

**DRAFT****Implementing Actions**

Within 180 days from the date of this directive, the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as appropriate, shall jointly submit to me a national space transportation strategy that includes requirements, implementation plans, schedules, and resources required for:

- 1) Reliable and affordable space access, including assuring access to space for critical national security and civil missions. The strategy shall address how the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program will be managed through 2009, and efforts to modernize the Federal space launch bases and ranges;
- 2) Demonstration of an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security requirements;
- 3) Access to, transport through, and return from space for space exploration, including options to meet exploration-unique requirements for heavy lift beyond the capabilities of existing launch vehicles;
- 4) Focused technology development efforts to transform U.S. access to and use of space, including development of next-generation space transportation capabilities for deployment of spacecraft or other payloads in Earth orbit and in-space transportation; and
- 5) Measures to encourage and facilitate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to enhance the achievement of national security and civil space transportation objectives, benefit the U.S. economy, and increase the industry's international competitiveness. The strategy shall consider the development of markets and plans for commercial human space flight.



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE  
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



POLICY

NOV 8 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Review of Draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on  
U.S. Space Transportation Policy

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft NSPD. I concur with the  
attached changes. They were previously provided to your staff.

  
Ryan Henry



11-L-0559/OSD/040005

October 26, 2004

**Department of Defense Proposed Changes to the Draft NSPD on Space  
Transportation**

**Page 5 and 6, Change as follows:**

For the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program will be the foundation for access to space for intermediate and larger payloads for national security and civil purposes to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and schedule requirements. New U.S. commercial space transportation capabilities that demonstrate the ability to reliably launch intermediate or larger payloads will be allowed to compete on a level playing field for United States Government missions.

- a) The Secretary of Defense will maintain overall management responsibilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and will fund the annual fixed costs for both launch services providers ~~through, at a minimum, fiscal year 2009~~ unless/until such time as the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, can provide an alternative to the EELV that provides an equivalent payload capability and reliably provides assured national security access to space.
  
- b) ~~To support a decision on funding after fiscal year 2009, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, and the Director of Central Intelligence, will evaluate whether to continue to maintain two Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle families to provide access to space for intermediate and larger national security and civil missions. This evaluation will consider whether a single Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle provider has the reliability and performance necessary to meet national security and civil requirements and the potential benefits of maintaining two families of~~

~~Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. In addition, management and funding responsibilities will be reevaluated dependent on the relative role of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle systems and infrastructure in national security and civil space missions.~~

e) b) Any Department or Agency seeking to significantly modify or develop new launch systems derived from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles or **its** major components, including human rating, shall be responsible for any necessary funding arrangements and shall coordinate with the Secretary **of** Defense and, as appropriate, the Secretaries **of** Commerce and Transportation and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GEN Shinseki's Retirement

General Shinseki's retirement ceremony was held on June 11, 2003. I was in Europe during that time, including Brussels -- attending a NATO meeting that had been set the year before.

DHR:ss  
102704-9

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*27 Oct 04*

*27 Oct 04*

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Washington Post Article of Oct. 26

Check with Jim Haynes, but I don't believe the Pentagon should be included in this list on item 40 in the *Early Bird*.

Attach.  
10/26/04 Early Bird (pg. 33)

DHR:ss  
102704-10

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

year arrived at a strikingly different conclusion. After investigating whether pre-war intelligence had been "cooked" by "Mr. Feith's shop" when it raised questions with the intelligence community about evidence of ties between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda, the committee unanimously declared: "The committee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the committee said that they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to terrorism."

Elsewhere, the SSCI went so far as to note, "In some cases, those [intelligence community] analysts interviewed stated that the questions had forced them to go back and review intelligence reporting, and that during this exercise they came across information they had overlooked in initial readings. The committee found that this process — the policy-makers probing questions — actually improve the Central Intelligence Agency's products."

Interestingly, Mr. Levin joined every other member of the intelligence committee in endorsing this report.

Equally peculiar is the Levin charge that "the intelligence community was consistently dubious" about a connection between Iraq under Saddam and al Qaeda. In a letter sent on Oct. 7, 2002, by the CIA's director to the then-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Bob Graham, George Tenet wrote:

"We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression. We have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The reporting also

stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs."

In short, Mr. Feith's staff did in the run-up to war precisely what one would expect a policy organization to do: Evaluate and, where appropriate, challenge available intelligence about the threat that might make military operations necessary. And, having done so — as the SSCI found, through established channels — the Feith organization contributed accordingly to the development of policy.

If anything, information that has emerged from liberated Iraq has made the Levin critique even more untenable. In the Oct. 19 edition of the New York Sun, Laurie Mylroie noted, for example, that "an 11-page document [found in Iraq and] dated Jan. 25, 1993, lists various organizations with which Iraqi intelligence maintained contacts. It recommends 'the use of Arab Islamic elements which were fighting in Afghanistan and now have no place to go and who are currently in Somalia, Sudan and Egypt.' Saddam approved the suggestion, with the order to 'concentrate on Somalia.'" At the time, the network that would become known as al Qaeda was among the "Arab Islamic elements" operating in these countries.

The danger associated with allowing Saddam's ties to such terrorist organizations to metastasize further is now clear as well. In the Wall Street Journal on Oct. 14, Richard Spertzel, a former U.N. weapons inspector and member of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), noted that the ISG uncovered a plan concocted by Iraqi intelligence's M16 directorate "to bottle sarin [a lethal nerve agent] and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe."

The effort to smear conscientious public servants who, thankfully, did their jobs to protect this country may fit with Mr. Kerry's anything-goes campaign for the White House. It does not inspire confidence, however, about either his ability to prosecute the war on terror or to select competent people to help him do it.

*Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.*

Washington Post  
October 26, 2004.

Pg. 24

#### 40. The CIA's Disappeared

THE BUSH administration pretends, and many Americans may believe, that the abuse of U.S.-held prisoners abroad ended after the release of sensational photographs from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Sadly, it did not. While blaming the crimes at Abu Ghraib on a small group of low-ranking soldiers, the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA have fought to preserve the exceptional and sometimes secret policies that allow U.S. personnel to violate the Geneva Conventions and other laws governing the handling and interrogation of foreign detainees. Under those policies, practices at odds with basic American values continue — even if there are no sensational photos to document them.

The latest example concerns "ghost prisoners," suspects captured in Iraq and Afghanistan who are interrogated by the CIA in secret locations, sometimes outside those countries, and whose identities and locations are withheld from relatives, the International Red Cross and even Congress. For all practical purposes, they have "disappeared," like the domestic detainees of some notorious dictatorships. The first official Army

investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib called this practice "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine and in violation of international law." Yet, according to reporting by The Post's Dana Priest, the CIA subsequently transported as many as a dozen more "ghost detainees" out of Iraq to interrogate them in its secret prisons.

The Geneva Conventions, which the administration says it is following in Iraq, require the registration of all detainees with the Red Cross. They also prohibit "forcible transfers as well as deportations" of individuals, and ban all "physical or moral coercion ... in particular to obtain information." To get around these rather clear-cut standards, the CIA seems to be relying once again on secret legal opinions whose conclusions — once they leak out — are disputed by nearly every authority other than Mr. Bush's political appointees. One, submitted to White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales on March 18, is titled "Protected Persons in Occupied Iraq"; it argues that certain people captured there may be excluded from the conventions — an interpretation at odds with that of the Red Cross. Another draft memo, drawn up by the Justice Department around the same time but never formally issued, argues that even "protected persons" may be taken out of Iraq and interrogated "for a brief but not indefinite period."

It's not clear what legal standards the CIA is using for its ghost prisoners, because it refuses to explain the standards even to the congressional committees charged with oversight, much less to the public. What ought to be clear, however, is that the practice of holding detainees incommunicado in secret prisons without any outside oversight violates basic standards of human rights. A number of members of Congress, including several

Republican senators, have expressed outrage about the ghost detainees and have promised to investigate; to date they have not done so. Now would be a good time to start.

New York Times  
October 26, 2004

#### 41. Making Things Worse

President Bush's misbegotten invasion of Iraq appears to have achieved what Saddam Hussein did not: putting dangerous weapons in the hands of terrorists and creating an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The murder of dozens of Iraqi Army recruits over the weekend is being attributed to the forces of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been identified by the Bush administration as a leading terrorist and a supposed link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. That was not true before the war - as multiple investigations have shown. But the breakdown of order since the invasion has changed all that. This terrorist, who has claimed many attacks on occupation forces and the barbaric murder of hostages, recently swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed his group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

The hideous murder of the recruits was a reminder of the Bush administration's dangerously inflated claims about training an Iraqi security force. The officials responsible for these inexperienced young men sent them home for leave without weapons or guards, at a time when police and army recruits are constantly attacked. The men who killed them wore Iraqi National Guard uniforms.

A particularly horrific case of irony involves weapons of mass destruction. It's been obvious for months that American forces were not going to find the chemical or biological armaments that Mr. Bush said were stockpiled in Iraq. What we didn't know is that while they were looking

for weapons that did not exist, they lost weapons that did.

James Glanz, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger reported in The Times yesterday that some 380 tons of the kinds of powerful explosives used to destroy airplanes, demolish buildings, make missile warheads and trigger nuclear weapons have disappeared from one of the many places in Iraq that the United States failed to secure. The United Nations inspectors disdained by the Bush administration had managed to monitor the explosives for years. But they vanished soon after the United States took over the job. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was so bent on proving his theory of lightning warfare that he ignored the generals who said an understaffed and underarmed invasion force could rush to Baghdad, but couldn't hold the rest of the country, much less guard things like the ammunition dump.

Iraqi and American officials cannot explain how some 760,000 pounds of explosives were spirited away from a well-known site just 30 miles from Baghdad. But they were warned. Within weeks of the invasion, international weapons inspectors told Washington that the explosives depot was in danger and that terrorists could help themselves "to the greatest explosives bonanza in history."

The disastrous theft was revealed in a recent letter to an international agency in Vienna. It was signed by the general director of Iraq's Planning and Following Up Directorate. It's too bad the Bush administration doesn't have one of those.

Los Angeles Times  
October 26, 2004

#### 42. Worse Than The Usual Bad

The confirmation Monday that U.S. forces in Iraq failed to prevent the looting of 380 tons

of conventional explosives represents a new chapter for the "just when you thought things could not get much worse" file. Further, the execution-style murder Saturday of dozens of Iraqis being trained as soldiers, the very men to whom the United States planned to transfer the job of guarding the country, demonstrates an abject failure by Iraqis and occupation officials to learn from past mistakes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency announced Monday what it told the interim Iraqi government and the Bush administration earlier this month: High-powered explosives that could demolish buildings, bring down aircraft or detonate nuclear weapons, have disappeared from a former Iraqi army site about 30 miles south of Baghdad. A Pentagon official said troops searched the site soon after the March 2003 invasion and found the explosives that had previously been counted by the United Nations. But U.S.-led coalition forces failed to guard the site, and the explosives later disappeared.

President Bush has repeatedly said his generals have not told him they need more than the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. But it's now clear that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his Pentagon colleagues should have listened to Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, when he warned that "several hundred thousand" troops would be required to win the peace as well as the war. Instead, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, disparaged Shinseki and shoved him aside.

The ineptness of the Pentagon's civilian leadership surfaced as well in its confused attack-and-retreat from the Sunni stronghold of Fallouja. Times reporters Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus reported Sunday that after the March 31 killing and mutilation of four American security guards, a

Marine general said that rather than besiege the city out of anger, his troops should first enlist moderates to provide intelligence. Rumsfeld did not tell Bush of the Marines' objections, and the president authorized the attack. Yet when the Marines reported that they were close to retaking the city, the White House, worried about backlash, ordered a cease-fire. Fallouja remains under insurgent control and is the base of one of Iraq's main terrorist leaders, Abu Musab Zarqawi.

Zarqawi's followers claimed responsibility for the Saturday attack on the unarmed army recruits. Rebels dressed as police or soldiers stopped three vehicles, ordered the passengers out and shot them. Iraqi police and military trainees have been targets for months. The recruits should have been protected by other soldiers or given weapons to defend themselves.

The U.S. military prides itself on the lessons it learns in combat. Yet the continued assaults on Iraqi police and military trainees, and the evidence that insurgents keep infiltrating those squads, indicate a failure to adapt tactics to an increasingly powerful and sophisticated enemy.

There have been better days in the Iraq war, but not many worse ones.

Wall Street Journal  
October 26, 2004  
Pg. 24

#### 43. War And 'Competence'

A week before Election Day, John Kerry and his allies have once again changed their line of attack on Iraq. The issue isn't any longer whether we should have fought the war at all ("wrong war, wrong place, wrong time"), it is that the Senator would fight it with more "competence."

The peg for this line is yesterday's story that a stockpile of explosives was

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

SECRET

December 31, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Protecting Officials

I just read the attached cable. We're simply going to have to find a way to get that responsibility moved to the Iraqis. There's no way DoD can keep using SOf for these personal security responsibilities.

If we have to, we should quickly put a team of people together to train Iraqis to train other Iraqis how to do this. The USG can't keep doing it all. In the meantime, they should use more contractors. *This is something that could be done outside Iraq!*

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach  
12/23/04 Cable (RUEHGBA23-06)

DRL:cas  
12004-10 (0)

.....  
Please respond by 1/10/04

1043

Tab A

# UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

7201

~~FOUO~~

1435  
12/7

December 6, 2004

2005 12/06 10:10:23

TO: Paul Walfowitz  
FROM: .  
SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Please check to see how much longer we plan to go on with these Commando Solo flights relating to Cuba. Everything costs money.

Thanks.

DFK:db  
120604-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

I-04/016523

ES-16/1

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

7 December 2004 - 1525 Hours


MEMORANDUM FOR: USD(P)

SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake.

Very respectfully,



Sean O'Connor  
CAPT, USN

Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Cc: D S

Response: 14Dec04

~~FOUO~~

07-12-04 17:47 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/040014

OSD 02229-05

7201  
TAB

26  
January 23, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Let's make sure we have a joint CIA-CENTCOM Konar Valley lessons learned effort.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012304-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

Iraq

26 Jan 04


OSD 02266-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/040015

7201  
TAB A

January <sup>26</sup> 23, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Article on Army Supply Issues

Please read this article and tell me if you could understand what this is **all about**. I am dumbfounded.

**Thanks.**

Attach.

Wood, David. "Military Acknowledges **Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War**."  
*Newhouse.com*, January 22, 2004.

DHR:dh  
012304-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

400

26 Jan 04

17 Feb 04

Newhouse.com  
January '22.2004

## Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems In Iraq War

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military juggernaut that swept into Iraq last March was plagued by shortages of ammunition, spare parts and fuel, an epic logistics mess for which the old military term "snafu" might have been invented.

Battalions of tanks and armored vehicles, dashing forward under grueling conditions, got no repair parts for three weeks. Broken-down vehicles had to be stripped of usable parts and left behind. Some units ran dangerously low on ammunition and couldn't get resupplied; others in desperate need of M-16 and machine gun rounds got unneeded rank shells instead, according to logistics officers. Some troops had virtually no water while receiving truckloads of stuff they didn't need and couldn't carry.

"We weren't as effective as we could be," the Army's logistics chief, Lt. Gen. Claude V. Christianson, acknowledged in an interview.

In a devastating self-critique, Christianson and his staff have produced an analysis that concludes, in essence, that the Army's logisticians can't see what is needed on the battlefield, can't respond rapidly when they do find out what's needed, and can't distribute what they have when it's needed.

Christianson, who ran the war's logistics operation from Kuwait before he was brought back to the Pentagon to fix the mess, confirmed that these problems will require scarce money and sustained attention to fix.

But the supply problems were exacerbated, officers said, by the decision of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to deploy mostly combat units in the weeks before the invasion, and to hold back Army and Marine Corps logistics and support units until weeks or months later -- gambling that the war would be over quickly enough that sustained resupply wouldn't be needed.

According to combat units' after-action reports, that shaved it too close.

Even now, nine months after the fall of Baghdad, it takes the Army 34 to 38 days to move a requested spare part from a depot in the United States to the soldier in Iraq who needs it.

During the war, it was worse.

Days into combat, with tank and mechanized infantry units streaking across empty desert toward Baghdad and then fighting into the city, the Army struggled to send forward ammo and water in huge truck convoys that quickly came under fire on unguarded two-lane highways. Soon, the 400 miles between Kuwait and Baghdad were nearly impassable with stalled traffic.

That meant combat units couldn't evacuate their wounded by road, the 3rd Infantry Division reported, and had to compete for scarce helicopter space instead.

Combat engineers struggled to build fortified supply depots along the way but lacked critical equipment

and supplies, which "extended the time troops were operating while exposed to enemy fires," according to an after-combat report by the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

With some combat units like the 3rd Infantry Division desperately short of water, ammo, spare parts and food, crates and pallets of supplies piled up at depots and ports in Kuwait. At least \$1.2 billion worth of supplies got lost, according to an audit by the General Accounting Office.

Then the Army ran out of trucks.

American forces managed to prevail only because of the "creative ability of individual soldiers to pull the pieces together," Gen. Paul Kern, who oversees Army supplies and maintenance, said in an interview. "They are heroes."

Until the problems are fixed, U.S. military operations are subject to the same snafus that threatened the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein:

-- When troops are on the move on distant battlefields, the Army doesn't know which supplies are running low because there are no reliable, fast communications between front-line units and the rear. **As** a result, Army logisticians ship a mix of fuel, tires, ammunition and food according to what planners working years ago imagined units might need.

The fix: a new satellite communications system dedicated to logistics, and data links tracking supplies from depot to user.

-- Once the Army figures out what soldiers actually need, it can't get the materiel to the battlefield, and can't distribute it to individual units when it arrives. There is no military equivalent of FedEx or United Parcel Service on the battlefield.

The fix: Create one, reorganizing transportation units and equipping them with more data-linked trucks. The cost, Christianson said, will be \$500 million a year -- for the next **20** years.

-- When the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines **work** side by side in the same region, as they did in Iraq, the combined supply system is a clashing mismatch of different cultures, incompatible communications systems, different stock numbers for similar items, even different vocabularies. Keeping track of a spare Marine Corps tank transmission as it moves from a Marine *Corps* depot to an Air Force cargo plane to an Army truck, for instance, "is one of our biggest challenges," Christianson said.

The fix: The U.S. Transportation Command, a multiservice agency, has been put in overall charge. The services and other agencies will have to adapt. "It's a cultural issue, not a technology issue," Christianson said.

The next hurdle is getting the Pentagon and Congress to invest more money than traditionally is spent on logistics.

"This isn't a terribly sexy business," Kern said. "It's hard to get people interested in it until you run out of something."



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CN-1526-04

17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Article on Army Supply Issues

- **Issue.** Please read this article and tell me if you could understand what this is all about. I am dumbfounded (TAB A).
- **Answer.** LTG Christianson answered the reporter's questions in the context of solving logistics challenges from the perspective of the Army White Paper, "Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army" (TAB B). The article contains incorrect perceptions and does not provide a good representation of the overall logistics picture. Attached information paper addresses incorrect perceptions in the article and lists some key points to provide a more complete picture of OIF logistics (TAB C).
- **Analysis**
  - The additional editorial comments and viewpoints in the article are Mr. Wood's and were not discussed during the interview.
  - The US Army (USA) G4 provided an executive *summary* to the Chief of Staff, USA, on 23 January that provides background and the context of LTG Christianson's portion of the interview given to Mr. Wood (TAB D).

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director for Logistics: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/040019

OSD 02280-04

400

17 Feb 04

## Army Logistics White Paper

### *“Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army”*

The Army G-4 exists to deliver materiel readiness to our Soldiers - a task that has remained the same for years. Today's operating environment has changed; we are an Army at War... relevant and ready. Our most critical task is to **sustain the combat readiness of our Deployed Force and to maintain the operational readiness of the Current Force**. The Current Force provides the war fighting readiness that serves our Nation. The Current Force must adapt to a changing enemy and fight and win decisively against any threat. Our fundamental challenge within G-4 is to enhance our current capabilities while transforming Army Logistics for tomorrow. We will accomplish this vital task by focusing our efforts on four clear objectives.

This White Paper describes four G-4 Focus Areas we will hold preeminent over the next two years. It addresses known shortfalls in our current structure that require immediate action, and directly supports our Army's transition to an expeditionary force that is agile, versatile, and capable of acting rapidly and effectively. These Focus Areas are the Army G-4's highest priority, and we will apply our policies, processes, and resources to ensure success.

**Focus Area #1 - Connect Army Logisticians.** Today's Army Logician cannot see the requirements on the battlefield. Our customers cannot see the support that is coming their way. As a result, we rely on pushing support based on our best estimate of what we think the Soldier needs. Soldiers order the same item several times because they have no confidence support is on the way. We will solve this problem by connecting Army Logisticians. Army Logisticians will be an integral part of the joint battlefield network with satellite-based communications that provide 24/7 connectivity on demand, enabling them to pass and to receive key data from the battlefield to the industrial base. This connectivity will cover the battlefield, and it will provide Army Logisticians the agility and flexibility to quickly plug into and unplug from a dedicated network with an asynchronous (stand-alone) capability.

The G-4, along with the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), will work with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA) Task Force Network to ensure logistics communications solutions are embedded within the Army's network and will optimize joint and combined operations in an expeditionary environment. Our Enterprise Resource Planning work in Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3), Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-A), Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), and Product Life-cycle Management (PLM+) are critical to implementing fully this Focus Area from foxhole to factory to foxhole. The logistics common operating picture (LCOP) will be improved by this network connectivity, and it will provide the vital link in the joint commander's ability to see his force and to make decisions based upon accurate, real-time logistics information.

**Focus Area #2 – Modernize Theater Distribution.** Today's Army is not able to respond rapidly and precisely when support requirements are identified. We do not have the battlefield distribution system that we need. We cannot provide time-definite delivery schedules, and we cannot effectively control physical movements across the new battle environment. Effective theater sustainment rests solidly on the fundamental concepts of distribution-based logistics. We need a single focus on the simple task of **guaranteeing** delivery -- on time, every time. We must have a distribution system that reaches from the Soldier at the tip of the spear to the source of support, wherever that may be. Our success will be measured at the last tactical mile with the Soldier.

We will build warfighter confidence by increasing visibility and establishing flexible, responsive distribution capabilities. We will not need to store large quantities of supplies forward because we will respond to customer requirements with speed and precision. The G-4 will work with CASCOM and the U.S. Transportation Command, the DOD distribution process owner, to develop this solution from factory to foxhole in the joint environment. Along with AMC and the Defense Logistics Agency, we are committed to enabling an effective distribution-based sustainment process. We will work with the CSA Task Force Modularity to develop this objective in the near term.

