

**-DoD Interest:** By statute, SecDef and the Chief, National Guard Bureau are both members of the Board. The SecDef's designee provides an OSD perspective to the Board.

**19. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member**

**-Requirement:** 42 U.S.C. §12651a

**-Established:** Nov. 16, 1990

**-SecDef designee:** Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(RA)

**-Purpose:** The Corporation works with governor-appointed state commissions, nonprofits, faith-based groups, schools, and other civic organizations to provide opportunities for Americans of all ages to serve their communities.

**-DoD Interest:** The Corporation helps DoD maintain good community relations by promoting community and volunteer service by federal civilians and military personnel.

**20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member**

**-Requirement:** Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)  
-SecDef or designated principal deputy

**-Established:** May 25, 1999

**-SecDef designee:** DUSD(I&E)

**-Purpose:** The Committee coordinates federal technical and financial assistance for state and local economic adjustment activities in response to Defense actions, including base closures, contractor reductions, and encroachment. It also prioritizes domestic program support for Defense-affected areas.

**-DoD Interest:** The Committee coordinates the provision federal economic adjustment assistance and supplements DoD's technical skills in supporting civilian adjustment actions. With current encroachment issues and base closures slated in the future, the Committee will provide the catalyst for the federal response to local base closure and encroachment issues.

**21. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member**

**-Requirement:** 38 U.S.C. §542

-SecDef or SecDef designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)

**-Established:** Aug. 6, 1991

**-SecDef designee:** DACOWITS Military Director

**-Purpose:** The Committee advises the Secretary of VA on benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs for women veterans, prepares reports and conducts studies pertaining to women veterans and the needs of women veterans with respect to compensation, health care, rehabilitation, outreach, and other benefits and programs administered by VA.

**-DoD Interest:** The Committee promotes the welfare of women who have served in the military.

**22. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member**

**-Requirement:** 5 U.S.C. §552 note

**-Established:** Oct. 8, 1998

**-SecDef designee:** Christina Bromwell, OASD(C3I)

**-Purpose:** The mission of the Working Group is to locate, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public through the National Archives all classified Nazi and Japanese Imperial Government war crimes records.

**-DoD Interest:** The Working Group oversees the efforts of DoD components in complying with the requirements of the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 and Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and coordinates with other agencies in locating and declassifying covered documents.

**\*Note:** The Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 requires the President to “designate the Working Group established under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246; 5 U.S.C. 552 note) to also carry out the purposes of this title with respect to Japanese Imperial Government records” by February 25, 2001. To date, this has not been done.

**Seek to Terminate DoD Membership**

**23. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member**

**-Requirement:** 20 U.S.C. §80

**-Established:** Aug. 30, 1961

**-SecDef designee:** Dr. Alfred Goldberg, DoD Historian

**-Purpose:** The Board provides advice to the Smithsonian Institution on matters concerned with the portrayal of the contributions of the Armed Forces to American society and culture.

**-DoD Interest:** None. The DoD Historian advises that the Board met once in 1980 and decided there was no reason to meet again.

**24. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member**

**-Requirement:** Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

**-Established:** May 25, 1999

**-SecDef designee:** DUSD(I&E)

**-Purpose:** The task force facilitate the provision of Federal resources to spur economic development along the southwest border region.

**-DoD Interest:** None identified.

**-Miscellaneous:** The Task Force terminates May 15, 2002, unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of its activities.

**TAB**

**B**

DEC. 17. 2001 7:16AM

December 17, 2001 1:00 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memberships

Is it possible for me to indicate a representative to attend some of these various memberships that I don't have time for, such as numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

Also, I would like to know who represents me on numbers 2, 3 and 4.

Thanks.

Attach  
11/07/01 GC memo to SecDef: Automatic Memberships

DHR:dh  
121701-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Mr. D. R. A. suggested determining what the groups do, and for those that do not provide value to DoD, have SecDef recommend that DoD/SecDef be deleted from memberships. For those that are of some value but do not need SecDef's personal attention, advise that a specific lower level person will perform DoD memberships functions. He noted that it may be necessary to contact the proponent/DoD-Heller to do this. v/R Carl Wagner*

November 12, 2001 4:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memberships

We ought to review this list of memberships and find out who my representative is on each one. Then we ought to change the representatives to make sure we have the people we want.

Please come up with a current list and a proposed list of changes.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/07/01 GC memo to SecDef re: Automatic Memberships

DHR:dh  
111201-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

INFO MEMO

NOV 12 2001

November 7, 2001, 11:11a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense

*WJ Haynes 11/9/01*

SUBJECT: Response to Your Query Concerning Automatic Membership

- You requested (tab B) a list of groups of which you are a member by virtue of your position as Secretary of Defense.
- The list at tab A is the result of our search of statutes and Executive Orders establishing Secretary of Defense membership on councils, committees, and other groups.
- We have not undertaken an exhaustive effort to determine the exact status of many of these committees. For most, representation has been delegated or has devolved to subordinate DoD officials. Some of these committees, although still "on the books," are moribund.
- Your note mentioned the Red Cross. The President appoints eight members of the Red Cross Board of Governors, traditionally including the Secretary of Defense. President Bush has not yet made his appointments.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: John A. Casciotti, (b)(6)

*SPD  
11/10*

UNCLASSIFIED

**Secretary of Defense Memberships****MOST SIGNIFICANT MEMBERSHIPS**

1. **National Security Council, member**  
Committee on Foreign Intelligence, member  
Committee on Transnational Threats, member  
-50 U.S.C. §402
2. **President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board**  
-Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202 (Oct. 16, 2001)  
-SecDef or designee
3. **Homeland Security Council, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 8, 2001)
4. **Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman**  
-22 U.S.C. §2751  
-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties  
-DepSecDef designated Committee Chairman  
-USD(AT&L) Chairs interagency group supporting committee

**OTHER MEMBERSHIPS**

5. **Invasive Species Council, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)  
-Primary Representative is ADUSD (E), Mr. John P. Woodley
6. **U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701 (Jun. 11, 1998), 16 U.S.C. §6401, note
7. **American Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48445 (Sep. 11, 1997)  
-SecDef or ASD-level designee
8. **Export Administrative Review Board, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

- No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of SecDef
  - Board responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve dispute
9. **Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member**
    - 15 U.S.C. §657c
  10. **National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, member**
    - 15 U.S.C. §4632
    - SecDef or designee
    - DDR&E advised that the Committee ceased activities in 1992
  11. **Trade Policy Committee, member**
    - Exec. Order No. 12188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. §2171 note
    - SecDef may designate a subordinate officer at the ASD-level to go in his stead to meetings when he is unable to attend
  12. **National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member**
    - 20 U.S.C. §80
    - DoD Historian advised that Board met once in 1980
  13. **DoD Advisory Council on Dependent's Education, cochairman**
    - 20 U.S.C. §929
    - SecDef or SecDef designee
  14. **Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member**
    - 22 U.S.C. §4605
    - SecDef may designate an DoD PAS official
  15. **White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member**
    - Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §1116 note)
    - SecDef or designee
  16. **Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member**
    - 38 U.S.C. §542
    - SecDef or SecDef designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)
    - DACOWITS Military Director is SecDef designee
  17. **Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member**
    - 38 U.S.C. §1974
    - DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller

responsibility for financial policy and ASD(FMP) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program

-Council meets once a year

18. **Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member**  
-38 U.S.C. §3689
19. **Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member**  
-38 U.S.C. §4110  
-Committee meets quarterly
20. **National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member**  
-40 U.S.C. §71a  
-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead  
-SecDef designee is Jerry Shiplett, Special Assistant to the Director, Real Estate and Facilities
21. **Interagency Council on the Homeless**  
-42 U.S.C. §11312  
-SecDef or designee
22. **Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member**  
-42 U.S.C. §12623
23. **Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member**  
-42 U.S.C. §12651a
24. **Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)  
-Task Force terminates May 15, 2002 unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of activities
25. **Economic Adjustment Committee, Chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member**  
-Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)  
-SecDef or designated principal deputy  
-Director Office of Economic Adjustment (DUSD(LA&I)), serves as Committee Chair

October 17, 2001 7:04 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Automatic Membership

Please pull together a list of all the things I am automatically a member of because of my role as Secretary of Defense. For example, I understand I am now a member of the Homeland Security Council. Of course, I am also a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

Are there other things like that? As I recall, the last time I was here I was a member of the board of the Red Cross.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ch  
101701-3

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
NOV 12 2001

*11/9*

*Sec Def -*

*Response attached. If you have questions about any particular membership, I have a binder with an explanation of each.*

*D. White*

October 17, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Authorities

We should take a look at the Presidential authorities under the September 12, 2001 authorities. Senator Graham told me that it only allows us to go after Al Qaeda, and that his amendment was to expand that, but it was defeated.

*000.5*

Do you know the story on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

*17 Oct 02*

U04095 /03

October 17, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Plan for Afghanistan

I am convinced we have to have a plan for Afghanistan and that nobody else in the government is going to do it unless we do. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-6

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

*000.5*

*17 Oct 02*

U04096 /03

October 17, 2002 9:55 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information

*311*

I want to listen in on the daily phone call of the Office of Global Communications. Larry, please put it on the schedule. I don't think people need to know I am on there, I would just like to hear how it works.

Also, I want to get briefed on the Iraq information policy plan and the strategic information plan for Iraq that were discussed in the SVTC yesterday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

*17 OCT 02*

U04097 /03

October 17, 2002 9:57 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief POTUS on IO and Oil

We have to brief the President on IO and oil.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-9

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

463

17 OCT 02

U04098 /03

January 9, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Central Asia

1000

ASia

It is pretty clear we have to design a Central Asia footprint for post-Afghanistan with bases, platforms, etc. ① What is it? timeframe?

Let's get a task force working on that immediately. Please put a deadline for the first draft in two weeks.

What is deliverable?  
Thanks.

~~JS info~~

DHR:dh  
010902-7

Accuracy, ICW  
USD(P) This  
will be an action  
of

.....  
Please respond by 01/23/02

1000 - Bondreau

① Caucasus,

9 Jan 02

October 17, 2002 10:00 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: List of Themes

I want to see a list of these themes we send out to speakers. I have never seen any.

If we are as well organized and as impressively arranged as I was told yesterday, I would like to be clued in, so I can get some guidance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-10

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

*350,001*

*17 Oct 02*

U04100 /03

**Snowflake**

October 17, 2002 10:05 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: IO Instructions

Iraq

You will notice I gave them a series of instructions yesterday in the SVTC on IO:

- how we define victory,
- how we describe Iraqi defeat,
- how we avoid being characterized as being in a quagmire,
- how we deal with not being able to find Saddam,
- how we move from one step to another,
- seeing that the IO people are prepared to do it very rapidly, in case that is necessary,
- what our themes are for:
  - the Arab street,
  - refugees,
  - defecting soldiers
  - Israel
  - Saddam killing Shia
  - WMD.

17 OCT 02

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

U04101 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7214

October 17, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Space Programs

Please see that Steve Cambone, John Stenbit and whoever has to do it—Gen. Myers—gets me through all of these compartmented space programs, so that we promptly get the authorities arranged and approved, ROEs established and public statements prepared.

4771.96

I don't want to save that kind of thing for the last minute.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

1706402

U04102 /03

October 17, 2002 10:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Ambassador from Afghanistan

The ambassador from Afghanistan is someone we could invite to dinner here at the Pentagon or at my house sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/07/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Ambassador from Afghanistan

DHR:Jh  
101702-13



Please respond by 11/01/02

Afghanistan

17 OCT 02

U04103 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7216



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ *WA*  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

OCT 4 2002 *RM*



**SECRET HAS BEEN**

17 2002 I-02/013618

USD P *copy provided 10/7* EF 2801

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

*MR* 07 OCT 2002

SUBJECT: Ambassador from Afghanistan

- You asked our thoughts on building closer relations with the new ambassador from Afghanistan to the U.S.
- The new ambassador from Afghanistan, Ishaq Shahryar, is a successful businessman and scientist (holds patents for photovoltaic solar cells) with 30-plus years of residency in California before becoming the first Afghan ambassador to the US since 1978.
- His close relations with President Karzai and the former king make him a valuable conduit of information—in both directions—as well as a point of leverage.
- He is interested in forging closer relations with the DoD. He met with DepSecDef in September.
- DASD Luti's office has frequent contact with the ambassador and can help to strengthen our ties further on key issues of interest including security, reconstruction, and political matters.
- I will also begin periodic meetings with the ambassador in order to build on existing ties with DoD. We will keep you informed of key issues that come out of these meetings with appropriate recommendations.

COORDINATION: Next under

Attachments: As stated

*DepSecDef*

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DASD *[Signature]* 10/4

PDASD/ISA *af*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10-07-02 09:599M1

11-L-0559/OSD/7217

Coordination Page

DASD (SO/LIC Stability Operations)

Dr. Joseph Collins

02 Oct 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7218

Snowflake

EF280164 MWP  
02/013618 10/17

September 12, 2002 10:16 AM -USDP

ISA, USA

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Ambassador from Afghanistan

LARRY DI PIERO  
10/14

Don't you think we ought to get a relationship with the new ambassador from Afghanistan to the U.S.? The President says he seems like a good man. He might be a way we can affect things from here and get better information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091202-29

.....  
Please respond by 10/04/02

10/7  
POLICY RESPONSE  
ATTACHED

11-L-0559/OSD/7219

09-13-02 10:49 IN

October 17, 2002 10:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DOMs

Where do we stand on DOMs? My impression is it ought to end and get folded into the Homeland Defense person we want to appoint.

384

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

10/20  
SecDef - Agree.  
I met with  
Paul McHale last  
week. He is our  
candidate to be the  
Homeland Defense Assistant  
Secretary.

I asked Paul to  
develop a plan to get  
DOMs folded in.

12 OCT 02

U04104 103  
11-L-0559/OSD/7220

Di Rita



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



INFO MEMO

2002 MAR -6 PM 5: 07

March 6, 2002, 9:20 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Cost of Requirements Submitted by the Commanders in Chief (CINCs)

- You inquired about putting a system in place to tell the CINCs the cost impact of their requests. A system currently exists to provide the CINCs the cost of each request or deployment order.
- My staff chairs a cost team that prices out the requests that come from the CINCs. Team members include Joint Staff (JS) representatives as well as representatives from each Service affected by the CINCs' request.
  - The CINCs' requests are priced out and compared with alternatives (for instance, cargo transportation by sea vice air) in an effort to determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy the CINCs' requests.
  - These cost estimates are provided to the Services and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the JS to ensure the original request is being satisfied.
- The CINC's staff is normally provided the final cost estimate either directly or via the appropriate Service. Cost estimates for every deployment order are available to the CINCs via multiple sources. First, the CINC Component Commanders' comptroller offices have the ability to determine costs for each request. Second, the Joint Staff or Service budget offices can provide the cost estimate determined by the cost team. The CINC Component Commanders' can provide the CINC

11-L-0559/OSD/7221

U04148 /02

with the cost for each request and the OSD cost team data can be made available to the CINCs via the Joint Staff.

COORDINATION: The Joint Staff

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7222



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100 FEB 25 10 43



INFO MEMO

February 25, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Cost of Requirements Submitted by the Commanders in Chief (CINCs)

- You inquired about putting a system in place to tell the CINCs how much the things they request cost the Department. A system currently exists to provide the CINCs the cost of each request *or Deployment Order.*
- My staff chairs a cost team that prices out the requests that come from the CINCs. Team members include Joint Staff (JS) representatives as well as representatives from each Service affected by the CINC request.
  - The CINCs' requests are priced out and compared with alternatives (for instance, cargo transportation by sea vice air) in an effort to determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy the CINCs' requests.
  - These cost estimates are provided to the Services and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the JS to ensure the original request is being satisfied.
- ~~For current operations,~~ Cost estimates for every deployment order are available to the CINCs via multiple sources. First, the CINC Component Commanders' comptroller offices have the ability to determine costs for each request. Second, the Joint Staff or Service budget offices can provide the cost estimate determined by the cost team. The CINC Component Commanders' can provide the CINC with the cost for each request and the OSD cost team data can be made available to the CINCs via the Joint Staff.

COORDINATION: The Joint Staff

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Ron Garant, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>4/26</i>
SR MR MANDASTIANI	
MA BUCCH	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>2/26</i>

TT-L-0559/OSD/7223

U03393 102

TO USD/CJ  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

2/26

Doc -

Your response  
won't answer his  
question. He

is referring to  
current ops, and  
your short graf on  
that makes cost accounting  
~~sound~~ <sup>permissive</sup> instead  
of required/verified.

11-L-0559/OSD/7224

January 26, 2002 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Deployments, Use of Assets and Cost

Dov, we had a secure video with the CINCs and Service Chiefs yesterday. During the course of it, it became clear that when the CINCs ask for something, there is no way for them to know what the cost is. Changing the deployment date two days or a week later, or four days earlier, could change the costs advantageously for the taxpayer, but the CINCs have no way of knowing that. There is no connection between cost and what they think they need.

We need to design a system so that, as with any company, individual or family, when they make a decision, they are aware of what it will cost and what it would cost if they did it different ways. At the present time, they don't have that.

Please get back to me with a proposal in 30 days.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
012602-13

.....  
Please respond by 02/26/02

STOW/ale  
2/14/02

6:09 PM  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2002 MAR -7 AM 8:09

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 14, 2002  
SUBJECT:

I would like to have instruction given to the DoD that no land will be purchased within 100 miles of Washington DC and no buildings will be leased without the approval of somebody. We have simply got to stop the concentration of government in the Washington DC area.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
021402.01

Please respond by: 2/18/02 *2/25*

→ Exec Sec:

Please task Mrs  
from SecDef to USD(AT&L)  
(~~if~~ assume) ~~via~~ via C.D.

Tight suspense / not more than

U04164 102-0559/OSD77226 of weeks. *D. Rita*



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

INFO MEMO

MAR 18 2002

FOR: Mr. Larry DiRita, Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr, DUSD (I&E)

*RF DuBois* 3.18.02

601

SUBJECT: "Land Acquisition within 100 miles of Washington DC" Snowflake

- We are staffing a revised policy memo that will require SecDef approval on all land acquisition and building leases within 100 miles of the Washington, DC. The current policy and background are provided below.
- Deputy Secretary Atwood established a moratorium on major land acquisitions in September 1990 (TAB A). Major land acquisitions were defined as purchases, the withdrawal of land from public domain, lease or permit from government or private entities, or any other type of agreement for use. The moratorium applies to any land acquisition involving either more than 1,000 acres or a purchase price or annual lease cost in excess of \$1 million.
- In December 1994, Deputy Secretary Deutsch delegated to USD(AT&L) the approval authority for requests for waivers to the moratorium (TAB B).
- Since January 20, 2001, five waivers have been approved by USD(AT&L) and two are in the staffing process. The Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) Pentagon Reservation request for the Boundary Channel Drive property is being staffed (after the fact, as Doc Cooke went directly to Dov Zakheim).
- No approval is currently required on building leases. For leasing activities within the NCR, WHS currently manages components' request. Outside of the NCR, those activities are managed by GSA. Relocation into the NCR is managed by WHS and such actions currently require SecDef approval.

18 MAR 02

COORDINATION: None

cc: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)



U04979 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/7227



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

September 13, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION &  
LOGISTICS)  
DIRECTORS OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Land Acquisition in the United States

The Secretary of Defense and I want to change fundamentally the way the Department of Defense acquires land in the future and to place a moratorium on acquisitions that are currently in process. As we reshape our forces and close or realign bases, the Department must ensure that we propose the acquisition of land only where there is a clearly demonstrated need.

Effective immediately, no major land acquisition proposals may be made public through a request for proposals, notice of intent to perform environmental analysis, or other official notice without the approval of the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

To permit the Secretary and me to review major land acquisitions, I am establishing a moratorium on such acquisitions. Effective immediately, no action shall be taken without my approval (including Records of Decision for an Environmental Impact Statement) to accomplish a major land acquisition. You may request exceptions to this moratorium for urgent military requirements or when, on balance, application of the moratorium would have an adverse effect on the Department's ability to perform its mission.

National Guard major land acquisitions which were to be funded in whole or in part by Federal funds shall be subject to the moratorium. Civil works programs managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers shall not be subject to the moratorium. Renewals of existing withdrawals, leases, permits or other use agreements other than those at bases being closed or which are candidates for closure shall not be subject to the moratorium.

Major land acquisition is defined for the purposes of this memorandum as the purchase, withdrawal from public domain, lease or permit from individuals or government entities, or any other type of use agreement involving more than 1,000 acres, or land whose estimated purchase price or annual lease price exceeds \$1 million.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum.

*W. A. Armstrong*

11-L-0559/OSD/7228



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 DEC 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ECONOMIC SECURITY)  
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Land Acquisition in the United States

On September 13, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued the attached memorandum instituting the moratorium on major land acquisitions in the United States. It requires that all major land acquisition proposals be reviewed and approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary before any public action is taken. This is to ensure that, in this period of downsizing, land is acquired only when there is a clearly demonstrated need.

As the Department continues to downsize, proposals to acquire more land still merit senior Office of the Secretary of Defense oversight. However, I feel it is no longer necessary for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to review each proposal.

Effective immediately, proposals for the acquisition of 1,000 or more acres of land, or land whose estimated purchase price or annual lease price exceeds \$1 million, shall be submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) for review and approval. All other definitions and restrictions set forth in the September 13, 1990, memorandum remain in effect.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John H. DeLoach".

Attachment

22801

11-L-0559/OSD/7229

October 17, 2002 10:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Chiefs and CINCs

I want to think about moving Chiefs and CINCs to the same program, where they have two-year appointments, with one- or two- or three-year additional ones at their option, as well as the Secretary's, the President's and the Congress's.

*322*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-16

.....  
*Please respond by 11/01/02*

*1706102*

U04207 /03

October 17, 2002 10:43 AM

TO: Tony Dolan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Your Note

Thanks so much for the note from Josh Gilder.

He's got the right instincts!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-20


.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*000.7*

*17 OCT 02*

U04208 /03



Oct. 16, 2002

Memo

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

Fr: Anthony R. Dolan 

Re: Post Piece

  
LARRY DI RITTE  
10/16

Rumsfeld's greatest achievement according to Josh Gilder:

"He's got the Washington Post complaining about civilian control of the military."

Snowflake

October 17, 2002 10:44 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Testimony

Here is a copy of a note I got from Henry about the testimony you prepared.

You're famous!

Thanks.

Attach.  
09/27/02 Kissinger note to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101702-21

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Iraq*

*17 OCT 02*

U04211 /03

HENRY A. KISSINGER

2002 OCT 15 21:10:44

September 27, 2002

Dear Don:

I wanted to drop you a quick note simply to say that your testimony before the House Armed Services Committee was the best presentation I have yet read of why we must not lose the opportunity to "connect the dots" and take decisive action against those who wish us harm before it is too late.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld  
The Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Pentagon, Room 3E-880  
Washington, DC 20301

U16546<sup>100</sup>/02

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022  
FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7234

October 17, 2002 10:48 AM

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: LCDR Speicher

My impression is that you handled the Speicher matter very well.

Thank you.

DHR:dh  
101702-22

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*704*

*17 OCT 02*

U04212 /03

Snowflake

October 17, 2002 3:30 PM

ACTION COMPLETE 11/06  
MTG HELD w/CSAF  
; GEN LOED

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Report from Air Force

I am going to need a report from the Air Force on the French satellite issue.

Thank you.

DHR:dh  
101702-23

France

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

1702102

U04213 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7236

Snowflake

October 17, 2002 3:33 PM

*Done*

TO: LTG Craddock  
Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Gen. Eberhart

I need to get Gen. Eberhart in here to have him brief me on what he thinks his job is at Northern Command.

And then at the right moment, we want to get the interagency people over to meet Gen. Eberhart and get a briefing from him and the Homeland Defense Office, so people are all on the same wavelength as to what is going on—but I don't want that until I have agreed.

Thank you.

DHR:dh  
101702-24

.....  
Please respond by 11/08/02

*NORTHCOM*

*SECDEF -  
Gen Eberhart is scheduled  
to brief you on 12 Nov,  
5:30 pm.*

*17 OCT 02*

*C 11/6*

U04214 103

11-L-0559/OSD/7237

October 17, 2002 3:40 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten mark]*  
SUBJECT: Karzai

Is there something we ought to be getting ready to have Marines take over to guard Karzai instead of SOF people, in case Biden ties up that money and we never get it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-26



Please respond by 10/25/02

*Afghanistan*

*170602*

U04215 /03

October 17, 2002 3:43 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Flying Automobiles

Please have someone find out what it costs us to fly the President's and the Vice President's limousines around the country and the world—just a rough, gross number. I want to tell Condi Rice.

*SRD*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101702-27

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02



*10/22 -*

*SecDef -*

*It costs \$4,118 per hour of flight time for a C-130, which is what we would probably fly Karzai's SUV around in.*

*Three round trips from Kabul-Kandahar and you've paid for a new SUV (sport utility vehicle.)*

*For general info, some additional data is attached regarding costs of travel. 11-L-0558/OSD/7239*

*10/20*  
~~*Exec Sec -*~~  
~~*Do we have something reasonably available?*~~  
~~*If we cannot get costs, at least get a sense of the logistic footprint that involves moving the President's car(s).*~~  
~~*Thanks-*~~

*1204702*

*U04216 /03*

# UNCLASSIFIED

21 August 2002

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Airlift Requirements for a POTUS Trip

1. (U) Purpose: To answer C-135 comment to the initial point paper submitted on Presidential airlift: "Pete -- problem here is these are absolute worst case examples (not nominal I wouldn't think) by a different administration. I'd be more interested in seeing data on a recent trip overseas by POTUS."

2. (U) Key Points.

- (U) J4 pulled historical data from two overseas trips by President Bush within the last 12 months. These trips frame the amount of support needed to distinctly different theaters of operations.

### CHINA

MDS	MISSIONS	HOURS	\$/HOUR	TOTAL COST
C005	21	601	\$15,955	\$9,588,955
C141	4	112.9	\$5,546	\$626,143
KC010	3	23.5	\$8,430	\$198,105
KC135	32	157.5	\$4,410	\$694,575
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>863.2</b>		<b>\$11,107,778</b>

### EUROPE

MDS	MISSIONS	HOURS	\$/HOUR	TOTAL COST
C005	43	890.4	\$15,955	\$14,206,332
C017	6	113.1	\$7,283	\$823,707
C130	15	48.5	\$4,118	\$199,723
KC135	7	25.4	\$4,410	\$112,014
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>1077.4</b>		<b>\$15,341,776</b>

WOW →  
43 C-5 MISSIONS

Prepared by: G.S. HOLDER, VADM, USN  
Director, Logistics, (b)(6)

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/7240

October 18, 2002 3:08 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fatality

There was a Navy ensign killed in a traffic accident in Yemen. I don't know if we add him to the list or not, or what we do about that. Apparently he hit a semi head-on, while trying to pass a slow-moving Yemeni vehicle.

*704*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101802-5

*T.C See me*

.....  
Please respond by 10/25/02

*DR*

*18 OCT 02*

U04217 /03

October 18, 2002 3:13 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Pete Aldridge  
John Stenbit  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracking

*LARRY Di Rita*  
*12/4*

Here is a proposal from John Stenbit for blue forces tracking.

I have no way of evaluating its merits in isolation. I do think we should make a priority of such systems, but this should be considered together with other priorities for the FY04 budget build.

*320.2*

All you smart folks should tell me whether it makes sense to do what John is proposing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
06/11/02 ASD(C3I) memo to SecDef re: Blue Force Tracking [U09856-02]

DHR:db  
101802-6

Please respond by 11/08/02

*11/25/02*  
ALDRIDGE RESPONSE

ATTACHED

*18 OCT 02*  
*V/R*

U04218 /03



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

November 20, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Jr., UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Review of ASD (C3I) Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Proposal

- You asked whether John Stenbit's recommendation on BFT makes sense. He called for a priority review of the Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS) in the FY04 Budget Review. We have done this and believe that GPRS merits continued investment as a BFT solution. In FY04, we are also investing in a related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA).
  - GPRS is an ACTD enhancement of the Army's Movement & Tracking System (MTS). The Army is now fielding MTS in their combat vehicles for BFT as part of the Gulf Digitization Initiative. GPRS was successfully demonstrated in MC02 and may also be suitable for coalition forces.
  - Another ACTD (Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA)) is about to start. It will fuse existing BFT technologies into a common plot. It was the highest ranked ACTD by Combatant Commanders and Services this year. The ACTD with GPRS (PRESS ACTD) will conduct its demonstration in FY04. The JBFSA demonstration will occur in FY05.
- There are Service variations on these technical solutions for BFT. In coordination with the JROC and ASD(C3I), I will nominate a DoD Executive Agent (EA) for BFT to you who will review BFT approaches, recommend appropriate solutions and quickly develop a joint BFT capability.

RECOMMENDATION: Wait until we have the results of the two ACTDs and the input of the DoD Executive Agent for BFT before selecting a technology.



11-L-0559/OSD/7243

DIRECTOR, PROGRAM AND INFORMATION

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

10/30

NOV 2 2002

Mr. Secretary

A proposal for blue force tracking is part of the proposed FY04-09 budget.

The proposal reflects Combatant Commander, J-8, PA/E & I believe, C3I views.



SK  
10/29

(Combene)

"A proposal for blue force tracking is part of the proposed FY04-09 budget. The proposal reflects Combatant Commander, J-8, PA/E, and - I believe - C3I views."



LARRY D. HIGGINS  
10/30



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE

**ACTION MEMO**

June 11, 2002 3:13 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action:

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I)

(CHERYL ROBY  
ACTING  
6-12-02)

SUBJECT: SecDef Request for Blue Force Tracking Proposal

- On March 18, 2002, you requested that USD(AT&L) respond "with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker" (Tab B).
- USD(AT&L) responded on March 29 with an info memo, and in an attachment referenced Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS) as a possible solution (Tab C). USD(AT&L) then approved a draft of C3I's recommendation on April 27 (Tab D).
- GPRS has broad support (Tab A). GPRS has been demonstrated on land and sea vehicles, and on fixed and rotary wing aircraft. GPRS uses the same technology as Army's Movement Tracking System (MTS), which is fielding up to 55,000 units.
- A GPRS user card (3.4 x 2.1 inch), due October 2003, will allow individuals to be continuously tracked, with security and Low Probability of Detection. GPRS operates over many existing "bent-pipe" L-Band satellite transponders, available worldwide.
- Estimated infrastructure cost: \$33M RDT&E over FY02-04, \$25M Procurement over FY04-06, and \$48M O&M thru FY12. Infrastructure includes hosting GPRS at existing earth stations, and building up to six earth stations for improved performance.
- Approximately 200,000 trackers (\$3k each with integration) is \$600M over FY03-12. GPRS could also be accessed by Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals.
- Assessment by OASD(C3I) technical staff confirms the potential of GPRS-like systems (supporting evaluations by Army, intell agencies, and Sandia National Lab). Availability by FY04 is aggressive but achievable, and the cost estimate is sensible.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef direct Comptroller to review, as priority, GPRS in 04 budget review process, and place priority on GPRS UFR support in FY02 & FY03 budget execution.

U09856-02

Prepared By: Morris Hornik,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7245

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE  
ACTION MEMO

June 5, 2002 1:17 PM

FOR: ASD(C3I) *6/12/02*

Principal Deputy Action:

THROUGH: DASD(PROGRAMS) *Hf*  
DASD(SPECTRUM, SPACE, SENSORS & C3I) *AD*

FROM: ACTING DIRECTOR, WIRELESS *DFF 6/3/02*

SUBJECT: SecDef Request for Blue Force Tracking Proposal

- On March 18, 2002, SecDef tasked USD(AT&L): "Please come back to me with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker" (Tab B).
- USD(AT&L) responded on March 29 with an information memo but no proposal, and referenced Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS) as a possible solution (Tab C). USD(AT&L) then approved a draft of this recommendation on April 27 (Tab D).
- Assessment by OASD(C3I) technical staff confirms the potential of a GPRS-like system, with supporting evaluations by Army (capacity and latency), the intelligence community (detectability), and Sandia National Lab (coverage and space systems).
- As specifically directed by ASD(C3I), references to situational awareness, two-way use, S-band, and hosting on GPS have been deleted from this recommendation. R&D is reduced from \$53M to \$33M, eliminating building of space hardware; production is reduced from \$125M to \$25M for the same reason: O&M is unchanged at \$48M.
- By FY04, GPRS can be operating over many existing "bent-pipe" L-band satellite transponders; the GPRS waveform can then be "ported" to JTRS, expanding access.
- SecDef direction to rapidly fund a GPRS-like capability, and support implementation, will produce superior Blue Force Tracking within two years, satisfying the Gingrich suggestion and meeting needs across DoD and other agencies (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION: ASD(C3I) submit the attached memo (Attachment 1) in response to SecDef request for a proposal.

Prepared by: Morris Hornik, C3, (b)(6)  
Suspense: C3-05-04/02

11-L-0559/OSD/7246

I. Written Endorsements For Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS)

Received From:

Unified Commands (all by J3s)

USSOUTHCOM  
USPACOM  
USCENTCOM  
USSPACECOM  
USSOCOM  
USEUCOM  
USJFCOM

Other DoD

COMACC (now USAF CoS)  
USAF XO (now USAF VCoS)  
USCENTAF  
DUSD (Advanced Systems & Concepts)  
DASD (Defense POW MIA Office)

Agencies, etc.

DEA  
FAA (signed by Administrator)  
Civil Air Patrol (signed by National Commander)

US Government Interagency Groups

National Search And Rescue Committee (NSARC)  
Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP)

II. Funding, Technical or Demonstration Support for GPRS

Provided By:

DoD

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) under USJFCOM  
OSD -- ASD(C3I), DUSD(AS&C), DASD(DPMO)  
USA -- CASCOM  
USN -- NRL, NavAir, and others  
USAF -- HQ/XOOP (Personnel Recovery)  
NSA and others

Other Agencies

USCG, NASA, US Customs Service  
Sandia National Laboratory

HR-222002 01101

7.04

March 18, 2002 11:16 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Please come back to me with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Blue Force Tracker

DHR:dh  
031802-30

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

MAR-22-2002 07:57 ... 9:26 AM

To: (b)(6) @osd.pentagon.mil; Ed. Giambastiani (b)(6)

Subject: secdef-2

II. Immediate action:

1. Establish Blue Force Tracker as the universal real time identity system for all services and for national assets (including intelligence field operatives in combat zones)

Received MAH 18 2002 /1800

Deputy EA hsm EA P

**CJCS Decision:**

Prepare for my Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Prepare for SOMing \_\_\_\_\_

Let Staff Reply \_\_\_\_\_

Send to Staff for Info \_\_\_\_\_

No Reply Required \_\_\_\_\_

Copy to:

*J. 8*  
*We have real equity*  
*here - ensure any*  
*efforts are planned*  
*in w/US State*  
*response.*  
*M3/A*



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

March 29, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) *3/29/02*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker (BFT) – Snow Flake

- Blue Force Tracker is a generic term that applies to systems that keep track of friendly forces and minimize fratricide.
- There are several Blue Force Tracker systems in use or under consideration.
- We have ACTD's actively addressing BFT issues.
- JROC is actively guiding the Department towards an objective BFT capability.
- The attached paper provides some details.

Attachments:

As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/7251

## Blue Force Tracking (BFT)

### Background

- Today, a number of legacy systems provide (BFT); none provide an automated Common Operational Picture (COP) of all friendly forces.
- A diversity of systems provide BFT for selected military units. For example, the Army's Movement Tracking System provides BFT for some of their forces – primarily logistics ground units. The Army Space Command runs a Mission Management Center (MMC) under CINC USSPACECOM where these systems are managed and results are provided to other CINCs.
- Also, semi-automated friendly force location reporting (via tactical data links) and manual reporting systems augment existing automated systems in assembling blue force picture.

### Status

- In May 2002, USSPACECOM will request JROC validation of a Beyond Line of Sight / Non-Line of Sight (BLOS / NLOS) Mission Needs Statement (MNS). USSPACECOM intends to brief the JROC again in September 2002 to request validation of a concept of operations for legacy operations, an operational concept for the objective BFT capability, and ORD-level requirements for a BFT augmented payload. USSPACECOM will also make recommendations for Lead Service / Executive Agent responsibilities. The draft MNS currently indicates that an objective BFT system should have full time, two way, LPI / LPD, global availability.
  - This Joint Staff effort should define the operational requirement for an optimum "objective system" for BFT. Selection of a technology to provide BFT should evolve from this requirement.
- Two ACTDs explore near- and intermediate-term technologies to support broader BFT capabilities.
  - A proposed Joint Blue Forces Situational Awareness (JBFSA) ACTD would provide fusion of existing BFT systems into a common plot. This proposal is in the process of soliciting a service sponsor and obtaining funding commitments.
  - The Personnel Recovery Extraction Survivability aided by Smart Sensors (PRESS) ACTD proposes an automated global, satellite-based personnel locator (GPRS) system as a possible solution for BFT. [Note: OSD staffing actions are in progress to preserve space/weight in GPS III for GPRS until the USAF makes a final recommendation on the best satellite host for this system.]



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

DDR&E AT WNET, TRG

ACTION MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS) **USD (AT&L) has seen**

FROM: DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ADVANCED) SYSTEMS  
& CONCEPTS *12 APR 02*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracking (BFT) System

PURPOSE: To obtain USD (AT&L) concurrence on USD(C3I) response to SecDef  
Request for a Blue Force Tracking Proposal

DISCUSSION:

- On March 18, 2002, SecDef tasked USD (AT&L) to respond to a suggestion from Newt Gingrich on universal BFT (Tab B). AT&L provided a response based on background information provided by DUSD (AS&C) (Tab C).
- Subsequent to AT&L's response, ASD (C3I) staff prepared a memorandum to SecDef recommending immediate funding of Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS) as the solution to universal BFT requirements.
- In coordination with AT&L staff, the proposal was amended to recommend SecDef direction of service support for a universal BFT system in the FY04 POM.
- This position no longer mandates GPRS, but reserves POM funding for accelerated acquisition of the BFT system agreed to meet operational requirements.
- This memorandum in draft format is provided here for AT&L concurrence.

RECOMMENDATION: USD(AT&L) concur with the draft ASD(C3I) memorandum at Attachment 1.

Attachment: Draft ASD(C3I) memo on BFT

CAPT Mike Knollmann, USN, (b)(6) April 22, 2002

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove *[Signature]*

Other *[Signature]*

**ACTION MEMO**

April 17, 2002 6:03 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action:

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT: SecDef Request for Blue Force Tracking Proposal

- On March 18, 2002, you requested that USD(AT&L) respond "with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker" (Tab B).
- USD(AT&L) responded on March 29 with an info memo, and in an attachment referenced *Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS)* as a possible solution (Tab C).
- GPRS has been demonstrated on land and sea vehicles, and on fixed and rotary wing aircraft. GPRS uses the same technology as Army's Movement Tracking System (MTS), which is fielding up to 40,000 units. GPRS has broad support (Tab A).
- A GPRS user card (3.4 x 2.1 inch), due October 2003, will allow individuals to be tracked, and to exchange messages, with security and Low Probability of Detection. GPRS will operate over existing "bent-pipe" L-Band and future S-Band transponders.
- Estimated infrastructure cost: \$53M RDT&E over FY02-04, \$125M Procurement over FY05-10, and \$48M O&M thru FY12. Infrastructure anticipates hosting GPRS Phase 2 on GPS Block III (requires under 5% of estimated GPS weight and power).
- 200,000 two-way trackers (\$3k each including integration) is \$600M over FY03-12. GPRS could also be accessed by 2nd-generation Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).
- Assessment by OASD(C3I) technical staff confirms the potential of GPRS-like systems (with related evaluations by Army, intell agencies, and Sandia National Lab). FY03 availability is aggressive but achievable, and the cost estimate appears sensible.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef direct Services to fully fund a GPRS-like system in their FY04 POM and place priority on UFR support in their FY02 & FY 03 budget execution.

11-L-0559/OSD/7254

October 18, 2002 4:23 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Money for Afghanistan

Please find out why the State Department and OMB didn't budget money for Afghanistan last year as Senator Leahy is saying. Who was supposed to do it and for what purposes? Please let me know.

We have to make sure we don't make that mistake again in the budget being prepared this fall. I need to see a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101802-7

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

*Afghanistan*

*18 OCT 02*

U04220 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2002 MAR -7 PM 2: 52

INFO MEMO

CM-214-02  
7 March 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/SL*

SUBJECT: Location of Combatant Commander Headquarters

- For your information, the following locations of the combatant commanders are provided, as requested at our roundtable meeting of 22 February.
- The following are locations of the combatant commander headquarters:
  - US Central Command – MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida.
  - US European Command – Patch Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany.
  - US Joint Forces Command – Norfolk, Virginia.
  - US Northern Command – TBD.
  - US Pacific Command – Camp H. M. Smith, Oahu, Hawaii.
  - US Southern Command – Miami, Florida.
  - US Special Operations Command – MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida.
  - US Space Command – Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
  - US Strategic Command – Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska.
  - US Transportation Command – Scott Air Force Base, Belleville, Illinois.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7256

U04223 /02

October 18, 2002 4:35 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Fort Detrick and Department of Health and Human Services

Secretary Thompson said he is having trouble. They want to build a Level Four laboratory at Fort Detrick to look at some bad stuff, and it is going to cost \$100 million. There is some problem the Defense Department is giving them about control over the building. I don't know what it's about.

653

Please have someone check into it and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101802-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

18 OCT 2002

U04225 /03

October 18, 2002 4:55 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Initiatives with Congress

Let's talk about how we can get the Congress to give us more freedom on personnel, the delays in dollars, the delays in confirmations, the reports—all these things we talked about and have never really gone back to Congress on.

*032*

Where do we stand?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101802-11

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

*18 OCT 02*

U04226 /03

October 19, 2002 1:03 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Marshall Paper

Please get for me the final, unclassified version of Andy Marshall's paper from last year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101902-5



Please respond by 10/25/02

*381*

*19 OCT 02*

U04227 /03

11/14

To: GC - (Note See Def Comment we can discuss. Larry Di Rita 11/15)

October 19, 2002 9:30 AM

11/16

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Office of Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization

Please let me know what is going on about these two ex-Pentagon people who have been arrested—where that office is, what it is about, who is in it now, and do we need the office at all?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Seper, Jerry, "Pentagon Ex-Officials Accused of Corruption," Washington Times 10/19/02

DHR:dh  
101902-1

Please respond by 11/08/02

10/25

~~[Full Address]~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN

11/15

SECDEF

- Attached are the bios of the two top people in the office right now.

- They are Bush Administration appointees.

- The top man (Ramos) was recruited by Aldridge, vetted by Presidential Personnel, and appointed last year (June '01).

U04228-03

11-L-0559/OSD/7260

DR Rita Larry Di Rita 11/15

11/14

To: GC - (Note SecDef Comment we can discuss. Di Rita 11/15  
October 19, 2002 9:30 AM

11/16

TO:  
CC:  
FROM:  
SUBJECT:  
  
Please let me  
have been arr  
we need the c

Have Hyman look into  
it & make sure he knows  
the rules, laws, ethics etc.

02005A

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 6 2002

Thanks.

Attach.

Seper, Jerry, "Pentagon Ex-Officials Accused of Corruption," Washington Times 10/19/02

DHR:dh  
101902-1

Please respond by 11/08/02

10/25

~~Full Aldridge~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN

~~SECDEF~~

- Attached are the bios of the  
two top people in the office right now.

- They are Bush Administration appointees.

- The top man (Ramos) was recruited by  
Aldridge, vetted by Presidential Personnel, and  
appointed last year (June '01)

19 Oct 02

11-L-0559/OSD/7261

U04228 103 11/5

Di Rita Larry Di Rita

## FRANK MANUEL RAMOS

(b)(6)

**Executive Experience Summary:**

**Present: Chief, Deputy Director, VA Department Minority Business Enterprise (DMBE), Richmond, VA appointed by James Gilmore, Governor (May 2000)**

- Recruited by the Office of the Governor to be the Chief Operating Officer bringing my expert oversight to the Department's fiscal and administrative programs.
- Launched the DMBE's disadvantaged business lending program that was under high scrutiny by the Legislature and the media by restructuring the management team and program direction under my leadership and direction.
- Developed and installed a comprehensive DMBE administrative and fiscal guidelines on line for all employees.
- Holds a key executive role in the Governor's E-Commerce technology initiative that installed a central business assistance web portal to direct all access to all Department services in the Commonwealth.
- Directed the re-construction of the DMBE web page for minority and disadvantaged business with an interactive access to business certification, loans and procurement services and access for the visual and hearing impaired.
- Introduced the Business Executive on Loan concept to DMBE with private sector advisors to minority and disadvantaged businesses covering technology, lending and highway construction information.
- Inaugurated internal management reviews that identified fraud, waste and mismanagement practices that led to major and substantive management reforms in the Department that has been acknowledged by the Governor.
- Revamped the strategic plans for the Department's Minority Small Business Information Technology Outreach Programs to complement Governor Gilmore's nationally noted Technology Initiatives.
- Introduced a new minority business international trade program with Guanajuato, Mexico and Ghana capitalizing on Virginia's world leadership in the computer, telecommunications, biotechnology and agri-business technology.

**Self-employed Consultant - Post Retirement**

- On a very selected basis contracted to various businesses to provide marketing, lending and advisory services.
- Represented firms to provide software for law enforcement and security intrusion systems.
- Represented a national leading institution to provide SBA guarantee loans to minority businesses.
- Represented firms on Federal contractual issues as an affiliate of a Washington, D.C. law firm.

**Deputy Associate Director for Policy Coordination, Program Certification and Eligibility  
For Minority Small Business, Washington, DC (Retired Career Senior Executive Service Level V)**

- Led the change over of the management and workflow structure, operating policies, computer hardware and software systems to provide an improved minority certification program process for business applicants.
- Initiated a revamped management direction over the design, test and installation of a problem plagued certification application tracking software system cited by an Congressional Oversight Committee for start up delays.
- Resigned Regional and District Office staffing to provide a streamlined and timely certification processing.
- Directed the elimination of recurring Office of General Accounting oversight reports through changes to management practices and introduction of quality assurance oversight.
- Eliminated fraud, waste and abuse in the certification and procurement contracting past management practices teaming with the Inspector General Criminal and Audit Services investigate and indict a number of abusive cases.

**Associate Deputy Administrator, Management and Administration  
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), Washington, DC**

**(Held Top Secret Clearance)**

- Recruited by the President George H. Bush Administration as a Presidential Appointee Senior Executive from the Internal Revenue Service in 1989.
- Selected as a Career Senior Executive by the President George H. Bush Administration to bring my large organizational executive skills and experience to re-inaugurate the SBA's executive direction.

- Successfully initiated an innovative and expert executive direction to the SBA's administrative, fiscal, personnel, information technology, and procurement grants management cited in OPM and national technology magazines.
- Exceeded expectations in the planning, construction build out and transfer into a technology-smart office facility for the SBA in Washington, DC that was completed on time and on budget.

Frank M. Ramos Ramos - Continued

- Select member of the President Bush Office of Management and Budget Council for Management Improvement that help drafts and initiate administrative and budget policy throughout the Administration.
- I served in a dual capacity as the Comptroller and as the Associate Deputy Administrator for Management and Administration and implemented the Comptroller's Act by piloting the first fiscal accounting software system for the Treasury Department Office of Disbursements for use by Federal agencies.

#### U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Top Level Management Positions

- Directed a diverse number of complex compliance, taxpayer service, tax return processing, collection and computing functions in IRS various Districts and Service Centers in California, Arizona and West Virginia.
- Led major tax system initiatives that ranged from the planning and installation a new 12-acre tax return processing center in Fresno, CA that ultimately hired, staffed and trained over 250 managers and 6,000 employees; Piloted the development of centralized tax information telephone answering complexes in Los Angeles, CA and Phoenix, AZ; to new multi story District office facilities in Phoenix AZ including related computer support systems.
- Continuously and successfully directed the largest IRS multi-function service center operational division with over 2,000 employees, that processed 28 million pieces of mail; \$20 billion dollars in remittances; and 20 million tax returns with a \$20 million dollars operational budget.
- My successful management record includes Treasury Department and IRS awards for cash management initiatives, quality accomplishments and having the number one divisional operation in the nation.
- International leadership achievements include leading various tax administration courses in Latin America and in the United States for over fourteen Latin American country tax executives in the Spanish language.

#### Leadership Achievements

- Albert Gallatin Award for Distinguished Service from the Department of Treasury,
- Board member of the Technology Entrepreneurial Community Center, Arlington, VA
- Camera de Comercio de Toledo, Spain
- Chairman of the Board of the VA Department of Environmental Quality Small Business Environmental
- Chairman of the Board of Advisors to the Virginia Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Richmond, VA
- Compliance Advisory Board appointed by VA Governor George Allen
- Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association member, Washington, DC
- Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Central California - Past President
- Honor Award for Community Service from the Mayor of the City of Fresno
- Key to the City Award from the City of Fresno
- League of United Latin American Citizens of Washington, DC - Past Vice President
- Outstanding Alumni Award and Commencement Speaker, Fresno Community College
- Reconocimiento de COFOCE from Vicente Fox, Governor of the State of Guanajuato, Mexico
- Standing Joint Committee on the School Dropout Problem appointed by VA Governor James Gilmore
- The American G.I. Forum member, Washington, D.C
- United States/Mexico Chamber of Commerce member, Washington, DC
- U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce member, Washington, D.C.

#### Education:

High School: San Joaquin Memorial High School, Fresno, CA

Universities: California State University at Fresno, CA

Major: History and Secondary Education

Degree Received: Bachelor of Arts Degree

Post graduate courses in Public Administration

University of Maryland, Chief, Financial Managers Course

Monterey, CA Naval Post Graduate School Statistical Problem Solving

Internal Revenue Service: Dr. Juran Quality Trilogy Executive Training Course

**FRANK MANUEL RAMOS**

(b)(6)

**Political Resume:**

- Actively supported to the Presidential Campaign of President George W. Bush through the Office of Tom Davis (VA) the Chairman of the Republican Central Committee that focused on Hispanics.
- Represented Virginia in the Presidential Inaugural Committee for President George W. Bush as a member of the Host Committee in the "Fiesta American Inaugural Ball" at the Organization of American States, where every Ambassador in the Western Hemisphere and three former Presidents of Latin American nations attended the event. I extended an invitation to Governor James S. Gilmore, III to be presented to the guests.
- Represented Hispanic Virginians at the Republican National Presidential Convention in Philadelphia as a member of the Hispanic Republican National Assembly at key events.
- Recognized for my Hispanic and small business leadership at national media events for key legislation by the joint Republican Congressional leadership at the U.S. Capitol through the sponsorship of Congressman Tom Davis, (VA)
- Assisted in the Gubernatorial campaigns of Governor James S. Gilmore III, as part of the "Veteran's for Gilmore" group and "Northern Virginia Republican Hispanic's for Gilmore" sponsored by the Virginia Hispanic National Assembly.
- Providing Virginia Republican candidates for office that are currently vying for the Office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General in the Commonwealth that have sought my Hispanic outreach contacts in Northern Virginia and Richmond
- My political resume extends to past Republican Presidential elections including Robert Dole, where my recommendation to him resulted in having U.S. Congressional of Honorees join his "Rally the San Joaquin Valley" in California campaign
- As a past president of a chapter arranged with the California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce State Conference to invited Vice President Nominee Jack Kemp to address the state Hispanic leadership

VITA

Dr. Robert Segura

BIRTHDATE AND PLACE

(b)(6)

Las Vegas, New Mexico

*Current  
Salary*

(b)(6)

*per year*

ADDRESS

Business:

School of Education and Human Development  
California State University, Fresno  
Department of Educational Research, Administration, and Foundations  
5005 N. Maple Ave., MS #303  
Fresno, CA 93740-8025  
(559) 278-0318

Residence:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- B.A. New Mexico Highlands University  
Las Vegas, New Mexico  
Education and Music
- M.A. New Mexico Highlands University  
Las Vegas, New Mexico  
Education and Music
- Ed.D. Washington State University  
Pullman, Washington  
Major: Curriculum and Instruction  
Minors: Higher Education Administration and Anthropology

1963 - 1970

Public school teacher, elementary and secondary levels.

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Excellent speaking, reading, and writing knowledge of Spanish

## OTHER COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED

University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico

San Jose State University, San Jose, California

## CONSULTANT/PRESENTOR-EVALUATOR

Consultant in the United States, particularly the Southwest and Northwest:

### Federal Government:

The United States Department of Education

-Proposal Reader/Evaluator

The National Institute of Education

-Desegregation policy studies and research project evaluator

### State Government:

California State Department of Education

-Migrant Education/Mini Corps Bilingual Education Program

Washington State Department of Education

-Migrant project evaluation

Alaska State Department of Education

-Lau remedies implementation workshops for all school  
superintendents

Michigan State Department of Education

-Wrote Bilingual Education Legislation which was passed by State  
Legislature signed by governor and became law

### Universities:

St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas

-Title III Site Evaluator

Pan American University, Edinburg, Texas

-Title III Site Evaluator

Pan American University, Brownsville, Texas

-Title III Site Evaluator

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah

-Conducted an assessment of problems in the College of Education

College of the Virgin Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, St. Thomas, St. Croix

-Title III Site Evaluator

New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, New Mexico  
 -Title III Site Evaluator  
 CSU, Northridge, Northridge, California  
 -Research presentation to faculty and students regarding my publication  
 CSU, Long Beach, Long Beach California  
 -Research presentation to faculty and students regarding my publication  
 San Diego State University, San Diego, California  
 -Serrano V. Priest, School Finance Reform  
 University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona  
 -California Bilingual Education Legislation report

**Other Agencies:**

Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE)  
 -Assisted with interstate agreements for minority students  
 Education Commission of the States (ECS)  
 -Assisted in assessment of public schools

**Public Schools:**

Chowchilla Elementary School District (1993-95)  
 -Bilingual Education evaluation  
 Parlier Unified School District  
 -Bilingual Education evaluation (1990-95)  
 -Special Education evaluation  
 Mendota Unified School District (1992)  
 -Board Recall procedures  
 Fresno County Office of Education  
 -Bilingual, Migrant and parent involvement (1990-95)  
 -Technical assistance  
 Sanger Unified School District (1994)  
 Fresno Unified School District (1985)  
 -Gifted Education Program development for Minority LEP youngsters

**PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

National Education Association, Washington, D.C.  
 National Association for Bilingual Education  
 National Linguistic Association  
 Association for California School Administrators  
 State Delegate for California Faculty Association  
 California Teachers Association Representative  
 California Faculty Association - Member  
 Vice-President - CSU, Fresno Chapter (1991)

**UNIVERSITY COMMITTEES**

Washington State University  
 Social Responsibilities Committee (1970-73)  
 Minority Affairs Committee (1970-73)  
 Financial Aid Advisory Committee (1970-73)

**Educational Innovations Subcommittee (1971-73)**

**California State University - Sacramento**

Chairman, Bilingual/Cross Cultural Task Force (1977)  
Committee for the Protection for Human Subjects (1978-79)  
Numerous Personnel Selection Committees (1973-79)  
Dean's Evaluation Committee (1978)  
Bilingual Cross-Cultural Faculty Committee (1973-79)  
Task Force for the Development of an University Student Affirmative Plan

**State Wide Activity**

Member of State Superintendent for Public Instruction Advisory Committee (1982-83)  
Member-Excellence in Professional Education CSU System wide task force (1981-83)  
Commissioner, Commission on Hispanic  
    Under representation-office of the chancellor 1985 to present  
Member of Accreditation teams for high schools  
Chair, Western Regional United States  
National Hispanic Scholarship Fund  
Assembled, trained, supervised panel of readers to read, score and rank scholarships  
    applications for eight Western States  
Committee for the Selection of the Outstanding Teacher for the State of California  
    (1987-88)

**Speaker**

Have been a speaker at various state and national conferences.  
Most notably at the American Educational Research Association (AERA) New York,  
    and New Orleans.

**California State University, Fresno**

University Outreach Coordinating Council  
Retention Committee  
Educational Enhancement Committee  
University Student Affirmative Action Committee  
Learning Assistance Center Committee, Subcommittee of the Academic Policies and  
    Procedures Body  
Learning Assistance Development Task Force  
Graduate Task Force  
Personnel Search Committees:  
    Dean's Advisory Committee (1993-94)  
    SOEHD Budget Committee (1990)  
    CBEST Task Force (1992)  
    Education Equity Committee (1993-94)  
Director of High School Equivalency Program-School of Education  
Director of Minority Business Development Grant Program-School of Business  
Staff for Minority Business Development Grant Program-School of Business  
Budget Committee  
SOEHD Planning Committee  
Ad Hoc Committee to work with area superintendents for articulation with the

university.  
 Chair - Ed. Equity Committee  
 Chair - SOEHD School Personnel Committee  
 Member of Strategic Planning Committee  
 Chair - Special Admissions and Standards Committee  
 Chair - PSSI Department Committee  
 Chair - Research Award Committee for the Department

## PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Writing partnership program (1991-95)  
 Comprehensive Teacher Education Institute (1990-91)  
 Development of Conceptual Models for High Risk Students at the Elementary and Secondary School Levels.  
 Multiple Subject Credential with a bilingual cross/cultural emphasis (Spanish-Cantonese) CSU, Sacramento (1976).  
 Liberal Studies Major with a bilingual Cross-Cultural Option. (Spanish-Cantonese-Japanese-Portuguese-Native American-Black) CSU, Sacramento (1975).  
 Two (2) Master of Arts Degree Programs in Education with Bilingual Cross-Cultural Specialization (Teacher Education and behavioral Sciences in Education) CSU, Sacramento (1975).

## CONSULTANCIES

National Education Task Force de la Raza-Director  
 The Potential Application of the Modal Learning Concept to Chicano Studies Curricula in the Community Colleges-Principal Investigator-Washington State University (1972)  
 A.B. 579 Student Aid Commission-Principal Investigator, CSU, Sacramento (1976).  
 Migrant Mini-Corps Training Program-Principal Investigator, CSU, Sacramento (1976).  
 California Post Secondary Education Commission Title VI-A  
 Higher Education Act of 1965-Principal Investigator-CSU, Sacramento (1978)  
 Bilingual Teacher Training Program-Principal Investigator, CSU, Sacramento (1975)  
 Bilingual Cross-Disciplinary Graduate Fellowship Program-Principal Investigator, CSU, Sacramento (1975-78).  
 The National Institute for Multi-Cultural Education (Lau Center), Director (1977-78).  
 The National Institute of Education (Workable Bilingual Desegregation School Models).

At CSU, Fresno, my office was instrumental to the funding of the following projects:

Health Career Opportunity Program (HCOP)

Minority Engineering Program (MEP)  
 The Progress and Advancement through Special Services Program (PASS)  
 The Student Affirmative Action Program (CORE-SAA) (College Outreach, Retention and Enhancement)  
 The Learning Assistance Center  
 The Public School Administration Training Program  
 The Migrant Gifted Education Demonstration Program  
 The Minority Business Development Program  
 The Migrant Day Care Teacher Aide Training Program  
 The Bilingual Multi-Functional Education Service Center  
 The Child Development Day Care Center Training Project  
 Comprehensive Teacher Education Project Planning Grant

## AWARDS

Rosa Parks Award for Outstanding Community Service (1993)  
 Migrant Gifted Award for Outstanding Service to the program (1993)  
 United States commission on Education Excellence for Hispanic Americans (1992)  
 Member-Human Relations for the City of Fresno (Chair - 1997-98)

## ACCREDITATION

Hoover High School  
 Roosevelt High School  
 CSU, San Bernardino (1990)  
 Eastern Washington State University (1991)

## PUBLICATIONS

"The Potential Application of the Modal Learning Concept to Chicano Studies Curricula in the Community Colleges," Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) also see Monthly Publication, Research in Education for resume of research report.

Spanish and English Children's Books for K-4 grades. Aardvark Media Inc., 1200 Mount Diablo Blvd., Walnut Creek, CA 94596.

"Hola"	"Hello"
"Mi Escuela"	"My School"
"Dias Alegres"	"Happy Days"
"Un Dia Sin Escuela"	"A Day Without School"
"Las Aventuras de Sapo"	"The Adventures of Sapo"
Mas Aventuras de Sapo"	"More Adventures of Sapo"
"Chato La Serpiente"	"Chato the Serpent"
"El Regreso de Chato"	"The Return of Sapo"

Mexican Americans in School: A Decade of Change, Carter-Segura-college Entrance

Examination Board, New York, 1979.

**COURSES**

Introduction to Bilingual Education  
Methods and Materials in Bilingual education  
Language Arts/Reading  
Social Studies  
Social Cultural Foundations of Education  
The teaching of Reading  
The teaching of Language Arts  
Chicano Studies instructor (WSU) 1970-73

**Dr. Robert Segura****Political Resume**

Member - Congressman  
George Radanovich Congressional  
Educational Advisory Committee  
Co-Chair- Congressman  
George Radanovich Hispanic Task Force  
Community Representative for Congressman George Radanovich  
President of the Fresno Chapter of the Republican National Hispanic Association  
(RNHA)  
Chair of the Human Relations Commission for the City of Fresno  
Central Valley Organizer for Hispanics for Dan Lungren for Governor  
Member of the Fresno County Republican Central Committee  
Campaign Steering Committee for Dr. Pete Mehas - County School  
Superintendent

**Local Campaigns**

Mike Briggs for State Assembly  
Chuck Poochigan for State Senator  
Dan Ronquillo for City Council  
Dan Payne for City Council  
Alan Autry for Mayor

**National Campaigns**

Ronald Reagan for President  
George W. Bush for President (served on the National Commission for Hispanic  
Education)  
Appointed by President Bush  
George Bush Jr. for President  
Statewide Steering Committee  
Central Regional Hispanic Outreach Chair (we won the valley)

1980 - 1984

Assistant Vice President for academic affairs and special project activities. Responsible for providing university wide assistance in the development of special university initiatives, financial allocations, and policy.

1979 - 1980

California State University (CSU), Senior Administrative Fellowship Program, CSU, Fresno Associate Dean of Education/Special Assistant to the President.

1973 - 1979

Director of federal programs: developed, implemented, administrated and supervised two title VII grants.

1. Title VII, Teacher Training Program
2. Title VII Graduate Fellowship Program

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

1980 - Present

Professor of Education; teach social and cultural foundations of education

1973 - 1979

Assistant/Associate Professor of Education, CSU, Sacramento taught reading, language arts, and bilingual education, supervised student teachers.

1970 - 1973

Instructor - Washington State University taught ethnic minorities in the public schools.

1965 - 1966

Graduate Assistant, New Mexico Highlands University

October 21, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Notebook of Joint Staff

Please get me a book that has the pictures and jobs of each of the senior members of the Joint Staff—for example, the Director, J-1, J-2, etc., what the “Js” stand for and a photo of the person who is doing those jobs.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
102102-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 25 2002

*Book is Attached*

*C 10/24*

U04229 /03

*020505*

*21 OCT 02*

October 21, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
GEN MYERS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Based on Assumptions

*LaPorte DJ 10/30*

I think I have to do a memo for each of the combatant commanders with an area of responsibility and then for each of the specified commanders, along the lines of the one I sent LaPorte. Should I do it, or do you have someone there from each of those regions who could take the LaPorte model and then use their brains to fashion a first draft, triple-spaced, for each of the other people, including Giambastiani, STRATCOM, etc. Please let me know if I should do it or if you have someone who could do it.

*322*

Attached is an assumptions page, which you can give to the people who are going to do the drafts, if you decide to do it, which might help them get started.

Thanks.

*→SD 10/22/02*

Attach.  
Assumptions

*I'll do a draft for each and give these to you for review.*

DHR:dh  
102102-3

Please respond by 11/01/02

*Doug Feith*

*21 OCT 02*

U04250 /03

10-21-02 17:21 IN

October 21, 2002 9:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gifts

On these gifts, it should say on the page in the notebook whether or not there is an inscription to me, some sort of a little plaque or something that says "gift to Rumsfeld" or something. I need to know that.

*005*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102102-8



Please respond by 11/01/02

*11/4 -*  

(b)(6)

 - *(Please note,*

*This may be a repeat note on the subject.*

*L*  
Larry Di Rita  
*1/4*

*2/10/02*

U04231 /03

snowflake

October 21, 2002 9:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Please give me some feedback on what happened on the (b)(6) letter, the person who had all the winter gear to go to Afghanistan. I would like to know what happened

430

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102102-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/25/02

*11/1*  
*Response Attached*

21 OCT 02

U04232 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7277

**Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD**

---

**From:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Friday, November 01, 2002 4:15 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** ski uniforms

secretary rumsfeld asked me to let you know about a point of contact in the department on the "denton program", so that (b)(6) can deliver the ski uniforms she has thoughtfully collected.

the denton program provides for transportation of donated items on a humanitarian basis.

if you or ms jensen has internet capability, there is a website at [www.dentonfunded.ida.org](http://www.dentonfunded.ida.org) that can provide some information, including some afghanistan-specific details, forms, etc..

otherwise, there is a point of contact within the department of defense. her name is:

(b)(6)

please let me know if this is helpful. you can call me anytime at (b)(6) if you need additional information or assistance.

regards,

larry di rita

October 21, 2002 9:42 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Statement on Consolidation

When am I going to get a first draft of the DoD statement on the issue of consolidating everything under the DCI?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102102-13

.....

Please respond by 10/25/02

*040 CIA*

*21 OCT 02*

U04234 /03

October 21, 2002 9:42 AM

10/22  
LARRY DI RITE

Mr Secretary

Have spoke to you on  
the 21<sup>ST</sup> on our progress.

8C

10/24

(C. Mbone)

ement on the issue of

.....



October 21, 2002 11:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Struck

Have I agreed to see Struck of Germany? Please check with Feith.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102102-15

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

OCT 24 2002

*Germany*  
*10/24*

*10/23*

→ *SecDef -*

*You have only just been asked (see attached from Defense Attache).*

*Spoke with Crouch. He thinks you should agree to see Struck.*

*Crouch further advises we should be prepared to tell Struck what U.S. needs and be clear with the Germans about what we will have to do if Germany cannot provide. For example -- withdrawal of certain units from Germany, etc.*

*N  
-  
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T  
S  
T  
A  
N*

*Col Succi*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/30*

*Schedule a Meeting* ✓

*Discuss* \_\_\_\_\_

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/30*

**U04235 103**

*D. L. R. Larry Di Rita*

11-L-0559/OSD/7281

Botschaft  
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  
Embassy  
of the Federal Republic of Germany  
Brigadier General Peter Goebel  
- Defense Attaché -

Washington, October 22, 2002

SECDEF

Received these 2 memo's from  
German Defense Attaché yesterday.  
German MOD asking for a meeting  
with you prior to Prague Summit.

C 10/23

Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock  
Senior Military Assistant  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Rm: 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1010

FAX: (b)(6)

Dear General Craddock:

I just received new information from the MOD in Berlin concerning the availability of Minister Struck for his visit to Washington.

Earlier than expected, the German Parliament will consult and decide on extending the mandate for the German military commitment to the OEF and ISAF operations in the first two week of November. As one of the key players in this process, Minister Struck needs to be in Berlin at this time.

However, he could make it to Washington on Sunday, November 10, and Monday, November 11 if these dates work for Secretary Rumsfeld.

I would therefore very much appreciate if you could look into whether these days would be possible. Let me reiterate that Minister Struck has a great interest in meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld before the Prague Summit and would be grateful if the Secretary could find time on these days in his schedule.

Thank you very much again for your all support and assistance.

Sincerely,

*P. Goebel*

Address  
4845 Reservoir Rd, N.W  
Washington, D.C. 20007 - 1908  
USA

P.O. Box 40680  
Washington, D.C. 20016 - 0680  
USA

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Tele.  
197685  
Answerback  
AAWN UT

10 5 (b)(6) T+

11-L-0559/OSD/7282

22-OKT-2002 10:40

Botschaft  
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  
Embassy  
of the Federal Republic of Germany

Washington, October 21, 2002

Brigadier General Peter Goebel  
- Defense Attaché -

Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock  
Senior Military Assistant  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Rm: 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear General Craddock:

I warmly congratulate you on your new assignment as Senior Military Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld and I wish you all the best in carrying out this new and challenging function.

Allow me to take this opportunity also to mention that your three previous predecessors and I had an arrangement under which I would contact them directly only in situations of critical importance and urgency which could not be resolved by other means. I hope we can continue in the same manner, which has proved effective and successful. Perhaps you could also brief your staff about this arrangement, and I promise to use it only in extremely rare cases.

By the way, I could not find out what caused the confusion we had on the weekend before the Defense Minister's meeting in Warsaw. Nevertheless, thank you very much for your immediate response and support, which helped solve the problem.

Finally, and of course most important, I wish to inform you that the new German defense minister, Dr. Peter Struck, who will be sworn in tomorrow together with all the other cabinet members of the second Schröder administration in Berlin, feels very strongly about continuing the tradition of introducing himself to his American colleague in Washington. Minister Struck believes this meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld should take place before the NATO summit in Prague. The topics for discussion would be very much the same as those of relevance to the Prague summit.

Address  
4645 Reservoir Rd., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20007 - 1998  
USA

P.O. Box 40680  
Washington, D.C. 20016 - 0680  
USA

Phone  
(b)(6)

Fax  
(b)(6)

Telex  
187685  
Answerbeck  
AAWN UT

11-L-0559/OSD/7283

Considering the tight schedules of Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Struck, the best time for a meeting to take place would be the first or second week of November. Minister Struck is happy to adjust his plans to Secretary Rumsfeld's calendar, but he has a preference for the week of November 11-15.

In order to be able to begin the planning and make further arrangements for Minister Struck's visit, I would very much appreciate if the actual day and time of the Pentagon meeting could be decided soon.

I look forward to hearing from you in the next few days regarding this matter.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "P. Gammal". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line that extends to the left.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~AWAY~~ COPY

325

October 21, 2002 5:43 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Philippines

Apparently there is a cable saying that Arroyo may raise a question with the President when she sees him on Friday about more help for the Philippines.

Condi and I talked, and I told her we would get a memo over to her by Wednesday that says some things we want to try to avoid and rule out, and then some things we would be willing possibly to consider.

Why don't we pull together something fast, so that at least he will sound informed and be able to steer her away from thinking she might get something that is not going to happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102102-19



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Philippines

21 OCT 02

U04237 /03

October 22, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Paul Hollrah Letter

Attached is some material from a fellow I have known over the years. It sounds to me like he knows a pretty smart fellow there. Why don't you have somebody in your IO shop get a hold of him and let's see what he has.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/07/02 Hollrah letter to SecDef  
10/22/02 SecDef note to Hollrah

DHR:dh  
102202-8

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

231.2

22 OCT 02

U04238 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Paul R. Hollrah

(b)(6)

Dear Paul,

Thanks so much for your recent letter. I have asked Doug Feith to look into the matter you raised. He will be back in touch with you on it.

Sincerely,

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**OCT 22 2002**

October 7, 2002

Note to (b)(6)

Under normal circumstances I would communicate with the Secretary at his home address, but these are not normal circumstances.

Please put my letter directly in the Secretary's hands. And if that is not possible, please have it reviewed first by someone close to the Secretary, someone in whom he puts his utmost faith and confidence.

Thank you,



Paul R. Hollrah

(b)(6)

Secretary of Defense



SA0017482

11-L-0559/OSD/7288

October 7, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**OCT 22 2002**

Dear Don:

Hardly a day or a week goes by that we do not hear a politician or a journalist quoting the legendary Chinese general, Sun Tzu, who said, "To win 100 victories in battle is not the acme of skill... To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

We pay passing homage to such "wishful thinking," but nothing more. So, while Sun Tzu's age-old challenge is a most seductive concept for 21<sup>st</sup> century leaders, in the harsh light of reality it's a bit like the weather: everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything about it. In the war against terrorism, and more specifically, in our stated intention of deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, everybody talks about removing him without spilling the blood of thousands of Americans and Iraqis, but no one does anything much about it.

We have it within our power to do just that. We have the ability to destabilize and depose Saddam without the application of massive military force. Unfortunately, the loneliest thing in Washington is a good idea. Please allow me to explain.

In 1992, I was recruited by Chuck deCaro, a former CNN combat reporter and president of the Aerobureau Corporation, to participate in the development of what was then the world's most sophisticated communications aircraft – a Lockheed L-188C Electra equipped with 4,200 mile fuel capacity and able to land on 3,000 foot unimproved runways. The plane was outfitted with all of the gear necessary to make it an airborne network-quality newsroom, including three complete Panasonic edit stations, Ku-band satellite uplink, C-band downlink, 14 video cameras, a Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) with 100 mile range to either side, a Forward-Looking Infra Red (FLIR) radar, optically-flat camera domes, gyro-stabilized hand-held TV cameras, 2 camera-equipped disposable UAV's, 2 lightweight ATV's, and many more features.

For the first time it was possible to take the broadcast newsroom directly to the source of the news, broadcasting the major news stories via satellite in real time. Needless to say, the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington has changed all that. Because of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Saddam Hussein the potential role for the Aerobureau aircraft has been expanded exponentially.

Since 1992, deCaro has served as an adjunct professor of Information Warfare at the National Defense University, the War College, and at some of our most important 3-letter agencies. He has been a lonely, but persistent voice, insisting that the most powerful

11-L-0559/OSD/7289

nation on Earth must have not only the best weaponry but the most effective IO/TW capability, as well. In the process he has gained hundreds of firm converts to his SOFTWAR concept, in the armed services, in the Congress, and at top levels of the federal bureaucracy.

One of his most significant supporters in Congress is Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). As a result, HPSCI has authorized \$10 million in FY 2003 expenditures for upgrading and outfitting our aircraft, putting the aircraft in service, and moving the base of operations from Tucson, AZ to Martinsburg, WV.

In the debate over how to rid the world of Saddam Hussein, deCaro has proposed the use of SOFTWAR concepts and the provisions of Article 41 of the United Nations Charter to deny Hussein the two things that all dictators must have in order to maintain themselves in power: the people's belief in a) their omnipotence, and b) their omniscience.

Article 41 tells us that "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication (emphasis added), and the severance of diplomatic relations."

If some of our reluctant allies require political cover, Article 41 provides it.

Aerobureau's SOFTWAR campaign against Saddam would include the pinpoint bombing of all Iraqi broadcast towers and transmitters, cornering the world market in klystron tubes so that Saddam could not repair his electronic communications systems, leaving all of his power generating capacity intact, and broadcasting our message to the Iraqi people through the use of satellites and UAV's, serving as flying broadcast platforms.

For example, our military commanders could announce in advance the targets that we intended to hit, broadcasting that information directly to the Iraqi people. And when the people see that Saddam is helpless to prevent the destruction of those targets his omnipotence soon goes out the window.

Unfortunately, while \$10 million in SOFTWAR operating funds for FY 2003 have been authorized by HPSCI, the line item has run headlong into the impasse in the House-Senate Appropriations Conference. Members of both houses would support the program, but inasmuch as the SOFTWAR program was a late add-on to the HPSCI authorization they are powerless to do so in the face of realities of the appropriations process. The Senate Appropriations staff member who handles defense appropriations has simply said "no" – not based on the merits of the program, but based solely on the need to arrive at a total dollar figure that can be agreed to by the conferees. It is a most egregious example of "penny wise and pound foolish," it seems to me.

How can reasonable men contemplate the spending of \$10-15 billion to eliminate Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction, and not be willing to invest \$10 million in a well-conceived plan that would avoid that huge expenditure – to say nothing of the many lives that would be lost in a full scale military assault?


In real life, Chuck deCaro also serves as technical advisor for the popular television series, *JAG*. Each weekly episode of *JAG* contains precisely forty-five minutes and forty-seven seconds of programming. Two episodes then contain ninety-one minutes and thirty-four seconds of audio and video. Yet, the cost to produce those two episodes is roughly equal to the total annual expenditure for the 4<sup>th</sup> PsyOps Detachment headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In the field of Information Warfare, the United States is not even a minor player, in spite of the fact that leaders of dozens of Third World and Terrorist nations have mastered the techniques of the use of global television to change the will of the American leadership and to alter our perception of reality. Examples of their success are abundant. It's time that we become a major player in that game.

As I have indicated above, Chuck deCaro has been a regular lecturer on Information Warfare topics at the National Defense University, the War College, and other agencies of the federal government for more than a decade. Is it possible that you could create some time in your busy schedule to hear what he has to say? If I were not firmly convinced that it would be time well spent by you, or by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, I would not plead this case to you.

Mr. deCaro can be reached at (b)(6) or at (b)(6) Mobile).

Respectfully,



Paul R. Holrah

(b)(6)

cc: Chuck deCaro  
Aerobureau Corporation

snovflake

October 22, 2002 7:19 AM

TO: Secretary White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: RAND Proposal

I am curious to know what your reaction is to this RAND Corporation proposal on privatizing arsenals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102202-3

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

*635*

*22 Oct 02*

U04239 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7292

Federal Times  
October 21, 2002  
Pg. 1

## Army Depot Inc.

### *Army Leaders Look to Private Sector To Revitalize Underused Depots*

By Chet Dembeck

The Rand Corp., an influential think tank, is encouraging top Army leaders to privatize arsenals and weapons plants and to convert five huge repair depots into quasi-government entities that can operate as commercial enterprises.

Army leaders have discussed these and other similar ideas for years as they tried to figure out how to cut their logistics and maintenance costs and increase efficiency at their aging and underutilized industrial facilities.

Now, it appears the Army leadership is exploring the notion of privatizing its maintenance facilities more seriously than ever.

Under pressure from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to shed operations considered secondary to the department's core mission of fighting wars, all military services are looking high and low for ways to improve efficiency, divest themselves of noncore operations, or outsource many activities.

The Army is considering a Rand recommendation to sell off some of its arsenals and convert its five depots into corporate-like entities known federal government corporations (FGC). Under this concept, the depots would be owned by the government, but would operate like a company and make commercial-like decisions about its finances, capital investments, personnel and other matters.

"The Army must focus its energies and talents on our core competencies functions we perform better than anyone else — and seek to obtain other needed products or services from the private sector where it makes sense," Army Secretary Thomas White said in an Oct. 4 memo to his top commanders. In that memo, White directed his commanders to set about identifying which Army jobs — civilian and military — could be outsourced.

Army weapons plants, arsenals, laboratories and repair depots employ more than 15,000 civilian employees and only a few military personnel. But the costs of maintaining those facilities has remained high relative to the amount of use the Army gets out of them. Utilization rates for the military services' in-house industrial capacity are lowest for the Army and are projected to decline further.

But while many Army leaders support the idea of farming out these facilities — and the personnel that go with them — to the private sector, two key challenges stand in their way.

One is Congress, which has historically opposed any moves to close down or privatize these facilities. The other is the need to attract enough interest from the private sector to take over these facilities if the decision is made to do that.

"The value of this model for the Army laboratories and depots will depend on how much external

commercial opportunity exists," said a Rand report released earlier this year titled "Seeking Non-Traditional Approaches To Collaborating and Partnering With Industry."

Army officials stress they have made no decisions on what they plan to do with any of the Army's industrial capacity and are only studying their options.

One recommendation by another Rand study, which has not been released, that the Army is studying is to sell off its Watervliet, N.Y., and Rock Island, Ill., arsenals to the private sector along with some of its 14 ammunition plants, said Luis Garcia-Baco, chief of industrial base capabilities for Army Materiel Command.

Currently, there are about 4,300 civilians and 20 military personnel working at the facilities.

Garcia-Baco declined to say how many ammunition plants Rand recommended be sold.

Another of Rand's recommendations the Army is considering is transforming its five repair depots, which employ 11,000 civilian and 75 military personnel, into federal government corporations. Such an entity would be similar to Amtrak or Fannie Mae.

The five depots are: Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Ala.; Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi Texas; Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pa.; and Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pa.

Congress first created such organizations — half government, half corporate — more than 200 years ago as a way to give commercial-like federal enterprises more freedom to act like companies. Such corporations are exempt from traditional rules federal agencies work under concerning personnel, procurement, funding, and finance activities.

Though they can act like a corporation, they remain wholly or partially owned by the government, with the potential to be privatized completely.

Such a move also could help the Army meet the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review's mandate to eliminate 17,366 civilian positions by fiscal 2004, Rand said in its report. By transforming the depots into government corporations, the Army could cut its civilian work force without eliminating depot jobs, it said.

Army officials declined to speculate on how much money such actions might save or where such savings would be shifted.

The Defense Department budgeted \$809 million for Army depots for fiscal 2003, a 34 percent increase over 2002. Yet, the average workload of all five depots in 2003 is projected to be just 76 percent of capacity. Some military and industry observers say that by leasing some of its excess capability to the private sector, the Army would make better use of its assets. By doing so it could also attract much-needed capital to finance upgrades.

Still, such partnerships would require legislation, which Garcia-Baco admits will be a challenge for the Army to get passed because of resistance from lawmakers with depots in their districts.

Rep. Max Sandlin, D-Texas, whose district is home to the Army's Red River depot, said in a statement to Federal Times that he would oppose any efforts by the Army to privatize the depot and thought it was

the wrong time to pursue such an effort.

"Numerous reports have shown that there is a tremendous cost associated with conducting Army privatization studies," Sandlin said.

Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, whose district is home to Corpus Christie Army Depot, also predicted congressional resistance to the Army's effort.

Bill Johnson, legislative director for Rep. James Hansen, R-Utah, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said the action plans had a familiar ring.

"It looks like we're going back to the '90s when the Army cut thousands of positions," Johnson said.

Johnson said such sweeping changes could cause the Army to be too dependent on private contractors.

"During Desert Storm the costs for buying services from contractors when up 300 percent, while the cost of in-house logistics only rose 15 to 20 percent."

William Tuttle, a retired general who once headed Army Materiel Command, said even if the Army received permission from Congress to privatize the depots, it is questionable whether any companies would be interested in taking them over.

"Repair depots are artifacts," Tuttle said. "The plants and equipment are old."

Instead, Tuttle believes that massive outsourcing of functions not essential to war-fighting is the best approach for the Army.

Some of those working at the depots in question offer different alternatives.

Rey Cortez, an engine night superintendent at Corpus Christi, said that his experience working with contractors such as General Electric has convinced him that closer partnerships between the public and private sectors — as opposed to privatization — is the answer.

David Stevens, a member of the Federal Managers Association Chapter 256 working at Letterkenny said privatizing depots was contrary to the White House's management agenda.

"The administration has stated that competition is great," Stevens said. "Then you don't want to get rid of depots. We provide the only competition" to contractors.

Meanwhile, John Williams, a spokesman for the National Defense Industrial Association, an Arlington, Va.-based association representing defense contractors said he couldn't comment on the Army's plan until he sees it.

"In general, we're for outsourcing," he said.

October 22, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note to Romanian MoD

Please make sure we get that paragraph and send a nice note to the Romanian MoD on the first time they have conducted combat operations in many years.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102202-5

*ROMANIAN*

*|||*

.....

*LTG C.*

Please respond by 10/25/02

ATTACHED IS THE LETTER  
THAT MR. DIRITA ASKED  
EXEC SEC TO SOM.  
JUST COMPLETED THIS AM.  
*v/r*  
CDR S.

*22 OCT 02*

U04240 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

His Excellency Ioan Mircea Pascu  
Minister of Defense  
Romania

Dear Minister Pascu:

I appreciate the great job Romanian troops are doing in Afghanistan. The security they are providing in Kandahar is vital, and the Romanian commitment to the global war on terrorism is notable.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



October 22, 2002 7:26 AM

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memos to the President

When I send a memo to the President, you shouldn't say "thanks" at the end of it, you should say "respectfully."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102202-6



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

312

220502

U04241 /03

October 17, 2002 8:40 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Mil-to-Mil

You have expressed an interest in the U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts. As you may recall, one of the aspects of the relationship is that we arranged for the head of the National Defense University, Vice Admiral Paul Gaffney, to visit the People's Republic of China earlier this month.

For your interest, prior to your meeting with Jiang Zemin, I am attaching a report from Admiral Gaffney's visit, which I think you will find of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/15/02 President NDU memo to CJCS re: Mil-to-Mil Contact with PRC - October 2002

DHR:dh  
101702-3



DIF

October 22, 2002 2:36 PM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: LTG McNeill

Please let me know when McNeill is going to be back in the US, if at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102202-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*210 Navy*

*10/25*

*SECDEF*

*LT GEN DeLong believes  
LTG McNeill will be back late  
November or early December for  
a few days*

*C*

*22 OCT 02*

U04242 103

October 23, 2002 8:59 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Approach on FIA

On FIA, I think we do need to get a different approach, a different set of assumptions that are more elevated.

We ought to recognize that the enemies go to school on us. The question is, since we take so long to get anything done in the US and to get something up into space, how can we not believe that they will have figured out what we are going to do before we ever get it up there? Their D&D is superb.

I think we need to look at what the cost-benefit ratio is from our standpoint. It costs \$27 billion. From their standpoint, it costs 15 cents.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102302-8



Please respond by 11/08/02

*381*

*2304102*

U04243 /03

October 23, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quote

Today in the *Early Bird*, the *NYT* editorial says that I used the word "bulletproof" in referring to Al Qaeda's link to Baghdad.

Please get me the exact quote where I said that and in what context. My recollection is it was right after I read the precise words I was given by the CIA as appropriate for release on that very subject. If that is true, I think we probably ought to communicate with the *NYT* and tell them that.

Please see me on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102302-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/30/02

000.757

23 Oct 02

U04244 /03

October 23, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Please get back to me and tell me whatever happened to (b)(6) proposal to get all that warm weather gear into Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102302-3

.....  
Please respond by 10/25/02

430

230402

U04245 /03

October 23, 2002 8:33 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keegan Article

There was an article by someone named Keegan who lives in Europe that described Europeans. Would you please see if someone could dig that up?

I would like to get a copy and send it to François de Rose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102302-5

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

*Europe*

*11/08/02*

U04246 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7304

October 24, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: France

You may want to send a copy of that list of French instances to Nick Burns. He was there when Lord Robertson said what he said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102402-5



Please respond by 11/01/02

*France*

*24 OCT 02*

U04247 /03

SHOWFILE

3/2

October 24, 2002 2:00 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter to the Editorial Board of the NYT

*Please see attached T.E.*

*Lamy Di Rita*  
*10/29*

Please show me the letter you are writing to the editorial board of the *New York Times* addressing this subject of "bulletproof."

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/23/02 *New York Time* editorial: "The Illusory Prague Connection"

DHR dh  
102402-7

.....

Please respond by 11/5/02

000.759

24 Oct 02

U04248 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7306

# The New York Times

Founded in 1851

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THOMAS K. CARLEY, *President, News Services*

## The Illusory Prague Connection

Most Americans — two-thirds, according to a Pew Research poll this month — believe that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq had a hand in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Trouble is, no hard evidence of such a link has been made public. In its campaign for military action against Iraq, the Bush administration frequently asserts that it has proof of extensive ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. What it has disclosed, however, is unconvincing. This is no way to justify a war — either the potential one against Iraq or the existing one against Islamic extremists.

James Risen of *The Times* reported Monday that an often-cited meeting between Mohamed Atta, the chief hijacker, and an Iraqi spy in Prague almost certainly never took place. The Czech president, Vaclav Havel, has told the White House that a report from Czech domestic intelligence of such a meeting in April 2001 could not be substantiated.

For an administration that has prided itself on a disciplined approach to public pronouncements, the Bush team has offered confused and scattered assertions about Iraq. After months of declaring that a regime change in Baghdad was the core goal of American policy, President Bush seemed to change course on Monday. He said the United States was trying to disarm Mr. Hussein "peacefully" and suggested that if Iraq complied with all United Nations resolutions, it would "signal the regime has changed." This may have been aimed at mollifying nervous allies, but it added to the impression that Mr. Bush isn't sure what his goals are in Iraq.

The *Times* report of the Prague meeting was

not the first time that it or a supposed earlier meeting has been questioned. Now it seems Mr. Atta may indeed have been in Prague in June 2000 — but with the intent of picking up a cheap flight to Newark rather than meeting an Iraqi spymaster.

This does not mean that Al Qaeda and Iraq have not had contacts or even collaborated over the past 5 or 10 years. Both hate America. And despite the fact that their ideologies are mutually antagonistic — Mr. Hussein's regime is based on notions of secular Arab nationalism that Osama bin Laden detests — they have much in common and are clearly capable of putting aside their differences for tactical ends.

American officials say they have evidence that Iraqi leaders visited Mr. bin Laden in Sudan in the early 1990's and that some Qaeda leaders have taken refuge in Iraq. They also speak of a credible claim that Iraq provided training to Mr. bin Laden's followers in the use of explosives and chemical weapons. These sound like important findings, but when asked for details the administration becomes hazy, saying it has sources to protect.

