/14/01

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE/FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/5550

SECDEF HAS SEEN**History of State-DOD Differences over Afghanistan and Pakistan**

NOV 12 2001

BACKGROUND. Col Terry Cook has 8 years of first hand ground experience in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the last half of the 1990's, there were two periods that significantly highlighted the growing differences between U.S. military and diplomatic interests in these countries. The State Department continually supported the actions of PM Benazir Bhutto and PM Nawaz Sharif as their regimes backed the political and military growth of the Taliban in Afghanistan. During these periods, the State Department's reporting was frequently inaccurate and/or deceptive, and attempts by the DAO to correct these misperceptions were censored.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS. The following is a summation of events involving these individuals, which occurred while Col Cook performed his military attache duties from 1994-99.

Bill Milam (recently retired Amb to Pakistan [1998-01] and previous Amb to Bangladesh)

- Coup attempt on Mullah Omar (after action report), Spring '99
With a red pen, the Amb crossed out all of the report except for 2 or 3 lines. The Amb's response: "Col Cook, lets understand something. The U.S. government doesn't give a damn about a coup attempt against Mullah Omar." At which point Col Cook reminded the Amb that Omar was providing shelter for Osama bin Laden, who the U.S. government has a \$5 million dollar reward.
The Amb's response to Col Cook was "take it or leave it."
- Pakistan ISI connection/contact with Osama bin Laden, Spring '99
During a meeting with some tribals in Quetta, a ISI Brigadier (who Col Cook knew) was also in attendance. During a one on one conversation, the Brigadier informed Col Cook (twice) that his personnel met with Osama bin Laden on a frequent basis.
Upon returning to the Embassy, the Amb did not want Col Cook to send out the report on the ISI-Osama connection.
- The opportunity for Amb Milam & Col Cook to meet with Mullah Omar, Spring '99
During the same meeting in Quetta, the same ISI Brigadier offered to set up a meeting (location of their choice) with Col Cook, the ISI Brigadier, Amb and Mullah Omar.
The Amb's response to the ISI Brigadier was a flat refusal and further responded, "You tell Omar that we want and intend to kill Osama."
- Detailed info on the LOC Kargil conflict, Spring '99
During the initial weeks of the Kargil conflict, the U.S. Government did not have specific proof of Pakistan Army involvement.

One evening Col Cook received the details on specific units, dispositions and timings, after which he called on the DCM (Al Eastham) late that night. He was very pleased with the information and told Col Cook to pass it to Washington ASAP.

The next morning, the Amb's response to Col Cook was that he was "off base" and that his sources were all liars.

Later that day, DG ISI (Lt Gen Ziauddin) informed the embassy of the Pakistan Army involvement in Kargil.

- Reports on PM Sharif & ex-PM Bhutto, reference their looting of the Pakistan Treasury and their bank accounts in London & the U.S., Spring-Summer '99
The Amb did not want the reports to go out.
- Newspaper set-up and the follow-up retraction from the same newspaper concerning LTC Cook, Sep '99
When Col Cook met with the Amb and informed him that the newspaper article was a set-up, his response to Col Cook was, "I am sure it is. But I feel it is time for a new team, and I know it will take a long time to replace you."

When Col Cook informed MG Harding (DIA) of the Amb's decision for him to leave Pakistan in the next 3-4 weeks, Col Cook told Gen Harding that "Amb Milam wanted the canary out of the coal mine."
Gen Harding concurred that was how it looked.
- Informed Amb Milam that the policies coming out of the Embassy & Washington were pushing the Pakistan Army towards a coup due to their shortsighted support of PM Nawaz Sharif, end of Sep '99.

Amb Milam ignored Col Cook and went on home leave.

- Four nights before the coup (Oct '99). Col Cook received a phone call and met with: Gen Pervez Musharraf, Brig Rashid Qureshi (now Maj Gen), and a civilian associate.
After half an hour of drinks and war stories Gen Pervez stated what he intended to do if the Prime Minister Sharif took any further actions that may endanger the country.

Michelle Scisson (DCM '99-present, was the previous Political Officer in Madras, India)

- Prior to the coup, the State Department had been considering decreasing the differential pay received by the State Department personnel at the embassy.
- As the Acting Ambassador (due to Amb Milam's home leave), Scisson's opening words in the country team meeting after the coup (in a country that had recently gone nuclear and had initiated the Kargil Conflict). Quote: "I wonder if we will be able to keep our differential pay?"

John Holzman (previous DCM in Pakistan [1994-97] under Ambassadors John Monjo & Thomas Simons. He has just completed a tour as Amb to Bangladesh)

- **False & misleading reporting.**
i.e.; meeting with Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat.
After writing up a report on a meeting attended by Gen Karamat, DCM and Col Cook, his report was reviewed by the DCM. The DCM's comment upon reading the report was: "My god, this is the conversation."
To which Col Cook responded that he has a good memory and takes good notes, and he thought that was the intent of the meetings.
The DCM responded that he would rewrite the report.
Upon reading his version, Col Cook could not recognize the meeting.
Col Cook then confronted the DCM with his report and pointed out that Gen Karamat had not said any of the things in the DCM's report.
The DCM responded that was what Gen Karamat meant.
Col Cook reminded the DCM that he had known Gen Karamat for a long time, that the General states what he means, and he had not stated any of the things in the DCM's report.
The DCM informed Col Cook that he had a conversation with Gen Karamat several weeks ago and that was what he meant. Col Cook disagreed and sent his report out, which Washington made positive responses on and further commented that they could not understand the DCM's report.
- **Reports on PM Bhutto's corruption, to include bank accounts in London & the U.S.**
The DCM stated that the report was "unsubstantiated" and would not let it go out. However, Pakistan's Amb to the U.S., Maleeha Lodhi and Pakistan's Interior Minister, Gen (Ret) Nasirullah Babar independently presented similar evidence to the DCM, to which his response to them was that "we have the same list."
Both Lodhi and Babar responded that their understanding of U.S. laws was that such activities were illegal in the U.S. banking system.
- **Lt Gen Hamid Gul, ex DG ISI.**
The DCM informed Col Cook that he did not want him to meet with or talk to Hamid Gul anymore because the DCM "did not like what he had to say."
NOTE: Retired Lt Gen Hamid Gul was heavily involved in ISI operations in both Afghanistan and Kashmir prior to and after his retirement. He also frequently met with Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and other radical militant groups.
Hamid Gul once commented to Col Cook that "you are the only American at the embassy who comes and talks to me."
- **Reports on the husband of PM Benazir Bhutto (Zulfioar Zardari)'s involvement with the drug trade, specifically in the Khyber area of the Northwest Frontier Province.**
Although Col Cook found out that the British had similar information, the DCM would not allow a report to go out because he felt it would jeopardize and destabilize PM Benazir Bhutto's "democratically elected government."

- Taliban

Prior to the Taliban seizure of Kandahar, Col Cook had a list of the timings and ISI personalities meeting at the Pakistani Consulate in Kandahar. The DCM would not allow the reporting to go out, stating that Benazir Bhutto and the ISI could not possibly be supporting the Taliban.

The "Taliban" then seized Kandahar in a well orchestrated operation, which included coordinated ground movement and low level helicopter support; securing choke points; consolidation of captured weapons and prisoners. Col Cook informed the DCM that this had been an ISI command and controlled operation and not a group of madrasa trained Taleb (students), as was being portrayed to the press and Washington. Again the DCM responded that PM Benazir Bhutto and the ISI could and would not be supporting the Taliban. The DCM would not allow the reports to go out.

Week of 11 September 2001

- That week:

Col Cook received a call from DIA concerning their intention of sending him back into Pakistan due to his extensive HUMINT contacts throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, to include the Pakistan Army.

- Admiral Blair (CINCPAC)

Heartily concurred that it was a good mission, and personally gave his approval for Col Cook's TDY.

- John Holzman:

Had just arrived on station as Admiral Blair's political advisor, after completing his tour as Amb to Bangladesh.

- Out of courtesy, Col Cook briefed Holzman on DIA's plan and Admiral Blair's approval.

- 2 days later DIA contacted Col Cook and informed him that the DCM in Pakistan (Michelle Scisson) was advising the new Ambassador (Wendy Chamberlain) to disapprove his return to Pakistan.

NOTES:

1. The "official" response to DIA from the embassy was that the Islamabad DAO did not require any augmentation.
2. The Army Attache on station (Col Dave Smith) is in a country that has a 520,000-man army, plus he has to deal with the current events in Afghanistan.
3. Col Smith has stated that upon Col Cook's departure from Pakistan in the Fall of '99, that basically all DIA and specifically DIA HUMINT reporting from Afghanistan ended.
4. All of the above stated incidents can be verified by witnesses and/or documentation.

5. Col Cook's current assignment is Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, HI. He is presently TDY in the Wash. D.C. area. He can be reached at

(b)(6)

snowflake

A-1100
B 12/4
1701

December 3, 2001 10:21 AM

See Action List

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Potential Outcomes

Please get back to me within 48 hours with a list of things that could go wrong, a separate list of things that could go right, and what we ought to do about each.

The perfect is the enemy of the good. Please respond.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120301-24



Please respond by _____

092

/

E D: 01

U14761 02

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 5, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Lists

SRS
12/6
G 12/6

Don,

Here is a first cut at the two lists of surprises we should perhaps be anticipating. Actually, I've added a third "neutral" list. I'm sure many more will come to mind as we think about it.

Good Things

- Capture UBL
- Afghanistan results quickly come close to complete "victory"
- Saddam dies:
 - 1) replaced by a new thug; or
 - 2) revolutionary upheaval
- People take to the streets in Iran to support Khatami against Khamanei/Rafsanjani
- Collapse of North Korea
- Civil War in Cuba

Neutral Things

- We find conclusive evidence of a state sponsor of 9/11
- Iraqi move against the Kurds

Bad Things

- Afghanistan starts to turn bad next spring
- U.S. prisoners ("hostages") taken by Taliban or Al Qaida
- Military set-back, perhaps a Mogadishu scenario
- Civil war in Afghanistan: e.g., Dostam vs. Atta, or Northern Alliance vs. Pashtuns
- Terrorist Attacks in U.S., perhaps with anthrax, radiological or nuclear WMD
- **Cyber/infrastructure** attack
- Terrorist attack on oil fields
- Terrorist attack on a major ally – Europe, Japan or Persian Gulf
- Anthrax in Israel
- China-Taiwan crisis
- North Korea missile launch
- **Indo-Pak** war
- Russian move into Georgia

SF 120301-24

11-L-0559/OSD/5557

snowflake

11/29/01

November 29, 2001 11:04 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Lists

092

When are you going to get back to me with the two lists-what could go right and how we should deal with it, and what could wrong and how we should deal with it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
11/29/01-9

.....
Please respond by _____

29 Nov 01

U14800 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5558

snowflake

D
A 11/20
11/20
1403

November 29, 2001 10:47 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Backfill

092

We have to take advantage of all those countries that have offered to backfill for our troops around the world.

Please come up with a proposal. Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112901-6

.....

Please respond by _____

29 Nov 01

U14802 02

snowflake

Personal 11/29
15953

November 28, 2001 3:07 PM

TO: Arlene
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Book

Please see if you can get the book entitled "All the Laws But One." That is a quote from Lincoln, referring to habeas corpus. I don't know who the author is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-17

.....

Please respond by _____

461

28 Nov 01

U14812 02

snowflake

D 11/25
0739
Agar

November 28, 2001 3:10 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boarding Ships

complete 11/30/01

You told me that only Coast Guard people could board ships. Why don't you find out how we get that law changed and get me a memo on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-19



Please respond by _____

/

520

10/24/01

U14814 02

snowflake

Aeron
to 12/12
08/11

December 12, 2001 12:15 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Humanitarian Role for DoD

AFghanistan

When you get ready to discontinue the flutter drops, I do think it is important for DoD to continue to have an active humanitarian role and that it be visible. How do we plan to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121201-12

.....

Please respond by _____

12 DEC 01

U15094 02

snowflake

December 19, 2001 5:15 PM

ACTION
2/10/03
1312

TO: Jim Roche
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Predators

452R

I don't think we ought to sell any more Predators to CIA. Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121901-18

19 Dec 01

U15123 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5563

snowflake

December 28, 2001 8:15 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Earmarks

Done 3/11

110.0

Please get me the list of those 4,000 earmarks in our legislation. I need to get a sense of what that is about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
1228014

.....
Please respond by _____

98 DE 01

U15130 02

INFO MEMO

January 10, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Congressional Changes to the FY 2002 DoD Budget

- You asked me to give you some details on the number of programs changed in the FY 2002 Appropriations Bills and the dollar value of these changes.
- The FY 2002 DoD and Military Construction Appropriations Conference reports made changes to over 2,000 individual programs and line items in the form of funding increases or decreases to requested programs and increases for unrequested programs.

<u>Appropriation Title</u>	<u># of Programs/ Line Items</u>	<u>(billions of dollars)</u>			<u>% of Request</u>
		<u>Adds</u>	<u>Cuts</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Military Personnel	48	+1	-9	1.0	1.2%
O&M	376	+1.4	-2.3	3.7	2.9%
Procurement	436	+2.9	-2.4	5.3	8.6%
Revolving & Mgt Funds	4	*	-7	.7	28%
RDT&E	995	-3.8	-2.4	6.2	13.1%
Counter-Terrorism	17	+5	0	.5	N/A
Undesignated		+4	-2.3	2.7	N/A
Military Construction	146	+1.0	-.5	1.5	15%
Total	2,022	+10.1	-11.5	21.6	6.6%

- This line item calculation excludes the allocation of the \$1.65 billion across-the-board reduction in the DoD Bill and the 1.127% across-the-board reduction in the Military Construction Bill. The implementation of these cuts will affect thousands of line items and individual programs in every appropriation except Military Personnel.
- These program changes of \$10.1 billion in adds and \$11.5 billion in cuts produced a net cut of \$1.4 billion to the request, but changed the DoD program by \$21.6 billion. (Table showing the changes for 1993-2002 is attached.)
- The \$21.6 billion in adds and cuts changed 6.6% of the total budget, but affected a much greater percentage of procurement and RDT&E.

Attachment: As stated

Coordination: None

Prepared by: (b)(6)

Professional Changes to Requests

(Authority for each budget year, excluding supplementals)

(billions of dollars)

<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>	<u>FY00</u>	<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>
+14.9	+15.0	+8.3	+15.7	+15.0	+14.4	+10.2	+18.5	+14.4	+10.1
-22.4	-16.2	-9.3	-8.3	-4.5	-9.5	-10.0	-12.1	-10.3	-11.5
-7.5	-1.2	-1.0	+7.4	+10.5	+4.9	+0.2	+6.4	+4.1	-1.4
37.3	31.2	17.6	24.0	19.5	23.9	20.2	30.6	24.7	21.6
13.8	12.4	7.0	9.8	8.0	9.5	7.9	11.5	8.5	6.6

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$ Millions)

1/11/02

	ADD	CUT
Military Personnel, Army		
Special Pays/Loan Replacement Pmgrar		5.000
Personnel Under Execution		-102.200
Individuals in Appellate Review		5.000
End of Year Retirements		-5.000
Excess PCS Requirements		50.000
\$30,000 Lump Sum Bonus		-20.900
Foreign Currency		-39.400
TOTAL MILPERS, A	.000	-281.500
Military Personnel, Navy		
Unemployment Benefit		-2.400
Individuals in Appellate Review		5.000
End of Year Retirements		-5.000
Excess PCS Requirements		-30.000
\$30,000 Lump Sum Bonus		-18.600
Foreign Currency		-.800
Recalculation of obligation requirement		-20.000
TOTAL MILPERS, N	.000	-84.800
Military Personnel, Marine Corps		
Unemployment Benefit		5.000
Individuals in Appellate Review		4.000
End of Year Retirements		-2.000
Excess PCS Requirements		-10.000
\$30,000 Lump Sum Bonus		4.300
Foreign Current		-9.900
TOTAL MILPERS, MC	.000	-35.200
Military Personnel, Air Force		
Special Pay/Critical Skills/Retention Bonu		-13.100
Special Pay/Critical Skills/Accession Bonu:		-19.000
Unemployment Benefit:		-9.400
Personnel Under Execution		-206.000
Variances in Personnel Strength Total		-121.600
Individuals in Appellate Review		-8.000
End of Year Retirement		-5.000
Excess PCS Requirements		-60.000
\$30,000 Lump Sum Bonus		-18.700
Foreign Currency		-19.500
B-52 Force Structure	2.300	
TOTAL MILPERS, AF	2.300	-480.300
Reserve Personnel, Army		
Additional ADREndstrength	10.000	
Duty MOS Qualification Training	3.000	
Professional Development Trainin	1.000	
TOTAL RESPERS, A	14.000	.000
Reserve Personnel, Navy		
Additional School Training	4.000	
Additional Special Training	3.000	
ADT Fleet Support	4.000	
TOTAL RESPERS, N	11.000	.000

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$ Millions)

1/11/02

	Add	Cuts
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps:		
Active Duty for Special Work	4.900	
Additional School Training	1.000	
Additional Special Training	2.000	
TOTAL RESPERS, MC	7.900	.000
Reserve Personnel, Air Force:		
Additional School Training	4.000	
Additional Special Training	2.000	
TOTAL RESPERS, AF	6.000	.000
National Guard Personnel, Army		
Personnel Underexecution		5.000
Duty MOS Qualification Training	7.000	
Additional AGR Endstrength	24.700	
Emergency Spill Response Program	.860	
TOTAL NOPERS, A	32.560	5.000
National Guard Personnel, AF		
Additional School Training	7.000	
Ballistic Missile Range Safety Tech Prc	.910	
TOTAL NGPERS, AF	7.910	.000
TOTAL MILPERS	81.670	5.000

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$ Millions)

1/11/02

O&M, Army		
Land Force Divisions		
Military Gator	2,500	
Camera Assisted Monitoring Sys (CAMS)	7,000	
Blister Guard Socks	1,000	
10th Mountain Division ASL Container	1,000	
Hydration on the Move (Camelbak)	1,000	
Land Forces Corps Support		
Finance & Personnel		-1,500
Land Force Readiness Ops Support		
Skid Steer Loaders	7,500	
Land Forces Depot Maintenance		
Anniston Army Depot Apprenticeship Proj	1,000	
Mobile Kitchen Trainers	4,300	
Communication & Electronics	6,000	
Land Forces Readiness Support Base Support		
NTC Airhead	1,300	
Training Facilities Support at Ft Irwin & NTC	7,800	
Salute our Services Pilot Program	2,600	
Efficient Basing Couth Costs		-3,500
Transition Studies		-2,000
Land Forces RPM		
ESEUR SRM		-15,000
Land Forces Mgt & Operational HC		
USARPAC Transformation Planning	8,500	
UASRPAC C3 Upgrades	3,200	
Land Forces Unified Commands		
Unified Commands--Hunter UAV	2,500	
Mobility Operations Strategic Mobilization		
Field Pack Up Systems	2,500	
Mobility Operations Industrial Preparedness		
Unutilized Plant Capacity	17,500	
Mobility Operations RPN		
Mobilization Enhancements-pre-QDF		-2,000
Senior Reserve Officers Training Corp:		
Air Battle Captain Program	1,000	
ROTC Facility Rehabilitation	200	
Specialized Skill Training		
Military Police School/MCTFT Jt Training	1,000	
Jt Assessment Neurological Examination E	2,800	
DLI Dormitory Furnishings & Equip	1,000	
Training Support--Other Contracts		-5,000
Training Support		
Armor Officers Distance Learning (Ft Knox)	2,100	
Base Ops Basic Skill & Adv Training		
Ft. Bliss Desalination Study	1,000	
Ft. Bliss Water System Pre-Design Study	1,000	
Basic Skill/Adv Trng RPN		
Ft. Knox MOUT Site Upgrades	2,500	
JROTC		
Servicewide Transportation		
Transportation		-10,000
MTMC DRMEC Demo Proj incl RAPIC	2,000	
Central Supply Activities		
Pulse Technology--Battery Mq	3,500	
Pulse Technology--BATTCAVE	1,500	
Unidentified Documents and Manuals for Recap E		-5,000
Logistic Support Activities		
Elect Maint Sys Interactive Elect Maint Manue	2,000	
LOGTECH Ctr of Excellence in Logistic	1,000	
Servicewide Support Administration		
Biometrics Support	14,750	
Administration		-10,000
Manpower Management		
DCPS		-6,400
Other Servicewide Support		
Conservation & Ecosystem Mg	4,300	
Other Servicewide Support		-9,000

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$Millions)

1/11/02

Servicewide Support Base		
Innovative Safety Mgt	2.500	
A-76 Process Aberdeen Proving Ground		-2.000
Servicewide Support RPM		
Ft Richardson, Camp Denali Water System:	.600	
Rock Island Bridge Repair:	2.000	
International Military HC		
NATO Administrative Growth		-30.000
Overstated Civilian Buyout Cost:		-40.640
Classified Programs	26.794	
Fires Program Data Capture	6.600	
Memorial Events	.350	
Civilian Underexecutor		-20.000
Strategic Sourcing (A-78)		-6.360
HQ Staff Reduction		-62.200
Travel of Persons		-21.000
Mobility Enhancement Study		
Study of Railroad Transportation Support at NTI	.500	
WMD Response Element Training	1.700	
Memorial Tunnel, Consequence Mgt	16.500	
Repairs at Ft. Baker	1.000	
Defense Joint Accounting System		-12.500
Camouflage Nets		-10.000
Foreign Currency		-67.600
Utilities		-34.700
Reduce Excess Carryover		
Govt Purchase Card Savings		-37.000
Army Acq Mgt Practices		-5.000
ARMY O&M TOTAL	178.894	-480.400
O&M. New		
Intermediate Maintenance		
DSM-156 Missile Test Set Upgrade	1.700	
Aircraft Depot Maintenance		
NAVAIR CAT & BADCQM Test Sys	8.500	
F-404-402 Spare Modules	1.400	
Combat Communications		
Jt Airborne Tactical Elect Combat Trng Prog	1.000	
Shipyard Depot Operations Support		
Shipyard Apprentice Program	7.600	
NUC Torpedo Depot Apprentice	1.400	
Improved Engineering Design Process	3.000	
PHNSY SRM	12.800	
Warfare Tactics		
Warfare Tactics PMRF Improvements	20.400	
Operational Meteorology & Oceanography		
UNOLS	1.500	
Hydrographic Center of Excellence	2.500	
Combat Support Forces		
Ctr for Excellence for Disaster Mgt & Human Ass	4.300	
Equipment Maintenance		
Manual Reverse Osmosis Desalinators (MROD)	1.000	
Naval Coastal Warfare Training Improvement	3.500	
Weapons Maintenance		
MK-45 Overhaul	5.800	
Phalanx CWIS Overhaul	7.000	
NULKA Ship Self-Defense Missile	1.000	
Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, & Modernization		
NAS Meridian Airfield Lighting	4.100	
Base Support		
Northwest Environmental Resource Ct	4.900	
Infrastructure Prog	4.000	
NWS Seal Beach Detachment Resource Ct	1.000	
Excess Administrative Overhead		-1.500
Ship Activations/Inactivation:		
Ship Disposal Initiative	3.500	
Submarine Converter		-17.000

FT 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$ Millions)

1/11/02

ROTC	2.200	
Specialized Skill Training		
Naval Aviation Apprenticeship Program	1.000	
Professional Development Education		
NDS CDTEMS	2.000	
Training Support		
Learning Network Prog-Ctr for Navy Educ & Trng (CNET)	3.400	
Distance Learning CNET	3.400	
Maintenance & Training Process CNE	2.600	
JROTC		
JROTC	.930	
Naval Sea Cadet Corps	1.000	
Servicewide Support Admin		
Biometrics	2.500	
Adv Technology Info Support (ATIS)	1.000	
Administration		-30.000
Other Personnel Support		
Center for Career Dev Prog Growth		-1.000
Planning, Engineering, & Design		
Naval Facilities Engineering Comman		-5.000
Planning, Engineering, and Design		-6.000
NSW Carderock All Weather Cargo Transfer Sys	.500	
Stainless Steel Sanitary Space Svsten	2.500	
Acquisition & Program Mgr		
Acquisition Mgt		-53.000
SPAWAR ITC Operations	4.500	
Air Systems Support		
Config Mgt Info Sye	3.600	
Classified Programs	9.223	
Strategic Sourcing A-7t		-30.000
HQ Staff Reduction		-51.106
Travel of Persons		-14.000
Defense Joint Accounting Sy:		-7.000
Foreign Currency		-18.300
Utilities		-8.800
USS Alabama	4.200	
Intrepid Sea-AirSpace	4.250	
Central Kitsap Schoo	3.500	
Govt Purchase Card Saving:		-29.006
NAVY O&M TOTAL	154.103	-271.700
O&M, Marine Corps		
Operational Forces		
ECWCS	1.000	
Jt Service NBC Def Eq Surveillance	2.900	
ULCANS	1.000	
Modular General Purpose Ten	2.500	
Blister Guard Socks	1.000	
Hydration on the Move(Camelbak	1.000	
MOLLE	4.800	
Field Logistics		
Log Improvement Initiative (Ground Supply	2.600	
Sys Intergration Environment Spt for VII MEI	1.700	
Depot Maintenancr		
Rabars t e m s	4.300	
Base Support		
Waste Water Treatment Study	.250	
Twenty-nine Palms MAGTF MOUT Fac Planning & Desig	1.300	
Training & Support Facilities	15.700	
Facility Sustainment, Restoration, & Modernization		
MAGTFTC Twenty-nine Palm:	2.200	
JROTC	.370	
Strategic Sourcing A-7t		-1.000
HQ Staff Reduction		-4.000
Foreign Currency		-1.300
Utilities		-7.200
Govt Purchase Card Saving:		-3.000

FY 2002
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Travel		-4,000
MC O&M TOTAL	42,820	-20,500
O&M, Air Force		
Primary Combat Forces		
B-52 Attrition Reserve	28,000	
Air Operations Training		
F-16 Distributed Mission Training	5,300	
Combat Communications		
Jt Airborne Tactical Elect Combat Tmg Prox	1,000	
Air Operations Real Property Main		
Grand Forks AFB Ramp Refurbishmen	5,000	
Wind Energy Fund	500	
Air Operations Base Support		
Battle Lab Engineering and Tech Suppo	4,700	
Pacific Server Consolidator	8,500	
Navigation/Weather Support		
University Partnering for Operational Suppo	3,400	
Management /Operational HC		
Scheduling Integration Team--Contractor Suppo		-4,000
Space Control Systems		-3,000
Satellite Systems		-1,000
Other Space Operations		
Unjustified Contractor Growth		-4,000
Mobilization RPM		
PACAF Strategic Airlift Planning	1,700	
Specialized Skill Training		
IT Workforce Re-Skilling Aeronautical Sys Ct	1,000	
Flight Training		
MBU-20 Oxygen Mask	1,000	
JROTC	1,000	
Logistics Operations		
Acquisition Efficiencies		-25,000
CKU-5 Rocket Catapult PP	1,700	
Aging Propulsion System Life Extensio	1,500	
L-SMART Information Sys Logistics Ops	2,500	
Logistics Operations RPM		
Eielson AFB Utilidors	8,500	
Hickam AFB Alternative Fuel Program	1,000	
Servicewide Transportation		-20,000
Servicewide Administration		-14,000
Servicewide Communications		-8,000
Other Servicewide Activities		-19,000
Civil Air Patrol Corporator	3,200	
Servicewide Base Support		
William Lehman Aviation Cente	750	
International Support		
NATO & Int'l Program Growth		-5,000
Classified Programs		-18,332
Active Duty MilPers Underexecution Support		-75,000
Strategic Sourcing (A-76)		-8,320
HQ Staff Reduction		-50,400
Consultants		-20,000
Travel of Persons		-180,000
Elmendorf AFB Trans Infrastruc	10,200	
Defense Jt Accounting Sy:		-9,000
Foreign Currency		-33,800
Utilities		-28,800
Govt Purchase Card Savings		-24,000
MTAPP	2,800	
Grant	6,000	
Contract Claim	8,000	
AF O&M TOTAL	105,250	-548,652

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	ADD	CUTS
O&M, Defensewide		
Special Operations Command		
Base Communications Sustainmen		-2.000
Program Growth		-2.800
Operation Focus Relief Drawdown		-9.000
Collateral Equipmen		-1.000
MAC SAAM Program Growth Focus Relie		-4.000
Defense Acquisition Universit		
IT Organizational Composition Researc	1.000	
Distance Learning Travel Saving:		-4.000
Distance Learning	2.500	
American Forces Information Servic		
Pay calculations and Utilitie:		-300
Civil Military Programs		
Youth Development & Leadership Pro	.750	
Innovative Readiness Trainin	8.500	
Classified & Intel		-11.701
DCAA		
Execution		-5.000
Program Growth		-7.400
DCMA		
Pay Calculation and Program Growt		-11.400
SPS Office Efficiencies		-1.000
Contingency Operations Contract Oversight		-2.800
DHRA		
CivPers Backfills for DLAMF		-10.000
DISA		
Overhead		-17.000
DLA		
Unemployment Compensation		-1.900
Security Locks	5.000	
Obsolete NSNs		-7.000
Defense POW/MIA Office		
Personnel Recovery Needs Assessmen	1.000	
DSCA		
Budget Justification		-7.000
Defense Security Service		
Improper Budget Adjustments		-1.500
DTRA		
Headquarters Program Growth		-5.450
CHemBio Warfare Defense Study	1.000	
DODEA		
Math Teacher Leader&it	1.000	
Galena IDEP	3.400	
SRM	5.000	
JCS		
Program Growth		-12.000
Elect Ed for Res Comp in Classroom & Dist Environ	1.700	
National Defenses University XX	1.700	
OEA		
Fitzsimmons Army Hospita	3.300	
NAS Cecil Field	2.000	
Adak Airfield Ops	1.000	
Philadelphia Naval Business Cents	2.500	
Norton AFB	2.500	
City of St. Louis SLAAP/ATCON	1.000	
Battery 204, Odiome Poin	.100	
Navy Security Group Activity WinterHarbo	4.000	
Barrow Landfill Fielocatio	3.400	
Broadneck Peninsula NIKESite	1.000	

FY 2002
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OSD		
Energy Sustainability Audit	1,500	
Clara Barton Center at Pine Bluf	1,000	
Commd Info Superiority Architectures (CISA)	3,500	
CTMA	6,000	
ADUSQ (MPP&R) Wearable Computers	1,700	
Pacific Command Regional Initiative	6,000	
Studies & Analyses		-5,000
Information Assumnce Scholarship!	6,100	
Program Growth		-15,000
Intelligence Fusion Stud!	5,000	
WHS		
Program Growth		-15,500
Strategic Sourcing A-7e		-5,260
Legacy	11,000	
CSS Alabama	1,000	
CSS Hunley	.900	
Impact Aid	30,000	
Reserve Component Jt Prof MII Ec	3,100	
Management HQ Reductor		-54,300
United Services Organization (USO)	8,500	
Red Cross	3,500	
Defense Joint Accounting System		-13,000
National D-Day Museum	4,250	
Foreign Currency		-29,400
Utilities		-4,500
Reduce Excess Carryover		
Grant	8,500	
Govt Purchase Card Savings		-7,000
Int'l Trust for Demining & Mine Victims Ass	14,000	
Freemarkets	1,400	
Travel		-20,000
Eisenhower Commissior	2,600	
Regional Def Count-terror Fellowship	17,900	
Armed Services Retirement Homr	5,200	
DEPWIDE O&M TOTAL	196,500	-263,211
O&M, Army Reserve		
Land Forces Mission Ops Support		
Other Contracts Unjustified Prog Growth		-15,000
Service-wide Communications		
HQ Growth		-1,000
Travel		-4,000
Utilities		-2,700
TOTAL ARRes O&M	.000	-22,700
O&M, Navy Reserve		
Travel		-2,000
TOTAL NRes O&M	.000	-2,000
O&M, Marine Corps Reserve		
Travel		-5,000
TOTAL MCRRes O&M	.000	-5,000
O&M, Air Force Reserve		
Primary Combat Forces		
Unjustufued Program Growth		-8,000
C-17 Reserve Base Planning & Design	1,000	
Travel		-8,000
TOTAL AFRes O&M	1,000	-12,000
O&M, Army National Guard		
Divisions		
Extended Cold Weather Clothing Sy:	2,500	
Land Forces Operations Support		

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 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
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Unjustified Program Growth		-10.000
Land Forces Systems Readiness		
Camp McCain Simulator Ctr Trainer Upgrade	3.200	
Base Operations Support		
Fl Harrison Communications Infrastructure	1.000	
Communications Network Equip	.209	
Multimedia Classroom	.850	
RPM		
Camp McCain Training Site Road	2.200	
Management & Operational HC		
Unjustified Program Growth		-7.000
Military Technicians (Dual Status)	6.300	
Additional Technicians	11.200	
Distributed Learning	25.500	
Emergency Spill Response Program	.790	
Nat'l Emergency Disaster Info Ctr	1.700	
Angel Gate Academy	1.500	
GSA Leased Vehicle Program	1.750	
Modular General Purpose Tents	2.500	
Joint Training & Experimentation Prog	3.400	
Camp Gruber Regional Training Ctr	2.400	
Domestic Emergency & Terrorist Response Ctr	2.500	
Information Technology Mgt Training	1.000	
Early Responders Distance Learning Trng Ctr	2.000	
Rural Access to Broadband Techn	3.400	
Northeast Counterdrug Training Ctr	6.800	
Utilities		-2.700
Travel		-6.000
TOTAL AING O&M	62.699	-25.700
O&M, Air National Guard		
Base Support		
Eagle s i o r	8.500	
National Guard State Partnership Prog	1.000	
Extended Cold Weather Clothing Syst	2.500	
Project Alert	2.990	
U t i l i t i e s		-3.400
Defense Systems Evaluation	1.700	
Bangor International Airport Runway Repair	5.000	
TOTAL AING O&M	21.600	-3.400
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund		
Program Cut		-650.104
Funded in FY00 Supp		
TOTAL OCOTF	.000	-650.104
Quality of Life Enhancements, Defense		
TOTAL QOLE	.000	.000

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
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Defense Health Program		
O&M		
Consolidate Health Support	1.500	
DOD-VA Health Care Consolidation Stud	2.500	
Health Care Centers of Excellence	1.500	
Automated Clinical Practice Guideline	6.400	
Clinical Coupler Demonstration Projec	7.000	
Alaska Federal Health Care Network	2.125	
Graduate School of Nursing	2.000	
Tri Service Nursing Research Program	6.000	
Padfic Island Health Care Referral Pro	4.300	
Brown Tree Snakes	1.000	
Hawaii Federal Health Care Network (PACMEDNET)	15.300	
Digital Access & Analysis of Historic Records at AFIF	3.400	
Defense and Veterans Head Injury Progra r	2.100	
Operation Ranch Hand/Agent Orange Stud	1.000	
Health Study at Iowa Army Armmn Plan	1.000	
Comprehensive Neuroscience Cente	8.000	
Computer Based Patient Record!	2.100	
R&D		
Breast Cancer Res Prop	150.000	
Prostate Cancer Res Prop	85.000	
Ovarian Cancer Res Prop	10.200	
Peer-Reviewed Medical Res Prop	50.000	
ACP-215 Blood Cell Washer	2.000	
Advanced Cancer Detector	3.500	
Comprehensive Breast Care Cente	11.900	
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia Research	5.000	
Coronary/Prostate Disease Revere	6.000	
HIV/AIDS Prevention Prog	14.000	
Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy for Cerebral Policy at WPAFI	1.100	
Int'l Medical Prog Global Satellite Sys (IMPGSE)	2.000	
Nat'l Ctr for Collaboration in Medical Modeling & Sir	.200	
Nat'l Naval Medical Ctr Hematology Lab Mod	1.500	
Periscopic Surgery for the Spine	2.500	
Post Polio Syndrome	2.500	
TRIS-AFIERA Environmental/Border Health Dem	1.500	
Tuberous Sclerosis Complex (TSC) Researd	1.000	
US Military Cancer Institute at USUHC	2.500	
National Prion Research Project (Mad Cow Disease/Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease)	42.500	
Comprehensive Breast Care Ctr at Walter Rees	4.000	
Fisher House Foundatlor	1.700	
Utilities		-5.100
TOTAL DHP	487.925	-5.100
Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction		
TOTAL CTR	.000	.000
Humanitarian/Disaster/Civic Aid		
	.000	.000