Final – published version

**Focus Area #3 – Improve Force Reception.** We have invested heavily over the past 10 years in improving our ability to deploy rapidly from our continental U.S. platforms. The strategic movement of forces by Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels and C-17 aircraft has significantly enhanced our capabilities. However, we have not invested at the other end -- in our ability to receive forces in the theater. We are hamstrung by the lack of an organizational construct that focuses on joint theater opening tasks. Today, we build ad hoc support organizations to execute aerial and sea port of debarkation operations, and we depend on forces from several organizations to establish the theater sustainment base. This process of receiving forces in theater takes time, a luxury we will not have as the Army develops an expeditionary structure that is capable of rapidly deploying joint-capable force modules.

In order to effectively facilitate the immediate operational employment and sustainment of the expeditionary force flow, we will design an integrated theater-opening capability that can respond on extremely short notice and can execute critical sustainment tasks immediately upon entry. That theater-opening capability will not be an ad hoc organization. It must be a support organization that has trained to the task. It must be enabled with the right tools to succeed, and it must have the capacity to expand to meet theater growth. The critical operational tasks for this organization include: (1) providing operational sustainment command and control with reach-back capability and initial network visibility; (2) conducting theater reception, staging onward-movement and integration operations, to include life support, force protection and port of debarkation operations; and (3) sustaining forces in theater with theater distribution and requirements visibility.

**Focus Area #4 – Integrate the Supply Chain.** Over the past several years the Army has taken supply reductions at many levels for various reasons. We changed Army policy several years ago to reduce the amount of items carried on unit prescribed load listings while simultaneously reducing stock levels in many authorized stockage lists across the field army. Additionally, we took risks at the strategic level by underfunding strategic spares programs. The cumulative result of these reductions is a lean supply chain without the benefit of either an improved distribution system or an enhanced information system. As a result, our Soldiers are at the end of a long line of communication with reduced inventories and an old distribution system.

We will view the supply chain in a holistic manner to ensure we understand the impact of actions across the chain, not just at a single level or within a single service. This joint, end-to-end view is essential if we are to provide the kind of support our Soldiers deserve. The solution is an enterprise view of the supply chain, and an agency and a service integration of processes, information, and responsibilities. We are committed to developing the Army's Enterprise Solution to the supply chain in close coordination and alignment with DOD's Focused Logistics Initiative. Ultimately, joint information will be freely and automatically shared among strategic, operational and tactical level headquarters and agencies. Consumers and logisticians from all agencies and services will enter local supporting systems, plug into the sustainment network, and be afforded end-to-end joint total asset visibility (JTAV). As a result of our Theater Distribution efforts, combatant commanders will be capable of seeing inventory in motion, as well as seeing what is available at storage locations, and they will be able to rapidly and effectively execute decisions that meet their requirements.

**Conclusion.** We will build confidence in the minds of the combatant commanders by delivering sustainment on time, every time. We can do that only if we provide Army Logisticians the capability to see the requirements every day and to control the distribution to guarantee precise, time-definite support. Army Logisticians will be part of joint and combined logistics processes that increase speed to deliver focused logistics. We will integrate real-time total asset visibility and seamlessly connect to the industrial base. This will give us an LCOP that will enable the kind of end-to-end control that always delivers the right support to the exact location at the precise time needed. If we do not connect Army Logisticians, improve the capability of the distribution system, modernize force reception, provide integrated supply management and give the joint force combatant commanders JTAV, we will study these same lessons after the next major conflict. The Army G-4 is committed to ensure that we will not have to relearn these same lessons.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/040021

28 January 2004

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: David Wood Article, "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War"

1. Purpose. To address incorrect perceptions in the article and highlight logistics successes not addressed for a complete picture of OIF logistics.

2. Key Points

- Incorrect Perceptions in Article
  - o No evidence supports the assertion that mostly combat units were deployed before invasion and that USA and USMC logistics and support units were held back for weeks/months. Priority of flow was to combat units but support units were moved and integrated accordingly. (See Enclosure (A))
  - o Article states, "it takes the Army 34-38 days to move a requested spare part from a US depot to the soldier in Iraq who needs it." This is an accurate portrayal of the length of time from the submission of the requisition until the requesting soldier has the part in his hands. LTG Christianson was illustrating that the strategic distribution processes may get the part from CONUS to Kuwait in 5-7 days, but additional time can be attributed to three factors. (1) Logisticians do not have access at all levels to a dedicated data network to rapidly pass the requisition. (2) There is not an integrated supply chain to efficiently locate the spare part from both Army and joint sources and then provide visibility of the requisition status to the user. (3) The distribution system is not responsive enough to swiftly deliver the part to the soldier once it arrives in theater.
  - o Article states, "combat units couldn't evacuate their wounded by road." Generally, *aeromedical evacuation is intentionally used as primary means of evacuation* due to evacuation distances and ground route challenges.
  - o Upon checking with USA Engineer School, no evidence supports the statement, "Combat engineers struggled to build fortified supply depots along the way." A quote was taken out of context and wrongly applied to another unrelated issue from a draft OIF after action report made available at GlobalSecurity.org. Per doctrine, the *combat engineer* mission is to support fast-moving maneuver forces (not to build fortified depots) while *general engineers* support logistics functions in the rear.

Tab C

While fast-paced maneuver may temporarily extend supply lines, *all* engineers are trained and equipped to operate in a hostile environment.

- o Article states, "There is no military equivalent of FedEx or United Parcel Service on the battlefield." These companies embody the attributes of the strategic and tactical distribution models of future military logistics: in-transit visibility of shipments and flexible, responsive employment of transportation assets by a single distribution process owner.
- o Article alludes to logistics disconnects among Services. Items moving through the Defense Transportation System are requisitioned and delivered to a DOD Activity Address using standard MILSTRIP format. The *same procedures apply to all four Services*. The locations of units are constantly updated as they move with combat formations. The combatant commander establishes priorities for sustainment based on overall operational requirements, not by individual Service.
- Highlights of logistics successes (from Enclosure (B)) are below:
  - o Theater-wide, logistics was a big-picture success. Air Force and Navy experienced little to few logistics problems. Ground maneuver units, however, did experience localized logistics challenges as reported by the Wood article. These were largely caused by tactical-level transportation and/or communications and are not uncommon during the fog of war.
  - o Since DESERT STORM, there has been significant progress at strategic/operational levels with In Transit Visibility (ITV) from CONUS to an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) or a seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The challenge is to sustain this and extend to tactical level.
  - o Even though radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is in its infancy, experiences with RFID during OIF were so positive that DOD now *mpndates* RFID use.
  - o Recent designation of USTRANSCOM as Distribution Process Owner (DPO) results in one organization managing entire supply chain. Pallets and containers now configured in United States for rapid distribution in theater.
  - o Services will continue to "push" most sustainment items to task forces until ITV methods improve. Efficiencies with DPO and ITV should negate need to push sustainment in future.

- o Medical evacuation and treatment was very successful. OIF experienced lowest died of wounds rate in history; 98 percent of patients seen at level I and III facilities were returned to duty.
- o Global Combat Support System being developed to link battlefield supply and distribution network into a common logistics operating environment.

Prepared by: VADM Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director for Logistics;  
(b)(6)

**DEPORD Reviews on Force Flow of Logistics Units  
Summary of Findings**

- Forces were deployed via numbered deployment orders (DEPORD).
  - Some DEPORDs were small; others encompassed hundreds of individual units.
- Combat operations began 19 Mar 03.
- DEPORD 36B released 10 Oct 02.
  - Main units in DEPORD 36B were USCENTCOM-requested logistics enablers.
    - Fuels units.
    - AMMO.
    - Engineer/construction units.
- DEPORD 165 released 25 Nov 02.
  - Major unit types.
    - Communications.
    - Port opening.
    - AOR arrival dates were mainly between Dec 02 and Feb 03.
- DEPORD 167 released 25 Nov 02.
  - Another major request by USCENTCOM for logistical prep forces.
  - Similar to forces in DEPORD 165.
    - Arrival dates for deploying units to AOR were Dec 02 - Feb 03.
- DEPORD 172 released 26 Nov 02.
  - Another logistical prep request for forces with arrival dates into AOR Dec 02 - Mar 03.
- DEPORD 174B released 24 Dec 02.
  - One of the major DEPORDs with well over a hundred units tasked to deploy.
  - AOR arrival dates from Jan - Apr 03.
  - Encompassed both logistical support and combat forces based upon USCENTCOM request for forces timelines.

**Logistics Successes Related to David Wood Article**  
**"What Went Right and Ongoing Efforts"**

- Asset Visibility
  - To provide in-transit visibility (ITV) of shipments into AOR, the United States and United Kingdom implemented an extensive RFID infrastructure. Pallets and containers were marked with RFID tags that would report shipment location to a central database as tag passed RFID interrogators placed at strategic locations along supply chain. This allowed logisticians to track supplies, resulting in increased confidence in the supply system and a decrease in supply reorders. Even though this technology is in its infancy, experiences with RFID during OIF were so positive that DOD now mandates RFID use.
  - In order to provide tactical asset visibility, CENTCOM requested funding for the Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative (JLWI). J4 championed initiative and submitted requests for supplemental funding, resulting in over \$7M being earmarked for JLWI in CENTCOM AOR. JLWI enables logisticians to see on-hand stock levels in units to allow commanders to exert directive authority for logistics. Although extremely useful to the tactical logisticians, Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) never incorporated JLWI into its "architecture umbrella" thus limiting its effectiveness.
  - Bandwidth limitations for logistics information systems down to tactical level are well documented. The logistics community is responding in two ways to mitigate limitations: increasing the bandwidth available to logistics information systems and decreasing the bandwidth requirements of these same systems. Logistics information systems are migrating toward a network-centric approach that processes information on strategic servers located in data centers with access to high-capacity data pipes and sending only the results forward to the user through lightweight hyper text markup language (HTML) information exchange.
  - The Army used Joint Deployment Logistics Modules (JDLM) as its logistics command and control (C2) system during OIF. While appearing to be a capable system, infrastructure requirements to provide feeder information, including security accreditation, were not fully in place. At the Joint level, the Global Combat Support System - Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force (GCSS CC/JTF) provides a limited logistics C2 capability and work is ongoing to modernize/integrate the Service logistics systems so they will provide decision support tools and asset visibility to identify "what is needed on the battlefield" by FY06. Since GCSS CC/JTF has a wide infrastructure and is fully accredited for

operation on the SIPRNET, work is also in progress to provide tools down to Service staff and component headquarters levels.

- Asset Distribution

- Recent designation of USTRANSCOM as Distribution Process Owner (DPO) should optimize global supply chain distribution by assigning one activity to control the process from wholesale to soldier. This should alleviate congestion at aerial ports and seaports.
  - During OIF, a significant amount of cargo arrived in theater at transportation nodes requiring reconfiguration by supply personnel. Due to limited aerial ports and seaports, there was not the time, space or capability to store or reconfigure supplies at transportation hubs. This resulted in delays. Battlefield distribution includes both a supply and a transportation capability. Key to battlefield distribution is minimum handling between origin and destination.
- Current distribution policy is for ALL eligible break-bulk freight to flow to a Defense Distribution Center (DDC) in the United States. **Pure** pallet/containers are configured at the DDCs (all items on pallet are designed for a single supply support activity). This has dramatically reduced in-theater distribution time by eliminating the requirement to handle break-bulk or to reconfigure containers/pallets at in theater transportation nodes.

- Fuel (Class III)

- OIF fuel support is a true joint success story -- no fuel shortages from Kuwait into Iraq. LTG Christianson highlighted this to reporter.
- 260 miles of Army's Inland Petroleum Distribution System were constructed, and augmented by 70+ miles of the USMC system.
- Over 2,000 host nation, USMC, USA and contractor trucks delivered fuel from bulk farms to individual combat units.
- To support future fast-paced operations, US Army is developing Rapidly Installed Fuel Transfer System (RIFTS). RIFTS is in RDT&E and received a \$5.2M Congressional plus-up in FY04. It requires \$29.7M to complete testing in FY05-FY07, and \$280M in production funds.

- Construction Material & Engineering (Class IV)
  - o Per doctrine, while combat engineers were forward supporting maneuver forces, general engineers in the rear constructed a series of supply depots supporting operations spanning hundreds of miles, constructed numerous base camps, and provided other critical support with minimal casualties.
- Ammunition (Class V)
  - o Pre-positioned and call-forward stocks ensured no strategic or operational shortages against spectrum of munitions support during major combat operations. Due to adequate theater stock levels, only one of two Army ammo ships was offloaded.
  - o Tactical air units strategically pre-positioned sufficient preferred munitions to sustain air war throughout combat operations and beyond.
  - o Army theater ammunition supply agencies had sufficient stocks to provide combat loads to Marine ground units until Marine Corps pre-positioned ships were downloaded. This allowed Marine combat units to reach combat readiness status earlier than expected.
  - o All ground ammunition resupply requests were headed north from Kuwait within hours of receipt of the requisition at theater storage areas.
  - o Munitions for five divisions, two armored cavalry units, aviation units, air defense units, CSS, 1 MEF, 1 MAW, and one UK division were brought into theater through one airfield and two seaports, and subsequently managed by a single distribution center.
- Medical (Class VIII)
  - o Medical evacuation and treatment were very successful. OIF experienced lowest died of wounds rate in history; 98 percent of patients seen at level II and III facilities were returned to duty.
  - o To mitigate risk at tactical level associated with having to move patients long distances for care, Services have established resuscitative surgical capabilities at brigade/division medical companies to stabilize seriously injured patients far forward prior to evacuation for more definitive care.
  - o Air Force established Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities (MASF) at far forward landing strips as soon as they were secured. Helicopters rapidly moved patients to MASF for evacuation by fixed wing aircraft leaving medical evacuation helicopters forward to evacuate the most seriously wounded patients.

- Repair Parts (Class IX)
  - CENTCIOM now working with DLA's Defense Distribution Command (DDC) to build all cargo pallets and multi-packs consigned to a single address within Iraq as unit packs at wholesale level rather than transferring workload to CJTF-7 ground units in difficult combat conditions. Action is improving corps distribution and cutting weeks off customer wait time.
  - Army successfully operated per current doctrine. Army ground forces deployed in combat with a Prescribed Load List (PLL) of repair parts. PLL is designed to support units with small quantities of demand supported repair parts to meet immediate demands for organizational-/unit-level equipment repairs. PLL is intentionally small so combat units are not overburdened with parts. Army Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) are designed to replenish PLLs. ASLs stocks are located within combat service support units.
    - During combat operations, units conducted controlled exchange, and in some cases cannibalization of non-mission capable vehicles in order to maintain operational momentum. However, as logistics units followed combat units toward objectives in Iraq, many of the disabled vehicles were recovered, repaired and returned to mission-capable status in designated maintenance collection points. This is doctrinal for US Army combat maintenance operations.
    - Army parts automation systems are designed to "push" requirements for Class IX from combat units to combat support units. During initial stages of combat operations, it was difficult for combat units to establish connectivity with their support units making it extremely difficult for logisticians to establish visibility of parts requirements.
 

Once combat operations stabilized and units were able to conduct operational halts, automation systems were established and repair parts flow was established.
  - Despite soaring numbers of requisitions, Operational Readiness (OR) rates remain high for most systems. Armored HMMWV OR rate as of 1 Sep 03 was 89 percent. Nine of eleven ground Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) achieved at least 90 percent readiness during this period. A team of Subject Matter Experts is currently reviewing repair parts distribution flow into the Iraqi theater.

- Unexpectedly high demand rates resulted from increased OPTEMPO and a punishing environment. Tank treads normally lasting 1 year wore out in 2 months. Vehicle tire tread wear outpaced Army's ability to resupply. Equipment requisitions soared from a pre-war annual rate of 67,000 Bradley tracks to a FY03 order of 480,000 tracks. HMMWV tire orders went from 48,000 to 204,000; transmission requests doubled from 6,000 to 12,000.

TAB D

**EXSUM**

**Interview of DCS, G4 on the White Paper, "Army Logistics: Delivering Materiel Readiness"** Interview conducted by Mr. Wood of Woodhouse News Service on 12 January 2004. I answered questions about my experiences as the CFLCC, C4 in support of OIF, to include; shortages of trucks; difficulty in seeing the battlefield; changes in the nature of warfare; problems with distribution and what keeps me awake at night. I answered these questions in the context of solving the same problems through the lens (focus areas) of our White Paper. Those focus areas are: Connect the Logistician, Modernize Theater Distribution, Improve Force Reception, and Integrate the Supply Chain. My overall message was that logistics worked well as a result of individual Soldier effort. Our support was not as fast or effective or precise as we would like, but logisticians knew the challenges and solved them. I explained that without the ability to "see" in real time it becomes very difficult to control or adjust to a changing battlefield. Class I & III support went pretty well, as those commodities are easier to plan for (more predictable). But commodities such as Class V & IX are harder to estimate given the dynamics of the battlefield. The solution to this problem is to have the capability to transmit those requirements 24/7 using satellite communications and wireless technology, enabling a rapid response and the ability to adjust to a changing battlefield. In response to the question about needing more trucks, I stated that the capacity of the road would not allow for more trucks, which was not really the issue. The solution is not more trucks but updating current trucks with new technology. I said that we think we would need about \$500m a year to provide a cyclic renewal of truck capability. Lastly, I stated that our logisticians are problem solvers; that is what we do. At no time did LTG Christianson discuss the issue of force deployment.

Tab D

11-L-0559/OSD/040031

TAB E

COORDINATION

US Army |

Col Chappell

29 January 2004

Tab E

11-L-0559/OSD/040032

8:10 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Yh*

DATE: ~~February 26~~, 2004  
*March 1*

SUBJECT: **Suicide and Depression**

Please draft a letter from me to Senator Dominici responding to this question as you have indicated.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022604.05

*Attach: Winkenwerder memo to SD 2/17/04 Re: Suicide*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *3/17*

*70%*

*1975000*

OSD 02313-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040033



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

February 17, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression-- SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

- The Office of Legislative Affairs has made several attempts to schedule a presentation, and we are prepared to brief Senator Domenici at his convenience.
- The suicide rate in-theater is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services (TAB B). Suicide rates for the Services have remained in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year, while the civilian rate (matched by age and gender) is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year.
  - There have been 22 medical examiner confirmed suicides in the Iraqi theater (18 Army, 2 Navy and 2 Marine Corps). (Each service Criminal Investigation Division provides the final determination.)
  - The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 13.5/100,000/year, compared against an overall Service rate of 11.6/100,000/year
  - The Marine Corps reports an in-theater rate of 5.3/100,000/year.
  - The Navy has experienced 2 confirmed suicides; with conservative estimates of the size of the naval force in theater, the rate would be less than the overall Service rate of 11.7/100,000/year.
  - The Air Force reports no suicides in theater.
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program; I have reviewed them all. The Army, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program, consisting of
  - A formal training program, Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), to educate leaders and service members.
  - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
  - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *David S. C. Lohan 17 Feb 04*

Attachments:  
 As stated

SPL ASSISTANT OF RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	2/26
MA BUGGI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/18

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs), (b)(6)

418  
1800  
1

October 16, 2003

TO Bill Winkenwerder  
CC Powell Moore  
David Chu  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT Depression



Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following. Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
101 503-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/040035



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

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  - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
  - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) / *David V. C. Lhar 17 Feb 04*

Attachments: |  
As stated |

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs), (b)(6)



**TAB**

**A**

October 16,2003

**TO:** Bill Winkenwerder  
**CC:** Powell Moore  
David Chu  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Depression

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Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311\*/03

11-L-0559/OSD/040038

**TAB**

**B**



LATEST NEWS

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- U.S. Census Database

Jan 14, 3:51 PM EST

## U.S. Soldiers' Suicide Rate Is Up in Iraq

By MATT KELLEY  
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. soldiers in Iraq are killing themselves at a high rate despite the work of special teams sent to help troops deal with combat stress, the Pentagon's top doctor said Wednesday.

Meanwhile, about 2,500 soldiers who have returned from the war on terrorism are having to wait for medical care at bases in the United States, said Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. The problem of troops on "medical extension" is likely to get worse as the Pentagon rotates hundreds of thousands of troops into and out of Iraq this spring, he said.

Both situations illustrate the stresses placed on the troops and the military's health system by the war in Iraq.

Suicide has become such a pressing issue that the Army sent an assessment team to Iraq late last year to see if anything more could be done to prevent troops from killing themselves. The Army also began offering more counseling to returning troops after several soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., killed their wives and themselves after returning home from the war.

Winkenwerder said the military has documented 21 suicides during 2003 among troops involved in the Iraq war. Eighteen of those were Army soldiers, he said.

That's a suicide rate for soldiers in Iraq of about 13.5 per 100,000, Winkenwerder said. In 2002, the Army reported an overall suicide rate of 10.9 per 100,000.

The overall suicide rate nationwide during 2001 was 10.7 per 100,000, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

By contrast, two U.S. military personnel killed themselves during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, although that conflict only lasted about a month. The Army recorded 102 suicides during 1991 for a rate of 14.4 per 100,000. The Army's highest suicide rate in recent years came in 1993, when the rate was 15.7 per 100,000.

The Marine Corps has the military's highest suicide rate. Last year the Marines'



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11-L-0559/OSD/040040

rate was 12.6 per 100,000. During 1993, the Marines' rate was 20.9 per 100,000.

The military investigates every death and some of those probes may be incomplete, meaning the actual suicide rate could be even higher, Winkenwerder said. He said health officials haven't identified any common threads among the confirmed suicides.

"We don't see any trend there that tells us that there's more we might be doing," Winkenwerder told a breakfast meeting of Pentagon reporters.

The military has nine combat stress teams in Iraq to help treat troops' mental health problems, and each division has a psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker, Winkenwerder said. Of more than 10,000 troops medically evacuated from Iraq, between 300 and 400 were sent outside the country for treatment of mental health problems, he said.

The military prefers to treat mental health problems such as depression by keeping troops in their regular duties while they get counseling and possibly medication, Winkenwerder said. Less than one percent of the troops in Iraq are treated for mental issues during an average week, he said.

Winkenwerder said he had no specifics on the number of soldiers being treated for battlefield stress, although the military is focused on treating that problem.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said.

The military also is working to solve the issue of soldiers awaiting non-emergency medical care. Since November, about 1,900 of 4,400 waiting for medical care have been treated, Winkenwerder said.

But the military expects more problems when tens of thousands of troops are rotated in and out of Iraq this spring, Winkenwerder said. Many of those troops leaving Iraq may have to wait at various bases in the United States for medical treatment such as physical therapy for injuries, he said.

The Army is working to sign contracts with civilian medical providers and bringing in more staff from the Navy, Air Force and Department of Veterans Affairs to help, Winkenwerder said.

Another source of the problem has been a large number of National Guard and reserve troops activated for duty in Iraq who have to be treated for underlying health problems, Winkenwerder said. The Army is working to solve that problem by screening those reservists at their home bases, rather than later.

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Comments and questions.

11-L-0559/OSD/040041

Washington Post  
January 15, 2004  
Pg. 14

## Army's Suicide Rgte Tops Recent Average

### *No Trend Found, Health Officials Say*

By Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writer

At least 22 U.S. service members committed suicide in Iraq last year, prompting concern among defense officials who describe the rate as elevated but not alarmingly high.