If the United States is to go to war, it had better not do so under false pretenses. The administration needs to lay out its case clearly and unambiguously. If there really is, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last month, "bulletproof" evidence of links between Al Qaeda and Baghdad, this seems like a moment to present the evidence. A way can surely be found to do so while protecting the identity of sensitive intelligence sources.

# DRAFT

To the Editor:

In a recent editorial, ["The Illusory Prague Connection", Oct X, 2002], the *Times* wrote that there is "no hard evidence" proving that Saddam Hussein had a hand in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, and that the U.S. should not go to war under "false pretenses," adding "if there really is, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last month, 'bulletproof' evidence of links between Al Qaeda and Baghdad, this seems like a good moment to present the evidence."

First, Secretary Rumsfeld has never said an Iraqi connection to September 11<sup>th</sup> would be the basis for a decision to take military action in Iraq. To the contrary, he told Congress last month: "The case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi link to 9/11. The issue for the U.S.... it is whether the Iraqi regime poses a growing danger to the safety and security of our people, and of the world. There is no question but that it does."

We are concerned about the relationships between terrorist networks and terrorist states, which could share WMD with terrorist networks to attack us without fingerprints. Since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks our knowledge of the

# DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/7308

# DRAFT

Iraq-al Qaeda relationship is evolving. Some of the information we have is very reliable, some less so. Most of it cannot be released publicly because doing so would a) put peoples' lives at risk and b) immediately close off that channel of information.

Secretary Rumsfeld asked the CIA to come up with a few sentences that could be released publicly. The CIA gave him a paper, which he read at a DoD press briefing. It is worth recounting what he said in its entirety:

“[W]e do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior level contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda] going back a decade, and of possible chemical and biological agent training.... The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal non-aggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire... weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have -- I believe it's

# DRAFT

one report indicating that Iraq provided unspecified training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al Qaeda members. There is, I'm told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their cooperation.”

This information is what the Secretary referred to as “bulletproof.” He did not at any time suggest that we have perfect evidence, explaining every facet of the relationship and level of cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda.

But when it comes to dealing with the terrorist networks and regimes that threaten us, we cannot expect evidence that would prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. That standard is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused. But our objective today is to “connect the dots” and to stop a nuclear, chemical or biological 9/11 before an attack occurs.

The only time we will have perfect evidence may be after an attack happens—and then it will be too late. We know enough about the threat

**DRAFT**

11-L-0559/OSD/7310

# **DRAFT**

today to know that, as the President has said, we face gathering dangers—  
and doing nothing is not an option.

Victoria Clarke

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

# **DRAFT**

11-L-0559/OSD/7311

October 25, 2002 7:33 AM

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: National Information Operations

I think the President thinks we need a national information operations leader. It is as important as homeland security.

Let's get a memo working on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-7



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

413.51

8500102

U04249 /03

October 25, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DSB Report

I need to see the Defense Science Board's report they were briefing me on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-8



Please respond by 11/01/02

*334*

*250702*

U04250 /03

October 25, 2002 11:09 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Security Cooperation Guidance

I have now completed reading the Security Cooperation Guidance. I have a lot of thoughts.

I think we ought to set a series of meetings, maybe two or three, to take a couple of these regions at a time. Let's make sure that you are there, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Andy Marshall and any people from Policy you feel should be in each individual meeting.

*0913*

I have some thoughts I can give you now:

1. When listing countries, please use alphabetical order wherever possible, so it doesn't look like we are showing preferences.
2. You need to get two or three people to read this for political problems, if and when it leaks. I found a lot of things that are going to be a problem.
3. You may want to put something in here that reflects the beginnings of our thinking on how we respond and deal with the charge of unilateralism that is basically coming from two or three countries. You can emphasize our multiple new relationships with the world and how countries are leaning forward.
4. You may want to mention ungoverned areas and border problem areas—they are real.
5. When this is done, then I think we ought to have to have a system where we test everything that we do against the statements in this document—that is to say, all the funding for IMET, senior level travel, military exercises, intel sharing, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-10

*050102*

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

U04251 /03

October 28, 2002 8:22 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Plus \$10 Billion

How do we get a solution on the plus \$10 billion for the last two years of the Forward Year Defense Plan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-18



*Please respond by* 11/08/02

*110.01*

*280402*

U04252 /03

October 28, 2002 9:51 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Statistics

Please have someone find out for me how many murders there were in Chicago and how many shootings in Chicago, separately, in 2001. Also, I would like to know the population of Chicago, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. Then tell me the number of coalition forces in Bosnia and Kosovo at the present time.

000.5

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-28

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

*11/12*  
*Sgt Reinemann -*  
*No Troops in Bosnia?*  
*Add Troops in Afghanistan, to a*  
*rank*

*11/4*  
~~*Capt Puetle -*~~  
*What can you*  
*put together for me?*  
*Thanks.*

*Di Rita*  
Larry Di Rita  
*11/18*

*Di Rita*  
Larry Di Rita  
*11/4*

28 OCT 02

U04253 /03

	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Shootings</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Police/SFOR</b>
Chicago	666	7,626	2,900,000	13,683
Afghanistan			26,800,000	
Bosnia			3,900,000	
Kosovo			2,250,000	21,000

(Last Kosovar census was conducted in 1981 (1,956,000). Figure in table is statistical projection for 2001)

look SETS

October 28, 2002 5:59 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GPS Jamming

I think we ought to get a competitive analysis of the risk of jamming on GPS and have someone take a hard look at it.

Would you please put that in motion for me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-33

413.77

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/02

*Withdrawn - 13 Nov 02  
per conversation between  
Mr Rumsfeld, Mr Meyers  
and Mr. Aldridge  
Jadson*

4804102

U04254 /03

October 28, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: Tom White  
Gen. Shinseki

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Funding

Given the briefing we had last Thursday, October 24, this is clearly not accurate.

Attach.

Naylor, Sean. "Rumsfeld Plan Has Army Officials Crying Foul," *DefenseNews*, October 21-27, 2002.

DHR:dh  
102502-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

110.01

28 OCT 02

U04255 /03

# Rumsfeld Plan Has Army Officials Crying Foul

By SEAN MAYLOR

**U.S. Army officials are fuming at what they describe as an attempt by Defense Department officials to raid the service's budget for their own pet projects.**

Their anger was sparked by a draft briefing produced by the office of Stephen Cambone, who directs the department's office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation. The briefing, sources say, recommends saving at least \$10 billion a year by making the following cuts, among others:

- Eliminating funding for the fourth, fifth and sixth Stryker brigades.

- Delaying the fielding of the Future Combat System (FCS) program — the centerpiece of the Army's Objective Force — by two years, from 2008 to 2010.

- Reducing the number of RAH-66 Comanche helicopters the Army buys.

- Slashing funding for the non-line-of-sight cannon system.

Army officials are angered at what they view as an effort by Cambone — and, by extension, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld — to subvert the normal acquisition process. Several believe Rumsfeld wants to steer the funding into national missile defense. The Army officials vowed to re-



**Comanche Cuts:** A U.S. Defense Department brief calls for saving at least \$10 billion a year by making several cuts, including reducing the number of RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopters the Army buys.

sist the budget maneuverings, which they said reminded them of the way Rumsfeld killed the Crusader howitzer program with no warning to the Army or to Congress, despite having funded the program in the defense budget.

"Is Cambone proposing to [cut funding for or delay fielding of certain Army programs]? Yes," said an Army officer familiar with the process. "Has the Army agreed? Absolutely not."

Marine Corps Lt. Col. Michael Humm, a Pentagon spokesman who handles public affairs for Cambone, said it is premature to discuss funding specifics.

"Programs being submitted by the services for consideration for the fiscal year '04 budget are currently being assessed and evaluated," he said. "No decisions have yet been made."

Army officials argued that to fund its so-called transformation

initiative, the service already has killed many programs that would have modernized its force. The Transformation plan aims to start fielding by 2008 its Objective Force, which would be more deployable, but no less lethal, than the existing force.

The service considers the FCS, Comanche and the non-line-of-sight cannon to be Objective Force systems.

The Stryker brigades, meanwhile, represent the Army's near-term attempt to fill the capabilities gap between its heavy forces, which are lethal and well-protected but slow to deploy, and its light forces, which can get to a contingency quickly but lack killing power, protection and mobility once there. The first of the six brigades, which are designed around a wheeled medium-weight combat vehicle, is supposed to be ready for operations next year.

### Sticking To The Plan

Delaying transformation and cutting the Stryker force in half in order to take money from the Army budget in effect would be punishing the service twice for trying to do the right thing, according to Army officials.

Army and industry officials said the approach by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to Army acquisition seemed to ignore the steps laid out to evaluate and fund programs. They cited the Comanche program, which passed an important hurdle Oct. 7 when the Defense Acquisition Board passed a plan to buy 679 Comanches. The board is the senior Pentagon panel charged with approving major weapon programs for production.

Shortly afterward, the OSD notified the Army that an Oct. 9 meeting between OSD and service officials to discuss the future of the non-line-of-sight cannon program was being expanded to include reviews of the Stryker brigades and all Objective Force programs, including Comanche.

The Army was not amused, according to the officer. "This is sort of stream of consciousness pro-

gramming up at the OSD level," the officer said.

A well-connected industry official agreed. "It's a process completely disconnected from reality," the official said. "They're trying to hurt the Army again, and make it irrelevant."

### Army Concedes Runaround

Army officials concede that when Rumsfeld launched his attack on the Crusader program, they erred by taking their case directly to Congress. This time around, the Army's strategy will be to defend the programs within the Pentagon, Army officials said. That defense will emphasize that the programs are passing all the tests set for them.

FCS faces a Milestone B decision — when successful programs are authorized to move into a development and demonstration phase — in the spring of 2003, he noted. "That's when the decision's supposed to be made on FCS, not in a small group meeting in October. The Army's position is, 'Hey, we have processes; let's stick to them.'"

The Army originally planned to convert as many as eight brigades to the Stryker design, but settled on six based on the presumption that FCS would be fielded in 2008, with the first Objective Force units ready for war by 2010.

FCS is envisioned as a family of vehicles that will perform reconnaissance, direct and indirect fire, command and control, and air-defense functions that can work together.

Not only did the Army restrict itself to six Stryker brigades, noted another Army official, it also sacrificed upgrades to the existing force to fund FCS.

"The Army killed its modernization program to put \$20 billion into the tech base over a five-year period, much of it for FCS," the official said.

"They are really tinkering with risk, and oh, by the way, we are at war," the officer said. "What the hell are we doing?"

Like other Army officials, the officer argued the Army had "made all the tough calls." The Army's next five-year spending plan covers 2004 through 2009. So by delaying the fielding of FCS to 2010, OSD would ensure the big acquisition bills for the program do not come due during this administration, he noted.

Army officials estimated OSD would save \$5 billion by delaying FCS for two years and \$4.5 billion by halving the number of Stryker brigades. They said they are convinced the Army would see none of that money.

Another Army official said he believed Cambone simply is caught between Rumsfeld's orders and the Army's funding needs and will keep an open mind toward the service's position.

"We hope to be able to persuade him that if he wants that money, he really should find it elsewhere," the Army official said. ■

## NGAUS Industry Day

Wednesday, Dec. 11, 2002  
National Guard Memorial Building,  
Washington, D.C.

Industry Days  
Building a Strong  
Partnership Between  
The NGAUS and  
the Industry to Enhance  
the Modernization and  
Readiness of the Army National Guard

For more information contact  
Glenn Rose at 202-408-5882  
Web site: [www.ngaus.org](http://www.ngaus.org)

General: 202-408-5882  
Promotions: 202-408-5882

October 28, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: October 24 Meeting

We had a meeting last week on the critical decisions this Department has to make over the next 30 days. The attendance by principals was not the best.

Everyone in this Department at the senior level has been given full opportunity to participate in the decisions that we need to make next month. If anyone ends up being surprised, it will not be the fault of the process.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-12



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*020 DAD*

*28 OCT 02*

U04256 /03

3/4  
18 20

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT  
9:25 AM  
2002 MAR -8 AM 10: 05

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 2, 2002  
SUBJECT:

On the CINCENT call this morning, I asked Myers for a technical description that we can use for public affairs on what a thermo-baric weapon is. Find out what's been said thusfar, what Sega says, and others.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030202.03

Please respond by:

3/8/02

~~3/7~~

→ To: Pete Aldridge

Does the memo  
you just sent in respond  
to this?

*D. Rita*  
Larry Di Rita

3/6  
1100

UNCLASSIFIED  
-5 11 10:38



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

UNCLASSIFIED  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010  
INFO MEMO

Feb 22, 2002, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

*Pete*  
*3/2/02*

SUBJECT: Thermobaric Weapon Programs

*3/2*  
*Wainwright*

• Thermobaric is a fuel rich explosive mixture that when exploded in a confined or semi-confined space will generate higher pressures/greater temperatures at further distances than traditional explosive warheads. On Sep 21, 2001, we initiated an accelerated development program to field a thermobaric explosive fill for the BLU-109 two thousand pound bomb - an effort which had been designated to begin in FY-02 as part of a new start Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Starting from basic chemistry in October, a new thermobaric bomb (designated as the BLU-118) was successfully flight tested against a tunnel complex in the Nevada Test Site on Dec 14, 2001. Ten additional BLU-118's were subsequently built up by DTRA/USN and have been shipped to the CENTCOM AOR. BLU-118's can be employed with the GBU-24, GBU-15 or the AGM-130. A FY-02 ACTD is aimed at developing alternate thermobaric explosive fills, additional operational employment concepts, planning tools, and tunnel defeat options for these weapons.

• An accelerated effort to develop a thermobaric warhead for the AGM-114 Hellfire missile was initiated on Jan 4, 2002. It is a joint DTRA/USMC/USN program to develop a thermobaric warhead as a potential improvement over the existing AGM-114M warhead for use against various enclosed structures such as multi-room buildings. The "M" model AGM-114 (in USMC and CIA inventory) is the most adaptable version for a thermobaric explosive. The "M" model is the only Hellfire missile with a blast/frag warhead - the other models all have shaped-charge anti-armor warheads. A three phase program is currently underway to identify the best specific fill mixture, verify effectiveness (through live fire testing) against actual multi-room structures, and (if warranted by the degree of improved effectiveness) complete the procedures necessary for the weapon to be certified for shipboard use. The full program completes by the end of CY-02. We continue to explore ways to accelerate this work.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Colonel R. Brady, USMC, ODDR&E, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/6
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	3/7
MA BUCCI	3/7
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/6

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/7323

U04009 /02

3/4  
1930

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT  
9:25 AM  
2002 MAR -8 AM 10:05

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

MAR 08 -6 AM 6:58

DATE: March 2, 2002

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT

SUBJECT:

On the CINCENT call

we can use for public e

been said thusfar, what

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030202.03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*MFR: 5 June  
ref: U04257-02*

description that

and out what's

*According to Tim Harp,  
ATL the answer to the  
question on the  
snowflake is "yes" the  
22 Feb memo that went  
to Kody on 7 Mar answered  
his question.*

*Please close  
U04257-02*

*John → to Aldridge*

*Does the memo  
you just sent in regard  
to this?*

*D. Rita  
Larry Di Rita*

*420*

*(2 Mar 02)*

*R* U04257 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/7324

October 28, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: James Roche  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: October 24 Meeting

We had a meeting last week on the critical decisions this Department has to make over the next 30 days. The attendance by principals was not the best.

Everyone in this Department at the senior level has been given full opportunity to participate in the decisions that we need to make next month. If anyone ends up being surprised, it will not be the fault of the process.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-13



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*020 D&D*

*28 OCT 02*

U04257 /03

October 28, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: October 24 Meeting

We had a meeting last week on the critical decisions this Department has to make over the next 30 days. The attendance by principals was not the best.

Everyone in this Department at the senior level has been given full opportunity to participate in the decisions that we need to make next month. If anyone ends up being surprised, it will not be the fault of the process.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*020 D&T*

*28 Oct 02*

U04258 /03

3/4/02  
snowflake

RECEIVED BY THE  
9:31 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 4, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Email From Newt Gingrich**

2002 MAR -8 AM 10: 05

On this email from Gingrich, get Tom White and Pete Aldridge's views on this  
LAV.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030402.10

Attach: Email dated Sunday, 3/3/02 from Newt Gingrich

Please respond by: 3/11/02 3/7

→ C.D.:  
Please ask to  
Aldridge, coord w/ White,  
short suspense.  
D. Pete

LARRY DI RITA

cc to DiRita  
Walowitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 03, 2002 8:42 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil;  
 Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** (no subject)

I have been receiving a series of emails from a wide range of officers who believe the Army light armored vehicle program is a scandal that is going to get a lot of young men and women killed. they assert:

the essential arguments are that the lav is now too thin skinned, because it uses wheels it is road bound and therefore almost certain to face land mines that will turn it into "a flaming coffin" (their term not mine)

if a significant gun is added the lav is now taller than an M-1 tank

the LAV is also now overweight and therefore no longer C-130 transportable and in fact is exactly as mobile by air as the much better much more powerful Bradley (2 in a C-17)

the senior army refuses to field test the LAV

there are tracked systems that are lighter, lower, more survivable, capable of off road maneuver and transportable easier than the LAV but the senior army is determined to vindicate itself and refuses to have an open competition because it is committed to the lav

I think an independent review is need before this becmes a totally unmanagable scandal that tarnishes the Army and DOD

the following is a typical (but calmer and more positive) email from a field grade officer  
 newt

Sir,

Please ask OSD to view the following web pages:

1. LAV-III/IAV: wrong vehicle

[www.geocities.com/lavdanger](http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger)

2. Upgraded M113A3 Gavin: the right vehicle

[www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm](http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm)

Suggest that any LAV-III/IAVs we are stuck with go to MPs...

3. 2nd ACR: the right Brigade-sized unit to start with

We use upgraded M113A3 (LSVs) and M8 AGS light tanks and START with the 2nd ACR, covering force for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Polk, LA.

Old M113A2s can be supplied from war-stock to IBCTs at Ft. Lewis to stop them from doing nothing until they can receive upgraded M113A3/IAV, M8 AGS/IAVs...

from an airborne field grade officer

----- Headers -----



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002, 2:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Jr., USD(AT&L)  
*Pitt 3/12/02*

SUBJECT: E-Mail from Newt Gingrich about Light Armored Vehicle

Mr. Gingrich has forwarded some concerns (e-mail at TAB A) about the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) program, which is developing the family of vehicles for the Army's Interim Force. The following comments are provided in response to these concerns:

Thin skinned

The IAV provides integral armor protection against 14.5mm armor piercing ammunition—better than other vehicles in the weight class such as the M113. Extensive testing has developed and confirmed this level of armor protection. Add-on armor that protects against RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades will also be provided.

Road bound

The IAV has been extensively analyzed for off-road performance using the NATO Reference Mobility Model in several key theaters of operation. Only in situations involving extremely wet weather and sloped terrain was there a significant difference between the mobility of the IAV and comparable tracked vehicles. This modest mobility penalty under extreme conditions is outweighed by the speed, on-road performance, quiet, lower ownership cost and logistics footprint of wheeled vehicles in most tactical situations.

Height with a "significant gun" greater than M1

The height of the IAV Mobile Gun System (MGS), which is equipped with the M68A1 cannon system, is 2.68 meters with the Commander's Panoramic Viewer in the normally stowed position (mast extended height is 3.13 meters). Height of the M1A2 Abrams tank is 2.89 meters.

Overweight for C-130 transport

The IAV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and the system specification allow tailoring of combat loads to meet mission and transportability



requirements. The Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) and the Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV) meet the total vehicle weight (38,000 pound allowable maximum for 1,000 mile leg) and the axle weight (13,000 pound maximum per axle) requirements in their fully loaded configuration. Seven of the eight other configurations meet weight requirements by cross-loading of stowed items. The user will ensure combat capability upon arrival by prioritizing vehicle load lists.

The Mobile Gun System (MGS), which is in development, requires re-engineering to minimize off-loading of equipment. An aggressive weight reduction program is underway and should be complete before the FY05 full-rate production decision. Worth noting is that the IAV's high degree of commonality will enable MGS changes to be applied to other ongoing IAV production, increasing the effective combat load of all configurations.

Army refuses to field test the IAV

The Army will conduct a complete operational evaluation of the IAV as required by Title 10 of the United States Code. Additionally the Army will certify the readiness and deployability of the first Interim Brigade Combat Team during an instrumented exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and during a deployment exercise. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 requires the Army to report the results of this evaluation to Congress before buying IAVs to equip more than three IBCTs.

Army refuses to have an open competition

The Army has conducted significant comparison testing and evaluation. The Army evaluated the performance of bid samples at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during source selection and evaluated written proposals submitted by offerors. The IAV selected possessed significant advantages that outweighed those of competing systems. The General Accounting Office (GAO) validated the results of the Army's evaluation when they denied a contract award protest by one of the competing offerors. Additionally, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency evaluated existing Army systems against IAV operational requirements and found that none met all requirements.

Independent review needed

The Defense Acquisition Board approved program initiation in November 2000. The DAB will review the program again in December 2003 following its operational evaluation, for full rate production.

RECOMMENDATION: None *INFORMATION ONLY*

COORDINATION: Army *AG Copyright for SMART*

Prepared By: Chuck Sieber, (b)(6)

October 28, 2002 7:00 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ) R  
SUBJECT: October 24 Meeting

We had a meeting last week on the critical decisions this Department has to make over the next 30 days. The attendance by principals was not the best.

Everyone in this Department at the senior level has been given full opportunity to participate in the decisions that we need to make next month. If anyone ends up being surprised, it will not be the fault of the process.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-15

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

020 040

2805102

U04260 /03

October 28, 2002 7:35 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Draft Security Cooperation Guidance to Mr. Greenspan

I would like to have Alan Greenspan take a look at our Security Cooperation Guidance draft and get his views. He watches the economies of these countries and their demographics. He is a very smart guy.

*091.3*

You could send it over to him at my request. After he has had a chance to read it, then please set up an appointment to meet with him, go over it, and get his thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-1



Please respond by 11/15/02

*28 Oct 02*

U04261 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7332

October 28, 2002 7:43 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: League of Nations

I am told that I ought to read a book on the League of Nations. Please copy something out of an encyclopedia on the history of the League of Nations, or see if there is a short, 10-15 page roundup of what happened.

*DRD*

My recollection is that it was pretty much over when the Japanese walked out of the League of Nations after invading Manchuria, and the League demonstrated that it was ineffective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-2

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

*DRD*

U04262 103

October 28, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Political Strategy

Please read this article about the fact that we need a political strategy and see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Zakaria, Fareed. "We Need a Political Strategy," *Washington Post*, October 22, 2002, Page A27.

DHR:dh  
102802-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/08/02

000.1

28 Oct 02

U04263 /03

washingtonpost.com

## We Need A Political Strategy

By Fareed Zakaria

Tuesday, October 22, 2002; Page A27

Last week George Tenet warned us that al Qaeda is armed and dangerous. He pointed to the series of threats and attacks around the world -- from Kuwait to Yemen to Bali -- as evidence that the organization is rejuvenated and in the "execution phase." One has to take Tenet's warning seriously, and yet the recent episodes of terrorism can be interpreted differently. Consider the two major "successes": the bombing of a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen and the explosions in Bali. In both cases al Qaeda -- or groups inspired by it -- went after non-American targets, and relatively easy-to-hit ones at that. For the past decade al Qaeda's chief objective has been to attack major symbols of American power -- military, political and economic. It bombed embassies, naval vessels and, of course, the World Trade Center. But since 9/11, with the exception of the recent killing of a soldier in Kuwait, it has not been able to hit America. Also, look at where it struck. In Yemen, al Qaeda has deep connections; in Indonesia, it is exploiting a weak and unstable country and government.

The terror attacks in Yemen and Indonesia will also result in much greater anti-terror vigilance and cooperation from France, Australia and Indonesia. Osama bin Laden's strategy should have been to divide America from its allies in the war on terror. His past rhetoric and actions have recognized this. But these latest scattered attacks are forging a more united coalition. It's always dangerous to make claims about al Qaeda. It is certainly trying to do America harm -- and it will certainly strike again. But before 9/11 al Qaeda was doing what it wanted; now it is doing what it can.

The war on terror has had an effect. The destruction of al Qaeda's base camps in Afghanistan, the detention of suspects around the world, the scrutiny of bank accounts -- all this has made mass terror more difficult. But while the Bush administration has a coherent military strategy in place, it does not have a similar political one. And on that crucial front, the war on terror is failing.

Two weeks ago Pakistan held national elections, and Muslim fundamentalists did well. This event did not get the attention it deserved. Islamic politics is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. Voters have gotten used to listening to fiery fundamentalists promising purity and delivering nothing. And yet over a half-century of intermittent elections in Pakistan, the fundamentalists never received more than 5 percent of the vote. This month they got nearly 25 percent.

I asked a Pakistani politician who took part in this election for an explanation. "America became a huge issue in the election," he said. "The fundamentalists were voted in to protest [Gen. Pervez] Musharraf's alliance with America. For those like me who advocate reform and close ties with America, the atmosphere is now very bad. People watch this [Bush] administration -- its arrogance, its bullying, its double standards on the Israel-Palestine issue -- and they conclude America is anti-Muslim."

America has become the big issue around the globe, but particularly in the Muslim world. Pro-American forces are fearful and quiet. This is partly why Indonesia's government did not want to crack down on Muslim fundamentalists. It is why not a single Arab regime -- including many that hate Saddam Hussein -- will publicly back the American campaign against Iraq. Doing what America wants is seen as carrying out orders from an imperious superpower.

This is not simply a public relations problem for Washington. Pakistan could stymie crucial efforts to flush al Qaeda out of provinces along its Afghan border -- provinces that are now run locally by Muslim fundamentalists. Scientists in its large nuclear establishment -- some of whom were sympathetic to the Taliban -- could leak know-how and materials to al Qaeda. Indonesia could become a haven for terror, which, given its size and geography, would be a nightmare. And throughout the Muslim world, the growing anti-Americanism only makes it easier to recruit young men for suicide missions.

During the Cold War, the United States had two approaches to confronting Soviet communism: military and political. The first involved nuclear weapons, proxy wars and covert action. The second was a concerted effort to build alliances with countries that had a common cause, to foster trade and to provide aid to Third World countries that eschewed communism. America built dams, funded magazines and created the Peace Corps, all as part of this effort.

In the war against terror, we are doing well militarily. But it will count for little without an effective political strategy. Otherwise we will kill fundamentalists but feed fundamentalism.

*The writer is editor of Newsweek International and is a columnist for Newsweek.*

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**Snowflake**

October 28, 2002 8:03 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Atrocities

We have to have a system to get the information on Iraqi atrocities out fast, if in fact we end up using force.

*Iraq*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-9

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

*28 Oct 02*

U04264 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7337

Snowflake

October 28, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: List to Ambassador Leach

Did we send a good list of those recent examples of French opposition to Howard Leach, the Ambassador to Japan, as well as to Nick Burns?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/08/02

*France*

*28 OCT 02*

U04265 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7338

October 28, 2002 8:15 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Midwifery Program in Afghanistan

I would like to invite Governor Thompson in, and whoever he wants to bring over, to talk to whoever you think we ought to pull together, like Winkenwerder, to talk about this midwifery program.

We could do it for lunch, or just get them over to talk and figure out how we are going to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-14

Afghanistan

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

Sec Def -  
They are coming  
in Thursday. Gov.  
Thompson, with  
Winkenwerder and  
Feith or Luti  
(Feith may have a  
D.C. meeting  
11/15/02

U04266 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/7339

October 28, 2002 8:18 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Congressman Lewis


What is our plan on dealing with Jerry Lewis after his negative quote in the paper?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102802-16

032

.....  
Please respond by 11/02/02

  
Larry Di Rita  
11/4

10/28 -  
SecDef -  
~~The Deputy spoke with  
Lewis at some length. I also  
asked Dov Zakheim to speak,~~ 28 Oct 02

U04267 /03

October 30, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Security Cooperation Guidance

*Advance copy provided*

I need my Security Cooperation Guidance paper back for my meeting Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103002-2

*09113*

.....  
Please respond by 11/01/02

*30 OCT 02*

U04269 /03

October 30, 2002 11:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Feith File

Please give my Feith file back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103002-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/02

10

*Sec Def - W.I. do.  
I had an hour file  
session with him  
Wednesday and another  
scheduled Friday (11/1).  
I'll get it back from you  
before the Friday meeting.*

*Dilata*

02605P

300402

U04270 /03

October 31, 2002 8:40 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo to Mitch Daniels

Please have someone give me a memo to Mitch Daniels, so I can get engaged on split funding.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103102-9



Please respond by 11/08/02

110.01

31 OCT 02

U04271 /03

Done  
11/2/02

October 31, 2002 11:42 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Boats

I need your recommendation as to what we do about those boats.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103102-11

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

S60

31 OCT 02

U04273 /03

November 1, 2002 7:19 AM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: On-the-Job Training

Please see the attached article on Surface Warfare Officer School. I don't know if that will work for everybody, but it sure makes sense to me. I have always believed in learning on the job. It's (b)(6) daughter, as you will notice.

350

Thanks.

Attach.

Rich, Megan. "SWOS at Sea Worked for Me," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 2002, Vol. 128/11/1,197, p. 86.

DHR:db  
110102-2



Please respond by 11/22/02

1 Nov 02

U04279 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7345

# NOBODY ASKED ME, BUT . . .

## SWOS at Sea Worked for Me

By Ensign Megan H. Rich, U.S. Naval Reserve

I was intrigued by a recent article on the revamped training pipeline for new surface warfare officers. These officers now will be sent directly to their ships for six to ten months before they attend a two-to-six-week streamlined Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS). The length of their training course will be determined by how much they learn on their ships. This is a significant change from the current program, which sends aspiring officers to school for up to seven months before they are assigned to a ship and can begin to earn their surface warfare qualifications.

I did not attend SWOS, but it is clear to me that it would not have prepared me for waking up one morning in a war zone, serving as the main propulsion assistant on a destroyer, and surviving on two to three hours of sleep at a time. I reported on board the destroyer *John Young* (DD-973) in July 2001, a little more than three months before she was scheduled to depart on what turned out to be her final Western Pacific deployment. I was slated for a temporary three-month assignment, followed by six months at SWOS and then permanent assignment to the *John Young*.

Fortunately for me, my command anticipated early that if I delayed school, or did not attend at all, I could get on-the-job training and an opportunity to earn my surface warfare qualifications during the upcoming deployment. While debating whether to attend school or remain on board, I spoke with several SWOS graduates, most of whom felt they did not learn as much as they would have liked. They said they had had a great time in Newport and enjoyed the opportunity to meet other surface warfare candidates, but their consensus was they had learned just enough to pass the tests and then quickly brain-dumped the information.

Based on these opinions, I believed the best decision for me was to stay for deployment. My chain of command requested a waiver, which was granted.

Deployment, which traditionally has been the best way to excel at being a surface warfare officer, took on a new meaning after 11 September. Our participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, in conjunction with the knowledge that



The author, with her mother in tow on a Tiger Cruise, earned her surface warfare officer pin at sea—on the job—and does not regret it.

the *John Young* would be decommissioned after we returned, made the deployment even more intense, exciting, and wide-ranging. We believed we were an integral part of the global war on terrorism. This environment made my training at sea more potent than I could have imagined or hoped.

What did I miss by going to the fleet first? It is hard to tell, but I heard I missed weeks on end of PowerPoint lectures and quizzes. All the information in those lectures, however, was available on CDs, so I studied them as final preparation for my surface warfare qualification boards. I did miss the opportunity to network and bond with other surface warfare officers. But nothing could top the time I spent

formed with my fellow shipmates in the *John Young*.

I also gained invaluable experience and self-assurance, as well as a step up in my career timeline. Working with both noncommissioned officers and senior officers, learning real-life applications of principles, and discovering how to manage time were all parts of my syllabus at sea. I did not have someone in a classroom telling me why someday this information would be useful to me. I was on the job, realized I needed the information, and learned it. Months did not go by between the learning and the doing. I did not sit in a trainer and learn to drive a ship; I stood on the bridge and took the conn.

I was able to finish the deployment with a combat information center watch officer letter, an officer of the deck letter, and my surface warfare officer pin. I had the added benefit of being on deployment for six of my first ten months in the Navy. But it would not have been possible without all the professional, dedicated shipmates who taught, trained, and encouraged me while showing great patience. It did require a good deal of initiative and self-motivation, but when you can see how critical safety, precision, training, common sense, and more training are, it is not hard to be motivated.

The new training program for surface warfare officers should be extremely successful. The learning curve when you first arrive at the ship is very steep, and the climb is full of challenges. But eliminating months of schooling at SWOS will allow aspiring surface warfare officers to spend their time benefiting from valuable on-the-job training, and it will push them to earn their surface warfare officer pins.

After the decommissioning of the *John Young*, Ensign Rich will transfer to the Aegis destroyer *USS Zumwalt (DDG-36)* as her fire control officer.

11-L-0559/CSD/7346

# PROCEEDINGS

U.S. Naval Institute


Independent Forum for the Sea Services

November 2002 Vol. 128/11/1,197

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
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**Cover:** This issue features Marine Corps coverage. Flying over the USS *Wasp* (LHD-1) in the Arabian Sea this June, two CH-53E Sea Stallions prepare to refuel from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252's KC-135 Hercules. The Sea Stallions from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 are assigned to the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit from North Carolina. (U.S. Air Force, Cheresa D. Clark)

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*Proceedings* (ISSN 0041-798X) is published monthly by the U.S. Naval Institute, 2062 Generals Hwy., Annapolis, MD 21401. To order subscriptions, memberships, or books: 800-233-8764, 410-224-3378; fax 410-224-2406. Subscriptions: \$42 one year Naval Institute memberships, \$39 one year (includes *Proceedings* subscription). Editorial offices: U.S. Naval Academy, Beach Hall, 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, MD 21402-5034; 410-268-6110, fax 410-293-1049. Bookstore: U.S. Naval Academy, 21401. Submissions (please supply contact numbers and return address): Editor-in-Chief, *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, 291 Wood Rd., Annapolis, MD 21402-5034 (include IBM-compatible e-mail); articles@navalinstitute.org; fax 410-293-1049.

11-L-0559/OSD/7347

November 1, 2002 7:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Al Qaeda in Oregon

I would like to get a briefing on Al Qaeda in the state of Oregon. It probably ought to be a mixed CIA-FBI briefing. Could you see how we could get that pulled together?

Larry, please schedule this briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110102-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

00015

1 Nov 02

U04280 /03

11/1  
SHOW/Re

November 1, 2002 2:00 PM

*See Mr. [unclear] change  
The [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]*

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Press Briefings

*Lamy Di R...*  
*11/2*

How often do you take the Service Secretaries or the Chiefs down to the press briefing room for a briefing?

Thanks.

DHR:jh  
110102-17

*See [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]*

0007

Please respond by 11/08/02

1 Nov 02

U04281 /03

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11/04/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Myers

## **October 2002:**

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10/07/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Pace  
10/08/2002: DoD Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception - John Yurechko, DIA  
10/09/2002: Briefing on Cold War-era Chemical and Biological Warfare Tests –  
Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., ASD HA  
10/11/2002: DoD News Briefing - ASD PA Clarke and Rear Adm. Gove  
10/17/2002: DoD News Briefing - Thomas White, Secretary of the Army  
10/17/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
10/22/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
10/24/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
10/28/2002: DoD News Briefing - ASD Clarke and Rear Adm. Gove

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09/03/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
09/04/2002: Special Briefing On The Opening Of The Transformational  
Communications Office - Undersecretary of the Air Force Peter Teets  
09/06/2002: DoD News Briefing - ASD (PA) Clarke And Gen. Rosa  
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Senior Defense Official  
09/16/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Pace  
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## **August 2002:**

08/02/2002: USD Feith Discusses Joint Statement On Multinational Force And  
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08/07/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
08/09/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers  
08/13/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld  
08/15/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks  
08/20/2002: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace

November 1, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Amendment on Contractor Personnel

When the Congress comes back, I want to try to get that one-line amendment that allows us to use contractor personnel for force protection. It is just not fair to the Guard and Reserve to be overusing them unnecessarily.

*384*

Let's get a good statement prepared, decide who we are going to ask to do it, and make a major push.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110102-18

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

*1 Nov 02*

U04282 /03

November 1, 2002 2:52 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Fallon, Nevada

Sometime I want to go to Fallon, Nevada, and see what they are doing out there.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
110102-20



Please respond by 11/22/02

333 ST

1 NOV 02

U04283 /03

November 1, 2002 2:56 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Reduce Turbulence

I think we need to get a set of things that we should do to reduce turbulence in the armed services.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110102-22



Please respond by 11/15/02

322

1 Nov 02

U04284 /03

November 1, 2002 3:19 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Joint Forces Command Budget

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on the budget for Joint Forces Command, and tell me what you think we ought to do, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/01/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: JFCOM Budget

DHR:dh  
110102-25



Please respond by 11/15/02

322

170002

U04285 /03

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

cc: Deputy Wolfowitz  
Di Rita

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Friday, November 01, 2002 11:34 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; giambastiani@jfc.com.mil  
**Subject:** JFCOM budget  
for secdef,depsecdef  
from newt 11/01/02

JFCOM budgeting

It is vital that you allocate \$1 billion or more for a JFCOM experimental budget in your decisions about this cycle.

This is vital as a signal that JFCOM is going to have real resources. It is also vital to enable Giambastiani to do bolder more decisive experiments.

This year will be a failure if there is not a significant amount of money enabling JFCOM to purchase rather than beg experimental resources.

Snowflake

November 1, 2002 3:23 PM

*Done  
11/2/02*

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NEO for the Central African Republic

I would like to know who put the Ambassador in the chain of command in that NEO for the Central African Republic.

*African*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110102-26

.....  
*Please respond by 11/08/02*

*11/02*

U04286 /03

November 1, 2002 3:24 PM

Done  
11/2/02

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Gen. Fulford to Africa

Please advise me what the exact train of events was that ended up with instructions being given to Gen. Ralston to send Gen. Fulford to Africa.

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110102-27



Please respond by 11/02/02

1 Nov 02

U04287 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7357

November 2, 2002 8:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Brucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Al Qaeda Briefing

When I have that briefing on Al Qaeda in Oregon, I want to have Dell'Orto sit in with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110202-1

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

00015

2 NOV 02

U04288 /03

November 4, 2002 8:03 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Remarks for Chile

I would like to see a draft of my remarks for the Defense Ministerial meeting in Chile. I hope it is short and creative and has a good, lasting effect and is helpful to the administration.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110402-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/08/02

*092.3*

*4 Nov 02*

U04289 /03

November 4, 2002 8:07 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bilateral Meetings in Chile

What countries am I supposed to have bilateral meetings with and why in Chile?  
There certainly is no reason to meet with Mexico or Canada. It would probably be nice to meet with Chile, since we are there. I don't know if I have met the Colombia MoD, but if I haven't I probably should.

*092.3*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110402-7

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

*4 NOV 02*

U04290 /03

HOT

November 4, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Struck Meeting

Where do we stand on the meeting with Struck? What is going on? Please advise me today without fail.

*Germany*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110402-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/04/02

*11/4*  
Sec Def -

You will be meeting him. Tentative date is 11/12 (week from Tomorrow). Germans are asking about possibility of moving it up a little (this Friday). Will advise.

*4 NOV 02*

*Di Rita*

U04291 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/7361

Larry Di Rita  
11/4

November 4, 2002 11:06 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hubs

I think you ought to develop your idea on hubs. You ought to talk to the Joint Staff and Paul Wolfowitz, then come back to me with a specific proposal.

I didn't think it was a good idea bringing the idea up as a surprise for the Australians. On the other hand, I do think the idea of hubs may be a good idea.

So let's develop it in an orderly way rather than springing it on somebody, including me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110402-11

.....

Please respond by 11/27/02

*325*

*4 Nov 02*

U04292 /03

November 4, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Relations

Let's see if we can get *National Journal* or somebody to do a story on all we've done on Congressional relations for a year. It seems to me that would be a useful thing.

*032*

Let's pull together the statistics, and add it all up and see if it would make a good story.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110202-5



Please respond by 11/15/02

*4 NOV 02*

U04293 /03

November 5, 2002 7:03 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Plan for Next Four Months

We need to develop a plan for November, December, January and February for the interaction between the inspections, DoD, force buildup, intel and the like.

Please give me an outline by Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110502-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/08/02

*DR DR DR*

*SN 0102*

U04295 /03

showtake  
5600

November 5, 2002 4:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Trip

CENTCOM told Wolfowitz that if I go to the Horn of Africa, I have to go to Kenya. Sorry I gave you some bum dope.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110502-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*done - 11/7*

Larry Di Rita

333 SD

5 NOV 02

U04296 /03

November 6, 2002 3:08 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Fargo's Con Plan

Where do you think we ended with Admiral Fargo on his con plan 5077 SDTE progress review? I felt we didn't give him any calibration, and I had trouble with it.

*381*

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-15



Please respond by 11/26/02

*6 Nov 02*

U04297 /03

November 6, 2002 3:10 PM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Next CINC Conference

Somebody ought to be thinking through what we might do at the next CINC conference, what messages I want to provide and so forth

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-17

331

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/02

SECRET -

- Combatant Commanders are here tomorrow for Program Review. At last week's CENTCOM SVTC's, you and the CJCS agreed that would be a good time for you to give the Combatant Commanders your thoughts on
  - UNMOVIC and timelines
  - Reserve Components - call-up numbers and timing
  - Discussions with the President - where his head is
- Will craft up some more detailed points for you

6 NOV 02

U04298 103

*C 11/12*

TO: Andy Marshall  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: March 6, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates**

Please take a look at this DoD Language Graduates for 2001 and tell me if you think I ought to send out a memorandum or directive getting it switched out of German and French and that type of thing and into languages that would be more appropriate for the decades ahead.

Thanks.

*352*

DHR/azn  
 030602.25

Attach: Dod Language Grads for 2001, 3/5/02

***Please respond by:*** \_\_\_\_\_

*6MARR02*

U04299 02

5 March 02

MEMORANDUM for the SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: VADM Giambastiani

SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates for 2001**

For info, attached is a list of DoD language graduates for calendar year '01 from COL Bucci.

Of note, 461 (25.4%) of the 1817 "basic" language graduates, or 1 out of 4, took **Arabic or Farsi**.

Very respectfully,



11-L-0559/OSD/7369

**Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Graduates  
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

- Defense Language Institute is located in Monterey, CA
- The attached document includes all DLIFLC military grads for the past 12 months, broken out by service, language and type of course.
  - The Basic category includes all basic acquisition of a language taught at DLIFLC.
  - The Other category includes all advanced courses and specialized courses.
  - The Contract category includes all courses taught by multiple vendors out of the DLIFLC-Washington Office. This office provides instruction in the low density courses, initial language familiarization for new commanders in Europe, as well as language training to the Defense Attaches.

• USA

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	198	10	10
ARMENIAN			1
BENGALI			1
BURMESE			1
CAMBODIAN			5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	86	1	4
CZECH	3		1
DUTCH			6
FRENCH	34	6	15
GERMAN	23	7	49
GREEK	1		1
HAITIAN CREOLE			4
HEBREW			1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			6
INDONESIAN			7
ITALIAN	5		2
JAPANESE	8	3	1
KOREAN	175	4	
LAO			3
LITHUANIAN			1
MACEDONIAN			1
MALAY			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN AFGAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	38		
POLISH	2		3
PORTUGUESE	9		
PORTUGUESE AFGHAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			2
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	153	17	18

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
SERBIAN CROATIAN	18		
SLOVAK			1
SPANISH	113	7	6
SWAHILI			1
TAGALOG	2		
THAI	8		1
TURKISH	2		3
UKRAINIAN			2
URDU			5
UZBEK			1
VIETNAMESE	4		2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>882</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>179</b>

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months  
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USAF**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
AFRIKAANS			1
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	53	18	5
BULGARIAN			1
CAMBODIAN			2
CHINESE-MANDARIN	40	4	2
CZECH	2		
DANISH			1
DUTCH			4
FINNISH			3
FRENCH	9	1	15
GERMAN	9		4
GREEK			2
HEBREW	7	2	1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			2
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	2		3
JAPANESE	1		
KOREAN	95	11	
PERSIAN AFGAN			5
PERSIAN FARSI	21		
POLISH	1		
PORTUGUESE	2		
PORTUGUESE BRAZILIAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			6
PUSHTU AFGHAN			5
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	78	18	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	26	4	11
SPANISH	92	16	14
TAGALOG			1
THAI	1		5
TURKISH	2		4
VIETNAMESE	14		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>113</b>

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months  
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USN**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	57	9	5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	37	4	1
DANISH			2
DUTCH			3
ESTONIAN			4
FRENCH	5	2	7
GERMAN	8		2
GREEK			1
HEBREW	11	3	
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	9		2
JAPANESE	4	1	4
KOREAN	28	1	
NORWEGIAN			4
PERSIAN FARSI	32		
PORTUGUESE	1		
ROMANIAN			2
RUSSIAN	43	7	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	15	1	
SPANISH	47	9	10
SWEDISH			2
THAI	4		2
TURKISH			1
VIETNAMESE	5		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>60</b>

• **USMC**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	54	3	4
CHINESE-MANDARIN	2		
FRENCH	3		1
ITALIAN			1
JAPANESE		1	
KOREAN	21	3	
LATVIAN			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	8		
PORTUGUESE	1		
RUSSIAN	36	4	3
SERBIAN CROATIAN	8		
SLOVENIAN			1
SPANISH	41		3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>

snowflake

Action  
410

March 18, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Language Training

Here is a note from Andy Marshall that I agree with.

Please get a memo drafted for me to do this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/11/02 Marshall memo to SecDef, "Language Training"

DHR:dh  
031802-37



Please respond by 04/12/02

0914

11MAR02

U12176 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/7374

3/12  
1580



DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

March 11, 2002

3/14  
CITY DIRECTOR

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Am*

SUBJECT: Language Training

The Defense Language Institute figures are driven by current defense intelligence requirements since most of the people who go there are enlisted intelligence operators who will listen in on foreign networks. Changing the intelligence requirement is the key to changing the output. The officers may matter most and there the problem is that only the Army has a good Foreign Area Officers (FAO) program, but the Army remains focused on Europe more than Asia and elsewhere.

Perhaps what you should do is to discuss this issue with the Services and then direct all services to have FAO programs modeled after the Army's, plus increased pay incentives for language proficiency, with size of incentive highest for those languages that are of long-term strategic interest and importance. i.e., Chinese, etc.

See attached pages from a recent study for additional information.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

THIS ISSUE IS WORTH  
BEING WORKED BY  
DEPSECDEF + SEC

3/12  
SEC  
3/12

11-L-0559 OSD/7375

U12176 / 02

November 6, 2002 3:59 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget Issues

How do we get things like missile defense and transformational communications better integrated into the Services' budgets early, rather than late? These things pop out from different parts of DoD and can affect the Services' budgets, and yet they seem not to know about them until late. There seems to be an issue with the Navy about their taking some ships out of service that may be needed for missile defense. Any thoughts?

*11.01*

Second, I met with the Navy, and I didn't see anything in what you gave me about the littoral ships.

Last, do you think we have assigned joint con ops to the J-8 and Joint Staff or to Joint Forces Command, or both? I am worried if it is simply the J-8. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-14

.....  
*Please respond by 11/26/02*

*6 NOV 02*

U04297 /03

Snowflake

November 6, 2002 7:10 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (D)  
SUBJECT: Lisa Bronson Brief to NATO

I want to have Lisa Bronson brief her technology transfer and the allies to an early NATO meeting, and maybe even offer it here in Washington when ministers of defense from NATO countries come to visit. It is excellent.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-4

.....

Please respond by 11/22/02

NATO 337

6 NOV 02

U04300 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7377

November 6, 2002 7:11 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DIA Visit

It has been suggested that Gen. Myers and I visit DIA and see the Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism. It should take about an hour total.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-5

.....

Please respond by 11/25/02

*11/23*  
*Col Bucci*  
*12/2*  
*1500 11/23/02*  
~~*11/23/02*~~

*6:20 PM*

*6 NOV 02*

U04302 /03

11/7 370.61

November 6, 2002 7:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Non-Lethal Weapons

I would like someone to fill me in on what we do with non-lethal weapons—what we have, what we are developing—so I have a good sense of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/9/02

*done*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*11/7*

370.61

6N002

U04303 /03

snoflake  
↓

November 6, 2002 11:01 AM

TO: Newt Gingrich  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legacy Force

I like your thought on not using the phrase "legacy force."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-11

322

6 Nov 02

U04304 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7380

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

cc DSD  
Di Rita

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 06, 2002 9:56 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** modern heavy Army forces

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

NOV 6 2002

for secdef, depsecdef  
from newt 11/05/02  
maintaining the best heavy land force in the world

If you put some money back into modernizing the heavy force and you indicate your commitment to keeping this the best heavy force in the world you send some powerful practical signals to the Army that its young officers can continue to go into working at an integrated joint heavy force with confidence that it will not be a "legacy" backwater.

Putting th money in and consistently describing the investment as deisgned to ensure the best heavy force in the world and never using the term 'legacy force" will send a huget message without direct confrontation.

you should make sure some money is set aside for this purpose.

November 7, 2002 6:57 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outreach to New Intel Committee Chairmen

Why don't we think about getting Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller down for lunch or breakfast someday and have a visit with them. They are the new heads of the intel committee. We have to think who we would want there—certainly Gen. Myers or Gen. Pace.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110702-1

.....  
Please respond by

*11/15/02*

*032*

*Wine*

*ATTN: DI: [unclear]  
12/17*

*7 NOV 02*

U04305 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7382

November 7, 2002 7:06 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld )  
SUBJECT: Congressman Ford

Larry Di Rita  
11/12

I would like to have Congressman Ford down to the Pentagon sometime for lunch or a cup of coffee. He is impressive.

032

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110702-3

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

2002

U04306 /03

11/15  
19/15

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300





LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

November 15, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs,  

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake 110702-3 regarding Representative Ford (D-TN)

- Rep. Harold Ford was invited to breakfast and a WMD briefing on four separate occasions. He declined one of the invitations, did not respond to two, and accepted but did not show on October 10, just prior to the vote on Iraq. By the way, he voted for the Resolution. We will, nevertheless, continue to extend invitations for coffee or lunch with you in the Pentagon.
- He and I were on a CODEL together to Afghanistan last March and developed a warm relationship. I agree he is impressive.
- Rep. Ford was an unsuccessful candidate to replace Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-MO) as House Democratic Leader. Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) defeated him.

11-L-0559/OSD/7384



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFORMATION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR -8 PM 1:44

CM-217-02  
7 March 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Participants in the USAF Red Flag Training Program

- For your Information, per your question on how participants are decided in the USAF Red Flag Training Program (Tab A).
- Of seven red flag training periods in FY02, three have been designated "US only" to fully integrate special access program training. For the four periods open to foreign participation, USAF Air Combat Command requests Deputy Under Secretary Air Force, International Affairs (SAF-IA) identify foreign participants. SAF-IA then solicits foreign participation for available periods.
- Germany and the United Kingdom are given the highest priority, and may participate in multiple exercises each year. Other allies are limited to one exercise per year and are selected based on their capability and how their participation contributes to both USAF training and Allied combined operations.
- Turkey did not request to participate in FY02.
- The attached USAF memo provides more detail, if needed (Tab B).

Prepared by: John P. Abizaid, LTG; USA; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7385

U04310 /02

February 21, 2002 10:33 AM

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Red Flag

Please find out what the Red Flag people use as their gouge for deciding which countries they will allow to participate. Apparently the requests greatly exceed the slots.

I would be curious to know how they make their decisions. For example, I notice they did not include the Turks, which I would have thought would be a higher priority than some of the people they had.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022102-9

.....

Please respond by 03/08/02



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

5 Mar 02

AFODM 04-02

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: RED FLAG INVITEE CRITERIA (DJSM-0182-02)

HQ Air Combat Command (ACC) uses USAF training requirements to determine how many and which Red Flag periods are available for allied participation. "US Only" Red Flag periods are reserved to fully integrate Special Access Programs / Special Access Required elements of the DoD. In FY02 there were three Red Flag periods designated "US Only" and three periods open to allied participation. For FY 03, there are three "US Only" periods and four periods open to allied participation.

In November of each year, HQ ACC forwards to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), the Red Flag periods available for foreign air forces' participation. SAF/IA solicits foreign participation through their respective country desk officers. Allied participation is then established by SAF/IA and coordinated with representatives from ACC and Pacific Air Force HQ at an annual SAF/IA hosted scheduling meeting. The United Kingdom and Germany are given the highest participation priority. Both countries may participate in multiple Red Flag exercises annually. All other allies are limited to a maximum of one Red Flag period per year. In general, allied selection is based on consideration of allies' operational capability to perform the requested mission type, how allied participation enhances USAF AEF combat capability, and how participation enhances ability of allies to support combined operations. SAF/IA has final determination authority when a conflict exists between two allies competing for the same exercise mission type or on whether a country other than the UK or Germany participate in multiple Red Flag exercises.

For those Red Flag periods open to international participants in FY02, the following foreign air forces participated: UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, NATO (AWACS), Singapore, and Israel. For FY 02, Turkey did not submit a request to participate in any international Red Flag periods and Norway cancelled, at their request.

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Air and Space Operations

11-L-0559/OSD/7387

11/12/02

showtime

11/12/02

November 7, 2002 7:22 AM

Sir:

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Fortune Article

DA

Distributed carefully  
to opinion leaders,  
formers, ret. generals,  
media elites.

Larry Di Rita  
11/18

This article from *Fortune* is pretty good. We might want to give it to people.

Thanks.

T. C  
004.7 50

Attach.

"Don Rumsfeld Talks Guns and Butter," *Fortune*, November 18, 2002, p. 143-144.

DHR:dh  
110702-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/02


7 NOV 02

U04311 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7388

# Don Rumsfeld talks guns and butter

Setting priorities  
when the stakes  
are scary.



*Command and control come naturally to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as anyone who watches cable TV's frequent coverage of his lively Pentagon press briefings can attest. Before he became the de facto host of America's War on Terror, Rumsfeld was a political prodigy—a four-term Congressman from Illinois, ambas-*

*sador to NATO, White House chief of staff and Defense Secretary under Gerald Ford—and then went on to a successful second career as CEO of drugmaker G.D. Searle and set-top box maker General Instruments. Recently he sat down in his cavernous Pentagon office for a wide-ranging interview with managing editor Rik Kirk-*

*land and senior writer Bill Powell. Here are some excerpts.*

## On being a CEO vs. running the Department of Defense

In business you can actually think something through, discuss it with your board and your management. Get outside advice.

So far it hasn't leaked. It's not been in the papers. You're just going through a normal private-sector experience. Put something in place, find that it's not perfect, calibrate it, adjust it, or even in some cases stop it if it doesn't work. And the world doesn't end. In the public sector the minute you think of something, it's in play—and all the critics are fully arrayed against it, and it's a matter of fighting it through every step of the way.

**On management**

The first thing you have to do is be willing to set priorities. Once you do that, you have said that something is more important than something else, and somebody is not going to like it. And that's life. You also have to recognize that you only improve what you measure, and if you don't select things to measure and test and inspect and track, then things are not going to get better. And if you try to measure everything, then nothing happens really.

For example, the other day I sat down and said, What have we accomplished at the DOD in my first 18 months? Not just the war on terrorism, but things you can't understand because they're inside [like the quadrennial defense review, the new defense strategy, a new command structure, a new way to balance risks]. What have we initiated that we've got to see through? And then what ought we to be working on for the next six months? And then I meet with [my staff and the military] and give them the chance to talk about it, and then we make adjustments, and then we circulate them so that at least the people in this department know what we ought to be focusing on. So that's how you do it. Imperfectly, but aggressively and energetically.

**On how today's embattled CEOs can restore trust**

[The private sector] can't be policed effectively by government agencies. Those agencies are important, and there ought to be rules. But [business] has to be policed internally by people who care about the responsibility that they have to investors, shareholders, employees, customers—and who get up every morning and worry about seeing that things are done well and right.

**On how much defense spending is enough**

The single most important thing for the economic prosperity and well-being of the American people is that we have a reason-

ably safe, a reasonably stable, world. It is only then that people will invest and have a degree of certainty and confidence that they can make those choices. So we as a society ought to be willing to spend whatever it takes to be able to contribute to a more peaceful and a more stable world. It's never going to be perfect. It's always going to be a bit untidy. On the other hand, if there is any country on the face of



**LISTEN UP**  
The Secretary of Defense doesn't have time for self-doubt.

**Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan. Iraq has oil.**

the earth that is capable of living in that kind of a world, it's the United States. We can afford to spend on national defense any absolute amount of dollars and any percentage of GDP that is necessary to have that reasonably stable, reasonably peaceful world, because without that we do not have the opportunity to enjoy our freedoms.

The idea of spending less, I think, would be—I was almost going to say mindless. Say imprudent, or something like that. Something more elegant and befitting FORTUNE magazine.

**On America's technology leadership**

I worry about the technology base in this country. The degree of competition is

declining in the defense industry. The longer the large defense contractors deal with the Defense Department, the more they become like the Defense Department—and I don't say that as a compliment. They get big and slow and sluggish and bureaucratic.

The energy and vitality that we see in smaller niche segments in our society, in technology, tends not to deal with government because ... dealing with government is just a put-off. Who in the world wants to do it if he can avoid it? It's burdensome. It's ugly. It takes forever to get anything done. Delay helps the big companies, because they've got all the lawyers and all the lobbyists and all the people in Washington. Smaller companies don't have time to do all of that. That means that government tends not to have the kind of interaction with the creativity and innovation that exists in our society.

[What's frustrating when you try to change this is that] you find people like things the way they are, so they try to stop it. I tried to put a couple of people on a science activity in the department some time back—a couple of young Silicon Valley 30-year-old types. And it was considered sacrilegious to bring those folks in to [lowering voice dramatically] "this distinguished body of people" who have been on this particular activity for many, many decades. We didn't win in that instance, but you just have to be persistent in this town.

**On the aftermath of a possible Iraq war**

If you [worry about just] the cost, the money, Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan. Iraq has oil. They have financial resources. The economy of that region would boom without Saddam Hussein's regime in there. It actually would be better for Turkey; it's actually better for Jordan. It's certainly better for the Iraqi people. It's a region that would prosper, without question.

There is no one model that you can press down on another country. The only thing we know for sure is that Iraq ought to be a single country and ought not to be broken up. It ought to be a country without weapons of mass destruction. It ought to be a country that's not imposing its will on its neighbors. It ought to be a country that's respectful of the rights and roles of the ethnic minorities in Iraq and not repressive or engaged in ethnic cleansing. □


# SPECIAL ISSUE

# FORBES

DISPLAY UNTIL DECEMBER 2, 2002

# THE CEO UNDER FIRE

Inside the  
world of  
today's  
embattled  
chief  
executives



IN THIS ISSUE

**Can Ford  
Save Ford?**

**Carly Fiorina:  
Now Comes  
the Hard Part**

**The Best of  
the New Breed**

**Confessions  
of a CEO**

... and more



www.fortune.com (AOL Keyword: Fortune)

SD/7

**WILLIAM  
CLAY FORD JR.**  
Scion and CEO

"I'm a very deliberate person. It doesn't mean I'm infallible. But deliberate. Very little happens by accident. And we will execute this merger."

Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, page 94



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
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FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259) is published biweekly, except for two issues combined in August and an extra issue in November, by Time Inc. Principal office: Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y. 10020-1393. Ann S. Moore, Chairman and CEO; Richard Atkinson, Treasurer and CFO. Subscriptions: U.S., possessions: 29 issues, \$66.87; Canada: 29 issues, \$88.12. Canada Post International Publications Mail (Canadian Distribution) Sales Agreement No. 669261. GST # 122781974RT. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. Authorized as second-class mail by the Post Office Dept., Ottawa, Canada, and for payment of postage in cash. Canada Post returns: Postal Stn. A, P.O. Box 4321, Toronto, Ont., M5W 3G8. Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FORTUNE, P.O. Box 30604, Tampa, Fla. 33630-0604. Customer inquiries: FORTUNE, P.O. Box 60001, Tampa, Fla. 33660-0001. Visit: fortune.com/subscriberservices. Phone: 1-800-621-8000. ©2002 Time Inc. All rights reserved. FORTUNE is a registered mark of Time Inc. PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. Subscribers: If the postal services alert us that your magazine is undeliverable, we have no further obligation unless we receive a corrected address within two years. Mailing List: We make a portion of our mailing list available to reputable firms. If you would prefer that we not include your name, please call or write us.

November 7, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Navy and Marine Personnel Successes in FY02

Attached are copies of memos from ADM Clark and Gen. Jones. This is a good news story we could use with the press, and something we ought to send to the appropriate people on the Hill. However, they are not in an appropriate format to send out or use.

*020 Navy*

We may want to check with the other Services and get their facts as well.

Please pull something together, let me look at it and we'll decide what we want to do with the Hill and what we want to do with the press.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/07/02 CNO memo to SecDef re: Navy Personnel Successes in FY02

11/07/02 CMC memo to SecDef re: Talking Points

DHR:dh  
110702-5



Please respond by 11/15/02

*7 NOV 02*

U04313 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7393

November 7, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Chief of Naval Operations



Re: Navy Personnel Successes in FY02

The following U.S. Navy personnel highlights from FY02 are provided for your information. We enjoyed remarkable success over the past year in recruiting and retaining our Sailors.

- **Deploying battle groups** are manned at no less than 96% six months prior to deployment and **no less than 98%** on deployment compared to 90% and 94% respectively only two years ago.
- Navy achieved its **recruiting goal** for each month of the entire fiscal year for the first time since 1983 and we achieved our overall goal for the **third consecutive year**. Only one month into FY03, 54% of the recruits we will need this year have already signed contracts and have reporting dates.
- First term **attrition** levels were 8%, representing a 23% reduction in just one year and the **lowest level on record**. With a one-for-one correlation, each Sailor retained is one less we have to recruit.
- **For the second year in a row, Navy retained an unprecedented 59%** of all eligible Sailors deciding to remain in the service at the end of their first term. This is an all-time Navy record, up from 48% only three years ago.
- **Increased officer retention across the board**. Especially encouraging was pilot retention, which at 43% was the highest since 1990.
- Over 1,200 more enlisted Sailors were promoted this year than in FY01.
- Nearly **88,000 Sailors enrolled in the Thrift Savings Plan**, the highest of any of the armed services.

I attribute these encouraging results in large measure to the outstanding support the Navy has received from the President, yourself, Congress, and the American people.

11-L-0559/OSD/7394



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

07 Nov 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBJECT: Talking Points

**Personnel**

Recruiting

- The Marine Corps has successfully achieved its recruiting goals for 87 consecutive months.

Retention

- First time reenlistments of Marines is currently at 57% of the FY 03 goal, only five weeks into the fiscal year.
- FY 02 marked an 18-year high for officer retention with 92.6%.

**Privatization**

- Over 50% of the approximately 24,000 government owned family housing units on Marine Corps' bases and stations are inadequate.
- The Marine Corps is aggressively pursuing Public-Private Venture Housing to eliminate inadequate military family housing units.
- Currently 4,500 Public-Private Venture Housing units, superior to what a Marines could afford on the open market, are available for Marine Corps families on Marine and Navy installations at Camp Pendleton California, San Diego, and New Orleans.
- The Marine Corps will privatize 95% of its worldwide inventory of family housing units by the end of FY 07.
- Public-Private Venture Housing is truly a transformational program that dramatically enhances the quality of life for Marines and their families and will have a significant and positive impact on retention.

11-L-0559/OSD/7395

November 7, 2002 5:07 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DARPA Briefing

I would like to get the DARPA briefing on biologicals that they gave to Vice President Cheney.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110702-10

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

337

7 Nov 02

U04315 /03

November 7, 2002 5:12 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Helen Thomas

Helen Thomas stopped me on the street over at the White House and said that she would like to have an interview with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110702-12



Please respond by 12/6/02

000,7150

7 NOV 02

U04316 /03

November 8, 2002 10:25 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (D/A)  
SUBJECT: Reserves and Force Flow

I do not want to wait until everyone thinks they have a perfect reserve call-up and force flow briefing for me before we have the SVTC with you and Gen. Franks. I need that soon. Otherwise, there is a danger you will have to re-do everything.

I need to get my input into your folks early, rather than after they have re-worked everything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110802-8



Please respond by 11/15/02

326

Closed  
11/12  
11/12

8 NOV 02

U04317 /03

November 8, 2002 10:31 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: CINC Meeting

*Advance copy given*

I have to get ready for the CINC meeting, and I may want to sit in on it the whole day they are all in town.

322

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110802-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/02

*closed @ PB  
C 11/12*

8 NOV 02

U04319 /03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: November 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Gen. Ralston**

MoD of Germany invited me January 16 to a torch ceremony in Berlin for General Ralston. See me about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 110902.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *11/15*

*0211 59*

*9 NOV 02*

U04320 /03

TO: Doug Feith  
 CC: Gen. Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: November 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Force Protection**

We ought to figure out everywhere we have forces where they may need protection in the event of a conflict with Iraq, such as Germany. And we ought to then go to those countries and ask them if they will provide the force protection so that we can use our forces in Iraq and not as force protection in countries a long way from Iraq.

*384*

I started this with Germany, they said they would do it. We need to get a major program going on this so we can reduce the number of reserve call-ups.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 110902.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *11/19* \_\_\_\_\_

*9 Nov 02*

U04322 /03

8:10 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT: **English Languages**

What should we do about promoting the development of English languages in countries across the the world? I think that Charlotte's point is a good one.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
110902.04

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *11/9*

*09119*

*9 Nov 02*

U04323 /03

11:52 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT: Calendar

I would like to block out some time next week to call Carl Levin and then Jerry Lewis and I ought to hear who else I should call to talk about what I would like them to do and what we need them to do in the short lame duck session.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
110902.09

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *11/15*

*020 SD*

*9 Nov 02*

U04324 103

snoflake  
11/13  
0500

12:13 PM

Call 14

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Should we have a meeting with the Big Eight up on the hill or should we bring them down here and brief them and talk to them about the things we are trying to do. Should we have a list of things we are trying to get them to do?

337

This is a short period. I don't feel like I have any sense of what I want out of the Congress during the lame duck session. I need help.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
110902.11

Please respond by: 11/14 **SECDEF HAS SEEN**



~~Sec Def~~  
We have considered all these items and options. The session is expected to be very brief. We don't have an agenda for lame duck other than the Auth. Bill, which passed. They will soon be gone.  
D. Rita

9 NOV 02

U04325 103

Larry Di Rita  
11-L-0559/OSD/7404

11/5 SHOWFILE  
0302

1:58 PM

11/15

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT: *The New York Times*

I need to know what is going on with that Poindexter article in *The New York Times* today. That could be a serious press problem. There is no substantive problem that I can imagine.

Thanks.

00017

DHR/azn  
110902.15

Please respond by:

11/15

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 14 2002

*DR*  
11/15  
LARRY DI RITA

~~11/13 -  
SecDef -  
I'm getting the  
info.~~

*L. Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita

11/13

Nov 12

U04326 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7405

November 12, 2002 12:35 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Vin Weber

Please make sure we have Vin Weber coming in regularly for this outreach group.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-45

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

334

12 Nov 02

U04327 /03

November 12, 2002 1:44 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Army Promotions

Please see the attached. What do you recommend?

Thanks.

Attach.  
SecDef MFR: Army Promotions [111201-50]

DHR:dh  
111202-49

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

210 Army

12 NOV 02

U04328 /03

November 12, 2002 1:42 PM

SUBJECT: Army Promotions

There has to be some way we can change the rules in the Army so that people get promoted, even if they are not "green" and have had a lot of joint jobs. All the incentives in the Army are to stay in Army jobs and not go into joint jobs.

DHR:dh  
111202-50

11-L-0559/OSD/7408

November 12, 2002 1:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
  
CC: Gen. Myers  
LTG Craddock  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: SVTC

*060*

In the future, when we have these SVTC meetings with Gen. Franks and EUCOM, I think we ought to add in TRANSCOM, Joint Forces Command, NORTHCOM and Special Forces Command.

These folks all have to start hearing what is going on.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
111202-51

.....  
Please respond by 12/1/02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
NOV 15 2002

*SECDEF -  
We have informed these Combatant Commanders and provided our SVTC schedule. May want to consider adding STRATCOM - Gen Ellis is a supporting commander.*

*12 Nov 02*

*C 1114*

U04329 103

November 12, 2002 1:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Plan

We simply have to pull together the things I ought to be doing with OMB and the things I ought to be doing with the Hill. I feel like it is lagging.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-53

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/02

032

12 Nov 02

U04330 /03

November 12, 2002 1:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Stryker

I promised Newt Gingrich I would get back to him on the Stryker before we make a decision.

451

Would you please have Steve Cambone connect with him and tell him precisely where we are going, so he knows that is my response to his request and we will have fulfilled it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-56

.....  
Please respond by 11/22/02

11/13 - SECDEF HAS SEEN  
NOV 14 2002

Secdef -

*Done*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*11/15*

Steve spoke with Newt and laid out your thinking. Newt reminds of Do view that we could get the same effect of a more robust Stryker Brigade if we stopped at 3; but understands what we are trying to accomplish.

12 Nov 02

U04331 103

11-L-0559/OSD/7411

*Sikita*

November 12, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Lame Duck CODELs

We probably ought to discourage lame duck Congressmen and Senators from going on sensitive CODELs to Afghanistan and other places. Can we do that?

Thanks.

DHR-dh  
111202-57



Please respond by 11/15/02

032

12 Nov 02

U04332 /03

November 12, 2002 2:19 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get a copy of this cartoon from the *Wall Street Journal*.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Cartoon

DHR:dh  
111202-59

.....  
Please respond by 12/13/02

000,7 57

12 Nov 02

U04333 /03

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explained

for almost anyone except authorized law-  
enforcement agents and dealers to pos-  
sess a gun in Washington.

Subordinates persuaded her to trade  
the weapon for a government-issue laser  
gun that emits a red dot. She since has  
visited a shooting range used by federal  
agents near Richmond, Va., and scheduled  
time at another near Kansas City, Mo.

Nov. 18 to prepare for the inspectors  
work. Baghdad has until Dec. 8 to pre-  
pare a declaration of its programs for  
building weapons of mass destruction.

The inspectors must report any Iraqi  
obstructionism, and the Security Council  
must meet at least once more to discuss  
further steps should a violation occur.

for a minor slip-up to justify an attack.



**JournalLink:** See a video report  
of Bush discussing the new  
United Nations resolution on  
Iraq, in the Online Journal at  
[WSJ.com/JournalLinks](http://WSJ.com/JournalLinks).

## ht Station Troops in a Post-Hussein Iraq

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Scott Peirick

central a role should be played by exiled  
Iraqis, including Ahmed Chalabi, head of  
the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella  
organization of anti-Hussein groups. Mr.  
Chalabi has strong ties to senior Penta-  
gon officials and aides in Mr. Cheney's

office, but is greatly mistrusted by the  
State Department. The current consensus  
seems to relegate Mr. Chalabi and other  
exile leaders to an advisory role for any  
international administration, along with  
respected leaders still inside Iraq who are

expected to emerge during any war and  
its aftermath.

Whether Pentagon officials will accept  
this is unknown. Some argue the U.S.  
should quickly give its blessing to a provi-  
sional government headed by Mr. Chalabi  
and his group. They warn that if the U.S.  
awaits elections before designating new  
Iraqi leaders, it will have little control  
over who emerges. "It would be a very  
good idea to bring in Iraqis as quickly as  
possible" after Mr. Hussein exits, a Penta-  
gon official said. "And of all the opposi-  
tion groups, the only one really interested  
in establishing a democracy is the INC."

U.S. officials say they still aren't cer-  
tain what they would do if an Iraqi military  
leader decides to stage a coup before a  
U.S. invasion begins, or in the early days  
of a military operation. The White House  
has urged the Iraqi military to do just that,  
but officials say privately that such a move  
could complicate matters.

U.S. officials have been discussing how  
they would judge whether such a coup  
meant enough real change for the U.S. to  
halt an invasion, or was simply replacing  
Mr. Hussein with another dictator it would  
want ousted. One of the biggest questions  
is whether the U.S. still would push to  
occupy the country if a new leader was  
deemed tolerable enough to work with. A  
minimum, officials say some plan would  
have to be devised to allow a large force to  
oversee the quick destruction of any hid-  
den weapons of mass destruction.

—Greg Jaf,

contributed to this article

### ash Expectations for Growth

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expectations

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based in Kan-  
its November  
erday, that the

forecasts were made before the Fed-  
eral Reserve cut interest rates half a  
percentage point Wednesday and be-  
fore the Republicans regained control  
of Congress in Tuesday's elections,  
which might lead to more tax cuts  
and government spending.

A big drop in car sales from Au-  
gust to October accounts for much of  
the gloomy outlook. Even if the  
plunge in car sales stops now, fourth-  
quarter sales will be much lower than  
sales in the third quarter. That de-  
cline will hold down growth figures  
for overall consumer spending. If car  
sales stabilize going into next year,  
then consumption growth should pick  
up. Still, economists expect overall  
growth of only 2.7% in the first quar-  
ter of next year, down from 3.7% fore-  
cast in July.

### Air Force Launches Inquiry on Fighter Jet

The Air Force said it has launched an in-  
vestigation into cost overruns of as much  
as \$690 million on its already-controversial  
fighter jet, the F/A-22 Raptor made by  
Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co.

The disclosure of the cost increases  
could spell trouble for the program, which  
works under a congressionally mandated  
cost cap of \$60 billion. The F/A-22 is one of  
several military programs under scrutiny  
by senior Pentagon officials for cutback as  
the department seeks to divert money to  
more modern equipment.

In a statement released late Thursday,  
the Air Force said the increased costs ap-  
pear to be related to the schedule for devel-  
oping the plane and not to performance or  
technical issues. A team of technical and  
financial experts from the industry and  
the service has been assigned to study the

matter, assess its magnitude, and make  
recommendations by later this month  
about how to contain future costs. Further  
cost overruns are possible.

A Lockheed spokesman said the  
Bethesda, Md., company is cooperating  
with the review and has been part of  
earlier review with lower-level service  
officials to analyze and estimate the po-  
tential cost increase.

Still, Air Force officials stressed the  
continued support of the aircraft, which  
frequently comes under attack by critics  
who believe it costs too much and is  
necessary in a world where U.S. fighter  
jets already outgun the enemy.

"The F/A-22 is essential to Amer-  
ican security in the 21st century, and we  
get to the bottom of this issue," said  
John Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, in  
a statement.

Brent

November 12, 2002 2:24 PM

Forae  
pls.  
G.R.

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Answers

When you get the answer to the Cox Commission, I would like to have a copy.

When you get an answer on the civilian use of the PX system, I would like a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-61

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

2504

12 Nov 02

U04334 /03

TO: SecDef  
FROM: ~~Torie Clarke~~  
CC: DSD Wolfowitz  
General Myers  
General pace  
DATE: November 22, 2002  
SUBJECT: Answers to Town Hall Questions

Per your request, attached are the responses to the unanswered questions from the November 12, Town Hall Meeting with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers and General Pace. Please note, the four responses were vetted and cleared by Dr. Chu and the OGC.

We will circulate the responses around the building and have posted them on both DefenseLink and DefendAmerica.

11-L-0559/OSD/7416

**Town Hall Meeting with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers and General Pace  
Tuesday, November 12, 2002**

**Answers to Unanswered Questions**

---

**Number One**

**Question:** "...The Cox Commission chaired by Judge Walter T. Cox, a former member of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, has presented to you a series of recommendations to improve the administration of military justice to members of the armed forces. When can members of the U.S. armed forces expect to have these measures implemented to provide them increased protections within the military justice system?"

**Answer:** Although the Cox Commission was neither initiated nor sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or any other U.S. governmental entity, the report it produced received comprehensive review within the Department (including legal). As a result of this evaluation, DoD has reaffirmed its confidence in the appropriateness and fairness of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The UCMJ provides the United States military with a fair and effective judicial system designed to address matters affecting good order and discipline while protecting the rights of its service members. No changes to the UCMJ in response to the report are being proposed at this time.

**Number Two**

**Question:** "We saw new change with the tuition assistance that just came out, which is now paying a hundred percent for up to a certain number of credits. And for some people that's going to be more helpful; for other people it's going to greatly decrease their ability to continue their education. My question is, what are we doing to try to expand and to improve on the education for the enlisted members of our armed forces? Note: This tuition change to me did not really seem like a positive move to improve the education level of our enlisted troops."

**Answer:** The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) policy (implemented 10/1/02 by the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps – Navy is working on falling into compliance) provides substantially improved tuition assistance benefits. Specifically, instead of paying for 75% of tuition costs (previous policy), DoD policy now provides for 100%. Instead of a credit cap at \$187.50, the new cap has been increased to \$250.00. Instead of limiting tuition assistance each year to \$3,500.00, the ceiling has been raised to \$4,500.00. DoD policy does not limit the number of credits service members can take.

Furthermore, most service members take courses that cost less than \$250.00 per credit and therefore could take as many classes/credits as time, job constraints, and/or personal responsibilities would allow.

**Number Three**

**Question:** "...I just wanted to ask how you felt about the continued movement to decrease headquarters staff sizes. One of the – I think this predates your transformation efforts, but one of the things that I know has changed in the last 10 years is headquarters staff now deploy, and all the promises of electronic technology that was going to make us more efficient seems to have increased the workload in many cases, rather than making us more effective. Do you have any insight on how we're going to continue reducing headquarters staff without seeming to reduce some of the demands on those staff?"

**Answer:** 10 USC 130a directed the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to reduce Major Headquarters Activity (MHA) manpower by 15% from the FY 1999 level by the end of FY 2002. The law also allows (the Secretary) to waive the ultimate reduction to 7.5%, upon determination that the full cut would adversely affect national security. As of September 30, 2002, DoD components had achieved aggregate MHA reductions of 11.1% (well within the waiver authority). This has enabled the Department to streamline MHA based on changes to doctrine and structure, as opposed to our past practice of meeting numeric targets.

Furthermore, last year, DoD advised the Congress that we would conduct an operationally focused review, as opposed to past "salami-slice" efforts. That review started early this year, using the "single service component" plan. In fact, the Joint Staff is evaluating this concept for feasibility in Southern Command, with a report due next month.

Lastly, a waiver package is being finalized on the 7.5% waiver. This package also advises the Congress that the "guidance for the Department to pursue further reduction opportunities remains in effect." For example, the Strategic/Space Command merger will yield savings, but Northern Command stand-up will require additional MHA manpower. On balance, opportunities exist to achieve at least 15% reduction, but it is unlikely that the requisite structural changes can be accompanied before the end of the FY 2003.

**Number Four**

**Question:** "I was heartened by the quote that the chairman used about thinking anew. We have a total force, armed forces, with military and DoD civilians, but yet the DoD civilians don't get to use the PX system. It wouldn't cost you a dime to say "Let'em use the PX system."

**Answer:** The Armed Services Exchanges are vital to mission accomplishment and form an integral part of the non-pay compensation and benefits package designed to recruit and retain professional, ready Armed Forces. In fact, the availability of exchange benefits is a factor considered in the cost of living allowances.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the Congress have exercised close scrutiny over the patronage of these facilities to ensure continuation of the military benefit. Exchange benefits are authorized for: Members of the Armed Forces and their eligible family; military retirees; certain members of the selected reserves; medal of honor recipients; disabled veterans with a 100% service-connected disability; DoD civilians working at overseas installations and/or those required to live at DoD installations; and, exchange system employees (limited purchases from the exchange where they are currently employed).

In a 1996 study, the Congressional Budget Office estimated a loss of \$470 million from foregone local community sales and excise taxes on exchange goods and services. Extending privileges to more civilian DoD employees could raise private sector objections based on competition, and create local community problems due to reduced sales tax revenues.

TAB

November 12, 2002 2:27 PM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>  
SUBJECT: Separate Systems

*11*

*471*

Let's get an answer to the question asked today on separate service systems for ammunition testing, storage, transportation, etc.

I thought it was a good question, and it sounded like a crazy way to do things. Let's get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-62

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

*Response Attached  
SFB  
1/02  
12 Nov 02*

NOV 18 2002

U04335 /03 Tab

1-L-0559/OSD/7420



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-686-02

24 December 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 12/24*

SUBJECT: Separate Systems

- In response to your question (TAB), the following information is provided.
- The differences in munitions systems have resulted from each Service's unique logistics and operational requirements. However, in an effort to strive toward "purple" systems, there are several initiatives already in place to inject joint criteria and standards into current and future systems. Those programs include the following.
  - The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) shapes the "jointness" of our forces. JROC prioritizes munitions interoperability upgrades for legacy systems and ensures new systems are "born joint." As you know, significant progress has been made with joint programs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Standoff Weapon and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.
  - The Joint Ordnance Commanders Group (JOCG) sponsors joint munitions systems toward reducing cost, increasing effectiveness and ensuring interoperability. JOCG also addresses operations of the Army's Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition.
  - Joint Staff J-4 and Naval Ammunition Logistics Center built a Web-based joint munitions report (MUREP) to manage critical systems during contingencies. The report provides near-real-time updates visible to individual units, staffs and the Services. The combatant chain of command uses the MUREP to track munitions inventory and expenditures.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

*Sir, system was broken and probably still is in some areas. Fix or alone will make munitions more joint over time.*  
*VR Dick*

11-L-0559/OSD/7421

**Snowflake**

November 12, 2002 3:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transportation Costs

*ADVICE  
Code set*

Please try to get the State Department to ask for the supplemental to pay for Karzai's transportation, unless you want to have us put it in our supplemental. But let's get it solved one way or another.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-67

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

*Afghanistan*

*12 Nov 02*

U04336 /03

November 12, 2002 3:46 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Brief

*ADVANCE COPY SENT*

I met with the President this morning. He said he would like to get briefed on where we stand on the 2-plus-6.

Please get me a briefing so I can see if it is ready for the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-68

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

*337 WH*

*12 Nov 02*

U04337 /03

November 12, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Language Training

Please have someone give me the same information that is on these two boards on two pieces of paper.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Display boards with language training info

DHR:dh  
111202-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

*09114*

*12 Nov 02*

U04338 /03

November 12, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Budget

When am I going to see the budget?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-5



Please respond by 11/25/02

118.01

12 Nov 02

U04339 /03

113 software  
1600

11/12

November 12, 2002 7:52 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Christmas Cards

DA

Give a few additional to  
Arlene Jones

Larry Di...  
11/14

Please let me know of anyone in the press corps you think I ought to send a Christmas card to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-7

.....  
Please respond by 11/25/02

33550

12 Nov 02

U04340 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7426

Pentagon Correspondents List

Current as of: Nov. 12, 2002

Last Name	First Name	Company	Address	Address	Address	City, State, Zip Code
Aldinger	Charles	Reuters	1333 H St., NW	5th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20005
Auster	Bruce	U.S. News				
Baier	Bret	Fox Network				
Barry	John	Newsweek	1750 Pennsylvania Ave.,			Washington, D.C. 20006
Becker	Elizabeth	New York Times				
Behrens	Thad	CONUS-TV				
Belida	Alex	Voice of America	330 Independence Ave.,			Washington, D.C. 20237
Bender	Bryan	STRATFOR.COM				
Bender	Bryan	Jane's Defense Weekly				
Bishop	Bianco	Federal Publications				
Bloom	David					
Bowman	Tom	Baltimore Sun	1627 K St., NW	Suite 1100		Washington, D.C. 20006-1762
Brown	Justin	Christian Science Monitor				
Brown	Christopher	NBC-TV				
Burger	Kimberly	Jane's	1340 Braddock Place	Suite 300		Alexandria, Va. 22314-
Burgess	Lisa	Stars & Stripes	National Press Building	529 14th St., NW	Suite 350	Washington, D.C. 20045
Burns	Bob	Associated Press	2021 K St., NW	Room 600		Washington, D.C. 20006-1082
Capaccio	Anthony	Bloomberg News	228 National Press Building			Washington, D.C. 20045
Carver	Tom	BBC-TV	2030 M St., NW	Suite 350		Washington, D.C. 20036
Castelli	Chris	Inside Washington Publishers				
Chaisson	Kernan	Forecast International				
Childs	Nick	BBC	Suite 350	2030 M Street NW		Washington DC 20036
Christenson	Sig	San Antonio Express-News	San Antonio, Texas			
Clark	Colin	Defense News				
Conan	Neal	National Public Radio				
Costa	Keith	Inside the Pentagon	Inside Washington	Suite 1400	1225 Jefferson Davis Hwy	Arlington, VA 22202
Cowan	Richard	Bridge News				
Crawley	Vince	Times News Service	Time News Service	6883 Commercial Dr.		Springfield 22159-0150
Crock	Stan	Business Week	Suite 1100	1200 G Street, NW		Washington, DC 20005-
Cromley	Raymond	Cromley News Service				
Dao	James	New York Times	1627 I St., NW	7th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20006

11-L-0559/OSD/7427

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de la Garza	Paul	St Petersburg Times	1100 Connecticut Ave N.W.	Suite 1300		Washington DC 20036
DeFrank	Thomas	New York Daily News	1615 M St., NW	Suite 720		Washington, D.C. 20036
Diamond	John	USA Today	1100 New York Ave., NW			Washington, D.C. 20005
Disch	Harry	Center for Media and Security	358 Saw Mill River Road			Millwood, New York 10546
Donnelly	John	Defense Week	627 National Press Building			Washington, D.C. 20045
Donnelly	John	Boston Globe	1130 Connecticut Ave., NW	Suite 500		Washington, D.C. 20036
Eisman	Dale	The Virginian-Pilot				
Elgart	Joanne	PBS Newshour				
Fulghum	Dave	Aviation Week				
Funk	Deborah	Times News Service				
Garamone	Jim	American Forces Information Service	601 N Fairfax St.			Alexandria, Va. 22314
Gertz	Bill	Washington Times				
Gjeltten	Tom	National Public Radio	635 Massachusetts Ave., NW			Washington, D.C. 20001-3753
Gordon	Craig	Newsday	c/o Craig Gordon	1730 Pennsylvania Ave.	Suite 850	Washington, DC 20006
Graham	Bradley	Washington Post	1150 15th St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20071-0070
Green	Stephan	Copley News Service	1100 National Press			Washington, D.C. 20045
Grossman	Elaine	Inside Washington Publishers	1225 Jefferson Davis Highway	Suite 1400		Arlington, VA 22202
Guggenheim	Ken	Associated Press				
Hamann	Carlos	Agence France-Presse				
Hartman	Brian	ABC Washington Bureau	1717 DeSales St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20036
Hedges	Michael	Houston Chronical				
Heller	Marc	Watertown Daily Times	1001 National Press Bldg.			Washington, D.C. 20045
Hendren	John	Los Angeles Times	1875 I St., NW	Suite 1100		Washington, D.C. 20006
Hess	Pam	United Press International	1510 H St., NW	Suite 700		Washington, D.C. 20005
Hiebert	Murray	Far Eastern Economic Review	1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.	Suite 800		Washington, DC 20010
Hoffman	Lisa	Scripps Howard News Service				
Inskeep	Steve	National Public Radio				
Jaffe	Greg	Wall Street Journal	1025 Connecticut Ave., NW	Suite 800		Washington, D.C. 20036

11-L-0559/OSD/7428

Pentagon Correspondents List

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Jelinek	Pauline	Associated Press	2021 K St., NW	Room 600		Washington, D.C. 20006-1082
Jontz	Sandra	Stars & Stripes	National Press Building	Suite 350		Washington, D.C. 20045
Joost	Nathalie	FOX-TV (WTTG)				
Kaufman	Gail	Defense News				
Keeter	Hunter	Defense Daily	Phillips Business Information Inc.	1111 North 19th St.	Suite 503	Arlington, Va. 22209
Kelleher	Kristine	Associated Press Television				
Kellerhals	Merle	State Dept....				
King	Neil	Wall Street Journal				
Komarow	Steve	USA Today	1100 New York Ave., NW			Washington, D.C. 20045
Kozaryn	Linda	OASD-PA	3227 Martha Custis Dr.			Alexandria, VA 22302
Kreisher	Otto	Copley News Service	1100 National Press			Washington, D.C. 20045
Kupperman	Tammy	NBC-TV	400 Nebraska Ave., NW			Washington, D.C. 20016
Landay	Jonathan	Knight Ridder	700 National Press Buidling			Washington, D.C. 20045
LeBrecht	Thelma	Associated Press Radio	1825 K St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20006-1253
Lee	Warren	AFRTS News Center	601 N Fairfax St.			Alexandria, Va. 22314
Loeb	Vernon	Washington Post	1150 15th St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20071-0070
Lopez	Ramon	Flight International				
Lynch	Collum	Washington Post UN Bureau				
Machamer	Rick	Foreign Press Center				
Magnusson	Paul	Business Week	Suite 1100	1200 G Street, NW		Washington, DC 20005-
Mannion	James	Agence France-Presse	1015 15th St., NW	Suite 500		Washington, D.C. 20005
Marano	Lou	United Press International				
Marash	David	ABC News (Nightline)	1717 DeSales St. N.W.			Washington, D.C. 20036
Martin	David	CBS-TV	2020 M St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20036
Matthews	Bill	Times News Service				
Mazzetti	Mark	U.S. News & World Report	1050 Thomas Jefferson St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20007-3837
McCarter	Mickey	Stars & Stripes Omnimedia, Inc.				
McIntyre	Jamie	CNN-TV	CNN Building	820 1st St., NW		Washington, D.C. 20003

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McIntyre	Dave	DPA(Deutsche Presse-Agentur Gmbh)				
McKenna	Kate	Associated Press				
McWethy	John	ABC News	1717 DeSales St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20036
Miklaszewski	Jim	NBC-TV	400 Nebraska Ave., N.W.			Washington, D.C. 20016
Miliano	Rugiero	CBS Radio Stations				
Miller	Kent	Times News Service				
Moniz	David	USA Today	1100 New York Ave., NW			Washington, D.C. 20005
Mount	Mike	CNN	820 1st, NE			Washington, D.C. 20003
Muradian	Vago	Defense News				
Myers	Steve	New York Times	1627 I St., NW	7th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20006
Newman	Rick	U.S. News	1050 Thomas Jefferson St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20007
None	None	States News Service				
None	None	Tribune Broadcasting				
None	None	Washington News Network				
None	None	Associated Press Daybook				
None	None	Defense Alert	Inside Washington	Suite 1400	1225 Jefferson Davis	Arlington, VA 22202
Ochs	Carol	Associated Press Radio	1825 K St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20006-1253
Offley	Ed					
Omae	Hitoshi	Nikkei	815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. #310			Washington, DC 20006
Omicinski	John	Gannett News Service				
Peniston	Bradley	Military.com				
Philpott	Tom	Fleet Reserve Association/Military Update				
Porth	Jacqui	State Department International Information Program				
Priest	Dana	Washington Post	1150 15th St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20071-0070
Ressler	Nikki	American Forces Information Service	601 N Fairfax St.			Alexandria, Va. 22314

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Ricks	Thomas	Washington Post	1150 15th St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20071-0070
Robbins	Carla	Wall Street Journal	1025 Connecticut Ave., NW	Suite 800		Washington, D.C. 20036
Roberts	Kristin	Reuters Equities	New York			
Rosenberg	Arnold	Washington Defense Publications	1800 Old Meadow Road			McLean, Va. 22102
Rosenberg	Eric	Hearst Newspapers				
Rosenberg	Carol	Miami Herald				
Sagalyn	Dan	PBS Newshour	3620 South 27th St.			Arlington, Va. 22206
Scarborough	Rowan	Washington Times				
Schlesinger	Robert	Boston Globe				
Schmitt	Eric	New York Times	1627 I St., NW	7th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20006
Schrader	Esther	Los Angeles Times	1875 I St., NW	Suite 1100		Washington, D.C. 20006
Scott	Ivan		P.O. Box 9550			Washington, D.C. 20016
Shanker	Thom	New York Times	1627 I St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20006
Sherman	Jason	Defense News				
Silverman	Daniel	Asahi Shimbun, The	1022 National Press			Washington, DC 20045
Sisk	Richard	New York Daily News				
Sleiman	Mounzer	Gulf Defense Magazine				
Sloyan	Pat	Newsday				
Sperling	Godfrey	Christian Science Monitor				
Squeo	Anne	Wall Street Journal				
Starr	Barbara	CNN	CNN Building	820 1st St., NW		Washington, D.C. 20003
Stone	Andrea	USA Today	1100 New York Ave., N.W.			Washington, D.C. 20005-3934
Storey	David	Reuters				
Sugita	Hiroki	Kyodo News Service				
Sunohara	Tsuyoshi	Nikkei (Nihon Keizai Shimbun)				
Tamerlani	George	Reuters Television	1333 H St., NW	5th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20005
Thompson	Mark	Time	555 12th St., NW	Suite 600		Washington, D.C. 20004
Tirpak	John	Air Force Magazine	Air Force Association	1501 Lee Highway		Arlington, VA 22209
Towell	Pat	Congressional Quarterly	1414 22nd St., NW	4th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20037
Trimble	Stephen	Aerospace Daily	1200 G St., NW	Suite 200		Washington, D.C. 20005

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Vineys	Kevin	Associated Press Television				
Vistica	Greg	Newsweek	1750 Pennsylvania Ave.,			Washington, D.C. 20006
Vogel	Steve	Washington Post	1150 15th St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20071-0070
Waller	Doug	Time	555 12th St., NW	Suite 600		Washington, D.C. 20004
Walsh	Mary	CBS	2020 M St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20036
Walsh	Ed	Washington Post				
Whittle	Richard	Dallas Morning News	1325 6th St., NW	Suite 250		Washington, D.C. 20005
Wilson	George	National Journal	1501 M St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20005
Wolf	Jim	Reuters	1333 H. St., NW	5th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20005
Wolfe	Frank	Defense Daily				
Wood	David	Newhouse Newspapers				
Wright	Christopher	FOX Network	400 N Capitol St., NW			Washington, D.C. 20001
Yun	Linda	Yomiuri Shimbun				
Zakaria	Toby	Reuters	1333 H St., NW	5th Floor		Washington, D.C. 20005
Zoroya	Gregg	USA Today				

11/13 09:00  
snowflake

November 12, 2002 7:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
  
CC: Arlene  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
  
SUBJECT: Trade Deficit Commission

I would like to invite the members of the Trade Deficit Commission, and possibly the key staff person, down to have lunch someday.