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
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Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities, Def		
Program Change		
Operation Caper Focus	2.500	
Southwest Anti-drug Border States Initiative	4.200	
Southwest Border Fence	5.000	
Tethered Aircraft Radar Program		-12.400
Regional Counterdrug Training Academy, Meridian MS	1.400	
EO/IR Sensors for Air Nat'l Guard OH-58	3.500	
WV Aft Nat'l Guard Counterdrug Prog	3.000	
Northeast Regional Counterdrug Training Ctr	3.500	
Counter-narcotics Ctr at Hammer	5.200	
Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force	3.400	
Nat'l Interagency Civ-Mil Institute	2.000	
Young Marines	1.400	
Indiana National Guard Counter-drug Activities	1.400	
Kentucky National Guard Counter-drug Activities	2.400	
Tennessee National Guard Counter-drug Activities	1.000	
Nevada National Guard Counter-drug Activities	1.000	
New York Nat'l Gd Counter-drug Port Initiative	1.000	
Peru Support		-7.200
Counter-drug Tanker Operations		-1.000
Columbia Airborne Surveillance		-3.500
RDT&E		-4.000
LEA OCONUS Support		-3.000
Mississippi National Gd Counterdrug Prog	1.800	
P-3 Counterdrug Thermal Imaging Sys	2.000	
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Demo	5.000	
Hawaii National Guard Counterdrug Program	2.800	
TOTAL DRUG INTERDICTION	53.300	-31.100
Environmental Restorator		
Program Increase	32.000	
ENVIRON RESTORATION TOTAL	32.000	.000
Pentagon Renovation Transfer Fund		
TOTAL PENTAGON REN TRANS FUND	.000	.000
Inspector General		
TOTAL INSPECTOR GENERAL	.000	.000
Payment to Kaho'olawe Conveyance		
Program Increase	42.500	
PAYMENT TO KAHO'OLAWA TOTAL	42.500	.000
Undistributed Adjustments		
TOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED ADJ	.000	.000
TOTAL O&M	1378.191	-2851.587

FY 2002
 APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE ADDS AND CUTS
 (\$Millions)

1/11/02

Aircraft Procurement, Army		
Utility F/W Aircraft		
Transfer of C-37A Replacement from RDT&E, Af	45.000	
Helicopter New Training		
TH-67 Creek Training Helicopte	25.000	
CH-47 Mods		
Crashworthy Cockpit Seats	2.000	
LRIP Delay		-26.000
Longbow		
Recapitalization and Safety Modification	7.000	
Fire Control Radar		-8.200
Oil Debris Detection & Burnoff Sys	3.500	
Longbow AP		
Airframes		-3.300
UH-60 Mods		
Crashworthy External Fuel Systemq ARNG	4.200	
De-icing Sys Upgrade Proc	1.500	
1/207th Search & Rescue	10.400	
GATM Rollup		
Fixed Wing		-6.500
Rotary Wing		-9.500
Spare Parts		
Aircraft Survivability Eq Trainer (ASET IV)	2.000	
Aircraft Survivability E c		
AN/AVR-2 Laser Detection Sets	5.000	
ASE Infrared- CM		
ATIRCM LRIP	7.000	
Air Traffic Control		
Cold Cathode Portable Landing Light	1.500	
National Airspace Sys		-12.000
Avionics Support Equipmen		
AV/AVS-8 Night Vision Goggles	1.800	
HGU-56/P Aircrew Integrated Sys	3.500	
TOTAL APA	119.400	-65.500
Missile Procurement, Army		
Stinger System		
Reduction		-426
Guided MLRS Rocket (GMLRS)		
Program Delays		-8.480
MLRS Launcher Sys		
Reduction		-10.250
ATACMS		
Program Reductor		-9.006
Patriot Mods		
Program Reductor		-12.500
Avenger Mods		
Reduction		8.000
ITAS/TOW Mods		
Reduction		-35.000
MLRS Mods		
Program Underexecution		-10.000
Missile Demilitarization		
Missile Recycling Center	1.000	
TOTAL MPA	1.000	-91.656
WTCV, Army		
Bradley Base Sustainmen		
Economic Production Profile Ad		-13.800
FIST Vehicle Mods		
Engineering & Support Cost Growth		-7.700
Heavy Assault Bridge (HAB) Training Device		
Vehicle Purchases		-41.000
BFVS Series Mods		
Armor Tiles	20.000	
Pre-Mod Depot Maintenance		-5.000

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FAASV PIP of Fleet		
Excessive Growth		-9.200
Abrams Tank Mod		
Excessive Growth/Unjustified Unit Cost Increase:		-31.700
System Enhancement PGM: SEP M1A:		
Unjustified Unit Cost Increase:		-2.100
Items Less than \$5M		
Product Improved Combat Veh Headse	7.500	
TOTAL WFCV	27.500	-110.500
Ammunition Procurement, Arm		
.50 CAL All Types		
50 Cal SLAP	2.000	
25mm, All Types		
M919 Ammunition	24.000	
40mm, All Types		
MTP M918 Linked Underexecution		-20.000
81 mm Mortar All Types		
M818	4.000	
M853 ILLUM	3.500	
M934 MO	3.500	
Mortar 120mm HE M934 W/MO Fuze	4.000	
155mm HE M-107		
M795 155mm HE, HF	2.500	
Modular Artillery Charge Sys (MACS)		
Cost Growth		-15.000
RADAM		
Cost Growth		-25.060
Mine AT/AP M87 (Volcano)	7.000	
Bunker Defeating Munition (BDM)		
SMAW-D	3.500	
Demolition Munition:		
Modernization Demolition Initiator	1.090	
Anti-personnel Obstacle Breaching Sys:	3.500	
Grenades, All Types:		
M83 Smoke Launcher/LVOSS Smoke Launcher	2.000	
Signals, All Types		
Practice M8		-8.900
Items less than \$5 million		
Smokeless Nitrocellulose	2.000	
Maintenance of Inactive Facilities:		
Production Base Support at Pine Bluff Arsenal	1.500	
ARM&S	10.000	
TOTAL PAA	74.000	-66.900
Other Procurement, Army		
Tactical Trailers/Dolly Sets		
Self Load/Off Load Trailer (SLOT)	1.000	
M129A2C		
Full Requirements		-7.300
HMMWV		
Up-Armored HMMWVs	19.000	
Firetrucks & Associated Firefighting Eq:	4.000	
Family of Heavy Tactical Veh:		
Movement Tracking Sys (MTS)	5.000	
Armored Security Vehicles:		
Tactical Fire Truck	3.500	
Modification of In-Service Eq (Tac Surv)		
Aluminum Mesh Liner	3.500	
SHF Term		
STAR-T Program Termination		-1 8.851
Army Global CMD & Control Sys		
AN/PSC-5 Spitfire, Radio P3	4.300	
Army Data Distribution Sys (ADDS)		
Nat'l Guard EPLRE	18.000	

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ACUS Mod Program (WIN T/T)		
ANUXC-10 (TS-21 Blackjack)	7.000	
AN/TTC-56 Single Shelter Switch:	26.500	
USRPAC C4 Suites	7.200	
Comms-Elect Equip Fielding		
Improved High Frequency Radio (ARes)	3.500	
USRPAC GCCS-A Suites	.300	
Information Sys Security Prog-ISSF		
Biometrics Information Assurance	9.000	
Secure Terminal Equip	1.500	
Base Support Communications		
Trunked Radio System	1.400	
Local Area Network		
CUTTNDigital Switch Sys Mod at Ft Huachuca & White Sand:	2.000	
All Source Analysis Sys (ASAS)		
Intel Analysis Adv Tool Sets (IAATS)	1.400	
GDIP	2.000	
JTT/CIBS-M (TIARA)		
Joint Tactical Terminal:	8.500	
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUA)		
FRP Delay		-27.000
CI HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS)		
Additional CHATS Units	1.000	
Shortstop Electronic Protection Sys		
Integrated Logistics Support	1.700	
Sentinel Mods		
USARPAC Trojan Lite	.800	
Night Vision Devices		
Borelight	1.400	
Night Vision Terminal Wpn Sigh		
AN/PVS-6 (MELIOS)	1.200	
Mortar Fire Control Sys		
Lightweight Laser Designation Rangefinder	2.000	
Program Delays		-7.000
Combat Identification/Aiming Ligh		
AN/PEO-2A Target Pointer	2.000	
Maneuver Control System		
Schedule Delay		-1.400
STAMIS Tactical Computers (STACOMP)		
Program Delays		-13.000
Standard Integrated Cmnd Post Sys		
Modular Command Post Sys	2.500	
ADP Equipment		
Ammunition AIT	3.500	
NG Distance Learning Courseware	4.000	
Automatic ID Technology	3.000	
Automated Manifest Sys	1.000	
LAN Install for Gauntlet FTX Site Ft Kno:	.450	
Regional Medical Distance Learning Cent	1.000	
Laundries, Showers & Latrines		
Laundry Advanced Sys	3.000	
Lightweight Maintenance Enclosur.		
LME	3.000	
Field Feeding and Refrigerator.		
Food Sanitation Cent	1.100	
Camouflage		
ULCANS	4.000	
Combat Support, Medical		
Rapid Intravenous Infusion Pump	3.000	
Life Support for Trauma and Transport (LSTAT)	2.500	
Portable Low Power Blood Cooling and Storage Devic	1.100	
HEMA Cool	1.000	
Scraper, Earthmoving 1 1/2 Cu Yc		
Scraper	7.000	
Mission Modules--Engineering	4.500	
Deployable Universal Combat Earth Mover (DEUCE)		
DEUCE	11.200	

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Floating Cranes		
100/250 Ton Crane	7,000	
Generators and Associated Equip		
2kw Military Tactical Generator	2,500	
Combat Training Centers Support		
Deployable Force on Force Instrumentatio	4,200	
Training Devices, Nonsystem		
Abrams & Bradley Interactive Skills Traine	6,300	
Guardlist	3,000	
Adv AVIATION Instit Trng Simulator (AAITS)	2,500	
COTS Mobile Reconfigurable Targeting Sy	1,000	
Deployable Range Trng & Safety Sys (DTRSS Ft Bliss ANG)	1,300	
Deployable Range Trng & Safety Sys (DTRSS Ft Hood ANC)	1,300	
Fire Fighting Training Sys	1,200	
Mil Ops in Urban Terrain (MOUT)	1,500	
SIMNET	10,500	
AFIST	8,300	
Ft Wainwright MOUT Instrumentation	5,500	
MILES 2000 for Cope Thunde	6,000	
Live Fire Ranges	3,500	
Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCA)		
Aviation Reconfigurable Man Simulator (ARME)	1,000	
Special Equip for User Testing		
Target Receiver Injection Module Threat Simulat	3,400	
Additional Target Acq Radar--Agile Multibear	11,500	
Spec Eq for User Testing	1,000	
Integrated Family of Test Eq (IFTE)		
IFTE	11,000	
Initial Spares--CE		
SMART-T Program Delays		-2,000
TOTAL OPA	289,050	-74,551
TOTAL ARMY PROC	610,060	-409,100
Aircraft Procurement, Navy		
F/A-18E/F		
Excessive Growth: Ancillary Support Et		-30,000
V-22		
Reduce # of Aircraft		-226,700
V-22 AP		
Unrealistic Schedule		-12,000
SH-60R		
Unjustified Ancillary Equip Costs		-15,000
E-2C		
Production Support Cost Growth		-3,000
UC-35		
Additional Aircraft	7,500	
C-9 Modernization		
Hushkits	3,000	
T-45TS Goshawk AP		
Operational Flight Trainer:	6,500	
JPATS		
Additional Aircraft	30,800	
KC-130J		
Excessive Unit Cost Growth		-4,800
Defer 2 Aircraft		-137,400
EA-6 Series Mods		
Band 9/10 Transmitters	14,000	
AV-8 Series		
Litening II Targeting Pod:	25,000	
F-14 Series		
TARPS C/D	2,500	

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F-18 Series		
ATFLIR	21,000	
ECP-5983 Avionics Upgrade for MC	24,000	
Delayed Prior Year Obligation		-5,000
A-18EIF	1,030	
Excessive Cost Growth SLMP & MIDS		-3,500
AH-1W Series		
Night Targeting System	3,500	
H-53		
AN/APR-39A & "A" Install Kits	2,500	
SH-60 Series		
AQS-13F Dipping Sonar	2,000	
Airborne Low Frequency Sonars (ALFS)	4,000	
ADHEELS	2,000	
H-1 Series		
AN/AAQ-22 Thermal Imaging System	1,500	
EP-3 Series		
Hyper-wide Delta Wing SIGINT Equip	5,000	
Program Delays/Slow Execution		-10,000
A R I E S I V M E SIGINT Tune	6,000	
P-3 Series		
SLAM-ER Harpoon II Integrator	3,500	
Digital Autopilot Upgrade	2,800	
Digital Instantaneous Freq Mgt Upgrade	7,700	
CNS/ATM	6,300	
BMUP SEI Upgrades	7,000	
Multi-Mode Receivers (MMRs)	2,500	
COTS Aircraft Health Monitoring Sys	1,400	
ALR-95 ESM System Upgrade	6,000	
Anti-Surface Warfare Improv Upgrade	36,000	
PACT Trainer	6,000	
Advanced Digital Recorder	2,000	
E-2 Series		
Hawkeye 2000 CEC Upgrades	21,500	
AN/USC-42 Mini-DAMA UHF SATCOM Terminal 5	6,000	
C-2A		
T-45 Series		
Unjustified Increases Directional Control Mod		-7,200
v-22 Mods		
Unjustified Funding		-17,500
Common ECM Equip		
AN/ARR-47 Optical Sensor Program	2,600	
Spares & Repair Parts		
Program Growth Reductor		-100,000
Aircraft Industrial Facilities		
Navy Calibration Standards Support	2,300	
Other Production Charges		
Excessive Growth: F-14 WSSA		-4,300
Common Ground Equipment		
Direct Support Squadron Readiness Training	4,500	
Excessive Growth: Automatic Test Ec		-18,700
War Consumables		
High Pressure Pure Air Generator	2,800	
TOTAL APN	282,700	-497,100
Weapons Procurement, Navy		
TRIDENT II		
Q-5 Service Life Extension Program		-25,000
Navy Area Missile Defense		
Program Termination		8,983
Tomahawk		
Tooling and Test Equip	24,500	
ESSM		
Support Cost Growth Reductor		3,000
Sidewinder		
Contract Savings		-2,900

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AMRAAM		
Support Cost Growth Reductor		-3.000
Aerial Targets		
SSST Program Delays		-7.500
Drones & Decoys		
Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy (ITALD)	14.000	
Ordnance Support Equip		
Increased MK-54 Torpedo Prod	2.500	
Weapons Industrial Facilities		
Allegany Ballistics Lat	19.000	
ASW Range Support		
Northwest Undersea Range Upgrade	3.500	
CIWS Mods		
CIWS Block 1B Upgrade Kits & Spares	4.000	
Gun Mount Mods		
MK45 Mod 4 Guns	21.000	
TOTAL WPN	88.500	-48.300
Ammunition Proc. Navy/MC		
JDAM		
Support Cost Increase		-4.000
Kit Additional	4.000	
Machine Gun Ammunition-f		
20MM Linkless Cost Growth		-3.000
Practice Bombs-N		
Laser Guided Training Round	2.500	
Cartridges & Cart Actuated Devices		
Cost Growth		-7.300
Air Expendable Countermeasures-f		
MJU-52/B IR Expendable Countermeasure	3.300	
5 Inch 54 Gun Ammunition-t		
Continuous Processing Scale-Up Facility Outfitting	4.200	
120mm All Types		
M830A1 Ammunition	7.000	
Grenades, All Types-MC		
M87A1 Fragmentation Hand Grenade Electro/Mech Fuz	1.000	
Demolition Munitions All Types-MC		
SMAW Common Round	5.600	
Artillery, All Types-MC		
105 HE Projectile		-9.000
TOTAL PANMC	27.600	-23.300
Shipbuilding & Conversion, Nav		
SSGN		
(Additional Reactor Core		
Advance Planning	279.000	
Virginia Class Submarine		
Cost Growth Reductor		-30.000
CVN Refueling Overhaul;		
CVN-69 ZRCOH	30.000	
DDG-51 AP	125.000	
Cruiser Converter		
Program Accelerator	75.060	
LPD-17-AP		
Premature Long-lead for LPDs 23/24		-266.330
Outfitting		
Reduction		-5.000
LCAC SLEP		
Completion of PY Shipbuilding Proj	5.000	
LPD-17 (Funded in Supp)		
Submarine Refueling	16.246	
General Reductor		-12.006
Mine Hunters SWATF		
	1.000	
Yard Oilers		
	3.000	
TOTAL SCN	534.248	-388.330

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Other Procurement, Navy		
Other Navigation Ec		
AN/WSN-7B Ring Laser Gyroscopes	5.000	
Computer Aided Dead Reckoning Tracke	6.000	
Military Sealift Command Thermal Imagin	3.500	
Strategic Platform Support Equip		
ANUYQ-70 Submarine Workstations	10.100	
Shipboard Eq less than \$5M		
CVN Smartship--Unjustified Prog Growth		-5.000
Standard Boats		
25 Person Life Rafts	2.800	
Operating Forces IPE		
N88 Other Equip		-2.700
IDPE Enhancemen	4.200	
Pearl Harbor Pilo	4.300	
Radar Support		
AN/BPS-15H Navigation Sys	8.300	
SPS-73 (V) Radar	10.000	
AN/SYS-2 Integrated Tracking Sys for FFG-7s	5.000	
MK-92 Upgrade	2.500	
SSN Acoustics		
Nonpropulsion Electronic Sys Modernizatio	6.300	
Submarine Acoustic Warfare Support Ec		
Expendable Baththermograph Test Device	1.000	
Undersea Warfare Support Eq		
Carrier Tactical Surveillance Ctr (CV-TSC)	2.000	
Surface Ship Torpedo Defens	3.300	
Submarine Acoustic Intercept Sys Upgrade	7.000	
Minesweeping Sys Replacemen		
MCM Sea Bottom Mapping & Change Detectio	1.500	
Navy Tactical Data System		
Shore Based AN/UJYQ-70 Display Modernizatio	8.500	
Cooperative Engagement Capabillt		
Low Cost Planar Array Antenna Prod Transitio	8.500	
National AirSpace Sys		
DASR Program Delays		-20.000
Other Training Equipmen		
Air Traffic Control on Board Trainer	2.800	
Tactical Comm On-Board Trainin	4.500	
ID Systems		
Surface Identification Sys		
Shipboard Adv Radar Target ID (SARTIS)	1.000	
TADIX-B		
Additional Joint Tactical Terminal	12.100	
Naval Space Surveillance Sys		
Excessive Program Growth		-1.000
Other Shore Electron Eq less than \$5M		
Integrated Condition Assessment Sys Wireless Sensors (ICAS)	2.600	
Ship Communications Automatio		
NAWCAD MSTIC Equip Upgrades	1.000	
Programmable Integrated Communications Terminal	3.400	
Communications Items less than \$5M		
Enhanced COTS ON-201 Secure Voice Sys Tech	3.400	
IT-21 Block 1 Upgrade C4ISR Computing Ec	7.700	
Network-based Shipboard Interior Secure Voice Comm	8.500	
Satellite Communications System:		
Digital Modular Radk	6.000	
JEDMICS		
JEDMICS Enhancemnts	7.000	
PACOM Coalition Wide Area Network	4.500	
Information Securities Support Equip		
Secure Terminal Equip	1.500	
Intelligent Agent Security Modul	1.500	
Naval Shore Communication:		
Mini-DAMA Terminals	7.000	
Definity Network Upgrade	3.500	
Sonobouys--All Types		
Additional Sonobouy:	5.000	

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Weapons Range Support Equip		
Mobile Remote Emitter Simulato	5.300	
Pacific Missile Range	5.100	
Other Aviation Support Equip		
Jt Tactical Data Integrator	8.400	
Gun Fire Control System		
AN/SPO-9B Solid State Transmitter	7.000	
Ship Self Defense Sys		
Nulka Decoy	5.000	
Aegis Support Eq		
COTS Emulators for NSWC Laboratories	2.500	
TSC Business Sys Suites Upgrade	4.000	
Surface ASW Support Equip		
Surface Vessel Torpedo Tube	4.200	
Strategic Missile Sys Equip		
Reduction		-2.000
Smartship Upgrades	1.000	
Tactical Vehicles		
MTRV Trucks	14.000	
Other Supply Support Equip		
Serial Number Tracking Systems	3.000	
Special Purpose Supply Systems		-50.000
Training Support Equipmen		
TRIDENT Sonar Manuals-Data Mgt & Conversio	3.500	
Command Support Equipmen		
Advance Technical Information Sy:	1.000	
Reduction		-1.000
SPAWAR Information Tech Ctr	1.000	
Man Overboard Indicator (MOBI)	7.400	
Education Support Ec		
Training Vessels		-5.500
Environmental Support Ec		
Naval Observatory/Univer Doppler Spectrometry Telescope Prog	6.400	
TOTAL DPN	258.800	-88.200
Procurement, Marine Corps		
AAAV		-1.512
Marine Enhancement Program		
Bayonet 200C	2.100	
Modular Weapon Sys		
Other Support Mod Kits		-3.100
Night Vision Equipmen		
AN/PVS-17	7.000	
Radio Systems		
STAR-T Contract Termination		-1.500
Comm Switching and Control Sys		
AN/AUX-C10 TS-21 Blackjack Digital Facsimile	1.000	
Comm & Electronic Infrastructure Supp		
DPRIS Database	2.000	
Air Operations C2 Sys		
Legacy Agencies		-2.100
Intel C2 Systems		
TCAIMS Program Delays		-1.270
Fire Support System		
Target Location Designation Handoff Sys Delay		-11.900
Tactical Fuel Systems		
Aluminum Mesh Tank Line	1.000	
5/4T Truck HMMWV		
Uparmored Variants	5.000	
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacemen		
Truck Training Simulator:		-2.500
Assorted Power Equip		
Laser Leveling Equipmen	1.000	
Portable Floodlights and Generator		-1.000
Command Support Equipmen		
M C - 2 4 0 . Ultimate Building Machine :	1.700	
Material Handling Equipmen		

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Extendable Boom Forklift	2.500	
TRAM	5.100	
Forklift 4K		-4.000
Field Medical Equip:		
CBIRF Personnel Protection Equip	5.300	
Family of Construction Equip:		
D-7 Bulldozers	11.900	
TOTAL PMC	45.600	-31.882
TOTAL NAVY PRGC	1235.248	-1177.195

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Aircraft Procurement, Air Force		
C-17 MYP		
TEPATs Simulator	9,750	
Rate Impact Savings		-36,000
Reduction		-500
C-17 AP		
EQO for Second C-17 MYF	142,900	
V-22		-95,110
V-22 AP		-14,991
Civil Air Patrol		
Additional Aircraft	4,900	
E-8C		
Prior Year Pricing		-8,000
Predator UAV		
Predator B	17,000	
B-2A Mods		
USAF COMA des -	11,000	
B-52 Mods		
Attrition Reserve Aircraft	14,300	
A-10 Mods		
On-Board Oxygen Generation Sys	2,500	
F-15 Mods		
BOL IR Countermeasures	3,000	
Comms Upfits	10,000	
AI O-135 Band 1.5 Internal Countermeasure	17,500	
IFF for ANG NORAD Alert Mission Acft	3,400	
F-16 Mods		
ACES II Upgrade	1,500	
On Board Oxygen Generating Sys (OBOGS)	3,500	
C-5 Mods		
Reduce C-5 AMP Quantities Pending Flight Test		-70,500
C-17A Mods		
Delay in Initiation of LAIRCM De		-20,000
GATM Contract Savings		-7,000
T-38		
Engine Seats	12,800	
C-130 Mods		
HC-130 FLIR Sys for NG	2,000	
Modular Airborne Firefighting Sys for ANC	1,700	
APIM-241 Radar Upgrade	5,100	
C-135 Mods		
KC-135R Reengine		-58,000
DARP Mods		
Theater Airborne Warning Sys Acft Mod Kit:	2,000	
Senior Scout: JTI DE	2,300	
Senior Scout: Data Mission Mgt Processo	800	
Senior Scout: Third Shelter Modernizatio	2,000	
Senior Scout: Ground Station Modernizatio	1,600	
Senior Scout: COMINT Search & Collection Sy:	4,000	
E-6 Mods		
Disapprove Spiral Dev Modification		-7,200
Jt Services Workstation & Support for Air Ops Ctr	3,500	
Predator Mods		
Structured R&M Program	5,100	
Spares & Repair Parts		
CV-22 Spares		-26,400
War Consumables		
MAILD	4,000	
Miscellaneous Production Charge:		
Air Combat Training Range Security	3,000	
DARP Post Production Charges:		
U-2 SAYERS Spares	1,500	
Classified Programs		
Reduction		-360
TOTAL APAF	292,850	-342,081

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Ammunition Procurement, AI		
Pockets		
Hydra	6.300	
2.75 in Rocket Motor Cost Growth		-5.000
TOTAL PAAF	6.300	-5.000
Missile Procurement, AF		
JSOW		
GAO Recommended Cu		-25.000
MMIII Mods		
Pricing for GRP		-5.000
Wideband Gapfiller Satellit		
Program Reductions		-20.000
GPS (Space)		
Excessive Program Office Support		-5.000
GPS Advance Prgc		
Eliminate AP for GPS Mode		-23.760
Nudet Detection Sys		
Transfer from NRO	19.066	
Defense Meteorological SatProg		
Launch Delays		-1.500
Defense Support Program		
Launch Delays		-2.500
Than Space Boosters (Space:		
Chronic Underexecutio		-30.000
Veh Space Launch		
Unjustified Growth in Delta Launch Service:		-2.500
SBIR High Adv Proc		-93.752
Special Programs		-54.066
TOTAL MPAF	19.066	-263.078
Other Procurement, AF		
Intel Communications Equipmen		
Secure Terminal Equipment (STE)	1.500	
National Airspace Sys		
DASR Test Failures		-25.000
Theater Air Control System Improvemen		
Delay of Jt Mission Planning Sys		-6.000
AN/TYQ-23 Modular Control Eq (MCE) Ops Modules for ANG	10.500	
General Information Technolog		
REMS	3.000	
Combat Training Ranger		
AN/MSQ-T-43 Modular Threat Emitt	1.000	
Mini-MUTES	2.500	
Mobile Remote Emitter Simulator	11.200	
P4 BE ACMI Pods for 11th AF	6.300	
Pacific AK Range Complex Mount Fairplay, Sustin	15.300	
UMPTE Upgrade-11th AF	5.100	
UHF/VHF Radios for Mount Fairplay, Sustin	3.000	
Base Information Infrastructure		
Digital Switched Sys w/ Integrated Telephone & Radio Ca	2.000	
Space Based IR Sensor Prograrr		-54.347
MILSATCOM Space		
Transfer CCS-C Dev Lab Eq to R&r-		-1.400
Combat Survivor Evader Locate		
Availability of Prior Year Fund:		-2.222
CAP' Comm & Elect		
Additional Communications Unit:	1.000	
Searchers EDGE	6.000	
Comm Elect Mods		
Unjustified Level of Proc of NCMC-TW/AA Hardwar		-6.500
Weather Observation & Forecast Sys Cost Growth		-6.000
Deferred Procuremen		-2.500
Personal Security & Rescue Eq Items less than \$5A		
SCOT Life Support & Comm Tests	3.000	
Mechanized Material Handling Er		
Supply Asset Tracking Sys (SATS)	5.000	

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Mobility Equip		
Hel-Basket Technology	3.000	
Intel Production Activiti		-7.000
Selected Activities		-33.589
First Destination Program		
History of Underexecution		-2.500
TOTAL OPAF	79.400	-149.058
TOTAL AIR FORCE PROC	387.416	-759.197
Procurement Defensewide		
Major Equipment, OSC		
High Performance Computing Mod Proj	25.000	
Major Equipment, WHS		
IT Underexecution		-4.000
PAC-3 Accelerator	60.000	
DTRA Other Major Equipmen		
Hard Target Smart Fuze Schedule Sll		-1.300
DCMA Major Equipmen		
SPS Schedule Sll		-4.400
SOF Rotary Wing Upgrades		
160th SOAR Aclt Mods	2.500	
MC-130H Combat Talon II		
Production Reductor		-3.000
Advanced SEAL Delivery Sys (ASDS)		
GFE		-4.500
Transporter		-1.511
SOF CV-22 Mods		
Production Reductor		-10.000
SOF Ordnance Acquisitor		
Sniper Detection System	3.400	
SOF Comm Equipment & Electronics		
ANPRC-14B SOF Radios	3.000	
SOF Intel Sys		
Portable Intell Collection & Relay Capabil	1.300	
SOF Small Arms & Weapons		
Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher (Striker	2.500	
Jt BioDefense Program		
Production Delay:		-2.000
Individual Protector		
Domestic Production of C2A1 Canister:	1.000	
Classified Programs	32.000	
Collective Protector		
CBC Collective Protection Shelter:	5.000	
Indian Financing (GP)	8.000	
TOTAL PDW	147.700	-30.711
Nat'l Guard & Reserve Equipment		
Army Reserve Eq:		
UH-60 Blackhawk	87.000	
Laser Marksmanship Training Sys (BEAMHIT	8.000	
Miscellaneous Ec	10.000	
Navy Reserve Eq:		
Miscellaneous Ec	10.000	
Marine Corps Reserve Eq:		
Miscellaneous Ec	5.000	
Air Force Reserve Eq:		
C-130J	71.300	
Miscellaneous Ec	5.000	

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Army National Guard Eq:		
Bradley ODS	51.000	
Heavy Equip Transport Sys (HETS)	2.500	
Reserve Component Automation Sys (RCAS)	15.500	
Laser Marksmanship Training Sys (BEAMHIT)	8.500	
SINCGARS	14.000	
Engagement Skills Trainee	4.200	
HMMWV	17.500	
FHTV	17.500	
Multi-role Bridge Company:	15.700	
UH-80 Blackhawk	58.000	
Distance Learning	8.000	
Miscellaneous Ec	10.000	
Air National Guard Eq		
c-130J	161.021	
P-19 Truck Crash	3.500	
F-15 E-Kit Upgrades	11.000	
F-16 Block 42 Engine Upgrades	31.200	
Miscellaneous Ec	10.000	
TOTAL NGRE	640.421	0.000
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruc		
Program Reduction for Underexecutor		
O&M		-50.000
RDT&E		
Access Road at Tocele Depo	1.000	
Emergency Access and Evacuation Infrastructure	1.000	
TOTAL CHEM AGENTS & MUN DEST	2.000	-50.000
Defense Production Act		
Program Reduction		
		-10.000
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT TOTAL	0.000	-10.000
TOTAL PROC	1036.755	-245.210
Revolving & Management Funds:		
National Defense Sealift Fund!		
Fund MARARD in CJS Appn		-99.000
Additional Sealift Capacity	25.000	
Defense Working Capital Fund:		
Reduction		839.000
utilities--		-7.100
TOTAL REV & MGT FUNDS	25.000	-745.100

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RDT&E, Army		
Defense Research Science:		
Display Performance and Evaluation Projec	2,000	
Adv Target Recognition using Nanotechnology	1,000	
Perpetually Assailable & Secure Info Sys (PASIS)	3,800	
Scientific Problems w/ Military Application:		-1,631
Cold Weather Sensor Performe	1,000	
Optical Technologies:	1,000	
University & Industrial Res Centers:		
Ctr for Optical Manufacturing--Adv Optics Proc	1,500	1
Global Information Porta	1,000	
Thermal Fluid Design Toc	1,000	
Virtual Parts Research Eng Ctr	1,000	
Materials Technology:		
Advanced Materials Processing	3,000	
FCS Composites Research	2,500	
AAN Multifunctional Material:	1,500	
Sensors & Electronic Survivability:		
Passive Millimeter Wave Camer	2,100	
S3I Technology Projec	1,800	
Advanced Sensors and Obscurant:	2,500	
Aviation Technology:		
Funding for NASA Shortfal		-5,000
Missile Technology:		
Lowcost inertial Guidance Technolog	5,000	
Accelerate Dev & Testing for Tac Msie Com	3,000	
CKEM Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)	1,000	
MEMS/GPS IMU Integration	7,000	
Loitering Attack Munition for Aviation (LAM-A)	2,000	
Jet interdiction CFD Testbed	3,500	
Adv Weapons Technology:		
Miniature Detection Dev and Analysis Method	1,000	
Microelectro Mechanical System:	8,100	
Rapid Targeting Acq & Tracking Sys (RATS)	1,400	
Reduce Programmed Growth		-6,000
HELSTF Solid State Heat Capacit	3,500	
Modeling & Simulation Technolog:		
STRICOM--Online Contract Document Mg	1,000	
Photonics	2,500	
Modeling, Sim & Trng Infrast & Community De	4,500	
3 Dimensional Ultra Sound Imagin	3,000	
Combat Vehicle & Automotive Technolog:		
Hybrid Electric HMMVW Field Eval & Tech Insertor	3,000	
Combat Truck Initiative (COMBATT)	14,000	
Combat Vehicle Transportation Tech Pro	1,000	
Integration of Army Interactive Device w/ Onboard CPU	1,700	
Automotive Research Cente	2,000	
Advanced Virtual Environment:	1,400	
Smart Truck initiative	3,400	
Hydrogen PEM Fuel Cell Heavy Duty Veh Dem	5,000	
Chemical, Smoke, & Eq Defeating Tech:		
Thermobaric Warhead De	1,000	
Army Center of Excellence in Biotechnolog	2,000	
Weapons & Munitions Technolog:		
Single Crystal Tungsten Aiooe Penetrator	2,000	
Cooperative Energetics Initiativ	3,500	
Corrosion Measurement and Contrc	4,300	
Future Combat Sys Propellant & Survivabilit	2,800	
	5,200	
Light Armament Technol (LAV) 30mm Piercing Amm	3,400	
Multiple Explosively-formed Penetrator	1,000	
Smart Coatings	1,000	
COE Acoustics	3,500	
Armament Systems Network IACtr	3,400	

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Electronics and Electronic Devices:		
Improved High Rate Alkaline Cell	1,800	
LoCost Reusable Alkaline Mang-Zinc Tec	800	
Rechargeable Cylindrical Cell	1,500	
Logistics Fuel Reformer Technoioq	1,000	
Explosives:		
Cylindrical Zinc Air Battery for Land Warrior Sy:	1,800	
Electronic Display Research	9,000	
Fuel Cell Power Syr	2,500	
TOWITASCylindrical BatteryReplacemen	1,500	
Heat Actuated Cooler:	1,000	
Night Vision Technology:		
Visual Band Detector imaging Ted	2,800	
Countermine Systems		
Acoustic Mine Detector	2,000	
Integrated Countermine Testbed & Trng Prc	1,400	
Standoff Mine Detector	2,000	
Landmine Detection Tech/Seismic Energ	1,000	
Human Factors/Engineering Tech		
Medical Errors Reduction ntes (Med Teams	2,500	
Soldier Centered Design Tools for Transformatio	1,000	
Environmental Quality Technology:		
Range Safe Tech Demo initiative	4,300	
Excessive Growth: Environmental Restoration Tec		-1,150
Waste Minimization & Pollution Researd	2,000	
Molecular & Computational Risk Assessment (MACEHAC	1,400	
Transportable Decontamination Chambe	6,000	
Duplicative Technology Researd		-5,000
Computer & Software Technology		
Duplication of Other DoD Program!		-2,000
Military Engineering Technology		
University Partnering for Ops Support	3,400	
Climate Change Fuel Cell Proj	3,500	
DoD Fuel Cell Test & Eval Ct	5,100	
Ft. Meade Fuel Cell Demk	2,500	
Center for Geoscience:	1,500	
Cold Regions Military Engineerin!	1,000	
Manpower/Personnel/Training Tech		
Excessive Growth: Studies		-1,000
Warfighter Technology		
Combat Ready Food Safet	1,700	
Airbeam Manufacturing Process	1,000	
Ctr for Reliable Wireless Communication:	1,000	
Standoff Precision Aerial Delivery Sy	2,000	
Army Nutrition Program	1,000	
Medical Technology		
Dye Targeted Laser Fusior	3,400	
Emergency Hypothermia for Adv Combat Casualt	2,800	
Center for innovative Minimally invasive Therap	5,000	
Diabetes Project (U of Pittsburgh):	5,100	
Medical Area Network for Virtual Tecl	8,000	
Osteoporosis Research	2,800	
Speech Capable Personal Digital Ass -	1,000	
Center for international Rehabilitatio	1,400	
Dermal Phase Meter	800	
Minimally invasive Surgery Simulatc	1,400	
Arthropod-borne infectious Disease Contrc	2,500	
VTC Lung Scan	3,200	
Tissue Engineering Research	4,700	
Monoclonal Anti-body Based Tech (Heteropolymer Sy:	3,000	
Operating Room of the Futun	2,500	
Dual Use Science and Technology:		
Manufacturing RDE Ctr for Nonotechnology	3,500	

