



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 203189999

CM-2753-05

26 September 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 9/26

SUBJECT: Drying Out New Orleans (SF)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), we are working closely with domestic and international partners and applying emerging technologies in unwatering New Orleans. The comprehensive plan includes many of the points Mr. Gingrich made in his e-mail. However, we continue exploring other tactics, techniques, and innovative strategies to speed our efforts.
- **Analysis.** A blend of public, private, domestic, and international resources is being used in New Orleans. Self-contained, truck-mounted German pumps are employed in areas that take advantage of their mobility and portability. Dutch pumps will be utilized in areas suited to their high capacity. Both the Germans and the Dutch are providing advice and assistance regarding best practices, lessons learned, and leading-edge technologies.
- Contracts by the US Army Corps of Engineers for FEMA include performance incentives for contractors to employ emerging technologies and techniques in unwatering, levee repair, and restoration of water-damaged infrastructure. Unwatering continues at a pace to avoid additional damage. Engineers continually monitor the pumping process and adjust pumping rates as conditions permit. Repair strategies for water-damaged buildings and other infrastructure will be driven by damage assessments.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director for Logistics, J-4;

(b)(6)

OSD 19317-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52410

TAB A

DJS

~~FOUO~~

September 06, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC Paul McHale

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drying Out New Orleans

Please have someone look at this Newt Gingrich issue on drying things out. I think it is a good point.

Please get back to me as soon as you can

Thanks.

Attach.

9/4/05 Gingrich-e-mail

DHR:dh
090605-22

.....
Please Respond By 09/15/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52411

TAB B

COORDINATION

USA

COL John L. **Strong**

15 September 2005

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005

TO: The Honorable Karen Hughes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: November 2004 Report

092

Attached is a report that was submitted to me privately by three folks who had been involved with USIA over the years. It is dated -- almost a year old now, but they did it at my request. I found it interesting and thought you might as well.

If I can be helpful, do let me know. I know that these individuals are all interested in being of assistance, if that is your desire.

Thanks.

Attach: November, 2004 Private Report to SecDef

DHR:ss
092705-07

amsep05

OSD 19352-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52413

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November. 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/52414

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - 10 an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on ~~Terrorism~~ will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-let-in market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

3) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams **was** asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third **had** opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can **win** over to their side. **As** such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are **fully** committed to Uşama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have **sat** on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement **that** there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror **has** required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs *to* consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including *Heritage Backgrounders* 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency; along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the **same** conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there **is** inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the **Administration** not because it will play well in the American media or because *of* a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital **national** interest.

I How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers *are* particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as *the* three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to **sharing** values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the **press**.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: 'Why, *given the* amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a **negative** light in the **rest** of the world?' While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which **might** even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to **comprehensively** study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these **data** is a crucial first step towards **engaging** the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

IX. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5** million annually on **this** type of analysis.⁵ Further, much of the research the **U. S** government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa **has** been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa **was** influencing **its** audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it **is** difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the **Arab** world," the draft report said.⁶

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, **and** how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so **would** require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U. S Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World." *The Brookings Institution*, January 2003.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report **was** leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure **and would** water down the conclusions."

⁷ U. S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. *This investment is essential to building an effective program.*

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time **and** would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long **sought** to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should **be** seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. **As** a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would **be** able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not **always** agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact **be** outweighed by the negative impact that policy **has** on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them **determine** whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they **are** communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this **way**, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America **and** the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the day” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has **been** ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response."⁵ This is certainly not the case for the **U.S.** government, which consistently **fails** to attempt to research the **reasons** for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. **As the** General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."⁶ America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial **part** of domestic politics – but we **are** notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely **on the** basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their **decision-making** and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. **If** the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government **as** well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To **be** successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they **are** exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we *are* trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to *attempt* to influence these audiences *as well as* how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's *vision* of freedom and prosperity under the *rule* of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must *begin* by identifying the different segments *that* exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group *within* a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands *for*, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the **U.S.** government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials *as well as* Americans in the **private** sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively *pair* a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an *Independent Taskforce* sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2005:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic **areas** required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing **research**, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important **actions** from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide array of interests. Finally: it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.”

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily “Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs” or “The Global Messenger” produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessmen, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pp. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SJG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2005
I-05/011801
ES-4098

A-4 08.02

TO: Eric Edelman
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on Progress

Do we ever report on the progress in reducing down towards 1700 to 2200
deployed offensive strategic nuclear warheads?

Thanks.

DHR, dh
083105-22

.....

Please Respond By 09/15/05

08/05



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

1-05/011801-SP&I
ES 4098

DepSecDef

USD(P)

WJ SEP 26 2005

A-476.02

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: PETER *OS* FLORY ASD/ISP SLP CB AMW

SUBJECT: Report on Progress in Reducing Deployed Strategic Nuclear Weapons

- On 31 August you asked if we report on progress in reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons (ODSNW) to 1700 to 2200 (Tab A).
- The Department provides several periodic updates.
 - Under NSPD 14, the Department provides an annual report to the President on nuclear forces available for employment and the status of reducing the number of ODSNW.
 - Additionally, we report the number of ODSNW to Congress annually.
 - We also inform Russia of the unclassified, aggregate U.S. number of ODSNW during biannual sessions of the US-Russia Bilateral Implementation Commission of the Moscow Treaty.
- We are on track to achieve the directed reductions of ODSNW to 3,800 by 2007 and 1,700-2,200 by 2012.

26 Sep 05

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Erik Finn, OSD/P/ISP/FP (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52431

OSD 19325-05

31 Aug 05

COORDINATION

Principal Director, Forces Policy ^{for} BGEN Roberts

THS 13 Sep 05

Senior Director, SP&I Mr. Scheber

THS 13 Sep 05

Director, Strategic Strike Dr. Dellermann

2580 9/9/05

COORDINATION

USD/I

Ms. Nagelmann

9 SEP 2005

DASD Negotiations Policy

Mr. Walter Earle

12 SEP 2005

~~FOUO~~

September 14, 2005

Turkey

TO: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request from Turkey

Please follow up on a note I gave Peter Flory to the effect *the* Minister of Defense of Turkey says they want 50-60 F-16s, and they are looking for block 50 or 60.

Thanks.

DJR:ss
091405.11

.....
Please respond by 9/29/05

14 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19331-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52434

15-09-05 11:33 14

FOUO

September 14, 2005

05/012419

ES-4209

Poland

TO: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Poland's offer for Afghanistan

At the NATO Ministerial meeting Poland offered to take over a PRT in Afghanistan. Why don't we let them take over one of ours?

Thanks.

DHR:as
091403-06

.....
Please respond by 9/29/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19332-05

14 Sep 05

11-L-0559/OSD/52435

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005


014.13

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Tony Dolan

Attached are a couple of notes from Tony Dolan that you might find interesting.

Sorry we missed you last night for dinner. I hope you are up and about soon.

Regards,



Attach: Tony Dolan memo to SecDef; 9/8/05 Tony Dolan memo to Secretary ~~Card~~

DHR:ss
092705-06

ansrepos

OSD 19349-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52436

Mr. Secretary,

Please permit a private note to you on larger issues.

Some think the administration should be "talking about Iraq" and thereby change the polls on this issue.

I think this is exactly wrong. The polls are not really about Iraq. They are about over 50% of the public thinking the economy is in bad or terrible shape. And just about everything else.

The president needs to get the country out of its current frame of mind – which is one dictated by the spot news of 24/7 coverage. Crisis. And pessimism.

He has at his command the one institution that can actually change the news dynamic.

First, he needs to give a major economic speech FROM THE OVAL OFFICE IN A SUIT AND TIE and celebrate the good news -- and how this makes it possible to deal with longer-term crises.

He then needs to get out and talk about domestic issues that have been real success stories.

This will utterly confuse some partisans in the media. And it will spark caustic reaction. But that is the point – they will be the ones doing the reacting for a change.

The people sense this is a great president. But they miss him explaining things to them. They miss him showing them that there is a plan and that it has big ideas behind it. And they miss him using his office to accomplish this.


Once the news dynamic and the country's mood have been changed the opening will occur through which the administration can drive the proverbial Mack truck on the Iraq issue.

I sent a follow-up memo to Andy a week and half ago through the door you opened.
(Attached)

I wonder if we should ~~try~~ the VP.

Anyway: Change the subject.

Best,


Anthony R. Dolan

Sept 22, 2005

Andy,

I'm grateful to DR for passing on the memo. You calling on vacation made me feel guilty though. Hope you got a few days rest anyway.

By the way, talked to John Roberts (old friend) the other day. Philosophy is important but the question is not just will the nominee change the court but will the court change the nominee. The president was shrewd to base his choice on the criteria of character and to see John's steadfastness.

Quite a guy you work for. And certainly Katrina shows -- Bush-at-his-best once again.

Anyway, additional thoughts.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'AD', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Anthony R. Dolan

Sept. 8, 2005

MEMORANDUM

TO: ANDY CARL)

FR ANTHONY R. DOLAN

RE: PRESIDENT AND THE PEOPLE

1. BRIEF FOLLOW-UP -- To earlier memo and your call. Thoughts from an outsider but an enthusiastic one.

2. PURPOSE -- The approach suggested below is meant to build on success. First, to suggest a way to pivot off the deep trust the President **has** established with the American people -- a way to use the presidential presence and voice and in a way the American people not only like but expect. Second, to put forward some ideas that *can* expand your communications-message operation's successes a la State of the Union build-ups, last year's convention etc. (**Which** is not to mention speeches that have ranked with the greatest of any presidency.)

3. KEY PREMISES -- Two premises need to be restated. (a) The American people sense this is a great president. (b) Any softness in the numbers is a bit of disappointment at not hearing from him more directly and not seeing his message more **often** driving the day-today news dynamic and its longer-term direction.

4. WHAT'S NEEDED -- To see and read about the issues that the people care about instead of angry complaints of partisan or media critics.

5. SO, SOME NEW ISSUES -- When done with good events and visuals (and substantive backgrounding), issues that are inherently newsworthy to the media and simply impossible for them not to cover. *Also*, new issues in the news dynamic cause disorientation in centers of opposition.

6. TWO ISSUE CLUSTERS CRITICS DO NOT WANT TO SEE ON THE NEWS -- The administration's record on: (1) Economy and (2) Family--crime-- youth-at-risk issue.

11-L-0559/OSD/52440

7. ECONOMY SPEECH -- For all the reasons in the attached memo -- an Oval Office speech of twenty minutes or more is a priority. All the economic good news offers a chance to attack longer-range problems. Set up for later speech on Social Security. Also hint at tax reform. The public wants a report from its President, also wants to hear about the economic theory behind his programs.

8. SECOND CLUSTER -- YOUTH, FAMILY, CRIME -- Lots can be added here (e.g. education) but the first three below start the process.

9. FAMILY DAY -- The recent study done by Califano for the Kaiser group has percentages (as high as 60 or 70 per cent) that are staggering about how much crime, teen age pregnancy, underage sex, health costs and other problems are the result of actions by young people who are on a high. The research also shows that kids do listen to parents -- though parents often don't realize this. And that the family dinner is the crucial obstacle to addiction.

The President has proclaimed Family Day in October. He should ask the networks (yes, again) right after his economics speech for five minutes. Some of the cable networks that young people watch are already committed to giving this issue some airtime.

With a speech aimed at citing the Kaiser-Califano statistics and more general family issues, the President should mention the bipartisan events he will participate in that week to emphasize parent, child, family issues.

10. FOLLOW-UP -- Events with Califano and Santorum and others from both parties who have emphasized this issue.

11. BUSH RECORD ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION -- This administration has an extraordinary record of accomplishment (one the public will find deeply reassuring) despite all the demands made on federal law enforcement by the 9/11 terrorism crisis.

The last few years of indictments and trials have continued the process of breaking the mob initially begun in the 1982 initiative. The Attorney General, Director Mueller and others should be very proud of the work done. The president should visit New York, meet with and address prosecutors, federal agents. His pledge is to finish the job as well as warn against other and newer

forms of organized crime. Possibly do some events with Rudy Guiliani.

12. THE ISSUE -- Organized crime and public corruption **are** not the sort of issue political consultants talk much about. Yet few issues resonate *so* deeply with the American people. Popular culture phenomenon from the Untouchables to the Godfather to the Sopranos *speaks* to a lot more than entertainment or melodrama. The public understands evil, it knows criminal conspiracies exist and believes one of the **first** duties of its federal leadership is fighting national syndicates-- what Bobby Kennedy called "the enemy within." The reason why from Dewey to Kefauver to the Kennedys to Giuliani the issue has always represented the fastest track to the presidency is a sound one; the American people reward Gangbusters because they know how syndicates and the official corruption can undermine democracy.

13. INTERNATIONAL. TIE-IN -- The administration **has** a similarly wonderful record of stressing the danger to new democracies of organized crime and the official corruption it breeds. The tie-in to terrorist and narco-syndicates is **also** a theme that can be developed.

14. YOUTH GANGS -- Again the administration's record here is excellent. A tour **of** affected areas of Los Angeles with Attorney General Gonzalez and Chief Bratton, who has done fine work on this issue, would send a message. So too would meetings with youth and parents **groups**.

This combines youth at risk and the law enforcement side. It also *speaks* to a deep concern of many parents in urban areas and minority neighborhoods.

15. COMMON THREAD -- Besides adding variety to the news dynamic, these initiatives would *start* developing issues that everyday Americans care about with sort of news items that stir them, often deeply.

16. SINE QUA NON: PREPARATION -- Before rolling out these issues substantive preparatory work must be done: facts and statistics in back-up material, build-up with preliminary events, much backgrounding of the media.

17. NOTE ON FOLLOW-THROUGH -- Obviously, something like an economics speech would **go** a long way towards satisfying the public's desire to hear **from** their President about the state of things and about the larger concepts behind his programs. This would also help them get a

sense of direction about domestic policy. Which the media gives no indication of.

So, there should be a plan for many follow-up events that range from emphasizing single moms and minority entrepreneurs to presenting the president in academic setting speaking on some point of theory such as entrepreneurship as the engine of the economy. (Good idea to stay away from campaign style events where president is seen onstage in shirtsleeves with mike in hand. This is about the presidency and it's a good idea to keep that context.)

(prior memo
August 18)

Andy Cord

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: DONALD RUMSFELD
RE: MESSAGE

Tom Dolan

I. GETTING OUT THE WORD

Your economic program has been enormously successful. Yet 51% of the public rates the economy as "bad, very bad or terrible." 41% say the economy is "getting worse". An astonishing 28% believe the US is in a recession.

While making stops in states or holding news briefings with cabinet members can be helpful, this does not utilize the single most potent means of presidential communications.

I think you should consider an address to the nation on the economy. You could talk about the successes and what caused them. And why this opens up the opportunity to take care of long-term problems.

And this should be done before Congress returns. A way of saying Congress has done pretty well so far but now you want to ask the American people to have a dialogue with their Senators and Representatives before they return to Washington.

Setting is important. I would resist suggestions this needs to be done off-site. The oval office speech is a basic tool of the presidency and meant not just for announcements of war or international crisis and the like. Some messages need a longer, more formal format. This is one. The president's expository role is an essential one.

You might want to consider flying back from Crawford for a day or two in order to make this address from the Oval Office. It would add drama.

II. HIDDEN FACTOR

Another factor comes into play here and may be the reason for any of the softness in polling numbers the media likes to talk about. I think it possible a good deal of the public not only favors your plan but suspects the economy is doing well and knows in a vague way that your leadership with Congress is responsible for the current prosperity.

At an even more subliminal level, however, there may be disappointment they have not heard from you. I think they want their President to explain the current situation, trust them with facts and ideas and ask for their help in the same way you have with national security problems.

III OBJECTIONS

Obvious objections can be made. I don't **think** they amount to much.

1. The networks might refuse to air it. This is doubtful, particularly if you put some news in the address. But even if they do, cable will carry the address and so will the print media. And this will move the ball.

2. An oval office address is characteristic of other presidencies not yours. Not after this speech.

3. We're getting the message out with news briefings and state visits. No, this looks too much like campaigning and the American people really don't like to see their president campaigning.

4. It might fail. Yes, if expectations are raised unnecessarily. This is not about having the public storm congress with telegrams and phone calls. It's about a *talk* with the American people about the economy - and a chance to tell them about using current good times to secure their children's future.

5. There isn't much to say. Come on. You took office, saw the economic troubles, put in place a dramatic recovery plan, fought very hard for those crucial **tax** cuts and asked for and got the public's and the Congress's support. That's leadership and a heck of a story.

But it goes beyond that. The actual facts of the recovery are startling. The Wall St Journal editorial the other day about "The American Job Machine," Christopher Bemanke's piece about the breadth of the growth and Stephen More's earlier piece on the impact of the **tax** cuts make for thrilling reading. Americans don't know this **stuff**. They need to hear it from you. And Americans will be thrilled to see how you are trying to build on success and solve the long-term problems. Thrilled too that you have asked for their help.

6. Too much risk. You've given some of the greatest speeches of any presidency. Your addresses before Congress may have been the most dramatic and successful in history. You know exactly what you want in speeches and you have a tremendous synergy with some of the most talented speechwriters the White House has ever seen.

This is a culture of success that can easily handle a change of format -- an oval office discussion with the American people about the good news of a growing economy.

Furthermore, no one speaks more eloquently than you have about the entrepreneur as the engine of the economy and the creator of wealth for all.

7. Still too much risk – Do a tape -- dry run. Take a look.

IV. FINALPOINTS

You might say: “I haven’t spoken often to you from **this** place but that a critical part of the presidency is **making** sure the people **have** the facts and **letting** them decide. And **this** office is just the right setting for that.”

You might also say: “With Congress in **adjournment** your representatives and senators **are** at home. You, the American people, have a chance now to **talk** with them.”

V SUMMARY -- Your often-shown willingness to treat the American people as receptive and intelligent is the key here. The American people want information, can understand a graph, and will, when in possession of the facts, do the **right** thing.

Public officials who trust them with the data, **take** the **time** to explain it and then tie it to the big ideas and larger themes of American **history** **earn** their gratitude.

Americans also want to **be** asked for help by **their** leadership. They respond generously, and even with a sense of excitement.

VI IDEAS AND OUTLINE – I think the attached outline is worth a look.

OUTLINE – OVAL OFFICE ADDRESS ON ECONOMY

* Tonight I’m going to give you some very good news and explain why this opens up enormous possibilities for the future. A chance to solve problems that some say are insoluble. Problems that at one time threatened to make the **future** of those children in your home tonight..... an onerous and heavily burdened one.

* Before getting to the good news, let me just go over what **things** were like a few years ago. A busted boom, a stock market hitting bottom, recession and inflation fears, and, of course, those deficits that looked like they were out of sight. All **this** only increased with the added burden of 9/11 expenditures. Only a gloomy economic forecast seemed realistic.

*We took steps:
[list them)

*Then In 2003 some additional tax cuts were passed. Usual fears this would cause huge deficits etc.

In fact, the cuts are what have dramatically improved things. (Stephen More piece in WSJ)

*Let me just pause here with a word on **tax** cuts. Some people say across-the-board tax cuts help the rich.

*First, extraordinary number of the small business people file individually. They aren't rich but they're on their way there and they're taking everybody else along with them (Minority and female owned businesses) as long as we don't take incentives away.

*But, second, yes, cuts do help the rich. But that just means they end up paying more taxes not less and putting their money in places were entrepreneurs who aren't rich can use it.

*You remember the luxury tax a few years ago on yachts. Guess who wanted it repealed? Workers and small business people.

It's a simply rule: high taxes mean lower growth and fewer jobs. Lower taxes means higher growth and more jobs.

Americans know that and have never had much patience with class warfare or *soak* the rich rhetoric.

*But let's just extend this discussion a little further and ask: why do tax cuts work?

You see, economists tend to look at the economy in two ways: The consumption side and the supply side. Consumption is about what consumers buy. But supply side is about the development of better products and services--just another way for describing the job and wealth creation side. It's about people really.

*I can remember in the 2000 when I first began running for president how I stressed the wealth-creators in our society. See, we tend to think of big corporations as the sources of economic activity and jobs. Not so. 95% of new jobs come **from** small firms.

*We value virtuosos in the arts -- it's why we go most of the time. And the same is true of the champions in sports -- we want to see the great ones.

*But, you know, somehow we miss appreciating as much as we should those virtuosos and champions of economic activity -- Entrepreneurs. We all know them, they are in our family, our next door neighbors. They have a new invention

or a new idea and make life better for everyone. They have special gift for making their own good fortune everyone else's'

*This is the genius, the secret power, some call it "the animal spirits" of any economy. What makes it go.

*And, boy, has ours been going.

*Here is the current economic situation
(list good signs)

*CHART I -- line showing how **tax** cut brought more revenue and second line showing deficit decline.

*Now with all this turn-up there is a chance to address the problem that threatens the future. The issue of retirement security . Some major corporation defaulting on pension plans -- unthinkable only a few years ago.

*The federal government has the same problem. Social Security. some people want to say reform is going nowhere. I feel differently. The last six month has been productive. I see openings and willingness to listen.

*But Congress needs our encouragement to do that.
Congress has a pretty good record so far (tort reform, bankruptcy bill, energy, Cafta etc) but it would be a tragedy to slack off now.
Here is what is needed

*First in order to solve these longer-term problems we need a good short-term economic climate. We need to keep growing. We have to keep making economic progress. Send strong pro-growth signs to the business and markets. That means two things:

* 1. Progress with taxes by making permanent the tax cuts and getting **tax** reform. Let's keep the economy humming.

*2. Telling your representatives that we have to get Social security fixed. To leave politics behind. It won't wait. And here's why we need private accounts.

*CHART II -- Line showing Social Security's implosion.

One last note -- we have come this far because of you. Each step along the way, particularly with regard to tax cuts in 2003, the people made a difference. I want to ask your help. **Make** an effort to contact your representatives and tell them how you feel.

*And let me just say that tonight won't be the end of it.

*When Congress reconvenes I will come back and report to you on how we are doing. And, yes, I may ask your help again.

*In the meanwhile, let's keep growing, moving ahead.
In the end economics is not really hocus pocus or high science. It's about "human action" -- human beings interacting in a million different ways to make a wealthier and better world. We call those interactions "markets." And markets have a mystery to them -- they make much better decisions than any group of government experts or panel of economists.

*Democracy is based on the same principle. That in the long run you the people know better than the political elites.

*With your help, we can shake up the pessimists in Washington, keep our economy growing and solve the seemingly insoluble problems. It takes some optimism, some good cheer.
But as a people we're pretty good at that.

*And that's the point. Good economics isn't really about just numbers, or charts, or theory.

*Our economy works because in the end it is about an idea. An idea that has found a very special place here in America. The idea is freedom, the idea that the individual should be allowed to excel -- to reach just as far native talent will take that individual.

*We shouldn't take that for granted. Foreigners who come here to live are always so struck by it.

*One of them recently talked about this. A man who once had to overcome much adversity in his life. He went on to become a doctor and then a famous Irish Tenor. Today Kenneth Tynan lives in New York and likes to talk about how proud he is to open Yankee games with God Bless America. He calls it his "hymn."

He also likes to talk about how wonderful Americans are to newcomers -- "They will you to succeed" he said.

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005

TO The Honorable Karen Hughes
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*
SUBJECT November 2004 Report

092

Attached is a report that was submitted to me privately by three folks who had been involved with USIA over the years. It is dated -- almost a year old now, but they did it at my request. I found it interesting and thought you might as well.

If I can be helpful, do let me know. I know that these individuals are all interested in being of assistance, if that is your desire.

Thanks.

Attach November, 2004 Private Report to SecDef

DHR:ss
092705-07

amSep05

QSD 19352-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52450

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/52451

Executive Summary

To win the **War on Terror**, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our **extremist allies** can win over to **their side**. Moreover, **it is** crucial that **we convince** a significant number of people to be actively on **our side**. As such, **the** challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and **central** component of **the War on Terror**. **Dozens of** studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's **foreign** communication effort have **already been** produced. This paper does not **seek** to add to **this** cacophony of **voices**. Rather, we **present two** substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of **the** world to the challenge of **shaping hearts** and minds and changing viewpoints in the **War on Terror**.

It is important to note **from the start**, however, that **any** attempt at changing the **attitudes** and behaviors of **foreign** publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as **the** lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations **beyond** foreign government leaders. This role **must** be a **priority** commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an (integral) component of **each of the** President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a **manner** that **changes** attitudes and behavior **towards** America, the United States **government should:**

1) **Establish a** _____

OBJECTIVE: Listen, **ask** questions, and **analyze** foreign public opinion as well as **test the effectiveness** of various **USG** messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently **engages** in public opinion polling and how irrelevant **much** of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort **must** monitor **how** the opinions of **various demographic groups** are changing **over** time and then inform **policymakers** of these changing sentiments. **By** listening to the opinions of **various groups** and tailoring **our message** and **to an**

appropriate ~~degree~~ — ~~our~~ policies to the information ~~they are~~ giving ~~us~~, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the ~~War on Terrorism~~ will require unprecedented use of America's technology, ~~broadcast, market~~ research, and communications ~~resources~~. To this end, the ~~Administration should~~ establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering ~~the information~~ required by the ~~USG~~ to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various ~~USG~~ messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product — coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the ~~USG~~ has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the ~~U.S. government's~~ message into the future. The ~~USG~~ must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the ~~US~~ government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion."¹ To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion" and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the **American** media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, *it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own* vital national interest.

I. Bow America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis!⁵ Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased Mideast-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.⁶

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from Visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audiences. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By **incorporating a serious** research component into the **overall** public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, **we** can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue **that has been** ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the **words of MIT** professor **Nobert** Wiener, **who** said "I never **know** what I say until I **hear** the response." This is **certainly** not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently **fails to** attempt to research **the reasons** for anti-Americanism abroad or **to use** research in formulating a **clear** communication strategy that **engages** foreign audiences in a dialogue. **As the** General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "**State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs.**"⁶ America is the **best** in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but **we** **are** notably **uninformed** about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the **U.S.** government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the **rest** of the world American public diplomacy officers **need** to understand **that** public opinion cannot **be** changed either solely on the basis of reason **nor solely on** the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason **to persuade** people and the **associated** emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes **and** behavior of foreign publics. If the **end** product of a particular program is **only** a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is **an exchange process** between the U.S. (including the **U.S.** government as well **as** the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the **United States** are better **than any** reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they **are** exposed to, and extremists who **can** often be quite persuasive. **This** relationship between the United States **and** foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private **sector** leads the world in **most** of the **key strategic** areas required **for** effective public diplomacy: technology, **film** and broadcast, marketing research, and communications." Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not **only** the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though **these** tools will remain vital), but **also** the resources and **expertise** of the **American private sector**

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for **engaging** the public opinion aspect of the **War on Terror** is making sure that American policy **makers** and advocates have the **most** accurate and up-to-date information about **foreign audiences** available to them at **all** times. Doing **so** requires two important actions **from** the Administration that will **allow** the **U.S. government** to bring the best **work** of the American public and private **sectors** to **bear** in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding **General** of the **Army Air Force**, Hap Arnold, wrote to **Secretary** of War Henry Stimson:

"During **this** war the Army, **Army Air Forces**, and the Navy have made unprecedented **use** of scientific and industrial resources. **The conclusion is** inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the **military**, other **government** agencies, industry, and the **universities**. Scientific planning **must** be years in advance of **the actual research** and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for **success** on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project **RAND**, the precursor of today's **RAND** Corporation. The Articles of **Incorporation** bluntly set forth **RAND's** purpose: "To further and **promote** scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for **the public welfare** and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

³¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the **U.S. government** has **so** many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing **off** the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over **recent** years, public diplomacy coordination has **deteriorated**.¹² **CFOA** will **provide** the data that **allows** **America** to **both** formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly **reevaluate and** revise that strategy into the future. The **U.S. government** **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that **someone** is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and **messages** so that they are aligned with the **U.S. government's** overall communication strategy. The current **Under** Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy **position** is clearly **not** this empowered **individual** as he **or** she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. **It is also** vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the **highest** levels of government.

As such, a **new** staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S. government's** overall communications **strategy**. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from **CFOA** and **disseminating** it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination **does** not currently exist. **As** the 2004 report of the **U.S. Advisory Commission** on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies **engage** in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, coordinating authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.¹³

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 8.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this dialogue between America and the rest of the world** and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector is **seen** as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the **U.S. government** the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "if the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world the extremists will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005

TO: President George W Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letter from Elisabeth A. Beard

293

Mr. President,

General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army sent me the attached letter, which I thought you should see.

You have twice been elected President by some truly wonderful people.

Respectfully,

Attach: Letter from Elisabeth A. Beard

DHR:ss
092605-35

27 Sep 05

OSD 19353-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52467

(b)(6)

September 17, 2005

Ft. Bragg Casualty Assistance Center
Fayetteville, NC

Dear Casualty Notification Officer,

Almost a year ago you came to my door with the devastating news of the death of my son, SPC Bradley S. Beard. You waited at the curb with your fellow officer in the predawn stillness of an October morning until you saw the lights come on in the house. My clock read 6:38 AM when you pressed the doorbell.


I don't know how you found the courage to walk up our front steps. Maybe that is why the Army assigns two soldiers to the mission: so they can't back out. I can't imagine how you were able to steel yourself, and resolve in your mind to say the words that would break my heart and shred my soul. Surely there cannot be a worse mission to give to a soldier.

I cannot fathom how a soldier is able to complete even one mission of this type. It isn't a warrior task for which anyone could truly become trained and proficient... and yet you were given this task and expected to perform the job with dignity and compassion. And you did just that. It must have something to do with the instilling of the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. That is the only explanation I have been able to come up with.

It bothers me all these months later, that I was unable to treat you with the respect and honor that you deserved for taking on such a horrible and thankless task; our notification. I remember yelling at my husband not to open the door, and then begging him not to let you inside the house. You were the last person I wanted to see standing on my porch, and I think I conveyed that to you. I would not speak to you or look at you or shake your hand when you offered it. I guess all my goodwill and courtesy somehow just drained away and bled out of my heart in those few moments as I saw you standing in the doorway.

I know that I cannot go back and rewrite the past so as not to be rude to you. God knows I would rewrite history if I could, but my rewrite would include Bradley still living. In my version, you and I would never meet. But we did meet, badly. The only thing I can do is make amends for that, if you are willing to give me the chance. I would be honored if you could visit us again. This time I would open the door. I would invite you in. I would look at you directly. I would speak to you civilly. I would offer you a cup of coffee. And most importantly, I would shake your hand, and thank you for your service to our country.

Sincerely,



Elisabeth A. Beard

Mom of SPC Bradley S. Beard, redeployed to heaven October 14, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/52468

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005

323

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Military Unit Information Card

Mr. President,

This might be helpful in keeping track of unit numbers and capabilities.

Respectfully,

Attach: Military Unit Information Card

DHR:ss
092705-05

295405

OSD 19354-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52469

OSD 19354-05

ARMY

Division

- 15,000-20,000 Soldiers
- 4 Brigades Combat Teams

Brigade Combat Team



- 3,000 -5,000 Soldiers
- Tanks, Artillery, Infantry fighting vehicles

Battalion

- 500-1,000 Soldiers

Company

- 75-200 Soldiers

Platoon

- 35 Soldiers

USMC

Division

- 17,300 Marines

Regiment



- 2,800 Marines

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)



- 2,200 Marines
- 22 Helicopters
- 6 Strike Aircraft

Battalion

- 870 Marines

Company

- 180 Marines

Platoon

- 45 Marines

NAVY

Carrier Strike Group ★★

- 8,000 Sailors
- Carrier
- Cruiser
- Destroyers
- Submarine
- Logistics ship
- Air Wing w/-75 aircraft

Expeditionary Strike Group ★

- 2,000 Sailors + 2,200 Marines
- Amphibious Assault Ship
- Amphibious Transport Ship
- Dock Landing Ship
- Cruiser
- Guided Missile Destroyer
- Frigate
- Submarine
- Marine Expeditionary Unit

AIR FORCE

Wing ★

- 20 - 72 Aircraft
- 1,000-5,000 Airmen
- Operations Group
- Logistics Group
- Medical Group
- Support Group

Operations Group



- 1,000-2,000 Airmen
- 20 - 72 Aircraft

Squadron

- 50-750 Airmen
- 12 - 24 Aircraft

DJS

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

September 06, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Rotations

I do want to see what the implications of Katrina will be on force rotations.

We'll have to make some judgments about assumptions -- as to whether or not we want to count this as a mobilization and a deployment.

Please come back with a concept for me.

Thanks.

DFR:dh
090605-26

.....

Please Respond By September 15, 2005

320.2
6 Sep 05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52471

OSD 19407-05

~~FOUO~~

505/011296
ES-4004

SEP 02 2005

TO: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Countries to Visit

I have revised this list of countries to visit, for the most part as you suggested.
The only places I am not sure I agree with you are: Finland, Nigeria, South Africa
and possibly Nepal.

Take a look and see me to discuss any remaining differences.

Attached is the revised list,

Thanks.

Attach.
List of Countries
8/26/05USD(P) memo to **SD re:** Countries to Visit [OSD17398-05]

DHR:dh
083105-32



Please Respond By 09/29/05

3335D

02-09-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52472

OSD 19465-05

20 Sept 05

Countries to Consider Visiting over the Next Few Years

North Africa

Algeria
Libya (at the right time)
Morocco
Tunisia

Africa

Kenya
Liberia
Niger

E. Europe

Serbia **and** Montenegro

Europe

Luxembourg

Central America and Caribbean

Belize
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles

South America

Bolivia
Guyana
Uruguay

Asia

China
Mongolia
Nepal

Central Asia

Armenia
Kazakhstan

SE Asia

Indonesia
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Vietnam

Middle East

Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia

September 1, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/52473

~~FOUO~~

MR

SEP 20 2005

ES-4276

TO: Gen Pete Pace
ADM Ed Giambastiani
Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Our Forces Around the World

Please take a look at how our forces are dispersed around the world, and let's talk about whether or not that is how that ought to be arranged.

Thanks.

DHR,ss
091905-24

.....
Please Respond By October 05, 2005

320,2 Strategic

20 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19466-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52474

~~FOUO~~

SEP-02-2005-

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu
GEN Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

You folks ought to take another hard look at how we can cut the number of days an activated reservist is "not" available to a combatant commander. There have to be ways to continue to reduce down the period when they are doing something other than that which they are being called up to do.

32210

I would like some data showing me where you think you were, where you think you are now, and what you think you might do to improve it.

Thanks.

DHR.db
090105-06

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

CF: USA
CSA
VCSA
DAS
ECC
SMA

25005-

~~FOUO~~ 11-L-0559/OSD/52475 OSD 19468-05



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2005-09-28 AM 11:42

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated September 2, 2005, subject as above (Tab A).
- 'Where we were.' Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom II the Army mobilized reservists via an immature training base, manual personnel processing tools, and limited experience with the rapid deployment of numerous reserve units. Between Oct 2003 and Jan 2004, company-size and larger reserve units that were mobilized to support Central Command spent an average 94 days preparing for deployment. This time is measured from their mobilization date to their latest arrival date (LAD) in theater. The average time spent directly supporting the combatant commander represented 79 percent of an individual's tour on active duty measured between mobilization and CONUS return (Tab B).
- 'Where we are now.' The Army has focused on reducing time spent preparing reserve units for deployment. We expanded the training base to improve throughput, automated our personnel processing tools, and became more efficient with cross leveling personnel and equipment. Since January 2004, the average time reserve units prepared for deployment in support of Central Command decreased to 68 days (as compared to 94 days in September 2003). As a result, the average time spent directly supporting the combatant commander is 84 percent (as compared to 79 percent in September 2003) of an individual's tour on active duty measured between mobilization and CONUS return. The Army has effectively implemented the necessary training infrastructures and management improvements to reduce the time reservists are not available to the combatant commander (Tab C).
- 'How we might improve.' Army staffs at all levels are examining ways to reduce the mobilization pre-deployment planning process. We generally reduced unit pre-deployment times by implementing phased mobilization, improving the cross leveling process of personnel and equipment during the Alert Phase, and making better use of automation tools to assist with inprocessing (Tab D).
- The recently implemented Mobilization for Training policy has not yet made a

326

R 8 Sp...
1

2 Sp...
1

OSD 19468-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52476

SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

significant impact to allow us to further reduce the 68 days on average that units are preparing to deploy. The Mobilization for Training policy allows us to mobilize Soldiers prior to the unit alert in order to complete Military Occupational Specific Training and Non-Commissioned Officer Educational System courses. Eventually, this will contribute to decreasing the time some reservists spend preparing for unit deployments. More importantly, it will ensure that Soldiers are properly trained and educated on their individual skills. This will make them more effective after mobilization when collective training time is so critical.

- There are also initiatives for Home Station mobilization which we are examining to further reduce preparation times. We will continue to improve our automation capability to track and manage each mobilized soldier to ensure compliance with established policies.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Kem (b)(6)

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

SEP-02,2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu
GEN Pete Schoomaker
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

You folks ought to take another hard **look** at how we can cut the number of days an activated reservist is "not" available to a combatant commander. There have to be ways to continue to reduce down the period when they are doing something other than that which they are being called up to do.