334

Arlene, you ought to be able to dig up those names and let me look at them.

Thanks.

DHK:dh  
111202-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/25/02



Larry Di Rita

11/13

12 NOV 02

U04341 /03

11/13  
0900  
snowflake

November 12, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Christmas Cards to MoDs

If I ought to send Christmas cards to the ministers of defense around the world,  
then someone ought to get the list together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/25/02

*Done*  
11/15  
LARRY DI RITA

*SCOTT - 11/13*  
*Do we have a mailing list?*  
*Please advise.*

Larry Di Rita

11/13

33550

12 Nov 02

U04342 /03



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
WASHINGTON



INFO MEMO

2002 MAR -8 PM 4: 45

March 8, 2002, 2:55 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

*Tom White* MAR 8 2002

SUBJECT: Winter Clothing

- In response to your question regarding the winter clothing for Army personnel in Afghanistan (attached), the following information is provided:
  - ◆ Forces deploying from Forts Bragg, Campbell, and Drum deployed with standard issue cold-weather equipment - Goretex, cold-weather boots, gloves, etc.
  - ◆ Some new troops have received the Black Fleece (replaces the Bear Suit) but most have not. The Black Fleece is lighter but the Bear Suit provides virtually the same protection.
- Our standard equipment is appropriate for the conditions under which our troops are fighting.
- I am confident they have the right gear.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

7:28 AM

TO: Secretary White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: March 7, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Winter Clothing**

The press is saying Army folks in Afghanistan have the wrong winter clothing.

What are the facts?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030702.08

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *3/12*

11/13  
6900  
SHOW/TKRe

11/13

November 12, 2002 8:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Al Qaeda in Oregon Meeting

I would like Dan Dell'Orto to sit in on the meeting when I get briefed on the Al Qaeda in Portland. Larry, you may want to sit in on it, too.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
111202-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 14 2002

11/13

*Sec Def*

*Will do. [unclear]*

~~*[unclear]*~~  
~~*[unclear]*~~  
~~*[unclear]*~~

*Di Rita*

12 NOV 02

*[Circular stamp: Done 11/13 LARRY DI RITA]*

Larry Di Rita

U04343 /03

11/13

11-L-0559/OSD/7437

7:28 AM

TO: Secretary White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: March 7, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Winter Clothing**

420

The press is saying Army folks in Afghanistan have the wrong winter clothing.  
What are the facts?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030702.08

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 3/12

7MAR02

November 12, 2002 9:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

*Admission sent*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Trip to Europe

If I am right there, why don't I visit both Slovenia and Slovakia in one day, and not make a career out of it?

*333 SD*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-21

.....

Please respond by 11/12/02

*12 November*

U04345 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7439

November 12, 2002 10:51 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Markoff Article

Please be sure to give me a report on this attached Markoff article from the *New York Times*.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Markoff, John. "Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans,"

DHR:dh  
111202-28

.....  
Please respond by 11/25/02

*413.51*

*12 Nov 02*

U04346 /03

# Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans

By JOHN MARKOFF

The Pentagon is constructing a computer system that could create a vast electronic dragnet, searching for personal information as part of the hunt for terrorists around the globe — including the United States.

As the director of the effort, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, has described the system in Pentagon documents and in speeches, it will provide intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials with instant access to information from Internet mail and calling records to credit card and banking transactions and travel documents, without a search warrant.

Historically, military and intelligence agencies have not been permitted to spy on Americans without extraordinary legal authorization. But Admiral Poindexter, the former national security adviser in the Reagan administration, has argued that the government needs broad new powers to process, store and mine billions of minute details of electronic life in the United States.

Admiral Poindexter, who has described the plan in public documents and speeches but declined to be interviewed, has said that the government needs to "break down the stovepipes" that separate commercial and government databases, allowing teams of intelligence agency ana-

lysts to hunt for hidden patterns of activity with powerful computers.

"We must become much more efficient and more clever in the ways we find new sources of data, mine information from the new and old, generate information, make it available for analysis, convert it to knowledge, and create actionable options," he said in a speech in California earlier this year.

Admiral Poindexter quietly returned to the government in January to take charge of the Office of Information Awareness at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as Darpa. The office is responsible for developing new surveillance technologies in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks.

In order to deploy such a system, known as Total Information Awareness, new legislation would be needed, some of which has been proposed by the Bush administration in the Homeland Security Act that is now before Congress. That legislation would amend the Privacy Act of 1974, which was intended to limit what government agencies could do with private information.

The possibility that the system might be deployed domestically to let intelligence officials look into commercial transactions worries civil liberties proponents.

"This could be the perfect storm

for civil liberties in America," said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington. "The vehicle is the Homeland Security Act, the technology is Darpa and the agency is the F.B.I. The outcome is a system of national surveillance of the American public."

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has been briefed on the project by Admiral Poindexter and the two had a lunch to discuss it, according to a Pentagon spokesman.

"As part of our development process, we hope to coordinate with a variety of organizations, to include the law enforcement community," a Pentagon spokeswoman said.

An F.B.I. official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, said the bureau had had preliminary discussions with the Pentagon about the project but that no final decision had been made about what information the F.B.I. might add to the system.

A spokesman for the White House Office of Homeland Security, Gordon Johndroe, said officials in the office were not familiar with the computer project and he declined to discuss concerns raised by the project's critics without knowing more about it.

He referred all questions to the Defense Department, where officials said they could not address civil lib-

erties concerns because they too were not familiar enough with the project.

Some members of a panel of computer scientists and policy experts who were asked by the Pentagon to review the privacy implications this summer said terrorists might find ways to avoid detection and that the system might be easily abused.

"A lot of my colleagues are uncomfortable about this and worry about the potential uses that this

## Bank records and phone logs without search warrants.

technology might be put, if not by this administration then by a future one," said Barbara Simon, a computer scientist who is past president of the Association of Computing Machinery. "Once you've got it in place you can't control it."

Other technology policy experts dispute that assessment and support Admiral Poindexter's position that linking of databases is necessary to track potential enemies operating inside the United States.

"They're conceptualizing the problem in the way we've suggested it needs to be understood," said Philip Zeilikow, a historian who is executive director of the Markle Foundation task force on National Security in the Information Age. "They have a pretty good vision of the need to make the tradeoffs in favor of more sharing and openness."

On Wednesday morning, the panel reported its findings to Dr. Tony Tether, the director of the defense research agency, urging development of technologies to protect privacy as well as surveillance, according to several people who attended the meeting.

If deployed, civil libertarians argue, the computer system would rapidly bring a surveillance state. They assert that potential terrorists would soon learn how to avoid detection in any case.

The new system will rely on a set of computer-based pattern recognition techniques known as "data mining," a set of statistical techniques used by scientists as well as by marketers searching for potential customers.

The system would permit a team of intelligence analysts to gather and view information from databases, pursue links between individuals and groups, respond to automatic alerts, and share information efficiently, all

from their individual computers.

The project calls for the development of a prototype based on test data that would be deployed at the Army Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Va. Officials would not say when the system would be put into operation.

The system is one of a number of projects now under way inside the government to lash together both commercial and government data to hunt for patterns of terrorist activities.

"What we are doing is developing technologies and a prototype system to revolutionize the ability of the United States to detect, classify and identify foreign terrorists, and decipher their plans, and thereby enable the U.S. to take timely action to successfully pre-empt and defeat terrorist acts," said Jan Walker, the spokeswoman for the defense research agency.

Before taking the position at the Pentagon, Admiral Poindexter, who was convicted in 1990 for his role in the Iran-contra affair, had worked as a contractor on one of the projects he now controls. Admiral Poindexter's conviction was reversed in 1991 by a federal appeals court because he had been granted immunity for his testimony before Congress about the case.

Snowflake

November 12, 2002 11:48 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Argentina

Should we be involving Argentina more in the global war on terrorism?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-35

.....

Please respond by 11/13/02

Argentina

12 Nov 02

U04347 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7442

November 12, 2002 11:49 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld PA  
SUBJECT: Opening Remarks

Please be sure we say nice things about Chile in my opening remarks down there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-36



Please respond by 11/15/02

092.3

12 Nov 02

U04348 /03

11/13 snowflake  
of 00

11/13

November 12, 2002 11:52 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*  
SUBJECT: Chairman Lewis

*HOT*

032

I have to talk to or see Chairman Jerry Lewis this week before I leave for Chile.

I think we are letting our Congressional relations lag with respect to me. We may be doing fine for Paul Wolfowitz, but I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111202-37

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
11/13

*Di Rita*  
11/15  
LARRY DI RITA

→ Sec Def -

We are working  
on a time to see Mr  
Lewis. Could be an  
early B'fest. Dike to

12 Nov 02

Larry Di Rita  
11/13

U04349 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/7444

November 13, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Contacts

I saw Cardoza, the new Congressman from California. He has Gary Condit's seat. He said he is a big supporter of the military and wants to be helpful if we ever need him. Saxby Chambliss said the same thing.

032

Let's get Chambliss down sometime and give him a briefing, maybe have lunch with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111302-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

11/13

SecDef

~~We invited him, together with all new Senators (total of 9), for breakfast on Thursday, 11/14 (tomorrow)~~  
Dilite

13 Nov 02

*Agree*  
11/13  
ARY DI RITE

U04350 /03

November 13, 2002 7:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

*ADVANCE COPY 6/10/02*

SUBJECT: William Webster Appointment

If we can't get Bill Webster in for lunch or a cup of coffee sometime this week, I would like to just call him and have an appointment on the phone to talk to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111302-3

*000.7159*



Please respond by 11/15/02

*13 Nov 02*

U04352 /03

November 13, 2002 1:00 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Management Flexibility

I think we need to go to Congress with a bunch of requests to get greater management flexibility at the Pentagon.

We need to put together a package. Why don't we look at CIA and Homeland Security and see what flexibility they got for reorganization and for personnel, and let's go in and ask for the same thing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111302-8



Please respond by 12/13/02

310.1

13 Nov 02

U04353 /03

showtake

November 13, 2002 1:03 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Graphic

*RA*  
*ACTION*  
*SP3 11/13*

Please have someone give me the DoD percentage of GDP on a graph and then the absolute numbers since 1970. Also, if you can do it, have somebody pull together the percentage of the DoD budget and the absolute dollars that are going for non-military things, like pensions, healthcare, breast cancer research, concurrent receipts, veterans, etc.—anything that is not really DoD-oriented.

*110.01*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111302-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

*13 Nov 02*

U04354 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7448

113  
390



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION



DEC 12 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *sc*

SUBJECT: DoD Budget Graphic Snowflake dated November 13, 2002

- Larry Di Rita*  
*12/14*
- Via Tab D you asked for the DoD budget as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) on a graph, the absolute numbers since 1970, the percentage of the DoD budget and the absolute dollars for non-military items.
  - The graphic with the Dod Budget Authority (BA) as a percentage of GDP and a table with the absolute number are at Tab A.
  - Tab B compares the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) forecasts of the Federal Budget surplus for FY02-FY09 with the effects of a \$10B increase to DoD in FY08 and 09.
  - Tab C itemizes non-military defense spending in FY03. It includes Senator McCain's annual pork barrel projects press release that details DoD appropriations added by Congress but not requested by DoD.

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Richard P. Burke (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7449

November 13, 2002 1:12 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Top Ten

ADVANCE COPY SENT

The President is going to want a briefing on the focus on the Top 10 next week, after he gets back from Prague.

337

Please get a briefing for me before I leave this weekend, so I can see what we have and where we are, and so you folks will have time to adjust it for the briefing for the President.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
111302-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02



13 Nov 02

U04355 /03

*CJS*

November 13, 2002 1:20 PM

*X*

SUBJECT: Review for POTUS

When the President gets back from Prague, he is going to want to do a full strategy review—how the coordination with DoD and CIA is, if the \_\_\_\_\_ teams have what they need, what our response time is, what our safe haven policy is country by country, how we reinvigorate our activities, etc.

DHR dh  
111302-15

337

13 Nov 02

U04356 /03

Non Responsive

11-L-0559/OSD/7452

Non Responsive

11-L-0559/OSD/7453

Non Responsive

11-L-0559/OSD/7454

Non Responsive

11-L-0559/OSD/7455

Non Responsive

11-L-0559/OSD/7456

November 13, 2002 1:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

CC: PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
GEN. MYERS  
DOUG FEITH  
GEN. PACE

HDT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: GWOT Review

Sometime in the next two or three weeks, there is going to be a review of the global war on terrorism. It could be at Camp David on Saturday, December 14 or on Monday, November 25—or some other date.

000.5

Larry, I need to schedule a meeting this week to get DoD ready for that meeting.

We should consider all the conceivable things that are going on and how we feel about them, including:

- What bad things could happen, like Saudi Arabia could flip.
- Are we doing enough on IO?
- What are we doing on focusing on the 2+6, etc.?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111302-18

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

13 Nov 02

U04358 /03

November 14, 2002 8:32 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legislative Authority

One of our legislative changes ought to be military-to-military contacts in Indonesia.

We ought to get a whole list of the micro things that are being done like that, show the whole list and get authority to deal with them ourselves.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-6



Please respond by 12/13/02

*Indonesia*

*MNavaz*

U04360 /03

November 14, 2002 8:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget Briefings

When do I get briefed on things like training, end strength, pay, length of tours and the like in terms of the coming budget?

When do I get briefed on C3?

What are we going to do about short-range missile defense that Fargo raised?

How do we solve the split funding issue?

When do we finish the Special Ops issues?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-7

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

*110.01*

*14 Nov 02*

U04362 /03

*Done 11/14*

November 14, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Poindexter Issue

I need a briefing from you on what Poindexter is doing. I am getting a lot of questions, and I want to end up with a short piece of paper I can send to Colin Powell, who asked me about it.

*4/13.51*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-8

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/13/02

*14 Nov 02*

U04363 /03

## **DARPA's TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS (TIA) EFFORT**

- **DARPA Information Office (IAO) established after 9/11; led by ADM (Ret) John Poindexter.**
  - **Mission is to research and demonstrate advanced information technology capabilities for the war on terrorism**
  
- **IAO's main thrust is the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system - a prototype, experimental effort centered at the US Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Ft Belvoir.**
  - **TIA uses advanced collaboration and data base search technologies to enable operational intelligence analysts to share data on terrorist activities overseas.**
    - **INSCOM uses their world-wide units as TIA nodes, enabling wide coverage of terrorist activities.**
  
  - **Idea is to share information in disparate data bases to quickly identify and track terrorist networks**
  
- **TIA intelligence analysts focus primarily on analyzing transactions. Terrorists must engage in transactions to plan and execute attacks – they buy things, obtain housing and driver's licenses, travel, etc. They will leave signatures when they make these transactions. The transactional data could supplement the more conventional intelligence collection.**
  - **Transaction data is already being exploited by the private sector for targeted marketing, fraud detection, tax recovery and other purposes. Catching terrorists before they act will require at some point that the U.S. tap into the same information, but with appropriate protection, oversight and accountability**
  
- **As a parallel effort, DARPA is creating technologies to extract information from those unified databases, and to ensure that the private information on innocent citizens is protected.**
  
- **TIA is not an operational system and no decision has been made to deploy such a system in the future.**
  - **If deployed, a future operational system would include safeguards to govern the collection of information. Rules built into the software would identify users, create an audit trail and govern the information that is available.**

November 14, 2002 8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Briefing

*X*

Condi says the President would like a briefing on the high-value target project sometime, so let's get me briefed up and then we'll do that sometime, maybe next week.

*337 WH*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

*14 NOV 02*

U04364 /03

November 14, 2002 9:36 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Town Hall

Your remarks at the opening of the Town Hall were first-class. Good for you!

DHR:dh  
111402-13

337

14 Nov 02

U04365 /03

November 14, 2002 9:38 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Town Hall


Since so many questions involve David Chu's area of responsibility, what do you think about having David Chu do a town hall with Paul Wolfowitz sometime?

*337*

Paul could deal with the policy issues and David could answer all the stuff they are interested in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-14



Please respond by 12/6/02

*14 Nov 02*

U04367 /03

November 14, 2002 9:40 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Employers of Guard and Reserve

I should mention the employers' program for the Guard and Reserve who are activated and what a big help it is. We should thank them, as well as the families, from time to time.

326

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-15

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/6/02

14 Nov 02

U04369 /03

November 14, 2002 10:11 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA and CENTCOM

Please make sure you get me a letter as to when we want to get agreement that CIA will chop to CENTCOM. I want it decided now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-23

.....

Please respond by 11/26/02

*CENTCOM*

*Haynes*

U04370 /03

November 14, 2002 10:15 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Talent

381

Senator Talent wants to help with authorities and we need to get him. He wants it done fast. He wants to get added right away in January. Now is the time. People are friendly and ready to go.

Senator Talent wants to be briefed and be reassured that we are not doing stupid transformational stuff that is going to penalize the present capabilities. Maybe Steve Cambone is the one to do that. I think he is a little leery of reformers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-24



Please respond by 12/6/02

14 Nov 02

U04372 /03

November 14, 2002 10:17 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Alexander

381

Lamar Alexander wants to help with authorities and to put sunset rules on things.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
111402-25



Please respond by 12/6/02

14 Nov 02

U04373 /03

November 14, 2002 10:18 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Dole

032

Please make sure Elizabeth Dole gets briefed on Vieques and any connection with North Carolina.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-26

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

14 Nov 02

U04374 /03

November 14, 2002 10:19 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Graham

Senator Lindsay Graham wants to help with the National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-27



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

325

14Nov02

U04375 /03

November 14, 2002 3:26 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Poindexter

I would like to have you look into the matter Larry Di Rita visited with you about—the extent to which Poindexter should be marketing what he is doing. It sounds to me like it's leaning a bit far forward for what his role is.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111402-29

.....  
Please respond by 12/6/02

413.51

14 Nov 02

U04377 103



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010  
INFO MEMO

2002 MAR 11 PM 12:57

March 7, 2002

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) *3/8/02*

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on Army, Navy, and Marines safety record tracking at Tab A.
- I concur with Dr. Chu's assessment of Secretary O'Neill's comments at Tab B. Ray DuBois is working closely with P&R and ODUSD(I&E) co-chairs the "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT). We will continue to support Dr. Chu on the Lost Day Integrated Process Team.
- I would like to emphasize Secretary O'Neill's second point "if people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours." Department leaders need near real time visibility of serious safety & health incidents (deaths, serious accidents and injuries, etc) in addition to close scrutiny of lost time injury and illness. We will work with the Services in conjunction with P&R to identify and implement quick, system-wide data sharing. Our initial focus will be on real time web-based incident reporting.
- The National Safety Council (NSC) completed a peer review in December, 2001 of the DoD's safety and occupational health programs. The NSC assembled a panel of experts from industry, labor, and government and made recommendations including best industry practices to improve our safety and health programs. The NSC Panel has conservatively estimated that the annual cost of injuries and illness for the DoD ranges from \$10 billion to over \$21 billion. The NSC report is at Tab C. Ray DuBois will continue to work with the Service Assistant Secretaries to review and implement the relevant recommendations of the National Safety Council report.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Curtis Bowling, I&E (SOH) (b)(6) 3088-2002 AT

11-L-0507OSD/7472

1104409 102

February 25, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: David Chu  
Gordon England  
James Roche  
Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety

I am attaching some comments Paul O'Neill sent me regarding our safety record tracking. He is commenting on the Navy's format, but his suggestions may apply across-the-board.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/19/02 Secretary O'Neill memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
022202-9

.....  
Please respond by 03/04/02

U03335-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7473

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 19, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *P. H. O'Neill*

Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/Marine report.

If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DOD (civilian and military). "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity. Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third, the civilian only rates in the Marine Corps are at the upper end (bad) range of U.S. work experience. (Looks like 35-40 times higher than the organization I know the best, where the environment is much more challenging than the one experienced by Marine Corps civilians.)

Attachments

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 15, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO*

DR: This is such a mish mash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases wrote this section!

If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question.

From what I see in this report - e.g., the Secretary <sup>(of the Army)</sup> receives quarterly reports - it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.

Attachments

*Before I got this in the mail back to you I reviewed the Navy/marine report.*

*If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DoD (civilian and military) "lost time" case rates per 100 workers per year. Has clarity.*

*Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third the civilian only rates in the marine corps are at the upper end of the ~~range~~ (bad) range of U.S. work experience.*

FEB-19-2002 18:21 US TREASURY

11-L-0559/OSD/7475

I know the best, where the work is much more  
challenging than the one experienced by  
marine corps civilians: )

(b)(6)

February 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Safety

Here is the quarterly report from the Army on safety. Are they on the right track?

Thanks.

Attach.

01/31/02 SecArmy Info Memo to SecDef re: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

DHR:m  
010402-4

*Look at #7 - someone who down & understand the difference between rates and # of cases write this section!*

*DR: This is such a mishmash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion.*

*If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question. From what I see in this report -- e.g. the Sec. receives quarterly reports it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.*

*Heine  
2-15-02*



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON  
INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

207 FEB -1 AM 10:39

SECDEF HAS SEEN

February 1, 2002, 8:33 A.M. FEB 04 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JAN 31 2002

SUBJECT: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

- Attached provides a current analysis of Safety goals and performance metrics.
- The small increase in fatalities that we experienced during the first quarter, FY 02 is attributable to Operation Enduring Freedom.
- POV accidents continue to be our greatest challenge and the focus of our efforts to reemphasize the efforts of commanders at every level to continue to work this problem hard.
- We have made significant strides in reducing workplace injuries and lost time involving the Army's civilian workforce.
- Safety will remain at the forefront of our efforts to keep the Army ready.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: COL Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>


**SUBJECT: Army Safety Goals and Performance Metrics**

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide a quarterly update to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Army Safety Statistics.

2. The Army has an effective safety program. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and I have recently approved a Safety Strategic Campaign plan that is closely tied to The Army Transformation Plan. In October 2000, the CSA established a goal of reducing overall fatalities in The Army by 6 percent per year through FY06. Our current metrics are based on these goals.


3. On a quarterly basis, the CSA and I receive an executive summary and a briefing from the Director of Army Safety on accident rates and trends for all Army categories to include: army motor vehicles, army combat vehicles, personal injury, POV, and aviation. Army-wide initiatives designed to reduce accident rates and stop negative trends are discussed with the senior leaders and attendees.

4. The 6 percent reduction in overall fatalities goal is attainable and consistent with the decreases in accidental fatalities The Army has experienced over the past 10 years. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY02.




5. In this first quarter of FY02, The Army lost 46 soldiers. This represented a 15 percent increase over the same time last year. Leaders and commanders took action and this spike in accidents has since leveled off to where The Army stands at one less fatality than last year at this time. Accidents related to Operation Enduring Freedom account for approximately 10% (5 fatalities) of Army accidental fatalities in the first quarter of FY02.

6. POV accidents continue to be the number one killer of Army Soldiers. FY01 had an eleven percent reduction in POV fatalities. For FY92 to FY01, POV accidents accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY01.



7. We continue to make progress in reducing workplace injuries and illnesses involving The Army's civilian workforce. In FY 93, over 28 of every 1,000 workers lost time from the job as a result of working conditions. In FY 01, this number had dropped to approximately 18 of every 1,000 workers. The graph below depicts year-end lost workday cases and the rate or cases per 100,000 employees from FY92 to FY01.



**Information Only Coversheet**

**Friday, February 15, 2002**

---

PROFILE #: 2002-SE-001516

DATE CREATED: 02/15/2002

ADDRESSEE: Paul H. O'Neill  
Secretary

AUTHOR: Rumsfeld, Donald  
Defense

SUBJECT: Safety Records

ABSTRACT: Requests assistance in changing the format and improving the safety performance of the Navy and Marine Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
CHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JAN 23 PM 12:44

January 28, 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld  
FROM: Gordon England  
SUBJECT: Safety Records

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

This is to provide our first quarterly safety report per your request (attached).

Safety is one of my top priorities. My first act was to establish myself as Chief of Safety for the Department of the Navy and to place responsibility for safety directly with me. We immediately established a Deputy Assistant Secretary position devoted solely to Safety. Weekly, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I monitor accident trends. Attached are the metrics I will submit to you quarterly.

My focus areas are:

- (1) Unify the safety effort in the Department.
- (2) Use state-of-the-art technologies to improve safety and occupational health.
- (3) Embed strong safety and risk management characteristics in our Naval culture.
- (4) Integrate best private and public sector safety practices.

You will start seeing improvements.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/22
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	2/1/02
MA BUCCI	2/1/02
EXECSEC WHITMORE	2/1/02

U015911/02


FORM 130688

US TREASURY

FEB-19-2002 18:20

11-L-0559/OSD/7482


## Navy and Marine Corps Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.


11-L-0559/OSD/7483

# Navy and Marine Corps Class A Flight Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01




rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A mishap is a mishap resulting in a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

# Navy Afloat Class A Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100 ships per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

# Navy and Marine Corps Class A Ashore Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-m personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.


# Navy and Marine Corps

## PMV Fatality Rates

As of 31 Dec 01


PERSONAL MOTOR VEHICLES

Navy/Marine  
FY00: 114 / 20.86  
FY01: 90 / 16.34  
FY02: 26 / 18.88



rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

# Navy and Marine Corps Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates As of 31 Oct 01



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2002

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on our safety record tracking at Tab A.
- Secretary O'Neill's comments reflect his in-depth understanding of managing lost time due to injuries. His review of the Army and Navy safety information is on target and we are working to address his concerns.
- Our civilian prototype "Lost Day" system calculates the incident (case) rates and days lost due to injuries as Secretary O'Neill suggested. Our system is based on payroll records, not compensation claims, and provides for objective and auditable data. We are also working on a prototype to capture similar information for our military personnel using medical data. This have proven more difficult.
- We are working towards an "objective system" that will provide real time facts regarding the incident that is similar to what Secretary O'Neill suggests. Our "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT) met mid-February to review progress and set DoD goals to reduce injuries by the end of the year.
- The third point mentioned by Secretary O'Neill is that the Marine Corps civilian case rate is at the high (bad) range of the U.S. work experience. Our data from the payroll and medical records confirms that point and suggests we have room for improvement.
- We will be prepared to brief you on our current efforts and proposed goals for managing lost time due to injuries by early April.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., RP&A, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7489

**TAB**

**C**

**Department of Defense  
Executive Assessment of Safety and Occupational  
Health Management Systems**

**Submitted to:**

**The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense**

**Prepared by:**

**National Safety Council  
1121 Spring Lake Drive  
Itasca, Illinois 60143-3201**



**December 6, 2001**

**11-L-0559/OSD/7491**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In May 2001, the National Safety Council (NSC) proposed a partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD) to work together on critical safety and health initiatives. The Secretary of Defense accepted the offer, and the NSC began its work in August by assembling a panel of experts from industry, labor and the government. This expert panel was charged with the task of helping the DoD improve its operational readiness capabilities. The focus of this study was an executive assessment of DoD's safety and occupational health management systems.

Although the Panel's review identified many areas of occupational safety and health excellence, **the major finding of the NSC assessment was the lack of an effective Department-wide safety and occupational health management system.** This deficiency has serious consequences for the Department's mission because preventable injuries and illnesses absorb substantial human and financial resources that are needed for operational readiness. The NSC Panel was unable to precisely determine the full cost impact of these preventable incidents throughout the DoD because aggregate data were not available. The NSC Panel has conservatively estimated that the annual cost of injuries and illnesses for the DoD ranges from \$10 billion to over \$21 billion.<sup>1</sup>

The DoD does not view occupational injury and illness loss as a key readiness concern that requires Department-level management commitment and leadership. The NSC panel found that, in the DoD, safety and occupational health generally have low visibility. There is no central, corporate management system to ensure coordinated policy, advocacy and oversight. The DoD lacks the data system to collect and analyze fundamental information needed for sound decision-making with respect to occupational injuries and illnesses.

The nation's leading businesses see the prevention of injuries and illnesses as a core business value that reduces human, social, financial and productivity costs and improves the bottom line. DoD also has a bottom line: operational readiness. Like industry, it needs to manage injuries and illnesses and reduce their adverse impact on operational readiness. DoD needs to integrate safety and occupational health into its overall management system. This effort will require senior leadership commitment and the development of new system components to ensure continuous improvement of safety and occupational health performance throughout the Department.

The NSC Panel conducted a high-level review of the management systems used in the DoD for safety and occupational health. Its principal recommendations follow.

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix E describes the methodologies and assumptions employed in developing this estimate.

## **PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Secretary of Defense should take the following actions to demonstrate that safety and occupational health are core values within the DoD:

- Demonstrate a continuing, strong, personal commitment to safety and occupational health within the DoD.
- Establish safety and health as an executive-level business responsibility by assigning overall system oversight to an existing executive-level committee reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Include safety and occupational health as an integral part of both the Defense Planning Guidance and Medical Planning Guidance systems.
- Provide the DoD safety and occupational health office with the authority, personnel and resources to meet its responsibility for the policy, advocacy and oversight of safety and occupational health issues within the Department.
- Establish a uniform performance measurement system within the DoD that provides senior management with the information necessary to ensure continuous improvement of safety and occupational health performance. The system should allow management to determine the human, financial and operational readiness impact of occupational injuries, illnesses and deaths.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The National Safety Council (“NSC”), founded in 1913, is the nation’s leading advocate of safety and health in the workplace, on the highways, and in homes and communities. The NSC was chartered by the United States Congress in 1953, by PL-83-259, and is the only safety and health organization chartered by the Federal Government. The NSC is a non-profit, non-governmental public service organization whose mission includes the responsibility

*“...to arouse and maintain the interest of the people of the United States in safety and in accident prevention....”*

This special report to the Secretary of Defense and the information and insights gained in the course of this review would not have been possible without the knowledge and candor of the officers and civilians within the many staff components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services’ headquarters staff, and the men and women at selected commands and installations who make up the vast network of safety and health professionals within the DoD.

In particular, the Services provided staff to supplement the NSC staff working on the project. The efforts of this technical support staff were invaluable.

The members of the NSC Panel volunteered their valuable time and energy to help improve the lives of the military and civilian personnel with the armed Services. Their effort shows dedication both to continuous safety and health improvement and to their country.

The NSC hopes that the information and recommendations contained in this report will enable the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants to expand the already impressive infrastructure supporting the safety and occupational health of uniformed, civilian and contract personnel, reduce the number and severity of injuries and illnesses sustained by these personnel, and provide improvements in the operational readiness of our nation’s military.

**EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT PANEL MEMBERS**

Gerard (Jerry) Scannell, President Emeritus (Chair)  
National Safety Council

Leo Carey, CIH, Director, Government Services (Vice Chair)  
National Safety Council

Karl Bossung, Corporate Manager, Health and Safety  
Delphi Automotive Systems

Ernest Clayton, Director, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs  
Boeing Companies

Michael N. Ferrara, Manager, SAFE Fleet  
Johnson & Johnson

Deborah L. Grubbe, PE, Corporate Director – Safety and Health  
DuPont

Jackie Nowell, CIH, MPH, Director, Occupational Safety & Health Office  
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union – AFL-CIO

James Lee McAtee, Acting Director, Environment, Safety and Health  
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Charles F. Redinger, CIH, MPA, Ph.D., Principal  
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Stoneturn Consultants

Rosemary Sokas, MD, Associate Director for Science  
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

James Thornton, CIH, CSP, Director, Environmental Health & Safety  
Newport News Shipbuilding

Richard Waxweiler, Ph.D., Director, Division of Acute Care  
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC

**NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM**

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Patricia S. Bradley, CIH, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary  
United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,  
on detail to Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations

Todd Briggs, Government Relations Program Specialist, National Safety Council

Lee Feldstein, Manager, Environmental Programs, National Safety Council

Ken Gladstone, REM, Director, Safety Management Office of Environment and Safety  
(SEA 00TP), Naval Sea Systems Command United States Navy on detail to the National  
Safety Council

Captain Philip Goff, BSC, CIH Fellow, Environmental and Occupational Health  
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Major Anthony Intrepido, CIH, Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene Field Services  
Program, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, United  
States Army

Larry Liberatore, Program Specialist, Office of Government Services, National Safety  
Council, on detail from the United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and  
Health Administration

Mike Quigley, Occupational Safety and Health Director, Naval Air Station, Patuxent  
River, MD, United States Navy

**DoD AND MILITARY SERVICE BRIEFING TEAMS  
August 2001**

**Department of Defense**

Mr. Curtis Bowling, Asst. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Safety and Occupational Health

Mr. Craig Schilder, Asst. for Safety Policy, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Safety and Occupational Health

**Air Force**

Maj. Gen. Timothy Peppe, Chief of Air Force Safety, Safety Center

Col. Brian McCarty, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)

Col. Forrest Sprester, BSC, RLS, PE, DEE, Chief, Environmental and Occupational Health Division, Office of the Surgeon General

Lt. Col. John Coho, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)

Mr. John Phillips, Chief, Air Force Safety Policy, Plans & Programs, Safety Center

Mr. J.R. Russell, Chief, Air Force Ground Safety, Safety Center

Maj. Tom DeVenoge, Environmental and Occupational Health Division, Office of the Surgeon General

**Army**

Mr. Raymond Fatz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Brig. Gen. Lester Martinez-Lopez, Commander, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Col. Kotu K Phull, Assistant for Occupational Health (outgoing), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Col. Paul D. Smith, Occupational/Environmental Medicine Staff Officer, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)

Col. Charles Welliver, Deputy Director, Army Safety Center

Col. Hershall Wolfe, Assistant Chief, Medical Service Corps and Consultant for Environmental Science & Engineering, Office of the Surgeon General

**DoD AND MILITARY SERVICE BRIEFING TEAMS**

**August 2001**

**(continued)**

**Army (continued)**

- Mr. Gary Abriz, Assistant for Safety, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army
- Ms. Donna Doganiero, Director, Occupational Health Sciences, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)
- Lt. Col. Steven P. Jones, Assistant for Occupational Health (incoming), of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Environment, Office of the Secretary of the Army
- Lt. Col. Mary Lopez, Ergonomics Program Manager, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM)
- Lt. Col. Paul Smith, Occupational/Environmental Medicine Staff Officer, Office of the Surgeon General

**Navy**

- Mr. Dan Reinhard, Director, Safety, Occupational Health & Fire Policy, Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Navy, (Safety)
- Ms. Joy Erdman, Head, Safety and Occupational Health, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Capt. Bill Stover, Branch Head, Occupational Health and Safety, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Surgeon General's Office
- Capt. Kurt Garbow, Liaison to the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Safety Center

**Marine Corps**

- Mr. Albert Lillibridge, Deputy Director, Safety Division, HQ USMC
- Ms. Anna Marie Pratt, Program Manager, Off Duty & Recreational Programs, HQ USMC
- Ms. Freya Arroyo, Safety Engineer, HQ USMC
- Lt. Col. James Grace, Head, Military Operations/Training Branch, HQ USMC
- Capt. Leonard Martin, Aviation Safety Officer, HQ USMC

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Paul H. O'Neill, who was chairman and CEO for Alcoa before taking the U.S. Treasury Secretary post, said the nation's employers should set dramatic goals for reducing injury rates.

*"The only legitimate goal is zero," O'Neill said in his address to the April 2001 Workplace Safety Summit held at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.*

*Alcoa was able to make dramatic gains in its severity injury rate – reducing it from 1.86 in 1987 to a current rate of 0.14 per 100 – not only by setting hard-to-reach goals but also by taking some unusual steps to ensure that management and workers "bought" into the effort.*

*"One of the things you have to do is say to everyone in the organization, that if something has to be done" it will be, he said. "I went to managers and said, there are no excuses anymore."*

*"You start to think you can't afford to get better" because the resources required provide diminishing returns, he said. "But you have to say, safety is not a value. Safety is a precondition" for a company to operate, he said.*

*"Most of what we need to do to get to zero [employee injuries] is not about huge investments, it's mostly about process and commitment – and constant learning," he said.*

Remarks by U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill  
at the April 2001 Workplace Safety Summit,  
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

With approximately 3.5 million men and women civilians and uniformed personnel (the active military, the National Guard and Reserves) the United States Department of Defense is the largest employer in the country. In addition to its size, the U.S. military is unlike any other employer. It confronts virtually all of the safety and health challenges facing corporate America, ranging from those in the manufacturing and service industries to those in research and development and office administration. At the same time, it must retain a constant state of operational readiness to meet the nation's national security and emergency preparedness needs.

As the U.S. Armed Forces deploy in the war against terrorism and continue to protect Americans at home, all civilian and uniformed personnel are critical components of overall force readiness. In addition, every dollar spent as a result of occupational injuries and illnesses is a dollar that could be spent on military priorities.

Historically, the U.S. military has lost more lives to disease and non-battle injuries than as a direct result of combat.<sup>2</sup> Tragically, the first casualty in the war against terrorism was an airman killed in an accident while engaged in a forklift operation.

What is the financial cost of DoD occupational injuries and illnesses? Currently, the DoD has no ready way to obtain an accurate accounting of this cost. Although injury and illness data abound among the Services, no standard measures are used to describe costs, nor is there a comprehensive DoD-wide data collection and analysis system. Further, the DoD does not use performance measures to link these costs with their overall impact on operational readiness. Nevertheless, we conservatively estimate the total cost of DoD-wide occupational injuries, illnesses and death ranges somewhere from \$10 billion to more than \$21 billion annually.

Although financial costs are certainly important, readiness is the military's true bottom line. Occupational injuries and illnesses may impact operational readiness in a number of ways: losses in skilled manpower which require the recruitment and training of replacements; losses in efficiency and productivity caused by degradation, damage and loss of equipment; and loss of senior managers' focus on readiness as attention is diverted to dealing with injury and illness issues.

It would be inappropriate, however, to measure occupational injuries and illnesses only in terms of monetary cost. Each of the 400 plus fatalities and thousands of injuries and illnesses military and civilian personnel reported in 2000 has far-reaching human costs as well.

The NSC Panel believes that the DoD and the Services can greatly reduce both the human and monetary costs associated with preventable occupational injuries and illnesses and set an example for others by instituting a world-class safety and occupational health management system.

---

<sup>2</sup> "Disease and non-battle injuries historically have accounted for three-quarters or more of battlefield admissions (69 percent in Vietnam, over 95 percent in World War II and Somalia.)" Force Health Protection, Healthy and Fit Force, Casualty Prevention, Casualty Care and Management; pg. 17

## **1. BACKGROUND**

In May 2001 Alan McMillan, President & CEO of the National Safety Council, sent a letter to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, suggesting a partnership between the National Safety Council and the DoD. The purpose of this proposed partnership was to work together on critical safety and health initiatives. Mr. McMillan proposed that an expert panel composed of private sector safety and health experts conduct an analysis of the DoD's safety and occupational health management system with the goal of improving the DoD's operational readiness capabilities.

On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr. Raymond DuBois, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment, accepted the NSC proposal to conduct a high-level review of the DoD safety and occupational health management systems.

The National Safety Council convened an expert panel composed of industry safety and health executives, government experts, and labor representatives. Staff members of the National Safety Council and military and civilian support personnel with the safety and health community on loan from the Services to the National Safety Council augmented the team.

The purpose of this NSC initiative was to conduct an assessment of the DoD safety and occupational health management systems, identify strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations for improvements. The expert panel's framework is based on best practices within industry and on national and international standards and guidelines.

The analysis seeks to highlight areas where the DoD and the Services currently conform to the best practices for safety and occupational health management systems and to identify priority areas where improvements would ultimately reduce occupational injuries, illnesses and fatalities. The results of this analysis provide the basis for developing specific recommendations and implementation plans for a comprehensive safety and occupational health management system.

### **1.3 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE**

During the week of August 6, 2001, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps presented summaries of their safety and occupational health management systems to the NSC Panel. The Service representatives provided details on their safety and occupational health policies, implementation, accountability, goals, objectives, performance, auditing and data collection. The NSC Panel and support team then conducted interviews with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and each of the Services to examine the details of their systems.

The Panel conducted brainstorming sessions on DoD's programs, identified best practices, and focused on a number of key functional areas. The NSC Panel and the project support team examined each of these subject areas. In addition to attending the briefings, the combined team reviewed briefing materials, military policy, directives and instructions, and conducted personal interviews with civilian and military staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General's Office, and each of the Services.

As part of the review, the Panel Chair offered the line leadership of the Services (Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries) the opportunity to provide direct input to the Panel. Also, NSC staff apprised the staff of the Congressional committees responsible for DoD oversight of the project.

The NSC did not review the implementation of specific programs or conduct systematic site visits. The Panel focused its attention on the safety and occupational health management systems affecting DoD's uniformed, civilian, and contractor personnel. In addition, we looked at the issue of off-the-job injuries and illnesses. We did not analyze the organization and interrelationships between DoD and other components of the total force concept, such as the National Guard and the Reserves; limitations of time and resources necessitated this reduction in scope. The Panel's recommendations to improve DoD safety and occupational health management systems may, however, also be applicable to these other components. Nor did the NSC Panel examine external factors that might influence DoD safety and occupational health performance. For example, a number of people who commented felt that occupational safety and health performance in DoD would improve if the Occupational Safety and Health Act, including sanctions, were applied to DoD. Such a recommendation was outside the scope of this document.

## 2.0 ASSESSMENT OF DoD's SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Within the last decade or so, management system concepts, theories, and practices have been applied to the well-established recognition, evaluation, and control-based practice of Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). This is evident in OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care program, and numerous International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-based standards around the world. Management system approaches in OSH have matured today to the point where common elements can be found in most, if not all, of the prominent management system approaches.

In the simplest terms, management systems are a way to organize OSH management activities. They contain a body of key activities that have been found to improve OSH performance. They also provide a way to measure OSH performance, particularly when leading indicators are measured. From a systems theory point of view, a system can also be described in terms of four components: inputs, process, outputs, and feedback. It is possible to arrange the components of the major management system approaches in terms of these four system components. Such an arrangement can facilitate an understanding of how the components relate to each other. See Appendix F for definitions of some key components of major management system approaches.

Organizations throughout the world have begun to use these management system concepts in their efforts to improve OSH performance. They have found, as have many of the Panel member's organizations, that these arrangements do lead to improved OSH performance and provide a way to measure improvement.

Based on a synthesis of several of the management system approaches, industry best practices, and findings from the Panel's deliberations with DoD, the following eight areas were assessed:

Leadership	Personnel Involvement
Culture	Acquisitions
Performance Measurement Systems	Contractor Management
Communication Systems	Off-the-Job Safety

## **2.1 LEADERSHIP**

*Companies with successful safety and health programs have active senior management participation. Without this active involvement, mid-level managers and front-line supervisors tend to ignore safety and health as an issue.*

National Safety Council, "14 Elements of a Successful Safety & Health Program"

*Management commitment to occupational health and safety may be operationally defined as: 1) the allocation of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of an OHS program or management system; 2) the establishment of organizational structures whereby managers and employees are supported in their OHS duties; and, 3) a senior management representative, who is responsible for overseeing the proper functioning of the OHSMS, is designated.*

Occupational Health and Safety Management System Performance Measurement,  
Drs. Charles Redinger & Steven Levine.

### **DISCUSSION**

Organizations that are successful in occupational safety and health have three things in common: top leadership commitment exemplified by regular review of safety and health performance by senior managers; a common and integrated system of collecting loss control data with continuous evaluation of those data; and involvement of employees in the development of continuous improvements in safety and health practices.

Of all the categories considered for review, leadership is perhaps the most important subject area. The term "leadership" embraces all the other focus areas. Leadership promotes the effective use of communication, conveys a set of cultural values, elicits and values employee involvement and makes necessary adjustments based on feedback mechanisms such as performance measures. Leaders demonstrate their commitment by being personally involved and by providing the organizational structure and resources necessary to ensure that goals are met.

It is the collective experience of the NSC Panel that in the best organizations in the private sector, safety and occupational health are integrated programs, and managers have direct access to senior management. In addition, leaders are ultimately held responsible for the occupational safety and health of their personnel.

### **FINDINGS**

Senior leaders within the DoD and the Services have expressed support for safety and occupational health through statements, policies, directives and memos. However, senior leadership in DoD has not taken specific actions that signal personal commitment to safety and occupational health and demonstrate the value placed on safety and occupational health within the organization. As a result, safety and occupational health performance often suffers.

The DoD has not established a rigorous system of accountability for safety and occupational health that is sufficiently tied to performance within the lines of authority at all levels of command, including the individual and unit level. The NSC Panel found little evidence that there is a clear link between safety and health performance and how senior leaders are held accountable. At the same time, responsibility for safety and occupational health is fragmented throughout the DoD and the Services and appears in many cases to be a staff and not a line responsibility.

Safety and occupational health have not been effectively integrated into the overall management system of the DoD. Currently, safety and occupational health follow separate paths and lines of authority within the chains of command. The DoD has also not instituted a system to ensure the continuous improvement of safety and occupational health systems. DoD needs an integrated, cohesive, and comprehensive approach to safety and occupational health that encompasses all units of the DoD.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the office that has responsibility for safety and occupational health lacks appropriate resources, access to senior management and the visibility to fulfill its mission of safety and health oversight, advocacy and policy development. One byproduct of this is that the Army, Navy and Air Force Designated Safety and Health Officials (DSHOs) have been primarily involved with environmental projects at the expense of safety and occupational health initiatives.

Nevertheless, the NSC Panel recognizes a number of activities that demonstrate leadership in the safety and health area in each Service. Some examples:

**Army**

- The Chief of Staff, Army Staff principals and selected Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and the DSHO, are briefed quarterly on the status of the Army Safety Program, including a review of safety performance. The Chief of Staff directs specific actions to improve Army safety performance at these briefings.

**Navy**

- The Navy has recently established and filled a new position for a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety.
- The newly appointed Secretary of the Navy has issued a strong statement emphasizing his personal commitment to safety and occupational health.

### **Air Force**

- The Air Force Chief of Staff and Secretary are briefed on all fatality investigations and review performance measures during weekly staff meetings with other senior staff.

### **Marines**

- The Commandant of the Marine Corps established a Marine Corps Executive Safety Board consisting of commanding generals from operations commands, major bases and supporting organizations. The Board's mission is to provide safety policy and guidance for the Marine Corps.
  - The Marine Corps Safety Office reports directly to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) and is an integrated office, staffed with several safety and occupational health professionals. The ACMC is directly briefed on and actively involved with the accident prevention program.
  - The Marine Corps includes a statement in every Executive Officer's fitness report on safety and occupational health performance within their unit. This integrates accountability for this function into line management.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Secretary of Defense should take actions to demonstrate that safety and occupational health are core values within the DoD, including:

- Demonstrate a continuing, strong, personal commitment to safety and occupational health within the DoD. As a first step, the Secretary should issue a statement establishing safety and occupational health as core values within the DoD;
- Establish safety and health as an executive-level business responsibility by assigning safety and occupational health management system oversight to an existing committee reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Include safety and occupational health as an integral part of both the Defense Planning Guidance and Medical Planning Guidance systems;
- Ensure that safety and occupational health issues are addressed at the highest levels of the Department and Services and are viewed as an integral component of operational readiness;
- Establish safety and occupational health goals for the DoD and provide a system of accountability for meeting them to line managers throughout the DoD; and
- Ensure that OSD provide oversight and advocacy for safety and occupational health to ensure that Service safety and occupational health program funding is allocated effectively and that programs are effectively implemented.

- Incorporate into DoD's existing individual accountability systems a component for safety and occupational health that is equal in importance to the other components used to evaluate the performance of senior managers of the Department and the Services.
- Provide the OSD safety and occupational health unit with the authority, personnel and resources to meet its responsibility for the policy, advocacy and oversight of safety and occupational health issues within the Department.
  - Ensure that this unit is placed at a level within the Department that allows it to raise safety and occupational health issues to the top levels of the Department management.
  - Structure the Services' safety and occupational health organizations so that they have access to the top levels of the Service.
- Improve management system capability to include comprehensive financial data that provide corporate budget visibility so DoD leadership can advocate for safety and health requirements at all levels.
- Functionally integrate DoD safety and occupational health components so they can better communicate and coordinate their activities. One way to achieve this is to implement the data integration recommended elsewhere in this report.
- Establish a forum that allows for ongoing communication and exchange of lessons-learned and best practices between top-level experts in industry and the DoD.

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: Leadership with Full Accountability**

- The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) sees himself as ultimately accountable for the safety and health of employees.
  - He often reiterates safety and health as a core value.
  - He begins every meeting with a safety message.
  - He sees safety as a competitive advantage in attracting new talent and in differentiating DuPont from its competitors in the markets it serves.
  - He sees investment in safety and health as good business. It is estimated that DuPont saves \$4 - \$5 for every dollar invested in safety.
- DuPont has a decentralized safety and health management system.
  - The corporate core safety and health group consists of six people who have direct access to the CEO.
  - A safety excellence center of 25 people supports the line organization by managing the safety standards approval process, proposing common safety

solutions for the business units, and compiling statistics and managing the incident tracking system.

- The majority of the safety work occurs at every facility, where:
  - Each plant manager is responsible for the safety and health of the employees at the facility.
  - Each plant manager has a safety and health professional who assists him/her on a tactical level in an internal consulting role.
  - Managers are held accountable for the safety and health performance of their units.
  - Managers with poor safety records are removed from their positions.

#### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Integration of Safety and Health Costs**

- An Executive Safety and Health Steering Committee has been formed to raise the visibility of occupational safety and health issues and to review progress toward goals.
  - The Committee is comprised of the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Vice President of Operations, Vice President of Human Resources, Director of Environmental Health and Safety and several operations managers.
  - The Committee meets at least every six weeks solely to discuss employee safety and health issues.
- Safety performance is linked to productivity.
  - The cost of injuries is charged back to the project where they occurred.
  - A department with a high number of occupational injuries does not generally meet its financial goals.
- Line managers are accountable for the occupational safety and health of employees.
  - Managers' performance agreements include financial, quality, productivity and safety goals.
  - Failure to meet safety and health goals adversely affects promotions, bonuses and raises.

#### **Johnson & Johnson: Safety Leadership from the Top**

- Safety and health are corporate values embodied in the Johnson & Johnson culture. They are transformed into workplace reality at every Johnson & Johnson company throughout the world.
- The Safety Vision Statement created by Johnson & Johnson Chief Executive Officer, Ralph Larsen, reads: "We are committed to making Johnson & Johnson the world leader in health and safety by creating an injury-free workplace." To attain and hold this leadership position the company affirms that:

- We hold safety and health as our highest values
- All accidents and injuries are preventable
- We operate on the basis of continuous improvement
- Safety is everyone's responsibility
- Job training and positive feedback are essential
- Safety is a key indicator of organizational excellence.
- We consider safety in every task we perform and in every decision we make
- Executive Committee members champion specific safety processes (i.e. Machine Safety, SAFE Fleet).
- Executive Committee and/or CEO reviews serious injuries/illnesses and incidents with operating company president and worldwide vice president of safety & industrial hygiene.

For more detailed best practices from panel member companies in each of the subject areas, see Appendix D.

## 2.2 CULTURE

*Implementing a systematic approach to workplace safety [and health] will require a cultural change in many organizations, among regulators and within the safety profession. All organizations need to nurture a "safety culture." Company policy and workstation practice must dictate that safety never takes a back seat to other interests. No one should be asked – and no one should tolerate – a potentially disabling or life-threatening risk in the name of cost-cutting, productivity or any other priority.*

Safety Agenda for the Nation, National Safety Council

### DISCUSSION

Core values of an organization stand the test of time, are not compromised and do not compete with other priorities or need to show a return on investment. Occupational safety and health should be core values consistent with an organization's mission. Leaders instill occupational safety and health as core values by setting specific measurable goals in occupational safety and health, providing the necessary resources, and holding themselves and each organizational level responsible and accountable for achieving results.

### FINDINGS

Safety and occupational health are not fully integrated into the cultural value system of the DoD. There is no sense of urgency to improve safety and health performance by reducing existing injury and illness rates. (In fact, rates have essentially reached a plateau over the last few years.) Neither the DoD nor any Service has truly adopted a zero-injury workplace culture. The Services have been unsuccessful in making safety and occupational health a core value within their operational units.

Because the Services do not link safety and occupational health to operational readiness, safety and occupational health are not seen as key parts of the military's primary business. For example, the generally accepted definitions of readiness do not include a safety and health component. The clear link between injury and illness and operational readiness has not been made within the DoD and the Services.

Within the DoD and the Services, safety and occupational health is approached differently for uniformed personnel, civilians and contractors. Although the same standards of care exist on paper for uniformed and civilian personnel, these standards are implemented differently in practice. The DoD expects its contractors to comply with federal regulations but accepts only limited responsibility for the safety and health performance of its contractors. This contrasts with the best practices of leading private sector organizations, which clearly see contractor oversight as the responsibility of the organization hiring the contractor.

Within DoD, the occupational health program operates within a culture that emphasizes treatment rather than prevention. The preventive-medicine community has made great strides in prevention programs aimed at behavior modification (e.g., smoking, alcohol and drug cessation), but more emphasis is needed on prevention when dealing with traditional safety and occupational health concerns. This focus on treatment rather than prevention is apparent in the allocation and distribution of resources, including both personnel and funds.

Cultural change is evident, however, in several areas:

- The Marine Corps safety and occupational health philosophy is consistent with a Corps' slogan: *Marines take care of their own.*<sup>3</sup> "Nothing is so critical as to place the life of a Marine at risk in a training situation." – United States Marine Corps Safety Campaign Plan, August 2000
- Some service training centers are leaders in integrating preventive concepts and preventive medicine into their operations. A few examples are:
  - At Parris Island, occupational physicians developed ways to reduce heat stroke in Marines by using temperature/humidity assessments that govern when training can occur.
  - Preventive medicine review found that placing people according to height during drills dramatically reduced pelvic stress fractures that had caused a number of female recruits to fail basic training.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The DoD should develop a strategy to clearly communicate that safety and occupational health are core values and are integrated into the primary business practices of the organization. Leadership at all levels of the DoD and the Services should demonstrate by personal action that safety and health is a core value of the organization.
- The Secretary of Defense should adopt a DoD-wide goal of zero injuries and illnesses.
- Senior leadership should incorporate safety and occupational health into the definition of readiness and recognize that the safety and health of military, civilian and contract personnel is an important component of operational readiness.
- The strategy for instituting safety and health as a core value within the DoD and Services should span military personnel, civilians and contractors. Although different

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<sup>3</sup> Safety Update to the 32ns Commandants Guidance, Ref (A); General J.L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; October 2000.

rules and regulations govern each of these groups, the institution of a core value goes far beyond solely following regulations.

- The safety and occupational health and medical communities should use their collective expertise to improve prevention programs to reduce occupational injuries and illnesses.

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: “The Goal is Zero”**

- In 1994 DuPont commissioned a Discovery Team to research why the numbers of safety and occupational injuries and illnesses were rising.
- The team, consisting of senior leaders, line managers and safety and support personnel, created a new level of safety and health expectation within DuPont, “The Goal is Zero.”
- Even with some initial management resistance, the company soon began to see a drop in the numbers of injuries and illnesses.
- Culture change was initiated by the team, and worked with the CEO, who drove it from the top. Team members explained the new goal to their peers.
- Through leadership commitment, intensive training, employee involvement and recognition and reward, the zero-injury culture has permeated throughout global DuPont.
- A zero-injury culture is considered a world-class benchmark.

### **Delphi Automotive Systems: A Culture Shift**

- In 1994 the General Motors board of directors commissioned a team to visit Allied Signal, DuPont, Boeing, Alcoa and other best-in-class companies to investigate their safety and health management systems.
- The team found that these companies had several things in common, including:
  - A plant safety and health review board (or the equivalent)
  - Detailed safe operating practices
  - Thorough incident investigation
- The team developed a new safety and health management system and rolled out the process over the next several years.
- Plant safety review board:
  - Is comprised of top union and management leadership, including the plant manager.

- Holds high-level, safety-only meetings once a month. If plant manager can't attend, meeting is rescheduled.
- Oversees development of detailed safe operating procedures.
- Commissioned every department to create a team that would train employees, implement and enforce procedures.

**Johnson & Johnson: Creating a Safety Culture in the Field Sales and Service**

- In 1995 Johnson Executive Committee decided to design a program to create cultural change within the sales/service force to reduce driving accidents and injuries.
- Each operating company vice-president of sales/service champions a SAFE Fleet team that implements the six-step SAFE Fleet process.
- SAFE Fleet performance is a factor in merit and bonus increases.
- Formal behind-the-wheel training is provided to each sales/service representative every three years
- Formal motivation and recognition programs were created for safe driving performance.

## **2.3 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS**

*The ability to measure Occupational Safety and Health performance over time is essential to eliminating occupational injuries and illness, and to verify continuous improvement. To achieve this, the organization should develop performance measures that are consistent with the variables expressed in the Occupational Safety and Health policy and goals and objectives, and measure both preventive ("upstream") and trailing performance indicators.*

Occupational Health and Safety Management System Performance Measurement,  
Drs. Charles Redinger & Steven Levine.

### **DISCUSSION**

Organizations should collect and analyze data that allow for an assessment of the overall performance of safety and occupational health management systems. Injury and illness data are commonly used in industry to form the basis of performance measures. The best programs use a combination of leading and trailing indicators. Trailing indicators include measures that describe injuries, illnesses, near-misses, or other mishaps that have occurred, while leading indicators measure safety and health activities that the organization is undertaking to prevent injuries and illnesses from occurring.

Organizations should collect data that are beneficial and meaningful to their continuous improvement efforts. The measures selected by the organization should be useful and meaningful to personnel, management and the overall organization, as well as to interested outside parties. Many organizations rely on audits or self-assessments to provide feedback on their occupational safety and health performance.

### **FINDINGS**

The NSC Panel found little evidence of a uniform set of occupational safety and health measures within the DoD. Instead, many measurement systems for safety and occupational health data exist within the Services. For example, definitions for the same measure may vary by Service. Most of the measures used are trailing indicators, such as the number of fatalities, lost-time cases, personal vehicle accidents, on- and off-duty accidents. The NSC Panel found little evidence that any service uses leading indicators as part of their safety and health measurement system. In addition, little or no data are collected on contractor safety and health performance.

Some Services have instituted audit programs that have the potential to raise safety and health performance. However, there is no consistency across the Services or Department in the use of audits or self-assessments and no common understanding of the importance of auditing and the auditing process. Many programs also lack an evaluation system and thus lose the opportunity to identify and correct deficiencies and design more effective interventions.

The Services collect an extensive amount of medical data on active-duty military personnel. The NSC Panel found that medical surveillance data on injuries are not integrated into the safety and occupational health measurement system. Consequently, the DoD lacks the information needed to fully understand the nature of injuries, develop prevention strategies, assess performance against policy goals and improve performance.

The Army Medical Surveillance Activity's (AMSA) Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) operates a comprehensive disease, injury and medical event database and analytical capability for all of the Services. The AMSA identifies and evaluates obstacles to readiness by linking various databases that communicate information that has the potential to affect soldiers' health. The DMSS tracks hospitalizations, ambulatory visits, reportable diseases, HIV tests and results, acute respiratory diseases, health risk appraisals, and longitudinal data on personnel and deployments. The DMSS's primary functions are to analyze, interpret, and disseminate information on the status, trends, and determinants of the health and fitness of America's Army and to identify and evaluate obstacles to readiness.

The NSC Panel believes that the DMSS offers the potential for filling the void on uniformed personnel injury and illness costs. It has the data collection and analytical foundation to prepare executive-level management reports for the DoD. The AMSA collects much hospitalization cost data for uniformed personnel. However, it is neither tasked nor funded to prepare high-level management reviews and is underutilized by the DoD.

Some efforts are underway to improve DoD's safety and occupational health measurement systems:

- The OSD is developing a Web-based reporting system for civilian lost-workday cases for all of the Services.
- The Navy is testing a set of performance measures (leading indicators) for use by all levels of command.
- The Air Force Safety Center has a Web-based reporting system for accidents that could be used as a model for Web-based indicators.
- The Air Force's Environmental Safety Occupational Health Compliance Assessment and Management Program (ESOH CAMP) is an example of an effective audit system that provides wing commanders with reports on the wing's safety and occupational health compliance status.
- The Army Reserve Command's Internet systems use the web to record incidents and conduct analysis.
- The Army's definition of readiness, which includes "deployability," could be used to link safety and occupational health to operational readiness.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Improve the performance measurement system used by DoD and the Services so that it is *uniform, effective, and includes both leading and trailing indicators* and allows for goal-setting and tracking. It should also be capable of showing how the injuries, illnesses and fatalities of military, civilian and contractor personnel are linked to levels of operational readiness and mission accomplishment.
- Integrate medical, personnel, financial, safety and health, and mishap data into DoD-wide safety and occupational health data systems.
- Analyze the data to evaluate progress against policy goals and to design intervention programs. Continually benchmark these policies, programs and performance with those of industry leaders.
- Determine the full costs of injury and occupational illness by conducting research to establish the ratio between direct and indirect costs for injury and illness for each Service.
- Task and fund a DoD-wide data center (like the Army Medical Surveillance Activity) to collect and analyze uniform, civilian and contractor injury and illness incident and cost data to support senior management decision making

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: Leading and Lagging Indicators**

- Lagging indicators include lost time cases, OSHA recordable injuries, and process incidents and environmental releases.
  - Incidents are investigated, categorized and recorded.
  - Information enters a corporate data collection system within a specified time frame.
  - The Safety Health Environmental Center creates periodic reports for managers and business leaders.
  - Measures are kept simple to allow easy comparison within DuPont and with other industries.
- Leading indicators are before-the-fact measures, which help managers and leaders understand if there is a higher risk or chance of a future injury or incident.
- Managed at the site level (weekly or monthly) by line managers and safety professionals, four factors are reviewed:
  - Performance of key safety tasks, e.g. number of completed audits, completion of job cycle checks, percentage of audit items closed, etc.

- Index trends based on prior safety injury and incident performance.
- Work force morale -- high, medium, low.
- Level of distraction – e.g. holiday period or weekend, percentage of people in new jobs, community distraction, etc.
- These factors are rated, averaged and used within the site to drive special management actions, or to alert the workforce to be extra cautious.

**Newport News Shipbuilding: Built-in Financial Accountability**

- Newport News uses a combination of leading and trailing indicators.
- The trailing indicators are:
  - Number of recordable cases
  - Number of lost-time cases
  - Reports submitted by medical clinics that are trained to report numbers
- The leading indicators are:
  - Number of health and safety training hours delivered
  - Quality of accident reports
- The cost of each injury is charged back to the department. Costs include:
  - Wage replacement
  - Medical costs
- High injury costs adversely affect department profitability.

**Johnson & Johnson: Leading and Trailing SAFE Fleet indicators**

- Series of leading and trailing indicators.
- Key metrics: accidents per million miles driven, percent of fleet in accidents, percent of high-risk drivers
- High-risk drivers within existing field sales and service receive special training and focused coaching by management.
- All drivers receive two commentary (coaching) drives per year conducted and rated by their manager. Used as a leading indicator to prevent accidents in areas where sales representatives need additional training (i.e. following too closely, speeding).
- The following leading indicators are used to identify and eliminate the hiring of high-risk drivers:

- Vehicle condition and maintenance treated as leading indicator: dents and scratches, poor maintenance indicates potential problems.
- SAFE Fleet team assessment scores
- Percent of drivers trained and successful completion of training
- Results – significant reduction in high-risk drivers; over five years fleet grew by 88 percent and the accident rate has been reduced by 39 percent.

## 2.4 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Arrangements and procedures should be established and maintained for:

- a) receiving, documenting and responding appropriately to internal and external communications related to occupational safety and health
- b) ensuring the internal communication of occupational safety and health information between relevant levels and functions of the organization; and
- c) ensuring that the concerns, ideas and inputs of workers and their representatives on OSH matters are received, considered and responded to.

Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems,  
International Labour Office

### **DISCUSSION**

A well-functioning communication system with defined feedback channels is essential to a successful occupational safety and health management system. For the system to survive and potentially grow, there must be mechanisms that allow system components to receive feedback from each other and from the external environment. In its most basic form a communication system should be able to transmit information to those responsible for the proper functioning of the safety and occupational health management system.

### **FINDINGS**

The DoD and the Services lack a fully integrated safety and occupational health system for receiving, analyzing and transmitting information on safety and occupational health. The Services have procedures, activities and written policies for communicating safety and occupational health information, but this information is poorly communicated up and down the chain of command within and across the Services. The presence of such communication networks is critical to continual improvement. Safety and occupational health functions are separate units in each of the Services, and professionals from the two disciplines rarely collaborate on program performance.

Success stories, lessons-learned in investigations, and service injury and illness data are not shared DoD-wide. The Services could improve the sharing of safety and occupational health information and training from the various centers of expertise. For example, the Navy has a Crane Safety Center in Philadelphia that conducts crane safety training, data collection and root-cause analysis of crane accidents, but the other Services do not use the Center's expertise in their crane work.

Within the OSD, the Prevention Safety Health Promotion Council could be used to share information within the DoD, but this group's focus should be expanded to include safety and occupational health.

There are obstacles to the sharing of successful techniques and lessons-learned among health and safety peers both among and within the Services and with the private sector. For example, there is no DoD-wide safety and occupational health conference, and professionals from the DoD do not regularly meet with their private sector counterparts to benchmark practices and processes.

Although all of the compensation and disability cases administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) consist of injured, ill, or disabled veterans transferred from the Services, the DoD and the VA have not established an effective channel of communication on safety and occupational health data between the two agencies. Such a channel could provide the DoD with valuable information on the costs, origin, prevention and treatment of occupational injury and disease.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Establish and maintain a communications management and oversight capability within the designated DoD safety and health units that links the separate service communication networks to each other and across the DoD.
- Establish a clearinghouse to collect and disseminate safety and occupational health information among all the Services. Information to and from the clearinghouse should flow from all levels of the organization, e.g., the service safety centers, hospitals, installations, commands, etc. The clearinghouse, in turn, would share lessons-learned across the DoD and with industry.
- Develop an installation-level award program similar to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Voluntary Protection Program, to help communicate the steps necessary to achieve safety and occupational health excellence throughout the Services.
- Establish effective interactions between health and safety professionals across DoD and the Services through regular joint activities. For example, establish a joint annual service safety and health symposium or conference.
- Establish and maintain open lines of communication for the exchange of pertinent safety and health and cost information with the VA and other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation.

### **BEST PRACTICES**

#### **Boeing: Communication Up, Down, Across System**

- Boeing uses regular meetings – both Web-based and in person – to ensure effective communications both with the company's safety and health professionals and with all Boeing personnel.
- Every Tuesday, the corporate director of safety, health and environment meets with the Process Council, which:

- Is comprised of the heads of safety, health and environment within each Boeing business unit;
- Makes safety and health policy decisions; and
- Communicates policies/plans/goals throughout the organization
- Executive safety councils on each site run safety and health systems.
  - These councils include the site operations director and all of his/her staff; meetings are run by the site director.
  - The councils:
    - Analyze measurement charts
    - Determine whether policies are being executed
    - Search for system improvements
- Crew safety meetings mimic executive safety council meetings.
  - These consist of small working groups, e.g., a group that puts together a wing.
- Web-based communications system regularly sends safety messages to all employees.
- Safety professionals have cross-sectional safety teams that:
  - Encourage interaction/sharing between business units
  - Have subcommittees (e.g., ergonomics, industrial hygiene, physical safety)
  - Make recommendations to Corporate safety office
- Once a year all Boeing safety and health managers meet for a three or four day conference.

**Redinger & Associates, Inc.: Communication System Best Practices**

- Several communication system trends observed in our management system assessment work follow.
  - The communication system is defined. That is, the organization has given thought to what OSH information needs to be communicated, and how.
  - Examples of information that is communicated: properties of hazardous materials, physical hazards in the workplace (e.g. noise, radiation), audit findings, accident reports, exposure assessment findings, corrective actions, emergency response information, facility evacuation information and contractor-related safety and health information
  - Ways that information is communicated: training programs, signs, labels, electronic mail, bulletin board postings, formal and informal meetings (e.g. daily "tailgate" meetings vs. more formal monthly meetings), Job Hazard Analysis, closed-circuit T.V. systems, informal communication from supervisors to workers.

- Organizations with robust communication systems can demonstrate that senior managers receive, evaluate, and take appropriate actions on OSH matters. Examples include the review of:
  - Information relating to fatalities and serious accidents
  - Audit findings
  - Agency citations
  - Emergency response simulation drill performance
- Organizations find ways to solicit input and participation from employees regarding the communication system. Examples include:
  - Employee input on the development of communication system procedures
  - Employee involvement in training delivery
  - Employee participation in accident investigations

**Johnson & Johnson: SAFE Fleet Communications**

- SAFE Fleet uses Web-based communications and e-based technology to communicate with drivers every month.
- Formal newsletters and executive communications are distributed every quarter.
- Every six weeks the SAFE Fleet Task Force (the steering group for the program in North America) meets and holds an open conference call for one hour with sales management and representatives company-wide.
- Annually, each SAFE Fleet Team meets at a Champions Conference to share best practices and launch new programs.

## 2.5 PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT

*The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) requires that employees have at least three active and meaningful ways to participate in safety and health problem identification and resolution. This must be in addition to the process enabling employees to notify management of hazardous conditions and practices and to have issues addressed.*

### Occupational Safety and Health Voluntary Protection Program Directive

#### *Worker Participation*

- 1. Worker participation is an essential element of the OSH management system in the organization.*
- 2. The employer should ensure that workers and their safety and health representatives are consulted, informed and trained on all aspects of OSH, including emergency arrangements, associated with their work.*
- 3. The employer should make arrangements for workers and their safety and health representatives to have the time and resources to actively participate in the processes of organizing, planning and implementation, evaluation and action for improvement of the OSH management system.*
- 4. The employer should ensure, as appropriate, the establishment and efficient functioning of a safety and health committee and the recognition of workers' safety and health representatives, in accordance with national laws and practice.*

Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems  
International Labour Organization

### **DISCUSSION**

Companies that are recognized as leaders in occupational safety and health view worker involvement as essential to the success of any safety and occupational health management system performance. Involvement by every person at all levels of the organization is the hallmark of successful private sector safety and health programs. For such programs to be successful, however, management must demonstrate its commitment to safety and health and to personnel involvement. Safety and health performance is improved when the contributions of everyone are integrated throughout the safety and health management system. When all personnel are involved in such systems from their developmental stage through implementation and ongoing program evaluation, they feel a positive sense of ownership in the system and therefore have a greater investment in the success of the program. Programs that do not emphasize and encourage full personnel involvement risk being ineffective.

## **FINDINGS**

The blend of DoD's workforce of uniformed, civilian and contractor personnel magnifies the challenge of stimulating personnel involvement in safety and health. Within the Services, senior leaders view participation primarily as a top-down activity – orders are expected to be obeyed. Personnel involvement in the military occurs primarily in the context of training and the communication of instructions/orders.

The military culture of following orders runs contrary to an environment in which subordinate personnel speak up when they identify an unsafe work practice or are asked to perform an unsafe act. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones, addressed this concern in a letter to the Corps: “It takes a bold individual to recommend to the commander that we cancel or halt an evolution. Yet, this aggressive and thoughtful spirit is just the sort of attitude that we expect from Marines in combat.”<sup>4</sup>

Many military installations and activities have established safety and health committees or councils that meet regularly to discuss safety and health issues and facilitate the exchange of information between senior management/commanding officer and work units/work centers. Each of the Services has established suggestion programs and award recognition programs for individuals, groups and installations.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Establish safety and health committees at all levels that involve a cross section of personnel. These committees would serve as the focal point to stimulate new and innovative ways to involve personnel in safety and health programs and to consider such industry practices as:
  - establishing *ad hoc* safety and health problem-solving groups
  - having shop level/work center enlisted personnel participate in audits and worksite inspections
  - having shop level/work center enlisted personnel participate in accident and incident investigations
  - developing and/or participating in improvement suggestion programs
  - training other personnel in safety and health
  - analyzing job/process hazards
  - serving on safety and health committees beyond the activity/installation level

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<sup>4</sup> United States Marine Corps Safety Campaign Plan; General J.L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Letter from the Commandant; August 2000.

- Increase the visibility of personnel and activity safety and health award/reward recognition systems, consistent with the level of recognition/reward given for operational readiness, battlefield performance, production goals and performance.
- Encourage personnel at all levels of management to make full use of existing systems to identify safety and health problems.
- Establish a mechanism to continually benchmark personnel involvement within the safety and occupational health management system with the best personnel involvement practices in industry.

### **BEST PRACTICES**

#### **Delphi Automotive Systems: Personnel Involvement an Intricate Part of the Process**

- Employee involvement is a cornerstone of Delphi Automotive System's safety and health culture change; employee representatives are involved in design process
- Joint union safety and health representatives report to plant managers
- Safety and health programs have as many union as management representatives
- Safety and health trainers (in ergonomics, lock-out, hazardous materials, etc.) are hourly employees that Delphi trained to be trainers

#### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Health and Safety Teams Give Return on Investment**

- Labor/management health and safety task teams work to improve health and safety performance
  - Forty health and safety task teams cover entire shipyard
  - Each team has hourly and salaried employees, including union representatives and a manager
  - Each team elects leaders: the leader is often not a manager
  - Teams work toward process improvement
  - Teams conduct root-cause analysis accident investigations
  - Teams conduct weekly inspections, noting improvements needed in equipment, compliance, etc.
- Measured by both leading and trailing indicators, safety and health task teams have produced the greatest return on investment of any aspect of the Newport News health and safety system

**Johnson & Johnson: SAFE Fleet – A Team Approach**

- Each sales/service organization has a cross-functional SAFE Fleet team.
- Membership includes Vice Presidents of Sales, Directors, Managers and Sales representatives, Safety Professionals, Health & Wellness Professionals and Human Resources representatives.
- Large fleets have regional field safety coordinators (similar to a plant safety rep), representatives that have volunteered to provide additional focus and support to their peers out in the field regarding SAFE Fleet.
- Team implements formal six-step process and is awarded for their process design (using scoring system) and accident/injury reduction.

*Recognizing the extensiveness of the culture change needed to successfully implement a newly adopted safety through design concept and the hazard analysis and risk assessment procedures integral in the design process, some companies issue policy and procedure statements....that hazards must be identified and addressed early in the design process, and as an integral part of the concurrent engineering program.*

*...it is necessary for personnel having design responsibilities to consider hazards during the early concept stages when developing new products, manufacturing processes, technology, and facilities that may impact on occupational safety and health...*

Safety Through Design, NSC, 1999, National Safety Council, 1999

## **DISCUSSION**

Leading companies incorporate a safety and occupational health review of major acquisitions, starting with initial design, then following through development and implementation. Occupational safety and health is built into the entire life cycle of acquisitions. Occupational safety and health management brings a unique perspective to the acquisition process. The acquisition process requires cooperation with other players in the process to ensure that risks and hazards are identified and managed before design, manufacture or customer use.

Significant results have been achieved in industry by integrating the disciplines of occupational safety and health (OSH) into the acquisition process. An effective strategy for successful integration of OSH into acquisition systems is top-management oversight throughout the process. Investment in safety is most effective early in the design phase.

## **FINDINGS**

The DoD acquisition system is unique. There is no other organization in the world that acquires the same range and complexity of weapons systems, products, and services. The DoD spends billions of dollars annually to replace aging systems.

The DoD has developed an interwoven system to ensure that the Services acquire quality products. The process is driven by the interaction of three basic program management systems: (1) the Requirements Generation System, (2) the Acquisition Management System, and (3) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Each of these three management systems incorporates a management process that defines mission needs, operational requirements and performance capabilities.

Unfortunately, safety and occupational health needs and requirements are often not fully integrated into these management systems, nor is the safety and occupational health perspective adequately represented at major programmatic and milestone reviews. The

DoD and Service program managers who are directly involved with decision making in the acquisition process are often not versed in safety and occupational health concerns. At the same time, the input of the safety and occupational health community is not consistently incorporated into the Requirements Generation System. All too often, the senior managers involved with the milestone reviews assume that safety and occupational health needs have been met and have been adequately addressed in the concept and design phase. Problem recognition often surfaces only after there is a system or equipment failure that results from a safety and health omission.

For the most part, safety and occupational health concerns follow separate paths. Since 1996, DoD Inspector General audits have found weaknesses in how program offices performed Programmatic Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Evaluations (PESHEs). Despite the requirement for these evaluations during the acquisition process, these reports noted that there is neither a uniform format or consistent review criteria for these documents. A flag level DoD panel (December 2000) also found a lack of consistent communication of safety requirements and lack of integration of safety and occupational health professionals into the acquisition process as well as deficiencies in the relationship between research and development and design safety.

Some examples of positive DoD acquisitions initiatives:

- The Army Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program integrates occupational health and system safety considerations throughout a system's entire lifecycle. To achieve this integration, the Army Medical Command's Health Hazard Assessment (HHA) Program and Army Safety Program provide support to acquisition programs and teams. The Army's senior leadership attention to these issues is ensured by having health hazard and system safety assessments, required under Army acquisition and MANPRINT regulations, presented and reviewed at each program milestone.
- The Air Force, as the preparing office for MIL-STD-882D, Standard Practice for System Safety, worked with government and industry representatives to tailor it for risk assessment of system safety and occupational health hazards.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- DoD should implement a Department-wide program (similar to the Army's MANPRINT program) that will support the integration of system safety and occupational health considerations throughout a system's lifecycle.
- DoD should reconsider the Services' recommendations regarding the addition of a separate section on system safety in DoD 5000.2-R and the application of MIL-STD-882D to system safety methodology.
- The DoD and Service program managers should include safety reviews as an integral part of the milestone review process.

- Field safety and occupational health professionals should be involved in the acquisition review process, particularly in the Requirements Generation System.
- System safety and occupational health training should be a mandatory part of the Defense Acquisition Management College curriculum for program managers.
- The DoD and Service safety and occupational health professionals should benchmark with industry and exchange information involving safety and occupational health in acquisition processes.

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: Building Safety and Health into Requirements**

- Acquisitions process staff ensures that safety, health and environmental considerations are integrated into specifications or requisitions for purchasing equipment and services.
  - Acquisitions staff is trained always to include safety and occupational health requirements in each contract or purchase order. Accountability is built into the system
  - Line management aids the acquisitions staff with suggestions.
  - Vendors design equipment based on specifications written or reviewed by DuPont.

If a safety flaw is found, steps are immediately taken to rectify the error with a short-term fix combined with a long-term acquisition system or specification improvement.

### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Using MSDSs to Track Acquisition Hazards**

- Safety and health integrated into acquisition process through the hazard communication program.
  - Every product must have a MSDS prior to use (no payment made until company receives it).
  - Information transferred to a Web-based hazard communication system.
    - Users in yard access MSDS information on company Intranet.
  - Destructive and non-destructive testing of materials judges:
    - Flammability
    - Toxicity
    - Other elements
  - Testing information and hazard-communication information passed on to users.

## 2.7 CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT

*One way that an owner can carry out this responsibility (to provide a safe work environment to minimize injuries) is to hire contractors who have a record of good safety performance. This requires attention during the processes of qualifying contractors for bidding work and selecting contractors for a contract award.*

*Both the contractor and the owner will reap cost savings from better safety performance. Owners can take measures to achieve better safety performance, such as:*

- *Provide safety and health guidelines that the contractor must follow.*
- *Require the use of permit systems for potentially hazardous activities.*
- *Require the contractor to designate a responsible supervisor to coordinate safety on the site.*
- *Discuss safety at owner-contractor meetings.*
- *Require prompt recording and full investigation of accidents.*

*Owners should recognize that the principles of management control commonly applied to costs, schedules, quality, and productivity are equally applicable to safety and that, if used, will improve safety performance. By showing more concern for construction safety, owners can help reduce injuries and loss of life and the billions of dollars needlessly wasted by construction accidents.*

The Business Roundtable: Improving Construction Safety Performance  
A Construction Industry Cost Effectiveness Report

### DISCUSSION

Frequent outsourcing is now standard practice both in industry and the government. Multi-employer worksites, consisting of multiple contractors and personnel of the contracting organization, are also common, with contractors and organizational personnel working side-by-side. Contractors often have key roles within the organization and can be responsible for critical tasks, which can vary in specialization and level of hazard.

Generally, the host employer is in the best position to ensure that communication and coordination of workplace safety and health is taking place. This is because the host employer often controls the means and methods of work and has specific knowledge of workplace hazards. Contract employers also have a significant role in workplace safety and health. The contract employers may also introduce hazards into the workplace that could endanger the host contractor's employees.

The nation's leading companies accept the responsibility of monitoring contractor occupational safety and health. They do it for a variety of reasons – complying with regulations, maintaining a zero-injury worksite, protecting the bottom line, and maintaining the company's image within the community. Contractor safety is more than a legal or contract issue. It affects the productivity, corporate image and morale of the

worksites. These companies consider the contractor's safety and health record in the bidding process and include the contractor's health and safety data in their measurement system.

## **FINDINGS**

As in industry, the trend within DoD and the Services has been toward increased outsourcing for a variety of services. The multi-employer worksite is generally the rule. Contractors are hired to perform a variety of tasks, including high-risk services such as hazardous materials and munitions shipping, asbestos/lead paint removal, and shipyard maintenance. Contractors often work side-by-side with civilian and military personnel and are increasingly expected to accompany military personnel during deployment.

The presence of multiple employers on a site introduces additional problems and complexities into the communication and coordination of worker safety and health. There needs to be two-way communication between DoD (the host employer) and contract employers, as well as a reasonable allocation of workplace safety and health responsibilities among these employers that takes account of this added complexity.

Contractors deploy into the field alongside the personnel in the Services and are responsible for conducting specialized and hazardous jobs. Injuries and illnesses among these individuals can have an impact on the operational readiness of the deployed unit. Although the contractor has a contractual obligation to fulfill its contract, injuries to contractor personnel can result in added costs, delays, and inadequate performance, and these costs are, for the most part, passed on to the government.

DoD contracting offices often do not take advantage of individual contractor information (e.g., their compliance history and safety record), even though some of this information is readily available.

Significant improvements in hazard prevention and injury reduction have been achieved by including requirements related to safety and health in contract provisions. Similar reductions in injuries and illnesses have occurred when the DoD exercises safety and health contractor oversight.

Management in DoD and in the Services has, for the most part, taken a "hands-off" approach to contractor safety and occupational health. This attitude is consistent across the Services. These managers argue that increased oversight of contractor occupational safety and health programs could increase the government's exposure to liability risks.