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Warfighter Advanced Technology		
Metrology	1,000	
Pneumatic Muscle Soft Landing Tect	1,000	
Force Projection Logistics		-2,500
Portable Cooling Sys Dev	1,000	
Embedded Training Sys		-5,000
Personal Navigation of the Future Warfighter	2,500	
Biosystems Technology	4,300	
Medical Adv Technology		
SOF Medical Diagnostic Sys		
Volumetrically Controlled Manufacturing (Artificial Hip)	3,500	
Diabetes Project (Joslin)	4,200	
Gallo Alcoholism Research	5,600	
Life Support for Trauma & Transport (LSTAT)	2,500	
Center For Prostate Disease Res-WRAMC	6,400	
Biosensor Research	2,500	
Blood Safety	6,800	
SEATreat Cancer Tect	1,700	
Disaster Relief & Emerg Medical Serv (DREAMS)	8,000	
Molecular Genetics & Musculoskeletal Res Pro	9,000	
National Medical Testbed	7,700	
Neurofibromatosis Research	21,000	
Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Prog (NETRF)	17,000	
Polynitroxylated Hemoglobin	1,000	
Synchrotron Based Scanning Research	8,500	
Secure Telemedicine Tech Proj	2,000	
Adv Diagnostics & Therapeutic Tect	1,300	
Biology, Ed, Screening, Chemoprevention & Treatment (BESCT) Lung Cancer Res Pr	3,500	
Brain Biology and Machine	1,800	
Cancer Ctr of Excellence (Notre Dame)	2,100	
Ctr for Integ of Med & Innovative Tech--Computer Assisted Minimally Invasive Surge	8,500	
Ctr for Untethered Health Care at Worcester Polytechnic Institute	1,000	
Continuous Expert Care Network Network Telemedicine Pr	1,500	
Fragile X	1,000	
Hemoglobin Based Oxygen Carrier	1,000	
Hepatitis C	3,400	
Jt US-Norwegian Telemedicine	1,400	
Memorial Hermann Telemedicine Pr	1,000	
Monoclonal Antibodies: Mass Biological Lab	1,000	
Emergency Telemedicine Response & Adv Tech Pro	1,500	
Retinal Scanning Display Tect	1,500	
Saccadic Fatigue Measurement	1,000	
Smart Aortic Arch Catheter	1,000	
Veterans Collaborative Care Model Pro	1,700	
Joint Diabetes Program	5,000	
Spine Research at WRAMC	2,100	
Trauma Research Center	2,100	
Medical Simulation Training Initiav	.750	
Laser Vision Correction (Walter Reed)	3,000	
National Tissue Engineering Center	2,000	
Aviation Advanced Technology		
Program Decrease		-8,000
Airborne Manned/Unmanned Sys Tech (AMUST) Wideband RF Network	1,500	
Turbo Shaft Engine in UAVs	3,500	
Program Delays/Execution		-3,000
Weap & Munitions Adv Tect		
SMAW-D Engineering Dev	2,500	
Low Cost Course Correction Tect	3,500	

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Combat Veh & Automotive Adv Tech		
Mobile Parts Hospital Tech (MPHT)	5.600	
Nat'l Autom Ctr Standardized Exchange of Product Dat	2.500	
Imp Materials & Power Train Arch for 21st Cent Trucks (IMPACT)	3.600	
Aluminum Reinforced Metal Matrix Composites for Track Shoe	2.500	- - - - -
Combat Vehicle Res--Weight Reductor	6.000	
electrochromatic Glass for Combat Vet	1.700	- - -
Fuel Catalyst Research Evaluation	.500	
Movement Tracking Sys (MTS) for Family of Heavy Tac Ve	2.500	
Up-Armored HMWWV	2.100	
TACOM Hybrid Vehicle Demonstration, Lithium Ion Elec	1.000	
Composite Body Parts	1.400	
Corrosion Prevention & Control Program	1.400	
Vehicle Body Armor Support Sys	3.300	
C3 Advanced Technology		
Battlefield Ordnance Awareness	2.800	
Excessive Growth: F i e l d i n g Demc		-4.000
Network Environment for C3 Mobile Service	2.600	
EW Technology		
Shortstop	6.000	
Multifunctional Intell & Remote Signal Senc	4.700	
Missile & Rocket Adv Tech		
Missile Simulation Tool	7.000	
Missile Recycling Program (Transition to Anniston)	2.500	
Standoff NATO Int'l Precision Enhanced Rocket (SNIPER) Laser Guidance for 27:	1.500	
Volumetrically Controlled Manufacturing (VCM) Composites Tech	2.500	
Wide Bandwidth Tech	3.000	
Landmine Warfare & Barrier Adv Tech		
Advanced Demining Technology	2.800	
Jt Service Small Arms Program		
Program Delays/Execution		-1.400
Night Vision Advanced Technology		
Helmet Mounted Infrared Sensor!	1.200	
Backpack UAV for Bde Combat Tests (BUSTER)	5.000	
Night Vision Fusion Technology	3.000	
Through Wall Radar	3.500	
Environmental Quality Technology		
Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) Fuel Cell Dem	3.500	
Program Delays/Execution		-1.000
Adv Tactical Computer Science & Senso		
Excessive Growth: GCSS Demc		-2.000
Army Missile Def Sys Integ DEMVAL		
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)	13.000	
Family of System Simulators (FOSSIM)	2.600	- - -
Low Cost Interceptot --	7.000	
Super Cluster Distributed Memory Tech	2.000	
Thermionic Technology	1.500	
Enhanced SCRAMJET Mixing	1.400	
Eagle Eyes	2.100	
Debris		
Advanced Warfare Environment (AWarE)	1.000	
Range Safety-Kodiak	6.100	
Cooperative Micro-Satellite Experimer	4.000	
Space Technology Developer	2.100	
Safety Support/Deconfliction (Kodiak)	10.000	
Landmine Warfare & Barrier Adv Dev		
Program Delays/Execution		-2.005
Plants Detecting Landmine:	.400	
Tank & Medium Caliber Ammunition		
XM-1007 (TERM-KE)		
Program Decrease	14.500	-2.966
GPS Interference Suppressor	1.000	- - -
TERM TM3	7.000	
Night Vision Systems Adv Dev		
Program Decrease		-4.000

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Environmental Quality Tech Dem/Va		
PEPS at Anniston Arsenal	6.000	
Managing Army Tech Environmental Enhancement Pro	1.000	
Commercializing Dual Use Technologies	5.800	
Environmental Cleanup Dem	2.500	
Ft. Ord Cleanup Demo Projec	2.000	
Tech Dev for Unexploded Ordnance	3.400	
Vanadium Tech Program	1.300	
Casting Emission Reduction Program(CERP)	5.800	
Warfighter Info Network-Tac-DEMVAL		
Program Decrease		-2.500
NATO R&D		
Unjustified Program Growth		-2.200
Aviation Advanced Dev		
Virtual Cockpit Optimization Prog (VCOP)	4.200	
Weapons & Munitions Adv Dev		
Precision Guided Mortar Munition	2.800	
Logistics & Engineer Equip Adv Dev		
Program Delays/Execution		-1.000
Medical Systems Adv Dev		
IMED Tools Rural Mobile Communications Platform	1.000	
Future Medical Center	3.500	
SCAMP block II Dem/Va		
AEHF Schedule Slip		-3.000
Aircraft Avionics		
Airborne Separation Video Sys (ASVS)	1.100	
Schedule Slip/Execution		-7.300
EW Development		
Adv Threat IR Countermeasures/Common Misic Warning Sys (ATIRCM/CMWE)	2.000	
Delays/Execution		-5.000
Jt Tactical Radio		
Program Delays/Execution		-5.000
All Source Analysis Sys (ASAS)		
ASAS-Light	1.000	
Intelligence Analysis Adv Tool Set	1.400	
Javelin		
Preplanned Product Improvement	2.500	
Tac Unmanned Ground Vehicle		
Viking Platform Engineering Analysis	1.500	
Night Vision Systems Eng Dev		
Avenger Upgrade of 1st Generation FLIF	3.400	
Non System Training Devices		
Camp Dawson Simulator	2.800	
Air Defense C2I Adv Dev		
Air Defense Alerting Device(ADAD)	1.200	
Excessive Growth		-2.200
Automatic Test Eq Dev		
Integrated Family of Test Equipment	1.700	
Distributive Interactive Simulations Eng Dev		
Program Testing Delay		-4.900
Tactical Surveillance Sys Eng Dev		
TES Program Delays/Execution		-8.000
Aviation Eng Dev		
S Cockpit Airbag y	1.800	
Weapons & Munitions Eng Dev		
Small Arms Fire Control System	1.000	
Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS)	3.400	
M795E1 115mm Extended Range, High Explosive Base Burnt	1.500	
Shoulder Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon	4.300	
Logistics & Engineer Equip Eng Dev		
Intelligent Power Mgt for Shelters & Vel	4.500	
Program Delays/Execution		-5.600
C3 Sys--Eng Dev		
Applied Communications & Information Networking Pro	7.000	
Excessive Growth		-10.000
Medical, Materiel/Medical Bio Def Ec		
Cartledge infuser PE0604807A-832	1.000	

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Landmine Warfare/Barrier Eng Dev		
Reduce Program Growth		-20.000
Artillery Munitions EMC		
Trajectory Correctable Munitions (TCM) SADARM Eng Dev	3.500	
Reduce Programmed Growth		-6.938
Army Tac Commd & Control Hardware & Software		
Next Generation Command & Control Sy	6.600	
Information Technology Op m e n		
Jt Computer Aided Acq & Logistics Supp	10.200	
Electronic Commodity Pilot	1.000	
Threat Simulator Development		
Next Generation Anti-Tank Guided Missil	1.000	
Adv Cognitive Reasoning Ted	1.000	
RF/SAM Threat Simulator	1.000	
Concepts Experimentation Program		
MANPRINT Analysis	1.000	
Program Decrease		-10.000
Battlelab Cooperative & Collaborative Re	4.200	
Battle Lab at Ft. Knox	3.500	
Army Tech Test Instrumentation & Target!		
Adv Comp Eng Simulator (ACES) & Msle Planning Tool	.750	
Survivability Analysis:		
Info Operations/Vulnerability & Surv Analysis	7.000	
High Energy Laser Test Fac (HELSTF)		
Solid State Laser	4.300	
Infrastructure & Mobile Diagnostia		
Lethality, Propagation, & Susceptilit	1.500	
Military Utility Analysis:		
Support of Operational Testng		
MATTRACKS	2.500	
Army Evaluation Center		
Live Fire Test of Starstreak & Block I Stinger	13.500	
Programwide Activities		
Program Decrease		-9.000
Technical Information Activities		
High Performance Computing Ct	10.500	
Excessive Growth		-5.000
Munitions Standardization, Effectiveness, & Safety		
Cyrofracture Anti-Personnel Mine Disposal Sy	2.600	
Public Private Partnering Initiative	10.500	
Plasma Ordnance Demilitarization Sys (PODS)	1.500	
MLRS Product Improvement Prop		
Excessive Growth		-11.000
Aerostat Joint Project Office		
Lightweight X-Band Radar Antenni	2.000	
Domestic Preparedness Against WM I		
National Terrorism Preparedness Ins	2.600	
Combat Veh Imp Programs		
Combat Vehicle Improvement Program	2.000	
ACE Execution Delay:		-32.461
Abrams Legacy Fleet Sidecar/Embedded Diagnostic	1.400	
Composite Tract Improvement	1.400	
Aircraft Mods/Product Imp Prog		
Guardrail/Aerial Common Sensor Termination of JSAF/LBS		-11.200
Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics System	14.000	
Aircraft Engine Component Imp Prog		
Variable Displacement Vane Pump & Lola Boost Pum	1.000	
Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC)	1.000	
Digitization		
Testing Digital Intel Situation Mapboard	1.000	
University XXI Effort--Digitization at Ft Hook	2.000	
Rapid ACQ Prog for Transformator		
Reduction		-6.000
Missile/Air Defense Product Imp Program		
Patriot Ground SLEF	5.300	
Other Missile Product Improvement Program:		
Program Decrease		-16.000

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Tractor Card		
Transfer from Missile Proc, Army		5.000
Special Army Program		
ERADS	2.000	
Security and Intelligence Activities		
INSOCM Information Dominance Center	2.000	
SATCOM Ground Environment (Space)		
STAR-T Terminator		-3.000
Information Systems Security Program		
Biometrics	5.100	
Global Combat Support System		
Program Delays/Execution		-9.000
Airborne Reconnaissance System		
Hyperspectral Long Wave Image	4.200	
End Item Ind Preparedness Activities		
Munitions Manufacturing Technology	11.200	
Total Integration Munitions Engineering (TIME)	7.000	
Continuous Manufacturing Tech for Metal Matrix Composite	2.600	
Laser Peening Tech for Acdt & Ground Eq	1.000	
Rechargeable Bipolar Wafer Cell NiMH Battery for SINCGAR	1.000	
Femtosecond Laser	4.200	
Force Provider Microwave Wastewater Treatment	1.400	
MANTECH Prog for Cylindrical Zinc Batteries	1.800	
Modular Extendable Rigid Wall Shelter	2.600	
NATO Joint Stars		-2.109
General Reductor		-5.000
TOTAL ARMY RDT&E	853.400	-261.073
RDT&E, Navy		
Defense Research Sciences		
Southeast Atlantic Coastal Observing Sys (SEA-COOS)	4.000	
Marine Mammal Low Frequency Sound Research	1.000	
Reduce Program Growth		-3.500
Quantum Optics Research	.500	
Power Projection Applied Research		
Integrated Bio & Chem Warfare Def Tech Platform	2.500	
Real World Based Immersive Imaging	1.250	
Hybrid Fiber Optic/Wireless Sys for Secure Comm	1.400	
SAR for All Weather Targeting	3.000	
Interrogator for High-Speed Retro-Reflect	4.200	
Combustion Light Gas Gun	3.500	
Fast Pattern Processor, SLAM-EF	2.000	
Force Protection Applied Research		
Modular Enhanced Hull Form	1.500	
Center for Adv Transportation Tech	3.600	
3 Dimensional Printing Metal Working Tech	2.500	
Battery Charging Tech	.865	
Fusion of Hyperspectral & Panchromatic Data	4.500	
Endeavor	1.000	
American Underpressure System	1.000	
Common Picture Applied Research		
Authorization Reductor		-1.912
Battlespace Information Display Tech	2.100	
Common Sensor Module	2.000	
Tactical Component Network/PMRF	35.500	
Theater Undersea Warfare Initiative	4.300	
Human Systems Technology		
Maritime Fire Training/Barbers Point	2.600	

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Materials, Elect, & Computer Tech	
Silicon Carbide Semiconductor Mater	1,400
ADPICAS	1,300
Carbon Foam for Navy Application:	2,800
Anti-corrosion Coatings	3,500
High Brightness Electron Source Proj	1,500
Development of Magnetic Random Access Memor	1,000
Thick Film Ferrite Magnetic Materials for Microwave Applications	1,000
Materials Micronization Technolog	3,500
MicroArray Technolog	3,500
Materials, Electronics, & Computer Tech	19,300
Warfighter Sustainment Applied Re	
Formable Aligned Carbon Thermo Sets (FACTS	1,500
Modeling, Simulation & Training Immersion Facilit	1,000
Virtual Company Distributed Manufacturing	1,100
Combinatorial Materials Synthesi	2,100
Wood Composite Technolog	2,100
Rhode Island Disaster Initiati	1,500
Marine Mammal Research	1,110
Advanced Fuel Additive Pilc	1,700
Automotive Diode Array Manufacturin	2,600
Battlespace Information Display Tec	3,400
Printed Wiring Boards	1,700
Bioenvironmental Hazards Res proj	1,000
Advanced Materials & Intelligent Processin	1,500
Titanium Matrix Composites Proj	2,600
Visualization of Technical informatio	1,700
Wire Chaffing Detection Technolog	1,400
AgileVaccinolog	8,500
Advanced Safety Tether Operatio	1,000
RF Systems Applied Research	
Nanoscale Devices (Wide Bandgap Materials	1,000
Nanoscience & Technolog	1,500
Maritime Synthetic Range	4,300
Ocean Warfighting Environment Applied Re	
Bioluminescence Truth Data Measurement & Signature Detectio	1,000
South Florida Ocean Measurement Ci	1,750
Multiple Intelligent Distrib Underwater Veh & Sensing Tec	3,000
Littoral Acoustic Demo Ctr(LADC)	1,000
Oceanographic Sensors for Mine Countermeasure	5,100
Undersea Warfare Weaponry Technolog	
SAUVIM	1,700
Dual Use Science & Technology Proj	
Energy & Environmental Technolog	2,600
Power Projection Advanced Tech	
Affordable Weapon Sys	7,000
Airt Lightening Protection Applique Sys	1,500
Variable Delivery Pump/Variable Engine Nou	1,500
DP-2 Thrust Vectoring Sys	5,800
HEL--Low Aspect Target Tracking Sys	8,400
Thermobaric Warhead Developmen	2,100
Magdalena Ridge Observator	8,400
integrated Hypersonic Aeromechanics Tool Prog (IHAT)	2,700
Vectored Thrust Ducted Propellio	3,400
Precision Strike Navigato	1,800

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	ADD	CUT
Force Projection Adv Tech		
Littoral Support Craft-Experimentz	16,200	
Advanced Water Jet AWJ-21	3,500	
DC Homopolar Motor Proc	2,000	
Curved Plate Technology	2,500	
Project M	2,800	
(Impact Mitigation MK V Patrol Craft		
Smartlink System	1,500	
Real Time Fire & Smoke Prediction Tox	1,000	
Wireless Sensors for Total Ship Monitoring	2,800	
Knowledge Projection for Fleet Mair	2,500	
AC Synchronous Propulsion Moto	4,000	
Wave Powered Electric Power Generating Sy	2,000	
SES 2000 Modification (HYSWAC)	7,300	
Common Picture Adv Tech		
National Cargo Tracking Proj	1,700	
Warfighter Sustainment Adv Tech		
Program Decrease		-2,500
Low Volume Production Program	3,500	
Nat'l Ctr for Remanufacturing & Resource Recover	1,000	
COTS Carbon Fiber Qualification Proj	1,000	
Distance Learning IT Cente	12,800	
RF Systems Adv Tech		
M3CAS	4,300	
Surface Ship & Sub HM&E Adv Tech		
Ship Service Fuel Cel	2,000	
DDG-51 Composite Twisted Rudde	1,000	
MC Advanced Tech Demo (ATD)		
C3RP	1,300	
Mobile Counter-Fire System	2,500	
Marine Corps Future Logistics	1,700	
Fast Refueling Sys	1,700	
Project Albert	4,000	
Medical Development		
National Bone Marrow Program	28,900	
Teleradiology	1,000	
Medical Readiness Telemedicine Initiativ	7,700	
Rural Health	6,800	
Vectored Vaccine Research	1,000	
Optical Sensing Sys: Robot Eyes	2,500	
Nursing Telehealth Application	2,600	
Mobile Integrated Diagnostic & Data Analysis Sy	1,000	
Minimally Invasive Surgical Tech Institut	1,000	
Biomedical Research Imaging Con	4,000	
Portable Production of Sterile Water for Intravenous Solution	1,000	
Community Hospital Telehealth Consortiur	1,500	
Joint Experimentation		
Program Growth Reductior		-15,000
Warfighter Protection Adv Tech		
Organ Transfer Technology	2,000	
Damage Control Operational Concept	1,700	
Distrib Sim, Warfighting Concepts to Future Weap Sys Design (WARCON)	5,100	
Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assis	2,200	
Manpower, Pers. & Trng Adv Dev Tech		
RIT Ctr for Integrated Manufacturing	2,000	
Environmental Quality & Log Adv Tech		
Sustainable Readiness Cente	1,400	
Undersea Warfare Adv Tech		
Magnetorestrictive Transductor	2,100	
Multi Pulse Airgun Sys	1,300	
Mine & Expeditionary Warfare Adv Tech		
Ocean Modeling	1,500	
Aviation Survivability		
Modular Helmet & Display De	2,000	
JPALS	1,500	
2 Color Focal Plane Array for Tac Acft Missile Warning	4,300	
Deployable Joint Command & Contro		
Program Reductior		-50,000

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ASW Systems Development		
Project Beartrap	2.000	
Surf & Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures		
UUV Center of Excellence at NUWC	6.100	
Surface Ship Torpedo Defense		
Anti-torpedo All Up Round	2.700	
Distributed Engineering Ctr	400	
On board Sensors and Signal Processing	7.600	
Associated Component	1.700	
Microelectromechanical System:	1.500	
Shipboard Sys Component Dev		
Automated Maintenance Environment	3.400	
MTTC National Service Treat	6.000	
SSGN Conversion		
Accelerate Design Effort to Convert 4 Boat:	45.006	
Adv Submarine Sys Dev		
Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sonar (CAVES)	2.100	
Adv Composite Sail Phase I	4.000	
MK 48 ADCAP Improvements	8.500	
Submarine Tactical Warfare Systems		
Multi Line Towed Array	4.660	
Ship Concept Advanced Design		
Small Combatant Craft	8.400	
Sealion Tech Dem	1.000	
Metallic Materials Adv Dev & Certification	3.400	
Document Automation of ICAS Maint & Other Navy Procedure sin XML Format	2.600	
Planning & Design LHD-type Ship	3.500	
Advanced Nuclear Power Sys		
Program		-2.100
Combat Systems Integration		
Common Command and Decision Sy:	17.066	
Optically Multiplexed Wideband Radar Beamformer (WOMBAT)	2.660	
Conventional Munition:		
Navy Insensitive Munition:	2.500	
MC Ground Combat/Support Sys		
Nanoparticles for Neutralization of Facility Threat	1.400	
Nonlethal & Urban Ops Weaponization Tech	1.000	
Nanotechnology-based Response to Chem/Bio Threat	1.500	
Imaging System Upgrade Developer	6.000	
Urban Operations Lat	2.800	
Cooperative Engagement		
Enhanced Comm & Network Capacity Expansio	12.750	
Next Generation Reduced Size CEC E	11.900	
Baseline 2.1 B Support	5.950	
Multilevel Security for CEC	1.500	
Environmental Protector		
Naval Environmental Compliance Ops Monitorin	2.000	
Navy Energy Program		
Stationary Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) Fuel Cell	2.000	
Navy Logistic Productivity		
Rapid Retargeting of Electronic Circuit:	4.300	
Compatible Processor Upgrade Prog (CPUP)	2.500	
JEDMICS Enhancements	4.900	
JEDMICS Security	1.700	
Collaborative Log Productivity Virtual Sys Implementation Pr	6.800	
Retract Maple		
Classified Programs	8.660	
Ship Self Defense-DemVa		
Transportable Anti-Intrusion Pontoon Barrier Sys	1.000	
Special Processes	6.800	

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Land Attack Technology		
Naval Fires Network Demonst & Tac Dissem Modul	18.000	
Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM)		-25.000
Tactical Dissemination Modulr	8.500	
Shipboard Training Software Application	3.000	
Advanced Medium Caliber Gun Demonstratc	2.800	
Autonomous Naval Support Round	10.200	
Integrated DeEP Water Sys	2.100	
Nonlethal Weapons DEMVAI		
New Generation Nontheal Weapon	1.400	
Space & Elect Warfare Architect/Enginr		
Collaborative Integrated Info Tech Initiativ	1.400	
IT-21 Block 1 C4ISR Computing Eq Upgradr	6.000	
Other Helo Development		
Laser Aim Scoring System (LASS)	1.000	
Hi Tech Tmg in Support of DoD Legacy Parts Solutio	1.000	
H-60 FLIR Mount	2.800	
H-60 Helo Dynamic Component Life Cycle Eng Evr	2.800	
MH-60S Airborne Mine Countermeasure Carriage, Stram, Tow, Recov Sys (CSTARS)	5.100	
Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic	7.000	
Standards Development		
Joint Services Metrology Program	3.250	
Navy Area Missile Defense		
Reduction		-286.496
V-22		
Program Decrease		-100.000
Air Crew Systems Dev		
Jt Helmet Mounted Cueing Sys (JHMCS)	2.500	
SIIS Ejection Sys	1.000	
Intensifier Tube Advanced Developmer	4.300	
EW Dev		
Integ Defensive Electronic Countermeasurers (IDECV)	2.500	
LOCO GPSI	3.800	
SC-21 Total Ship System Engineering		
Power Node Control Program	2.750	
DD-21 Program Restructure		-125.000
Regional Electric Power Tech, Integration & Leveraging Enterprises (REPTILE)	3.000	
Aluminum Mesh Tank Line	1.500	
Surface Combatant Combat Sys Eng		
AEGIS Operational Readiness Training Sys (ORTS)	4.000	
Aegis Peripheral Consolidatio	6.500	
Aegis Tactical Display Upgradr	7.000	
Traveling Wave Tube Circui	1.000	
Navy Area Theater	5.000	
Standard Missile Improvement	12.800	
Airborne MCM		
Remote Tech Assist Program (RTAS)	2.800	
AQS-20 Sonar Data Recording Capabilit	2.500	
CH-60S Untethered Airborne Mine Neutralization Sy	4.300	
SSN-688 and Trident Modernizator		
Multipurpose Processor (MPP)	21.500	
Shipboard Avlation Systems		
Aviatin Shipboard Info Tech Inifativ	1.750	
New Design SSN		
Virginia Class SSN Combat Sys Tech Insertion/Refresh SBIRBas	4.900	
Submarine Tactical Warfare Sys		
Submarine Combat Sys Modernization Pro	10.000	
Ship Contract Design/Live Fire T&E		
Titanium Watertight Door and Hatch Cove	1.000	
Navy Tactical Computer Resources		
AN/UJYQ-70 Common Electronic Eq Replacemer	6.800	
AN/UJYQ-70 Tactical Computer Resource	21.000	
Multi-level Security for Newtworkcentric AN/UJYQ-70	3.400	
Complementary High Energy Laser/Missile for Shelf-Defens		
Unguided conventional Air-Launched Weapon	6.000	
Light Defender Precision Strike Missil	4.300	

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Ship Self Defense-EMC		
NULKA Decoy Developmen	2.800	
AIEWS SBIR Phase Iii Follow-or	2.100	
SEA RAM Sys Ordalt Upgrade	1.400	
Phalanx CIWS SEA RAM OrdAlt	5.600	
Medical Development EMC		
Voice Interactive Device	6.000	
Coastal Cancel	3.500	
Dental Research	2.800	
High Resolution Digital Mammograph	1.500	
Sonaran Earcom Technology	.500	
Naval Blood Research Lab	1.000	
Navy Medical Research Ctr Exposure Treatment	2.500	
Distributed Surveillance System		
Adv Deploy Sys Imp	4.000	0 0
Cable Burial Capabilit	4.000	
Joint Strike Fighter EMC		
Alternative Engine Program	2.500	
Information Technology Dev		
SPAWAR ITC Enterprise Mgt	4.500	
Defense Software Productivity Initiative	2.600	
Secure Interactive Distributed Learning (SIDL)	1.060	
Total Fleet Support Sys	2.600	
Major T&E Investment		
Test & Eval Range & Airbone Telemetry Sys	1.700	
Flight Operaton Safety at Patuxent River	1.000	
Studies & Analysis Support		
Program Decrease		-2.000
Technical Information Services		
Supply Chain Best Practices	2.000	
Commercialization of Adv Tech	5.100	
Lean Pathways Project Expansion & Distance Learning	2.200	
Mgt, Tech, & International Support		
Program Decrease		-3.000
T&E Support		
Program Decrease		-3.000
Safety & Survivability Study of Protective Purmice Tec	2.200	
Collaborative Virtual Interactive Design Environment	1.700	
SEW Surveillance/Recon Support		
Time Critical Strike Projects	1.000	
Limited Demo of Radiant Argon on F/A-18	2.600	
MC Program Wide Support		
CIBRF	3.000	
Nanoparticle Responses to Chem Bio Threat	1.000	
ChemBio Multi-Sensor Analyzer/Detect	1.700	
Consequence Mgt interoperability Service	5.000	
Tactical Cryptologic Activities		
Defense Cryptologic Program		85.000
Foreign Counter-Intel (FCI)	1.600	
Strategic Sub & Weapon Sys Support		
Radiation Hardened Electronics Applications Pro	2.500	
F/A-18 Squadrons		
SHARP Pods	6.000	
Fleet Telecommunications (Tactical)		
Programmable Integrated Computer Terminal	3.400	
Integrated Surveillance Sys		
Web Centric Warfare (WeCAN) Tech	6.000	
USS Mission Planning Sys	6.600	
Fixed Distributive System	3.000	
SURTASS/LFA	2.800	
Amphibious Tactical Support Unit		
Supporting Arms Technology Insertion	2.500	
Consolidated Training Sys Dev		
SEAT Battleforce Tactical Training	1.000	
Tac Comm On-Board Trainer for Battle Force Tac Trn	1.000	
Link On Board Trainer	1.000	
EW Readiness Support		
CDL-N Modernization	2.500	

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HARM Improvement		
Adv Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)	14.700	
Aviation Improvement:		
Acft AGE Exploration Model Dev	2.500	
Nano-Composite Hard Coat for Acft Coating	1.400	
Navy Science Assistance Program		
LASH	5.100	
LASH ASW	4.300	
Littoral/Mine Countermeasure Rapid Respons	4.300	
F-14 Upgrade		
Demonstrate SAR Poc	1.500	
MC Communications Systems		
Combined arms Commd & Control Tmq Upg (CACTUS)	5.100	
Surface Warfare Ctr--Balloon Upgrade for Sonobuoy	1.100	
AN/TPS-59(v)3SLEP Slotted Waveguide Antenn	6.000	
Mobile Electronic Warfare Support Sys (MEWSS)	3.600	
MC Grnd Combat/Supporting Arms Syst		
Lightweight 155MM Howitze		-5.000
ISSP		
Intelligent Agent Security Moduli	2.500	
Navy Meteorological & Ocean Sensors Space		
Programs		-1.000
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle --		
Maritime Patrol & Reconnaissance Study (MPR)	5.000	
Jt Operational Test Bed for UAVs (Upgrades to Gov't Flight Activity)	2.000	
Airborne Reconnaissance System		
Hyperspectral Modular Airborne Recon Sy	2.600	
EP-3 Upgrade/Weight Reduction Study	2.500	
(Precision Strike)	5.000	
C NLR e	1.700	
Manned Reconnaissance System!		
Advanced Multiband Receiver Surveillance Sys (AMOSS)	4.000	
Distributed Common Ground Sya		
PC Diftal Imagery Workstation Suite (DIWS)	2.600	
Naval Space Surveillance Space Activitie		
Excessive Program Growth		-1.000
SPAWAR Convert Comm & Infor Transfer (CITT)	1.700	
Modeling & Simulation Suppor		
SPAWAR Modeling & Simulation Initiativ	4.900	
Industrial Preparedness		
General Increase	2.500	
Maritime Technology (MARITECH)		
High Speed Cargo Craf	4.000	
National Shipbuilding Research Prograr	2.500	
New Orleans Maritime Technology Ctr of Excellence	7.000	
Classified Programs	65.000	
General Reductor		-5.000
TOTAL NAVY RDT&E	1149.825	-719.500
RDT&E, Air Force		
Defense Research Science:		
Coal Based Adv Thermally Stable Jet Fuel	2.500	
Ctr for Solar Geophysical Interactions at Mt. Wilson Observator	.750	
Focused ion Beam Sye	1.300	
Center for Astronomical Adaptive Optic:	2.000	
Clafomia Science Cente	1.000	
Materials		
Carbon Foam Dev for Aircraft & Spacecraf	3.400	
Free Electron Laser	1.700	
Environmentally Sound Coating:	1.000	
Metals Affordability Initiativ	3.000	
Titanium Matrix Composite:	4.300	
Adv Silicon Carbide Crystal Device Tecl	6.000	
Durable Hybrid Coatings for Aircraft Ss	2.000	
Aerospace Vehicle Technologe:		
AFRL Tyndall	1.200	
Advanced Comprehensive Eng Simulator (ACES)	.750	
Human Effectiveness Applied Re:		

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Fatigue Countermeasure Research at Brooks AFI	1.100	
Rapid Detection of Bio WMA	1.700	
Aerospace Propulsion		
Magnetic Bearing Cooling Turbine Tec	3.000	
Lithium Ion Battery Aircraft, Spacecraft, & Handheld Application	1.000	
Lithium Ion Battery Technology for Solid State Laser	1.000	
PBO Membrane Fuel Cell	1.000	
Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Tec	7.100	
Pulse Detonation Engine	3.000	
Engineering Tool Improvement Pro	1.500	
Jet Engine Test Cell Upgrade	2.300	
AFRL Test Stands	10.700	
Aerospace Sensors		
Program Decrease		-7.000
Adverse Weather Ballistic Imaging	1.800	
Advanced FT-IR Gas Analysis	1.000	
Integration of Flexible Substance	1.200	
Space Technology		
Terabit	1.700	
Composite Cryogenic Fuel Tank	3.000	
Mixed Signal VLSI for Space Veh Comm Subsy	1.300	
HAARP Electromagnetic Wave Gradimete	1.700	
HAARP Incoherent Rada	2.800	
HAARPSpace Technology	8.500	
Satellite Simulation Tool K	1.800	
Directed Energy Technology		
Program Decrease		-3.000
Tactical Ops Sys Simulator	1.000	
Command Control & Communication		
PrDecrease		-3.000
Simulation Based Acq/Initiativ	3.900	
Info Hiding, Stenography & Digital Watermarking for Info Protect & Authent Sys	1.800	
Assured Communications	2.300	
Advanced Materials for Weapon Syr		
Handheld Holographic Radar Gui	1.000	
Ceramic Matrix Composites	2.800	
Materials Technologies for Aging Aircraft	2.100	
Advanced Aluminum Aerostructure	3.400	
Vapor Growth Carbon Fiber (VGCF)	1.000	
Metal Affordability Initiati	1.100	
Plasma Enhanced Chemical Deposition Technique	2.100	
Advanced Aerospace Sensor		
AdvPhysical Vapor Transpor	1.000	
Radar Target Modeling Thrus	7.400	
Flight Vehicle Technology		
E-Smart Chem/Bio Sensors	2.800	
AFRL Tyndal	1.800	
Aerospace Technology Dev/Demc		
Access-to-Se Jt Sys Prog Office	1.400	
Aeronautical Sys Ch	4.900	
Affordable Combat Sys Avionics Initiati	1.800	
3D Bias Woven Preforms	1.000	
Aerospace Propulsion & Power Tec		
Vectored Thrust Ducted Propelle	2.000	
Joint Expendable Turbine Engine (JETEC)	2.000	
HPRT	4.400	
Crew Sys, Pers, Protection, Tech		
Combat Automation Req Testber	1.000	
Head Mounted Technology	1.000	
Electronic Combat Technology		
IDAL C3NI	1.000	
CLIRCM	3.500	
Ballistic Missile Technology		
GPS Range Safety Demc	1.200	
Adv Spacecraft Technology		
Scorpius	6.000	
Next Generation Hybrid Orbital Maneuver Ve	1.000	
Maui Space Surveillance Sys (MSSS)		

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Program Increase	17.400	
PAN Stars	3.400	
Conventional Weapons Technolog		
Low Cost Autonomous Attack Sys (LOCAAS)	3.800	-1.000
Advanced Weapons Technolog		
Field Laser Radar Upgrade	8.500	
LaserSpark Countermeasure	1.500	
Program Decrease		-3.000
GLINT	7.000	
Sodium Wavelength Laser	1.700	
Manufacturing Analysis for Adv Tac Laser	1.700	
Aerospace Relay Mirror Sys	6.400	
C3I Advanced Development		
Adaptive Information Protection Tech	1.700	
Information Hiding, Steganography & Digital Watermarking for Info Protection	3.000	
Advanced EHF MILSSATCOM (Space)		
Delay in Start of EMC		-70.000
Integrated Broadcast Service		
Program Decrease		-3.000
ICBM DEMVAL		
Northern Edge Exercise	3.500	
Air Force/National Program Cooperation		
Program Decrease		-2.000
Pollution Prevention DemVal		
Program Decrease		-2.688
B-2		
EGBU-28 Integrator	17.000	
Link 16/CID/IFF	47.000	
Space-Based Radar EMC		-25.000
EW Development		
Precision & Location ID Prog (PLAID) for ALR-6	6.700	
Poor Executor		-5.000
Extended Range Cruise Missile (ERCM)		
Delays in Defining Program		-40.235
Small Diameter Bomb		-5.000
Space Based Infrared Sys (SBIRS) High		
SBIRS High End	40.000	
MILSTAR LOR/MDR Satellite Comr		
Satellite Planning & Information Networ	4.800	
Unjustified Growth in Satellite Engineerin		-4.500
Agile Combat Support		
Integrated Medical Info Technology Sy	8.500	
Rural Low Bandwidth Medical Collaboration Sy	1.000	
Life Support Systems		
ACES II Ejection Seat Digital Sequencer	1.500	
Panoramic Night Vision Goggle (PNVG) Dev	2.500	
LESPA	.700	
Integ Commd & Control Application		
NPLACE	2.000	
AF Product Line Engineering Activit	1.000	
AF Ctr for Acquisition & Enabling Tech	1.000	
ASSET eWing Program	2.600	
Intelligence Equip	500	
Evolved Expendable Launch Veh (EELV) (Space EMI)		
Excessive SPO and FFRDC Growth		-5.000
RDT&E for Aging Aircraft		
Aging Landing Gear Life Extension	10.500	
Aging Wing & Corrosion Treatment for Aging Act	7.000	
Aging Propulsion Systems Life Extension	2.000	
Aging Aircraft Knowledge Porta	2.000	
CV-22		
2 CV-22 EMD Test Articles	180.000	
Major T&E Investment		
MARIAH II Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Program	8.500	
Laser Induced Surface Imp (LISI)	1.000	
Holloman High Speed Test Track Upgrad	2.500	
Airborne Separation Video Sys (ASVS)	1.000	
Initial Operational T&E		