Soldiers accounted for 19 suicides, officials said yesterday. The tally included a spike in deaths in July that prompted the Army to dispatch a 12-member mental health assessment team to Iraq in September.

William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in an interview yesterday that military health officials have not discovered "any trend" or identified specific steps the Army could have taken that would have prevented the suicides. **Nothing** has been found, he said, "that tells us that there's more we might be doing."

Col. James K. Gilman, director of health policy and services for the Army surgeon general, said July's spike in suicides caused "great concern," but that no obvious common factor has emerged linking the individual cases. July's high rate, he said, did not reappear.

"You don't see worsening over time," Gilman said. The findings of the mental health team sent to Iraq in September have not been publicly released, he said.

The 19 Army deaths represented a suicide rate of more than 13.5 per 100,000 troops, officials said, which is higher than the Army's average of 10.5 to 11 per 100,000 troops in recent years. The overall suicide rate in the 1.2 million-member, active duty military is about one-third lower than that of the civilian population of about the same age range, defense officials said.

One official who spoke on the condition of anonymity called suicides in Iraq "an issue of concern, not an epidemic. It certainly is not at the oh-my-God stage or panic or anything. But when the Army saw the numbers start to go up, they took very swift action, and have been working very hard ever since."

The Army and the Marines have stressed suicide prevention since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, after suicides that officials say may be at least partly attributable to lengthy deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The numbers last year run counter to experience in past conflicts, when military suicides dropped during times of combat, officials said. During those conflicts, officials thought the reduction could be linked to troops' preoccupation with surviving combat, and with their removal from domestic problems and other personal pressures.

Whatever the cause of the elevated number of suicides in Iraq, Gilman said, "we want to get the rate lower. These are soldiers, and we care about every one of them. We want to get inside the problem even more and try to drive the rate down, in Iraq and in the Army as a whole."

To date, the 22 suicides represent about 14 percent of 153 nonhostile deaths in Iraq since the war began in March. An additional 343 service members have been killed in combat, bringing the total number of dead to 496, the Pentagon reported yesterday.

Winkenwerder said the military has committed considerable resources to treating soldiers' mental health problems, with the Army deploying nine combat stress company detachments to Iraq. Each Army division in Iraq, he said, has a

psychologist, a psychiatrist and a social worker, with an emphasis on trying to treat soldiers' stress problems as close to the front lines as possible.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said. Of 10,128 service personnel transported out of Iraq for medical reasons since the war began, he noted, 300 to 400 have been for mental health problems.

As Winkenwerder expressed concern about suicides in Iraq during an interview with reporters, he said military doctors and medical personnel have proven more successful than ever in saving the lives of wounded service members.

Of 2,413 soldiers wounded in action as of Jan. 8, he said, about 37 were said officially to have "died of wounds" after arriving at a combat medical facility, a rate of about 1.5 percent. "That is stunning. It is remarkable. It has never been seen before," said Winkenwerder, a physician who became the Pentagon's top health official in late 2001 after serving as executive vice president of health care services for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts.

He attributed the low rate of soldiers who died of wounds to a combination of high-tech body armor worn by all soldiers in Iraq, surgical teams much closer to the front lines than in previous wars, new clotting agents that help stop bleeding on the battlefield, and new, portable ultrasound devices to determine whether soldiers are bleeding internally.

"All of our people have been working on these things for years, and I think it all came to fruition" in Iraq, Winkenwerder said. "We're saving people."

**TAB**

**C**

# Depression and Suicide

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD


Briefing for  
Senator Domenici

11-L-0559/OSD/040045

# Suicide in the Department of Defense

- Suicide rates for the Services have been stable in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year since 1990.
- The rate for a civilian population matched for age and gender is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year.
- Despite the stable rates, the Services continue their efforts to bring the suicide rate down, because every life lost is a tragedy for families and a detriment to military readiness.

# DoD Suicide Rates 1990-2003



# Operation Iraqi Freedom - 2003

- **Army**
  - 18 confirmed suicides
  - Suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
- **Marine Corps**
  - 2 confirmed suicides
  - Suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
- **Navy**
  - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
  - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
  - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

# Risk Factors for Suicide

- Malegender
- Age 18-25
- Untreated depression
- Alcohol or drug abuse
- Relationship problems
- Financial problems
- Legal problems
- Easy access to firearms

# Diagnostic Criteria for Depression

- Sleep disturbance
- Loss of interest or pleasure
- Feelings of guilt
- Lack of energy
- Difficulty with concentration or memory
- Loss of Appetite
- Slowed movements
- Suicidal ideation

# Treatment of Depression

- Behavioral Health Care (psychiatry, psychology, social workers)
- Psychotherapy
- Medication

# Suicide Prevention Programs

- Each Service has its own program tailored to its organizational structure
- Each provides education to leaders and service members on
  - Risk factors for suicide
  - Signs and symptoms of depression
  - Appropriate actions to take to intervene with a suicidal person

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST)
  - Formal training program to teach the skills for recognizing and intervening with a suicidal person
  - 2 day workshop and interactive computer simulation

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Developed as a result of
    - The Army Well-being Initiative (2001)
    - Recommendations after the investigation of domestic violence deaths at Fort Bragg (2003)
    - Post Deployment Clinical Practice Guidelines from Deployment Health Clinical Center

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase I – Pre-deployment
  - Identify potential family issues
  - Suicide awareness and prevention training
  - Information briefing to spouses
  - Pre-deployment health evaluation

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase 2 – During deployment
  - Combat Stress Control units
    - Outreach facilitated by stationing CSC units with combat units
    - Suicide prevention and depression awareness education
    - Far-forward treatment of combat stress casualties
  - Military Healthcare System
    - Treatment for mental health casualties

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase 2 – During deployment
  - Pre-redeployment briefing
    - Manage expectations
    - Communication with family
    - Control alcohol use
  - Educate regarding Deployment Health Clinical Center and Army One Source
  - Provide information on transition benefits to reservists leaving active duty

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
  - Post deployment health screening for
    - Exposure to combat, violence
    - Depression
    - Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
  - One week of half-days of work before block leave
  - Care managers embedded in primary care trained in post-deployment health issues

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Deployment Health Clinical Center
  - Located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
  - Established to evaluate soldiers returning from first Gulf War with health problems
  - Mission is to improve military occupational health care by providing healthcare services, clinical consultation and practice improvement; develop health information and education programs; and conduct research to ensure evidence-based care.

# Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
  - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Army One Source
  - Available to all active duty, mobilized reservists, and deployed civilians
  - 1-800 access – no preauthorization and no chain of command knowledge
  - Telephone advice and up to 6 face-to-face counseling visits for a problem

# Navy Suicide Prevention

- Shipboard mental healthcare assets
- Increased emphasis on education, awareness, and prevention
- Training for leaders and sailors to make each person a “first responder” to a shipmate in crisis

# Marine Corps Suicide Prevention

- Marine Corps adding division level mental health providers and Combat Stress Control units similar to the Army
- Return and reunion training through the “Warrior Transition” Program
- Chaplain Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO) – Navy Chaplain outreach Program

# Air Force Suicide Prevention

- Developed with a community philosophy
  - Healthcare system
  - Commanders
  - Chaplains
  - Families
- Medical records screen pre-deployment
- Mental Health Rapid Response Teams
  - Training
  - Command consultation
  - Individual and group therapy
- Reunion and reintegration briefings
- Post deployment surveillance and education


# Summary

- Depression is a risk factor for suicide
- Depression is actively looked for and treated
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program
- The Service-specific suicide rates for 2003 are similar to those for the past decade
- The Service-specific suicide rates for Operation Iraqi Freedom are within the range of overall suicide rates for the last decade

**TAB**

**D**

# DOD Suicide Rates 1990-2000



11-L-0559/OSD/040067

# Operation Iraqi Freedom -

- **Army**
  - 18 confirmed suicides
  - In-theater suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
  - Overall suicide rate 11.6 (difference not significant)
- **Marine Corps**
  - 2 confirmed suicides
  - In-theater suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
  - Overall rate 12.6 (in-theater rate not significantly different)
- **Navy**
  - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
  - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
  - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

11-L-0559/OSD/040068

1/3  
08000

120

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

08/24

2005 FEB -03 PM 3:23

**ACTION MEMO**

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

1-04/015884  
ES-1495

Pal: Butler  
2/3  
1/13

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FEB 2 2005  
FOR [Signature] [Signature]

SUBJECT: Meetings for Defense Ministers

- You asked whether there were groups of defense ministers, like the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, that we ought to pull together (attached).
  - o You suggested a triennial gathering of Central American MODs as an example.
  - o Regarding your specific suggestion, the DoD Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) is considering holding two-day seminars for MODs and defense chiefs by sub-region of the Western Hemisphere.
- You also might consider gathering defense ministers to address specific functional priorities for the Global War on Terrorism, particularly:
  - o Building partner nation security capacity
  - o The Proliferation Security Initiative.
- If you approve, we will come back to you shortly with proposed timing, agenda, and participants for each gathering.
- RECOMMENDATION: That you invite key defense ministers to summits on the topics listed above.

Approve DA Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

FEB 4 2005

Attachment: as stated

Cc: Dr. Downie, CHDS

Prepared by: John Kreul, Strategy (b)(6)

092.3  
2 FEB 05  
22 NOV 04

FEB 03 2005

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	MZ/S		
ESR MA	KSV	2-3-05	7:26

OSD 02316-05

02-02-05 10:23 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/040069

~~FOUO~~ OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 FIN November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there other parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
112204-22

.....  
Please respond by 12/17/04

Sir, *DK 2/4*  
Response attached.  
*v/n*  
*Lt Col Lemay*  
FEB 03 2005

23-11-04 12:33

~~FOUO~~

23-11-04 07:31 1X

11-L-0559/OSD/040070

**OSD** 02316-05

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

092.3

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there other parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR:sf  
112209-22

.....  
Please respond by 12/17/04

23-11-04 12:33

~~FOUO~~

23-11-04 07:31 IN

22 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/040071

OSD 02316-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ST  
2005 FEB 03 10 16

ACTION MEMO

CM-2315-05  
3 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 2/3*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief (SF 909)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue \_\_\_\_\_ the attached implementing memorandum (TAB B) captures the initiatives CDRUSJFCOM briefed to you on 1 December 2004. The contribution that Reserve Component (RC) personnel may play in Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQs) requires further study.
- **Analysis.** On 1 December 2004, CDRUSJFCOM briefed you on a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make JTF HQs immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. You questioned using RC personnel to supply JTF HQs. The memorandum proposes to study the role the RC should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommends an RC mobilization process supporting this role. The memorandum also adds a second operational Standing Joint Force Headquarters within USJFCOM.
- During coordination, OSD(P&R) proposed a rewrite (TAB C) of the implementing memorandum with significant changes, to include: creation of permanent JTF HQs from Service Operational HQs through expansion of the Joint Manpower Exchange Program by 800 billets; CJCS validation of requirements for Joint RC augmentation units and eliminating the proposed study; USJFCOM publish Joint Training Guidance that would apply to the other combatant commands; and direct all policy changes be effective 31 March and personnel moves take place by 31 August.
- CDRUSJFCOM and I recommend not incorporating these additional items in this implementing document. To do so would negate some of the original intent of the memorandum and your discussion with CDRUSJFCOM.

322

3 Feb 05 2 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the implementation memorandum (TAB B).

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

FEB 4 2005

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

MA SD	MA DSD	FEB 04 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>M 2/3</i>		
ESR MA	<i>FEB 03/05</i>		

11-L-0559/OSD/040072

Prepared By: LtGen J.T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 02374-05

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
UNDERSECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters.

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate the Department's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of our air, land, maritime and information capabilities. In order to meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

Individual Augmentees

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned Joint Task Force headquarters to guide manning and resourcing decisions. With support from the Combatant Commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF headquarters, using Execute Orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of active and reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are individually assigned to serve on the staff of a JTF headquarters. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their ~~field grade end strength~~ skill inventories against individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters and resource these requirements in future personnel program objectives.

~~The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF headquarters and recommend a Reserve Component mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units to plug into JTF headquarters in key functional roles will be considered.~~

Service Operational Headquarters

Combatant Commanders will designate selected Service Operational Headquarters as enduring JTF headquarters. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will validate requirements for Joint Reserve component augmentation units to support expansion capability of

TAB C

these JTF headquarters. Combatant Commanders, in conjunction with the Services, will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to man these JTF headquarters totaling not less than 800 spaces.

——— Commander, USJFCOM will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF headquarters designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will assist other Combatant Commanders in developing Joint Manning Documents for JTF headquarters. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF headquarters, Commander, USJFCOM will establish a second operationally-ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element).

### Personnel Policies

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and USD (P&R), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify active and reserve personnel with JTF headquarters experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF headquarters.

——— USD (P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DoD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF headquarters in a combat zone. ~~Combatant Commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their Combatant Commander as potential JTF headquarters.~~

USD (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the U.S. Government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to man the suggested coalition positions in high priority, combined JTF headquarters.

### Readiness Reporting

Combatant Commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs will develop JTF headquarters training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commander, USJFCOM will publish Joint Training Guidance to guide development of joint training programs

All policy and process changes will be effective by 31 March. All actions requiring personnel moves will be in place by 31 August. These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements to our ability to form and sustain JTF headquarters, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D

## COORDINATION PAGE

Mr. Shepherd	USJFCOM	6 January 2005
Mr. Gardner	OSD(P&R)	4 January 2005
Mr. Gunziner	(OSD(Policy)	29 December 2004

TAB D

Tab D

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/040075

12/02

December 2, 2004

322

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
  
CC: **ADM** Giambastiani  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his **staff** and the Joint **Staff** as well went into it.

I do want to see **you** carefully think through whether it ought to be **an** active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use **reserves**. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can **sign** in the next two weeks. We need to move out on **this**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120204-10



Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

2 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 4 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

322

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF HQs) immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. To meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned JTF HQs to guide staffing and resourcing decisions. With support from the combatant commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF HQs, using execute orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of Active and Reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are assigned as individual augmentees to serve on the staff of a JTF HQs. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their skill inventory and field grade end strength against individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs and accommodate these requirements in future personnel program submissions.

4 Feb 05

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the combatant commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components (RCs) should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommend an RC mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units in key functional roles will be considered.

2 Dec 04



OSD 02374-05

Commander, USJFCOM, will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF HQs and assist other combatant commanders in developing joint staffing documents for JTF HQs. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF HQs, Commander, USJFCOM, will establish a second operationally ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (core element).

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (USD(P&R)), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify Active and Reserve personnel with JTF HQs experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF HQs.

USD(P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DOD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF HQs in a combat zone.

Combatant commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their combatant commander as potential JTF HQs.

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the US government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to combined JTF HQs.

Combatant commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other combatant commanders and the Service Chiefs, will develop JTF HQs training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. A. [unclear]".

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft Register

I received the "draft register" for my personal papers that are already on deposit with the Library of Congress. I have several questions.

I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

- 1) White House personal file #125.
- 2) The memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7.
- 3) The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7.
- 4) In container 546, it mentions photographs. And also 547, 559, and 615.
- 5) CL 18 has a file that says "DR Personal Save" container 559, CL 20, there are two folders that say "DR Personal Save" in container 575.
- 6) SCI-1 says "DR Personal Save" in container CL 20.
- 7) And then there's something called oversized 1 and 2.

*500*

I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of gift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121304-22

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/05

*14 Dec 04*



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600  
 INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -3 PM 1:22



February 3, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

*D. Dell'Orto*

SUBJECT: Donation of Papers to Library of Congress -- Update

- In December you asked to see certain items listed in the "draft register" for your personal papers already on deposit with the Library of Congress (Tab A).
  - A Library historian has located what he believes to be the material responsive to your request and has summarized the material (Tab B).
  - I have reviewed the summary of the items, but I have not examined them to confirm that they are the items you seek.
  - Based on the description in the historian's letter, it appears that the items you seek are contained in approximately 25 small and 2 large boxes that I estimate to total in excess of 10 linear feet of material.
  - Some of the items are classified and will require appropriate storage if removed from the Library.
  - You may view these materials either at the Library or request that they be delivered to you upon 48 hours' notice to the Library. I will arrange for their transportation from the Library if you would prefer to view them either in your office or at your home.
- In December you asked a number of questions about the draft instrument of gift (Tab C).
  - I am available to discuss these at your convenience.
  - I have scheduled a meeting with an attorney at the Library on Tuesday, February 8 to discuss the intellectual property question and to compare notes on some of the terminology in the draft instrument of gift.

314.7

3 Feb 05

14 Dec 04



OSD 02375-05

December 14, 2004

**TO:** Dan Dell'Orto  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Draft Register

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I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

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I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of gift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121304-22

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/05


13 January 2005

To: Mr. Craig Glassner

Acting Director, ESCD

Fax: (b)(6)

From: John Earl Haynes



20th Century Political Historian

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress

Phone: (b)(6) fax: (b)(6)

e-mail: (b)(6)

Subj: Secretary Rumsfeld's Personal Papers

Dear Mr. Glassner:

Attached is a description of what we believe to be the material designated in the fax you send on 12 January. The description is keyed to the eight items in your fax. In addition, the relevant pages of the register (finding aid) are also included.

The material outlined represents roughly twenty-five archival boxes and two oversize flat containers. Archival boxes are sized 12 1/4 x 10 1/4 x 5, much smaller than a record center carton which is roughly 12 x 12 x 12.

Secretary Rumsfeld can examine the material in two ways. He can come to the Manuscript Division and the material will be made available to him in the Manuscript Division Conference Room. Alternately, the material can be picked up and transported to Secretary Rumsfeld

If the latter is preferable, please note that the material in items #5 and #6 contain security classified documents (Secret and SCI and currently stored in our vault room for security classified material). Consequently whoever picks up the material should have appropriate authority to courier classified material. If Secretary Rumsfeld would prefer to have the material brought to him, we can have the boxes ready for pickup at the Library of Congress Madison Building loading dock within 48 hours.

Please let us know Secretary Rumsfeld's preference and we will do our part.

[7 pages follow]

- 1. **White House personal file #125:**  
 This refers to the Personal File subseries (Containers 528-548) in the **White House** series. Its contents are listed **starting** on page 125 of the container list. Here is a **general** description of the subseries (see the container list for a more precise breakdown):

**Personal File, 1962-1976, n.d.**

Correspondence, **casework files**, memberships, photographs, congratulations, clippings, **memorabilia**, and invitations. **Arranged alphabetically** by type of material, name of person, organization, or topic and filed **thereunder** as received.

- 2. **Memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7:**  
 This refers to a Scope and Content Note mention of memorabilia and photographs in the **White House Personal File** (See #1 above).

I took a look at the memorabilia. It consists of printed **ephemera** such as invitations, programs, tourist map and brochures, **inaugural** printed ephemera, name tags, dinner place cards, and stationery. **Quantity:** three large folders in boxes 545-546 and additional material in OV 1.

- 3. **The photographs in 6 15 referred to on page 7:**  
 Photographs of Rumsfeld as a Boy Scout (6 photographs) and naval officer (8 photographs) located in **Box 615** and mentioned on page 7 of the Scope and Content Note.

- 4. **Photographs in containers 546, 547, 559 and 615:**

**Containers 546-547: White House series photographs**  
**Cost of Living Council, 1972**  
 Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) **See also** Oversize  
**Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970**  
**Oval office meetings, 1974-1975 See also Oversize**  
**Pay Board, 1972**  
**Portraits See also Oversize**  
**Others, 1975-1976**  
**Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders)**  
**Rumsfeld with**  
**Kissinger, Henry, 1975**  
**Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969**  
**Members of Congress, 1970, n.d.**  
**Members of the press, 1971, n.d.**  
**Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969**  
**Staff party on Sequoia (yacht), 1975**  
**State of the Union speech, 1976**  
**Travel**

Container 559: NATO series photographs  
 Award ceremonies, 1973  
 Ministerial meetings, 1973-1974 (3 folders)  
 Miscellaneous, 1973-1974, n.d.  
 Oval Office meetings, 1973-1974 See Oversize  
 Public relations, 1973  
 Reception at the residence, 1973  
 Summit meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 1974 See also Oversize  
 Container 615: Miscellany series (Boy Scout and navy photos)

5. "DR Personal Save" files in CL 18 container 559 and CL 20 container 574 (two folders of "DR Personal Save")  
 "DR Personal Save" was the original title of several folders in the NATO and DOD series. The folders contain copies of official memoranda, agenda, and reports which DR probably wanted segregated for easy reference. These folders do not contain personal information about him.  
 NATO series (Container CL18-classified items removed from Container 559)  
 Department of Defense (Containers 575/CL20/SCD)
6. SCI-1 "DR Personal Save" file in CL 20  
 See #5 above
7. Oversize 1 and 2  
 These boxes contain oversize photographs and memorabilia.
8. All of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversize items:  
 The only other photographs and memorabilia not listed above are in the Congressional File series and Department of Defense series.