The DoD and the Services are consequently unaware of the full financial and other impacts of contractor injuries and illnesses on DoD. Although contract costs are tracked, the direct and indirect costs of on-the-job illnesses and injuries to contractors, the impact of these injuries on military and civilian personnel, and therefore, on readiness, is unknown.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

DoD should:

- Take a larger role in rewarding safe contractors and disciplining unsafe contractors. DoD should also take each contractor's occupational safety and health record, performance, and programs into account.
- Develop guidelines for safe contractors and disqualify companies that do not meet these standards.
- Publish guidelines to ensure that contract employees are covered under appropriate military service and activity-level occupational safety and health policies and procedures.
- Strengthen the involvement and clarify the role of DoD safety and occupational health professionals in contractor oversight.
- Include performance measures of contractor accidents in an integrated DoD safety and occupational health information system.
- Include safety and occupational illness performance requirements in all contracts. The DoD and the Services must ensure oversight for these requirements and develop a quality assurance program for contractors' safety and health.
- Continue to benchmark performance with leading companies on a periodic basis. DoD and the Services should establish a mechanism to collect and exchange best practice information among themselves and with industry on a periodic basis.

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: Holding Contractors To Higher Standards**

- Contractors are included in the safety and occupational health management systems.
- Contractors will not make the bidder's list without at least three things:
  - EMR (Experience Modification Rate) of less than one
  - Submitted documentation of the contractor's corporate safety and health program
  - Agreement to obey all applicable laws and regulations, as well as any specialized requirements outlined by DuPont in the contract language and conditions
- Contractor on-the-job lost workday cases are reported to the DuPont CEO and the business Vice President within 24 hours of occurrence (same as is done for DuPont employees).
- Contractor injury and illness metrics are reported monthly to the DuPont Operations Network, a group of senior leaders. These leaders self report, look for trends, and take action if needed. The head of the acquisitions process is a member of this team.
- There are six steps in the DuPont Contractor Safety Process:

1. Contractor Selection
  2. Contract Preparation
  3. Contract Award
  4. Orientation and Training
  5. Managing the Work
  6. Post-Contract Evaluation
- Contractors perform their own audits. DuPont may oversee these and sometimes participate.
  - Unsafe acts by contractors may cause DuPont to shut down the job for an indefinite period of time.
  - Contractors who regularly have poor outcomes or are regularly seen conducting unsafe acts are removed from the job and/or removed from a list of approved contractors for a period of time.

**Newport News Shipbuilding: Contractor Accountability**

- Contractors are held accountable for matching Newport News and OSHA VPP safety and health standards and programs
- To be considered for work at NSS contractors must have:
  - Statistics that show their safety and health rates relative to their industry;
  - Written safety and health programs;
  - Hazard-specific programs (lead, asbestos) for specialized contractors;
  - Accident rates below the respective industry average.
- Each contractor has a trained contractor coordinator, who:
  - Ensures that contractors follow company standards
  - Removes contractor workers from the shipyard who are conducting unsafe work
- Newport News removes unsafe contractors from the yard and removes them from the list of approved contractors.
- Newport News requires contractors' lost-time case rates and total case rates to be reported to the shipyard throughout the time the contractor is onsite.

## 28 OFF-THE-JOB SAFETY

*America's safety challenge is also Corporate America's challenge. No matter where an injury or tragedy occurs, your employees lose. They might lose their lives, or the life of a loved one. Or they might lose some of their health or mobility. Or the emotional trauma will affect them in some way for a period of time.*

*Even if the injury is relatively minor, the process of recovery, or the need to help treat a spouse or child, will likely cause your people to be absent from work. Or if they are at work, they will be distracted and not fully productive. When an injury strikes, your employees lose a part of themselves. And you lose part of your employees.*

*The fact is that a company is affected in many tangible ways when an injury strikes a member of its corporate family – ways that go well beyond the obvious, and enormous, costs of health care.*

Remarks by Alan McMillan, President and CEO, National Safety Council  
to the Organization Resources Counselors' Occupational Safety and Health Group  
Washington, D.C., August 9, 2001

### DISCUSSION

The NSC Panel firmly believes that it is important to incorporate off-the-job safety and health elements in occupational safety and health management systems. Accidents that occur off-the-job have large personnel costs, impact corporate productivity, and may adversely impact delivery of customer services. A total "24/7" safety and health systems approach includes a thorough review of off-the-job injuries and illnesses, analyses of root cause, application of findings and results, and evaluation of the effectiveness of preventive measures.

### FINDINGS

Off-the-job fatalities impact operational readiness. They take more service member lives than any other cause – 60 percent of DoD fatalities happen while driving, boating, hunting, or during other recreational activities. For example, the Navy estimates that private motor vehicle accidents cost \$131 million between fiscal years 1996 and 2000, and traffic and recreation accidents comprised 73 percent of Navy fatalities between FY1996 and 2000.

Because the Services are responsible for uniformed personnel 24 hours a day, seven days a week, they are in a unique position – much stronger than that of industry – to influence off-duty well being. The military can also influence the future behaviors of uniformed personnel and civilian employees once they leave the Services.

The Services have the ability to capture data for uniformed personnel and their families. Not only does the military have access to data that industry does not have; it also has the capability to analyze these data and develop prevention and intervention programs to address specific problem areas (e.g., drunk driving). Because of their ability to gather and analyze data and their progress in prevention programs, the Services have the potential to be world leaders in the prevention of off-the-job injuries and fatalities.

Throughout the entire safety and occupational health system, however, the Services could more effectively share and benchmark prevention information from one service to another. The existing off-the-job prevention programs also lack military-wide uniformity and analysis for effectiveness. Finally, just as with occupational injuries within the DoD, there is no system to quantify the impact of off-the-job fatalities, injuries, and illnesses and relate them to operational readiness.

The Services are in a singular position to be able to design programs, determine effectiveness and share lessons-learned about reduction of off-the-job injuries, fatalities and illnesses (including injuries to family members and dependents). The military can serve as a laboratory for developing these injury-prevention programs that have applicability to industry.

A military-wide system to reduce off-the-job injuries, illnesses and fatalities could put the U.S. military in a position to be the world-leader in off-the-job injury and illness prevention. Industry – and, in fact, organizations around the world – would benchmark their programs against the DoD system.

Examples of existing programs:

- The U.S. Marine Corps program consists of the following key elements:
  - The Marine Corps uses Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) accountability techniques to induce personnel to exercise proper safety behavior. Traffic safety is covered by a Marine Corps Order that directs the wearing of seat belts and makes non-use a punishable offense.
  - For both traffic safety and recreational safety – Unit Commanders and MCSC managers are encouraged to use Operational Risk Management in the development of their safety programs.
  - HQMC Safety Office sends staff to the field to personally review status of implementation, encourages force commanders to take active role per Commandant's directive and reminds them of consequences for failure to comply.
  - Marine Corps Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) programs implemented at the unit level have reduced off-duty deaths by 50 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2001.
- The Air Force has developed and administers a number of traffic-related and defensive training courses. In addition, installations develop peer-sponsored Drivers Against Drunk Drivers programs and work with community law enforcement organizations and support groups to target at-risk populations.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

DoD should:

- Develop and share lessons-learned with off-the-job injury prevention programs among the Services.
- Evaluate the off-the-job injury prevention programs for uniformed personnel and consider ways to extend them to the DoD civilian workforce and military families.
- Quantify the operational readiness impact of off-the-job incidents. As part of existing readiness indicators, include statistics on what percent of the force is not deployable due to off-the-job injuries and illnesses.
- Expand measures to include data collection for off-duty incidents in a consistent fashion for both military and civilian personnel.
- Continue to benchmark performance with leading companies. Establish a mechanism to collect and exchange best practice information about off-the-job injury prevention systems among Services and with industry.
- Increase analysis of medical data on uniformed personnel and their families to develop effective prevention and/or intervention programs to reduce off-the-job injuries, illnesses and fatalities.

## **BEST PRACTICES**

### **DUPONT: OFF-THE-JOB SAFETY**

- DuPont company tracks off-the-job fatalities and lost time injuries that cause employees to miss a day of scheduled work.
  - Categories measured include: slips and falls, sports-related, and motor vehicle related
  - Employee off-the-job fatalities are reported to the CEO and the employee's Vice President and business leader within 24 hours of occurrence
  - Off-the-job lost-time injuries are reported monthly to the corporate operations senior leaders for analysis and potential action. The CEO sees these numbers as part of the same management communication.
- DuPont places significant effort in educating its employee population to "take safety home with you." Examples of education efforts:
  - Home electrical outlet protection
  - Use of personal protective equipment at home
  - Value of healthy diet, exercise and appropriate rest
  - Dangers of falls in the home
  - Seat belt usage and defensive driving techniques

**Los Alamos National Laboratory: Off-the-Job Safety as a Core Value**

- Zero off-the-job injuries has been adopted as a key Laboratory policy.
- Training, education, and safety meetings include home safety subjects.
- Off-the-job education is integrated into the Ergonomics Program. Education examples include:
  - Defensive driving
  - Healthy lifestyles and preventive care
  - Home electrical safety
  - Field safety
- Sharing of lessons-learned from off-the-job accidents and injuries.
- Community involvement to promote off-the-job health and safety. For example, participation in:
  - Health Fairs
  - Waste disposal assistance
  - Seatbelt and child restraint usage
- The Laboratory is initiating a pilot in reporting/tracking off-the-job lost workday cases

### **3.0 CONCLUSION**

The goal of this NSC cooperative effort with DoD was to improve the DoD's operational readiness capabilities through reduction in the human and financial costs resulting from non-combat injuries and illnesses. The NSC convened a panel of experts from industry, labor, and government to conduct an assessment of the DoD's Safety and Occupational Health Management Systems.

The NSC review identified many DoD programs and initiatives that have a positive impact on reducing work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses. Despite these pockets of excellence, however, the NSC panel found that the DoD lacks an effective department-wide safety and occupational health management system. No overall system ensures continuing improvement in performance. The performance of the DoD in safety and occupational health is, therefore, less than it should be.

The DoD injury and illness rates are only slightly better than average but more than eight times the rates of the best companies. The occupational fatality rate is unacceptable at 16 times higher than these same industry leaders. The total costs associated with DoD occupational injuries and illnesses are largely unknown but are conservatively estimated at anywhere from \$10 billion to more than \$21 billion annually. Finally, and perhaps most telling, the DoD has almost no knowledge of the impact of these occupational fatalities, injuries, and illnesses on operational readiness.

Many of the NSC panel members commented that the current DoD situation is not unlike the one that their own companies faced about a decade ago. The NSC's recommendations in this report are consistent with the steps that many of the panel member's companies have taken to become leaders in occupational safety and health.

In order for the DoD to take safety and occupational health to the next level of performance, the NSC panel recommends that the DoD adopt a systems approach to improving performance. Such an approach would be consistent with the one that best-in-class companies have taken. It requires top-level leadership commitment, system integration focused on continuing safety and occupational health performance improvement, and executive level oversight of overall system improvement. This is the formula many of the NSC panel members' companies followed to improve their safety and occupational health performance.

The NSC panel is confident that the DoD can rise to the level of best-in-class companies if it follows the report's recommendations. The NSC panel also felt that DoD is uniquely positioned to provide leadership in "off-the-job" and "family" safety and occupational health issues.

The Department has done well; it is time to do better.

**APPENDIX A- LETTER TO HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD**



May 29, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense, Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I would like the opportunity to meet with you to discuss how we can work together on critical safety and health initiatives. I believe the Council is uniquely qualified to help improve DoD's operational readiness capabilities.

The National Safety Council, founded in 1913, is the nation's leading advocate of safety and health in the workplace, on the highways, and in homes and communities. NSC was *chartered by the United States Congress in 1953, by PL 83-259* and is the only safety and health organization chartered by the Federal Government. NSC is a nonprofit, non-governmental public service organization whose mission includes the responsibility "...to arouse and maintain the interest of the people of the United States in safety and in accident prevention..."

We have a network of 50 affiliated chapters, encompassing 37,500 member companies, unions, and associations. These members include the largest, technologically advanced corporations in the Fortune 500. Together, our world-class members and professional staff determine best practices in safety and health. A team of our innovative leaders is available to assist you.


Last year, DoD experienced over 450 deaths to civilians and military personnel. Besides the human tragedies, DoD has experienced loss of operational capability due to injuries and fatalities to your soldiers, sailors, aviators and marines. In addition, the economic impact of civilian injuries alone has exceeded \$3 billion in workers' compensation costs over the last five years. The National Safety Council can help you to reduce these human tragedies, loss of operational capability and economic impact.

We would begin with a quick, executive assessment of DoD safety and health programs conducted by our executive team. I look forward to discussing this proposal with you. We

could begin in July and brief you in August. Then we could meet with your safety officials at our National Safety Congress in September to discuss the next steps.

I will follow-up with your office in the next few weeks to discuss how the National Safety Council can assist you and the Department of Defense. I look forward to speaking with you then.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan C. McMillan". The signature is stylized with large, overlapping loops.

Alan C. McMillan  
President & CEO

**APPENDIX B- LETTER TO NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL**

**OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000**



**ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS**

Alan McMillian, President & CEO  
National Safety Council  
1121 Spring Lake Drive  
Itasca, IL 60143-3201

JUN 26 2001

Dear Mr. McMillan:

On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, I am responding to your letter of May 29, 2001 offering an executive assessment of the Department of Defense (DoD) safety and health program. The safety and health of our military, civilians and their families as well as our contractors are very important to the Secretary and to the readiness of the Defense Department.

We appreciate the fact the National Safety Council is Congressionally chartered by PL 83-259 as a non-profit service organization for accident prevention with a membership of major corporations, unions, and other associations. Over the years, various DoD installation safety offices have used your expertise. This administration desires to learn from industry successes.

We agree with your proposal to conduct your review in July, outbrief the appropriate individuals in August and meet with our Service Safety Officials in September at the National Safety Congress. We understand this review is to be at no cost to DoD.

The Installations and Environment staff will arrange for an introductory meeting between our key directors and your team. The point of contact is (b)(6), who can be reached at (b)(6) or by email at (b)(6).

Sincerely,

Raymond F. Dubois, Jr.  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installations & Environment)

**APPENDIX C - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PANEL MEMBERS**

**Jerry Scannell  
President and Chief Executive Officer (Emeritus)  
National Safety Council  
Panel Chair**

Jerry Scannell joined the National Safety Council as President in 1995 and brings more than 30 years of government and private sector safety and health experience.

During 1992-1994, he served as Vice-President of Worldwide Safety Affairs at Johnson & Johnson in New Brunswick, New Jersey and also served as Director of Corporate Safety, Fire, and Environmental Affairs from 1979 to 1989.

In 1989, Mr. Scannell was nominated by President George Bush to serve as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

Mr. Scannell graduated from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and completed postgraduate training in epidemiology and environmental economics at George Washington University.

**Leo Carey**  
**Director, Government Services**  
**National Safety Council**

Mr. Carey received a BS in Chemistry from Allentown College and an MS in Occupational Health from Temple University. He pursued additional graduate studies at the Pennsylvania State University.

As Director of Government Services, Mr. Carey is the central liaison between the National Safety Council (NSC) and the various branches of the U.S. government. In this role, Mr. Carey is responsible for developing policy and business opportunities with the government for the NSC. Mr. Carey is responsible for coordinating the process for the development of NSC policies. He also serves as liaison for the NSC with other safety and health organizations.

Prior to coming to the National Safety Council, Mr. Carey was part of several significant projects on domestic and international occupational safety and health. In 1995 he served as team leader for the team that developed the "New OSHA" document, which became the blueprint for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration under the Clinton Administration. Mr. Carey was appointed by the governing body of the International Labor Organization to serve as Chairman of the Eleventh Session of the Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health in Geneva, Switzerland, reviewing worldwide occupational health development. He also served on an ANSI International Advisory Committee Task Force on Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. He currently serves on the ANSI Z10 Accredited Standards Committee on Occupational Health and Safety Systems. For nine years he was OSHA's Director of Field Programs, providing direction to OSHA's regional offices. Mr. Carey is a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association and the American Conference of Industrial Hygienists and is certified in the comprehensive practice of industrial hygiene by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

**Karl L. Bossung**  
**Corporate Manager, Health and Safety**  
**Delphi Automotive Systems**

Karl Bossung began his career with General Motors as a Cooperative Education Student in 1974. After graduating with a Bachelors Degree in Business Administration from General Motors Institute in 1979, he was promoted to Manufacturing Supervisor at the General Motors, Central Foundry Division, Saginaw Malleable Iron Plant in Saginaw, Michigan. Mr. Bossung spent the next 10 years in various manufacturing assignments ranging from skilled trades to production and quality. He was then promoted to Salaried Personnel Administrator in 1987, which included the oversight of all health and safety activities for the foundry.

In 1991, Mr. Bossung was transferred to the UAW-General Motors, Human Resource Center for Health and Safety as a Program Manager and Staff Assistant. In this assignment, Mr. Bossung was responsible for all Health and Safety program development at UAW represented General Motors facilities. In 1992, Mr. Bossung was promoted to Coordinator and Senior Staff Assistant at the Health and Safety Center with the responsibilities of supervising and coordinating the management staff of safety professionals. He held this position for the next three years.

In 1995, Mr. Bossung was promoted and appointed to the newly created position of Manager, Health and Safety, for Delphi Automotive Systems, a division of General Motors. In 1999, when Delphi separated from General Motors, Mr. Bossung was promoted to the new position of Corporate Manager, Health and Safety, Delphi Automotive Systems, the position that he holds today. In this position, Mr. Bossung is responsible for coordinating all safety activities in Delphi locations around the world.

Mr. Bossung is a charter member of the National Safety Council's Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Board and has recently been nominated for a position on its Board of Delegates. Additionally, Mr. Bossung has been elected to a position on the Automotive Industry Action Group's (AIAG) newly created Occupational Health & Safety Steering Committee.

**Ernie O. Clayton**  
**Director, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs**  
**The Boeing Company**

Ernie Clayton was appointed Director for Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs (SHEA) in August 1998. In this assignment, he is responsible for overall policy and management of The Boeing Company's efforts related to employee safety and health, energy and the protection of the environment.

Before his current assignment, Mr. Clayton served as the SHEA Director for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG), the company's largest product division.

He joined the Boeing Company in 1980 as Safety Manager for Boeing Engineering and Construction. He was Safety Manager for Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia, PA from 1984 to 1989, and Safety Manager and SHEA Director at the Commercial Airplane plant in Everett, Wash. from 1989 to 1996, when he became SHEA Director for BCAG.

A native of Torrance, CA., Mr. Clayton earned a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry from California State College at Fullerton. He currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Evergreen Safety Council.

**Michael N. Ferrara Jr.**  
**Manager, SAFE Fleet – North America**  
**Johnson & Johnson**

Michael has 13 years of experience in the field of occupational safety and health. He has held positions with the Connecticut State Police in the Public Safety and Transportation Group and the University of Connecticut Health Center in the Radiation Safety Department. Over the last 10 years, he has held positions within Johnson & Johnson in the areas of safety and industrial hygiene and operations.

Over the last five years he has specialized in the area of fleet safety within the sales/service organizations at Johnson & Johnson. In his current position, Mr. Ferrara and his team manage the overall SAFE Fleet program in North America. He has responsibility for 27 Johnson & Johnson operating company SAFE Fleet Teams and over 10,000 field sales/service representatives. He is a member of the Somerset County Business/Education Partnership where he teaches basic management techniques and key job performance skills to students entering the workforce.

A native of Ansonia, CT., Mr. Ferrara holds a B.S. in Safety Engineering and a B.S. in Manufacturing Engineering.

**Deborah L. Grubbe, P.E.**  
**Corporate Director – Safety and Health**  
**DuPont**

Deborah Grubbe is Corporate Director – Safety and Health for DuPont. She is accountable for leading new initiatives in global safety and occupational health for the \$27 billion corporation. Ms. Grubbe was formerly the Operations Director for two of DuPont's global businesses, where she was accountable for manufacturing, engineering, safety, environmental and information systems. She has 24 years of experience in five of DuPont's 20 Business Units. Ms. Grubbe is also a past director of DuPont Engineering's 700 person engineering technology organization. Her 15 different assignments range from capital project implementation through manufacturing management and human resources.

Ms. Grubbe currently serves on the National Institute of Standards and Technology Visiting Committee for Advanced Technology. She also serves the National Academy of Sciences as a member of the oversight committee for the Demilitarization of US Chemical Weapons Stockpile. Ms. Grubbe sits on the Board of Directors of the Engineering and Construction Committee of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and is on the Business Management Advisory Committee of Wilmington College. She is the former co-chair of the Benchmarking and Metrics Committee of the Construction Industry Institute, and currently serves as a member of its Fully Integrated and Automated Project Processes committee. She is currently a member of the Purdue University School of Chemical Engineering New Directions Executive Committee. Ms. Grubbe was the first woman and youngest elected member on the State of Delaware Registration Board for Professional Engineers (1985-1989). During her tenure on the State Board, she was the Chair of the Law Enforcement and Ethics Committee. She is active with the Society of Women Engineers, and is a former board member of the Women in Engineering Program Advocates Network (WEPAN). Ms. Grubbe has been featured in the books "Engineering Your Way to Success" and "Journeys of Women in Science and Engineering – No Universal Constants." She is one of the named supporters of Engineer's Week, 2002, "Introduce a Million Girls to Engineering" initiative.

In 1994, Ms. Grubbe was named an outstanding Chemical Engineering Alumna by the Purdue University School of Chemical Engineering, and is a recipient of the 1986 Trailblazer Award from the Delaware Alliance of Professional Women. She is a recent recipient of the Purdue Engineering Alumni Association Service Award.

Ms. Grubbe was born in suburban Chicago and graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering with Highest Distinction from Purdue University. She received a Winston Churchill Fellowship to attend Cambridge University in England, where she received a Certificate of Post Graduate Study in Chemical Engineering. She is a registered professional engineer in Delaware and is the engineer of record for DuPont. She is married to James B. Porter, Jr., and resides in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania.

**J. Lee McAtee**  
**Deputy Director of Environment, Safety & Health**  
**Los Alamos National Laboratory**

Lee McAtee has undergraduate degrees in Health Physics and Psychology and a Master of Science degree in Radiology and Radiation Biology from Colorado State University. In the mid-1970s, Mr. McAtee worked as a radiation protection specialist for a variety of companies in the nuclear industry. Since 1980, he has worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he served as a staff health physicist and manager of radiation protection. Since 1996, Mr. McAtee has been the Deputy Director of the Environment, Safety, & Health Division. This 800-person organization provides leadership, expertise, and support throughout the Laboratory in all ES&H disciplines, including health physics, industrial hygiene and safety, occupational medicine, nuclear safety, hazmat response, and environmental protection.

In his current role, Mr. McAtee has helped lead the Laboratory's development and implementation of a new integrated safety management system that has resulted in dramatic improvements in ES&H performance, including more than a three-fold reduction in recordable injuries and more than a four-fold improvement in environmental violations during the past few years.

Mr. McAtee is active in the Health Physics Society, where he has served as President and Director of the Rio Grande Chapter and is currently a nominee for Board of Directors of the national society. He has also participated in numerous ES&H reviews throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, holds patents for development of several radiation monitoring techniques, taught health physics at the University of New Mexico, Los Alamos Branch, served as a senior advisor to the DOE Radiological Assistance Program, and participated in or chaired a number of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) committees.

**Jacqueline (Jackie) Nowell, MPH, CIH**  
**Director, Occupational Safety and Health Office,**  
**United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW)**

Jacqueline Nowell joined the UFCW in 1990. She is currently Director of the Occupational Safety and Health Office for the Field Services Department.

A Certified Industrial Hygienist, Ms. Nowell earned her Masters in Public Health at the University of California, Los Angeles. She previously served as Assistant Professor, Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Division, Hunter College, CUNY; and Staff Industrial Hygienist, New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health, a coalition of labor unions that provides technical assistance and training on occupational safety and health to member local unions.

**Charles F. Redinger, CIH, MPA, Ph.D.  
Principal, Redinger & Associates, Inc.**

Charles Redinger is a principal with Redinger & Associates, Inc., in San Rafael, California. Since the early 1990s, he has been at the forefront of environmental health and safety management system and performance measurement research and methods development. He works for a wide range of public and private sector organizations in their efforts to improve environmental health and safety performance.

He has a Ph.D. in Industrial Health from the University of Michigan, a Master's Degree in Public Policy from the University of Colorado and a BA in Chemistry from the University of California at Santa Cruz. He is a member of the Public Policy honor society Phi Alpha Alpha, and has been a Kemper Fellow in Public Health and an Erb Fellow in Environmental Management. He is a Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

He writes and teaches extensively on EHS performance improvement and system implementation. Most recently, he was a co-editor of a performance metrics book and is the author of a management system assessment instrument. His research activities continue with colleagues at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the University of Michigan, and Loma Linda University on management system effectiveness, validation, as well as occupational exposure assessment.

Dr. Redinger has worked for several international organizations on the development of EHS policies and standards. He is a technical advisor to the International Labour Office in their development of an international occupational health and safety management system, as well as the ANSI Z-10 Committee in the development of a similar American standard.

**Knut Ringen, Dr., P.H., M.H.A., M.P.H.**  
**Principal, Stoneturn Consultants**

Dr. Knut Ringen is a principal with Stoneturn Consultants in Seattle, specializing in environment, safety and health risk management, workers' compensation and group health insurance. He also is managing member of The Risk Advisors, LLC in Washington D.C.

He was executive director of the Laborers' Health and Safety Fund of North America 1987-92, and director, The Center to Protect Workers' Rights, 1992-97. He served as Chairman, National Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health from 1993 to 1997.

Among many honors, he is elected to the European Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Collegium Ramazzini. He specializes in the development of research and service programs with an emphasis on workers and other special populations, and has been instrumental in developing many health programs that have achieved national significance. He has lectured extensively throughout North America, Europe, Asia and South America. He is an author or editor of more than 80 scientific publications, including *Occupational Medicine State of the Art Reviews: Construction Safety and Health*, Hanley and Balfus, Philadelphia, 1996 and *Chapter 93: Construction, Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*, International Labor Organization, Geneva, 1997.

He has focused extensively on the use of data to characterize the construction industry, develop industry-wide safety and health objectives and programs, and evaluate the industry's safety and health performance, including the role of compliance inspections.

He received the Doctor of Public Health degree from Johns Hopkins University for his research on the development of health policy. He also holds a Master of Hospital Administration degree from the Medical College of Virginia and a Master of Public Health degree from Johns Hopkins University.

**Rosemary K. Sokas, MD, MOH**  
**Associate Director for Science**  
**National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health**

Rosemary Sokas, MD, MOH, is the Associate Director for Science at NIOSH and adjunct professor of medicine at George Washington University. She received her MD from Boston University School of Medicine and her Master's of Occupational Health from the Harvard School of Public Health, and is board certified in internal medicine and in preventive medicine (occupational).

Dr. Sokas previously directed the Office of Occupational Medicine at OSHA. She has served as full-time faculty at the George Washington University, where she directed the Occupational Medicine Residency Program and the Institute for the Environment, and at the University of Pennsylvania, where she coordinated occupational health consultation programs and directed the Philadelphia VA hypertension clinic.

Her research publications include health care worker safety, medical education, lead toxicity, and the effects of occupational exposures on blood pressure. She is the co-team leader for the National Occupational Research Agenda Priority Team focusing on Special Populations at Risk. She has served on an Institute of Medicine committee evaluating the primary care provided to Persian Gulf veterans, and served as a member of the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board from 1996 to 2001.

**Jim Thornton**  
**Director of Environmental Health and Safety**  
**Newport News Shipbuilding**

Jim Thornton is the Director of Environmental Health and Safety at Newport News Shipbuilding. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering from Auburn University and a Master of Science degree in Industrial Hygiene from Texas A&M University. Mr. Thornton began his career with NNS in 1976 as Manager of Industrial Hygiene. In a restructuring move, he next served as Manager, Health Safety & Environmental. His current position of Director, which he has held since 1993, includes responsibility for the Medical Department and Workers' Compensation as well as Environmental, Industrial Hygiene and Safety.

From June 1999 – June 2000, Mr. Thornton served as President of the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The organization is the world's largest association of occupational and environmental health professionals who come from government, labor, industry, universities and private business. AIHA has 12,000 members, an annual budget of \$12 million and members' equity of \$8 million.

At NNS, Mr. Thornton directed efforts and programs to obtain "STAR" status in the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program. NNS is the largest site and the only shipyard in the program. In addition, the Environmental and Workers' Compensation programs have won awards acknowledging their excellence.

**Richard J. Waxweiler, Ph.D., M.S.I.E.**  
**Director, Division of Acute Care, Rehabilitation Research, and**  
**Disabilities Prevention and**  
**Acting Deputy Director**  
**National Center for Injury Prevention and Control**  
**Centers for Disease Control and Prevention**

Richard Waxweiler received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in engineering from the University of Michigan and a Doctorate in epidemiology from the University of North Carolina. His career at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began in 1971 as an epidemiologist/industrial hygienist at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), where he led a research staff that focused on the identification and control of occupational carcinogens. Afterwards, he investigated radiation-related health effects while at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and toxic waste site health effects for the National Center for Environmental Health at CDC.

Dr. Waxweiler joined the injury control program at CDC in 1985, where he first directed the Epidemiology Branch. As Special Assistant for Scientific Affairs for the injury program, he led the development of the National Agenda for the 1990s and National Plan for Injury Control. He has directed DACRRDP/NPIPC since its creation in 1993. He has authored/co-authored more than 80 papers in occupational/environmental/injury epidemiology and has been active in the American Public Health Association where he served as Chairman of the Injury Control and Emergency Health Services Section, and in the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and Brain Injury Association of Georgia as a board member.

## **APPENDIX D – BEST PRACTICES**

### **DuPont: Leadership with Full Accountability**

DuPont is a \$27 billion company with 90,000 employees. Approximately half of these work outside the United States. The company operates in 70 countries and has 210 manufacturing and processing facilities with 40 research and development and customer service labs in the United States, and more than 35 labs in 11 other countries. DuPont delivers science-based solutions in markets such as food and nutrition, health care, apparel, home and construction, electronics and transportation.

The ultimate responsibility for safety and health at DuPont rests with the chief executive officer. The CEO begins every meeting by reinforcing the safety message and often reiterates that safety is one of the organization's core values.

Everyone in the core corporate safety, health, environment group of six has direct access to the CEO. The bulk of the work for running the world-class safety and health management system is decentralized. A safety excellence center with 25 people compiles statistics and manages the incident tracking system, manages the standards approval process and proposes common safety solutions for the business units. The center is funded and paid for by DuPont's businesses. The businesses use center services to help meet goals.

At a regular operations network meeting of manufacturing and engineering leaders, safety is always the first topic of discussion. The leader of the 25-member group is the Vice President of Operations for DuPont, who reports directly to the CEO.

If a major incident has occurred, the group will often spend a majority of the meeting talking about safety. The team member who is accountable for the site where the incident occurred stands before the group and explains what happened, why it happened, and what actions will be taken to prevent it from occurring in the future. As of the printing of this report, DuPont has not had an employee fatality in more than 3 years.

The leader of each DuPont facility, usually the plant manager, has responsibility for safety and health at the facility level. Each plant manager has a safety and health manager who assists the manager on a tactical level.

Managers are held accountable for safety and health performance. DuPont has found that when safety performance is poor at a plant, production, quality and labor relations are also suffering. Managers with poor safety records are usually removed from their positions, because DuPont leaders consider the poor safety record an indication that the manager is not using management systems appropriately.

One of the reasons safety at DuPont has strong management support is that the company considers safety to be a good investment – they save four or five dollars for every dollar they spend on safety. The results: in 1999, DuPont’s worker’s compensation costs were \$9 million for 50,000 employees – one of the lowest in the country per employee.

Another example: DuPont’s construction management group, which builds facilities and conducts major maintenance globally, controls 12,000 to 15,000 contractor workers for capital projects. The company pays \$12 million for 100 people who manage construction contractors and ensure they are following the DuPont safety and health culture. Partly as a result of this group’s work, DuPont’s workers’ compensation rate for contractors is extremely low – \$21 million less than the yearly industry average.

DuPont leadership shows commitment to safety not only by investing money, but also by being willing to stop production at a plant. If two or three OSHA recordable injuries happen within a short period of time, many plants will hold “stop the music” meetings.

The entire production process shuts down and everyone in the plant goes into a safety meeting, where small groups talk about what has happened and work to find solutions that will prevent further incidents. The company philosophy is that the money lost during the production stoppage will be more than recouped in savings from injury prevention.

#### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Injury Costs Integrated Into System**

Newport News Shipbuilding is a \$2 billion company with 17,000 employees based in Newport News, Virginia. The company constructs and repairs a full complement of naval and sub-surface vessels as well as commercial vessels.

At Newport News Shipbuilding, leaders continually show their commitment to safety in both big and small ways. Leaders make routine safety visits throughout the shipyard, always wearing personal protective equipment. The higher the level of the manager making the visit, the more attention the visit receives. At each level of the company, the managers have responsibility for safety and health.

Three years ago Newport News formed an executive safety steering committee to raise visibility of safety within the company and review progress toward goals on a high-level basis. The company sees the committee as a valuable way to show leadership commitment within the company. The committee, comprised of the COO, Vice President of Operations, Vice President of Human Resources, Director of Environmental Health Safety and several of the operations managers, meets at least every six weeks to discuss safety.

Additional meetings are called on a case-by-case basis – responding to a serious accident or new safety-related legislation, for example.

The group monitors progress against specific company health and safety goals, and determines where program adjustments are needed. If the goals are not being met, the

group discusses problems and solutions. Each group member has the power to take actions.

Another way leaders show commitment is through resources commitment. At the corporate level, safety and health has its own budget. This budget pays for the corporate safety and health staff as well as equipment such as sampling pumps and test kits.

Line operators don't have a separate safety and health budget. Ergonomic corrections to machines, for example, come out of general maintenance budgets.

A leadership commitment that safety is equal in priority to productivity ensures that management feels those expenditures are necessary and prudent.

To ensure accountability within the company, each manager has a performance agreement. This agreement includes goals for each manager in financial progress, productivity, quality etc. Each manager's performance agreement includes health and safety goals. If the manager does not meet health and safety goals, promotions, bonuses and raises are adversely affected. The CEO also has a health and safety target for the company for which he is responsible.

Costs of injuries are charged back to the project where they occurred, so the head of a department with high injury rates is held financially accountable for safety performance along with production levels and quality goals. (See Performance Measurement section for more details on the system.)

### **DuPont: The Zero-Injury Culture**

In 1994 DuPont noticed that safety numbers were deteriorating. The DuPont CEO commissioned the Discovery Team, which created a new safety and health process and said the goal of the process would be zero occupational injuries and illnesses for the company.

Although there was some management resistance to the zero-injury goal – a few managers felt the goal would be impractical and impossible – the company saw an immediate drop in safety numbers.

The culture change was initiated by a team and driven from the top. A cross-section team of corporate leadership, plant management and safety leaders began telling their constituents within DuPont about the zero-injury goal. Through leadership commitment, intensive training and employee involvement, the 0-injury culture permeated through every level of the company and is now treated as a benchmark in safety and health by organizations all over the world.

The new culture has dramatically reduced significant incidents at DuPont. From a level of more than 100 significant incidents annually in the early 1990s, the company had only

one distribution incident and zero process and environmental incidents in 2000. The businesses are now focused on reducing the less severe incidents to zero.

The zero-injury goal affected other areas of the company as well – people began asking if the company could also set a zero-goal in sexual harassment, off-the-job injuries, ethics violations, environmental releases and transportation.

### **Delphi Automotive Systems: A Culture Shift**

Delphi Automotive Systems is a \$29.2 billion mobile electronics and transportation components and systems manufacturer with approximately 200,000 employees working on 196 wholly-owned manufacturing sites, 43 joint ventures, 53 customer centers and 32 technical centers in 43 countries.

In 1994, when Delphi Automotive Systems was still part of General Motors, Paul O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, was on the General Motors board. At the time, Secretary O'Neill was also CEO of Alcoa.

At one of the board meetings a leader profiled GM's safety record. Mr. O'Neill pointed out that the automotive industry had one of the worst records for safety and health of any industry in the country: thus GM was only the best of the worst.

Mr. O'Neill inspired the board members to begin to benchmark against the country's leading companies in safety and health. The General Motors board of directors commissioned a team of 10 people, including senior executives of manufacturing, several union representatives, several safety and health managers and representatives from legal and finance departments, to visit Allied Signal, DuPont, Boeing, Alcoa and others.

After extensive visits and investigation, the team decided the safety and health management systems of best-in-class companies had several things in common including: a plant safety review board (or central safety committee), detailed safe operating practices, thorough incident investigation and safety observation tours. The Delphi and union team took those four elements and created a new joint leadership process.

At each of Delphi's 196 manufacturing sites throughout North America, South America, Asia Pacific and Europe, the company rolled out this leadership process over the next several years.

The plant safety review board acts as the overall safety steering committee for a site. Ad-hoc committees on ergonomics, falls, lock-out, etc...report to that board. The board is comprised of the site's top management and union leadership.

The plant safety review boards are charged to hold stand-alone, high-level meetings at least once per month for one to two hours. If the plant manager can't attend, the meeting is rescheduled.

The boards also oversaw the development of detailed safe operating procedures and commissioned every department at each site to create a team, who would train employees, implement procedures and enforce them.

Next, Delphi began conducting a thorough root-cause analysis of every injury. In the past, Delphi's accident investigations had often blamed the employee; thus the investigations did not reach the real root cause. Delphi decided that the real root cause could seldom be employee fault or human error. Within the hierarchy of health and safety controls, the new accident investigations were not permitted to cite warning signs, training or personal protective equipment as the sole correction to a root cause. The solutions should either be elimination or substitution of a hazard.

For example, if an employee cut his hand on a part while not wearing a glove, the root cause of the incident would not be that the employee failed to wear the glove, but that the part had a hazard, a sharp edge or burr. In the past the company would discipline, counsel and reinstruct the employee in wearing the required personal protective equipment. The solution within the new process would be to eliminate the sharp edges on the part the employee handles.

Finally, every month, every level of leadership on a site conducts safety observation tours. Previously, leaders often visited the shop floors but never conducted safety-based tours.

Instead of chastising incorrect behavior, the leaders now praise employees following safe operating procedures. The employees who consistently follow the safe procedures are picked to train new employees in safe behavior.

If the managers observe problems on the tours, they document the problem, find a corrective solution and assign someone to implement the solution and follow-through to check that the solution occurred.

Initially, the safety observation tours met with resistance. Managers felt that the tours were a waste of their valuable time and some employees felt the managers were spying on them. The union expressed concern that the tours would be used to discipline employees. Management agreed that the tours would not be used in the disciplinary process and the unions accepted them. Now the safety observation tours are considered a crucial and valuable part of Delphi's safety and health management system.

The culture change at Delphi is an ongoing process. It began in 1994. In 1995 leaders touted the change throughout the organization. After several months of "waving the flag for safety" they began to implement the change. The company is now in phase 2 of the 3-phase operation.

Even though the safety culture change is not complete, the company has seen definitive results. Since 1993, Delphi has reduced lost-workday cases by 89 percent. Since 1993 Delphi's total OSHA recordables have dropped 86 percent, which means 28,500 fewer recordable injuries each year.

The safety and health culture change at Delphi has increased the company's competitive advantage, improved employee loyalty, improved public image, lowered costs, improved quality and improved management relationship.

**Johnson & Johnson: Dramatically Reducing Work-Related Driving Accidents**

In 1995, the Johnson & Johnson Executive Committee decided to create a culture change within their field sales and service organization to reduce motor vehicle accidents and injuries. The Executive Committee appointed the member responsible for the Pharmaceutical Franchise as program champion. The champion was responsible for creating the culture change, funding programs and making sure the program received high-level visibility and support from senior management.

He formed a corporate SAFE Fleet Task Force, and they developed a comprehensive 16-step process, which recently has been improved and streamlined to six steps. The Task Force set goals for the year, benchmarked against other companies, conducted baseline assessments and instituted systems to collect and report metrics and develop recognition and incentive programs.

Each operating company vice-president of sales sponsors a SAFE Fleet team, and each team follows the six-step process. There are currently 27 SAFE Fleet teams. The process includes senior management involvement, field management involvement, team performance, driver training, motivation and recognition systems, and safety and health. Each team is formally assessed every two years on program progress and accident and injury reduction. Management commitment is one of the main reasons the program works. Senior management views the safe driving program as a core value and provides financial support and leadership.

The SAFE Fleet Task Force reviews the SAFE Fleet performance of each operating company. They then rank the companies based on program metrics (See Performance Measurement section for more details on this system). Since the program began, the Johnson & Johnson fleet has more than doubled in size from 3,000 to 10,000. In that time, the accident rate has dropped by 39 percent.

**DuPont: Leading and Lagging Indicators**

DuPont uses a combination of leading and lagging indicators. The lagging indicators include lost-time cases and OSHA recordable injuries. The incidents are recorded and incorporated into the corporate data collection system. The safety, health and environment excellence center uses those numbers to create reports that are sent to all the plant managers, as well as the company Vice Presidents and CEO. A simple set of metrics makes injuries and illnesses easily comparable both within DuPont businesses and with the rest of industry.

Leading indicators are judged at the site level on four factors: performance of key safety tasks, index trends, “success attitude” displayed and level of distraction.

**Performance of key safety tasks** includes adherence to employee audit schedule and relief valve/vessel inspections, state of housekeeping, serious incident follow-up, training tasks completed and safety meetings held. The performance is rated either as “dependent” – done with much effort and follow-up, “independent” – understand and execute with minimum follow-up and, the highest rating, “team” – adding scope to work, upgrading approaches and integrating across functions.

**Index trends** include unsafe acts (measured by management audits), serious defects (observed on individual audits) and serious incidents. The performance is rated as “concern” – high number of defects found routinely, open violation of rules, no knowledge of rules, “normal” – predictable, reasonable number of defects found, organization knowledgeable and defects on improving edges, or “excellent” – defects hard to discover, except by trained professionals.

**Success attitude** includes spirit of the work force, percentage of the work force involved in safety activities, obvious interest in safety activities, repeat violations of rules/procedures, equipment condition, employee use of repair systems for equipment, participation in safety and health opportunities (i.e. contests). The performance is rated as “dependent” – must urge to comply or participate, “independent” – employees participate in areas of personal interest, or “team” – employees volunteer to participate and plan and conduct safety activities without direction. They also take initiative to make improvements and enlist other employee’s help.

**Level of distraction** includes high job turnover, employment insecurity, union/management problems, high overtime numbers and overhauls within the department. The performance is rated as “high” – employees have their minds on some key issue, “normal” – employees are integrating safety and health tasks with some difficulty or “low” – safety and health activities are normal and repeating, requiring little extra attention and there are no identified external issues.

Each of the above ratings is assigned a numerical score of 5, 3 or 1.

The manufacturing manager, safety professional, maintenance manager and operational unit manager all judge each factor monthly. Results are averaged for a consensus score at the site.

### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Financial Accountability Built Into Metrics**

Newport News uses a combination of leading and trailing indicators in its metric system. Trailing indicators include total number of recordables rate, as defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. If any kind of medical treatment or first-aid is needed, the injury is recordable.

Leading indicators include number of health and safety training hours given and quality of accident reports. For example, if an employee falls and incurs a scalp laceration requiring suturing and lost-time, some would say the root cause was that the person wasn't wearing safety equipment. A more mature report would cite instead the equipment or situation that caused the fall.

The medical clinic reports the numbers to the corporate safety and health department. Company nurses are trained in recording procedures and reports are routinely audited.

Monthly reports are distributed throughout management of the company. The level of leadership determines the level of detail of the report. Whereas the CEO receives a one-page report summarizing all company injuries and illnesses for the month, a supervisor of a department with multiple injuries will receive a report with dozens of pages. Each recordable case warrants an extensive report, including a statement from the nurse who handled the injury.

Within the corporate health and safety department, the data is compiled into a database that can analyze numbers in various ways – by type of injury, department, etc.

Costs of each injury, including direct cost (workers' compensation), wage replacement and medical cost are charged back to the department. High injury costs adversely affect department profitability.

#### **Johnson & Johnson's Safe Fleet Program: Leading and Trailing SAFE Fleet Indicators**

Johnson & Johnson's SAFE Fleet Program uses a series of leading and lagging indicators to reduce motor vehicle accidents within their fleet. The key metrics for the SAFE Fleet program is accidents per million miles (APMM) driven, percent of fleet vehicles in accidents and percent of high-risk drivers.

The corporate SAFE Fleet team tracks the metrics of each field sales/service organization and reports the metrics to the Vice Presidents of sales/service of each of these organizations monthly.

The company use leading indicators such as high-risk driver screening, commentary drives and vehicle condition/maintenance reports. Johnson & Johnson staff review the driving records of all prospective new hires. High-risk drivers are disqualified from the hiring process. SAFE Fleet offers additional training and coaching to those fleet drivers within Johnson & Johnson who exhibit the high-risk behaviors they have identified.

Managers observe all drivers twice a year by conducting commentary drives. In addition, Johnson & Johnson conducts vehicle inspections and reviews maintenance records as a leading indicator. For example, dents and scratches on the vehicle, lack of routine oil changes or low tire pressure can indicate a potential problem/high-risk driver. Some additional metrics are:

- mileage driven
- number of accidents
- types of accidents
- circumstances of accidents
- percentage of vehicles in accidents
- regional and driver demographics related to accidents
- number and types of injuries
- whether certain regions have more accidents than others
- whether time of day is a factor in accidents
- whether those in accidents drive more or less than the average in the company
- percent of accidents caused by the other driver
- percent of accidents caused by high-risk drivers

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### **Boeing: Communication Up, Down, Across System**

Every Tuesday, the corporate director of safety, health and environment meets through video conferencing with the Process Council, which includes the heads of safety, health and environment within each Boeing business unit. Site safety and health directors may also tune in if they wish.

Every business unit has executive safety councils for each site. At larger sites, the executive safety councils generally have separate safety meetings; smaller sites often integrate safety into a regular business meeting.

The executive safety councils of 25-40 are comprised of the site operations director and all of their staff. The councils analyze metrics charts provided by the corporate safety and health department, determine whether policy is being properly executed and search for system improvements.

Often the head of safety and health for the site keeps minutes, but sometimes they lead the meeting. Ideally, the heads of safety and health are considered subject matter experts who are knowledgeable about best practices, changes in laws and government policies. The site directors analyze trends and implement improvements. The executive safety council meetings are mimicked throughout the organization with crew safety meetings. A crew safety meeting might consist of the group who puts wings together and their supervisor.

In addition to the series of meetings, the company has a web-based communications system that delivers daily news to managers and employees. Recently, the corporate safety and health department used this web-based system to send out information about the anthrax threat and company response to all employees.

Safety professionals in the organization also have cross-section teams organized by subject. These teams hold a monthly web-based meeting. They include a safety

committee, environmental, medical and materials. Within each of these large subject areas are subcommittees. For example, the safety committee has subcommittees for ergonomics, industrial hygiene and physical safety.

The corporate safety department uses the groups a resource. If a new ergonomics law is passed, the ergonomics group will develop suggestions to ensure that the company is in compliance. The group reports to the Process Council, which takes the input, builds the plan and communicates the plan throughout the organization.

Therefore, changes in the system are not solely top down. The ideas come to the corporate safety and health department from a cross-section of safety professionals within the business units and are then distributed throughout the company.

Once a year all the safety and health managers at Boeing meet for three or four days to discuss best practices and lessons-learned.

### **Delphi Automotive Systems: Personnel Involvement an Intricate Part of the Process**

Employee involvement has been one of the cornerstones of Delphi Automotive System's safety and health culture change. Delphi worked extensively with the union when designing the culture change and every aspect of the system involves employee representation.

Every plant has joint management and union health and safety representatives who report to the plant manager. All of the safety and health programs, such as ergonomics, have as many union representatives as management representatives. All of the safety and health trainers in ergonomics, lockout, hazardous materials, etc., are hourly employees who Delphi trained to be trainers.

Hourly employees are involved in writing safe operating practices because no one knows the job better than the ones performing it. Union representatives work beside management when conducting the safety observation tours and union representatives helped design a new root-cause analysis investigation process that never blames the employee (see Culture Change section).

"We would not be anywhere near the improvement we've had if we had not worked with our unions," says Karl Bossung, manager, health and safety for Delphi.

### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Health and Safety Teams Give Return on Investment**

Newport News Shipbuilding has 40 health and safety task teams that represent the entire shipyard. Each team has both hourly and salaried representatives, including union representatives, as well as a manager. Each team elects its own leaders – often the elected leader is not the supervisor.

The teams work toward process improvement. For example, rather than telling employees “you need to wear your hard hat” they work to remove hazards from the process so the hard hat becomes unnecessary. They also conduct root-cause accident investigations of more severe accidents – those that involve property loss, for example. Generally, accident investigations are the responsibility of the foreman.

The health and safety task teams conduct weekly inspections of their area, noting improvements that are needed in compliance, equipment, etc. They compile inspection data and report to management. Task team leaders meet in a quarterly summit to compare data and lessons-learned. At an end of the year task team celebration, a judging panel made up of company management and employee representatives recognizes the best achievers.

It is a sign of management commitment at Newport News that the employees on the task teams spend considerable time away from their regular jobs. Management feels that the time spent is well worth it: Measured by both leading and trailing indicators, the health and safety task teams have produced the greatest return on investment of any aspect of the Newport News Shipbuilding health and safety program.

### **DuPont: Building Safety and Health into Requirements**

DuPont’s acquisitions total \$11-\$12 billion per year, including everything from complex chemicals to cardboard boxes. At DuPont the people who work with the acquisitions process ensure that safety, health and environmental considerations are integrated into specifications or requisitions to buy or lease the equipment.

Because line management is responsible for safety and health, they will often aid the acquisitions staff – the better the engineering on the front end, the less need for controls such as personal protective equipment.

Vendors sometimes build equipment specifically for DuPont and then sell the newly designed equipment to other companies, advertising that DuPont considers it safe.

If a safety flaw is found in a piece of equipment at DuPont, steps are taken immediately to solve the problem. Solutions range from retrofit fixes to scrapping the equipment altogether.

### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Using MSDSs to Track Acquisition Hazards**

Newport News Shipbuilding integrates safety and health into their acquisition requirements process through their hazard communication program. Every product Newport News purchases must be accompanied by a MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) before payment is made on the product. That material is transferred into a web-based hazard communications system on the company’s Intranet, so that anyone in the yard can access the information.

Newport News conducts both destructive and non-destructive testing of materials to judge flammability, toxicity and other elements. If a material is judged inadequate it is replaced. Both the testing information and hazard communication (MSDS) information about materials are passed to customers.

### **DuPont: Holding Contractors to High Standards**

DuPont's contractors are integrated into DuPont's safety and health management system. The safety and health record of a contractor is a factor in whether the contractor is chosen for a job. They must have an experience modification rate<sup>5</sup> of less than one and they must show documentation of their corporate safety program.

If those two things are not in place, the contractor will not make the bidding list. The sourcing departments within the line organization make contract decisions.

The sourcing groups within the line organization make the contract decisions with the input of key stakeholders. Contractor on the job lost time injuries and fatalities are reported to the CEO within 24 hours. The statistics are updated monthly for recordkeeping and trend comparison. Contractors have a number of requirements as part of their safety and health programs at DuPont.

Contractors perform their own audits, which DuPont oversees.

DuPont supervisors also watch contractors for any signs of unsafe acts. If a supervisor notices something amiss, DuPont shuts down the job for the day. If safety numbers don't match DuPont standards during a job, a contractor is removed from the list of approved contractors for some period of time.

### **Newport News Shipbuilding: Contractor Accountability**

Every contractor who applies for work within Newport News Shipbuilding must provide the company with a written safety and health program and some statistics that show where the contractor's safety and health rates are relative to industry – total case rate or experience modification rate of one or less, for example. Prospective contractors are also required to disclose any Occupational Safety and Health Administration willful violations within the past three years.

In addition, the companies often must provide industry-specific plans and qualifications. Asbestos contractors need to provide a written asbestos plan, along with certifications. Lead-abatement has its own industry-specific requirements, etc.

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<sup>5</sup> Experience modification rate is an insurance measurement that relates a company's health and safety loss performance against their industry average. 1.0 is the average, less than one is better than average, and greater than one is worse than average.

Two people on the corporate health and safety staff work exclusively with verifying the qualifications of contractors. If applicants are below industry standards in safety and health, they are rejected as a qualified contractor.

Once a contractor begins a job, each contractor has a company liaison who works to ensure that contractors follow safety and health rules. If a contractor worker commits unsafe acts, he or she is removed from the shipyard. If a contractor as a whole does not live up to safety and health requirements, they are either removed from the job or removed from the list of approved contractors.

Metrics of lost-time case rates and total case rates must be reported to Newport News Shipbuilding throughout the time the contractor is on site.

The company's contractor safety and health program improves safety and health of both Newport News and the contractors.

### **DuPont: Working to Prevent Off-the-job Injuries**

As part of their evolving program, DuPont is working to integrate off-the-job safety into their safety and health management system. Whether an employee is hurt on or off the job, the collective productivity of the company is reduced. While DuPont does not tell employees what they can do with their time off work, they do educate employees so they can make good choices away from the office or factory.

DuPont tracks off-the-job fatalities and injuries that cause employees to miss work. Those injuries and fatalities are reported at the corporate level and to the CEO along with numbers of occupational injuries and fatalities.

The injuries and fatalities are categorized as falls and slips, sports related, driving and other. Just as with an on-the-job fatality, the company CEO receives a report on an on-the-job fatality within 24 hours.

Along with the on-the-job metrics, the corporate safety and health director always has the current off-the-job injury and fatality numbers at her fingertips. As of September, of 90,000 DuPont employees around the world, the company had six fatalities, including four driving fatalities, one motorcycle fatality, zero pedestrian and one other.

Of 360 off-the-job injuries that cause employees to lose time off work through the end of August, 23 percent were from falls and slips, 19 percent from sports, 19 percent driving and 16 percent other.

In order to influence employee behavior outside work, DuPont must walk a fine line between helping employees and invading their privacy. One of the ways to accomplish this is by education at work that benefits DuPont employees away from work.

An example: May is electrical safety month at DuPont. The education campaign includes training on how to use good electrical safety practices at work, as well as education on electrical safety at home.

DuPont employees also learn about home electrical outlet protection, use of personal protective equipment at home, value of healthy diet and exercise, dangers of falls in the home, the importance of wearing a seat belt and defensive driving techniques.

## **APPENDIX E - COST METHODOLOGY**

### **DoD Safety and Occupational Health Costs**

It is important to state at the outset that the NSC panel was unable to find a way to assess the total OSD and military service cost of injuries and illnesses – direct and indirect -- consistent with standard industry practices. Much of the data needed for this analysis was unavailable. NSC could not find the proper data, nor could the OSD (or the Military Services) provide it. The NSC Panel considers this omission a major managerial shortfall because injury and illness loss data is fundamental information needed for sound, executive decision-making.

The lack of data forced the NSC to make many assumptions, and we did so very conservatively. We used two methodologies. Both methodologies are problematic because key data elements are missing. In addition, both methodologies are very conservative. Our estimates for annual OSD and Services injury and illness loss range from \$10 billion to \$21 billion. The methodologies are described below.

#### **Methodology A: Civilian FECA extrapolation - \$10 billion per year.**

The FY 2000 FECA cost for DoD's 659,000 civilians is \$615,000,000. With 1.4 million uniformed personnel, the civilian to uniformed personnel ratio is 1:2.12. Using the civilian FECA costs as a base, the annual cost for hospitalization, disability and compensation for uniformed personnel is \$1.3 billion. This total does not include such cost elements as death and/or termination compensation, sick leave, outpatient medical expenses and long term compensation, which are paid for by the government for uniformed personnel. Data for these costs were not available for the assessment.

**Total direct costs are \$2 billion per year.**

The NSC multiplied direct costs by a factor of 4\*\* to obtain indirect costs, which include such avoidable costs as those to train and compensate a replacement worker, repair or replace damaged property, investigate the accident and implement corrective action, and maintain insurance coverage. Other productivity loss costs include those expenses related to schedule delays, added administrative time, increased insurance premiums, lower morale, increased absenteeism, and poorer customer relations. The NSC felt that a factor of 4 was conservative, especially considering the unique and specialized infrastructure and equipment requirements of the Services.

**Total indirect costs are \$7.7 billion annually.**

**Total annual injury and illness costs are \$10 billion.**

\*\* Only further research will reveal the exact indirect cost ratio. Studies show that the ratio of indirect costs to direct costs varies widely, from a high of 20:1 to a low of 2:1. For the purposes of this assessment, we are using a conservative ratio of 4:1.

Sources: OSHA's webpage: "Safety Pays" Expert System

*Business Roundtable, Improving Construction Safety Performance: A Construction Industry Cost Effectiveness Project Report, Report A-3, January, 1982*

**Methodology B: Partial Aggregate Cost Computation - \$21 billion per year.**

For this approach, the NSC searched for aggregate costs that would be considered an injury or illness expense. Fortunately, the OSD and the services do collect an abundance of information. However, much of it is inconsistent and cannot be consolidated into a cohesive and comprehensive picture of injury and illness cost for uniform and civilian personnel either within a single service, much less across the DoD. The data is derived from multiple databases, each with different data definitions, elements and collection methodologies. Consequently, the NSC had to make many assumptions.

The chart below outlines the NSC's data sources and computations. The methodology, including assumptions, is described in the footnotes.

Type of Cost	Civilian	Military	Total
<b>Direct Costs:</b>			
1. Worker Compensation	\$ 615 million <sup>1</sup>	\$ 888 million <sup>2</sup> \$ 432 million <sup>2</sup>	\$ 1.93 billion
2. Boarded out to the Veterans Administration	N/A	\$ 2.2 billion <sup>3</sup>	\$ 2.2 billion
<b>Indirect Costs:</b> Include training, retraining, replacement, work stoppage and productivity loss. A factor of 4 times the Direct Cost	x 4 <sup>4</sup>	x 4 <sup>4</sup>	x 4 <sup>4</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 3.1 billion</b>	<b>\$ 17.6 billion</b>	<b>\$ 20.6 billion</b>

**About the data.** Loss data for DoD civilian employees is derived directly from FECA data (Federal Employees' Compensation Act). This data is equivalent to workers' compensation data in the private sector. Since comparable data is not collected for uniformed personnel, we have partially replicated this cost from discrete sources. Off-duty losses for uniformed personnel have been included in the total cost because these employees need to be available 24 hours a day.

<sup>1</sup>**Civilian Workers' Compensation** data is from U.S. Department of Labor (the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs), FECA. Data provides workers' compensation for occupational injury costs charged to Federal employing agencies for FY2001. Total = \$614,966,821

<sup>2</sup>**Uniformed personnel workplace compensation.** Uniform workers' compensation costs are based on best available data and are a combination of Class A-C Mishap and hospitalization data.

Of the total, \$888 million is from Class A, B and C Mishaps for FY94. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces*, Air Force pp 3-77; Marines pp 3-51; Navy pp 3-23; Army pp 3-21). Class A data consists of fatality or permanent total disability, incidents with a loss of at least \$1 million, and/or aircraft, missile or spacecraft destroyed. Class B includes permanent partial disability, or five or more people hospitalized as inpatients and incidents resulting in costs over \$200,000 but under \$1 million. Class C includes lost time and incidents resulting in cost between \$10,000 and \$200,000.

Unlike FECA data, however, Class A Mishap data includes equipment losses, which can be significant. Because equipment expenses could not be separated from disability and compensation costs, they were kept as a direct expense, rather than an indirect cost, which may be more appropriate.

\$432 million is based on FY 94 uniformed personnel hospitalization rates. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces*, Air Force pp 5-95; pp 5-71 Marines; Navy pp 5-49; Army pp 5-13). We are treating all of the hospitalization as injury and trauma events.

In FY 1994, there were 170,000 hospitalization events, and we are assuming that this is an average annual rate that can be applied to FY 2000. Deduct an all service average of 10 percent for pregnancies. (Source: *Atlas of Injuries in the U.S. Armed Forces*). Deduct another 8 percent for hostile, assault and self-inflicted injuries (Source: Amoroso, Paul, et al. Viewpoint: A comparison of Cause-of-injury coding in U.S. Military and Civilian Hospitals, *Am J Pre Med* 2000;18(3S):169). Multiply the total of 139,230 events by \$3,100 - FY 2000 per event average. (Source: Surgeon's General Office, U.S. Navy).

<sup>3</sup>**Veterans Administration.** The life-cycle cost of injuries and illnesses includes costs for long term compensation and medical care for uniformed personnel who have been discharged from the military for their disability. The Veterans Administration is responsible for these cost, which for FY 2000 exceeded \$22 billion. Since the VA does not track causes of disability, we conservatively estimated that 10 percent of the population administered by the VA were discharged from the service for an occupational injury or illness.

<sup>4</sup>**Indirect Costs.** Indirect costs are described above. These costs are substantial and have not been researched by the OSD or the Services. We are assuming that their costs will be higher than those in general industry because of DoD's mission, and we are using an indirect cost factor of 4.

## **APPENDIX F – OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS -- MAJOR COMPONENTS**

**Management Leadership and Commitment:** This addresses 1) the establishment of organizational structures where managers and employees are empowered and supported by senior management in the execution of their OSH duties and the designation of a management representative who is responsible for overseeing the proper functioning of OSH arrangements; and 2) the allocation of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of the OSH management system.

**Employee Participation:** This addresses the way workers at every organizational level are actively involved in the development, implementation and continuous improvement of OSH arrangements. Many OSH professionals believe that management leadership and commitment, and worker participation, are among the most, if not the most, important elements of a sound OSH management system.

**Continual Improvement:** This addresses the way OSH performance improves. This can be defined and expressed in numerous ways. The basic idea here is that an organization seek ways to achieve ongoing improvement of OSH performance. The primary goal of continual improvement activities is the elimination of worker injury, illness, disease, and death.

**Evaluation:** Within a systems framework, the evaluation functions can be thought of as part of the feedback loop that allows system elements to find out how they are performing. These functions include an overall performance measurement system, traditional audits, incident investigations, and medical surveillance.

**Integration:** This addresses the manner in which OSH activities are integrated into the fabric of an organization. These are typically activities that happen as OSH activities and management systems mature. The extent to which OSH activities are integrated on an ongoing basis is one example of a measure of continual improvement. An example within the DoD would be the extent to which OSH issues are integrated with operational readiness functions.

**Management Review:** Management review is a function that provides an overall assessment of the management system's performance in relation to organizational norms, regulatory expectations, and stakeholder concerns. The general purpose of the management review is to assess the overall OSH management system, to aggregate lessons-learned, improve performance, and modify existing systems in response to changing conditions and activities. It is through this activity that the OSH arrangements, the organization, and the environment external to the organization are linked. This involves evaluating the OSH arrangement's ability to meet the overall needs of the organization, its stakeholders, its employees, and regulating agencies.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 11 2002

335 SA

Mrs. Shari Tolbert

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Tolbert:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of October 29. We have had significant delays in mail deliveries to the Pentagon during the past several weeks, so it has just reached me.

You and your children – and all the families who lost loved ones at the Pentagon on September 11 – are never far from my thoughts. Lieutenant Commander Tolbert was a patriot, and a defender of our freedom. We will never forget his sacrifice.

Thank you again for your letter and for your kind words of support. I appreciate them a great deal.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11MAR02

U04431-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7574

February 14, 2002 2:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter

Please give me a copy of the letter from the woman whose husband I mentioned in my Day of Remembrance speech. Also, I would like to see the draft of the letter going back to her.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021402-11



Please respond by 02/22/02

*2/25*

→ Exec Sec -

*Copy BDM  
done 2/20  
sc*

*Please ask C/D  
for another copy. Come  
in around the time of  
the snow/fake (2/15).  
Do not recall the woman's  
name - Tony Dolan can  
help.  
D. Rita*

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JAN 31 PM 12:09

October-29, 2001

Mr Donald H. Rumsfeld  
1000 Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Secretary of Defense



SA0001975

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I wanted to thank you for mentioning my husband specifically in your speech at the Pentagon memorial service. My husband was LCDR Otis V Tolbert who worked in your IP section under Admiral Porterfield and Ms. Long.

(b)(6)

I want you to know sir, that I find no greater comfort than to see you on the television during news conferences. I can see it in your eyes that you are about the business of tracking down these terrorists and exacting war upon them and their supporting nations. I appreciate your resolve and unwavering determination.

May God bless you and our nation's leaders during this difficult time

Sincerely,

Shari Tolbert

March 11, 2002 12:39 PM

China

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith  
 Steve Cambone  
 Gen. Myers  
 Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PRC

Here is an interesting paper on China that is well worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.

John W. Garver, "The [former] Coming War with America," Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology

DHR:dh  
031102-29

.....

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

11MAR02

## **The [former] Coming War with America**

John W. Garver

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs  
Georgia Institute of Technology

In February 2001 the Newspaper and Periodical Department of China's State Press and Publishing Administration issued a Notice on Clarifying and Rectifying News Reporting on Military Affairs. The Notice stipulated that "All special periodicals and pages on military affairs published by local institutions should be reviewed by the General Political Affairs Department of the PLA and approved by the State Press and Publishing Administration." The notice said that in order to boost sales, some publications had made up or distorted military news, used sensationalized headlines and terminology to attract readers, and had even led to "serious disclosure of China's military secrets." Henceforth serious investigation and punishment would be applied to news publications that violated guidelines by fabricating stories on military affairs or by disclosing military secrets.<sup>1</sup>

During the spring and summer of 2000 I had occasion to purchase at book stalls on the streets of several interior Chinese cities --- Yinchuan, Lanzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu --- examples of the publications which were later banned. During the same period I visited a number of eastern and coastal Chinese cities, but found none of these sensationalist journals there. These journals provide a window into a militaristic strain of China's new nationalism.

As the State Press and Publishing Administration Notice indicated, these magazines used sensationalistic headlines, text, and photographs to attract leaders. All of the magazines I ran across had high quality, glossy photographs on the outside covers showing Chinese soldiers rushing across beaches, some grasping knives in their mouths and faces covered with camouflage grease, or PLA ships, planes, tanks, and artillery blazing away. Amphibious assault vessels and troops were a favored theme. Similar photographs were liberally dispersed on inside pages.

The theme of these magazines was China's preparations for an upcoming war to recover Taiwan. All of the magazines were issued in months before or just after the March 2000 Taiwan election which Chen Sui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party won. The magazines were clearly part of a psychological warfare campaign intended to influence the voters of Taiwan not to vote for Chen and the DDP. The message was: a vote for Chen is a vote for war. They were also intended to deter Taiwan's rulers, whoever they might be, from reckless actions. A number of articles specified the taboo actions which would force China to resort to war: writing "Lee Teng-hui's 'two states theory'" into Taiwan's constitution, changing the formal name of the Taiwan state, changing the flag, formally declaring independence. Continued refusal to accept Beijing's "one country, two systems" concept, and/or "the one China principle" was also frequently identified as grounds for China's resort to military force against Taiwan.

Talk of war between China and Taiwan is not new or remarkable. What *is* new, and what is significant about these magazines and makes them worthy of consideration, is their open contemplation of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. In each magazine several articles wrote in graphic detail about a China-U.S. war. Writers

in all journals were agreed that the United States would enter a cross-Strait war over Taiwan --- although writers differed as to the scope of probable U.S. intervention. Most significantly, they agreed that China could defeat the United States in such a war. China, they agreed, could win a war with the United States over Taiwan. They described in considerable detail how this would be accomplished.

All of the dozen or so articles describing a U.S.-China war envisioned that conflict arising out of a cross-Strait China-Taiwan war that began with a PLA response to "Taiwan independence provocations." Scenarios for a PLA attack on Taiwan differed from article to article. Several articles envisioned, or argued in favor of, a swift, overwhelming, decisive PLA attack on Taiwan which could create a fate accomplished by bringing that island under PLA control before United States forces could deploy and respond in force. An article in one magazine published in Lanzhou, argued that at the start of a war over Taiwan, U.S. military strength in the region "would not be great" (bu hui tai duo) and "incapable of all out war with China" (bu zu yi dui zhongguo quanmian kaizhan).<sup>2</sup> The United States and its Japanese ally would therefore probably adopt very limited involvement --- e.g. declaring a protective zone around Taiwan for commercial ships and aircraft of neutral countries. In this event "China can make appropriate concessions to win time and conclude the Taiwan war." If the U.S. military again pressed in on China, China would respond with "counter-deterrence." China could consider "allowing its forces to clash with those of the United States" (bu xi yu meijun fasheng mocha), while using diplomatic channels to "convey regret." This would demonstrate China's resolve "while doing everything possible to control the situation."

During the initial period of the Sino-U.S. war, U.S. forces would not have completed their regional deployments and would therefore not take the initiative. During this period "the crux of [Chinese] counter-deterrence would be to convey to the United States and Japan that they cannot undertake 'limited intervention,' and that any intervention would necessarily mean all out war with China" (mei ri bu neng 'you xian jie ru,' yi dan jie ru, jiu bixu yu zhongguo quan mian jiaozhan). The PLA could also put to sea large numbers of submarines to "struggle" with U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. The concentration of PLA strength in the East China Sea, i.e., between Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan, would pose considerable threat to Chinese forces. But if the PLA followed the tactics of "drawing the enemy to our doorstep" and used shore-based anti-ship missiles, the battle "could continue for some period of time" (jinchi xiangdang yi duan shijiande). By these means U.S. forces might be dissuaded from intervening. If the United States nonetheless decided to intervene in a major fashion, "China can only be prepared to quickly escalate the war to a major nuclear war" (zhongguo zhi you junbei jiang zhanzheng xunshu shengji bu xi da hedazhan). Chinese willingness to wage a nuclear war with the United States over Taiwan "may compel the U.S. military not to dare to throw in major military forces, allowing China to win time and conclude the Taiwan war."

Another article in the same magazine also stressed the role of China's nuclear arsenal in deterring U.S. intervention in a Taiwan war.<sup>3</sup> When it came to a major nuclear war, the article said, 200 warheads were no different from 5,000 warheads. The U.S. could be expected to intervene in a cross Strait war, but would limit its intervention to a "high technology local war to avoid setting off a nuclear war." Thus a U.S.-PRC war

over Taiwan would be confined to a limited area. China could then prevail by waging a long war of attrition. United States would not undertake a "direct contest with the mainland," but could be expected to give Taiwan military assistance. This would leave China "no choice but to declare that the whole nation is in a state of war" and send its submarines to attack U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. At the cost of twenty Chinese submarines for each U.S. carrier sunk, the PLA should be able to sink over three U.S. carriers. This would force the remaining three to four U.S. carriers to withdraw from the battle zone and return to their bases in Japan. These engagements would cost the PLA half of its warships and over 1,000 aircraft. But the result would deny U.S. forces air and sea superiority around Taiwan. The United States would also be "continually surprised by discovery of new PLA weapons" and by "an unbelievably rapid system for reinforcing" PLA forces.

At some point the United States might decide to bomb strategic sites deep in China. The U.S. would discover, however, that Chinese defenses were not weak. The U.S. would lose one out of every three "stealth aircraft" it sent to attack China. China's great size would give it a major strategic advantage. U.S. forces would find attack on targets deep inside China to be very difficult and costly. The war might continue for one year. Bridges, railways, highways, power stations, and military production facilities in China's coastal areas might be bombed and those regions generally "cease production." Yet the U.S. would find that China's state organs continued to function, electricity was still being delivered to China's coastal cities, and that China's war effort was still powerful. Munitions factories in China's "third front" --- which one article listed in some detail --- would continue to produce submarines, warplanes, and missiles. Finally

internal crisis within the United States would compel Washington to abandon the war. U.S. casualties would be far higher than anticipated. An economic crisis would ensue from the war. Finally the U.S. Congress would impeach the President responsible for the war and the new President would declare U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan war. Japan would soon thereafter reach its own peace agreement with China. With U.S. forces out of the way, the PLA would mobilize a massive invasion force. This would force Taiwan's capitulation. The war would set back China's economy by 8 years, the author predicts. But within five years of the war, China's economy would have recovered and relations with the United States and Japan would be "normalized."

The lead article in another magazine argued that China enjoyed the major strategic advantage of being able to determine when a Taiwan war would be fought.<sup>4</sup> The Taiwan independence elements in Taiwan were propped up by the United States and "will not be so stupid as to suddenly declare independence or take some other reckless independence moves." This meant that "When to fight a war over Taiwan will be determined by us, not by the United States or Taiwan" (shemo shihou kai da taiwan shi women shoule suan, er jue bu shi meiguo he taiwan). This would give China perhaps two to four more years to prepare for war. During this period China would enter the World Trade Organization. This meant that "the Western economies will become even more dependent" on the China market, and that "economic sanctions against the Chinese mainland will bring [the Western economies] even greater damage." During the several years before launching a war to recover Taiwan, the PLA could also carry out constant maneuvers against Taiwan. This would accustom the enemy to seeing large-scale military activity on the mainland adjacent Taiwan, and cause Taiwan and the U.S. to

eventually lower their level of alertness. These maneuvers could also be used as camouflage for secret concentration of forces for a swift attack on Taiwan. "Once exercises are finished, for every five tanks participating, leave two behind. For every five cannon, leave two behind, and hide them in previously prepared fortifications while using artificial tanks and cannot to make up the deficits and ostentatiously withdraw them. U.S. satellites will see how many we deploy and how many are withdrawn." PLA soldiers could be covertly deployed to frontline positions by using leave issued for National Day or New Years, then having them put on civilian clothes and "disappear among the masses" until the designated time. Shortly before the attack, aircraft from across China could be deployed to front line airfields within one or two hours. The result would be complete surprise. This would deny the U.S. adequate time to prepare for intervention.

At the appointed hour, coordinated assaults on Taiwan's beaches, harbors, and airports would establish beachheads through which large and heavily armed PLA forces would pour. The objective would be to bring all of Taiwan under full and effective PLA occupation within two weeks or at most a month. Once on Taiwan, PLA forces would root out all resistance and dig in deeply in preparation to resist possible U.S. invasion. Additional Chinese armies would be deployed to Taiwan as quickly as possible. This would confront the United States of the necessity of invading and wresting Taiwan from large, well-prepared, and determined PLA armies. This swift and resolute Chinese action in the opening stages of the war would create a fate accompli that could only be undone by major U.S. ground forces and, thus, casualties.

China would use diplomatic, legal, and economic measures to prevent U.S. intervention, but it could not hope that the U.S. would not intervene. Yet the experience of the Korean War demonstrated that the U.S. "will not, or will not dare, to formally declare war on China or launch a complete war against China." If the United States could not even defeat little Vietnam, how could it dare to take on China?, the author asked. "We can confidently say that a [U.S.-PRC] war over Taiwan will occur only in the Taiwan Strait, just as the Korean War was confined to the Korean peninsula."

Confronted by the prospect of major ground operations and thus U.S. casualties, the U.S. Congress would need some time, "at least several weeks or a month," to debate the question of war or peace with China. The longer the U.S. debate continued, the stronger the PLA position on Taiwan would become. U.S. businesses would oppose war with China because it would injure their commercial interests. Fear of U.S. casualties would be great; "The U.S. did not dare to fight a ground war in Yugoslavia [in 1999], how would it dare to fight a ground war with the PLA?" U.S. territory would not have been attacked; "Taiwan is not Pearl Harbor." The question before the U.S. Congress would be: "Should we send troops to attack a Taiwan occupied by China?" Eventually the Congress would decide that U.S. youth should not be sacrificed for the sake of Chinese matters. The U.S. "would abandon the idea of attacking Taiwan." That would leave only blockade of Taiwan. Blockade of Taiwan would, however, expose U.S. ships and aircraft to continual air and missile attack from PLA forces on Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, it would create hardships for the people of Taiwan and thus condemn the United States before world opinion. In the end, "the United States would do nothing and tacitly accept the fact that China now has Taiwan."

Another article in the same magazine involved interviews with two individuals who were apparently the head or deputy head and a researcher at a PLA research center.<sup>5</sup> These individuals also deemed U.S. intervention in a cross Strait war virtually certain, and felt that the crux of Chinese victory in such an eventuality was "understanding the confrontation between the United States and China." "U.S. intervention would probably be limited" (meiguo de jieru yingai shi you xiande), because the U.S. was unwilling to lose the China market and U.S. allies would be unwilling to go along with the United States. U.S. leaders would also fear that a war with China would require the blood of American youth. While a large-scale regional war or even a nuclear war were possible, they were not likely. A big war would not be advantageous to either side. Thus, indirect and limited U.S. intervention was most likely --- arms transfers, intelligence support, logistic support, and threatening maneuvers or even attacks on Chinese facilities by U.S. aircraft carriers. Ultimately, however, U.S. leaders would decide that U.S. interests in Taiwan were not important enough to entail major sacrifices to protect. The major reason the U.S. was engaged with Taiwan was not democracy, as the U.S. said. "Democracy" was simply a tactic used by the U.S. leaders to fool the people. U.S. interests in Taiwan were not very important, and had to do with partisan or even individual political advantage on the U.S. domestic political scene. Ultimately these sober facts would dominate U.S. policy, and the U.S. would acquiesce to Chinese take over of Taiwan.

The lead article of a third magazine also laid out a scenario of swift and massive PLA assault on Taiwan.<sup>6</sup> PLA missiles, warplanes, and electronic warfare measures first paralyze Taiwan's defenses. Then PLA assault forces seize beachheads and harbors.

Mobilized commercial vessels then ferry large second echelon forces to Taiwan. Within a short period the island will be under PLA control. A series of subsequent articles discuss preparations for attack and seizure of Taiwan's Gaoxiong harbor, PLA amphibious capabilities and maneuvers, preparations for rapid nation-wide concentration of airplanes to areas adjacent to Taiwan. One article described how PLA M-9 and M-11 missiles could completely overwhelm Taiwan's within 3-4 hours. Another article detailed Chinese preparations transportation and communications links, railways, core airports, harbors and wharves, and other "critical installations" against air attack. All articles shared complete confidence in the PLA's ability to swiftly subdue Taiwan; one article estimated that Taiwan could hold out for five days.

Articles in this third magazine agreed that the United States would intervene in such a cross Strait war, but also maintained that such intervention would be very limited and ultimately ineffective. Public opinion polls in the United States indicated that a substantial majority was opposed to war with China for the sake of Taiwan.<sup>7</sup> Anti-war sentiments were strong among American youth. Those youth were not willing to fight a war, and this was in accord with the "democratic spirit." The American "masses are generally unwilling to fight a war" (laobaixing pubian bu yuan da jiang de xintai). In the U.S., "Even one casualty produces a national outcry." U.S. interests in Taiwan were essentially "moral" and the U.S. people would be skeptical of sacrificing American youth for such interests. Ultimately the United States would conclude that "American lives are probably too valuable" (meiguoren de ming dagai tai zhi qian). Thus, "The probability of the U.S. sending forces to assist in the defense [of Taiwan] is not great."

Another article in the same magazine agreed. The United States would certainly act in the event of a cross-Strait war, but "U.S. actions will be based on U.S. national interests."<sup>8</sup> This meant that U.S. intervention would be very limited. A U.S. war with China would mean that "U.S. economic, cultural, and military cooperation interests with China would suffer greatly in such areas as talks regarding the Korean peninsula, cooperation regarding nuclear disarmament, missile exports, arms control, and actions in the United Nations Security Council." To protect its interests in these areas "The United States will not brave the danger of a war with the China mainland for the sake of Lee Teng-hui's 'Taiwan independence,' even less will it deploy land, naval, and air forces to undertake a direct contest with the PLA." There was "no danger of an all-out China-U.S. war" because such a war would not accord with U.S. national interest. "China is a huge market and U.S. commercial circles are not willing to lose.

This article also pointed toward a Chinese strategy of threatened drastic escalation as a way of countering limited U.S. intervention. Limited U.S. intervention in the form of weapons transfers to Taiwan, intelligence cooperation, and aircraft carrier deployments was the most likely form of U.S. assistance to Taiwan. "Actually, if the U.S. adopts such hidden measures to support Taiwan in the midst of a PLA attack on Taiwan, this is equivalent to declaring war on China" (Ruguo meiguo zai zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dui tai kai zhan zhi huo xisu zaichu zhexie yinxing fangshi dui tai shishi zhiyuan de hua, nei jiu dengyu xiang zhongguo xuan zhan). This, in turn would "carry the danger of a major nuclear war which the American people are also unwilling to see" " (ruguo zhong mei zhijian jiaozhan de hua, nei jiang you hedazhan de weixian, zhe shi baokuo meiguo

renmin zai nei duo by yuanyi kan dao de). The next article discussed China's ability to produce tactical nuclear weapons.

Yet another magazine published in Beijing about the same time and dealing with the same issues, took a markedly less militaristic tone. This Beijing-published magazine spoke in far more general and less blood-curdling terms about a Chinese confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. This journal also contained no mention of possible threatened use of nuclear weapons by China. Interestingly, it also targeted Japan, rather than the United States, as the chief villain in the Taiwan situation.<sup>9</sup> Yet articles in this Beijing-published magazine agreed in broad contours regarding the PLA's ability to thwart or defeat the U.S. in a cross-Strait conflict. Taiwan's military strategy was based on defeat of the first wave of a PLA assault and then holding out until U.S. help arrived, one article said.<sup>10</sup> This was an illusion: "To want Americans to shed blood for Chinese affairs is absolutely and completely a dream." The U.S. "is not very likely to directly intervene" (bu tai keneng zhijie jieru). At most the U.S. would supply weapons to Taiwan. U.S. anti-war sentiment was strong. The U.S. withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines also left the U.S. without the capability to intervene effectively in a Taiwan Strait war and deprived the United States of the ability to "win a victory on China's doorstep." Like the non-Beijing magazines this one used lots of military-related photographs to spice up the issue.

### **Implications**

The most obvious implication of this genre of literature is that fire-breathing, jingoistic, militaristic publications have a significant popular appeal in China. The fact

that these magazines proliferated across China's interior suggests that publishers recognize a market opportunity when they see it. The simplicity and stridency of this literature also suggests a powerful emotional appeal and potential popular support available to Chinese elites that successfully associate themselves with such appeals. It is also significant that publications containing contrary points of view --- e.g., arguing that China might lose a war with the United States over Taiwan with potentially huge political and economic costs --- are not allowed. At least, this author did not encounter publications containing such perspectives in his several months of searching book stores. The abundance of literature fanning jingoistic perspectives could combine with the dearth of counter-information to create a potentially quite dangerous situation.

More ominously, the thinking exemplified in these journals probably represents, to some extent at least, thinking within PLA circles. Articles usually reflected a high degree of familiarity with PLA weaponry, exercises, and planning, and were probably derived from reporter's discussions with PLA academics. It is also worth recalling that disclosure of military secrets was one reason given by the State Press and Publishing Administration for tightening control over such publications. The implication that these magazines probably reflect, to some degree, PLA thinking is deeply troubling.

The issue of whether the PLA is willing to undertake a war with the United States often comes up at conferences and security workshops in the United States. The most common view expressed at these meetings is that PLA leaders are sober, rational men who understand very well the immense gap in military capabilities between China and the United States. They therefore understand that China would lose a war with the United States and suffer heavy losses in the process. Thus, while PLA leaders may

occasionally rattle the saber and talk about war with the United States, they in fact are clear-eyed, rational men who will be deterred by superior U.S. power. Talk of war with Taiwan and the United States is a type of political theater intended primarily to warn and pressure Taiwan, but not as an expression of actual intent --- or so the orthodox thinking in the United States runs.

The consensus of the arguments contained in these magazines challenges this comforting, orthodox U.S. thinking. Many and in fact quite sound reasons are marshaled to demonstrate that China can win a war with the United States over Taiwan. The arguments made are not irrational, but solid, manifold, and all point in the same direction: China can win at acceptable costs a war with the United States over Taiwan. This suggests that the world of rational calculation inhabited by at least some PLA officers and analysts is fundamentally different from the rational world populated by U.S. security analysts. It is quite possible that the militaristic views expressed in these journals are a minority even within the PLA. It is equally possible, however, that those views may be widespread.

Key Chinese strategies in the event of a war with the United States over Taiwan are also apparent from these articles. One strategy is to respond to the limited U.S. intervention which is deemed most likely, with major escalations --- declaration of war, nationwide mobilization for all-out war, massed submarine attacks on U.S. carrier battle-groups, massive air and naval deployments cutting sea lanes between Taiwan and Japan, etc. If the U.S. then persists in intervention, China will threaten the United States with nuclear attack. This will create a political backlash in the United States against war with China for the sake of Taiwan. Public opinion will rebel at the prospect of nuclear war

and/or the cost of heavy U.S. casualties in the Far East. U.S. commercial interests will oppose war out of fear of losing the China market. U.S. leaders will fear the many problems that hostile China could create for the United States around the world. Finally, the U.S. will acquiesce to PLA moves against Taiwan. Peace will be restored between China and the United States with Taiwan under Chinese control.

U.S. awareness of such PLA thinking may go some distance toward explaining shifts by the Bush administration in early 2001. That administration's adoption of a less "ambiguous" commitment to Taiwan, clarification of U.S. willingness to accept losses for the sake of Taiwan, and insistence on missile defense, can all be seen as responses to the influence of such militant thinking within China and, apparently, within the PLA.

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Newspapers that want to run military news must get government go-ahead, 8 February 2001, *China in the World Press*, <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/0102081/1/B201020722.asp>

<sup>2</sup> "Jiefangjun neng zai tai hai zhanzheng zhong shuzhan shu jue ma?" (Can the PLA achieve a quick war and quick decision in a Taiwan Strait war?), Tai du jiu shi zhanzheng. shi jie yue kan (Taiwan independence is war, World Observer Monthly), Special issue, 2000. Lanzhou, Gansu., p. 18-19.

<sup>3</sup> "Lun taihai zhanzheng qijian zhongguo dalu de kangdaji nengli" (On the ability of the Chinese mainland to hit back during a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 41-44.

<sup>4</sup> "Tai hai zhanzheng li women hai you dou yuan," (A Taiwan Strait war is still some distance from us), Tai hai zhanzheng. Da dong fang (Taiwan strait war, Great east), occasional publication. Haikou, Hainan. No date, but apparently published in early 2000. p. 4-31.

<sup>5</sup> "Zhongguo bu pa meiguo jiefu tai hai zhanzheng," (China does not fear American intervention in a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 32-35.

<sup>6</sup> "Jiefangjun junshi xingdong shengji," (PLA military activities escalate), Xin shi ji, zhongguo sanjun de yanxi (New Century Newsweek, big maneuvers by China's military), June 1999, general issue # 128. Haikou, Hainan.

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<sup>7</sup> "Meiguo bu hui qingyi wuli jieru liangan fenzheng," (U.S. will not lightly intervene in a cross-strait conflict", *ibid.*, p. 76-77.

<sup>8</sup> "Xifang hui junshi guanyu tai hei wei ji ma? (Will the west intervene militarily in a Taiwan strait crisis?), *ibid.*, p. 78-80.

<sup>9</sup> 'Liangguolun' xia de taiwan jundui. Shijie hangkong hangtian bolan. (Taiwan's military under the 'two state theory,' Extensive survey of world aviation and space travel), Beijing, "Special Issue. No date of publication but apparently in April 2000. 112 pages.

<sup>10</sup> "Qianli xun 'lao mu' meiguo hang mu: 'tai du' de mimi wuqi?" (Desperately seeking the U.S. aircraft carrier 'old Nimitz': the secret weapon of 'Taiwan independence?'), *ibid.*, p. 82-83.

Snowflake

March 11, 2002 1:31 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: PRC

Attached is an interesting paper on China.

Regards.

Attach.

John W. Garver, "The [former] Coming War with America," Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology

DHR:dh  
031102-32

China

11 Mar 02

11-L-0559/OSD/7594

U04481 /02

Snowflake

March 11, 2002 12:56 PM

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DHR:dh  
031102-31

11-L-0559/OSD/7595

U04481 /02

## The [former] Coming War with America

John W. Garver

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs  
Georgia Institute of Technology

In February 2001 the Newspaper and Periodical Department of China's State Press and Publishing Administration issued a Notice on Clarifying and Rectifying News Reporting on Military Affairs. The Notice stipulated that "All special periodicals and pages on military affairs published by local institutions should be reviewed by the General Political Affairs Department of the PLA and approved by the State Press and Publishing Administration." The notice said that in order to boost sales, some publications had made up or distorted military news, used sensationalized headlines and terminology to attract readers, and had even led to "serious disclosure of China's military secrets." Henceforth serious investigation and punishment would be applied to news publications that violated guidelines by fabricating stories on military affairs or by disclosing military secrets.<sup>1</sup>

During the spring and summer of 2000 I had occasion to purchase at book stalls on the streets of several interior Chinese cities --- Yinchuan, Lanzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu --- examples of the publications which were later banned. During the same period I visited a number of eastern and coastal Chinese cities, but found none of these sensationalist journals there. These journals provide a window into a militaristic strain of China's new nationalism.