I would like some data showing me where you think you were, where you think you are now, and what you **think** you might do to improve it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
090105-06

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

CF: USA
CSA
VCSA
DAS
 ECC
SMA

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52479

Tab B





MOBILIZATION TIME THAT UNITS SUPPORT THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

(Taken from Army Mobilization orders with deployment and redeployment data for units with over 100 personnel since 1 Sept 2003)

	Company and larger units with Mob Dates Between October 2003 and January 2004	Company and larger units with Mob Dates between January 2004 and July 2004
AVERAGE TOTAL UNIT MOB TIME SPENT PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT	94 days	68 days
AVERAGE PERCENT OF DAYS SUPPORTING COMBATANT COMMANDER (MOB DATE THRU REDEPLOYMENT TO CONUS)	79%	84%

Tab C

RC TRAINING & DEPLOYMENT MO




EDE Then = 191 d
 BN Then = 146 d
 PAX Then = 107 d
 DET Then = 91 d

- Acronyms:**
- BOG – Boots on the Ground
 - HS – Home Station
 - LAD – Latest Arrival Date
 - Pax – Personnel or Passengers
 - RIP – Relief in Place
 - RLD – Ready to Load Date
 - RSDI – Reception, Staging, Onward Mover
 - SRP – Soldier Readiness Processing
 - TOA – Transfer of Authority

Tab D

PREPARATION TIME FOR UNITS

(Taken from Army Mobilization orders with deployment and redeployment data for units with over 100 personnel since 1 Sept 2003)



■ DAYS SPENT FROM IN DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION- FROM MOBILIZATION DAY THRU ARRIVAL IN THEATER



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

205 SEP 22 PM 3:35

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

DECISION MEMO

32

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Possible Names for the Joint Great Lakes Medical Facility

- One of the Administration's successes in Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs collaboration is the single medical facility being established in North Chicago to serve both the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. It will replace the hospital at Great Lakes Naval Training Station, capitalizing on the nearby Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital. Your successor, Congressman Kirk, is very pleased with the plan
- Veterans Affairs would like to make **this** a joint facility, much like the only other such facility, the Mike O'Callaghan Federal Hospital in **Las** Vegas, Nevada.
- Veterans Affairs facilities **are** named by acts of Congress, and Veterans Affairs prefers naming its facilities after Medal of Honor recipients. TAB A provides background on two Illinois recipients who served in the medical arena from the medical community.
- Congressman Kirk's office has raised the possibility of **naming** the facility after the astronaut James Lovell. Captain Lovell was the Command Module pilot for the first flight to the moon. He served a long and distinguished career **as** a naval aviator and astronaut. Captain Lovell is currently retired and resides in Lake Forest, Illinois. (TAB A)
- I believe it would be better policy to follow Veterans Affairs' tradition. If you would indicate **any** preferences you have in naming this facility, we will undertake negotiations with the Veterans Affairs and Congressman Kirk.

RECOMMENDATION: That the SECDEF approve one of the names below.

Kilmer	_____
Lester	_____
Lovell	_____
Other	_____


28 SEP 05

Attachment: As stated *B. Winkenwerder* SEP 26 2005
Prepared by: Dr. Winkenwerder, Jr., ASD (HA) (b)(6) DOCS Open 89741,92237

Korean War

John **E. Kilmer** was born on 15 August 1930 in Highland Park, Illinois. At the time of action he was a Hospitalman, USN. His citation reads, "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty in action against enemy aggressor forces on 13 August 1952. With his company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position well forward of the main line of resistance during an assault by large concentrations of hostile troops, Hospitalman Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments while moving to the aid of a casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of a stricken Marine though a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage of enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body. Mortally wounded by flying shrapnel while carrying out this heroic action, Hospitalman Kilmer, by his great personal valor and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in saving the life of a comrade, served to inspire all who observed him. By his exceptional fortitude, determined efforts, and unyielding devotion to duty, Hospitalman Kilmer reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the United States naval service. He gallantly gave his life for another."

John Kilmer is buried in San Jose Bunal Park, San Antonio, TX (Lot 349, Block 9, Section 1, Grave 6)



The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

HOSPITALMAN
JOHN E. KILMER
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Medical Corpsman while serving with a Marine Rifle Company in the First Marine Division in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 13 August 1952. With his Company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position well forward of the main line of resistance during an assault by large concentration of hostile troops, Hospitalman Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments while moving to the aid of casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of the stricken Marine through a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body. Mortally wounded by flying shrapnel while carrying out this heroic action, Hospitalman Kilmer, by his great personal valor and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in saving the life of a comrade, served to inspire all who observed him. His unyielding devotion to duty in the face of heavy odds reflects the highest credit upon himself and enhanced the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for another.

/s/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

In mid-July, when Army Chief of **Staff** Gen. J. Lawton Collins visited **South Korea**, he permitted **Gen. James A. Van Fleet**, Eighth Army commander, to increase the Korean Augmentation to the **U.S. Army** to **2,500** men per division. In August, when the ROK Army grew to **350,000 men**, permission **increased** the ceiling of KATUSA soldiers to a total of **28,000**. Van Fleet was directed to cap the manpower of the ROK Army to between **363,000 and 450,000**.

One benefit to South Korea **from** the KATUSA program is that those soldiers receive the same training as GIs. That makes them an efficient cadre for their Army.

Aug. 9-14 -- Part of the First Marine Division is driven **off Hill 58** four miles west of **Panmunjom** on Aug. 9. Over the next two days the hill changes hands five times, **until the Chinese finally secure it**. The Marines then attack Hill 122, which overlooks Hill 58. The Chinese on 122 have been watching the action on 58 and are caught by surprise. They are easily driven off. But from Aug. 12-14, the Chinese **try** to regain the hill by sending units up to battalion strength against a reinforced Marine company. They are repulsed each time. The place will become **known** as Bunker Hill.

Intense artillery fire just after midnight Aug. 13 means another Chinese attack will soon follow. During the barrage, Navy Corpsman John E. Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet Joyce Kilmer killed in World War I, answers the calls of "Corpsman!" When the attack begins, Kilmer repeatedly exposes himself to enemy fire to treat wounded marines, carrying some of them to safety.

The attack is broken **off**, but is followed by more artillery and mortar fire. **Through** the sounds of explosions, Kilmer hears cries for help from a Marine caught in the open. Although **Marines try** to keep him from going to the wounded man, Kilmer crawls through the explosions. Before he reaches him, Kilmer is **hit** several times in **the** side by shrapnel, and is **bleeding heavily** by the time he makes it to his patient. Several rounds impact nearby and Kilmer throws himself over the Marine. He is mortally wounded by shrapnel.

Kilmer, who volunteered for medical duty with fleet Marines to escape a Navy court-martial, is posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

At the truce conference table at Panmunjom, North Korean Lt. **Gen. Nam Il**, Red team leader, rails against the attacks on North Korea. He said "any so-called military pressure on your side will only invite you to miserable defeat."

For two days the U.N. team listens to such talk from Nam. After listening for another half hour on Aug. 11, Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, U.N. team leader, calls another weeklong recess, declaring Nam's comments leave "nothing to discuss."

Aug. 9 -- In the **air** war, U.N. tactical fighters strafe and bomb enemy soldiers and a supply base at Sinchon in Southwestern North Korea. On the same day a British carrier-based Sea Fury shot down its first MiG-15 in a dogfight near Chinnampo.


The Fifth Air Force and British Navy from Aug. 4-9 say pilots downed 20 MiGs and damaged 19 against no losses.

Aug. 10-12 -- B-29s hit a large concentration of vehicles close to **Pyongyang** on Aug. 10, but a Peking radio broadcast Aug. 11 claims "a new program of blanket bombing of civilians is not aimed at any military targets." The Reds say that 1,000 civilians were killed and wounded in the Aug. 10 raid **on** Pyongyang.

World War II

Fred Faulkner Lester was born on 29 April 1926 in Downer's Grove, Illinois. At the time of action he was a Hospital Apprentice First **Class**, USN. His citation reads, "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Medical Corpsman with an Assault Rifle Platoon, attached to the First Marine Battalion, 22nd Marines, Sixth Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on Okinawa Shima in the Ryukyu Chain, 8 June 1945. Quick to spot a wounded Marine lying in an open field beyond the front lines following the relentless assault against a strategic Japanese hill position, Lester unhesitatingly crawled toward the casualty under a concentrated barrage from hostile machine guns, **rifles**, and grenades. Tom by enemy rifle bullets as he inched forward, he stoically disregarded the mounting fury of Japanese fire and his **own** pain to pull **the** wounded man toward a covered position. Struck by enemy fire a second time before he reached cover, he exerted a tremendous effort and succeeded in pulling his comrade to safety where, too seriously wounded himself to administer aid, he instructed two of his **squad** in proper medical treatment of the rescued Marine. Realizing that his **own** wounds were fatal, he staunchly refused medical attention for himself and, gathering his fast-waning **strength** with calm determination, coolly and expertly directed his men in the treatment of two other wounded Marines, succumbing shortly thereafter. Completely selfless in his concern for the welfare of his fighting comrades, Lester, by his indomitable spirit, outstanding valor, and competent direction of others, had saved the life of one who otherwise must have perished and had contributed to the safety of countless others. Lester's fortitude in the face of certain death sustains and enhances the highest traditions of the United States naval service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

Lester is buried in Clarendon Hills **Cemetery, Darien, Illinois**
The **USS Fred Lester (DE-1022)** was named in his honor.



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[By-Laws](#)

[Officers](#)

[Reunion](#)

[Contact](#)

[Links](#)

[WW II
Decorations
& Awards](#)

[Home](#)

BIOGRAPHY

Fred Faulkner Lester was born in Downers Grove, Illinois on April 29, 1926. Dedicated to serving his country during the early days of World War II, Fred attempted to enlist at the young age of 16 years in 1942, but was denied. He patiently waited a year and with his parents approval enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserves as Apprentice Seaman at Chicago, Illinois on November 1, 1943. He received training at the Naval Training Station, Farragut, Idaho, and was promoted to Seaman Second Class in January 1944. On March 3, 1944 his rating was changed to Hospital Apprentice Second Class after additional training at Hospital Corps School, U.S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, California. Later that month he reported to the Fleet Marine Force, Camp Elliott, San Diego, California. Fred served with Marine units until he was killed in action on June 8, 1945, in the battle for Okinawa Shima. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. He was laid to rest in Clarendon Hills Cemetery, Westmont, Illinois.

MEDAL OF HONOR

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

FRED FAULKNER LESTER

HOSPITAL APPRECIITCE FIRST CLASS

UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

For service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity and the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Medical Corpsman with an Assault Rifle Platoon, attached to the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines, 6th Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on Okinawa Shima in the Ryukyu Chain, June 8, 1945. Quick to spot a wounded marine lying in an open field beyond the front lines following the relentless assault against a strategic Japanese hill position, LESTER unhesitatingly crawled toward the casualty under a concentrated barrage from hostile machine guns, rifles, and grenades. Torn by enemy rifle bullets as he inched forward, he stoically disregarded the mounting fury of Japanese fire and his own pain to pull the wounded man toward a covered position. Struck by enemy fire a second time before he reached cover, he exerted tremendous effort and succeeded in pulling his comrade to safety where, too seriously wounded himself to administer aid, he instructed two of his squad in proper medical treatment of the rescued marine. Realizing that his own wounds were fatal, he staunchly refused medical attention for himself and, gathering his fast waning strength with calm determination, coolly and expertly directed his men in the treatment of two other wounded marines, succumbing shortly thereafter. Completely selfless in his concern for the welfare of his fighting comrades, LESTER, by his indomitable spirit, outstanding valor and competent direction of others, had saved the life of one who otherwise must have perished and had contributed to the safety of countless others. LESTER's heroic fortitude in the face of certain death sustained and enhanced the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

/S/ Harry S. Truman

ADDITIONAL HONORS

Lester Elementary School, Downers Grove, Illinois - dedicated November 11, 1956

USS Lester - DE 1022 - commissioned June 14, 1957, decommissioned December 14, 1973

Camp Lester, Okinawa, Japan - rededicated June 8, 1982 (originally Camp Kuwae)

CPL ANTHONY P. DAMATO

MPL HENRY A. COURTNEY, JR.

CPL JAMES L. DAY

Biographical Data

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058



NAME: James A. Lovell (Captain, USN, Ret.)
NASA Astronaut NASA Astronaut (former)

PERSONAL DATA Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 25, 1928.
Married to the former Marilyn Gerlach, of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. They have four children.

EDUCATION: University of Wisconsin; United States Naval Academy, bachelor of science, 1952; Test Pilot School, NATC, Patuxent River, Maryland, 1958; Aviation Safety School, University of Southern California, 1961; Advanced Management Program, Harvard Business School, 1971; honorary doctorates from Rockhurst college, Illinois Wesleyan University, Western Michigan University, Mary Hardin-Baylor College and Milwaukee School of Engineering.



SPECIAL HONORS: Eagle Scout; Sam Houston Area Council 1976 Distinguished Eagle Scout Award; Presidential Medal for Freedom, 1970; NASA Distinguished Service Medal; two Navy Distinguished Flying Crosses; 1967 FAI De Laval and Gold Space Medals (Athens, Greece); the American Academy of Achievement Golden Plate Award; City of New York Gold Medal in 1969; City of Houston Medal for Valor in 1969; the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences special Trustees Award, 1969; the Institute of Navigation Award, 1969; the University of Wisconsin's Distinguished Alumni Service Award, 1970; co-recipient of the American Astronautical Society Flight Achievement Awards, 1966 and 1968; the Harmon International Trophy, 1966, 1967 and 1969; the Robert H. Goddard Memorial Trophy, 1969; the H. H. Arnold Trophy, 1969; General Thomas D. White USAF Space Trophy, 1969; Robert J. Collier Trophy, 1968; Henry G. Bennett Distinguished Service Award; and the AIAA Haley Astronautics Award, 1970.

AFFILIATIONS: Trustee of the National Space Institute; Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots; member Explorers Club; Fellow - American Astronautical Society; Captain Lovell is on the Board of Directors of the Federal Signal Corporation; Astronautics Corporation of America; Astronaut Memorial Foundation; Captain Lovell is also on the Sports Medicine Advisory Board at Rush Presbyterian - St. Lukes Medical Center. He is a regent emeritus for the Milwaukee School of Engineering; on the board of trustees of Lake Forest College; a trustee of the National Space Institute, the Association of Space Explorers; and the Chairman of the National Eagle Scouts Association.

EXPERIENCE: During his Naval career he has had numerous aviator assignments, including a 4-year tour as a test pilot at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

While there he served as Program Manager for the F4H "Phantom" Fighter. A graduate of the

Aviation Safety School of the University of Southern California, he also served as **Safety Engineer** with the Fighter Squadron 101 at the Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia.

He has logged more than 7,000 hours flying time--more than 3,500 hours in jet aircraft.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Captain Lovell was selected as an Astronaut by NASA in September 1962. He has since served as backup pilot for the Gemini 4 flight and backup Commander for the Gemini 9 flight, as well as backup Commander to Neil Armstrong for the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission.

On December 4, 1965, he and Frank Borman were launched into space on the history-making Gemini 7 mission. The flight lasted 330 hours and 35 minutes and included the first rendezvous of two manned maneuverable spacecraft.

The Gemini 12 mission, commanded by Lovell with Pilot Edwin Aldrin, began on November 11, 1966. This 4-day, 59-revolution flight brought the Gemini program to a successful close. Lovell served as Command Module Pilot and Navigator on the epic six-day journey of Apollo 8 - man's maiden voyage to the moon - December 21-27, 1968. Apollo 8 was the first manned spacecraft to be lifted into near-earth orbit by a 7-1/2 million pound thrust Saturn V launch vehicle; and Lovell and fellow crewmen, Frank Borman and William A. Anders, became the first humans to leave the Earth's gravitational influence.

He completed his fourth mission as Spacecraft Commander of the Apollo 13 flight, April 11-17, 1970, and became the first man to journey twice to the moon. Apollo 13 was programmed for ten days. However, the original flight plan was modified en route to the moon due to a failure of the Service Module cryogenic oxygen system. Lovell and fellow crewmen, John L. Swigert and Fred W. Haise, working closely with Houston ground controllers, converted their lunar module "Aquarius" into an effective lifeboat. Their emergency activation and operation of lunar module systems conserved both electrical power and water in sufficient supply to assure their safety and survival while in space and for the return to earth.

Captain Lovell held the record for time in space with a total of 715 hours and 5 minutes until surpassed by the Skylab flights.

On March 1, 1973, Captain Lovell retired from the Navy and from the Space Program to join Bay-Houston Towing Company in Houston, Texas. Bay-Houston Towing company is a diversified company involved in harbor and coastwise towing, mining and marketing of peat products for the lawn and garden industry, and ranching. He was promoted to the position of President and Chief Executive Officer on March 1, 1975.

BUSINESS BACKGROUND: On January 1, 1977, Captain Lovell became President of Fisk Telephone Systems, Inc. in Houston, Texas (marketing business communications equipment) in the southwestern United States. On January 1, 1981, he was appointed Group Vice President, Business Communications Systems, a Centel Corporation. He retired from Centel Corp as Executive Vice President and member of Board of Directors on January 1, 1991.

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT: President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Captain Lovell as his consultant for Physical Fitness and Sports in June, 1967. When the Physical Fitness Council was revised under President Nixon in 1970, Captain Lovell was assigned the additional duty of Chairman of the Council. After eleven years of performing his dual role with the Council, he relinquished these positions in 1978. However, he is still a Consultant to the Council and is presently assisting the Council in achieving its objective of making all citizens aware of the importance of being physically

fit. **The office of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports** is located in Washington, D.C.

DIRECTORSHIPS: Federal **Signal** Corporation, Chicago **Astronautics Corp. of America**, Milwaukee.

DECEMBER 1994

This is the only version available from NASA. Updates must be sought direct from the above named individual.

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2005

6032

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Naming Joint Great Lakes Medical Facility

In reading through the material you sent me on naming the Great Lakes ~~Medical~~ Facility, I came across a notation that Kilmer volunteered for medical duty to escape a Navy court-martial. What was the court-martial charge against ~~him~~?

I am inclined to go with Lester or Kilmer because I am a little uncomfortable naming things for people who are still living.

Please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/28/05 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Possible Names for the Joint Great Lakes Medical Facility [OSD 19473-05]

DHR:dh
100305-16

.....
Please Respond By 10/27/05

4 Oct 05

28 SEP 05

OCT 04 2005

DR
OSD 19473-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52496

1/24
1/20



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

208
10/3

2005 SEP 28 PM 3:35

Action
DECISION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

Robert Rangel
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

22
9/30

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Possible Names for the Joint Great Lakes Medical Facility

- One of the Administration's successes in Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs collaboration is the single medical facility being established in North Chicago to serve both the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. It will replace the hospital at Great Lakes Naval Training Station, capitalizing on the nearby Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital. Your successor, Congressman Kirk, is very pleased with the plan
- Veterans Affairs would like to make this a joint facility, much like the only other such facility, the Mike O'Callaghan Federal Hospital in Las Vegas, Nevada.
- Veterans Affairs facilities are named by acts of Congress, and Veterans Affairs prefers naming its facilities after Medal of Honor recipients. TAB A provides background on two Illinois recipients who served in the medical arena from the medical community.
- Congressman Kirk's office has raised the possibility of naming the facility after the astronaut James Lovell. Captain Lovell was the Command Module pilot for the first flight to the moon. He served a long and distinguished career as a naval aviator and astronaut. Captain Lovell is currently retired and resides in Lake Forest, Illinois. (TAB A)
- I believe it would be better policy to follow Veterans Affairs' tradition. If you would indicate any preferences you have in naming this facility, we will undertake negotiations with the Veterans Affairs and Congressman Kirk.

RECOMMENDATION: That the SECDEF approve one of the names below.

- Kilmer
- Lester
- Lovell
- Other

Walt Lewis Count Marshall Chase ✓

No - I am uncomfortable naming things for people who are alive

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Dr. Winkenwerder, Jr., ASD (HA)

SEP 26 2005

DOCS Open 89741, 92237

MA SD	9/30	SMA DSD	
ISA SD	10/2/05	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	10/9/05	1045	


11-L-0559/USD/52497

OSD 19473-05

Korean War

John E. Kilmer was born on 15 August 1930 in Highland Park, Illinois. At the time of action he was a Hospitalman, USN. His citation reads, "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty in action against enemy aggressor forces on 13 August 1952. With his company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position well forward of the main line of resistance during an assault by large concentrations of hostile troops, Hospitalman Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments while moving to the aid of a casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of a stricken Marine though a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage of enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body. Mortally wounded by flying shrapnel while carrying out this heroic action, Hospitalman Kilmer, by his great personal valor and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in saving the life of a comrade, served to inspire all who observed him. By his exceptional fortitude, determined efforts, and unyielding devotion to duty, Hospitalman Kilmer reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the United States naval service. He gallantly gave his life for another."

John Kilmer is buried in San Jose Bunal Park, San Antonio, TX (Lot 349, Block 9, Section 1, Grave 6)



The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

HOSPITALMAN
JOHN E. KILMER
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service asset forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Medical Corpsman while serving with a Marine Rifle Company in the First Marine Division in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 13 August 1952. With his Company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position well forward of the main line of resistance during an assault by large concentration of hostile troops, Hospitalman Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments while moving to the aid of casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of the stricken Marine through a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body. Mortally wounded by flying shrapnel while carrying out this heroic action, Hospitalman Kilmer, by his great personal valor and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in saving the life of a comrade, served to inspire all who observed him. His unyielding devotion to duty in the face of heavy odds reflects the highest credit upon himself and enhanced the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for another.

/s/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

In mid-July, when Army Chief of Staff Gen. J. Lawton Collins visited South Korea, he permitted Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army commander, to increase the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army to 2,500 men per division. In August, when the ROK Army grew to 350,000 men, permission increased the ceiling of KATUSA soldiers to a total of 28,000. Van Fleet was directed to cap the manpower of the ROK Army to between 363,000 and 450,000.

One benefit to South Korea from the KATUSA program is that those soldiers receive the same training as GIs. That makes them an efficient cadre for their Army.

Aug. 9-14 -- Part of the First Marine Division is driven off Hill 58 four miles west of Panmunjom on Aug. 9. Over the next two days the hill changes hands five times, until the Chinese finally secure it. The Marines then attack Hill 122, which overlooks Hill 58. The Chinese on 122 have been watching the action on 58 and are caught by surprise. They are easily driven off. But from Aug. 12-14, the Chinese try to regain the hill by sending units up to battalion strength against a reinforced Marine company. They are repulsed each time. The place will become known as Bunker Hill.

Intense artillery fire just after midnight Aug. 13 means another Chinese attack will soon follow. During the barrage, Navy Corpsman John E. Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet Joyce Kilmer killed in World War I, answers the calls of "Corpsman!" When the attack begins, Kilmer repeatedly exposes himself to enemy fire to treat wounded marines, carrying some of them to safety.

The attack is broken off, but is followed by more artillery and mortar fire. Through the sounds of explosions, Kilmer hears cries for help from a Marine caught in the open. Although Marines try to keep him from going to the wounded man, Kilmer crawls through the explosions. Before he reaches him, Kilmer is hit several times in the side by shrapnel, and is bleeding heavily by the time he makes it to his patient. Several rounds impact nearby and Kilmer throws himself over the Marine. He is mortally wounded by shrapnel.

Kilmer, who volunteered for medical duty with fleet Marines to escape a Navy court-martial, is posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

At the truce conference table at Panmunjom, North Korean Lt. Gen. Nam Il, Red team leader, rails against the attacks on North Korea. He said "any so-called military pressure on your side will only invite you to miserable defeat."

For two days the U.N. team listens to such talk from Nam. After listening for another half hour on Aug. 11, Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, U.N. team leader, calls another weeklong recess, declaring Nam's comments leave "nothing to discuss."

Aug. 9 -- In the air war, U.N. tactical fighters strafe and bomb enemy soldiers and a supply base at Sinchon in southwestern North Korea. On the same day a British carrier-based Sea Fury shot down its first MiG-15 in a dogfight near Chinnampo.

The Fifth Air Force and British Navy from Aug. 4-9 say pilots downed 20 MiGs and damaged 19 against no losses.

Aug. 10-12 -- B-29s hit a large concentration of vehicles close to Pyongyang on Aug. 10, but a Peking radio broadcast Aug. 11 claims "a new program of blanket bombing of civilians is not aimed at any military targets." The Reds say that 1,000 civilians were killed and wounded in the Aug. 10 raid on Pyongyang.

World War II

Fred Faulkner Lester was born on 29 April 1926 in Downer's Grove, Illinois. At the time of action he was a Hospital Apprentice First Class, USN. His citation reads, "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Medical Corpsman with an Assault Rifle Platoon, attached to the First Marine Battalion, 22nd Marines, Sixth Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on Okinawa Shima in the Ryukyu Chain, 8 June 1945. Quick to spot a wounded Marine lying in an open field beyond the front lines following the relentless assault against a strategic Japanese hill position, Lester unhesitatingly crawled toward the casualty under a concentrated barrage from hostile machine guns, rifles, and grenades. Tom by enemy rifle bullets as he inched forward, he stoically disregarded the mounting fury of Japanese fire and his own pain to pull the wounded man toward a covered position. Struck by enemy fire a second time before he reached cover, he exerted a tremendous effort and succeeded in pulling his comrade to safety where, too seriously wounded himself to administer aid, he instructed two of his squad in proper medical treatment of the rescued Marine. Realizing that his own wounds were fatal, he staunchly refused medical attention for himself and, gathering his fast-waning strength with calm determination, coolly and expertly directed his men in the treatment of two other wounded Marines, succumbing shortly thereafter. Completely selfless in his concern for the welfare of his fighting comrades, Lester, by his indomitable spirit, outstanding valor, and competent direction of others, had saved the life of one who otherwise must have perished and had contributed to the safety of countless others. Lester's fortitude in the face of certain death sustains and enhances the highest traditions of the United States naval service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

Lester is buried in Clarendon Hills Cemetery, Darien, Illinois
The USS *Fred Lester* (AE-1022) was named in his honor.



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[WW II
Decorations
& Awards](#)

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BIOGRAPHY

Fred Faulkner Lester was born in Downers Grove, Illinois on April 29, 1926. Dedicated to serving his country during the early days of World War II, Fred attempted to enlist at the young age of 16 years in 1942, but was denied. He patiently waited a year and with his parents approval enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserves as Apprentice Seaman at Chicago, Illinois on November 1, 1943. He received training at the Naval Training Station, Farragut, Idaho, and was promoted to Seaman Second Class in January 1944. On March 3, 1944 his rating was changed to Hospital Apprentice Second Class after additional training at Hospital Corps School, U.S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, California. Later that month he reported to the Fleet Marine Force, Camp Elliott, San Diego, California. Fred served with Marine units until he was killed in action on June 8, 1945, in the battle for Okinawa Shima. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. He was laid to rest in Clarendon Bills Cemetery, Westmont, Illinois.

MEDAL OF HONOR

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

FRED FAULKNER LESTER

HOSPITAL APPRECIITCE FIRST CLASS

UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

For service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity and the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Medical Corpsman with an Assault Rifle Platoon, attached to the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines, 6th Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on Okinawa Shima in the Ryukyu Chain, June 8, 1945. Quick to spot a wounded marine lying in an open field beyond the front lines following the relentless assault against a strategic Japanese hill position, LESTER unhesitatingly crawled toward the casualty under a concentrated barrage from hostile machine guns, rifles, and grenades. Tom by enemy rifle bullets as he inched forward, he stoically disregarded the mounting fury of Japanese fire and his own pain to pull the wounded man toward a covered position. Struck by enemy fire a second time before he reached cover, he exerted tremendous effort and succeeded in pulling his comrade to safety where, too seriously wounded himself to administer aid, he instructed two of his squad in proper medical treatment of the rescued marine. Realizing that his own wounds were fatal, he staunchly refused medical attention for himself and, gathering his fast waning strength with calm determination, coolly and expertly directed his men in the treatment of two other wounded marines, succumbing shortly thereafter. Completely selfless in his concern for the welfare of his fighting comrades, LESTER, by his indomitable spirit, outstanding valor and competent direction of others, had saved the life of one who otherwise must have perished and had contributed to the safety of countless others. LESTER's heroic fortitude in the face of certain death sustained and enhanced the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

/S/ Harry S. Truman

ADDITIONAL HONORS

Lester Elementary School, Downers Grove, Illinois - dedicated November 11, 1956

USS Lester - DE 1022 - commissioned June 14, 1957,
decommissioned December 14, 1973

Camp Lester, Okinawa, Japan - rededicated June 8, 1982
(originally Camp Kuwae)

CPL ANTHONY P. DAMATO

MAJ HENRY A. COURTNEY, JR.

CPL JAMES L. DAY

Biographical Data

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058



NAME: James A. Lovell (Captain, USN, Ret.) - -
NASA Astronaut NASA Astronaut (former)

PERSONAL DATA Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 25, 1928. Married to the former Marilyn Gerlach, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. They have four children.

EDUCATION University of Wisconsin; United States Naval Academy, bachelor of science, 1952; Test Pilot School, NATC, Patuxent River, Maryland, 1958; Aviation Safety School, University of Southern California, 1961; Advanced Management Program, Harvard Business School, 1971; honorary doctorates from Rockhurst college, Illinois Wesleyan University, Western Michigan University, Mary Hardin-Baylor College and Milwaukee School of Engineering.



SPECIAL HONORS: Eagle Scout; Sam Houston Area Council 1976 Distinguished Eagle Scout Award; Presidential Medal for Freedom, 1970; NASA Distinguished Service Medal; two Navy Distinguished Flying Crosses; 1967 FAI De Laval and Gold Space Medals (Athens, Greece); the American Academy of Achievement Golden Plate Award; City of New York Gold Medal in 1969; City of Houston Medal for Valor in 1969; the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences special Trustees Award, 1969; the Institute of Navigation Award, 1969; the University of Wisconsin's Distinguished Alumni Service Award, 1970; co-recipient of the American Astronautical Society Flight Achievement Awards, 1966 and 1968; the Harmon International Trophy, 1966, 1967 and 1969; the Robert H. Goddard Memorial Trophy, 1969; the H. H. Arnold Trophy, 1969; General Thomas D. White USAF Space Trophy, 1969; Robert J. Collier Trophy, 1968; Henry G. Bennett Distinguished Service Award; and the AIAA Haley Astronautics Award, 1970.

AFFILIATIONS: Trustee of the National Space Institute; Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots; member Explorers Club; Fellow - American Astronautical Society; Captain Lovell is on the Board of Directors of the Federal Signal Corporation; Astronautics Corporation of America; Astronaut Memorial Foundation; Captain Lovell is also on the Sports Medicine Advisory Board at Rush Presbyterian - St. Lukes Medical Center. He is a regent emeritus for the Milwaukee School of Engineering; on the board of trustees of Lake Forest College; a trustee of the National Space Institute, the Association of Space Explorers; and the Chairman of the National Eagle Scouts Association.

EXPERIENCE: During his Naval career he has had numerous aviator assignments, including a 4-year tour as a test pilot at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

While there he served as Program Manager for the F4H "Phantom" Fighter. A graduate of the

Aviation Safety School of the University of Southern California, he also served as Safety Engineer with the Fighter Squadron 101 at the Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia.

He has logged more than 7,000 hours flying time--more than 3,500 hours in jet aircraft.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Captain Lovell was selected as an Astronaut by NASA in September 1962. He has since served as backup pilot for the Gemini 4 flight and backup Commander for the Gemini 9 flight, as well as backup Commander to Neil Armstrong for the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission.

On December 4, 1965, he and Frank Borman were launched into space on the history-making Gemini 7 mission. The flight lasted 330 hours and 35 minutes and included the first rendezvous of two manned maneuverable spacecraft.

The Gemini 12 mission, commanded by Lovell with Pilot Edwin Aldrin, began on November 11, 1966. This 4-day, 59-revolution flight brought the Gemini program to a successful close. Lovell served as Command Module Pilot and Navigator on the epic six-day journey of Apollo 8 - man's maiden voyage to the moon - December 21-27, 1968. Apollo 8 was the first manned spacecraft to be lifted into near-earth orbit by a 7-1/2 million pound thrust Saturn V launch vehicle; and Lovell and fellow crewmen, Frank Borman and William A. Anders, became the first humans to leave the Earth's gravitational influence.

He completed his fourth mission as Spacecraft Commander of the Apollo 13 flight, April 11-17, 1970, and became the first man to journey twice to the moon. Apollo 13 was programmed for ten days. However, the original flight plan was modified en route to the moon due to a failure of the Service Module cryogenic oxygen system. Lovell and fellow crewmen, John L. Swigert and Fred W. Haise, working closely with Houston ground controllers, converted their lunar module "Aquarius" into an effective lifeboat. Their emergency activation and operation of lunar module systems conserved both electrical power and water in sufficient supply to assure their safety and survival while in space and for the return to earth.

Captain Lovell held the record for time in space with a total of 715 hours and 5 minutes until surpassed by the Skylab flights.

On March 1, 1973, Captain Lovell retired from the Navy and from the Space Program to join Bay-Houston Towing Company in Houston, Texas. Bay-Houston Towing company is a diversified company involved in harbor and coastwise towing, mining and marketing of peat products for the lawn and garden industry, and ranching. He was promoted to the position of President and Chief Executive Officer on March 1, 1975.

BUSINESS BACKGROUND: On January 1, 1977, Captain Lovell became President of Fisk Telephone Systems, Inc. in Houston, Texas (marketing business communications equipment) in the southwestern United States. On January 1, 1981, he was appointed Group Vice President, Business Communications Systems, a Centel Corporation. He retired from Centel Corp as Executive Vice President and member of Board of Directors on January 1, 1991.

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT: President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Captain Lovell as his consultant for Physical Fitness and Sports in June, 1967. When the Physical Fitness Council was revised under President Nixon in 1970, Captain Lovell was assigned the additional duty of Chairman of the Council. After eleven years of performing his dual role with the Council, he relinquished these positions in 1978. However, he is still a Consultant to the Council and is presently assisting the Council in achieving its objective of making all citizens aware of the importance of being physically

fit. The office of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports is located in Washington, D.C.

DIRECTORSHIPS: Federal Signal Corporation, Chicago Astronautics Corp. of America, Milwaukee.

DECEMBER 1994.

This is the only version available from NASA. Updates must be sought direct from the above named individual.

September 28, 2005 -MC 081f

To: Dino Aviles
Fr: Gordon England
Dino *Dino*

I need a quick look into the first ~~three~~ topics mentioned in the attached snowflake. I know that John **has** already been working some of these issues, specifically related to bringing Ingalls back on line. Get with me as soon as you can.

Gordon



Enc.

Cc: CNO
John Young

560.05

28 Sep 05

26 Sep 05

OSD 19478-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52507

~~FOUO~~

1145
9/27

September 26, 2005

Feb. 27

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Haley Barbour

093

I met with Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi on Friday. He said he didn't want to ask us for something that isn't right for the Department, or the country. However, he has some thoughts that relate to accelerating things that DoD may already be planning to do to help get the economy of Mississippi going.

1. He suggested speeding up DDX and LHDR. The contractor is apparently a big employer.
2. He mentioned a company called Ballinger (?), which has a shipyard with a license to build the Australian fast boat in the U.S. -- the one that we are currently leasing. They have a shipyard at Nachez. He said if we are going to order them then sooner is better than later.
3. He mentioned the Naval Air Station at Pascagoula -- he said it could be a terrific Coast Guard base and we ought to restore it to what it was, because the Coast Guard will use it.
4. Last, he mentioned a company named Ionatron that manufactures the Jinex -- an IED detector and destroyer. He says we have ordered 12. It is the size of a golf cart. They make them at Stennis.

265005

Why don't you look into these and get back to me with your thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092605-25

.....

Please Respond By 10/11/05

OSD 19478-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52508

September 28, 2005

TO: GEN Doug Brown

CC: Gen Dick Myers
ADM Ed Giambastiani
Tom O'Connell

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Laydown of SOF

*W
e
e*

Please give me a laydown of all Special Operations Forces during my visit to Tampa in October. Specifically:

- What has changed over the last few years
- How often and for how long are your SOF units deployed for training, exercises, theater engagement, and in combat zones?
- Do you have the manpower needed to manage stress on the force?
- Do you have the right equipment?

Thanks.

DHR.gj
092805-18



28 Sep 05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

2005 SEP 28 10 09 AM '05



ACTION MEMO

September 28, 2005, 10:00 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 28 Sep 05

SUBJECT 2005 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) Member Selection

- You suggested that we assess the size of DACOWITS. You also asked that we discuss the extension of any members of DACOWITS with you and suggested individuals for the Committee (SNOWFLAKE, TAB A).
- In 2002, the membership of the DACOWITS was reduced from 35 to 13. Additionally, the 2002 DACOWITS Charter limited the Committee to not more than 15.
- The membership of the DACOWITS can be reduced from 13 to 11 members and still meet the requisite expertise requirements and mission set forth in the Charter (Tab B).
- Ten of 13 current members of DACOWITS, including the Chairperson, complete their three-year terms in December 2005. Additionally, Mrs. Ellen Sauerbrey has been nominated for an Assistant Secretary of State position and will be leaving the Committee. The terms of the two remaining members expire in 2006 and 2007.
- For the eight appointments TAB C offers eleven candidates, including the individuals you suggested.
 - One is a current member whose term expires in December 2005, but would like to serve a fourth year. Her expertise is extremely valuable.
- Candidates to fill the position of DACOWITS Chairperson are being submitted separately.

334 DACOWITS

28 SEP 05

28 IN 05



OSD 19509-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52510

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the reduction in the sizes of the DACOWITS to eleven members and select eight members.

Committee of 11: Approved _____ Disapproved _____ other _____

Selection of Members: _____

COORDINATION: White House Liaison Office and Services

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Col Denise Dailey, USA (b)(6)

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

6/28/05

June 28, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld,
SUBJECT DACOWITS

Please don't extend the DACOWITS people without talking to me.

Attached is a paper on Diane Denman. Let's take a look at **her** as a possibility, and **also**, let's take a look at **Mary** Kay Turner (John Turner's wife). She previously served on DACOWITS, and is a friend of the Vice President's.

Please see me about it, so you can get a little guidance and calibration.

Thanks.

Attach: Note from Diana Denman

DHR.ss
062705-49

.....
Please Respond By July 21, 2005

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52513

Subj: **No Subject**

Date: **Sunday, June 26, 2005 4:08:05 PM**

DACOWTTS

Diana Denman

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

cell

e mai (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Is a candidate for Windsec Board - papers in process - only meet once or twice a year?

Was co-chairman Peace Corp Board and always interested in National Defense - see resume

TAB

B

APPENDIX A
Charter

Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)

A. Official Designation: Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS).

B. Objectives and Scope of Activities: The Committee shall provide the Department of Defense, through the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (personnel and Readiness) (PDUSD (P&R)), with advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces. In addition, the Committee shall provide advice and recommendations on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. To accomplish this mission, the Committee shall be composed of not more than 15 civilian members, representing a distribution of demography, professional career fields, community service, and geography, and selected on the basis of their experience in the military, as a member of a military family, or with women's or family-related workforce issues. Members must be US citizens selected without regard to race, creed, gender, national origin, age, marital status or physically challenging conditions. Members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and shall serve as individuals and not as official representatives of any group or organization with which they may be affiliated. While the members serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, normally the term of membership is three years, with approximately one-third of the membership rotating annually. The members of the Committee shall serve without compensation, but may be allowed transportation and per diem for Government-directed travel.