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	ADD	CUT
AFOTEC	4,500	
T&E Support		
Large Unoblig Balance:		5,000
Enhanced Flight Termination Sys:	1,000	
Rocket Systems Launch Prog (Space)		
Missile Tech Demo (MTD)-3E	4,000	
Ballistic Missile Range Safety Tech Prog	15,300	
General Skill Training		
Program Reductor		309
Region/Sector Op Contro, Ctr Modernizator	6,000	
Jt Expeditionary Force Experimen		
Program Decrease		20,000
A-10 Squadrons		
Precision Engagemen	2,500	
F-16 Squadrons		
Distributed Training Centers	4,300	
F-15E Squadrons		
Block Upgrade Program	7,000	
AF TENCAF		
GPS-Jammer Detection and Location Sys:	2,000	
Theater Battle Management C4		
Theater Battle Management Core Sys	1,000	
JSTARS		
Poor Prior Year Execution		4,000
USAF Modeling and Simulation:		
Synthetic Theater Ops Res Model (STORM)	1,000	
Intelligent Flight Control Sys Sim Re:	2,500	
Oklahoma City ALC Modeling & Simulatio	2,000	
Wargaming and Simulation Center:		
Theater Air Commd & Control Sim Facilit	3,000	
Mission Planning System:		
Powerscene	1,500	
Cobra Ball		
Advanced Airborne Senso	5,100	
Information Systems Security Prog		
Lighthouse Cyber Security Program	2,500	
Info Assurance for Enabling Tech	1,000	
Worldwide Info Security Environment (WISE)	9,100	
Global Combat Support Sys		
GCSS (Enterprise Data Warehouse)	4,100	
Selected Activities		20,000
NAVSTAR Global Positioning (Space & Control)		6,000
Spaceflight Range System		
Space Integration Master Plannin	1,800	
RSA	4,000	
Dragon U2 (JMIP)		
SYERS Polarization Projec	2,000	
Dual Data Link New Star		4,000
Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		
Demo at Berlin Air Show		4,500
Program Office Growth		4,000
Global Hawk Sensors	16,000	
Airborne Reconnaissance System:		
High Data Rate Laser Communication:	3,500	
Wideband Integrated Common Data Link	7,000	
Theater Airborne Recon Sys (TARS)	10,500	
Termination of JSAF		36,381
JSAF Program Office		4,600
Manned Reconnaissance System:		
Combat Sent Passive Airborne Rangin	2,000	
Distributed Common Ground Sys		
NCCT	5,000	
SPACETRACK (Space)		
Space Base Surveillance Concept Tech De		2,900
Space Situational Awareness:		6,000
C-130 Airlift Squadron		
Late EMD Contract Awar:		20,000
C-5 Airlift Squadrons		

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Program Decrease		-10.000
Nudet Detection Sys (Space)		
Program Reductor	3.000	
Depot Maintenance (Non-IF)		
Jt Service Metrology R&D Suppor	1.200	
Industrial Preparedness		
Adv Low Observable Coating:	4.200	
Laser Peening for F-1E	1.000	
Productivity, Reliability, Availability, Maintenanc		
Automated Nondestructive Inspection for Turbine En	4.000	
Inspection Tech for Turbine Eng	2.200	
Jt Logistics Program--Ammo Standard Sys		
Program Reductor		-1.106
Support Systems Development		
Center for aircraft and Systems Suppor	3.000	
Commodity Management Sys Consolidatio	1.000	
Battlespace Logistics Readiness and Sustainmer	1.000	
Classified Programs		-34.932
General Reductor		-5.000
TOTAL AF RDT&E	719.600	-306.181
RDT&E, Defensewide		
Defense Research Science:		
Advanced Photonics Composites Re:	4.200	
Ultra Performance Nanotechnology Ct	2.100	
Nanotechnology Initiativ	1.000	
Spectrum Lab	2.000	
University Research Initiative:		
Defense Commercialization Research Initiativ	4.000	
Active Hyperspectral Imaging Sensor Re:	3.400	
Adv Power & Energy Proc	1.500	
National Security Training	1.000	
MEMS for Rolling Element Bearing:	2.500	
Desert Environmental Research	2.600	
Bioengineering/Nanotechnology Re	4.250	
Tropical Remote Sensing Application	1.250	
Center of Excellence in Bioformatic	2.000	
Focused Manufacturing Technologis	1.000	
Adv Films and Coating:	1.000	
Corrosion Protection of Aluminum Alloy	1.000	
Force Health Protection		
Chronic Multi-symptom Illness	4.200	
Interdisciplinary Res on Gulf War Related Illnes	5.500	
Govt/Industry Copponsorship/ Univ Re:		
Focus Center Research Proc	6.800	
Program Delays/Executio		-1.000
Def Experl Prog to Stim Compet Res		
Research Funding Increase	7.000	
Chemical & Biological Def Proc		
Bug to Drug Identification and Ch	2.000	
900 MHz Magnetic Resonance Spectromete	2.500	
Lightweight Chem-Bio Sensor!	2.500	
Medical Free Electron Laser		
Program Increase	5.000	
Historically Black Colleges & Universitie:		
AIHEC--Tribal College & Univ Comp Eq & Science La	3.500	
Business/Tech Manuals R&C	1.500	
Hispanic Serving Institution:		
Project Grants	4.300	
Computing Systems & Computing Tech		
RTAPS	2.000	
Sys Engineering for Miniature Device:	2.600	
Secure and Dependable Softwar	1.000	
Intelligent Software for Multilingual Program		-4.400
Excessive Growth: New Start:		-25.000

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Embedded Software and Pervasive Computing		
DARPA Reduction		-10.000
Biological Warfare Defense		
Asymmetrical Protocols for Bio Warfare Defens	3.000	
Hydrate Fractionation Desalination Teo	2.600	
Center for Water Security	1.000	
Chemical and Biological Defens		
CB Regenerative Air Filtration Sy	1.000	
Air Purification Systems	2.600	
BiResearchtics	3.500	
Integmtd Detection of Energetic & Hazardous Materia	1.000	
Common Asset for Biological Securit	1.000	
Chemical & Biological Threat	3.500	
Continuation of Jt Biological & Chemical Terrorism Response Proje	9.000	
Tactical Technology		
CEROS	4.700	
DARPA Reduction		-9.000
Materials & Electronics Tech		
Fabrication of 3-D Micro Structure:	1.400	
Strategic Materials	3.400	
Detection & Destruction of CW-Nanotechnology	1.000	
Center for Integrated Technolog	5.000	
Ctr for Optoelectronics & Optical Comn	2.000	
ProDelays/Executior		-30.000
Advanced Materials/Frequency Tunable Device	1.500	
Boron Energy Cell Technolog	2.000	
Nuclear Sustainment & Counterproli		
Thermobaric Warhead Developmen	2.600	
Discrete Particle Method:	1.600	
ProgramDelays/Executior		-1.100
Radiation Hardened Microelectronic	1.500	
Explosives Demilitarization Tech		
Explosives Demilitarization Ted	1.000	
Hot Gas Decon Facility	1.400	
Thin Layered Chromatograph	2.000	
Demil & Destruction of Conventional Ammo & Chem Warfare Agents	1.500	
Rotary Furnace Technolog	1.300	
HMX Recovery from Demilitarized Energetic	1.400	
ProReductor		-400
SOLIC Adv Tech		
Special Recon Capabilitie:	1.400	
Combating Terrorism Tech Suppor		
Blast Mitigatio	3.100	
Facial Recognition	1.000	
Aerogel Chem Bio Detector:	2.600	
ChemBio Electrostatic Decontamination Sy	5.600	
Historical Underground Exploitation (HUGE)	1.700	
Ballistic Missile Defense Tech		
Airborne Infrared Surveillance Sys (AIRS	5.600	
Wideband Gap Semiconductor Research	5.600	
Silicon Thick Films	5.100	
AEOS MWIR Adaptive Optics	1.700	
High Data Rate Wireless Communication:	4.300	
Advanced RF Technology De	1.700	
POAP Technology	1.000	
Water-scale Planarization Technolog	2.000	
Silicon Brain Architecture	1.200	
Chem & Biological Def Prog Adv Dei		
Biodefense Statewide Medical Respons	1.300	
Dentistry of New Jersey	3.500	
Miniaturized Chem-Bio Detector:	1.700	
Special Technical Suppor		
Complex Systems Desigr	1.200	
Arms Control Technology		
Arms Control Technolog	4.200	
Center for Monitoring Research	2.600	
Nuclear Test Monitorinc	3.500	
Generic Logistics R&D Tech Demc		

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Computer Assisted Tech Transfer (CATT)	2,800	
Corrosion Prevention Control & Info Dis	1,000	
Silicon-28 Program	2,000	
Sub Micron CMOS and CMOS/SOS Lithograph	2,400	
Strategic Radiation Hardened Microelectronic	2,300	
Center for Nanosciences Innovatio	8,500	
Digital Electronic Warfare	2,500	
Diminishing Manufacturing Source Sata Warehouse	1,000	
Optimizing Electronics for Adv Controlled Environ Sy	5,000	
Spray Cooling Migration Proj	7,700	
Ultra Low Power Battlefield Sensor	17,000	
Strategic Environmental Res Proj		
Toxic Chemical Cleanup Crteri	1,000	
National Environmental Education & Trng Cl	2,500	
Program Delays/Executio		-10,000
Advanced Electronics Technologe		
Defense TechLink	1,000	
Laser Plasma Point Source X-ray Tec	4,300	
Laser Plasma Source Steppe		
Advanced Lithography Dem	4,300	
Advanced Lithography X-Ray Mask Researcl	3,500	
Novel Crystal Components for Imaging & Comr	8,000	
MEMS at Army Res Lab, Zuhl Physical Sciences Lal	5,200	
Program Delays/Executio		-2,000
ACTDs		
Flexible JP-8 Pilot Plan	3,500	
Advanced Tactical Lase	7,000	
Hi Perform Computing Modern Proj		
Program Decrease		-12,178
Operation of Selected Supcomputing Center	9,400	
Sensor & Guidance Technolog		
Large Millimeter Telescope	1,500	
Excessive Growth: Tactical Targeting, ELJ		-10,000
Software Engineering Instituts		
Technical Insertion Demo & Eval Proj	1,000	
Quick Reaction Projects		
Unjustified New Program Star		-25,000
Joint Wargaming Sim Mgt Office		
WMD Attack-Effects Response Assess Cap at JFCOM	1,500	
Agile Port Demonstrator		
CCDOT	8,500	
Physical Security Equipmen		
Backscatter Mobile Truck Sys	5,500	
Waterside/Landside Force Protection Planne	1,000	
Jt Robotics Prog		
TUAGV Part I	1,500	
Adv Sensor Applications Proj		
Remote Ocean Sensing Program	4,300	
Component Dev for Active Sensor	1,000	
Innovative Solid State Lase	3,500	
Program Delays/Executio		-3,000
CALS Initiative		
CALS--DemVal	5,100	
Environ Security Tech Cert Proj		
Program Delays/Executio		-5,180
Decontamination Technology Dem	920	
Ballistic Missile Def Sys Segmen		
Ctr for Missile Defense--Optical Data/Sensor Fusio	1,000	
ESPRIT	3,000	
Advanced Multi-Sensor Fusion Testbet	1,700	
PMRF Upgrades	23,800	
Airborne Intercept Monitorin	1,000	
SHOTS	4,300	
Range Data Fusion Upgrade	3,000	
Kodiak Road Planning/Desigi	1,700	

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BMD Terminal Def Segment		
MEADS Reduction		-2.000
Arrow	66.000	
BMD Midcourse Defense-men		
NTW--Sea Based Mid-Course Study		-20.000
Sea-Based Midcourse		-100.000
BMD Boost Defense Segment		
SBL		-120.000
ABL	73.500	
Space Based Kinetic Energy Study		-10.000
Sea Based Boost Study		-20.000
Chemical/Biological Def Prog DEMVAI		
Mobile Chemical Agent Detector	6.300	
M93A1 FOX Simulation Training Suite	1.400	
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensor:		
RAMOS		-20.000
SBIRS-Low		-365.000
Satellite Sensors Program	250.000	
Coalition Warfare		
Program Decrease		-6.620
Jt Service Educ & Trng Sys Dev		
Advanced Distributed Learning Initiative	6.500	
ADL Prototype for OSD ADL Co-Laborator	1.500	
Chemical & Biological Def Prog EMC		
Laser Interrogation of Surface Agents (LISA)	2.500	
Joint Robotics Program EMC		
TUGV Part II	2.000	
Theater Hi Altitude Area Def Sys TMD-EMC		
Accelerator		-50.000
PAC-3 TMD Acq-EMC		
PAC.3 R&D	22.000	
Information Technology Development		
Program Delays/Execution		-2.000
Technical Studies, Support, and Analysis		
Information Tech Superiority Study	1.000	
Reduction		
General Support to C3I		
UAV Integration into Civil Air-Space	1.500	
Pacific Disaster Center	6.000	
Defense Travel System		
Program Decrease		-10.000
Foreign Comparative Testing		
HELLAS	7.300	
Program Delays/Execution		-3.000
Classified Program (USDPI)	45.000	
Classified Programs (C3I)		
Intelligence Management		-20.000
Global Infrastructure Data Capture	4.000	
Open Source Exploitation-MHPCC	4.300	
Commercial Ops & Support-Savings Initiative		
Acft Affordability Initiative (EW Digital PiP)	12.000	
ISSP		
Protection of Vital Data	6.000	
Computer Science & Internet Security Degree Pro	.750	
National Information Assurance Training	1.700	
Superconducting Processors Development	1.000	
IOTC	1.700	
Defense Imagery & Mapping Prog		
Geographic Syn Aperture Radar (GEOSAR) Airborne Mapping Sys	9.000	
Commercial Jt Mapping & Visualization Toolkit	12.600	
Imagery Library Req for NAVOCENO (SURF EAGLE)	2.000	
Def Jt Counterintdi Program (JMIP)		
JCAG and ITSO	12.000	
C3I Intelligence Programs		
Miniaturized Wireless Initiative	5.000	
Joint C4ISR Architecture	1.200	
Technology Development		
Special Access Program		-35.000

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Manned Recon Sys		
Combat SENT Upgrades	12.600	
Industrial Preparedness:		
DLA Competitive Sustainment Initiativ	3.500	
Defense Supply Chain Management Pro	12.800	
Laser Additive Manufacturing	5.700	
ERIM Defense Sustainmen	4.200	
Special Operations Technology De:		
Wireless Video Links for SOMROV	1.800	
Spike Urban Warfare Sys	4.000	
Lightweight Counter-Mortar Rada	3.000	
Dual Band Detector Imaging Tecl	4.300	
Special Operations ATD:		
SOF Aircraft Defense Sys	2.000	
Electronic Digital Compass Sys	1.400	
Special Operations Tactical Sys De:		
Leading EDGE	4.300	
PSYOPS Advanced Developmen		-550
SOF Miscellaneous Equipmnt Adv De		-301
Miniature Day/Night Sight Developmer	1.500	
160th SOAR Modifications	1.000	
Titanium Tilting Helmet Mount:	1.000	
Advanced SEAL Delivery Sy:	7.000	
Surface Planning Wet Submersible (SPWS)	3.700	
Mark V Computer Upgrade	1.000	
Maverick & Hummingbird Systems	6.700	
Rebreather	1.000	
Special Operations Intel Sys De:		
Joint Threat Warning System (JTWS)	2.400	
Stoid State Synthetic Aperture Rada	3.000	
SOF C4I Threat Warning & Situational Awarenes	1.400	
Counterproliferation Analysis & Planning Sy	5.100	
SOF Medical Technology De:		
Transfer from PE 040411F	2.100	
SOF Operational Enhancement:		
Integrated Command & Control Sy:	1.100	
Classified Programs	23.800	
BMD Waiver of P.L. 102-564		-39.000
Challenge Prograir	12.500	
General Reductior		-5.000
TOTAL DEFWIDE RDT&E	1087.670	-1003.927
OT&E		
Advanced Technology Developmen		
Test, Evaluation, Science, & Technolog		-8.000
Central Test & Evaluation		
Roadway Simulato	9.500	
Digital Video Laborator	1.500	
Digital Imagery Systems	4.000	
Big Crow	4.000	
Development Test & Evaluator		
Target & Threat Sys Interoperability Testin	1.500	
Implementing DSB Recommendation:		-1.000
Live Fire Testing		
Live Fire Testing	3.000	
TOTAL OT&E	23.500	-9.000
TOTAL RDT&E	1111.170	-2112.927

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Counter-Terrorism & Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction		
Counter-Terrorism & Operational Response transfer Fun		
Unconventional Nuclear Threat	75.000	
O&M, DW		
RDT&E, DW		
Military NBC Equipment	60.000	
Proc, DW		
Biological Warfare Detection Sys	34.000	
Proc, DW		
Antibiotics and Vaccines (Stockpile & R&D)		
RDT&E, DW	44.000	
O&M, DW	32.000	
AFIP Lab Maintenance & Repairs		
DHP	25.000	
Domestic Response Exercises		
O&M, DW	10.060	
WMD-Civil Support Teams		
OMA	10.000	
OPA	25.000	
Local Emergency Communications Gear		
OPA	17.000	
DARPA-Biological Warfare Post-Exposure Therapeutics		
RDT&E, DW	30.000	
Chemical-Biological Medical Training		
DHP	15.000	
Attack, Sensing, Warning and Response-Information Assurance		
O&M, DW	5.000	
Proc, DW	26.000	
RDT&E, DW	39.000	
Facial Recognition System		
Proc, DW	11.000	
TOTAL Counter-Terrorism & Def Against Weap of Mass Destruction	479.000	000
TOTAL MII Conf Am Hours	1069.726	-532.040

snowflake

sent 12/26/01
December 21, 2001 1:43 PM

Done 01/10/02

692

TO: Dov Zakheim
c c Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jordan and Pakistan

You did a terrific job on the Jordan and Pakistan project. I assume from what you said that the good news has already been given to both of them. Good news travels fast.

Nonetheless, I would like to have a letter drafted from me to the President and the King explaining what has been done. I felt strongly about it. I have been urging it on, and I want them to know that I personally care.

Please see that this gets worked out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122101-18

Please respond by/

SECRET

Draft Responses attached

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
1/3

U15132 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5613



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

His Excellency
General Pervez Musharraf
President, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear President Musharraf:

I appreciate the substantial assistance you have provided in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and I am pleased to advise you that the Congress has passed legislation that will allow me to make direct payments to your country for the support you are providing.

We anticipate that President Bush will sign the legislation soon. Shortly thereafter, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Dov Zakheim, will forward an initial payment. We would hope to provide further funds and will work with your government to deal with this in the most effective manner.

Thank you again for all you have done in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/5614



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

His Majesty
King Abdullah II
Amman
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Your Majesty:

I appreciate the substantial assistance you have provided in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and I am pleased to advise you that the Congress has passed legislation that will allow me to make direct payments to your country for the support you are providing.

We anticipate that President Bush will sign the legislation soon. Shortly thereafter, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Dov Zakheim, will forward an initial payment.

Thank you again for your support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/5615

Action
15 01/02
1008

December 29, 2001 11:36 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Senior Executive Council

334

It seems to me that, with all the things we had going on in the year 2001, we never really got the Senior Executive Council (SEC) going and functioning and getting the kind of traction it is going to have to have in the Department if we are going to make the kind of progress you and I want to make.

I think what you ought to do is sit down with your calendar and flesh out the next four months as to how you are going to put energy and drive into that institution and get these management reform issues moving along and done.

The other thing I think you need to establish as a priority is the legislative changes we need the big, major changes in how we interact with Congress. Why don't you come up with a program for that and give me a briefing ~~some time~~, maybe around January 15, so we can find out what role I should play in helping get that accomplished.

Thanks.



DHR:dh
1229014

29 Dec 01

U15142 02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
Admiral G
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 9, 2001

g 6/12

COL BYRD *B 6/12*
COL BUCCI *SAS 6/12* (A)
CDR MILLS (A)

*Need you to come up
with a recommendation
on how we can
execute this.*

I think we want to think about gently discouraging gift giving and exchanging. It is taxpayer's money and I am uncomfortable with it.

If someone wants to do it you can't stop them and we ought to give them something but our gifts ought to be quite modest.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.23.3

005

95 Jun 01

0/24
11/03

snowflake


October 23, 2001 10:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Frist for Congressional Breakfast

Sometime let's include Bill Frist in a breakfast here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102301-19



*ASD (LA)
To: Powell Moore
fy1*

00 71 50

23 OCT 01

snoflake

November 6, 2001 3:18 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intelligence System

350.09

Attached is the memo Blair left for me. You should read it.

Let me know what you think.

Attach.
10/30/01 Blair Memo

DHR:dh
110601-7

.....
Please respond by _____

6 Nov 01

~~SECRET~~ HAS BEEN

Blair
30 Oct 07

Fixing the Intelligence System

1. Tighter Accountability

Collection: Intelligence Community works on priorities, not on missions. Needs missions such as “Collect the PRC plan for aggression against Taiwan by the end of 2002,” or “Penetrate Central Military Commission communications in the PRC by the end of 2003.” Currently China is classified as a “hard target” and greater effort is going into collection against China, but there is no plan which leaders have approved and can track.

Resources: The budgeting system for the Intelligence Community is so complicated that it is very difficult to track future plans against future requirements. There is a clear need for Mandarin linguists, but there is no way for SecDef and DCI to approve a plan, assign accountability and track the results. There are huge gaps between planned IMINT collection capability and ability to use the data collected (TPED). In the case of intelligence collection from submarines, the platforms are available, but the funding to use them fully is not; in the case of airborne surveillance platforms, the missions are being flown without the gear needed to collect all the signals. At lower levels, inordinate staff is necessary simply to understand all the different sources of funding for a single intelligence unit such as a Joint Intelligence Center.

Major programs: Compared to similar programs in DoD, Multi-billion dollar technical intelligence programs do not receive the informed scrutiny, and then the support of the DCI and SecDef because the acquisition process is ad hoc, alternatives do not receive attention, presentations to leadership are unclear, and cost and schedule are not tracked clearly for accountability.

Solution: Strengthen the IDR process. Simplify or integrate the Intelligence Community budgeting processes into program elements which capture all of the component parts of a program, and fund the program elements in a balanced way. – set clear missions at the DCI/SecDef level and review them frequently for progress, adjustment or attainment. Hold officials accountable for attaining the missions and for bringing the hardware programs in on time. Strengthen the Community Management Staff, as recommended below, to build the budget/program process.

2. Integrated Collection Management

SIGINT collection priorities are adjusted continually. IMINT collection priorities are set daily. The two collection management processes are independent of each other, coordinated only because the officials running the centers are experienced and know one another. HUMINT tasking takes longer, is highly decentralized and is not connected to either SIGINT or IMINT. Collection managers for different analytical organizations compete for tasking attention based on current events; generally if an area is “hot” it will receive heavy SIGINT and IMINT coverage, without any tradeoff thinking being done about which would be the most relevant.

Solution: Combine the IMINT, SIGINT and HUMINT tasking centers into a single organization, which can allocate collection resources in accordance with capabilities as well as topicality.

3. Director of Central Intelligence

Because he is also Director of the CIA, the DCI is inevitably drawn into tactical management of the CIA Directorate of Operations. I have seen directors forced to spend as much time and attention on a single agent as on billion dollar collection programs.

Solution: Human intelligence operations – the clandestine service - should be run by the Executive Director of the CIA, who should invariably be an experienced clandestine service officer. The CIA directorate for analysis should work for the Director of the National Intelligence Council. The DCI should be staffed by an expanded Community Management staff, with staff members drawn from all the intelligence organizations, not by the CIA. His duties should concentrate on allocation of resources and effectiveness of the organization, rather than on making the intelligence calls. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should always be a 4-star military officer, generally, but not always, a military intelligence officer. NSA, NIMA and NRO should remain combat support organizations

117
1145

snowflake

November 6, 2001 6:38 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India

INDIA

The Ambassador talked me into inviting Fernandes of India to the United States sometime next year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110601-16

Please respond by _____

*To: ASD(P) Feit -
FYI -
D. Rita*

Larry Di Rita
11/9

6 Nov 01

0 10 (27)
FILE

snowflake

October 26, 2001 2:21 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Media Advisors

000.7

Do you know anything about this proposal of DoD to send teams of contract media advisors to each of these countries? Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.
0 2501352 OCT 01

DHR:dh
102601-16

.....

Please respond by 10/29

260301

2

SPTD 10/25

10/25

OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA5857 2980140-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UWUU ZZH
0 2501352 OCT 01
FM SECSTATE WA&DC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 3595
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1538
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0208
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2297
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 7983
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 3499
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2354
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1460
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2425
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8809

UNCLAS STATE 185857

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM U/S GROSSMAN AND U/S BEERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, KPAQ, TFUS01

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL TO DEPLOY INTERNATIONAL MEDIA
@VISORS /CONTRACTORS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM U/S GROSSMAN AND U/S BEERS

1. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARAGRAPH 4.
2. DOD HAS PROPOSED TO SEND TEAMS OF 2-4 CONTRACT MEDIA ADVISORS TO EACH ADDRESSEE COUNTRY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORMULATION OF THEIR NATIONAL MEDIA STRATEGIES, INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEMES AND PREPARATION OF CONTENT MATERIAL FOR DISTRIBUTION TO PRESS/MEDIA OUTLETS. THE TEAMS ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE HOST COUNTRY, AS WELL AS ASSISTANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE MEDIA ADVISORS ARE CIVILIANS UNDER CONTRACT TO DOD IN COORDINATION WITH THE RENDON GROUP (TRG). THE NUMBER OF TEAMS THAT COULD BE FUNDED IS STILL UNDER REVIEW.
3. THE MEDIA ADVISORS WOULD OPERATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COM TO FURTHER U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND WOULD MAINTAIN OFFICES IN THE U.S. MISSION. IF AGREED WITH COM, THEY COULD ALSO HAVE OFFICES WITH HOST

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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C&D: CCD: / / CABLE CH: _____ FILE: _____

USDP: / DIA: _____ OTHER: _____
MILPER: _____ PER SEC: _____ COMM: _____

COUNTRY CLIENTS. THEIR EFFECTIVENESS WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO USE THEM TO THEIR FULL POTENTIAL.

4. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ASCERTAIN HOST GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN THE MEDIA ADVISOR PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT OF THE RESPONSE. POSTS ARE ALSO REQUESTED TO ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT AT THE SAME TIME OF THEIR OWN EVALUATIONS OF THE UTILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF THE PROGRAM IN THEIR COUNTRIES AND THEIR MISSIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LOCAL CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES AND OTHER FACTORS THAT WOULD EITHER SUPPORT OR ARGUE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL. THE MEDIA ADVISORS CAN PROVIDE TECHNICAL MEDIA EXPERTISE TO GOVERNMENTS THAT MAY BE STRUGGLING WITH THEIR OWN INFORMATION PROGRAMS.

5. POSTS SHOULD ADVISE DEPARTMENT ASAP IF THEY JUDGE THAT AN APPROACH TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS NOT USEFUL OR ADVISABLE.

POWELL

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION (U)
INFO SJS-C(*) SJS-C(1) CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JSAMS(*)
JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(*) BOARDMAN(*) NOOH(*)

SECDEF V2

ACTION (U)
INFO CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1)
SECDEF-C(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#5857

NNNN

snowflake

December 5, 2001 11:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Casualties

704

Please get me the assessments that have been made after each conflict as to percentage of casualties, killed and wounded, that occurred as a result of:

- a. Enemy action.
- b. Friendly fire.
- c. Training and other non-combat incidents *in the theater*

I would also like a proposal as to how, during this conflict, we can improve those percentages from past eras.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120501-18

.....
Please respond by _____

5 Dec 01

→ To: Exec Sec -
 Please ask
NDA to put someone
 on this and get a
 quick answer 1-1-0559/OSD/5626

U19420 /01



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R) *Cham* 15 FEB 2001

SUBJECT: Information paper on "Letter to Employers for Reserve and Guard Forces"

The information paper at TAB A responds to your question following the trip to West Virginia with the President, TAB B.

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense



11-L-0059/OSD/5627

U03277 /01

RE: YOUR NOTE OF FEBRUARY 14, 2001: Letter to Employers of Reserve and Guard Forces

You asked if we have “underway” the “letter to employers” mentioned by the President. Yes, we do. The “letter to employers” refers to Statement of Support and National Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve Week Proclamation issues.

- Statement of Support:
 - o First one signed by President Nixon in 1972 shortly after he established the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.
 - o Since then, every President, numerous governors, leaders of major business associations and several hundred thousand employers have signed them.
 - o Package will be to you by February 28, 2001, for proposal to the President.

- “National Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve Week” Proclamation:
 - o Annual recognition normally held in the Fall of each year. The last proclamation was signed by President Clinton on October 30, 1997.
 - o A major activity during the week is the awarding of Employer Support Freedom Awards by SECDEF to the top five most supportive employers.

- Federal Government as Model Employer
 - o Former SECDEF/SECLABOR signed memo encouraging all Federal agencies to remove barriers to Reserve service by government civilians.
 - o All 14 former Cabinet Secretaries signed Statements of Support. Will propose you renew with Cabinet colleagues.

- OPM policy encourages federal agencies to pay employee share of Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) premiums for Reserve component members called to active duty in contingencies.
 - o Would support operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq, as well as federal civilian employees called to active duty for future contingencies.
 - o Package at DEPSECDEF.

- Employer Database will list civilian employers, facilitating future employer surveys and direct communication with employers.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 14, 2001 5:51 PM

TO: Charles Cragin, Acting USD P&R
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Letter to Employers for Reserve and Guard Forces

We went to see the Reserve and Guard folks today, and the President asked me about the letter to employers. Do you have that underway?

DR:dh
021401-4

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 8:01 AM

TO: Marty Hoffmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Phil Major

020 PAE

We've got to take a quick look at Phil Major, who is an executive VP of IDA. We need to check with Larry Welch with the thought that he could do PA&E.

DHR:dh
021901-1

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 01



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

2001 FEB 20 AM 10:22

February 15, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: John K. Veroneau, Assistant Secretary for Defense (Legislative Affairs@)

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements (SecDef Memo dated February 5, 2001)

PURPOSE: To address questions and concerns about the number of congressionally mandated reports that are required by law or policy.

DISCUSSION: Historically, the Comptroller has tracked the Department's congressional reporting requirements that are mandated by law and emanate from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Appropriations-Defense Subcommittees. I asked Bruce Dauer in the Comptroller's office to provide the cost estimates and other data to address some of the questions you have posed. His response is at Tab A.

Reports fall into one of two categories: 1) periodic (e.g., annual; semi-annual; quadrennial, ect.); or 2) one-time requirements. This distinction is important because in 1995, as part of the Contract with America, the new Republican majority pushed through the Federal Report Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995. The bill arose from initiatives of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and was introduced in the Senate by Senator John McCain (R-NM). The bill was signed into law on December 21, 1995. The law eliminated some reports and created a sunset provision of four years for all previously enacted laws with re-occurring annual, semi-annual, or periodic reports. The deadline, however, was extended to May 15, 2000, to give congressional committees more time to scrub their requirements. In the meantime, the Armed Services Committees, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, "preserved" most of their periodic reports by exempting them from the sunset provision after undergoing an extensive scrub of all existing periodic reports.

The majority of congressionally mandated reports fall into the "one-time requirement" category and, as such, are not subject to the 1995 law. Currently, the only check on the Congress' thirst for information through reporting requirements is the exercise of self-discipline. According to sources on the Hill, only Senator McCain is expressing concern about the number of reports required by law. Apparently, nobody else is taking a good hard look at the issue. There exists a certain mentality in some circles on the Hill that the Pentagon has vast resources of personnel and money and

032

15 FEB 01

should not complain about providing necessary information to Congress. Others know the requirements are onerous and burdensome, but see it as a necessary evil. At a minimum, the number of reporting requirements is something that is discussed by Members and professional staff as the bill is being put together. My assessment is that all are concerned about this issue, but none are motivated to act.

On the other side of the issue, some Members and professional staff will claim that they have exercised some self-discipline in reducing the number of reports. As you will note in the Comptroller's assessment, the number of congressionally mandated reports has actually declined from a historic high of 861 in 1990 to the current figure of 567 for 2 0 0 1 .

RECOMMENDATIONS: One approach you may want to explore that will highlight this issue is to seek a line item authorization/appropriation to fund the Department's reports that are congressionally mandated. Another approach is for you to use your office as a bully pulpit, much like then-Secretary Cheney did on this very issue during his tenure in DoD, to encourage greater self-discipline by our Committees to ensure that only the most critical reporting requirements are mandated by law.

Attachment:
As Stated

CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. What does all of this cost?

A: Reports are prepared either entirely in-house or with contractor support. No recent cost estimates have been prepared

- The costs of preparing these reports could be calculated by requiring each office that prepares a report to make a formal cost estimate similar to that made for responses to Freedom of Information requests
- Alternatively, total costs could be estimated by extrapolating total costs based on samples of cost estimates

2. Which committees are requiring these reports?

A: The House and Senate Defense Authorization Committees and House and Senate DoD and Military Construction Subcommittees include reporting requirements in committee reports, conference reports, and the Authorization and Appropriations Bills. The following tables provide an historical distribution of these reports:

<u>FY</u>	<u>AUTH</u>			<u>APPN</u>			<u>Supps/</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>HASCS</u>	<u>SAS</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>MilCon</u>	<u>Other</u>	
80									231
81									223
82				No breakout available					221
83									325
84									422
85									458
86	51	43	179	126	77	122	69	9	676
87	52	32	184	77	55	181	88	11	680
88	49	35	185	101	57	165	105	22	719
89	77	44	219	92	53	96	80	0	661
90	133	76	308	72	70	115	87	0	861
91	74	78	232	80	56	91	46	19	676
92	52	67	180	90	86	166	46	47	734
93	60	66	233	67	95	86	36	11	654
94	92	66	248	86	80	86	18	0	676
95	108	57	216	68	93	138	27	2	709
96	65	45	254	47	32	64	48	0	555
97	76	50	189	47	40	81	51	0	534
98	126	86	220	36	15	62	49	27	621
99	60	74	287	38	20	69	41	8	597
00	62	50	184	35	36	88	52	0	507
01	76	60	222	39	23	62	85	0	567

3. Which individuals are requesting these reports?

A: Both staffers and members request reports to:

- obtain information they may otherwise be unable to get
- punish the Department or a particular Service or Component because information has not been forthcoming, or
- force the Department to take a particular course of action (such as requiring DoD to report details on contingency costs and to submit supplemental appropriations requests before undertaking a contingency operation)

Sometimes DoD proposes a reporting requirement as a cheap alternative to a congressional budget cut or as a vehicle to resolve problem conference issues

4. Are there some that can reasonably be eliminated completely?

5. Are there some that can be combined?

A: Services and OSD components routinely try to work around, eliminate, or consolidate some reporting requirements by negotiating with the committees about report content or type of compliance for reports not required in statute

- For example, committees often will agree to briefings, consolidation of submissions (either for content or due dates), or accepting information informally in lieu of a formal report
- The Services and OSD Components are encouraged to seek such relief wherever possible

6. Is it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunsets on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?

A: In each year's budget and authorization request, the Department formally asks that statutory reports included in the previous year not be repeated. However, each year a new set of "one time only" reports are included on a new set of subjects

7. Does someone have the due dates?

A: The Plans & Systems Directorate in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for identifying, tasking, and monitoring compliance of all annual congressionally reporting requirements

- The Comptroller signs out an annual tasking memo to the Military Services, the Joint Staff, and the OSD Components
- This tasking is consistent with the DoD General Counsel's annual Delegation of Authorities memos that assign responsibility for actions required in Defense Authorization and DoD Appropriations Acts

8. Is this something we should be talking about to the key members of Congress about and see if we can't calm it down?

A: The Secretary and Deputy Secretary and senior military and civilian staff could address the excessive reporting burden placed on the Department in a number of venues:

- The burden could be underscored at meetings with Committee chairs and ranking members and at annual Authorization and Appropriation budget hearings
- Senior DoD officials could advise informally the senior congressional leadership and committee staff directors of the Department's willingness to work with the committees to provide alternatives to their reliance on annual reporting requirements

9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be? For example, the ones for the President being reduced to me and the ones for me being reduced down to lower levels.

A: It is very difficult to reduce the President's reports to a lower level after the fact. Generally they are in statute and are identified as a President's report because the Congress wants the President to sign or requires an action by the President. However, the Department has much discretion with Secretary of Defense reports.