As the State Press and Publishing Administration Notice indicated, these magazines used sensationalistic headlines, text, and photographs to attract leaders. All of the magazines I ran across had high quality, glossy photographs on the outside covers showing Chinese soldiers rushing across beaches, some grasping knives in their mouths and faces covered with camouflage grease, or PLA ships, planes, tanks, and artillery blazing away. Amphibious assault vessels and troops were a favored theme. Similar photographs were liberally dispersed on inside pages.

The theme of these magazines was China's preparations for an upcoming war to recover Taiwan. All of the magazines were issued in months before or just after the March 2000 Taiwan election which Chen Sui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party won. The magazines were clearly part of a psychological warfare campaign intended to influence the voters of Taiwan not to vote for Chen and the DDP. The message was: a vote for Chen is a vote for war. They were also intended to deter Taiwan's rulers, whoever they might be, from reckless actions. A number of articles specified the taboo actions which would force China to resort to war: writing "Lee Teng-hui's 'two states theory'" into Taiwan's constitution, changing the formal name of the Taiwan state, changing the flag, formally declaring independence. Continued refusal to accept Beijing's "one country, two systems" concept, and/or "the one China principle" was also frequently identified as grounds for China's resort to military force against Taiwan.

Talk of war between China and Taiwan is not new or remarkable. What *is* new, and what is significant about these magazines and makes them worthy of consideration, is their open contemplation of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. In each magazine several articles wrote in graphic detail about a China-U.S. war. Writers

in all journals were agreed that the United States would enter a cross-Strait war over Taiwan --- although writers differed as to the scope of probable U.S. intervention. Most significantly, they agreed that China could defeat the United States in such a war. China, they agreed, could win a war with the United States over Taiwan. They described in considerable detail how this would be accomplished.

All of the dozen or so articles describing a U.S.-China war envisioned that conflict arising out of a cross-Strait China-Taiwan war that began with a PLA response to "Taiwan independence provocations." Scenarios for a PLA attack on Taiwan differed from article to article. Several articles envisioned, or argued in favor of, a swift, overwhelming, decisive PLA attack on Taiwan which could create a fate accomplished by bringing that island under PLA control before United States forces could deploy and respond in force. An article in one magazine published in Lanzhou, argued that at the start of a war over Taiwan, U.S. military strength in the region "would not be great" (bu hui tai duo) and "incapable of all out war with China" (bu zu yi dui zhongguo quanmian kaizhan).<sup>2</sup> The United States and its Japanese ally would therefore probably adopt very limited involvement --- e.g. declaring a protective zone around Taiwan for commercial ships and aircraft of neutral countries. In this event "China can make appropriate concessions to win time and conclude the Taiwan war." If the U.S. military again pressed in on China, China would respond with "counter-deterrence." China could consider "allowing its forces to clash with those of the United States" (bu xi yu meijun fasheng mocha), while using diplomatic channels to "convey regret." This would demonstrate China's resolve "while doing everything possible to control the situation."

During the initial period of the Sino-U.S. war, U.S. forces would not have completed their regional deployments and would therefore not take the initiative. During this period "the crux of [Chinese] counter-deterrence would be to convey to the United States and Japan that they cannot undertake 'limited intervention,' and that any intervention would necessarily mean all out war with China" (mei ri bu neng 'you xian jie ru,' yi dan jieru, jiu bixu yu zhongguo quan mian jiaozhan). The PLA could also put to sea large numbers of submarines to "struggle" with U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. The concentration of PLA strength in the East China Sea, i.e., between Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan, would pose considerable threat to Chinese forces. But if the PLA followed the tactics of "drawing the enemy to our doorstep" and used shore-based anti-ship missiles, the battle "could continue for some period of time" (jinchi xiangdang yi duan shijiande). By these means U.S. forces might be dissuaded from intervening. If the United States nonetheless decided to intervene in a major fashion, "China can only be prepared to quickly escalate the war to a major nuclear war" (zhongguo zhi you junbei jiang zhanzheng xunshu shengji bu xi da hedazhan). Chinese willingness to wage a nuclear war with the United States over Taiwan "may compel the U.S. military not to dare to throw in major military forces, allowing China to win time and conclude the Taiwan war."

Another article in the same magazine also stressed the role of China's nuclear arsenal in deterring U.S. intervention in a Taiwan war.<sup>3</sup> When it came to a major nuclear war, the article said, 200 warheads were no different from 5,000 warheads. The U.S. could be expected to intervene in a cross Strait war, but would limit its intervention to a "high technology local war to avoid setting off a nuclear war." Thus a U.S.-PRC war

over Taiwan would be confined to a limited area. China could then prevail by waging a long war of attrition. United States would not undertake a "direct contest with the mainland," but could be expected to give Taiwan military assistance. This would leave China "no choice but to declare that the whole nation is in a state of war" and send its submarines to attack U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. At the cost of twenty Chinese submarines for each U.S. carrier sunk, the PLA should be able to sink over three U.S. carriers. This would force the remaining three to four U.S. carriers to withdraw from the battle zone and return to their bases in Japan. These engagements would cost the PLA half of its warships and over 1,000 aircraft. But the result would deny U.S. forces air and sea superiority around Taiwan. The United States would also be "continually surprised by discovery of new PLA weapons" and by "an unbelievably rapid system for reinforcing" PLA forces.

At some point the United States might decide to bomb strategic sites deep in China. The U.S. would discover, however, that Chinese defenses were not weak. The U.S. would lose one out of every three "stealth aircraft" it sent to attack China. China's great size would give it a major strategic advantage. U.S. forces would find attack on targets deep inside China to be very difficult and costly. The war might continue for one year. Bridges, railways, highways, power stations, and military production facilities in China's coastal areas might be bombed and those regions generally "cease production." Yet the U.S. would find that China's state organs continued to function, electricity was still being delivered to China's coastal cities, and that China's war effort was still powerful. Munitions factories in China's "third front" --- which one article listed in some detail --- would continue to produce submarines, warplanes, and missiles. Finally

internal crisis within the United States would compel Washington to abandon the war. U.S. casualties would be far higher than anticipated. An economic crisis would ensue from the war. Finally the U.S. Congress would impeach the President responsible for the war and the new President would declare U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan war. Japan would soon thereafter reach its own peace agreement with China. With U.S. forces out of the way, the PLA would mobilize a massive invasion force. This would force Taiwan's capitulation. The war would set back China's economy by 8 years, the author predicts. But within five years of the war, China's economy would have recovered and relations with the United States and Japan would be "normalized."

The lead article in another magazine argued that China enjoyed the major strategic advantage of being able to determine when a Taiwan war would be fought.<sup>4</sup> The Taiwan independence elements in Taiwan were propped up by the United States and "will not be so stupid as to suddenly declare independence or take some other reckless independence moves." This meant that "When to fight a war over Taiwan will be determined by us, not by the United States or Taiwan" (shemo shihou kai da taiwan shi women shoule suan, er jue bu shi meiguó he taiwan). This would give China perhaps two to four more years to prepare for war. During this period China would enter the World Trade Organization. This meant that "the Western economies will become even more dependent" on the China market, and that "economic sanctions against the Chinese mainland will bring [the Western economies] even greater damage." During the several years before launching a war to recover Taiwan, the PLA could also carry out constant maneuvers against Taiwan. This would accustom the enemy to seeing large-scale military activity on the mainland adjacent Taiwan, and cause Taiwan and the U.S. to

eventually lower their level of alertness. These maneuvers could also be used as camouflage for secret concentration of forces for a swift attack on Taiwan. "Once exercises are finished, for every five tanks participating, leave two behind. For every five cannon, leave two behind, and hide them in previously prepared fortifications while using artificial tanks and cannot to make up the deficits and ostentatiously withdraw them. U.S. satellites will see how many we deploy and how many are withdrawn." PLA soldiers could be covertly deployed to frontline positions by using leave issued for National Day or New Years, then having them put on civilian clothes and "disappear among the masses" until the designated time. Shortly before the attack, aircraft from across China could be deployed to front line airfields within one or two hours. The result would be complete surprise. This would deny the U.S. adequate time to prepare for intervention.

At the appointed hour, coordinated assaults on Taiwan's beaches, harbors, and airports would establish beachheads through which large and heavily armed PLA forces would pour. The objective would be to bring all of Taiwan under full and effective PLA occupation within two weeks or at most a month. Once on Taiwan, PLA forces would root out all resistance and dig in deeply in preparation to resist possible U.S. invasion. Additional Chinese armies would be deployed to Taiwan as quickly as possible. This would confront the United States of the necessity of invading and wresting Taiwan from large, well-prepared, and determined PLA armies. This swift and resolute Chinese action in the opening stages of the war would create a fate accompli that could only be undone by major U.S. ground forces and, thus, casualties.

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Confronted by the prospect of major ground operations and thus U.S. casualties, the U.S. Congress would need some time, "at least several weeks or a month," to debate the question of war or peace with China. The longer the U.S. debate continued, the stronger the PLA position on Taiwan would become. U.S. businesses would oppose war with China because it would injure their commercial interests. Fear of U.S. casualties would be great; "The U.S. did not dare to fight a ground war in Yugoslavia [in 1999], how would it dare to fight a ground war with the PLA?" U.S. territory would not have been attacked; "Taiwan is not Pearl Harbor." The question before the U.S. Congress would be: "Should we send troops to attack a Taiwan occupied by China?" Eventually the Congress would decide that U.S. youth should not be sacrificed for the sake of Chinese matters. The U.S. "would abandon the idea of attacking Taiwan." That would leave only blockade of Taiwan. Blockade of Taiwan would, however, expose U.S. ships and aircraft to continual air and missile attack from PLA forces on Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, it would create hardships for the people of Taiwan and thus condemn the United States before world opinion. In the end, "the United States would do nothing and tacitly accept the fact that China now has Taiwan."

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Mobilized commercial vessels then ferry large second echelon forces to Taiwan. Within a short period the island will be under PLA control. A series of subsequent articles discuss preparations for attack and seizure of Taiwan's Gaoxiong harbor, PLA amphibious capabilities and maneuvers, preparations for rapid nation-wide concentration of airplanes to areas adjacent to Taiwan. One article described how PLA M-9 and M-11 missiles could completely overwhelm Taiwan's within 3-4 hours. Another article detailed Chinese preparations transportation and communications links, railways, core airports, harbors and wharves, and other "critical installations" against air attack. All articles shared complete confidence in the PLA's ability to swiftly subdue Taiwan; one article estimated that Taiwan could hold out for five days.

Articles in this third magazine agreed that the United States would intervene in such a cross Strait war, but also maintained that such intervention would be very limited and ultimately ineffective. Public opinion polls in the United States indicated that a substantial majority was opposed to war with China for the sake of Taiwan.<sup>7</sup> Anti-war sentiments were strong among American youth. Those youth were not willing to fight a war, and this was in accord with the "democratic spirit." The American "masses are generally unwilling to fight a war" (laobaixing pubian bu yuan da jiang de xintai). In the U.S., "Even one casualty produces a national outcry." U.S. interests in Taiwan were essentially "moral" and the U.S. people would be skeptical of sacrificing American youth for such interests. Ultimately the United States would conclude that "American lives are probably too valuable" (meiguoren de ming dagai tai zhi qian). Thus, "The probability of the U.S. sending forces to assist in the defense [of Taiwan] is not great."

Another article in the same magazine agreed. The United States would certainly act in the event of a cross-Strait war, but "U.S. actions will be based on U.S. national interests."<sup>8</sup> This meant that U.S. intervention would be very limited. A U.S. war with China would mean that "U.S. economic, cultural, and military cooperation interests with China would suffer greatly in such areas as talks regarding the Korean peninsula, cooperation regarding nuclear disarmament, missile exports, arms control, and actions in the United Nations Security Council." To protect its interests in these areas "The United States will not brave the danger of a war with the China mainland for the sake of Lee Teng-hui's 'Taiwan independence,' even less will it deploy land, naval, and air forces to undertake a direct contest with the PLA." There was "no danger of an all-out China-U.S. war" because such a war would not accord with U.S. national interest. "China is a huge market and U.S. commercial circles are not willing to lose.

This article also pointed toward a Chinese strategy of threatened drastic escalation as a way of countering limited U.S. intervention. Limited U.S. intervention in the form of weapons transfers to Taiwan, intelligence cooperation, and aircraft carrier deployments was the most likely form of U.S. assistance to Taiwan. "Actually, if the U.S. adopts such hidden measures to support Taiwan in the midst of a PLA attack on Taiwan, this is equivalent to declaring war on China" (Ruguo meiguo zai zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dui tai kai zhan zhi huo xisu zaichu zhexie yinxing fangshi dui tai shishi zhiyuan de hua, nei jiu dengyu xiang zhongguo xuan zhan). This, in turn would "carry the danger of a major nuclear war which the American people are also unwilling to see" " (ruguo zhong mei zhijian jiaozhan de hua, nei jiang you hedazhan de weixian, zhe shi baokuo meiguo

renmin zai nei duo by yuanyi kan dao de). The next article discussed China's ability to produce tactical nuclear weapons.

Yet another magazine published in Beijing about the same time and dealing with the same issues, took a markedly less militaristic tone. This Beijing-published magazine spoke in far more general and less blood-curdling terms about a Chinese confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. This journal also contained no mention of possible threatened use of nuclear weapons by China. Interestingly, it also targeted Japan, rather than the United States, as the chief villain in the Taiwan situation.<sup>9</sup> Yet articles in this Beijing-published magazine agreed in broad contours regarding the PLA's ability to thwart or defeat the U.S. in a cross-Strait conflict. Taiwan's military strategy was based on defeat of the first wave of a PLA assault and then holding out until U.S. help arrived, one article said.<sup>10</sup> This was an illusion: "To want Americans to shed blood for Chinese affairs is absolutely and completely a dream." The U.S. "is not very likely to directly intervene" (bu tai keneng zhijie jieru). At most the U.S. would supply weapons to Taiwan. U.S. anti-war sentiment was strong. The U.S. withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines also left the U.S. without the capability to intervene effectively in a Taiwan Strait war and deprived the United States of the ability to "win a victory on China's doorstep." Like the non-Beijing magazines this one used lots of military-related photographs to spice up the issue.

### **Implications**

The most obvious implication of this genre of literature is that fire-breathing, jingoistic, militaristic publications have a significant popular appeal in China. The fact

that these magazines proliferated across China's interior suggests that publishers recognize a market opportunity when they see it. The simplicity and stridency of this literature also suggests a powerful emotional appeal and potential popular support available to Chinese elites that successfully associate themselves with such appeals. It is also significant that publications containing contrary points of view --- e.g., arguing that China might lose a war with the United States over Taiwan with potentially huge political and economic costs --- are not allowed. At least, this author did not encounter publications containing such perspectives in his several months of searching book stores. The abundance of literature fanning jingoistic perspectives could combine with the dearth of counter-information to create a potentially quite dangerous situation.

More ominously, the thinking exemplified in these journals probably represents, to some extent at least, thinking within PLA circles. Articles usually reflected a high degree of familiarity with PLA weaponry, exercises, and planning, and were probably derived from reporter's discussions with PLA academics. It is also worth recalling that disclosure of military secrets was one reason given by the State Press and Publishing Administration for tightening control over such publications. The implication that these magazines probably reflect, to some degree, PLA thinking is deeply troubling.

The issue of whether the PLA is willing to undertake a war with the United States often comes up at conferences and security workshops in the United States. The most common view expressed at these meetings is that PLA leaders are sober, rational men who understand very well the immense gap in military capabilities between China and the United States. They therefore understand that China would lose a war with the United States and suffer heavy losses in the process. Thus, while PLA leaders may

occasionally rattle the saber and talk about war with the United States, they in fact are clear-eyed, rational men who will be deterred by superior U.S. power. Talk of war with Taiwan and the United States is a type of political theater intended primarily to warn and pressure Taiwan, but not as an expression of actual intent --- or so the orthodox thinking in the United States runs.

The consensus of the arguments contained in these magazines challenges this comforting, orthodox U.S. thinking. Many and in fact quite sound reasons are marshaled to demonstrate that China can win a war with the United States over Taiwan. The arguments made are not irrational, but solid, manifold, and all point in the same direction: China can win at acceptable costs a war with the United States over Taiwan. This suggests that the world of rational calculation inhabited by at least some PLA officers and analysts is fundamentally different from the rational world populated by U.S. security analysts. It is quite possible that the militaristic views expressed in these journals are a minority even within the PLA. It is equally possible, however, that those views may be widespread.

Key Chinese strategies in the event of a war with the United States over Taiwan are also apparent from these articles. One strategy is to respond to the limited U.S. intervention which is deemed most likely, with major escalations --- declaration of war, nationwide mobilization for all-out war, massed submarine attacks on U.S. carrier battle-groups, massive air and naval deployments cutting sea lanes between Taiwan and Japan, etc. If the U.S. then persists in intervention, China will threaten the United States with nuclear attack. This will create a political backlash in the United States against war with China for the sake of Taiwan. Public opinion will rebel at the prospect of nuclear war

and/or the cost of heavy U.S. casualties in the Far East. U.S. commercial interests will oppose war out of fear of losing the China market. U.S. leaders will fear the many problems that hostile China could create for the United States around the world. Finally, the U.S. will acquiesce to PLA moves against Taiwan. Peace will be restored between China and the United States with Taiwan under Chinese control.

U.S. awareness of such PLA thinking may go some distance toward explaining shifts by the Bush administration in early 2001. That administration's adoption of a less "ambiguous" commitment to Taiwan, clarification of U.S. willingness to accept losses for the sake of Taiwan, and insistence on missile defense, can all be seen as responses to the influence of such militant thinking within China and, apparently, within the PLA.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Newspapers that want to run military news must get government go-ahead, 8 February 2001, *China in the World Press*, <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/0102081/1/B201020722.asp>

<sup>2</sup> "Jiefangjun neng zai tai hai zhanzheng zhong shuzhan shu jue ma?" (Can the PLA achieve a quick war and quick decision in a Taiwan Strait war?), Tai du jiu shi zhanzheng, shi jie yue kan (Taiwan independence is war, *World Observer Monthly*), Special issue, 2000. Lanzhou, Gansu., p. 18-19.

<sup>3</sup> "Lun taihai zhanzheng qijian zhongguo dalu de kangdaji nengli" (On the ability of the Chinese mainland to hit back during a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 41-44.

<sup>4</sup> "Tai hai zhanzheng li women hai you dou yuan," (A Taiwan Strait war is still some distance from us), Tai hai zhanzheng, Da dong fang (Taiwan strait war, Great east), occasional publication. Haikou, Hainan. No date, but apparently published in early 2000. p. 4-31.

<sup>5</sup> "Zhongguo bu pa meiguo jiefu tai hai zhanzheng," (China does not fear American intervention in a Taiwan Strait war), *ibid.*, p. 32-35.

<sup>6</sup> "Jiefangjun junshi xingdong shengji," (PLA military activities escalate), Xin shi ji, zhongguo sanjun de yanxi (New Century Newsweek, big maneuvers by China's military), June 1999, general issue # 128. Haikou, Hainan.

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<sup>7</sup> "Meiguo bu hui qingyi wuli jieru liangan fenzheng," (U.S. will not lightly intervene in a cross-strait conflict", *ibid.*, p. 76-77.

<sup>8</sup> "Xifang hui junshi guanyu tai hei weiji ma? (Will the west intervene militarily in a Taiwan strait crisis?), *ibid.*, p. 78-80.

<sup>9</sup> 'Liangguolun' xia de taiwan jundui, Shijie hangkong hangtian bolan, (Taiwan's military under the 'two state theory,' Extensive survey of world aviation and space travel), Beijing, "Special Issue. No date of publication but apparently in April 2000. 112 pages.

<sup>10</sup> "Qianli xun 'lao mu' meiguo hang mu: 'tai du' de mimi wuqi?" (Desperately seeking the U.S. aircraft carrier 'old Nimitz': the secret weapon of 'Taiwan independence?'), *ibid.*, p. 82-83.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 12 2002

His Excellency Kim Dong Shin  
Minister of Defense  
Republic of Korea

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for the beautiful holiday card. You were kind to think of me. Because of delays in delivery of mail to the Pentagon, it has just reached me.

Please accept my warmest wishes for health, happiness and prosperity in the coming year.

Sincerely,

335 SD

12/1/02

U04484-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7612

showfake

9/16/02

September 16, 2002 5:53 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Transcription

350.00150

I just looked at the book by the Frenchman who claims that 9/11 was a fake. In there, he quotes me saying something from the press briefing the night of 9/11, and I never said it. It turns out it was a question, and your transcribers put my name to it. That is a serious problem. It is a terrible quote.

You are going to have to correct the transcript and find a way to get proofreaders for future transcripts. If it takes a little longer, that's tough apples, but I can't have inaccurate things going out the way they are going out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091602-38

.....  
Please respond by 09/27/02

16SEP02

U04484 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/7613

TO: SecDef  
FROM:  Terrie Clarke  
DATE: 1 October 2002  
SUBJECT: Transcription

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
OCT 9 2002

Since the "LOC" - "Yellow Sea" mistake in the transcript, we have been very deliberate with all phases of transcription. I am attaching the additional steps we put in place to help assure our transcripts are complete and accurate, yet delivered in a timely manner (Snowflake response dtd 5 August 2002, Tab 24). The new system has only been in place for a month, but it seems to be working.

I agree, the mistake in the transcript from the Sept 11, 2001 briefing is awful. To the best of our knowledge Mr. Meyssan is the only one to catch the error (Tab 25). We corrected the record immediately and prepared the attached response to query which addresses why we felt it important to correct the transcript (Tab 26). We are also prepared to provide copies of the briefing videotape to anyone who asks about the error. Additionally, we have contacted Senator Levin's staff to inform him of the error and our subsequent correction.

We will continue to deliberately review every transcript in an effort to provide the best product we are capable of producing.

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/7614

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke

DATE: 5 August 2002

SUBJECT: Transcripts/Kurdistan/Kyrgyzstan

We have instructed Federal News Service to pay close attention to proper names when transcribing and to call the Press Ops duty officer if they have any questions or confusion. Additionally, the duty officer will take additional steps above and beyond the current proofing to include:

- 1) Listening to the tape of the briefing while reviewing the transcript to ensure the transcript accurately reflects the comments made,
- 2) Watching the briefing as it occurs to note any sensitive topics and to better understand the context of comments; and
- 3) Paying special attention to geographic locations and the names of people mentioned in the transcript.

# UNCORRECTED

Q: Mr. Secretary, were there threats issued against other U.S. facilities elsewhere in the world today?

Rumsfeld: The -- I don't know that there's a day that's gone by since I've been in this job that there haven't been threats somewhere in the world to some facility somewhere. It's a -- it's one of the complexities of the intelligence business that you have to sort through those kinds of things. But we don't get into the specifics.

Yes? You had your hand up? Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, there were rumors earlier in the day that the plane which crashed in Pennsylvania had been brought down by the United States, either shot down or in some other manner.

Rumsfeld: We have absolutely no information that any U.S. aircraft shot down any other aircraft today.

Q: I wonder if we could just ask Senator Levin one thing, Senator, if that's all right.

Levin: You bet.

Rumsfeld: Senator Levin, you and other Democrats in Congress have voiced fear that you simply don't have enough money for the large increase in defense that the Pentagon is seeking, especially for missile defense, and you fear that you'll have to dip into the Social Security funds to pay for it. Does this sort of thing convince you that an emergency exists in this country to increase defense spending, to dip into Social Security, if necessary, to pay for defense spending -- increase defense spending?

Levin: One thing where the committee was unanimous on, among many, many other things, was that the -- we authorized the full request of the President, including the \$18 billion. So I would say that Democrats and Republicans have seen the need for the request.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you describe what steps are being taken -- defensive measures -- beyond force protection, and whether there's been any operational planning for homeland defense and as to --

Rumsfeld: Those aren't the kinds of things that one discusses.

Q: Sir, the perpetrators of the Khobar Towers bombing were never found -- the Cole bombing as well. What assurances or what confidence do you have that the perpetrators of this act will be found?

Rumsfeld: All one can offer by way of assurance is a seriousness of purpose. We're still taking bodies out of this building, so I would say that that's a little premature.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: You've talked about -- and others at the podium have talked about being ready, the military is ready, General Shelton said. And we understand the Navy has dispatched two carriers and some guided-missile cruisers and destroyers and a couple of Marine Corps helicopter amphibious ships, such as the Bataan -- it's not the Bataan -- here and to New York. Can you tell us if that's true? And also any other things you can share with us about how the United States military is preparing to take

11-L-0559/OSD/7616



United States Department of Defense

## News Transcript

On the web: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09112001\\_t0911sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09112001_t0911sd.html)Media contact: [media@defenselink.mil](mailto:media@defenselink.mil) or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: [public@defenselink.mil](mailto:public@defenselink.mil) or +1 (703) 428-0711

UNCORRECTED

**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001 - 6:42 p.m. EDT

### DoD News Briefing on Pentagon Attack

(Also participating were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), and Senator John Warner (R-Va.))

Rumsfeld: This is a -- first of all, good evening. This is a tragic day for our country. Our hearts and prayers go to the injured, their families and friends.

We have taken a series of measures to prevent further attacks and to determine who is responsible. We're making every effort to take care of the injured and the casualties in the building. I'm deeply grateful for the many volunteers from the defense establishment and from the excellent units from all throughout this region. They have our deep appreciation.

We have been working closely throughout the day with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dick Myers, who is currently participating in a meeting elsewhere in the building, and a great many other officials from throughout the government.

I should say we've received calls from across the world offering their sympathy and indeed their assistance in various ways.

I'm very pleased to be joined here by Chairman Carl Levin and Senator John Warner. Senator Warner called earlier today and offered his support and was kind enough to come down and has been with us. We've very recently had a discussion with the president of the United States. Chairman Hugh Shelton has just landed from Europe. Secretary of the Army Tom White, who has a responsibility for incidents like this as executive agent for the Department of Defense, is also joining me.

It's an indication that the United States government is functioning in the face of this terrible act against our country. I should add that the briefing here is taking place in the Pentagon. The Pentagon's functioning. It will be in business tomorrow.

I know the interest in casualty figures, and all I can say is it's not possible to have solid casualty figures at this time. And the various components are doing roster checks, and we'll have information at some point in the future. And as quickly as it's possible to have it, it will certainly be made available to each of you.

I'll be happy to take a few questions after asking first General Shelton if he would like to say anything, and then we will allow the others to make a remark or two.

11-L-0559/OSD/7617

**Correction to DoD Transcript Dated September 11, 2001**  
**"DoD News Briefing on Pentagon Attack"**  
**(Response to Query Only)**  
**September 17, 2002**

**QUESTION:** Why is the Pentagon changing the news briefing transcript from September 11, 2001?

**ANSWER:** While we strive to ensure all transcripts are correct before they are posted; when an error is identified it is critical that we correct the record. In the transcript cited, a question asked by one of the media representatives present at the briefing was inadvertently attributed to Secretary Rumsfeld. When this was brought to our attention, we reviewed the tape of the briefing, verified there was an error and corrected it.

**QUESTION:** Is a copy of the tape available?

**ANSWER:** Absolutely. We would be happy to provide the tape to anyone interested in viewing it.

**QUESTION:** Why wait so long to correct this error?

**ANSWER:** The error was not identified until recently. As soon as it was brought to our attention, we verified who made the statement and corrected the record.

**QUESTION:** If such a significant error was made on such an important transcript, why should we believe your transcripts are accurate?

**ANSWER:** Our transcripts are provided by an independent transcription service. They are then verified by a desk officer who listens to an audiotape of the event while simultaneously reading the transcript. While it is inevitable that occasional errors will occur, we strive to be as accurate as possible in a timely manner.

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Updated: 11 Sep 2001



United States Department of Defense

# News Transcript

**CORRECTED**

On the web:

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09112001\\_t0911sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09112001_t0911sd.html)

Media contact: [media@defenselink.mil](mailto:media@defenselink.mil) or (b)(6)

Public contact: [public@defenselink.mil](mailto:public@defenselink.mil) or (b)(6)

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## CORRECTED

Rumsfeld: Those kinds of decisions are made day to day. It is correct that we had aircraft flying protective missions at various places in the United States today. And they will do that as appropriate.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: -- what do you say to the American people who may have questions on how something so coordinated has been carried out against this nation? What do you say to them who might not have confidence that our intelligence and security are what they should have been?

Rumsfeld: I say to them that the president of the United States will be making some remarks to them this evening that will address those subjects.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've declared -- the Pentagon has declared Threatcon Delta for forces around the world. Could you tell me why? Have you received any threats? Or has anyone claimed credit for this?

Rumsfeld: We have in fact declared Force Protection Condition Delta and a condition of high alert -- indeed, the highest alert. We did so almost immediately upon the attacks, and it is still in force.

Q: Mr. Secretary, were there threats issued against other U.S. facilities elsewhere in the world today?

Rumsfeld: The -- I don't know that there's a day that's gone by since I've been in this job that there haven't been threats somewhere in the world to some facility somewhere. It's a -- it's one of the complexities of the intelligence business that you have to sort through those kinds of things. But we don't get into the specifics.

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Rumsfeld: We don't make announcements about ship deployments.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Can you describe the fire-fighting efforts that are going on right now in that corridor and the search-and-rescue efforts that are beginning?

Rumsfeld: Can I describe them?

Q: Yeah.

Rumsfeld: Why don't we let the Secretary of the Army, who was out there with me a few minutes ago and has been talking to the incident commander on the site.

Snowflake

October 7, 2002 4:45 PM

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq's WMD

Here is the unclassified paper on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.

We ought to have a stack available to pass out at briefings, so people can take it with them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
October 2002 CIA White Paper: "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"

DHR:dh  
100702-64

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

NOCT02

U04506 /03



# **Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

*October 2002*

**0012**

11-L-0559/OSD/7623

## **Key Judgments**

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### **Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

**Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.**

**Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts.** Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

**Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.**

- Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.
- Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
- Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
- Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

**How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.**

- If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
  - Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.
- Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

- Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

**Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.** Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

- Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.
- The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.

**All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.**

- Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
- Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

**Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.**

- Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
- Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.
- Baghdad's UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.
- Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.

## Discussion

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### Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.

Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

- Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.
- Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information about Iraq's WMD programs.

Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries. **Nevertheless, Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.**

- UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extended-range Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.
- Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas.

## UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections and Monitoring: Theory and Practice

Resolution Requirement	Reality
<p><b>Res. 687 (3 April 1991)</b> Requires Iraq to declare, destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also formed the Special Commission and authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of WMD-related facilities based on Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's designation of any additional locations.</p>	<p>Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, submitted several declarations as part of its aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for longer-range systems and did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.</p>
<p><b>Res. 707 (15 August 1991)</b> Requires Iraq to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or requests.</p>	<p>Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive," and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after lengthy negotiations at each site.</p>
<p><b>Res. 715 (11 October 1991)</b> Requires Iraq to submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs; approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.</p>	<p>Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of Iraq's WMD programs does not have a specified end date under current UN resolutions.</p>
<p><b>Res. 1051 (27 March 1996)</b> Established the Iraqi export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items.</p>	<p>Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuring—outside of UN controls—dual-use items with WMD applications. The UN lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough inspections of goods at Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.</p>
<p><b>Res. 1060 (12 June 1996)</b> and Resolutions 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205. Demands that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraqi officials for interviews. UNSCR 1137 condemns Baghdad's refusal to allow entry to Iraq to UNSCOM officials on the grounds of their nationality and its threats to the safety of UN reconnaissance aircraft.</p>	<p>Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals. At times, Baghdad would promise compliance to avoid consequences, only to renege later.</p>
<p><b>Res. 1154 (2 March 1998)</b> Demands that Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply.  <b>Res. 1194 (9 September 1998)</b> Condemns Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.  <b>Res. 1205 (5 November 1998)</b> Condemns Iraq's decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM.</p>	<p>UNSCOM could not exercise its mandate without Iraqi compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM and instead negotiated with the Secretary General, whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.</p>
<p><b>Res. 1284 (17 December 1999)</b> Established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and demanded that Iraq allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all aspects of Iraq's WMD program.</p>	<p>Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN resolutions relevant to disarmament. Compared with UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman less authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that inspectors be full-time UN employees.</p>

Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq's stockpile of uranium oxide.

**In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad's already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs. Baghdad's vigorous concealment efforts have meant that specific information on many aspects of Iraq's WMD programs is yet to be uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.**

- Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile-development facilities and to increase its ability to produce WMD.

### **Nuclear Weapons Program**

More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

- Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.

- Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.
- In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements—outside the Oil-for-Food process—some of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.

Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear program—unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.


Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continued interest in reviving a nuclear program.

Iraq's expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program.

- The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.
- **Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.**

**Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon.**

**Iraq: Declared Nuclear Facilities**



## Chemical Warfare Program

Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors. Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s Saddam had a formidable CW capability that he used against Iranians and against Iraq's Kurdish population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than 20,000 people in multiple attacks, delivering chemical agents (including mustard agent<sup>1</sup> and the nerve agents sarin and tabun<sup>2</sup>) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets, and artillery shells against both tactical military targets and segments of Iraq's Kurdish population. Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad had a large stockpile of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production capacity.

Documented Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons				
Date	Area Used	Type of Agent	Approximate Casualties	Target Population
Aug 1983	Hajj Umran	Mustard	fewer than 100	Iranians/Kurds
Oct-Nov 1983	Panjwin	Mustard	3,000	Iranian/Kurds
Feb-Mar 1984	Majnoon Island	Mustard	2,500	Iranians
Mar 1984	al-Basrah	Tabun	50 to 100	Iranians
Mar 1985	Hawizah Marsh	Mustard/Tabun	3,000	Iranians
Feb 1986	al-Faw	Mustard/Tabun	8,000 to 10,000	Iranians
Dec 1986	Umm ar Rasas	Mustard	thousands	Iranians
Apr 1987	al-Basrah	Mustard/Tabun	5,000	Iranians
Oct 1987	Sumar/Mehran	Mustard/nerve agents	3,000	Iranians
Mar 1988	Halabjah	Mustard/nerve agents	hundreds	Iranians/Kurds

<sup>1</sup> Mustard is a blister agent that causes medical casualties by blistering or burning exposed skin, eyes, lungs, and mucus membranes within hours of exposure. It is a persistent agent that can remain a hazard for days.

<sup>2</sup> Sarin, cyclosarin, and tabun are G-series nerve agents that can act within seconds of absorption through the skin or inhalation. These agents overstimulate muscles or glands with messages transmitted from nerves, causing convulsions and loss of consciousness. Tabun is persistent and can remain a hazard for days. Sarin and cyclosarin are not persistent and pose more of an inhalation hazard than a skin hazard.

**Chemical-Filled Munitions Declared by Iraq**

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
*Iraqi 250-gauge  
chemical bomb.*



*Iraqi 500-gauge  
chemical bombs.*



*Iraqi DB-2  
chemical bomb.*



*Iraqi R-400  
chemical bombs.*



*Iraqi 155-mm  
chemical shell.*



*Iraqi Al Husayn  
chemical  
warheads.*



*122-mm rockets  
filled with the  
chemical nerve  
agent sarin prior  
to destruction.*

Although precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of even more Iraqi chemical attacks against civilians in the 1987 to 1988 time frame—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to the Iranian and Turkish borders.

- UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven different types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads.

More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX,<sup>3</sup> sarin, cyclosarin,<sup>4</sup> and mustard.

- **Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort.** Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for.
- UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq War—bombs that remain unaccounted for.
- Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.
- Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents.

**Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production.** The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian


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<sup>3</sup> VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to but more advanced than G-series nerve agents in that it causes the same medical effects but is more toxic and much more persistent. Thus, it poses a far greater skin hazard than G-series agents. VX could be used for long-term contamination of territory.


<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5.

needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production.

- Fallujah II was one of Iraq's principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levels—capabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.




**Iraq: CW-Related Production Facilities and Declared Sites of Deployed Alcohol-Filled or Chemical Agent-Filled Munitions During Desert Storm**



## Biological Warfare Program

**Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so.** This capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program.

**After four years of claiming that they had conducted only “small-scale, defensive” research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents.** The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq’s military industries.



*Two R-400A bombs in foreground photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bear markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs appear to have markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill. This evidence contradicted Iraq’s declarations that it did not deploy BW munitions to operational airbases and that it destroyed all BW bombs in July 1991—declarations that were subsequently retracted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.*

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Iraq: Declared BW-Related Sites



### Iraqi-Acknowledged Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons

Location-Date	Agent	Munition
Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i> <sup>5</sup>	250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	Aflatoxin	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Khan Bani Saad – Aug 1988	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	aerosol generator – Mi-2 helicopter with modified agricultural spray equipment
Al Muhammadiyat – Dec 1989	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	Aflatoxin	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range – Sep 1989	Ricin	155mm artillery shell (cap. 3 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990	Water	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990	Water/potassium permanganate	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991	Water/glycerine	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i> /Glycerine	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

- Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax,<sup>6</sup> botulinum toxin, (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours), and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion), and preparing BW-filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war.


Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. **Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad's declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing, including *Bacillus anthracis*—the causative agent of anthrax—and botulinum toxin.**

The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally "civilian" facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990-1991 Gulf war.

<sup>5</sup> *Bacillus subtilis* is commonly used as a simulant for *B. anthracis*.

<sup>6</sup> An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores, or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non-immuno-compromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to seven days, although in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate.

- The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Facility is one of two known Biocontainment Level-3—facilities in Iraq with an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war Al-Dawrah had been a BW agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted to render it useless for BW agent production in 1996 but left some production equipment in place because UNSCOM could not prove it was connected to previous BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce a vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq easily can import all the foot-and-mouth vaccine it needs through the UN.
- The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal cover location for BW research, testing, production, and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related to BW research at this facility, some showing that BW cultures, agents, and equipment were stored there during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the plant's new storage capacity, which greatly exceeds Iraq's needs for legitimate medical storage.
- The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is situated on a large complex with an historical connection to Iraq's CW program. Of immediate BW concern is the



potential production of ricin toxin.<sup>7</sup> Castor bean pulp, left over from castor oil production, can be used to extract ricin toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it manufactured ricin and field-tested it in artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq operated this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny before 1998 when UN inspectors left the country. Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures destroyed during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim they are making castor oil for brake fluid, but verifying such claims without UN inspections is impossible.

In addition to questions about activity at known facilities, **there are compelling reasons to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile production units and laboratories.** Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW research and production capability to better conceal its program.

- UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial Commission letterhead indicating that Iraq was interested in developing mobile fermentation units, and an Iraqi scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was trying to move in the direction of mobile BW production.
- Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW facilities.

## **Ballistic Missile Program**

**Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687.** During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.

Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.

Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.

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<sup>7</sup> Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days after inhalation.

## Iraqi Ballistic Missiles

Meters

25

20

15

10

5

0



Al Husayn

Al Abbas

Al Samoud

Ababil-100

Estimated range (km)	650	900	150 <sup>a</sup>	150 <sup>a</sup>
Propellant type	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Solid
Use	Iran/Iraq and Gulf war 1987-91	Flight tested 1988-90	Early deployment	Early deployment

<sup>a</sup>Capable of flying beyond the allowed 150-km range.


- Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.

Iraq continues to work on UN-authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those with a range no greater than 150 km—that help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM and the Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles.

- The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.


#### SA-2 (Al Samoud) Engine Test

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


*Iraq conducted static tests of the SA-2 SAM sustainer engine to support development of the Al Samoud SRBM. This test stand is capable of testing engines for Iraq's UN-authorized liquid-propellant ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles. The new test stand at Al-Rafah is larger than both this test stand and the defunct Scud engine test stand, indicating Iraqi intentions to test engines for longer-range missiles.*

# Iraq: Ballistic-Missile-Related Facilities



## IRAQ: Al Mamoun Solid-Propellant Production Plant



- The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.
- At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built

to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant.

- Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to “mix” solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings—about as large as the original ones—are ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.

**Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions.** Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.

- The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq’s solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.
- In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear SLBMs, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.


### **Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft**

**Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents.** Immediately before the Gulf war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraft—manned or unmanned—is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area.

- Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liters of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered by helicopters.

## Iraqi L-29 UAV Test-Bed Aircraft at Samarra East Airbase


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- Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq's use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This capability represents a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors and to international military forces in the region.
- Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.

### **Procurement in Support of WMD Programs**

Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. **Baghdad diverts some of the \$10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead.** Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the last four years Baghdad's earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to about \$3 billion this year.



*Test of dissemination of BW agents from a modified drop tank carried by a Mirage F1. The drop tank was filled with 1000 liters of slurry Bacillus subtilis, a simulant for B. anthracis, and disseminated over Abu Obeydi Airbase in January 1991. The photo is from a videotape provided by Iraq to UNSCOM.*

- UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo—worth hundreds of millions of dollars—that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.
- Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspections—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Even within the UN-authorized Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq does not hide that it wants to purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, **Baghdad diverted UN-approved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the civilian population.**

- Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.
- On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods—such as neutron generators and servo valves—that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment.

UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UNSCR 1284 in December 1999 and since has identified more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items as defined in UNSCR 1051 that can be diverted into WMD programs. UNMOVIC also has requested that suppliers provide technical information on hundreds of other goods because of concerns about potential misuse of dual-use equipment. In many cases, Iraq has requested technology that clearly exceeds requirements for the stated commercial end-use when it easily could substitute items that could not be used for WMD.

- On some UN contracts, Baghdad claimed that the requested goods are designed to rehabilitate facilities—such as the Al Qa'im phosphate plant and Fallujah—that in the past were used to support both industrial and WMD programs.

January 21, 2002 12:39 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

019

Please take a look at this final paragraph of Terry Robbins' memo and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/17/02 Robbins memo to SecDef re: Liability Insurance

DfR:dh  
012102-31



Please respond by 01/25/02

21 Jan 02





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR 13 AM 11:11

INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002, 3:30 PM

DEPSECDEF Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Unavailable Personnel

- Your attachment asks that we begin a process to recall Defense employees and troops performing outside the Department. At any one time, the number is about 3,500 allocated approximately as follows:
  - 1,920 in grad school (e.g., military officers pursuing Masters degrees)
  - 1,300 detailed outside DoD, fewer than half on a reimbursable basis
  - 310 in fellowships (190) or in training with industry (120)
- There has been no recent DoD-level review of the processes employed for validating the merit of these patterns (e.g., the need for graduate education or for training with industry). I believe we should initiate that review right away.
- I will brief you Monday on this matter.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by : (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7651

U04541 /02

2/26/02

February 25, 2002 4:32 PM

TO: David Chu

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel

I need help on personnel.

We have an urgent need to bring back as many military people as possible who are currently serving in non-military assignments. We are doing stop-loss, and we have brought in many Guard and Reserve forces. But we are facing a prolonged period with a high level of optempo and perstempo, and we don't have the luxury of trying to do everything at once.

I am doing everything I can to get people back from places like the Sinai, Iceland and Bosnia. I need help from you as to how we start getting detailees back and all the people working in different places in the private sector and around the government. We need to look at the number going to schools next year and see if we want to cut that back.

Please get me a list and schedule a meeting to brief me as to how we can get our arms around getting this done. I think now is the time to do it, and I would like to get it done in the next 14 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022502-54



Please respond by 03/12/02

2/26/02

February 25, 2002 4:32 PM

2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel

I need help on personnel.

We have an urgent need to bring back as many military people as possible who are currently serving in non-military assignments. We are doing stop-loss, and we have brought in many Guard and Reserve forces. But we are facing a prolonged period with a high level of optempo and perstempo, and we don't have the luxury of trying to do everything at once.

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Please get me a list and schedule a meeting to brief me as to how we can get our arms around getting this done. I think now is the time to do it, and I would like to get it done in the next 14 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022502-54

.....

Please respond by 03/12/02

25 Feb 02

Snowflake

March 11, 2002 8:58 AM

TO: Zal Khalilzad  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: King Zahir Shah

What in the world is going on with the king? Has he always been that way?

Attach.  
03/08/02 *USA Today*, "Exiled Afghan King Slams War on Terrorism"

DHR:dh  
031102-3

AFGHANISTAN

11MARR02

U04553-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7654

USA Today  
March 8, 2002  
Pg.7

### 28. Exiled Afghan King Slams War On Terrorism

The exiled king of Afghanistan denounced the U.S.-led war on terrorism in his country as "stupid and useless." In an interview with Italian daily La Stampa, Mohammad Zahir Shah said the campaign should end. He will return to Afghanistan in two weeks for a meeting of tribal elders to decide the future of the nation. It's unclear what role he will play. Zahir Shah, who did not say how to rid the country of al-Qaeda fighters still there, is in conflict with interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, who wants the anti-terrorist offensive to continue. Zahir Shah, 87, has lived in Rome since 1973, when he was ousted in a coup.

Los Angeles Times  
March 8, 2002

### 29. Philippines Narrows U.S. Hostage Search

By Tyler Marshall, Times Staff Writer

MANILA -- Philippine armed forces, with U.S. assistance, have determined the general location of two American hostages being held by Islamic militants on the southern island of Basilan and are ready to launch operations to free them, the country's chief military spokesman said Thursday.

Brig. Gen. Edilberto Adan said he expected new sightings of American missionary couple Martin and Gracia Burnham to come quickly, now that U.S. military personnel and high-technology surveillance and communications equipment had arrived on the island.

"Maybe in the next few days," he said. "We have a good idea of the general location of the Burnhams. We're now awaiting the results of our latest initiatives."

The Abu Sayyaf extremist group is holding a third hostage, a Philippine nurse named Deborah Yap, seized from a hospital in Basilan a few days after the Burnhams.

Under a U.S.-Philippine agreement signed last month, 660 American military person-

nel, along with aircraft and equipment, have been deployed to the Philippines to help rescue the hostages and crush the Abu Sayyaf rebels. A total of 160 U.S. Army Special Forces troops are on Basilan, with the remaining 500 uniformed personnel in support elsewhere.

"This has increased our awareness dramatically," Adan said.

Adan described the new initiatives as a combination of three factors: American P-3 surveillance aircraft patrolling overhead, U.S. specialists now on the ground trained to interpret the electronic imagery gathered from the sky, and the fruits of local informants who have been offered rewards for information on the Burnhams' whereabouts.

"We've had the aircraft for a while, but there was no one on the ground to interpret what they were picking up," Adan said. "Now they are in place."

The Manila newspaper Philippine Star posted a report on its Web site late Thursday evening quoting the mayor of the remote Basilan village of Maluso, who claimed that all three hostages had been seen last week moving through the community. The report could not be independently confirmed.

A Philippine force of about 3,500 has been deployed on Basilan to rescue the hostages and flush out or kill Abu Sayyaf members holding them. The government estimates the group's strength at about 80 fighters.

A far larger group of several hundred Abu Sayyaf fighters is believed to be on the nearby island of Jolo.

Although vastly outnumbered, the Islamic militants have avoided detection and capture since taking the Burnhams in May. They've been helped by the dense jungle that covers much of the island and by the fact that the poorly equipped Philippine forces have been unable to react quickly when the hostages have been sighted before.

In addition, the Abu Sayyaf has been aided by the support of another group of Muslim activists who share the goal of making the area an in-

dependent Islamic homeland. On Thursday, a former Abu Sayyaf hostage told a congressional hearing in Manila that he was handed over for a month to members of the other, larger group, known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

The Philippine military force, which includes marine and army units, has only three helicopters, each capable of transporting only nine soldiers, and communicates using old two-way radios that have a maximum range of just over one mile.

Adan said that with the arrival of the Americans, the rebels were guarding their hostages with a new level of intensity.

The terms of the U.S.-Philippine agreement, part of the American-led effort to crush international terrorist groups, forbid the Americans from engaging in combat, but they can defend themselves.

The national television channel ABS-CBN released a videotape Thursday of Martin Burnham reading a statement warning that Abu Sayyaf was "targeting U.S. citizens, those from Europe and other nations" for a variety of grievances, including Western support for Israel, sanctions against Iraq and Libya, and the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

The TV station claimed that the video dated from mid-January, but many questioned that timing.

The Abu Sayyaf group, which first surfaced in the mid-1990s, has financed its quest for an independent Muslim homeland by staging a series of kidnappings for ransom. Senior U.S. officials have linked it to the Al Qaeda terrorist network.

Manila Times  
March 8, 2002

### 30. Expanded Theater Eyed For Balikatan War Games

By Mirasol Ng-Gadil and Johanna Villaviray, Reporters; Bong Fabre and Dorian Zumel-Sicat, Correspondents

Malacañang is studying expanding the joint Philippine-US Balikatan war games from

Basilan to the Mindanao mainland, raising the possibility of a larger theater of conflict for American troops.

However, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) said new war games would need new negotiations for Terms of Reference (TOR), as the current document specifies only Basilan and Zamboanga City, with the required personnel and logistics.

#### Muslims' warning

As the Palace announced the development, Muslims in Central Mindanao rallied to protest the holding of the joint military exercises. Leaders of various Moro separatist groups warned they would "strike in Christian heartlands" in the event of a government offensive against secessionist forces.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) said it would continue its defensive posture. But the shadowy "Spider teams" of the Bangsamoro Army warned of impending attacks against major cities in Mindanao, the Visayas, and Luzon. The leftist National Democratic Front (NDF) also threatened to attack Philippine and American forces that encroach into guerrilla fronts in Southern and Western Mindanao.

President Arroyo confirmed yesterday she has asked an inter-agency Cabinet group to study the proposal for Balikatan exercises in Cotabato, Maguindanao and the Lanao provinces.

Request from local officials

She said local executives, led by South Cotabato Gov. Emmanuel Piñol, have asked for military support to stave off the spread of guerrilla activities in Central Mindanao.

An expanded Balikatan would need a new TOR, Ed Manuel, operations director of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) Commission said.

"The TOR is clear on how the Balikatan should be conducted. Any changes should be discussed and agreed on by the RP-US Mutual Defense Board (MDB)," Manuel said.

The TOR specifies that the military exercise be confined to Zamboanga, Basilan and Cebu, would not last more than



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
INFO MEMO

2002 MAR 13 PM 4:09

March 12, 2002 4:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on our safety record tracking at Tab A.
- His review of the Army and Navy safety information is on target and we are working to address his concerns.
- Our civilian prototype "Lost Day" system calculates the incident (case) rates and days lost due to injuries as Secretary O'Neill suggested. Our system is based on payroll records, not compensation claims, and provides for objective and auditable data. We are also working on a prototype to capture similar information for our military personnel using medical data. This has proven more difficult.
- We are working towards an "objective system" that will provide real time facts regarding the incident that is similar to what Secretary O'Neill suggests. Our "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT) met mid-February to review progress and set DoD goals to reduce injuries by the end of the year.
- The third point mentioned by Secretary O'Neill is that the Marine Corps civilian case rate is at the high (bad) range of the U.S. work experience. Our data from the payroll and medical records confirm that point, and suggest we have much room for improvement.
- We will be prepared to brief you on our current efforts and proposed goals for managing lost time due to injuries by early April.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by:

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7656

U04559 /02

February 25, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: David Chu  
Gordon England  
James Roche  
Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety

I am attaching some comments Paul O'Neill sent me regarding our safety record tracking. He is commenting on the Navy's format, but his suggestions may apply across-the-board.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/19/02 Secretary O'Neill memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
022202-9



Please respond by 03/04/02

U03335-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7657

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 19, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL 

Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/Marine report.

If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DOD (civilian and military). "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity. Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third, the civilian only rates in the Marine Corps are at the upper end (bad) range of U.S. work experience. (Looks like 35-40 times higher than the organization I know the best, where the environment is much more challenging than the one experienced by Marine Corps civilians.)

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/7658

2002 JAN 23 PM 12:44

January 28, 2002


TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Safety Records

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002



This is to provide our first quarterly safety report per your request (attached).

Safety is one of my top priorities. My first act was to establish myself as Chief of Safety for the Department of the Navy and to place responsibility for safety directly with me. We immediately established a Deputy Assistant Secretary position devoted solely to Safety Weekly, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I monitor accident trends. Attached are the metrics I will submit to you quarterly.

My focus areas are:

- (1) Unify the safety effort in the Department.
- (2) Use state-of-the-art technologies to improve safety and occupational health.
- (3) Embed strong safety and risk management characteristics in our Naval culture.
- (4) Integrate best private and public sector safety practices.


You will start seeing improvements.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/30
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	2/1/02
MA BUCCI	2/1/02
EXECSEC WHITMORE	2/1/02

11-L-0559/OSD/7659


U0159101/02

# Navy and Marine Corps Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01




Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

## Navy and Marine Corps Class A Flight Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01




Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

# Navy Afloat Class A Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100 ships per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.


# Navy and Marine Corps Class A Ashore Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

**Navy and Marine Corps  
PMV Fatality Rates  
As of 31 Dec 01**


PERSONAL  
MOTOR  
VEHICLES →



Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

11-L-0559/OSD/7664

# Navy and Marine Corps Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates As of 31 Oct 01



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

Information Only Coversheet

Friday, February 15, 2002

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PROFILE #: 2002-SE-001516

DATE CREATED: 02/15/2002

ADDRESSEE: Paul H. O'Neill  
Secretary

AUTHOR: Rumsfeld, Donald  
Defense

SUBJECT: Safety Records

ABSTRACT: Requests assistance in changing the format and improving the safety performance of the Navy and Marine Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
CHIEF OF STAFF

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 15, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO*

DR: This is such a mish mash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases wrote this section!

If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question.

From what I see in this report - e.g., the Secretary <sup>(of the Army)</sup> receives quarterly reports -- it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.

Attachments

*Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/marine report.*

*If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DoD (civilian and military) "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity.*

*Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third the civilian only rates in the marine corps are at the upper end of the ~~range~~ (bad) range of U.S. work experience.*

11-E-0559/OSD/4667

FEB-19-2002 18:21

know the best, where the work is much more <sup>environment,</sup>  
challenging than the one experienced by  
marine corps civilians. )

February 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Safety

Here is the quarterly report from the Army on safety. Are they on the right track?

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/31/02 SecArmy Info Memo to SecDef re: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

DHR:db  
020402-4

*Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases write this section!*

*DR: This is such a mishmash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question. From what I see in this report -- e.g. the Sec. receives quarterly reports it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.*

*DR  
2-15-02*

(b)(6)



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON  
INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FEB 7 2002 10:39 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

February 1, 2002, 8:33 A.M. FEB 04 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Tom White* Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JAN 31 2002

SUBJECT: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

- Attached provides a current analysis of Safety goals and performance metrics.
- The small increase in fatalities that we experienced during the first quarter, FY 02 is attributable to Operation Enduring Freedom.
- POV accidents continue to be our greatest challenge and the focus of our efforts to reemphasize the efforts of commanders at every level to continue to work this problem hard.
- We have made significant strides in reducing workplace injuries and lost time involving the Army's civilian workforce.
- Safety will remain at the forefront of our efforts to keep the Army ready.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: COL Joseph Schroedel

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>Heil</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>Whitmore</i>


**SUBJECT: Army Safety Goals and Performance Metrics**

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide a quarterly update to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Army Safety Statistics.

2. The Army has an effective safety program. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and I have recently approved a Safety Strategic Campaign plan that is closely tied to The Army Transformation Plan. In October 2000, the CSA established a goal of reducing overall fatalities in The Army by 6 percent per year through FY06. Our current metrics are based on these goals.


3. On a quarterly basis, the CSA and I receive an executive summary and a briefing from the Director of Army Safety on accident rates and trends for all Army categories to include: army motor vehicles, army combat vehicles, personal injury, POV, and aviation. Army-wide initiatives designed to reduce accident rates and stop negative trends are discussed with the senior leaders and attendees.

4. The 6 percent reduction in overall fatalities goal is attainable and consistent with the decreases in accidental fatalities The Army has experienced over the past 10 years. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY02.




5. In this first quarter of FY02, The Army lost 46 soldiers. This represented a 15 percent increase over the same time last year. Leaders and commanders took action and this spike in accidents has since leveled off to where The Army stands at one less fatality than last year at this time. Accidents related to Operation Enduring Freedom account for approximately 10% (5 fatalities) of Army accidental fatalities in the first quarter of FY02.

6. POV accidents continue to be the number one killer of Army soldiers. FY01 had an eleven percent reduction in POV fatalities. For FY92 to FY01, POV accidents accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY01.



7. We continue to make progress in reducing workplace injuries and illnesses involving The Army's civilian workforce. In FY 93, over 28 of every 1,000 workers lost time from the job as a result of working conditions. In FY 01, this number had dropped to approximately 18 of every 1,000 workers. The graph below depicts year-end lost workday cases and the rate or cases per 100,000 employees from FY92 to FY01.





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
**INFO MEMO**

762 MAR 13 PM 1:



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

March 12, 2002 - 6:30 PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 12 Mar 02*

(Signature and Date)

**SUBJECT:** Promotion Board Processing

- You asked for OGC and P&R views on eliminating levels of review of promotion board packages in OSD (Tab A).
- Procedures for processing reports of selection boards derive from law and policy, and are designed to ensure smooth processing when forwarded to the White House and Senate for those lists requiring confirmation.
- We have streamlined the current process, while continuing to ensure accuracy of packages and consistency among Services in treatment of officers eligible for promotion.
- We conducted a Departmental review of our current administrative staffing procedures. Recommendations from the review included:
  - SecDef delegate 3/4-star retirements to the USD(P&R) as permitted by FY2002 NDAA legislative amendment. An action memo is being staffed to you for decision.
  - Change policy allowing the ASD(FMP) to process a G/FO nomination when the DoDIG check is no more than 90 days old. Current policy states the DoDIG check can be no more than 60 days old. Interim change was implemented.
  - Encourage the Secretaries of the Military Departments to consider processing the names of officers with reported adverse information as single nomination packages. This action would permit the other officers on the list to proceed forward toward Presidential nomination to the Senate in an expedited manner. Our records indicate that nomination packages are slowed in the entire staffing process when a Secretary of a Military Department forwards a list of officers for promotion that includes a name or names of officers with reported adverse information.
  - DepSecDef delegate approval authority for active duty O-6 and below selection board reports to the ASD(FMP). Delegation was implemented.

**RECOMMENDATION:** For information only.

**COORDINATION:** Tab B

Prepared by: LTC Sally Jo Hall, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7673

U04560 /02

May 29, 2001 8:52 AM

TO: Charles Abell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Promotions

Please take a look at this package and then visit with David Chu and tell me what you two think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.


Attach.

5/11/01 General Counsel Memo to SecDef re: Promotions

DHR:dh  
052901-8

11-L-0559/OSD/7674

U10096 /01



May 10, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Promotions

I am told it takes months for commanders, captains, rear admirals, and admirals to get through the confirmation process. The Services spend a long time going through it, checking everything, then it comes up to OSD and it goes through a process, then it goes to the White House and it goes through a process, then it goes to the Hill and goes through a process.

What do you think about having a reform where the Service is the checker, and we approve it swiftly and by exception the White House does the same thing and the real responsibility is left with the Senate. If they want to hire a lot of people and do all that, why not let them?

DHR:dh  
051001-19

11-L-0559/OSD/7675



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 11, 2001, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel *XJD 5/11/01*

SUBJECT: Promotions

- You asked for my views about whether we could reduce the amount of processing officer nomination packages receive between the Services and the Senate (Tab A).
- Promotion laws require that such packages must be submitted through you to the President, and by the President to the Senate (for most officer promotions).
- OSD review and assembly of routine nomination packages and non-routine general and flag officer (GFO) nominations with substantiated adverse information duplicate some aspects of Service nomination review, but ensure impartiality and consistency.
- Since 1988, DoD has been required to inform the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) of adverse information pertaining to GFO nominees (Tab B), and promulgated guidance for processing nomination packages, including those with adverse information.
- You may permit the Services to forward nomination packages directly to you or the Deputy Secretary, by-passing the OSD staff, and the President could, without further review, forward packages to the Senate. You and the President would then rely on each Service Secretary to perform the appropriate reviews.
- Such a procedure eliminates the impartial OSD review, which frequently is touted to the SASC as a primary reason that it should rely on the information provided by DoD. Also, the SASC indicated in 1989 that a procedure that compelled it to conduct substantial reviews would not "be in the interests of the Department" (Tab B).
- I recommend that you discuss this matter with the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Charlie Abell, who recently served as a SASC staffer and worked nominations, before you direct any changes in OSD nomination processing procedures.

Attachments:

As stated *✓*

Prepared By: James O. Smyser, (b)(6)

3/15  
11-L-0559/CS/7676

**SUBJECT:** Promotion Board Processing

COORDINATION:	DASD(MPP)	Has seen 1 Mar 02
	ASD(FMP)	<u>CLA 3-10-02</u>



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100  
**ACTION MEMO**



April 1, 2002, 1:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) APR 2 2002

SUBJECT: Training and Equipping (T&E) the Afghan National Army (ANA)

AFGANISTAN

- The USD(Policy) briefed you on the "Quick Start to Training the ANA" on March 16, 2002. It is my understanding that you agreed that DoD would fund the first cycle of training for the ANA rather than awaiting enactment of the recently submitted Supplemental.
- The estimated cost for the first cycle of training (2,400 troops) for 2 months is about \$4 million.
- The DoD has very limited authority to fund T&E support out of its regular authorities and appropriations. The Chairman has approved the use of \$0.860 million out of his CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) to fund partially the training of the ANA. For the remaining \$3 million requirement, the following two authorities could be invoked to permit DoD to train and equip the ANA.
  1. Presidential determination to draw down up to \$2 million of DoD goods and services to fulfill this requirement. (This is a Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Authority.)
  2. Secretary of Defense's Emergency and Extraordinary (E&E) Expenses Authority to support the remaining \$0.950 million requirement. Use of this amount of E&E funds will require a 5-day notification to Congress. Informal notification of key congressional staff prior to forwarding the formal notification is recommended.
- Since the Department of State (DoS) is responsible for staffing Presidential drawdown determinations under the FAA, I recommend that you ask the Deputy Secretary to contact the DoS Deputy Secretary to forward such a proposed determination to the President for his approval to draw down DoD goods and services in the amount of up to \$2 million to support this effort.
- The Component executing the drawdown will do so from existing operating resources.
- It is my understanding that this \$4 million should be sufficient until the Congress enacts the Supplemental, which includes funding to train and equip the ANA.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve actions to begin T&E the ANA by (1) using E&E authority and (2) asking DoS to process a Presidential drawdown determination under the FAA.

COORDINATION: Attached.

APPROVE SEC DEF approval 5/April 1700 DZ

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

(11/2/02)



Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: John Roth, (b)(6) -0559/OSD/7678 L U04590 / 02

March 25, 2002 10:49 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding Training of Afghan Army

I cannot imagine why the training of the Afghan army would come out of the DoD topline.

If in fact the Administration decides they want to do it, wouldn't they fund State or Defense to do it? The organization that has the funds would have the greater control.

I don't understand your memo.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/12/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef, "Training and Equipping the Afghan Army" [U04590 02]

DHR:dh  
032502-24

.....  
Please respond by 04/05/02

3/14  
1400

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



COMPTROLLER



ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

March 12, 2002, 6:13 PM  
MAR 25 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Training and Equipping the Afghan army

- The Department of State possesses the authority to train and equip foreign military forces under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). State has requested \$50 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in the FY02 Emergency Supplemental to train and equip the Afghan army. We also understand that \$20 million in peacekeeping operation funds have been set aside in the State Department supplemental if the decision is made to pay for Afghan army salaries.

- Seeking DoD authority and funding to train and equip the Afghan army has both advantages and disadvantages:

**Advantages**

- DoD would obtain more direct authority to control the training and equipping of the Afghan army.

**Disadvantages**

- The funding for this mission <sup>may</sup> (would) come out of DoD's topline budget, not the Department of State's topline, and DoD probably would be responsible for seeking any further funding necessary. CENTCOM estimates that \$133 million will be required for this mission in FY02, and an additional \$260.7 million in FY03. As noted above, State is requesting some supplemental funds for this mission. If DoD undertakes this mission, the initial \$70 million, as



11-L-0559/OSD/7680

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/15
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	3/15
MA BUCCI	3/15
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/14

02

well as some or all of the additional \$63 million would have to be found in FY02.

- The Department of State would likely oppose DoD taking on a security assistance role, as would Congressional Appropriations Committees (Foreign Operations and Defense). Moreover, State is supportive of the funding of the Afghan National Army and has organized an early donors conference in Geneva to increase international support. In addition, State can pay Afghan military salaries with its existing peacekeeping operations accounts without the legislative relief that DoD would require to do likewise.
  - The training and equipping of the Afghan army could become a protracted requirement that could, over time, continue to compete with DoD O&M priorities.
  - Other train and equip programs could migrate to DoD.
- 
- The Office of the General Counsel, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and my office believe that the DoD should not seek the authority to train and equip the Afghan army, and that this mission should be conducted by the State Department through the FMF and peacekeeping operations programs. Moreover, DSCA advises that for implementation, it makes no difference whether the train and equip program is funded by either DoD or State.

RECOMMENDATION: DoD should not seek this authority.

COORDINATION: See Attached

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared By: Tina Jonas (b)(6)

**COORDINATION**

General Counsel

*Dr. J. Dell'Ante*

3/13/02

Under Secretary of  
Defense (Policy)

Dr. Steve Cambone

March 12, 2002

**Coordination**

General Counsel, DoD    Dan J. Dell'Orto    Principal Deputy    April 2, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7683

\* FYI - Mr. Horner -  
per om phone con

March 25, 2002 10:49 AM

VIR  
CRIS

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding Training of Afghan Army

I cannot imagine why the training of the Afghan army would come out of the DoD topline.

If in fact the Administration decides they want to do it, wouldn't they fund State or Defense to do it? The organization that has the funds would have the greater control.

I don't understand your memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/12/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef, "Training and Equipping the Afghan Army" [U04590 02]

DHR:dh  
032502-24

.....  
Please respond by 04/05/02

U04590-02  
11-L-0559/OSD/7684



CONTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

March 12, 2002, 6:13 PM  
MAR 25 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Training and Equipping the Afghan army

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SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/15
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	3/15
MA BUCCI	3/15
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/15

02

11-L-0559/OSD/7685



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000  
2002 MAR 13 PM 4:16

INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002, 2:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Jr., USD(AT&L)  
*Bill 3/12/02*

SUBJECT: E-Mail from Newt Gingrich about Light Armored Vehicle

Mr. Gingrich has forwarded some concerns (e-mail at TAB A) about the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) program, which is developing the family of vehicles for the Army's Interim Force. The following comments are provided in response to these concerns:

Thin skinned

The IAV provides integral armor protection against 14.5mm armor piercing ammunition—better than other vehicles in the weight class such as the M113. Extensive testing has developed and confirmed this level of armor protection. Add-on armor that protects against RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades will also be provided.

Road bound

The IAV has been extensively analyzed for off-road performance using the NATO Reference Mobility Model in several key theaters of operation. Only in situations involving extremely wet weather and sloped terrain was there a significant difference between the mobility of the IAV and comparable tracked vehicles. This modest mobility penalty under extreme conditions is outweighed by the speed, on-road performance, quiet, lower ownership cost and logistics footprint of wheeled vehicles in most tactical situations.

Height with a "significant gun" greater than M1

The height of the IAV Mobile Gun System (MGS), which is equipped with the M68A1 cannon system, is 2.68 meters with the Commander's Panoramic Viewer in the normally stowed position (mast extended height is 3.13 meters). Height of the M1A2 Abrams tank is 2.89 meters.

Overweight for C-130 transport

The IAV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and the system specification allow tailoring of combat loads to meet mission and transportability



11-L-0559/OSD/7686

U04601 /02

requirements. The Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) and the Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV) meet the total vehicle weight (38,000 pound allowable maximum for 1,000 mile leg) and the axle weight (13,000 pound maximum per axle) requirements in their fully loaded configuration. Seven of the eight other configurations meet weight requirements by cross-loading of stowed items. The user will ensure combat capability upon arrival by prioritizing vehicle load lists.

The Mobile Gun System (MGS), which is in development, requires re-engineering to minimize off-loading of equipment. An aggressive weight reduction program is underway and should be complete before the FY05 full-rate production decision. Worth noting is that the IAV's high degree of commonality will enable MGS changes to be applied to other ongoing IAV production, increasing the effective combat load of all configurations.

#### Army refuses to field test the IAV

The Army will conduct a complete operational evaluation of the IAV as required by Title 10 of the United States Code. Additionally the Army will certify the readiness and deployability of the first Interim Brigade Combat Team during an instrumented exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and during a deployment exercise. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 requires the Army to report the results of this evaluation to Congress before buying IAVs to equip more than three IBCTs.

#### Army refuses to have an open competition

The Army has conducted significant comparison testing and evaluation. The Army evaluated the performance of bid samples at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during source selection and evaluated written proposals submitted by offerors. The IAV selected possessed significant advantages that outweighed those of competing systems. The General Accounting Office (GAO) validated the results of the Army's evaluation when they denied a contract award protest by one of the competing offerors. Additionally, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency evaluated existing Army systems against IAV operational requirements and found that none met all requirements.

#### Independent review needed

The Defense Acquisition Board approved program initiation in November 2000. The DAB will review the program again in December 2003 following its operational evaluation, for full rate production.

RECOMMENDATION: None **INFORMATION ONLY**

COORDINATION: Army **B6 Copyright for SAAR**

Prepared By: Chuck Sieber, (b)(6)

SHOW/FAK  
3/3/02

OFFICE OF THE  
9:31 AM  
2002 MAR -8 AM 10:05

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 4, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Email From Newt Gingrich**

On this email from Gingrich, get Tom White and Pete Aldridge's views on this  
LAV.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030402.10

Attach: Email dated Sunday, 3/3/02 from Newt Gingrich

*Please respond by:* 3/11/02 *3/7*

*→ C, D:  
Please look to  
Aldridge, coord w/ White,  
short suspense.  
D. Rita*

Larry Di Rita

U04259 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/7688

cc to D. Rita  
Wolpowitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 03, 2002 8:42 AM  
**To:** (b)(6).pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil;  
 (b)(6).pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** (no subject)

I have been receiving a series of emails from a wide range of officers who believe the Army light armored vehicle program is a scandal that is going to get a lot of young men and women killed.

they assert:

the essential arguments are that the lav is now too thin skinned, because it uses wheels it is road bound and therefore almost certain to face land mines that will turn it into "a flaming coffin" (their term not mine)

if a significant gun is added the lav is now taller than an M-1 tank

the LAV is also now overweight and therefore no longer C-130 transportable and in fact is exactly as mobile by air as the much better much more powerful Bradley (2 in a C-17)

the senior army refuses to field test the LAV

there are tracked systems that are lighter, lower, more survivable, capable of off road maneuver and transporable easier than the LAV but the senior army is determined to vindicate itself and refuses to have an open competition because it is committed to the lav

I think an independent review is need before this becmes a totally unmanagable scandal that tarnishes the Army and DOD

the following is a typical (but calmer and more positive) email from a field grade officer  
 newt

Sir,

Please ask OSD to view the following web pages:

1. LAV-III/IAV: wrong vehicle

[www.geocities.com/lavdanger](http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger)

2. Upgraded M113A3 Gavin: the right vehicle

[www.geocities.com/equipmentsshop/m113combat.htm](http://www.geocities.com/equipmentsshop/m113combat.htm)

Suggest that any LAV-III/IAVs we are stuck with go to MPs...

3. 2nd ACR: the right Brigade-sized unit to start with

We use upgraded M113A3 (LSVs) and M8 AGS light tanks and START with the 2nd ACR, covbering force for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Polk, LA.

Old M113A2s can be supplied from war-stock to IBCTs at Ft. Lewis to stop them from doing nothing until they can receive upgraded M113A3/IAV, M8 AGS/IAVs...

from an airborne field grade officer

----- Headers -----

3/4/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7689



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET  
3/13/02 14:00:00

INFO MEMO

March 13, 2002, 10:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Spare Parts for Air Force Aircraft at Nellis Air Force Base

- The spare parts situation at Nellis Air Force Base has improved, as a result of initiatives to increase the availability of aircraft spare parts.
- Mission capable rates (MCR) for the F-16s stationed at Nellis were 75.8 percent in FY 1999, 79.6 percent in FY 2001, and are projected to be 80.2 percent in FY 2002.
- The MCR for the A-10 and F-15 aircraft at Nellis similarly improved.
- The situation has also improved in terms of another readiness metric, Not Mission Capable for Supply rate. This rate reflects circumstances when aircraft cannot undertake a mission due to problems with spare parts not in stock.
  - For the F-16, this rate declined from 14.3 percent in FY 1999 to 11.4 percent in FY 2001 and is estimated to be 11.1 percent in FY 2002.
  - The A-10 and F-15E aircraft rates similarly improved.
- Nevertheless, the Air Force believes that the F-15 spare parts availability at Nellis may decrease in FY 2002 as the spares in the supply system for F-15 aircraft are pushed to improve the readiness of aircraft supporting ongoing operations.
- Overall, mission capable rates for the Active Air Force were 72.9 percent in FY 2000, 73.5 percent in FY 2001, and are expected to be 76.2 percent in FY 2002. This improvement results from the initiatives (including \$962 million in FY 2002) to

11-L-0559/OSD/7690

U04643 /02

improve readiness through increased funding for spare parts, for readiness spares packages for deploying aircraft, and for realistic budgeting of flying hour costs.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

February 21, 2002 10:42 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Spare Parts

I got a lot of concern about spare parts for Air Force aircraft out at Nellis AFB.

What is the situation?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022102-10

.....  
Please respond by 03/08/02

February 21, 2002 10:42 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Spare Parts

I got a lot of concern about spare parts for Air Force aircraft out at Nellis AFB.

What is the situation?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022102-10

.....  
Please respond by 03/08/02

*452.13*

*21 Feb 02*



COMPTROLLER


UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim  MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Savings

- As you requested, we have prepared a short presentation on BRAC savings.
- The attached charts identify BRAC savings as reported by the Department, the methodology for calculating savings estimates, and issues raised with the reported savings.
- Audits and reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office, the DoD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have all affirmed that BRAC savings are real and substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.
- The independent affirmation of the reported savings provides the most persuasive argument that BRAC savings are real.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Henry Sodano

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7694

U04647 /02

# **ATTACHMENT**

11-L-0559/OSD/7695



# BRAC Savings

March 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7696

# Savings From Prior BRAC Rounds



- **Net BRAC Savings total \$15.5 billion over the implementation period from FY 1990 to FY 2001**
- **Annual recurring savings after implementation are about \$6.0 billion**
- **Savings or Cost Avoidance are achieved primarily through:**
  - **elimination or reduction of base support costs**
  - **elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel costs**
  - **cancellation of military construction and family housing projects**

# Calculation of BRAC Savings Estimates



- **Initial BRAC savings estimates were calculated using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model**
  - **Provided standard, analytical tool based on series of algorithms**
  - **Previous Defense Secretaries mandated use of COBRA by all Services**
- **Initial COBRA savings estimates have been updated to reflect BRAC implementation experience**
- **In preparation of the annual budget submission the Services are required to update savings estimates based on best projection of what savings will actually accrue**

# Examples of BRAC Savings



- **Army - Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey**
  - **\$1.0 million annual recurring savings from reduced operating cost of 121 family housing units**
  - **One time savings of \$13.0 million for cancellation of dredging project**
  - **\$16.8 million of annual recurring savings for reduced operating and real property maintenance costs and the elimination of 175 civilian positions**
- **Navy - Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California**
  - **One time savings of \$12.9 million for cancellation of a Military Construction Project from FYDP**
  - **\$5.9 million of recurring savings for reducing operating cost of 834 family housing units**
  - **\$14.9 million of recurring savings for reduced base operations support costs and elimination of 2,871 civilian personnel**
- **Air Force - McClellan AFB, California**
  - **\$142.0 million of annual recurring saving for reduced operation and maintenance cost and elimination of 768 civilian personnel**

# Independent Verification of BRAC Savings



- **Audit and review agencies affirm that BRAC savings are real and substantial**
  - **GAO report of July 2001 titled “Military Base Closure - DoD’s Updated Net Savings Estimates Remain Substantial” affirms the net savings are considerable and result in decreased funding requirements.**
  - **In July 1998, the Congressional Budget Office reported substantial BRAC savings, even though it found imprecision in DoD’s cost and savings estimates. CBO found that DoD’s annual recurring savings estimates were reasonable.**
  - **In May 1998, the DoD Inspector General found that BRAC savings were understated by as much as \$1.7 billion based on their review of more than 70 BRAC installations.**
  - **In July 1997, the Army Audit Agency concluded that savings would be substantial for the ten 1995 BRAC round sites it audited.**

# Issues with Reported BRAC Savings



- **Net BRAC Savings are calculated by deducting the cost to implement closure actions from reported savings achieved through the elimination or reduction in operating costs and cancelled construction projects.**
- **BRAC savings could be viewed as greater than reported considering:**
  - **The majority of environmental restoration costs attributed to BRAC would have occurred regardless if the facility remained open.**
  - **BRAC savings do not account for capital investment that would have been required had the installation remained open.**
- **BRAC savings could be viewed as less than reported because BRAC costs do not include expenditures of over \$1.2 billion made by other federal agencies. These expenditures were made to assist communities impacted by BRAC.**

# Projected Savings for BRAC 2005



- **The new round of base closure and realignment in 2005 is expected to save about \$6.5 billion annually after implementation based on a 20 to 25 percent reduction in infrastructure.**
- **The savings estimate is calculated based on the savings achieved in BRAC III and IV.**

**INCOMING**

11-L-0559/OSD/7703

2/28

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To: ASD(c)

I would rather not  
forward. It is ① not  
that "persuasive" ②  
not a "presentation".

You ought to do a  
actual presentation.  
(brief), cite the actual  
GAO, audits, etc. make it  
something we should show. ~~DP~~

Mike Z

Jr

Pls see Larry DiPietro's  
note of instruction

Suspense: March ~~28~~ ~~29~~ AM

MAR 5 2002  
Deputy Comptroller  
has seen

311  
1700



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

FEB 27 2002

February 26, 2002, 10:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim *DZ* FEB 27 2002

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Savings

- Audits and reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have all affirmed that BRAC savings are real and substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.
- The Department is reporting net BRAC savings of \$15.5 billion over the implementation period from FY 1990 to FY 2001. Annual recurring savings following implementation are about \$6.0 billion based on the FY 2003 President's Budget.
- Savings or cost avoidance resulting from BRAC are achieved primarily through (1) overall elimination or reduction of base support costs at specific installations, (2) elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel costs, and (3) cancellation of military construction and family housing projects at closed or realigned bases.
- Most recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO) report of July 2001 titled "Military Base Closures - DoD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial" (attached) finds that although imprecise, savings from the four rounds of base closure are substantial.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Henry Sodano

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI
MA BUCCI
EXECSEC WHITMORE

*RC 3/1*

U03585 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/7705

*2-27-02*

# **ATTACHMENT**

11-L-0559/OSD/7706

July 2001

# MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

## DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial



GAO

Accountability \* Integrity \* Reliability



G A O

Accountability • Integrity • Reliability

United States General Accounting Office  
Washington, DC 20548

July 31, 2001

The Honorable Vic Snyder  
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Snyder:

Through four rounds of base closures and realignments in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Department of Defense expected to reduce its domestic infrastructure and provide needed dollars for high priority programs such as weapons modernization. Although the Department projects it will realize significant recurring savings from the closure and realignment actions, as noted in your request, many members of Congress continue to raise questions as to how much, if any, money has been saved through the base closure process. This issue takes on increased importance as the Department considers the need for additional base closures.

We have examined costs and savings associated with the base closure process in recent years. In two reports issued in late 1998, we concluded that net savings from the four closure rounds were substantial but that the cost and savings estimates used to calculate the net savings were imprecise.<sup>1</sup> The Department calculated net savings by deducting the reported costs to implement closure actions from reported savings achieved through the elimination or reduction of personnel and base operations and the cancellation of planned military construction projects. Reviewing the Department's data, we found that cost estimates did not include all costs attributable to the closures and that savings estimates were not routinely updated in the Department's records. Since that time, the Department has revised its estimates; and its data indicate that net savings have increased.

As agreed, this report addresses the basis for the Department's recent increase in net savings projected to be realized from the closure process. In addition, we summarized others and our previous observations on the basis for savings from base closure and realignment actions and the precision of the cost and savings estimates. We are continuing to examine

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<sup>1</sup> *Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec. 11, 1998) and *Military Bases: Review of DOD's 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure* (GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998).

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cost and savings issues as part of a broader review intended to provide updated information on the status of the four rounds, as closure authority for the last round expires this year. We expect to issue an overall status report in early 2002.

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## Results in Brief

Department of Defense fiscal year 2001 budget request and documentation<sup>2</sup> show that it now expects net savings of about \$15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001 and about \$6.1 billion in annual recurring savings thereafter, an increase from the \$14.2 billion and about \$5.6 billion, respectively, the Department reported in fiscal year 1999.<sup>3</sup> While cost and savings estimates fluctuate over time based on changes within base closure funding (e.g., environmental and military construction), our analysis of the data showed that the net savings increase through fiscal year 2001 was due primarily to an overall reduction of about \$723 million in reported costs and an increase of about \$610 million in expected savings resulting from the closure actions. Specifically, almost 50 percent, or about \$359 million, of the reported cost reduction was attributable to lower environmental restoration costs through fiscal year 2001. Over 86 percent, or about \$526 million, of the total reported savings was attributable to increased savings in base operation and maintenance activities. A \$101 million increase in the reported post-implementation savings through fiscal year 2001 resulted from using an inflation factor to convert savings into fiscal year 2001 dollars.

Our work has consistently affirmed that the net savings for the four rounds of base closures and realignments are substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements in specific operational areas. In addition to our audits, reviews by the Congressional Budget Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have affirmed that net savings are substantial after initial investment costs are recouped. However, those same reviews also showed that the estimates are imprecise and should be viewed as a rough approximation of the likely savings. That perspective applies as well to the Department's updated net savings estimate. At the same time, arguments can be made that net

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<sup>2</sup> The fiscal year 2002 budget request was not available at the time we completed this review.

<sup>3</sup> The annual recurring savings estimate excludes an estimated \$3.4 billion in environmental costs beyond fiscal year 2001. However, because these costs are spread over many years, they have relatively limited impact on DOD's annual savings estimate.

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savings could be more or less than reported by the Department. For example, net savings could be viewed as greater than reported by the Department if one considers that the majority of environmental restoration costs attributed to the closures would have occurred, but most likely at a slower pace, even if the bases would have remained open. Further, new facility construction at many receiving bases, while funded by the base closure account, reduced the need for other capital funding investments that would have been needed to address issues of an aging and deteriorating infrastructure. On the other hand, reported costs attributable to the closure rounds do not include federal government expenditures of over \$1.2 billion incurred by agencies in assisting communities and employees impacted by the base closure process. While these costs do not significantly reduce overall savings, they are one-time costs that, if reported as closure-related costs, increase the time required for savings to fully offset costs.

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## Background

In the late 1980s, changes in the national security environment resulted in a Defense infrastructure with more bases than the Department of Defense (DOD) needed. To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress enacted base closure and realignment (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, special BRAC Commissions were established to recommend specific base closures and realignments to the President, who, in turn sent the Commissions' recommendations and his approval to Congress. A special commission was also established for the 1988 round that made recommendations to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. For the 1988 round, legislation required DOD to complete its closure and realignment actions by September 30, 1995. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, legislation required DOD to complete all closures and realignments within 6 years from the date the President forwarded the recommended actions to the Congress.<sup>4</sup>

BRAC has afforded DOD the opportunity to reduce its infrastructure and free funds for high priority programs such as weapons modernization and force readiness. As the closure authority for the last round expires in fiscal year 2001, DOD has reported reducing its domestic infrastructure by about

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<sup>4</sup> Property disposal and environmental cleanup actions may continue beyond the 6-year period.

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20 percent and saving billions of dollars that would otherwise have been spent supporting unneeded infrastructure. In essence, reported savings include both distinct savings that actually occur during the budget year or years a BRAC decision is implemented and cost avoidances during future years—costs that DOD would have incurred if BRAC actions had not taken place. Some of the savings are one-time, such as canceled military construction projects. The vast majority of BRAC savings represent a permanent and recurring avoidance of spending that would otherwise occur, such as for personnel. Over time, the value of the recurring savings is the largest and most important portion of overall BRAC savings.

DOD reports its BRAC cost and savings estimates to the Congress on a routine basis as part of its annual budget requests. In preparing the estimates, DOD guidance to the military services and defense agencies states that the estimates are to be based on the best projection of what savings will actually accrue from approved realignments and closures. In this regard, prior year estimated savings are required to be updated to reflect actual savings when available.

The Congress recognized that an up-front investment was necessary to achieve BRAC savings and established two accounts to fund certain implementation costs.<sup>5</sup> These costs included (1) relocating personnel and equipment from closing to gaining bases, (2) constructing new facilities at gaining bases to accommodate organizations transferred from closing bases, and (3) remedying environmental problems on closing bases. DOD, in its annual budget request, provides the Congress with estimated cost data relative to the implementation of each BRAC round. For the most part, these estimated costs are routinely updated as they are recorded on an ongoing basis in DOD's financial accounting systems.

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## Estimated BRAC Net Savings Have Increased

Since we last reported on this issue in December 1998, DOD has increased its net savings estimate for the four BRAC rounds. DOD now estimates a net savings of about \$15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001, an increase of \$1.3 billion from the previously reported \$14.2 billion. DOD data suggest that cumulative savings began to surpass cumulative costs in fiscal year 1998. The increase in net savings is attributable to a combination of lower estimated costs and greater estimated savings, as reported in DOD's fiscal

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<sup>5</sup> There are two BRAC accounts. BRAC I was established to fund base closure in the 1988 round. BRAC II was established to fund base closures in the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds.

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year 2001 budget request and documentation.<sup>6</sup> Overall, DOD has reduced its cost estimates from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2001 for implementing BRAC by about \$723 million and increased its savings estimates by about \$610 million, resulting in a net savings increase of \$1.3 billion. Table 1 summarizes the cumulative cost and savings estimates through fiscal year 2001 for the four BRAC rounds as reflected in DOD's fiscal years 1999 and 2001 BRAC budget requests and documentation, along with associated changes in the various costs and savings categories. In addition to the estimates shown in table 1, DOD now reports annual estimated recurring savings of \$6.1 billion beyond fiscal year 2001, an increase from approximately \$5.6 billion that DOD reported in fiscal year 1999.

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<sup>6</sup> The fiscal year 2002 budget request was not available at the time we completed this review

**Table 1: Cumulative Cost and Savings Estimates for the Four BRAC Rounds as Reflected in DOD's Budget Requests and Documentation for Fiscal Years 1999 and 2001**

Dollars in millions			
	FY 1999 budget request	FY 2001 budget request	Total change
<b>Costs through FY 2001</b>			
Military construction	\$6,566	\$6,667	\$100
Family housing	93	93	0
Environmental	7,337	6,978	(359)
Operation and maintenance	7,984	7,741	(243)
Military personnel-permanent change of station	175	132	(43)
Estimated land revenues	(121)	(300)	(180)
Other	847	847	(1)
<b>Sub-total costs (through FY 2001)</b>	<b>\$22,881</b>	<b>\$22,158</b>	<b>(\$723)</b>
<b>Savings through implementation period</b>			
Military construction	\$965	\$965	\$0
Family housing-construction	177	177	0
Family housing-operations	658	652	(7)
Operation and maintenance	10,583	11,109	526
Military personnel	5,229	5,229	0
Other	4,601	4,591	(10)
<b>Sub-total savings (through implementation period)</b>	<b>\$22,213</b>	<b>\$22,722</b>	<b>\$509</b>
<b>Post-implementation savings (through FY 2001)<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>\$14,853</b>	<b>\$14,953</b>	<b>\$101</b>
<b>Sub-total savings (through FY 2001)</b>	<b>\$37,066</b>	<b>\$37,676</b>	<b>\$610</b>
<b>Net cumulative savings (through FY 2001)<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>\$14,185</b>	<b>\$15,518</b>	<b>\$1,333</b>

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

<sup>a</sup>These savings begin the year after the implementation period for each BRAC round, are cumulative estimates up to fiscal year 2001, and are usually based on estimated savings during the last implementation year for each round.

<sup>a</sup>Net cumulative savings consist of total savings less total costs through fiscal year 2001.