C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purposes: Indefinite.

D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports: The Committee reports to the PDUSD (P&R) in functional responsibilities under the staff cognizance of the Director for DACOWITS and Women's Military Matters. The PDUSD (P&R) shall appoint a Designated Federal Official (normally the Director) to approve or call each meeting, to approve the meeting agenda, to attend all meetings, and to chair meetings when so directed by the agency head. The Designated Federal Official shall have the authority to adjourn any meeting of the Committee which is not considered to be in the public interest.

E. Agency Responsible for Providing Necessary Support: The PDUSD (P&R) provides such personnel, facilities, and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Committee's functions.

F. Duties: The duties of the Committee include assisting the Department of Defense by advising on specified matters relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will advise on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. In carrying out its duties, the Committee serves as a conduit of information and advice to the Department of Defense on issues relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women and on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. Through its work, the Committee encourages public acceptance of military service as a citizenship responsibility and as a career field for qualified women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will actively promote family-related issues that will assist the Department in recruiting and retaining a highly qualified professional military.

G. Annual Operating Costs: It is estimated that the annual operating costs to support the Committee will not exceed \$500,000, which includes staff support years, meetings, per diem and travel costs. The annual person-years of Federal staff support for the Committee will not exceed five.

H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings: A minimum of two meetings shall be held annually.

I. Termination Date: The Committee shall terminate upon the completion of its mission or two years from the date this Charter is filed with the US Congress.

J. Filing Date: April 17, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/52516

Recommended Criteria for Selection of New Members as outlined in the DACOWITS Charter

Military Experience: Personal military experience will allow members to identify with the issues and concerns of today's Servicemembers and their families. Military veterans of the Active and Guard Reserve components understand the unique experiences, concerns, issues and needs of Service members and how each affects readiness, recruitment and retention, and quality of life. The nomination of a retired military service member to DACOWITS is highly encouraged. To prevent a conflict of interest, currently servicing Department of Defense military and civilian personnel and drilling Guard/Reserve members will not be considered for membership.

Military Family Member: Military family members will bring a unique perspective to the Committee as it expands its focus to family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. Family members feel the direct impact of policy on quality of life issues.

Women's or Family-Related Work Force Experience: The Department of Defense is committed to recruiting and retaining the best people of both genders for military service, and will compete with the private sector to become an employer of choice. Experience in women's or family-related work force issues will provide critical background to reviewing these issues within the Department of Defense.

Availability: Members whose other obligations make it difficult or impossible to conduct installation visits or attend meetings ultimately do a disservice to the Committee, the Department of Defense, and our military women and families.

TAB C

Recommend Members
 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>SOURCE OF NOMINATION</u>
1. Dr. Lynda Davis	Military Experience. Extend for a 4 th Year.	Sec Rumsfed
2. Mrs. Mary K. Turner	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience	Sec Rumsfed
3. Mrs. Diana D. Denman	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience	Sec Rumsfed
4. Mrs. Denise Balzano	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience; Public Policy Experience; Chief of Staff for Mrs. Quayle (1988-91)	White House Liaison Office
5. Roberta L. Santigao	Major Military Experience; Key troop Leading positions in USAR units; Recognized for leadership by AUSA	USD(P&R)
6. Mrs. Zandra M. Krulak	Military Family Member Experience; Spouse of former Commandant USMC	USD(P&R)
7. Felipe Torres	Military Experience; Garrison and Combat Marine leadership, EO and IG Experience	USMC
8. Allison L. Johnson	Military Experience; EO Advisor to Sec Army ; Member of Sec Army Sexual Harassment Panel (1996-97)	Army
9. Michael J. Halpin	Military Experience; Marine Unit Command and leadership Positions	Rep Heather Wilson

- | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|
| 10. Vincent W. Patton | Military Experience; Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard (Retired) | Coast Guard |
| 11. Dr. Alan Gropman | Military Experience; 27 Years Air Force, Leadership and Staff Positions (Retired)
NDU Academic Research Expertise | USD (P&R) |

TAB

C

TAB

1





Fact Sheet

Defense Department Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services
(DACOWITS)



DR. LYNDA DAVIS

DACOWITS ASSIGNMENTS: Appointed 2002- Completes Fall 2005.

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Dr. Davis received her Bachelor of **Arts** Degree in Developmental Psychology from the University of Santa Barbara, her Master of **Arts** in Community/Clinical Psychology from the California State University at Northridge, and her Master of Public Administration and Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration from the University of Southern California. She currently serves as both the President and CEO of Davis O'Connell, Inc. and the President of The Carlton Group. The former is a Washington-based government relations firm providing technical consulting services to educational institutions, school districts, municipalities, **high technology firms** and non-profit organizations in their work with the U.S. Congress; the latter is a communications firm providing advise to non-profit organizations and public relations firms on project and grassroots development. Her career also spanned **numerous** other positions, from Director of Clinical Services to Director, State of Florida, Washington Office. She was also a member of the Florida Army **National Guard** from 1987 to 1994 when she transferred to the United States Army Reserves until 1997, where she attained the rank of Captain.

MEMBERSHIPS AND C M C ACTIVITIES: Since 1998, Dr. Davis is a Board Member and past Chair of the National Council for Adoption. She is also the founder of Linkages, an organization to assist orphanages in Bosnia.

AWARDS AND HONORS: Dr. Davis was a Presidential Management Intern with assignments at the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S. Congress from 1980-1982. At the same time, she served as the Intergovernmental Human Services Coordinator, American Society for Public Administration. From 1975 to 1977, she was an appointee to the National Task Force on Education American Psychological Association.

PERSONAL INFO WTION: Dr. Davis lives in (b)(6)

(b)(6)

4000 Defense Pentagon?Room 2C548A, Washington, DC 20301-4000
For more information, call (b)(6) or DSN (b)(6)

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Presidential Scholars Foundation



COMMISSION

ABOUT US
HISTORY
COMMISSION
NEWSLETTER
SCHOLARS
SUPPORT
LEADERSHIP
NOTABLE ALUMNI
SHOP
HOME

The Commission on Presidential Scholars



Flo N. Traywick: Virginia

National Committeewoman, Republican Party of Virginia, elected in 1984. Chief Deputy Commissioner, Department of Aging. Member of the Executive Committees of both the Republican Party of Virginia and the Virginia Federation of Republican women. Trustee of the Lynchburg Academy of Music. Member of the White House Commission on Presidential Scholars from 1991 to 1993. Worked extensively on the Republican National Convention from 1976 to the present. A member of President Reagan's Virginia Steering Committee and a Founding Board Member of the Virginia School of Arts. Candidate for Congress in 1986 and House of Delegates in 1977.



Mary K. Turner: Virginia

Mary Kay Turner teaches World Religion and Ethics at Bishop O'Connell High School in Arlington, Virginia. After teaching on an Indian Reservation in Montana, Mrs. Turner pursued her graduate studies in Humanities with a focus on Indian education and later researched alternative education programs, helping to found Western Wyoming Alternative High School and The Learning Center, a program for developmentally disabled young children in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. As Chairman of Western Wyoming Mental Association, Mrs. Turner worked to bring services to rural areas in the state. More recently she completed an appointment to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) and is presently on the board of the Alliance for National Defense.



Paul G. Vallas: Illinois

In 2002, Mr. Vallas was named the Chief Executive Officer of the School District of Philadelphia, charged with improving student achievement and leading the largest school reform effort in the history of public education. As CEO of Chicago Public Schools, a position he held from 1995 until his move to Philadelphia, he is credited with improving student test scores by virtually every academic indicator, eliminating waste, streamlining operations, implementing large-scale school construction and renovation, ending social promotion, partnering with national and civic groups and the private sector, and establishing the largest after-school and summer reading programs in the country. He previously served for six years as Chicago's Budget Director and Director of Revenue, and for five years as the Executive Director of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission. Mr. Vallas began his career as a teacher in elementary school and higher education. He served in the Illinois Army National Guard for twelve years, earning the rank of Captain, and was a senior instructor at the Illinois Military Academy. He holds undergraduate and master's degrees from Western Illinois University. He and his wife Sharon have three sons.

Fidel Vargas: California

Fidel Vargas is currently Vice President of Reliant Equity Investments. Previously he served as Mayor of Baldwin Park, California, where his innovative approaches to city government-- resulting in balanced budgets, decreased crime, increased city services, public safety, community improvement and business recruitment-- earned praise as "best practices" by the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Mr. Vargas is a founding member of the Cesar Chavez Foundation, and has served on two Presidentially-appointed national Social Security commissions, including President George W. Bush's bi-partisan Social Security Study

**DIANA DESTINE DENMAN
(THEHONORABLE)**

PERSONAL:

Date of Birth:

(b)(6)

Office:

(b)(6)

Social Security:

Spouse:

Home:

(b)(6)

EDUCATION:

American **University/Catholic** University, Washington, DC
Communications and Theater Arts (1955-1956)
George Washington University, Washington, DC
Bachelor of Arts in Journalism (1953-1955)
1954 - **Elected** to Pi Beta Phi Sorority
Mount Vernon Junior College, Washington, DC
(1951-1953)
Mount Vernon Seminary, Washington, DC
(1948-1951)

PROFESSIONAL:

Investor/Volunteer
(1964-present)
Actress - Los Angeles, California
(1956-1965)

MEMBERSHIPS:

The Hoover **Institution** - Former Member, Board of Overseers
The **Jamestown** Foundation - Board of Directors
Center **for** Security **Policy** - Board of Advisors
The **Philadelphia** Society - Member
Council on National Policy - Member
Hillsdale College - Associate
Landrum Society - Board of Directors
Young Conservatives of **Texas** - Board of Advisors

HONORS & AWARDS:

Distinguished Alumna Award
Mount Vernon College (1986)

Voted One of the Three Most Influential Couples in **San Antonio**
ABC affiliate (KSAT-TV) (1986)

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INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT:

Member, American Foreign Policy **Council** / Congressman **M. Weldon** Delegation to Tbilisi, Georgia - Minsk, Belarus - **Moscow**, Russia (2002)

Observer, **The Jamestown** Foundation Delegation to the **Russian** Presidential Elections (2000)

Observer, International **Republican Institution** to Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Elections (March 29, 1998)

Observer, **The Jamestown** Foundation Delegation to the Russian Presidential Elections (1996)

Official Guest, **Inaugural** of President **Armando** Calderon Sol, El Salvador (1994)

~~Observer~~, **Alianza Republica Nacionalista (ARENA)** Party **Conference**, El Salvador (1993)

Accuracy in Media Conference, El Salvador (1990)

11th World Media Conference, **Advancement of Global Communications and Cooperation**, Moscow, **USSR** (1990)

8th World Media Conference, **Leaders Delegation to Eastern Europe and the USSR** (1989)

Member, **United States** Presidential Delegation to Grenada, West Indies (1988)

Member, National **Museum Services Board** (1986-1991)

~~Observer~~, US Delegation to Presidential Elections in Honduras, **Central** America (1985)

Member, Women for Peace **through Real** Defense, Geneva Summit, Geneva, Switzerland (1985)

Guest, Conservative **Party Conference**, Brighton, **England** (1984)

Co-Chairman, **US Peace Corps** Advisory Council (1982-1983)

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Denise W. Balzano

(b)(6)

Phone

(b)(6)

Fax

(b)(6)

E-mail:

(b)(6)

PERSONAL PROFILE

- **Co-founder, grassroots consulting firm** specializing in workforce communications
- **Local community activist** advocating for at-risk children and families
- **Skilled fundraiser: more than 10 years** fundraising and nonprofit board experience

EXPERIENCE

Co-Founder & Vice President, External Affairs, Balzano Associates
Arlington, VA *1985-88; 1991-present*

- Co-founded consulting firm designed to create **grass roots** education and outreach programs for both industrial climb and elected officials.
- Public policy analysis, **issues** management, message selection; strategic planning.
- **Grassroots mobilizations, event planning,** and media management

Childhelp/Virginia Board of Trustees, Childhelp USA

Childhelp is one of the nation 5 leading organizations in the fight against child abuse. **1991-present**

- Chairman, Program **Committee** - Childhelp/VA Board of Trustees.
- As president of Washington Chapter, created **annual gala fundraiser.**
- Working with corporate committee, raised nearly **\$2.5 million** in eight years for construction of new **facilities** and for program expansion.
- Developed **new chapters; expanded membership;** created new volunteer opportunities.
- Created and directed **National Day of Hope Congressional outreach.**

Editor, Media Directory of Women Experts, Independent Women's Forum
Washington, D.C. *1993-95*

- Developed and organized a media *directory* of 300 **women experts,** listing **areas** of expertise and **professions.**
- Directory **distributed** to more than **2,500** media outlets throughout the country.

Chief of Staff to Marilyn Tucker Quayle, The White House
Washington, D.C. *1988-91*

- Established and managed Office of the **Second Lady.**
- **Helped** create the message and outreach for **MTQ** involvement in breast cancer treatment/ prevention and in **disaster** preparedness issues.
- Responsible for all official, political and diplomatic programs, activities and events related to the **Second Lady, Quayle family and the Vice President's Residence. Managed** renovation of Vice President's Residence.
- Served as press **spokesman.**

Professional Profile: Denise Balzano

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Executive Director, Republican Women's Federal Forum
Washington, D.C. 1981-86

- Reorganized, revitalized and **managed** group's operations.
- Increased membership fourfold and **net revenues** tenfold
- Organized forums **hosting** Cabinet & Congressional leadership to speak on current public policy **issues**.
- Directed work of Advisory Council, including Cabinet & congressional **spouses**.
- **Since 1987** & currently, serve as Member of Advisory Council

International Economist, U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 1971-74

- Legislative analysis in preparation of **departmental** position and congressional testimony.
- Liaison with industry & interagency working groups.

Legislative Assistant, Office of Congressman Tim Lee Carter (Ky)
Washington, D.C. 1970-71

- **Organized** and managed legislative and press operations.
- Key issues: health **care**, **habe**, drug **abuse**, and environment.

POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

- **Official Proceedings** - Republican National **Conventions** - 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000
- Delegate to Virginia State Republican Conventions - 1988, 1992
- **Glester McLean** Republican Women's Club - Assisted **with** get-out-the-vote efforts
- Republican Women's Federal **Forum** Advisory Council **Member** - 1979 to present.

EDUCATION

M.A. International Relations, Georgetown University, 1970 (Economics and Political **Theory** minors)
A.B. Political Science, Hollins College, 1968 (Economics and French minors. Hollins Abroad, Paris)

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NCO MATTERS

Message from the Director

Santiago Honored

October 1, 2003

Command Sergeant Major
Jimmie W. Spencer, USA, Ret.
Director, Noncommissioned Officer
and Soldier Programs

Command Sgt. Maj. Roberta J. Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve,
Ret., is the 2003 recipient of the Sergeant Major of the Army
William Bainbridge Noncommissioned Officer Medal.

The Bainbridge medal is awarded annually to a
noncommissioned officer -- active, reserve component or retired
-- contributing most to the U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer
corps.

Santiago will receive the award **Oct. 6** at the Opening Ceremony
of this year's Association of the U.S. Army's Annual Meeting at
the New Washington Convention Center.



Santiago served the Army and this nation for more than 23 years.

She entered the U.S. Army Reserve under the Civilian Acquired Skills Program (CASP), Sept. 20, 1975, and during her Army career she held a variety of assignments of increasing responsibility.

Key assignments including senior legal specialist, personnel staff NCO, senior financial NCO, and first sergeant and command sergeant major of three U.S. Army Reserve hospitals.

Her last Army assignment was as the command sergeant major of the 352nd Combat Support Hospital in Oakland, Calif.

She retired from the Army Reserve on Jan. 12, 1999.

Santiago is the epitome of a noncommissioned officer.

She is a leader, teacher and role model for soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

AUSA is also recognizing this outstanding NCO for her extensive involvement with Association activities in the civilian and military communities.

Santiago is a key AUSA leader at both the chapter and region levels.

She has served on the Maj. Gen. William F. Dean Chapter's executive board of directors for more than 10 years as the chapter treasurer and chairperson of the Women's Advisory Committee.

Additionally, Santiago is the Sixth Region vice president for NCO and soldier programs.

At the national level, has she served six years on AUSA's Resolutions Committee where the Association's platform for the coming year is developed and presented to the chapter delegates for adoption.

For the past two years, Santiago has chaired the policy subcommittee that deals with many issues that directly affect the men and women who serve in our Army.

11-L-0559/OSD/52532

Her many awards include the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal and the Armed Forces Reserve Medal.

In 1997, she was awarded the Navy Meritorious Service Award for her participation in the closure of the Naval Supply Center in Oakland.

CSM Roberta L. Santiago is clearly deserving of the prestigious Bainbridge medal for her service both in and out of uniform.

She is a leader, a role model, a distinguished noncommissioned officer and an important member of her community.

Still Serving!

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Zandra M. Krulak

Preface: Because a traditional resume would doubtless have terms that would be meaningless to anyone outside the Marine Corps family programs arena, I have, as succinctly as possible, included explanatory information. Additionally, my involvement in relevant family readiness/family issues efforts is the focus, with only brief mention of other military or community endeavors.

Married for 38 years to a Marine Corps officer---2nd Lieutenant through General. General Krulak co-chaired, with Congressman "Sonny" Montgomery, the Veterans for Bush portion of the presidential campaign

- Recognizing 25 years ago the changing demographics in the military as the percentage of married service personnel increased, I began to address the need to treat family readiness as a significant factor in combat readiness. This was done in various ways over the ensuing years, as follows:
 - Established a battalion-level program of volunteer spouses (later called Key Volunteer Program) whose role it was (a) to provide information from the battalion commanding officer to families (b) to communicate family issues to the battalion commanding officer (c) to refer families with problems they could not solve to proper resources. The intent was to promote family readiness in support of unit readiness, which leads to combat readiness. Program reduced early returns from deployment to nil.
 - Established a like program for a 7,000 member Force Service Support Group (FSSG) during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Worked to develop and standardize a program of volunteer training at both the FSSG and the 2nd Marine Division.
 - Presented to Headquarters, Marine Corps and championed the formalization throughout the Marine Corps of the above Key Volunteer Program. Formalization effected July 1991.
 - Co-designed and ran a weeklong planning conference focused on developing program standards and writing the training manual and three participant guidebooks (Key Volunteer, Key Volunteer Coordinator, and Commanding Officers') for the Key Volunteer Program.
 - Initiated planning for, as well as design, development and implementation of, The Spouses' Workshop—a 4-day training program, located at Quantico, Va., attended by spouses of incoming battalion and regimental commanding officers. Purpose: to provide information that would enable them to carry out more effectively their role as the commanding officers' spouses.

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Felipe Torres
(b)(6)

PH: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)

Felipe Torres

Objective Seeking a challenging and responsible position in organizational development, human resources, or criminal justice.

Experience Most recently served as an executive in the juvenile services field after culminating a successful career as a Marine Corps officer with the rank of Colonel. Offering a balance of technical proficiency, extensive experience, senior leadership, mature judgement, initiative, and the ability to interface effectively with all levels of management, personnel, and clientele. The last 10 years of responsibilities are summarized below:

November 2000 – July 2001 Cornerstone Programs Corporation
Englewood, Colorado

Director, Staff Development and Training/Director, East Coast Region/Director, Camp Kenbridge, Virginia

- Responsible for identifying, coordinating, and implementing required staff training and development within the company.
- Responsible for two east coast region programs.
- Director of Camp Kenbridge, a Direct Challenge Program and the most successful juvenile regimented treatment program for adjudicated juveniles in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

July 1999 – July 2000 U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Base, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan

Inspector (Inspector General), Marine Corps Bases Japan

- Inspected or investigated all areas with emphasis on: government fraud, waste, and abuse; discrimination and sexual harassment; ethics/integrity; effectiveness/efficiency; environmental protection; safety; and quality of life.
- Performed as the Magistrate for the adjudication of misconduct cases and traffic violations involving U.S. civilians and military family members who violated U.S./Japan laws or regulations.
- Oversaw the complete rewrite of the Misconduct of U.S. Civilians and Military Family Members Directive which provides guidance and direction for adjudicating violations of laws and regulations while in Japan.
- Chaired the Teen Focus Group (providing guidance/solutions for students at risk).

July 1997 – June 1999 U.S. Marine Corps
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington DC and Virginia

Advisor (Consultant) to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on Equal Opportunity (EO) Matters and Head of the Manpower EO Branch

- Oversaw the Equal Opportunity Program in the Marine Corps and monitored the impact and long-term effects of personnel policies and practices on the organizational climate and unit readiness in the Corps (over 210,000 personnel).
- Responsible for Marine Corps participation at diversity conferences and workshops involved in addressing organizational human climate issues.
- Oversaw the creation of the Campaign Plan to recruit the best officer corps from a diverse nation to lead the Marine Corps into the 21st Century.

- Totally revised the Marine Corps climate survey tools to better assess the organizational human climate as it affects readiness.

June 1995 – June 1997 U.S. Marine Corps
Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia

Commanding Officer (CEO), Marine Corps Security Force

- Responsible for the security of a significant portion of the strategic nuclear triad.
- Responsible for the welfare, training, equipping, and resourcing of almost 400 highly trained and equipped Marine Security Force personnel.

Coordinated responses, training, and memorandums of understanding with federal, state, and local agencies concerning special security missions/situations.

July 1992 – May 1995 U.S. Marine Corps
United States Strategic Command, Nebraska

Chief (Director), Command Security

Responsible for the interpretation, implementation, and administration of nuclear security policy and involved in the budgeting and programming associated therewith.

- Conducted/participated in oversight inspections of the physical security of strategic assets throughout the U.S. (sensitive security clearance/access required).
- Key player involved in the rewrite of the Department of Defense Directive on Nuclear Security and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Instruction on safeguarding the national strategic plan.
- Conducted Total Quality Leadership workshops throughout the Command.

June 1990 – June 1992 U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton California

Commanding Officer (CEO), Corrections Battalion

- Responsible for the effective and efficient operation of all aspects of the confinement facility to include the security, safety, welfare, and rehabilitative/educational programs involving hundreds of confined personnel.
- Responsible for the leading, training, and equipping of over 300 staff personnel.

Education Webster University, San Diego, California campus
 • M.A. Management, 1991.
 Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas
 • BAAS, Occupational Education, 1985 (Cum Laude graduate)

Interests and Skills Extensive knowledge of total physical fitness; small arms and ballistics expertise and marksmanship; master instructor certification in Okinawan karate (7th Degree Black Belt); total quality leadership instructor; motivational speaker; challenge course facilitator.

Projects Developed and directed the Marine Corps Corrections School; chaired various boards and proceedings; participated in Marine Corps-wide promotion boards; hosted corrections (ACA) conference and held numerous corrections workshops; taught total quality leadership.

Awards Military: Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and four Meritorious Service Medals. Civilian: National Image Meritorious Service Award, Hispanic Magazine Avanzando Award, and Clara Barton Red Cross Volunteer Leadership Award/Meritorious Community Service Award for lifelong service to community.

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Allison L. Johnson

(b)(6)
Work: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6) Home: (b)(6)
e-mail: (b)(6)

EDUCATION/CREDENTIALS

M.A.R.	Master of Arts in Religion	Trinity International University	2004
M.H.R.	Human Relations	University of Oklahoma	1993
B.S.	Psychology	University of Maryland	1992
C.P.C.M. Consultant Certification	National Bureau of Professional Management Consultants		1998

DIPLOMA/CERTIFICATES

Senior Team Alignment Process™, Certification, 2004
Myers Briggs Type Indicator, Certification, 2002
Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor, Certification, 1998
The Society for Human Resource Management Learning System, Certificate, 1997
Professional Human Resource Management, American University, Certificate, 1996
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Diploma, 1990

CAREER SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE

- o Director international training
- o International consulting
- o Start-up operations/project management
- o Staff supervision/development
- o Organizational development
- o Marketing/public relations
- o Project management
- o Panel advisor
- o Distance learning
- o Seminar/workshop development
- o Small group trainer/facilitator
- o Adult learning model
- o Platform/instructor skills
- o Written/oral communication skills
- o Analytical/assessment skills
- o Computer skills/Microsoft Office Suite

CAREER ACHIEVEMENTS

- o President and owner of the Lee Johnson Group, a full service human relations company specializing in interpersonal skill development, teambuilding, diversity, EEO and prevention of sexual harassment training. In the seventh year of operation, the company has conducted highly successful diversity and human relations training programs for public and private sector customers reaching well over 11,500+ students without one customer complaint.
- o Represented the Department of Defense, U.S. State Department, and the Department of the Army on numerous occasions at home and abroad in discussions and training sessions concerning racial, gender, equal opportunity and diversity issues. Countries for which training has been conducted include: Canada, Burundi, Japan, Romania, Russia, South Africa and Committee on Women in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Future delegates.
- o Appointed as Director for International Affairs and Corporate Initiatives at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. Organized and co-led an unprecedented international training team to South Africa reaching 780 senior managers and leaders at multiple locations. This training initiative played a pivotal role in the South African National Defense Force allocation of limited funds for American sponsored equal opportunity training. Expertly coordinated this international project which firmly established a positive relationship between the South African military and the Department of Defense through the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.
- o Appointed to the 1996-1997 Secretary of the Army's Sexual Harassment Panel Working Group. Conducted 60 focus groups and over 43 in-depth individual interviews with senior managers and specialists assigned in Europe, Middle East, and the Continental United States. Participated in development of a survey that was administered to over 25,000 employees. Wrote equal opportunity interview protocol and analyzed eight other protocols for content accuracy. Advised panel chair, members, and scientists on all equal opportunity policy and regulatory requirements. Provided human relations expertise, which contributed to overall success of the Army's most comprehensive human relations' assessment that resulted in immediate policy changes.

ALLISON L. JOHNSON

o Effectively restructured the Army's triannual equal opportunity regional director's conference. The revised format resulted in a major increase of conference attendance from 35 to 130 participants in just 12 months. As a result of the economical format and incisive training design, director's received current information, made better use of travel dollars, and development of an automated reporting system was introduced.

o Facilitated and assisted international clients and student officers in developing prototype strategic equal opportunity plans both at home and abroad. Through delicate coordination and mediation, 100% of agencies' goals were met. Plans that were developed are currently being institutionalized in each of the assisted nations.

CAREER EXPERIENCE

The Lee Johnson Group

President, 1998-Present

Operate and manage full service human relations consulting and training company. Work with private and public sector clients to identify individual and group performance issues and needs. Develop, design, and deliver customer focused training programs in diversity, equal employment opportunity, prevention of sexual harassment, team building, leadership, basic and advanced facilitation training, and management strategies. Trained 11,500+ executives, managers and employees since 1998.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D C

Senior Equal Opportunity Advisor, 1996-1998

Advised Army's most senior leadership on all matters of equal opportunity, diversity, sexual harassment, and affirmative action policies and procedures. Monitored and wrote policy initiatives and changes. Coordinated with field operating agencies on implication and action in their policy domain. Answered congressional correspondence and other agency inquiries. Analyze and process equal opportunity complaints.

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, FL

Director, Corporate Initiatives, 1995-1996

Managed and implemented national and international education and training programs for the Department of Defense. Conferred with staff and outside agencies to formulate and institute program initiatives, policies, and procedures. Prepared reports and papers that was forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Served five international clients who expressed 100% satisfaction and commitment to future training endeavors.

• **International Education and Training Specialist, 1995**

Assessed, designed, coordinated and advised national and international clients seeking consultation and training in the areas of diversity, cross cultural differences, gender issues, and race relations.

• **Trainer/Instructor/Facilitator, 1993-1995**

Facilitated four groups through 680 hours of experiential learning activities. Evaluated students skill acquisition and provided developmental coaching and counseling. Primary instructor for five key classes: including Communication, Racism, Managing a Dynamic Equal Opportunity Program, and an eight hour class in Jewish American History and Culture. The American Council on Education accredited all courses taught at the Institute for 23 undergraduate credits.

United States Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany

Equal Opportunity Advisor, 1990-1993

Managed a community equal opportunity program for over 26,000 military and civilian employees. Promoted to headquarters staff position to assist with policy implementation. Organized and coordinated two conferences with over 200 attendees. Managed \$265,000 budget. Participated in the development of an organizational climate assessment instrument. Developed assessment follow-on strategies to include the feedback mechanism that is still in use today.

University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez, PR

Military Science Instructor, 1986-1990

Technical instructor for 80 undergraduate students in newly established accredited reserve officer training program. Taught, assessed, evaluated, and counseled students fully developing their technical and leadership skills.

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MICHAEL J. HALPIN

(b)(6)

OBJECTIVE

An executive management role where my ability to lead, solve problems and communicate will achieve results in improved customer relations, strong teamwork and increased profitability.

SUMMARY

Innovative and energetic professional with over twenty-five years of demonstrated leadership to solve management problems and significantly improve an organization's operations.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT

Airport Manager, Santa Fe, NM Municipal Airport

Over five years experience managing a primary, non-hub airport with over 84,000 annual operations and over 30,000 commercial airline enplanements. Directed airfield operations, maintenance, self-inspection program, security, development and expenditure of a budget of over \$1.5 million, grant application, approval and compliance under the FAA Airport Improvement Program and development of long-range plans for the airport; business program development by and developing a plan to increase airport revenue ten-fold and by attracting new tenants to the airport and formulating policies so that they operated within FAA regulations; providing financial management by accounting for all funds from City accounts, airport revenue, and federal and state grant programs; supervising the administrative and maintenance staff and establishing policies to ensure that specific employees of the tenants met FAA standards; negotiating contracts and leases and obtaining approval and compliance with their terms; managing the information systems used by my office and providing overall office management.

Bureau Chief, Investigations Bureau, New Mexico Human Services Department

Developed new investigative standards and procedures for the conduct and reporting of welfare fraud and internal investigations, improving case management and tracking. Developed training program for investigators, creating both a basic training program and recurring training. Conducted the hiring of new investigators and personnel evaluations. Coordinated joint investigations with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.

Aviation Consultant

Provided airport construction project management and marketing consulting to HDR Engineering in Albuquerque, allowing them to enter the New Mexico market.

Captain, U.S. Marine Corps

Second-in-Command, Chief of Executive Staff and Director of Operations of a unit supporting air command and control operations. Identified, formulated, recommended and supervised policies and procedures. Developed budget details, review and expenditure of funds for multi-million dollar budget. Supervised personnel assignments. Directed, coordinated and supervised the activities of several organizations at one time. Directed and supervised the planning and conduct of air operation center and air command center in which the activities of thousands of personnel and multi-million dollar assets were directed and coordinated. Supervised the training and operation of air defense and electronic warfare activities. Developed operation plans and after-action reports. Conducted line-of-duty/misconduct investigations. Conducted courts-martials. Trained and flew as a Radar Intercept Officer in the F-4N Phantom aircraft. Liaison Officer between tactical fighter/attack squadron and air defense radar squadron.

Customs Officer, U.S. Customs Service

As Watch Commander, coordinated the use of Customs Service air assets in joint counter-narcotic effort with military and law enforcement agencies. Scheduled flight personnel and coordinated flight scheduling with the U.S. Air Force. Flew counter drug missions as radar Intercept operator onboard U.S. Air Force and U.S. Customs aircraft. Planned, directed and coordinated the detection, interception, tracking and apprehension of drug smuggling aircraft.

Major, U.S. Army Reserve

Petroleum Supply Battalion Operations Officer. Planned and supervised the operations of several units and over a thousand personnel in the supply and distribution of petroleum. Supervised fiscal accounting of petroleum products. Developed, executed and supervised operational plans. Military Police Officer trained to conduct and supervised military investigations and military police combat operations. Planned and supervised the training provided to other military police units.

Apprenticeship Program Specialist, New Mexico Veterans Commission

Manage approval of apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs allowing qualified veterans to use their veteran education benefits with them. Initiated outreach to familiarize programs with veterans approval, assisted them with the application process and conducted annual audits. Maintained records of program details.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Public Safety Communication Center Manager, City of Santa Fe, NM

Police Officer, Los Alamos & Santa Fe Police Departments

Overall management of 911 answering center and dispatching of police, fire and rescue personnel and ~~investigations~~. Conducted investigations, responded to emergency situations to bring them under control.

SELECTED ACHIEVEMENTS

BUSINESS/PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Increased airport revenue by 210% and commercial airline enplanements by 146%. Supervised planning and completion of over \$8 million of major construction projects. Developed plan for certification of the airfield. Developed voluntary noise abatement program. Develop aircraft crash & rescue program. Selected as Airport of the Year for 1998-1999 by the NM Airport Managers' Association.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Successfully planned and executed the conduct of several different types of military units in numerous training operations.

MEETING OBJECTIVES

Guided a military unit in meeting the requirements of the Inspector General of the Marine Corps and through the successful completion of the inspection.

COORDINATION

Coordinated the seizure of several million dollars worth of illegal narcotics.

EDUCATION

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 1996

U.S. Naval War College Strategy and Policy Course, 1994

U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984

TAB

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VINCENT W. PATTON, III, Ed.D.
Master Chief Petty officer of the Coast Guard, Retired

A native of Detroit, Michigan, Vinca Patton retired from the U.S. Coast Guard after serving 30 years of active duty. He retired November 2002, holding the service's senior-most enlisted ranking position as the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard. His illustrious career included Staff and operational assignments both afloat and ashore throughout the country.

Vince served as the Eighth Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard from May 1998 to October 2002. As the service's top senior enlisted leader and ombudsman, he was the principal advisor to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, his directorates, and the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense, with primary focus on quality of life issues, career development, work environment and personnel matters affecting over 40,000 active duty, reserve enlisted, and civilian personnel service-wide. He routinely addressed these specific issues before appropriate Senate and House committees in Congress, and the 'Commander-in-Chief,' along with his senior enlisted counterparts of the other four military services.

All of Vince's college education was earned while on active duty. He received his Doctor of Education degree in 1984 from the American University, Washington, DC. His dissertation was based on the development and implementation of the Coast Guard Enlisted Evaluation System. He has a Masters degree in Counseling Psychology from Loyola University, Chicago, IL; a Bachelor of Science degree in Social Work from Shaw College at Detroit, MI; and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communications from Pacific College, Angwin, CA. After retirement, he earned his Master of Theology degree in Applied Religious Studies from the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, CA.

His numerous military awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, two Meritorious Service Medals, three Coast Guard Commendation Medals, three Coast Guard Achievement Medals, the Commandant's Letter of Commendation Ribbon, eight Meritorious Team awards and nine Coast Guard Good Conduct awards. He has also earned the Cuttlerman's insignia (seaduty recognition) and coveted 'Parachutist Wings' specialty badge completing ten combat jumps during his military career.

Presently, Vinca is the director of business development for Military Advantage, also known as 'Military.com,' the largest website devoted to the military community covering benefits, information and transition. He is also an ordained Unitarian minister and volunteers as executive director for the 'Halley's Comet Foundation,' a nonprofit organization founded by noted Emmy-award nominee actor, John Amos. The foundation is a youth development program for at-risk teenagers, teaching sailing and seamanship skills. Most recently he served as an advisor to the USO participating in "Operation Handshake" during the 2004 Thanksgiving holiday week with U.S. troops in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and also was in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia involved with Operations 'Iraqi Freedom' and 'Enduring Freedom,' over the 2003 holiday season.


In addition, Vince is cochair of the National Coast Guard Retiree Council. He holds board memberships with the following organizations: Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence College, Military Advantage ('Military.com'), Navy Memorial Foundation, Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, Managers Mentors, Inc., and the First Command Financial Planning, Inc.

Vince resides in Alexandria, VA with his wife, Joyce Aivalotis, who is a U.S. Coast Guard officer. His teenage daughter (b)(6) is a freshman at (b)(6). He also has an adult son (b)(6) who is a U.S. Army veteran (82nd Airborne) and resides (b)(6).

TAB

11

11-L-0559/OSD/52547



▪

Dr. Alan Gropman

Dr. Alan Gropman has been a member of the Industrial College Faculty since 1991. He is the Chairman of the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilization, teaching core and elective courses in both semesters. He served 27 years in the United States Air Force, including two tours in Vietnam where he accumulated more than 670 combat missions. He retired as a Colonel. He also served as a ~~war~~ planner in Europe and the Pentagon. He has a Ph.D. in History from Tufts University, earned a diploma from the National War College, and is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College.

Functional Expertise:

Aerial Navigation and Bombardment
Military Doctrine
Military Planning
Military and National Security Strategy

Regional Expertise:

Western Europe
Southeast Asia
South and Central America
South Pacific

FOUO

6/28/05

June 28, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld,
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

334 DACOWITS

Please don't extend the DACOWITS people without talking to me.

Attached is a paper on Diane Denman. Let's take a look at her as a possibility, and also, let's take a look at **Mary** Kay Turner (John Turner's wife). She previously served on DACOWITS, and is a friend of the Vice President's.

Please see me about it, so you can get a little guidance and calibration.

Thanks.

Attach: Note from Diana Denman

DHR:ss
06270549

.....
Please Respond By July 21, 2005

2874405

FOUO

OSD 19509-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52549

~~FOUO~~

SEP 27 2005

TO: Eric Edelman *see [signature]* SEP 28 2005

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[signature]*

SUBJECT: Uzbek MOD

I-05/012972
ES-4303

I want to think about the possibility of calling or writing to the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, Qodir Gulomov. Has he resigned?

Thanks.

DHR ss
092605-17

OSD 19536-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52550

FOUO

2005 SEP 27 11:11

SEP 27 2005

I-05/012972
ES-4303

Uzbekistan

TO: Eric Edelman *ER* *SEP 28 2005*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Uzbek MOD

I ~~want~~ to think about the possibility of calling ~~or~~ writing to the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, Qodir Gulomov. Has he resigned?

Thanks.

DHR ss
092605-17

.....
Please Respond By 10/04/05

USDP copy provided

Mr. Secretary,

Uzbek Defense Minister Gulomov, according to our Defense Attache, has submitted his resignation. However, at this time, President Karimov has not accepted the resignation.