- Generally, the Secretary of Defense signs certifications and elected waiver authorities required in statute
- Other Secretary of Defense reports can be delegated to a senior OSD official

10. Any other thoughts?

A: The Department should change its management approach to complying with reporting requirements

- Senior DoD managers should take an active interest in determining the most efficient way to respond to congressional reports assigned to their organizations
- Contractor support should be used only as necessary or appropriate to prepare reports
- DoD staff should reduce reliance on reports as a negotiating tool during congressional markups
- DoD components should be discouraged from promoting congressional reporting requirements to garner support for their programs



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

huvk

3-Feb-01

Exceller

MEMORANDUM FOR Dr Cambone

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Sir

Attached for your information is a paper explaining the subject reports

Also attached is a listing of all Congressionally mandated reports

Package prepared by Bruce Dauer and Warren Hall

They indicated in red which reports they believe the Secretary should personally sign (i.e. not delegate to Component leadership for signature)

*Very respect fully
Mauo*

MARIA I. CRIBBS
Colonel, USAF
Executive Secretary for the
Department of Defense



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 12:12 PM

TO: Mr. John Veroneau, Legislative Affairs

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Attached is a report that indicates the Congressional reporting requirements for 2001.

I am absolutely amazed. I have not seen anything like this.

I have these thoughts:

1. What does all this cost?
2. Which committees are requiring these reports?
3. Which individuals are requesting the reports?
4. Are there some that can be reasonably eliminated completely?
5. Are there some that can be combined?
6. Is it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunsets on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?
7. Does someone have the due dates?
8. Is this something we should be talking to the key members of Congress about and see if we can't calm it down?
9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be? For example, the ones for the President being reduced to me and the ones for me being reduced down to lower levels.
10. Any thoughts from anyone?

cc:

Dr. William Schneider

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz

Dr. Dov Zakheim

Attachment

DR:dh
020501-7



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000



FEB 28 2001

The Honorable Adrian A. Basora
Eisenhower Fellowships
256 South 16th St.
Philadelphia, PA 19 102

Dear Adrian:

Thank you for your letter asking me if Eisenhower Fellowships could keep my name on the letterhead with the designation Chairman Emeritus. First, let me extend my appreciation for your thoughtfulness in acting so promptly to record my resignation as a trustee.

You may certainly keep my name on the letterhead with the designation Chairman Emeritus, as it appears on the letter you sent to me. There would be a legal impediment, however, to your using my current official title or position on your letterhead or in any other communication that you have. I appreciate your understanding the legal and ethical restrictions that are placed on me in my position as the Secretary of Defense.

I hope things are going well.

Best regards,

086

28 Feb 01



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
2001 FEB 20 11 43 AM '01

FEB 20 2001

2/27/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

-cy

FROM: DANIEL J. DELL'ORTO, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL *DJD 2/17/01*

Prepared by (b)(6)

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO RETAIN YOUR NAME AS CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
ON EISENHOWER FELLOWSHIPS - ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To Accept the Request

DISCUSSION: The Eisenhower Fellowships confirms that you are removed as a trustee of the organization, but ask if they may publish your name as Chairman Emeritus on the letterhead. There is no legal or ethical restriction on your giving permission to do that.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the Secretary sign the attached letter granting the request.

APPROVED: _____
DISAPPROVED: _____
OTHER: _____

fed

Attachment



BOARD OF TRUSTEES

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(b)(6)

www.eef.org

February 6, 2001

RECEIVED FEB - 9 2001

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld Chicago, Illinois

Dear Don:

Your resignation as a trustee has been duly recorded, effective January 19, 2001.

Thank you for your words of respect for the achievements of Eisenhower Fellowships during my presidency and earlier. I am certain, however, that my predecessor and all of our most active trustees would respond as I do, namely that you yourself have added immeasurably to that success during your years of active trusteeship.

Unless there is a legal impediment or you feel it inappropriate, we would like to keep your name on our letterhead as Chairman Emeritus, since this is a simple recognition of fact and does not involve trustee status.

Sincerely,

Adrian A. Basora

cc. RFA

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL WARREN CHRISTOPHER, Chairman

- JAMES H. AODER
- BEATHA CLARK KING
- DANIEL Y. C. NG
- THOMAS J. WAGNER
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- FRANK G. WISNER

11-L-0059 OSD 75640

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

16-Feb-01 8:45 AM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
3

SUBJECT:

Take a look at this letter from Eisenhower Fellowships and see if it's okay for them to keep my name as an Emeritus.

DJR/azn
021601.01
Attach.

11-L-0059/OSD/5641

snowflake

TO: Rudy De Leon
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 2, 2001
SUBJECT: GAO

Here's the background sheet on GAO, Why don't you have Paul begin to work this problem with you. I've got no problem with being stiff on not giving access to the decision-makers.

DHR/azn
030201.05

UN

2 Mar 01

BACKGROUND PAPER: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) INQUIRY INTO EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION-MAKING ON UN PEACEKEEPING

- In March 2000, the GAO **sought** to commence an inquiry at the Departments of State and Defense into the Executive **Branch's** application of U.S. policy to the recent approval of new or expanded U.N. peacekeeping operations.
- **DoD** and **DoS** initially declined meetings, informing GAO that the **inquiry** would intrude into their deliberative process, which is exempted **from** inquiry under the GAO statute, and might also impinge on the Presidential communications privilege.
- GAO first focused on State, insisting upon a document search. **DoD** stated its preference not to begin until State and NSC had **taken** positions. GAO did not specify the parameters of its search to **DoD** until September 2000.
- State provided GAO access to some documents and withheld and redacted others because of their deliberative content or for referral to NSC for release authority.
- In **November** 2000, a Congressional hearing was held on the issue, and GAO formally demanded the State and NSC documents under the relevant statute. In December 2000, the Director of the **Office** of Management and Budget (OMB) defeated GAO's demand by certifying under the statute that the documents could be withheld.
- A demand letter was also sent to **DoD** in November 2000. The **DoD** General Counsel (GC) responded that the demand **letter** was premature, as **DoD** had not withheld any documents **from** GAO and was still conducting its search.
- On 6 **February**, the GAO sent another letter (Tab A), -stating **that** DOD had "failed to deliver on its promises," and making a number of other unfounded assertions of delay.
- The Acting GC responded to GAO (Tab B) (1) setting out the prematurity of the **demand**, (2) insisting upon our right to protect the Department's deliberative process, and (3) **confirming** that **DoD** expected by 27 February to provide access to those documents (or parts thereof) that we could make available, and the status of those (or parts thereof) for which we require the views of another Executive Branch agency.
- On 27 February, **DoD** provided the stated document access and status report. We understand that the Comptroller General is still unhappy with DOD's cooperation, and that GAO intends to force this to OMB certification, as with the State and NSC documents described above.
- The Acting GAO General Counsel has also telephoned GC a few times on this inquiry (and on the now-suspended inquiry on the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review) and has suggested that there may be further hearings, or contacts with Members, or a call from the Comptroller-General to **SecDef**.
- We expect to prevail on these matters; however, we will ultimately require your **support** and that of NSC and **OMB** in so doing.

BACKGROUND PAPER: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REVIEW OF 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

- GAO wrote you on 22 January 2001 (Tab A) that it **intended** to begin reviewing the 2001 QDR process.
- GAO sought to-examine
 - the roles of OSD and Joint Staff,
 - membership and roles of working groups;
 - methodology and decision-making process;
 - use of studies and other tools for addressing limitations; and
 - the basis for **DoD** conclusions in defining a strategy, program and budget plan based on the **final** QDR.
- By statute, SecDef is responsible for conducting the QDR, in consultation only with CJCS.
- By statute, the QDR process supports both other **DoD** decision processes and the preparation of SecDef's QDR report to Congress.
- GAO **inquiry** into SecDef's and DoD's deliberative processes is **limited** under the statute providing access to Defense Department documents.
 - The standard for denying access is substantial impairment of agency operations.
- SecDef should be able to conduct the QDR without interference by GAO and with the confidence that staff may provide confidential recommendations and opinions in an unfettered manner.
- The Acting General Counsel (GC) has replied to GAO (Tab B) setting out DoD's view that this inquiry is premature and offering to work with GAO to review the QDR once the Congressional report has been submitted.
 - This was consistent with discussions with **DepSecDef, Dr. Cambone,** and Mr. Gebhard, and in coordination with Mr. Verga and Mr. Di Rita.
- We now understand from the GAO Acting General Counsel that GAO is backing down on this inquiry at this time, as it was a self-initiated investigation.
- Nevertheless, we should remain vigilant about such an inquiry being restarted later in the QDR process, given
 - the GAO's initial overreaching on this inquiry and
 - the current Comptroller-General's aggressive approach to the ongoing GAO inquiry into Executive Branch decision-making on UN peacekeeping operations.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 18 2001

(b)(6)

230-02

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your note. It was good to hear from you.

Isn't it amazing the twists and turns life can take. Here we are, 25 years later, back in the Pentagon, and hard at it. What a surprise it is!

I will keep in mind your offer. It would be good to see you.

Best personal regards,

18 Mar 01

U05664 /01

11-L-0059/OSD/5645

snowflake

March 18, 2001 2:33 PM

TO: Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Here is a terrific guy, (b)(6) who indicated he would be willing to do something on a pro bono basis. You might want to keep that in mind.

He is a good lawyer and a good friend.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031X01-9

U05664 /01

11-L-0059/OSD/5646

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT

190 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60603-3441

(b)(6)

MAIN TELEPHONE

(b)(6)

March 14, 2001

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don and Joyce:

Thank you very much for sending me your new Washington address. I have been intending to drop you a congratulatory note but I wasn't sure that such a note would make its way through the Pentagon ladder of command.

Now to the congratulations -- to both of you for agreeing to help keep the Republic ticking and safe. I include both of you in the congratulations because -- in ways Hilly and Bill don't even begin to consider -- a major office holder cannot really function without the support of the proper type of spouse.

I note, Don, that your current pictures reveal a Don Rumsfeld remarkably similar to the Navy photo used in your first run for political office which inspired the Evanston Republican Old Guard to dub you Captain Midnight.

As you can see from the letterhead, I am still with the law firm I have been with since September of '53. My job title is "Senior Counsel". This means I have an office to come to and office support, including the young lady who typed this letter. but I don't have to do anything. What I do do is teach trial lawyering, judge moot court trials, try an occasional pro bono case and give senior counseling to those who need it regardless of whether they have asked for it.

If it should ever occur to you that there is something pro bono and short lived that someone like me might be able to help you with, don't hesitate to call. I was in Air Force JAG for two years (1951-1953) and was "Chief, Military Justice, Headquarters Northeast Air Command which consisted of Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland and certain secret North Pole ice islands. I was surrounded by people preparing for World War III. Since then I have been dealing with disputes of all kinds in all kinds of courts.

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld
March 14, 2001
Page 2

On the personal side, (b)(6) and I are functioning well and in fine fettle. So are our offspring and their respective spouses. (b)(6) All of them live nearby. Brothers (b)(6) are doing well as are their spouses and numerous heirs.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

snowflake

March 23, 2001 8:45 AM

FAX TRANSMISSION

(b)(6)

FAXED

3/23
9am
DHR

TO: William F. Buckley, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: White House Correspondents' Dinner

Dear Bill,

Thanks so much for the nice thought about the White House Correspondents' Dinner. Unfortunately, I have already accepted another group's invitation.

You were nice to think of me. I hope we have a chance to visit that evening, if not before.

Best regards,



DHR:dh
032301-I

001.15D

23 Mar 01

U06034 /01

Tel. (b)(6)

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

March 16, 2001

A handwritten circled 'D' is located to the right of the date. The 'D' is written in a simple, slightly slanted font and is enclosed within a hand-drawn circle.

Dear Don:

I happily invite you and Joyce to join our little **National** Review party at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. It is a great affair, teeming with nice & awful people including our new (nice) President. Date, April 28, time 7:30, place, Washington Hilton. Dress -- black tie.

We'll be hosting a reception before the dinner at 6PM, and hope to see you there. Please say yes to -- Liz Capano, (b)(6) by March 30, 2001,

With cordial regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'WFB', is written above the typed name.

Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

The Honorable and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld
2206 Kalorama Road, NW
Washington, DC 20008-1621



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 26 2001

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks for your note about (b)(6)
I will see that our mutual friend, (b)(6)
feeds it into the process.

Thanks so much,

Regards,

230.02

26 Mar 01

U06084 /01

snowflake

March 20,2001 8:17 PM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

FYI

Attach.

DHR:dh
032001-15

(b)(6)

March 16, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

It is my understanding that (b)(6) is a candidate for an appointive post in Defense, or one of the Services. I have known (b)(6) for many years going back to his active duty service in the Army when I was Secretary and he did legislative liaison with the Appropriations Committee. He also had a **fine** combat record in Vietnam.

As you are aware, the House Sub-Committee on Defense Appropriations wants liaison by the Department with the sub-committee handled through the Office of Financial Management rather than the traditional Congressional liaison **staffs** of the services. This is an expertise of (b)(6) who carried out these duties first as an Army officer and later in a civilian capacity. Through the years, he has developed a most helpful relationship with the sub-committee members and staff. Congressman Murtha, especially, has relied heavily on him.

He has held other key positions in the building, and Sean O'Kieff gave him assignments in the Navy secretariat when he, Sean, was Secretary of the Navy.

Because of his broad experience in Defense matters, and his special expertise in legislative affairs, I wanted to commend him to you.

With best wishes, I am,

(b)(6)

11-L-0059/OSD/5653



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MAN 30 1001

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Undersecretary of the Air Force

You requested a summary of the duties and responsibilities for the Director, NRO position. I have attached such a summary.

I have also included some attributes of a candidate that seem to make sense to us.

As you know, this is critically important to our efforts here at DoD.

Our folks here have been visiting with Mr. Al Smith for the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, NRO. I have attached his background sheet. I am sure many of your colleagues know him.

I would appreciate your getting back to me with your thoughts as to the duties and qualifications for the Director, NRO and also any observations you may have with respect to Mr. Smith. We have not formally put him forward at the White House as yet and will await hearing from you.

Thanks.

Attachment:
 As stated

236.02

30 Mar 01

U06518 /01

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Manage and lead a program of over \$XXBillion per year

Acquire advanced technology to penetrate our adversary's most sensitive secrets

Direct the unique and extraordinary DCI acquisition authorities

Address the most advanced technological issues with the nation's leading defense contractors

Lead our allied space program involving the most trusted and important foreign partners

Formulate US commercial space business development

Integrate the nation's space reconnaissance with our manned and unmanned airborne programs

Understand in detail the nation's intelligence requirements and shortfalls

Organize the presentation of the Air and Space reconnaissance programs to the Congress

ATTRIBUTES OF A CANDIDATE

Director of the NRO should be a recognized "world class" engineer; scientist, manager

Director of the NRO must have intimate working knowledge of the DCI acquisition authority

Director of the NRO should be someone recognized and respected by the aerospace industry

Director of the NRO should have extensive background in intelligence programs and requirements

Director of the NRO should have experience with most advanced and sensitive technologies associated with remote sensing

Director of the NRO should already be recognized by Congressional leaders as a leading authority on reconnaissance and technology issues

Director of the NRO must have extensive working knowledge of Military programs and strategies

COMMENTS

The NRO is the single largest and most important component of the intelligence community

The NRO has been the primary technology engine for most the US predominance in space and information technology. Most of our space and information technology industry was invented inside the "Black" world of the NRO and then brought out into the "White" commercial world

The NRO and the nation require that this technology leadership role be resumed, we should settle for nothing less than the very best for this position

The NRO achieved its greatest success when the Director of the NRO was dual hatted as either the Secretary of the Air Force or Under Secretary of the Air Force. Tom Reed, Hans Mark, Pete Aldrich and Bud Whelon are examples of the kind of extraordinary leaders who have not only made a difference in our national security,; but also created the technology world we live and thrive in today. The issue before us is really tomorrow. The nation needs a leader at the helm of the NRO whole will lead that organization to new heights from which we will benefit in the coming decades

ALBERT E. SMITH
Undersecretary of the Air Force

1999 – Present	Lockheed-Martin	Exec. VP. Space Systems
1985 – 1999	Lockheed	Various Management Positions.
	Central Intelligence Agency	Engineering Project Management
	Northeastern University	B.A., Electrical Engineering

Candidate: Albert E. Smith

Positions: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
Director of NRO & Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Space)
NASA Administrator

Registration: Republican (CO)
Voted in Primary & General Election

Political Activity: Contributed to Bush/Cheney

Prior Confirmation: No

Clearances: Top Secret Codeword
Up to Date Special Background Investigation

Form SF86: Completed

Contact Number: ,

Bio:

Albert E. Smith is Executive Vice President of the \$5.8 billion Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company and also an officer of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. He was promoted in September 1999 from his previous position as President of Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, one of the principal operating elements comprising Space Systems.

Before joining Space Systems, Smith was President of Lockheed Martin Aerospace Electronics Systems, which includes Sanders, Space Electronics & Communications, Fairchild Systems, and IR Imaging Systems. He had served as President of the Sanders division before his promotion to Aerospace Electronic Systems.

Smith joined Lockheed in 1985 as Director of Communications Systems Engineering in the company's Space Systems Division. Over the next 10 years, he advanced through positions of increasing responsibility, including Vice President, MILSTAR Program; Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Advanced Government and Commercial Systems; and President of the Space Systems Division. Smith also served as President and Chairman at Lockheed Khrunichev Energia, a Proton rocket joint venture with Russian industry.

Prior to joining the Lockheed Corporation, Smith served with the Central Intelligence Agency, first as chief engineer of a CIA ground-station facility, and later as division manager responsible for program management of classified large-scale engineering projects. Smith holds a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Northeastern University in Boston and is a graduate of executive programs at Dartmouth and Stanford universities. He is a member of the Security Affairs Support Association, Association of the United States Army, Association of Old Crows, and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.

" Where Space Means Business TM"

Albert E. Smith

Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company



Albert E. Smith is Executive Vice President of the \$5.8 billion Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company and also an officer of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. He was promoted in September 1999 from his previous position as President of Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, one of the principal operating elements comprising Space Systems.

Before joining Space systems, Smith was President of Lockheed Martin Aerospace Electronics Systems, which includes Sanders, Space Electronics & Communications, Fairchild Systems, and IR Imaging Systems. He had served as President of the Sanders division before his promotion to Aerospace Electronic systems.

Smith joined Lockheed in 1985 as Director of Communications Systems Engineering in the company's Space Systems Division. Over the next 10 years, he advanced through positions of increasing responsibility, including Vice President, MILSTAR Program; Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Advanced Government and Commercial Systems; and President of the Space Systems Division. Smith also served as President and Chairman at Lockheed Khrunichev Energia, a Proton rocket joint venture with Russian industry.

Prior to joining the Lockheed Corporation, Smith served with the Central Intelligence Agency, first as chief engineer of a CIA ground-station facility, and later as division manager responsible for program management of classified large-scale engineering projects.

Smith holds a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Northeastern University in Boston and is a graduate of executive programs at Dartmouth and Stanford universities. He is a member of the Security Affairs Support Association, Association of the United States Army, Association of Old Crows, and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.

Headquartered in Denver, Colorado, Lockheed Martin Space Systems is one of four principal business areas within the Lockheed Martin Corporation. A world-class value provider of space and missile systems, Space Systems' primary product lines encompass strategic and defensive missile systems, satellites, space transportation systems and ground systems. Space Systems has also played a role in every U.S. planetary mission. Target markets for Space Systems' broad range of products are defense, classified, civil, commercial telecommunications and remote sensing. Space Systems

generated sales of \$5.8 billion in 1999 and employs nearly 22,000 dedicated men and women through its three primary operating units.

Please send any technical questions or comments to our [Interactive Media Department](#).

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snowflake

March 29, 2001 6:31 PM

TO: ^{MLC} ExecSec ^{3/30/01}
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Revised Text for DCI Letter

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Undersecretary
of the Air Force

You requested a summary of the duties and responsibilities for the Director, NRO position. I have attached such a summary.

I have also included some attributes of a candidate that seem to make sense to us.

As you know, this is critically important to our efforts here at DoD.

Our folks here have been visiting with Mr. Al Smith for the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, NRO. I have attached his background sheet. I am sure many of your colleagues know him.

I would appreciate your getting back to me with your thoughts as to the duties and qualifications for the Director, NRO and also any observations you may have with respect to Mr. Smith. We have not formally put him forward at the White House as yet and will await hearing from you.

Thanks.

Attachment:
As stated

DHR:dh
032901-26

11-L-0059/OSD/5661



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Attached is a Duties and Qualifications summary for the Director, NRO position.

As you know, space and intelligence operations are at the center of our building for the future. We are fortunate that Al Smith has ~~accepted~~ the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force, including the responsibilities of Director, NRO. I've attached Al's bio, but I am sure many of your colleagues know him.

I would appreciate your support for this position so that I may forward it to the White House. Please let me know.

Attachment:
As stated

judicious that he would accept

it affected

vital to our efforts here or DOD

any to be your way here. If you agree he





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Coordination on Recommendation to the President for position of
Director, NRO

Attached is a Duties and Qualifications summary for the Director, NRO position.

As you well know, our space and intelligence operations are at the center of our building for the future. We have been fortunate to attract Al Smith to accept the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force, including the responsibilities of Director NRO. His bio is also attached, but I am sure many of your colleagues know Al.

I would appreciate your support for this position so that I may forward it to the White House. Please let me know.

Attachment:
As stated



11-L-0059/OSD/5663



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 30 2001

Israel

Honorable Shimon Peres
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister
of the State of Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Shimon:

Congratulations on your appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister in Israel's 29th government. Israel will benefit greatly from the wisdom you have accumulated over more than five decades of public service.

Your vast experience will be a valuable asset in the ongoing effort to bring peace and stability to the region. I look forward to working with you as our two nations continue our long-standing cooperation on matters of mutual interest.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

30 Mar 01

snowflake

March 29, 2001 7:15 AM

TO: ~~ExecSec~~ *MIC 3/29/01*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Shimon Peres

MIC 3/29/01
3:00 PM
3/29/01

Have I written Shimon Peres on his new post as Foreign Minister?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032901-I

MIC 3/29/01
Peres

MR SECRETARY

Proposed LETTER IS Attached

Respect fully

Mmic

11-L-0059/OSD/5665

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Rudy de Leon R

Re: Inspectors General

Mr. Secretary,

You asked the question as to how many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities.

Acting General Counsel Dan Dell'Orto has prepared the attached sheet that lists the organizations that have an inspector general.

020 IG

3 APR 0

INSPECTORS GENERAL IN DoD

REQUIRED BY LAW: 4

- DoD Inspector General – Inspector General Act of 1978
- Military Departments:
 - Inspector General of the Army – 10 U.S.C. § 3020
 - Naval Inspector General – 10 U.S.C. § 5020
 - Inspector General of the Air Force – 10 U.S.C. § 8020

NOT REQUIRED BY LAW: Unknown

- Within each of the Military Departments, in addition to the statutory Inspector General, there are subordinate Inspectors General below the Department level, down to the local level. These subordinate Inspectors General are not required by law.
- Intelligence Agencies listing an Office of Inspector General
 - National Imagery and Mapping Agency
 - Defense Intelligence Agency
 - National Reconnaissance Office
- Other Defense Agencies/DOD Field Activities listing an Office of Inspector General
 - Defense Commissary Agency
 - Defense Information Systems Agency
 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency

f

snowflake

March 28, 2001 10:45 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Inspectors General

How many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities?

DHR:dh
032801-1

11-L-0059/OSD/5668

U07228 /01

snowflake

March 28, 2001 10:45 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Inspectors General

How many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities?

DHR:dh
032801-1

02016

28 MAR 01

11-L-0059/OSD/5669

U07228 /01

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Rudy de Leon R

Re: Inspectors General

Mr. Secretary,

You asked the question as to how many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities.

Acting General Counsel Dan Dell'Orto has prepared the attached sheet that lists the organizations that have an inspector general.

020 IG

3 APR 0


INSPECTORS GENERAL IN DoD

REQUIRED BY LAW: 4

- DoD Inspector General – Inspector General Act of 1978
- Military Departments:
 - Inspector General of the Army – 10 U.S.C. § 3020
 - Naval Inspector General – 10 U.S.C. § 5020
 - Inspector General of the Air Force – 10 U.S.C. § 8020

NOT REQUIRED BY LAW: Unknown

- Within each of the Military Departments, in addition to the statutory Inspector General, there are subordinate Inspectors General below the Department level, down to the local level. These subordinate Inspectors General are not required by law.
- Intelligence Agencies listing an Office of Inspector General
 - National Imagery and Mapping Agency
 - Defense Intelligence Agency
 - National Reconnaissance Office
- Other Defense Agencies/DOD Field Activities listing an Office of Inspector General
 - Defense Commissary Agency
 - Defense Information Systems Agency
 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 10 2001

The Honorable David L. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
GAO Building
Room 7100
441 G. Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Walker:

I talked to Pete Aldridge and he's willing to do it if
and when he is confirmed.

Regards,

334

10 Apr 01

U07277 /01

snowflake

April 7, 2001 4:29 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

TO FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Commission on Outsourcing

Walker from GAO says there is a statutory commission on outsourcing, and he is anxious to have you serve on it for the Department.

It is your call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040701-1

*Don
This is important.
I'll do it.
Pete*



THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION

TELEFAX COVER SHEET

E. C. Aldridge, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer

Date: 4/9/01

TO: **The Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld**
Secretary Of Defense
U.S. Department Of Defense

Fax: (b)(6)
Phone: [Redacted]

FROM: **Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.**
Chief Executive Officer
The Aerospace Corporation

Fax: (b)(6)
Phone: [Redacted]

CC:

No. of Pages: 2 each (including Cover Sheet)

Corporate Offices: 2350 East El Segundo Blvd., El Segundo, CA 90245-4691/Mail: P.O. Box 92957, Los Angeles, CA 90009-2957/Phone: (b)(6) Washington Corporate Office: 1000 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 2600, Arlington, VA 22209
Phone: (b)(6)

snowflake

April 9, 2001 4:10 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Inspectors General

Do we really need all these inspectors general? Why don't we have one for the Department of Defense and one for each of the services and let them handle the rest of these activities?

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/3 Memo from Mr. de Leon

DHR:dh
040901-48

OIG

9 Apr 01

U07297 11/01

snowflake

March 28, 2001 10:45 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Inspectors General

How many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities?

DHR:dh
032X01-1

11-L-0059/OSD/5676

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
From: Rudy de Leon *R*
Re: Inspectors General

Mr. Secretary,

You asked the question as to how many inspectors general does the Department of Defense have in all of its various entities.

Acting General Counsel Dan **Dell'Orto** has prepared the attached sheet that lists the organizations that have an inspector general.

11-L-0059/OSD/5677

INSPECTORS GENERAL IN DoD

REQUIRED BY LAW: 4

- DoD Inspector General – Inspector General Act of 1978
- Military Departments:
 - Inspector General of the Army – 10 U.S.C. § 3020
 - Naval Inspector General – 10 U.S.C. § 5020
 - Inspector General of the Air Force – 10 U.S.C. § 8020

NOT REQUIRED BY LAW: Unknown

- Within each of the Military Departments, in addition to the statutory Inspector General, there are subordinate Inspectors General below the Department level, down to the local level. These subordinate Inspectors General are not required by law.
- Intelligence Agencies listing an Office of Inspector General
 - National Imagery and Mapping Agency
 - Defense Intelligence Agency
 - National Reconnaissance Office
- Other Defense Agencies/DOD Field Activities listing an Office of Inspector General
 - Defense Commissary Agency
 - Defense Information Systems Agency
 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

MAY 3 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Dual Absence

If the Chairman or the Service Chiefs intend to be absent from the Washington area, their Vice/Assistant should remain. In instances where there will be a dual absence, please notify the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the OSD Executive Secretary.

In the event of a dual absence, the Chairman and Vice Chairman should limit their travel so at least one remains in CONUS, could return to the Pentagon within 4 hours, and has access to secure communications. The Service Chiefs/Commandant and their Vice Chiefs/Assistant Commandant should coordinate their travel so that at least one remains in CONUS and has access to secure communications.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. M. A. [unclear]".



U08239 /01

11-L-0059/OSD/5679



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HASSEEN

MAY - 3 2001

5/3
0920

2001 APR 27 AM 10:05

GENERAL COUNSEL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD
HITTING SECTION
MAY 2001

FROM: ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL *JD 4/26/01*
(Prepared by Mr. James Smyser, OGC(P&HP), (b)(6))

MT
4/20/01

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
and Dual Absences of Senior Military Officers – ACTION
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To Obtain the President's Designation of Acting Chairman Pursuant
to title 10, United States Code, section 154(e), and to Establish
Departmental Policy with Regard to Dual Absences of Senior
Military Officers.

DISCUSSION: ,

- CJCS requests that the President designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to become Acting Chairman in the Absence of the CJCS and Vice Chairman (VCJCS) on a rotating calendar basis (Tab A).
- In absence of JCS member, a Service Vice Chief (Assistant Commandant for Marine Corps (CMC)) would assume Acting Chairman duties.
- CJCS also requests that SECDEF establish policy that requires VCJCS and the Vice Service Chiefs/Assistant CMC to remain in the Washington area when the principal is absent and establishes restrictions on dual absences of both senior officers for a Service.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman at Tab B and sign the memorandum at Tab C that promulgates guidance on dual absences.

Attachments:
As stated

SECDEF DECISION:
APPROVED _____
DISAPPROVED _____
OTHER _____

U08239 /01

W00546 01





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1162-01
19 April 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e (Enclosure A), state that the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices.

a. To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, recommend the President appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule is absent or disabled, responsibilities fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

b. These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

2. Guidance with regard to dual absences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Service Chiefs and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is also enclosed.

3. Request your signature at Enclosure B forwarding the proposed memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman and at Enclosure C promulgating guidance on dual absences.


HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

(A)GC _____

(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare:

(2) The Chairman shall include in each such report recommendations for such changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation as may be necessary to achieve the changes in the assignment of functions recommended by the Chairman.

(Added P.L. 99-433, § 201, Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1007.)

§ 154. Vice Chairman

(a) APPOINTMENT.—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR APPOINTMENT.—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) as a general or flag officer.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) DUTIES.—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(d) FUNCTION AS ACTING CHAIRMAN.—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

(e) SUCCESSION AFTER CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman or in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

(f) GRADE AND RANK.—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except

Enclosure A

snowflake

April 28, 2001 4:41 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman

I am ready to sign these papers from General Shelton if you are comfortable with them.

Thanks.

Attach.

CJCS memo to SecDef re: "Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences"

DHR:dh
04280 1-2 1

11-L-0059/OSD/5683

U08397 /01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 4/16

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

TO: SECDEF _____

SUBJ: ① DESIGNATION OF ACTING CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
② DUAL ABSENCES

SIR.

— GEN SHELTON SENT THESE WORKING
DRAFTS FOR YOUR REVIEW.

— REGARDING YOUR QUESTIONS ON
ORDER OF SUCCESSION IN THE PENTAGON
TO DAN DELL'ORTO, — DAN STILL
IS WORKING WITH OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL AT JUSTICE DEPT. TO RECEIVE
AN OFFICIAL REPLY.

YR

11-L-0059/OSD/5684

J/SMA 4/16

Working Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences

1. Title '10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e (Enclosure A), state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices.

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b. These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

2. Guidance with regard to dual absences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Service Chiefs and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is also enclosed.

3. Request your signature at Enclosure B forwarding the proposed memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman and at Enclosure C promulgating guidance on dual absences.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.

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and

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(e) SUCCESSION AFTER CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman or in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

(f) GRADE AND RANK.—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e, state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the **office**. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both **offices**.

To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, I recommend you appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances,

I recommend you approve these procedures by signing the attached memorandum.

Attachment:
As stated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby designate the following officers to act as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the circumstances described in section 154 (e) of title 10, United States Code, during the period indicated in CY 2001 and in succeeding calendar years:

<u>Period of Designation:</u>	<u>Designated Officer:</u>
1 January to 31 March	Chief of Naval Operations
1 April to 30 June	Chief of Staff, US Army
1 July to 30 September	Commandant of the Marine Corps
1 October to 31 December	Chief of Staff, US Air Force

If the member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next member in the rotation. In the event no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities will be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE **JOINT** CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subject: Dual Absence

If you intend to be absent from the Washington area, your Vice/Assistant should remain. If both you and your Vice/Assistant intend to be absent, please notify the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the OSD Executive Secretary.

In the event of a dual absence, the Chairman and Vice Chairman should limit their travel so at least one remains in **CONUS**, could return within 4 hours, and has access to secure communications. The Service Chiefs/Commandant and their Vice Chiefs/Assistant Commandant should coordinate their travel so that at least one remains in **CONUS** and has access to secure communications.

copy to:
Secretaries of the Military Departments

snowflake

March 15, 2001 3:46 PM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Order of Succession

Have Dell'Orto take a look at that order of succession in the Pentagon for me.

DHR:dh
031501-26

11-L-0059/OSD/5690

March 15, 2001 12:13 PM

SUBJECT: Order of Succession

I want to review the order of succession for the Pentagon and be told to what extent it is statutory and to what extent we can propose changes to it.

DHR:dh
031501-12

11-L-0059/OSD/5691

JH/26

snowflake

April 25, 2001 2:51 PM

TO: Chris Williams

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mark Stokes

I definitely will not detail Mark Stokes out of OSD. I want him here-he is excellent.

←—————→

DHR:dh
042501-15

MIC 4/30/01

Gen Maria Cribbs —

For appropriate action. I had understood that Maj Stokes was set to be detailed beginning this coming Monday, April 30th.

*Chris Williams
4/27*

040 STATE

25 APR 01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

4/30/01

To: Chris William

REF: MARK STOKES ASSIGNMENT
TO STATE

SIL

GENERAL BANISTER ADVISES THAT
THE DEPUTY WILL CALL SECRETARY
ARMITAGE EARLY THIS WEEK
AND CANCEL THE MARK STOKES
ASSIGNMENT TO STATE.

Respectfully

Maia



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1 800



SECRET
2001 MAY 19 11:19:44

INFO MEMO

May 9, 2001 3:53 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 9 May 01*

SUBJECT: Facilities Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ You requested information regarding standard recapitalization rates for various types of infrastructure in order to determine costs for each of the services to meet standards over 6 to 12 years (TAB A)
- ◆ The overall DoD recapitalization rate is about 67 years
 - PA&E calculated this value independently
 - Agrees with the value provided by USD(AT&L) in the April 2001 Report to Congress on reducing the backlog of maintenance and repair facilities
 - Recapitalization rates for the Services range from 65 years for the Army to 68 years for the Marine Corps
- ◆ The current backlog is approximately \$82B
 - The cost to work off that backlog in 6 to 12 years (while maintaining the rest of the facilities at the 67-year rate) is \$10-\$20B per year above the current funding level of \$2.5B
- ◆ Privatization efforts (such as utilities), BRAC rounds, or demolition of facilities could reduce the costs substantially, but without details we can not estimate those savings
- ◆ TAB B provides details on these calculations, as well as tables of recapitalization rates and funding requirements

600
9 May 01

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, (b)(6)



U09017W/01

April 30, 2001 7:21 PM

TO: PA&E
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Recapitalization Rates

Would someone please give me the correct information as to what the proper recapitalization rates are for the various types of infrastructure the Pentagon invests in. I understand it could vary from Service to Service and from housing to other types of facilities. Let me know how you can most easily present it.