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

As shown in table 1, the cost estimates for implementing the four BRAC rounds have decreased by about \$723 million from \$22.9 billion to \$22.2 billion with most of the decrease, or about \$359 million, attributable to lower reported environmental restoration costs through fiscal year 2001. Our analysis of the data shows that most, or about \$313 million, of the environmental cost reduction occurred in the Navy BRAC account. Some of this can be attributed to shifting planned actions to future years.

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Further, estimated revenues generated from actions—such as land sales, property leases, and other reimbursements—have increased by \$180 million to \$300 million, thereby increasing the offset to BRAC program cost estimates. According to the Air Force, its increased revenues resulted from the reporting of reimbursements received from the city of Chicago, Illinois, for the cost of moving an Air National Guard unit from O'Hare International Airport to Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and from increased proceeds from land sales and property leases.

In addition to reductions in estimated costs, DOD is reporting over \$610 million in additional estimated savings through 2001 in its closure accounts. Our analysis shows that more than half, or \$381 million, of the \$610 million increase in savings shown in table 1 is attributable to Air Force operation and maintenance. Air Force officials told us that the savings increase was attributable to actions at two bases—McClellan Air Force Base, California, and Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. While the Air Force did not provide an estimate for savings at these two bases in its fiscal year 1999 budget request because of uncertainties regarding the performance of the bases' workloads, it reported a \$381 million savings estimate in its fiscal year 2001 budget request. Further, an additional \$101 million in increased savings is due primarily to inflationary adjustments in the estimated post-implementation savings for the 1988, 1991, and 1993 rounds through fiscal year 2001. Post-implementation savings for the 1995 round do not begin accruing until fiscal year 2002.

In addition to the revisions made to the cost and savings estimates through fiscal year 2001, DOD has also revised its annual recurring savings estimate for fiscal years 2002 and beyond. DOD is now projecting annual recurring savings of \$6.1 billion for the four BRAC rounds, an increase of approximately \$500 million from the \$5.6 billion DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. Our analysis shows that the increase is attributable equally to an increase in the BRAC 1995 round savings estimate and to a reported increase in prior rounds' recurring savings caused by using an inflation factor to convert them into current year dollars.

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## Observations on Basis and Precision of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates

Our prior work, along with work by others including the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency, has shown that BRAC savings are real and substantial, and are related to cost reductions in key operational areas as a result of BRAC actions. At the same time, limitations have existed in DOD's efforts to track actual costs and savings over time, which limits the precision of its net savings estimate.

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## Basis for BRAC Savings

Audits of BRAC financial records have shown that BRAC has enabled DOD to save billions of dollars, primarily through the (1) overall elimination or reduction of base support costs at specific installations, (2) elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel costs, and (3) cancellation of military construction and family housing projects at closed or realigned bases.

Our prior work as well as work of others has shown that eliminating or reducing base support costs at closed or realigned bases is a major contributor to generating BRAC savings. Savings are realized through a number of actions, such as terminating physical security, fire protection, utilities, property maintenance, accounting, payroll, and a variety of other services that have associated costs linked specifically to base operations. For example, as stated in an April 1996 report, our analysis of the operation and maintenance costs at eight closing installations from the 1988 and 1991 rounds indicated that base support costs had been reduced and that annual recurring savings would be substantial—about \$213 million—after initial costs were recouped.<sup>7</sup> DOD Inspector General and Army Audit Agency reports have also shown base support reductions at closing and realigning facilities as real and substantial, although not precise. The DOD Inspector General, in affirming savings for a sample of bases in the 1993 BRAC round, consistently found that the services had significantly reduced their operating budgets because of the closure process.

The elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel at closed or realigned bases is also a major contributor to generating savings. In an April 1998 report, DOD estimated that about 39,800 military personnel and about 71,000 civilian positions had been eliminated by BRAC, resulting in an overall recurring savings of about \$5.8 billion annually.<sup>8</sup> While we were not able to precisely reconcile these estimated reductions with actual BRAC-related end strength reductions in the services, we reported that the large number of personnel reductions was a significant contributor to the substantial savings achieved through BRAC.<sup>9</sup> DOD Inspector General and

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<sup>7</sup> *Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily Quantified* (GAO/NSIAD-96-97, Apr 8, 1996)

<sup>8</sup> *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Department of Defense, Apr. 1998.

<sup>9</sup> GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998.

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Army Audit Agency reports have validated personnel savings at various BRAC locations, although the savings estimates were not well documented in many cases. In other cases, the personnel reductions were greater than estimated. For example, in a review of nine 1995 BRAC bases, the Army Audit Agency found that, in contrast to no savings being identified for the elimination of civilian personnel authorizations at tenant activities providing support to BRAC bases, over \$13 million in net recurring savings had accrued.<sup>10</sup>

Additionally, the cancellation of planned military construction of facilities and family housing at closed or realigned bases contributes to the savings generated from BRAC. Prior DOD Inspector General and Army Audit Agency reports have affirmed savings attributable to such cancellations. For example, in a May 1998 report, the DOD Inspector General reported that, after a review of a Navy-reported savings of about \$205 million from cancelled military construction projects in the 1993 round, the savings were actually \$336 million, or \$131 million more than reported.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, as we reported in 1998, DOD, as part of its budgeting process, has subtracted projected BRAC savings from the expected future cost of each service's funding plans in the Future Years Defense Program.<sup>12</sup>

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### Limitations in Precision of Cost and Savings Estimates

While our work has consistently shown that savings from BRAC actions are expected to be substantial, we have also noted the cost and savings estimates are imprecise. This relates to the development of initial estimates and efforts to track changes in these estimates over time.

While cost estimates are routinely updated and tracked in financial accounting systems, they are based on DOD obligations<sup>13</sup> and not actual outlays, thereby adding a degree of imprecision to the actual costs and the

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<sup>10</sup> *Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates*, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Audit Report AA97-225, July 31, 1997.

<sup>11</sup> *Audit Report: Cost and Savings for 1993 Defense Base Realignments and Closures*, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

<sup>12</sup> The Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure costs and personnel levels approved by the Secretary of Defense. See *Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec. 11, 1998), p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Our prior work indicates that obligational data do not necessarily reflect final costs.

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basis for savings projections.<sup>14</sup> Also, as we have previously reported, a fundamental limitation in DOD's ability to identify and track savings from BRAC closures and realignments is that DOD's accounting systems, like all accounting systems, are not oriented to identifying and tracking savings.<sup>15</sup> Savings estimates are developed by the services at the time they are developing their initial BRAC implementation budgets and are reported in DOD's BRAC budget justifications. Because the accounting systems do not track savings, updating these estimates would require a separate tracking method or system.

Our prior work has shown that the savings estimates have been infrequently updated and, unlike for estimated costs, no method or system has been established to track savings on a routine basis. Over time, this contributes to imprecision as the execution of closures or realignments may vary from the original plans. Further, because arguments can be made as to what costs or savings can be definitely attributed to BRAC, such as environmental restoration costs, the precision of the estimates comes into question. Nevertheless, we and others have consistently expressed the view that these factors are not significant enough to outweigh the fact that substantial savings are being generated from the closure process.

In reports issued in November and December 1998, we concluded that, while closure and realignment savings for the four BRAC rounds would be substantial after initial costs were recouped, the estimates were imprecise.<sup>16</sup> In particular, we cited that savings estimates were not being routinely updated and that federal economic assistance costs of over \$1 billion that had been provided to communities and individuals impacted by BRAC were not included in DOD's reported costs.<sup>17</sup> Those economic assistance costs now exceed \$1.2 billion. While the inclusion of these costs

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<sup>14</sup> The results of our most recent financial audit at DOD show that the Department does not have the systems and processes in place to capture required cost information. See *DOD Financial Management: Integrated Approach, Accountability, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective Reform* (GAO-01-681T, May 8, 2001), p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> *Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds* (GAO/NSIAD-97-11, July 25, 1997 )

<sup>16</sup> GAO/NSIAD-99-36, Dec. 11, 1998, and GAO/NSIAD-99-17, Nov. 13, 1998.

<sup>17</sup> A number of federal agencies—DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration—have provided financial assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC actions.

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as attributable to BRAC has the effect of delaying the point at which savings surpass costs, it does not negate the fact that the savings are substantial.

A July 1998 Congressional Budget Office report also indicated substantial BRAC savings, even though there was imprecision in DOD's cost and savings estimates.<sup>18</sup> In its comments on cost estimates, the Congressional Budget Office cited that not all BRAC-related costs are included in the estimates. As we had also pointed out, the Budget Office cited federal economic assistance costs as not being included in the estimates. Further, the Budget Office pointed out that operating units sometimes had borne unexpected costs when services at DOD facilities were temporarily impacted by BRAC actions. As to savings, the Congressional Budget Office stated its belief that DOD's estimate of \$5.6 billion in annual recurring savings at that time was reasonable, given that the Budget Office's estimate was about \$5 billion annually.

DOD Inspector General reports also pointed out substantial BRAC savings, despite imprecision in cost and savings estimates. In its May 1998 report of more than 70 closed or realigned bases during the 1993 BRAC round, the Inspector General found that, for the 6-year implementation period for carrying out the BRAC Commission's recommendations, the savings would overtake the costs sooner than expected.<sup>19</sup> While DOD's original budget estimate indicated costs of about \$8.3 billion and annual recurring savings of \$7.4 billion during the implementation period, the Inspector General concluded that costs potentially could be reduced to \$6.8 billion and that savings could reach \$9.2 billion, a net savings of \$2.4 billion. The Inspector General's report indicated that the greater savings were due to such factors as reduced obligations that were not adjusted to reflect actual disbursements, canceled military construction projects, and a lower increase in overhead costs at bases receiving work from closing bases. On the other hand, an Inspector General's review of 23 bases closed during the 1995 BRAC round noted that savings during the implementation period were overstated by \$33.2 million, or 1.4 percent, and costs were overstated by \$28.8 million, or 4.5 percent of initial budget estimates.

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<sup>18</sup> *Review of the Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Congressional Budget Office, July 1, 1998.

<sup>19</sup> *Audit Report: Cost and Savings for 1993 Defense Realignments and Closures*, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-130, May 6, 1998.

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Also, the Army Audit Agency, in a July 1997 report on BRAC costs and savings, concluded that savings would be substantial after full implementation for ten 1995 BRAC round sites it had examined but that estimates were not exact.<sup>20</sup> For example, the Agency reported that annual recurring savings beyond the implementation period, although substantial, were 16 percent less than the major commands' estimates.

The difficulty in precisely identifying savings is further complicated if one considers the specific actions being undertaken under the BRAC process. For example, while environmental restoration costs are a valid BRAC expenditure, DOD reported that the vast majority of its BRAC environmental restoration costs would have been incurred whether or not an installation is impacted by BRAC.<sup>21</sup> DOD acknowledges, however, that environmental costs under the BRAC process may have been accelerated in the shorter term. Others suggest that in some instances BRAC-related environmental cleanup may be done more stringently than would have been the case had the installation remained open. However, the marginal difference is not easily quantified and depends largely on the end use of the closed installation. To the extent that much of the environmental cost is not considered as an additional cost to DOD, this has the effect of increasing net savings, especially considering that DOD estimates \$7 billion in BRAC-related environmental costs through fiscal year 2001. DOD also expects to spend \$3.4 billion in environmental costs beyond fiscal year 2001.<sup>22</sup> This is a \$1 billion increase over the \$2.4 billion environmental cost estimate DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. According to DOD officials, this increase is attributable primarily to the inclusion of cleanup costs for unexploded ordnance, the refinement of cleanup requirements and DOD's cost estimates, and the utilization of more stringent cleanup standards due to changes in the end use of closed installations. While the \$3.4 billion in environmental costs is not reflected in DOD's \$6.1 billion

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<sup>20</sup> *Base Realignment and Closure 1995 Savings Estimates*, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Audit Report AA97-226, July 31, 1997.

<sup>21</sup> *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, Department of Defense, Apr. 1998.

<sup>22</sup> At the same time, uncertainties exist regarding the full cost of environmental restoration beyond fiscal year 2001 because DOD does not have complete and accurate data needed to estimate cleanup costs of unexploded ordnance, such as bombs and ammunition, and other constituent contamination, such as propellants and explosives, on closed training ranges. See *Environmental Liabilities: DOD Training Range Cleanup Cost Estimates Are Likely Understated* (GAO-01-479, Apr. 11, 2001), pp. 4-6.

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annual recurring savings estimate, these costs are spread over many years and should have limited impact on cumulative long-term savings.

A similar case can be made for new military construction at receiving bases under the BRAC process. While significant funds have been expended on new military construction (an estimated \$6.7 billion through fiscal year 2001), the military did benefit from the improvement in its facilities infrastructure. While this is somewhat difficult to precisely quantify, it appears that some portion of the cost would have been incurred under DOD's facilities capital improvement initiatives. If so considered, this would also have the effect of increasing net BRAC savings.

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## Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report on July 25, 2001, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations agreed with our findings. This official also provided technical clarifications, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

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## Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which cost and savings estimates have changed over time, we compared the data contained in DOD's fiscal year 2001 BRAC budget request and documentation with similar data in the fiscal year 1999 budget request and documentation, which were the latest documents available since we last reported on this issue in December 1998. We noted revisions in the data and identified where major changes had occurred in the various costs and savings categories within the BRAC account. To the extent possible within time constraints, we discussed with officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and military services the rationale for those cases where the changes were significant, but we did not independently verify the validity of DOD's reported cost and savings data. We are continuing to examine the basis for the changes in DOD's cost and savings estimates and will discuss the issue in greater detail in an overall status report on BRAC that we expect to issue in early 2002.

To comment on the validity of the net savings estimates, we relied primarily on our prior BRAC reports and reviewed Congressional Budget Office, DOD, DOD Office of Inspector General, and service agency audit reports. As part of our ongoing broader review of BRAC issues, we are examining the extent to which the military services have updated their cost and savings estimates since we last reported on this issue in December 1998. We will discuss that issue in more detail in the status report that we expect to issue in early 2002. In assessing the accuracy of

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
the cost and savings data, we reviewed the component elements that DOD considered in formulating its overall BRAC savings estimates. Because DOD did not include in its estimates federal expenditures to provide economic assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC, we collected these expenditure data from DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment and considered them in our analysis of the estimated BRAC savings.

We conducted our review in June and July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (b)(6) if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Mark Little, James Reifsnnyder, Michael Kennedy, and Tom Mahalek.



Barry W. Holman, Director  
Defense Capabilities and Management

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## Ordering Information

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11-L-0559/OSD/7722

February 8, 2002 9:27 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: BRAC Savings

Please marshal a persuasive presentation as to the savings BRAC actually produces.

I am tired of having people say it is not so. It either is or isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020802-3

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

*Henry -* *2/12*  
PLEASE prepare the requested  
paper. MAKE SURE YOU MAKE THE  
DEADLINE.  
*DR*

MilCon

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Henry - 2/12  
Please prepare the requested  
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DEADLINE.

*DR*

3233

8 Feb 02

March 13, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz      Jim Roche  
 Tom White              Gordon England  
 Gen. Myers              Gen. Pace  
 David Chu                Pete Verga  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Outside DoD Assignments

This is to request that you not make any commitments, or lead anyone to believe we will make any commitment, for the use of additional military personnel outside of our main-line DoD military responsibilities.

We have had stop-loss in place for some months, preventing people on active duty from leaving the Service. In addition, we are extending the assignment of thousands and thousands of Guards and Reserves, who have been called away from their homes and normal employment to serve on active duty.

The entire force is facing the adverse results of the high-paced optempo and perstempo.

We are past the point where the Department can, without an unbelievably compelling reason, make any additional commitments.

Quite apart from making any additional commitments, it is time that we begin to aggressively reduce our current commitments. I want everyone involved to begin to pull back personnel from activities and locations where they can be spared, so we can ease the pressure on the system.

Thanks.

DHR:dh/azn  
022602-13

.....  
Please respond by 03/29/02

*2004*

*13 Mar 02*

March 14, 2002 7:21 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

Here is Newt Minow's paper on public diplomacy. I think you ought to move it around. Newt Minow is a very distinguished person and was JFK's head of the Federal Communications Commission. He also was one of the individuals who helped us with respect to the tribunal format.

092

Why don't you get copies to Karen Hughes and Charlotte Beers.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-21

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 Mar-02

March 11, 2002 12:17 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper by Newt Minow

You may want to send this to Mark Kirk, who may want to put it in the Congressional Record.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/19/02 Newton N. Minow, "The Whisper of America," Morris I. Leibman Lecture, Loyola University

DHR:dh  
031102-26

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

Morris I. Leibman Lecture – Loyola University—March 19, 2002

### **The Whisper of America**

By Newton N. Minow

In World War II, when the survival of freedom was still far from certain, the United States created a new international radio service, the Voice of America. On February 24, 1942, William Harlan Hale opened the German-language program with these words: “Here speaks a voice from America. Every day at this time we will bring you the news of the war. The news may be good. The news may be bad. We will tell you the truth.”

My old boss, William Benton, came up with the idea of the Voice of America. He was then Assistant Secretary of State and would later become Senator from Connecticut. He was immensely proud of the Voice of America. One day he described the new VOA to RCA Chairman David Sarnoff, the tough-minded and passionate pioneer of American broadcasting. Sarnoff noticed how little electronic power and transmitter scope the VOA had via short-wave radio, then said, “Benton, all you’ve got here is the whisper of America.”

Although The Voice of America, and later other international radio services, have made valuable contributions, our international broadcasting services suffer from miserly funding. In many areas of the world, they have seldom been more than a whisper. Today, when we most need to communicate our story, especially in the Middle East, our

broadcasts are not even a whisper. People in every country know our music, our movies, our clothes, and our sports. But they do not know our freedom or our values or our democracy.

I want to talk with you about how and why this happened, and what we must do about it.

First, some history:

At first, the Voice of America was part of the Office of War Information. When the war ended, the VOA was transferred to the Department of State. With the beginning of the Cold War, officials within the government began to debate the core mission of the VOA: Was it to be a professional, impartial news service serving as an example of press freedom to the world? Or was it an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, a strategic weapon to be employed against those we fight? What is the line between news and propaganda? Should our broadcasts advocate America's values—or should they provide neutral, objective journalism?

That debate has never been resolved, only recast for each succeeding generation. In August 1953, for example, our government concluded that whatever the VOA was or would be, it should not be part of the State Department. So we established the United States Information Agency, and the VOA became its single largest operation.

A few years ago, Congress decided that all our international broadcasts were to be governed by a bi-partisan board appointed by the President, with the Secretary of State as an ex-officio member.

This includes other U.S. international broadcast services which were born in the Cold War, the so-called "Freedom Radios." The first was Radio Free Europe, established in 1949 as a non-profit, non-governmental private corporation to broadcast news and information to East Europeans behind the Iron Curtain. The second was Radio Liberty, created in 1951 to broadcast similar programming to the citizens of Russia and the Soviet republics. Both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were secretly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, a fact not known to the American public until 1967, when the *New York Times* first reported the connection. The immediate result of the story was a huge controversy, because the radios had for years solicited donations from the public through an advertising campaign known as the Crusade for Freedom. Such secrecy, critics argued, undermined the very message of democratic openness the stations were intended to convey in their broadcasts to the closed, totalitarian regimes of the East.

In 1971, Congress terminated CIA funding for the stations and provided for their continued existence by open appropriations. The stations survived and contributed to American strategy in the Cold War. That strategy was simple: to persuade and convince the leaders and people of the communist bloc that freedom was better than dictatorship, that free enterprise was better than central planning, and that no country could survive if it did not respect human rights and the rule of law. Broadcasting into regimes where

travel was severely restricted, where all incoming mail was censored, and all internal media were tools of state propaganda, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty communicated two messages that conventional weapons never could – doubt about the present and hope for the future.

They did so against repeated efforts by Soviet and East European secret police to sabotage their broadcast facilities, to create friction between the stations and their host governments, and even to murder the stations' personnel. In 1962, I personally witnessed an effort by Soviet delegates to an international communications conference in Geneva to eliminate our broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Because I was then Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, the Soviets assumed I was in charge of these broadcasts. I explained that although this was not my department, I thought we should double the broadcasts.

Listening to the radios' evening broadcasts became a standard ritual throughout Russia and Eastern Europe. Moscow, no matter how hard it tried, could not successfully jam the transmissions. As a result, communism had to face a public that every year knew more about its lies. In his 1970 Nobel Prize speech, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn said of Radio Liberty, "If we learn anything about events in our own country, it's from there." When the Berlin Wall fell, and soon after the Soviet Union crumbled, Lech Walesa was asked about the significance of Radio Free Europe to the Polish democracy movement. He replied, "Where would the Earth be without the sun?"

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continue to broadcast, from headquarters in downtown Prague, at the invitation of Vaclav Havel. The studios are now guarded by tanks in the street to protect against terrorists.

With very little money, Congress authorized several new services: Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Iraq, Radio Free Iran, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Democracy Africa, and Worldnet, a television service that broadcasts a daily block of American news. After 9/11, Congress approved funding for a new Radio Free Afghanistan. What most people don't know is that this service is not new – Congress authorized funds for Radio Free Afghanistan first in 1985, when the country was under Soviet domination. Even then the service was minimal – one half-hour a day of news in the Dari and Pashto languages. When the Soviets withdrew, we mistakenly thought the service was no longer needed. We dismantled it as the country plunged into chaos. We are finally beginning to correct our mistakes with a smart new service in the Middle East called “The New Station for the New Generation.”

Indeed, as the Cold War wound down, we forgot its most potent lesson: that totalitarianism was defeated not with missiles, tanks and carriers, but with ideas – and that words can be weapons. Even though the Voice of America had earned the trust and respect of listeners for its accuracy and fairness, our government starved our international broadcasts. Many of the resources that had once been given to public diplomacy – to explaining ourselves and our values to the world – were eliminated. In the Middle East, particularly, American broadcasting is not even a whisper. An Arab-language radio

service is operated by Voice of America, but its budget is tiny and its audience tinier – only about 1 to 2 percent of Arabs ever listen to it. Among those under the age of 30 – 60 percent of the population in the region -- virtually no one listens.

As we fell mute in the Cold War's aftermath, other voices grew in influence.

### **Al Jazeera**

In the past few months, Westerners began to learn about Al Jazeera as a source of anti-American tirades by Muslim extremists and as the favored news outlet of both Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The service had its beginnings in 1995, when the BBC withdrew from a joint venture with Saudi-owned Orbit Communications that had provided news on a Middle East channel. The BBC and the Saudi government clashed over editorial judgments, and the business relationship fell apart. Into the breach stepped a big fan of CNN, Qatar's Emir, Sheikh Hamed bin Khalifa Al Thani. He admired CNN's satellite technology and decided to bankroll a Middle East satellite network with a small budget. He hired most of the BBC's anchors, editors and technicians, and Al Jazeera was born.

Al Jazeera means "the peninsula" in Arabic, and the name is fitting. Just as Qatar is a peninsula, the station's programming protrudes conspicuously into the world of state-controlled broadcasting in the Middle East. Several commentators, including many Arabs, have sharply criticized the service for being unprofessional and biased. CNN and Al Jazeera had a dispute this year and terminated their cooperative relationship.

Well before September 11, Al Jazeera had managed to anger most of the governments in its own region. Libya withdrew its ambassador from Qatar when Al Jazeera broadcast an interview with a critic of the Libyan government. Tunisia's ambassador complained to the Qatari foreign ministry about a program accusing Tunisia of violating human rights. Kuwait complained after a program criticized Kuwait's relations with Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, officials called for a "political fatwa" prohibiting Saudis from appearing on any Al Jazeera programming. In March 2001, Yasser Arafat closed Al Jazeera's West Bank news bureau, complaining of an offensive depiction of Arafat in a documentary. Algeria shut off electricity to prevent its citizens from watching Al Jazeera's programs. Other countries deny Al Jazeera's reporters entry visas.

And of course, our own country has plenty to complain about Al Jazeera.

Al Jazeera came to our notice first because a 1998 interview with Osama bin Laden called upon Muslims to "target all Americans." Al Jazeera broadcast the tape many times. As the only network with an office in Afghanistan, Al Jazeera was the only one the Taliban allowed to broadcast from the country. On October 7, 2001, the network's Kabul office received a videotape message from Osama bin Laden, which it transmitted around the world. Hiding in caves, Osama could still speak to the world in a voice louder than ours because we allowed our story to be told by our enemies.

Forty years ago, I accompanied President Kennedy on a tour of our space program facilities. He asked me why it was so important to launch a communications satellite. I

said, "Mr. President, unlike other rocket launches, this one will not send a man into space, but it will send ideas. And ideas last longer than people do." I never dreamed that the ideas millions of people receive every day would come from Al Jazeera.

### **The Global Media Marketplace**

Whatever one thinks of Al Jazeera, it teaches an important lesson: The global marketplace of news and information is no longer dominated by the United States. Our own government, because it has no outlet of its own in the area, is looking into buying commercial time on Al Jazeera to get America's anti-terrorism message out. And because of privatization and deregulation in the international satellite business, a huge number of Americans now have direct access to Al Jazeera through the EchoStar satellite service.

The point is simply this: Whether the message is one of hate or peace, in the globalized communications environment it is impossible either to silence those who send the message, or stop those who want to receive it. Satellites have no respect for national borders. Satellites surmount walls. Like Joshua's Trumpet, satellites blow walls down.

That was the last lesson of the Cold War. In Beijing, the Chinese government would not begin its brutal sweep through Tianamen Square until it thought the world's video cameras were out of range. In Manila, Warsaw and Bucharest, dissenters first captured the television station – the Electronic Bastille of modern revolutions. In Prague, a classic urban rebellion became a revolution through television. The Romanian revolution was not won until television showed pictures of the Ceaucescus' corpses and scenes of rebels

controlling the square in Bucharest. In the final days of the Soviet Union, the August 1991 coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev failed when video of the supposedly ill president was broadcast by satellite around the world. Those satellites, Gorbachev later said, “prevented the triumph of dictatorship.” Now, we have the newer technologies of the internet and e-mail – technologies the Voice of America and the Freedom Radios use with enthusiasm without adequate support.

What we have failed to realize is that the last lesson of the Cold War is also the first lesson of the new global information age. We live now in a world where we are the lone superpower, and the target of envy and resentment not just in the Middle East but elsewhere. Terror is now the weapon of choice.

But if you believe we are only in a war against terrorism, you are only half-right. Nation-states can sponsor terrorism and provide cover to terrorists, but the war against terrorism is asymmetric. This is my friend Don Rumsfeld’s favorite word – asymmetric. This means that war is not waged by a state against another state per se, but against an ideology. Think of the campaign of the past few months. The enemy has been a band of religious zealots and the Al Qaeda terrorists they harbor, not the people of Afghanistan. President Bush has been emphatic and effective on this point, as have Prime Minister Tony Blair and other world leaders.

Asymmetry also refers to the strategies and tactics used by those who cannot compete in a conventional war. In an asymmetric war, it is not enough to have Air Forces to

command the skies, Navies to roam the seas, or Armies to control mountain passes. Although the Cold War led to staggering advances in military technology to win the battles, there is not a corresponding change in our government's use of communications technology to win the peace.

Asymmetry, in other words, is not limited to what happens on the battlefield. While U.S. Special Operations forces in Afghanistan use laptops and satellites and sophisticated wireless telecommunications to guide pilots flying bombing missions from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea, we still use obsolete, clumsy and primitive methods, such as short-wave radio, to communicate to the people.

Here is another incongruity: American marketing talent is successfully selling Madonna's music, Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola, Michael Jordan's shoes and McDonald's hamburgers around the world. Our film, television and computer software industries dominate their markets worldwide. Yet, the United States government has tried to get its message of freedom and democracy out to the 1 billion Muslims in the world and can't seem to do it. How is it that America, a nation founded on ideas – not religion or race or ethnicity or clan – cannot explain itself to the world?

In the months since September 11, Americans have been surprised to learn of the deep and bitter resentment that much of the Muslim world feels toward us. Our situation is not just a public relations problem. Anyone who has traveled the world knows that much anti-American sentiment springs from disagreements with some of our economic and

foreign policies. Our support of authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world has not endeared us to the people who live there. And there is no more poisonous imagery than that of Palestinians and Israelis locked in mortal and what seems to be never-ending combat.

Still, the United States has an important story to tell, the story of human striving for freedom, democracy and opportunity. Since the end of the Cold War, we have failed to tell that story to a world waiting to hear it on the radio and see it on television. We have failed to use the power of ideas.

Within days of the Taliban's flight from Kabul, television was back on the air in the country. The Taliban had not only banned television broadcasts, but confiscated and destroyed thousands of TV sets. They hung the smashed husks of TV sets on light poles, along with videocassettes and musical instruments, as a warning to anyone who might try to break the regime's reign of ignorance. And yet no sooner were the Taliban driven from the city than hundreds of TV sets appeared from nowhere. Even in the midst of a totalitarian, theocratic regime, there had been a thriving underground market for news and information. Television antennas were quickly hung outside of windows and on rooftops. The antennas are like periscopes, enabling those inside to see what is happening outside.

Where were we when those people needed us? Where were we when Al Jazeera went on the air? It was as if we put on our own self-created burka and disappeared from sight. The voices of America, the voices of freedom, were not even a whisper.

### **The New Challenge**

I believe the United States must re-commit itself to public diplomacy – to explaining and advocating our values to the world. As Tom Friedman put it in his *New York Times* column not long ago: “It is no easy trick to lose a PR war to two mass murderers – (Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein) but we’ve been doing just that lately. It is not enough for the White House to label them ‘evildoers.’ We have to take the PR war right to them, just like the real one.”

There are two leaders of both parties who need our support in this fight for aggressive, vigorous public diplomacy. Illinois Republican Congressman Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, wants to strengthen the Voice of America and the many Freedom Radio services that broadcast from Cuba to Afghanistan.

Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is on the same page. He has developed legislation known as “Initiative 911” to give special emphasis to more programming for the entire Muslim world, from Nigeria to Indonesia.

In November, Congress finally set aside \$30 million to launch a new Middle East radio network. The AM and FM broadcasts (not short wave) will offer pop music – American

and Arabic – along with a mix of current events and talk shows. The proposal to fund Radio Free Afghanistan is for \$27.5 million this year and next, and will allow about 12 hours a day of broadcasting into the country. The goal is to make our ideas clear not just to leaders in the Muslim world, but to those in the street, and particularly the young, many of whom are uneducated and desperately poor, and among whom hostility toward the United States is very high.

These efforts are late and, in my view, too timid. They are tactical, not strategic. They are smart, not visionary. The cost of putting Radio Free Afghanistan on the air and underwriting its annual budget, for example, is less than even one Commanche helicopter. We have many hundreds of helicopters which we need to destroy tyranny, but they are insufficient to secure freedom. In an asymmetric war, we must also fight on the idea front.

Bob Shieffer put the issue well not long ago on CBS' "Face the Nation":

“The real enemy is not Osama, it is the ignorance that breeds the hatred that fuels his cause. This is what we have to change. I realized what an enormous job that was going to be the other day when I heard a young Pakistani student tell an interviewer that everyone in his school knew that Israel was behind the attacks on the Twin Towers and everyone in his school knew all the Jews who worked there had stayed home that day.

“What we have all come to realize now is that a large part of the world not only misunderstands us but is teaching its children to hate us.”

Steve Forbes, who once headed the Broadcasting Board of Governors, put the issue even more bluntly: “Washington should cease its petty, penny-minded approach to our

international radios and give them the resources and capable personnel to do the job that so badly needs to be done right.... What are we waiting for?"

### **The proposal**

What are we waiting for? I suggest three simple proposals. First, define a clear strategic mission and vision for U.S. international broadcasting. Second, provide the financial resources to get the job done. Third, use the unique talent that the United States has – all of it – to communicate that vision to the world.

First, and above all, U.S. international broadcasting should be unapologetically proud to advocate freedom and democracy in the world. There is no inconsistency in reporting the news accurately while also advocating America's values. The real issue is whether we will carry the debate on the meaning of freedom to places on the globe, where open debate is unknown and freedom has no seed. Does anyone seriously believe that the twin goals of providing solid journalism and undermining tyranny are incompatible? As a people, Americans have always been committed to the proposition that these goals go hand in hand. As the leader of the free world, it is time for us to do what's right – to speak of idealism, sacrifice and the nurturing of values essential to human freedom – and to speak in a bold, clear voice.

Second, if we are to do that, we will need to put our money where our mouths are not. We now spend more than a billion dollars each day for the Department of Defense. Results in the war on terrorism demonstrate that this is money well invested in our national security.

Whatever Don Rumsfeld says he needs should be provided by the Congress with pride in the extraordinary service his imaginative leadership is giving our country. As President Bush has proposed, we will need to increase the defense budget. When we do, let's compare what we need to spend on the Voice of America and the Freedom Radio services with what we need to spend on defense. Our international broadcasting efforts amount to less than two-tenths of one percent of Defense expenditures. Al Jazeera was started with an initial budget of less than \$30 million a year. Now Al Jazeera reaches some 40 million men, women and children every day, at a cost of pennies per viewer every month.

Congress should hold hearings now to decide what we should spend to get our message of freedom, democracy and peace into the non-democratic and authoritarian regions of the world. One suggestion is to consider a relationship between what we spend on defense with what we spend on communication. For example, should we spend 10 percent of what we spend on defense for communication? That would be \$33 billion a year. Too much. Should we spend 1 percent? That would be \$3.3 billion, and that seems about right to me -- one dollar to launch ideas for every \$100 we invest to launch bombs. This would be about six times more than we invest now in international communications. We must establish a ratio sufficient to our need to inform and persuade others of the values of freedom and democracy. More importantly, we should seek a ratio sufficient to lessen our need for bombs.

Third, throwing money alone at the problem will not do the job. We need to use all of the communications talent we have at our disposal. This job is not only for journalists. As important as balanced news and public affairs programming are to our public diplomacy mission, the fact is that we are now in a global information marketplace. An American news source, even a highly professional one like the VOA, is not necessarily persuasive in a market of shouting, often deceitful and hateful voices. Telling the truth in a persuasive, convincing way is not propaganda. Churchill's and Roosevelt's words – "never was so much owed by so many to so few" – "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself" – were as powerful as a thousand guns.

When Colin Powell chose advertising executive Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs, some journalists sneered. You cannot peddle freedom as you would cars and shampoo, went the refrain. That is undoubtedly so, and Beers has several times said as much herself. But you can't peddle freedom if no one is listening, and Charlotte Beers is a master at getting people to listen – and to communicate in terms people understand.

So was another visionary in this business, Bill Benton. Before he served as Assistant Secretary of State, Benton had been a founding partner in one of the country's largest and most successful advertising firms, Benton and Bowles. To win the information war, we will need the Bentons and Beers of this world every bit as much as we will need the journalists. We have the smartest, most talented, and most creative people in the world in our communications industries – in radio, television, film, newspapers, magazines,

advertising, publishing, public relations, marketing. These men and women want to help their country, and will volunteer eagerly to help get our message across. One of the first people we should enlist is a West Point graduate named Bill Roedy, who is President of MTV Networks International. His enterprise reaches one billion people in 18 languages in 164 countries. Eight out of ten MTV viewers live outside the United States. He can teach us a lot about how to tell our story.

### **Conclusion**

In 1945, a few years after the VOA first went on the air, the newly founded United Nations had 51 members. Today it has 189. In the last decade alone, more than 20 countries have been added to the globe, many of them former Soviet republics, but not all. Some of these new countries, as with the Balkan example, have been cut bloodily from the fabric of ethnic and religious hatred. Some of these countries are nominally democratic, but many – especially in Central Asia – are authoritarian regimes. Some are also deeply unstable, and thus pose a threat not only to their neighbors, but to the free world. Afghanistan, we discovered too late, is a concern not only to its region, but to all of us.

In virtually every case, those whose rule is based on an ideology of hate have understood better than we have the power of ideas and the power of communicating ideas. The bloodshed in the Balkans began with hate radio blaring from Zagreb and Belgrade, and hate radio is still common in the region today. The murder of 2 million Hutus and Tutsis

in central Africa could not have happened but for the urging of madmen with broadcast towers at their disposal. The same has been true of ethnic violence in India and Pakistan.

I saw this first hand in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President Kennedy asked me to organize eight American commercial radio stations to carry the Voice of America to Cuba because the VOA was shut out by Soviet jamming. We succeeded, and President Kennedy's speeches were heard in Spanish in Cuba at the height of the crisis. As we kept the destroyers and missiles out of Cuba, we got the Voice of America in because we had enough power to surmount the jamming. On that occasion, our American broadcasts were more than a whisper.

Last spring – well before the events of September 11 – Illinois Congressman Henry Hyde put the need eloquently. I quote him:

During the last several years it has been argued that our broadcasting services have done their job so well that they are no longer needed. This argument assumes that the great battle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the long struggle for the soul of the world, is over: that the forces of freedom and democracy have won. But the argument is terribly shortsighted. It ignores the people of China and Cuba, of Vietnam and Burma, of Iraq and Iran and Sudan and North Korea and now Russia. It ignores the fragility of freedom and the difficulty of building and keeping democracy. And it ignores the resilience of evil.

Fifty-eight years ago, Albert Einstein returned from a day of sailing to find a group of reporters waiting for him at the shore. The reporters told him that the United States had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, wiping out the city. Einstein shook his head and said, "Everything in the world has changed except the way we think."

On September 11 everything changed except the way we think. It is hard to change the way we think. But we know that ideas last longer than people do, and that two important ideas of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are now in direct competition: the ideas of mass communication and mass destruction. The great question of our time is whether we will be wise enough to use one to avoid the other.

March 14, 2002 8:13 AM

2002 MAR 15 11:18:04

Handwritten signature: *Jim Fraser* (circled)

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Dodd

Please put Chris Dodd on our list of friends. He wants to help, he is interested in transformation, and he would love to meet Andy Marshall sometime—maybe we also ought to get him with Cebrowski.

Handwritten: 231.2

Let's see if he wants to pull together four or five senators and come down and have a session—a breakfast or something—with Cebrowski and Marshall.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031402-6

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

Handwritten: 14Mae02



February 25, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: David Chu  
Gordon England  
James Roche  
Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety

I am attaching some comments Paul O'Neill sent me regarding our safety record tracking. He is commenting on the Navy's format, but his suggestions may apply across-the-board.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/19/02 Secretary O'Neill memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
022202-9

.....  
Please respond by 03/04/02

*Le del 3/13*

*4/3/14*

→ *Chris Aldridge Responses attached*  
**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
MAR 15 2002

*D. H. R.*

Lamy Di Rita  
*3/1*

U03335-02

3/12  
0800



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010  
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR 11 PM 12: 57

March 7, 2002

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) *3/8/02*

MAR 15 2002

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

● This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on Army, Navy, and Marines safety record tracking at Tab A.

● I concur with Dr. Chu's assessment of Secretary O'Neill's comments <sup>next under</sup> at ~~Tab B~~. Ray DuBois is working closely with P&R and ~~MA BUCCI~~ co-chairs the "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT). We will continue to support Dr. Chu on the Lost Day Integrated Process Team.

● I would like to emphasize Secretary O'Neill's second point "if people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours." Department leaders need near real time visibility of serious safety & health incidents (deaths, serious accidents and injuries, etc) in addition to close scrutiny of lost time injury and illness. We will work with the Services in conjunction with P&R to identify and implement quick, system-wide data sharing. Our initial focus will be on real time web-based incident reporting.

● The National Safety Council (NSC) completed a peer review in December, 2001 of the DoD's safety and occupational health programs. The NSC assembled a panel of experts from industry, labor, and government and made recommendations including best industry practices to improve our safety and health programs. The NSC Panel has conservatively estimated that the annual cost of injuries and illness for the DoD ranges from \$10 billion to over \$21 billion. ~~The NSC report is at Tab B.~~ Ray DuBois will continue to work with the Service Assistant Secretaries to review and implement the relevant recommendations of the National Safety Council report.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Curtis Bowling, I&E (SOH) (b)(6)

3088-2002 AT

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>3/12</i>

MAR 15 2002

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2002

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Lost Days Inquiry Response

- This paper responds to Secretary O'Neill's comments on our safety record tracking at Tab A.
- Secretary O'Neill's comments reflect his in-depth understanding of managing lost time due to injuries. His review of the Army and Navy safety information is on target and we are working to address his concerns.
- Our civilian prototype "Lost Day" system calculates the incident (case) rates and days lost due to injuries as Secretary O'Neill suggested. Our system is based on payroll records, not compensation claims, and provides for objective and auditable data. We are also working on a prototype to capture similar information for our military personnel using medical data. This have proven more difficult.
- We are working towards an "objective system" that will provide real time facts regarding the incident that is similar to what Secretary O'Neill suggests. Our "Lost Day" Integrated Process Team (IPT) met mid-February to review progress and set DoD goals to reduce injuries by the end of the year.
- The third point mentioned by Secretary O'Neill is that the Marine Corps civilian case rate is at the high (bad) range of the U.S. work experience. Our data from the payroll and medical records confirms that point and suggests we have room for improvement.
- We will be prepared to brief you on our current efforts and proposed goals for managing lost time due to injuries by early April.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., RP&A, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7751

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 19, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO*

Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/Marine report.

If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DOD (civilian and military). "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity. Second, if the people are going to learn from incident experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third, the civilian only rates in the Marine Corps are at the upper end (bad) range of U.S. work experience. (Looks like 35-40 times higher than the organization I know the best, where the environment is much more challenging than the one experienced by Marine Corps civilians.)

Attachments

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

February 15, 2002

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL *PHO*

DR: This is such a mish mash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rates and # of cases wrote this section!

If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question.

From what I see in this report - e.g., the Secretary <sup>(of the Navy)</sup> receives quarterly reports - it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.

Attachments

*Before I got this in the mail back to you I received the Navy/marine report.*

*If I were doing this for you, I would begin by using the OSHA reporting scheme and definitions for all of DoD (civilian and military) "Lost time case rates per 100 workers per year" has clarity.*

*Second, if the people are going to learn from incident's experience, the facts regarding the incident should be shared system wide within 24 hours. Third the civilian only rates in the marine corps are at the upper end and ~~not~~ (bad) range of U.S. work experience.*

US TREASURY

FEB-19-2002 18:21

11-L-0559/OSD/7753

I know the best, where the work is much more  
challenging than the one experienced by  
marine corps civilians. )

February 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Safety

Here is the quarterly report from the Army on safety. Are they on the right track?

Thanks.

Attach.

01/31/02 SecArmy Info Memo to SecDef re: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

DHR:dh  
0204024

*Look at #7 - someone who doesn't understand the difference between rats and # of cases write this section!*

*DR: This is such a mishmash of non-comparable data it isn't possible to draw any conclusion. If you will send someone over who understands the facts I will give you an answer to your question. From what I see in this report -- e.g. the Sec. receives quarterly reports it is not possible to have a system that learns from itself.*

*DR  
2-15-02*

(b)(6)



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON  
INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

127 FEB -1 AM 10:39

SECDEF HAS SEEN

February 1, 2002, 8:33 A.M. FEB 04 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JAN 31 2002

SUBJECT: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

- Attached provides a current analysis of Safety goals and performance metrics.
- The small increase in fatalities that we experienced during the first quarter, FY 02 is attributable to Operation Enduring Freedom.
- POV accidents continue to be our greatest challenge and the focus of our efforts to reemphasize the efforts of commanders at every level to continue to work this problem hard.
- We have made significant strides in reducing workplace injuries and lost time involving the Army's civilian workforce.
- Safety will remain at the forefront of our efforts to keep the Army ready.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: COL Joseph Schroedel (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SRI MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>


**SUBJECT: Army Safety Goals and Performance Metrics**

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide a quarterly update to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Army Safety Statistics.

2. The Army has an effective safety program. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and I have recently approved a Safety Strategic Campaign plan that is closely tied to The Army Transformation Plan. In October 2000, the CSA established a goal of reducing overall fatalities in The Army by 6 percent per year through FY06. Our current metrics are based on these goals.


3. On a quarterly basis, the CSA and I receive an executive summary and a briefing from the Director of Army Safety on accident rates and trends for all Army categories to include: army motor vehicles, army combat vehicles, personal injury, POV, and aviation. Army-wide initiatives designed to reduce accident rates and stop negative trends are discussed with the senior leaders and attendees.

4. The 6 percent reduction in overall fatalities goal is attainable and consistent with the decreases in accidental fatalities The Army has experienced over the past 10 years. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY02.




5. In this first quarter of FY02, The Army lost 46 soldiers. This represented a 15 percent increase over the same time last year. Leaders and commanders took action and this spike in accidents has since leveled off to where The Army stands at one less fatality than last year at this time. Accidents related to Operation Enduring Freedom account for approximately 10% (5 fatalities) of Army accidental fatalities in the first quarter of FY02.

6. POV accidents continue to be the number one killer of Army soldiers. FY01 had an eleven percent reduction in POV fatalities. For FY92 to FY01, POV accidents accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY01.



7. We continue to make progress in reducing workplace injuries and illnesses involving The Army's civilian workforce. In FY 93, over 28 of every 1,000 workers lost time from the job as a result of working conditions. In FY 01, this number had dropped to approximately 18 of every 1,000 workers. The graph below depicts year-end lost workday cases and the rate or cases per 100,000 employees from FY92 to FY01.



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JAN 28 PM 12:44

January 28, 2002

TO: Donald Rumsfeld  
FROM: Gordon England  
SUBJECT: Safety Records



SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

This is to provide our first quarterly safety report per your request (attached).

Safety is one of my top priorities. My first act was to establish myself as Chief of Safety for the Department of the Navy and to place responsibility for safety directly with me. We immediately established a Deputy Assistant Secretary position devoted solely to Safety. Weekly, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I monitor accident trends. Attached are the metrics I will submit to you quarterly.

My focus areas are:


- (1) Unify the safety effort in the Department.
- (2) Use state-of-the-art technologies to improve safety and occupational health.
- (3) Embed strong safety and risk management characteristics in our Naval culture.
- (4) Integrate best private and public sector safety practices.

You will start seeing improvements.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/28
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/31
MA BUCCI	1/31
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/28

U0159102


# Navy and Marine Corps Total Class A Operational Mishap Rate As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap involves a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.


11-L-0559/OSD/7760

# Navy and Marine Corps Class A Flight Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01




Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

# Navy Afloat Class A Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01



Rates reflect mishaps per 100 ships per year. A Class A mishap is a mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-military personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or more.

# Navy and Marine Corps Class A Ashore Mishap Rates As of 31 Dec 01




Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year. A Class A mishap mishap involving a fatality or permanent total disability to military or non-mi personnel, a destroyed DoD aircraft, or total damage costs of \$1 million or mo

11-L-0559/OSD/7763


**Navy and Marine Corps**  
**PMV Fatality Rates**  
**As of 31 Dec 01**

PERSONAL  
MOTOR  
VEHICLES



Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

# Navy and Marine Corps Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates As of 31 Oct 01



Civilian lost time case rates = total number of worker's compensation cases in lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

11-L-0559/OSD/7765

March 14, 2002 3:49 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
David Chu  
Torie Clarke  
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Secretary O'Neill Trip Report

Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill recently traveled to the Gulf and sent me this excellent trip report.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/08/02 O'Neill Trip Report, Gulf Region, March 4-8, 2002

DHR:dh  
031402-23



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*333*

*14 Albu d z*

U04784-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7766

March 8, 2002

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Paul O'Neill

SUBJECT:

Trip to the Gulf Region, March 4-8, 2002

From March 4-8, 2002, I led a Treasury delegation to the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The trip was part of a broader international effort to strengthen the international coalition to combat the financing of terrorism. We received a very warm welcome from the ruling families and senior ministers in each of the countries visited. Many – including Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah --reminded me that they have known you for many years and were looking forward to your visit. I believe our trip strengthened our close ties of friendship and achieved some concrete results. The trip provided the opportunity to learn a great deal and gain a better appreciation of Islam and Arab culture, attitudes, and terrorism financing efforts.

**OVERALL EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE FINANCING OF TERRORISTS**

The efforts in all four countries to block terrorist assets and share information with us has been exemplary. Bahrain blocked \$18 million in assets of a Hamas financier. Kuwait has issued blocking orders against every one of nine lists issued by the United States. Saudi Arabia has frozen \$300,000 in Al Qaida-related funds and has frozen additional assets of Al Kadi. The UAE took domestic action against Al Barrakat offices with us in November and has frozen \$2 million in assets since then. However, the actions remain sensitive and the four Gulf states do not want any of the amounts frozen made public.

**U.S.-SAUDI JOINT DESIGNATION**

One of the most significant accomplishments of the trip was our agreement with the Kingdom to take joint action and block the assets of two overseas offices of a Saudi charity. This is the first time we have issued a joint list with any country and is a prime example of the action we have been urging other countries to take. It required the Saudis to strike a careful balance between strong cooperation with the United States and concerns of their domestic population and demonstrated considerable courage on their part. In turn, they request that the US treat the initiative in a low key manner.

**CHARITIES**

In meetings with government officials, the press, and the business community, we made it clear that the United States has a strong tradition of charitable giving, just as in the Gulf, and that we have no intention of preventing charities from providing funds to those in need. However, we explained that, when the international community determines that a charity is being misused to funnel money to terrorists, it will freeze assets without delay.

11-L-0559/OSD/7767

—Before our trip, we planted the seeds of an initiative to strengthen the regulation of charities to ensure that they are not being misused. In the course of our trip, the government of Bahrain provided us with draft guidelines to strengthen the oversight of charities. We hand delivered a copy of these guidelines to each of the other three Gulf states, where they were well-received. The fact that it is a "home-grown" Gulf initiative is the most significant aspect.

### HAWALAS

The Hawala system is an informal mechanism used mostly by the expatriate community in a foreign country to remit earnings (without physically transferring cash) back to their families in their home country. We emphasized that hawalas are legitimate businesses that we do not want to close down, but only to prevent terrorists from abusing them. Once again, the Gulf states, in particular the UAE, are taking their own initiative to understand and to regulate better the hawala system.

### ISLAMIC BANKING

During our trip, we were able to *demystify* for ourselves the concept of Islamic banking, which structures transactions in such a way as to avoid fixed interest, but is otherwise comparable to western banking. As with charities and hawalas, we explained that we have no complaints with Islamic banking, but we want to prevent its abuse by terrorists. We were impressed by the efforts that Bahrain is taking to develop high quality banking and accounting standards for Islamic banks.

### DEFINING TERRORIST GROUPS

We received many questions from the press and business community about what constitutes a "terrorist" and whether HAMAS should be considered a terrorist group since it provides charitable services and also serves as a movement of national liberalization. I was also struck by comments in Saudi Arabia that the bulk of their youth view Usama bin Laden as a hero. To respond to these concerns, I continued to stress that the United States is not against Arabs or Islam. I defined terrorism as any act that would purposely harm innocent people. I found it particularly helpful to provide a few examples of non-Arab terrorist groups, such as the six IRA names that the British gave us and the 21 ETA names from the Spanish, all of whose assets we have frozen.

### MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

While the purpose of our trip was economic, rather than political, it was inevitable that the Middle East conflict would arise. Many of the Arabs with whom we spoke believed that either the United States is not engaged enough in Israel-Palestine dispute or, if engaged, is biased in how it judges the conflict. Nevertheless, my feeling is that a large number of Arab business and government leaders strongly support the United States. Most have lived here, gone to school here, worked here, or vacationed here. They have true feelings of friendship that should be tapped into. We need to do a better job of communicating that America is not at war with Islam and wants all people to prosper.

3/12  
0800

March 11, 2002 10:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mail

It is taking months to get mail—things mailed December 7, I am just receiving now on March 9. Three months is an awful long time.

I wonder if there is some way to speed that up a little? If not, we'll just live with it.

3/11

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-11

.....  
Please respond by 03/22/02

3/15

→ Larry Curry -

Please advise  
*DHR*  
11 MAR 02

Larry Di Rita

EF761 SA  
02 1003035-USD

February 25, 2002 12:53 PM

~~ISA/AF~~

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Defense Consultative Group

2/8  
Larry Di Rita

Apparently, Jiang Zemin raised the question with President Bush of when the Defense Consultative Group could start meeting again. He said he thought there was a date set for March.

China

What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022502-35

.....  
Please respond by 02/28/02

25 Feb 02

\* 200

March 11, 2002 3:12 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defending Against Bio Warfare

Is there anyone in the defense establishment who has the overall responsibility for seeing that the Defense Department is developing the appropriate capabilities to defend against and deal with biological attacks?

370.64

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-44

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

3/18

Response attached

~~cc: USD(AT&L) Aldridge~~

Larry Di Rita  
3/18

Larry Di Rita  
3/18

11 Mar 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-233-02

14 March 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 3/14*

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Developing the Capability to Defend Against and Deal with Biological Attacks

- For your Information, per your question on who is responsible for developing the capability to defend against and deal with biological attacks (TAB).
- The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Dr. Dale Klein, is responsible in the Department of Defense.
- Mrs. Anna Johnson-Winegar, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense is who, I believe, is primarily responsible to Dr. Klein for the specific areas in your question.
- The Secretary of the Army is the Executive Agent for the Chemical and Biological (CB) Defense Program and is responsible to coordinate, integrate, and review all Services' CB defense requirements and programs.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTG John P. Abizaid, USA; DJS; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7772

March 18, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: IMET

Attached is a response to your question as to whether or not we can handle the increases in IMET. It looks as though we can.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/11/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: IMET

DHR:dh  
031802-9

*110.01*

*18 March*

7/13  
103



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

MAR 11 2002 EF 826 LK  
762 B23 3/2  
SECDEF HA  
50  
ANNIVERSARY  
OF  
WORLD WAR II  
1945-2002

INFO MEMO

MAR 18 2002

In reply refer to:  
I-02/003034/USDP

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) for Peter Rodman 11 MAR 2002)

SUBJECT: International Military Education and Training (IMET)

- Question: Do we have enough school slots open for a significant increase under IMET? (See reference tab.)
- Answer: Yes. Military Services prepared to support IMET funded at \$70 million in FY02, \$80 million in FY03, and \$100 million in FY04.
- Additional background at Tab ~~B~~

COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Rita Verry, DSCA/P3, (b)(6)

DIR, DSCA John Watt 11 MAR 2002

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/7774

MAR 12 2002 / 1100

MAR 11 2002

## TAB A: BACKGROUND

**Subject:** International Military Education and Training (IMET) Expansion

**Purpose:** To answer SecDef question: Does DoD have enough school slots open for a significant increase under IMET?

**Answer:** Yes. Military Services slated to support IMET funded at \$70 million in FY02, \$80 million in FY03, and \$100 million in FY04.

### Key Points:

- IMET increased from \$55M in FY01 to \$70M in FY02.
- SecState IMET request is \$80M in FY 03 with intent to request \$100M in FY04.
- SecState increase based on SecDef's willingness to provide DoD funds to increase class capacity to accommodate additional IMET funded students.
  - DoD PBD increased Military Services' FY03 training budget by \$15M to provide increased infrastructure requirements to support IMET expansion.
  - Military Services directed to POM for further adjustments, as required, for FY04 and beyond.
  - Services were requested to work closely with DSCA to maximize the IMET student fill rate in priority classes for FY02 IMET expansion.
- Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) just completed in-depth global survey and analysis of existing English language labs and training requirements to address language skills. DLIELC scheduled to receive \$3.8M in DoD funds in FY03 to support anticipated increase.
- Several Military Service Schools are increasing capacity for international students, as well as courses that teach military leadership, management, journalism, and technical skills. New CONUS-based courses are being developed in vital areas of emphasis.
- DoD (DSCA) and State working to optimize IMET, considering use of third-country training centers, teaching U.S. military doctrine and curriculum, and using Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) technology.

Prepared by: Rita Verry, DSCA/P3, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7775

EF7628A  
02/003034/OSDT

February 25, 2002 12:56 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: IMET

*Do not send this page*

*9/15 Larry Di Rita*

Colin Powell tells me he has an increase in IMET. The issue is if he gets more money, do we have enough school slots open for a significant increase under IMET? The real value of IMET is to have them mixed in with our people.

Please check into that and get back to me. I suppose you should work with J-7.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022502-36

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/02

*3/15*  
*Response attached*  
*14 3/16*

Larry Di Rita

EF76281A

02/003034/USDY

February 25, 2002 12:56 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: IMET

*3/5 Larry Di Rita*

Colin Powell tells me he has an increase in IMET. The issue is if he gets more money, do we have enough school slots open for a significant increase under IMET? The real value of IMET is to have them mixed in with our people.

*110.01*

Please check into that and get back to me. I suppose you should work with J-7.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022502-36

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/02

*3/15*  
*Response attached* *14 3/16*

Larry Di Rita

*25 Feb 02*



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600  
 INFO MEMO



March 15, 2002, 1:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel *DJ Dell'Orto* (b)(6) *3/15/02*

SUBJECT: Stocks

- You may continue to hold both Gilead and Amylin stocks.
- I spoke with Lloyd Rowland, Amylin General Counsel, on Thursday, March 14. He confirmed that Amylin does not contract with the DoD. He promised to alert our office if Amylin anticipated a contract with DoD, although he viewed that as unlikely.
- I spoke to Gregg Alton, Gilead General Counsel, on Monday, March 11. He confirmed that Gilead is not a DoD contractor and promised to alert us if it were to become a DoD contractor, but he did report that Gilead has provided small quantities of Cidofovir (trade name Vistide) to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for evaluation as a potential treatment for smallpox under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement.
- Cidofovir is a drug the FDA approved for treating CMV retinitis in AIDS patients. I confirmed that USAMRIID is evaluating Cidofovir as part of an Interagency Smallpox Work Group that was chartered before your appointment as Secretary.
- In addition, the Army Surgeon General is considering sponsoring an Investigational New Drug application with the FDA for Cidofovir's use against smallpox and the Army Medical Materiel Development Agency is working on two protocols for Cidofovir's use in smallpox-related applications.
- If Cidofovir were to be considered as an Investigational New Drug for force protection purposes in the event of a smallpox outbreak, under DoD regulations you or the Deputy Secretary would be the approval authority. In this instance, the Deputy Secretary should be the approval authority since you would be disqualified based on your Gilead holdings. Secretary Aldridge would be the decision authority if Defense research funding were to be dedicated to anti-viral drugs for smallpox. Again, you would be disqualified based on your Gilead holdings.
- Attached is a copy of the most recent memorandum to your staff that identifies Gilead as one of three companies about which matters that may have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests should be directed to the Deputy Secretary.

COORDINATION: None *concord and Harmon 3/15/02*

Attachment: As stated



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

FEB 30 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR IMMEDIATE STAFF OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SUBJECT: Potential Conflicts of Interest

On March 13, 2001, the Acting General Counsel forwarded you a list of companies in which Secretary Rumsfeld had a financial interest or relationship and which he was in the process of divesting. Since then, Secretary Rumsfeld has divested most of those interests. The remaining interests are:

Wire One  
Bruker AXS  
Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Please continue to screen correspondence, memoranda, and decision papers that may have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of these companies. Such matters should be diverted to the Deputy Secretary. Please ensure they are not forwarded to the Secretary.

If you have any questions, please contact Steve Epstein, Gail Mason, or Jeff Green of my office. They are prepared to provide immediate assistance and may be reached at (b)(6)

  
William J. Haynes II

cc:  
Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense



11-L-0559/OSD/7779

March 13, 2002 3:56 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Stocks

Where do you stand on getting back to me as to whether I can keep holding Gilead and ~~Amylin~~ stocks?

*Amylin*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031302-6

.....

Please respond by 03/19/02

*3/18*

*Sec Def -*

*Dell'Orto response  
attached.*

*D. Rumsfeld*

showfile

March 13, 2002 3:56 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Stocks

Where do you stand on getting back to me as to whether I can keep holding Gilead and ~~Amylin~~ stocks?  
*Amylin*  
Thanks.

*250*

DHR:dh  
031302-6

.....  
Please respond by 03/19/02

*3/18*

*Sec Def -  
Dell'Orto response  
attached.*

*Dikita*

*13 MAR 02*

NEF-0404



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



INFO MEMO

2002 MAR 19 AM 9:48

I-02/003851-WH

4/16

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *AD 3/16*  
(Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: HOUSE RESOLUTION ON COLOMBIA (H.R. 358)

PURPOSE: Reply to your question about my views on H.R. 358 (Tab A)

- H.R. 358 is a non-binding Sense of Congress that urges the President to propose a policy framed in terms of support for Colombian democracy, and that for the first time would add counter-terrorism as an explicit goal of U.S. policy in Colombia, along with traditional counter-narcotics goals (Tab B).
- The resolution is consistent with DOD's position in the interagency process.
- This represents the first formal acknowledgement by either house that the threat to Colombia now goes beyond drugs, and that U.S. policy should reflect this.
- It is <sup>a</sup>positive but not overly important development. It passed by unanimous consent, but a full debate on Colombia has yet to occur.

COORDINATION: Tab C

(Prepared by: Roger Pardo-Maurer, DASD-WHA, (b)(6))



TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 5, 2002  
SUBJECT: Resolution

Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) gave me this. It is a resolution his committee is working up; a lot of Republicans and Democrats are working up to get the government to support Columbia to a greater extent. Let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030502.02  
Attach: Draft Resolution

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *3/10/02*

NRK 6 02 15 03

107TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. RES. 358

Expressing support for the democratically elected Government of Columbia and its efforts to counter threats from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 6, 2002

Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GOSS, Mr. FARR of California, Mr. KOUBE, Mr. DELAHUNT, Mr. GILMAN, Mrs. TAUSCHER, and Mr. MORAN of Virginia) submitted the following resolution: which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

MARCH 6, 2002

Committee on International Relations discharged; considered under suspension of the rules and agreed to

---

## RESOLUTION

Expressing support for the democratically elected Government of Columbia and its efforts to counter threats from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.

Whereas the democratically elected Government of Colombia, led by President Andres Pastrana, is the legitimate authority in the oldest representative democracy in South America;

Whereas the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, is re-

quired to designate as foreign terrorist organizations those groups whose activities threaten the security of United States nationals or the national security interests of the United States pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act;

Whereas the Secretary of State has designated three Colombian terrorist groups as foreign terrorist organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN);

Whereas all three United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations regularly engage in criminal acts, including murder, kidnapping, and extortion perpetrated against Colombian civilians, government officials, security forces, and against foreign nationals, including United States citizens;

Whereas the FARC is holding five Colombian legislators, a presidential candidate, and Colombian police and army officers and soldiers as hostages and has recently escalated bombings against civilian targets, including a foiled attempt to destroy the city of Bogota's principal water reservoir;

Whereas, according to the Colombian Government, the FARC has received training in terrorist techniques and technology from foreign nationals;

Whereas, since 1992, United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations in Colombia have committed serious crimes against United States citizens, kidnapping more than 50 Americans and murdering at least ten Americans;

Whereas the Drug Enforcement Administration believes that members of the FARC and the AUC directly engage in narcotics trafficking;

Whereas individual members of Colombia's security forces have collaborated with illegal paramilitary organizations by, inter alia, in some instances allowing such organizations to pass through roadblocks, sharing tactical information with such organizations, and providing such organizations with supplies and ammunition;

Whereas while the Colombian Government has made progress in its efforts to combat and capture members of illegal paramilitary organizations and taken positive steps to break links between individual members of the security forces and such organizations, further steps by the Colombian Government are warranted;

Whereas in 1998 Colombian President Andres Pastrana began exhaustive efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC and implemented extraordinary confidence-building measures to advance these negotiations, including establishing a 16,000-square-mile safe haven for the FARC;

Whereas the Government of Colombia has also undertaken substantial efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the ELN;

Whereas the United States has consistently supported the Government of Colombia's protracted efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC and supports the Government of Colombia in its continuing efforts to reach a negotiated agreement with the ELN;

Whereas the United States would welcome a negotiated, political solution to end the violence in Colombia;

Whereas, after the FARC hijacked a commercial airplane and took Colombian Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay as a hostage into the government-created safe haven, President Pastrana ended his government's sponsorship of the peace negotiations with the FARC and ordered Colombia's security forces to re-establish legitimate governmental control in the safe haven;

Whereas President Pastrana has received strong expressions of support from foreign governments and international organizations for his decision to end the peace talks and dissolve the FARC's safe haven; and

Whereas the Government of Colombia's negotiations with the ELN are continuing despite the end of the negotiations with the FARC: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That—

2           (1) the House of Representatives—

3               (A) expresses its support for the democrat-  
4               ically elected Government of Colombia and the  
5               Colombian people as they strive to protect their  
6               democracy from terrorism and the scourge of il-  
7               licit narcotics; and

8               (B) deplores the continuing criminal ter-  
9               rorist acts of murder, abduction, and extortion  
10              carried out by all United States-designated for-  
11              eign terrorist organizations in Colombia against  
12              United States citizens, the civilian population of  
13              Colombia, and Colombian authorities; and

1           (2) it is the sense of the House of Representa-  
2           tives that the President, without undue delay, should  
3           transmit to Congress for its consideration proposed  
4           legislation, consistent with United States law regard-  
5           ing the protection of human rights, to assist the  
6           Government of Colombia protect its democracy from  
7           United States-designated foreign terrorist organiza-  
8           tions and the scourge of illicit narcotics; and

9           (3) it is the sense of the House of Representa-  
10          tives that the Secretary of State should designate a  
11          high-ranking official to coordinate all United States  
12          assistance to the Government of Colombia to ensure  
13          clarity of United States policy and the effective de-  
14          livery of United States support.

C

BILL TEXT  
SRES220  
VERSION INTRODUCED IN SENATE  
March 7, 2002

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107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION

S. RES. 220

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the continued attacks on democracy and the rule of law in Colombia, including the kidnappings of the elected representatives of the people of Colombia.

## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 7, 2002

Mr. GRASSLEY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

### RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the continued attacks on democracy and the rule of law in Colombia, including the kidnappings of the elected representatives of the people of Colombia.

Whereas Colombia is home to the oldest democracy in Latin America and has consistently been a friend of the United States;

Whereas Colombia has been affected by the violence generated by the terrorist acts of illegal armed groups;

Whereas the largest of these groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has used kidnapping, extortion, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking to raise money for its activities;

Whereas those most affected by the targets of these activities have been the people of Colombia;

Whereas in October 1997, almost 10,000,000 Colombians voted for a mandate for peace that asked all presidential candidates to find peace in Colombia through political negotiation;

Whereas in June 1998, 6,500,000 Colombians voted for President Andres Pastrana and his project for peace in Colombia;

Whereas, since his election, President Pastrana has worked consistently and persistently to

find a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict between the Government of Colombia and the insurgency groups operating within the borders of Colombia;

Whereas the Government of Colombia put forth several proposals for peace and made sacrifices in sovereign territory and commitments in funding in hopes of achieving peace in Colombia only to have these overtures repeatedly rejected;

Whereas, on January 20, 2002, the Government of Colombia and the FARC were able to agree on a schedule to be followed in order to define the future of the peace process;

Whereas, since this accord was signed by the FARC, the FARC has consistently and repeatedly taken violent actions against the people and the Government of Colombia in the form of terrorist attacks, including-

- (1) car bombs;
- (2) attacking government installations;
- (3) mining new fields;
- (4) homicides, including women and children;
- (5) destroying electric pylons;
- (6) bombing oil pipelines;
- (7) destroying bridges; and
- (8) attacks on the dam that provides water to Bogota;

Whereas five democratically elected representatives of the Colombian Congress are currently being held against their will after being kidnapped by the FARC, including-

(1) Representative Oscar Tulio Lizcano, a member of the Conservative Party and elected by the people of Colombia to represent the Province of Caldas, who was kidnapped in the municipality of Riosucio, Province of Caldas, on August 5, 2000, by members of the "Aurelio Rodriguez Front" of the "Jose Maria Cordoba Block" of the FARC;

(2) Senator Luis Eladio Perez, a member of the Liberal Party and elected by the people of Colombia, while visiting several municipalities on a political tour who was kidnapped in the town of Ipiales, Province of Nariflo, on June 10, 2001, by elements of the FARC, as a second attempt to kidnap Senator Eladio, the first occurring at the end of May 2001, and frustrated by his security detail;

(3) Representative Orlando Beltran Cuellar, a member of the Liberal party from the Province of Huila and elected by the people of Colombia, who was kidnapped by the FARC in the municipality of Gigante, Province of Huila, on August 28, 2001;

(4) Representative Consuelo Gonzalez de Perdomo, a member of the Liberal Party from the Province of Huila and elected by the people of Colombia, who was kidnapped by the FARC in the municipality of Hobo, Province of Huila, on September 11, 2001; and

(5) Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay, a member of the Liberal Party from the Province of Huila, elected by the people of Colombia, and President of the Colombian Senate's Peace Commission, who was kidnapped on February 20, 2002, when four members of the FARC hijacked a commercial AIRES aircraft traveling from Neiva to Bogota with 30 passengers on board and who was removed from the aircraft after it was forced to land on a rural road in the municipality of Hobo, Province of Huila; and

Whereas Saturday, February 23, Presidential Candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign manager Clara Rojas were kidnapped by the FARC as she traveled to San Vicente del Caguán: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved, That the Senate-*

(1) expresses its strong support for the democratically elected Government of Colombia and the Colombian people in their struggle to protect their democracy from terrorism and the scourge of illicit narcotics;

(2) deplores the continuing criminal terrorist acts of murder, abduction, and extortion carried out by all illegal armed groups in Colombia against the civilian population of Colombia and Colombian authorities;

(3) condemns the kidnapping of elected representatives of the people of Colombia by the FARC and extends its sympathy to the families and friends of the kidnapped members of the Colombian Congress; and

(4) urges the President to develop a comprehensive strategic policy proposal, consistent with United States law regarding human rights and the environment, to assist the Government of Colombia in defending its democracy and rule of law from illegal armed groups and the scourge of illicit narcotics.

---

Source: Government Printing Office

From **CQ Bill Text Service**

*Providing government documents on demand, in context.*

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COORDINATION

Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Mr. Peter W. Rodman

Assistant Secretary of Defense, LA

Mr. Powell A. Moore

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory

TDY  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
MAR 13 2011

TO: Doug Feith  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: March 5, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Resolution**

Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) gave me this. It is a resolution his committee is working up; a lot of Republicans and Democrats are working up to get the government to support Columbia to a greater extent. Let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 030502.02  
 Attach: Draft Resolution

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *3/12/02*

*COLUMBIA*

*5 Mar 02*

107TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. RES. 358

Expressing support for the democratically elected Government of Columbia and its efforts to counter threats from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 6, 2002

Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GOSS, Mr. FARR of California, Mr. KOEHLER, Mr. DELAHUNT, Mr. GILMAN, Mrs. TAUSCHER, and Mr. MORAN of Virginia) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

MARCH 6, 2002

Committee on International Relations discharged; considered under suspension of the rules and agreed to

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## RESOLUTION

Expressing support for the democratically elected Government of Columbia and its efforts to counter threats from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.

Whereas the democratically elected Government of Colombia, led by President Andres Pastrana, is the legitimate authority in the oldest representative democracy in South America;

Whereas the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, is re-

quired to designate as foreign terrorist organizations those groups whose activities threaten the security of United States nationals or the national security interests of the United States pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act;

Whereas the Secretary of State has designated three Colombian terrorist groups as foreign terrorist organizations, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN);

Whereas all three United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations regularly engage in criminal acts, including murder, kidnapping, and extortion perpetrated against Colombian civilians, government officials, security forces, and against foreign nationals, including United States citizens;

Whereas the FARC is holding five Colombian legislators, a presidential candidate, and Colombian police and army officers and soldiers as hostages and has recently escalated bombings against civilian targets, including a foiled attempt to destroy the city of Bogota's principal water reservoir;

Whereas, according to the Colombian Government, the FARC has received training in terrorist techniques and technology from foreign nationals;

Whereas, since 1992, United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations in Colombia have committed serious crimes against United States citizens, kidnapping more than 50 Americans and murdering at least ten Americans;

Whereas the Drug Enforcement Administration believes that members of the FARC and the AUC directly engage in narcotics trafficking;

Whereas individual members of Colombia's security forces have collaborated with illegal paramilitary organizations by, inter alia, in some instances allowing such organizations to pass through roadblocks, sharing tactical information with such organizations, and providing such organizations with supplies and ammunition;

Whereas while the Colombian Government has made progress in its efforts to combat and capture members of illegal paramilitary organizations and taken positive steps to break links between individual members of the security forces and such organizations, further steps by the Colombian Government are warranted;

Whereas in 1998 Colombian President Andres Pastrana began exhaustive efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC and implemented extraordinary confidence-building measures to advance these negotiations, including establishing a 16,000-square-mile safe haven for the FARC;

Whereas the Government of Colombia has also undertaken substantial efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the ELN;

Whereas the United States has consistently supported the Government of Colombia's protracted efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC and supports the Government of Colombia in its continuing efforts to reach a negotiated agreement with the ELN;

Whereas the United States would welcome a negotiated, political solution to end the violence in Colombia;

Whereas, after the FARC hijacked a commercial airplane and took Colombian Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay as a hostage into the government-created safe haven, President Pastrana ended his government's sponsorship of the peace negotiations with the FARC and ordered Colombia's security forces to re-establish legitimate governmental control in the safe haven;

Whereas President Pastrana has received strong expressions of support from foreign governments and international organizations for his decision to end the peace talks and dissolve the FARC's safe haven; and

Whereas the Government of Colombia's negotiations with the ELN are continuing despite the end of the negotiations with the FARC: Now, therefore, be it

1        *Resolved*, That—

2            (1) the House of Representatives—

3                    (A) expresses its support for the democratically elected Government of Colombia and the Colombian people as they strive to protect their democracy from terrorism and the scourge of illicit narcotics; and

8                    (B) deplores the continuing criminal terrorist acts of murder, abduction, and extortion carried out by all United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations in Colombia against United States citizens, the civilian population of Colombia, and Colombian authorities; and

13

1           (2) it is the sense of the House of Representa-  
2           tives that the President, without undue delay, should  
3           transmit to Congress for its consideration proposed  
4           legislation, consistent with United States law regard-  
5           ing the protection of human rights, to assist the  
6           Government of Colombia protect its democracy from  
7           United States-designated foreign terrorist organiza-  
8           tions and the scourge of illicit narcotics; and

9           (3) it is the sense of the House of Representa-  
10          tives that the Secretary of State should designate a  
11          high-ranking official to coordinate all United States  
12          assistance to the Government of Colombia to ensure  
13          clarity of United States policy and the effective de-  
14          livery of United States support.

○



UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

NEF0389LA

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

2002 MAR 19 AM 9:52



I-02/003821-USDP

FOR: ~~DEPUTY~~ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *AD 3/15/02*  
(Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: FY02 Supplemental Funding and Authorities for Colombia (U).

PURPOSE: To reply to your question about proposed authorities that would allow for greater assistance to Colombia (Tab A).

- The Department of State has requested interagency coordination of proposed draft legislation that seeks a new and broader authority for providing assistance to Colombia (Tab B).
- State's proposal recommends adding a new section that would explicitly recognize the link between narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities in Colombia and authorize the provision of assistance to Colombia to fight these activities.
- DoD agrees and has provided concurrence for adding the language that expands current authority.
- State submitted to OMB an FY-02 counterterrorism supplemental appropriations request for Colombia of \$48M. OMB approved a request of \$35M on 6 March. State's proposed allocation is as follows:
  - anti-kidnapping training (\$25M),
  - training for critical infrastructure protection, pipeline security (\$6M),
  - establishing police/judicial presence in conflicted areas (\$4M).

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Charles Reed, ISA/WHA, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

11-L-0559/OSD/7799

U04922 /02

**Snowflake**

10:05 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*0003815*  
*003821*

DATE: March 8, 2002

SUBJECT: **Columbia**

Colin Powell is apparently going to put in for \$48M for Columbia. We need to find out precisely what authorities we want expanded so that we can do what we need to do in the legislation he is proposing. He is going to try to get some expanded authorities. I told him we needed to get the legal details and get them to him. Please do so.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030802.28

*3/12/02*  
**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/7800

*0003815*  
*003821*



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

**ACTION MEMORANDUM**  
**S/ES**

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

**TO:** The Secretary  
**FROM:** H - Paul V. Kelly

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Language for Counter-Terrorism Supplemental to Provide Additional Authorities for Assistance to Colombia and to Waive Cooperative Threat Reduction Act and Freedom Support Act Restrictions

**Issue for Decision:**

Whether to provide OMB with proposed language and justification for counter-terrorism supplemental that would give additional authority to provide assistance to Colombia and to waive Cooperative Threat Reduction Act and Freedom Support Act restrictions for Russia and the other NIS countries.

Two draft provisions of law are recommended for inclusion in the counter-terrorism supplemental currently being prepared. The first provides expanded authority to assist the Government of Colombia in its unified fight against terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The second is a proposed Presidential national security interest waiver from the annual certification requirements of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act and the Freedom Support Act, which have been delegated to the Secretary of State.

In recent briefs to Congressional Oversight Committees, key appropriators and authorizers of State Department programs have suggested the need for more flexible legal authority to assist Colombia in its fight against internal terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Additionally, on March 6, 2002, the House passed House Resolution 358 by voice vote. This Resolution called on the President to transmit to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

11-L-0559/OSD/7801

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

-2-

for its consideration proposed legislation, consistent with United States law regarding the protection of human rights, to assist the Government of Colombia protect its democracy from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations and the scourge of illicit narcotics \* \* \*." With that in mind and to provide explicit authority for the U.S. to provide support for a counter-terrorism campaign in Colombia, we have prepared draft legislation at the attachment for submission to OMB and consideration by the Congress in the counter-terrorism supplemental to be submitted in mid-March.

The draft legislation we are proposing for Colombia includes "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language, but makes explicit that such authority would not apply to Section 556 of the FY 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Leahy Amendment). That section provides that no funds under that Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign government if the Secretary of State has information that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice.

The second provision the Department seeks is a national security interest waiver from the annual certifications of Russia's and other Newly Independent States' commitment to observing certain courses of action prior to provision of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funds and Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds pursuant to 22 USC 5952 and 22 USC 5885, respectively. We are concerned by the degree of Russia's commitment to complying with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Were the Administration unable to make applicable certifications this year, we would be prevented from providing over \$416 million in critically important CTR assistance to dismantle excess nuclear weapons and to secure fissile material. To address these problems, we recommend requesting a national security interest waiver from the CTR and FSA certification requirements at the attachment.

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

11-L-0559/OSD/7802

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

-3-

Issues for Decision

Whether to seek additional legal authority through OMB for assistance to Colombia and waiver authority regarding CTR and FSA certifications for Russia and the other NIS countries.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Whether Assistant Secretary Paul V. Kelly should sign the attached letter to OMB Director Daniels seeking additional legal and waiver authority.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment: As stated

UNCLASSIFIED/NODIS

11-L-0559/OSD/7803

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



Mitchell Daniels, Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, #252  
Washington, DC 20503

Dear Director Daniels:

The Secretary of State has requested that two new provisions of law be included within the counter-terrorism supplemental to be submitted in mid-March. The first involves an expanded authority to assist the Government of Colombia in its unified fight against terrorist violence and narcotics trafficking. The second is a proposed Presidential national security waiver provision to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act annual certification requirement delegated to the Secretary of State.

On February 20, President Bush responded to President Pastrana's request for help after the break-down of negotiations with the FARC by committing to increase U.S. intelligence support and to accelerate the delivery of helicopter spare parts ordered and paid for by the Government of Colombia (GOC). The Administration currently plans to propose funds in the FY-02 State counter-terrorism supplemental to help the GOC with anti-kidnapping training, to provide training for the GOC brigade charged with pipeline security, and to establish a police/judicial presence in conflicted areas.

While President Bush indicated that he did not expect that this assistance to Colombia would require new authorities, in recent briefs to Congressional Oversight Committees, key appropriators and authorizers of State Department programs urged us to shift focus in order to assist Colombia in its fight against internal terrorism based on more flexible legal authorities. They urged we not "stretch" current counter-narcotics or anti-terrorism authorities legislation to support new cross-cutting counter-terrorism/counter-narcotics missions. Additionally, on March 6, 2002, the House passed House Resolution 358 by voice vote. This Resolution called on the President to "transmit to Congress for its consideration proposed legislation,

-2-

consistent with United States law regarding the protection of human rights, to assist the Government of Colombia protect its democracy from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations and the scourge of illicit narcotics \* \* \*."

The principal current authorities that could be used to authorize assistance to the GOC are Sections 481 and 571 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Section 481(a)(4) authorizes the President to furnish assistance to any country or international organization for the control of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, and for other anticrime purposes. Section 571 authorizes the President to furnish assistance to foreign countries in order to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts. These authorities are very broad in scope and include "notwithstanding" language. Assuming the circumstances in Colombia would support the argument that narcotics trafficking and guerrilla/terrorist activities are factually intertwined and largely indistinguishable, both Section 481 and Section 571 could be relied upon to authorize assistance to counter those activities as a unified problem. There are certain activities that we would like to undertake at Pastana's request, however, that could invite significant opposition from various members of Congress, on legal and policy grounds, if conducted under these authorities.

We expect that some in Congress would criticize a reliance on either the counternarcotics or the "other anticrime purposes" authority in Section 481 as an unwarranted expansion of those authorities, because they believe those authorities should be limited to counternarcotics activities or more "traditional" international criminal activities. Further, we must notify Congress 15 days in advance of our intent to obligate anti-crime funds. Use of Section 571 could also raise Congressional concerns because the President has stated the FARC is not is not a terrorist organization of global reach. We believe it would be preferable to avoid any potential political criticism and face the issue head-on with the Congress now, by seeking a new, broader authority to provide assistance to Colombia to counter the unified "cross-cutting" threat posed by groups that use narcotics trafficking to fund their terrorist and other activities that threaten the

11-L-0559/OSD/7805

-3-

national security in Colombia. Such authority would not prejudice our ability to rely on existing authorities to provide such assistance to Colombia, assuming we are able to defend the necessary factual propositions, as discussed above. We thus propose adding a new section with "notwithstanding" language in our supplemental request that would explicitly recognize the link between narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities in Colombia and authorize the provision of assistance (whether appropriated in FY-02 or in past or future years) to the GOC to fight these activities from a cross-cutting perspective. Further it would allay potential Congressional concerns about any perceived expanded use of existing Section 481 and 571 authorities. Like Sections 481 and 571, this proposed section would carry "notwithstanding" authority, which has proven critical to S/CT and INL to get past various restrictions, including a prohibition in the FAA against providing assistance to law enforcement. We recommend that the language at Tab A be included in the FY 02 counter-terrorism supplemental.

Our draft language makes clear that the Administration does not intend this to overcome the Leahy Amendment to the FY 02 Foreign Operations Authorization Act (FOAA). The Leahy Amendment, Section 556 of the 2002 FOAA, provides that no funds under that Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign government if the Secretary of State has information that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice. It has been INL's practice to comply with Leahy even though INL's current authorities could be used to "notwithstand" that restriction.

Our willingness to provide the Hill assurances that we would continue to comply with the Byrd Amendment in providing assistance to Colombia's security forces will likely be crucial to securing the new authority. The Byrd Amendment precludes the U.S. from using funds appropriated for Plan Colombia to support more than 400 military and 400 non-military personnel at any one time for support of Plan Colombia.

11-L-0559/OSD/7806

-4-

The second provision the Department seeks is a national security interest waiver relating to the annual certifications imposed by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Act, as codified in 22 USC 5952, and Title V of the Freedom Support Act, 22 USC 5852. These provisions require as a condition of providing CTR and Title V assistance to those states, in the year of certification, that the President certify their commitment to the courses of action in section 1203(d) of the CTR Act of 1993 (Title XII of P.L. 103-160), 22 USC 5952, and Section 502 of the FSA, (P.L. 102-511), 22 USC 5852. The President has delegated his authority to make these certifications to the Secretary of State. Among the certifications which the Secretary must make under CTR are the commitments of these countries to comply with all relevant arms control agreements and to observe all internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities. Current law does not provide a waiver.

We are concerned by the degree of Russia's commitment to comply with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Were the Administration unable to make the applicable certifications, we would be prevented from providing over \$416 million in critically important CTR assistance to dismantle excess nuclear weapons and to secure fissile material. As the President stated in his State of the Union address, preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them from falling into the hands of terrorists and proliferant states is one of our most important national priorities.

The requirement that Russia and the Newly Independent States be certified as committed to the provisions set forth in 22 USC 5952 and 5852, before the provision of CTR and/or FSA funds, could preclude us from using one of our key instruments to reduce the WMD and WMD proliferation threat from Russia and other former Soviet states, and to induce the changes in arms control compliance and human rights behavior that we seek from them.

To address these problems, we are requesting a national security interest waiver from the restrictions on providing CTR and FSA assistance where the required certifications cannot be made. At the same time, the Administration will continue to work intensively at senior levels with Russia and,

11-L-0559/OSD/7807

where necessary, with other Newly Independent States to resolve our concerns in these areas. We recommend that the language at Tab B be included in the FY 02 counter-terrorism supplemental.

Sincerely,

Paul V. Kelly  
Assistant Secretary  
Legislative Affairs

Attachments:

- Tab A Colombia enhanced counter-terrorism authority
- Tab B Waiver provision for CTR funding restrictions

Section xxx: ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA. (a) Assistance under this or any prior or subsequent Act may be provided to the Government of Colombia, notwithstanding any other provision of law (except Section 556 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operation, Export Financing and related Programs Appropriations Act (Leahy Amendment), 2002 (P.L. 107-115) and Section 8093, of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107), to support its unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security.

(b) During the current fiscal year and hereafter, the term "counter-drug activities" as used in section 124 of title 10, United States Code, section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, (Public Law 101-510), as amended, section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85), and section 3101 of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-246) shall be deemed to include activities of the Government of Colombia to counter terrorist, insurgent, and other criminal activities of organizations engaged in narcotics trafficking.

3/15 PROPOSED  
LEGISLATION  
BY OGC.

## Tab B

22 USC 5952 is amended by adding a new subsection (e):

(e) Waiver. The restrictions contained in subsection (d) of this section and section 502 of the Freedom Support Act (P.L. 102-511) shall not apply if the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate that waiving such restrictions is important to the national security interests of the United States.

Drafted by JTerry

Cleared by: WHA - LGutierrez

L - PClayman/SCrocker/JHerr/MCurry

H - JTerry

INL - RBeers

P - RBlake

S/CT - FTaylor

NP - JWolf

RM - JBowab (info)

D - Tkaidanow (info)

COORDINATION

DoD General Counsel

Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Assistant Secretary of Defense, LA

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

DASD, SOLIC/CN

Mr. Peter W. Rodman for Peter W. Rodman <sup>See Attached  
Copy 12/15/00</sup> MAR 14 2002

Mr. Powell A. Moore Copy 12/15/00

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory PCW MAR 14 2002

Mr. André D. Hollis See Attached  
Copy 12/15/00

Snowflake

10:05 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 8, 2002  
SUBJECT: Columbia

*0003818*  
*003821*

Colin Powell is apparently going to put in for \$48M for Columbia. We need to find out precisely what authorities we want expanded so that we can do what we need to do in the legislation he is proposing. He is going to try to get some expanded authorities. I told him we needed to get the legal details and get them to him. Please do so.

Thank you.

*COLONIA*

DHR/azn  
030802.28

*3/11*  
**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*8 MAR 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/7813

*0003818*  
*003821*  
U04923 / 02

March 18, 2002 12:43 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Torie Clarke  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Speech on Nucs

What do you think about this recommendation from Williams and Schneider?

Will the three of you please come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/07/02 Williams/Schneider ltr to SecDef re: Speech on Nuclear Weapons Matters

DHR:dh  
031802-40



Please respond by 04/12/02

*A-471.61*

*15 Mar 02*

U04932-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7814

3/8  
1930

March 7, 2002

3/8  
SECRET -  
Havent seen the  
yet. Will  
discuss with you  
when I do.  
D: Rita

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams and Bill Schneider  
SUBJECT: Speech on Nuclear Weapons Matters

We are pleased with the results of the Nuclear Posture Review in helping to reshape U.S. nuclear policy in important ways. The emphasis on establishing a "New Triad" makes sense in light of the growing role missile defenses and advanced conventional weapons can and should play in the emerging security environment; we also endorse the added attention to the R&D and Industrial Base, both at DOE/NNSA and within Defense, and how they can contribute to the objectives of reassuring allies, dissuading military competition, deterring aggression, and defending and defeating an adversary should hostilities erupt.

Although the NPR represents an important "first step", we're sure you agree that more needs to be done. Translating the NPR's conceptual framework into specific programmatic and policy decisions will not be easy. We stand ready to assist in any way you deem appropriate, in carrying through with various NPR implementation tasks.