A/DASD Jim MacDougall met with Minister Gulomov on 27 September while in Uzbekistan with A/S Dtna Fried. Upon Jim's return, he will send you a note about his meeting and his recommendations on whether you should call or write Minister Gulomov

v/r

Peter Flynn

SEP 28 2005

28-09-05 16:48 IN

28 Sep 05
27 Sep 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52551

OSD 19536-05

27-09-05 09:39 IN



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 SEP 27 PM 2:

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE) *yl*

SUBJECT: Script for SecDef to Use on Classification Program Video

- TAB A is a proposed script for you to use in a video you asked us to set up to initiate a program to reduce the amount of classified information and to speed up the process of declassification (TAB B).
- Air Force will produce the video.

RECOMMENDATION: That SecDef approve the script by initialing as appropriate:

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: D. D. Ross, (b)(6)

Sia-
You should treat this as a first draft from which you can build the points of greatest interest to you.
Looking for edits-

SC

313.4
295 sep 05
9 Aug 05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ATTACHMENT—TAB B~~

OSD 19572-05

CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM VIDEO
PENTAGON
DATE AND TIME TBD UPON APPROVAL OF SCRIPT
[717 Words, 5 Minutes]

The Department of Defense has a strong security classification management program; however, we need to continue to strive to look at ways to better share information. To this end, we must reduce the amount of information we classify as well as speed up the process of declassification.

In September 2004, in an all DoD message, I expressed my personal commitment to a strong information security program and reminded classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information. I also directed that classifiers be trained.

Everyone who handles classified information is responsible for protecting it. Original classification authorities (OCA) have a unique responsibility in that they are the ones that initially identify what

information needs to be classified. The exercise of an **OCA's** prerogative to classify certain information has ripple effects throughout the entire executive branch. For example, it can serve as an impediment to sharing information with those who genuinely need to know this information; another agency, state or local officials, or the public.

I have long believed in the importance of granting the public greater access to information about their government – the good and the bad. This openness, however, does not obviate the necessity of protecting the secrecy of certain information that, if revealed, could harm the security of the United States. Too much material is classified across the federal government as a general rule, therefore, we need to take the responsibility of classifying information seriously and make timely and sound classification decisions.

Here are some things I want classifiers to do to improve classification and declassification of information within the Department:

--Make better classification decisions at the beginning of the process. It is essential that classifiers critically assess, during that initial decision making process, whether or not the information meets the classification standards of Executive Order 12958. Information can only be classified if it is expected to cause damage to national security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.

Do not classify information to:

- Conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative error;
- Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
- Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

--Make better declassification decisions at the beginning of the process. Classification decisions need to be reassessed and changed as circumstances warrant, but, at a minimum every 5 years after the initial decision. Consider applying a date less than the full 25 years permitted by the Executive Order. Some information lends itself to a more situational type of declassification, for example, military tactical information that no longer requires protection once it is relayed to the soldier on the battlefield. Classifiers need to identify this at the point of classification instead of automatically applying the longest duration of classification permitted under the Executive Order.

--Question classification decisions. When classifying a document based on another classified source, don't just automatically carry forward the markings, but think about whether it meets the classification standards. Will it likely cause damage to national security if we don't protect it? If you think it doesn't meet the test,

then do not stop protecting it, or release it to unauthorized persons, or leak it to the press – that's against the law – but formally challenge it through your chain of command and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, as necessary.

--Systematically review classified information. We've made significant headway within the Department to review and declassify historical records. In fact we have declassified more documents in all but one year since 1995 than any other executive branch agency.

I want us to continue the momentum on conducting these declassification reviews and declassifying information as soon as it is in the best interests of our national security to **do** so.

Organizations need to ensure they have sufficient resources to continue the systematic reviews.

--When unsure about classification, get advice from the security professionals. We have security professionals throughout the

Department who can assist you in the **classification/declassification** process. Seek their advice. They can help you make informed decisions.

I am committed to seeing the Department excel in the effective classification and declassification of Information. I charge each classifier, whether you are an original classifier or a derivative classifier, as well as all those who handle classified information, to make this a priority within the Department of Defense.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE) *4* **AUG 26**

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake Regarding Program for Classification

- o Your snowflake of 9 August 2003 (under) asked about "initiating a program to reduce the number of things that are classified and to speed up the process of declassification." Efforts are underway in these areas with additional initiatives (details attached) to begin in the near future provided resources are available. Education and training are key components of the information security program.
- Your message to all DoD Components in September 2004, expressing your personal commitment to a strong information security program and reminding classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information, gave the necessary impetus for a number of actions, including the Component security officials reducing original classification authority positions by 14%.
- o Although the classification and declassification programs are decentralized, DUSD (CI&S) maintains coordination and oversight responsibility. Information is declassified as a result of systematic, mandatory and Freedom of Information Act declassification reviews, changes to security classification guides and Congressional requests for special reviews, such as the Nazi/Japanese Interagency Working Group.

RECOMMENDATION: To kick off the program initiative, we propose you do a 5 minute video for the Defense Security Service Academy, and DefenseLink, emphasizing the need to minimize that which must be classified for national security and to speed up the process of declassification.

COORDINATION: None required.

APPROVE *[Signature]* **DISAPPROVE** *[Signature]*

Set it up

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: D. D. Rosa. (b)(6)



A-18-3

Background

- EO 12958, as amended, “Classified National Security Information” provides for the classification and declassification of information and requires all executive branch agencies to establish a classification management program. The EO is implemented by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) through the ISOO Directive No. 1. The Department implements the national policy through DoD 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program.”
- After the Department received public and Congressional criticism last year of alleged over classification of detainee related information that was highlighted in the public media, we began a number of initiatives to emphasize and strengthen the DoD security classification policy.

Initiatives to “Reduce the Things that Are Classified”

- On 16 September 2004, you conveyed to all DoD Components your personal commitment to a strong information security program, reminding classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information.
- On 5 October 2004, the Director of Security, DoD, chaired a meeting of the DoD Security Directors Group (SDG) consisting of senior security personnel from the Military Departments, Defense Agencies and Combatant Commands and emphasized their responsibility to have a strong classification management program. The SDG meets quarterly and discusses all security issues.
- In December 2004, the Director of Security, DoD, made a video broadcast emphasizing classification management that was made available to DoD Components through the Defense Security Service Academy (DSSA). As of the end of July, the video has been downloaded 543 times.
- We facilitated the update of Guantanamo Bay detainee classification guidance to reduce the amount of information that was classified and improve the quality of the decisions.

- We reassessed and updated the need for DoD original classifiers to **retain** the authority and have **so** far reduced the number of **original** classifiers by 14%, leaving us with **912** original classifiers DoD-wide.
- 4 We conducted security reviews of Combatant Commands with ISOO to determine if information had been appropriately marked and **made** classification management a point of emphasis during out briefs with the **senior** leadership.
- We continue to work with DSSA on updating and reinforcing the training requirements. DSSA has been working on new training courses to **further** enhance classification management, to include computer-based training that **will** be more accessible to a larger audience.
- o During the review of security classification guides that are over their normally scheduled **5** year review date to be completed by May 2006 we will **encourage** a classification date at the earliest possible date or event. Related is **an** effort to do a routine sampling of guides to ensure quality decisions **are** being made and **are** easy to follow.
- We are actively pursuing and assessing automation capabilities such as the **Portion** Marking Verification Tool to facilitate proper classification and application of classification markings.
- We are contacting commands to ensure they provide classification training **prior** to deployments.
- We have **made** preliminary contact with the Office of the Inspector General to request classification management be a point of emphasis on oversight visits to DoD Components and are developing an approach.

Initiatives to “Speed Up the Process of Declassification”

- We have established **an** interagency website for quickly coordinating classification/declassification issues in special subject areas, **i.e.**, nuclear classification while **maintaining** need to **know** for the information.
- **We** have begun meeting with the Military Departments, Joint **Staff** and OSD declassification managers to ensure oversight of the process and assist in finding solutions to problems.

- DoD agencies have been crucial to the establishment of a referral center ~~at~~ the National Archives where agencies can review documents for declassification and not spend the time and effort taking them **back** to their locations and returning them.
- We are drafting a memo for your signature endorsing these initiatives **and** emphasizing classification management at senior **executive levels**.
- We are coordinating the very generous Washington Headquarters Services ~~offer~~ to conduct the review the Combatant Commands classified records eligible for automatic declassification in order to meet the EO **12958** date of December **2006**.
- We are coordinating a revision to the Operation Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom security classification guide that will declassify **some** information.
- We will establish, resources permitting, a centralized coordination for classification reviews of classified documents at issue in court cases in the new **combined** Defense Security Service/Counterintelligence Field Activity Agency. **This** will provide a necessary quality control on the DoD agencies classification decisions. We **are also** drafting a classification review manual that will **support this and** will be coordinating with OGC.

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Program for Classification

What do you think about initiating a program of finding ways to reduce the number of things that are classified, and to speed up the process of declassification?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
080905-16

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

.....
Please Respond By September 01, 2005

INTELLIGENCE

Carol -

Over to you!

*Please provide Dr. C with
your thoughts by Wednesday,
17 August.*

Thank you!

Jarah 8/11/05




~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52563

**RECORD OF COORDINATION
(TAB C)
SCRIPT FOR SECDEF TO USE ON CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM
VIDEO**

<i>Office</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Comments</i>
OASD(PA)	S. Thayer	15Sep05	Concurred w/comments that have been adopted.
HAF/ICMT	D. Brown	20 Sep 05	Concur



CDR Brian Helme
 Navy Military Assis
 OSD Executive Secre

(b)(6)

Discuss
 w/ JS in
 Am.

JB
 10/5

MEMORANDUM

TO: ESD
 SUBJ: ADMIRALTY

Matt Patterner has a
 copy.

Recommend hold this
 in your files until
 closed out
 Thanks ✓✓

Brian
 Go Navy! ← This is goofy

9/30
1600



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

2005 SEP 27 01 24 46

DU
10/4

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)&

SUBJECT: Script for SecDef to Use on Classification Program Video

- TAB A is a proposed script for you to use in a video you asked us to set up to initiate a program to reduce the amount of classified information and to speed up the process of declassification (TAB B).
- Air Force will produce the video.

RECOMMENDATION: That SecDef approve the script by initialing as appropriate:

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: D. D. Ross, (b)(6)

Give to
Lattimer
- D. RITA -
for
edits.

Pass
back
to
me
then.

Sic-
You should
treat this as a
first draft from
which you can
build the points
of greatest interest
to you.
Looking for edits -
SC

J.S.
Get J.S. Gary + Marshall
to edit - & give to
me to edit. I
DJS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ATTACHMENT—TAB B

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	151/102 11/7 9-30	1510102	
ESR MA	800 9/27 0825		

1-L-055 SD/52566

DSD 19572-05

CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM VIDEO
PENTAGON
DATE AND TIME TBD UPON APPROVAL OF SCRIPT
[717 Words, 5 Minutes]

The Department of Defense has a strong security classification management program; however, we need to continue to ~~strive to~~ look at ways to better share information. To this end, we must reduce the amount of information we classify as well as speed up the process of declassification.

In September 2004, in an all DoD message, I expressed my ~~personal~~ commitment to a strong information security program and reminded classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information. I also directed that classifiers be trained.

Everyone who handles classified information is responsible for protecting it. Original classification authorities ^{or} ~~SOCA~~ have a unique responsibility in that they are the ones that initially identify what

information needs to be classified. The exercise of an OCA's prerogative to classify certain information has ripple effects throughout the entire executive branch. For example, it can serve as an impediment to sharing information with those who genuinely need to know this information; another agency, state or local officials, or the public.

I have long believed in the importance of granting the public greater access to information about their government – the good and the bad. This ~~openness~~, however, ^{GENERAL PRINCIPLE} ^{MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEED TO} protect ^g ^{ing th} the secrecy of certain information that, if revealed, could harm the security of the United States. **[Too much material is classified across the federal government as a general rule, therefore, we need to take the responsibility of classifying information seriously and make timely and sound classification decisions.]**

REACTIVE

TO STRIKE THE PROPER BALANCE, CLASSIFIERS SHOULD

~~Here are some things I want classifiers to do to improve~~

USE THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES!

~~classification and declassification of information within the~~

Department: ~~e~~

First,

--Make better classification decisions at the beginning of the

process. It is essential that classifiers critically assess, during that

initial decision making process, whether or not the information

meets the classification standards of Executive Order 12958.

Information can only be classified if it is expected to cause damage

to national security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.

Do not classify information to:

--Conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative error;

--Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;

--Prevent or delay the release of information that does not

require protection in the interest of national security.

SECOND,
X

??
repetitive
w/ first
point

Make better declassification decisions at the beginning of the process. Classification decisions need to be reassessed and changed as circumstances warrant, but, at a minimum every 5 years after the initial decision. Consider applying a date less than the full 25 years permitted by the Executive Order. Some information lends itself to a more situational type of declassification, for example, military tactical information that no longer requires protection once it is relayed to the soldier on the battlefield. Classifiers need to identify this at the point of classification instead of automatically applying the longest duration of classification permitted under the Executive Order.

THIRD,
X

Question classification decisions. When classifying a document based on another classified source, don't just automatically carry forward the markings, but think about whether it meets the classification standards. Will it likely cause damage to national security if we don't protect it? If you think it doesn't meet the test,

then do not stop protecting it, or release it to unauthorized persons, or leak it to the press – that’s against the law – but formally challenge it through your chain of command and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, as necessary.

Fourth
^

--Systematically review classified information. We’ve made significant headway within the Department to review and declassify historical records. In fact we have declassified more documents in all but one year since 1995 than any other executive branch agency.

I want us to continue the momentum by
declassifying information as soon as it is in the best interests of our national security to do so.

Organizations need to ensure they have sufficient resources to continue the systematic reviews.

Finally
~~Finally~~

--When unsure about classification, get advice from the security professionals. We have security professionals throughout the

Department who can assist you in the classification/declassification process. Seek their advice. They can help you make informed decisions.

I am committed to seeing the Department excel in the effective classification and declassification of information. I charge each classifier, whether you are an original classifier or a derivative classifier, as well as all those who handle classified information, to make this a priority within the Department of Defense.



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE) *st* **AUG 26**

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake Regarding Program for Classification

- o Your snowflake of 9 August 2005 (under) asked about "initiating a program to reduce the number of things that are classified and to speed up the process of declassification." Efforts are underway in these areas with additional initiatives (details attached) to begin in the near future provided resources are available. Education and training are key components of the information security program.
- Your message to all DoD Components in September 2004, expressing your personal commitment to a strong information security program and reminding classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information, gave the necessary impetus for a number of actions, including the Component security officials reducing original classification authority positions by 14%.
- Although the classification and declassification programs are decentralized, DUSD (CI&S) maintains coordination and oversight responsibility. Information is declassified as a result of systematic, mandatory and Freedom of Information Act declassification reviews, changes to security classification guides and Congressional requests for special reviews, such as the Nazi/Japanese Interagency Working Group.

RECOMMENDATION: To kick off the program initiative, we propose you do a 5 minute video for the Defense Security Service Academy, and DefenseLink, emphasizing the need to minimize that which *must* be classified for national security and to speed up the process of declassification.

COORDINATION: None required.

APPROVE *[Signature]* **DISAPPROVE** *[Signature]*

Set it up

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: D. D. Ross (b)(6)



A-18-3

Background

- EO 12958, **as** amended, “Classified National Security Information” provides for the classification and declassification of information and requires **all** executive branch agencies to establish a classification management **program**. The EO is implemented by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) **through** the **ISOO** Directive No. 1. The Department implements the national policy through DoD **5200.1-R**, “Information Security **Program**.”
- After the Department received public and Congressional criticism last year of alleged over classification of detainee related information that was **highlighted** in the public media, we began a number of initiatives to **emphasize** and strengthen the DoD security classification policy.

Initiatives to “Reduce the **Things that Are Classified**”

- On **16** September 2004, you conveyed to **all** DoD Components **your** personal commitment **to** a strong information security program, **reminding** classification authorities of their responsibility to properly classify information.
- **On** 5 October 2004, the Director of Security, DoD, chaired a **meeting** of **the** DoD Security Directors Group (**SDG**) consisting of senior security personnel **from** the Military **Departments**, Defense Agencies and Combatant Commands and emphasized their responsibility to have a strong classification management program. The SDG meets quarterly and **discusses** **all** security issues.
- In December 2004, the Director of Security, DoD, **made a** video broadcast emphasizing classification management that was made available to DoD Components **through** the Defense Security Service Academy (DSSA). As of the end of July, the video has been downloaded **543** times.
- We facilitated the update of Guantanamo Bay detainee classification guidance to **reduce** the amount of information that **was** classified and improve the quality of the decisions.

- We reassessed and updated the **need** for DoD original classifiers to retain the authority **and** have **so** far reduced the number of **original** classifiers by 14%, leaving us with 912 original classifiers DoD-wide.
- We conducted security reviews of Combatant Commands with ISOO to determine if information had been appropriately marked and made classification management a point of emphasis during our briefs with the senior leadership.
 - a We continue to work with **DSSA** on updating and reinforcing the **training** requirements, **DSSA** has been working on new **training** courses to further enhance classification management, to include computer-based **training** that will be more accessible to a larger audience.
 - a During the review of security classification guides that **are** over their normally scheduled **5** year review date to be completed by May 2006 we will encourage a classification date at the earliest possible date or event. Related is **an** effort to do a routine sampling of guides to ensure quality decisions **are** being **made** and **are** easy to follow.
- We **are** actively pursuing and assessing automation capabilities such as the Portion Marking Verification Tool to facilitate proper classification and application of classification markings.
- We are contacting commands to ensure they provide classification training prior to deployments.
- We have made preliminary contact with the Office of the Inspector General to request classification management be a point of emphasis on oversight visits to DoD Components **and** are developing an approach.

Initiatives to “Speed Up the Process of Declassification”

- We have established an interagency website for quickly coordinating classification/declassification issues in **special** subject areas, **i.e.**, nuclear classification while maintaining need to **know** for the information.
- We have begun meeting with the Military Departments, Joint **Staff** and OSD declassification managers to ensure oversight of the **process** and assist in finding solutions to problems.

- DoD agencies have been crucial to the establishment of a referral center ~~at~~ the National Archives where agencies can review documents for declassification and not spend the time and effort taking them **back to their** locations **and** returning them.
- We are ~~drafting~~ a memo for your signature ~~endorsing~~ **these** initiatives **and** emphasizing classification management ~~at~~ senior executive levels.
- We ~~are~~ coordinating the **very** generous **Washington Headquarters** Services ~~offer~~ to ~~conduct~~ the review the **Combatant Commands** classified records **eligible** for automatic declassification in order to ~~meet~~ the **EO 12958** ~~date~~ of December **2006**.
- We ~~are~~ coordinating a revision to the **Operation Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom** security classification guide that will declassify some information.
- We ~~will~~ establish, resources ~~permitting~~, a centralized coordination for classification reviews of classified documents at issue in court **cases in** the new **combined** Defense Security Service/Counterintelligence Field Activity Agency. This will provide a necessary quality control on the DoD agencies classification decisions. We ~~are~~ also drafting a classification review manual **that will** support ~~this~~ and will be coordinating ~~with~~ OGC.

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Program for Classification

What do you **think** about initiating a program of finding ways to reduce the number of things that are classified, and to speed up the process of declassification?

Thanks.

~~055905-16~~

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

.....
Please Respond By September 01, 2005

INTELLIGENCE

Carol -

Over to you!

*Please provide D.C with
your thoughts by Wednesday,
17 August.*

Thank you!

Josh 8/11/05



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52577

**RECORD OF COORDINATION
(TAB C)
SCRIPT FOR SECDEF TO USE ON CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM
VIDEO**

<i>Office</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Comments</i>
OASD(PA)	S. Thayer	15Sep05	Concurred w/comments that have been adopted.
HAF/ICMT	D. Brown	20 Sep 05	Concur

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2005

313.4

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Program for Classification

What do you think about initiating a program of finding ways to reduce the number of things that are classified, and to speed up the process of declassification?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
080905-16

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

.....

Please Respond By September 01, 2005

INTELLIGENCE

*Carol -
Over*

*Please provide D.C with
your thoughts by Wednesday,
17 August.*

*Thank you!
Sarah 8/11/05*

9 AUG 05



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52579

OSD 19572-05

k

September 15, 2005

ES-4224
05/012491

000.92

TO: Paul McHale
cc: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: KATRINA Investigation

There will likely be a review of the response to Hurricane KATRINA of some sort.

Please put together a team that will gather the relevant data , generate a detailed time line, access and catalog documents, and put a place a process to respond to appropriate requests for information. You will need representatives from Ed Giambastiani's office, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, National Guard, Corps of Engineers, etc.

Your folks should have the lead, with OSD support from GC, P&R, PA, and other relevant entities. Steve Cambone can probably be helpful.

I would like to see a proposed concept, membership, and plan of organization soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091505-11

.....
Please Respond By September 21, 2005

15 Sep 05



HOMELAND
DEFENSE

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600
INFO MEMO

USD() *R* SEP 28 2005

I-05/012491
CS-4224

Pa

000,92

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: KATRINA Investigation

- On September 15 you asked that I "put together a team that will gather relevant data, generate a detailed timeline, access and catalog documents, and...respond to appropriate requests for information" (TAB A).
- We have a team in place to do the things you ask and to conduct a coordinated review of the Department's response to Hurricane Katrina. This team has been active since shortly after the Hurricane Katrina response began. TAB B contains a functional outline of the team's efforts.
- The team includes representatives from my office, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and the other organizations you noted, including the National Guard Bureau, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Office of the General Counsel, OUSD(P&R), and OASD(PA). I have also consulted closely with ADM Giambastiani.
- RADM Mauldin, Director, Joint Staff J-7, and I are the senior officials in charge. We will directly support the HSC effort to review the USG response to Hurricane Katrina (TAB C).
- You should also be aware that the Government Accountability Office (GAO), under the Comptroller General's authorities, has initiated an investigation into the Department's response to Hurricane Katrina. It should run for three to four months.

28 Sep 05

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

cc:

DepSecDef

CJCS

ASD(PA)

Prepared by: Mr. Skaluba, OASD(HD)/SP&R, (b)(6)

15 Sep 05

OSD 19579-05

1:00PM Thursday, September 22, 2005

DoD Review of Hurricane Katrina

- DoD is conducting a coordinated review (OSD, Joint Staff, JFCOM, NORTHCOM) of the DoD response to Hurricane Katrina. This review has four areas of focus:

Policy:

- Developing recommendations on mid and long-term policy and planning issues.
- Identifying roles and missions implications for the Department.
- Expects policy and planning recommendations to be completed by October 13.

Review of Past Events:

- Comparing DoD's response to Hurricane Katrina to past DoD response efforts.
- Compiling data to serve as baseline for planning and capabilities development.
- Identifying factors that facilitated or constrained DoD response efforts.
- Characterizing commonly used units and missions.
- Expects to report out by October 14.

Lessons Learned:

- Compiling observations at all levels (tactical, operational, theatre, and national).
- Developing a draft list of issues.
- Analyzing issues, including C2 authorities.
- Expects initial draft of timelines and findings by September 30.

QDR Implications:

- Channels relevant data into the QDR process.
- Analyzing DoD's role for responding to catastrophic emergencies.
- Will work with Ryan Henry's QDR integration cell.
- Tentatively expected to present findings to Secretary England on October 27.

- Preparing responses to inquiries and investigations will be handled by a Geren-Maples-like group with dedicated staff. The work outlined above will form the foundation of our responses.

B

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

11 October 2005 - 0720 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL M. W. HAGEE, CMC

SUBJECT: Arabic Studies and Language Program

Sir:

Please see the Deputy Secretary's comments to you on the attached 29 Sep 05 memo:

"Terrific - the right initiative! Gordon E. 10/10 "

Please return a copy of this snowflake with your response.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

As stated

OSD 19620-05

091.4

11 Oct 05

29 Sep 05



9/30
DSD Comg
9/30

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

2005 SEP 29 PM 12:40 IN REPLY REFER TO:

3000
CMC
29 Sep 05

original to GOTO SD

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: ARABIC STUDIES AND LANGUAGE PROGRAM

1. On 1 September 2005, we began the first-ever Arabic Studies and Language Program at the Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. Participants include the entire student body of 176 intermediate-level students (168 U.S. and 8 International officers). The student/teacher ratio in the program is 11:1.
2. We do not intend to make Foreign Area Officers out of the students but rather strive to improve foreign cultural and language skills Marine Corps-wide. A secondary goal is to encourage career-long study and improvement in the use of a foreign language. We designed the Arabic Studies and Language Program in coordination with the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Service Institute, and the service academies' language departments. Our operational experience and current deployments also influenced the establishment of this pilot program. We plan to add additional languages in future academic years.
3. The program incorporates two 90-minute classes and two 90-minute labs per week, as well as practical application scenarios incorporated throughout the academic year. Current curriculum includes teaching the Arabic alphabet and moves steadily toward operational language requirements. Additional training for deploying officers is provided by incorporating language into a *stability negotiations scenario* in the final Capstone Exercise. We use the Federal Interagency Language Roundtable Scale for student assessment. Tailored "extra-instruction" is available for those who require it.
4. We have taken resources "out-of-hide" (manpower, time, and material) in order to jump-start the project. Sustainment of the Arabic Studies and Language Program and expansion into other important language/cultural areas is a function of future funding. Based on the success of this initial program, we will seek funding to expand the project into our career-level schools as well as additional linguistic areas.

✓/R
halse

M. W. Hagee
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



copy to:
SECNAV
CNO
CJCS
USDP&A

Terrific - the right initiative
[Signature]

10-10
OSD 19620-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52584

DSD



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3000
 CMC
 29 Sep 05

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: ARABIC STUDIES AND LANGUAGE PROGRAM

1. On 1 September 2005, we began the first-ever Arabic Studies and Language Program at the Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. Participants include the entire student body of 176 intermediate-level students (168 U.S. and 8 International officers). The student/teacher ratio in the program is 11:1.
2. We do not intend to make Foreign Area Officers out of the students but rather strive to improve foreign cultural and language skills Marine Corps-wide. A secondary goal is to encourage career-long study and improvement in the use of a foreign language. We designed the Arabic Studies and Language Program in coordination with the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Service Institute, and the service academies' language departments. Our operational experience and current deployments also influenced the establishment of this pilot program. We plan to add additional languages in **future** academic years.
3. The program incorporates two 90-minute classes and two 90-minute labs per week, **as well as** practical application scenarios incorporated throughout the academic year. Current curriculum includes teaching the Arabic alphabet and moves steadily toward operational language requirements. Additional training for deploying officers is provided by incorporating language into a *stability negotiations scenario* in the final Capstone Exercise. We use the Federal Interagency Language Roundtable Scale for student assessment. Tailored "extra-instruction" is available for those who require it.
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0914

M. W. Hilde
 M. W. Hilde

General, U.S. Marine Corps
 Commandant of the Marine Corps

copy to:
 SECNAV
 CNO
 CJCS
 USDP&A

29 Sep 05

OSD 19620-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52585

HOLD

DEPARTMENT OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT 20 PM 5:16

ACTION MEMO

20 Oct. 2005

Iraq

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Lawrence DiRita, Principal **Deputy** Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA)

SUBJECT: Letter to Committee to Protect Journalists - Snowflake Response

- Per direction at TAB A, this forwards a **draft** response to a September 30, 2005 letter **from** the Committee **to** Protect Journalists.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign response at TAB B

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by Colonel Joe Richard, (b)(6)

20 Oct 05

30 Sep 05

Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA

From: Lawrence Di Rita (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 1:27 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA
Attachments: 106587346-Oct_0605_SecDef_to_CPJ__2_[1].doc

here is the letter back to cpj. please get it to (b)(6) together with the incoming letter, which i don't have, so she can get it properly formatted and in for signature. tx...

Yahoo! Music Unlimited * Access over 1 million songs. Try it free.

10/20/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/52587



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Mr. Paul Steiger
Chairman of the Board
Committee to Protect Journalists
330 7th Avenue, 11th Floor
New York, **NY** 10001

Dear Mr. Steiger:

Senator John Warner raised with me the issue of journalist safety in Iraq, and I received your letter of September 30, 2005. General Casey, the Commander of Multi-National Force, Iraq, is mindful of the issues summarized in your letter and I understand he has agreed to look into the issues you raised.

I am aware that you and your colleagues, including Mr. Heyward of CBS News and Mr. Schlesinger of Reuters have discussed this matter on multiple instances with Mr. Lawrence Di Rita, of the Office of Public Affairs. I am told that Mr. Di Rita has arranged briefings for these and other news organizations as to the manner in which military commanders in Iraq have attempted to develop and regularly review procedures to ensure the potential dangers to journalists are kept to a minimum. From this process arose the process by which journalists are issued international zone badges to help facilitate their entry into the green zone. Mr. Di Rita further has advised me that Mr. Bryan Whitman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has met with you and other representatives of the Committee to Protect Journalists on several occasions.

Iraq is a country experiencing a violent insurgency, and news organizations must balance for themselves the risks associated with covering this story. I am confident that coalition forces do what they reasonably can to ensure that journalists do not face unnecessary danger. The Department of Defense will continue to encourage that news organizations consider embedding their journalists if news organizations wish to further minimize the risks associated with covering this conflict.

To echo the counsel Mr. Di Rita and Mr. Whitman have provided to CBS, Reuters, and other news organizations, it is important that bureau chiefs and journalists in Baghdad maintain regular interaction with MNF-I press officers, who are in the best position to respond to such particular matters as credentialing, "green zone" access, and the other issues that undergo regular review in theater.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/52588

10/22
1815
10/21
6800

10/22

TO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NOV 01 2005 PM 5:16

ACTION MEMO

[Signature]
20 Oct. 2005

Robert Rangel
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RR
10/21

FROM: Mr. Lawrence DiRita, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA)

SUBJECT: Letter to Committee to Protect Journalists - Snowflake Response

- Per direction at TAB A, this forwards a draft response to a September 30, 2005 letter from the Committee to Protect Journalists.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign response at TAB B

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Colonel Joe Richard (b)(6)

*Robert -
Larry would
like this passed to
Gordon England to
go under his signature*

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

*Sec Def
has edited
Thanks -*

(b)(6)

MA SD	10/21	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/21	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	MICHAEL TSS	10/21 N	
ESR MA	10/21 1750		

OSD 19662-05

A-198-9

Mr. Paul Steiger
Chairman of the Board
Committee to Protect Journalists
330 7th Avenue, 11th Floor
New York, NY 10001

Dear Mr. Steiger:

Senator John Warner raised with me the issue of journalist safety in Iraq, and I received your letter of September 30, 2005. General Casey, the Commander of Multi-National Force, Iraq, is mindful of the issues summarized in your letter and I understand he is looking into the issues you raised.

I am aware you and your colleagues, including Mr. Heyward of CBS News and Mr. Schlesinger of Reuters, have discussed this matter on multiple instances with Mr. Lawrence Di Rita of the Office of Public Affairs. I am told Mr. Di Rita has arranged briefings for these and other news organizations as to the manner in which military commanders in Iraq have attempted to develop and regularly review procedures to ensure the potential dangers to journalists are kept to a minimum. From this review arose the process by which journalists are issued international zone badges to help facilitate their entry into the "green zone." Mr. Di Rita has also advised me that Mr. Bryan Whitman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has met with you and other representatives of the Committee to Protect Journalist on several occasions.

Iraq is a country experiencing a violent insurgency, and accordingly, news organizations must balance for themselves the risks associated with covering this story. Coalition forces are directed to do what they reasonably can do to ensure that journalists do not face unnecessary danger. The Department of Defense will continue to encourage news organizations to consider embedding their journalists with our forces to further minimize the risks associated with covering the conflict.

To echo the counsel Mr. Di Rita and Mr. Whitman have provided to CBS, Reuters, and other news organizations, it is important that bureau chiefs and journalists in Baghdad maintain regular interaction with MNF-I press officers, who are in the best position to respond to such particular matters as credentialing, "green zone" access, and the other issues that undergo regular review in theater.

Sincerely,

~~FOUO~~

October 03, 2005

TO: Robert Rangel

CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
Dan Stanley
Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Journalist Safety in Iraq

Let's assign somebody to handle this letter we received on journalist safety. Please draft a memo for mi.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/30/05 Committee to Protect Journalists ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
100305-09

.....
Please Respond By October 20, 2005

SIC -

- Larry DiRita's public affairs office has been tasked to develop a response to this letter.
- SUSPENSE FOR A RESPONSE IS 17 October.

Robert

OSD 19662-05

Robert Rangel

11-L-0559/OSD/52591

10/1

Without fail !!

Fields


10/14



COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS

330 7th Avenue, 11th Fl, New York, NY 10001 USA Phone: (212) 460-1000 Fax: (212) 460-0990 www.cpj.org E-Mail: info@cpj.org

Fax



To:	Senate Armed Services Committee	From:	Paul Steiger
Fax:	202 224 0007	Pages:	
Phone:		Date:	9/30/05
Re:	CC: Letter to Donald Rumsfeld	CC:	

A15-2



COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS

330 7th Avenue, 11th Fl., New York, NY 10001 USA Phone: (212) 465-1804 Fax: (212) 465-9589 Web: www.cpj.org E-Mail: info@cpj.org

2005 (09) -3 AM 11: 26
OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR GENERAL

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Gandra Mirra Flores
THE OREGONIAN
John Seligson
THE FREEDOM FORKS
FRANK ANTHONY CENTER
Paul C. Taylor
Dr. Petermann and Tracy
Mark Whitaker
HeraldEx

September 30, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Via facsimile: (b)(6)

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

We are writing in response to yesterday's hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee to request a meeting to discuss the issue of journalist safety in Iraq.

We welcome the effort of Senator John Warner to raise this issue with you and senior U.S. commanders, and, as Senator Warner noted after the hearing, your agreement to take it under consideration.

It is essential that journalists covering the important events in Iraq are able to do so as freely and as safely as possible. We hope to have the opportunity to discuss with you some of our concerns about the journalist detentions and accidental shootings by U.S. forces in Iraq as well as suggestions on ways to resolve some of these outstanding problems.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Paul Steiger
Chairman of the Board
Committee to Protect Journalists

David Schlesinger
Global Managing Editor,
Head of Editorial Operations
Reuters

Andrew Heyward
President
CBS News

Martin Baron
Chair, International Committee
American Society of Newspaper Editors

OSD 19662-05



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



NOV 28 2005

Mr. Paul Steiger
Chairman of the Board
Committee to Protect Journalists
330 7th Avenue, 11th Floor
New York, NY 10001

Iran

Dear Mr. Steiger:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to respond to the issues raised by Senator John Warner regarding journalist safety in Iraq, and to your letter of September 30, 2005. General Casey, the Commander of Multi-National Force, Iraq, is mindful of the issues summarized in your letter and officials at his command are looking into the issues you raised.

Recognizing that Iraq is experiencing a violent insurgency and that news organizations need to balance the risks associated with covering a story, coalition forces do everything reasonable to ensure that journalists do not face unnecessary danger. The Department of Defense will continue to encourage news organizations to consider embedding their journalists with our forces to further minimize the risks associated with covering the conflict.

In addition, I understand that Multi-National Force, Iraq, officials meet with bureau chiefs from time to time in Iraq to review issues of common concern, including credentialing, "green zone" access, and other issues that are best resolved in theater.

The Secretary of Defense also has asked the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, to review the matter of journalist detention, in particular. Under consideration, for instance, is a tracking process for detained journalists that will heighten the awareness of such instances for senior commanders. There may be other procedures the military commanders can develop to help ensure that journalists who are detained are not held longer than is appropriate to establish the facts and resolve their circumstances.

I hope this information is helpful.

[Handwritten Signature]
ACTING

28 Nov 05

30 Sep 05

OSD 19662-05

Writer's Direct Dial
+44 20 7542 8380
Writer's Email
david.schlesinger@reuters.com

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 NOV -9 PM 1:45

November 0, 2005

Via Facsimile and US Mail

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Re: Treatment of Journalists in Iraq by U.S. Forces

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to pursue the issues raised in our letter of September 30, 2005, a copy of which is attached.

As you know, Reuters and several other media organizations have been experiencing significant problems with the arbitrary detention and shooting of journalists by U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq. During the September 29, 2005, hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chairman Warner raised this concern directly with you, General Abizaid and General Casey. You responded that you would address the issue, and General Casey pledged to independently investigate and convene a meeting with press organizations in Iraq to work through these concerns. Senator Warner specifically urged you to contact the media organizations directly and convene such a meeting in the United States. The next day, several media organizations, including Reuters, wrote to you to pursue Senator Warner's suggested course of action. Unfortunately, we have received no response to date.

AS I trust you agree, it is a matter of the greatest public interest and to the benefit of all that journalists be able to provide accurate and comprehensive coverage of the unfolding events in Iraq to the world. Our coverage of the situation in Iraq depends on our ability to operate as freely and safely as possible. To this day, however, several journalists remain in Iraqi prisons, held by U.S. forces for what appear to be legitimate journalistic activities. Accordingly, I request the opportunity to meet with you, as Senator Warner suggested, to discuss reasonable measures that would improve the current situation.

TSK617

Reuters America Inc
The Reuters Building
3 Times Square
New York NY 10036

OSD 22040-05

Tel 646-223-4000
www.reuters.com

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

sincerely,



David Schlesinger
Global Managing Editor
Head of Editorial Operations

Enclosure

cc: Hon. John M. Warner
Hon. Carl M. Levin
Gen. George W. Casey Jr., USA
Gen. John P. Abizaid, USA

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Action
DEP SEC DEF
HAS BEEN
ISIDE
NOV 28 2005

~~FOUO~~

SEP 02 2005 4:35
- SEP 02 2005 - 3 PM 4:35

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Briefing

Thanks for the briefing today. It was a good one.

I would like to see a disaggregation of the "other" category that, as I recall, involves something like 21,700 people in the so-called "control" category, the orange on briefing chart 4 in the "Size of the Army" briefing.

Thanks a lot.