My goal is to end up being able to figure out a number for each of the Services as to what it would cost if we decided to get them to the proper recapitalization schedule in 6, 8, 10 or 12 years for, say, 75% of their infrastructure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043001-63

Facilities Recapitalization

Background

- ◆ You requested information regarding standard recapitalization rates for various types of infrastructure in order to determine costs for each of the services to meet standards over 6 to 12 years (TAB A)

Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ Facilities Recapitalization includes:
 - Replacement Projects
 - Revitalization Projects
 - Associated Planning and Design
 - Minor Construction
 - Restoration and Modernization
- ◆ Recapitalization rates were computed by PA&E from more detailed rates established by a panel of DoD experts in 1997 in connection with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These rates:
 - Provide the only comprehensive DoD rates
 - Reflect judgement of panel members-not explicitly sounded on benchmarks
- ◆ Table 1 (attached) provides detailed listings of recapitalization rates by service and by type of facility
 - The breakout by Service is:
 - Army – 65 years
 - Navy – 67 years
 - Air Force – 67 years
 - Marine Corps – 68 years
- ◆ Aggregating over all the services and facility types, the standard recapitalization rate for facilities funded through the military construction and family housing accounts is about 67 years
 - This figure agrees with the value computed by USD(AT&L) in the *Report to Congress on Identification of the Requirements to Reduce the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair of Defense Facilities* (April 2001)

Comparison versus Commercial Standards

- ◆ Table 2 (attached) provides benchmark data for comparing DoD recapitalization rates to commercial standards
 - The data represents the best that is readily available to us
- ◆ Compared to these benchmarks:
 - DoD lines up well for:
 - Medical (DoD ~ 50 years; benchmarks ~ 50 years)
 - Office buildings (DoD ~ 56 years; benchmarks ~ 36-50 years)
 - Housing (DoD ~ 42 years; benchmarks ~ 30-65 years)
 - DoD seems high for:
 - Supply facilities (DoD ~ 77 years; benchmarks ~ 32-40 years)
 - Utilities and ground improvements (DoD ~ 68 years; Army, Air Force, USMC ~ 70-75 years; benchmarks ~ 60 years)
 - Because we do not have the underlying data behind these benchmarks, we can not evaluate the reasons for these differences

Recapitalization Funding

- ◆ The steady-state cost of sustaining the department-wide recapitalization rate of 67 years is roughly **\$8B** per year (ignoring the backlog)
 - The services currently program about **\$2.5B** per year
 - The shortfall is thus about **\$5.5B** per year for the facilities in Table 1
- ◆ Because past funding has been well below the steady-state need, the recapitalization backlog is about **\$82B**
- ◆ Table 3 (attached) displays the annual additional resources needed to:
 - Either eliminate this backlog and fully fund the steady-state needs (100%)
 - Or, eliminate 75% of the backlog and fund 75% of steady-state needs
 - In the second case, the backlog would continue to grow absent measures such as a round of base closures
 - After working off the backlog, the steady-state funding would need be the **\$8B** per year discussed above (**\$5.5B** above current levels) to prevent the backlog from growing again
- ◆ Data in Table 3 suggest at least **\$10-20B** per year more would be needed to work off the backlog in the next 6 to 12 years (see caveats below)

Caveats

- ◆ In computing these funding requirements, two points must be considered:
 - Some categories of facilities should be outsourced (such as utilities), which account for over 25 percent of the replacement value of DoD facilities
 - Many facilities should be declared excess and torn down rather than replaced, which is particularly important if no additional BRAC rounds are authorized

- ◆ We can not estimate the effects of these changes without details on which facilities are affected, but the changes could be substantial

Table 1. Facility Recapitalization Rates (Years)

Infrastructure Type	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	DoD
Operations and Training	61	73	75	75	71
Maintenance and Production	50	74	50	51	59
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation	46	48	45	48	46
Supply Facilities ²	78	76	75	77	77
Medical (excluding Defense Health Program)	50	50	50	50	50
Administrative	38	50	65	61	56
Housing	65	64	62	76	68
Utilities and Ground Improvements	70	58	75	73	68
Overall	65	67	67	68	67

Notes:

1. The recapitalization rates shown are target rates and are equal to the service life of the respective facility infrastructure type.
2. Supply facilities include warehouses, hazardous material storage facilities, and ammunition storage facilities.

Variance in Infrastructure Recapitalization Rates

- A 1997 DoD panel established service life estimates for approximating 130 groupings of like facilities.
- The differences in the proportion of these facilities owned by each service produced the variance shown in the infrastructure type recapitalization rates
- For example:
 - Shipyard maintenance facilities had an estimated service life of 100 years, far greater than other maintenance facilities. The Navy has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall maintenance and production recapitalization rate is noticeably higher than the other services.
 - One group of Morale, Welfare, and Recreational facilities in the administrative infrastructure type had an estimated service life of 25 years, far lower than other administrative facilities. The Army has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall administrative recapitalization rate is noticeably lower than the other services.

Table 2. Comparison of Service Life Estimates'

	BEA² <u>(private)</u>	BEA <u>(government)</u>	Marshall <u>& Swift³</u>
Office Building	36	50	45-55 35-50
Warehouse	40	50	35-60
Hospital	48	50	35-50
Single Residence	80	na	30-65

Notes:

1. Extracted from Implementation of the Department of Defense Sustainment Model, Whitestone Research, January 2001.
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
3. Marshall and **Swift** is a commercial firm that specializes in collecting, processing, and distributing building cost data.

Table 3. Additional Annual Resource Needs to Recapitalize Facilities

		<u>6 Years</u>	<u>8 Years</u>	<u>10 Years</u>	<u>12 Years</u>
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	Navy	\$7B	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B
	Air Force	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B
	<i>Total</i>	<i>\$19B</i>	<i>\$16B</i>	<i>\$14B</i>	<i>\$12B</i>
75%	Army	\$5B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	Navy	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B
	Air Force	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	<i>Total</i>	<i>\$14B</i>	<i>\$12B</i>	<i>\$10B</i>	<i>\$9B</i>

Note: These resources are above the \$2.5B the Services are currently investing and include eliminating the backlog within the prescribed times



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



2001 MAY 11 11 09:45

INFO MEMO

May 11, 2001 5:42 PM

6000

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E

Barry D. Watts 11 May 01

SUBJECT: Facilities Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ You requested information on the infrastructure-recapitalization rates of each Service to help you determine how much each Service needs to recapitalize, for example, 75% of its infrastructure over 6, 8, 10, or 12 years (TAB A)
- ◆ We have broken the answer into three pieces (recapitalization, backlog, facilities funding), which are presented in the attached point papers
- ◆ The overall DoD recapitalization rate is about 67 years (TAB B)
 - This figure represents the average lifetime before facilities need to be restored, modernized, or replaced
 - Separately, the Department funds efforts to sustain facilities in good working order
- ◆ The current backlog of recapitalization is approximately \$82B (TAB C), but this figure has several important caveats:
 - Many of facilities are not in need of replacement and/or will never be replaced
 - Some facilities will be demolished and not replaced
 - Base closures via BRAC will reduce the inventory of facilities
 - Privatization efforts (for example, utilities) will reduce the inventory of facilities
 - We do not have the data available to estimate how much these caveats reduce the backlog figure, but we propose to start a study to examine this issue
- ◆ The cost to work off the full \$82B backlog in 6 to 12 years is \$10-\$20B per year more than the current funding level (TAB D). But, other factors must be considered:
 - This level of funding could not be executed in the near term because we could not ramp up our construction capabilities
 - The caveats discussed above serve to reduce this requirement, but we do not know how much

11MAY01



- ◆ In addition to the backlog of recapitalization, the Department's funding for sustainment is approximately \$1 .0B below requirements
- ◆ Taking these considerations into account, we recommend facilities funding be increased by **\$8B** per year in FY02, based on:
 - Sustainment funding be increased approximately \$1 B per year
 - Recapitalization funding be increased approximately **\$6.5B to \$7B** per year, which includes the cost to:
 - Reduce the recapitalization rate to 67 years (**\$2.5B to \$3B**)
 - Begin to reduce the backlog (**\$4B**)
 - Recapitalization funding levels for FY03 and beyond should be determined based on the results of a study to properly evaluate what portion of the backlog should be recapitalized
- ◆ Adding the **\$8B** to the **\$7B** currently in the program in FY02 brings the total funding to **\$15B**

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, (b)(6)

April 30, 2001 7:21 PM

TO: PA&E
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Recapitalization Rates

Would someone please give me the correct information as to what the proper recapitalization rates are for the various types of infrastructure the Pentagon invests in. I understand it could vary from Service to Service and from housing to other types of facilities. Let me know how you can most easily present it.

My goal is to end up being able to figure out a number for each of the Services as to what it would cost if we decided to get them to the proper recapitalization schedule in 6, 8, 10 or 12 years for, say, 75% of their infrastructure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043001-63

Facilities Recapitalization Rates

Definition of Recapitalization

- ◆ Facilities Recapitalization includes:
 - Restoration activities, which are repairs necessary to restore degraded facilities to useful condition
 - Modernization efforts, which are repairs and replacements necessary to implement new standards or functions for facilities
 - Replacement of facilities
 - Examples include replacing heating and air conditioning throughout a building, replacing a roof, or rewiring a building to accommodate new communication and computer capabilities

- ◆ Recapitalization is distinct from Facilities Sustainment, which is maintenance and repair necessary to keep facilities in good working order
 - Examples of sustainment include replacing filters on heating and air conditioning units, replacing a few shingles on a roof, refinishing wall surfaces

Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ Recapitalization rates were computed by PA&E from more detailed rates established by a panel of DoD experts in 1997 in connection with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These rates:
 - Provide the only comprehensive DoD rates
 - Reflect judgement of panel members-not explicitly grounded on benchmarks

- ◆ Table 1 (attached) provides detailed listings of recapitalization rates by service and by type of facility
 - The breakout by Service is:
 - Army – 65 years
 - Navy – 67 years
 - Air Force – 67 years
 - Marine Corps – 68 years

- ◆ Aggregating over all the services and facility types, the standard recapitalization rate for facilities funded through the military construction and family housing accounts is about 67 years
 - This figure agrees with the value computed by USD(AT&L) in the *Report to Congress on Identification of the Requirements to Reduce the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair of Defense Facilities* (April 200 1)

Comparison versus Commercial Standards

- ◆ Table 2 (attached) provides benchmark data for comparing **DoD** recapitalization rates to commercial standards
 - The data represents the best that is readily available to us

- ◆ Compared to these benchmarks:
 - **DoD** lines up well for:
 - Medical (**DoD** - 50 years; benchmarks - 50 years)
 - Office buildings (**DoD** - 56 years; benchmarks - 36-50 years)
 - Housing (**DoD** - 42 years; benchmarks - 30-65 years)

 - **DoD** seems high for:
 - Supply facilities (**DoD** - 77 years; benchmarks - 32-40 years)
 - Utilities and ground improvements (**DoD** - 68 years; Army, Air Force, USMC - 70-75 years; benchmarks - 60 years)

 - Because we do not have the underlying data behind these benchmarks, we can not evaluate the reasons for these differences

Table 1. Facility Recapitalization Rates (Years)

Infrastructure Type	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	DoD
Operations and Training	61	73	75	75	71
Maintenance and Production	50	74	50	51	59
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation	46	48	45	48	46
Supply Facilities ²	78	76	75	77	77
Medical (excluding Defense Health Program)	50	50	50	50	50
Administrative	38	50	65	61	56
Housing	65	64	62	76	68
Utilities and Ground Improvements	70	58	75	73	68
Overall	65	67	67	68	67

Notes:

1. The recapitalization rates shown are target rates and are equal to the service life of the respective facility infrastructure type.
2. Supply facilities include warehouses, hazardous material storage facilities, and ammunition storage facilities.

Explanation of Variance in Infrastructure Recapitalization Rates in Table 1

- A 1997 DoD panel established service life estimates for approximating 130 groupings of like facilities.
- The differences in the proportion of these facilities owned by each service produced the variance shown in the **infrastructure** type recapitalization rates
- For example:
 - Shipyard maintenance facilities had an estimated service life of 100 years, far greater than other maintenance facilities. The Navy has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall maintenance and production recapitalization rate is noticeably higher than the other services.
 - One group of Morale, Welfare, and Recreational facilities in the administrative **infrastructure type** had an estimated service life of 25 years, far lower than other administrative facilities. The Army has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall administrative recapitalization rate is noticeably lower than the other services.

Table 2. Comparison of Service Life Estimates'

	BEA² (government)	BEA	Mars hall & Swift³
Office Building	36	50	45-55
Warehouse	40	32	35-50
Church	48	50	35-60
Hospital	48	50	35-50
Single Residence	80	na	30-65

Notes:

1. Extracted **from** Implementation of the Department of Defense Sustainment Model, Whitestone Research, January 2001.
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
3. Marshall and **Swift** is a commercial firm that specializes in collecting, processing, and distributing building cost data.

Recapitalization Backlog

Backlog Definition

- ◆ The recapitalization backlog is calculated based on the Plant Replacement Value (PRV) of facilities, which is the cost to replace facilities at current standards
- ◆ The backlog calculated using PRV represents the total inventory of facilities that exceed their recommend lifetimes
 - Many of those facilities are not in need of replacement and/or will likely never be replaced (for example, buildings at Service academies or buildings of an historic nature)
 - Some facilities will be demolished and not replaced
 - Base closures via BRAC will reduce the inventory of aged facilities
 - Privatization efforts (for example, utilities) will reduce the inventory of facilities
- ◆ Other backlog calculations have been used to identify shortfalls, but those have uncertainties as well
 - The Department previously calculated the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR), but discontinued that when it become obvious the reported data was inaccurate and could not be verified
 - The Department has attempted to relate facility conditions to “C ratings” used for readiness reporting, but those calculations are based on uncertain standards and are subjective and difficult to verify

Recapitalization Funding

- ◆ The current recapitalization backlog based on PRV is approximately **\$82B**
 - The latest estimate (FY 2000) for the backlog based on BMAR is **\$49B**
 - The latest estimate (FY 2002) for calculating the funding needed to raise all facilities from C3/C4 to C2 is **\$62B**
- ◆ Using the PRV calculation, Table 3 (attached) displays the annual additional resources needed to:
 - Either eliminate this backlog and **fully fund** the steady-state needs (100%)
 - Or, eliminate 75% of the backlog and fund 75% of steady-state needs
 - In the second case, the backlog would continue to grow unless the inventory of facilities was reduced by 25% via measures such as a round of base closures

- ◆ Data in Table 3 suggest at least **\$10-20B** per year more would be needed to work off the backlog in the next 6 to 12 years
 - This level of funding could not be executed in the near term because we could not ramp up our construction capabilities

- ◆ The caveats discussed above reduce the **\$82B** requirement, but we do not know how much
 - If we assume 25% of the inventory can be reduced via BRAC or demolition, the backlog would be about **\$60B**
 - Including divestitures via privatization and accounting for facilities that will never be replaced reduces the requirement further, but we have no estimate for that level
 - If we arbitrarily assume the total reduction is 50% we are left with a backlog estimate of **\$40B**

Table 3. Additional Annual Resource Needs to Recapitalize Facilities

		<u>6 Years</u>	<u>8 Years</u>	<u>10 Years</u>	<u>12 Years</u>
100%	Army	\$6B	\$5B	\$5B	\$4B
	Navy	\$7B	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B
	Air Force	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B
	<i>Total</i>	\$19B	\$16B	\$14B	\$12B
75%	Army	\$5B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	Navy	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B
	Air Force	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	<i>Total</i>	\$14B	\$12B	\$10B	\$9B

Note: These resources are above the \$2.58 the Services are currently investing and include eliminating the backlog within the prescribed times

Facilities Funding Levels

Sustainment Funding

- ◆ The requirement for sustainment funding is about **\$5.5B** to **\$6.0B** per year
- ◆ The Department currently spends about **\$4.5B** to **\$5.0B** per year on sustainment, leaving a shortfall of about **\$1 .0B** per year
- ◆ Historically, funding for facility sustainment has been a bill-payer during budget execution, because base commanders can readily move this O&M funding to meet other “higher-priority” needs
 - Any decision to fund additional facility sustainment efforts should recognize this funding migration issue

Recapitalization Steady-state Funding

- ◆ The steady-state cost of maintaining the department-wide recapitalization rate of 67 years for 75% of the inventory is roughly **\$5B** per year (ignoring the backlog)
- ◆ The Department currently spends about **\$2.0B** to **\$2.5B** per year on recapitalization, leaving a shortfall of about **\$2.5B** to **\$3.0B** per year

Recapitalization Backlog: Funding

- ◆ The cost of funding the backlog depends on the perceived backlog level and the time period for buying this out
- ◆ Accounting for the considerations that could reduce the backlog to **\$40B** and spreading this out over 10 years, the estimated annual cost to buy out the backlog would be **\$4B**

Total Facilities Funding

- ◆ Adding each of these components, the annual shortfall is approximately **\$8B**

snowflake

TO: Jackie Arends
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

I am told that (b)(6) has a resume in to get a job, I think in the Under Secretary for Policy and Readiness shop.

Can you dig that out for me? Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.20

U10038 /01

11-L-0059/OSD/5713

02045P

29MAY01

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: Attached

600

Attached is a paper on Managing The Pentagon from 1989. I have no idea who wrote it, but it has some interesting thoughts, although somewhat out of date.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.34
Attach. (Managing the Pentagon 1/31/89)

U10134 /01

29MAY01

11-L-0059/OSD/5714

f DOD 7

Date: January 31, 1989

Subject MANAGING THE PENTAGON

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum identifies several issues that you should resolve early because they affect the charters of OSD offices and the quality of support for your decision processes. Separate sections lay out aspects of the management problems you face, stress the importance of strategy development, describe the operation of three separate decision processes that you inherit, and raise issues for your consideration. My recommendations are included where appropriate.

Without knowing how familiar each of you is with this material, I have tried to provide minimal background. I would, of course, be pleased to discuss any **of** these matters in more depth at your convenience.

THE PROBLEM

The new Administration has staked a great deal on good management of the Pentagon. Yet the country could be shortchanged by the very focus on cutting the budget and reforming weapons procurement that many inside the Administration and out are calling for. It all depends on how it's done.

The new Pentagon management team is being called upon to deliver better value for the taxpayer and to restore confidence in the integrity of defense management. Yet even this understates the true challenge. If the President accepts level or even declining real defense spending, the cuts in currently approved forces and programs must be very large.

This acceptance would be grounded more in domestic political reality than in an admittedly uncertain assessment of the U.S. world role. Thus, diving right into budget cutbacks would be like ordering materials for a new house before the architect has drawn the plans.

A thoroughgoing reassessment of our national security needs and the means to attain them is needed to guide the force restructuring, the reformed procurements and the budget cuts. The real job of defense management is to match a **strategy**, and the military capabilities needed to carry it out, with a defense **program** made up of forces and weapons that can be provided at budget levels that Congress can be persuaded to make available.

Making this match means reassessing objectives, evaluating means, and searching out more efficient ways of doing business. It takes literally hundreds of decisions about policies, forces, weapons, personnel, organizations, operations, and **timing**. To pull it off, the Secretary must control the Pentagon agenda. The passive management style in vogue recently--setting budget limits for the Services and then reacting to their spending, proposals--can't lead to a balance of strategy, program, and budget. ✓

The task of matching strategy, program and budget is further complicated by two realities of the Pentagon. First, agreement rarely exists on specific objectives. Second, all the players will **not** always be on your **team**, including **some** appointees of the Administration and **some** senior military officers. Yet, more than usual, the national interest requires clear policy direction and civilian/military teamwork at the Pentagon.

THE PRIMACY OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Why is rethinking defense strategy so important, and how should you see that it gets, done?

Stripped to its fundamentals, managing the defense program is about preparing for the use of military force. That stark realization guides everything else.

Military force is only one instrument of policy. But the credible use of force is the only constant and effective instrument of order in a fractious world. The U.S. has a special role as global keeper of order. Our capacity to play this role far outstrips that of any like-minded country. ✓

For this role to be credible, the U.S. must be willing to use force, in concert with allies and security partners when possible, unilaterally when necessary. To accord with American values and secure the support of the American people, any use of force must be thoughtful and appropriate. And that requires instruments--military forces--designed and employed with the ends and circumstances of their potential use in mind.

This is what a defense strategy means--defining U.S. interests and objectives, thinking through the circumstances that could threaten them to the point of calling upon the use of U.S. military power, devising the military capabilities needed for each case, and deciding the **mix** of forces and deployments that will best deter hostile acts against U.S. interests, or attain U.S. security objectives should deterrence fail. A defense strategy should fit coherently into an overall national security strategy, which means close coordination is needed during its development at the level of the National Security Council and some key

decisions will have to be made by the President. Nonetheless, the Secretary of Defense has the **management** challenge of preparing the nation's military capabilities to support the defense strategy.

While it may be obvious that no force structure, and defense budget to go with it, can be adequately justified to Congress and the American people unless it derives from a thoughtful and coherent strategy, consider your day-to-day management challenge if you were forced to operate without one. Along comes a key decision about a new major weapon system pushed hard by the Chief or Secretary of a Service. You might say to either of them, "I'm worried that your system is too costly and won't work as well as advertised." The Chief or Secretary could respond, "We know how to solve all the remaining technical problems. The system will have several impressive capabilities. The requirement for it was approved years ago. Maybe we can get the cost down some, but we can't put a price tag on our security. Besides, the costs are low for the first couple of **years.**" What happens next? Perhaps your staff can uncover a technical Achilles heel in the design, or produce independent cost estimates **you'd** be willing to stand on. Even so, an aura of arbitrariness will creep into decisions based primarily on cutting and fitting the defense program, with many **such** pieces, to a fixed budget. The perception of arbitrary, budget-driven decisions will undermine the credibility of defense management, which partly explains the problems Secretary Weinberger had when the budget stopped growing and his ambitious program had to be cut back.

How much better if you were able to say, "That system won't add very much to the capabilities needed to carry out our strategy. Besides, there are several other ways to skin that **same** cat (conduct the mission) that give us more capability for the money." This way you provoke **an** assessment carried out in terms of national needs rather than Service preferences, greatly increasing **your** ability to **shape** the Pentagon agenda and generate the kind of information needed to support your decisions.

Therein lies an important principle of defense management and a key underlying design criterion for the management systems which serve the Secretary of Defense. If you are to exercise your authority as required by law, control the Pentagon agenda, and produce a credible defense program, you will have to see to it that issues are framed for decision in terms that put you in the driver's seat. This means dealing with defense missions that often cut across Service lines in pursuit of national objectives. Then you are managing a national exercise in which each Service is a part. But the **DoD** is not organized in mission terms. If decisions get framed in Army or **Navy** or Air Force terms, the Service will clearly speak with greater authority than the Secretary in any debate about the merits. Obviously, dividing budget changes by three to give each Service its "share" of any increase or cut, though frequent practice in the Pentagon, abdicates the responsibilities entrusted to the Secretary of Defense. To discharge these responsibilities, you have

to get the bureaucracy to play on the national team, not let them call the shots.

The kind of questions that should dominate the Secretary's agenda flow from the elements of strategy and missions. For an illustrative though certainly not exhaustive list, see Enclosure 1. While all are good questions, this list offers just a few examples of the many questions that have to be formulated and answered in the process of developing a strategy with a matching set of force plans and capabilities.

Strategy development must come first because efficiency in the defense program depends in the first instance on ensuring that only those forces and weapons are budgeted which fit the strategy and provide needed capabilities. But delivering better value for the taxpayer takes more. New weapons should actually work in the field and not be "gold-plated". (This is discussed in somewhat greater depth below). Substantial efficiencies can also be found in different ways of "doing business." A few examples are listed in Enclosure 2. These "macro-efficiency" issues don't arise from strategy development and won't bubble up from the bureaucracy. You will have to create mechanisms to raise and consider such issues, either through the ongoing resource allocation decision process or by special task force. Decisions will be difficult, implementation even harder, and most of the savings will come several years in the future. Yet, attacking these kinds of issues offers the only real hope of lowering the defense budget without cutting needed military capabilities, or of getting more capability from any given budget levels.

THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

In dealing with these questions, and the **myriad details** of systems and budgets, how do the Secretary and Deputy actually manage the Department? You get this done through three distinct decision processes that are often confused in public discussion. One gives strategic direction to the JCS and the Commands to guide the organization and employment of existing forces, often called contingency planning. It has a short-term orientation with the focus on preparing to use existing forces, if necessary. A second provides for future capabilities and is usually referred to as the budget process, or the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS). It covers up to 5 or 6 fiscal years at a time. The third, usually called the acquisition process, manages the development and procurement of new weapons systems. It often must look out 7-10 years, sometimes longer.

Both the Packard Commission's recommendations and the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols defense reform legislation speak to some aspects of each of these areas. These remove any doubt that the Secretary is charged with controlling, rationalizing, and interrelating these three areas of defense decision making. The Congress seems determined to do

more in the future to hold the **DoD** leadership accountable in all three domains.

Some aspects of this heightened attention are new. Contingency planning--defined broadly to include the assignment of missions and forces to the Commands, planning for military operations, the preparation of crisis management capabilities, and the assurance of sound procedures and mechanisms for the command and control of the military forces--is a time-honored professional military discipline. It has been largely under the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) since the Department of Defense was formed in 1947. A 1958 law moved the Secretary into the chain-of-command under the President, and took the **JCS** out. Since then, the Unified and Specified Commands (whose Commanders-in-Chief are called, **CINCs**) report to the Secretary, through the JCS (now the Chairman of the JCS since Goldwater-Nichols) only by the Secretary's assignment. But over the years, Secretaries of Defense have rarely devoted much effort and attention to contingency planning, except in the area of command and control of the nuclear forces.

What's new is the insistence that the Secretary take this on. Political guidance is a key ingredient of strategic direction for the employment of the forces. The professional military of a free society expect political guidance, even if a few do not welcome it. Guidance is needed on such topics as--the role expected of other nations; what warning assumptions to use; when to plan for mobilization or make do with active forces; where it is essential to avoid casualties, POWs, or collateral damage; assumptions about base access and overflight rights in various circumstances; how much risk to run of provoking the involvement of other powers; the relative priorities of different commitments; which cases must be handled simultaneously; what geographical constraints will have to be respected. These and other elements should be covered in your operational guidance to the JCS and the **CINCs**, as a basis for their development and your review of contingency plans, command and control, and preparations for crisis management.

The PPBS was established by Secretary **McNamara** in the early 1960s, shortly after the Secretary's power over the purse was strengthened by that same 1958 Act. The basic idea was to organize into missions terms the Secretary's decisions on the programs of the Services, so that alternatives and tradeoffs could be considered on a meaningful basis. The process was modified by Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard in 1969 with the addition of strategy and fiscal guidance from the Secretary to establish direction for set limits on the Services' program proposals, at the same time shifting much of the initiative for program development back to the Services. Secretary Brown added a Defense Resources Board chaired by the Deputy Secretary. The resulting process remains today the Secretary's principal management mechanism for assessing the needs for military capabilities, evaluating the alternative means for achieving them, and deciding the content of the

*What's new
Mech to build
the program*

defense program and the budget, The PPBS captures all decisions which affect the defense budget and, thereby, provides the only unifying context for **resource** allocation decisions. The recent reform efforts have mainly exhorted the Secretary to use the process to its full potential in making strategy, forces, and budgets "match-up."

The acquisition process received major attention from the Packard Commission and Goldwater-Nichols. The function has been reorganized at the Pentagon and more emphasis has been placed on adhering to good management practices in weapons development and procurement, streamlining the bureaucracy, and clarifying lines of authority and accountability. Two years later, many observers believe that the intended improvements are barely discernible; there is certainly no evidence yet that program outcomes are better. Coincidentally, concern about the quality of acquisition management has been heightened by disclosures of alleged illegal behavior by **some** contractors and a few Service civilian officials.

The top management process for weapons acquisition directly under the Secretary has not materially changed from that established by Deputy Secretary Packard about 1970. The overall process is intended to ensure that acquisition projects are initiated and conducted to satisfy mission needs rather than generating technical solutions in search of a problem, i.e. succumbing to "technology-push." A Defense Acquisition Board oversees each individual **system**, reviewing each one at a series of milestones tied to the stages of system development and production." At each decision point, the **system** managers are supposed to demonstrate certain standards of technical progress and management practice before being authorized to proceed into the next phase. Good management **practices** such as unambiguous objectives tied to mission needs, prototyping and hardware demonstration, competition in its various forms, independent cost **estimates**, extensive realistic testing before high-rate production, special procedures for critical subsystems (e.g. engines and complex electronics), and accountability in contracting are frequently encouraged but not always practiced,

Because the acquisition decision process is necessarily organized around individual systems, even when considering trade-offs with competing **systems**, and operates on a schedule tied to events in that particular **system** life-cycle, it does not easily maintain a broader perspective on strategy and competing demands for resources. It is the right forum for ensuring the efficiency and integrity of "how we buy" defense systems; it is not a good forum for deciding "what we buy." The PPBS fills that latter bill.

You will have to delineate more clearly within the Department the major responsibilities for "how we buy" and clarify their relationship to the PPBS. **At the same time**, any efforts you make to stamp out illegal behavior can't be allowed to interfere with the good management practices needed to develop and procure effective weapons at affordable

prices. And the discipline to adhere to those good practices needs to be strengthened.

Fortunately, as you undertake to manage all of this, you have lots of help available--from the Chairman, the **CINCs**, the Services, and from your own staff. Unfortunately, not all of them will be able all the **time** to work a given issue from your broader perspective, or even be willing to address **some** issues you will consider important--in **some** cases because of bureaucrat-ic bias, in others due to lack of knowledge or access. Most of the proposals for forces and weapon **systems** will continue to **come** from the Services. It is much harder to get a Service to adopt a program it didn't invent than it is to refuse their proposals. So you will need help in developing guidance to increase and shape the options available from the Services, in assessing options on their merits in the proper mission context, and in making the tradeoffs necessary to fit within an overall budget constraint.

One important and recently strengthened source of help is the Chairman of the JCS. The Goldwater-Nichols Law made the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary and the President, instead of the JCS as a committee. It also added a Vice Chairman to strengthen the cross-Service or "**joint**" perspective and chartered the Chairman to advise the Secretary on resource-constrained force plans and on strategy. The current Chairman and the new Vice Chairman have already begun to perform parts of their **new** charter. It **will** be up to you to manage this upgraded resource to exploit its full potential. This will take supervision and careful tasking to bring the Chairman fully into deliberations on resource-constrained plans and programs. Now cooperative the JCS will be in supporting Secretarial management of contingency planning remains untested. Overall, the experience of the first couple of years with JCS reform suggests that you could get more help from this source than did your predecessors.

Like your predecessors, you will have to depend **most** heavily on your own staff, and also on the Service Secretaries, for the civilian support you need. **The Service Secretaries** can **be** of great assistance in providing insights into the thinking behind Service proposals, offering independent evaluations, advancing your interests with their Service, providing political advice, and implementing your decisions. It will be your challenge to keep them on your team since pressures are strong to take on the coloration of their Service. For help that consistently adopts your perspective, you will have to count on your own staff. You can improve the quality of this support by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of certain parts of the OSD, selecting well-qualified individuals, and insisting that they build up staff competencies in selected areas.

DECIDING THE ROLES OF OSD OFFICES

The new position of Undersecretary for Acquisition (USD/A) is by law the third-ranking official in the DoD. Recommended by the Packard Commission, and enacted into law in 1986, this position has overall responsibility for the acquisition process. The Secretary will need to make clear that the USD/A has complete responsibility and authority over major systems development and procurement with respect to "how we buy", and that he is one of the key advisors to the Secretary on "what we buy." He has line responsibility for management of the basic research, advanced **technology** and management support portions of RDT&E funds (so called 6.1, 6.2, 6.3a, and 6.5 monies). And the offices responsible for development testing, procurement policy, logistics, and **C³I**, as well as the Director of **Defense** Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the DNA, also report directly to him. Thus, the Undersecretary should be delegated responsibility for the quality and integrity of all development and procurement projects, for the policy guidance controlling all other acquisition activities, for the defense technology base, and for the management of the RDT&E funds placed under his care. He should control the milestone decisions for major **systems**, subject to funding having been made available through the PPES and appropriate prior consultation with one of you. You will need to clarify and reissue the charter of the USD/A.

One glaring gap in the USD/A's authority arises from the Congressional insistence on having the office of **operational test** and evaluation report to the Secretary and the Congress, but not the USD/A. The **OT&E** function is an integral part of the development process. It must be kept independent of the Services that develop the **weapons** systems, but should not be detached from an otherwise integrated acquisition authority. You should consider urging Congress to change the law so that OT&E works under the day-to-day supervision of the USD/A, with direct access to the Secretary, and with independent OT&E reports available to Congress.

✓ The Undersecretary for Policy (USD/P) is technically the fourth ranking official of the DoD. In reality, because his is a staff office with minimal line authority, and because his pay grade is one notch lower, his stature relative to the USD/A and the Service Secretaries is somewhat less. Nonetheless, the USD/P is the principal staff arm of the Secretary on political-military operations. This office should be assigned the role of helping you manage the contingency planning process. The USD/P, working closely with the JCS and the Commands, should develop political guidance for you to issue, and should be given authority to review on your behalf all aspects of contingency planning, command arrangements, and control of the forces. You will have to insist that the JCS and the **CINCs** provide the USD/P adequate access to their plans and data. The USD/P would also continue responsibilities for the DoD role in arms control negotiations, relations with allies and

security partners, programs of security assistance and arms sales, intelligence policy, and net assessment. You might consider renaming the office--either Under Secretary for Operations or Under Secretary for Political Military Affairs would be more properly descriptive of its function. ✓

The PPBS can be managed by two offices reporting to the Secretary, much as has been the **case at times** in the past. The office of program analysis and evaluation, with a broadened charter (and appropriately renamed), would be responsible for the planning and programming phases; the comptroller would manage the budget phase. Responsibility for planning future capabilities and analyzing program alternatives should be consolidated in PA&E, which could then be renamed Assistant Secretary for Planning & Programming or Planning & Analysis. A full resource analysis capability should be reconstituted, including responsibility for analyzing manpower and logistics requirements. This will allow the "macro-efficiency" issues to be identified and examined. The office should have an unconstrained analytical charter and you will want to ensure it has access to all needed information. This office will be the only substantive staff supporting you that can stand entirely clear of operational and line responsibilities. Since it has no axe to grind, it can adopt and sustain your point of view. If it also provides high quality analysis of the issues, and polices the analytical quality produced by others, it will be invaluable to you (as it has been in **some** earlier administrations). ✓

If you plan on a division of responsibilities under which the Secretary concentrates on policy and strategy, and the Deputy Secretary on operational management, one possible allocation would be for Secretary Tower to supervise the contingency planning process, while assigning supervision of the PPBS and the **USD/A's** management of the acquisition process to Deputy Secretary Atwood. YOU would then need to work closely together over the planning phase in PPBS so that Secretarial thinking leads strategy development and assures its coordination with **contingency planning**. This arrangement would also leave Secretary Tower more **time** for outside duties involving the Congress and the White House, and for NSC-level issues such as **arms** control. He would have to make it clear that the **USD/A** reported to Deputy Secretary Atwood.

In the final analysis, managing the Pentagon, like any other enterprise, comes down to people. No amount of organizational clarification or staff work can substitute for intellectual leadership and management discipline from the top. The best organization and process can't ensure good outcomes, but can **make it** easier for management to produce good outcomes.

Defense management will not be judged only on whether the program can be cut and fit to a politically feasible budget level or abuses are reduced in the procurement of weapons systems. It will matter whether the defense leadership can describe the U.S. role in the world, define how military capabilities contribute to that role and to U.S. security, and explain why the forces and weapons in the budget are an effective and efficient way to provide the needed capabilities. I hope this memo makes **some** small contribution toward that broader end. ✓

ENCLOSURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE QUESTIONS FOR STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

What should be the future role and shape of the NATO alliance, especially if the Soviet threat is reduced? Could a stronger European role be specified?

If conventional arms reductions, or NATO force enhancements, could relieve somewhat the threat of short-warning attack in Europe, what are the implications for the levels, deployment, and readiness of NATO forces?

What can be realistically done to counter a possible Soviet invasion of Iran or Turkey? What forces or systems would be employed? Given the likelihood of such an event, how much should the U.S. program for this eventuality?

What is the role of and need for forward-deployed U.S. ground forces in the Pacific? Can some reductions be made from historical levels and, if so, what compensating adjustments in U.S. or local forces would be prudent?

For what missions do we plan to use the carrier task forces of the Navy? Could some be accomplished by modern, long-range, high accuracy weapons instead? With what effect on the required size of the carrier force?

In what scenarios would the U.S. use the levels of forcible entry forces--Marines over the beach, paratroopers, special **assault units--currently** in our force structure?

What scenarios can be specified in which current or programmed forces would be inadequate to protect U.S. interests? What operational capabilities are missing? How could they be provided?

What is our base-access plan world-wide? What capabilities would hedge against base denial? What opportunities could the U.S. pursue to increase **our** ability to operate wherever we might need to in the world?

In each scenario, what role do we expect our security partners to play? How should their force planning be coordinated with our own?

Given the air-superiority forces in the Air Force and Navy, should the Marine air arm be focused on ground attack and troop transport? If good for the Marines, should the Air Force give over its close air support mission to the Army?

- In the face of future threats and changing missions, do we need a different Navy, one less tied to carriers and blue water operations, with more emphasis on submarines, and with surface ships designed to operate in circumstances more -like those of the Persian Gulf campaign?

Does the current widespread deployment of nuclear weapons on Naval ships serve U.S. long term interests? Will our Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy hold up? What alternative nuclear weapons deployment patterns should be considered, together with or separate from U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements?

- In both the conventional and nuclear realms, how can our arms control planning and force improvements be made complementary and mutually reinforcing?
- How does technological change affect strategy? Where would advanced capabilities in the hands of adversaries call elements of strategy into question? Would projected new **capabilities** make feasible elements which heretofore were considered too risky or costly, or simply impossible?
- What strategic defense capabilities are feasible in the next decade or so? Which ones add to stability and security if both sides have them?

ENCLOSURE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE MACRO-EFFICIENCY ISSUES

The taxpayer could be better served if the DoD bureaucracy and the defense contractors were both subjected to pressures to consolidate operations and reduce overhead similar to those that much of American business has faced since the 1982 recession. Ab-1...