In this regard, we wish to bring to your attention a possible future opportunity for you to publicly discuss the results of the NPR and decisions regarding its implementation. We understand that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory plans to celebrate its 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in September of this year. We further understand that Bruce Tarter, Director of the Lab, is planning to formally invite you to deliver a major speech during the Lab's celebratory events sometime in September.

The NNSA laboratories are under-utilized by DoD as their science and technology expertise can contribute to a wide range of DoD requirements in addition to their core competence in nuclear weapons. In the long (or perhaps medium) term, a rationalization of all USG defense-related laboratories may be appropriate for consideration in a "super-BRAC" environment involving DoD facilities, laboratories, industrial centers, etc.

We respectfully recommend that you give serious consideration to accepting Bruce's invitation. Given the Lab's vital and historic role in helping win the Cold War, Livermore's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration would provide an appropriate venue and a tremendous opportunity to further elucidate on the NPR and what it means for U.S. national security. By September, additional details regarding NPR implementation should also be available. You might also consider using such a forum to lay out your vision of the role and mission of the NNSA laboratories and plants in sustaining U.S. nuclear expertise and capabilities.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our comments and suggestions. Best regards.

March 18, 2002 1:53 PM

TO: Gordon England  
Tom White  
  
CC: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Jim Haynes  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
  
SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse

4/00.13

This is very troubling. How can someone charge all these items and then not be prosecuted?

Please explain.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/18/02 Brian Faler, "GAO Calls Navy Lax on Employee Fraud," *Washington Post*

DHR:dh  
031802-54



Please respond by 03/29/02

18 Mar 02

U04933-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7816

Washington Post  
March 18, 2002  
Pg. 15

## 22. GAO Calls Navy Lax On Employee Fraud Report Cites Personal Shopping Charges

By Brian Faler, Special to The Washington Post

Scores of Navy employees at two San Diego facilities have been using government credit cards to buy their groceries. And luggage. And DVD players. And almost none of them have been punished.

The General Accounting Office, the congressional watchdog agency that has been investigating employees at the two centers, reported last week that many there have been using those cards for personal shopping sprees. And, despite previous warnings, congressional hearings and investigations, the GAO said, the Navy still isn't doing enough to stop them.

The cards, which look and work much like regular credit cards, were created to help cut down on bureaucratic red tape for government purchases of goods and services.

But GAO investigators, along with several members of Congress, say the Navy has taken the program too far, distributing the cards "willy-nilly," in the words of one senator, without any credit checks and with virtually no oversight or enforcement.

"Every shred of evidence that I have seen says that internal controls at the Pentagon are weak or nonexistent," Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) told the House government efficiency subcommittee last week. "That means there is an army . . . authorized to spend money with no checks and balances. The potential for abuse and fraud is virtually unlimited."

Grassley and Rep. Stephen Horn (R-Calif.), chairman of the House panel, have asked the GAO to expand its probe in the Defense Department to determine whether there is a larger problem of credit card abuse. The GAO has reported on similar problems at the Education Department.

Officials representing the Defense Department, as well as others representing the two Navy centers, acknowledged at the subcommittee hearing that credit card fraud continues to be a problem among employees, but they said they are clamping down on the abuses.

"We are painfully aware of the issues of purchase cards, and I am here personally to commit that we will make sure these cards are used appropriately," said Deidre Lee, a defense procurement official.

Lee and other defense officials blamed the two naval facilities' previous management for the lax enforcement and said that officials have since reduced the number of cards circulating and have expanded the offices responsible for overseeing the accounts.

There are now 1.7 million Defense Department cards in circulation. Cards were used during fiscal 2001 to ring up \$9 billion in charges. Some charges are billed directly to the federal government; most are sent to the individual cardholder, who, after paying the bill, is supposed to be reimbursed by his or her agency. Most cards have a credit limit of \$2,500 per transaction.

At last week's hearing, Grassley cited one woman, Tanya Mays, as a particularly egregious offender at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego. He said that, according to GAO records, Mays charged almost \$12,000 to her government card -- including a personal computer, a kitchen range, gift certificates and clothing. Both the Navy and the U.S. attorney in San Diego declined to pursue her case, Grassley said, and Mays transferred to the Army, where she is now a budget analyst. She was not asked to repay the money, he said.

Mays could not be reached for comment. The Post e-mailed her and asked the Army's press office to forward its requests to her. The office declined to provide Mays's phone number, saying it was private. They added that because she was never prosecuted, they have no record of the alleged improprieties.

Grassley said he named Mays out of frustration, add-

ing, "When you put one of these cards under the microscope, it seems like the whole problem comes into much sharper focus."

Los Angeles Times  
March 17, 2002  
Pg. 30

## 23. U.S. To Resume Vieques Training

By Reuters  
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico - The Navy will conduct a new round of training exercises on the island of Vieques in a few weeks, a move that protest groups said Saturday would reactivate their civil disobedience campaign.

A press assistant for the governor's office said that Secretary of State Ferdinand Mercado received a letter from the U.S. Navy Friday informing him that it would conduct about 22 days of training from as early as April 1.

Groups opposing the use of the 33,000-acre island as a Navy training and bombing range said they would try to disrupt the maneuvers through by sneaking onto the bombing range during the training.

The protests would be the first since the civil disobedience campaign was halted after Sept. 11.

Washington Times  
March 18, 2002  
Pg. 8

## 24. Hit By Inmate, X-Ray Guards Reassigned

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba (AP) — Two guards at Camp X-ray, the detention center holding 300 al Qaeda and Taliban guerrillas, were transferred after an inmate struck one of them, military officials said yesterday.

Two male soldiers at the field hospital were reassigned after a detainee hit one of them while being escorted to the bathroom, said Pat Alford, commander for the fleet hospital. The guards usually travel in pairs.

The detainee, who was being treated for bone loss in his forearm, was sedated for one night after the disruption.

Earlier yesterday, Capt. Shimkus, commanding officer of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, said the soldiers were reassigned after "breaking the rules." But "the initial report provided by a military official was incorrect," spokeswoman Maj. Rumi Nielson-Green said.

The two men were reassigned to Camp X-ray and could eventually return to the fleet hospital.

Since the first captives arrived at this remote outpost in January, some have spat on or yelled at the guards. One inmate bit a soldier.

A hunger strike that began on Feb. 27 but has since fizzled apparently was prompted by a guard who stripped an inmate of a towel he put on his head for morning Islamic prayers.

Detainees later said the strike was also to protest their indefinite detention.

On Saturday, five detainees skipped dinner, 12 skipped lunch and seven skipped breakfast.

Military officials also said yesterday that two other male soldiers at the hospital were reassigned after requesting a transfer.

The two men were moved to administrative duties shortly after the first batch of inmates arrived in January, said Marine Maj. Stephen Cox, a spokesman for the detention mission.

The two men "simply were uncomfortable in that environment," Maj. Cox said.

The captives, accused of having links to either the fallen Taliban regime in Afghanistan or Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, are expected to be moved from the hastily built Camp X-ray to Delta Camp by next month.

Delta Camp will be equipped with toilets, beds and ventilation and eventually could be expanded to hold more than 2,000 detainees.

New York Times  
March 18, 2002  
News Analysis

## 25. Bush Finds That Ambiguity Is Part Of Nuclear Deterrence

By David E. Sanger

the case that appeared in this week's editions of The Washington Times.

A U.S. intelligence report made public this week states that Cmdr. Speicher, who was lost when his F-18 plane was shot down over Iraq in 1991, "probably survived the loss of his aircraft, and if he survived, he almost certainly was captured by the Iraqis."

Cmdr. Speicher was initially declared killed in action in 1991, but new evidence in later years led to a reversal of the designation. In January 2001, the Pentagon reclassified him as missing in action. It was the first time the Pentagon had ever made such a status change.

Mr. Rumsfeld said "a very serious effort" is under way on the part of the U.S. government over "a sustained period to try and gather as much information as possible."

Some of the information about the case is classified and some is unclassified, he said.

"Some of it is speculation," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "Some of it — most of it is unauthoritative. That is to say, it is coming from people who heard from somebody about something, or believe there might be a situation that could be characterized as encouraging from our standpoint."

Pressed on whether there is evidence Cmdr. Speicher is alive in Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld said: "I've answered that to the best of my ability."

Mr. Rumsfeld said he read The Times articles and, "I have not seen any current intelligence in the last week that would enable me to cast any additional light" on the case.

Mr. Rumsfeld said he has reviewed intelligence data over the past year "because we're interested" in the case.

U.S. intelligence officials, however, said new information about the case was obtained from a foreign intelligence service in the past several months, indicating Iraq is holding an American pilot captive.

The report — based on information from someone who had been inside Iraq — stated that the pilot was being kept in isolation and only two Iraqi officials would see him.

President Bush also commented on the Speicher case this week. Mr. Bush suggested the pilot could be alive and said if he were, it would show the cruelty of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Bush said he "wouldn't put it past him, given the fact that he gassed his own people" — a reference to Saddam's ordering of chemical-weapons attacks on Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq in the late 1980s.

The intelligence community report dated March 27, 2001, stated that a team of investigators visited Cmdr. Speicher's crash site in 1995 and determined that the pilot ejected.

The investigators also believe Iraq is concealing information about the fate of the pilot and once supplied human remains to U.S. officials that upon laboratory testing turned out not to be Cmdr. Speicher's.

U.S. officials said the intelligence regarding the case includes numerous agent reports of an American pilot being held prisoner in Iraq.

"There are at least three independent sources," one official said.

Some U.S. intelligence officials have tried to dismiss the reports, saying Saddam would not keep an American pilot hostage and would have used him for propaganda if he was a captive.

However, other officials said Saddam held an Iranian pilot prisoner for 17 years, while denying Iraq held any prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

The State Department said this week that it questioned Iraqi officials about Cmdr. Speicher's fate during a meeting in Geneva. The Iraqis did not respond, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said.

Washington Times  
March 16, 2002  
Pg. 3

#### **20. Rumsfeld Has Growth Removed From Neck**

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld had a growth removed from his neck yesterday, the Pentagon announced.

Scans and examination of the growth — called a lipoma — indicated it was benign, the statement said. The tissue was sent for tests to confirm that, it added.

The growth was removed in a 90-minute operation, and Mr. Rumsfeld returned to his office afterward, the statement said.

Washington Times  
March 18, 2002  
Pg. 6

#### **21. Army Denies Request To Quit By 'Bisexual'**

SPRING LAKE, N.C. (AP) — In the past 19 months, Army Capt. David Donovan has made four resignation requests based, he says, on the fact that he is bisexual.

Army officials have not only refused him, but have questioned the credibility of the 17-year Army veteran stationed at Fort Bragg.

"I'm just trying to do what I believe is right," Capt. Donovan said.

Capt. Donovan, who is married, says he engaged in homosexual conduct in the past but has refused to provide specifics for fear the Army might charge him with a crime. Homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under military law.

An Army spokeswoman said an admission of such activity generally is enough to allow a soldier to resign, but such decisions usually are left up to the local commander. In this case, the Fort Bragg commander recommended Capt. Donovan for an "other than honorable" discharge, but the Army has rejected the recommendation.

Capt. Donovan's refusal to back up his admission with details may be at the crux of his problem.

"Soldiers who make admissions may be asked to provide supporting information if the credibility is in question," said Martha Rudd, an Army spokeswoman. "And if there is, the request to separate from the military may be denied."

His commanding officer at the time of his first resignation request was even more blunt.

"There is insufficient evidence that any homosexual conduct has occurred," wrote Maj. Gen. Raymond Barrett Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, S.C. "The resignation does not disclose a homosexual act ... and does not contain a statement of homosexual conduct."

The dispute is unusual because it comes at a time when military discharges for homosexuality are at their highest point since 1987 — 1,250 last year, according to a study by the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, an advocacy group for homosexuals in the military. Steve Ralls, a spokesman for the group, said cases like Capt. Donovan's are unusual.

Capt. Donovan was 17 when he left Billings, Mont., to join the Army in January 1983. He married and had a son, now 18, who lives with Capt. Donovan's second wife and her two children in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

In August 2000, when he was in graduate school in Fort Lauderdale, Capt. Donovan made his first request for permission to resign "for homosexual conduct in lieu of a general court-martial," and offered to repay the Army for his education.

Three months later, his request still pending, he was transferred to Fort Bragg. He didn't bring his family to North Carolina because he thought the military would summarily approve his dismissal and he could return to Florida.

On the advice of the judge advocate general's office at Fort Bragg, Capt. Donovan's second request said he was bisexual within the meaning of the military definition. His third request included a letter from a close friend in Florida and a psychiatrist, each saying Capt. Donovan was bisexual.

As to his fourth request, Miss Rudd said, the Army usually rejects requests for unqualified resignations if the soldier has an active-duty service obligation, which Capt. Donovan owes through October 2005 because the Army has paid for him to go to graduate school.



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

APR 11 2002 7:30 AM

INFO MEMO

April 11, 2002 7:30AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH 4/11/02*

SUBJECT: Credit Card Abuse Case

400.13

- You asked how an employee could allegedly have charged personal items amounting to almost \$12,000 on a government purchase card and not be prosecuted.
- According to a recent GAO report dealing with credit card abuse in DoD, handwriting analysis indicated that the employee in this case had not signed the receipts for the items in question.
- Since the employee has denied making the purchases, this could have made criminal prosecution of the case problematic.
- Although the individual in question was a Navy employee at the time of the purchases, she now works for the Army. The Army is conducting an investigation to determine whether disciplinary action should be taken against the employee.

COORDINATION: None

*4/17*  
*GC -* →

Prepared by: Helen Sullivan (b)(6)

*White's memo back to SecDef basically said it was too late to do anything. SecDef found that unfulfilling and asked for your review. Please advise. D. Rite*  
*Larry Di Rite*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
11-L-0559/OSD/7819  
1108963 702



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 MAR 19 PM 1:03



INFO MEMO

March 18, 2002 - 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*  
*18 Mar 02*

SUBJECT: Reducing Limits on Reservists

- I have incorporated in an action memorandum requested by the Deputy Secretary your direction to reduce the limits on involuntarily mobilized reservists at 85,000 (versus the present level of 101,100). (Tab A)
- The memorandum to the Deputy Secretary (Tab B) reviews the requirements for reserve call-ups, in light of our actual experience to date. He asked that we check whether all the requirements set initially remained meritorious in light of actual experience to date. Of the approximately 82,500 now on active duty, we conclude that 7,500 could be demobilized by April 30, 2002, and an additional 5,000 by mid-summer, absent new military developments.
- The results of this review, undertaken six months after the call-ups began, suggests that we should review requirements every six months as long as current operations continue, and I will undertake to do so.

COORDINATION: None Required

Attachments:

- As stated

cc: DepSecDef

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock (b)(6)

**TAB**

**A**

3/14/02

March 14, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Reducing Limit on Reservists

My understanding is that we have a current limit of 100,000 on reservists.

My further understanding is that we are at about 82,000 now and that the Services have the authority to keep moving up to that level.

My impression is that we need to put a leash on this. Let's revise the 100,000 down to 85,000 and force them to come and justify anything that goes above that—let them know that is where it is and that they best be careful.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031402-8

.....

Please respond by 04/15/02

**TAB**

**B**

**ACTION MEMO**

March 15, 2002, 2:00 PM

**FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)**

**SUBJECT: Guidance to Contain Costs of Reserve Component Mobilization**

- TAB A is a recommended approach to contain the costs of the Reserve Component mobilization, in order to reduce the FY 2002 Supplemental Request in support of Operations Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom.
- TAB B contains proposed mission areas that may be reduced quickly (by end April.)

**RECOMMENDATION: Approve the recommended approach at TAB A.**

**COORDINATION: None**

**Attachments:**

As stated

**Prepared by: Jennifer Buck, DASD/Reserve Affairs (Resources),**

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7824

**PROPOSED APPROACH TO CONTAIN COSTS OF  
RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION**

1. Issue the Secretary of Defense guidance to reduce the mobilization authorization ceiling to the Services from 101,100 (excluding Coast Guard) to 85,000.
  - a. Coordinate with the Services and the Joint Staff to redistribute the authorizations, consistent with known mission requirements for the remainder of the fiscal year.
  
2. USD (P&R), in coordination with the Joint Staff, issue guidance to the Services which will target the immediate directed demobilization of 7,500 Guard and Reserve members who will be off active duty no later than 30 April, 2002.
  - a. Proposed mission areas to reduce are at TAB B.
  
3. USD (P&R), in coordination with the Joint Staff, negotiate with the Services for an additional reduction of activated 5,000 Guard and Reserve members, who will be demobilized no later than 30 June, 2002.
  - a. These additional cuts have been prorated as an initial strawman for incorporation in the Supplemental request.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MISSION	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINES	PROJECTED 31 Mar
Force Protection	16,400	7,700	5,000	300	29,400
CAP		2,100			2,100
C3I	4,000	2,000			6,000
Log & Maint		9,000			9,000
Training Base Expansion	1,100	100			1,200
Engineer	-	2,000	300		2,300
Mobilize the Force	500				500
Staff Augmentation	1,700	4,300		1,100	7,100
IRR	400		200	1,200	1,800
Operational Support	5,200	11,300	4,400	2,200	23,100
Projected 31 March	29,300	38,500	9,900	4,800	82,500
Prorata cuts- by end June	(1,741)	(2,399)	(623)	(237)	(5,000)
Revised Strength July-Sep	24,369	33,591	8,727	3,313	70,000

11-L-0559/OSD/7826

**Examples of How DOD might Reduce RC Participation in NE/EF to 75,000**

**By**  
**30 April 2002**

**Force Protection** **-3000**

Services should evaluate force protection requirements given the current environment. Consideration should also be given to replacing RC performing force protection missions with AC soldiers at installations with large troop concentrations (for example: Ft. Hood, Texas and Ft. Stewart, Georgia). Army -1700; AF -800; Navy - 500.

**Quick Reaction Force** **-1,000**

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) is performed by 2 Marine Infantry Battalions along with 1 AF C-130 squadron -- one at Camp Pendleton and one at Camp Le Jeune on alert today to support FEMA requirements. Based on our experience to date, DOD could reduce QRF to 1 battalion (-500) and put the C-130 Squadron on strip alert (-500).

**Training Base Expansion** **-1000**

Given the assumption that RC use will reduce through the end of the year, the Training Expansion Base should be scaled back substantially from a total on board today of 1200 to 200. The Army would reduce from 1100 to 950; the Air Force from about 100 to 50 for a total reduction of 1000.

**Staff Augmentation** **-1500**

Services should prioritize RC use for Staff Augmentation and achieve overall reductions of at least 20%. Army would reduce by about 340 from 1700; Air Force by about 860 from 4300; and Marines by about 300 from 1100 for a total possible reduction of 1500.

**Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)** **-1000**

Reductions in IRR from 1800 to 800 provide the Services with specialized skills not found in the AC in sufficient numbers but could reduce underutilized staff augmentation.

**Summary of Possible Reductions by Service** **-7500**

Army	-3190
Air Force	-2510
Navy/Marine Corps	-1800

3/14/02

March 14, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reducing Limit on Reservists

326

My understanding is that we have a current limit of 100,000 on reservists.

My further understanding is that we are at about 82,000 now and that the Services have the authority to keep moving up to that level.

My impression is that we need to put a leash on this. Let's revise the 100,000 down to 85,000 and force them to come and justify anything that goes above that—let them know that is where it is and that they best be careful.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031402-8



Please respond by 04/15/02

14 Mar 02



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

March 19, 2002, 11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, DoD

SUBJECT: Credit Card Misuse

- Recent General Accounting Office (GAO) reporting on abuses of DoD purchase cards at two Navy organizations and Congressman Horn's hearings have highlighted a range of problems related to the use of both purchase cards and travel cards by DoD personnel.
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) have taken a series of actions over the past several months to tighten controls. In large part, those actions have been in reaction to GAO and DoD internal audit findings. Most elements of the DoD audit and investigative communities have been and plan to remain actively engaged in efforts to identify control weaknesses, recommend corrective actions, verify implementation of those actions, identify card abusers and seek criminal or administrative penalties against those abusers.
- The DoD Purchase Card Program was addressed by 382 audit reports over the past four years. The Travel Card Program was addressed by 31 audit reports over the past three years. The bulk of the coverage was in the Air Force, which has made a particularly vigorous effort to avoid credit card misuse.
- My office will issue another report on purchase cards later this month. We will report a range of control weaknesses, including poorly conceived procedures for determining who should have a DoD purchase card and for ensuring appropriate review of charges with the card. However, we found only one possibly fraudulent transaction in a sample of 229. It is being reviewed by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. We have been working closely with the DoD Purchase Card Program Office and other stakeholders during the audit, so that we will be able to state in our report that aggressive corrective actions are ongoing.
- The Defense Criminal Investigative Service is working proactively with the DoD Purchase Card Program Office, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and other components to develop data mining techniques for identifying questionable transactions. We encourage all DoD components to make appropriate use of the criminal investigative support available to them.

400.13

19 Mar 02

U04953 02

11-L-0559/OSD/7829

- Although more needs to be done to root out Government credit card abuse, particularly in the Navy, any impression that a DoD credit card abuser runs little risk would be wrong. Attached is a list of examples of recent felony convictions of DoD employees who were caught committing fraud with DoD credit cards.

Coordination: None

Attachment

As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)  
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
General Counsel, DoD

Prepared by: Robert J. Lieberman, (b)(6)

**Examples of Defense Criminal Investigative Service**  
**Cases on Credit Card Fraud**

- David M. White pled guilty to placing fraudulent charges against 13 Government credit cards. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Panama City, Florida, to 18 months incarceration, \$262,840 in restitution and other fees and 36 months supervised release.
- John L. Henson, Jr., pled guilty to using a Government credit card to buy a television for personal use. He was terminated from DoD employment and sentenced in Federal Court in the Eastern District of Texas to a \$3,000 fine and \$1,400 restitution.
- Lionel G. Green pled guilty to a one count criminal information charging him with theft using a Government credit card. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 4 months imprisonment, 4 months home detention, 3 years probation and \$61,465 in restitution and other fees.
- Jerome D. Phillips pled guilty to conspiracy in a fraudulent scheme involving the misuse of a purchase card while assigned to the Joint Staff Supply Service. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to serve a jail term of 12 months and one day, 24 months probation, and restitution and other fees of \$120,100.
- Johnny L. Bailey, formerly assigned to the Joint Staff Supply Service, pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the Government using his official purchase card. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 2 years probation, restitution and other fees of \$70,100 and 6 months of electronic monitoring.
- Tyrone X. Celey, Sr., pled guilty to bribing Joint Staff Supply Service employees to make credit card purchases from his office supplies company. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 27 months of incarceration, 36 months of supervised release, and \$400,200 in restitution and other fees.
- Former Master Sergeant Bobby Gilchrist, also a figure in the Joint Staff Supply Service case, pled guilty to one count of money laundering, bribery and conspiracy. He conspired with contractors to defraud the DoD by accepting cash payments for making both otherwise legitimate and bogus purchases from them, using his and other employees' credit cards. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 41 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, and \$400,300 in restitution and other fees.
- Carla F. Armstrong pled guilty to six counts of theft and other charges related to misuse of her Government credit card. She was sentenced in Federal Court, Southern District of Indiana, to 3 years of supervised probation, including 4 months of home confinement, and \$10,945 in restitution and other fees.

- Tommie Ray Briley pled guilty to stealing Government property by using his official credit card to buy hardware items and selling them to a second party for cash. He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas, to 3 years probation and \$26,378 in restitution and other fees.
- Quintin A. Swann pled guilty to charges related to fraudulent use of his Government credit card while employed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller). He was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 14 months imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release and \$90,200 in restitution and other fees.
- Susan E. Johnson and James E. Johnson, Navy employees, pled guilty to charges related to the purchase of a motorcycle and other items for their own use, misusing a Government credit card to do so. Susan E. Johnson was sentenced in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, to 5 years probation and fines totalling \$1,025. James E. Johnson was sentenced to 6 months home confinement, 3 years probation and \$13,279 in restitution.

Press releases on indictments, convictions, sentences and civil settlements stemming from Defense Criminal Investigative Service cases are available at [www.dodig.osd.mil](http://www.dodig.osd.mil). Many of these cases are joint efforts with other Federal and DoD law enforcement agencies, as explained in the individual press releases, when applicable.



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE  
DEFENSE

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010  
INFO MEMO

2002 MAR 19 PM 1:39

March 14, 2002, 4:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: USD(AT&L) *Jett 3/18/02*

DEPSECDEF Action \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Cost of Cruise Missiles

DISCUSSION

- At TAB A, you asked "Is there a way to get a much cheaper cruise missile?" The short answer is yes, and the department is procuring two missile systems that are demonstrating the principles of cost reduction.
- In recent years, the cost of cruise missiles has been reduced significantly without a decrease in performance – from a Tomahawk at a cost of \$1.3M to a Tactical Tomahawk at \$600K/missile. Similarly, the Air Force led Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) has a relatively long range (>200miles), and is being manufactured for approximately \$400K/missile. JASSM had cost as a Key Performance Parameter.
- Primarily, cost reductions today are due to more efficient/streamlined manufacturing techniques and materials, less expensive electronics, and GPS (which helps to provide precision, without expensive wide-field-of-view seekers).
- Barring any further breakthrough technology, significant reductions under \$300-600K/missile will be difficult to achieve in the near future. Range, survivability/stealth, precision, and limited quantities are all factors that contribute to the high cost of cruise missiles. The long-range capability required for access into denied areas drives the design to incorporate an efficient engine; the need for survivability of the weapon over the long distances to the target requires special designs/materials; requirements for precision tend to drive toward costly seekers; and multi-stage or special purpose warheads are more expensive.
- Furthermore, the inventory quantity requirement for cruise missiles is generally in the thousands, as opposed to tens or hundreds of thousands which can provide for greater economies of scale.

Prepared by CAPT Rick McHarg, USN, OSD-ATL/ S&TS- Air Warfare/ 031302/

(b)(6)

2245-2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7833

U04954 /02

**TAB**

**A**

March 11, 2002 3:43 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cost of Cruise Missile

Is there a way to get a much cheaper cruise missile?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-51

.....  
Please respond by MARCH 15, 2002

March 11, 2002 3:43 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cost of Cruise Missile

Is there a way to get a much cheaper cruise missile?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-51

.....  
Please respond by MARCH 15, 2002

*411.94*

*11 Mar 02*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR 19 PM 5:06

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

19 March 2002 1340

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

*David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 02*

SUBJECT: Response to your 21 FEB 02 Question on Retention

- Retention to date in the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps exceeds or is very close to the services respective retention goals; the Air Force is not able to provide retention data at this time. Service data follows as of 28 Feb 02:

- Army

	Pro-rated Annual Goal	# Reenlisted	% of Prorated Goal
Initial Term (0 - 6 YOS)	7,129	8,491	119%
Mid Career (7 - 10 YOS)	9,536	9,606	101%
Career (10 - 20 YOS)	6,117	7,315	120%
Aggregate	22,782	25,412	112%

- Navy

	Annual Goal	% Reenlisted
Zone A (0 - 6 YOS)	57%	64.4%
Zone B (7 - 10 YOS)	70%	75.5%
Zone C (11 - 14 YOS)	90%	86.2%

- Marine Corps

	Annual Goal	# Reenlisted	% of Annual Goal
First Term (0 - 5 YOS)	5,900	5,400	91.5%
Subsequent Term (6 + YOS)	5,784*	3,473	60.0%

\*Note: Goal revised in Dec 02 from 5,758 to 5,784

- Enlisted members who deploy to a combat zone or a qualified hazardous duty area
- pay no Federal income tax on their compensation, including bonuses, for active service for any month they serve in a qualifying area.
- An enlisted member eligible for a selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) is incentivized to reenlist while deployed to a CZ or QHDA by not having to pay taxes on the bonus (including any future installments).

Prepared by: Lt Col Gina Grosso, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/7837

U04976 /02

2/22/02  
B

February 21, 2002 10:57 AM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Retention

Please get me a report on how we are doing on the retention of people. Please try to divide it between people who get deployed and those who don't.

I am told one of the reasons we may have reasonable retention on people who get deployed is because they get a tax-free bonus if they are deployed. What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022102-16

.....

Please respond by 03/15/02



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
2002 MAR 20 AM 8:22

INFO MEMO

March 19, 2002, 6:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

WJ Haynes  
3/19/02

SUBJECT: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the NORTHCOM  
Headquarters Decision

- NEPA constrains your ability to announce a final decision on the headquarters of the new NORTHCOM unified combatant command before DoD conducts some initial analysis of its environmental impacts.
- Although the new headquarters will likely be established at one of two existing military installations, each of which has suitable offices for the new headquarters, other potential biophysical impacts of the siting decision—such as increased traffic congestion, air pollution, and demand for housing—likely will require some environmental impact analysis before a *final* site-selection decision may be made.
- Given the insignificant nature of these potential impacts, an environmental assessment (EA) of the potential environmental impacts at each of the sites being considered would likely suffice, rather than a full environmental impact statement (EIS).
- An EA likely can be done within 30-90 days, and—absent unanticipated significant impacts—will satisfy NEPA requirements, so that a final site-selection decision can be made and announced. (By contrast, an EIS requires at least 9-12 months.)
- Until the EA is completed and you consider its results, you should not make a *final* headquarters decision.
- Pending completion of the EA, you may announce your recommendation to establish a new combatant command, identify the installations under consideration for the new headquarters, and identify the Department's *preferred alternative* site for the new headquarters.
- The only alternative available appears to be referring the siting decision to the President, who is not subject to NEPA lawsuits.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Ben Cohen (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7839

U04978 /02



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

INFO MEMO

MAR 18 2002

FOR: Mr. Larry DiRita, Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr, DUSD (I&E)

*R DuBois* 3.18.02

SUBJECT: "Land Acquisition within 100 miles of Washington DC" Snowflake

- We are staffing a revised policy memo that will require SecDef approval on all land acquisition and building leases within 100 miles of the Washington, DC. The current policy and background are provided below.
- Deputy Secretary Atwood established a moratorium on major land acquisitions in September 1990 (TAB A). Major land acquisitions were defined as purchases, the withdrawal of land from public domain, lease or permit from government or private entities, or any other type of agreement for use. The moratorium applies to any land acquisition involving either more than 1,000 acres or a purchase price or annual lease cost in excess of \$1 million.
- In December 1994, Deputy Secretary Deutsch delegated to USD(AT&L) the approval authority for requests for waivers to the moratorium (TAB B).
- Since January 20, 2001, five waivers have been approved by USD(AT&L) and two are in the staffing process. The Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) Pentagon Reservation request for the Boundary Channel Drive property is being staffed (after the fact, as Doc Cooke went directly to Dov Zakheim).
- No approval is currently required on building leases. For leasing activities within the NCR, WHS currently manages components' request. Outside of the NCR, those activities are managed by GSA. Relocation into the NCR is managed by WHS and such actions currently require SecDef approval.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)



11-L-0559/OSD/7840

U04979 /02

601

18 MAR 02



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

September 13, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION &  
LOGISTICS)  
DIRECTORS OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Land Acquisition in the United States

The Secretary of Defense and I want to change fundamentally the way the Department of Defense acquires land in the future and to place a moratorium on acquisitions that are currently in process. As we reshape our forces and close or realign bases, the Department must ensure that we propose the acquisition of land only where there is a clearly demonstrated need.

Effective immediately, no major land acquisition proposals may be made public through a request for proposals, notice of intent to perform environmental analysis, or other official notice without the approval of the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

To permit the Secretary and me to review major land acquisitions, I am establishing a moratorium on such acquisitions. Effective immediately, no action shall be taken without my approval (including Records of Decision for an Environmental Impact Statement) to accomplish a major land acquisition. You may request exceptions to this moratorium for urgent military requirements or when, on balance, application of the moratorium would have an adverse effect on the Department's ability to perform its mission.

National Guard major land acquisitions which were to be funded in whole or in part by Federal funds shall be subject to the moratorium. Civil works programs managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers shall not be subject to the moratorium. Renewals of existing withdrawals, leases, permits or other use agreements other than those at bases being closed or which are candidates for closure shall not be subject to the moratorium.

Major land acquisition is defined for the purposes of this memorandum as the purchase, withdrawal from public domain, lease or permit from individuals or government entities, or any other type of use agreement involving more than 1,000 acres, or land whose estimated purchase price or annual lease price exceeds \$1 million.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum.

*V. A. ...*

11-L-0559/OSD/7841



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 DEC 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ECONOMIC SECURITY)  
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Land Acquisition in the United States

On September 13, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued the attached memorandum instituting the moratorium on major land acquisitions in the United States. It requires that all major land acquisition proposals be reviewed and approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary before any public action is taken. This is to ensure that, in this period of downsizing, land is acquired only when there is a clearly demonstrated need.

As the Department continues to downsize, proposals to acquire more land still merit senior Office of the Secretary of Defense oversight. However, I feel it is no longer necessary for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to review each proposal.

Effective immediately, proposals for the acquisition of 1,000 or more acres of land, or land whose estimated purchase price or annual lease price exceeds \$1 million, shall be submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) for review and approval. All other definitions and restrictions set forth in the September 13, 1990, memorandum remain in effect.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John R. DeLoach".

Attachment

22801

11-L-0559/OSD/7842

Hirata, Stacey, COL, OSD-ATL

---

**From:** Aldridge, Pete, Hon, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 07, 2002 7:13 AM  
**To:** DiRita, Larry, CIV, OSD  
**Cc:** DuBois, Ray, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** RE: Cong. Moran

Thanks. Will pass it on to DuBois.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** DiRita, Larry, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 06, 2002 7:28 PM  
**To:** Aldridge, Pete, Hon, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** RE: Cong. Moran

i have sent another note your way from secdef in which he says he wants a directive prohibiting land purchases within 100 miles of d.c. without prior secdef approval.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Aldridge, Pete, Hon, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 06, 2002 11:36 AM  
**To:** DiRita, Larry, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Cong. Moran

Larry: Got your note regarding the "hot button" and the twin bridges site purchase. What's the issue?

SHOWTIME

Mar-07-02 12:40P OUSD(AT&L) S&SC

(b)(6)

P.02

2/22  
1000:

6:09 PM

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR -7 AM 8:09

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 14, 2002  
SUBJECT:

I would like to have instruction given to the DoD that no land will be purchased within 100 miles of Washington DC and no buildings will be leased without the approval of somebody. We have simply got to stop the concentration of government in the Washington DC area.

Thank you.

OHR/azn  
021402.01

Please respond by: 2/18/02 *2/25*

→ Exec Sec:

Please task Mr  
from SecDef to USD(AT&L)  
(I ~~am~~ assume) ~~via~~ via C.D.

Tight suspense (not more than

U04164 102-0559/OSD-7844 of weeks D. Rita

March 19, 2002 12:46 PM

TO: Service Secretaries  
Service Chiefs

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Under Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Eisenhower Quote

070

Attached is a clipping I found most interesting.

As we have discussed on many occasions, it is vital that large institutions find ways to be hospitable to all kinds of people, people with unusual talents, and not create an environment that requires every individual to fit in exactly the same cookie mold.

I hope we can all keep this in mind as we go forward in the months ahead. It is particularly critical during this period when transformation is front-and-center.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Eisenhower quote from *At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends*

DHR:dh  
031902-21

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ *—*

19 Mar 02

U04990-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7845

**General Eisenhower's version of how ideas were suppressed and innovative personalities repressed in the old Army (taken from *At Ease: Stories I tell my Friends*):**

In 1920 or 1921 "Both of us [he and George Patton] began articles [on armored warfare's future] for the military journals. He for the cavalry, I for the infantry. Then I was called before the Chief of Infantry.

"I was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. Particularly I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court-martial.

"George, I think, was given the same message." p.173

In 1924 Eisenhower applied to go to the Infantry School at Benning which was appropriate for his rank and a stepping stone to Fort Leavenworth and the Command and General Staff School and which was vital for his future advancement but the Chief of Infantry refused to send him.

"I went to see the Chief of Infantry. I asked whether the orders could be changed, and whether I could be sent to school. I should have known better; he refused even to listen to my arguments...

"A strange telegram arrived. It was from Fox Conner (Pershing's chief of staff in World War I and a senior General who mentored both Marshall and Eisenhower), serving as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Hines. General Conner knew of my disappointment...the telegram was cryptic in the extreme.

"NO MATTER WHAT ORDERS YOU RECIEVE FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT, MAKE NO PROTEST.ACCEPT THEM WITHOUT QUESTION. SIGNED CONNER {all caps in the original}

"...For several days I was in a quandary until orders arrived. Normally, they would have been so difficult to accept that it was well I had advance warning. The orders detailed me to recruiting duty in the state of Colorado!

"They relieved me from duty with the Infantry. To be assigned to the recruiting service, in those days, unless it was to meet an immediate and temporary personal requirement of an officer, was felt by most of us to be a rebuke a little less devastating than a reprimand.

"...After my gloomy interview with the Chief of Infantry, I had reached the somber conclusion that he and I did not see eye to eye on my place in the military service. ...I learned that the Chief of Infantry had been circumvented, not converted, to enthusiasm.

"A letter arrived from General Conner. He said that because Benning was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief of Infantry, it was impossible for an infantry officer to go there except with the Chief's approval. Instead, General Conner had arranged for my transfer on a temporary basis to the Adjutant General's office--which was in charge of recruiting. I had never thought of so drastic a measure. Had anyone else suggested to me that I desert an arm for a service I would have been outraged. Now it had been done without consultation. But with my solid belief in Foc Conner I kept my temper.

"Under his novel arrangement, a final order came to me which said that I had been selected by the Adjutant General as one of his quota of officers to go to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth." pp. 199-200

Eisenhower went on to note that because of this support he entered Leavenworth years before he otherwise would have and Conner changed his career decisively.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 MAR 20 PM 12:22

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2002 8:30 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 19/3/2002*  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Sabbaticals for Military Personnel

- At a March 2002 Town Hall meeting, you were asked about sabbaticals for the military; this responds to your March 8 note (Tab A).
- The concept of sabbaticals is being reviewed as part of the Department's Human Resource Strategy with a view of expanding current policy, which permits up to a two year leave of absence to pursue education (Tab B).
- Under that policy, approval authority rests with the Secretaries of the Military Departments. I plan to consult closely with them in establishing the right scope for a sabbatical program.
- Issues that we will address include –
  - Are sabbaticals something the military would value? If so, should the circumstances be limited to those carrying a direct benefit to the Service (e.g., education), to the member (sabbaticals for family needs), or both?
  - Depending on the type of sabbaticals we select, what should be the length of each? Should compensation continue?
  - Would a Reserve affiliation be constructive during the course of a sabbatical?
  - How long should we allow a person to be separated – one year, two years, more?
- With respect to the question you raised about sabbaticals among other nations, we have confirmed that Australia (but not Canada) has a sabbatical-type program achieved through leave without pay; it permits education, different work, or family presence. Granted in one year increments, the program freezes seniority and pay at the pre-departure level, and resumes each following completion of the (sabbatical) leave period. We will explore this and other models.



COORDINATIONS: Mr. Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP)

*Charles S. Abell* 3-18-02

LTG John A. Van Alstyne, DASD (MPP)

*John A. Van Alstyne*  
197 Mar 02

Attachments  
As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Knighton, ODASD (MPP) OEPM,

(b)(6)

**TAB**

**A**

7:01 AM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: March 8, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Sabbaticals**

At the Town Hall meeting yesterday, I was asked by a woman about three, four, five year sabbaticals for men and women in the armed services so they could go off without pay, and then come back into the service. She said that I believe the Royal Canadian or Australian, or some military unit does that.

Has anyone given thought to that question?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030802.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

3 | 13

**TAB**

**B**

purpose.

6.8.7. Participation in pre-separation job search and house hunting activities which facilitate relocation of members during the period from June 1, 1992, to September 30, 1999. The permissive temporary duty (PTDY) authorized below may be taken in increments not to exceed the amounts indicated. The Secretary concerned:

6.8.7.1. Shall grant members being discharged or released from active service as involuntary separatees under honorable conditions as defined in section 1141 of title 10 of the United States Code, or as approved participants in the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) programs established under Section 1174a or section 1175 of title 10, such excess leave for a period not in excess of 30 days, or such transition PTDY not to exceed 10 days, as members require to facilitate relocation, unless to do so would interfere with military mission; and

6.8.7.2. May authorize for members described in subparagraph 6.8.7.1. above and for those being retired:

6.8.7.2.1. An additional 20 days up to a total of 30 days transition PTDY for those members stationed outside the CONUS.

6.8.7.2.2. An additional 10 days up to a total of 20 days transition TDY for those members stationed in the CONUS.

6.8.7.2.3. An additional 20 days up to a total of 30 days transition PTDY for those members who were domiciliaries before entering active duty and continue to be domiciliaries of States, possessions or territories of the United States located outside the continental United States (CONUS), including domiciliaries of foreign countries, and are stationed at a location other than the State, possession, territory or country of their domicile. Members may be authorized up to a total of 30 days transition PTDY only for house and job hunting to the State, territory, possession or country of their domicile.

6.9. Educational Leave of Absence. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. 708 (reference (b)), eligible Service members, after October 1, 1985, may be authorized an educational leave of absence not to exceed 2 years for the purpose of pursuing a program of education. Authority to authorize such an educational leave of absence rests with the Secretary concerned, and it may not be delegated below the Headquarters level that directs the leave policies or procedures for the Military Service. Furthermore, it shall only be granted when it is determined that the

educational leave of absence is in the best interest of the Government.

6.9.1. For the purpose of this program, an "eligible Service member" means any member of the Armed Forces on active duty who is eligible for basic educational assistance under chapter 30 of title 38, United States Code (reference (e)), and meets all of the following criteria:

6.9.1.1. Has completed at least one term of enlistment and has reenlisted (enlisted Service members) or has completed his/her initial period of obligated military service on active duty (officers).

6.9.1.2. At the time the Service member applies for an educational leave of absence, he or she is stationed within the continental United States (CONUS).

6.9.2. An "eligible Service member" may not be granted an educational leave of absence unless the Service member agrees in writing to extend his/her current enlistment (enlisted Service members) or to serve on active duty (officers) after completion (or other termination) of the program of education or a period of 2 months for each month of the period of absence. In addition, an educational leave of absence may not be granted until the Service member has completed any extension of enlistment or reenlistment, on any period of obligated military service, incurred by reason of any previous educational leave of absence under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 708 (reference (b)).

6.9.3. Service members on an educational leave of absence shall for administrative and accountability purposes remain assigned to the unit they were assigned to before approval of their educational leave of absence. Even though the Service member's educational leave of absence is considered to be nonchargeable leave, the Service member shall be charged leave during scheduled school breaks unless he or she returns to duty with the unit of assignment during the break. Also, the carry over of leave that exceeds 60 days at the end of the fiscal year may not be authorized.

6.9.4. While on an educational leave of absence, Service members shall be entitled to basic pay for their applicable pay grade and to accrue leave. However, they may not receive basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), basic allowance for subsistence (BAS), or any other pay and allowances or assistance in-kind to which they would otherwise be entitled to. Furthermore, Service members authorized an educational leave of absence shall not, as a result of their decision to pursue a program of education, be entitled to any entitlements governed by the JTR (reference (c)).

Notwithstanding, the period of time that Service members are on an educational leave of absence shall count toward the computation of the Service member's basic pay, eligibility for retired pay, and time-in-grade for promotion purposes. However, this period of educational leave of absence may not count toward the completion of the term of enlistment for enlisted Service members or for entitlement to supplemental educational assistance under 38 U.S.C. 1421 (reference (e)).

6.9.5. In time of war or national emergency, as declared by the President or the Congress, the Secretary concerned may terminate any educational leave of absence authorized under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 708 (reference (b)). In addition, the Secretary concerned may also terminate an educational leave of absence when in his judgment it has been determined that the Service member is not satisfactorily pursuing the program of education for which the absence was granted.

6.10. Absence Over Leave or Liberty

6.10.1. Service members absent from duty beyond their authorized leave shall be considered absent without leave (AWOL), unless it is determined that the absence was unavoidable, in such case it shall be charged to the Service member's leave account.

6.10.2. The period of time that Service members may be absent from duty beyond their authorized liberty, when the absence has been determined to be unavoidable, shall be charged to the Service member's leave account when the entire period of authorized and excused unauthorized absence exceeds 72 hours. However, when the absence is determined to be avoidable, the period exceeding that authorized will be considered as unauthorized.

6.10.3. Absences over leave or liberty caused by mental incapacity, detention by civilian authorities, or early departure of a mobile unit due to operational commitments, whether determined to be avoidable or excused as unavoidable, shall not be charged as leave, regardless of duration.

6.11. Leave in Conjunction with Temporary Duty. Whenever requested and operationally feasible, accrued leave shall be granted together with TDY. Liberty may not be used to extend TDY periods. Advance leave may also be approved if the criteria of this Directive are met.

6.12. Leave in Conjunction with Permanent Change of Station

6.12.1. In conjunction with a PCS movement, Service members shall,

7:01 AM

TO: David Chu  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: March 8, 2002  
 SUBJECT: Sabbaticals

At the Town Hall meeting yesterday, I was asked by a woman about three, four, five year sabbaticals for men and women in the armed services so they could go off without pay, and then come back into the service. She said that I believe the Royal Canadian or Australian, or some military unit does that.

*201.8*

Has anyone given thought to that question?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
030802.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 3/13 \_\_\_\_\_

*8 March*

3:35 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
 CC: Gen. Richard Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: March 1, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **GPS Jamming**

413.77

I want to go ahead and see that we invest now in capability for the US to harden against GPS jamming. We are too dependent on it. I am told that for \$35M we can get on with the task. Please develop something and then come and see me about it, please.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
 030102.08

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

1 MAR 02



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2002 MAR 20 PM 2:37



INFO MEMO

March 20, 2002, 8:05 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

MAR 20 2002

SUBJECT: Outside Department of Defense Assignments

- We are absolutely in synch with your direction on the above subject.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

March 13, 2002 Note from Secretary Rumsfeld, subj: Outside DoD Assignments

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

SHOW HERE

1/4  
1600

March 13, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz      Jim Roche  
 Tom White              Gordon England  
 Gen. Myers              Gen. Pace  
 David Chu                Pete Verga  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Outside DoD Assignments

This is to request that you not make any commitments, or lead anyone to believe we will make any commitment, for the use of additional military personnel outside of our main-line DoD military responsibilities.

We have had stop-loss in place for some months, preventing people on active duty from leaving the Service. In addition, we are extending the assignment of thousands and thousands of Guards and Reserves, who have been called away from their homes and normal employment to serve on active duty.

The entire force is facing the adverse results of the high-paced optempo and perstempo.

We are past the point where the Department can, without an unbelievably compelling reason, make any additional commitments.

Quite apart from making any additional commitments, it is time that we begin to aggressively reduce our current commitments. I want everyone involved to begin to pull back personnel from activities and locations where they can be spared, so we can ease the pressure on the system.

Thanks.

DHR:dh/vzm  
022602-13

.....  
Please respond by 03/29/02

11-L-0559/OSD/7858

U04680 /02

EF 758 f4

February 25, 2002 12:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Evaluation

383.6

Let's take a look at some of the most high profile people we currently have in captivity and decide if we think any of them are appropriate for a military commission and what charges would be brought against them.

Thanks.

D1R:dh  
022502-34

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/02

25 Feb 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

March 20, 2002, 5:00 PM

110.01

FOR: LARRY DIRITA

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: DoD Budget – Your Question

- You requested additional information on the article from the *Aerospace Daily* on the DoD budget.
- The data they presented using DoD outlays are correct.
- However, in discussing the budget, I feel that we are better served by addressing budget authority (BA), which is a truer measure of the Bush defense program. The same observations can be made using outlays, but I believe that this approach does not reflect the Bush defense program accurately because \$108 billion, almost 30 percent, of our FY 2003 outlays comes from programs that were appropriated in prior years under the previous Administration.
- I have attached charts showing percentages of DoD BA and outlays in terms of the Federal Budget and the Gross Domestic Product.
- I have also attached two charts showing DoD BA and outlays in current and FY 2003 constant dollars.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments  
As stated

Prepared By: Bob Shue, (b)(6)




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11-L-0559/OSD/7860


20MAR02

# DoD Outlays as Percent of GDP




11-L-0559/OSD/7861

# DoD BA as Percent of GDP




11-L-0559/OSD/7862

# DoD Outlays as Percent of Federal




11-L-0559/OSD/7863

# DoD BA as Percent of Federal B




11-L-0559/OSD/7864

# DoD BA in Current and FY 03 D



11-L-0559/OSD/7865

# DoD Outlays in Current and FY 03 Dollars



11-L-0559/OSD/7866

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

3/20

Doc

Notwithstanding your  
comments, in the articles  
analysis of comparing % of  
federal outlays over time  
wrong? ~~What is the~~  
~~cost this is of~~ I'll send  
in your memo, but it seems  
unclear - D. H. K.  
LEAHY DA FILE

2/18  
13:00

March 18, 2002 12:29 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Dov Zakheim  
Larry Di Rita  
Marc Thiessen  
Tony Dolan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Budget

I want us to use this *Aerospace Daily* statement.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/12/02 Nick Jonson, "Proposed Defense Budget Isn't Historically High, Fitch Says,"  
*Aerospace Daily*

DHR:dh  
031802-36

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

To Secretary:

The problem with the article is that  
it addresses OUTLAYS. Our increase is in terms  
of BUDGET AUTHORITY.  
The last part of the report is fine.

- Dan Z.

*SDA*  
*3/19*

begin screening their troops for depleted-uranium exposure and unexplained illnesses.

Italy subsequently reported it found the incidence of cancer in soldiers who served in Bosnia and Kosovo was lower than that in the general population.

In line with other expert groups that have studied the issue, the Royal Society panel determined that the majority of soldiers on the battlefields of Kosovo, Bosnia and the Persian Gulf would not have been exposed to high-enough levels of depleted uranium to suffer harm.

"Levels of uranium in the kidneys of soldiers surviving in tanks struck by DU rounds, or of soldiers working for protracted periods in struck tanks, could reach concentrations that lead to some short-term kidney dysfunction," the report said. "But whether this would lead to any long-term adverse effects is unclear."

Most of the soldiers affected would be Americans in the gulf war, who were involved in friendly-fire incidents or cleanup operations.

In a report last year, the Royal Society concluded that those same few soldiers could be at increased risk of lung cancer from intense exposure to the munitions, but that such cancers would take decades to show up.

The report, which entailed a review of the current state of scientific knowledge on the issue, also concluded that children playing at sites where the uranium munitions fell could be harmed if they ate the soil. In the long term, buried uranium shells also could eventually leach into local water supplies, it said.

NATO denies the ammunition could have triggered cancer in soldiers, and many European Union and other experts have concluded over the last year that the risk was negligible.

Aerospace Daily  
March 12, 2002

### 17. Proposed Defense Budget Isn't Historically High, Fitch Says

The Bush Administration's fiscal 2003 defense budget would not be a historically high level of defense spending, according to a report by the ratings agency Fitch Inc.

As a percentage of total federal outlays, defense spending is projected to be 17 percent for FY '03, rising to about 17.2 percent in FY '07, according to the March 7 report.

"Other than the fiscal years 1996 [through] 2002, these current percentages are lower than any other year in the post World War II-era," the report says.

The same is true of Department of Defense outlays as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), which are projected to be in the 3.2 percent to 3.3 percent range for the FY '03-'07 period, according to the analysts.

Looking at DOD outlays in constant 2002 dollars, the projections for that period are low relative to wartime budgets, but high compared with other years, the report says.

"The constant dollar fiscal year 2003 request exceeds the amounts spent in approximately 75 percent of the fiscal years since the end of World War II, but is lower than the defense budgets during the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Reagan buildup that preceded the end of the Cold War," the report says.

Fitch aerospace and defense analysts disagree with critics who say the proposed defense budget doesn't do enough to fund "transformational" programs.

"An organization with a \$379 billion budget will take longer to transform than the typical organization, and criticizing the DOD for not changing in the course of a few years is unrealistic in our view," the report says.

The analysts said transformation does not necessarily require the purchase of new platforms, but can consist of "new technology inserted into existing platforms and new operating modes, such as using platforms as a part of an in-

formation network rather than in isolation."

The Bush Administration faces the challenge of funding transformational programs while maintaining current defense capabilities and aging equipment. "The new budget works toward all three objectives," the report says.

-- Nick Jonson

Washington Post  
March 12, 2002  
Pg. 1

### 18. Soldier, Son, Brother Laid To Rest

#### Army Corporal Died in Afghanistan, Trying to Save Comrade

By Fredrick Kunkle, Washington Post Staff Writer

The young soldier came home with a tattoo, as young soldiers so often do, and his mother cringed at the thought of it, as mothers so often do.

But the tattoo that Patricia Marek's son chose to display on his back was a cross, bigger than her hand, with "Jesus" flowing over it in Hebrew script. It made her proud, and she told him so. She brought it up in her prayers to God, too.

"I would say, 'Okay, he's wearing your cross. Please don't let him bear your cross,'" Marek said.

Then, on March 4 on a mountain in eastern Afghanistan, her 21-year-old son, Cpl. Matthew A. Commons, was killed in combat.

Yesterday, in a ceremony that cast his death as an act of sacrifice for his country, Matt Commons was buried with honors at Arlington National Cemetery six months to the day after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and 18 months after he enlisted.

On a day that was as clear as Sept. 11, the crowd of mourners gazed skyward from time to time as jets from Reagan National Airport thundered overhead. Beyond the line of riflemen that fired off three volleys in salute, two cranes swung over the Pentagon as work went on to rebuild the section damaged by one of the hijacked planes.

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Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) followed, then the Army's highest-ranking noncommissioned officer and, finally, a line of young men from Commons's unit, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment, from Hunter Army Airfield in Georgia. When the mourners began to depart, Aaron Commons, 18, knelt over his brother's silver casket and prayed.

"He made a sacrifice that will always be remembered," the Rev. Joseph Annese said in his eulogy. Annese is pastor of the church in Boulder City, Nev., where Matt Commons taught Sunday school.

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2/4  
13/00

March 18, 2002 12:29 PM

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18MARCH02

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 21 2002

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6028

322

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding our proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan.

We share a goal of protecting our important security interests in the Pacific region. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan seek both to support that commitment and strengthen our organizational approach to defense in light of our new strategy and the dangerous challenges we face.

With regard to your specific concerns, please be assured of our intention to continue to assign Alaska-based forces to U.S. Pacific Command as well as to associate the Alaska NORAD region to any successor to NORAD.

As we discussed, the assignment of West Coast forces is not specifically addressed in the Unified Command Plan. Thus, we do not intend to delay concluding the Unified Command Plan revision process. We will keep in mind your concerns about these forces as we develop the "Forces For" document later this year.

Again, thank you for your support on these important changes to the Unified Command Plan.

Sincerely,

21 MAR 02





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 21 2002

The Honorable Ted Stevens  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6028

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Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/7873

U05195 /02

SECRET  
732 FEB 20 11 09 AM

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII  
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
TOM HARKIN, IOWA  
BARBARA A. MURKINS, MARYLAND  
HARRY REID, NEVADA  
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN  
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON  
BYRON L. DORNAN, NORTH DAKOTA  
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RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND

TED STEVENS, ALASKA  
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI  
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO  
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI  
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY  
CONRAD BURRIS, MONTANA  
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA  
JUD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE  
ROBERT F. BENNETT, UTAH  
SEN RICHARD CAMPBELL, COLORADO  
LARRY CRAIG, IDAHO  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHESON, TEXAS  
MIKE DEWINE, OHIO

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025  
www.senate.gov/appropriations

February 26, 2002

TERRENCE E. SALVARI, STAFF DIRECTOR  
STEVEN J. CONTESE, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

A.O. USP  
ACTION PR S  
COORD. LA  
DUE 3-6-02

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

*77*  
-6 MAR 2002  
*Cambard*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We appreciate your willingness to discuss the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan. We now better understand your views and your desire to make the changes.

We recognize and support your recommendation to clearly delineate CINC responsibilities for all foreign nations. We believe the understanding between the European Command and the Pacific Command that the Pacific Command will still have principal responsibility for the Russian Far East will provide adequate assurances that this important region is not forgotten.

We were buoyed by your statement that you recognize the importance of the Pacific and that the Administration should not take any action which might be seen by a potential adversary as a sign of weakness or disengagement. With that in mind, we are confident you will share our belief that we should take no actions which diminish the forces assigned to the Pacific Command.

With regard to the Unified Command Plan we believe the following adjustments are necessary and essential:

- **ALASKA BASED FORCES:** All aspects of Alaska forces and territory, including the National Guard, should remain integral parts of the Pacific Command. Alaska NORAD Region responsibilities should be aligned appropriately to any successor NORAD command, pursuant to existing relationships.
- **WEST COAST BASED FORCES:** We also believe that all forces that are currently under the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command must remain operationally and administratively tied exclusively to the Pacific Command.


We hope to be able to support your proposal to the President on this matter, and can do so to the extent that we have your assurance that you will not reallocate forces from the Pacific Command pursuant to the Unified Command Plan or in your Forces for Unified Commanders Memorandum later this year. With that assurance you will have our support to establish a Northern Command to better coordinate the homeland defense mission.

We look forward to your response regarding the forces assigned to the Pacific Command.

Sincerely,



Ted Stevens  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on Defense



Daniel K. Inouye  
Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on Defense



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

March 20, 2002, 11:30 PM

452F

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) *MAR 21 2002*

SUBJECT: Navy and Marine Tactical Aircraft Integration

- You asked how the Department of the Navy's proposal to cut Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) procurement would affect the Future Years Defense Program (Tab A).
- While the procurement cutback in JSF (and F/A-18E/F) would produce cost savings for the Navy, it would not, in and of itself, halt future growth in the RDT&E and procurement accounts (see charts at Tab B).
- Other savings (not reflected in these charts) could come from consolidating the Navy's training and support infrastructures.
- A number of factors, however, may offset the anticipated savings:
  - **Impact on unit costs.** A reduction in Navy and Marine Corps JSF procurement would almost certainly raise Air Force unit costs. Additionally, the proposed reduction in short take-off and vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft bought by the Marines (from 609 to roughly 250) would increase the unit costs of those aircraft.
  - **Readiness posture.** A smaller force may require much higher readiness levels for nondeployed units than currently deemed acceptable by the Navy. Additional resources might be needed for flying hours, spares, and depot maintenance.
- PA&E will work with the Navy to further define its proposal and illuminate the pros and cons. (PA&E will also investigate related issues, such as the feasibility of procuring only STOVL variants for the Navy—a move that would reduce the cost of maintaining carrier-qualified pilots and could, if the STOVL variant of JSF fulfills its promise, make way for smaller aircraft carriers.)

*Pete Aldridge is also looking at this. The program makes sense, but needs to be managed carefully*

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Barry D. Watts, (b)(6)



*-Dov*

COMAR02

**TAB**

**A**

**SENSITIVE  
(HAND DELIVER)**

March 11, 2002 6:01 PM

*3-13-02*

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Navy and Marines

*received  
3:55 p.m.  
3/13/02*

I got a briefing by the Marines and the Navy showing how they want to reduce the buy on Joint Strike Fighter by merging the two aviation wings of the Department of the Navy.

They showed a graph where there is a cutoff of the forward-year defense plan budget projections. I suspect that chart just showed tacair.

I would like to see what their decision does for the entire forward-year defense plan. I would like to see a chart that shows what it is before their merger and what it is after their merger. I think we may still have a problem.

Please see if you can get that to me in the next few days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-37

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

**SENSITIVE**


11-L-0559/OSD/7878

**TAB**

**B**

FOUO

# DoD Investment Projection



3/18/2002


DRAFT

FOUO/Pre-Decisional

11-L-0559/OSD/7880

FOUO

# DoN Investment Projection



3/18/2002


DRAFT

FOUO/Pre-Decisional

11-L-0559/OSD/7881

FOUO

# DoN Strike Fighter Procurement



3/18/2002

DRAFT

FOUO/Pre-Decisional

11-L-0559/OSD/7882

**(HAND DELIVER)**

March 11, 2002 6:01 PM

*received  
3:55 p.m.  
3/13/02*

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Navy and Marines

I got a briefing by the Marines and the Navy showing how they want to reduce the buy on Joint Strike Fighter by merging the two aviation wings of the Department of the Navy.

They showed a graph where there is a cutoff of the forward-year defense plan budget projections. I suspect that chart just showed tacair.

I would like to see what their decision does for the entire forward-year defense plan. I would like to see a chart that shows what it is before their merger and what it is after their merger. I think we may still have a problem.

Please see if you can get that to me in the next few days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-37

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

**SENSITIVE**

MAR -21' 02 (THU) 18:34

S A S C

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(b)(6)

P. 002/003

MAR 22 AM 9:47

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DAVID E. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR  
JUDITH A. ANBLEY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

March 21, 2002

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Room 3E880 The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I applaud your initiative to establish a new unified command responsible for the land, sea and aerospace defense of the United States. As you are well aware, I have long been a strong advocate of streamlining responsibility for defense of our homeland, even before the tragic events of September 11. I think this proposal is a positive step in that direction.

In speeches at the Citadel in September, 1999 and at the National Defense University in May, 2001, President Bush identified homeland defense as his highest priority and called for the transformation of our armed forces to be able to deter, detect and defeat the very different threats we will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The events of September 11 clearly illustrated the need to have our military better organized to defend our Nation against a wide range of potential threats, both at home and abroad. I strongly support our President in making the security of our homeland the most urgent priority.

As you consider the requirements associated with the new homeland defense command, I am confident you will conclude that the need for this new "CINC" to coordinate with the Department of Defense and many other federal agencies involved in homeland defense argues strongly for locating this new command in the metropolitan Washington area. I urge you to give strong consideration to the fine military installations in northern Virginia as the location for this new command. In particular, Fort Belvoir and Quantico Marine Corps Training Base offer the facilities, security, flexibility, communications links, and proximity to related government agencies that this important new organization requires. Quantico has the added benefit of already being host to related federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation

U05210 /02


11-L-0559/OSD/7884

Academy and Department of State anti-terrorism training activities.

I look forward to continued consultation on this important initiative.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Warner", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John Warner  
Ranking Member

STRAAT

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 26 2002

The Honorable John Warner  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for your letter proposing locations in Northern Virginia as possible sites for the Northern Command headquarters. We are examining the matter closely, and I appreciate having the benefit of your views.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


322

Re: I-02/004533  
4 05210/02

(26 Mar 02)

P U05408-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7886



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 22 2002

(b)(6)

WRAMC Walter Reed Medical Center  
The Fisher House  
6900 Georgia Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20307-5001

Dear Sergeant (b)(6)

I enjoyed meeting you last week and wanted to wish you well in your recovery.

You have my deepest appreciation for the sacrifices you made in Afghanistan. You should be proud of the commitment you have shown to your fellow forces and to your country.

Thanks again for your selfless service.

Sincerely,

U05266-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7887

3355D

22 Mar 02



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2002 MAR 22 PM 6:06

March 20, 2002 12:00 p.m.

Administration  
& Management

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: D.O. Cooke, Director, Administration and Management *Doc*

SUBJECT: United States Postal Service (USPS) Mail

- This responds to SECDEF note (TAB A) regarding mail delays.
- The Directorate for Communications and Directives is closely monitoring USPS processing of official mail addressed to the SECDEF and DEPSEC.
- The three month delay in receipt can be attributed to the processing of backlogged mail that was created when USPS closed the Brentwood facility in October due to anthrax contamination. Based on routinely conducted sample surveys, the number of incoming pieces postmarked during the months of October through December 2001 is rapidly declining - but there is no finite date when we can expect USPS to only deliver mail with current postmarks.
- In addition to routine postal transit time, it is taking USPS an additional two weeks to deliver first class government mail because of irradiation.
- Memo at TAB B provides more detailed information regarding mail processing and delivery here in the Pentagon.
- Members of Congress were alerted to mail delivery delays to the Pentagon and provided alternative means for more expedient delivery via an LA "Blast Fax" article (TAB C).
- Mail addressed to the White House is being delayed for four to six weeks (TAB D).
- On April 1, I will meet with senior officials from USPS to discuss means to eliminate the backlog, speed up delivery and future USPS plans for checking incoming mail for hazards without irradiation.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by Craig H. Glassner, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7888

U05284 /02

**TAB**

**A**

3/12  
08 00

March 11, 2002 10:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mail

It is taking months to get mail—things mailed December 7, I am just receiving now on March 9. Three months is an awful long time.

I wonder if there is some way to speed that up a little? If not, we'll just live with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031102-11

.....  
Please respond by 03/22/02

3/15

→ Larry Curry

Please advise

*DLR*

Larry Di Rita

**TAB**

**B**



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

March 7, 2002

Administration  
& Management

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES


SUBJECT: Pentagon Mail Update

Due to the contaminated mail found in the USPS Brentwood postal processing facility in October 2001, the Pentagon Defense Post Office implemented a mail screening operation to safeguard against the possibility of receiving any Pentagon mail that may have been cross-contaminated at the Brentwood facility prior to delivery.

Attached are answers to frequently asked questions regarding the irradiation of mail and Pentagon mail processing procedures. This information addresses issues such as why the mail currently being received contains older postmark dates and actions the United States Postal Service (USPS) is taking in processing the mail.

The USPS plans to have all first class letters and flats that were in the Brentwood facility at the time it was shut down in October irradiated, sorted, and distributed in the near future. The USPS is exploring options that can be used to detect hazardous substances as part of their normal process, rather than relying on irradiation as a long term solution. The need for implementing long term safety precautions in processing mail received into the Pentagon is a matter currently under consideration.

To date, the Pentagon Defense Post Office has not received any contaminated mail. Pentagon employees are encouraged to continue to exercise caution, and report any suspicious looking mail or parcels to the Defense Protective Service at (b)(6)

  
D. O. Cooke  
for Director

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/7892

U04234-02

## UPDATE

### Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About

#### THE PENTAGON MAIL AND PARCEL PROCESSING PROCEDURES

##### **1. Who made the decision to irradiate mail and why?**

The decision to irradiate mail addressed to certain zip codes in the Washington DC area was made by the United States Postal Service (USPS) after mail contaminated with anthrax was delivered to Senator Tom Daschle. Further investigation determined that there were high levels of contamination within the primary USPS processing facility located at Brentwood.

Mail addressed to the Pentagon routinely is processed through the Brentwood facility. Therefore, all mail in the Brentwood facility at the time that anthrax contaminants were detected required irradiation. The USPS implemented procedures to irradiate first class letters and small flats delivered to addresses in the Washington DC area.

##### **2. What is the impact of the irradiation process on mail delivery time to the Pentagon?**

In addition to normal transit time and processing time, mail delivery is being delayed by approximately two weeks. First class letters and small flats are trucked to and from the irradiation facilities being used in Ohio and New Jersey, and then returned to the Washington DC area. The mail must then be held at the USPS location to allow time for the mail to air out, eliminating the fumes that are produced during irradiation process.

Much of the irradiated mail must then be hand sorted by USPS. The hand sorting process is labor intensive and time consuming. As a result of this, mail can get misrouted, which further delays delivery.

##### **3. Are other safety preventive measures being taken once the mail arrives at the Pentagon?**

Yes, for safety and security measures, all USPS mail (which includes packages and parcels) delivered to the Pentagon via the Remote Delivery Facility undergoes a screening process that involves opening, visually inspecting and testing for the presence of active contaminants prior to release of that mail to the Defense Post Office, and subsequent distribution within the Pentagon. The mail must be held for an additional 2-3 days from the time it is delivered by USPS to verify, based on testing results, that the mail contains no active contaminants. As more advanced screening and testing procedures become available, the time required to hold the mail will likely be reduced.

##### **4. Why does mail have to undergo additional testing at the Pentagon if the USPS has irradiated it?**

The USPS sorts irradiated and non-irradiated mail at the same facility. Due to the risk of cross contamination, the additional screening is necessary to minimize the risk of contaminants from being spread into the Pentagon.

The USPS is developing an action plan for implementing safeguards to deal with possible future incidents of contaminated mail, but those safeguards will require significant funding support that must be approved by Congress. Concurrent with that, an evaluation of the Pentagon mail processing procedures will be conducted to determine appropriate levels of continued safeguards. Until such time that appropriate safeguards can be fully implemented, it is imperative that every reasonable precaution be taken to.

- Minimize the potential for contamination of the Pentagon, similar to that which occurred at the Hart Senate Office Building, and avoid having to shut down Pentagon operations.
- Ensure the overall safety and well being of Pentagon occupants.

**5. Some mail being received within the Pentagon was postmarked as far back as October. Why? How long will that continue and when is current mail expected to be received?**

The Brentwood Postal Facility is the primary distribution point servicing Government zip codes in the Washington Metropolitan area. When the presence of anthrax was detected in that facility in October and it had to be closed, all mail and parcel packages in the facility at that time were considered potentially to be contaminated. The closing of the Brentwood processing facility caused a significant backlog of mail until the USPS could implement irradiation procedures. As the USPS did not begin these procedures until late December, and due to the limited capacities of the irradiation facilities, USPS continues to irradiate and process mail postmarked for the October through December timeframe. The USPS acknowledged in a recent article published by the Washington Post, that "redistributing the 1 million pieces of mail that were quarantined when Brentwood closed on October 21 took longer than expected." The USPS expects that final sorting of that backlogged mail will be completed in the very near future.

The Department of Defense formally requested that USPS deliver mail with current postmarks on a "first-in-first-out" basis and process the backlog of old postmarks as a secondary priority. However, the USPS was not sufficiently able to modify their processing procedures; therefore, delivery of a mix of "old" and current mail will continue until the backlog is eliminated.

The irradiation process being applied to first class letters and small flats is not adequate to handle the bulk and size of many of the larger parcel packages. Therefore, the USPS is still investigating options for irradiating the parcel packages before they can be released from the Brentwood facility. Only the parcel packages that were in the Brentwood facility at the time of the initial anthrax detection are being held by the USPS

**6. What affects does irradiation have on the mail?**

USPS has advised that irradiated mail does not contain any residual radiation or radioactivity. However, possible affects of the irradiation process include such things as pages becoming discolored, brittle, or stuck together. In addition, plastic items such as credit cards, a plastic window on the envelope, plastic wrapping, or diskettes and CDs may be harmed or totally "destroyed" due to the irradiation process. Any medication that has been through the irradiation process should not be taken

**7. Are there any other means for the USPS to make mail safe without irradiating it?**

The USPS has advised DoD officials that various options are being explored that would ensure that mail is safe prior to delivery. However, it will be some time before their plan can be finalized and approved by Congress. For now, expect to contend with the delays in the delivery of mail, due to the reasons described above.

**8. Does the irradiation process result in any other problems or risks?**

The media reported that many postal workers experienced problems when the irradiation process first began. The majority of the problems were minor skin rashes that disappeared in a few days, respiratory problems, and sensitivity by persons with asthma or other pre-existing respiratory problems. The airing-out process that the USPS implemented reduced these problems. The mail delivered to the Pentagon from USPS has had time to air out. It should not pose health problems. The Defense Post Office employees, who are the first persons to handle the mail after it has been inspected and cleared for delivery into the Pentagon, are not experiencing any health problems with handling the irradiated mail

**9. First class letters and small flats are being irradiated. Are packages and items being delivered by Federal Express, UPS, etc. being checked?**

All items entering the Pentagon via the Remote Delivery Facility undergo an X-Ray process by the Defense Protective Service prior to their acceptance for delivery into the Defense Post Office. The

← packages and parcels also undergo a visible inspection to determine if they fit the profile of a suspicious or-suspect package. Typically, packages and parcels that are considered to be from "known sources or suppliers" are not physically opened since only mail and parcels that are being routed through the Brentwood facility are considered to be a risk. However, as an added precaution, packages being delivered by commercial carriers undergo additional screening.

**10. What alternatives are there to having something delivered to the Pentagon without being delivered by USPS?**

Items that require immediate attention, digital equipment, data disks, plastic items such as credit cards, or prescription drugs, should be sent to the the Pentagon via a commercial carrier like UPS or FedEx. UPS provides "UPS Ground" service that is competitive with USPS overnight mailings. Although all parcels and packages undergo X-Ray prior to delivery into the Pentagon, the level of X-Ray being applied to those packages will not adversely affect the contents.

**11. Does mail for DoD activities within the National Capital Region that are not located in the Pentagon undergo the same screening process?**

The Pentagon Defense Post Office and the Pentagon Remote Delivery Facility only screen and inspect mail addressed to activities and agencies with a Pentagon or Navy Annex address. Other DoD activities within the National Capital Region that are not located within the Pentagon should continue to be alert for suspicious letters and parcels and exercise caution in processing incoming mail.

**12. When can patrons with a personal USPS post box at the Pentagon Concourse expect to again receive mail here at the Pentagon?**

The personal Post Office boxes located at the USPS facility on the Pentagon Concourse remain closed at the present, and will likely remain closed for some time to come until an assessment can be completed for determining the risk of future contaminants entering the Pentagon via the Post Office boxes.

Those individuals who were renting a personal Post Office box are encouraged to contact the Pentagon Concourse USPS facility and complete a change of address kit so that USPS can redirect mail either to a home address or to a post office box at some other USPS facility.

**13. What about mail that is addressed to the Pentagon concessionaires?**

To alleviate disruption of mail service to Pentagon concessionaires, the Defense Post Office has made provisions for pick-up of their mail. Concession managers should contact the manager of the Defense Post Office for instructions.

Pentagon concession managers should ensure that they provide their correspondents with the correct zip code for their activity.

**14. Can personal mail be addressed to an official office here within the Pentagon?**

As a matter of policy, personal mail should not be addressed to an official address here in the Pentagon. Personal mail received through the Defense Post Office, along with official mail, is subject to being opened so that it can be inspected and tested, which will result in delayed delivery.

**15. If there are questions about Pentagon mail and parcel processing procedures, to whom should those questions be directed to?**

Please contact Ms. Myrna Phifer, Director, Pentagon Defense Post Office, (b)(6) or by email at (b)(6) if you have any questions regarding this information.

**TAB**

**C**



**Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense  
Legislative Affairs  
14 March 2002**

FOR: ALL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

**HIGHLIGHTS:**

**IMPORTANT NOTICE**

**MAIL DELIVERY DELAYS TO THE PENTAGON ARE AFFECTING THE  
TIMELY RECEIPT OF CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE**

(NEXT PAGE)

**- DoD Hearings:**

- o House Appropriations Committee
- o House Armed Services Committee
- o Senate Armed Services Committee

**- DoD News Highlights:**

- o Rumsfeld, Ivanov Discuss Nuclear Review, Terrorism
- o Army Hero Recalls Pentagon 9-11 Rescue-Recovery Efforts
- o National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of March 13
- o U.S. Helps Other Nations Root Out Terrorists

**- Transcripts Posted at DefenseLink:**

- o Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Press Conference with Russian Defense Minister Ivanov
- o Wolfowitz Gives Turgut Ozal Lecture
- o DoD News Briefing - ASD PA Clarke and Brig. Gen. Rosa

OSD/LA OFFICE: (b)(6)

**SENATE**

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Senate Affairs (Acting)

CDR Jim Fraser (b)(6)

**HOUSE**

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for House Affairs

Mary Beth Carozza (b)(6)

Director for House Affairs

COL Rick Stark (b)(6)

Please don't hesitate to call our office with any questions or feedback.

UNCLASSIFIED TRANSMISSION: 4 PAGES. IF THIS TRANSMISSION IS NOT COMPLETE, CALL (b)(6)

To receive this document electronically and discontinue the hard copy, please e-mail

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7897



**Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense  
Legislative Affairs  
14 March 2002**

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:**

- **Mail Delivery Delays to the Pentagon are Affecting the Timely Receipt of Congressional Correspondence:** On average, in addition to normal transit time, it is taking approximately two additional weeks for **all** mail processed through the United States Postal Service to arrive at the Pentagon- to include that mail coming from Capitol Hill. The additional time is needed for the Postal Service to transport the mail to and from irradiation sites in New Jersey and Ohio and then it must be hand sorted prior to delivery. To ensure timely delivery of Member's correspondence, especially that addressed to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the following alternate means of delivery should be considered.

1. Have the mail hand carried and delivered to the Secretary of Defense Communications' Correspondence Control Division (CCD) in the Pentagon in Room 3A948. Their phone number is (b)(6)
2. Fax the correspondence to CCD at (b)(6) (unclassified) or Cable Division at (b)(6) (unclassified) or (b)(6) (classified).
3. Arrange to have the correspondence delivered to CCD via a representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (Contact the Senate or House Service Liaison as appropriate).

**DOD HEARINGS:**

- **House Appropriations Committee:** Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki testifies on the Army budget at a hearing of the House Appropriations Committee today at 9:30 a.m. EST in the Capitol H-140
- **House Armed Services Committee:** Air Force Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, commander in chief, U.S. Space Command, and Army Gen. William F. Kernan, commander in chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, testify at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee today at 9:30 a.m. EST in Rayburn House Office Building 2118
- **House Armed Services Committee:** Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Raymond F. DuBois, Jr. and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness Paul W. Mayberry testify on environmental and encroachment issues at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee today at 2 p.m. EST in Rayburn House Office Building 2118
- **Senate Armed Services Committee:** Vice Chief of Staff United States Army General John M. Keane and Under Secretary Army Les Brownlee testify on Army modernization and transformation at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee today at 2:30 p.m. EST in Russell Senate Office Building 222

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(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7898



**Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense  
Legislative Affairs  
14 March 2002**

**DOD NEWS HIGHLIGHTS:**

- **Rumsfeld, Ivanov Discuss Nuclear Review, Terrorism:** U.S. and Russian defense leaders met reporters yesterday and stressed progress the two countries have made in putting decades of mistrust behind them. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov conferred at the Pentagon and faced the press March 12-13. Ivanov also met with President Bush March 12 and will meet with Secretary of State Colin Powell before returning to Moscow. For more information, see:  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002\\_200203134.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002_200203134.html)
  
- **Army Hero Recalls Pentagon 9-11 Rescue-Recovery Efforts:** An Army noncommissioned officer described "reaching through a cloud of smoke" to rescue people in the Pentagon shortly after the terrorist- hijacked airliner slammed into the building Sept. 11. Staff Sgt. Christopher D. Braman, a special operations soldier, told an audience March 12 at the National Press Club here how he had used his combat search and rescue skills at the Pentagon attack site. The NCO was one of several guest panelists at the first of a series of National Mental Health Awareness Campaign Town Hall meetings. For more information, see:  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002\\_200203136.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002_200203136.html)
  
- **National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of March 13:** This week the Army and the Air Force announce increases of 2,143 and 44 reservists respectively on active duty in support of the partial mobilization, while the Marine Corps announces a decrease of 11 fewer reservists. The net collective result is 2,176 more reservists than last week. Total number currently on active duty in support of the partial mobilization for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is 27,965; Naval Reserve, 10,597; Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, 35,775; Marine Corps Reserve, 4,398; and the Coast Guard Reserve 1,841. This brings the total Reserve and National Guard on active duty to 80,576 from 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and individual augmentees. A cumulative roster of all National Guard and Reserve who are currently on active duty can be found at:  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020313ngr.pdf>.
  
- **U.S. Helps Other Nations Root Out Terrorists:** Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network found a safe haven in Afghanistan. But there will be no more safe havens for terrorists in Afghanistan or anywhere else if the United States can help it. On March 11, six months after last year's Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush vowed he would not relent in the struggle for the freedom and security of America and the civilized world. The second stage of the war on terrorism, the president said, calls for "a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world." For more information, see:  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002\\_200203131.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03132002_200203131.html)

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11-L-0559/OSD/7899



**Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense  
Legislative Affairs  
14 March 2002**

**TRANSCRIPTS POSTED AT DEFENSELINK:**

- **Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Press Conference with Russian Defense Minister Ivanov (13 March)** [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03132002\\_t0313sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03132002_t0313sd.html)
- **Wolfowitz Gives Turgut Ozal Lecture (13 March)**  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020313-depsecdef.html>
- **DoD News Briefing - ASD PA Clarke and Brig. Gen. Rosa (12 March)**  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03122002\\_t0312asd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03122002_t0312asd.html)

We will continue to provide notice of all transcripts of Department news briefings available at [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil). It is possible for your office to subscribe to DefenseLINK, and receive e-mail notifications as items are posted to the site. This would include all Department of Defense transcripts, news releases, and press advisories.

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(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7900

**TAB**

**D**

**D** heights. The latest rage sweeping Nixon biographers: The president with a hardscrabble past understood how hard it was to fight barriers like segregation and fought to open doors to blacks. "If Bill Clinton had Richard Nixon's record, he'd be quite a worshiped figure," says **Dean Kotlowski**, a Nixon scholar. A Salisbury (Md.) University history professor and author of *Nixon's Civil Rights* (Harvard University Press), Kotlowski is just the latest to find gold in the trash heap of Nixon domestic policy. While there was "little doubt" Nixon was prejudiced, Kotlowski found repeated examples of the prez telling aides he had to "do what was right," even if it hurt politically. Like expanding voting rights, funding black colleges, and desegregating the South's schools. Ditto his efforts on behalf of American Indians. Odd, then, that it's Clinton who's lauded by African-Americans as the "first black president." By comparison, says Kotlowski, Clinton "talked the talk but didn't walk the walk."

### Ridge Inc.

He won't testify before Congress about his White House operation, but we learn that homeland security czar **Tom Ridge** is building quite a little empire. White House officials say that when the hiring ends, he'll have about 145 people working for him, many dispatched from other agencies. The price: \$23 million a year. But only bigwigs will get White House desks. For \$12 million, other offices nearby have been outfitted.

### In the mail—still

The anthrax scare is over, but the White House still isn't getting its mail on time. Officials say that because every item has to be irradiated and inspected, a letter sent today won't get to the designated office for four to six weeks. The result: The White House is spending thousands of dollars on messengers to Capitol Hill and its agencies to avoid the Postal Service backlog.

### The 'Nam ticket

It's still two years off, but there's already talk of a Democratic ticket that might be able to challenge Bush-Cheney on the war issue. Who? Massachusetts Sen. **John Kerry** and California Gov. **Gray Davis**. Kerry was highly decorated in Vietnam, and Davis earned a Bronze Star there. We hear they got on famously during a recent visit and "connected" when discussing their experiences in 'Nam.

### Ike's face-lift

Among the security precautions taken by the White House after the September 11 attacks was the evacuation of 750 Eisenhower Executive Office Building workers in window offices facing wide-open 17th Street NW. Now, we hear, they may not return for years. But not because of a security threat. Instead, feds may use the evacuation as an excuse to finally renovate the old heap of a building. White



It's not supposed to be this way. When **William Rehnquist** got on the Supreme Court, the caseload was about 4,200 a year. Thanks to clerks and a lot of homework, the judges could make quick work of the cases and kick back. No wonder they call it a "job for life." But now even the judges on the top court are complaining about those danged lawyers and their suing ways. "Our workload is increasing," carps Associate Justice **Anthony Kennedy**. Want proof? Since Rehnquist joined in 1972, the caseload has doubled, and Kennedy

says the number could reach over 10,000 this year. And those poor "Supremes" aren't the only ones working their fingers to the bone. Just look at the busy court kitchen, for example. One worker identified in budget papers as an "assistant food preparation specialist" does more than make BLTs. She's also tasked to hem judicial robes, like Chief Justice Rehnquist's fancy gown decorated with stripes. And she tailors uniforms for others, even the janitors. No wonder, then, that Rehnquist is seeking a \$1,000 raise for his seamstress.

3/14  
0800

March 11, 2002 1:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: SFC (b)(6)

Please get a letter drafted to SFC (b)(6). I saw him at Walter Reed on Saturday. He had his arm shot off in the Karzai attack.

I would like to send him a note saying I enjoyed meeting him, wish him well and thank him for what he does.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Address

DHR:dh  
031102-33

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/02

(b)(6)

Ft Campbell, KY 42225.

ODA 574

SWT -  
Please take for action

Di Rita  
Larry Di Rita  
3/15

335512

11/11/02

U05338-02  
U05338-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7903

2002 MAR 25 PM 3:14

INFO MEMO

March 04, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations

VIA: Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy

March 22, 2002

SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

- You requested additional information on the subject of a "Maritime NORAD," a concept I mentioned briefly during my presentation to you on 12 February. This is an interim reply while we continue to develop the concept.
- The purpose of a Maritime NORAD would be to provide warning of terrorist threats originating from the sea to include an appropriate and timely response.
- Over the course of the coming months, we will work closely with Northern Command to determine if this concept has overall merit and how its tenets might best be adopted. Areas being rapidly explored include:
  - Broadening and accelerating the International Maritime Organization's surface ship tracking regime that will be implemented in 2008 for all vessels over 300GWT. A Blue/White ship-tracking regime is the lynchpin of the Maritime NORAD concept.
  - Using the above regime to establish sea-approach procedures comparable to approaching U.S. airspace.
  - Expanding our ongoing activity at the National Maritime Intelligence Center, in conjunction with the Coast Guard and the interagency. The aim is to ensure we know what is aboard the ships being tracked as they approach the United States.
  - Developing a command and control organization that permits "NORAD-like" (rapid, flattened hierarchy) decision-making when the situation poses sufficient danger to the United States.
  - Identifying realistic joint/interagency/combined responses to threats that are identified.
- I will come back to you periodically to report progress as we continue to develop this Maritime NORAD concept.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: None

Prepared By: RDML James G. Stavridis, N3/N5 Deep Blue, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/7904

U05357 /02

February 12, 2002 12:30 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

Please have someone prepare for me something on the subject of a maritime NORAD, as was discussed in the meeting today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021202-22

.....

Please respond by 03/01/02

February 12, 2002 12:30 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

Please have someone prepare for me something on the subject of a maritime NORAD, as was discussed in the meeting today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
021202-22



Please respond by 03/01/02

322

12 Feb 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 26 2002

322

The Honorable John Warner  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for your letter proposing locations in Northern Virginia as possible sites for the Northern Command headquarters. We are examining the matter closely, and I appreciate having the benefit of your views.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

26 March 02

U05408-02

11-L-0559/OSD/7907

MAR -21' 02 (THU) 18:34

S A S C

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(b)(6)

P. 002/003

MAR 22 AM 9:47

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS  
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA  
JOSEPH I. LIBERMAN, CONNECTICUT  
MAX BAILEY, GEORGIA  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND  
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII  
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA  
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA  
JEAN CARNAHAN, MISSOURI  
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RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA  
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TIM HUTCHINSON, ARKANSAS  
JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA  
SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE  
JIM DUNNING, KENTUCKY

DAVID E. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR  
JUDITH A. ANBLEY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

March 21, 2002

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Room 3E880 The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I applaud your initiative to establish a new unified command responsible for the land, sea and aerospace defense of the United States. As you are well aware, I have long been a strong advocate of streamlining responsibility for defense of our homeland, even before the tragic events of September 11. I think this proposal is a positive step in that direction.

In speeches at the Citadel in September, 1999 and at the National Defense University in May, 2001, President Bush identified homeland defense as his highest priority and called for the transformation of our armed forces to be able to deter, detect and defeat the very different threats we will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The events of September 11 clearly illustrated the need to have our military better organized to defend our Nation against a wide range of potential threats, both at home and abroad. I strongly support our President in making the security of our homeland the most urgent priority.

As you consider the requirements associated with the new homeland defense command, I am confident you will conclude that the need for this new "CINC" to coordinate with the Department of Defense and many other federal agencies involved in homeland defense argues strongly for locating this new command in the metropolitan Washington area. I urge you to give strong consideration to the fine military installations in northern Virginia as the location for this new command. In particular, Fort Belvoir and Quantico Marine Corps Training Base offer the facilities, security, flexibility, communications links, and proximity to related government agencies that this important new organization requires. Quantico has the added benefit of already being host to related federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation

U05210 /02


11-L-0559/OSD/7908

Academy and Department of State anti-terrorism training activities.

I look forward to continued consultation on this important initiative.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Warner", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John Warner  
Ranking Member

FYE - Mr. Horner =  
per our phone con.

March 25, 2002 10:49 AM

VIR  
CRIS

AFGHANISTAN

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding Training of Afghan Army

I cannot imagine why the training of the Afghan army would come out of the DoD topline.

If in fact the Administration decides they want to do it, wouldn't they fund State or Defense to do it? The organization that has the funds would have the greater control.