DHR.db
090105-07

.....
Please Respond By 09/22/05

cf: USA
CSA
VCSA
DAS
ECC
SMA

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52599

OSD 19703-05



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2005-10-03 10:35:58 AM
2005 OCT -3 10 4:35

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: OSD-Controlled Programs Within the Institutional Army

- Reference the Size of the Army Briefing conducted September 1, 2005, and the Army Briefing Snowflake (Tab A) dated September 02, 2005.
- During the Size of the Army briefing controlled programs were identified in two categories – Controlled and Defense Health Programs.
- For FY06, approximately 40.8K of military authorizations are controlled by OSD. Some controlled programs involve positions assigned to Army organizations (such as Medical Command, Intelligence and Security Command or Military Entrance Processing Command).
- Other controlled programs include positions assigned to organizations external to the Army (such as Joint and Defense organizations). A summary table depicts the allocation of Institutional Army positions (Tab B). Additional detailed breakouts of various Joint (Tab C) and Defense (Tab D) Organizations are attached.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Flohr (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52600

OSD 19703-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: **OSD** - Controlled Programs Within **the** Institutional Army

ACTIVITY	Army Authorizations
Army organizations funded as controlled programs	
Army Health Program	24,956
Army Intelligence	2,533
Special Operations Command	3,161
Joint Organizations	
National Intelligence Program	611
Special Operations Program	9
Defense Health Program	42
COCOMs, SHAPE	4,388
Subtotal	5,040
Defense Organizations	
National Intelligence Program	1,236
Special Operations Program	53
Defense Health Programs	135
DLA, DISA, OSD Staff	2,684
Subtotal	4,908
Army Executive Agent - Joint Service Command	
Military Entrance Processing Command	262
TOTAL	40,860

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: **OSD** - Controlled Programs Within *the* Institutional Army

TAB C

Joint Activities	Army Authorization
National Defense University	83
International American Board	14
Special Operations	9
Southern Command	320
European Command & SHAPE	1978
Secretary Army Joint Activities	72
Joint Test Element	75
Army Support to non-DoD Activities	96
Headquarters, Military Observer Support Group	21
Headquarters, United Nations	1
Joint Forces Command	376
Pacific Command	786
Navy Activities	78
Strategic Command	230
Air Force Activities	110
Central Command	460
NORAD	27
Transportation Command	26
Northern Command	251
Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Organization	13
Other	14

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: OSD - Controlled Programs Within the Institutional Army

Defense Activities	Army Authorizations
Defense Commissary Agency	4
Transportation Command	165
Defense Logistics Agency	198
Defense Acquisition University	30
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office	123
Defense Human Resource Activity	10
Special Operations	861
Office, Secretary Defense	159
Washington Headquarters Services	62
Defense Security Coordination Agency	60
Defense Legal Services Agency	22
Defense Armed forces Information System	114
Tri-Care Medical Activity	23
Office, Economic Adjustment	1
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff	343
Defense Information Services Agency	793
Defense Intelligence Agency	1119
Defense Threat Reduction Agency	281
Uniform Services University of Health Sciences	112
National Imagery & Mapping Agency	146
DARPA	3
DoD Inspector General	11
Counterintelligence Field Agency	1
Missile Defense Agency	44
Defense Finance & Accounting Service	208
Defense POW MIA Office	15
TOTAL	4908

FOUO
PRINCIPALS ONLY

June 16, 2005

Z007

TO: Fran Harvey Doug Feith
Mike Dominguez Steve Cambone
Tina Jonas Mike Donley
Dan Stanley Ken Drieg
Larry Di Rita Dino Aviles
David Chu Jim Haynes

17:06

CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Division of Labor

DR

Attached, for your information, is a division of labor that Deputy Secretary England and I have developed. It may be useful to you as you work issues in the Department. Obviously, anything you feel should come to me personally should do so, regardless of topic. But for routine matters, this division should serve as a guide

Further, you can all be helpful to Gordon and me by making sure that I am kept aware of those matters which you are working with him on.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061605-3

.....
Please respond by _____

16 June 05

FOUO
PRINCIPALS ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD/52604

OSD 19718-05

H JUN 16 ENT'D

DIVISION OF LABOR - SECDEF & DEPSECDEF**SECDEF**

GWOT
Iraq
Afghanistan
SLRG
Contingency Planning
POTUS Briefings
Deployment Orders
Special Operations
Stress on the Force/End Strength
Intelligence/DNI/CIA
SRO
Global Posture
Special Computer Programs
Nuclear Policy
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Active/Reserve Balance
Defense Policy Board

BOTH (Lead)

Sr Civilian Personnel Selection (SD)
Sr Military Personnel Selection (SD)
Budget (DSD)
Jointness (SD)
Legislative Issues (DSD)
Public Outreach (SD)
Accountability (DSD)
Public Affairs (SD)
Detainees (with Doug Feith)
Transformation (DSD)
QDR (DSD)
Missile Defense (SD)
Interagency (SD)
Homeland Defense (DSD)
Personnel Policy (DSD)
Quality of Life (DSD)
Compartmented Programs (SD)
Pentagon Renovation (DSD)
Defense Science Board (DSD)

DEPSECDEF

DoD Reorganization
Financial Mgmt Systems
Business Mgmt Systems
Supply Chain Mgmt
Facilities and Infrastructure
Acquisition
Acquisition Reform
Procurement
IED Task Force
NSPS
Medical Affairs
USAF Tankers/C-130s, etc.
Network & Info Integration
Defense Business Board
BRAC
Readiness
NSPS
Foreign Weapons Sales
IED Task Force
Defense Business Board

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

c c : The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable John Negroponte
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Civil Service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror

As we all try to get the best and brightest to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other front-line states in the GWOT, would it make sense to set up an incentive system of sorts, requiring every Government employee accepted for the Senior Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or Minister-Counselor rank at State to commit to a 180-day tour overseas in a "hardship" post?

We need the best folks going to work in the front lines, and without a lever it can be difficult to get them engaged in some of the hardship spots overseas.

DHR:dh
100405-08

.....

230 Supergraders

4 lists

OSD 19746-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52606

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: ~~The~~ Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable John Negroponte
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Civil Service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror

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DHR:dh
100405-08

.....

OSD 19746-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52607

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable John Negroponte
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Civil Service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror

As we all try to get the best and brightest to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other front-line states in the GWOT, would it make sense to set up **an** incentive system **of sorts**, requiring every Government employee accepted for the Senior Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or Minister-Counselor rank at State to commit to a 180-day tour overseas in a "hardship" post?

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DHR.dh
100405-08

.....

OSD 19746-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52608

FOUO

October 04, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable John Negroponte
Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Civil Service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror

As we all **try** to get the best and brightest to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other front-line states in the GWOT, would it make sense to **set up** an incentive system of sorts, requiring every Government employee accepted for the Senior Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or Minister-Counselor rank at State to commit to a 180-day tour overseas in a "hardship" post?

We need the best folks going to work in the front lines, and without a lever it can be difficult to get them engaged in some of the hardship spots overseas.

DHR:dh
100405-08

.....

OSD 19746-05

FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/52609

~~FOUO~~

05/012490
ES-4223

TO: ~~██████████~~

SEP 16 2005

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Germany

SUBJECT: The Meeting with Peter Struck on 9/13/05 in Berlin

1. Struck indicated that Germany **was** going to discontinue providing force protection anywhere in Germany for U.S. Forces, except at Ramstein and the Marshall Center. I told him I was not aware of this and was surprised. I was later told that B.B. Bell had objected. Struck left the impression that the U.S. Military had agreed to it.

2. He went on to talk about some **unusual** legal issue pertaining to a German soldier filing a lawsuit because of U.S. involvement in Iraq. The effect of which was that anything the German Government does to help the U.S. would violate some law regarding the German's decision not to be supportive of Iraq, and that that would include providing force protection and overflight rights. I said if that were the case, and a lawsuit like that could succeed in Germany, then anytime we were doing something Germany didn't like, they could take away overflight rights, and our military locations in Germany would be deemed to be in support of something that contradicted German law. If that were the **case**, we would, obviously, have to take our forces out of Germany, and make other arrangements. Struck said that he is a legal expert, and he answered that he (Struck) is a legal expert. We need to get this sorted out.

DHR:ss
091405-14

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19750-05

16 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

205 001 - 0 03 11: 43

TO: ~~Eric Edelman~~

SEP 16 2005

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT The Meeting with Peter **Struck** on 9/13/05 in Berlin

1. Struck indicated that Germany was going to discontinue providing force protection anywhere in Germany for U.S. Forces, except at Ramstein and the Marshall Center. I told him I was **not** aware of this and was surprised. I was later told **that** B.B. Bell had objected. Struck left the impression that the U.S. Military had agreed to it.
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DHR:ss
091405-14

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19750-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52611

OCT 04 2005

TO: Senator John Warner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Article

Mr. Chairman--

In case you missed this, it is well worth reading.

Regards,

Attach.

Pollock, Robert. "The Torture Narrative' Unravels," *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2005, p. 8.

DHR:dh
100305-34

352.6

OSD 19756-05

4018

11-L-0559/OSD/52612

Wall Street Journal
October 1, 2005
Pg. 8

The 'Torture Narrative' Unravels

By Robert L. Pollock, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

It's hardly a secret that Private First Class Lynndie England was sentenced this past week for her role as "leash girl" in the infamous abuses photographed at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison in late 2003. But it was also noticeable that the denouement of this spectacular story was relegated to the innards of newspapers that had once given it weeks of front-page treatment. That's almost surely because the trial of the last of the Maryland Army Reservists to face justice -- like those of the others that came before her -- offered no evidence to support claims that the abuses were caused by a Bush administration that had "created the climate" or "set the tone" for "torture."

That was, of course, the widespread and explosive charge last (election) year. Almost immediately the leaked photos of Private England and her compatriots generated calls for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's resignation. So-called "torture memos" were unearthed, in which administration lawyers had discussed the range of permissible interrogation techniques -- for al Qaeda suspects in the wake of 9/11. And by one of the greatest leaps of logic ever seriously entertained in our national discourse, those memos were said to have caused the behavior of soldiers in Iraq who knew nothing beyond the limits outlined in the Army Field Manual. Ted Kennedy, for one, offered up a useful reminder of why Americans have never wanted him to be president by declaring that "Saddam's torture chambers reopened under new management, U.S. management."

The writer Heather Mac Donald dubbed this the "torture narrative." And it persists today despite the conclusion a year ago of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations that the abuses "were not part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets" (emphasis added). Or in the words of the panel's chairman, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger -- whose bipartisan cabinet career included a stint in the Carter administration -- what those pictures showed was sick behavior by the "night shift."

But don't just take his word for it. "You feel that by doing these things you were setting conditions for interrogations," a judge asked Private England in a hearing earlier this year. "No, sir," she responded. "So this was just a way to embarrass them?" he continued. "Yes, sir," was her reply.

Or consider the testimony of Specialist Jeremy C. Sivits: "Our command would have slammed us. They believe in doing the right thing. If they saw what was going on, there would be hell to pay."

In all, seven guards and two military-intelligence personnel have now faced justice for the Abu Ghraib abuses, with even those pleading guilty undergoing detailed sentencing hearings. No evidence has emerged to support the theory that abuses had anything to do with interrogation.

It's worth remembering too that these prosecutions were based on investigations conducted with dispatch that did the Army nothing but credit: A criminal probe was begun within a day of the abuse reports traveling up the chain of command on January 13, 2004; two days after that, Central Command issued a press release about the investigation; on March 20 it was announced that charges had been brought against six of those involved. Meanwhile, Major General Antonio Taguba had completed an investigation whose conclusions have now stood the test of nine courts martial. And this all more than a

month before the photos were leaked to the press.

Have detainee abuses occurred elsewhere in the war on terror? Of course. But they were "widespread" only if you define that term geographically instead of by frequency. The adjective "systematic" has been similarly misused. Overall, more than 70,000 detainees have passed through U.S. military custody since late 2001. About 500 criminal investigations have been conducted into allegations of related misconduct, many of which were found to be unsubstantiated. But more than 200 people have already been disciplined for actions ranging from failure to report to prisoner abuse itself.

There have also now been 12 major inquiries -- including investigations led by Major General George Fay and Vice Admiral Albert Church -- into detainee treatment in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. More than 2,800 interviews have been conducted and 16,000 pages of documents produced. And there have been 31 Congressional hearings and 45 staff briefings. Given that track record, we can be quite sure that the latest abuse allegations to surface (from an officer of the 82nd Airborne) will get the thorough hearing they deserve.

In short, all the evidence suggests a low rate of detainee mistreatment, one that compares favorably with U.S. civilian prisons, never mind that of other and earlier militaries. "The behavior of our troops is so much better than it was in World War II," Mr. Schlesinger told me last year. I called him this week to ask what we've learned since. "That the press exaggerated," he replied. The suggestion that Mr. Schlesinger and countless others -- from decorated officers to military juries -- have lent their good names to some kind of whitewash only reveals the remaining accusers for the crackpots they are.

Let me add some final words on how the Abu Ghraib scandal has affected America's image in Iraq. It hasn't been helpful, of course. But -- having traveled there three times in the past two and a half years, most recently in August -- I can attest that the dominant image of the American soldier in the minds of most Iraqis is that of liberator, as depicted in the sculpture shown here by a craftsman from Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. Americans can be proud of the way their young men and women have performed in Iraq and elsewhere in the war on terror. And they can be proud of the way the military has meted out justice for those few abuses that have occurred.

~~FOUO~~

OCT 05 2005

TO: The Honorable Michael Chertoff
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Edited Briefing

I would very much appreciate it if you would send back to me the briefing we prepared, with any edits you believe to be appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100405-09

337

OSD 19796-05

5 Oct 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52615

~~FOUO~~

OCT 05 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Staffing the NCTC

You ought to check whether or not the rest of the government has staffed up the NCTC the way the President asked.

DHR.db
100405-25

OYOCIA

OSD 19799-05

5 Oct 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52616

~~FOUO~~

OCT 05 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

c c : Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thanks for a Good Job in DC

I appreciate your time ~~and~~ effort in coming back to DC, and the media and Congressional briefings you both did. It makes an enormous difference. It's always a bumpy road, but our obligation is to tell the story honestly to the American people.

Thank you for all you are doing each day in two of the most demanding jobs on the planet!

DHR.dh
100405-07

3355D

OSD 19800-05

50005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52617

~~FOUO~~

OCT 05 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: *Thanks* for a Good Job in DC

I appreciate your time and effort in coming back to DC, and the media and Congressional briefings you both did. It makes an enormous difference. It's always a bumpy road, but ~~our~~ obligation is to tell the story honestly to the American people.

Thank you for all you are doing each day in two of the most demanding jobs on the planet!

DHR,dh
100405-07

OSD 19800-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52618

~~FOUO~~

OCT 0 5 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PC on Thursday

Why are we having a PC on Iraq on Thursday, October 6? I cannot imagine what it is for. It seems to me that just having another regular meeting won't add much.

If you decide to have it, I have two briefings from Casey that I think should be presented.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100405-19

3M4 msc

OSD 19802-05

5/11/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52619

~~FOUO~~

JUN 28 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Briefing for Secretary Rice

Condi Rice asked to be briefed on the way ahead in Iraq. I told her that would be fine, but rather than Abizaid or Casey doing it, I thought it would be much better if you or Skip Sharp got with her. She should be walked through the paper on the state of the insurgency and the preliminary thinking, but whoever does it will have to give her all the question marks and cautions that aren't on the paper.

TRM

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062705-46

.....
Please Respond By July 28, 2005

28 June 05

OSD 19820-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52620

FOUO

June 16, 2005

TO: Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Illinois Information

253

Please have somebody get information on Illinois prisons and what kind of abuse that has existed.

Also get information on how many homicides there are in Illinois on an annual basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-4

.....
Please respond by _____

16 June 05

Y

JUN 16 ENT'D

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52621

OSD 19821-05

FOUO

June 16, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Davis

Congressman Tom Davis of Virginia, who has been such a good friend, is really hot on this GTMO issue. He said he would like to take a team of Congressmen down to GTMO and get briefed and knowledgeable, so they can come back and help us.

333

Please get that going fast and set it up. Work out schedules, and let's get it done. We can use some help from people like that.

In the meantime, let's get him some copies of the detainee paper, so he can start being helpful off of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-5

.....
Please respond by 6/23/05

16 June 05

FOUO

JUN 16 ENT'D

KJ

11-L-0559/OSD/52622

OSD 19822-05

FOUO

16/23

June 16, 2005



TO: Dan Stanley
 CC: Steve Bucci
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Congressman Boren

I think it ~~was~~ Congressman Boren who asked me if I would speak to his interns.
 Please check that ~~and~~ see what that's about.

Thanks.

037

DHR:dh
061605-6

.....
 Please respond by 6/30/05

Sir,
 Congressman Boren
 has been notified that
 you will address all interns
 at one event later in
 the summer. The DepSecDef
 is also speaking to this
 specific group

DR
Dr. B

16 June 05

FOUO

OSD 19832-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52623

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY 7/1

June 16, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman Boren

I think it was Congressman Boren who asked me if I would speak to his interns.
Please check that and see what that's about.

Thanks

DHR:df
61065-0

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

Sir,
Response attached.
v/r
Lt Col [Signature]

JUN 30 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19832-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52624



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1300

*OSD
7/1*

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

Jun 29, 2005, 5:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #061605-6

You asked me to follow up on Rep. Boren's request for you to participate in a brown bag lunch for the Oklahoma Delegation's summer interns.

We have coordinated with the Congressman's office and you are scheduled to speak to all House and Senate interns on Monday, August 8th from 10:00-10:30.

Acting Deputy Secretary England is going to meet with the Boren group on Wednesday, July 20th from 12:00-12:45.

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake

OSD 19832-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52625

FOUO

June 16, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Briefing on Stress on the Force Memo

I have asked dozens of times to be briefed on the Stress on the Force memo that I wrote, and what the progress is.

Please take it away from David Chu and give it to Brad Berkson, and let's get a disciplined approach done. I am tired of waiting.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 061605-13

.....
 Please respond by 7/1/05

320.2

16 June

OSD 19843-05

FOUO

JUN 16 ENT'D

CPD

11-L-0559/OSD/52626

~~FOUO~~

June 16, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Insurance Issue

You have simply got to get back to me on that insurance issue on Gordon England.
I was asked about it by John Warner yesterday.

What is the problem?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061605-15

.....
Please respond by 6/21/05

019

16 Sept 05

OSD 19845-05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2005



11-L-0559/OSD/52627

June 17, 2005



000,7

~~TO~~ Larry Di Rita
 CC Dan Stanley
 FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Quick Reaction Cell

We simply need to develop a quick reaction cell that does nothing else 24 hours a day but get prepared to support our friends with information, talking points, ideas and connections to talk radio and the like.

Please put someone in charge of it, tell me who that person is, give them a deadline date, and get back to me with a report within two weeks as to how you are going to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061705-4

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

6/20 -

SECRET -

We pump out more points quickly than is necessary. What we don't do is connect Subject

SECRET


OSD 19850-0

Matter Experts to speakers.
We put out points to 25-30000 several times a week. See attached, for example.

I'll come back with a proposal that might help us.
The bottom line: We need more communications ~~too~~ leadership centers at senior levels. More soon.

11-L-0559 OSD/52628

JUN 21 ENTD



Pentagon Briefing

A Weekly Report From the Department of Defense
www.defendamerica.mil www.pentagonchannel.mil

June 16, 2005

From the Podium

Secretary Rumsfeld Outlines Guantanamo Policies

"Detainees are sent to Guantanamo only after a proper screening process that identifies these prisoners who pose a threat to the United States or who have intelligence value. The kind of people held at Guantanamo include terrorist trainers, bomb-makers, extremist recruiters and financiers, bodyguards of Osama bin Laden and would-be suicide bombers. They are not common car thieves. They are believed to be determined killers." [\(transcript\)](#) [\(story\)](#) [\(DoD release\)](#)

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
Pentagon Press Conference, June 14, 2005

Gen. Pace Discusses Army Recruiting Goals

"I think the Army's taking the right leadership approach to the problems it had the last couple of months in meeting their recruiting goals. First of all, we should make note of the fact that they're looking for almost 8,000 more soldiers this year than they were last year, because of our desire to grow the Army so it can transform itself, and then go back down to its prewar size. But there is an increased number there. The Army has allocated another 3,000 recruiters and a good deal of leadership time to train those recruiters in getting out to our communities. Interestingly, those who serve in the Army today, who are currently on active duty, are reenlisting at historic numbers. We have had the goals for reenlistment exceeded, especially by those units who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why? Because those soldiers have had the opportunity to serve the country the way they volunteered to do. They get it. They understand the tremendous positive impact they are having." [\(transcript\)](#) [\(story\)](#)

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace
Pentagon Press Conference, June 14, 2005

In the News

Despite Insurgency, Things Better in Iraq, Rumsfeld Says

WASHINGTON, June 15 – Despite the insurgency, things are getting better in Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told the BBC's David Frost. Statistically, the security situation in Iraq is unchanged in recent months. DoD officials said between 50 and 60 attacks a day take place in the country. But Rumsfeld pointed to the increase in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces as an important security and political milestone. [\(story\)](#)

Top Army Sergeant Outlines Transformation

WASHINGTON, June 14 – In addition to making the Army a sleeker, more deployable force, transformation will add predictability and stability to the lives of soldiers and their families, Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston said in an interview with the Pentagon Channel. [\(story\)](#)

Terrorist Threat Not Just a U.S. Problem, Cheney Says

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla., June 13 – The United States is far from alone in facing the threat posed by terrorists, Vice President Richard B. Cheney said here June 10 in an interview with the Pentagon Channel. "The global terrorist threat really is a worldwide problem; it's not just a U.S. problem," he said. "Since we were attacked on 9/11, obviously, there have been attacks in Madrid, Casablanca, Mombassa, Istanbul, Bali (and) Jakarta. So our ability to deal with this threat requires really an international effort." Cheney cited the need to share intelligence and conduct bilateral and multinational training, exercises and operations as being key to that effort for the United States. [\(story\)](#)

Oath of Office



Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker administers the oath of office to about 30 new Army volunteers from the recruiting district of Baltimore, Md., during Pentagon ceremonies on June 14, 2005, marking the 230th anniversary of the Army's founding. Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey (left) looks on. DoD photo by R.D. Ward. (Released)

Iraqi Freedom Veteran Reflects on Meaning of Flag Day

WASHINGTON, June 14 – It's been a little more than two months since I returned from Iraq. More than a year earlier I promised my wife I'd come home safely, and the day I returned, hours after I had come home, I watched my wife eagerly remove the Blue Star Service Banner that hung in our front window, and she happily watched me bring down the yellow ribbon that had hugged our yard's corner tree for a year. [\(link to Capt. Steve Alvarez's essay\)](#)

Support the Troops - www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil



US Department of Defense
DoD Update: June 14, 2005 – Rumsfeld GTMO

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today. Following are highlights of the secretary's opening remarks.

- Before Sept. 11, 2001, the United States dealt with terrorism primarily as a law enforcement issue.
 - Terrorists who killed Americans were investigated, arrested, put on trial and then punished.
 - In the post-September 11th era, it became clear that prosecuting terrorists after they strike was an inadequate approach, particularly given the lethal threat that violent extremists pose.

- The military apprehended thousands of enemy combatants after September 11th; several hundred were determined to be particularly dangerous and valuable from an intelligence perspective.
 - After extensive discussions with his senior advisors, the president decided these enemy combatants were not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions. Nor were they criminal defendants in the traditional law enforcement sense.
 - The president ordered the detained combatants be treated humanely under the laws of war.

- The Guantanamo Bay detention facility was established because the United States needed a safe and secure location to both detain and interrogate enemy combatants.
 - The solution was not a perfect option, but, simply, the best option available.
 - The US taxpayers have already invested more than \$100 million in the facility.

- The Department of Defense, working through the National Security Council inter-agency process, established procedures to provide appropriate legal process to these detainees – procedures that go beyond what is required even under the Geneva Conventions. These included:
 - Combatant Status Review Tribunals to confirm each individual is an unlawful enemy combatant. Every detainee currently at Guantanamo now has received such a hearing; as a result, some 38 have been released;
 - Military Commissions -- trials with full and vigorous representation by defense counsel for those suspected of committing war crimes. The commissions have been temporarily suspended pending further review by the federal court system; and
 - Administrative Review Boards that annually assess the remaining potential threat and intelligence value represented by each detainee. These boards are designed to reexamine detainees regularly in order to identify which can be released.

- One terrorist detained at Guantanamo is Mohammed Al-Khatani, believed to be an intended 9-11 hijacker. He and other detainees have provided valuable information, including:
 - Insights into al Qaeda's September 11th planning;
 - Identities and details on 20 of Osama bin Laden's body guards;
 - Information leading to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, architect of the 9-11 attacks; and
 - Information allowing foreign police to detain 22 suspected terrorists plotting attacks earlier this year.

- Detainees are sent to Guantanamo only after a thorough screening process that identifies prisoners who pose a threat to the United States or who have intelligence value.
 - The kinds of people held at Guantanamo include terrorist trainers, bomb makers, extremist recruiters and financiers, bin Laden's bodyguards and would-be suicide bombers.

- The Guantanamo facility is transparent and has been scrutinized.
 - To set the record straight, DoD last year declassified and posted on the internet highly sensitive memoranda on interrogation techniques.
 - There have been nearly 400 separate media visits to the facility by more than 1,000 journalists.
 - Some 180 congressional representatives have visited Guantanamo.
 - The International Committee of the Red Cross has had continuous access, and its representatives meet privately with detainees.

- Allegations of abuse at Guantanamo and other facilities have been thoroughly investigated.
 - Wrong-doers are being held accountable.
 - The military has instituted numerous reforms of detainee operations conduct, including a renewed emphasis on standards and training.
 - Detainees' religious sensibilities are respected: Detailed regulations have been issued governing how the Koran is to be handled; detainees' schedules are arranged around the five daily calls to prayer required by the Muslim faith.; dietary requirements are acknowledged – in fact, the military spends more per meal to meet detainees' religious dietary requirements than it spends per ration for U.S. troops.

- Since September 11th, the military has released tens of thousands of detainees -- including some 200 detainees from Guantanamo.
 - Regrettably some of those decisions we now know were imperfect-- some detainees released from Guantanamo have taken up arms again against the United States and its allies.
 - The United States will continue to transfer other detainees to their countries of origin after negotiating agreements to ensure humane and appropriate treatment for the detainees.

- While the United States does not want to hold suspected terrorists longer than necessary, as long as there is a need to keep terrorists from striking again, Guantanamo will be needed.
 - The war on terror is a complex struggle against extremism; we are in unconventional territory and traditional doctrines governing criminals and military prisoners do not apply.
 - Our goal is to retain as few people as is necessary and safe.
 - As the president has said, we are always looking to improve procedures and better manage detainees who pose a lethal threat to the civilized world.

FOUO

June 17, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: List of Countries

During my meeting with the President yesterday, I mentioned I had given Andy Card a list of countries the Department of Defense has a particular interest in.

You will recall Condi said there "is a process" and "we should use it." I don't know what the process is - apparently, it is Andy Card, though Andy Card thinks it is you. Whatever it is, we need to have you - if you are the one - keep us posted when there are any upcoming planned vacancies in any of these countries, so that we can be alerted as to what people are thinking, and what the criteria are for the selection of individuals to assume those posts.

092

If we have opinions or concerns, we will provide them. It would be helpful to have that kind of discussion early, before the Department gets locked in on a successor.

Thanks.

Attach.
List of Countries

DHR:ss
061705-7

17 June 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52632

JUN 17 2005
AK
OSD 19858-05

15 June 2005

Europe & Eurasia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Romania

Russia

Turkey

Ukraine

Uzbekistán

AP:

Japan

Korea

China

Philippines

NESA:

India

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Iraq

Kuwait

Syria

Qatar

Yemen

WHA:

Colombia

Venezuela

Africa:

Djibouti

Other

NATO

UN

6-13-05

Hi Neighbor,

At the risk of being
risky I'm enclosing
this email copy I received.

My donations are not enough.

Please forgive me if this is
taking advantage of a neighbor
who can't lose.

Thanks very much for all you
are doing for our Country.

My Gut Ferrie

OJD 19864-05

11-1-0550/03D/52637

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FOUO

June 20, 2005

TO: Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Mary Gail Ferris

Please take a look at the attached letter from a neighbor of mine (b)(6)
and tell me what we should do with it.

I would like to **know** why there are these shortages.

Thanks.

Attach
6-13-05 Letter from Ferris to SecDef

DJR:ss
062005-03

.....
Please Respond By 07/07/05

DR

DR

OSD 198 51 -05

FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/52635

MARYGAIL FERRIS

From: "John Folsom" <johnfolsom@woundedwarriors.org>
 To: (b)(6)
 Sent: Monday, June 13, 2005 11:54 AM
 Subject: "Care Packages" to Balad, Iraq

~~~~~  
**Wounded Warriors**  
 ~~~~~

Greetings!

June 13, 2005

I just received the e-mail printed below from Senior Master **Sergeant** Elizabeth Christiansen. Senior Master Sergeant Christiansen— is assigned to the the 332 Air Expeditionary **Wing**, Expeditionary Medical Group which is **currently** deployed to Iraq.

She attached a "wish list" of items that they need at the hospital.

Send **the** "care packages" to:

SMSgt Elizabeth Christiansen

(b)(6)

Semper Fidelis!

John Folsom
 Camp Fallujah, Iraq

Dear Colonel Folsom,

Thank you for taking th **time to speak** with m **As** you probably re aware, we are an extremely busy, advanced, state **of** the art, trauma hospital and **see** upwards to over a thousand patients a month. Some patients **are returned** to duty **directly** from the hospital while others **are sent over** to the CASF for **air** transportation to higher levels of health care at places **such as** Landstuhl, Germany.

The reason I **am** writing is to request your **help** in **finding** certain items **that** we **are** in **need** of here. Due to our high patient load, we are in constant need of hygiene and **clothing** items. Because of the urgency of our patient's condition, they usually arrive here without these necessities. When **our** rotation **arrived** here at the **beginning** of May the supplies seemed adequate, however **they** have rapidly dwindled, **are** almost **gone**, and we are not sure **where** to find replenishment. Any assistance you **can** provide **us** will

6/13/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/52636

be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your kindness and all the work you do for the American forces-

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH M. CHRISTIANSEN, SMSgt, USAF

Health and comfort *items* for the patients:

- Air freshener (spray)
- Baby wipes
- T Chap Stick
- Deodorant
- Female items
- Kleenex
- Lotion
- Magazines, CDs
- Mirrors
- Q-tips
- Shaving cream & Razors
- Shampoo & conditioner
- Stationary & Pens
- sunscreen
- soap & body wash
- Toothpaste, toothbrushes, mouthwash, floss
- Sweat pants & matching shirts/T-shirts (Male & Female)
- Socks (Male & Female)
- Sports bra's (small, medium, & large)
- Women's underwear
- Boxers
- Towels
- Washcloths
- Pillowcases
- Twin bed sheets

Contact Information

~~~~~  
 email: [johnfolsom@woundedwarriors.org](mailto:johnfolsom@woundedwarriors.org)  
 web: <http://www.woundedwarriors.org>  
 ~~~~~

Forward email

FOUO



June 20, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Women in Combat Closure on Priority List

Please make sure my priority list includes:

1. Women in combat closure
2. Insurance issue closure

Thanks.



DHR:ss
062005-08



Please Respond By 06/21/05

6/21/05

SIR —

Added. Updated.

v/r jim

205

20 44 05

OSD 19866-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52638

Current Actions (In Priority Order)

6/21/2005

Priority Action	Key Responsibility	Next Steps	Due Dates 2005
Iraq Strategy for POTUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • MNF-I 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Casey/Abizaid visit 23-28 Jun (T) • Detailed Schedule 	6/23
Afghanistan Strategy for POTUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • CFC-A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eikenberry SVTC 29 Jun 	6/29
Testimony/Hearings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LA/PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Casey/Abizaid Hearings 23-28 Jun (T) 	6/23
Stress on the Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P&R, Services, PA&E 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief all 44 areas to SD with Metrics 	6/24
Detainees-ISN	USD (P)/ Detainee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain CIA final concurrence • Promulgate guidance 	6/24
Operational Control Elements	USD (I)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolve reporting issues with State • Change name • In NSC process 	6/24
"List" Countries for POTUS	USD (I) USD (P)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD (I) submit example plan 	6/24
Assessment Rooms and Processes (Afghan/Iraq/GWOT/Latin Am)	CJCS		7/1
Crawford Briefs for 11 Aug 05	OSD-Immediate Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed list w/ SD • Forward to NSC • Publish schedule/taskers 	6/24
Noble Eagle Ground Battery	NORTHCOM with OSD Immediate Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SD tasked NORTHCOM for comment 	7/1
EMP Protection	USD (I)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefs w/ SD-Awaiting Guidance • Issue Snowflakes 	6/24

11-L-0559/OSD/52639

Current Actions (In Priority Order)

6/21/2005

	Key Responsibility	Next Steps	Due Dates 2005
t	• Army	• Army generate simple, readable statement of policy	6/28
	• OGC • I.A	GC negotiate agreement with SASC staff	6/28

~~FOUO~~

June 20, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Zal Khalilzad

I think Zal Khalilzad should retain the title of "Special Envoy ~~for~~ Afghanistan" in case ~~we~~ need to slip him back in there and use him ~~for~~ something.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062005-11

Afghanistan

to you

OSD 19868-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52641

B

~~FOUO~~

JUN 21 2005

TO: Mike Donley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Personal Security Details and Car/Driver

Please take a fresh look at this list of people who receive Personal Security Details and Car/Driver support. It seems too generous to me. I have put question marks next to ones that should be carefully reviewed.

Thanks.

Attach 12-14-04DIR A&M Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
062005-19

.....
Please Respond By 06/30/05

380.01

21 Jun 05

OSD 19872-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52642

Donp

214
1800

2/28/05

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/14/04

SUBJECT: Personal Security Details (PSDs)

In response to your snowflake of 6 December, Subject: "Vehicles and Security," I submit the following:

- Attached listing of all DoD officials, civilian and military, was forwarded to Peter Sobich, Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Cabinet Secretary, on 17 November 2004. Sobich had requested that each Department provide the White House a list of all officials who are assigned a PSD.
- Six DoD Civilian officials and 21 Military officials are assigned 24/7 PSD here and abroad.
- The following civilian officials, (five Under Secretaries of Defense) have dedicated cars and drivers and are eligible for home to office transportation, but do not have a PSD assigned: Mike Wynne, Doug Feith, Tina Jonas, David Chu and Steve Cambone.

Handwritten circle with a question mark and an arrow pointing to the list of officials.

RECOMMENDATION: None

Attachments:

DoD Inventory of Personal Security Details, November 2004

T 6/11

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004
Inventory of Personal Security Details

Department of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Protectee Name	Protectee Title	Protectee Telephone	Protectee Status (Political/Civilians)	DEPT Providing Organization	Detail Status (F/T, etc)	Notes
Donald H. Rumsfeld	Secretary of Defense	(b)(6)	PAS Level I	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
Paul D. Wolfowitz	Deputy Secretary of Defense		PAS Level II	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS

Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies

Protectee Name	Protectee Title	Protectee Telephone	Protectee Status (Political/Civilians)	DEPT Providing Organization	Detail Status (F/T, etc)	Notes
GEN Richard Meyers	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	(b)(6)	General, USAF	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Peter Pace	Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff		General, USMC	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN James L. Jones	CDR, EUCOM		General, USMC	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Charles Wald	Deputy CDR, EUCOM		General, USAF	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM E. P. Giambastiani	CDR, JFCOM		Admiral, USN	USAMP/ USAF SP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN James E. Cartwright	CDR, STRATCOM		General, USMC	USAF SP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS

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11-L-0559/OSD/52644

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**NOVEMBER 2004
Inventory of Personal Security Details**

ADM Timothy Keating	CDR, NORTHCOM	(b)(6)	Admiral, USN	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Leon J. LaPorte	CDWCFC USFK		General, USA	Army MP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM Thomas Fargo	CDR, PACOM		Admiral, USN	Navy NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN John Handy	CDR, TRANSCOM (also USAF Air Mobility Command Commander)		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ /all OCONUS
GEN Bantz J. Craddock	CDR, SOUTHCOM		General, USA	Army	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Bryan Brown	CDR, SOCOM		General, USA	SOCOMPSTD	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
VADM Lowell E. Jacoby	Dir. DIA		Vice Admiral, USN	DIA (Federal Law Enforcement Officers)	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN John Abizaid	CENTCOM CDE		General, USA	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN George Casey Jr.	MNF-I CDR		General, USA	MNF-I (PSU)	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LT GEN Lance Smith	CENTCOM DCDR		Lieutenant General, USAF	USCENTCOM	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
VADM David Nichols Jr.	5 TH FLEET/ NAVCENT CDR		Vice Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG David Barno	CFC-A CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	CFC-A	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LT GEN Walter Buchanan III	9 TH AF/ CENTAF CDR		Lieutenant General, USAF	CENTAF	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

(?)

¹ Provides personal security detail as necessary in CONUS.