A start has been made on closing unneeded bases, but more could be done, especially if the headquarters structures of the Services were scrutinized at the same time. ✓

Modern technology can multiply the wartime effectiveness of delivered munitions. We usually take the benefits in increased capability rather than a smaller force of costly delivery platforms to do the same military **job**.

Various ideas have been studied for reconstituting the logistics support for combat forces that would make maintenance and supply more effective in wartime, and might well **save money** in peacetime.

Compensation for enlisted personnel could be adjusted to rely somewhat less on the pay tables that apply to all and more on special pays and bonuses for scarce skills, with a likely reduction in overall budget costs.

NATO treats logistics support as a "**national**" responsibility, each member responsible for support of its own forces. Moving to the seemingly sensible concept of "**coalition** logistics" would offer greater combat capability or cost savings, but lacks the needed political support, even for developing a specific plan.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFOMEMO

2001 JUN 15 PM 4:05

June 15, 2001 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, DoD

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Grassley

032

- To respond to your memo regarding a meeting with Senator Grassley and his request for information concerning an internal inquiry.
- I have not met with anyone from Senator Grassley's office since March 19, 2001, on a different subject. My Director of Audit Policy and Oversight, who conducted the internal inquiry into this matter, met with Senator Grassley's staffers in early May. She provided them a copy of our internal inquiry report. At that meeting and in subsequent telephone conversations, one of the staffers (Charlie Murphy) asked for additional information and documents.
- When I assigned the task of responding to these requests to the Deputy General Counsel (Inspector General), he requested the staffer put his requests in writing for purposes of clarification of what information was needed. Instead, the Deputy General Counsel received a letter, dated June 7, 2001, signed by Senator Grassley, delineating the requests. Because the requested data includes the names of over 3,600 DoD employees, we are ensuring that Privacy Act requirements are met. A response to this letter is being prepared and coordinated with the Office of General Counsel.

Coordination: None

cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
General Counsel, DoD

Prepared by: Robert J. Lieberman,

(b)(6)

15 June 01

U10977 /01

snowflake

June 13, 2001 5:29 PM

TO: Inspector General
cc: General Counsel *TL*
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Grassley

I met with Senator Grassley today. He tells me his office had a meeting with you within the last month and you have not responded to the meeting. He said you then told him you needed a letter from the Chairman of the Committee to respond.

Please advise me as to what the status is.

DHR:dh
061301-38

11-L-0059/OSD/5729

U10879 /01

INFO MEMO

SECRET

2001 JUN 15 12:00 PM
June 15, 2001, 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy

15 June 2001

SUBJECT: Answer to SecDef question of June 13 "I am told that the Air Force uses Tunisia for a target range. Could we use that instead of Vieques?"

- The Ben Ghilouf range in Tunisia is not a suitable alternative to Vieques. Specifically:
 - o Ben Ghilouf is a single mission bombing range (air-to-ground ordnance delivery).
 - o Access to the range is limited to participation in bilateral exercises upon 90 days advance notification.
 - o Range operations are limited to daylight bombing only, with inert ordnance only.
 - o By contrast, Vieques allows for realistic, integrated combat training and evaluation of major Fleet units across the full range of warfare missions -- land, sea, air, and amphibious.
 - o Navy uses Ben Ghilouf when it is available. For example, aircraft from the HARRY S. TRUMAN Battle Group participated with Tunisian Air Force units in a bilateral exercise in December, 2000.
- Defense Planning Guidance and current operational requirements dictate that U.S. Naval Forces be fully trained and ready for combat before arrival in theater. Delaying combat proficiency training until **after** arrival in theater reduces the flexibility and responsiveness of deploying forces and increases operational risk.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: CDR Chris Noble, SECNAV OPA analyst

(b)(6)

11-L-0059/OSD/5730

U11008^W/01

15 June 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: TUNISIA TRAINING RANGE

This responds to your 13 June question concerning use of a range in Tunisia instead of Vieques. The Ben Ghilouf range in Tunisia is not a suitable alternative to Vieques. Specifically:

- Ben Ghilouf is a single mission bombing range (**air-to-ground** ordnance delivery).
- Access to the range is limited to participation in bilateral exercises upon 90 days advance notification.
- Range operations are limited to daylight bombing only, with inert ordnance only.
- By contrast, Vieques allows for realistic, integrated combat training and evaluation of major Fleet units across the full range of warfare missions -- land, sea, air, and amphibious.
- Navy uses Ben Ghilouf when it is available. For example, aircraft from the BARRY S. TRUMAN Battle Group participated with Tunisian **Air Force units** in a bilateral exercise in December, 2000.
- Defense Planning Guidance and current operational requirements dictate that **U.S.** Naval Forces be fully trained and ready for combat before arrival in theater. Delaying combat proficiency training until after arrival in theater reduces the flexibility and responsiveness of deploying forces and increases operational risk.

Gordon England

...but
could be part
of an alternate
plan & will be
evaluated!

Gordon R. England

11-L-0059/OSD/5731

snowflake

June 13, 2001 9:46 AM

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tunisia

I am told that the Air Force uses Tunisia for a target range. Could we use that instead of Vieques?

DHR:dh
061301-23

11-L-0059/OSD/5732

snowflake

TO: William J. Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 18, 2001

SUBJECT: **IG Peer Review**

Please work with Powell Moore to make sure we handle this IG issue properly and then get back to Sen. Grassley in an appropriate way.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
061801.10

020 IG

18 Junc 01

U11067 /01

11-L-0059/OSD/5733



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 19 2001

Dr. Henry Kissinger

(b)(6)

001.15D

Dear Henry,

It is getting closer to August, and it is now clear to me that Joyce and I are not going to be able to make it up to Connecticut.

I simply have too many big issues we are wrestling with here that it would be highly unlikely I could get away.

Joyce and I do thank you for thinking of us and hope you have a terrific weekend. Maybe we can do it some other time.

Best personal regards,

P.S. Do call if you have thoughts or suggestions.

19 Jun 01

U11106 /01

April 5, 2001 10:40 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

Maj Damiano

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld₃

SUBJECT: Calendar: Kissinger/August 10

Kissinger has invited me up to his place in Kent, Connecticut, on the weekend of August 10. He is having Charles Powell of the UK. There is an airport nearby.

I will have to get back to him on it. Let's tickle a note for June 15 for us to respond.

Thank you.

DHR:dh
040501-9

HENRY A. KISSINGER


2001 JUN 25 11:10:07

June 14, 2001

Dear Don:

You told me to ask you again around this time about spending the weekend of August 10 with us in Kent. Nancy and I would be delighted to have you and Joyce with us when Charles and Carla Powell will also be visiting. We hope you can make it and look forward to seeing you.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR . 350 PARK AVENUE . NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 .

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JUN 18 2001
sh

JUN 14 2001 5:12

INFO MEMO

I-01/006959
June 14, 2001 6:05 p.m.

19

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

JMM 15 June 01

SUBJECT: Response to Question

- On 9 June you asked what meeting Ivanov mentioned he was invited to in Naples and said he would accept (Tab A).
- Mr. Ivanov was referring to the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial Meeting which will be held in Naples, Italy September 26-27.
- In response to your request, we will send Tom Miller copies of statements you made on Bosnia in the various ministerial meetings.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments:
a/s

Prepared by: Scott Schless, ISA/NATO, (b)(6)

TO: Steve Cambone
Lisa Bronson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: June 9, 2001

RE:

Find out what the meeting that Ivanov mentioned that he was invited to in Naples and said he would accept. He said that during the Ministerial meeting in Brussels.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.11

1022

snowflake

TO: Lisa Bronson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 9, 2001

Make sure you send Tom Miller anything I said about Bosnia in the various ministerials.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.16

COORDINATION

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Policy Matters
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Policy Support)
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense International
Security Affairs

Jan 19 2007
Mr. Gallington
Mr. Verga *19 2007*
for Mr. McConnell 9/12



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 17 2001

The Honorable Pat Roberts
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10- 1605

452 B

Dear Senator Roberts,

We have discussed the Ellsworth Study a number of times at **DoD**. It is a very good piece of work. I do thank you for bringing it to my attention. We are certainly taking it into account.

I understand Secretary **Roche** had a good exchange with you at a recent hearing.

Sincerely,

195001

May 29, 2001 5:00 PM

snowflake

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Pat Roberts

DR

Wayne for action
Bzz

You might want to draft a letter for me to send to Pat Roberts on the Ellsworth paper he was involved in and worked on. He has mentioned it to me twice. It was a good piece of work.

Our people have read it, we are certainly taking it into account, and I think it would be nice to tell him that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052901-56

11-L-0059/OSD/5742

snowflake

September 10, 2001 5:56 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Staff College

352

Jim Roche has suggested that they abolish the Armed Forces Staff College. Apparently, they have a 16-week program that is worth about 4 weeks, and they could cover the same subjects in the Army, Navy and Air Force Staff Colleges.

Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-54

1050pa1

U12725 /02

11-L-0059/OSD/5743

Handwritten initials/signature at top right.

October 25, 2001 1:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA&E

020 PAE

We have to fix PA&E fast. I am crippled. We need to start a search. I simply have to have someone, and my instinct is to maybe pull someone out from under Dov.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102501-30

.....

Please respond by 10/26

25 OCT 01

U12945 /02

snowflake

Approved 10/27/01
1142

October 26, 2001 8:54 AM

Germany

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Germany

I see that there is a split in the German government about whether or not to provide forces for the anti-terrorism campaign.

If that is the case, why don't we get them to backfill us in Bosnia and Kosovo? They can feel they are helping that way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102601-8

.....
Please respond by 10/30

26 OCT 01

U12950 /02



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2001-07-26 11:13

INFO MEMO

July 26, 2001, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons

- With regard to your note (Tab A), the Russian initiative to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile is beset by a failed economy and poor management. U.S. assistance for these efforts is being managed through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. DoD has been working with Russian officials to develop a chemical weapons destruction process and munitions processing equipment, upgrade a central analytical laboratory, and, most significantly, construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch'ye (Tab B). This facility will use the Russian developed and demonstrated two-stage destruction process.
- The U.S. Congress has criticized Russia for delays with construction-related requirements and curtailed funding for this program beginning in FY00.
- To address the problem and demonstrate its commitment, the Russian government centralized all chemical demilitarization activities under one office to advance the program and seek foreign assistance. This has been perceived as a positive step.
- The U.S. program has nine sites, one in the closure phase, one operational, five under various stages of construction, and two locations where we will make a technology decision in FY02. In contrast, the Russian program has only one facility under construction. The Chemical Weapons Convention has a 2007 destruction deadline and the Russian program will require a full five-year extension. U.S. program data strongly suggests that we also need an extension. This will be determined in an upcoming Defense Acquisition Executive review.

Coordination: OUSD(P)

Attachments:

As Stated

Prepared by: Mr. Pat Wakefield, ODATSD(CBD)

(b)(6)

Don - I met with Dr. Rak, the Russian in charge of this project. They are beginning to move out on the process, and told me they still have a goal to meet the 2007 date (not likely). They will do all of the destruction at the single site.



11-L-0059/OSD/5746

U13303 / 01

May 25, 2001 9:09 AM

~~snowflake~~

TO: Pete Aldridge
cc: Paul Wolfowitz 
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Chemicals

I notice the Russians are having the same problem getting rid of their chemicals. I wonder if we ought to delay the timing and try to cooperate with the Russians to figure out how we can each do it.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh
052501-4

11-L-0059/OSD/5747

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY

Project Objective: Assist the Russian Federation in eliminating chemical weapons through the creation of a Russian destruction facility at Shchuch'ye for nerve agent-filled artillery munitions.

Shchuch'ye: A 5,460 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) is stored at the Shchuch'ye CW storage depot, Kurgan Oblast, Russia. These include modern, nerve agent-filled munitions which are: in excellent, ready-to-use condition; for the most part, small and easily transportable; easily mated to delivery systems found throughout the world-both short-range missiles and artillery. The agents stored at Shchuch'ye comprise 14 percent of the total declared Russian CW stockpile and roughly 50 percent of the modern artillery- and rocket-launched nerve agent. Included in the munitions stored at Shchuch'ye are nearly one million 122-mm nerve agent-filled artillery munitions.

Project Overview: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program provides, among other things, assistance for the design and construction of a CW destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye to destroy approximately 800 metric-agent-tons per year. This facility will use the Russian developed and demonstrated two-stage destruction process. The Shchuch'ye CWDF, as planned, will be readily expandable to allow the Russians to scale-up destruction rates (to 1,600 metric agent-tons per year).

US Project Cost: CTR support to the Russian CW destruction facility effort has committed U.S. funding in the amount of \$229.5 M (FY94-FY99) for the following:

- Evaluation, optimization and scale-up of the Russian nerve agent destruction process;
- Development, design, fabrication and testing of the munitions processing equipment;
- Preparation of the Justification of Investment and design (working construction documents) of the integrated CWDF processes and facility.
- CWDF site clearing, water drainage and preparation of the land for construction.

Additional funding (FY02-08) for construction, equipment acquisition/installation, systemization, training, and start-up of the Shchuch'ye CWDF is estimated at \$657.5 M. Total U.S. project cost is projected to be \$888 M.

US Congressional Action in FY 2000: Section 1305 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of FY 2000 appropriations, or any appropriations thereafter, for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. DoD understands the Congressional action was taken largely as a result of concern about the slow progress by the Russian Federation in meeting construction-related requirements at the Shchuch'ye CWDF site and the lack of international assistance for the project. Substantial progress has been registered recently in both areas.

US Congressional Action in FY 2001: Although Congress noted recent progress, they declined to lift the post-FY 1999 construction ban and restore funding for the project in FY 2001. However, in the FY 2001 authorization language, Congress did note the availability of prior-year funding that may be used to secure and eliminate Russia's CW stockpiles. Accordingly, on 21 Dec 2000, DoD began site preparation activities for the CWDF using FY 1999 funding and will seek the lifting of the construction ban and \$35 M in additional funding for CWDF construction in its FY2002 budget request.

COORDINATION

OUSD(P)

COL Baldwin

July 25, 2001

11-L-0059/OSD/5749

AUG 24



UNCLASSIFIED
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON- WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400
AUG 27 2001

INFO MEMO

AUG 27 2001

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

August 21, 2001, 1540
I-01/010069-APR

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Australia-U.S. Submarine Statement of Principles

- This memo responds to your comments (TAB 1) on the Submarine Statement of Principles (SSOP) between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy.
- The SSOP (TAB 2) provides for unprecedented free and open exchange of information and technology in all aspects of submarine warfare.
- The SSOP language has been agreed to at the Flag level on both sides and will undergo final review by the Chief of Naval Operations before signature during the 10-12 September visit of Australian Prime Minister Howard.
- The CNO and the Australian Chief of Navy will sign the SSOP.
- Although the SSOP is a non-binding agreement, it does provide impetus for Naval cooperation through other legally binding agreements such as Project Arrangements and Memoranda of Understanding.
- Conclusion of the SSOP is nevertheless important to the Australians in light of their recent decision to select a U.S. solution for a replacement combat system for their COLLINS-class submarines.
- This agreement is a good thing for U.S.-Australian security ties and is something that we should support.

Coordination: TAB 3

Reviewed by DASD/AP PTB 24 Aug 2001

Prepared by: Peter Ipson, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-000000/OSD/5750

U14526 /01

July 31, 2001 7:21 AM

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Statement of Principles

In the meeting, you will **recall** that the Defense Minister of Australia said he was hoping to have some sort of a statement of principles in September concerning the Navy. We better think through what that is going to be between now and then.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-I

**STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES NAVY
AND
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
IN MATTERS RELATING TO SUBMARINES**

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

11-L-0059/OSD/5752

RATIONALE

The United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), herein referred to as the Participants, aspire to the defense of mutual interests. We see a common goal in the employment of submarines to achieve these aspirations and seek to achieve the maximum interoperability and synergy of effort.

The RAN can make an important contribution to the knowledge base of the USN by providing highly capable diesel submarines for operations and exercises in shallow water environments. The RAN is also able to provide appropriate support facilities for weapon firings, signature measurements, and forward support of common systems or weapons. In turn, the USN contributes to the tactical proficiency of the RAN by providing loyal opposition for submarine versus submarine exercises, test ranges and other equipment and facilities.

Training and appropriate experience is vital for the attainment and maintenance of full operational capability. The type of training that is most suitable for instilling operational capability is practical exercising at sea with other ships and submarines. The USN and RAN can gain great mutual benefit from this type of exercise cooperation.

The benefits that can be gained from cooperative activities can only be gauged by effective gathering of pertinent data and exhaustive analysis. Mutual cooperation in the field of warfare data exchange would have synergistic benefits in drawing the appropriate lessons.

The appropriate lessons drawn from data analysis will form the stimulus for research and development. It is anticipated that considerable advantage would flow **from** cooperation into research projects designed to enhance the **warfighting** ability of the submarine forces of both navies.

The exchange of data and experiences on issues of mutual interest in submarines will benefit both navies and should be encouraged as much as possible by the research and development organizations and the operational forces of both navies.

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Statement of Principles (hereinafter referred to as the **SoP**) is as follows:

For both navies to assist each other in providing fully capable, sustainable and interoperable submarine forces.

To engage in collaborative activities that will enhance the ability of submarines to operate effectively in the prevailing strategic circumstances.

To share training opportunities to increase mutual skills in warfare disciplines.

To facilitate participation in collaborative ventures designed to maximize the Participants' advantage in submarine warfare in the region.

To facilitate the exchange of test, evaluation and warfare data, plus the analysis of information that flows from this data in support of mutually determined objectives.

To maximize the mutual benefits of interoperability and the synergy of equipment production and logistics support which results from increased opportunities for both Participants' industrial bases.

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

SCOPE

In implementation of this SoP, and where there will be no prejudice to the national security of either Participant, the Participants will use their best efforts to:

(1) Encourage the exchange of the following types of information:

- a. Details for the coordination of combined submarine exercises.
- b. Reconstruction and analysis products derived from combined exercises.
- c. Tactical capability development data.
- d. Advice on operational concepts that might increase the capability and interoperability of submarines.
- e. Characteristics of the performance and capability of submarines.
- f. Surveillance data, analysis and advice.
- g. Technical information that will advance the war-fighting capability of the submarines of both Navies.

(2) Facilitate access to, and use of their respective facilities, equipment, and personnel as follows:

- a. Collins class submarines.
- b. Base facilities consistent with national policy for nuclear powered vessels.
- c. USN and Australian research, engineering, test, and analysis facilities.
- d. Ranges.
- e. Defense scientific laboratories for the purpose of submarine research.
- f. Loan, exchange, or purchase of equipment for the purpose of the stated objectives.
- g. Operation orders, doctrine, instructions, and guidance where these are necessary for the furtherance of the stated objectives.
- h. Exchange of personnel where all costs associated with travel and accommodation are borne by the parent navy of the individual unless otherwise mutually determined by the Participants.

(3) Cooperate in research, development, and engineering projects as follows:

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

- a. Projects to improve the acoustic characteristics of submarines.
- b. Projects to improve submarine combat systems.
- c. Projects to enable submarines to achieve their full operational potential.
- d. Projects to develop improvements jointly for software updates for a common combat system. The USN and the RAN intend to maximize convergence on software improvements with a goal of ensuring a **USN/RAN** common baseline, thereby providing cost savings and interoperability benefits to both Participants.

MANAGEMENT

The Participants will be jointly responsible for the administration of this **SoP**, including its periodic **review**.

Each Participant will ensure the proper execution of their respective responsibilities in the management of this **SoP**.

Visits necessary to accomplish the objectives of this **SoP** will be subject to normal visit clearance procedures and security regulations.

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The Participants recognize that the cooperation and technology transfer contemplated by this SoP will be executed in accordance with the Participants' respective national laws and regulations.

The Participants further recognize that technology transfer is predicated upon the safeguarding of such information exchanged or shared between the Participants in accordance with the provisions of the arrangements under which the exchange or sharing occurs. It is acknowledged by the Participants, that they have the right to ensure to their own satisfaction that their information will be protected before it is exchanged. Both Participants will use their best endeavors to cooperate as fully as possible in the spirit of this document with the understanding that the national security provisions, laws, regulations, and policies of both Participants must be complied with.

This SoP is meant to be an expression of the Participants' future intention to cooperate in matters relating to submarines under separate existing or new arrangements appropriate for the particular proposed cooperative activity, and is not intended to be an agreement binding under international law. This SoP does not establish legally binding commitments or obligations on either Navy, and does not create any rights, duties, or responsibilities enforceable against any person or entity in any court of law or equity, or before any Third Party. In addition, this SoP creates no commitment by either Participant to indemnify final products, or to provide oversight of, or assistance with, the other Participant's industrial activity or contracting with U.S. or Australian industry.

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT

This SoP will remain in effect for 5 years unless terminated or amended, and will be examined by both Participants at that time with a goal of renewal.

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

EFFECTIVE DATE

This **SoP** will enter into effect on the date of last signature of the Participants.

Signed (in duplicate) by the authorized representatives designated below:

FOR THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY	FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY
Signature	Signature
Name	Name
Title	Title
Date	Date
Location	Location

DRAFT AUS V1 26 JUL 01

COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Mr. Douglas J. Feith)



AUG 28 2001

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs (Peter C.W. Flory, (b)(6))



24 AUG 2001

November 12, 2001 3:32 PM

TO: Powell Moore
cc: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Christmas Cards to Members of Congress

335 SD

Joyce wonders if we ought to send any Christmas cards to any members of the House or Senate, or to the press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111201-5

Please respond by _____

Jackel-

Powell recommends that you do send cards. His note is attached.

*Di Rita
11/9*

12 Nov 01

U14692 02



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300
UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

November 14, 2001 7:50 a.m.

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Christmas Cards to Members of Congress

- If you and Joyce plan to send Christmas Cards this year, I recommend that the list include both Members of Congress and the press.
- Legislative Affairs will provide you with a complete list of names and addresses for all Members of Congress, highlighting the ones we recommend that should be included on your list.
- Public Affairs should develop a press corps list,
- We will also provide you and Joyce with any other support that may be necessary to complete your Christmas card mailing to Members of Congress.

Actw D11/20
0725

November 19, 2001 11:30 AM

33550

TO: ~~Torie Clarke~~ Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Thank You Note


Let's get a thank you note off to Bigger and the African-American woman who co-chaired that **function** for women that I spoke to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111901-15



Please respond by _____



Done

D. R. A.
11/21

19 NOV 01

U14721 02



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

November 13, 2001

The Honorable Judy Biggert
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 205 15

Dear Madame Chair:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would like to thank you for your visit to the Pentagon with your colleagues from the Women's Issues Caucus.

We truly appreciate your interest and recognize that your cooperation is an important element of bipartisan support for the policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense. We especially welcome your interest in the restoration of the Pentagon and in promoting a better understanding of the brutality of the Taliban regime.

If you ever need any assistance with Department matters or wish to share your ideas and *views*, please do not hesitate to contact me or Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (House) at (b)(6).

Sincerely,

Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

November 20, 2001 2:05 P.M.

TO: SECDEF
FROM:  TORIE CLARKE
SUBJECT: Thank You Note

Attached you will find a copy of the letter that Powell Moore sent to all participants in the Women's Issues Caucus. Let me know if it is necessary for me to also send a thank you letter.

Attachment
As stated

11-L-0059/OSD/5765

snowflake

Account 11/27/01

November 26, 2001 2:22 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Central Time

Please find out what time it was in Chicago when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112601-17

See Response Attached 11/26

380

Please respond by _____

26 Nov 01

U14828 02

November 26, 2001

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

The Pearl Harbor attack occurred at 7:55 a.m. in Hawaii.

That would have made it 12:55 p.m. in Chicago, December 7.

11-L-0059/OSD/5767



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

381

OCT 22 2001

(b)(6)

Dear Dr. Hicks:

Thanks so much for sending me your paper, "Beyond Mad: Toward a Seamless Deterrent."

You were thoughtful to send it, and I am pleased to have the benefit of your expertise on the subject.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

U17757 /01

22OCT01

9/27/01
9/27/01

snowflake

September 27, 2001 7:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

Please get this letter from (b)(6) answered. I have kept the paper to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/10/01 (b)(6) letter

DIR:dh
092701-3

Exec Sec => SWT

9/23

To SWT-

Please draft response.

L. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

(b)(6)

September 10, 2001

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have met, the last time when my wife and I were guests of Harold Brown at a Rand Director's dinner, but we have had little personal contact. Anecdotically, with the recommendations of Albert Wohlstetter and Andy Marshall, I hired Jim Roche to head the Northrop Analysis Center, when you also were considering him. And, my wife and I had your seats at the Gala during President Reagan's first Inaugural when you were unable to attend (thank you). Tom Korologos was able to work through the chaotic reservation situation.

To give you a feeling for my background, with the exception of the years spent at the University of California at Berkeley receiving my PhD in Nuclear Physics, I have been involved in defense related activities since I was an Army First Lieutenant during World War II. I have had technical and management roles at Boeing and Northrop, served as a Director on the board of three Defense Companies, and chaired or served on Task Forces of the Defense Science Board for the last thirty years. I also have and continue to serve on advisory panels for the National Laboratories. And, most importantly to me, I served during the second Reagan Administration as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

I only present my background since it is the foundation for my enclosed commentary "Beyond Mad: Toward a Seamless Deterrent". I hope you will find the paper useful. I believe that it is consistent with the statements made by both you and President Bush and expresses the issue of deterrent in an important way. It strongly supports the purchase of additional B-2C bombers.

11-L-0059/OSD/5770

Many of us are totally supportive of this Administration's position that a major change is required in our military services if we are to be prepared for future threats - so different from that of the Cold War. At the same time those of us with Washington experience recognize the difficult task you face in dealing with the super sand boxes of Congress, the Military Services, and the Defense Industry. Many of these supported systems are really social welfare programs that bring jobs and votes. The real hope for the necessary change is for an increase in the Defense budget. As you know the defense budget percentage of the GDP has gone from 6% when I was USDRE in 1986 to the present 2.9%. Yet, Defense is the one governmental responsibility that only the Federal Government supports.

Recognizing that you have to deal with your share of megalomaniacs, I am somewhat embarrassed, since I'm not of that ilk, to relate the following success while I was Under Secretary. However, it makes a point that I trust will be helpful to you.

I began to develop the technical capability in Stealth at Northrop during the Sixties and continue to believe in its great importance. In that period before I left Northrop to become USDRE, I focused on the B-2 bomber and paid little attention to our efforts in the competition that resulted in the F-22 fighter. However, when I went into the Department in the late summer of 1985, I had to focus on that program since the proposals were due in about one month. I was astonished to find that the requirements for stealth were completely inadequate. Since it was clear technically that it could be a stealthy fighter, what had happened? Those in the Air Force without the necessary knowledge had had experience with the F-117 fighter that, while stealthy, had poor aerodynamic characteristics. They wanted a high performance fighter. But the B-2 bomber incorporating a new generation of stealth technology had proved that an aircraft could be both stealthy and efficient.

As a result I forced a four-month delay in the competition and changed the specifications to require a stealthy fighter. The reaction was world class. All of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Air Force castigated me. Those in the Congress with the proper access demanded an explanation, and those companies in competition with Northrop accused me of conflict of interest because of Northrop's experience with Stealth. As you know from your own experience, I had made a great financial sacrifice in coming into government and had no financial ties to that company. Only the program's classification prevented a front-page attack in the New York Times or the Washington Post.

But I held firm. No one could justify building a non-stealthy fighter when we had F-15s and F-16's. As you are well aware, the Air Force now is using the F-22's stealth as an argument against the group calling for its cancellation. (Note that from an acquisition stand point the first development contract for the F-22 was signed in 1986.) General Joe Ralston, then a colonel, can confirm my actions.

Surprisingly, when the dust had settled, I received a visit **from** the Vice Chief of Staff - representing the Air Force - who commended me for my action.

I bring this issue up because I believe that the Air Force is just as remiss in understanding the importance of long-range force projection and a stealthy bomber- centric force. I believe that the arguments in my paper are valid, and that the Senior Leadership and their consultants are just as incorrect as those in my time. I have known, supported, and admired Jim **Roche** and Larry Welch for twenty years, but they are missing the point as badly as the Air Force did sixteen years ago.

You have pointed out that major military impacts can be made with a small percentage change of the force. I fully believe that proceeding with the purchase of the B-2C will give that impact. The Navy and the Army have much to do to meet the new requirements, but the Air Force should have a major role in the deterrent force.

We have seen the last ten years pass with little effort to change our military force to meet the new requirements. It would be a tragedy for the Nation's **future** if the Clinton Drift were allowed to continue through this Administration.

(b)(6)

The stealth capability of the B-2C is sometimes questioned. Drs. John Foster & Bill Perry were the original chairmen of the Red Team concerned with this issue. Dr. Foster recently has been **thoroughly briefed on** this subject and would be an excellent reference if you were concerned. (b)(6)



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
 INFO MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
 SECRET
 2001 DEC - 3 11 1: 54

PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

December 3, 2001 - 9:00 AM
 DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu* DEC - 4 2001

SUBJECT: An Update on Tracking "Lost Days"

- As reported to you in July, we have worked with Ray DuBois to carry out your instruction that a "lost day" tracking web site be established (Tab A).
- For civilians, these data can now be viewed at <https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/1twi/owa/cop>. The data show that the Department has a lost day rate of approximately "34." This means that for the November 3, 2001 pay period, the Department lost 34 workdays for every 100 work years. Put another way, we have about 1,300 employees out of our 665,000 civilian workforce who have lost an average of seven days of work due to job related injuries during this time.
- Our current data also indicate that the Navy has the highest rate (45) and the Air Force the lowest (26). These data are preliminary; we will refine the metrics as we finalize and validate the web site.
- We are working to develop a similar metric for tracking military lost time using the Defense Medical Surveillance System. We have a prototype targeted for spring 2002.
- ALCOA appears to calculate their lost day rate somewhat differently than DoD; however, initial analysis indicates that our lost day rate is considerably higher than theirs. We seem to have room for improvement.
- Ray and I will bring the availability of these data to the attention of the Senior Executive Council.

COORDINATION: Ray DuBois *RJ* 12/4/01

Attachments
 As stated



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 26 2001

INFO MEMO

July 25, 2001, 11:00 a.m.

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Status of Tracking "Lost Days" for DoD

- You asked us to ensure that we could track workdays lost to injury as Paul O'Neill had done with ALCOA. This is a quick status of our efforts.
- Working with Pete Aldridge's safety office, we have made quick progress toward capturing these data. Currently, our civilian personnel office has ready access to the amount of time lost to injury for our civilian workforce as these data are gathered from payroll records.
- We do not have as ready access to capture the time lost for our military as the payroll records do not directly record this information. Instead, we expect to use accident records from the Service safety centers and DoD hospitals to develop a good metric of the time lost. The attached update to the Air Force chart presented you earlier illustrates why this is important: The Air Force estimate is much lower than the estimate from hospitalization records alone (and these in turn will not capture all workdays lost).
- As to disseminating this information, the Air Force is developing a web based tool to capture many of these safety metrics. We have established an IPT to consider this system as well as others to implement quickly lost workdays tracking.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L)

Attachments:

As stated


Prepared By: Joseph J. Angello, (b)(6)

11-L-0059/OSD/5774



U.S. AIR FORCE

Lost Workday Injury Rate: USAF vs. Alcoa



USAF Rates Include Class A, B & C On-Duty Mishaps.

Hospitalizations and Quarters data is per event and does not include all days lost.

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0059/OSD/5775

snowflake

June 25, 2001 1:03 PM

TO : David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lost Day Rate

Let's require that every one of our units give us a "lost day" rate like Paul O'Neill suggested, and let's think of starting to put it on some sort of a web so everyone can see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
06250 1-2 1

7/25
→ *Doc of*
Response attached.
D. Lita

7/26
1125

11-L-0059/OSD/5776

2112408-01

snowflake

August 7, 2001 12:02 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

(
3 ↙

FAXED

335 SD

Thanks for the kind words in *The Washington Post!*

Regards and good fishing.

DHR:dh
080701-14

7 Aug 0

11-L-0059/OSD/5777

snowflake

10/30 1700
October 29, 2001 2:56 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Genghis Khan

Attached is a paper on the subject of Genghis Khan written by the President of Kansas State University and sent to General Myers. I found it interesting. It is a quick read-you might enjoy it.

Very respectfully,



Attach.
10/12/01 Wefald ltr to CJCS plus attachments

DHR:dh
102901-26

095

29 OCT 01

W01356 /01

SPD

Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff



24 Oct 01

19/10/21

Secretary Rumsfeld —

Some interesting reading
from the President of K. State
Univ. This is a paper he wrote
on Genghis Khan several years
ago.

Dick



October 12, 2001

Office of the President
110 Anderson Hall
Manhattan, KS 66506 -0112

(b)(6)

General Richard B. Myers
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Dear General Myers:

I look forward to seeing you at the football game between the University of Kansas and Kansas State University. I hope that you and your wife, Mary Jo, and your key aids can stop by at our house about 45 minutes to an hour **after** the game for hors d'oeuvres, cookies, and coffee before you embark on your trip back to Washington, DC. It would be fun to catch up on what is going on in the world, especially in the Near East.

Meanwhile, I am sending you a copy of a paper I wrote on Genghis Khan and the Mongolian Horde several years ago. As you might know, Genghis Khan became the greatest empire builder in the entire history of the world. With only horses, bows, arrows, and sabers, and without guns, tanks, jeeps, planes, helicopters, and night-vision goggles, Genghis Khan and the Mongolian Horde turned the world upside down. They conquered the great states and empires of China, the old Persian Empire, much of India, Russia, and much of Eastern Europe.

Genghis Khan's empire extended east to west from the China Sea almost to the Baltic Sea. Khan's empire extended for about 6,000 miles from east to west and 2,000 miles from south to north from the Persian Gulf to Siberia. In short, his empire extended from the tip of Korea and Peking, China to Cracow in Poland and Breslau in modern-day Germany up to about the Oda River.

Genghis Khan took six warring tribes in Mongolia and united them into one huge army of about 200,000 men on horseback. It became the finest Calvary in the history of the world. They were virtually unbeatable. Many military historians claim, and I tend to agree, that the Mongol warriors might very well be the toughest and most ferocious soldiers in history-with the exception of our 46,000 special forces. This is what Harold Lamb said about the Mongol warriors that moved west to conquer the Old Persian Empire in the spring of 12 19: "Forging ahead in the utter cold of high Asia a quarter million men endured hardships that would have put a modern division into the hospital. . ."

The reason I am sending you this paper on Genghis Khan and the Mongol Horde is so that you understand that the so-called Afghan soldier-warrior has been beaten in the past 1000 years. As you know, since September 11, 200 1, there has been talk about the Afghan fighter as unbeatable. We know that at least twice in the 19th Century the British failed to subdue the Afghan nation and its fighters and have that territory as a full-fledged segment of the British Empire. We also know that the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and put about 100,000 troops on the ground. Yet, 10 years later, the Soviets had to withdraw. Thus, the Afghans have the image as being unbeatable.

In the spring of 12 19, as you will see in my enclosed paper, Genghis Khan gave the orders to his Mongol **Horde** to start preparations for the invasion of the Persian Empire. To go from the Mongolian Steppes

11-L-0059/OSD/5780

General Richard B. Myers
October 12, 2001
Page 2

and the Lake Baikal area to present-day Afghanistan would be about 1500 miles. This is a huge trek for 200,000 troops on horseback-let alone a modern-day army with planes and helicopters. During the **1500-mile** march, the Mongols lived off their sheep and reindeer herds and lived off the land.


The head of the Persian Empire, the Shah Muhammad, had over 500,000 troops. The Mongols and the Persian forces first met up in what we call present-day Afghanistan. Using brilliant strategy somewhat reminiscent of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Genghis Khan attacked the Afghan warriors of the Persian Empire in Afghan cities that we know about today-including Merv, **Herat**, Bamiyan, etc. In February of 1221, the Mongol warriors attacked the Afghan city of Merv. The Mongols killed over 500,000 Persian-Afghans. In March of 1221, the Mongols attacked Bamiyan and killed over 100,000 Afghans. In November of 1221, the Mongols attacked **Herat** and killed well over 200,000 Afghans and destroyed the city completely. In about a one-year period, the Mongols killed well over 1 million Afghans and literally destroyed those fairly advanced cities of the Middle Ages in Afghanistan.

Quite **frankly**, it probably is true to say that the Afghan civilization of the **13th** Century never recovered from the Mongol Horde of 1221 and 1222. To this day, there is no basic industry or basic agriculture in Afghanistan.

Now, the Afghans that make up the Taliban regime will be facing the greatest military force that they have faced in about 800 years. They had better be ready. The Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden will regret that they ever reawakened the Sleeping Giant called the United States of America. WE will be approaching the Taliban and its troops with the same ferocity and determination of the Mongol warriors of the **13th** Century. I read an e-mail concerning your visit to the Quantico Marine Base about several weeks ago. I read where you were demonstrating your shooting skills. I also appreciate the response of what the Marine said to you when you asked him how he could calibrate how long it took to fire six to eight rounds. The Afghans will soon be facing that same ferocity from our troops in the very near future.