Congressional File:

**Memorabilia:** Campaign buttons, earrings, matchbook, brochures, and bumper stickers.

1962	Box 58	1 folder
1964	Box 69	2 folders
1966	Box 73	1 folder
1968	Box 78	1 folder

Photographs

Campaign

1962	Box 58	(1 photograph)
	Box 67	(2 folders)
1964	Box 72	(2 folders)
1966	Box 76	(2 folders)
1968	Box 81	(2 folders)

**Congressional File**

**Other Congressional photographs (see finding aid, pp. 85-86 )**

**Box 317 (6 folders)**

**Box 318 (11 folders)**

**Defense Department (Containers 579-580)**

**Photographs**

*Greece, 1976*

*Miscellany, 1975-1976 See also Oversize*

*Swearing-in ceremony, 1975 See also Oversize*

*Veterans of Foreign Wars ceremony, n.d.*

**White House**

**Bill-signing ceremony, Fiscal Year 1978 defense appropriation,  
1976**

**Dinner honoring Defense Department officials, 1976**

## WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>ContainerNos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
528 (cont.)	<b>Personal File</b> Acknowledgments, 1968-1975 (2 folders) Book proposal re House of Representatives, 1969
529	Business executives, lists, 1970-1972, n.d. (2 fold —) <b>Casework</b> 1969-1971 (6 folders)
530	1972-1975 (5 folders) <b>Clippings</b> Cabinet members, 1968-1969 Friends and associates, 1966-1970 People and projects, 1969 People in politics, 1969 <b>Condolences and get-well wishes, 1969-1976</b>
531	<b>Congratulations</b> <b>Received</b> Ford administration, 1974-1975 <b>A-R (6 folders)</b>
532	<b>S-Z (2 folders)</b> <b>Nixon administration</b> Counselor to the president, appointment, 1970-1971 (2 fold —) Office of Economic Opportunity, appointment as director, 1969 (2 folders)
533	(4 folders) <b>Sent, 1969-1972</b> (2 folders)
534	(1 folda)

## WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
534 (cont.)	<b>Personal File</b> <b>Correspondence</b> American Political Science Association, fellowship program, 1967-1977 Brady, James S., 1977-1982 English, Robert E., 1969-1970 Robson, John E., 1962-1974 Searle, Daniel C., 1962-1967, 1975 <b>Invitations regretted</b> 1969, Apr.- June (3 folders)
535	1969, July-1970, June (9 folders)
536	1970, July-1971, June (8 folders)
537	1971, Aug.-1972, Feb. (8 folders)
538	1972, Mar.-Nov. (11 folders)
539	1972, Dec.-1974, June (16 folders)
540	1974, July-Dec. (7 folders) <i>See also Classified</i> 1975 Jan. (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
541	(1 folder) Feb.-Mar. (5 folders)
542	Apr.-May (6 folders) June (1 folder)
543	(1 folder) July-Sept. (4 folders)

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 127

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, a.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
543 (cont.)	<b>Personal File</b> <b>Invitations regretted</b> <b>1975</b> <b>Oct.</b> <b>(2 folders)</b>
544	<b>(1 folder)</b> <b>Nov.-Dec. (4 folders) See also Classified</b> <b>Memberships and sponsorships</b> <b>Regretted, 1963-1976</b> <b>Terminated, 1963-1976</b> <b>(1 folder)</b>
545	<b>(3 folders)</b> <b>Memorabilia, 1967-1977. See also Oversize</b> <b>(1 folder)</b>
546	<b>(2 folders)</b> <b>Photographs</b> <b>Cost of Living Council, 1972</b> <b>Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) See also Oversize</b> <b>Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970</b> <b>Oval Office meetings, 1974-1975 See also Oversize</b>
547	<b>Pay Board, 1972</b> <b>Portraits See also Oversize</b> <b>others, 1975-1976</b> <b>Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders)</b> <b>Rumsfeld with</b> <b>Kissinger, Henry, 1975</b> <b>Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969</b> <b>Members of Congress, 1970, n.d.</b> <b>Members of the press, 1971, n.d.</b> <b>Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969</b> <b>Staff party on Sequoia (yacht), 1975</b> <b>State of the Union speech, 1976</b>

11-L-0559/OSD/040088

(b)(6)

p no.

**WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)**

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
547 (cont.)	<b>Personal File</b> <b>Photographs</b> <b>Travel</b> Nigeria and Senegal, 1971 Vail, Colo., 1974 <b>Thank-you letters</b> Ford administration, 1974-1975 A-H (3 folders)
548	I-Z (5 fold—) Nixon administration, 1969-1973 (2 folders)

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 1966-1977, n.d.**

548	<b>Alphabetical file (correspondence received and copies of  correspondence sent), 1973-1974</b> <b>A-B</b> (2 folders)
549	(I folder) <b>C-G (5 folders) See also Classified</b>
550	<b>H-L (5 folders)</b> <b>M-O</b> (1 folder)
551	(3 folders) <b>P-R (3 folders) See also Classified</b> <b>S-U</b> (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
552	(1 folder) <b>V-Z (2 folders)</b>

December 14,2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
CC: Terry Robbins  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft Instrument of Gift

Thanks for the draft Instrument of Gift.

I have the following questions and thoughts.

- 1) It says "residing in Washington, D.C." I think my legal residence is still in Illinois. I ought to talk to Terry to see if I want to use Illinois or Maryland, but I'm pretty sure I won't want to use Washington, **D.C.**
- 2) On line 5, it refers to the type of papers, but it does not mention "business," unless that's what professional means.
- 3) On the next to the last line, on page 1, it says that I may retain any of the originals of my personal papers and furnish a copy. Does that permit me to do it after digitization, when I have had a chance to look at everything and see what I might like the original of? Or do I need to decide before digitization?
- 4) Page 2, paragraph 1: I would like to discuss what "intellectual property" means, and how you solve that.
- 5) Page 3: I'd like to discuss the fact that it does not transfer title to classified information and how that gets handled.
- 6) Page 3, paragraph 2, line 5: I wonder if we ought to make it ten years.
- 7) Page 3, paragraph 2, Line 7 (under Access): I'd like to discuss those policies.
- 8) Page 3, next to last paragraph: When it mentions those that should be restricted from public access, for what length of time is that, and who makes the judgment?

- 9) Page 3, last line: I'd like to discuss that.
- 10) Page 4, item E: It talks about adversely affecting the security. I also think the reputation of the United States, or there may be something other than security. Let's discuss it.
- 11) Page 5, paragraph 1, line 2: Let's discuss this triple X series.
- 12) Page 5, paragraph 1: Let's discuss the five years.
- 13) Page 5: I wonder about case work and possible embarrassment for the constituents when I was a Member of Congress.
- 14) Page 5: I'd like to talk about press access.
- 15) Page 6, last three lines: Let's discuss.
- 16) Page 7, paragraph 5: I think that I should agree to pay for some or all of the digitization. Let's discuss that.
- 17) Page 7, paragraph 5: We may want to add "except as designated by the donor" and under the add, we may want to include "for all or most."
- 18) Page 8: We should include the George W. Bush Library, if/when it ever exists.
- 19) Page 8, Item 7: Let's discuss.
- 20) Page 9, middle of the first paragraph: Let's discuss a timeframe.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

11/30/04 Draft Instrument of Gift

DHR:ss  
121304-25

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

DRAFT  
11/30/04

**INSTRUMENT OF GIFT**

*Dr. Jmd.*

I, Donald H. Rumsfeld, residing in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration therein by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule. Donor warrants that he **owns** the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any liens. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

*Borell?*

This is a gift of only the physical property contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not limited to copyright. Further, Donor, in his complete discretion, may retain the original of any of his personal papers and furnish a copy of that original to the Library.

*after the gift? & digitization?*

By accepting this gift, however, the Library does ~~so~~ to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed as a conclusive determination by the Library that the Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property as above identified or described.

*How Glue?*

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. Classified Materials. All materials in the Collection that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in accordance with such statutes ~~or~~ executive orders. Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the United States Government to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the Library's request, by appropriate security classification authorities), and materials which, because of the passage of time or other

*17  
2* /

DRAFT

circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be opened to public access, subject to the access requirements of provision #2 below. This gift does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; and, in accepting the gift, the Library agrees to receive classified information only as a deposit for administration under the terms of this document.

2. Access. With the exception that the entire Collection shall at all times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years <sup>10</sup> from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access:

(a) Papers and other historical materials the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living

person or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the Collection.

(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations of the United States or which could affect adversely the security of the United States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals or organizations, to proposed appointments to office, or to other personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

**[Add: Except for papers that contain national security information as described in (2)(b), all the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers after the restriction period described above.]**

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those granted access also must

DRAFT

agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material in the Collection.

Additionally, access to that section of the collection designated on the attached schedule as the xxx series will be reserved to the Donor and to others only with the Donor's written permission during the Donor's lifetime and the lifetime of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever comes later. In the event of the death of Donor, access to the xxx series will be restricted to those with the permission of the Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the date thereof or during the life of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever is later. Thereafter, the xxx series shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

The Donor will appoint his literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce P. Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including herself. Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the surviving children.

The Library will notify the Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

Corr 6.2

Pratt ?

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual property as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies as may be allowed by copyright law (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library **may** make preservation copies of the materials in the Collection in any format as determined by the Library.

4. Use. Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of this nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any or all of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any or all of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any other electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of the Donor or the Donor's literary executor *{Delete: during the period of Donor's life and for 10 years thereafter}* [Add: for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld] and subject to the other

DRAFT

conditions expressed in provision 2 of this Instrument. Donor reserves the right to make selected unclassified materials available to the public at any time upon written notification to the Library.

5. Digitization of Material Currently on Deposit. {Delete: Donor agrees to <sup>same as all</sup> pay for the cost of digitization of the papers either currently on deposit or to be deposited with the Library, which under this Instrument become the Library's physical property. Upon a mutually agreed-upon schedule, the Library agrees to make these papers available to Donor or his designee for the purpose of their digitization. Donor or his designee agrees to ensure that the original papers are returned to the Library in good order and condition upon completion of their digitization. Donor also will provide the Library a digital copy of these papers). ✓

[Add: Donor agrees to donate to the Library funds to be used to pay for the <sup>for all or most</sup> cost of digitization of the papers currently on deposit at the Library and those papers to be placed on deposit at the Library. The Library agrees to use [name of company] to perform the digitization. The Library agrees to provide the Donor or Donor's literary executor, upon either's request, digital copies of all papers the Donor gives to the Library.] Donor reserves the right to provide digitized copies of the collection to other institutions, including but not limited to except  
for deposit  
by Donor

EW Books

the Ronald Reagan Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, George H. W. Bush Library, Richard M. Nixon Library, Herbert Hoover Institute [?], and Princeton University, subject to the same conditions as provided for in **this** instrument.

6. Additions. Such other and related materials as the Donor may from time to time donate to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library shall be governed by the terms of this Instrument of Gift or such written amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon between the Donor and the Library. At the discretion of the Donor, future additions to the Collection **may** be transferred to the Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of Gift.

7. ~~*{Delete: Removal. Donor or a representative acting on Donor's behalf pursuant to his written authorization may remove any or all of the Collection at Donor's complete discretion during Donor's lifetime.}*~~ [Add: Original Items. The Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by the Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.]

8. Disposal. Should any part of the Collection be found by the Library to

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include materials which the Library deems inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to the Donor and allow the Donor ninety (90) days from the date of such offer to reply. If the Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or has not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid ninety (90) days, the Library **may** dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of materials not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of the Collection includes classified information which the Library deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall notify the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of the appropriate disposition **of** these classified materials.

Time frame?

9. Communications. The Donor will provide the Library with a current address and other contact information in order that the Library can meet its responsibilities as herein described. The Library will send notices and requests to addresses of record as provided and updated by the Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand and seal this \_\_\_\_\_ day of

\_\_\_\_\_, 2004 in the City of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Donald H. Rumsfeld**

**Accepted for the United States of America**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**The Librarian of Congress (seal)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Gift Statement

Where do we stand on that gift statement for the Library of Congress?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
013105-7

.....  
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/040102

OCT 06 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking PAS

230.02

We need to capture the Presidential appointees-Senate confirmed vacancies that have occurred over the entire time we have been here.

Specifically, I would like to know what percentage of the DoD PAS positions have been vacant over the first three years, through today. For example, of the 365 days in a year, what percentage of the days was each job vacant? Some would be vacant a year or a year and a half, and many would be vacant six or eight months.

My guess is if you add it all up, it will end up that we have been operating at about a 20 to 25 percent vacancy rate.

Please get back to me with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100504-16

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

600784

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Force Level Updates

*DR*

Please arrange a briefing for me to get a report on everything that's happening on each of these items in my Force Level memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/07/04 Working Paper on Force Levels (v.6)  
9/27/04 CJCS Info Memo to SecDefre: Force Level Memo

DHR:ss  
100404-18

\*\*\*\*\*

Please respond by 10/29/04

*320.2*

*405.754*

~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas  
David Chu  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

*Get mjt*

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss  
090704-41

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*9/14*

OSD 14746-04

~~XXXX~~  
*Closed*  
*9/14/04*  
~~XXXX~~

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/040105

**SUBJECT:** “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force” — Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

**Summary:** The U.S. can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

**Background:** The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the U.S. military, but have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

#### 1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

## WORKING PAPER

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

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- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
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- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will—require a diplomatic effort—to substantially reduce the current restrictions

## WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
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- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

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- Organization of Forces. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

## 5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

## Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

WORKING PAPER

easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/ End Strength

~~FOU~~  
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 28 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas  
David Chu  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss  
090704-41

.....  
Please respond by 9/14

320.2

7 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/040115

OSD 14746-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 23 AM 8:55

INFO MEMO

CW-2086-04  
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
  - The Joint **Staff** will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
  - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

copy to:  
DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

3107

REPORT

10/1/04

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

**SUBJECT:** “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current **U.S.** military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

**Summary:** The **U.S.** can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people **who** distinguish the **U.S.** military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the **U.S.** military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that **U.S.** forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase **risk** in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

**Background:** The operational tempo of **U.S.** forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the **U.S.** military, **but** have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. **A** number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for **retired**, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. **As** a result, there is a **lag** between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

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**Tab A**

11-L-0559/OSD/040117

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- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must **be** closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; **and**
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well **as** respect **for** the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts **as** well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing **and/or** examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. **As** appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. **Though** it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis **might** later indicate is necessary in the future.

### 1. Lessons Being Learned (JT lead with J1/J3/38/35)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency **plans** to take account of the lessons learned thus **far** in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in **the** information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/040118

## WORKING PAPER

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.

- Training, and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
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- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
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## 2. People (J1 lead with JS/J3/J4)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
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## WORKING PAPER

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/040121

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- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among **U.S.** agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

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- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century one **size** doesn't fit all. DoD **will** modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve **improved** modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize **units** to task. This should allow commanders to build **capability** by adding modules and right-sizing **the** force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined **arms** effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this **approach**. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation: force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of **mishaps** as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

### 5. Policy (JS level with JS3)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term **U.S.** commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We **will** advise nations at the outset that 'deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also **use** care in adding new commitments of forces.
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### Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

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easy and more expensive *course* of increasing force levels. We **owe** the American people no **less**.

DHR:db  
Current MFRs/ End Strength

TAB B  
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE  
(without increasing military end strength)

1. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p><b>USD(P)</b> - Update Contingency Planning Guidance to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p><b>CJCS</b> - Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p><b>CDRJFCOM</b> – Publish &amp; oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p><b>CJCS</b> - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
c. Training and Exercises	<p><b>USD P&amp;R</b> – Update the Training Transformation [mplementationPlan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p><b>CDR JFCOM</b> – Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p><b>CDR JFCOM</b> - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into maior Service training events (FY 04)</p>
d. Global Force Management	<p><b>CJCS</b> – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Oversec implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p><b>CDR JFCOM</b> – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p><b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
c. Reserve/Active Force Balance	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the <b>18 Aug</b> SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R) and Secretary of Army</b> – work with PA&amp;E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” &amp; high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Work with USD(P&amp;R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>CDR,JFCOM:</b> In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM's roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
f. Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Work with USD(P&amp;R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)-</b> with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p><b>CJCS:</b> With Services, identify each Services need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces <b>are</b> actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	<b>USD(P&amp;R), CJCS, Service Secretaries</b> – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04).  <b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		<b>USD(AT&amp;L)</b> – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03)
i. Deployments	<b>CDRJFCOM</b> - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	<b>CJCS</b> – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	<b>Service Secretaries</b> - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		<b>USD(P)</b> – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Non-Military Jobs	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions (Oct 03).	<b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Continue progress toward achieving the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divesture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&amp;R) and USD(AT&amp;L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	<b>USD(C)</b> – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	<b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
d. Education	<b>CICS</b> – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	<b>Dir, OFT</b> – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces		<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
f. Allies	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04).</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Reserve Forces	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&amp;R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p><b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on reengineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command.</p>
j. Volunteers	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT Oct 03.</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p><b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)</p>
k. Holidays		<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p>
l. Call Ups	<p><b>CDRJFCOM</b> – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
m. Incentives	<b>USD(C) and USD(P&amp;R)</b> - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		<b>USD(P)</b> – Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) <b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	<b>USD(I)</b> – Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in our ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	<b>USD(I)</b> - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04).

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	<b>ASD(NII)</b> – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	<b>ASD(NII)</b> – with <b>CJCS</b> , conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of <b>C4</b> systems on reducing U.S.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	<b>USD(AT&amp;L)</b> - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov.03)	<b>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</b> – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04)  <b>CJCS</b> – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		<b>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</b> - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	<b>Secretary of the Army</b> - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDM I, FY04-09. (1 <sup>st</sup> Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	<b>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</b> – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. <b>U.S.</b> and Coalition Transformation	<b>CDRJFCOM</b> – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	<b>USD(P)</b> - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	<b>CDR,JFCOM</b> – with CJCS and P, OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	<b>Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders</b> – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	<b>USD(P)</b> – With ASD (NII) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	<b>CJCS</b> – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	<b>CDR,JFCOM</b> – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo).  <b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)
d. Procurement	<b>Services</b> – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	<b>USD(AT&amp;L)</b> - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04)  <b>USD(P)</b> – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Strategic Lift	<p><b>CJCS</b> – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).</p>	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p><b>Service Secretaries.</b> Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).</p>
f. Rotation Ratio	<p><b>CJCS</b> – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force.(Oct 03)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – work with D,PJA&amp;E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ration by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)</p>	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b>- assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)</p>
g. Headquarters Layering	<p><b>CJCS, USD(P&amp;R), USD(P)</b> – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03.</p> <p><b>USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS</b> – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> –with USD(P&amp;R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03).</p> <p><b>CJCS</b> – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)</p>
h. Best Practices		<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Propose options to establish a process to identify and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov. 03).</p> <p><b>CDRJFCOM</b> - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p><b>CJCS</b> - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. ( Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p><b>USD(I)</b> – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(I)</b> – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p><b>CJCS</b> - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p><b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department’s mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p><b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Work with USD(AT&amp;L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03)</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. US Foreign Commitments	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its presence. Brief SECDEF by Dec 03.	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
b. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<p><u>USD(P)</u> - Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03)</p> <p><u>USD(P)</u> - Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
c. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		<u>USD(P)</u> - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004

October 4, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
Powell Moore  
Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Regulations during 'Wartime

Here is an excellent cable from Ambassador Negroonte in Iraq concerning the difficulties he faces as a result of constrictive rules and regulations governing acquisition.

Let's get a team of people together and take this on, using concrete examples from the Ambassador's cable. We can do some real good here.

Thanks.

Attach.  
UNCLASS AMEMBASSY Baghdad Cable (P 031705Z OCT 04 ZDK)

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Please respond by 10/29/04

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OSD 02404-05

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD.  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1772.  
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001220

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: AMGT, PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: PEACETIME RULES IN A WARTIME ENVIRONMENT

1. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE, IN EFFORTS TO REBUILD IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE, DUE TO ACQUISITION REGULATIONS ILL SUITED FOR EFFORTS IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT. I ASK THAT AND DEFENSE ESTABLISH A TEAM OF PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS AND LAWYERS TO REVIEW THE SUGGESTIONS BELOW AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROVIDE RELIEF FROM THESE RULES. THIS CABLE OUTLINES PROSPECTIVE RELIEF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES UNDER COM AS WELL AS MNF-I AND ITS MNSTC-I.

2. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING DEPARTMENT OF EFFORTS TO INCREASE SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION THRESHOLD PROCUREMENT IN IRAQ FROM USD 500,000 TO USD 1 (MODIFICATION TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT PROGRESS). STATUTORY CHANGE TO 41 U.S.C. - 403 ET SEQ REQUIRED, AFFECTING FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION AND PART 13 (MNSTC-I).

3. REFERENCE FAR 13.301 (G) (1) THE CURRENT MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IS USD 15,000. RECOMMEND MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD BE INCREASED TO USD 25,000 FOR IRAQI FREEDOM REQUIREMENTS (PCO AND MNSTC-I).

4. REFERENCE FAR 5.203 (A) "PUBLICIZING AND RESPONSE TIME". THE FAR CURRENTLY READS THAT THE SYNOPSIS MUST BE PUBLISHED AT LEAST 15 DAYS PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF A SOLICITATION. RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI FREEDOM THE SYNOPSIS PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT BE REDUCED TO SEVEN DAYS. (PCO)

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF:            DEPSEC:            EXECSEC:             
C&D:            CCD:            CABLE CH:            FILE: X mem  
USDP:            DIA:            OTHER:             
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5. REFERENCE FAR 6.304(A)(1) (APPROVAL OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION). RECOMMEND CONTRACTING OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION SERVE AS APPROVAL FOR UP TO USD 1 MILLION DOLLARS OR THE LIMIT OF HIS OR HER WARRANT, WHICHEVER IS LOWER (USACE).
6. REFERENCE FAR 28.102-1 (REQUIRING PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS EXCEEDING USD 100,000). THESE REQUIREMENTS SEVERELY RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE MARKET ON THE PART OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL FIRMS (AS THEY CAN NOT OBTAIN INSURANCE AND BONDS) AND SHOULD BE WAIVED. (USACE)
7. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFORT TO MODIFY FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.249-14 AND ADD TERRORIST ACTS AS A REASON FOR EXCUSABLE DELAYS.. (MNF-I).
8. REFERENCE FAR 46.305 (A)(4) AND 52.246-25 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY BE LIMITED TO REPLACING COMPONENTS AND NOT THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES (E.G. ELECTRICITY OR WATER NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE THE WORK CAN NOT BE COMPLETED).. (MNF-I).
9. REFERENCE FAR 28.309 (B) AND 52.228-4 WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION FOR EACH PROJECT SHALL BE LIMITED TO USD 10,000 DUE TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ. (MNF-I)
10. REFERENCE FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.228-7 THIRD PERSON LIABILITY. THE CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY SHOULD BE LIMITED. (MNF-I)
11. REFERENCE FAR PART 12 AND 2.101 AND 15.4 COMMERCIAL ITEM/CERTIFIED COST DATA APPLY THE DEFINITION OF "COMMERCIAL ITEMS" TO CONSTRUCTION FOR THE REMAINDER OF IIRP. IF CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE DEFINED AS A "COMMERCIAL ITEM," WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR "CERTIFIED COST DATA" BASED ON PERFORMANCE OF DETAILED PRICE ANALYSIS ON ALL NON-COMPETED ACQUISITIONS AND CHANGES. (USAID).
12. REFERENCE FAR 52.245-2 ALT 1 (5) EQUIPMENT RISK OF LOSS ADDITIONAL WAR RISK INSURANCES DEEMED REIMBURSABLE IF SUCH INSURANCE IS AVAILABLE. IF INSURANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE (AND IT HAS NOT BEEN TO DATE), THEN U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT RISK OF LOSS ONCE EQUIPMENT CROSSES THE IRAQ BORDER.. (USAID)
13. REFERENCE DEFENSE BASE ACT, 42 USC 1651-1654; FAR 52.228-3, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE (DEFENSE BASE ACT)"; FAR 28.309, "CONTRACT CLAUSE FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE"; AND FAR 52.228-4, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WAR HAZARD INSURANCE OVERSEAS". THESE PROVISIONS TOGETHER PROVIDE THAT (WHERE THE SECRETARY OF LABOR HAS WAIVED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BASE DEFENSE ACT)

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WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE OR ITS EQUIVALENT SHALL BE SUCH AS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE NATION OF WHICH THE EMPLOYEES ARE NATIONALS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT EACH NATION'S OWN SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY STANDARDS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ITS CITIZENS. THE BASE DEFENSE ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO APPLY THIS STANDARD WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A "WAIVER" BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. (USACE)