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NOVEMBER 2004

utils

LTG Steve Whitcomb	3 RD ARMY/ ARCENT CDR	(b)(6)	Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Thomas Metz	MNC-I CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	MNC-I (PSU)	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
MG Eric Olsen	CTJF-180 CDR		Major General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
MG Gary Harrell	SOCCENT CDR		Major General, USA	SOCCENT	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
Maj Gen Samuel Helland	CJTF-HOA CDR		Major General, USMC	CTJF-HOA	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

Department of Army

Protectee Name	Protectee Title	Protectee Relationship	Protectee Status (Active/Inactive)	Detail Providing Organization	Detail Status (P/T/F/T/ etc.)	Notes
FRAN HARVEY Leo Brownlee (d/d 19 Nov 04)	Acting Secretary of my	(b)(6)	PAS Level IV	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker	Chief of Staff of the Army		General, USA	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Richard A. Cody	Vice Chief of Staff of the Army		General, USA	Army CID	P/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN B. B. Bell	USAREUR		General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
LTG Tim Kinnan	NATO U.S. Rep.		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
LTG David McKiernan	CG CFLCC		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

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11-L-0559/OSD/52646

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NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

MG Gary Speaks	DCG CFLCC	(b)(6)	Major General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Ricardo Sanchez	V Corps CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Thomas F. Metz	III Corps CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG David Barno	CG, CFC-A		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
BG(P) Lloyd Austin	CG, CJTF-180		Brigadier General(P), USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
Maj Gen Craig P. Weston	C, OMC-A		Major General, USAF	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

Department of Navy

Protectee Name	Protectee Title	Protectee Telephone	Protectee Service (Qualification/Category)	Detail Branching Organization	Detail Status (F/T/Part)	Notes
HON Gordon England	Secretary of the Navy	(b)(6)	PAS Level II	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM Vernon Clark, USN	Chief of Naval Operations		Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Michael Hagee, USMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps		General, USMC	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS

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11-L-0559/OSD/52647

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NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security De

ADM Michael G. Mullen	COMUSNAVEUR (Italy)	(b)(6)	Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
VADM Harry Ulrich	CDR, US Sixth Fleet		Vice Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based, no CONUS PSD
ADM Walter Doran	CDR, USPACFLT		Admiral USN	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
VADM Jonathan Greenert	CDR, US Seventh Fleet		Vice Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based, no CONUS PSD
BGEN Larry New, USAF	Deputy Commander, Combined Air Operations Center 7		Brigadier General, USAF	NCIS	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

7

Department of Air Force

[Redacted Header]						
Dr. James D. Roche	Secretary of the Air Force	(b)(6)	PAS Level II	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
Peter B. Teets	Under Secretary of the Air Force		PAS Level IV	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN John P. Jumper	Chief of Staff of the Air Force		General, USAF	AFOSI	FIT	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN T. Michael Moseley	Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	CONUS/OCONUS

7

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11-L-0559/OSD/52648

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NOVEMBER 2004

?	GEN Robert Foglesong	US Air Forces in Europe Commander	(b)(6)	General, USAF	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
?	GEN Hal M. Homburg	Air Combat Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Donald G. Cook	Air Education and Training Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Gregory S. Martin	Air Force Material Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Lance W. Lord	Air Force Space Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Paul V. Hester	Pacific Air Forces Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS

We are seeking an inventory of both political and career agency officials possessing full-time, part-time or conditional (i.e. foreign travel only, etc.) personal security details. In each case, we would like to know which organizations are providing security services (USSS, etc.).

Please return completed form(s) to Peter Sobich at the Office of Cabinet Affairs (psobich@who.eop.gov) by **COB Monday November 15.**

1 Provides personal security detail as necessary in CONUS.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52649

11/29
1430

DEPARTMENT OF THE
DEFENSE
2005 NOV 22 AM 9:47

ACTION MEMO

A/DSD
USD (P) *[Signature]* 8 2005
I-05/015367-P&S
ES-4739

OSD 19875-05

Afghanistan

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) *O'Connell 22 NOV 05*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Attorney General Gonzales on Air Support (U)

- Attorney General Gonzales sent a letter thanking you for DoD air support to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Afghanistan and referred to a DoD agreement to provide military air support for up to four interdiction operations per month (Tab B).
 - General Pace informed you that there is no formal agreement for DoD to provide such support (Tab C).
- USCENTCOM continues to provide aviation support to interdiction operations as mission and resources permit.
- DEA dependence on DoD airlift will diminish as State helicopters arrive in Afghanistan in January and SOLIC (CN) helicopters arrive in April 2006 and start providing dedicated support to interdiction operations.
- A reply to Attorney General Gonzales' letter is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letter at Tab A

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

50al Approvers
Rangel
Robert Rangel
11/30

Prepared by: LCDR Robert Mook, USN. SO/LIC(CN) (b)(6)

SPD 11/25

MA SD	<i>11/30</i>	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	<i>11/29</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>M 11/29</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>11/30</i>
ESR MA	<i>DA 11/29</i>	<i>1271</i>	

11-L-0559/OSD/52650

Policy Action Memo Template

OSD 19875-05

22 Nov 05

5 Oct 05

~~SECRET~~
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-6004



33
CH-0055-05
15 November 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR/PA/10/11/05*

SUBJECT: Letter From Al Gonzales (SF 100605-15)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), there is no formal agreement for the Department of Defense to provide a predetermined number of support missions per month to the Drug Enforcement Administration or other counternarcotic interdiction forces in Afghanistan.
- **Analysis**
 - While the concept or target of providing four interdiction support missions per month has been discussed, the Department of Defense did not formally agree to provide a predetermined number of support missions.
 - Since March, US Central Command has provided direct and indirect support, in the form of US military airlift, deconfliction, intelligence, mission planning, contracted civilian helicopter airlift, and in extremis close air support and medical evacuation to numerous individual operations as resources permit.
 - A detailed information paper of the history behind the four missions per month concept and the support provided by Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan is attached (TABB).

COORDINATION TABC

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General V. E. Renuart, Jr., USAF; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

273 1/16

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>11/1/05</i>	<i>1020</i>	
ESR MA	<i>PA 11/1/05</i>		

Unclassified without attachments

~~SECRET~~
OSD 78044-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52651

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 06,2005

TO: GenPete Pace

CC Eric Edelman
Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Letter from Al Gonzales

Please have someone find out what the agreement is that is referred to by Attorney General Al Gonzales.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/5/05 Letter from Attorney General Gonzales to SecDef

Attach
10/06/05 letter from Gonzales

DHR:es
100605-15

.....

Please Respond By 11/01/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19875-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52652



Dear Don:

I want you to know how much I appreciate the air support that you brought on the ground in Afghanistan provided to my DEA and Afghan instructors here last weekend. This critical air support enabled our DEA Team-deployed Advisory and Support Team and U.S. Air Force Liaison Unit partners to launch a very successful informant operation resulting in the seizure of five fully operational Anomni Submachine, 200 kilograms of heroin, and significant intelligence information. Given the principal opium cultivation and trafficking areas are located outside of Kabul in remote regions of Afghanistan, we cannot conduct all these operations against high value targets without you.

After the dedicated DoD air assets are delivered to us in April or June 2006, we will be able to conduct more independent operations. Unlike the Anomni, it will be something on your continued support. Now that the elements in Afghanistan are behind us, I will be working forward to returning to the April DoD agreement to provide us with U.S. military air support for up to four independent operations a month unlike the dedicated air assets current in June 2006.

These counterdrug informant networks are critical to our long term success in Afghanistan as you know and I am grateful for your Partnership.

Joe

DDO 19875-05

Tab A



The Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

2005 MAY -9 01 14:20
10-5-05

Dear Don:

I trust you to know how much I appreciate the air support
that your troops on the ground in Afghanistan provided to my DEA and
Afghan interdiction team last weekend. This critical air support
enabled our DEA Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Team and Afghan
detachment Unit partners to launch a very successful enforcement
operation resulting in the seizure of five fully operational
 heroin laboratories, 300 kilograms of heroin, and significant
 intelligence information. Since the principal opium cultivation
 and trafficking areas are located outside of Kabul in remote
 regions of Afghanistan, we cannot conduct all these
 operations against high value targets without you.

After the dedicated DoD air assets are delivered to us
in April or June 2006, we will be able to conduct more
 independent operations. Unlike the summer, it will be
 working on your continued support. Now that the electronic
 in Afghanistan are behind us, I will be sending forward
 to returners to the April CDD agreement to provide us
 with U.S. military air support for up to four interdiction
 operations a month until the dedicated air assets arrive
 in June 2006.

These counterdrug enforcement missions are vital
 to our long term success in Afghanistan as you know and
 I am grateful for your Partnership.

pa

OSD 19875-05

11-L-05559/OSD/52654

The Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-5000

11-L-0559/OSD/52655



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

NOV 30 2005

Afghanistan

The Honorable Alberto Gonzales
Attorney General
Room 5111
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Al,

Thank you for your October 5, 2005 letter regarding DoD **air** support for your interdiction operations in Afghanistan. I **am** glad we were able to assist with such a successful event.

Aerial support will continue to improve with the arrival of State helicopters in **January** and April, and DoD-procured Afghan counternarcotics helicopters in April and May of 2006. U.S. Central Command forces will continue to provide support as well, as mission and resource requirements permit.

Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

30 Nov 05

5 Oct 05



OSD 19875-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52656

FOUO

June 27, 2005

205

TO: David Chu
CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
VADM Staser Holcomb
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Diversity - Woman and Minorities

I received your first cut at diversity in the senior ranks, and frankly it is discouraging. We have to do better. I would like to see a more detailed list of ideas and what you're doing to execute them over the coming months. You mentioned a quarterly update - make it every two months, please. We have to get some energy into this.

Thanks.

Attach: 6/7/05 USD (P&R) to SecDef (OSD 12074-05)

DHR:ss
062705-05

.....
Please Respond By July 28, 2005

2750 N05

FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/52657

OSD 19891-05

BMB

FOUO

JUN 23 2005



TO: Gordon England
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from the SASC

Please take a look at the attached letter from the Senate **Armed** Services Committee and brief me on what you think it means, what we need to do, and then assume responsibility for pushing it along.

471.8c

Thanks.

Attach.
6121105 Letter from Senators Warner and Levin

DHR:ss
062205-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir.
Response attached.
W/R
LtCol Lengyel

DR
6/27

JUN 27 2005

23 June 05

FOUO

OSD 19921-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52658

Stt
6/27

June 27, 2005

To: Donald Rumsfeld
Fr: Gordon England
Subj: Letter from SASC (IED TF)

Don,
DM

- Response attached.
- IED Task Force has been restructured with new direction issued to align authority and responsibility with the Director.
- Director's expenditure authority has been increased to \$25M (approximately 90% of all contracts).
- The hierarchy, "mother may I", etc., have all been eliminated
- The long-term research initiated by the Department of the Navy is progressing and has been incorporated into the IED Task Force.
- This effort is now on track to hopefully yield faster and better results.

Asst



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
10 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 27 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Washington Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator
Mr. Levin,
Man:

Thank you for your recent communication regarding the Department of Defense's (DoD) efforts to counter the increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). We fully concur with your emphasis on the importance of countering IED attacks in the Central Command area of operations.

Be assured that this effort has my very highest personal priority. Since assuming the duties of the Deputy Secretary, I have already conducted several senior-level reviews on this subject. Today, I signed out a DoD Directive that fully consolidates this effort under a single Director who, in turn, has full authority and responsibility to take all appropriate actions to defeat IEDs. By this Directive, the Task Force Director will report directly to me and has spending authority up to \$25 million, which we judge will cover 90% of all contracting actions. Actions above \$25 million require only my approval. Additionally, the DoD Comptroller is streamlining our processes for executing those spending authorizations.

Please know that the Department is taking all steps to develop and implement near-term, mid-term and long-term solutions to IED threats. This activity has our highest priority, and we will periodically brief you on our progress and seek the Congress' assistance as needed. Thank you for your continued support. A similar letter has also been sent to Senator Warner.

Sincerely,



ACTING



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
10 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 27 2005

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Many thanks for your recent communication regarding the Department of Defense's (DoD) efforts to counter the increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). We fully concur with your emphasis on the importance of countering IED attacks in the Central Command area of operations.

Be assured that this effort has my very highest personal priority. Since assuming the duties of the Deputy Secretary, I have already conducted several senior-level reviews on this subject. Today, I signed out a DoD Directive that fully consolidates this effort under a single Director who, in turn, has full authority and responsibility to take all appropriate actions to defeat IEDs. By this Directive, the Task Force Director will report directly to me and has spending authority up to \$25 million, which we judge will cover 90% of all contracting actions. Actions above \$25 million require only my approval. Additionally, the DoD Comptroller is streamlining our processes for executing those spending authorizations.

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Sincerely,

Andrew England
ACTING

JOHN MAHRELL, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
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 EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

JUDITH A. ANSLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
 RICHARD D. DRABEK, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8060

June 21, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Senate Armed Services Committee received a briefing today from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Defeat Task Force on the continuing efforts of the Department of Defense to develop measures to counter the increasing use of IEDs against our troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This briefing was the latest in a series of periodic updates our Committee has received to monitor the progress of the Department in developing devices and tactics to defeat IEDs.

We are committed to ensuring that the Department receives the authorities and resources necessary to protect our warfighters. We cannot emphasize enough the importance this Committee places on the work of the IED Task Force to find the means to counter the daily IED attacks on our troops in the Central Command area of operations. We must do everything we can to stop the casualties we are sustaining from these IED attacks.

As you know, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, Congress provided rapid acquisition authority to the Department to streamline the acquisition of equipment essential to saving the lives of our troops in the field. Section 843 of this year's Senate bill would further expand on this rapid acquisition authority. Today's briefers confirmed that issues related to technology evaluation, contracting, testing, and technology transfer are no longer significant barriers to the work of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force.

We urge you to review the processes in the Department that could delay the development and deployment of IED countermeasures. It is our understanding that it can take up to four times as long for the IED Task Force to get approval within the Department to release funds from the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF) as it takes for the Task Force to evaluate technology that may prove useful in defeating IEDs. We are sure that you will agree that such a time lag is simply unacceptable.

We believe that you must find ways to quickly streamline the budget process for IED countermeasures programs so that the Department can more rapidly acquire and field IED technologies. The Committee has been concerned for some time that one of the key limiting factors in quickly countering IEDs is the lack of a separate "pot of money" dedicated to this

purpose. In response to this concern, in section 1409 of the Senate version of the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization bill, the committee authorized a \$500 million fund for the Joint IED Defeat Task Force specifically for the development, acquisition, and deployment of IED countermeasures. Given the urgency of the IED problem, we believe that Department should take immediate steps to dedicate such a "pot of money" & om the IEF to the Joint IED Defeat Task Force.


We also believe that the Director of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force should be given the authority to approve the use of these funds. The fact that the Director of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force currently can approve only those counter-IED initiatives that cost less than \$1.0 million only adds unnecessary layers of review to a process that must be streamlined.

By implementing the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, the Department took the initiative in addressing the IED problem. However, we feel strongly that more must be done to streamline the process and accelerate the deployment of IED countermeasures to our troops in the field.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin
Ranking Member



John Warner
Chairman



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO



ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT

June 27, 2005

FOR: ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration & Management *MD*

SUBJECT: Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Directive, Memo and Staffing Requirements

- The directive at TAB A establishes the Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Task Force (JIEDD TF) and associated policies. The directive also documents the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the Director, JIEDD TF, and specifically establishes a direct reporting relationship to the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense. Also prescribed are the responsibilities of other Departmental Component Heads to support the JIEDD TF in the accomplishment of its critically important mission. The directive in its current form was developed in coordination with Mr Bob Earl, Dr Bob Buhrkuhl, BG Joe Votel and his staff, members of the OGC staff, and my staff.
- The memo for your signature at TAB B clearly communicates your personal emphasis that defeating IEDs is one of the Department's highest priorities and transmits the Directive to the Component Heads.
- The Director, JIEDD TF has determined the staffing requirements that are crucial to the Task Force mission accomplishment. To date, staffing has been inadequate and lacked continuity. To resolve this key problem, the Directive tasks the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide qualified personnel for a minimum of one year, and further provides the Director, JIEDD TF with the option to extend representatives beyond one year. TAB C outlines the specific staffing requirements and upon your approval, will also be attached to your memo to the Component Heads.
- To expedite the publication of this critical directive, coordination was obtained as reflected in TAB D.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the directive at TAB A, sign the memo at TAB B, and approve and initial the staffing requirements at TAB C.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52664

TAB A



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 2000.19

DepSecDef

SUBJECT Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

References: (a) Title 10, United States Code

(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Joint Integrated Process Team (IPT) for Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices," July 17, 2004 (hereby canceled)

(c) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs)," September 3, 2004

(d) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs)," November 15, 2004

(e) Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum, "Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWN)," September 10, 2004

I. PURPOSE

As authorized by section 113 of reference (a), this Directive:

1.1. Establishes the Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Task Force (JIEDD TF), designates it as the focal point for all efforts in the Department of Defense to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and prescribes its authorities, responsibilities, and relationships.

1.2. Authorizes the Director, JIEDD TF, to establish a Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team (JIEDD IPT).

1.3. Provides management principles and mandatory policies and guidance for the Joint IED Defeat mission in the Department of Defense.

1.4. Establishes a Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSBG) to advise the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

1.5. Supercedes reference (b).

11-L-0559/OSD/52666

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

2.2. Does not alter or replace the Single Manager or Executive Agent responsibilities and authorities previously assigned.

3. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 1.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy to:

4.1. Establish a holistic approach to defeating IED that incorporates intelligence, information, training, operations, materiel, technology, policy and resourcing solutions designed to address all of the tenets of assured mobility including prediction, detection, prevention, neutralization and mitigation.

4.2. Streamline Joint IED Defeat management, staffing, and operating guidance to ensure timely and effective support to the warfighter.

4.3. Build a dedicated staff with a knowledge base on Joint IED Defeat that provides institutional continuity for the Department of Defense.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 The Deputy Secretary of Defense shall:

5.1.1. Serve as the DoD proponent for Joint IED Defeat.

5.1.2. Serve as the chair of the SRSG.

5.1.3. Approve Joint IED Defeat initiatives valued greater than \$25 million, taking account of advice and recommendations of the SRSG.

5.1.4. Select a Director, JIEDD TF who shall be a General/Flag officer or civilian equivalent from nominations submitted by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5.2. The Director, Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Task Force shall act as the Deputy Secretary of Defense's direct representative with full authority and responsibility for Joint IED Defeat efforts, report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and perform the functions and responsibilities in enclosure 2.

5.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide qualified personnel to staff the JIEDD TF for a minimum of 1 year. The Director, JIEDD TF may extend these representatives beyond 1 year to meet mission requirements.

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USDAT&L); the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E); and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall integrate the approved Joint IED Defeat initiatives approved by the Director, JIEDD TF, into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer shall:

5.5.1. Take the necessary action to establish and fund a central program for Joint IED Defeat in the DoD budget.

5.5.2. Assist the Director, JIEDD TF in ensuring the Heads of the DoD Components address the sustainment and transition costs for items jump-started by the task force.

5.5.3. Expeditiously provide funding for approved JIEDD TF initiatives. The standard for processing is 13 calendar days.

5.6. The Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation shall provide support to the Director, JIEDD TF on operational test and evaluation matters.

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall ensure public affairs activities regarding Joint IED Defeat are consistent with JIEDD TF delineated messages and information.

5.8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs shall ensure congressional liaison activities regarding Joint IED Defeat are consistent with JIEDD TF delineated messages and information.

5.9. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.9.1. Provide acquisition support to the JIEDD TF on approved Joint IED Defeat initiatives on an expedited basis.

5.9.2. Ensure the JIEDD TF has visibility on all Joint IED Defeat initiatives, programming, and funding being pursued on a unilateral or single Service basis.

5.9.3. Address sustainment costs for approved decisions and transition jump-started initiatives into their programs and budgets or report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Director, JIEDD TF, the reason why the task has not been done.

5.9.4. Inform Director, JIEDD TF about all solicitations, such as Broad Agency Announcements, regarding initiatives to defeat IEDs and obtain the concurrence of the Director, JIEDD TF, on these solicitations. This includes training and materiel initiatives in research, development or testing.

5.9.5. Assign representatives to designated subordinate working groups established by the Director, JIEDD TF.

5.9.6. Exercise their authority and responsibility giving the absolute highest priority for rapid and immediate implementation of this Directive.

5.10. The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense shall evaluate whether current authorities and responsibilities assigned herein are sufficient, considering long-term organizational and management arrangements for addressing the warfighters' immediate needs, and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

5.11. The Secretary of the Army shall provide an operating budget and administrative support for the JIEDD TF and the JIEDD IPT including facilities, equipment, security, secure communications, personnel support, logistics, and other required administrative services.

5.12. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall grant Joint Cumulative Duty Credit to those officers serving on the JIEDD TF according to section 664 of reference (a).

5.13. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall designate liaison officers to the Director, JIEDD TF who shall regularly attend scheduled JIEDD TF activities.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.


Gordon England *ACTING*
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 2

E1. Definitions

E2. Responsibilities and Authorities of the Director, JIEDD TF

Enclosures - 2

E1. Definitions

E2. Responsibilities and Authorities of the Director, JIEDD TF

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

DEFINITIONS

E1.1.1. Approved Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Initiative. A material or non-material solution that addresses Joint E D Defeat capability gaps.

E1.1.2. Joint IED Defeat. The collection of all DoD-wide efforts to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition Forces, including policy, resourcing, materiel, technology, training, operations, information, intelligence, assessment, and research aimed at reducing or eliminating the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition forces and specifically includes the following:

E1.1.2.1. Defeat of the IED. Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations including route clearance, device neutralization explosive detection, military explosive ordnance disposal, and vehicle and personnel protection.

E1.1.2.2. Defeat of the IED System. Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects and interrupt the insurgent chain of IED activities through, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, device technical and forensic exploitation, disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance, and persistent surveillance.

E1.1.2.3. Training the Force. Actions and activities designed to mitigate the effects of insurgent IED employment through, but not limited to, multi-echelon training, technology training, information management and dissemination, strategic communications, and doctrinal and institutional training changes.

E1.1.3. Joint IED Defeat IPT (JIEDD IPT). An advisory body to the Director, JIEDD TF, consisting of representatives at the General Officer/Flag Officer or civilian equivalent level from the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Intelligence, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Personnel and Readiness, and Comptroller; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; the General Counsel of the Department of Defense; the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and such representatives as the Director may determine.

E1.1.4. Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSB). An advisory body to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, consisting of: the Principal Deputies of the Under Secretaries of Defense; the Deputy Director of PA&E; Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense; the Vice Chief of Staff of Army; the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC); and other members as the Deputy Secretary of Defense may determine.

E2. ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF DIRECTOR, JIEDD TF

The Director, JIEDD TF shall:

- E2.1. Integrate proposed multiple E D Defeat solutions throughout the Department of Defense, seeking Interagency assistance and identifying innovative near-term solutions.
- E2.2. Coordinate with other DoD Components for on-going mid-term research and development initiatives and long-term science and technology efforts.
- E2.3. Approve Joint E D Defeat initiatives valued up to \$25 million.
- E2.4. Identify specific timelines and DoD Component leads to sponsor, coordinate, and program approved Joint IED Defeat initiatives and supporting documentation.
- E2.5. Establish a Joint Common Operational Picture and Joint Common Intelligence Picture of IEDs and their employment in the Global War on Terrorism.
- E2.6. Establish a rapid and accountable method for identifying issues requiring interservice resourcing and prioritization decisions to the SRSG. Forward to the DoD Components approved Joint IED Defeat initiatives that require programming for sustainment and further integration into the force.
- E2.7. Make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the transfer of technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures to our allies on Joint IED Defeat solutions. Provide technology transition assistance to foreign governments, consistent with applicable law.
- E2.8. Coordinate the efforts and programs of the Single Manager for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training with other efforts and programs of the JIEDD TF.
- E2.9. Establish decision criteria for meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs in conjunction with the JRAC, as established by and defined in the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memoranda dated September 3, 2004 and November 15, 2004 (references (c) and (d)) and the Acting USD(AT&L) Memorandum dated September 10, 2004 (reference (e)), to ensure rapid identification and acquisition actions.
- E2.10. Perform the integration and management oversight of Joint IED Defeat concept development, experimentation, and capabilities generation on a DoD-wide basis in accordance with applicable law and pertinent Federal and DoD policies and regulations.
- E2.11. Develop and oversee implementation and maintenance of a Joint E D Defeat Master Plan. Review the Master Plan at least annually and recommend necessary changes to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

E2.12. Establish, maintain, and preserve records that document significant activities of the JIEDD IPT for providing historical records of organization, functions, policies, procedures, and decisions.

E2.13. Establish working groups as necessary to support Joint IED Defeat.

E2.14. Communicate with other Government officials, members of Congress, representatives of foreign governments, and the media in carrying out assigned responsibilities.

E2.15. Establish a Joint Systems Integration Board (JSIB) led by a General/Flag officer or civilian equivalent to provide systems integration advice, prioritize Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements, and refine operational capabilities in coordination with the contingency theater. This Board shall serve to provide operational capabilities advice to the JIEDD TF and a Colonel/Captain or civilian equivalent level forum for Joint IED Defeat issues.

E2.16. Establish a Joint IED Test Board under the lead of the Army Test and Evaluation Command to coordinate all Joint IED Defeat developmental testing in the Department of Defense. The JSIB shall coordinate testing priorities on Joint IED Defeat initiatives with the Joint Test Board and all COCOMs.

E2.17. Establish a Joint IED Resource Board with the appropriate Departmental representation to perform the following tasks:

E2.17.1. Coordinate JIEDD TF resource requirements including interface with the DoD Components.

E2.17.2. Develop strategies for initiatives integration into the JCIDS.

E2.17.3. Perform independent analyses for identifying trends and ensuring program and DoD-wide balance among resources.

E2.18. Establish a JIEDD IPT to:

E2.18.1. Advise the Director, JIEDD TF.

E2.18.2. Comprise members who can be present and fully empowered to speak for and make recommendations on the DoD Components' behalf at regularly scheduled IPT activities.

E2.18.3. Serve as a joint forum to collect and synchronize all applicable efforts of members and other agencies.

E2.18.4. Serve as a joint forum to identify Joint IED Defeat efforts and requirements to be rapidly implemented, accelerated, or developed.

E2.18.5. Serve as a joint forum for the coordination of Joint IED defeat solutions identified from industry, interagency, and international sources.

E2.18.6. Perform such other functions as required by the Director.

E2.19. Perform other duties as assigned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

TAB B



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 27 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

Our enemies kill and injure American and Coalition service members and the innocent citizens of many nations virtually every day using improvised explosive devices. Defeating the IED threat is one of the highest priorities for the Department of Defense.

Pursuant to Title 10, U.S.C. 113, I hereby grant full authority and responsibility to the Director, Joint IED Defeat Task Force, to lead the Department's wide-ranging efforts in fighting the IED threat. The Director, Joint IED will report directly to me.

We will not have a business-as-usual approach. DoD Directive 2000.19 attached, expresses my total commitment to defeating the IED threat. I expect your highest sense of urgency in actions that support the Task Force and this mission. As a start, you are expected to identify and provide your best, brightest, and most capable personnel to staff the Task Force, as identified in the attachment. My point of contact on this matter is Colonel Lamont Woody at (b)(6)

Andrew Engel
ACTING

Attachments:
As stated

11-L-0559 OSD/52676

TAB C

STAFFING REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE

The Army will provide 33 personnel as follows: Director (O7/O8 02A), Technology Director (SES 1515), Deputy Director (O6/O7 02A), Iraq Field Team Leader (O6 02A), IPT Facilitator (O5 02A), Training Officer (O5 02A), Afghanistan Field Team Leader (O5 02A), Operations Officer (O5 02A), Technology Evaluation Team Leader (O5 02A), Resource Chief (O4/O5 51C), Budget Officer (O4 FA45), COR (O4 01A with contracting experience), EOD Officer (O4 91E), Plans Officer (O4 02A), 2 Intelligence Officers (O4 35D), 2 Iraq Detachment Team Leaders (O4/O5 02A), Center for Army Lessons Learned LNO (O4/O5 02A), Training Officer (O3/O4 02A), Public Affairs Officer (GS13/14), 3 Operations SGMs (E8/E9 11, 12, 18 or 19 series), Electronic Counter Measure Repair NCO (E9 25 series), 3 Supply NCOs (1 E8 and 2 E6/E7 92Y), 2 Operations NCOs (E7/E8 11, 12, 18, or 19 series), Admin NCO (E7/E8 42A), Intel Analyst (E7/E8 96B), and EOD NCO (E7/E8 55D).

The Air Force will provide 9 personnel as follows: Airborne ISR Officer (O4/O5 11FX), Electronic Warfare Officer (O4/O5 11FX), Budget Officer (O4/O5 65F4), 2 Admin NCOs (E6/E7 3A071), Training NCO (E7/E8 3P071), EOD NCO (E7/E8 3E8X1), Operations NCO (E7/E8 3P071), and Information Technology Administrator (E6/E7 3C051).

The US Marine Corps will provide 9 personnel as follows: Deputy Chief of Staff (O6 01A), Operations Officer (O4/O5 0302), Iraq Deputy Team Leader (O4 0302), Iraq Detachment Team Leader (O4 0302), Training Officer (O3/O4 9910), Operations Officer, Technology Team (O3 0402), 2 Operations NCOs (E7/E8 0369), and EOD NCO (E7/E8 2336).

The Navy will provide 8 personnel as follows: Programming & Budget Officer (O4/O5 1025), EOD Officer (O4/O5 1140), 2 Intelligence Officers (O3/O4 1610), 4 EOD NCOs (E7/E8 533X).

The Joint Staff will provide the Deputy Chief of (O6 0302).

ALL REQUIREMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE AS DIRECTED BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE.

APPROVE



DISAPPROVE

OTHER

TAB D

11-L-0559/OSD/52679

Coordinating Officials

Organization	Official & Position	Date Coordinated
Director, JIEDD Task Force		
USD(C)		
USD(P&R)		
USD(AT&L)		
GC, DoD		

Coordinating Officials

-Organization-	Official & Position	Date Coordinated
JIEDD TF		
USD(C)		
USD(P&R)		
PDGC, DOD	<i>Asst. Dir. of Policy & Plans, Principal Deputy</i>	<i>6/27/05</i>
JRAC		

*Joint Improvised Explosive Device (JIED)
 DEFZAT Directive, Memo, & Staffing Requirements*

Coordinating Officials

Organization-	Official & Position	Date Coordinated
Director, IIEDD Task Force		
USD(C)		
USD(P&R)	<i>Charles Bell</i>	1:15 6-27-05
USD(AT&L)		
GC, DoD		

Coordinating Officials

Organization	Official & Position	Date Coordinated
JIEDD TF		
USD(C)		
USD(P&R)		
GC, DoD		
JRAC	<i>Robert L. Bublinski</i> DIRECTOR, JRAC	27 Jun 05

~~FOUO~~

October 17, 2005

272

TO: David Chu

CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Pete Geren
Brad Berkson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Compensation

Attached is an analysis by Brad Berkson on compensation. It is clear we are not communicating the compensation appropriately or several things would be different; 1) One would think we would have better results on recruiting and retention. 2) Congress would get the message and stop adding on deferred compensation.

11 OCT 05

It is pretty clear to me that this is not the proper compensation mix that is most appropriate for the target audiences we want to recruit and retain.

I would like you to come up with a proposal as to how we get this fixed. David [unclear] within these weeks.

Thanks.

Attach:
10/6/05 Director, PA&E memo to SecDef re: Compensation Review [OSD 19947-05]

DER:ch
101705-16(78).doc

.....
Please respond by November 10, 2005

0000

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52684

OSD 19947-05 *DR*

197
1845



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

OFFICE OF THE
DEFENSE



10/7

2005 OCT -6 PM 2:23

INFO MEMO

OCT 6 2005

Robert Rangel

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RA
10/12

FROM: Brad Berkson, Director, PA&E RB

SUBJECT: Compensation Review

- In preparation for upcoming discussions on military pay, I wanted to advise you of our current compensation situation.
- Including all sources of compensation for military personnel and retirees, the USG spends \$260B/year, over 40% of which is outside the DoD budget (Tab 1).
- A blended yearly compensation estimate for military personnel comes near to, or in excess of, \$100k. By contrast, estimates for private industry range from \$45k to \$60k (Tab 2).
- This difference is primarily the result of the dramatic difference in deferred compensation when compared to private industry. Furthermore, the trend toward increased deferred compensation continues as Congress grants more entitlements to retirees (Tab 3).
- When all USG sources of compensation are considered, it would appear that DoD's pay is sufficient to attract a high quality workforce; however, it is unclear whether our compensation mix suits the workforce shape we want.
- I have briefed these results to the Deputy Secretary, Service Secretaries, and various Under Secretaries. Dr. Chu is working with your military compensation board to identify actions we should take in this area.
- Let me know if you would like a more detailed review of these findings.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachments:

As stated


SPD 10/7

MA SD	10/12	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/11	SA DSD	
EXECSEC	Melb	11/5	10/2 rrr
ESR MA	10/16/05		




OSD 19947-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52685




FY05 Outlays for Military Personnel and R



¹ \$7B of MILPens associated with military personnel working for the Defense Health Program is represented in Compensation Costs.
² Some compensation (e.g., combat pay, allowances) is not subject to federal income tax. If it was subject to taxation, the Department of the Treasury would need additional outlays of \$3B to maintain the level of after-tax earnings of military personnel. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Tab 1


Tab 2
Average Annual Cost per Person
(\$K)



Source:


Blue Collar: *Delivering Cash and Noncash Benefits*. Congressional Budget Office, January 16, 2004.

White Collar: *DOD Needs to Improve the Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and Sustainability of its Government Accountability Office, July 2005.*



Tab 3

Military Personnel* Compensation Mix Trends



* Includes current and former active duty, national guard, and reserve personnel.

** Includes outlays from Dept. of Education (\$0.4B), Dept. of Labor (\$0.2B), Dept. of Treasury (\$4.2B, excluding outlays for unfunded liabilities), and Dept. of Veterans' Affairs (\$69.5B, which includes outlays for non-military personnel that could not be segregated).

*** Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2005

Tab 3



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



INFO MEMO

2005 OCT 6 12:23

OCT 6 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Brad Berkson, Director, PA&E

BB

SUBJECT: Compensation Review

- In preparation for upcoming discussions on military pay, I wanted to advise you of our current compensation situation.
- Including all sources of compensation for military personnel and retirees, the USG spends \$260B/year, over 40% of which is outside the DoD budget (Tab 1).
- A blended yearly compensation estimate for military personnel comes near to, or in excess of, \$100k. By contrast, estimates for private industry range from \$45k to \$60k (Tab 2).
- This difference is primarily the result of the dramatic difference in deferred compensation when compared to private industry. Furthermore, the trend toward increased deferred compensation continues as Congress grants more entitlements to retirees (Tab 3).
- When all USG sources of compensation are considered, it would appear that DoD's pay is sufficient to attract a high quality workforce; however, it is unclear whether our compensation mix suits the workforce shape we want.
- I have briefed these results to the Deputy Secretary, Service Secretaries, and various Under Secretaries. Dr. Chu is working with your military compensation board to identify actions we should take in this area.
- Let me know if you would like a more detailed review of these findings.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachments:

As stated


11-L-0559 OSD/52689

OSD 19947-05



Tab 1

FY05 Outlays for Military Personnel and Retirees




¹ \$7B of MilPers associated with military personnel working for the Defense Health Program is represented in Compensation Costs.

² Some compensation (e.g., combat pay, allowances) is not subject to federal income tax. If it was subject to taxation, the Department of the Treasury estimates that additional outlays of \$3B would be needed to maintain the level of after-tax earnings of military personnel.

Numbers may not add due to rounding.



Tab 2
Average Annual Cost per Person
(\$K)



* In FY03. Bureau of Labor Statistics


** In FY02. Military Compensation: Balancing Cash and Noncash Benefits. Congressional Budget Office, January 16, 2004.

*** In FY04. Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Improve the Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and Sustainability of Its Military Compensation System. Government Accountability Office, July 2005.



Tab 3

Military Personnel* Compensation Mix Trends



* Includes current and former active duty, national guard, and reserve personnel.

** Includes outlays from Dept. of Education (\$0.4B), Dept. of Labor (\$0.2B), Dept. of Treasury (\$4.2B, excluding outlay for unfunded liabilities), and Dept. of Veterans' Affairs (\$69.8B, which includes outlays for non-military personnel that could not be segregated).

*** Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2005

10/6
12:00
10/24
1:00



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



10/6/05 12:52

ACTION MEMO

October 6, 2005 (9:00 am)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*
SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Warner Regarding Surety Issue

- In response to your snowflake of October 5, for your consideration are attached two draft alternative responses to the September 23rd letter from Senators Warner and Levin, which announces the SASC policy that replaces the former requirement to purchase sureties.
- Tab A heartily endorses the SASC policy.
- Tab B is a more measured response.

250

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Steve Epstein 703/571-9451

60005

Robert Rangel
10/24 Some approvals
Rangel
10/24

SAB 10/7

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/11	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M 10/6	1745	10/13
ESR MA	KSV	10-6-05	1653

10/24

50005

OSD 19951-05



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

DRAFT

ACTION MEMO

October 3, 2005 (5:00pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel
SUBJECT: SASC Policy for Nominees with Pensions from Defense Contractors

- Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin announced a new SASC policy regarding nominees who have defined-benefit pensions from Defense contractors. Their September 23, 2005 letter (attached):
 - ◆ Replaces the former policy requiring nominees to purchase sureties, but requires annual DoD report on efforts to find commercial surety.
 - ◆ Requires nominees to recuse themselves from acting on particular matters that have a direct, predictable, and substantial effect on their former employers unless the Designated Agency Ethics Official authorizes nominee participation after making a written finding that the interest of the Government in the nominee's participation outweighs appearance of impropriety.
 - ◆ Reduces class of Defense contractors to those with contracts that exceed \$1M. (7,910 contractors in FY 04)
 - ◆ Requires the ethics agreements of nominees to reflect this understanding.
- SASC requests ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter and Mr. Mike Wynne to include these provisions before October 6th hearings.
- Implementation of the SASC policy will create additional oversight and review by ethics officials and subject both the nominee and the ethics officials to second-guessing by SASC. Nevertheless, the SASC requirements only slightly expand upon statutory conflict of interest restrictions.

OPTIONS:

1. Decline to accept the SASC policy. The result likely would delay the confirmations of Bill Anderson, James Finley, John Grimes, Mike Wynne, and Donald

DRAFT



11-L-0559/OSD/52694


Winter, but would preserve a DoD position that its officials would act ethically even in the absence of the SASG policy.

2. Acknowledge the application of the SASG policy. The result likely would aid the confirmations of Bill Anderson, James Finley, John Grimes, Mike Wynne, and Donald Winter, but would direct nominees to amend their ethics agreements to comport with the policy.

COORDINATION: None

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION: _____ Approve Option 1

D. A. [Signature] Approve Option 2



NO SIGN HERE

ATTACHMENTS: ais

DRAFT

October 3, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Range 

RE: SASC confirmation hearings and surety policy

- * Mike Wynne and Don Winter are scheduled to have their confirmation hearings before the Senate **Armed Services Committee** (SASC) this Thursday, October 6.
- The SASC is requesting that Wynne and Winter sign the ethics agreement provision required under the proposed new surety policy outlined in their September 23 letter to you.
- Attached is a memo from Jim Haynes summarizing the situation and providing a brief analysis of the implications of the proposed policy.
- Both Wynne and Winter need guidance from you on how to respond to SASC's position prior to their Thursday hearing.