I hope you have a chance to read my paper. You will love it.

Sincerely,



Jon Wefald
President


dh

Enclosure

VOL. 190 NO. 6

DECEMBER 1996

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC



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GENGHIS KHAN

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY WASHINGTON, D.C.

11-L-0059/OSD/5782

**GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLIAN HORDE:
AND THEIR IMPACT ON WORLD HISTORY, ESPECIALLY RUSSIA**

**By Jon Wefald
President, Kansas State University**

Spring 1998

- I. GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLIAN HORDE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE OF THE WORLD IN 1200 A.D.--OR ABOUT 800 YEARS AGO-- DURING THE SO-CALLED DARK AGES:**
- A. Only about 350 million people in the world-compared to almost 6 billion today.**
 - B. Most people lived only to be 25 years old.**
 - C. Most people were always hungry and malnourished.**
 - D. Vast bulk of people were agriculturalists or nomads.**
 - E. There were millions and millions starving to death.**
 - F. The only source of energy and power came from the muscle power of animals and people.**
 - G. Freedom-as we know it--did not exist and servitude was commonplace.**
 - H. People literally did not know where they were-east or west and north and south-and would not know until after the era of Christopher Columbus in the late 15th Century and early 16th Century.**
 - I. There were no great civilizations in 1200 A.D. With the' exception of some church scholars, the greatness of Rome and Athens were long forgotten. The glories of Greek City States and the Roman Empire dated from about 500 B.C. to 500 A.D. From this point to the 12th and 13th Centuries, the world regressed into the Dark Ages.**

II. There were only 2 dominant civilizations in 1200 A.D.—

- A. China
- B. Islam
 - 1. China-was the most advanced and ancient civilization.
 - 2. Islam was supreme from India and the old Persian Empire to today's Middle East, North Africa, and even Spain.
 - 3. Christian Europe was, as a writer for The Washington' Post said in a 1995 article, "A backwater. A bunch of fiefdoms, bishoprics, baronies. The Holy Roman Empire was the poor man's version of the real thing. No one would have gambled a 1000 years ago that the Christians of Europe would go on to colonize (dominate) the planet."
- C. But a new Empire was about to arrive. Indeed, the new Mongol Empire that arose about 800 years ago changed virtually everything.

I. THE STORY OF GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MONGOL HORDE:

- A. In his excellent book on Genhis Khan: Emperor of All Men, Harold Lamb says this: About 800 years ago, "A man almost conquered the earth. He made himself master of half the known world, and inspired humankind with a fear that lasted for generations. In the course of his life, he was given many **names--** the Mighty Manslayer, the Scourge of God, the Perfect Warrior, and the Master of Thrones and Crowns. He is better known to us as GENGHIS KHAN."
- B. The Mongols said of him: "One sun in heaven, one Lord on Earth."
- C. The Great Khan came to feel that he had a mandate to **rule** the world. As Harold Lamb puts it: "Indeed it is difficult to measure him by ordinary standards. When he marched with his horde, it was over degrees of latitude and longitude instead of miles; deserts were peopled with the fleeing and dying; when he had passed, wolves and ravens often were sole living things in once populous lands."

II. How difficult is it to measure the importance of Genghis Khan?

- A. From 2000 B.C. to 1227 AD. or between the time of Abraham to Genghis Khan, we can list conquerors and emperors like Ramses II, **Xerxes**, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar. Genghis Khan exceeds them all as a conqueror and even as a general. Khan's Empire becomes twice the size of Alexander the Great's Empire and lasts much longer.

- B. How about the period from 1300 A.D. to the present? We can name generals and emperors like Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Suvorov, **Bismarck**, Hitler, Rommel, Stalin, Eisenhower, Patton, and MacArthur and Schwarzkopf. Genghis Khan tops them all.
- C. In short, Genghis Khan is the world's all-time conqueror and one of the most brilliant generals ever.
- D. **MY LIST OF THE GREATEST GENERALS AND CONQUERORS IN HISTORY IN THE ORDER THAT I PICKED THEM:**
 - 1. Genghis Khan
 - 2. Alexander the Great
 - 3. Hannibal
 - 4. Napoleon
 - 5. Suvorov
 - 6. Zhukov
 - 7. Frederick the Great
 - 8. MacArthur
 - 9. Patton
 - 10. Grant
 - 11. Julius Caesar

III. The truth is that the Mongolian army of the 13th and 14th Centuries probably is the greatest army in the history of the world from 2000 B.C. to the Age of Gunpowder:

- A. With only horses, bows, arrows, and sabers, and without guns, tanks, jeeps, planes, helicopters, and night-vision goggles, Genghis Khan and the Mongolian Horde turned the world upside down. They conquered the great states and empires of China, the old Persian Empire, much of India, Russia, and much of Eastern Europe.
- B. By 1241, the Mongols were looking straight into modern-day Germany, France, and Italy-nothing stood in their way.
- C. In terms of distance, what are we talking about?
 - 1. Keep in mind that from New York City to San Francisco, it is about 3,000 miles.
 - 2. Khan's Empire is east to west from the Pacific Ocean to the present-day boundaries of Western Europe. It is about 6,000 to 7,000 miles east to west and 2,000 miles from south to north from the Persian Gulf to Siberia. Thus, it is about 6,000 to 7,000 miles wide and 2,000 miles deep.
 - 3. It is literally from the tip of Korea and Peking, China, to Cracow in Poland and Breslau and Liegnitz in modern-day Germany up to about the Oder River.



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4. Remember the Korean War of 1950-1954 and how American soldiers bogged down there: America did not win or lose the war but ended up at the 38 ° parallel. Despite our vaunted technology advantage, America could not win the war in Vietnam either.
5. Thus, with Korea and Vietnam in mind-how even with a high technology advantage-America could not prevail. In your mind's eye, think of this, with no rifles, tanks, and trucks and planes but rather only with horses and basically bows and arrows, the Mongol Horde conquered an area of the world about 7,000 miles long and 2,000 miles deep.
6. In his book, Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy, Professor Paul Ratchnevsky said this about the Mongol Empire: It was "the largest contiguous land-based Empire in human history."
7. The Khan's Empire and the wars fought to achieve that Empire in terms of distances covered would not be eclipsed until World War II in the 20th Century.

Iv. Who was Genghis Khan?


- A. His first name was Temuiin-born in 1163 A.D.; died in 1227 A.D. He lived to be 64 years old.
- B. His marriage was arranged at 13 to a 9 year-old.
- C. By age 17, he had become a powerful tribal leader.
- D. At age 33, in the year 1196, he was proclaimed Chief of the Mangkhols.
- E. What was Mongolia in 1196?
 1. Disparate and warring tribes from beginning of time on the Mongolian steppes and Gobi Desert.
 2. Warring tribes included the: Naimans, Keraits, Merkits, Oirats, Tatars, and Genghis Khan's tribe, the Mangkhols.
- F. Between 1196 and 1206, Genghis got all tribes under control and in 1206--he was appointed the Supreme Head--the Khan--and his new name was Genghis Khan.
- G. By 1211 and 1212, Genghis Khan was leading his forces into North China. By 1215, the khan had conquered most of North China.
- H. By 1217, Genghis Khan felt he had a mandate to rule the world.


V. Let us look at the chances in 1196 A.D. of Genghis Khan becoming the World's Greatest Conqueror. How about 1 out of a million or 350 million-the population of the world in 1200. Khan's chances were about the same in 1986 of KSU turning its football team into a national Dower. In short, it was out of the question.

- A. Genghis Khan is a classic example of how one person with will and determination can make a difference--for good or bad.
- B. Let us remember as students of history that history is not scripted; it is not irreversible; and it is not dominated by laws of history.

VI. In looking at Mongolia today or in the 13th Century, you will see why Genghis Khan's chances of becoming a great world conqueror are 1 out of a million.

- A. Mongolia is what in 1200 A.D.?
- B. The Mongolian Steppes represent a huge and mainly treeless area of land that has an extreme temperature range.
- C. There are barely 3 months of summer.
- D. There are 9 months of winter.
- E. Mongolia is a barren, stark world.
- F. It is a land totally unsuitable for agriculture.
- G. It is a land of no cities and no towns and no villages.
- H. In growing up, Genghis never saw a city, a town, or a farm.
- I. Mongolia-then and now-was a forbidding land of nomads with horses, reindeer, sheep, and goats.
- J. This Mongolia has no one-room school houses, no Jeffersonian democracy, no books. Mongolians cannot read or write.
- K. How harsh is the climate? As one observer said: "Winds blow with such ferocity as almost to lift a rider from his saddle. The height and rarified atmosphere sometimes induce giddiness and exhaustion, and the lack of oxygen often obliges the nomad to desist from his attempts to kindle a fire. The monotony of the steppe is notorious; as far as the eye can travel, it sees little but a flat wilderness."
- L. What about their food and eating habits? Thirteenth-century travelers confirm that., besides having some goats and sheep, the Mongols were not fastidious in







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their eating habits. As one 13th Century observer said of the Mongols, “They consume everything which can be eaten - dogs, wolves, foxes, horses, and, in an emergency, human flesh. . . They also eat the afterbirth of mares, we even saw them eating lice; and with our own eyes we saw them consume mice.”

- M. As Harold Lamb says, ‘When food failed, the Mongol soldiers opened a vein in the horse, drank a small quantity of blood, and closed the vein . . .’

VII. It is difficult to compare Genghis Khan to other conquerors like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler.

- A. Virtually all of the great world generals and conquerors inherited the armies and civilizations of their predecessors.
- B. Alexander the Great, for example, inherited at age 20 the army of his father, Philip of Macedonia, and the Civilization of Pericles and the Greek City States.
- C. Julius Caesar inherited the Legions and Civilization of Rome.
- D. Napoleon inherited the army and civilization of the French kings.
- E. Genghis Khan built his world-class army from virtually nothing. He did it with mirrors.

VIII. How do we put Genghis Khan and the Mongolian Horde into perspective.

- A. In his History of the Mongol Conquests, J. J. Saunders said we should not view him from a western world and 20th Century point of view.
- B. J. J. Saunders says this about the Khan: he “was the product of his people and time, His actions were determined by the brutal law of the steppe which knew no compassion toward enemies.”
- C. Genghis Khan, his sons, and grandsons might have killed upwards of 40 to 50 million people over 250 years or about 8% to 10% of the world’s population of 500 million from 1211 to 1500.
- D. **Adolf Hitler** and the Nazis probably account for the deaths of 50 million people from 1939-45. But Hitler rejected the civilization and culture of Germany and Western Europe.
- E. Genghis Khan mirrored his civilization.
- F. Genghis Khan never knew the values of western civilization; he never read Norman Vincent Peale, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Plato. As Harold Lamb suggests, “To visualize this man, we must actually approach him, among his people and on the surface of the earth as it existed seven hundred years ago. We

cannot measure him by the standards of modern civilization. We must view him in the aspects of a barren world peopled by hunters, horse-riding and reindeer-driving nomads. Here, men clothe themselves in the skins of animals, and nourish themselves on milk and flesh. They grease their bodies to keep out cold and moisture. It is even odds whether they starve or freeze to death, or are cut down by the weapons of other men.”

Ix. How did Genghis Khan start organizing this most fearsome army?

- A. He organized it by 10's on horses.
 - 1. 10 = Platoon
 - 2. 100 = Company
 - 3. 1,000 = Battalion
 - 4. 10,000 = Division
 - 5. 30,000 = Corp
 - 6. 120,000 = Army
- B. Khan's Army was probably somewhere between 200,000 and 240,000 or about 2 armies of cavalry troops in 1220.
- C. Each Division of 10,000 was headed by a general that formed an independent tactical formation.
- D. Unlike the Greek and Roman armies, or the armies of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Genghis had no nobles, princes, or dukes to appoint to key military or political positions.
- E. Because there was no landed class or aristocracy, there was a kind of opportunity for anyone to be a military leader for the Mongols.
- F. Indeed, many of the Khan's top leaders were common shepherds or stable lads. The Khan looked for intelligence, loyalty, dedication, and ferocity.
- G. Ironically, Genghis Khan had no racial or religious bias for either his troops or leaders. He did not care if they were Shamanists (religion basically like our Native Americans), Muslims or Christians or if they were light or dark skinned.
- H. Actually, the Mongols were derived from a Turkish-Iranian Mix.
- L. Khan's army was classless; common troops had the same food and clothing as the generals.
- J. The Khan was loyal to his commanders and troops.

X. What was the Essence of the Mongol Army? The Key to Success?

- A. Khan's soldiers were tough-extraordinarily tough-maybe the toughest and most ferocious soldiers in history.
- B. Harold Lamb talks about the Khan's Army moving to the west in the spring of 1219. "Forging ahead in the utter cold of high Asia, a quarter million men endured hardships that would have put a modern division into the hospital . . ."
- C. Khan's soldiers had incredible discipline and a great capacity for hard work and unbelievable loyalty to the Khan-maybe only matched by Hitler's troops from 1939-45.
- D. Khan's troops gave a new meaning to the concepts of will and determination. They simply did not know the meaning of giving up and we all know that, if you are surrounded by people that never give up, you eventually will win.
- E. A retreat could only be ordered by the Khan or one of his top generals. If 1 retreated, he was executed. If 100 retreated, they were executed. If 1,000 retreated, they were executed.
- F. Discipline was fast and harsh.

XI. The Mongol's normal strategy in war was simple: Attack, ~~Hit~~ attack. as the overall rubric of their strategy. Harold Lamb, Paul Ratchnevsky, J. J. Saunders, and Bertold Spuler in his book The Mongol Period all talk about Mongol military strategy and tactics.

- A. The element of surprise and speed with their cavalry army.
- B. Incredible mobility.
- C. Concentration of force at key points. Keep in mind the brilliant American general in the Pacific during JWW H-Douglas MacArthur. e w e r e surprised over and over again by MacArthur's tactics of attack, speed, surprise, and mobility.
- D. The standard envelopment was often used. As David Woolman points out in an article in Military History for October of 1995 on the Mongol Military Strategy in the 13th Century, "it was this trinity of speed, mobility, and the concentration of forces that led . . . the Mongols . . . to victories time after time."
- E. What we are talking about: the Mongol Army is the equivalent of a Medieval Blitzkrieg-maybe unlike any other until the Nazi German forces of 1939-41.
- F. Genghis Khan would have loved the American strategy of Operation Desert Storm and Operation Left Hook with Fort Riley's The Big Red One in 1991 against Iraq, where the concepts of speed and surprise, mobility, the concentration of forces, and envelopment with Operation Left Hook way out in



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COLUMBIAN
MUSEUM IN VICTORIA
BC EXHIBIT ON
EDWARDS MOUNTAIN
CHRIS LARRY

the Saudi Arabian desert were deployed, successfully and quickly. Iraq was defeated in about 2 days.

XII. The Actual Planning

- A. The Khans always tried to follow a well-thought through plan.
- B. To formulate a plan, a General Council (or Kumltaia) was called.
 - 1. All lead officers had to attend.
 - 2. The war situation was discussed and the plan of campaign was explained.
 - 3. Routes were selected.
 - 4. Generals and various Divisions were chosen for the upcoming battle.
 - 5. They practiced and practiced.
- C. The Mongols had the equivalent of a CIA-KGB group that sent out spies to travel in merchant caravans into hostile territory and spies were also sent into enemy towns, markets, and bazaars. They gathered information and intelligence and spread disinformation.
- D. The Mongols virtually always attacked the enemy nation or empire or area from several points at once. ✓
- E. Harold Lamb and J. J. Saunders explain that the individual commanders had the flexibility and discretion to alter a course or maneuver in a different direction.
- F. But they all used couriers to keep in touch with the Khan and top generals.
- G. The Mongols basically lived off the land as they marched and gathered supplies, food, and clothing from conquered peoples.

XIII. The Mongols' tactics within the broad strategy and plan:

- A. Again, the elements of speed and surprise were central.
- B. If necessary, they would ride day and night to surprise the enemy.
- C. For example, they might use 3 Divisions or a Corp of 30,000 cavalry to ride 80 miles in 1 day and night and surprise the enemy by hours or days. They would get to the enemy long before they thought it was humanly possible. Keep in mind, for commanders from Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar to Napoleon

and even America's George Patton, they usually only moved their armies 20 to 25 miles a day. When the Mongols marched 80 miles in 1 day and night or 150 miles in 2 days and 2 nights, they always had the element of surprise. Speed kills in war and athletics.

- D. The Mongols' horses were short, sturdy, and strong. A Mongol Army Cavalry Division could average 10 miles an hour for a limited period of time.
- E. A great Mongol general, Subotai, rode his divisions-about 5 or 6 divisions-so at least 50,000-290 miles in 3 days in the Mongol invasion of Hungary in 1241. (That probably ranks as a record from 2000 B.C. up to 1940 and 1941 in WWII.)
- F. THE SPECIFIC TACTICS: Some examples of Mongol tactics:
 - 1. The Khan would have 2 or more Divisions coming from different directions converge at the place of battle with a huge concentration of forces and punch huge holes in the enemy lines.
 - 2. Many times, the Mongol leaders from different directions would use the tactic of envelopment. They would use an Operation Left Hook or Right Hook and then attack the enemy from behind and from the sides. This was the Standard Sweep of Alexander the Great.
 - 3. At other times in other battles, the Mongols would send several thousand troops right to the middle of an opposing force to unleash their arrows and then retreat. The opposing force would chase them until they found they were surrounded by larger Mongol forces on both sides.
 - 4. Or a whole Mongol force would attack and then retreat for a day or so until the opposing forces were scattered and tired and the Mongols would switch to fresh horses and attack.
 - 5. Other times, the Mongols would fight a tough opponent and allow that enemy to retreat and then attack on the march.
 - 6. The Khans would never allow themselves to get involved in a 2 front war.
 - 7. The Chinese said that Genghis Khan "led his armies like a god" . . . and that he "moved large armies of men over vast distances without an apparent effort."

XIV. What the Mongol Army was like?


Juvani the Chronicler said this of the Mongol Army: "From the days of Adam to the present, there has been no army comparable to that of the **Tatars.**" Fra Carpini who was sent by the Pope to implore the Khan not to invade Europe in 1242, said this of the

Mongols: "No single kingdom can resist the Tatars . . . They fight more by stratagem than by sheer force."

- A. All Mongol horsemen were mobile, quick, light, and nasty. Each soldier had to keep 2 to 4 horses and had to be prepared to move in minutes. Each soldier carried his own cooking pots, dried meats, water bottle, and needle and thread. Mongols all wore SILK SHIRTS because the silk would go in with the arrow and could be pulled out more smoothly.

- B. Mongol Army divided up into Light Cavalry and Heavy Cavalry:
 - 1. Light Cavalry—each light cavalry soldier had 2 bows and 3 quivers of 60 arrows. (They also might have a javelin.) The bow was a compound bow made of Yak horn and bamboo and was stressed against the natural curve of the bow to give the bow great power to shoot the arrows.
 - a. The Mongols, with their powerful bows, were the greatest archers in history.
 - b. Each bow had a pull of about 160 pounds and the bow could shoot the arrow about 250-300 yards. The American Sioux Indians, for example, at the Little Bighorn in 1876 had a bow with a pull of about 50 pounds, compared to Mongol bow of 160 pounds and Sioux arrow could go from 50 to 75 yards compared to Mongol's arrow of 250-300 yards. (One Mongol Division could have easily defeated both the 8,000 Sioux warriors and Custer's entire cavalry at the same time.)
 - c. The top Mongol archers could shoot 12 arrows a minute and top archers could shoot 7 arrows before the first one hit the ground. It was, in effect, the Mongol artillery.
 - 2. Heavy Cavalry:
 - a. The Mongol horsemen in the heavy cavalry had swords and shields and axes hanging from their belts.
 - b. They also had lariats for pulling siege weapons, catapults, and supply carts.
 - c. They also had huge crossbows and the equivalent of flame throwers from their bows in their assaults on towns.
 - d. A Division of 10,000 Mongols had, in effect, a Corn of Engineers that operated the siege cannons, catapults, and they built bridges, etc.

XV. The Mongol Battle Formations:




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- A. For huge battles under Genghis Khan between 1219 and 1227 A.D., as Harold Lamb says, if the army was about 200,000, Genghis would command the center of 100,000 troops and there would be 50,000 troops on right flank and 50,000 troops on left flank
- B. With this *army* of 200,000, approaching over a wide distance, as one observer said, “With the Mongolian Horde approaching a town or city the dust clouds appeared and the ground shook. . . and. . . the noise of the carts, the neighing of horses, and the savage war cries of the Mongols were deafening.”
- C. Professor Harold Lamb explained how the Mongols operated when they were preparing a battle formation on an open plain, : “The Mongol battle formation took the form of two ranks of heavy armored cavalry in front with three ranks of armorless mounted archers behind. The latter, moving forward through the intervals of the front *ranks*, poured forth a devastating fire and then withdrew, whereupon the heavy cavalry charged the demoralized enemy off the field.”

If you have seen Braveheart, where archers shot their arrows two or three times and, then, the Infantrymen charged, and, then, the cavalry-you get somewhat the idea.

D.




1. The Light Cavalry would move through the intervals of Heavy Cavalry and unleash thousands of arrows. Remember many of the archers could shoot 12 in a minute. This was the artillery barrage of the Mongols. Then, Heavy Cavalry moved in for the kill.
2. This was the Mongol Medieval Blitzkrieg. They were virtually unbeatable.
3. When they met the Europeans, the Mongols faced European medieval knights that had heavy protective armor. European knights had very heavy protective armor.
 1. Mail Mesh Leggings = 20 lbs.
 2. Mail Mesh Shirt = 50 lbs.
 3. Mail Mesh Headress = 20 lbs.

Throw in the lance, the shield, etc. and the Medieval warrior could be carrying up to 250 pounds of weight each.

4. Mongol archers had files for sharpening arrowheads that when dipped in red hot brine could pierce mail armor. Some of the Mongol’s arrows



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made a whistling noise in the air that added to the terror.

Paul Ratchnevsky says in his book that “The Mongol leaders were masters of the art of war such as the world scarcely saw before or has been seen since.”

XVI. Genghis Khan and the Mongols start looking to the West

- A. North China had been conquered. By 1217, the Khan was looking west to the Old Persian Empire of Darius and Xerxes. By the 13th Century, this empire was called the Khwar-izm Empire. Harold Lamb says of Khan by 1217 that the Khan “knew now that beyond the ranges of his westerly border existed fertile valleys where snow never fell. . .” and “where rivers never froze. . . .”
- B. For the Mongols to get there, they would have to cross a network of mountain ranges. These mountains served as a Continental Divide that separated the Plains Dwellers of the Khan from the Valley Dwellers of the West.
- C. Initially, the Khan was mainly interested in starting lucrative trade with the Khwar-izm State of the Shah Muhammad and his Muslim inhabitants.
- D. From the first, the Shah of the Old Persian Empire was suspicious of the Khan. The Shah had an army of over 400,000 troops. The Empire of the Shah had never felt threatened by a foreign state or nation.
- E. The Shah felt invincible and did not fear the illiterate infidels-the Mongols. The Shah was sent envoys from the Khan twice- the first time as trade merchants whom the Shah killed and the second time as envoys to the Shah to protest and they, too, were killed. Never again did Genghis or any of his successor Khans permit being crossed more than once. In the future, if any of his top leaders, envoys, etc. were killed by an empire, a city, or a fortress, all men, women, and children. Their heads were cut off and their ears were collected in sacks.
- F. As the Khan now said, “There cannot be two suns in the heavens, or two Kha Khans upon the earth.”
- G. War between the great empire of the Shah and the nomadic warriors of the Khan was now inevitable.
- H. To show you what the Mongols were up against, Harold Lamb says the Muslims and Islam in the 13th Century were at the height of their martial power. (Remember Mahomet lived from 572 A.D. to 632 A.D. and Islam quickly spread to all of the Middle East, North East, and North Africa and even Spain.)
- I. The Shah’s Empire extended from India to modern-day Iraq and Iran, and from the Persian Gulf to the Aral Sea to present-day Afghanistan and several southern former USSR Republics and this area included great Middle Ages

cities like Samarkand and **Herat**, **Bokhara**, and **Balkh**, etc., Tashkent.

- J. This is the kind of distance the Khan and the Mongols faced-think of Korea and Vietnam, for example, and how difficult they were.
- K. From the heart of the Mongolian Steppes and Lake Baikal to modern-day Iraq and Iran, and this is as the crow flies over the mountain ranges of mid-Asia, it is 2,000 miles. As Lamb says, for a modern army of 200,000 troops, this would represent an impossible march and mission. Travelers today can make it only in well-equipped caravans.
- L. But the Khan had no doubt his cavalry army could make the march. In the spring of 1219, he gave orders to the Mongol Horde to assemble. Each soldier brought 4 or 5 horses. The Khan was now 56.
- M. Every Light Cavalryman had 2 bows and 3 quivers of arrows-about 60 arrows. The Heavy Cavalrymen had swords, axes, and knives. They also brought siege engines, catapults, and flame throwers.
- N. During the 2,000-mile march, they lived off their sheep, reindeer, and goat herds, and they lived off the land.
- O. They had to cross raging rivers where 20 horses would be roped together by the saddle horns.
- P. Even in the middle of the summer, masses of ice and snow accumulated in the mountain.
- Q. Finally, the Mongols could see the first frontier of the Persian Empire of Islam and the wide River Syr.
- R. Remember the Shah had 400,000 men to Khan's 150,000 to 200,000 and the Khan is attacking. The Shah was confident: "The Mongols have conquered only non-believers-now the banners of Islam are arrayed against them."
- S. In the first engagement, the Shah outnumbered the Mongols by 10 to 1-yet the forces of the Shah lost over 100,000 in that first battle.
- T. The Shah Muhammad still had the bulk of his forces. But now the Shah split up his forces-putting 40,000 along the Syr River with the rest going to the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. He did not believe the Mongols could storm his city citadels.
- U. Keep in mind, the Mongols are outnumbered 4 or 5 to 1 and are the ones attacking. In a move reminiscent of Operation Desert Storm where American and UN troops went way out into the Saudi desert in Operation Left Hook and swept back along the Iraqi lines, Genghis Khan led his forces way out into the Red Sands Desert in a kind of Operation Right Hook-except his troops came from the east and went out into the desert northwest and attacked a Muslim

citadel, Bokhara, from the west, Now the great Khan suddenly and swiftly was attacking Bokhara from the west.

- V. The Shah Muhammed was outfoxed and outflanked just like Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis were in 1991. In 1221, however, Genghis Khan and the Mongolian Horde totally defeated the Persians and the Mongols pursued the Shah until they found him and killed him.
- W. Like Saddam Hussein, Shah Muhamed had been totally out-generated.

XVII. Genghis Khan and the Mongols make use of terror, brutality, and psychological warfare.

- A. As Paul Batchnevsky says, "Genghis Khan set out to create a reputation of ferocious terror where the Mongols involved whole populations in their terror." This use of terror probably was not duplicated until the Nazis of WWH.
- B. As Ratchnevsky says in his book: "There is something indescribably revolting in the cold savagery with which the Mongols carried out their massacres. The inhabitants of a doomed town were obliged to assemble in a plain outside the walls, and each Mongol trooper, armed with a battle-axe, was told to kill so many people, ten, twenty, or fifty. As proof that orders had been properly obeyed, the killers were sometimes required to cut off an ear from each victim, collect the ears in sacks, and bring them to their officers to be counted. A few days after the massacre, troops were sent back into the ruined city to search for any poor wretches who might be hiding in holes or cellars; these were dragged out and slain."
- C. The use of terror, slaughter, and massacres was first seen at Merv in February of 1221, because the people of Merv fought back Genghis ordered his Mongols to cut off the heads of all Persian Officers. Then, the remaining men, women, and children were forced to lie down with arms behind their backs. They were slashed and strangled to death.

Merv, February 1221, possibly up to 700,000 were killed.

- 1. At Merv, 400 craftsmen or so sent back to Mongolia.
 - 2. Some children saved to be slaves and sent back to Mongolia.
 - 3. 600 wealthy rounded up; they gave up their wealth and were killed.
 - 4. 5,000 Muslims hid in cellars, but Mongols searched them out and killed them.
- D. Bamiyan-March 1221--over 100,000 were killed
 - E. Nishapur--April 1221--500,000 to maybe 2,000,000 were killed

-
- F. **Herat-November 1221--Herat leveled and 200,000 to over 1,000,000 killed. The great cities of Samarkand and Bokhara were earlier ravaged. These cities were some of the greatest cities of the Near East during the Middle Ages. Many of these cities have never recovered right up to the present day.**
- G. Compared to 700,000 killed at Merv to 500,000 at Nishapur, here are some other totals of people killed in other great battles:
1. Alexander the Great killed 300,000 Persians at Arbella in 331 B.C. and 100,000 Persians at Issus in 333 B.C.
 2. Hannibal killed 80,000 Romans at Cannae in 216 B.C.
 3. Russians killed 10,000 Japanese in 1904 at Pt. Arthur
 4. Germans killed 60,000 British in Battle of Somme in 1916.
 5. From 1941-45, America lost 400,000 troops killed in both Europe and the Pacific.

XVIII. Genghis Khan dies in 1227 A.D. and Oeadaï becomes the Great Khan in 1229 and the Mongol Horde heads west into Russia. The Mongols reach Moscow and take it over in 1237 A.D.

- A. By 1239 and 1240, the Mongols are in control of much of Russia, including Moscow.
- B. In December of 1240, the Mongols head to Kiev, one of the key centers of Christendom in Eastern Europe.
- C. By now, the Russians are calling the Mongols the Hervill's Horsemen. Warsaw is reduced to ashes. Kiev's Byzantine churches and treasures were destroyed. Piles of heads of men, women, and children were built into pyramids. Even dogs and cats were killed. In Kiev, bodies were found on the plains 5 years later.
- D. In Kiev, observers said, "The stench of death hung over the land."
- E. Genghis Khan told his sons and generals: "I forbid you to show clemency to my enemies without an express order from me."
- F. Or, as the Khan said another time, "There is no better place for an enemy of our nation than in the grave."
- G. By 1240 and 1241, the Mongols were heading further into Europe. They won separate victories over the Europeans in both Hungary and Poland. In Poland, they sacked the beautiful and historic city of Cracow. Remember, the great Mongol general, Subotai, leads his Mongol cavalry 290 miles in 3 days to defeat

the Europeans at Hungary. In Hungary, the Mongols kill 30,000 Hungarians and 1 ear was *cut* off each body. Nine sacks of ears were gathered.

- H. By late 1241, the Mongolian Horde is right up against Western Europe.
- I. Germany, France, and Italy were liable to suffer the same fate as China, Persia, India, and Russia.
- J. There was no European army of any consequence between the Mongols and the Atlantic Ocean.
- K. Had Germany, France, and Italy been conquered by the Mongols, there probably would have been no Renaissance, Reformation, and the Enlightenment. What would the world be like today?
- L. But Ogadei died as the Great Khan in 1241 and the Mongols left Poland and Hungary. They abandoned Western Europe.
- M. Historians vary on the number of people killed by the Mongolian Horde over 200 years from 1213 to 1550 A.D. During this period of time, the world contained about 400 million to 500 million people. Some historians speculate that the Mongols killed about 10% of the world's population from about 1200 to 1500 A.D. This would mean that the Mongol Horde killed from 40 million people to 50 million people over this period of time.

XIX. The Impact of the Mongol Invasion on Russia from 1220 A.D. to the Present

- A. The examples of past conquerors and empires and how long they lasted:
 - 1. Alexander the Great and Macedonian Empire: 336 B.C. to 323 B.C.
 - 2. Napoleon and the French Empire: 1798-1815.
 - 3. Hitler and the 3rd Reich: 1933-45
- B. The Mongol Empire lasts in Russia from about 1240 A.D. to 1500 or even as late as 1555 A.D. Because of the Mongol 300-year rule over Russia, a kind of Eastern, Oriental despotism was fastened onto the Russian body politic. Like the Khans, the Tsars became supreme rulers and despots.
- C. Because of the Mongol rule that lasted for about 300 years, the Russian people basically miss:
 - 1. The Renaissance-remember it is in Florence, Rome, and Italy between 1450 and 1530 with Leonardo Da Vinci, Raphael, Michelangelo, and Botticelli where the Renaissance blossomed.

2. **The Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, etc. were all critics of the established church.**
 3. **The democratic concepts of the Enlightenment and Evolving Democracy.**
- D. The legacy for Russian history of the Mongol rule from the center includes the following:**
1. **The Khans are replaced by the Tsars. The terms are interchangeable.**
 - a. **The first important Tsar is Ivan IV the Terrible: 1533-1584 with power consolidated in the Tsardom.**
 - b. **The Tsarist tradition of power consolidated in the Tsardom accelerates with the Romanov Tsars who rule Russia from 1613-1917.**
 - c. **But it is the Tsar, Peter the Great, 1689-1725, who totally defeats the Russian Boyars (nobility) and moves Tsarist Russia to a total autocracy.**
 2. **With the evolving Kingships in Western Europe, in contrast to the Khans and Tsars, there were other developing power centers in the West,**
 - a. **In Western Europe during the Middle Ages from 1100 to 1500, for example, a multitude of different power centers developed to counter the Monarchs: The countering power centers in Western Europe included the following:**
 1. **A more independent and powerful nobility**
 2. **An independent Catholic Church and later with the Reformation other independent churches led by Martin Luther, John Calvin, etc.**
 3. **Chartered towns**
 4. **A freer peasantry**
 5. **Rising middle class**
 6. **An evolving system of laws**
 3. **In Russia, after the Mongols departed, the Russians, as Paul Ratchnevsky and J.J. Saunders suggest, used the word Tsar to describe the replaced Khan.**
 4. **Like the Mongol Khan, the Russian Tsar, as J. J. Saunders says, “was**

not restrained by a powerful aristocracy, an independent Church, the liberties of chartered towns, the bold self-confidence of a free peasantry, or the legal limitations defined and enforced by an ancient and revered system of jurisprudence. The *boyars* or nobles were dependent on the grand duke for bounty in the form of landed estates from the territory retrieved from the Mongols, the Orthodox clergy preached the virtues of submission to the prince who fought for the faith against the accursed infidels.”

5. Thus, the Russian Tsar not only did not face an evolving and revered system of jurisprudence, a growing middle class, chartered towns, protestant reformers, but
 - a. The Russian nobility was dependent on the Tsar for the leasing of their estates.
 - b. The Russian Eastern Orthodox Church and the top patriarch became an integral part of the Russian Tsardom.

XX. In the past 1000 years, Russia has been attacked many times from the west: **Gustavus Adolphus and the Swedes; Napoleon Bonaparte and the French; Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler and the Germans.**

- A. Russia rebuffed all attacks from the West.
- B. But the one time Russia was attacked from the East, Russia lost and was conquered.
- C. Professor J.J. Saunders, in his book The History of Mongol Conquests, tells of what it meant for Western Europe when the Mongol offensive to the West was called off when Ogadei, the Great **Khan**, died in 1241: “Thus Western Europe, free from the scourge of barbarian attack since the Viking raids, was able to develop the arts and sciences and steal a march on the Christian nations of the East, who languished under Tatar or Turkish servitude. The unequal evolution of the two halves of Europe originating in the Mongol Age has never been rectified. The West pressed ahead to a more dynamic future, through Renaissance and Reformation, scientific and industrial revolutions, while the East stagnated under allied tyranny, in despotism, serfdom and ignorance.”

XXI. Today, many American politicians, writers, and citizens blame all of the woes and problems of Russia on the Communist takeover in 1917. They tick off Lenin, Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and **Leonid Brezhnev** for the horrible problems of Russia today and the fact that Russia has such limited democracy and private enterprise today.

- A. The truth is that the lack of democracy and free enterprise can be traced all the way back to the Mongol rule of Russia that started in 1239 and 1240 and lasted for almost 300 years.

- B. Then, this Khan-type rule was continued by the Tsars until 1917.
- C. Then, in 1917, the Communist dictatorship took over with the Communist Party secretary becoming the new Tsar and the new Khan.
 - 1. The Communist Party secretary replaced the Tsar and the Khan.
 - 2. The religion of Marxism replaced the Russian Orthodox Church.
 - 3. The Communist KGB replaced the Tsarist Secret Police.
 - 4. The Communist-owned state industries replaced the Tsarist-owned state enterprises of the 19th and early 20th Centuries.

XXII. The truth is that the Mongolian yoke of about 800 years is only broken in August of 1991 when Boris Yeltsin climbed on the Russian tank in front of the Russian Parliament building on August 19, 1991, and said, in effect, that the 800 years of the Khan-Tsarist-Communist rule is over.

Thus, the political continuum of Russian political despotism that lasted from 1240 to 1991 was ended when Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament symbolically threw off the 800-year-old Mongolian yoke on August 19 and 20, 1991. On August 21, 1991, the 800-year era of the Khans, the Tsars, and the Communist dictatorships was ended.