14. REFERENCE FAR 33.201 ET SEQ., "DISPUTES AND APPEALS." THE FAR CURRENTLY PROVIDES FOR THE CONTRACTING OFFICER TO PROVIDE A CONTRACTOR WITH A "FINAL DECISION" REGARDING ANY DISPUTES THE CONTRACTOR HAS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE CONTRACTOR MAY APPEAL A CONTRACTING OFFICER'S FINAL DECISION TO EITHER THE ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS OR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS. IRAQI CONTRACTORS HAVE LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH OR ACCESS TO EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPELLATE BODIES. RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI CONTRACTORS, THEIR APPEALS FROM CONTRACTING OFFICER FINAL DECISIONS BE DECIDED WITHIN THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN IRAQ. (USACE)

15. REFERENCE FAR 6.304, "APPROVAL OF THE JUSTIFICATION". THE FAR REQUIRES JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL (J&A) ACTIONS FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION TO BE APPROVED BY OFFICIALS AT HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVELS WITHIN THE PROCURING AGENCY AND ABOVE THE AGENCY, DEPENDING UPON THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF THE PROCUREMENT. RECOMMEND THAT, FOR J&A ACTIONS RELATED TO CONTRACTS TO BE PERFORMED IN IRAQ, THE APPROVAL OFFICIAL BE THE HEAD OF THE CONTRACTING ACTIVITY FOR THE IRAQ PCO. (USACE)

16. REFERENCE FAR 28.306, "INSURANCE UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS". THE FAR SHIFTS THE RISK OF LOSS TO CONTRACTORS UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS; THE FAR LEAVES IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO BUY AND MAINTAIN INSURANCE COVERAGE AGAINST MOST RISKS. IN IRAQ, SUCH INSURANCE IS EITHER IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN OR VERY COSTLY. RECOMMEND THE FAR BE AMENDED TO ADD A "WAR RISKS" PROVISION TO ALL CONTRACTS IN IRAQ THAT MAKES CONTRACTOR LOSSES DUE TO HOSTILE ACTIONS COMPENSABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT. (USACE)

17. REFERENCE FAR 15.404-3, "SUBCONTRACT PRICING CONSIDERATIONS." THE FAR IMPOSES COST AND PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS AGAINST ALL CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS WHEN THE CONTRACT PRICE (OR ADJUSTMENT TO THE CONTRACT PRICE) REACHES A CERTAIN AGGREGATE THRESHOLD. MANY SUBCONTRACTORS IN IRAQ ARE LOCAL FIRMS OR INTERNATIONAL FIRMS, LACKING EXPERIENCE WITH U.S. COST STANDARDS AND HAVING COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS THAT DON'T MEET US STANDARDS. RECOMMEND THAT IRAQI OR INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTORS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN IRAQ MERELY HAVE TO MEET THE MORE RELAXED PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS IMPOSED BY FAR 12.209, "DETERMINATION OF PRICE REASONABLENESS." (USACE)

18. REFERENCE FAR PART 12.404 WARRANTY. WHILE WE ARE ASKING FOR A RULING THAT ALLOWS CONSTRUCTION AS A COMMERCIAL ITEM, WE ARE ALSO SUGGESTING THAT COMMERCIAL STANDARDS BE APPLIED WHICH EXCLUDE WARRANTY FOR MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE. (USAID)

19. USG VS. MINISTRY/GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ PROPERTY- EITHER DECLARE MINISTRY PROPERTY USG PROPERTY OR AGREE THAT CONTRACTORS WHO INADVERTENTLY DAMAGE MINISTRY PROPERTY ARE ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT TO REPAIR/RESTORE IT. FAR PART 46 THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED THROUGHOUT RELATE TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, WE ARE SEEKING A RULING THAT SUCH PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THE FAR WILL TREAT IRAQI PROPERTY AS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF INADVERTENT DAMAGE. (USAID)

20. ADDITIONAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT INSURANCE- SUPPLEMENTAL WAR RISK INSURANCE OVER AND ABOVE WHICH DEFENSE BASE ACT (52.228-3) PROVIDES AND COVERS. DBA COVERAGE DOES NOT IN AND OF ITSELF COMPENSATE FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY AND UNPRECEDENTED PERSONAL RISKS OF SERVICE IN IRAQ. FURTHER, UNLIKE THE SITUATION IN OTHER USAID- ASSISTED COUNTRIES WHERE DBA IS DEEMED SUFFICIENT, EMPLOYEES IN IRAQ LOSE ALL THEIR EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE DUE TO STANDARD WAR RISK EXCEPTION IN THEIR INSURANCE COVERAGE. ALLOW PURSUANT TO COST PRINCIPLES FAR 31.205-19. (USAID)

21. FAR CITATION - LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EQUAL TO VALUE OF THE SUBCONTRACT, EXCLUSIVE OF LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY CLAIMS ARISING FROM INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS AND LOSSES ARISING FROM WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL. THIS IS NOT A FAR REQUIREMENT AS SUCH-WE ARE SEEKING A BLANKET AUTHORIZATION TO INCLUDE THIS LIMITATION AS IT IS A COMMERCIAL PRACTICE UTILIZED INDUSTRY WIDE IN SITUATIONS WITH EXCESSIVE RISK. (USAID)

JEFFREY

\*\*\*\*\* RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(U,6)

1

INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS2(\*)  
SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*)  
USDAT:ENVS-ATLIE(\*) USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) USDP:ESC(\*) ESC-SMTP(\*)  
OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED.

1

#1220

NNNN

October 15, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Brownlee and Schoomaker

Please arrange a meeting for me with Les Brownlee and GEN Schoomaker to discuss this memo on Defense Attaches.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/12/04 Acting SecArmy Memo to SecDef re: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attaches

DHR:ss  
101504-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*h'1.0*

*15 OCT 04*



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

October 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attachés

The following is provided reference your inquiry regarding the Army's processes for selecting officers to serve as the Defense Attachés (DATT) to Russia and China.

The DATT billets in China and Russia are currently the only validated, joint general/flag officer requirements for defense attachés. Although not mandated for fill by a general/flag officer in Title 10, these two billets have historically been held by general/flag officers due to the nature and scope of associated duties and the attendant political significance. Of note, before being repealed by the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act, § 714, Title 10 specifically required that the DATT - ~~France~~ billet be filled with a general/ flag officer. This legislation was enacted to overcome the Department of Defense's long-standing practice of filling the DATT - France with a colonel or Navy captain.

Each of the DATT billets are filled on a rotating basis by the Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure ability to train and select officers with the right skills and experience, while also precluding over-representation of officers with a potentially limited skill set among the Services' general/flag officer ranks. The Army is scheduled to fill the DATT - China billet in 2006 and the DATT - Russia in 2007. Accordingly, the Army Competitive Category Brigadier General Promotion Boards in FY05 (DATT - China) and FY06 (DATT - Russia) will need to select one officer (each) with the needed background to represent the Department and the Nation well in these critical positions.

Historically, Army colonels selected to serve as DATTs in China, Russia (and France) have possessed advanced degrees in area studies, regional experience and language skills that were consistent with the specific country for which a general officer DATT was required. This notwithstanding, and given precedents demonstrated by the other Services, I am confident that this year's Brigadier General, Army Competitive Category Promotion Board will select the best-qualified officer from among the 121 colonels eligible for consideration who possess the requisite background to serve as a DATT (Army officers holding this specialization are termed Foreign Area Officers). Accordingly, in the Memorandum of Instruction to the board members, I intend to provide generic guidance to select the best officer to serve as the DATT-China, vice specific guidance requiring that the selected officer be one whose foreign area of concentration is China. This is especially prudent given that the selected officer must possess the skills and attributes needed to continue serving the Army and Department of Defense in a variety of other billets upon completion of his duties as the DATT - China.

R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 02408:05

11-L-0559/OSD/040146

091.4

12 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

No

No  
Silve

No

file

OCT 27 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces Updates

In the future, on the Afghan Security Forces Update, they ought to put a mark for the April elections, so people will know where the forces will be for the April elections. We may also want to put a mark on the Iraqi Security Forces Update for the January 30 elections, and the other sequenced elections later next year, when the votes are going to occur.

On the Afghan Security Forces Update, page 5, it reads *MoD/GS*. I'd prefer not to use acronyms like that on the update, if you can avoid it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102604-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Not sent to  
Chairman...  
These changes already  
accomplished.*

*v/r  
H. Col King*

OSD 02412-05

*AFGHANISTAN*

*27 Oct 04*

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Schoomaker and Brownlee

322

I would like a meeting with Gen Pete Schoomaker and Les Brownlee on the subject of the Location of Civil Affairs.

I'd like the attached memo given to me for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/27/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Location of Civil Affairs

DHR:ss  
100404-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

405704

OSD 02415-05

APR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042304-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/04

*DR*  
*DR*

*closed*  
*9/15/04 Memo*  
*to SecDef promising*  
*future brief.*

OSD 13900-04

APR 27 2004

755

322

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are **we going to get** closure on where the **Civil Affairs** functions ought to be located? What is the **pending** item there? Is it **getting** on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042304-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040150

1001111.R

30 August 2004

**INFORMATION PAPER**

**Subject:** *Army* "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest *Army* briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) **briefed the** Vice Chief of Staff, *Army* (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.
  - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
    - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US **Army** Special Operations **Command** (USASOC). Reassigning CA to *Army* Forces Command would not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the **Army** Campaign Plan.
    - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US **Army** Forces Command and USASOC.
    - Operations **would** benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level **Civil** Military Operations [**CMO**] planning/coordination capability.
    - The **Army** should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
    - USASOC must redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structure for modularity **and use** Total *Army* Analysis to review AC/RC mix.
    - Extending the Reserve Component CA branch to the Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote **the** management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
  - VCSA approved the **findings and** gave the following guidance:
    - Continue to **work** the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
    - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per **the** *Army* Campaign Plan. This should include Combat **Training** Centers.
    - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation **plan**.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
201 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations  
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also analyzed two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the Army Staff, selected Army major commands, and **selected** outside agencies. It ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues were reviewed and considered.

2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces **could** best **support** the Army by remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will **be** assigned **down** to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and **relook the AC/RC** mix.

3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team **review** and assessment the **following** three concepts were **developed**:

a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC, with **all** currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support **modularity**.

b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC **with** all CA and **PSYOP** Forces reassigned to JFCOM.

c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.

4. **Recommendation:** The CAPOTT endorses Concept 1 by **utilizing** the comparison criteria of *Training/Readiness*, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with **FORSCOM** to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

11-L-0559/OSD/040152



Recycled Paper

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of **this Tiger Team, the members are** available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to **build on** the momentum **gained thus far**. Furthermore, USASOC's pursuit of **branches** for **CA** and PSYOP will help to increase professionalism, management, and **availability of the officers** in **those** branches.

6. The **POC** ~~for~~ this action is COL Jose Olivero, **HQDA, G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)



RICHARD A. CODY  
General, United States Army  
Vice Chief of Staff

**TAB D**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

OCT 15 2004

TO: Jim McDougal  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: October 6 Letter from Sergey

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I assume this letter of Oct 6 from Sergey to me, which I just received, has been answered by our meeting and the things we hand-delivered to him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/6/04 Letter from Ivanov to SecDef re: Tule Radar Station

DHR:ss  
101404-44

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*T 10/25*

1565701

OSD 02417-05

6 October 2004

Mr. D. Rumsfeld  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
Washington D.C. United States of America

Dear Mr. Secretary

I would like to thank you for your letter of August 19, 2004 in which you responded to the Russian concerns in connection with the plan to modernize the missile strike early-warning radar station, located in Tule, Greenland.

At the same time, it would be appreciated if you could provide the Russian side with more complete information concerning the purpose, function, and capabilities of this station. Such information would help to bring the relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to a new level.

I hope that the productive work on all issues connected with the cooperation between our countries in the military sphere will continue. The Russian side is prepared for such a dialog.

Respectfully,

<signature>

S. Ivanov  
Minister of Defense  
Russian Federation

11-L-0559/OSD/040156

OSD 15867-04

A118-4

October 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accomplishments

020060

I think we've got to come up with a calculation of all the things that were done:

- the millions of people that move back and forth
- the millions of tons
- the millions of meals
- all of the weapons that were captured

The military is getting a bum rap and they've done a great job. Someone needs to go out there and explain what's been done and how magnificent it's been done. I need data for that, so let's get it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102904-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/3/04

29OCT04

file

October 19, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Druyun Statement

Please mark on this Darlene Druyun paper the things she admitted to, so I can just read it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Druyun plea

DHR:ss  
101904-7

*FAST*

*452T*

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lengyel 10/19*

*19 OCT 04*

10/19

To: SecDef

October 19, 2004

From: Paul Butler *sub*

Re: Druyn Plea

Druyn admitted to influencing 4 separate deals on behalf of Boeing (outlined in numbered paragraphs 1-4 on pages 2 and 3). *Marked and highlighted* She claims she did so in exchange for her job with Boeing and for Boeing's favorable treatment of her daughter and hiring of her son-in-law. The 4 deals are:

1. The KC 767A tanker lease deal. Druyn admits she agreed to a higher price and passed proprietary info to Boeing.
2. NATO AWACS program. Druyn admitted to influencing a decision to make an inflated \$100 million payment to Boeing in connection with a restructuring of this deal.
3. Upgrade of C 130 avionics. Druyn admitted that her selection of Boeing for this contract was influenced by Boeing having hired her son-in-law and that another contractor could have been selected absent this influence.
4. Settlement of C 17H22 contract. Druyn admitted that her decision to pay \$412 million to Boeing to settle this dispute was also influenced by Boeing's decision to hire her daughter's then boyfriend.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	
	)	
v.	)	Criminal No. 04-150-A
	)	
DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is agreed by and between the parties that the following facts are true and that they supplement the Statement of Facts filed in the above referenced case.

The Defendant's Post-Plea Admissions

On April 20, 2004 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 208(a) in the Eastern District of Virginia. As a part of that plea, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. That agreement required the defendant to provide full, complete and truthful cooperation to the government. Prior to entering the plea agreement with the United States, the defendant entered into a proffer agreement with the United States to formulate an appropriate resolution of this case. On December 2, 2003 the defendant was interviewed by agents of the government as part of the proffer agreement. On April 23, 2004 the defendant was again interviewed by government agents as part of the cooperation required by her plea agreement. The defendant now acknowledges that she provided false, misleading and untruthful information to government investigators at both of those sessions.

On July 28, 2004 the defendant was reinterviewed by government agents and acknowledged, as a result of the government's investigation, that she had not been truthful in her prior cooperation. The defendant had previously maintained that she had always acted in the best interest of the United States during her negotiations with the Boeing Company while she was employed by the Air Force. She acknowledged a conflict of interest in negotiating employment with Boeing while at the same time negotiating with Boeing on behalf of the Air Force. However, the defendant had maintained that her relationship with Boeing did not influence her official actions or harm the government.

The defendant, since July 28, 2004, now acknowledges that she did favor the Boeing Company in certain negotiations as a result of her employment negotiations and other favors provided by Boeing to the defendant. Defendant acknowledges that Boeing's employment of her future son-in-law and her daughter in 2000, at the defendant's request, along with the defendant's desire to be employed by Boeing, influenced her government decisions in matters affecting Boeing.<sup>1</sup> That as a result of the loss of her objectivity, she took actions which harmed the United States to include the following:

1. In negotiations with Boeing concerning the lease agreement for 100 Boeing KC 767A tanker aircraft, the defendant agreed to a higher price for the aircraft than she believed was

---

<sup>1</sup> The defendant also acknowledges contacting a senior official of Boeing in 2002 concerning the continued employment of her daughter by Boeing. The defendant had been told by her daughter that she feared termination by Boeing for employment performance issues. The defendant contacted a senior official of Boeing, with whom she was negotiating the KC 767A tanker lease, to prevent any adverse action by Boeing against her daughter. The daughter was not terminated and instead was transferred to a new position. This same senior Boeing official routinely updated the defendant concerning the daughter's employment with Boeing, for example advising the defendant of pay increases received by the daughter.

appropriate. The defendant did so, in her view, as a "parting gift to Boeing" and because of her desire to ingratiate herself with Boeing, her future employer. The defendant also now acknowledges providing to Boeing during the negotiations what at the time she considered to be proprietary pricing data supplied by another aircraft manufacturer.

2. During 2002 the defendant, as chairperson of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program Management Board of Directors, was involved in negotiations with Boeing concerning a restructuring of the NATO AWACS program. The defendant negotiated a payment of 100 million dollars to Boeing as part of that restructuring. The defendant now acknowledges that at the time she believed a lower amount to be an appropriate settlement and she did not act in the best interest of the United States and NATO. Her agreement to the 100 million dollar settlement was influenced by her daughter's and son-in-law's relationship with Boeing and the employment negotiations.

3. The defendant was the selection authority in 2001 for the C-130 AMP which was an Air Force procurement of more than four billion dollars to upgrade the avionics of C-130 aircraft. The defendant selected Boeing from four competitors, and now acknowledges that she was influenced by her perceived indebtedness to Boeing for employing her future son-in-law and daughter. The defendant believes that an objective selection authority may not have selected Boeing.


4. During 2000 the defendant negotiated a settlement with Boeing concerning the C-17 H22 contract clause with a senior executive of Boeing. These negotiations occurred at the time the defendant was seeking employment at Boeing for her daughter's boyfriend. The defendant's decision to agree to a payment of approximately 412 million dollars to Boeing in connection with

the C-17 H22 clause was influenced by Boeing's assistance to the defendant.


The defendant has also acknowledged since July 28, 2004 that her earlier cooperation with the government was untruthful and misleading in other respects. For example, the defendant has revealed that a notebook she had provided to government investigators had been altered by her. This notebook contained what purported to be contemporaneous notes written by the defendant when she was employed by the Air Force. The defendant now acknowledges secretly adding notations to the notebook, before providing it to the government for the purpose of supporting her version of events.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul J. McNulty  
United States Attorney


By:   
Robert Wiechering  
Assistant United States Attorney

After consulting with my attorneys and pursuant to the Supplemental Plea Agreement entered into this day between me and the United States, I hereby stipulate that the above Supplemental Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter proceeded to trial, the United States could have proved the same beyond a reasonable doubt.



Darleen A. Druyun  
Defendant

I am Darleen Druyun's attorney. I have carefully reviewed the above Supplemental Statement of Facts with her. To my knowledge, her decision to stipulate to these facts is an informed and voluntary one.



John M. Dowd  
Counsel for the Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	
	)	
v.	)	CRIMINAL NO. 04-150-A
	)	
DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,	)	
Defendant.	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL PLEA AGREEMENT

Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Robert W. Wiechering, Assistant United States Attorney, the defendant, Darleen A. Druyun, and the defendant's counsel have entered into a Supplemental Plea Agreement pursuant to paragraph 14 of the original plea agreement (hereinafter plea agreement) in criminal case 04-150-A. The terms of the Supplemental Agreement are as follows:

1. The defendant agrees and stipulates that she breached the plea agreement by not providing full, complete and truthful cooperation as required by paragraph 11 of the plea agreement. The Supplemental Statement of Facts filed with this Supplemental Plea Agreement outlines the nature of that breach and constitutes a stipulation of facts for purposes of Section 1B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

2. The defendant agrees that the United States is entitled to exercise it's remedies for the defendant's breach under the provisions of paragraph 13 of the plea agreement and as set forth in the Supplemental Plea Agreement.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of the plea agreement, the defendant agrees that the government may use information provided by her under the provisions of the plea agreement to enhance the defendant's guidelines range. Further, the defendant agrees to waive the provisions of the proffer agreement with the government dated November 25, 2003 and agrees to permit the government to use the information and statements provided by her to the government in this criminal case.

4. The parties agree to the preparation of a revised Presentence Report in this case and further agree to the following guideline calculation in this case:


- a. A base level of 6 under the provisions of § 2C1.3(a) and a 4-level increase for actual or planned harm to the government under the provisions of § 2C1.3(b).
- b. An increase of 2 levels in the offense level pursuant to the provisions of § 3C1.1 Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.
- c. No reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the provisions of § 3E.1.
- d. This results in an offense level total of 12, Criminal History Category I, and a sentencing range of 10-16 months. The defendant agrees that there exists no mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from the range determined by the court. Accordingly the defendant agrees not to seek or support any downward departure from the applicable guideline range.

5. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial on Sentencing Factors.


The defendant also waives the right to have facts that determine the offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines (including facts that support any specific offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment) (1) charged in the indictment, (2) proven to a jury, or (3) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant explicitly consents to be sentenced pursuant to the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, to have the sentence based on facts to be established by a preponderance of the evidence before the sentencing judge, and to allow the court to consider any reliable evidence without regard to its admissibility at trial. The defendant explicitly acknowledges that her plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence that is authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines up to and including the maximum sentence set forth in the United States Code. The defendant also waives all challenges to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.

6. In all other respects the plea agreement between the defendant and the United States remains in full force and effect.

Paul J. McNulty  
United States Attorney

By:   
Robert W. Wiechering  
Assistant United States Attorney


APPROVED:

  
John Klein  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Supervisor Fraud Unit


Date of Approval:

4-28-2004

Defendant's Signature: I have read this Supplemental Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand this agreement and voluntarily agree to it.

Date: 8/27/04   
Darleen A. Drayun  
Defendant

Defense Counsel Signature: I am counsel for the defendant in this case. I have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, the defendant's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Date: 8/29/04   
John M. Dowd  
Counsel for the Defendant

10/20 1930

~~FOUO~~

file

USDP COPY

October 15, 2004  
ES-1065  
04/013844

TO: Jim MacDougall  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

Here is the letter Ivanov gave me on Orlov. You will recall it came up in my meeting with him.

Please handle it from here.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Ivanov Letter to SecDef re: Orlov

DHR:ss  
10140443

R  
U  
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Paul Butler

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 18 2004

10/21  
→

See ref

Mr. Secretary:

In your meeting, Ivanov reported Orlov was in custody in Prague and that Ukraine asked the Czech Republic to extradite him. I have passed this on to CIA and State and will continue to follow up on this with them, the Russians and the Ukrainians.

15 OCT 04

OSD 02420-05

Respectfully,  
15-10-04 18:55 IN

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/040169 JIM MAC DOUGALL

Moscow, October \_\_\_\_ , 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Let me express my gratitude to you for the information released regarding the complicity of Oleg Orlov in an attempted smuggling operation involving an IGLA-type man-portable air defense system to be illicitly shipped into Iran.

We have undertaken a preliminary investigation in regard to the said person, which brought us to a conclusion that the person indicated has no affiliation with state-run, or any other, structures involved in military and technical cooperation with foreign states on behalf of the Russian Federation.

The information furnished by you in regard to the activities pursued by Oleg Orlov has been promptly forwarded to the relevant law enforcement agencies with an object of undertaking investigative work as appropriate. Any credible information worthy of interest will be forwarded to you through military diplomatic channels.

Respectfully yours,

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

S.Ivanov

Attn. The Rt. Hon. D.Rumsfeld  
US Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C., US

OSD 02420-05

11-L-0559/OSD/040170

Russia

15 OCT 04

15 OCT 04



Москва, 13 октября 2004 г.