11-L-0559/OSD/52696

FOUO

October 05, 2005

2005 OCT 5 AM 2:50

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Levin and Warner on Surety **Issue**

I suppose we ought to draft a letter to Levin and Warner on the surety issue, now that I have decided it.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/23/05 Letter from Senators Levin and Warner to SecDef

DHR.ss
100505-02

.....
Please Respond By October 20, 2005

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52697

OSD 19951-05

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
 SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE
 JOHN SUNUNU, NEVADA
 JAMES M. TALENT, MISSISSIPPI
 GARRY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
 ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS
 JOHN THUNE, SOUTH DAKOTA

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 JACK PRED, RHODE ISLAND
 DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
 BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
 MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
 EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

CHARLES E. ABELL, STAFF DIRECTOR
 RICHARD D. DELOER, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

Nels

September 23, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On July 25, we wrote to you regarding the Committee's need for a new policy regarding nominees for senior civilian positions in the Department of Defense who have defined-benefit pension plans with defense contractors, in light of the announcement of the firm that had been offering sureties to Department officials that it would no longer do so. We understand that the Department has made numerous inquiries in an effort to find a replacement firm, but that the only qualified firm to make an offer has quoted premiums so high as to be unreasonable, and therefore unacceptable.

The Committee's surety requirement, like its requirement that officials divest themselves of all stock holdings in defense contractors, was intended to ensure such officials could perform their duties without risking conflicts of interest. In the absence of such sureties, we believe that alternative steps are required to ensure continued public confidence in the integrity of the Department of Defense and its senior officials. These steps should be designed to ensure that senior ROD officials with financial interests or pension expectations in defense contractors do not participate in decisions that are likely to have a huge financial effect on those contractors unless specifically cleared by ethics officials to do so.

In our earlier letter, we proposed a test based upon an existing Office of Government Ethics (OGE) requirement: the "covered relationship" rule found in 5 C.F.R. 2635.502. Our proposal was to apply a modified version of that recusal rule, and the procedures applied under it, to the class of nominees previously required to obtain sureties. Our proposed modification was to lighten the rule by clarifying that a waiver of the recusal requirement could be granted only on the basis of a specific, case-by-case determination that the interest of the Government in the official's participation outweighs any appearance of impropriety. The new test, as modified, will protect the integrity of the Department and its senior officials, while ensuring that those officials remain free to participate in the routine business of the Department.

Accordingly, the Committee will apply the following policy to current and future nominees who have defined benefit plans with defense contractors until such time as such officials are once again able to obtain sureties:

11-L-0559/OSD/52698

The ethics agreement of any nominee who has a defined-benefit pension plan with a defense contractor which had a contract or contracts with the Department that exceed \$1,000,000 in the most recent year for which data are available shall contain an undertaking that, prior to acting in any particular matter which is likely to have a direct, predictable, and substantial effect on the financial interest of the former employer, the official will consult the relevant Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO), and will not act in the matter unless the DAEO determines that the interest of the Government in the official's participation outweighs any appearance of impropriety and issues a written determination specifically authorizing the official's participation in the particular matter. The ethics agreement will further state the official's understanding that such an authorization does not constitute a waiver of 18 U.S.C 208 and does not affect the applicability of that section.


The Department will continue to actively pursue the possibility of obtaining a private surety to insure defined benefit pension plans of senior DOD officials, and will report to the Committee on at least a yearly basis on the progress of these efforts.

We look forward to working with you to ensure swift Committee action on nominees who meet this standard.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin
Ranking Member



John Warner
Chairman

TAB

A



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2005, regarding civilian nominees for positions in this Department which require Senate confirmation, when these nominees have defined-benefit pension plans from major defense contractors.

As you have seen, the measures set out in your letter have already been incorporated into the ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter, who has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Michael Wynne, who has been nominated to be the Secretary of the Air Force. These measures will be included in the ethics agreements of future nominees who have qualifying defined-benefit pensions.

These procedures, which constitute an added measure of protection, will help ensure the continued public confidence in the integrity of this Department and will assist senior personnel to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. I am confident that in implementing this policy, we can find an appropriate balance between the efficient management of this Department and our obligation to demonstrate to the public the objectivity and impartiality of our decision-making.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Carl Levin



11-L-0559/OSD/52701

TAB

B



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2005, regarding civilian nominees for positions in this Department which require Senate confirmation, when these nominees have defined-benefit pension plans from major defense contractors.

ARE AWARE
As you ~~have seen~~, the measures set out in your letter have already been incorporated into the ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter, who has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Michael Wynne, who has been nominated to be the Secretary of the Air Force. These measures will be included in the ethics agreements of future nominees who have qualifying defined-benefit pensions.

~~Thank you and Senator Levin for your leadership in this matter.~~

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Carl Levin

*THIS RIGHT? DOES
\$1M THRESHOLD
CONSTITUTE "major"?*

Dept. of Defense

*Senate
Confirmation*

2005 SEP 23 10 54 AM



11-L-0559/OSD/52703



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2005, regarding Department of Defense civilian nominees for Senate confirmation, who have defined-benefit pension plans from defense contractors, which have contracts with the Department that exceed \$1M.

As you are aware, the measures set out in your letter have already been incorporated into the ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter, who has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Michael Wynne, who has been nominated to be the Secretary of the Air Force. These measures will be included in the ethics agreements of future nominees who have qualifying defined-benefit pensions.

Sincerely,

CC:
Honorable Carl Levin

11-L-0559/OSD/52704

4957-05

130
180
100



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



10/52

ACTIONMEMO

October 6, 2005 (9:00 am)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FOR: SEC

10/12

FROM: Will

TO - Jim Haynes

SUBJECT: Lett

sue

- In response to two draft al and Levin, topurchase

- Let's go with Tab B option.

* consideration are attached letter from Senators Warner ;places the former requirement

- Tab A hex

- SEE EDITS.

R.

- Tab B is ai

Robert Rangel

10/13

COORDINATION

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

SAB 10/17

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	12/10/11	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M 10/6	1745	10/13
ESR MA	K6V	10-6-05	1653

11-L-05 OSD/52705

OSD 19951-05



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2005, regarding civilian nominees for positions in this Department which require Senate confirmation, when these nominees have defined-benefit pension plans from major defense contractors.

THIS right? Does \$1M threshold constitute "major"?

Dept. of Defense

Senate Confirmation

ALL AMT2E

As you have seen, the measures set out in your letter have already been incorporated into the ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter, who has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Michael Wynne, who has been nominated to be the Secretary of the Air Force. These measures will be included in the ethics agreements of future nominees who have qualifying defined-benefit pensions.

~~Thank you and Senator Levin for your leadership in this matter.~~

Sincerely,



cc:
Honorable Carl Levin



~~FOUO~~

2005 OCT -05

October 05, 2005

250

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Levin and Warner on Surety Issue

I suppose we ought to *draft* a letter to Levin and Warner on the surety issue, now that I have decided it.

Thanks.

Attach 9/23/05 Letter from Senators Levin and Warner to SecDef

DHR.ss
100505-02

.....
Please Respond By October 20, 2005

5 OCT 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52707

OSD 19951-05

JOHN WAHNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
BLAKE A. COLLINS, MAINE
JOHN ENBERN, NEVADA
JAMES M. TALENT, MISSOURI
BARRY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
LYNDEE O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
ELIZABETH BOLE, NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS
JOHN THUNE, SOUTH DAKOTA

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
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JOSEPH I. LIBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
ELL NELSON, FLORIDA
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

CHARLES E. WELLS, STAFF DIRECTOR
RICHARD G. GRIBBLE, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

Pat

September 23, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On July 25, we wrote to you regarding the Committee's need for a new policy regarding nominees for senior civilian positions in the Department of Defense who have defined-benefit pension plans with defense contractors, in light of the announcement of ~~the firm~~ that had been offering sureties to Department officials that it would no longer do so. We understand that the Department has made numerous inquiries in an effort to find a replacement firm, but that the only qualified firm to make an offer has quoted premiums so high as to be unreasonable, and therefore unacceptable.

The Committee's surety requirement, like its requirement that officials divest themselves of all stock holdings in defense contractors, was intended to ensure such officials could perform their duties without risking conflicts of interest. In the absence of such sureties, we believe that alternative steps are required to ensure continued public confidence in the integrity of the Department of Defense and its senior officials. These steps should be designed to ensure that senior DOD officials with financial interests or pension expectations in defense contractor do not participate in decisions that are likely to have a huge financial effect on those contractors unless specifically cleared by ethics officials to do so.

In our earlier letter, we proposed a test based upon an existing Office of Government Ethics (OGE) requirement: the "covered relationship" rule found in 5 C.F.R. 2635.502. Our proposal was to apply a modified version of that recusal rule, and the procedures applied under it, to the class of nominees previously required to obtain sureties. Our proposed modification was to tighten the rule by clarifying that a waiver of the recusal requirement could be granted only on the basis of a specific, case-by-case determination that the interest of the Government in the official's participation outweighs any appearance of impropriety. The new test, as modified, will protect the integrity of the Department and its senior officials, while ensuring that those officials remain free to participate in the routine business of the Department.

Accordingly, the Committee will apply the following policy to current and future nominees who have defined benefit plans with defense contractors until such time as such officials are once again able to obtain sureties:

19241-05

The ethics agreement of **any** nominee who **has** a defined-benefit pension plan with a defense contractor which **had** a contract **or** contracts with the Department that exceed \$1,000,000 in the **most** recent year **for** which **data** are available shall contain an undertaking that, prior to **acting** in any particular matter which is likely to have a direct, predictable, **and** substantial effect on the **financial** interest of the former employer, the **official** will consult the **relevant** Designated Agency Ethics Official (**DAEO**), and will not **act** in the matter unless the **DAEO** determines that the **interest** of the Government in the **official's** participation **outweighs** any appearance of **impropriety** and **issues** a written determination specifically authorizing the official's participation in the particular matter. The ethics agreement will **further** state the **official's** **understanding** that such an authorization does not constitute a waiver of **18 U.S.C. 208** and does not affect the applicability of that section.


The Department will continue to actively pursue the possibility of obtaining a private surety to **insure** defined benefit pension plans of senior DOD officials, and will report to the Committee on at least a yearly basis on the progress of these efforts.

We look forward to working with you to ensure swift Committee action on nominees who meet this **standard**.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin
Ranking Member



John Warner
Chairman



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 24 2005

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2005, regarding Department of Defense civilian nominees for Senate confirmation, who have defined-benefit pension plans from defense contractors, which have contracts with the Department that exceed \$1M.

As you are aware, the measures set out in your letter have already been incorporated into the ethics agreements of Dr. Donald Winter, who has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Michael Wynne, who has been nominated to be the Secretary of the Air Force. These measures will be included in the ethics agreements of future nominees who have qualifying defined-benefit pensions.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Carl Levin

252

240105

520105

OSD 19951-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52710

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

373.24

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Our national missile defense system recently brought its ninth missile interceptor "on line," with seven at the missile field in Alaska and two in California. By the end of 2005, the plan is to have 12 interceptors in place. The total number of interceptors should increase to 18 by the end of 2006, spread over three different missile fields.

I will give you an update on the system's overall progress at **an** early meeting.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
100605-19

6 Oct 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20012-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52711

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
CLASSIFICATION

FAX COVERSHEET
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES

N

002180

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: Donald Runsfeld OFFICE/DESK: SECDEF PHONE NBR: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Missile Defense FAX NBR:

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: 4
(including cover)

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
 IMMEDIATE/URGENT

NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery.

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
WH PRES	Honorable George W Bush			
WH VP	Honorable Richard B Cheney			
WH COS	Honorable Andrew H Card, Jr			
WH NSC	HONORABLE STEPHEN J HADLEY			

REMARKS:
OSD 20012-05
For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB

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CLASSIFICATION

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION

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USDI	NSD	CCD	CABLE CH	FILE

FOUO

October 06, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

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Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



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Respectfully,

DHR:dh
100605-19

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52713

FOUO

October 06, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Our national missile defense system recently brought its ninth missile interceptor "on line," with seven at the missile field in Alaska and two in California. By the end of 2005, the plan is to have 12 interceptors in place. The total number of interceptors should increase to 18 by the end of 2006, spread over three different missile fields.

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Respectfully,

DIR:dt
100605-19

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52714

FOUO

October 06, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Our national missile defense system recently brought its ninth missile interceptor "on line," with seven at the missile field in Alaska and two in California. By the end of 2005, the plan is to have 12 interceptors in place. The total number of interceptors should increase to 18 by the end of 2006, spread over ~~three~~ different missile fields.

I will give you an update on the system's overall progress at an early meeting.

Respectfully,

DHR.dh
100605-19

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52715

FOUO

October 06, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Our national missile defense system recently brought its ninth missile interceptor "on line," with seven at the missile field in Alaska and two in California. By the end of 2005, the plan is to have 12 interceptors in place. The total number of interceptors should increase to 18 by the end of 2006, spread over ~~three~~ different missile fields.

I will give you an update on the system's overall progress at an early meeting.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
100605-19

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52716

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

TO: ADM Tim Keating

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

335 SD

Tim, your team has done terrific work in responding to both of the hurricanes. We have some formal recognition coming in the pipeline, but as things wind down, I wanted to let you know personally how impressed I have been with your leadership and the performance of the NORTHCOM team.

Well done!

DHR.ch
100695-17



60 Oct 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20013-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52717

~~FOUO~~

2005 09 14 09:09

September 14, 2005

I-05/012423

ES-4210

Hungary

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Offer from Hungary

In the NATO meeting the Minister of Defense of Hungary offered to do additional training and equipping in Iraq. I am wondering why he hasn't been taken up on that offer.

Thanks.

DFER:as
091405-05

.....
Please respond by 9/29/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52718

OSD 20020-05


15-09-05 P12:06 IN

14 SEP 05

~~FOUO~~

October 07, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Pete Geren's Nomination

020 Army

We have recommended Pete Geren to be Under Secretary of the Army. He is currently Acting Secretary of the Air Force. Pete has been working in the Pentagon for four years, and has done a superb job. He is a former Member of Congress from Texas, and I believe the President knows him.

One of the offices in the White House is saying it is going to take eight to ten weeks to get his clearance. That is a very long time and means his confirmation could drag into next year. That's hard for us.

Is there some way you could put this on a very fast track? I can't imagine why it would take so long for a person with as many clearances as Pete Geren has had and with as long a record of government service in the Executive branch in this Administration to be cleared. The Army needs civilian leadership.

Please put your head into it and let me know what can be done about it. I'll do anything I have to from this end.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100605-28

70405

OSD 20028-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52719

FOUO

OCT 07 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H Card Jr

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: FEMA

Some thoughts on FEMA: General Dick Myers, General Chuck Wald, General Jim Jones, Admiral Vern Clark, General John Jumper. You know all of them except Wald. His background sheet is attached.

Thanks.

Attach.
Wald background sheet

DHR.dh
100605-31

040 FEMA

OSD 20029-05

7 OCT 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52720



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL CHARLES F. "CHUCK" WALD

Gen. Charles F. "Chuck" Wald is Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. USEUCOM is responsible for all U.S. forces operating across 91 countries in Europe, Africa, Russia, parts of Asia and the Middle East, and most of the Atlantic Ocean.

General Wald earned his commission through the Air Force ROTC program in 1971. He has combat time as an O-2A forward air controller in Vietnam and as an F-16 pilot flying over Bosnia. The general has served as a T-37 instructor pilot and F-15 flight commander. Other duties include Chief of the U.S. Air Force Combat Terrorism Center, support group commander, operations group commander, and special assistant to the Chief of Staff for National Defense Review. He was also the Director of Strategic Planning and Policy at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and served on the Joint Staff as the Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy.



General Wald commanded the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base, Italy, where on Aug. 30, 1995, he led one of the wing's initial strike packages against the ammunition depot at Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the first-ever NATO combat operation. He also commanded the 9th Air Force and US Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., where he led the development of the Afghanistan air campaign for Operation Enduring Freedom, including the idea of embedding tactical air control parties in ground special operations forces. Prior to assuming his current position, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations at the Pentagon.

The general is a command pilot with more than 3,500 flying hours, including more than 430 combat hours over Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq and Bosnia.

EDUCATION

- 1971 Bachelor of Arts degree in pre-law, North Dakota State University
- 1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1982 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1982 Master of Political Science degree in international relations, Troy State University
- 1990 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
- 1993 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass

ASSIGNMENTS

1. February 1971 - January 1972, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. May 1972 - February 1973, forward air controller, Da Nang AB, South Vietnam
3. May 1973 - May 1976, instructor pilot and wing flight examiner, Air Training Command, Craig AFB, Ala.
4. December 1976 - August 1978, project officer, Operational Systems Engineering Branch, Norton AFB, Calif.
5. August 1978 - August 1981, F-15A aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight commander, 22nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bitburg AB, West Germany
6. August 1981 - September 1982, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

7. September 1982-August 1985, flight commander, assistant operations and operations officer, 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, Va.
8. August 1985-August 1989, Chief, Strategic North Atlantic Treaty Organization Branch; later, Chief, Strategic and Middle East-Africa Branch; later, Chief, U.S. Air Force Combat Terrorism Center; later, assistant executive officer to the Air Force Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
9. August 1989- July 1990, student, National War College, Fori Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
10. July 1990- March 1993, Deputy Commander for Operations, 86th Tactical Fighter Wing; later, Commander, 86th Support Group; later, Commander, 86th Operations Group, Ramstein AB, Germany
11. March 1993 - September 1993, executive officer to Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, Boerfink AB, Germany
12. September 1993- May 1995, executive officer to Director of Operations and U.S. Senior National Representative, Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany
13. May 1995- July 1997, Commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano AB, Italy
14. July 1997-January 1998, special assistant to the Chief of Staff for National Defense Review, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
15. January 1998 - October 1998, Director of Strategic Planning and Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
16. October 1998-January 2000, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
17. January 2000 - November 2001, Commander, 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw AFB, S.C.
18. November 2001 - December 2002, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
19. December 2002 - present, Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 3,500, including 430 combat hours

Aircraft flown: C-20, O-2, T-37, T-38, F16 and F-15

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Medal with silver oak leaf cluster

Aerial Achievement Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Presidential Unit Citation with oak leaf cluster

Joint Meritorious Unit Award with two oak leaf clusters

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with V device and silver oak leaf cluster

Air Force Organizational Excellence Award with four oak leaf clusters

Combat Readiness Medal

National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Vietnam Service Medal with bronze star

Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Armed Forces Service Medal

Humanitarian Service Medal

Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon with Gold Border

French National Order of Merit (Rank of Commander)

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm

NATO Medal (Yugoslavia)

Inter-American Defense Board Medal with silver star

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Department of State Superior Honor Award

North Dakota Distinguished Service Medal
Honorary Doctorate of Laws, North Dakota State University

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Feb. 3, 1971
First Lieutenant Aug. 3, 1972
Captain Feb. 3, 1975
Major Oct. 24, 1980
Lieutenant Colonel Feb. 1, 1986
Colonel March 1, 1991
Brigadier General Feb. 1, 1996
Major General Sept. 1, 1998
Lieutenant General Jan. 12, 2000
General Jan. 1, 2003

(Current as of March 2005)

~~FOUO~~

OCT 07 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
cc: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Simple Metrics on Iraq

I
Q

Attached is a simple set of metrics that shows progress in Iraq. It may be useful for speeches and other public outreach. We'll keep them updated.

Attach.
Metrics on Iraq

DHR:dh
100605-25

902105

OSD 20051-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52724

May 2003

Oct 2005

Political

1 political party

157 political parties registered

139 new party applications pending for December elections

Security Forces

0 Army or Special Police

197K individual military/police

0 Army battalions

85 operational battalions, 33 in the lead on operations

0 brigade headquarters

28 operational brigades, 9 in the lead on operations

0 division headquarters

4 operational divisions, 1 in the lead on operations

0 Special Police battalions

28 operational battalions, 2 in the lead on operations

0 Navy squadrons

2 operational squadrons

0 Air Force squadrons

3 operational squadrons

0 Iraqi units with professional partnerships to US or Coalition units

10 Divisions
30 Brigades
107 Battalions } partnered

Quality of Life

Electricity

Demand **5200 MW**

7750 MW

Production **3300 MW**

4800 MW

Communications Subscribers

Telephone **833K**

4520K

Internet **5K**

196K

Commercial Mass Media

Television	0	29
Radio	0	80
Newspapers/ Magazines	0	170

~~FOUO~~

OCT 07 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

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DHR.dh
100605-25

OSD 20051-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52727

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Oct 2005

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Production **3300** MW

4800 MW

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452013

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196K

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Stephen J. Hadley
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Metrics on Iraq

DHR.dh
100605-25

OSD 20051-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52730

May 2003

Oct 2005

Political

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157 political parties registered

139 new party applications pending for December elections

Security Forces

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4800 MW

Communications Subscribers

Telephone 833K

4520K

Internet 5K

196K

Commercial Mass Media

Television	0	29
Radio	0	80
Newspapers/ Magazines	0	170

October 13, 2005

To: Donald Rumsfeld
Fr: Gordon England
Subj: Halcy Barbour Response

Don,

Don

- We are leaning forward to constructively help Mississippi with the first order of business to get their workers and yards back in operation. We have moved two 400-person barges (ships with living quarters) to the Gulf Region, one for Ingalls Shipyard in Mississippi and one for Avondale in Louisiana to house shipyard workers. We have also requested \$2.8B in supplemental Katrina funds for recovery of Ingalls, Avondale and other Gulf Coast yards.
- Once the yards are **up** and running? we have plenty of work already in place; Ingalls has contracts for six DDGs, two LPD 17's and LHD 8. Follow-up ships are still in the design phase.
- Bollinger facilities are in Lockport, LA, but there is some thought that they may expand to Natchez, **MS** in support of the LCS contract. The QDR will emphasize increased and accelerated construction of LCS.
- HSVs are also receiving more emphasis in the QDR. No quick fixes here, but Bollinger could partner with Incat, an Australian high speed ferry building to compete.
- Naval Station Pascagoula experienced about \$90M in damage and is also scheduled to close as a result of BRAC. Still determining future course of action with Navy: State of Mississippi and U.S. Coast Guard to understand the way ahead.
- I will be pleased to call Haley if you so desire.

Amelia
10-13

093

13 OCT 05

30 Sep 05

11-L-0559/OSD/52738(S) 20052-05

5/20/05

*1145
9/27*

~~FOUO~~

September 26, 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Haley Barbour

I met **with** Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi on Friday. He said he didn't want *to ask* us for something that isn't right for the Department, or the country. However, he has some thoughts that relate to accelerating things that DoD **may** already be planning **to do** to help get the economy of Mississippi going

1. He suggested speeding up DDX and LHDR. The contractor is apparently a big employer.
2. He mentioned a company called Ballinger (?), which has a shipyard **with** a license to build the Australian fast boat in the U.S. -- the one that we are currently leasing. They have a shipyard at Natchez. He said **if we** are going **to order** them then sooner **is better than** later.
3. He mentioned the Naval Air Station at Pascagoula -- he said it could be a terrific Coast Guard base and we ought to restore it to what it was, **because** the Coast Guard will use it.
4. Last, he mentioned a company named Ionatron **that** manufactures the Jinx -- an IED detector and destroyer. He says we have ordered 12. It is the **size** of a golf cart. They **make** them at Stennis.

Why don't you look into **these** and get back to me **with** your thoughts

Thanks

DHR:se
092605-25

.....
Please Respond By 10/11/05

~~FOUO~~

BACKGROUND

at noon of 9/27

1149
9/27

FOUO

September 26, 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Haley Barbour

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NAVY

129 TF

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- 2. He mentioned a company called Ballinger (?), which has a shipyard with a license to build the Australian fast boat in the U.S. -- the one that we are currently leasing. They have a shipyard at Nachez. He said if we are going to order them then sooner is better than later.
- 3. He mentioned the Naval Air Station at Pascagoula -- he said it could be a terrific Coast Guard base and we ought to restore it to what it was, because the Coast Guard will use it.
- 4. Last, he mentioned a company named Ionatron that manufactures the Jinex -- an IED detector and destroyer. He says we have ordered 12. It is the size of a golf cart. They make them at Stennis.

Why don't you look into these and get back to me with your thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092605-25



Please Respond By 10/1 1/05

FOUO

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR



HALEY BARBOUR
GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT -7 PM 1:15

September 30, 2005

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Thank you for meeting with me last week. I genuinely appreciate you **and** your people's considering the matters I brought up as **ways** for DOD to help us recover. **Those** actions all would be consistent with **what** I believe to be Administration policy; some would simply adjust the schedule for the spending.

I particularly urge you to order **a** hundred or **hundreds of** Ionatron's JIN **Ex** IED detectors and destroyers. Today Mississippi's 155th Brigade **Combat** Team **suffered** five **more** casualties **from** and **IED** in Iraq. The **overwhelming majority** of our people killed have been victims of IEDs, the Ionatron destroyer works at a very high rate.

Ordering a hundred or **more** (**many** more, I hope) would be good for **our** economic recovery (they're build at Stennis Center in Hancock **County**, Mississippi), **but**, more **importantly**, it would save **our** people's lives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks for letting me tell you personally what can be done to help us. And I enjoyed lunch.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour

HRB/ams

CC: Anthony J. Principi

TAB 1

11-L-0559/OSD/52738

BACKGROUND



10/30
2001
9/30

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY THE NAVY

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY *AS 9/30/05*

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake based on mtg with Haley Barbour

- Request SECNAV sign response to SECDEF regarding mtg with Haley Barbour
- Snowflake is TAB B.
- SECNAV memo is TAB C.

RECOMMENDATION: SECNAV sign response letter at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: James Aiken, CDR, AASN (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52739

TAB

A

RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Gordon England

DD(X) and LHA(R)

- DD(X) and LHA(R) are each in the design phase. The next milestone for each is November 05 where each will move to the advanced design phase. New appropriations from Congress will be required to proceed beyond this milestone. Following Congressional approval, extensive advanced design work is planned for FY06 in which Northrup Grumman Ship Systems, Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, MS (NGSS) will have a significant role.
- DD(X) and LHA(R) construction start is scheduled for Second Quarter FY08 and First Quarter FY08 respectively. In the interim, NGSS has contracts on 6 DDG's, 2 LPD 17's and LHD 8.
- The Navy has requested \$2.8 billion in supplemental funds from the OUSD (Comptroller) to expedite the recovery of NGSS and other Gulf Coast yards.

BOLLINGER

- Bollinger is a partner with Lockheed Martin on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Bollinger facilities are located in Lockport, LA, but there is speculation that they may expand to Natchez, MS in support of the LCS contract. Accelerating construction of Bollinger built LCS, would require additional funds in FY06.
- Army, Navy and USMC are evaluating the need for a Joint High Speed Vessel capability. Bollinger in partnership with Incat, an Australian high-speed ferry builder, may compete for work should this become an acquisition program.

NS PASCAGOULA

- Hurricane Katrina caused an estimated \$90.3M in facility damage at NS Pascagoula Singing River Island site.
- BRAC 2005 closes NS Pascagoula. Currently, the Navy is assessing what repairs will be necessary to avoid further degradation of the facilities. No decision has been made as to how much of the damage should be repaired.
- The existing reversion clause in the NS Pascagoula deed requires the Navy and the State of Mississippi to review the proper course of action to achieve the best use of that property. This could include potential reuse by USCG or other federal agencies.
- USCG may want to use at least part of the facility. However, they are still assessing their need. The post Katrina recovery is slowing the assessment.

TAB

B

~~FOUO~~

1145
9/27

September 26, 2005 *File 427*

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Haley Barbour

I met with Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi on Friday. He said he didn't want to ask us for something that isn't right for the Department, or the country. However, he has some thoughts that relate to accelerating things that DoD may already be planning to do to help get the economy of Mississippi going.

1. He suggested speeding up DDX and LHDR. The contractor is apparently a big employer.
2. He mentioned a company called Ballinger (?), which has a shipyard with a license to build the Australian fast boat in the U.S. -- the one that we are currently leasing. They have a shipyard at Natchez. He said *if* we are going to order them then sooner is better than later.
3. He mentioned the Naval Air Station at Pascagoula -- he said it could be a terrific Coast Guard base and we ought to restore it to what it was, because the Coast Guard will use it.
4. Last, he mentioned a company named Ionatron that manufactures the Jinex -- an IED detector and destroyer. He says we have ordered 12. It is the size of a golf cart. They make them at Stennis.

Why don't you look into these and get back to me with your thoughts

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092605-25

.....
Please Respond By 10/1 1/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52743

TAB

C

September 28, 2005

To: Dino Aviles

Fr: Gordon England

Dino 

I need a quick look into the first three topics mentioned in the attached snowflake. I know that John has already been working some of these issues, specifically related to bringing Ingalls back on line. Get with me as soon as you can.

Gordon



Enc

Cc: CNO
John Young

11-L-0559/OSD/52745

TAB

D

COORDINATION

DASN SHIPS	CAPTAIN ANTONIO	30 SEP 05
I&E	CAPTAIN HEFERNAN	30 SEP 05
I&E	CAPTAN SIENICKI	30 SEP 05
SAL	CDR PROTIN	30 SEP 05

TAB 2

INFORMATION PAPER

September 30, 2005

SUBJECT: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Neutralizer (JIN)

1. PURPOSE. ~~(FOUO)~~ To provide information on IONATRON'S Joint IED Neutralizer (JIN).

2. BACKGROUND. ~~(FOUO)~~

a. ~~(FOUO)~~ The JIN system is a direct electrical energy discharge device designed to initiate the explosive train of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The system is a remotely operated mobile system that travels up to 30 mph while directly discharging electricity in order to initiate or render IED's inoperable.

b. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Joint IED-Defeat Task Force authorized release of \$10M Iraqi Freedom Funds for acquisition of the Joint IED Neutralizer capability. IONATRON received funding to build six JIN EX (expendable) and six JIN IIa (armored) prototypes for evaluation and deployment. The US Army Manuver Support Center OPR was responsible for integrating JIN into the Route Clearing Operational Concept drafted May 05. The JW II program is managed through the USAF Force Protection Battle Lab and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division.

3. CURRENT STATUS. ~~(FOUO)~~

a. ~~(FOUO)~~ The JIN II is currently in the final stages of testing prior to fielding to U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) for further evaluation. The JIN II system has received funding to complete five of the six operational tasks for development. Task 1-3 consisted of developing the 12 JIN prototypes and operational testing. Tasks four and five consisted of conducting a Military Utility Assessment and training Field Service Representatives to deploy to theatre for subsequent task six, a 90-day operational deployment. JIN II has received \$4.67M funding to date and will require approximately an additional \$12 \$13M in order to complete the in-theatre operational testing.

b. ~~(FOUO)~~ The JIN II system completed a Military Utility Assessment from 12-16 September at Yuma Proving Grounds. The test was written and evaluated by the Air Force Operation Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC). The evaluation test were observed by the Army's 14th Engineer Battalion. Technically, the JIN II EX appeared able to function as stated. Engineering Battalion personnel expressed some concern with the JIN II regarding the tactical utility, survivability of the system and the potential burden this system will place on the route clearance teams. Additional tactical review and viability test should be conducted in order to determine the suitability for this system in theatre. During the testing phase the utility of an armored vehicle was questioned and a recommendation was made to build all 12 JIN II as expendable with small arms ballistic protection. The savings from not building armor vehicles will be used to fund minor modifications to the system.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

c. ~~(FOUO)~~ Discussions with the project technical advisor indicates that the Force Protection Battle Lab will request additional funding from the JIEDD-TF in early October 05. With the appropriate funding the operational deployment may begin in January 06.

d. ~~(FOUO)~~ Over the course of JIN development, IONATRON has openly and aggressively disseminated technical aspects of their product capabilities. DoD has formally requested that IONATRON cease and desist such activities in the interest of National security.

Prepared By: CDR Timothy Rudderow (b)(6)

Approved By: BG Joseph L. Votel

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

100

BACK
1613
10/5/05

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

28 September 2005 - 0800 Hours

MEMO FOR: BG JOE VOTEL, DIFUJOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE
COL DAN ALLYN, c/o JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE

SUBJECT: Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi

Joe:

DepSecDef received a note from Secretary Rumsfeld. Secretary Rumsfeld met with Haley Barbour, the Governor of Mississippi. Barbour expressed some thoughts that could help the economy of Mississippi get going based on the recent hurricane.


One thing he mentioned was a company named Ionatron that manufactures the Jinex. He says we have ordered 12. Evidently they are made at Stennis.

Are we doing anything else with Ionatron and are we ordering any more of the Jinex?

Any other thoughts that you have, please provide Secretary England

Please provide a copy of this tasker with your reply. Thank you.

Very respectfully,


Frank G. Elmick 9/28
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: Wednesday, 5 October 2005

copy to: VCSA
Army G-3

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52751



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1010

October 5, 2005

Honorable Haley R. Barbour
Governor of Mississippi
501 North West Street
Jackson, Mississippi 39201

Dear Governor Barbour:

Thank you for your continued interest regarding IONATRON and the Joint IED Neutralizer (JIN) II. IONATRON's JIN II represents a unique approach to neutralizing IEDs over more conventional neutralization capabilities.

The Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD TF) committed to purchasing twelve JIN II prototypes from IONATRON. We recently completed the military unit assessment (MUA) for JIN at Yuma Proving Ground. As a result of this assessment, we expect to make additional technology changes as well as further refinement to operational concepts to optimize its employment on the battlefield. These improvements are absolutely vital as we prepare JIN for a hands-on assessment in Iraq. Once this is complete, then we will be in a position to recommend future procurement and production.


As mentioned, JIN represents a unique approach that potentially offers a significant advantage for our deployed service members. We have expressed this concern to IONATRON and have directed them, through the Program Manager, to cease public dissemination of this potential capability. Failure to adequately safeguard new technology information could provide a tactical advantage to our adversaries and ultimately endanger the lives of our Servicemen and women in combat.

Again, thank you for your interest and support of our efforts to provide the best protection possible for our brave men and women serving in harm's way. We are absolutely committed to identifying and fielding effective counter-IED solutions for our Soldiers as quickly as possible. As always, we remain ready to provide additional information at your request.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/52752

September 28, 2005

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
VIA: Secretary England
FROM: John Young 

SUBJECT: ~~HALEY BARE~~ OUR MEETING SNOWFLAKE

SPEEDING UP DDX AND LHA(R)

- DD(X) and LHA(R) are currently in the early design phases – construction was scheduled to ~~start~~ on these ships in xx and xx respectively.
- We cannot accelerate construction without the design, and design and construction already have a degree of concurrency that concerns some in the Congress.
- Further, it is not clear after Katrina that Ingalls can provide the labor to accelerate these ships.
- Ingalls is currently building 6 DDG-51's, 2 LPD-17's, and LHD-8. We expect significant delivery delays and cost impacts from Katrina as the yard recovers its facilities and workforce.
- We have asked for \$2.8 billion in Supplemental funds to cover cleanup and labor recovery in order to expedite the recovery of Ingalls and other Gulf Coast yards.

BOLLINGER

- Bollinger is a partner with Lockheed Martin on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
- Bollinger does not currently have any facilities in Mississippi.
- Reportedly, Bollinger has considered opening a facility in Natchez for LCS.
- We would like to accelerate construction of their LCS, and the House Appropriations mark includes an add to buy the second Lockheed LCS which would be built by Bollinger.
- Beyond LCS, DoD is completing requirements to support a Joint Intra-Theater Lift ship, and the first procurement is planned in FY 08.
- Bollinger has a partnership with Incat in Australia.
- The Department does not currently have any plans to buy Incat design catamarans.
- While Bollinger may compete for this program with Incat designs, it is not clear they will win and DoD requirements are not defined adequately to compete earlier.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR



HALEY BARBOUR
GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT -7 PM 1:15

September 30, 2005

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Thank you for meeting with me last week, I genuinely appreciate you and your people's considering the matters I brought up as ways for DOD to help us recover. Those actions all would be consistent with what I believe to be Administration policy; some would simply adjust the schedule for the spending.

I particularly urge you to order a hundred or hundreds of Ionatron's JIN Ex IED detectors and destroyers, Today Mississippi's 155th Brigade Combat Team suffered five more casualties from and IED in Iraq, The overwhelming majority of our people killed have been victims of IEDs, the Ionatron destroyer works at a very high rate.

Ordering a hundred or more (many more, I hope) would be good for our economic recovery (they're build at Stennis Center in Hancock County, Mississippi), but, more importantly, it would save our people's lives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks for letting me tell you personally what can be done to help us. And I enjoyed lunch.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour

HRB/ams

CC: Anthony J. Principi

OSD 20052-05

FOUO

OCT 07 2005

TO: Gordon England

dicto to all Coloms, etc listed.

- GEN John Abizaid
- GEN Doug Brown
- Gen James Cartwright
- ADM Tim Keating
- GEN John Craddock
- ADM Bill Fallon
- Gen Norty Schwartz
- GEN **Leon** LaPorte
- LTG Robert Wagner

350-001 WH



SUBJECT: President's Remarks on the Global War on Terror

The President's speech today was an excellent overview of our current approach in the GWOT. Please ensure it receives the widest dissemination throughout the Department. Senior leaders should find it helpful in preparing remarks and articles on the war. I have attached a *summary*.

I have also attached a sheet of some metrics on improvements in Iraq since the beginning of the war that may be helpful as well.

Attach.

- 10/6/06 President Bush Remarks on the War on Terror
- Metrics on Iraq

DHR.dh
100605-27

7 Oct 05

OSD 20057-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52755

President Bush Remarks On The War On Terror

Today's Presidential Action:

Today, President Bush Addressed The National Endowment For Democracy On The Nature Of The Enemy We Face And The Strategy For Victory. In this new century, freedom is once again under assault. The President outlined the ideology of the terrorists and the strategy needed to defeat this danger and see freedom's victory.