I don't understand your memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/12/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef, "Training and Equipping the Afghan Army" [U04590 02]

DHR:dh  
032502-24

.....  
Please respond by 04/05/02

25 MAR 02



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

March 26, 2002, 9:30 am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary Of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

*File 3/26/02*

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense Against BioTerrorism

334 DSB

- In January, you requested that you be advised of advisory boards' charters and membership (Tab C).
- Attached is the Terms of Reference for the subject DSB Task Force, which I recently signed (Tab A). The Task Force membership list is at Tab B.
- The Task Force will assess the scope of activities conducted by DoD to ensure its ability to respond to an attack of the US homeland by terrorists using biological weapons.
- The study will be co-sponsored by the Department of Health and Human Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and my office.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachments:  
As stated

26 Mar 02

Prepared by: Brenda Leckey, DSB, (b)(6) 21 15 2002 AT

Approved by: John Ello, Exec Dir, DSB, (b)(6) JVE, 26 Mar '02



11-L-0559/OSD/7911

U05465 02

**TAB**

**A**



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

March 25, 2002

### MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

**SUBJECT: Terms of Reference-Defense Science Board Task Force on  
Homeland Defense Against Bioterrorism**

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force to assess the scope of activities conducted by the DoD to ensure its ability to respond to an attack of the US homeland by terrorists using biological weapons.

An effective DOD response will depend on the prior establishment of contingency plans for attacks of various sizes and with different organisms. Strategically placed medical teams and specific plans for personal protection of DOD responders, containment of the infection, and decontamination must be established.

The Task Force should identify actions required to develop and implement these contingency plans including RDT&E, development of tools for planning and analysis, means to assure availability of capabilities, facilities, logistics, C3, vaccines, and therapeutics. Prior studies by the DSB and TRAC have addressed specifics for improved intelligence and for rapid warning and characterization of attacks. This study should focus on the other elements of biological defense: vaccination, passive protection, rapid response, therapeutics, and adequacy of facilities, decontamination, and forensics.

As outlined, the Task Force will comprehensively address the implementation of biological defense measures. One very important element is therapeutics. Full coverage of this topic is outside the scope of this study but the Task Force should provide a preliminary assessment of the status, plans and progress of development of bio-agent therapeutics.

In the near-term, it will be important to define and provide the tools necessary to allow comprehensive contingency planning. These include:

- a. Processing for advanced surveillance;
- b. Comprehensive epidemiological and population-based modeling of epidemics for management of treatment and isolation and for determining the event initiation;

c. Contamination prediction models.

The Task Force should identify and characterize potential decontamination techniques and, overall, the defense capabilities and postures that have the largest potential for comprehensive protection of military and civilian targets. These defense capabilities must integrate the findings in detection, modeling, and decontamination field.

The Task Force should outline a comprehensive R&D program, together with an investment strategy to ensure adequate capability. The Task Force should also assess areas in which DoD should seek strong partnering relationships outside DoD, within government, academia, and industry. It should also recommend research and development areas that are uniquely in DoD interest and may not be accomplished by the private sector.

The Task Force should begin by identifying actionable recommendations that can be implemented now and provide near term value (the next six months) as well as recommendations that can be implemented now and provide value in six months to three years. The Task Force should provide its initial thoughts on such nearer term recommendations within three months. The final report should include recommendations that require investments from the FY 03-08 Future Year Defense Program.

The study will be co-sponsored by me as the USD (AT&L), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Director, Office of Public Health Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. Anna Marie Skalka and Mr. Larry Lynn will serve as co-chairpersons of the Task Force. Millie Donlon, DARPA will serve as Executive Secretary and Commander Brian Hughes, United States Navy, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act" and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, US Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.



**TAB**

**B**

**MEMBERSHIP LIST**  
**Defense Science Board Task Force**  
**On**  
**Defense Against Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons**

**Task Force Chairman**  
**Dr. Anna Marie Skalka\***  
Fox Chase Cancer Center

**Mr. Larry Lynn\***  
Private Consultant

**Task Force Members**

**Dr. Barry Bloom@**  
Harvard University

**Dr. Gary Resnick@**  
LANL

**Dr. Robert Morrisey@**  
Johnson and Johnson

**Mr. Richard de Schutter@**  
Independent Consultant

**Dr. Dennis M. Perrotta@**  
Texas Department of Health

**Dr. Tara O'Toole@**  
Johns Hopkins University

\* DSB Member

# Approved USD(AT&L) Consultant

@ Not yet an approved USD(AT&L) Consultant

**Executive Secretary**

**Dr Millie Donlan**  
DARPA

**DSB Secretariat Representative**

**CDR Brian Hughes, USN**  
USD(AT&L)/DSB



USD(AT&L) Approved

2/20/02

Date

**TAB**

**C**

showfile

01/18/2002 17:03 (b)(6)


PAGE 01

JAN 18 2002 5:03 PM EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

January 17, 2002 3:49 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Pete Aldridge  
 Doug Feith  
 Richard Perle  
 William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Agenda Items for Policy Boards

In the future, before advisory boards undertake projects, please make me aware of what the proposals are, what the charter will be and who is likely to be involved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011702-3

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

01/18/2002 17:03 (b)(6)


PAGE 01

JAN 16 2002 9:21AM

January 17, 2002 3:49 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Fete Aldridge  
 Doug Feith  
 Richard Perle  
 William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Agenda Items for Policy Boards

334

In the future, before advisory boards undertake projects, please make me aware of what the proposals are, what the charter will be and who is likely to be involved.

Thanks.

DHR:eb  
01/17/02-3



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

17 Jan 02



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

2002 MAR 27 PM 2:32



INFO MEMO

March 22, 2002, 4:38 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: First meeting of the Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

- The Defense Business Practice Implementation Board, chaired by Gus Pagonis, conducted its first meeting on Friday, March 15. The agenda and a list of those attending are at Tab A.
- As cosponsors, Pete Aldridge and I opened the meeting with remarks that emphasized the Department's open invitation to the Board to make business process recommendations. Dave Chu, speaking at the Board's luncheon, echoed the request for a full spectrum of private sector advice. The Board also got a perspective on the role of the Senior Executive Council from Ken Krieg, and heard Steve Friedman's synopsis of his financial management study.
- The Board engaged energetically with briefings regarding the financial management modernization program, financial management metrics, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service operations, and human capital. The members



11-L-0559/OSD/7920

U05502 /02

established four subcommittees in Management Information, Change Management, Personnel, and Supply Chain activities, and will return comments on the proposed issues by April 1, 2002. The Board tentatively scheduled its next meeting for May 15, 2002.

- Pete and I will review the topics the Board proposes to address, to ensure congruence with your management agenda.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Gretchen Anderson, (b)(6)

DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE IMPLEMENTATION BOARD  
 PLANNING SESSION  
 March 15, 2002  
 (Room 1E801#7, Pentagon)

Agenda

8:00-8:30 am	Introduction of Board Members	Gus Pagonis Chair
8:30-8:45 am	Introductory Comments	Dov Zakheim, USD(C) Pete Aldridge, USD(AT&L)
8:45-9:15 am	Role of the Senior Executive Council (SEC)	Ken Krieg Exec Secretary of SEC
9:15-9:45 am	Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)	Tom Bloom Director of DFAS
9:45-10:00 am	Break	
10:00-10:15 am	Transforming DoD Financial Management	Steve Friedman
10:15-11:00 am	Financial Management Modernization Program/ Business Lines and Best Practices	Ron Brooks/ Catherine Santana OUSD(C) BMSI
11:00-11:30 am	Financial Management Metrics	Greg Kuechler OUSD(C) AP
11:30-11:45 am	Proceed to OSD Blue Room (3D854)	
11:45-1:00 pm	Working Lunch  Human Resources Strategy Triad -- Quality of Life/Civilian/Military	David Chu, USD(P&R) John Molino Ginger Groeber Bill Carr
1:00-1:15 pm	Return to 1E801#7	
1:15-2:00 pm	Discussion >Operating Plan 2002 >Future Meeting Dates >Select Members for Focus Areas >Actions Required Before Next Meeting	Gus Pagonis
2:00-2:45 pm	Remarks/Questions and Answers	Secretary Rumsfeld
2:45-3:00 pm	Wrap Up	Gus Pagonis

11-L-0559/OSD/7922

# DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICES IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

Initial Planning Session

March 15, 2002

(Room 1E801 #7, Pentagon)

## Attendance List

### Key Government Officials

Dov. S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))  
E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics  
David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)  
David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States  
Mark Everson, Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management, Office of Management and Budget  
Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Principal Deputy and Under Secretary of Defense for Management Reform, OUSD(C)  
Tina W. Jonas, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management), OUSD(C)  
De Ritchie, Acting Deputy Chief Financial Officer, OUSD(C)

### Designated Members

William (Gus) Pagonis, Executive Vice President, Supply Chain, Sears, Roebuck and Company (Chair)  
Michael Bayer, private consultant engaged in enterprise strategic planning and mergers and acquisitions (Vice Chair)  
Neil Albert, Senior Vice President and Director of MCR Federal, Inc.  
Brad Bends, Vice President, Financial Services, KPMG  
Denis Bovin, Vice Chairman, Bear Stearns and Company, Inc.  
Frederic Cook, Frederic Cook & Company  
\*Travis Engen, President and CEO, Alcan, Inc.  
Steve Friedman, Chairman, Board of Columbia University  
Robert Hale, Senior Fellow, Logistics Management Institute  
W. N. Johnson, Vice President, Dean of Students, Boston University  
James Kimsey, Founding CEO and Chairman Emeritus of America Online  
Dana Mead, Retired Chairman, Tenneco, Inc.  
Phil Merrill, Chairman, Board of Capital-Gazette Communications  
Richard Perle, Chairman, Defense Policy Board, *ex officio*  
William Phillips, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Washington  
\*Arnold Punaro, Senior Vice President and Director, Federal Business Development, Science Applications International Corporation  
\*William Schneider, Jr., Chairman, Defense Science Board, *ex officio*  
Andrew Siegel, Deutsche Bank  
\*Frank Sullivan, Frank Sullivan Associates  
Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor-in-Chief, U.S. News & World Report

\*indicates member not in attendance 11-L-0559/OSD/7923

**COORDINATION**

**USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) Mr. Aldridge**


**March 22, 2002**

11-L-0559/OSD/7924

March 27, 2002 10:13 AM

TO: Gen. Kernan  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Myers  
VADM Giambastiani  
Larry Di Rita  
STEVE CAMBONE

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Millennium Challenge

353

I understand that you are executing Millennium Challenge this summer, and I'm looking forward to seeing the results of this important event. It struck me that it might be useful to apply to Millennium Challenge the lessons of Afghanistan and the transformation principles from the work we have been undertaking. If you have not yet been briefed on the transformation work that has been done by the Service Chiefs, the Joint Staff and the civilian leadership of the Department, I would like to have you briefed by Ken Krieg or Steve Cambone, PUSD(P).

I would appreciate it if you would brief me on the Millennium Challenge experiment and exercise plan as it relates to transformation and jointness sometime in the next 30 days. It is my understanding that the Services have been supportive of your efforts, particularly with respect to the joint and transformational aspects of the experiment. This is good—we need to give the right signals to all of DoD that we are serious about change and to let the Services know that they must work closely with Joint Forces Command on joint transformation and that they must cooperate with JFCOM's efforts.

27 March

I would also suggest that you share the Millennium Challenge execution plan with Art Cebrowski in the Transformation Office and with Steve Cambone. One other

individual who might be helpful is the Honorable Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, who has some very interesting ideas on transformation and has been in from time to time to share his thoughts.

I apologize for not getting this note off to you earlier in the year, and I do realize that the planning for Millennium Challenge is well underway; nonetheless, a country that may have to be ready to fight in hours ought to be flexible enough to not lock in exercises many months in advance.

I have asked Vice Admiral Ed Giambastiani in my office to be your point of contact on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031902-24.2

.....

*Please respond by* 04/26/02

2002 MAR 29 PM 1:27



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

March 29, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

*Pete*  
*3/29/02*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker (BFT) – Snow Flake

- Blue Force Tracker is a generic term that applies to systems that keep track of friendly forces and minimize fratricide.
- There are several Blue Force Tracker systems in use or under consideration.
- We have ACTD's actively addressing BFT issues.
- JROC is actively guiding the Department towards an objective BFT capability.
- The attached paper provides some details.

Attachments:  
As stated

## Blue Force Tracking (BFT)

### Background

- Today, a number of legacy systems provide (BFT); none provide an automated Common Operational Picture (COP) of all friendly forces.
- A diversity of systems provide BFT for selected military units. For example, the Army's Movement Tracking System provides BFT for some of their forces – primarily logistics ground units. The Army Space Command runs a Mission Management Center (MMC) under CINC USSPACECOM where these systems are managed and results are provided to other CINCs.
- Also, semi-automated friendly force location reporting (via tactical data links) and manual reporting systems augment existing automated systems in assembling blue force picture.

### Status

- In May 2002, USSPACECOM will request JROC validation of a Beyond Line of Sight / Non-Line of Sight (BLOS / NLOS) Mission Needs Statement (MNS). USSPACECOM intends to brief the JROC again in September 2002 to request validation of a concept of operations for legacy operations, an operational concept for the objective BFT capability, and ORD-level requirements for a BFT augmented payload. USSPACECOM will also make recommendations for Lead Service / Executive Agent responsibilities. The draft MNS currently indicates that an objective BFT system should have full time, two way, LPI / LPD, global availability.
  - This Joint Staff effort should define the operational requirement for an optimum "objective system" for BFT. Selection of a technology to provide BFT should evolve from this requirement.
- Two ACTDs explore near- and intermediate-term technologies to support broader BFT capabilities.
  - A proposed Joint Blue Forces Situational Awareness (JBFSAs) ACTD would provide fusion of existing BFT systems into a common plot. This proposal is in the process of soliciting a service sponsor and obtaining funding commitments.
  - The Personnel Recovery Extraction Survivability aided by Smart Sensors (PRESS) ACTD proposes an automated global, satellite-based personnel locator (GPRS) system as a possible solution for BFT. [Note: OSD staffing actions are in progress to preserve space/weight in GPS III for GPRS until the USAF makes a final recommendation on the best satellite host for this system.]



# Joint Blue Forces Situational Awareness (JBFS)

FY03 ACTD Candidate

### PROBLEM STATEMENT:

- POOR INTEROPERABILITY
- INSUFFICIENT COVERAGE
- LIMITED TACTICAL DISSEMINATION
- INCOMPATIBLE DISPLAY SOFTWARE
- UN-LEVERAGED NON-SPACE COMPONENTS

### ACTD OBJECTIVES:


- DEMO FUTURE BFT ARCHITECTURE
- BETTER USER APPLICATIONS/DEVICES
- INTEGRATE NEXT-GENERATION USER DEVICES

### POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS:

- Grenadier BRAT
- LYNX/NGT/MTX
- GPRS/MTS
- OmniTRAC/Iridium/LEOPARD
- JASSM/SDB
- FCB2
- SBSS/ANGAS
- LOS Receivers/UAVs/Aerostats

### TRANSITION/RESIDUALS STRATEGY:

- Software
- Connectivity
- Operational/Spars test Bed MMC



### POTENTIAL FUNDING SOURCES

- USPACECOM - AFSPACECOM/ ARSPACE/ NAVYSPACE
- Operational CINCS - CENTCOM/ SOCOW/ EUJCOM/ SOUTHCOM/ PACOM
- Functional CINCS - JFCOM/ TRANSCOM
- Special Operations - SOCOW/ NSWG

### RISKS

- MMC Testbed - TRL 7
- GPRS and CSEL Interface - TRL 6
- OMNITRACS and Lynx Interface - TRL 7
- JTF Warner - TRL 6
- GCCS Module - TRL 6
- JASSM/SDB/Quickbolt Interface - TRL 6
- LOS Receivers - TRL 7
- SATCOM Dissemination - TRL 7

POC: LTC Sutcliff, (719) 554-5955, timothy.sutcliff@peterson.af.mil



# Personnel Recovery Extraction Survivability aided by Smart-Sensors ACTD (PRESS)

### Objective:

Correct personnel recovery deficiencies thru:


- 2 phased, 2 pronged approach:
  - Real time, automated, precision Survivor Location, Tracking and Re-Supply (Phase I / II)
  - Highly survivable Extraction Aircraft (Phase II)
  - Integrated, semi-automated, real time Situational Awareness & Mission Management capabilities (Phase I / II)
- Leveraged technologies:
  - PR Mission Software ACTD, CSEL, UAV Decoy, RTV ACTD

### Warfighter Needs:

- Location/ID systems (e.g., covert signaling, sensors, GPRS)
- Aircraft survivability (e.g., IRCM, decoys)
- Passive detection of evader location (i.e., MMW, EO, IR)
- Threat detectors (e.g., adv. sensors, UAVs)
- Situational awareness (e.g., threats, imagery)

### Warfighter Payoff:

- Improve survivability, prevent detection, attack and damage



FUNDING (\$M)	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	TOTAL
	9.5	15.3	18.7	17.0	2.0	2.0	64.5

### Metrics

- 50% Reduction In Reaction/Recovery Time
- 30% Increase in force protection & interoperability
- 60% Increase in LOC/ID accuracy

### Participants/Endorsements

- Lead Service: Air Force
- User Sponsor : USJFCOM
- Supporting CINC: USSOCOM
- Tech Manager: JPRA
  - NASA/USCG/DUSD(S&T)/A RMY/DPMO/DARPA

53/10

March 18, 2002 11:16 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Please come back to me with some proposal with respect to this suggestion from Newt Gingrich on Blue Force Tracker.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Blue Force Tracker

DHR:dh  
031802-30

.....  
Please respond by 04/05/02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

---

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:25 AM

**To:** (b)(6) pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

**Subject:** secdef-2

II. Immediate action:

1. Establish Blue Force Tracker as the universal real time identity system for all services and for national assets (including intelligence field operatives in combat zones)

March 18, 2002 11:16 AM

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DHR:dh  
031802-30



Please respond by 04/05/02

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

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**Subject:** secdef-2

II. Immediate action:

1. Establish Blue Force Tracker as the universal real time identity system for all services and for national assets (including intelligence field operatives in combat zones)

3/5/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/7933



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2002 MAR 29 PM 3:17

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

SUBJECT: Question Regarding Smart Artillery Rounds

- You asked, "How do we get a smarter artillery round"?
- The Information Paper at Tab A identifies three possible alternatives for obtaining a Smart Artillery Round. These are: (1) Use of existing inventory; (2) Off-shore procurements; and (3) Completion of an existing RDT&E program.

Prepared By: Walt Squire, OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS/LW, (b)(6)

11-L-0539 OSD/7934

U05643 /02

**TAB**

**A**

## INFORMATION PAPER

QUESTION: "How do we get a smarter artillery round?"

SUMMARY: There are three different ways of providing our artillery forces with a "smart" round capability. These are: (1) drawing from existing inventory; (2) off-shore procurements; and (3) completion of the RDT&E program for a "smart" projectile.

### EXISTING INVENTORY:

- **Copperhead:** In the mid-1980's, the Army completed the development and fielded in excess of 20,000, 155mm Copperhead rounds. After launch the projectile "homes in on" a laser spot designated on the target by a ground, forward observer. The time between laser designation and projectile launch is a little less than 20 seconds. For this reason, Copperhead is not effective against moving (armored) targets.
- **SADARM (Sense and Destroy Armor):** The Army terminated procurement of SADARM in Fiscal Year 2000. SADARM is a 155mm, thin-wall, projectile which carries two SADARM sub-munitions to the target area. The sub-munitions have a sensor suite which utilizes Infrared and Active and Passive millimeter wave radar. SADARM is actually a counter battery weapon as moving (armored) targets would move outside of its footprint during the projectile's flight. There are 348, full-up SADARM projectiles which are approved as conditional release. The contractor is Northrop/Aerojet Electro Systems. An average unit cost in production would be \$50-60K.

OFF-SHORE PROCUREMENTS: There are potential sources that could deliver spin-stabilized sensor-fuzed munitions; however, the availability timelines vary.

- **BONUS:** BOFORS Defence and GIAT Industries have developed 155 BONUS under a common specification for the Swedish and French Armies. BONUS is a projectile carrier for two "smart" submunitions. The submunitions use a passive, multi-channel, IR-sensor, and the BONUS carrier is equipped with a base bleed for extended range. A total of 800 Bonus rounds would be purchased and delivered by mid 2003 for an estimated unit price of \$25-35K.
- **SMArt 155:** SMArt 155 is another submunition carrier with a more robust sensor suite. The submunitions use millimeter wave radar and radiometer as well as infrared sensors. SMArt 155 is manufactured by GIWS of Nuremberg, Germany. A total of 1600 SMArt 155 rounds could be purchased and delivered by the end of 2002 for an estimated unit price of \$50-60K. There are two submunitions in each SMArt, 155mm projectile.

COMPLETION OF ARMY'S RDT&E PROGRAM: The Army's RDT&E program to field a precision guided "smart" artillery projectile is Excalibur. Excalibur is being developed in three blocks – block I contains a unitary (high explosive) warhead, block II adds smart, sensor-fuzed submunitions as in BONUS or SMArt 155, and block III adds

target discriminating capabilities to the unitary warhead. Given an accurate target location, the on-board guidance (GPS/INS) and navigational control system enables this projectile to come within 10 meters of the intended target (irrespective of range). This precision allows much less collateral damage. A production milestone decision for block I is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2006. Army estimates the first year unit production cost to be \$90K per round; average unit production cost is estimated at \$30K per round.

*We are looking at accelerating Excalibur  
in FY04.*

Read SIGTS - 3/18/02  
1736

March 15, 2002 9:35 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Artillery Round

LW —  
#031901

How do we get a smarter artillery round?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031502-18

.....  
Please respond by 04/15/02

Read S:TS - 3/18/02  
1736

March 15, 2002 9:35 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Artillery Round

LW -  
#031901

471

How do we get a smarter artillery round?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031502-18



Please respond by 04/15/02

15 MAR 02

March 29, 2002 7:40 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Myers  
 Gen. Pace  
 Gen. Franks  
 Doug Feith  
 Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: British in Afghanistan

Attached is an interesting piece on the British experience in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 03/20/02 PDBMemoKabul 1812.doc

DHR:dh  
 032902-7

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

29MARCH

20 March 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 29 2002

20 March 2001

**Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz*****In response to your request for a short summary on the British experience in Afghanistan in 1842:***

A review of available historical works—including the eyewitness account of the Kashmiri-born secretary to Sir Alexander Burnes, Mohan Lal, who survived the three-month ordeal—indicate the British rout from Afghanistan was the result of serious political and military miscalculations. Historians of that time—such as Peter Hopkirk, Karl Meyer, Shareen Brysac, and Martin Ewans—identify four major factors that led to the fall of Kabul and the subsequent British retreat across Afghanistan to Jalalabad:

**The imposition of an Afghan ruler whose authority derived from a foreign power.** The British did not anticipate the depth of Afghan animosity toward their candidate to rule Afghanistan, a former Afghan leader—Shah Shuja—who had failed in three attempts in thirty years to regain his crown. The British resorted to extensive force and lavish bribes to maintain the security of Shah Shuja's regime with the Afghan tribal leaders.

**The lack of an exit strategy.** The British had not devised a strategy for keeping Shah Shuja on his throne without having to maintain a sizeable military presence. Before Shah Shuja's position was secured, however, London ordered a significant reduction in the British regiment in Afghanistan, leaving just two brigades in Kabul and one division at Kandahar. In addition, London slashed the tribal subsidies to well below what had been promised to the Afghan warlords to maintain their acquiescence to Shah Shuja and commitment not to attack British troops.

**Tactical missteps.** The British made a series of tactical blunders from the beginning of their occupation of Kabul. For example, they ceded the high ground in Kabul to Shah Shuja's harem (so none could peek over the walls), forcing the British troops to garrison on a low-lying plain, vulnerable to the hills above them. In addition, the British also ignored mounting intelligence reporting on growing Afghan discontent with their presence. The beginning of the end came on 1 November 1841 when Mohan Lal warned Burnes—then the political counselor-in-waiting—of an attempt to be made on his life that night by Afghans who blamed him personally for the British occupation of Kabul. Burnes ignored the warning, which led to his death hours later at the hands of an angry

For further information, contact the South Asia Issue Manager at 71213 secure.

20 March 2002

mob.

**British infighting and duplicity.** The fate of the British in Afghanistan was sealed with the paralyzing quarrels between the current political advisor, Sir William Macnaghten, and General Elphinstone, the ranking military commander, over how to rescue Burnes from the Afghan mob. Unable to reach agreement, British forces did not respond, nor even take effective retribution for his death afterward, encouraging a general Afghan uprising. Starved out and their ranks decimated, the British called for a truce 25 days later. Frustrated with Elphinstone's inability to decide how to extricate the remaining British, Macnaghten attempted some double dealing with the Afghan warlords during the truce negotiations. They beat him at his own game, however, luring him out of the garrison and killing him and several other top British officials.

The British finally negotiated their safe passage—or, so they thought—from Afghanistan in early January 1842, leaving approximately 130 officers and their families behind as hostages. However, the promised Afghan escort never arrived, and the beleaguered troops, their families, and camp followers were attacked throughout the long march by the tribes which had had their subsidies cut by the British. On 13 January 1842, one lone British officer, the army physician, arrived at the British fort in Jalalabad.

For further information, contact the South Asia Issue Manager at 71213 secure.

\* \* \* TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT ( MAR.29.2002 5:11PM ) \* \* \*

TTI

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERS. NAME	FILE
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L : SEND LATER  
D : DETAIL  
1- : MIL\_STD MODE

\$ : TRANSFER  
@ : FORWARDING  
F : FINE  
G- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING  
E : ECM  
> : REDUCTION

11-L-0559/OSD/7943

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION



**WASHFAX**  
**Secretary of Defense**  
**Cover Sheet**  
**12/N**



**FROM: SECDEF CABLES**

**OFFICE/DESK: SECRETARY RUMSFELD**

**PHONE NO.:**

**SUBJECT: British in Afghanistan**

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**(Including Coversheet)**

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CENTCOM	GENERAL FRANKS				

**REMARKS:** \_\_\_\_\_

**PLEASE INSURE THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL RECEIVE THIS DOCUMENT FROM THE SECDEF**

**Please call Cables upon receipt.**

**Please call Secretary of Defense Cable Division to report transmission problems.**

**Phone number**

12/31  
1000

C-410

December 28, 2002 3:16 PM

Larry Di Rita  
#7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld M  
SUBJECT: Statistics

Please have someone pull together the number of ministers of defense I have met with individually, the number of foreign ministers, the number of heads of state and then the big groups I have participated in—NATO, South America, Australia, Prague and the like. I kind of want to get some sense of the diplomatic side of what I have been doing.

092

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122801-9 (to computer)

.....  
Please respond by 01/24/03

4/7  
SecDef  
Another tally of  
your foreign meetings  
I thought would be  
interesting

4/7  
Col ~~Walters~~ Lindner -  
~~Please get with~~  
~~policy and balance~~  
~~and get this~~  
~~put together. Thanks~~

28 Dec 02

Done 4/15

D. Di Rita  
4/8

Di Rita  
Larry Di Rita



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2002 APR -1 PM 4: 29

INFO MEMO

April 1, 2002, 9:54 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding

- Per your tasking to me (and your statements at Congressional hearings) that I put together a study of possible shipbuilding futures, and their impact on the shipbuilding base, I enclose a set of preliminary PA&E slides, which were developed in concert with the Navy.
- The slides are consistent with the Navy briefing you received last week. They do offer several alternatives, however. These are:
  - maintaining the current program;
  - an alternative the Navy prefers
  - and a PA&E "middle option."
- All of the plans will require an increase in FY 07 and 08 funding; the "middle option" calls for an average of \$1.6 billion in additional shipbuilding funds beginning in FY 04.
- If we are serious about changing the mix of the fleet, and maintaining the shipbuilding base, the middle option, and its costs, seems quite reasonable.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)  
Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (P)  
Director, PA&E

11-L-0559/OSD/7946

U05740 /02



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



INFORMATION MEMO

March 27, 2002; 5:00 PM

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

FROM: Barry D. Watts *BDW*

SUBJECT: Results of Shipbuilding Study

- PA&E developed, with Navy participation, three potential future fleets and the build plans necessary to achieve them.
- The size of the Navy can be increased to 350-375 ships by 2020 if the funds allocated to shipbuilding are increased to \$13.1B per year in FY00 constant dollars.
  - PB03 allocates \$11.5B per year to shipbuilding.
  - The Navy submitted an alternate plan that requires \$14.3B per year.
- The increase in numbers is due to the introduction of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
  - Our future fleets include 50-70 of these ships. The LCS is not yet designed, so this is a notional estimate rather than an actual requirement.
  - The LCS is projected to cost about \$400M per ship. If the costs rise too far above this, the LCS concept will become uncompetitive with an all-high-end surface combatant mix. In this case, it will be difficult to sustain a fleet larger than about 325 ships.
- A submarine build rate of two boats per year can sustain a force of 50 SSNs plus 4 SSGNs through 2025, provided that we begin building two SSNs per year in FY06.
- All of the plans considered required above-average funding in FY07 and FY08.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

Attachment: Shipbuilding brief.

Prepared By: M. Webster Ewell, (b)(6)




11-L-0559/OSD/7947





# Concept of the Future Navy




**Current nominal composition:**  
CVBG = CV + 6 CG/DDG  
ARG = 3 amphibs, no escorts

**Future nominal composition:**  
CVBG = CV + 3 CG/DDG  
ARG = 3 amphibs + DDX + 2 DDG

OSD/PA&E



# Navy Global CONOPS circa 2020



OSD/PA&E



# Ship totals for three 2020 fleets

	Fleet #1	Fleet #2	Fleet #3
CVs	12	12	12
Amphibs	36	36	36
CG	22	27	27
DDG	61	60	60
DDX	20	12	31
LCS	52	70	12
SSBN	14	14	14
SSN	56	50	50
SSGN	4	4	4
MIW	26	26	26
CLF	36	36	29
Support	25	25	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>326</b>

- Fleet #1 was provided by the Navy
  - Navy plans to reach 375 ships by 2025
- Fleet #2 is a variant which:
  - Builds more LCS
  - Caps the DDX buy at 12
  - Changes submarine build profile to 2 per year
- Fleet #3 is provided to show what could happen if LCS is too expensive


## *Illustrative Only*

- DDX, LCS not yet designed

OSD/PA&E




# Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #1



- 364 ship fleet, including 20 DDX, 52 LCS, 56 SSNs



# Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #2




- 372 ship fleet, including 12 DDX, 70 LCS, 50 SSNs

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# Shipbuilding Plan for Fleet #3



- 326 ship fleet, including 31 DDX, 12 LCS, 50 SSNs




## DD(X)-LCS Mix

- **Peacetime presence requirement for DD(X) is 12 ships**
  - Navy plan builds 20 DD(X), pending ongoing war fighting and industrial base analyses
  - These plans assume a two-gun, large magazine DD(X)
- **LCS requirement depends on concept of operations and final ship characteristics**
  - 70 LCS gives full-time presence in 4 forward nodes + SOUTHCOM
  - Assumes 4 crews per 3 ships
- **LCS concept is viable only if unit cost of LCS is at most one-third that of a large surface combatant**
  - Fleet #3 is an alternative if the LCS concept turns out to be unworkable



# Submarine Force Structure



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# Submarine Force Structure

- **Plan #1 sustains a fleet of 53 SSNs and 4 SSGNs**
  - Two additional submarines would need to be built before FY10 to sustain the Navy's desired force structure of 55 SSNs
- **Plan #2 sustains a fleet of 50 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, without ever building three submarines per year**
  - A force of 55 submarines can be sustained by building 2 SSNs in FY05
    - FY03 advanced procurement funds would be needed



# Amphibious Ships

- **LHA(R) timing**
  - Fleet #1 builds LHA(R) in FY09, FY13, FY16, and FY18
  - Fleet #2 builds LHA(R) in FY06, FY09, FY12, and FY14
  - LHA's reach end of service lives in 2011-2015
- **LHA(R) will be designed to operate JSF, V-22**
  - Delaying the replacement of the existing LHAs is not consistent with the establishment of Expeditionary Striking Groups
- **LHA(R) program can support an FY06 start provided LHA(R) is a modified LHD and not a new design**

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# Industrial Base Analysis

***Only very rough estimates of the industrial base implications of the three plans can be made now because some crucial inputs are not available***

- **LCS Design**

- Size, extent of composite material use, systems complexity
- Will a third bidder emerge?

- **DDX Design**

- Capacity of some yards varies with ship displacement

- **Outcome of LPD-17 consolidation negotiations**

- **Will SSNs remained “teamed” at 2 per year?**

***The Navy will provide industrial base results by 29 March (?)***

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# Backup

[Redacted]

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# The Transformed Fleet

CV(N)	Amphibious Ships	Surface Combatants	Subs	CLF	MIW	Support & Command	Total
12	37	160	73	42	26	25	375

	CG/DDG	DD(X)		Total
CVBG	36	0		116
ESF	24	12		27
TBMD SAG	27	0		0
UNITAS/CARAT	0	0		0
SNFL	0	0		0
SNFM	0	0		0
SOUTHCOM	1	0		13
MTW	0	4		4
	88	16		160


(As briefed to SEC on 5 March)

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# Shipbuilding Program of Record

- Uses CAIG cost estimates



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# Calculation of Fleet #2

	CVs	Amphibs	CG/DDG	DDX	LCS
12 CVBG	12		36		
12 ARG+		36	24	12	
Guam Sqd			4		
LCS Squadrons					
SOUTHCOM			4		12
EUCOM			5		15
CENTCOM			7		21
PACOM			6		18
Japan/Korea			1		4
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>70</b>

- Escorts per CVBG and ARG+ from Navy IWARS analysis
- LCS force structure supports 1.0 presence of a squadron consisting of 4 LCS + 1 CG/DDG in each of 5 nodes
  - Multiple crewing of LCS assumed



# Submarine Force Requirement

- The QDR process did not address SSN force structure
- Requirement is based on 1999 JCS Study
  - 55 SSNs for warfighting, 68 for peacetime presence/ISR missions

## *Changes since 1999:*

- **Guam homeporting**
  - 3 SSNs homeported in Guam generate ~7 SSNs worth of peacetime presence, mostly due to reduced transit times
- **4 SSGNs added to the force**
  - Greater underway time due to dual-crewing allows each SSGN to contribute ~2 SSNs worth of peacetime missions
- **With these changes, a fleet of 50 SSNs and 4 SSGNs can generate ~62 SSNs worth of peacetime presence**

OSD/PA&E

April 1, 2002 8:21 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
Tony Dolan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Perspectives

Attached is a paper I pretty much wrote 25 years ago. It was the first defense paper that tried to send a defense message. The message today is very different, and this obviously looks crude after 25 years.

There are things we are doing today that we should measure in the same way we measured things then.

Please return this to me after you have had a chance to look at it. I would be curious to know if either of you have any brilliant ideas as to what we ought to be measuring. I have asked several other people, and they have come up blank.

Thanks.

Attach.  
January 1977 "U.S. Defense Perspectives"

DHR:dh  
040102-3

.....  
Please respond by 04/26/02

381

1 Apr 02

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11-L-0559/OSD/7965

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# **U.S. DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES**

**FISCAL YEAR 1978**

**DONALD RUMSFELD**  
**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**



**JANUARY 1977**

11-L-0559/OSD/7966

## INTRODUCTION

THE FUNDAMENTAL TASK OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND LIBERTIES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ... IN A WORLD WHICH IS DIFFICULT, TENSE, AND DANGEROUS FOR THOSE WHO SEEK TO LIVE IN FREEDOM AND DIGNITY.

MILITARY STRENGTH IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY, GIVEN THE WORLD SITUATION. WHERE, FOR 20-25 YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE SUPERIORITY OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH WAS HARDLY QUESTIONED, THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A "SUPERPOWER" PUTS U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT.

THERE IS CONSENSUS THAT U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITY AND STRENGTH CAN BE DESCRIBED AS "SUFFICIENT" -- TODAY. THAT IS, WHEN COMPARED TO THE SOVIET UNION, WE HAVE PARITY IN SOME ASPECTS OF MILITARY POWER, MARKED SUPERIORITY IN SOME OTHERS, AND A DEGREE OF INFERIORITY IN STILL OTHERS.

HOWEVER, THE TRENDS OVER A 10-15 YEAR PERIOD HAD BEEN DECIDEDLY ADVERSE, QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, AS WELL AS WITH RESPECT TO THE KEY MILITARY BALANCES, UNTIL ARRESTED BY REAL INCREASES IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET IN FY 1976 AND FY 1977. WHILE NO ONE CHART, STATISTIC OR TREND CAN PRESENT THE COMPLETE PICTURE, A SWEEPING LOOK AT LEVEL OF EFFORT, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, PROCUREMENT AND R&D EFFORTS, EQUIPMENT

PRODUCTION RATES, FORCE LEVEL TRENDS, AND SHIFTS  
IN RELATIVE CAPABILITY DOES MAKE IT CLEAR WHAT HAS TAKEN  
PLACE. AN UNCLASSIFIED COLLECTION OF GRAPHICS IS PRESENTED  
HERE, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES AND APPROPRIATE CAVEATS.


ON THE BASIS OF THESE FACTS PRESENTED, ONE CAN MAKE A  
JUDGMENT WITH REGARD TO THE EFFORT REQUIRED TO PREVENT  
RECURRENCE OF TRENDS IN THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH ARE  
ADVERSE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY.

IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT  
WILLING TO ACCEPT A POLICY OF INFERIORITY.

## GEO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- ECONOMIC INTERESTS
- POLITICAL COMPETITION
- SUPPORT OF FREEDOM

- ALL REQUIRE GLOBAL MILITARY ASSETS AND ACCESS
- ALL REQUIRE A GLOBAL STRATEGY



### GEO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS


U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS ABROAD FALL INTO THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL. THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE OVERLAPS AMONG THESE CATEGORIES, DEPENDING ON THE AREA OF THE WORLD UNDER CONSIDERATION. OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS REFLECT AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX COMBINATION OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS AS THE WORLD BECOMES MORE INTERDEPENDENT. A SENSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY INVOLVES ALL THESE FACTORS, CAREFULLY BALANCING THESE INTERESTS AND FORMING THE BASIS FOR ALLIANCES ABROAD AS WELL AS ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

o ECONOMIC INTERESTS -- THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AN ECONOMIC ISLAND. WE DEPEND FOR OUR STANDARD OF LIVING AND ECONOMIC SECURITY INCREASINGLY ON RAW MATERIALS IMPORTED FROM ABROAD, AND SOME OF THESE IMPORTS HAVE STRATEGIC VALUE AS WELL.

o POLITICAL INTERESTS -- THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE AND NORTHEAST ASIA, UNDERLINES THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTEMPORARY U.S. INTERESTS AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY ARE INTERRELATED. IN A WORLD WHERE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY HAS CAUSED CONVENTIONAL POWER TO RANK IN IMPORTANCE WITH NUCLEAR POWER, WE CANNOT GO IT ALONE.

o IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS -- POLITICAL BALANCES STRUCK AMONG NATIONS IN NO WAY MINIMIZE OUR DEDICATION TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES AT HOME AND SUPPORT OF THOSE BELIEFS ABROAD. IT IS LOGICAL THAT WE TREAT DIFFERENTLY NATIONS WITHIN THE LARGE GROUP THAT DOES NOT PRACTICE FREEDOM, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THOSE WHICH ARE AGGRESSIVE AND DO NOT RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, AND THOSE WHICH RESPECT THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF VALUES.

## DEFENSE ALLIANCES & TREATIES WITH U.S.




### DEFENSE ALLIANCES AND TREATIES WITH U.S.

THIS CHART EMPHASIZES THE MUTUAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

AS OUR ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY GLOBAL, AND AS A RESULT OF CONTINUING THREATS TO THOSE INTERESTS, THE UNITED STATES HAS ENTERED INTO ALLIANCES AND TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH 43 NATIONS. WHILE THESE TREATIES AND ALLIANCES ARE INDIVIDUALLY TAILORED, THEY NONETHELESS FORM THE BASIS OF THE SECURITY STRUCTURE WHICH HAS UNDERGIRDDED DETERRENCE AND THE COMMON DEFENSE SINCE WORLD WAR II.

WHILE THE NATURE OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS HAS REMAINED FAIRLY STABLE, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE CONTINUALLY EVOLVING. IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT TO RE-EXAMINE THESE ALLIANCES PERIODICALLY TO ENSURE THAT THEY REMAIN RELEVANT TO THE CHANGING NEEDS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PARTNERS.

## WORLD TENSION SPOTS, 1945-1975



### WORLD TENSION SPOTS - 1945-1975

AS THIS MAP INDICATES, THE WORLD SITUATION HAS BEEN REplete WITH TENSION AND CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II. SOME OF THESE CRISES, SUCH AS THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OR THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, WERE OF FINITE DURATION. OTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE RECURRENT, WITH ALMOST CYCLICAL LEVELS OF TENSION.

BECAUSE PEACE IS STILL SUCH A TENUOUS THING, ONE OF THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS TO PREVENT MINOR PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS FROM BECOMING MAJOR CRISES. IN A WORLD AS UNCERTAIN AND UNTIDY AS OURS REMAINS, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO PROTECT ITS PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. OUR STRENGTH AND THE ROUTINE DEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES OVERSEAS SERVE TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE WORLD.

## GLOBAL MILITARY POWERS --US/USSR



★ NUCLEAR CAPABLE POWERS

### WHERE THE POWER IS

TO PLACE U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE IN TODAY'S WORLD, ONE FACT MUST BE EMPHASIZED ABOVE ALL OTHERS: THERE ARE BUT TWO GLOBAL POWERS -- THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THESE TWO NATIONS DO NOT SHARE MANY ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THEY DIFFER ON MOST POLITICAL ISSUES. THEY ARE FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED IN TERMS OF BASIC PRINCIPLES.

MOREOVER, BOTH ARE MILITARILY STRONG. WHILE THERE ARE OTHER NATIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT MILITARY STRENGTH -- AND FOUR OTHER NATIONS IN THE WORLD WITH PROVEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES -- THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. DOMINATE CONSIDERATIONS OF GLOBAL POWER.

BOTH THE USSR AND THE U.S. HAVE SUFFICIENT AND DIVERSE INTERESTS IN THE WORLD, AND ENOUGH POWER, TO BECOME INVOLVED IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS, WHETHER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE, ASIA, OR AFRICA. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT OUR POSITION RELATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION STANDS AT THE FOREFRONT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY, OUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND OUR MILITARY PLANNING AND POSTURE AROUND THE WORLD.

# INDICATORS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

## ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

- DOLLAR ESTIMATES
- RUBLE ESTIMATES
- ECONOMIC BURDEN

## WEIGHT OF INVESTMENT EFFORT

- PEOPLE
- FACILITIES
- PRODUCTION

## ORDER OF BATTLE


- FORCE LEVELS, MIX, DEPLOYMENTS, DOCTRINE
- UNIFORMED MANPOWER
- EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, READINESS, EFFECTIVENESS

## INDICATORS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ACCEPTED MEASURES OF MILITARY POWER. THESE MEASURES -- THE ALLOCATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE WEIGHT OF INVESTMENT EFFORT IN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES, AND THE CURRENT ORDER OF BATTLE OR MILITARY CAPABILITIES -- REVEAL A SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY POWER OVER THE LAST 10-15 YEARS. CERTAINLY, THERE ARE ASPECTS OF MILITARY POWER WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN LITTLE IMPROVEMENT, BUT THESE ARE THE RARE EXCEPTIONS.

WHEN THESE MEASURES ARE USED AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY POWER, THE AGGREGATE PICTURE THEY FORM IS CLEAR. COMPARISONS USING THESE MEASURES ARE PRESENTED IN THE PAGES THAT FOLLOW.

**U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAM TRENDS**  
**(U.S. Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs)**  
 (Constant FY 1978 Dollars)




U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAM TRENDS

WHILE REDUCTIONS IN REAL TERMS HAVE BEEN GOING ON IN THE U.S., THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MOVING STEADILY IN AN UPWARD DIRECTION.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS WORKED AT THE TASK OF ESTIMATING THE MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET EFFORT, AND THERE REMAINS SOME DIFFERENCE AMONG ANALYSTS AS TO THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF MILITARY EFFORTS IN THEIR CONTROLLED ECONOMY. HOWEVER, THE LATEST ESTIMATE, COMPLETED IN JANUARY 1977, SHOWS THAT THE CONSTANT 1978 DOLLAR VALUE OF THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO SOVIET NATIONAL DEFENSE APPEARS TO HAVE GROWN FROM 104 BILLION IN 1964 TO 149 BILLION IN 1976, AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE OF JUST OVER 3%.

THE CHART COMPARES ESTIMATED SOVIET PROGRAM COSTS WITH COMPARABLE COSTS OF U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS. IN 1975, THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET HAD DECREASED IN REAL TERMS (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION) BY ALMOST ONE-THIRD FROM THE 1968 WARTIME PEAK. TODAY, IN REAL TERMS (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION), IT IS 12% BELOW THE PREWAR, 1964 LEVEL.

## Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Defense, 1970-1975




### SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE, 1970-75

THE PREVIOUS CHART DID NOT PRESENT DATA ON SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. IT PRESENTED THE DOLLAR COSTS OF THE U.S. CREATING FORCES AND PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE ABOVE CHART PORTRAYS A CIA ESTIMATE (MAY 1976) OF ACTUAL SOVIET EXPENDITURES IN CONSTANT RUBLES (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION) FOR FY 1970-75. THE CURVE DOES NOT GO BACK BEYOND 1970 BECAUSE A SOVIET PRICE REFORM IN THE LATE 1960S INTRODUCED MAJOR DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DATA BASE.

THE MOST RECENT CIA ESTIMATE STATES THAT SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE HAVE INCREASED EVERY YEAR SINCE 1970, AS SHOWN ABOVE. THE RATE OF GROWTH IN RUBLE OUTLAYS AVERAGED 4-5% PER YEAR DURING THE ENTIRE 1970-75 PERIOD, WITH RELATIVELY HIGHER GROWTH RATES OCCURRING IN THE LATTER HALF OF THAT PERIOD. THUS, THERE APPEARS TO BE AN ACCELERATION IN THE GROWTH OF SOVIET DEFENSE OUTLAYS.

BASED ON THESE DATA, THIS CIA ESTIMATE DESCRIBES THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY AS BEING 11-13 PERCENT OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP). IN CONTRAST, THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET REPRESENTS ABOUT 5% PERCENT OF U.S. GNP.

## U.S./U.S.S.R. MILITARY MANPOWER







### U.S./USSR MILITARY MANPOWER

THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS (NOT INCLUDING SOME 400,000 MILITARY SECURITY FORCES) FROM 3.4 TO 4.4 MILLION SINCE 1964.

DURING THE SAME PERIOD, U.S. UNIFORMED MILITARY STRENGTH INCREASED FROM A PREWAR 1964 LEVEL OF 2.7 MILLION TO A PEAK OF 3.5 MILLION DURING THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THEN DECLINED TO 2.1 MILLION TODAY. THERE ARE FEWER AMERICANS IN UNIFORM TODAY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE FALL OF 1950.

## COMPARATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT



1/ Based on 1974 data. Data for 1978 is not yet available.


### COMPARATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT

THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED AN INDUSTRIAL BASE WHICH HAS QUANTITATIVELY OUT-PRODUCED THE U.S. IN MOST CATEGORIES OF MILITARY HARDWARE. THEIR INVESTMENT IN A LARGE SCIENTIFIC BASE HAS LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS. THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND THE MOMENTUM WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEVELOPED IS CLEAR.

AS THE CHARTS ABOVE ON THE LEFT SHOW, OVER THE PAST 10-12 YEARS, SOVIET INVESTMENT, IN REAL TERMS, IN DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAS CLEARLY EXCEEDED THAT OF THE U.S. THE CHART ON THE TOP LEFT DISPLAYS AGGREGATED DATA. MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS SHOWN IN THE CHART ON THE LOWER LEFT.

THE CHARTS ON THE RIGHT REVEAL THE LONG TERM COMMITMENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING TO A HIGH LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS THROUGH THE TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF A WORKFORCE THAT HAS HIGH TECHNICAL SKILLS.

**COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF NEW SYSTEMS  
DEVELOPED DURING 1965-1976 BY U.S. AND U.S.S.R.**




**COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF NEW SYSTEMS DEVELOPED  
DURING 1965-1976 BY U.S. AND U.S.S.R.**

THE CHART COMPARES THE NUMBER OF NEW AIRCRAFT, MISSILE SYSTEMS, AND SHIP DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST ELEVEN YEARS. OWING TO THE UNCERTAINTIES CAUSED BY INTELLIGENCE LAGS, THE ESTIMATES OF NEWLY DEVELOPED SOVIET SYSTEMS MAY BE UNDERSTATED. AS TIME PASSES WE MAY DISCOVER ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS THAT WERE ACTUALLY DEVELOPED DURING 1965-1976.

DURING THE PERIOD INDICATED, THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED MORE NEW SYSTEMS IN FIVE OF THE SIX CATEGORIES, HELICOPTERS BEING THE EXCEPTION.

# US AND SOVIET ICBM DEVELOPMENTS <sup>1</sup>




<sup>1</sup> The numbers in parentheses represent the number of independently targetable re-entry vehicles associated with each missile

## U.S. AND SOVIET ICBM DEVELOPMENTS

THIS CHART ILLUSTRATES THE EMPHASIS THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLACED ON THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS ICBM FORCE DURING THE PAST 25 YEARS. WHILE THE U.S. HAS DEVELOPED ONLY ONE NEW SYSTEM SINCE 1966, THE MINUTEMAN II, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEVELOPED SEVEN NEW ICBM'S IN THE SAME TIME PERIOD.

MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE NUMBERS OF NEW TYPES OF MISSILES IS THE FACT THAT THREE OF THE SOVIET'S NEWEST ICBM'S, THE SS-17, SS-18 AND SS-19, ARE LARGE-THROW-WEIGHT MIRVED ICBM'S THAT COULD, BY THE EARLY 1980'S, PROVIDE A COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY FAR IN EXCESS OF THAT POSSESSED BY OUR CURRENT MINUTEMAN FORCE.

## CHANGES IN U.S./U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS



### CHANGES IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - U.S./U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THEIR ICBM'S FROM APPROXIMATELY 225 IN 1965 TO ABOUT 1,550 TODAY, HAVING OVERTAKEN THE U.S. IN THE LATE 1960'S.



THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES HAS GROWN FROM 29 TO MORE THAN 800, WHILE THE U.S. LEVELLED OFF AT 656 IN THE LATE 1960'S.

IN BOMBER FORCES, THE U.S. MAINTAINS A LEAD.



THESE COMPARISONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE EVOLVING QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO FORCES.

# US/USSR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE MIX

## WARHEADS



## MEGATONS




## U.S./U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE MIX

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R., WHILE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT, ARE ASYMMETRICAL. THE MAJOR ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES ARE SHOWN BY COMPARING THE DISTRIBUTION OF WARHEADS AND MEGATONNAGE AMONG DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

THE U.S. RELIES MUCH MORE HEAVILY ON ITS BOMBER FORCE THAN DOES THE U.S.S.R., THE SOVIETS HAVING PUT MOST OF THEIR EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ICBMs. BOTH COUNTRIES REDUCED THEIR INITIAL RELIANCE ON BOMBERS BY THE INTRODUCTION OF ICBMs AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, STRENGTHENED THEIR OVERALL DETERGENT BY THE INTRODUCTION OF SLBMs.

# US/USSR STRATEGIC FORCES ADVANTAGE




## U.S./U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCES ADVANTAGE/PRESADANTAGE

THIS CHART -- WHICH INCLUDES STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES, ICBMS AND SSBNs -- SHOWS THAT THE ADVANTAGE SHIFTED MARKEDLY AWAY FROM THE U.S. TOWARD AN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE EARLY 1970s. ABOVE THE HORIZONTAL LINE WHICH DIVIDES THE CHART, THE ADVANTAGE RESIDES WITH THE U.S.; BELOW THE LINE, IT FALLS TO THE U.S.S.R.

TAKING CURRENT SOVIET AND U.S. DEVELOPMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION, WE EXPECT A CONTINUED SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES (SSBNs), THROWWEIGHT (THW) AND EQUIVALENT WEIGHTS (EMTS), ALTHOUGH THE U.S. SHOULD RETAIN A LEAD IN NUMBERS OF WARHEADS.

# MEASURES OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE - ON-LINE FORCES -




## U.S./USSR PERFORMED NUCLEAR INVENTORY

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE TOTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INVENTORY, INCLUDING MISSILES (SLEMs AND ICBMs) AND BOMBERS, PROJECTED TRENDS INDICATE A U.S. LEAD IN NUMBERS OF WARHEADS, BUT THE U.S.S.R. WOULD MAINTAIN AN ADVANTAGE IN MEGATONS AND THROW-WEIGHT. CALCULATIONS OF HARD TARGET KILL CAPABILITY SHOW THAT WE EXPECT THE U.S. TO ENJOY AN ADVANTAGE IN THE FUTURE.

THE ILLUSTRATIONS ARE BASED ON FORCE STRUCTURES WHICH ASSUME ADHERENCE TO THE LIMITATIONS OF 2,400 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES (SNV) AND 1,320 MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED FREIGHT VEHICLES (MIFV) AS DISCLOSED IN MADIIVOSTOK.

## US SILO SURVIVABILITY SENSITIVITY TO SOVIET ACCURACY



### THREAT TO U.S. ICBM SILES

U.S. ICBM SILO SURVIVABILITY IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO OUR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF THE NEW GENERATIONS OF SOVIET ICBMs.

IF SOVIET ACCURACY IS AS GOOD AS WE BELIEVE POSSIBLE, THEN A VERY LARGE SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. ICBM SILES COULD DESTROY MANY OF THEM AS EARLY AS THE END OF FY 1976. IF SOVIET MISSILES ARE LESS ACCURATE, THEN U.S. ICBM SILES WILL BE CONSIDERABLY LESS VULNERABLE IN THE NEAR TERM. HOWEVER, IT IS REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT BY THE MID-1980'S ONLY A FRACTION OF THE U.S. SILES WOULD SURVIVE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS CHART IS BASED ON THE PESSIMISTIC ASSUMPTION OF A PERFECTLY COORDINATED AND VERY LARGE SOVIET ATTACK.

# STRATEGIC FORCES BALANCE

<u>U.S. LEADS</u>		<u>USSR LEADS</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• LONG RANGE BOMBERS</li><li>• MIRVed LAUNCHERS</li></ul>	OFFENSIVE FORCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ICBM LAUNCHERS</li><li>• SLBM LAUNCHERS</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DELIVERABLE WARHEADS</li><li>• HARD TARGET DESTRUCTION POTENTIAL (DUE MAINLY TO BOMBERS AND MISSILE ACCURACY)</li></ul>	OFFENSIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• THROWWEIGHT</li><li>• MEGATONNAGE</li><li>• LAND MOBILE ICBMs</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• LOOK-DOWN/SHOOT-DOWN INTERCEPTORS</li></ul>	DEFENSIVE FORCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• SAMS</li><li>• AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• AWACS DEVELOPMENT</li></ul>	DEFENSIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• OVER THE HORIZON RADARS</li><li>• CIVIL DEFENSE</li></ul>

## THE STRATEGIC BALANCE


ASYMMETRIES THAT INFLUENCE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE TODAY ARE SHOWN ABOVE. THEY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- U.S. ADVANTAGES:
  - o A SUPERIOR BOMBER FORCE.
  - o MORE MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) LAUNCHERS AND DELIVERABLE WARHEADS.
  - o SUPERIOR BALLISTIC MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS.
- SOVIET UNION ADVANTAGES:
  - o LARGER NUMBERS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER DESTRUCTION POTENTIAL (THROW-WEIGHT AND MEGATONNAGE).
  - o MORE AIR DEFENSE RADARS, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS.

WHEN ALL FACTORS ARE CONSIDERED, ONE MUST CONCLUDE THAT NEAR-PARITY IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES EXISTS TODAY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION.

HOWEVER, THE GROWING NUMBERS AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES SUGGEST THAT, UNLESS COUNTERED, THE STRATEGIC BALANCE THAT EXISTS TODAY COULD SHIFT IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

## SOVIET CONVENTIONAL WEAPON ADVANCES 1967 - 1977




### ADVANCES IN SOVIET CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

FOR SOME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE STRESSED AN OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE EMPHASIZING FAST-MOVING BLITZKRIEG-TYPE WARFARE. IN THE PAST DECADE THEY HAVE MADE PROGRESS TOWARD BUILDING A FORCE WHICH COULD IMPLEMENT THIS DOCTRINE. SINCE THE MID-1960S THEY HAVE INTRODUCED FOUR TYPES OF AIRCRAFT (IN EIGHT NEW MODELS) TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT AND PROVIDED THEIR GROUND FORCES WITH A NEW GENERATION OF WEAPONS IN MOST MAJOR CATEGORIES.

THESE WEAPONS, IN MOST CASES, HAVE SOPHISTICATED NEW DESIGNS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED WITH AS MANY AS FIVE DIFFERENT SURFACE-TO-AIR GUN AND MISSILE SYSTEMS, DESIGNED WITH CAPABILITIES THAT OVERLAP. THESE SYSTEMS USE DIFFERENT METHODS TO ACQUIRE, TRACK AND ENGAGE THEIR AIRCRAFT TARGETS. IMPROVEMENTS IN GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE HAVE FREED MUCH OF THE SOVIETS' TACTICAL AVIATION TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS.

MODERN SOVIET ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS ARE CONFIGURED TO ALLOW TROOPS TO FIGHT FROM WITHIN THE VEHICLE. THEY MOUNT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WHICH CAN BE FIRED FROM WITHIN THE ARMOR PROTECTION OF THE VEHICLES. THE NEW SOVIET MEDIUM TANK, WHICH IS COMPARABLE TO THE MOST MODERN NATO TANKS NOW DEPLOYED, IS BEING INTRODUCED IN LUKOV AT AN UNPRECEDENTED RATE TO REPLACE OLDER, LESS CAPABLE TANKS.

**TRENDS IN US/USSR PRODUCTION  
OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT  
1966-1976**



ESTIMATED U.S./U.S.S.R. PRODUCTION OF AIR-GROUND WARFARE EQUIPMENT

DURING THE PAST 10 YEARS, THE U.S. HAS PRODUCED FEWER OF MOST MAJOR ITEMS OF AIR-GROUND WARFARE EQUIPMENT THAN HAS THE SOVIET UNION.

-- OVER THE PAST DECADE THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY OUTPRODUCED THE U.S. IN TANKS, APC'S (ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS), AND ARTILLERY. THE RECENT DECLINE IN SOVIET TANK PRODUCTION WAS PROBABLY DUE TO THE RETOOLING NECESSARY FOR PRODUCING THEIR NEW TANK, THE T-72.

-- SOVIET PRODUCTION OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS NOW EXCEEDS U.S. LEVELS. MUCH OF THEIR CURRENT PRODUCTION IS COMPOSED OF REASONABLY SOPHISTICATED MODELS.

-- THE U.S. LEADS IN THE PRODUCTION OF ANTITANK MISSILES AND U.S. SYSTEMS ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN THE OLDER GENERATION SOVIET SAGGERS AND SWATTERS.

# ESTIMATED U.S./USSR RELATIVE PRODUCTION RATES (1972 - 1976)





	USSR 1972-76 AVG	U.S. 1972-76 AVG	USSR/U.S. RATIO 1972-76
	2,770	469	5.9:1
	4,990	1,556	3.2:1
	1,310	162	8:1
	1,090	573	1.9:1
	666	733	0.8:1
 1/	27,000	27,351	1:1

1/ Ground launched antitank missiles

## U.S./USSR RELATIVE PRODUCTION RATES IN GROUND AND TACAIR FORCE EQUIPMENT

OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, AVERAGE SOVIET PRODUCTION OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GROUND AND TACAIR WARFARE EQUIPMENT -- TANKS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, ARTILLERY PIECES, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS, AND ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES -- IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE EXCEEDED QUANTITATIVELY THAT OF THE U.S. -- EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO HELICOPTERS -- BY THE MARGINS INDICATED.

**CHANGES IN QUANTITIES OF MILITARY  
EQUIPMENTS - U.S./U.S.S.R.  
(1966-1976)**



GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES MILITARY EQUIPMENT - U.S./U.S.S.R.


SOVIET TANK INVENTORIES EXCEED THOSE OF THE U.S. BY NEARLY 3 TO 1, DESPITE RECENT INCREASES IN U.S. TANK INVENTORIES.

THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE THAN 3 TIMES AS MUCH ARTILLERY.


THE SOVIETS HAVE MODERN, CAPABLE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN GREATER NUMBERS THAN THE U.S., ALTHOUGH THE QUALITY OF NEW SOVIET AIRCRAFT IS LESS THAN THE NEWEST U.S. MODELS.

IN HELICOPTERS, THE U.S. MAINTAINS A SIGNIFICANT NUMERICAL LEAD, ALTHOUGH SOVIET INVENTORIES ARE GROWING RAPIDLY, AND THEIR MODERN HELICOPTERS ARE TECHNICALLY COMPETITIVE WITH CURRENT U.S. MODELS.

### CHANGES IN THE SOVIET TANK DIVISION, 1976 COMPARED TO 1964



### CHANGES IN THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, 1976 COMPARED TO 1964



Includes artillery and mortars 100 mm or larger, and multiple rocket launchers.

### SOVIET GROUND FORCES ARE BEING MODERNIZED

THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE MUCH TO INCREASE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ORIENTED TOWARD EUROPE. GROUND FORCES NOW HAVE MUCH GREATER COMBINED-ARMS POWER, SPEED AND AIR DEFENSE PROTECTION THAN THEY HAD A DECADE AGO.

-- A NEW MEDIUM TANK (THE T-72) IS NOW BEING DEPLOYED TO UNITS IN EUROPE IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS.

-- SOVIET ARTILLERY HAS BEEN IMPROVED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF SELF-PROPELLED WEAPONS WITH ARMORED CREW PROTECTION.

-- THE COMBAT POWER AND SUPPORT CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN ENHANCED THROUGH LARGER ORGANIZATIONS.

# CENTRAL EUROPEAN BALANCE

## QUANTITATIVE FACTORS

<u>NATO LEADS</u> (NUMBERS OF)	<u>FORCE</u> <u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>PACT LEADS</u> (NUMBERS OF)
	MANPOWER	— TROOPS — DIVISIONS
— TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS — MAJOR ANTI-TANK SYSTEMS — ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS — HELICOPTERS — TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS	GROUND FORCE WEAPONS	— TANKS — RECON VEHICLES — ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS — AIR DEFENSE GUNS AND MISSILES
	AIR FORCE WEAPONS	— AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT — GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT — RECON AIRCRAFT

### CENTRAL EUROPEAN BALANCE - NATO/WARSAW PACT

CENTRAL EUROPEAN FORCE POSTURES AND DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT, UNLESS COUNTER-BALANCED WITH NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, INCREASING SOVIET FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY COULD BEGIN TO GIVE WARSAW PACT FORCES AN UNACCEPTABLE ADVANTAGE.

ASYMMETRIES OTHER THAN THOSE SHOWN ABOVE THAT INFLUENCE THE ASSESSMENT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING.


-- NATO ADVANTAGES.

- C A DEFENSIVE MISSION WITH ADVANTAGES OF INTERIOR LINES AND FAMILIAR TERRAIN.
- C SUPERIOR INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES, TACTICAL AIR FILT SKILLS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL.

-- WARSAW PACT ADVANTAGES:

- C THE INITIATIVES IN CHOOSING THE TIME AND NATURE OF ATTACK.
- C HIGH STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
- C MORE COHESIVE AND BETTER PROTECTED CHAIN OF COMMAND.
- C SOPHISTICATED AND EXTENSIVE CBR CAPABILITIES.
- C READILY AVAILABLE RESERVE FORCES, WELL INTEGRATED WITH THE ACTIVE FORCE.

## US/USSR COMBATANT SHIP DELIVERIES <sup>1/</sup> 1966-1976




<sup>1/</sup> SUPPORT SHIPS OTHER THAN THOSE CAPABLE OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT ARE NOT INCLUDED.

### U.S./U.S.S.R. NAVAL COMBATANT DELIVERIES

SINCE 1966, THE SOVIETS HAVE ADDED MORE THAN THREE TIMES AS MANY SHIPS TO THEIR FLEET AS HAS THE U.S. THEY STILL EMPHASIZE SMALLER SHIPS FOR OPERATING ADJACENT TO THE EURASIAN LAND MASS, ALTHOUGH THE SIZE OF MAJOR SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS HAS GROWN STEADILY. THE U.S. HAS LONG EMPHASIZED LARGE COMBATANTS FOR OPERATIONS IN DISTANT OCEAN AREAS. THUS, THE U.S. HAS ADDED SMALLER NUMBERS OF SHIPS BUT MORE TONNAGE TO ITS FLEET.

THIS CHART COMPARES QUANTITATIVELY, BUT NOT QUALITATIVELY, THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS -- SUBMARINES, MINOR COMBATANTS, MAJOR COMBATANTS (UNDER AND OVER 10,000 TONS) AND UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SHIPS.

## CHARACTERISTICS AND CHANGES IN GENERAL PURPOSE<sup>7</sup> NAVAL FORCES - U.S./U.S.S.R.



\* DOES NOT INCLUDE BALLISTIC MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES

### CHARACTERISTICS AND CHANGES IN NAVAL FORCES - U.S./U.S.S.R.

A 1976 COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF SHIPS AND TOTAL TONNAGE OF THE TWO NAVIES SHOWS TWO ASYMMETRIES. FIRST, THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE SHIPS OF SMALLER TONNAGE. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL VIEW THAT THE NAVY IS THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE RED ARMY, AND THUS HAS BEEN LARGELY COASTAL IN ORIENTATION.


SECOND, THE U.S. LEADS IN DISPLACEMENT. WE HAVE HISTORICALLY BUILT SHIPS CAPABLE OF DEPLOYMENT IN DISTANT WATERS.

WHILE THE NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN BOTH NAVIES HAVE DECLINED THE MIX OF SHIPS IN THE SOVIET NAVY IS CHANGING TOWARD LARGER, MORE CAPABLE SHIPS, AS THEY BUILD AIR-CAPABLE SHIPS AND CRUISERS.

WHEN THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRINCIPAL ALLIES ON BOTH SIDES ARE INCLUDED, THE NUMBERS OF SHIPS TEND TO BE EQUIVALENT, WHILE THE TONNAGE ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IS INCREASED.

## CHANGES IN NAVAL FORCE LEVELS-- U.S. / U.S.S.R.

(1966 - 1976)



### CHANGES IN NAVAL FORCE LEVELS - U.S. / U.S.S.R.


THE SOVIET FORCE HAS BECOME NUMERICALLY SMALLER WITH THE RETIREMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF DIESEL SUBMARINES. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS RETAIN A 3-TO-1 ADVANTAGE IN ATTACK SUBMARINES.

THE SOVIETS HAVE 20% GREATER NUMBERS OF MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS -- AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, AND FRIGATES. THE U.S. HAS AN UNQUESTIONED LEAD IN SEA-BASED AVIATION.

THERE IS A MARKED ASYMMETRY IN THE WAY THE TWO NAVIES HAVE DISPERSED THEIR OFFENSIVE, STANDOFF WEAPONS CAPABILITY. U.S. STANDOFF, OFFENSIVE STRENGTH LIES ALMOST ENTIRELY IN 13 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, WHEREAS THE SOVIETS HAVE SOME 240 SHIPS WITH STANDOFF WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE BUILT A FORCE OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT SHIPS WHICH NUMERICALLY EXCEEDS OURS. HOWEVER, U.S. ASSAULT CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY EXCEEDS THEIRS.

**U.S./U.S.S.R. COMBATANT SHIP-DAYS  
ON DISTANT DEPLOYMENT**




INCLUDES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS, GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES, MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, AND MINE WARFARE SHIPS

**U.S./U.S.S.R. COMBATANT SHIP-DAYS  
ON DISTANT DEPLOYMENT**

AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY IS THE WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SHIPS ON A ROUTINE BASIS, BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1900'S.

RECENTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED A STEADY NAVAL PRESENCE AT A LEVEL ABOUT TWO-THIRDS THAT OF THE U.S.

**US/USSR COMBATANT DEPLOYMENTS\***  
(AVERAGE CY 66 AND 76)



14 JANUARY 1977

\* INCLUDES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES, MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS, MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, AND MINE WARFARE SHIPS.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF  
U.S./U.S.S.R. COMBATANT DEPLOYMENTS

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ADOPTED A NAVAL DEPLOYMENT PATTERN QUITE DISSIMILAR TO THAT OF THE U.S.

THIS CHART SHOWS 1966 COMPARISONS TO THE LEFT AND 1976 COMPARISONS TO THE RIGHT, FOR EACH MAJOR OCEAN AREA. NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NATIONS ALLIED WITH THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THESE COMPARISONS.

# CURRENT US/USSR MARITIME BALANCE


<u>U.S.</u>	<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>SOVIET UNION</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OPEN ACCESS TO OCEANS</li> <li>• LONG DISTANCES TO ALLIES</li> </ul>	GEOGRAPHY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CONSTRAINED ACCESS TO OCEANS</li> <li>• SHORT DISTANCES TO ALLIES</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SEA CONTROL/POWER PROJECTION</li> </ul>	MISSIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SEA DENIAL/PERIPHERAL SEA CONTROL</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FEW LARGE SHIPS</li> <li>• SEA BASED AVIATION</li> <li>• ATTACK SUBMARINES</li> <li>• AMPHIBIOUS FORCES</li> <li>• MARGINAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE CAPABILITY</li> </ul>	OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LAND BASED NAVAL AIR FORCE</li> <li>• MANY SMALLER SHIPS</li> <li>• ANTI-SHIP MISSILE SYSTEM</li> <li>• ATTACK SUBMARINES</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE</li> <li>• AIR COVER</li> </ul>	DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MARGINAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE CAPABILITY</li> <li>• INADEQUATE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE</li> <li>• INADEQUATE SEA-BASED AIR</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EXCELLENT UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT</li> <li>• WORLD WIDE BASE STRUCTURE</li> <li>• MAJOR ADVANTAGE-- OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY</li> </ul>	SUSTAINED OPERATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LIMITED UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT</li> <li>• LIMITED OVERSEAS BASE SYSTEM</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EXTENSIVE EXERCISES</li> <li>• VOLUNTEER FORCE</li> <li>• WARTIME EXPERIENCE</li> </ul>	TECHNOLOGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANTI-SHIP MISSILES AND SURFACE OCEAN SURVEILLANCE</li> </ul>
	EXPERIENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LIMITED AT-SEA TIME</li> <li>• MANNING BY CONSCRIPTS</li> </ul>

## CURRENT US/USSR MARITIME BALANCE

THE U.S. NAVY HAS OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY AT SEA FOR MANY YEARS IN THE SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION MISSIONS. SHIPBUILDING AND R&D PROGRAMS AS WELL AS EXERCISES HAVE LONG BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD OPERATIONS ON THE WORLD OCEANS. (ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT OPERATED EXTENSIVELY AT SEA BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1905 AND THE OCEAN-1970 EXERCISE. SOVIET SHIPS AND SUBMARINES HAVE IMPROVED RAPIDLY IN CAPABILITY DURING THE PAST DECADE, BUT THE USSR IS STILL BEHIND OVERALL IN EMBODYING TECHNOLOGY IN NAVAL SYSTEMS.

OVERALL, THE U.S. NAVY CURRENTLY MAINTAINS A MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY WHICH PERMITS IT TO CARRY OUT ITS MISSIONS OF PROTECTING OUR SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO OUR ALLIES, PROJECTING POWER ASHORE AT GREAT DISTANCES FROM THE U.S., AND MAINTAINING A CONSISTENT PRESENCE IN THE VITAL OCEAN AREAS OF THE WORLD. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET NAVY'S ABILITY TO CHALLENGE U.S. FORCES ON THE HIGH SEAS IS INCREASINGLY MORE CONVINCING, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET NAVY HAS BUILT A FORCE CLEARLY CAPABLE OF SEA CONTROL AND POWER PROJECTION ASHORE IN OCEAN AREAS PERIPHERAL TO THE SOVIET UNION.

## EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POWER




### EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POWER

WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, NAVAL, AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN FRONT BALANCES TOGETHER, IT IS CLEAR THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST 15 YEARS. THE SOVIETS HAVE COME FROM THE UNSOPHISTICATED, CONTINENTALLY CONFINED, ARMED FORCES OF THE PAST WORLD WAR II DAYS TO CLEAR MILITARY SUPERPOWER STATUS IN THE 1970'S.

THERE IS GROWING MOMENTUM IN SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS AND IN THE EMERGING PATTERN OF THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET POWER.

## U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS (TOA)




### U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS

THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET HAS DECREASED IN REAL TERMS (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION) BY 20% FROM THE 1968 WARTIME PEAK. TODAY, IN REAL TERMS (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION), IT IS \$7 BILLION BELOW THE LEVELS OF THE PREWAR, EARLY 1960'S.

TRENDS ARE SHOWN HERE IN TERMS OF TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (TOA). THE BROKEN LINE SHOWS TOTAL TOA (IN CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS); THE THICK LINE LABELED "BASELINE" SHOWS THE TREND OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO MILITARY CAPABILITY (EXCLUDING SEA/SEA WAR COSTS, RETIRED PAY, AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES); AND THE LOWER CURVE SHOWS THE PROGRESSION OF DEFENSE BUDGETS AS THEY APPEARED IN CURRENT DOLLARS (NOT CORRECTED FOR INFLATION).

## SHARES OF THE U.S. BUDGET



### SHARES OF THE U.S. BUDGET

U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING TODAY HAS STABILIZED AT ABOUT 25% OF THE TOTAL FEDERAL BUDGET -- THE LOWEST SHARE SINCE FY 1940, SHORTLY BEFORE PEARL HARBOR -- HAVING DROPPED FROM 43% IN PREWAR 1964.

AS SHOWN, BENEFIT PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS AND GRANTS HAVE INCREASED FROM A 30% SHARE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET TO 55% DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET**  
**DEFENSE BUDGET TOTALS**  
(\$ IN BILLIONS)

<u>CURRENT DOLLARS</u>	FY 1964	FY 1974	FY 1975	FY 1976	FY 1977	FY 1978	PROPOSED
	ACTUAL	ACTUAL	ACTUAL	ACTUAL	ESTIMATE	BUDGET REQUEST	INCREASE FY 1977-78
<b>Total Obligational Authority (TOA)</b>	50.6	85.1	87.9	97.5	110.2	123.1	13.0
<b>Budget Authority (BA)</b>	50.7	88.5	91.5	102.2	106.6	120.5	13.8
<b>Outlays</b>	50.8	78.4	86.0	88.5	98.3	110.1	11.8
<b>CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS</b>							
<b>Total Obligational Authority (TOA)</b>	124.7	113.0	106.6	110.8	116.9	123.1	6.3
<b>Budget Authority (BA)</b>	124.8	118.5	111.0	116.2	113.1	120.5	7.4
<b>Outlays</b>	123.2	107.0	105.0	101.0	104.8	110.1	5.5

U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET TOTALS

IT IS CLEAR TO THOSE WHO STUDY THE MILITARY BALANCE THAT, IF THE U.S. IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD AND NOT SLIP INTO A POSITION OF INFERIORITY, THE ADVERSE BUDGET TRENDS OF THE PAST 10-15 YEARS MUST BE PROMPTLY ARRESTED.

THIS CHART SHOWS WHERE THE FY 1978 BUDGET -- WITH WHICH WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CONTINUE CHECKING THESE ADVERSE TRENDS BY STOPPING THE DOWNTREND (IN REAL TERMS) IN U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING -- STANDS WITH RESPECT TO BUDGETS OVER PAST YEARS. THE TOP THREE LINES DISPLAY DATA, WITH FRENCH FY 1964 FOR REFERENCE, IN TERMS OF CURRENT OR "THEN YEAR" DOLLARS (NOT CORRECTED FOR INFLATION). THE BOTTOM SECTION OF THE CHART PRESENTS THE SAME DATA IN REAL TERMS ... CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS (CORRECTED FOR INFLATION).

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET**

***FINANCIAL SUMMARY***


	<u>FY 1964 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 1974 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 1975 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 1976 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 1977 ESTIMATE</u>	<u>FY 1978 ESTIMATE</u>
<b>DOD/MAP as Percentage:</b>						
Federal Budget (Outlays)	42.9%	29.2%	26.5%	24.1%	23.9%	25.0%
Gross National Product	8.2%	5.8%	6.0%	5.5%	5.4%	5.4%
Labor Force	8.3%	5.3%	5.2%	5.0%	5.0%	6.1%
Net Public Spending	28.6%	18.1%	17.3%	15.9%	16.0%	16.5%

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET  
FINANCIAL SUMMARY

THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED THAT DOD OUTLAYS INCREASE BY \$5.5 BILLION FROM FY 1977 TO FY 1978 -- UP FROM \$104.6 BILLION TO \$110.1 BILLION IN REAL TERMS. HOWEVER, EVEN IF CONGRESS WERE TO APPROVE THE ENTIRE AMOUNT, THE PORTION OF THE NATION'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE WOULD REMAIN HISTORICALLY LOW. IN FY 1977, IT WOULD BE THE LOWEST LEVEL IN OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY.

- O DEFENSE REPRESENTS 23.9% OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET, THE LOWEST LEVEL SINCE PRIOR TO THE KOREAN WAR.
- O DEFENSE AS A PERCENT OF GNP AT 5.4% IN FY 1977 REPRESENTS THE LOWEST SHARE SINCE PRIOR TO THE KOREAN WAR.
- O DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT (INCLUDING MILITARY, CIVILIAN AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY) REPRESENTS 5.0% OF THE LABOR FORCE, THE LOWEST LEVEL SINCE PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR.
- O IN TERMS OF NET PUBLIC SPENDING (FEDERAL AND STATE AND LOCAL) DEFENSE REPRESENTS 16.0% OF THE TOTAL. FOR FY 1976 AND FY 1977, THE DEFENSE SHARES OF NET PUBLIC SPENDING ARE THE LOWEST RELATIVE SHARES SINCE PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR.

## U.S. FEDERAL OUTLAYS - CONSTANT 1978 DOLLARS



### U.S. FEDERAL OUTLAY PATTERN

OUR NATION'S NON-DEFENSE SPENDING CAN NO LONGER BE FUNDED OUT OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET. TODAY, NON-DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE NEARLY THREE TIMES THOSE OF DEFENSE.

IN THE EXTREME:

- o A 10% INCREASE IN NON-DEFENSE SPENDING, TAKEN FROM THE DoD BUDGET, WOULD MEAN A CRIPPLING 30% CUT.
- o A 33% INCREASE IN NON-DEFENSE SPENDING, FUNDED FROM DEFENSE SPENDING WOULD Wipe OUT THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ALTOGETHER.

## CONCLUSION

THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE TWO GLOBAL POWERS -- THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION -- ARE TODAY ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT.

ADVERSE TRENDS OF THE 10-15 YEAR PERIOD WHICH ENDED IN 1976 APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY REAL GROWTH IN THE FY 1976 AND FY 1977 BUDGETS. TO ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO A CONSCIOUS DECISION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES -- REPRESENTED BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS -- TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO BECOME MILITARILY INFERIOR TO THE SOVIET UNION. STEADINESS OF PURPOSE AND A SUSTAINED EFFORT OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS WILL BE REQUIRED TO COUNTERBALANCE THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION WE OBSERVE.

IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO MAKE A DECISION WHICH ALLOWED THE U.S. TO SLIP TO A POSITION OF MILITARY INFERIORITY, WE WOULD SOON BE LIVING IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD -- A WORLD FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE ONE WE HAVE KNOWN DURING OUR LIFETIMES.

IT COULD BE A DECISION AS DANGEROUS AS THE DECISION BY THE DEMOCRACIES PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II NOT TO ARM AND PREPARE AS HITLER WAS MOBILIZING. IT WOULD BE WORSE, BECAUSE WE ARE THE NATION THAT TURNED THE TIDE AND PREVENTED A VICTORY BY FASCISM, AND TODAY THERE IS NO NATION TO DO THAT FOR US.

IT IS FOR US TO DO -- WE MUST DO IT. I BELIEVE WE SHALL.

**Snowflake**

**March 29, 2002 7:32 AM**

**TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice**

**FROM: Donald Rumsfeld** 

**SUBJECT: India and Pakistan**

INDIA

Our mutual friend, Harry Rowen, handed me this. He may very well have given you copies, but if not, you might want to read it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated paper by Harry Rowen, "A Proposal for Tackling the Fundamentals of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict"

DHR:dh  
032902-5

11-L-0559/OSD/8005

U05774 /02

29MARCH

4/1

CABLES

Attn: Watch officer

- ▶ Received the attached in CID this a.m. Was dispatched on 3/29.
- ▶ Was dispatched under a SECRET cover.
- ▶ There are no classification markings on the "snowflake" or the attachment.
- ▶ Pls verify if classified, and if so, what is. Pls. get back to me.

Thanks,

Mr. HORNER  
CAD

Harry Rosen

**A PROPOSAL FOR TACKLING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE  
INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT**

MA 09 4 2007

- **This Conflict Now Seriously Endangers Us**
  - We now have a much larger stake in South Asia than before. Vigilance (and Pakistani help) will be needed to prevent terrorism re-rooting in Afghanistan. Still worse would be an unstable, radicalized Pakistan. The “Talibanization” of Pakistan was well underway before Musharraf started to crack down on Islamic extremism last year. If he and other “Westernized” generals are overthrown, as they could be if the conflict with India gets out of hand, we could face an unstable, unfriendly Pakistan, including doubts about the security of its nuclear weapons.
  - We want to strengthen our ties with India but if India and Pakistan continue to use brinkmanship with the aim of enlisting our support against the other, they could make our involvement in South Asia (including Afghanistan) dangerous and unprofitable. Unfortunately, brinkmanship is politically popular in both countries, neither having a sufficient understanding of how nuclear weapons create a potential for disaster.
  - Assuming that the present crisis subsides, that will constitute a breathing space, not a solution. If Pakistan (and Afghanistan) still spawn extremist groups, India and Pakistan may be back at the brink in a year or two
  
- **The Kashmir Dispute is One of the World’s Most Intractable**
  - It is seen as zero-sum by both sides. Kashmir is the main cause for the conflict and so dominates Pakistani thinking that it takes priority over modernization and even stability. Politically, it could cause the fall of either or both governments.
  - Pakistan, has resorted to the weapon of the weak: terrorism. Although, Musharraf has been bold in tackling this issue and he (and his successors) might manage to scale it back, the Pakistanis, failing to mobilize international support, have seen this as their only instrument in the dispute. In response, India uses the

11-L-0559/OSD/8007

threat of war but this evidently has not been effectual in the past and might not be in the future.

- Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as an equalizer if conflict goes badly, and also as a cover for limited operations (like the Kargil incursion) in the belief that India, fearing to provoke nuclear devastation, would not risk a strong counter-stroke. But if “rational” calculations were always correct, World War I would not have occurred. The BJP-led government in Delhi is highly nationalistic. It would love to hammer Pakistan and assert India as a Great Power. It believes it has adequate cause, with the attack on the Parliament perceived widely as a shock equivalent to that on the US World Trade Center.

- **The Indo-Pakistani Power Relationship is Asymmetric**

- India is the stronger party in this relationship, believes time is on its side and so sees no reason to compromise. This drives the Pakistanis wild, especially since they have had to compromise their own objectives in Afghanistan.
- Nevertheless, both sides – Pakistan more than India – know that even if the present crisis is surmounted the confrontation will remain dangerous. So, though neither can safely appear to give ground, both might accept a US-inspired exit strategy. But only if it does not appear publicly as surrender to a foreign diktat.
- There will be no traction in repeating the well-worn positions: India should carry out the plebiscite and Pakistan should stop all incursion and support for violence in Kashmir. Something different is needed.

- **A Suggested Strategy for Fundamentally Improving the Relationship**

- Pakistan’s greatest need is economic development but politically Musharraf has to show persistence in the Kashmir dispute or progress towards an acceptable solution. India needs respect as a Great Power, economic development and a settlement of Kashmir consistent with its principles. The non-Kashmir needs of each can be used to lever a Kashmir settlement.

- Unlike Israel-Palestine, the issues of land and people in Kashmir can (up to a point) be separated. This offers the possibility of a compromise whereby one party gains more on the land, the other more on the people
- As regards the land, there is only one real option. Neither side would accept even a minor change in the existing Line of Control (i.e. the old cease-fire line) so the LOC has to become formally what it is already, the international boundary. Pakistanis will regard this a defeat – they have said a settlement cannot be based on the status quo – but to gain international support the Pakistani Government’s public position puts the main stress on the wishes of the people, the Kashmiris.
- The Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC are tired of war and brutality and also of being the plaything of two hostile countries, neither of which truly cares about them. Left to themselves the Kashmiris would probably opt for independence, but the denial of independence is the one point on which India and Pakistan agree. In the circumstances, a reliable end to violence would probably reconcile the Kashmiris to the international boundary following the LOC and, if so, their support could be gained by the offer of a degree of autonomy.
- Three principles might be used to determine the degree of autonomy. First, all Kashmiris would be either an Indian or a Pakistani citizen. Second, all Kashmiris would also have a special status (and identity card) allowing them to cross the international frontier freely and to live on either side. Third, some local issues, e.g., forestry and education, would be run by an all-Kashmiri executive elected locally.
- Theoretically, India could live with this because its constitution provides for a possible special status for Kashmir. Again, theoretically, Pakistan could tolerate autonomy of this sort if it appeared to meet the wishes of the Kashmiri people. But the real positions of both countries are less flexible than their PR suggests. That is why there has been no major attempt by the US (or others) to intervene since the failure of effort in the early 1960s. The argument for intervention now rests only on two points: the situation is more fluid than ever and more dangerous to US interests than ever before.

- **What Carrots Can We Offer?**

- The possibilities for economic development in both countries are considerable, not least in gas pipelines and need no elaboration here. Pakistan's financial situation remains so precarious that assistance with it is a top priority for the regime. For our own reasons, we will have to push the claims of moderate Pashtuns in Afghanistan, but we can take credit for this with the Pakistanis.
- Enhancing India's status is partly a matter of label, mirrors and visits, but there has to be some reality as well. India would like to become a Permanent Member of the Security Council, but this is not possible (or perhaps desirable) at present. China would probably veto and the very proposal would attract a hostile reaction from Germany, Japan, Brazil and others unless they too were made Permanent Members. Besides, the process of amending the UN Charter is as difficult as amending the US constitution. Instead, India might be co-opted into the G7/8, as happened with Russia. There are other possibilities, including a Council on Terrorism with a global reach. In any event, India and Pakistan should be drawn into the London Suppliers Group on nuclear equipment and technology.

- **What Sticks Can We Use?**

- Sticks will be needed because the Indians may well say what business is of ours, and anyway we can do nothing about it. The Pakistanis may equally say it is unfair to put pressure on them twice for our own objectives. The most obvious sticks are the converse of the carrots, e.g., being stingy with financial aid and development assistance. With the help of the Russians and the Chinese (which might not be forthcoming) we could deprive both countries of the arms supplies they crave. Publicly, we could ring-fence them as irresponsible, old-fashioned governments with petty nationalistic quarrels, thus damaging India's prospects for soon being considered a Great Power.

- **How Might We Proceed?**

- The pride of both countries is enormous and they have dug themselves into entrenched positions over decades, so we should make no public frontal assaults

nor offer any plan of our but rather elicit comments that might lead to the kind of deal suggested above. We should conduct talks with the two countries through normal diplomatic channels including visits by Cabinet officers, but without appointing special envoys. It will be wise not to commit ourselves openly to any action and to limit public statements to traditional hopes that reason will prevail. But we should add the obvious point that what they do or don't do may affect our national interests.

- We should sound other governments to assess their attitudes and the degree of support, if any, we might expect from them. Obvious candidates are the UK, Japan, Russia, and China.
- We should talk in determined terms separately with Delhi and Islamabad and not try to push them into bilateral negotiations until we sense there could reasonably be an agreement. At this stage, it is premature to plan in more detail, but we should be conscious of how action on Kashmir relates to the global war on terrorism. The more we succeed with the latter, the more effective will be pressure on the Kashmir issue and success over Kashmir would be a notable victory by anyone's standards in the war on terrorism.



**WASHFAX**  
**Secretary of Defense**  
**Cover Sheet**  
**12/N**



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**(Including Coversheet)**

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