Уважаемый господин Министр.

Позвольте выразить Вам мою признательность за предоставленную информацию о причастности гражданина Олега Орлова к попытке организовать по нелегальным каналам поставку ПЗРК типа «Игла» в Иран.

Мы провели предварительное расследование в отношении этого гражданина, в результате которого пришли к выводу о том, что указанный фигурант не имеет никакого отношения к государственным или другим структурам, осуществляющим военно-техническое сотрудничество с иностранными государствами от имени Российской Федерации.

Ваша информация о деятельности Олега Орлова была оперативно адресована соответствующим правоохранительным структурам с целью проведения необходимых следственных действий. При получении от этих структур какой-либо заслуживающей внимания информации, направим ее Вам по военно-дипломатическим каналам.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

 С.Иванов

Господину Д.Рамсфельду  
Министру обороны США  
г.Вашингтон, США

11-L-0559/OSD/040171

7201  
TAB

2004 JAN 27 10 53 AM  
2004 JAN 27 10 53 AM  
29  
January 27, 2004

676

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, "Oh the Joint Staff is connected."

I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is.

**Thanks.**

DHR:dh  
012704-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

OSD 02430-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040172

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

CM-1532-04

18 February 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMyers 2/18*

SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

- **Question.** "In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, 'Oh the Joint Staff is connected.' I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is."  
(TAB)
- **Answer.** It is my understanding that DOD is not currently involved, and potential involvement will be based on the Commission's request. To date, my staff has not been tasked or requested to respond to any of its findings or deliberations, nor asked to attend meetings. I am not aware of any other participation within the DOD.
- **Analysis.** The President created the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba on 30 November 2003 via NSPD-29 to identify additional means by which the United States can assist the Cuban people to bring about an expeditious end of the dictatorship. The Commission is co-chaired by the Secretaries of State and Housing and Urban Development. Other members include: the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce and Homeland Security; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Administrator of the US Agency for International Development. NSPD-29 states that DOD participation is required only if requested by the co-chairs to address issues pertaining to specific areas of responsibility.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 02430-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040173

TAB

29  
January 27, 2004

676

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, "Oh the Joint Staff is connected."

I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

OSD 02430-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040174

Tab

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

CC: Adm. Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

**SUBJECT:**

Attached is a memo from SecNav, Chief of Naval Operations on some legislation that is needed.

I hope we will provide every assistance to this memo, assuring this gets passed by Congress.

Please keep me posted as to the progress of this legislation.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604E.01ts

Attach: Depr. Navy note re: Alternative Crewing Concepts for Warships 2/13/04

Please respond by:

6/30

*9/17*

*TO: See Def*

*Sir*

*Response Attached*

*Col B*

*7/12*

**OSD 02431-04**

*2012*

*(6 JUN 04)*

*13 Feb 04*

*7/10  
1800*

*720*

*File*

*J  
7/12*



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF THE DEFENSE

Via: *Sec Nav*  
FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Alternative Crewing Concepts for Selected Warships

- Mr. Secretary, Navy will conduct a demonstration of alternative crewing concepts for selected categories of warships. Project seeks to reduce military members involved in other than duties directly related to combat.
- Barriers exist in current International and U.S. laws:
  - o Only a warship may conduct belligerent operations, and a warship must be manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline.
  - o Under US law, civilian crewmembers could be subject to UCMJ in a time of declared war.
  - o If a warship engages in hostilities, civilian crewmembers may be deemed unlawful combatants and denied protections under the Geneva Conventions, even if subject to the UCMJ.
- Navy will introduce legislation to gain greater flexibility in the use and protection of civilians and will pilot a program on USS CORONADO to modify international law with respect to the status of civilians performing non-combatant functions on certain categories of warships performing belligerent operations.
- Beginning Feb 04 and ending with her decommissioning by 30 Sep 05, 350 of the 450 USN crew on the command ship USS CORONADO will be replaced by 150 CIVMARS. CIVMARS will perform only functions not directly related to combat (navigation, engineering, deck/stewards department). Commanding Officer will be active duty Navy. 100 active duty Sailors and embarked fleet commander's staff will perform command and control functions and any assigned belligerent operations.
- During this period, CORONADO will deploy in support of 7th Fleet operations. Risk of CORONADO's engaging in belligerent operations in this timeframe is low, but she will participate in international exercises and port visits. We gain the opportunity to socialize the concept of non-combatant civilians serving as crewmembers of some categories of warships with the international community, while reducing the cost of operations by \$5M.
- Follow on candidates for similar crewing concepts include other command ships, submarine tenders, Afloat Forward Staging Bases, Maritime Prepositioning Force Future.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Captain S. DeLong, N42, (b)(6)

Cc: CJCS

OSD 02431-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040176

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF USE OF CIVILIAN MARINERS ON SELECTED  
WARSHIPS

Summary. USS CORONADO will retain designation as warship and be partially crewed by civilian mariners (CIVMARS) in a pilot program as the Seventh Fleet flagship. However, under international law, a warship must be manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline and civilians must not directly participate in hostilities. To comply with these requirements, legislation authorizing activation of CIVMARS as naval reservists will satisfy the legal requirements.

Discussion.

1. The transition of CORONADO from a military to a partial CIVMAR crew presents two legal issues under international law:

a. First, under international treaties and customary international law, only warships may engage in belligerent activities (generally, these include engaging in combat, and other offensive activities in which the entire crew is considered to participate, including visit and search, blockade, interdiction, and convoy escort operations). To be classified as a warship, two of the four requirements for a ship include being under the command of a commissioned officer, and manned by a crew under an armed forces discipline system.

CORONADO will be under the command of a commissioned officer. CIVMARS can be subject to regular armed forces discipline through a requirement of naval reserve affiliation, and enacting legislation that will activate them upon designation by the Secretary of Defense. Alternatively, legislation could subject them to the Uniform Code of Military Justice upon designation by the Secretary of Defense without reserve affiliation. Navy will introduce these legislative proposals, which will provide greater future flexibility in the use and protection of civilians.

b. Second, civilians who directly participate in hostilities may be deemed to be unlawful combatants, and do not have the protections under the Geneva Conventions. The proposed legislation authorizing reserve activation will have the added benefit of protecting the CIVMARS on this issue (unlike the UCMJ alternative) since, as military members, they will be lawful combatants during hostilities.

2. Utilization of CORONADO in the pilot program will precede enactment of legislation. To gain international acceptance that civilian members of a warship's crew may perform various shipboard functions (engineering, navigation, support services, etc.) as long as they do not participate in activities that cause direct and immediate harm to the enemy, this concept will be introduced through actual practice, diplomatic clearance requests, and publication to the international community.

Prepared by: RADM M. F. Lohr, (b)(6)  
Mr. J. E. Baggett, (b)(6)

**COORDINATION**

•  
Military Sealift Command

VADM Brewer

7 Jan04

OJAG

RADM Lohr

7 Jan04

7/6  
1800

2004/9/17



LEGISLATIVE

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 6, 2004 5:00 PM

801.2

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 060603E.01ts

- This responds to your request that we provide "every assistance" to the Navy in advancing their proposed legislation for Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS) assuring it gets passed by Congress.
- The Navy did not submit any new legislative initiatives concerning CIVMARS to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance as part of its Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) and Navy are continuing to resolve issues internally before preparing and submitting proposed legislation.
- Legislation will not be ready in time to be considered for Fiscal Year 2005.

(6 JUL 04)

Attachments:  
SECDEF Snowflake w/attachments

Prepared by Tom Jones, (b)(6)

13 FEB 04



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 28, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding SECNAV Memo on CIVMAR  
Legislation # 060604E.01ts

No change in status, from my previous memo dated July 6, on proposed legislation concerning CIVMARS.

11-L-0559/OSD/040180

02431.04

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004  
I-04/016582  
ES-1616

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Expressing Gratitude


We need to thank the people who were involved in helping us prevail in Afghanistan. Now that the President of Afghanistan has been inaugurated, it is the time, for example, to write Karimov and MoD Gulomov in Uzbekistan, and send them something or thank them. We couldn't have done it without Uzbekistan.

I need a list of the people like that - Pakistan, the Brits, and others who were helpful. We need to get a full list, and then we need to develop a terrific letter. Also, let's think about sending them some memorabilia or something and marking the historic event that took place.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120804-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

*An Afghan  
Letter should  
go ~~to~~ to the  
Preliminary decisions.*  


*Sir,  
Response Attached  
VLF, 100 B/8*

Afghanistan

8 Dec 04

OSD 02458-05

03-12-04 11:00 18

720  
UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

January 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Spain

At the January 14 White House dinner, President Aznar of Spain talked to me about the fact that apparently the U.S. Navy has agreed to sell Tomahawk missiles to the Spanish Navy. He said now it needs a political push, so I need someone to tell me what that is about.

He mentioned the new frigates with Aegis and how important that will be.

He mentioned that the submarine construction is getting started, and they are going to want US combat systems. He asked me to be helpful if I could.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011504-8

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 02513-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/040182

UNCLASSIFIED

Spain

15 Jan 04

SECRET

REF ID: A6321

February 8, 2004

**TO:** David Chu

**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** Individual Ready Reserve

I think we need to rethink the Individual Ready Reserve and their availability or lack of availability, the extent to which we track them and how we ought to value them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-53

.....  
*Please respond by*

2 / 18 / 04

OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040183



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
2004 FEB 19 04:22

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

February 19, 2004 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - SNOWFLAKE

- We have begun rethinking the use and management of the IRR.
- Over 30,000 IRR members were mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, which constituted 11.5% of the total Reserve force called up. For the current operation, about 6,500 have been mobilized — or about 2% of the Reserve force called up.
- IRR members are required to keep their Service informed of their address and other personnel information. Although the Services use both public and commercial locator services, some have had difficulty tracking IRR members. We have a legislative proposal for FY05 that would allow the IRS to provide DoD with address information on IRR members.
- The Marine Corps has placed a higher value on its IRR force than the other Services, and as a result has had more success in using that force — both in peacetime and wartime.
- Pilot programs in the areas of Arabic linguists and Spectrum Management (Wireless Engineers) have been undertaken to test innovative management and use of the IRR concepts.
- Other concepts for enhanced management and use of the IRR are being developed by the Services and the OSD staff. We plan to complete this work at the annual IRR conference scheduled for July, so the first ideas can be used to support OIF 3.
- We will include an update on IRR in the next “rebalancing” SLRG.

INFORMATION ONLY

Prepared by: Dan Kohner, OASD/RA (M&P) (b)(6)



OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040184

February 8, 2004

**TO:** David Chu  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld   
**SUBJECT:** Individual Ready Reserve

I think we need *to* rethink the Individual Ready Reserve and their availability or lack of availability, the extent *to* which we track them and how we ought *to* value them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-53

.....  
Please respond by

2 / 18 / 04

OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040185



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

020 1 19 2004  
07:57:12 PM 6:31

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**INFO MEMO**

February 19, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. ~~Chen~~ USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chen 19 Feb 04*

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components – SNOWFLAKE

- In your July 9, 2003, memo you had indicated a planning factor of not involuntarily calling up Reserve members more than one year out of every six. Our recommendation to you reflected a judgment as to what might be sustainable. As is evident, it implies approximately three years active service in a 20-year service career.
- Though there has been some discussion regarding flexibility in implementing this guidance, it has been widely reported and is generally accepted as approximately right by the Military Departments and Reserve Components.
- What really counts is what Reservists think. Reserve member expectation management is critical.
- We are undertaking an evidentiary process using survey research, empirical data, and modeling to determine the effect of activation on recruiting and retention-- some results are expected this year. In our April status of forces surveys we will ask about the frequency of call up, which will give us a better basis for judging the appropriateness of one in six.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

OSD 02515-04



February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in 50 years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-55

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

OSD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040187

SECRET

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in **50** years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-55

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

OSD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040188



7:35 PM

TO: George Tenet  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gen. Hayden**

I talked to Mike Hayden today. He has agreed to stay on from September '04 to September '05.

He said he would like to meet with the three of us and talk about what he would like to get accomplished over the next 18 months.

Let's have him to lunch **at** the next meeting. Steve, why don't you include him if that is OK with George.

Thanks

*Cathy*  
*Burnan 2/19*

DHR/azn  
021804.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*O'D NSA*

*18 Feb 04*

OSD 02521-04

2/12  
2004

720

February 8, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: End Strength Language

I want to see the proposed legislation we have to get new end strength language.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-52

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

320.2

✓  
2/20

Sir,  
Response attached.  
rr/cor Noseny  
2/19

8 Feb 04

12 Feb 04

OSD 02523-04

Rec'd 11 Feb  
-50



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
4/20

INFO MEMO

February 12, 2004, 5:11 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: New Legislation concerning End Strength

- This responds to your request to see the proposed legislation on getting new end strength language.
- The Department has not submitted any major new legislative initiatives concerning end strength to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance as part of its Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) is reviewing options for new legislation, including re-submission of the bold proposal eliminating end strength in favor of average strength that the Department submitted last year as part of the Department of Defense Transformation Bill. (TAB A)
- Last year, the Senate supported the Department's average strength proposal, but the House did not. The ensuing Conference Committee agreed upon an amendment requiring the Department to submit planned end-of-quarter strength reports in addition to the existing annual end strength report. (TAB B) The final provision enacted by Congress last year did not include the Department's average strength proposal.
- I expect to deliver the Department's OMB-cleared Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program to Congress at the beginning of March. USD(P&R) is aware of this time frame.

*Del-14*  
*320.2*

*12 Feb 04*

Attachments: As stated

COORDINATION: (1) USD(P&R) B. Loo 2/12/04  
(2) ASD(LA) D. Stanley 2/12/04

Prepared by Vic Bernson, (b)(6)

OSD 02523-04



**SEC. 131. MEASURING PERSONNEL STRENGTHS.**

1 (a) **STRENGTH ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENT.**—section 115 of title 10, United States Code.

2 is amended —

3 (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

4 "(a) Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for  
5 each of the following:

6 "(1) The average strength for each of the armed forces (other than the  
7 Coast Guard) for active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds  
8 appropriated for active-duty personnel.

9 "(2) The average strength for each of the armed forces (other than the  
10 Coast Guard) for active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty  
11 personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

12 "(3) The average strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve  
13 component of the armed forces.";

14 (2) in subsection (b)—

15 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";  
16 and

17 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

18 (3) in subsection (c)—

19 (A) in paragraph (1)—

20 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
21 "strength"; and

22 (ii) by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)"; and

1 (B) in paragraph (2)—

2 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
3 "strength"; and

4 (ii) by striking "(a)(1)(B)" and inserting "(a)(2)"; and

5 (C) in paragraph (3)—

6 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
7 "strength"; and

8 (ii) by striking "(a)(2)" and inserting "(a)(3)";

9 **(4)** in subsection (d)—

10 (A) by striking "end-strengths" and inserting "strengths";

11 (B) by striking "subsection (a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of  
12 subsection (a)";

13 (C) in paragraph (9)(B), by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)";

14 (5) in subsection (e), by striking "subsection (a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1)  
15 and (2) of subsection (a)";

16 (6) in subsection (f)—

17 (A) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
18 "strength"; and

19 (B) by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)"; and

20 (7) in subsection (g), by striking "end strength" both places it appears and  
21 inserting "strength".

22 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. — (1) Subparagraph (A) of section 168(f)(1) of such title

1 is amended—

2 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength"; and

3 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of section  
4 115(a)".

5 (2) Subsection(f) of section 691 of such title is amended by striking "section 115(a)(1)"  
6 and inserting "paragraphs(1) and (2) of section 115(a)";

7 (3) Subsection(b) of section 3201 of such title is amended by striking "section 115(a)(1)"  
8 and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 115(a)";

9 (4) Paragraph (4) of section 12310(c) of such title is amended—

10 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

11 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)(B) and 115(a)(2)" and inserting "section  
12 115(a)(2) and 115(a)(3)";

13 (5) Subsection(d) of section 16132 of such title is amended—

14 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength"; and

15 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)(B)" and inserting "section 115(a)(2)".

16 (6) Section 112 of title 32, United States Code, is amended—

17 (A) in subsection (e)—

18 (i) in the heading, by striking "END-STRENGTH" and inserting  
19 "STRENGTH"; and

20 (ii) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

21 (B) in subsection(f)—

22 (i) in the heading, by striking "END-STRENGTH" and inserting

- 1 "STRENGTH"; and
- 2 (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";
- 3 and
- 4 (C) in subsection (g)(1), by striking "end strengths" and inserting "strengths".

### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

This section would change the method DoD uses to measure the strength for active duty and Reserve component personnel from strength at the end of the fiscal year to average strength throughout the year.

Managing by average strength is consistent with the process used to budget personnel appropriations and is a more realistic approach to managing active duty and Reserve personnel effectively. This approach would improve readiness by allowing DoD to better meet manning requirements rather than planning for a specific number on one day at the end of the year. Managing for a one-day strength encourages poor strength management practices, particularly in the 4th quarter where manning surges such as delaying retirements and other losses, and increasing recruiting takes place. These practices negatively impact real force readiness and quality.

This section would allow DoD to sustain adequate personnel over the entire year

on maintenance conducted from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003.

(4) **An** itemization of improved corrosion repair processes for KC-135E and KC-135R aircraft used between fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 2003 which resulted in a decrease in the number of manhours required for control and treatment of corrosion.

(5) **An** analysis of the relationship between manhours for corrosion repair as set forth under paragraph (2) and the processes set forth under paragraph (4).

(6) **An** analysis of major structural repairs required due to corrosion for KC-135E and KC-135R aircraft annually from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003.

## TITLE IV—MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

### Subtitle A—Active Forces.

- Sec. 401. End strengths for active forces.  
 Sec. 402. Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum levels.  
 Sec. 403. Personnel strength authorization and accounting process.

### Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

- Sec. 411. End strengths for Selected Reserve.  
 Sec. 412. End strengths for Reserves on active duty in support of the reserves.  
 Sec. 413. End strengths for military technicians (dual status).  
 Sec. 414. Fiscal year 2004 limitations on non-dual status technicians.  
 Sec. 415. Permanent limitations on number of non-dual status technicians.

### Subtitle C—Authorizations of Appropriations

- Sec. 421. Military personnel.  
 Sec. 422. Armed Forces Retirement Home.

## Subtitle A—Active Forces

10 USC 115 note. SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy,
- (3) The Marine Corps,
- (4) The Air Force,

SEC. 402. REVISION IN PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS.

Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

- (1) ARMY.—Paragraph (1) is amended by striking “480,000” and inserting “482,400”.
- (2) NAVY.—Paragraph (2) is amended by striking “375,700” and inserting “373,800”.
- (3) AIR FORCE.—Paragraph (4) is amended by striking “359,000” and inserting “359,300”.

SEC. 403. PERSONNEL STRENGTH AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTING PROCESS.

(a) QUARTERLY STRENGTH LEVELS.—section 115 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (c), (e), and (g) as subsections (e), (g), and (c), respectively, and by transferring—

(A) subsection (c), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (d);

(B) subsection (g), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (f); and

(C) subsection (e), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (b);

(2) by transferring subsection (d) to the end of such section and redesignating that subsection as subsection (h); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (c), as redesignated and transferred by paragraph (1), the following new subsection (d):

“(d) **END-OF-QUARTER STRENGTH LEVELS.**—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President’s budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary’s proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary’s proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

“(2)(A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

“(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

“(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Services of the House of Representatives of that strength or of that modification, as the case may

(b) **CONFORMING AND STYLISTIC AMENDMENTS.**—Such is further amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting “ACTIVE-DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.—” after “(a)”;

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “LIMITATION ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL.—” after “(b)”;

(3) in subsection (c), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(4), by inserting “MILITARY TECHNICIAN (DUAL STATUS) END STRENGTHS TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.—” after “(c)”;

(4) in subsection (e), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(1), by inserting “AUTHORITY FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VARIANCES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS.—” after “(e)”;

(5) in subsection (f)—

(A) by inserting “AUTHORITY FOR SERVICE SECRETARY VARIANCES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTHS.—” after “(f)”;

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (c)(1)” and inserting “subsection (e)(1)”;

(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(4), by inserting “ADJUSTMENT WHEN COAST GUARD IS OPERATING AS A SERVICE IN THE NAVY.—” after “(g)”;

(7) in subsection (h), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(2), by inserting “CERTAIN ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL EXCLUDED FROM COUNTING FOR ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTHS.—” after “(h)”.

(c) CROSS REFERENCE AMENDMENTS.—Section 10216 of such title is amended by striking “section 115(g)” each place it appears and inserting “section 115(c)”.

10 USC 115 note.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (d) of section 115 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(3), shall apply with respect to the budget request for fiscal year 2005 and thereafter.

## Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

10 USC 12001 note.

### SEC. 411. END STRENGTHS FOR SELECTED RESERVE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for Selected Reserve personnel of the reserve components as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 350,000.

(2) The Army Reserve, 205,000.

(3) The Naval Reserve, 85,900.

(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 39,600.

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 107,030.

(6) The Air Force Reserve, 75,800.

(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 10,000.

(b) ADJUSTMENTS.—The end strengths prescribed by subsection (a) for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by—

(1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at the end of the fiscal year; and

(2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at the end of the fiscal year.

# REPORT LANGUAGE

681

Service	FY 2003 authorized	FY 2004		Change from	
		Request	Recommendation	FY 2004 request	FY 2003 authorized
Air Force .....	359,000	359,300	359,300	0	300
<b>DOD Total .....</b>	<b>1,389,700</b>	<b>1,388,100</b>	<b>1,390,500</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>800</b>

## *Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum levels (sec. 402)*

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 402) that would establish new permanent active duty end strength minimum levels in section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, for the Army and Air Force as of September 30, 2004.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would set the following minimum end strengths: Army, 482,400; Navy, 373,800 and Air Force, 359,300.

## *Personnel strength authorization and accounting process (sec. 403)*

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 421) that would authorize a change to the method used by the Department of Defense to measure the strength for active duty and reserve component personnel from strength at the end of the fiscal year to average strength throughout the year.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe quarterly end strength levels for each service and permissible maximum variances of actual strength at the end of each quarter. The levels and variances established by the Secretary should be such that they support maintenance throughout the year of the personnel strengths necessary to achieve the annual authorized end-strength levels.

## Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

### *End strengths for Selected Reserve (sec. 411)*

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 411) that would authorize the following end strengths for the selected reserve personnel, including the end strength for reserves on active duty in support of the reserves, as of September 30, 2004: Army National Guard, 350,000; the Army Reserve, 205,000; the Naval Reserve, 85,900; the Marine Corps Reserve, 39,600; the Air National Guard, 107,000; the Air Force Reserve, 75,800.

The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 413) that would authorize an end strength for the Air National Guard of 107,030.

The House recedes.

The conferees' recommended Selected Reserve end strengths for fiscal year 2004 are set forth in the following table:

Service	FY 2003 authorized	FY 2004		Change from	
		Request	Conferees recommendation	FY 2004 request	FY 2003 authorized
Army National Guard .....	350,000	350,000	350,000	0	0

2/24  
0800  
43  
1500

no 129

~~W~~

Sec Def

C92  
3/17

We could schedule  
a Town Hall with them, and  
have Haynes brief on election  
year ethics  
other topics.

January 12, 2004

D. Rita  
Larry Di Rita  
311

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and  
take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

Ray Dubors:  
Please provide SD w/a  
list of PAS + Sched e + ~~SES~~ (Bit)  
appointees here today.

4  
1/30

Thanks,  
Jaymie

Suspense: 2/4/04

OSD 02562-04

2305 Supergrades

120 Feb 04

2/24  
2840

3/17



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRETARY OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 20 PM 5:25

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

INFOMEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois* 2/20/04

SUBJECT: DoD Team - Breakout of Personnel

2305 Supergrades

- In the attached snowflake, dated January 12, 2004, you requested a list of personnel you selected for your DoD team. Per clarification with Jaymie Durnan, we understood that you would like a listing of Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation, Non-Career SES members, and Schedule C appointees that **are** here today.
- We have also included the Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees who are members of your DoD Team.
- Tab A lists 38 Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation; Tab B lists 87 Non-Career SES Members; Tab C lists 113 Schedule C appointees; and Tab D lists 12 Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees. In sum, they constitute the **250** members of your DoD Team that are presently serving in the Department.
- Lists, which **are** arranged in alphabetical order, include names of personnel and their position titles, with separate breakouts for OSD and the Military Departments.

COORDINATION None

Attachments:

**As** stated

Prepared By: Linda Roper, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SRI MA COWDOCK	
SA BUCKI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	2/24

2DFeb04

OSD 02562-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040201



**PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES/SENATE CONFIRMATION**

**Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Name	Position Title
✓ ABELL CHARLES S.	DUSD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
✓ CAMBONE STEPHENA.	USD (INTELLIGENCE)
✓ CHRISTIE THOMAS P.	DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
✓ CHU DAVID S. C.	USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
✓ FEITH DOUGLAS J.	USD (POLICY)
✓ HALL THOMAS F.	ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ HAYNES WILLIAM J. II	GENERAL COUNSEL
✓ HENRY CHRISTOPHER R.	PDUSD (POLICY)
✓ KLEIN DALE E.	ATSD (NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, & BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM)
✓ MCHALE PAUL F.	ASD (HOMELAND DEFENSE)
✓ MOORE POWELL A.	ASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
✓ OCONNELL THOMAS W.	ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS & LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)
✓ RODMAN PETER W.	ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
✓ SEGA RONALD M.	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
✓ SCHMITZ, JOSEPH	INSPECTOR GENERAL
✓ <del>STENBIT JOHN P.</del>	ASD (NETWORKS & INFORMATION INTEGRATION)
✓ WINKENWERDER WILLIAM JR.	ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
✓ WOLFOWITZ PAUL D.	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
✓ WYNNE MICHAEL W.	DUSD (ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY)
✓ <del>ZAKHEIM DOV E.</del>	USD (COMPTROLLER)

**Department of the Army**

Name	Position Title
BOLTON CLAUDE M. JR.	ASA (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS & TECHNOLOGY)
BROWN REGINALD J.	ASA (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ BROWNLEE LES R.	UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
MORELLO STEVEN J.	GENERAL COUNSEL
WOODLEY JOHN P. JR.	ASA (CIVIL WORKS)

Name	Position Title
✓ AVILES DIONEL M.	ASN (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & COMPTROLLER)
✓ ENGLAND GORDON R.	SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
✓ JOHNSON HANSFORD T.	ASN (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
✓ MORA ALBERTO	GENERAL COUNSEL
✓ NAVAS WILLIAM A. JR.	ASN (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ YOUNG JOHN J.	ASN (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)

**Department of the Air Force**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>
DOMINGUEZ MICHAEL L.	ASAF (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
GIBBS NELSON F.	ASAF (INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT & LOGISTICS)
MONTELONGO MICHAEL	ASAF (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ROCHE JAMES G.	SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
SAMBUR MARVIN R.	ASAF (ACQUISITION)
TEETS PETER B.	UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WALKER MARY L.	GENERAL COUNSEL

## NONCAREER SES EMPLOYEES

### Office of the Secretary of Defense & Defense Agencies

Name	Position Title
BEEHLER ALEX A.	ADUSD (ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH)
BERKSON BRADLEY M.	DIRECTOR, STUDIES & ANALYSIS
BERNSON VICTOR E. JR.	DIRECTOR, DOD LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
BOYANTON EARL B. JR.	ADUSD (TRANSPORTATION POLICY)
BRZEZINSKI IAN J.	DASD (NATO & EUROPE)
BUTLER PAUL W.	DASD (SPEC OPS PROG SUPPORT)
CEBROWSKI ARTHUR K.	DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
COHEN BENEDICT S.	DEP GEN COUNSEL (ENVIRONMENT & INSTALLATIONS)
COHEN ROBERT S.	SR HOMELAND DEFENSE ADVISOR FOR CIVIL SPT
COLLINS JOSEPH J.	DASD (STABILITY OPERATIONS)
DAVIS LISA A.	PADUSD (INDUSTRIAL POLICY)/DIR INDUSTRIAL BASE MGT INITIATIVE
DECAIN VINCENT F.	PADUSD (INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY SECURITY)
DEGRAFFENREID KENNETH E.	DUSD (POLICY SUPPORT)
DELL'ORTO DANIEL J.	PRINCIPAL DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRITA LAWRENCE	PDASD(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)/THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DUBOIS RAYMOND F. JR.	DIR ADMIN & MGT/DIR WHS/DUSD(INST & ENVRN)
DUEHRING CRAIG W.	PDASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DURNAN JAYMIE A.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY & DEPUTY SECRETARY DEFENSE
ESPER MARK T.	DASD (NEGOTIATIONS POLICY)
ESPERNE JEANINE V.	DASD (HOUSE AFFAIRS)
FLORY PETER C W	PDASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
FORD NELSON M	DASD (HEALTH BUDGET & FINANCIAL POLICY)
GALBRAITH EVAN G.	DEFENSE ADVISOR, US MISSION TO NATO
GRONE PHILIP W.	PADUSD (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
GUTHRIE PRISCILLA E.	DASD (DEPUTY CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER)
HAAVE CAROL A.	DUSD (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SECURITY)
HARTFORD JOHN A. JR.	SPEC ASST FOR INTEL MATTERS & SPEC ACTIVITIES
HOPPS JOHN H. JR.	DDDR&E/DUSD (LABORATORIES & BASIC SCIENCE)
JENNINGS JERRY D.	DASD (POW/MISSING PERSONNEL)/DIRECTOR, DPMPO
KRIEG KENNETH J.	DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
LANZILLOTTA LAWRENCE J.	PDUSD (COMPTROLLER)/DUSD (MGMT REFORM)
LAWLESS RICHARD P. JR.	DASD (ASIA & PACIFIC)
LUTI WILLIAM J.	DUSD (SPEC PLANS & NEAR EAST/ASIAN AFFA)
MARSHALL ANDREW W.	DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
MAYBERRY PAUL W.	DUSD (READINESS)
MOFFITT STEPHEN R.	DASD (SENATE AFFAIRS)
MOLINO JOHN M.	DUSD (MILITARY COMMUNITY & FAMILY POLICY)
NICHOLAS DAVID R.	SECRETARY DEFENSE REP TO OSCE
NORQUIST DAVID L.	DUSD (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
OBEIRNE JAMES H.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR WHITE HOUSE LIAISON
PARDO MAURER ROGELIO IV.	DASD (WESTERN HEMISPHERE)
PATRICK SUZANNE D.	DUSD (INDUSTRIAL POLICY)

Name	Position Title
PATTERSON JACK D.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY & DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAYTON SUE C.	DUSD (ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS)
PENN BUDDIE J.	DIRECTOR, INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT
RAMOS FRANK M.	DIRECTOR, SMALL & DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
RICARDEL MIRA R.	PDASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
ROOD JOHN C.	DASD (FORCES POLICY)
ROWELL SCOTT W.	DASD (STRATEGY, PLANS, RESOURCES)
RUFF RICHARD N.	SPEC ADV TO DEFSECDEF FOR COMMUNICATIONS STRGY
SCHROEDER WAYNE A.	DUSD (RESOURCE PLANNING/MANAGEMENT)
SHAW JOHN A.	DUSD (INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY SECURITY)
STANLEY DANIEL R.	PDASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
TETHER ANTHONY J.	DIRECTOR, DARPA
<del>THIESSEN MARG</del>	SPEC ASST FOR SPEECHWRITING
THOMAS JAMES P. JR.	SPEC ASST TO USD (POLICY)
TORNBERG DAVID N.	DASD (CLINICAL & PROGRAM POLICY)
WELLS LINTON II	PDASD (NETWORKS & INFORMATION INTEGRATION)
WESTPHAL MICHAEL A.	DASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS & COMBAT TERRORISM)
WILLCOX CHRISTOPHER P.	DASD (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLANNING)
WINKLER JOHN D	DASD (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)

#### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
ARMBRUSTER WILLIAM A.	DASA(PRIVATIZATION & PARTNERSHIP)
DENNING DANIEL B.	PDASA (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DUNLOP GEORGE S.	PDASA (CIVIL WORKS)/DASA (LEGISLATION)
KELLEY THOMAS E. II	SPEC ASST TO SEC OF THE ARMY (SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY).
KROHN CHARLES A.	PRIN DEP TO THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (MEDIA RELATIONS)
PROSCH GEOFFREY G.	PDASA (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
SHEARER RUSSELL H. C.	SPEC ASSISTANT TO THE ASA (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
WHITE SARAH	DASA (FORCE MGMT, MANPOWER & RESOURCES)
WILLIAMS AVON N.	PRIN DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
<b>SES Noncareer Presidential Appointees that do not require Senate confirmation</b>	
WHERLEY DAVID F. JR.	DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GUARD
SCHWARTS ERROLL	DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD
	Noncareer Detailee from NASA

#### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
ARNY WAYNE	DASN (INSTALLATIONS & FACILITIES)
BARNUM HAR	DASN (RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT)
BLAIR ANITA K.	DASN (MIL PERSONNEL PROGRAMS)
EARL ROBERT L.	SPEC ASST TO THE SEC OF THE NAVY
KRANZ THOMAS K.	DEP GENERAL COUNSEL (LEGISLATION & SPECIAL COUNSEL)
KUNESH NICHOLAS J.	DASN (LOGISTICS)

SCHREGARDUS DONALD R.	DASN (ENVIRONMENT)
SMITH ROGER M.	DASN (LITTORAL & MINE WARFARE SYSTEMS)

**Department of the Air Force**

Name	Position Title
BODIE WILLIAM C.	SPEC ASST FOR POLICY AND PLANNING
CRAVEN KELLY F.	DASAF (FORCE MANAGEMENT & INTEGRATION)
DICKMAN ROBERT S.	DEPUTY FOR MILITARY SPACE
KOETZ MAUREEN T.	DASAF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH)
MARTINEZ SHIRLEY A.	DEPUTY FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
RAMOS DANIEL J.	PRIN DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
TRUESDELL JOHN C.	DASAF (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

**SCHEDULE C EMPLOYEES**  
**Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>
ANDERSON JAMES H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
BARBER ALLISON B.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
BAUER GREGG E.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
BECKER JOHN B.	STAFF SPECIALIST
BECK WILLIAM G.	DEFENSE FELLOW
BINKERT NICOLE C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (COMMUNICATIONS)
BLUMENTHAL DANIEL A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
BOEHM JOSHUA M.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
BROOKS COREY D.	DEFENSE FELLOW
BURMEISTER CHRISTINA	DEFENSE FELLOW
CHAFIN CLAUDE H.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
CICIO KRISTEN K.	STAFF ASSISTANT
CRONAUER ADRIAN J.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DASD(POW/MP)/DIRECTOR,DPM
CROWDER SUSAN E.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CURCIO SHARON D.	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DAVIS BARBARA M.	PERS SEC TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DAVIS LINDA C.	PERS CONF ASSISTANT TO ASD(RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DICKOW JOANNE M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
DOWLEY AENGUS D.	STAFF ASSISTANT
ELLIS MARK	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PDUSD (POLICY)
ERICKSON NELSON V.	STAFF ASSISTANT
FEENEY SCOTT R.	STAFF ASSISTANT
FERKO JON GARY	STAFF ASSISTANT
FLANIGAN TIMOTHY	DEFENSE FELLOW
GLANCY DAVID A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
GODWIN ASHLEY D.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
HAMAR LISA M.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO GENERAL COUNSEL
HARRISON KRISTOFER L.	STAFF ASSISTANT
HARVIN CHRISTOPHER	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
HAUKEDAHL JOHN H	PROTOCOL OFFICER
HEMENWAY MARGARET C.	DEPUTY WHITE HOUSE LIAISON
HENDERSON HEDY D.	RESEARCH ASSISTANT
(b)(6)	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HENRY DONALD P.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT
HEWITT MARK S.	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTINUITY PROGRAM OFFICE
HORN MATTHEW	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
HOLLAND ERIC W.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
JONES THOMAS L.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
KARRE MEREDITH A.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)
KATZAMAN JENNIFER M.	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
KOERNER JO ANN	PERS AND CONF ASSISTANT TO ATSD (NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS)
KONKLER MATHEW J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
KYGER TIMOTHY B.	STAFF ASSISTANT

Name	Position Title
LAWRENCE GAYLE A.	COORDINATOR OF RESERVE INTEGRATION
LAWRENCE LILIAN I	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
LESTER SUSAN C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
LEWIS L. JEAN	CHIEF OF STAFF
LOVE KAREN A.	PERS AND CONF ASSISTANT TO TASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
LUKACH TERESA A.	SPEECHWRITER
MAINARDI CATHERINE A.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MAKOVSKY MICHAEL S.	STAFF ASSISTANT
MARLO FRANCIS H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
MARSLENDER JULIA D	DEFENSE FELLOW
MARTINEZ ROMAN.	STAFF ASSISTANT
MASON JEB J.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MCGINN JOHN G.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PDUSD FOR POLICY
MCFIFF JAMES M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MEYER DONALD W.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
MILLER MICHAEL W.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MOBBS MICHAEL H.	SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE USD (POLICY)
MURPHY MARGARET	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
MURPHY MARY CLAIRE	DIRECTOR, PROTOCOL
NADANER JEFFREY M.	STAFF ASSISTANT
(b)(6)	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFF ELEANOR B.	STAFF ASSISTANT
ORTIZ ALCIDES	DEFENSE FELLOW
PASCO BRANDT J. C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
PLATA NANCY D.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
REID JAMES H.	DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
ROSTOW VICTOR A. D.	STAFF ASSISTANT
RUBIN MICHAEL A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
RUNKLE BENJAMIN G.	STAFF ASSISTANT
SADOWSKA MALGORZATA M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SCHENKER DAVID K.	STAFF ASSISTANT
SCIARRO BONNIE L.	PROGRAM SUPPORT SPECIALIST
SENR DANIEL S.	SENIOR ASSOCIATE DIR, OFC OF GLOBAL COMM
SEWARD PAMELA J.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO PDUSD (POLICY)
SHAW ROBERT G.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
SHERLINE STEPHANIE L.	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SHERRILL WILSON N.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SHOCKEY HEATHER	PERS & CONF TO THE ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
SHORT SIDNEY F.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SMITH ROBERT FRANCIS	SPEECHWRITER
SOULEYRET MARGARET Y.	CONF ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ST. JULIEN CECILE FRANCES	EXEC ASST TO ASD (SR&R)
THOMPSON BARBARA W.	PERS & CONF ASST TO ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
TIMPERLAKE EDWARD T.	DIRECTOR OF ASSESSMENTS
TOMB MARK C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Name	Position Title
TULBAH ALI H.	DEFENSE FELLOW
TURENNE WILLIAM J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
TURNER MARY E.	CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
VALENTE CLAUDIA B.	PERS & CONF ASST TO USD (COMPTROLLER)
VICTORY BERNARD C.	STAFF ASSISTANT
VONGLIS JOHN G.	DIRECTOR, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
WALKER MARK M.	STAFF ASSISTANT
WATSON PAUL H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
WHEELER HOLLEN J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
ZEMEK ALEXANDER F.	DEFENSE FELLOW

### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
ALRIDGE MADELINE C.	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
HAGELINE JOHN A	ASSISTANT FOR WATER RESOURCES POLICY
REISMAN DAVID A.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY GENERAL COUNSEL
ROSS SUZANNE K. L.	CONF ASSISTANT
SMITH JUDY	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WALKER ERNEST J.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
WYRO ALICE	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT

### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
DRENNAN JOANN	STAFF ASSISTANT
DENNY ELIZABETH	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DAVIS ELIZABETH	CONF ASSISTANT
ROWAN JEAN C.	CONF ASSISTANT
WRIGHT DANIELLE A.	CONF ASSISTANT

### Department of the Air Force

Name	Position Title
PATTERAKIS CHRIS	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS
RANDALL SEAN	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT
TONI DOLORES	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT

## SES LIMITED TERM/LIMITED EMERGENCY

### Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies

Name	Position Title
ADAMS, NANCY	SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR, TMA
GEREN, PRESTON	SPEC ASS'T TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
KRAEMER, SVEN	SPEC POLICY ADVISOR TO THE USD(POLICY)
McGRAW, RICHARD	SPEC ASS'T TO THE DA&M FOR SPECIAL EVENTS
PUDAS, TERRY	DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
SHULSKY, ABRAM	SPEC POLICY ADVISOR TO THE USD(POLICY)
WAX, CHARLES	DIRECTOR, UNIFIED EXCHANGE TASK FORCE

### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
GILPIN RICHARD	PRINCIPAL ASS T FOR ACQUISITION, PROGRAMMING & BUDGETING
LEADMON JOHN	PRINCIPAL ASS T FOR SUBMARINE/SUBMERSIBLE DESIGN
SOWA, FRANK	FOG M DIRECTOR, JTR/ SOURCING
WIKENHEISER, DAVID	SPEC ASS T FOR INFO MANAGEMENT / INFO TECH

### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
VON BERNEWITZ, CARLA	DIRECTOR, BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION TASK FORCE

### Department of the Air Force

No Limited Term/Limited Emergency Appointees

Note: Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees recruited to serve during this Administration.

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 2/20/2004

Handwritten: JR 022304

DOCUMENT TYPE: INFO MEMO

OSD CONTROL OSD 02562-04

DOC 2/20/2004

DOR 2/20/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM ADM DUBOIS

TO SECDEF

SUBJECT W D TEAM -BREAKOUT OF PERSONNEL

KEYWORDS DUBOIS, R

COMMENTS

FN 230 5/20/04

SEC U

OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED I&R

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

INFO MEMO

CREATED BY reynolds

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ES OWI  
DSD RWI  
ADC RWI

113  
1501

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
01/12/04-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

Ray Dibois:

4  
1/30

Please provide SD w/a list of PAS + Sched e + SES (Bit) appointees here today.

Thanks,  
Jaymie

Suspense: 2/4/04

OSD 02562-04

0205D230 Supergrades

30 JAN 04

20 FEB 04

'SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL.

SM23Feb04  
S

Print Date: 2/20/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE QUESTION/NOTE

OSD CONTROL **OSD 02562-04**

DOC 1/12/2004

DOR 2/20/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM TSA DI RITA

TO ADM DUBOIS

SUBJECT PLEASE PROVIDE SECDEF WITH A LIST OF PAS AND SCHEDULE C AND SES (POLITICAL) APPOINTEES  
HERE TODAY.

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL. CAF

FN **230 Superpages**

SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

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PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

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113  
1500

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

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1/30

Please provide SD w/a list of PAS + Sched e + SES (Bit) appointees here today.

Thanks,  
Jaymie

Suspense: 2/4/04

85D 02562-04

2305waeomdx

12Jan04

20Feb04

# SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 8/9/2006

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC      ATTACHMENT:      SIGNATURE CASE  
OSD CONTROL    **OSD 02562-04**      DOC 1/12/2004      DOR 5/13/2005

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD      TO **TSA**

SUBJECT DODTEAM

KEYWORDS DI RITA, L LIST SNOW **FLAKE**

COMMENTS NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION W/O FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL

FN 230 **SUPERGRADES**      SEC U      OCN 011204-25

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE	DECISION	DECISION DATE	PRIORITY ACTION REPORT
AGENCY	ACTION ASSIGNED	SUSPENSE	DOC SUSPENSE
SUSPENSE COMPLETE	ACD	COORDINATION	
PAGES	ENCLOSURES 0		

SUSPENSE STATUS

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**OSD 02562-04**  
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QUESTION/NOTE  
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# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

Action Agency:  
Action Required: **INFORMATION AND RETENTION**  
Coordinate With:  
References:  
Remarks:  
Document Type: **INFO MEMO**

Suspense Date:

Routing Date: **February/20/2004**

OSD CONTROL #: **OSD 02562-04**

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

2004 FEB 23 PM 5:25

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Team – Breakout of Personnel

- In the attached snowflake, dated January 12, 2004, you requested a list of personnel you selected for your DoD team. Per clarification with Jaymie Durnan, we understood that you would like a listing of Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation, Non-Career SES members, and Schedule C appointees that are here today.
- We have also included the Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees who are members of your DoD Team.
- Tab A lists 38 Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation; Tab B lists 87 Non-Career SES Members; Tab C lists 113 Schedule C appointees; and Tab D lists 12 Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees. In sum, they constitute the 250 members of your DoD Team that are presently serving in the Department.
- Lists, which are arranged in alphabetical order, include names of personnel and their position titles, with separate breakouts for OSD and the Military Departments.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Linda Roper, (b)(6)

OSD 02562-04

720

plam

26 Jan 04

January 26, 2004

000 11 03 11 0 34

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability

Thanks for the update. Please keep pushing hard on this.

Are there other areas of language expertise we should be thinking about?

Attach.  
 1/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: 8<sup>th</sup> Report [OSD 00771-04]

DHR:dh  
012204-2

.....

Please respond by 2/12/04

0914

26 JAN 04

OSD 02581-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

1/22  
2004 JAN 10 PM 5:29

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2004, 1:25 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Status of our Efforts to Employ Nearly Bilingual Managers and Provide Language Capability - Eighth Report

This is my eighth report on our efforts to recruit and employ nearly bilingual managers. I am adding to this update a summary of our efforts to assist in providing language capability to deployed forces and the CPA.

- As of December 29, 2003, we have received 1,636 interest forms and 530,347 hits on our web site. Americans are continuing to apply. We have established a database that lists applicants and their skills, and have provided that data base and appropriate resumes to the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority Representative. I understand that about 20 of our applicants have been hired by the CPA. All told, to date about 60 individuals have been hired by CPA or by other Defense interests.
- To facilitate the screening and hire of the Invitation to Serve candidates, we have engaged a contractor, Chugach-McKinley Incorporated (CMI). CMI has contacted all those who applied and is engaged in screening those who indicate a continued interest in employment. CMI has completed the screening of individuals from the Washington, DC area and has identified what they believe are eighteen excellent candidates. The candidates' skills include from pharmacy, civil engineering, banking, business, and architecture. Chugach is prepared to hire and deploy these individuals at our direction.
- The Army continues to make progress with the implementation of the Direct Entry Individual Ready Reserve program. This program targets the enlistment of Arabic heritage speakers. Since August of 2003, the Army has successfully recruited 156 native Arab speakers. The vast majority of recruits have advanced Arabic speaking skills. The Army has set a monthly recruiting goal of 21 people and is currently meeting that goal. We anticipate the first 09L "Translators" to be ready for deployment in April 2004. The success of this program has improved the Army's penetration of the Arabic-speaking market, in general. While initially skeptical about the program, the Army has now embraced it and its possibilities. We will need to monitor this program as the recruits are deployed in the field, but the overall

TSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>1/21</i>

OSD 00771-04

assessment at this point is that the initiative has tremendous potential as a model for building the Department's language capability.

- Although not related to our efforts to hire bilingual managers, you may be interested to know that since early December my Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy has worked with the CPA staff, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to identify Department of Defense civilians who have critical expertise needed for positions in Baghdad and the Washington, DC area. These detailees will be TDY for at least 6 months. For Baghdad, CPA is paying for transportation and providing billeting and food; the Components are covering salary and all other TDY expenses.

CPA provided a brief description of the functions of the positions; e.g., Information, Contracting, Logistics; expertise required; estimated series and grade of the duties; and, proposed a number of employees by Component. In turn, we asked the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, through the Human Resources Directors, to submit names and resumes of volunteers.

- To date, we have forwarded 49 names for the Baghdad positions and 17 names for positions in Washington, DC. For the Baghdad, 2 are filled, 3 are pending confirmation, and 5 employees are under consideration. For the local positions, one employee is under consideration. All employees identified thus far are volunteers.

This has been a successful collaboration between the CPA staff and the human resource community throughout the Department to put needed staff in place.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

Prepared by: Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)



1

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

71 FEB 11 10 09 AM '04

February 11, 2004, 9:30 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S.C. Chu*  
*20 Feb 04*

SUBJECT: Snowflake: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability (TAB A)

- As a result of your pronounced interest in this critical subject, I have developed a defense-wide language plan whose goal is to comprehensively transform the way language and regional area expertise is valued, developed, and employed within the Department (TAB B).
- To effectively execute this undertaking, I have established a limited term (six-month duration) language transformation team that includes Service and Agency representation, headed by my Deputy Under Secretary for Plans. The team is fully engaged in executing the language plan. The focus is on the set of "investment" languages and regions referenced in the plan and attached at TAB C.
- On February 6, 2004, I hosted a meeting with Steve Cambone, Ryan Henry and Major General Maples (Vice Director, Joint Staff), in which we clarified governance issues with respect to this matter and articulated a unified way ahead on this subject.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared by Mr. John G. Vonglis, Director, Management Initiatives, P&R, (b)(6)

OSD 02501-04



11-L-0559/OSD/040221

**TAB**

**A**

26 Jan 04

P1407

January 26, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability

Thanks for the update. Please keep pushing hard on this.

Are there other areas of language expertise we should be thinking about?

Attach.

1/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: 8<sup>th</sup> Report [OSD 0077 1-04]

DHR:dh  
012204-2

.....

Please respond by 2/12/04

OSD 02581-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

1/22

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2004, 1:25 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Status of our Efforts to Employ Nearly Bilingual Managers and Provide  
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TSA SD	
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/21



OSD 00771 - 04

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This has been a successful collaboration between the CPA staff and the human resource community throughout the Department to put needed staff in place.

**RECOMMENDATION:** None, for information only.

Prepared by: Gail McGinn, **DUSD** (Plans), (b)(6)

**TAB**

**B**



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

August 26, 2003, 3:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Signature & Date

**SUBJECT:** Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs, and a "Transformation Plan" for DoD's Language Capability.

- You asked me about my plans for Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs (TAB A).
- I believe both of these programs need to be viewed in the larger context of how language and regional area expertise are valued, developed and employed, a subject on which you have pressed me on several occasions for a "transformation plan" (TAB B). I propose that we:
  - Work with the Combatant Commanders to integrate language capability needs into the operational planning process. Assign a foreign area officer to their personal staffs.
  - With the Military Services, work toward every newly commissioned officer having an educational background in an "investment language and region". (see attached list at TAB C). The curricula at the Service Academies and educational requirements in the Reserve Officer Training Corps should be aligned with this goal.
  - Take steps to provide adequate language ability to operational units:
    - (1) Ensure that the Defense Language Institute is capable of addressing our demand for numbers and types of highly proficient language speakers. Ensure that the graduates are assigned to jobs using the skill they acquired.
    - (2) Develop a "crash course" of basic language training for non-language trained Service members in preparation for deployment (DLI has developed a concept for 1-, 3-, and 6-month courses that General Casey and I are discussing).
    - (3) Assess the feasibility of offering "extra credit" to recruiters who recruit personnel who are bi-lingual in an investment language.
    - (4) Establish a Direct Entry Individual Ready Reserve program for all Services to take advantage of native language speakers in the United States (already underway as a pilot program in the Army).

- o Revise Foreign Language Proficiency Pay to ensure that it adequately rewards those with investment language ability and is sufficient to encourage the development and maintenance of language ability within the force.
- The Olmsted Scholar **Program**, of course, is a voluntary program administered by a private foundation. The foundation prefers candidates who are in combat or combat arms specialties. I will **ask the Services** to encourage applications from combat and combat arms specialties and encourage the completion of a related graduate degree as a part of the program. I will also direct the assignment of graduates to an appropriate utilization tour that takes advantage of the foreign language and regional expertise gained.
- We will meet with the Deputy Secretary to review this plan. Steve Cambone and General Pace agree with it. Steve has also forwarded to me a draft language strategy compiled by his staff that we will incorporate.
- In order to do all this in an expeditious manner, I **am** asking the **military** services to designate a full time member of a time-limited (six month) Language Transformation Team.
- To truly accomplish transformation, it will be necessary to have the American educational system engaged for the long term. **If** you agree, **I** will engage national language associations in discussion of our plan and how we might work together to improve language capability.

COORDINATION: VCJCS; **USD** (I) (at **TAB D**)

Prepared by: Mrs. Gail McGinn, **DUSD** (P) (b)(6)

**TAB**

**C**

## INVESTMENT LANGUAGES/REGIONS

- Arabic \*
- Chinese\*
- Spanish
- Korean
- Farsi
- Indonesian\*
- Philippino\*
- Kurdish
- Turkish
- Hindi
- Central Asia\*
- Russian
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Serbo-Croatian

\* Multiple Dialects

10 MAR 04  
(1845 NRS)



**From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz**

Powell Moore -

- ① Please get back to me with the details on what the SASC plans for March 31.
- ② Is it the right format for us or should we recommend they structure it differently?
- ③ Talk to Robert Rangel and see if the HASC would like to do something similar.

NO OSD 02583-04

326

(8 Feb 2004)

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**The Senior Military Assistant**

10 March 2004 - 2130 Hours - HC 3/11

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. POWELL MOORE, ASD / LA


SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

Sir:

The Deputy forwards the attached SecDef snowflakes with the following guidance:

- “(1) Please get back to me with the details on what the SASC plans for March 31.
- (2) Is it the right format for us or should we recommend they structure it differently?
- (3) Talk to Robert Rangel and see if the HASC would like to do something similar.”

Very respectfully,



William B. Caldwell, IV  
Major General, USA  
Senior Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments:

SD # 022104-11, 21Feb04  
SD # 020804-95, 8Feb04  
SecAF 28Feb04 Comments on Rebalancing

Suspense: Monday, 15 March 2004

Copy to: Mr. Chu, USD/P&R  
Mr. Di Rita, PDASD / PA  
LTG Craddock, SMA / SD  
Mr. Peter Geren, SATSD

326



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

FEB 26 2004

2/26/04

326

Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington DC 20301-4000

Dear Mr. Wolfowitz:

*Paul,*

I agree it is a good idea to address the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve forces with the Congress. The Air Force is certainly looking into the necessary steps to ensure post OIF/OEF that our total force team is still viable and balanced. We stand by to support the Department in whatever means necessary or desired when engaging Congress.

Sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*

26 FEB 04

8 FEB 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Powell.<sup>8</sup>  
SD looking  
for your  
input.

OSD 02583-04

Thanks  
Jay

Purnau 2/24

326

24 Feb 04

8 Feb 04

02583-04

11 Feb-0730  
scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

What do you think about asking the Congress to hold a hearing on the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve? We could do it once we think we know where we want to go, so we can let the air out of it before all the people in the country get concerned about it and start calling their representatives and senators.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-95

.....  
Please respond by 2 / 17 / 04

*2/12*  
*SecDef -*  
*It is a good idea.*  
*I'll discuss with Powell about*  
*how to go about it.*  
*(Army?)* *D, Rita*

*C 2/18*

Larry Di Rita  
2/13

OSD 02583-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040235

OSD 02583-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 FEB 20 11 04 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 20, 2004, 7:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*  
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Hearing-- SNOWFLAKE *20 FEB 2004*

- The Senate Armed Services Committee will be holding a hearing on this subject 31 March.
- In the meantime, we have delivered the Department's Rebalancing Report to the major committees and their staffs. We also briefed the principal staff of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. We have reached out to the applicable associations, and we have posted the Report on the Reserve Affairs web site, where it is available to every Member and staff person on the Hill.
- For the House, we are offering a briefing from Tom Hall to every Member who indicated an interest during the Secretary's 4 February testimony, adding others who have since expressed interest (the list is growing, and now includes two Senators — see Tab **B**).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

0 SD 02583-04



**TAB**

**A**

11 Feb - 0730  
scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

What do you think about asking the Congress to hold a hearing on the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve? We could do it once we think we know where we want to go, so we can let the air out of it before all the people in the country get concerned about it and start calling their representatives and senators.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-95

.....  
Please respond by

2 / 17 / 04

OSD 02583-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040238

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**Military Assistant**

11 February 2004 - 1200

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Chu (USD P&R)


SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

Sir,

The Deputy asks that you take the attached SecDef snowflake for action. Please coordinate with PA, LA, and the Joint Staff.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hagerott  
Commander, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

**SUSPENSE: 17 Feb 04**

cc: DJS, ASD/PA, ASD/LA

11-L-0559/OSD/040239

**TAB**

**B**

Follow-up Rebalancing Briefings to Congressional Members

Congressman Simmons	Connecticut	Completed
Congressman <b>Schrock</b>	Virginia	Completed
Congressman Kline	Minnesota	
Senator Ensign	Nevada	
Senator Sessions	Alabama	
Congressman Wilson	South Carolina	
Congressman Thornberry	Texas	
Congressman Baldwin	Wisconsin	

February 21, 2004

TO: Tillie Fowler  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Healthcare

*D.R.*

701

I think it would be a terrific idea if you set up a little group to look at Department of Defense healthcare. Newt Gingrich has some interesting ideas.

Why don't you ask him to chair it and have him choose one or two other people so they can get to work on it. It is conceivable we could save a good deal of money.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-13



*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

21 Feb 04

OSD 02592-04

February 21, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: 2001 Press Comments

In a February 2001 press briefing, I said the things you will see here on this page.  
We might want to include that in our 9/11 testimony.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/2/01 Transcript of press briefing

DHR:dh  
022104-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.750

21 Feb 04

OSD 02593-04

during the campaign in, I think, in July or something in Washington at the Press Club, maybe. In any event, he did. And he has asked us to do that and that is just beginning. I am now in my fourteenth day.

Q: Is that principally a Defense Department review?

Rumsfeld: Yes. That process is taking place. He's indicated a desire to review the quality of life issues and address that, and as part of the strategy review, you would **look** at offensive and defensive weapons, including missile defense. You would look at numbers of weapons, as he indicated in some of his speeches, and you would look at transformation issues, which he has indicated an interest in, as to how you transform this force into a force that is appropriate to the 21st century. We are also looking at a few other things in the process. I have got a group of people that are starting to look at financial management issues. You may recall Senator Byrd raised those questions in the hearing. And we are looking at quality of life issues with a different group of people. We are looking at defense strategy, transformation and missile defense, and acquisition reform. And we are just getting started on some of those.

Q: Does this take precedent over the QDR?

Rumsfeld: I think it is really different people, and I think as our thinking clears and as we get our brains wrapped around some of these things, very likely those inputs -- we would find a way in the QDR process to implant them down into that process so that you would not wait until the end and have a disconnect, but I expect that the things I am talking about, while they may not reach full flowering in 30 or 60 days, nonetheless, we are expecting that we want to get in a month or two or three depending on which one of these things they are, pretty well down the road so that we have some good idea of what we think about those things and then we would probably plug them into the QDR, some of them, for the kind of refinement of thought you get by engaging people who are really into the details of things.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in your confirmation hearing you talked about the dangers of **cyber-terrorism**, weapons of mass destruction, and I guess that this should be something that you will be talking about with the folks you will be meeting tomorrow. What kind of a message are you delivering to them? What do you want to accomplish with them?

Rumsfeld: It was one of the things that the president mentioned, as you will recall, during the campaign and subsequently. I do not plan to get into it in detail in my brief remarks. We are still messing with them, and they are too long. But what I have in mind is the reality that as you move out of the Cold War and you go into a relaxed environment and you see an acceleration in proliferation, and simultaneously, almost in the same time period, earlier in the last decade you had the Gulf War, which taught people that contesting Western armies, navies and air forces, is not a good idea. It is expensive and you would probably lose, which suggests that because of the proliferation that is taking place, and their interest in things other than armies, navies and air forces, and cheaper and easier ways to do things, that people look for so-called asymmetrical responses to dissuade people from attempting to have them not do what they would like to do in their neighborhoods to their neighbors. Obviously, those things include all across the spectrum from **terrorism** through cyber attacks to information warfare to cruise missiles to short-range ballistic missiles to longer range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Now, those are the kinds of things that are increasingly attractive to various nations of the world. We know from watching them that they are taking steps to not just be interested in them, but to develop

February 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

c c : Gen. Dick Myers  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Authorities

Today I raised the question on authorities you asked me to raise with George Tenet. He said he is working on it and will get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-23

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

350.09

20 Feb 04

OSD 02603-04

7201

February 20, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Keeper of the Flame

I just saw your invitation from Frank Gaffney for the Keeper of the Flame Award. It is a good outfit, and they have been consistently helpful to us.

I hope you can give them a hand!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-27

*DO I WTH*

*20 Feb 04*

OSD 02604-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040246

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 22, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Attached Article**

Attached is a paper that Bing West wrote that might be of interest.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022104a.05ts

*Attach: "Change the Strategy in Iraq" by Bing West*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 02606-04

11-L-0559/OSD/040247

IRAQ

22 Feb 04

NYT tomorrow

February 4, 2004

## Change the Strategy in Iraq

By F.J. Bing West

TAKRIT. We were several blocks inside Takrit, the northern city where Saddam was captured, when Captain Deel showed me where an IED, or Improvised Explosive Device, had blown a large hole in the cement sidewalk. It was late January and I was back in Iraq on my third visit with our soldiers. The patrol of three American and nine Iraqi soldiers moved with practiced ease, showing an outsider their city by starlight. Captain Jason Deel of the 22d Infantry – whose motto is “Regulars, by God!” – had invited me on a night patrol with his combined Iraqi-American platoon. Iraqi Lt. Uday Nofan led us down the dark streets while Deel pointed out the sites of recent bombings – a gouge in the sidewalk near a kabob stand with colored lights and farther on, shattered cement next to an internet café.

Last August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz quietly urged the organization of such combined units, which had been successful in Vietnam. By January, professionals like Captain Deel had trained 30 local Iraqi battalions and were turning the patrolling over to eager leaders like Lt. Nofan. After several months of on-the-job training with American soldiers, these Iraqi units, called the Civil Defense Corps, are beginning to stand on their own. By late spring, there will be 40,000 soldiers like Lt. Nofan serving in these quasi-National Guard units.

At the same time, the nature of the war has changed. The insurgents rarely shoot at Americans any more, because they learned that to exchange rifle fire meant death. Instead, the extremists' weapons are now car bombs and IEDs, detonated with murderous caprice. This is a war requiring police rather than soldiers to track down the bombers. In a society where every family has a weapon, where extremists and criminals mingle in the marketplaces and where kidnapers and car-jackers prey on the people, restoring law and order is essential to the credibility of the coalition and the emerging Iraqi government.

The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps can provide the security umbrella, but the police have to make the arrests. Therein lies the rub. Under Saddam, the army and the dreaded Mukhabarat Security Service imposed order through torture and killing. The local police were at the bottom of the security barrel, ill-led, poorly equipped and specializing in petty extortion. In the Balkans, under UN and NATO auspices, hundreds of police advisers instructed the local cops in how to restore civil order. But in Iraq, the very bombings which require detective work have deterred civilian advisers from coming into the country. In the areas where they are most urgently needed, the Iraqi police are least effective, a defect well understood by our battalions on the ground.

After Takrit, I visited the city of Kirkuk, inhabited by over a million Kurds and Arabs whose mutual distrust periodically spills over into bloody riots. LtCol Dominic Caraccilo, commanding the 2d Battalion of the 503<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade, brought me to the Maghreb Police Station in the heart of the city, where he had stationed an American infantry

platoon alongside two hundred Kurdish and Arab police officers. The police chief, Abu Turham, told me his biggest regret was that the 503<sup>rd</sup> was leaving. The American soldiers had set the example for his men by patrolling with them. He said "extreme Islamists" were as intent on killing Iraqi police as Americans. His station had been attacked four times and he expected bombings to go on for years, because the terrorists could drive wherever they wanted and set off an explosion.

Iraq is beset by blood feuds, religious and ethnic strife, porous borders and a desire for revenge after decades of torture and mass murder. Even if Iraq achieved the same level of normalcy as, say, Rio de Janeiro, there would still be more than 12,000 homicides a year. Worse still, terrorists are incited by some Islamic clerics untouchable by American military power. Police chief Turham said that he was urging, with limited success, the 117 mullahs in Kirkuk to preach against terrorism. Only Iraqis can resolve the sectarian violence and the nexus between religion and hate. The primary military mission of the coalition should not be to continue offensive operations until there is a cessation of violence, because that is not going to happen. A military security umbrella without an effective police force is what exists in Iraq today, and it is insufficient for the threat.

Three new US divisions deploy to Iraq in March under guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Replacing coalition troops with Iraqis qualified to provide internal security is the key to defeating the threat. Priority should be given to building up the Iraqi forces, with the initiative of Mr. Wolfowitz to train via combined units extended to the police. Each American division is already conducting a three-week police training course. In addition, mentoring of police on-the-job by US soldiers will be required. Our military will also need budget authority to purchase rapidly equipment for the Iraqis.

It took six months for our divisions to mentor and train 40,000 Iraqi National Guard soldiers; it will take another six months to mentor 50,000 or more police, as well as additional Iraqi soldiers. This means a large fraction of the soldiers in every US battalion will be operating with Iraqis. This requires a shift in strategy emphasizing training and combined action rather than unilateral offensive operations.

This strategy isn't open-ended. By next September, US battalions should conduct tests to certify that Iraqi military and police units are qualified to take control and stand on their own in the areas of highest crime and terrorist activity. This will enable US and coalition forces to pull back to regional redoubts as a deterrent against external aggression, while Iraqis take responsibility for their own internal security and law and order.

*Mr. West, a former assistant secretary of defense and former Marine in the Vietnam conflict, is the author of books about both combined action forces and the war in Iraq.*

7:46 AM

TO: Amb. Jerry Bremer  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: **Constitutions**

I received a call today from a constitutional law expert at AEI named Dr. Robert Goldwin. He has spent decades studying the U.S. Constitution and other constitutions. He says he is no expert on the Spanish Constitution, but he recalls that the Spanish Constitution has some provisions relating the autonomy, semi-autonomy or elements of autonomy that might be worth considering for the Iraqi Constitution, given the position of the Kurds.

He said there used to be a professor at Yale names Juan Linz who knows a lot about the Spanish Constitution. He doesn't know if the man is still there, or even alive, etc. but he believed he might be worth consulting.

This is something that ought to be looked into. If you have your constitutional experts look into it, please let me all know if there is anything of interest.

Thanks so much.

DHR/azn  
022104.02ts

*Iraq*

*21 Feb 04*

OSD 02607-04

7201

TAB A

28  
January 28, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

Please take a look at this Tom O'Connell memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and tell me where you think we are and **what** needs to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/17/03 ASD(SOLIC) memo Re: NDU Stabilization and Reconstructions **Operations Study**

DHR:db  
012604-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/13/04

Iraq

28 Jan 04

OSD 02610-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/040251



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 FEB 23 11:13:52

INFO MEMO

CM-1547-04

23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 2/21*

SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

- In response to your request (TAB A) regarding Tom O'Connell's memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and your inquiry on where we are and what needs to be done, the following information is provided.
- The Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), is in the process of an effort to rebalance the force, create modular capabilities and convert conventional combat units to have greater utility throughout the spectrum of conflict. Insights from the Operational Availability 04 (OA 04) Study will further define capabilities for Phase IV and Stability Operations. Recommend we support the CSA ongoing initiative while we continue to study this issue in greater detail.
- The CSA is assessing the conversion of six Division Headquarters to a more modular design that improves capabilities for stability and special operations. The Army proposes converting the existing brigades to a mobile light brigade design. These converted units would be lighter and more mobile, and have a higher density of infantry formations than the brigades they would replace. Other Army conversions include 149 Military Police, 8 Civil Affairs, 4 PSYOP, and other units that provide support for stability operations to the Active Component by FY 2009.
- Initial insights from the OA 04 Study, to be completed 31 March 2004, indicate that development of forces specifically for stability operations is not an efficient means of addressing the current capabilities gap. The Services are evaluating solutions for potential shortfalls through task organization and are not considering development of specialized units. In addition to the OA 04 Study, the USD(P)-led Stability Operations Study, due 30 June 2004, will assess Service proposals and make recommendations for additional force alignment solutions.
- Creation of specialized units introduces a low density/high demand problem. Given the duration of stability operations, force rotation will be a management challenge. The limited number of specific stability units and the regional focus of civil affairs and psychological operations units may preclude global sourcing.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; DJ-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/040252

OSD 02610-04

TAB A

28  
January 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

Please take a look at this Tom O'Connell memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and tell me where you think we are and what needs to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/03 ASD(SOLIC) ~~memo~~ Re: NDU Stabilization and Reconstructions Operations Study

DHR:dh  
012604-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

**TAB B  
COORDINATION**

Agency  
Army  
USMC

Name  
BG Ryan  
COL A. E. **Van** Dyke

Date  
6 Feb 04  
**4** Feb 04