- 9 In The Four Years Since September 11th, The United States And The World Have **Been** Committed To Winning The War On Terror. The evil that came to our shores on September 11th has reappeared on other days and in other places. In cities across the world, we have seen images of destruction and suffering that can seem like random acts of madness but are part of a larger terrorist threat. To combat this evil, we must remember the calling of September 11th – we will confront this mortal danger to all humanity and not tire or rest until the war on terror is won.
- 9 Muslims Are Playing A Vital Role In The War On Terror. Muslim leaders are denouncing terrorism, and the time has come for all responsible Islamic leaders to denounce an ideology that exploits Islam for political ends and defiles a noble faith. Many Muslims have joined the fight against extremism. The United States is proud to stand by those who stand up for the liberty, justice, and humanity of their own tradition.

The Militant Threat And The Importance Of Winning The War On Terror

The Terrorists Serve A Clear And Focused Ideology. The ideology known as Islamic radicalism, militant Jihadism, or Islamo-fascism – different from the religion of Islam – exploits Islam to serve a violent political vision that calls for the murder of all those who do not share it. The followers of Islamic radicalism are bound together by their shared ideology, not by any centralized command structure. Although they fight on scattered battlefields, these terrorists share a similar ideology and vision for the world openly stated in videos, audiotapes, letters, declarations, and websites.

- 9 First, These Extremists Are Determined To End American And Western **Influence** In The Middle East. Because the United States is spreading democracy and peace, we stand in the way of their radical ambitions. Al-Qaida's leader Osama Bin Laden has called on Muslims to dedicate their 'resources, sons and money to driving the infidels out of their lands.' To meet this goal, they hit us and expect us to run in the hope that we will repeat the sad history of Beirut in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1993 – only this time on a larger scale and with greater consequences.
- 9 Second, The Militant Network Wants to **Use The Vacuum** Created By Retreat To Expand Its Power. As they once did in Afghanistan and are trying to do now in Iraq, they will seek to gain control of an entire country – a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments.
- 9 Third, From Their New Base, These Militants Will Seek To Establish A Radical Islamic Empire. The militants believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East and establish a radical Islamic empire that spreads from Spain to Indonesia.
- 9 To Accomplish Their Extremist Agenda, The Militants Thrive On The Suffering And Frustrations Of Others. The radicals exploit local conflicts to build a culture of victimization, exploit resentful and disillusioned young men and women, and use modern technology to multiply their destructive power.
- 9 In Pursuit Of Their Goals, Islamic Radicals Are Empowered By Helpers And Enablers. They are sheltered and supported by authoritarian regimes – allies of convenience like Syria and Iran – that share the goal of hurting America and moderate Muslim governments, and that use terrorist propaganda to blame their own failures on the West, America, and Jews. They are strengthened by front operations – such as corrupted charities – and those who aggressively fund the spread of radical, intolerant versions of Islam. The militants are aided by elements of the Arab news media that incite hatred and anti-Semitism, feed conspiracy theories, and speak of a so-called American "war on Islam" – with seldom a word about American action to protect Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq.
- 9 This Extremism Cannot Be Given Concessions, Bribed, Or Appeased. We Must Never Accept Anything **Less** Than Victory. To those who argue that extremism has been strengthened by the actions of our Coalition in Iraq, we

must remember that we were not in Iraq on September 11, 2001. The radicals' hatred existed before Iraq was an issue, and it will exist after Iraq is an excuse. The government of Russia did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom, and yet the Islamic militants killed more than 180 Russian schoolchildren in Beslan.

Islamic Radicalism Is Another In A Line Of Bankrupt Ideologies:

The Islamic Radical Threat Of This Century Greatly Resembles The Bankrupt Ideology Of The Last. The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our century. Yet, in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century.

- 9 Like Communism, Islamic Radicalism Is Led By An Elitist Self-Appointed Vanguard That Presumes To Speak For The Muslim Masses. Bin Laden says his role is to tell Muslims "what is good for them and what is not." What this man who grew up in wealth and privilege considers good for poor Muslims is that they become killers and suicide bombers. He assures them that this is the road to paradise – though he never offers to go along for the ride.
- Islamic Radicals Purposely Target Innocent Individuals For A Political Vision. This explains their cold-blooded contempt for human life seen in the murders of Daniel Pearl, Nicholas Berg, Margaret Hassan, and many others. These militants have shown themselves to be enemies of not only America and Iraq, but enemies of Islam and humanity. The world has witnessed this kind of cruelty before – the heartless zealotry that led to the gulags, the Cultural Revolution, and the killing fields.
- 9 Islamic Radicals Pursue Totalitarian Aims. Islamic Radical leaders have endless ambitions of imperial domination, and they wish to make everyone **powerless** except themselves. While promising a future of justice and holiness, the terrorists are preparing a future of oppression and misery – banning dissent and books, brutalizing women, and controlling every aspect of life.
- 9 Islamic Radicalism Is Dismissive Of Free Peoples. Zarqawi has said that Americans are "the most cowardly of God's creatures." However, it is cowardice that kills children and the elderly with car bombs, cuts the throat of a bound captive, or targets worshipers leaving a mosque. It is courage that liberated 50 million people from tyranny, keeps an untiring vigil against the enemies of a rising democracy, and will once again destroy the enemies of freedom.
- 9 And Like Communism, Islamic Radicalism Contains Inherent Contradictions That Doom It To Failure. By fearing freedom, distrusting human creativity, punishing change, and limiting the contributions of half the population, this ideology declares war on the idea of progress itself. The only thing modern about the militants' vision is the weapons they seek to use. The outcome of this war is not in doubt – those who despise freedom and progress have condemned themselves to isolation, decline, and collapse. Because free people believe in the future, they will own the future.

The Strategy To Win

The President Outlined The Strategy To Win The War On Terror. Defeating a broad and adaptive network requires patience, constant pressure, and strong partners. Working with these partners, the U.S. is disrupting militant conspiracies, destroying their ability to make war, and giving millions a hopeful alternative to resentment and violence.

- First, We Are Preventing Terrorist Attacks Before They Occur. We are reorganizing government for a broad and coordinated homeland defense, reforming intelligence agencies for the difficult task of tracking enemy activity, and acting, along with governments from many countries, to destroy the terrorist networks and incapacitate their leaders. We have prevented terrorist plots and Al-Qaida efforts to case targets in the United States. Because of strikes against terrorist leaders and disruption of their plots, the enemy is wounded but still capable of deadly operations around the globe. Our commitment is clear: we will not relent until the organized international terror networks are exposed and broken and their leaders held to account for their acts of murder.
- 9 Second, We Are Denying Weapons Of Mass Destruction To Outlaw Regimes And Their Terrorist Allies. Working with Great Britain, Pakistan, and other nations, we shut down A.Q. Khan's black-market operation in nuclear technology. Libya abandoned its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its long-range ballistic missiles. In the last year, America and our partners in the Proliferation Security Initiative have stopped more than a dozen shipments of suspect weapons technology – including equipment for Iran's ballistic missile programs. This progress

has reduced the danger, but not removed it. Evil men still work to gain these weapons, and we are working urgently to keep them out of their hands.

- 9 Third, **We Are Determined To Deny Radical Groups The Support And Sanctuary Of Outlaw Regimes.** State sponsors like Syria and Iran have a long history of collaboration with terrorists – and they deserve no patience from the victims of terror. The United States makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor terrorists, because they are equally guilty of murder.
- Fourth, **We Are Fighting To Deny The Militants Control Of Any Nation.** The United States is fighting beside our Afghan partners against the remnants of the Taliban and its al-Qaida allies. We are working with President Musharraf to isolate the militants in Pakistan. We are fighting the terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq who seek to overthrow a democracy, claim a strategic country as a haven of terror, destabilize the Middle East, and strike America and other free nations with ever increasing violence. Our goal is to defeat the terrorists and their allies at the heart of their power – and we are achieving this goal.
- **With Iraqi Forces, The Coalition Is Fighting The Enemy With A Comprehensive And Specific Military Plan.** We are improving the lives of Iraqi citizens by conducting offensive operations to clear out enemy forces and leave Iraqi units behind to prevent the enemy from returning. With our help, the Iraqi military is gaining new capabilities and new confidence with every passing month. At the time of our Fallujah operations 11 months ago, there were only a few Iraqi battalions in combat – today there are more than **80**. The progress is not easy, but it is steady.
 - **Iraq Is Making Incredible Political Progress.** The extremists in Iraq are not patriots or resistance fighters but murderers at war with the Iraqi people. In contrast, the elected leaders of Iraq are proving to be strong and steadfast. In the space of **two** and a half years, Iraq has made incredible progress on the path to becoming a democracy. It is true that the seeds of freedom have only recently been planted, but we are confident that if our Coalition and the Iraqi people each does their part, Iraqi democracy will succeed.
 - **We Must Reject The Dangerous Illusion Of Those Who Claim That America Would Be Better Off By Cutting Our Losses And Leaving Iraq Now.** Having removed a dictator who hated free peoples, we will not stand by as a new set of killers seize control of Iraq. There is always a temptation, in the middle of a long struggle, to seek the quiet life, escape the duties and problems of the world, and hope the enemy grows weary. However, this enemy is never tired and considers every retreat an invitation to greater violence. In Iraq, there is no peace without victory. **We** will keep our nerve and win that victory.
- Fifth, **We Are Denying The Militants Future Recruits By Advancing Democracy And Hope Across The Broader Middle East.** If the region is left to grow in bitterness and misery, while radicals stir the resentments of millions, then that part of the world will be a source of endless conflict and mounting danger. However, the extremists will be marginalized and their violence ended if the peoples of that region are permitted to choose their own destiny and advance by their **own** energy and participation as free men and women. America is making this stand in practical ways. We are encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights of people. We are standing with dissidents and exiles against oppressive regimes, because we know that the dissidents of today will be the democratic leaders of tomorrow. We are making our case through public diplomacy – stating clearly and confidently our belief in self-determination, religious freedom, and equal rights for women. By standing for the hope and freedom of others, we will make our own freedom more secure.

May 2003

Oct 2005

Political

1 political party

157 political parties registered

139 new party applications pending for December elections

Security Forces

0 Army or Special Police

197K individual military/police

0 Army battalions

85 operational battalions, 33 in the lead on operations

0 brigade headquarters

28 operational brigades, 9 in the lead on operations

0 division headquarters

4 operational divisions, 1 in the lead on operations

0 Special Police battalions

28 operational battalions, 2 in the lead on operations

0 Navy squadrons

2 operational squadrons

0 Air Force squadrons

3 operational squadrons

0 Iraqi units with professional partnerships to US or Coalition units

10 Divisions
30 Brigades
107 Battalions } partnered

Quality of Life

Electricity

Demand 5200 MW

7750 MW

Production 3300 MW

4800 MW

Communications Subscribers

Telephone 833K

4520K

Internet 5K

196K

Commercial Mass Media

• Television	0	29
Radio	0	80
Newspapers/ Magazines	0	170



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2005 OCT -7 PM 3:33

October, 6, 2005, 1300p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response

- You asked me about the question from Representative Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS): "One of the questions was from a Member of Congress from Jackson, Mississippi. I cannot recall their name, but they said there are military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana that could temporarily house people, and they asked if we are doing it – and I didn't have an answer."
- Military bases in both Mississippi and Louisiana are currently housing DoD Displaced Personnel, DoD Relief, Non-DoD Relief, and Non-DoD Evacuees.
- Non-DoD Evacuees consist of non-dependant family members who have been sponsored onto base by DoD members, general population evacuees invited onto National Guard bases by the State Governors, and evacuees who have had a prior relationship with the Department of Defense.

620

Attachments:

- Snowflake# 091305-15
- Draft Response to Rep. Thompson

Prepared by: LTC Roger D. Carstens/OSD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52761

OSD 20070-05

6 Oct 4

FOUO

SEP 14 2005

TO Dan Stanley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Question about Temporary Housing at Military Bases

One of the questions was from a Member of Congress from Jackson, Mississippi. I cannot recall their name, but they said there are military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana that could temporarily house people, and they asked if we are doing it - and I didn't have an answer.

Please draft a response.

Thanks.

DHR:m
091305-15

.....
Please respond by 9/20/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52762

OSD 18940-05



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Thompson:

During the September 6th briefing to Members of Congress on Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, you asked me whether or not the Department of Defense could temporarily house people on military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Title 10, Sec. 2556 "*Shelter for Homeless; Incidental Services,*" provides authority for the sheltering of displaced persons on DoD installations. Although not invoked, we are currently housing over 2600 persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina on military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana, as well as a number of other states throughout the Continental United States. Those evacuees consist of non-dependant family members who have been sponsored onto base by DoD members, general population evacuees invited onto National Guard bases by the State Governors, and evacuees who have had a prior relationship with the Department of Defense.

I appreciate your continuing support for the U.S. Armed Forces.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/52763

10/11
10/10

OCT 5 2005

2005 OCT 07 11:48

ACTION MEMO

4/DepSecDef
USDP ~~10/12~~ **OCT 07 2005**
I-05013324
ES-4359

Robert Rangel
10/12

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman (b)(6))

Robert Rangel 10/14

SUBJECT: Condolence Letter to Indonesian Minister of Defense (U)

- (U) As you requested (Tab 2), attached is a letter of condolence to Indonesian Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono on the recent Bali terrorist attacks (TAB 1).

RECOMMENDATION: (U) SECDEF sign letter at TAB 1.

Attachments:

- TAB 1 - Response Letter
- TAB 2 - SecDef Snowflake

Prepared by: Mr. Peter Ipsen, Southeast Asia Team, ISA/AP, (b)(6)

Reviewed by: PDASD/ISA *[Signature]*
DUSD/AP *[Signature]*
PD/AP *[Signature]*

293

4 Oct 05

Sin, 10/12
Response attached.

4 Oct 05

MA SD	10/12	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/14	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	10/14	1000	10/12/05
ESR MA	10/14	10-11-05	932

11-L-0559/OSD/52764

DSD 20079-05

14-2

FROM:
SECDEF//

TO:
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

INFO:
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
USPACOM
NSC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CHAIRS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY RUMSFELD LETTER TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. REQUEST THAT THE AMEMBASSY FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MINISTER SUDARSONO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE JUWONO SUDARSONO
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I WANT TO EXPRESS MY CONDOLENCES TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA FOLLOWING THE RECENT TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN BALI. THESE ACTIONS ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE VALUES OF TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM THAT INDONESIA AND THE UNITED STATES SHARE AS PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACIES.

AS WE CONFRONT THESE VIOLENT EXTREMISTS WHO MURDER INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN, I AM REASSURED BY THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. AS I RECENTLY REMARKED AT OUR OWN COMMEMORATION OF THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, HUMAN HISTORY SHOWS THAT **THOSE** WHO SEEK POWER THROUGH FEAR AND MASS MURDER HAVE ALL FAILED AS THEIR OWN FANATICISM PROVED NO MATCH FOR THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION OF FREE PEOPLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT **INDONESIA**, AS A NEW Ah?) VIBRANT DEMOCRACY, HAS THE CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THESE EXTREMISTS

THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES ON OCTOBER 1ST ARE IN OUR THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS.

SINCERELY,

141-4

11-L-0559/OSD/52765

//DONALD RUMSFELD//
END TEXT.

8/17/05 : 1
141-5



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Juwono Sudarsono
Minister of Defense
Republic of Indonesia

ML

Dear Mr. Minister:

I want to express my condolences to you and to the people of Indonesia following the recent terrorist bombings in Bali. These actions are an **affront** to the values of tolerance and freedom that Indonesia and **the** United States share **as** pluralistic democracies.

As we confront these violent extremists who murder innocent men, women, and children, I am reassured by the lessons of the past. **As** I recently remarked at our own commemoration of the **attacks** of September 11, 2001, human history shows that those who seek power through fear and mass murder have all failed as their own fanaticism proved no match for the courage and determination of free **people**. I am confident that Indonesia, **as** a new **and** vibrant democracy, has the capacity to defeat these extremists.

The families and friends **of** those who lost their lives on October 1st are in our thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

*OK
This is very
important
in the future*



141-3

~~FOUO~~ - THE
SECY - CHIEF
2005 10-04 10:48

OCT 04 2005
JOS/013324
ES-4359

TO: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Indonesian MoD re: Bombings in Bali

Please draft a letter for me to send to the Minister of Defense of Indonesia on the bombings in Bali.

Thanks.

DIA &
100905-13

293

.....

Please Respond By October 05, 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20079-05

6/2/05

4 Oct 05

K41-6



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 13 2005

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Republic of Indonesia

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Sincerely,

293

13 Oct 05

4 Oct 05

i#

OSD 20079-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52769

11-3

UNCLAS
IMMEDIATE

FROM: SECDEF
TO: AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
INFO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
USPACOM
NSC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECRETARY RUMSFELD LETTER TO INDONESIA MOD SUDARSONO

REQUEST THAT THE AMEMBASSY FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MOD SUDARSONO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE HONORABLE JUWONO SUDARSONO
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

(PARA) I WANT TO EXPRESS MY CONDOLENCES TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA FOLLOWING THE RECENT TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN BALI. THESE ACTIONS ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE VALUES OF TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM THAT INDONESIA AND THE UNITED STATES SHARE AS PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACIES.

(PARA) AS WE CONFRONT THESE VIOLENT EXTREMISTS WHO MURDER INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN, I AM REASSURED BY THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. AS I RECENTLY REMARKED AT OUR OWN COMMEMORATION OF THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, HUMAN HISTORY SHOWS THAT THOSE WHO SEEK POWER THROUGH FEAR AND MASS MURDER HAVE ALL FAILED AS THEIR OWN FANATICISM PROVED NO MATCH FOR THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION OF FREE PEOPLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT INDONESIA, AS A NEW AND VIBRANT DEMOCRACY, HAS THE CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THESE EXTREMISTS.

(PARA) THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES ON OCTOBER 1ST ARE IN OUR THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS.

SINCERELY,
//DONALD RUMSFELD//
(END TEXT)

11-L-0559/OSD/52770 OSD 20079-05

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SEC. OF DEFENSE

2008-09-17 14:57 SEP 21 2005

ES-4265
05/012705

TO: Ryan Henry
Brad Berkson
Andy Marshall

cc: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR-*

SUBJECT: Piece by Barry Blechman

Attached is an interesting article by Barry Blechman, a friend of mine who serves on the Defense Policy Board. Please take a look at it, and tell me if you *think* we are doing the things he thinks we ought to be doing, and if we are not, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach: *U.S. Defense Planning* by Barry Blechman

DHR:ss
091905-32

.....

Please Respond By 10/18/05

2008-09-17 14:57

OSD 20080-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52771



INSIDE VIEW

U.S. Defense Planning

It's Not That Complicated

The Pentagon has been working hard all spring and summer on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Particular attention has been paid to the formula that should be used as the basis for force planning, with the old standard "1-4-2-1" focusing on home defense, and deterring and defeating aggression in certain world regions — deemed by some to be over-looked by events.

The stakes are high as both the relative size of the military



By **Barry Blechman**, the chief executive of DFI International and the co-founder and chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

services and their components, and the relative priority accorded to weapon programs, could rise or fall depending on the outcome. The formulas proposed for force planning, in fact, are euphemisms for bread-and-butter

issues, such as larger or smaller fighter aircraft forces, a bigger or smaller Army, and whether to spend more money on space

continued, as technology allows, but defense against cruise missiles should be added to the Missile Defense Agency's agenda, as these latter weapons are more ubiquitous and far easier for enemies to operate and launch.

Defense against unconventional means of delivering a nuclear or biological device has received far fewer resources. Partly, this is a jurisdictional issue. The Department of Homeland Security is primarily responsible for securing the nation's ports and borders, but the defensive boundary needs to be drawn much farther out and the Defense Department has a major role to play.

Defending Unconventional Nukes

If we took the unconventional nuclear threat to the United States seriously, we would allocate defense resources sufficient to build the sensor networks and information systems capable of monitoring all air, land and sea traffic approaching

Protecting the United States requires preventive actions overseas to disrupt terrorist networks before they can acquire and deploy nuclear or biological devices.

on terror. What should not be in question is that this should be the highest priority.

■ The capability to fight major theater wars (MTWs).

Debate rages over whether we should have capabilities to fight one or two such conflicts simultaneously. This is an artificial debate, however, as the term itself is misleading. There is not one type of MTW, but two distinct types of contingencies.

One is the kind of war we are now fighting in Iraq. It requires

There are plenty of people who know what to do. American military officers and civilian government officials learned lessons throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the Balkans, Central America and elsewhere.

But the Army and the Defense Department resisted looking seriously at these requirements for years. The current QDR is an opportunity to set a new course.

Obviously, like preventing nuclear attacks, effectively stabilizing foreign governments requires contributions from many U.S. departments — State, Treasury and many other civilian agencies. Only DoD, however, has the resources to make any interagency approach work, and the Army has to take the lead.

Variety of Sources

To better prepare for the role, the department must develop the means to generate additional, trained forces with little warning, and add resources for

other regional organizations, evacuating U.S. citizens from troubled nations, search-and-rescue missions, disaster relief, and the insertion of small groups of forces to deal with criminal bands or rebel movements that sometimes threaten weak but friendly governments.

How many and which specific types of forces are necessary can be gleaned by looking at the now 15 years of post Cold War history.

Special Capabilities, Enough Troops

Two things are evident: The forces required for lesser contingencies are not completely provided by planning for m s ; they are not just lesser operations, but require some specialized capabilities. Second, not having sufficient numbers of such forces raises U.S. military operating tempos to levels with deleterious effects on personnel and equipment.

□ Preparing for the threats we cannot now foresee and taking advantage of the technologies that are now only dimly understood.

This requires spending on basic and advanced research, but not the advanced systems development that accounts for the largest share of the research and development budget.

systems or on ground equipment.

Debates like this are as old as the Defense Department itself; only the terminology changes every four years. What's surprising, this time, is that debate rages despite the department having entered the QDR with an established and clear military strategy, and a good understanding of the contingencies the United States faces now and will likely face in the future.

Four Priorities

So long as one looks squarely at those threats, keeping in mind the strategy already established to defeat them, the basis for U.S. force planning should be evident. It all comes down to four priorities:

☐ Prevention of nuclear or biological attack in this country.

Such an event would be an unprecedented catastrophe for the United States. A nuclear bomb exploded in a U.S. city during a business day could kill hundreds of thousands of people, injure millions and affect the health of still millions more — born and unborn.

The U.S. armed forces are now making plans to contain the consequences of such an attack, but preventing it must be the highest priority. Yet the allocation of government resources suggests that we haven't truly internalized that. Three elements are involved.

Defending ourselves against possible ballistic missile attacks is the one aspect of the problem that has received high priority. These efforts clearly should be

our borders and deploy the forces needed to intercept and inspect or destroy questionable platforms.

This is not a technology problem; it is a matter of engineering and resources, and insisting the commercial carriers that control the bulk of traffic to and from the United States establish procedures to make the task easier.

Finally, protecting the United States requires preventive actions overseas to disrupt terrorist networks before they can acquire and deploy nuclear or biological devices.

It means cooperating with as many countries as possible to help them reduce and secure dangerous materials, and to exert better controls on their borders — and, in the case of poorer countries, facilitating such cooperation by providing expertise, technology and money.

It means international cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence organizations, which sometimes requires a more forthcoming U.S. position than, one gathers, is typically the case.

And, of particular interest to the QDR debate, it means raising, training, equipping and deploying U.S. special forces that can work with foreign militaries to find and destroy terrorists, and, when necessary, independently take out such groups in ungoverned territories or in countries that won't cooperate with us.

One question for the QDR to decide is how many and what types of special forces the United States needs to fight the war

integrated air, ground and naval combat forces capable of invading a nation, destroying its armed forces, and stabilizing the situation on the ground sufficiently to transition to a stable and friendly government.

How big do these forces have to be? Answering that question requires diverting from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's favored capabilities-based approach to planning and taking a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies.

While national and international politics can certainly surprise us, a look around the world will make clear which specific contingencies are possible in the midterm.

The requirement for these kinds of forces is not open-ended. Presumably, the United States is not going to repeat Napoleon's and Hitler's mistake of attempting regime change in Moscow, no matter what course future Russian governments take. Nor can one imagine a U.S. president violating the long-standing maxim of avoiding large-scale land war in East Asia.

Stabilization Phase

The more pressing question for QDR defense planners is how to structure, equip and train forces for the stabilization phase of the fighting. The Defense Department demonstrated convincingly in March 2003 that it had mastered the regime change part of the challenge. But it is clear that we had not paid enough attention preparing to help countries make political transitions effectively.

a variety of logistical, engineering and civil affairs chores.

Some of these capabilities can be located in the active forces, others in the reserves, and still others can be provided by civilian contractors. In addition, the U.S. armed forces, and especially the Army and Marine Corps, must pay greater attention to these missions in training their personnel.

The second type of MTW places greater emphasis on air and naval forces. This type of contingency is harder to define, but typically involves utilizing air and naval power to isolate a hostile nation or to defend a friendly one from attack. A Taiwan crisis would fit in this category, as would a need to keep open the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Strait to ensure oil flows.

Militarily, it requires an ability to rapidly establish total air and sea dominance in a particular region, to conduct precision air strikes anywhere in the world in a timely manner, and to support such forces far from the United States.

America has invested heavily in these capabilities in the past, has unsurpassed forces to conduct these missions now, and need only ensure that U.S. air, space and naval forces are modernized at a sufficient rate to maintain this qualitative edge indefinitely.

☐ Maintaining the forces necessary for conducting a variety of lesser contingencies.

These could include supporting peace operations by the United Nations, NATO and

How much money should be devoted to basic research is a matter of subjective judgment, but 3 percent of the total budget seems to garner widespread support.

There are a host of capabilities that underlie all four priorities — of course, from the training, sustaining and medical systems that support the troops, to the intelligence, communications and information (and disinformation) systems that are the true enablers of modern U.S. military capabilities.

Some of these enablers are based in space, some on aircraft or ship platforms, others on the ground. Choosing how to provide these capabilities efficiently poses difficult problems, but these are problems best handled in the normal acquisition and budgeting processes. They should not enter debate on the fundamental issues in U.S. defense priorities.

The four priorities should be clear:

Prevent a nuclear or deadly biological attack in this nation; be prepared for two types of major theater wars, one which requires the invasion and replacement of hostile regimes that threaten the nation's basic interests, and a second which requires gaining air and sea dominance over any region of the globe as necessary to achieve the nation's objectives there; be prepared for a variety of lesser contingencies; and invest in future technologies so that the United States will remain, indefinitely, the most powerful military actor on Earth. □



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1800



INFO MEMO

OCT 7 2008

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Brad Berkson, Director, PA&E

SB

SUBJECT: Piece by Barry Blechman

- You asked if we are doing the things Barry Blechman says we ought to be doing his article "U.S. Defense Planning" (attached).
- He lays out four priorities for defense force planning: (1) prevention of WMD attacks in the United States; (2) preparation for major theater wars; (3) preparation for lesser contingencies; and (4) investment in future technologies. I concur with his priorities and think the Department is by and large tackling these issues.
- **Prevention of WMD Attacks.** A limiting factor for success is that other departments share responsibility for preventing unconventional delivery of such weapons—and the adequacy of their efforts is an open question. We should continue to engage aggressively within the interagency arena.
- **Major Theater Wars / Lesser Contingencies.** We may need to accept more risk in major theater wars in order to shift resources to higher-priority needs. Furthermore, we may want to take a harder look at feasible, real-world contingencies. The final question is whether the current demands on our force represent a new baseline or a temporary spike.
- **Investment in Future Technologies.** Blechman proposes allocating 3 percent of the DoD budget to research activities. The QDR is not directly addressing investment levels for future technologies; however, science and technology (S&T) expenditures now account for 2.5 percent of the defense budget. The most important factor in the performance of the S&T portfolio is the retention of world-class researchers, not the share of the DoD budget devoted to S&T activities. The retention of S&T researchers hinges on maintaining stable and predictable programs.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachment:
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/52774

OSD 20080-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

2005 OCT 14 11:35

00SDIP3
I-05/012705
ES-4265

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

OCT 12 2005

SUBJECT: Defense News Article by Barry Blechman of September 5, 2005

- You asked if the QDR is pursuing a strategy analogous to that suggested by Barry Blechman in his article on "U.S. Defense Planning" (note attached).
- Yes, the QDR has addressed Barry Blechman's four priorities and continues to do so.
- Priority #1: "Prevention of nuclear or biological attack in this country."
 - Preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile state or non-state actors is a focus area from the QDR Terms of Reference. We looked at the capabilities needed for the focus area during an April roundtable, and continue to address the priorities in three of the twelve QDR "major muscle movements."
- Priority #2: "The capability to fight major theater wars."
 - The QDR has recognized future campaigns may be similar to OIF as well as a China/Taiwan-type contingency relying primarily on air and sea dominance.
 - The war time force planning construct we have reviewed with you accounts for sustained irregular operations, conventional warfare and tailored deterrence. It further recognizes that we must be capable of executing both types of campaigns
- Priority #3: "Maintaining the forces necessary for conducting a variety of lesser contingencies."
 - Again, the war time force planning construct accounts for such contingencies
- Priority #4: "Preparing for the threats we cannot now foresee and taking advantage of the technologies that are now dimly understood."
 - The National Defense Strategy you signed in March highlights the need to address disruptive technologies that may be unforeseen. Your QDR Integrated Product Team for joint enablers has and continues to explore emergent and potentially disruptive challenges in the realm of Net Centricity and Persistent ISR.

Prepared by: Ms. Kristie Canegallo, QDR Integration, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52775

OSD 20080-05

~~FOUO~~

SEP 21 2005

ES-4265
05/012705

TO: Ryan Henry
Brad Berkson
Andy Marshall

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

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Attach: *U.S. Defense Planning* by Barry Blechman

DHR:ss
091905-32

.....
Please Respond By 10/18/05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52776

OSD 20080-05



INSIDE VIEW

U.S. Defense Planning

It's Not That Complicated

Protecting the United States requires preventive actions overseas to disrupt terrorist networks before they can acquire and deploy nuclear or biological devices.

There are plenty of people who know what to do. American military officers and civilian government officials learned lessons throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the Balkans, Central America and elsewhere. But the Army and the Defense Department resisted locking seriously at these requirements for years. The current QDR is an opportunity to set a new course.

Obviously, like preventing nuclear attacks, effectively stabilizing foreign governments requires contributions from many U.S. departments — State, Treasury and many other civilian agencies. Only DoD, however, has the resources to make any interagency approach work, and the Army has to take the lead.

Variety of Sources
To better prepare for the role, the department must develop the means to generate additional, trained forces with little warning, and add resources for

gathering regional organizations, evacuating U.S. citizens from troubled nations, and the insertion of small groups of forces to deal with criminal bands or rebel movements that sometimes threaten weak but friendly governments.

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Special Capabilities, Enough Troops

Two things are evident: The forces required for lesser contingencies are not completely provided by planning for MTWs; they are not just lesser operations, but require some specialized capabilities. Second, not having sufficient numbers of such forces raises U.S. military operating tempos to levels with deleterious effects on personnel and equipment.

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By **Barry Blechman** is the chief executive of DfI International and the co-founder and chairman of the Harry L. Stimson Center.

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And, of particular interest to the QDR debate, it means raising, training, equipping and deploying U.S. special forces that can work with foreign militaries to find and destroy terrorists, and, when necessary, independently take out such groups in un-governed territories or in countries that won't cooperate with us.

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□ Maintaining the forces necessary for conducting a variety of lesser contingencies.

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FOUO

October 07, 2005

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte
Richard Lawless

c c : Gen Pete Pace
Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: South Korea Memo

Korea

Please see the attached. The handwriting is on the wall. Let's fashion an arrangement to be worked toward over a period of time that is best for everyone.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/01/05 Cable(OW48534615)

DHR:ss
100705-02

.....
Please Respond By November 08, 2005

7 OCT 05

OSD 20084-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52779

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT_ID: CW48534615
 DOCST: ACTIVE
 ENGLISH
 VENDOR: AGENCE FRANCE ESSE
 PUBNAME: AGENCE FRANCE ESSE
 ORIGDATE: 200510010529
 PUBLISHR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
 PUBNO: e0061
 DOR: 20051001
 TOR: 013212
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 TITLE: South Korea leader hints at ending US control over army

TOPLINES:

SEOUL, Oct 1 (AFP) - President Roo Moo-hyun gave a strong indication on Saturday that he plans to end the United States' right to control South Korea's armed forces in case of war, a source of

TEXT:

South Korea leader hints at ending US control over army

SEOUL, Oct 1 (AFP) - President Roo Moo-hyun gave a strong indication on Saturday that he plans to end the United States' right to control South Korea's armed forces in case of war, a source of lingering resentment here.

Roh, elected on a wave of anti-American sentiment in December 2002, made the remarks at a ceremony to celebrate the armed forces' 57th anniversary.

"The recently announced military reform programme reflects our determination to achieve independence in defence capability. When completed, this reform will transform our armed forces into advanced, crack units," Roh said.

"It will be reborn as independent armed forces that fit its name and reality as well, especially by exercising our own wartime operational control," he added.

Under a controversial 1950 accord, operational control over South Korea's 680,000-strong armed forces would be exercised by the commander of US troops stationed in South Korea in case of an armed conflict.

The recovery of the wartime operational rights, handed to US military authorities during the Korean War, is seen by many South Koreans as a matter of national sovereignty.

South Korea last month unveiled a military reform programme highlighted by a 26 percent cut in troops to 500,000 by 2020 and a drastic increase in fire-power.

South Korea hosts 32,500 US troops. President George W. Bush has nominated the current commander of US Army forces in Europe to lead the US forces in Korea, the Pentagon said last month.

If confirmed by Congress, General Burwell Bell III will replace General Leon Laporte as head of the combined US-South Korean forces command.

Ties between the two allies have been strained over how to rein in North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and Roh's rejection of a joint plan for armed intervention in the event of instability there.

Other contentious bilateral issues are the sharing of defense costs and a plan for redeployment of US troops.

However, Roh stressed the alliance is stronger than ever, as

HW-42

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

11 October 2005 - 0715 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL MULLEN, CNO

SUBJECT: International Seapower Symposium(ISS) #17

Sir:


Please see the Deputy Secretary's comments to you on the attached 26Sep05 memo:

"Mike -
Sounds like real progress. It's about partnerships!
Thanks - Gordon"

Please return a copy of this snowflake with your response.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

n/4

Attachment:
As stated

OSD 20099-05

092.3

11 Oct 05

26 Sep 05

original to CG BSD

AC 112...
PA, 9/18

1430
9/27

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT International Seapower Symposium (ISS) #17

Mr. Secretary, I hosted the biennial ISS in Newport, RI last week (20-23 Sep) at the Naval War College. The discussions and engagement this year were both rewarding and encouraging. Highlights:

- ISS Theme – "A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons"
 - o 72 countries represented, 49 Chiefs of Navy/Coast Guard
 - o 36 Foreign Chiefs were previous graduates of the Naval War College (we need to keep doing this...and are)
- Conducted three Panel Discussions: 1) Collaboration Among Navies, 2) Building a Common Picture of Maritime Activity, and 3) Required Maritime Security Capabilities.
- Conducted multiple Regional Seminar Working Groups which addressed a series of questions related to Global Maritime Security.
- Additionally, I had one-on-one meetings with 18 of the CNOs.
 - o Many delegates presented me ways/options with which they desire help and support from the US/Navy
 - o Art 98 issue was raised by many of them
- This conference had a much greater sense of collaboration and urgency/purpose to tackle global maritime security than those in recent years.
 - o Terrorist/terrorism is ALL our problem – they get it.
 - o They understand the need to for cooperation and sharing to achieve desired results. They need to participate and are.
 - o Level of discussion/interaction has matured greatly since ISS #16
- Discussions were forthright and well thought through – both in open forum and private discussions. Most delegates seem genuine in their efforts and willingness to work through political/tough issues at the Navy-to-Navy level.
- Many regions are moving out and conducting their own Regional Symposia. Several delegates (South Africa, Singapore, Italy and Peru) briefed results of their recent regional work.
 - o They are addressing the right security issues.
 - o Next step would be for them to invite others to sit in on their next Regional Symposia moving towards a global construct.

Mike
Sumals like
real progress.
It's about
partnerships!
Thanks!
John

As we look to future security and maritime challenges, events such as this one will help us shape the global maritime environment.

JR Mike Mullen
CNO

11-L-0559/OSD/527826.05

AL 1/27 DSO Comg
PA 9/13

1490
9/27

original to Co B57

092.3

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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John
26 Sep 05

As we look to future security and maritime challenges, events such as this one will help us shape the global maritime environment.

JR Mike Mullen
CNO

11-L-0559/OSD/527836.05
OSD 20099-05

FOUO

SEP 23 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request from Senator Bunning.

250

Senator Bunning told me there is something pending before you to be signed. I don't know what it is about, but I think he said it has something to do with a declaration of some kind.

please check with Dan Stanley to see if he knows what it is about. If not, please call Senator Bunning and find out.

Thanks.

DHR:db
092205-01

.....
Please Respond By October 06,2005

Actually, there is a request coming from Senator Bunning but he hasn't signed it out to us. It has to do with sexual harassment.

DR

23 Sep 05

FOUO

SEP 23 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request from Senator Bunning.

250

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DHR:dh
092205-01

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

29 Sep 05

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DR

23 Sep 05

9/30
06/16
0720

FOUO

September 29, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Award on Your Desk

250

I saw Jim Bunning again. He said that there is some award about "Extremely *something*" on your desk. Can you tell me what he is talking about, or give him a call to find out what he is referring to? Every time I see him, he brings it **up**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092905-12

.....
Please Respond By 10/13/05

SECRET :
Received fax copy of Bunnings
27 page letter (w/ attachments)
dealing with "Exemplary Conduct
Standard". In review. Hopefully
an answer this Monday (Oct 3)
29 Sep 05
9-30-05

FOUO

050-11-L-0558/QSD/52786
28940-05

9/30
06/16
0730

FOUO

September 29, 2005

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CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Award on Your Desk

250

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DHR ss
092905-12

30 Sep 05

.....
Please Respond By 10/13/05

SECDEF :
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27 page letter (w/ attachments)
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an answer this Monday (Oct. 3)

29 Sep 05

FOUO

OSD 12-0559/OSD 52787



9-30-05

FOUO

OCT 05 2005

300.8

TO: Mike Donley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ~~Status~~ of DoD Directives

Please get an update for me on the status of DoD Directives.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/5/05 Dir A&M memo to SecDef re: DoD Directives Review Update

DHR,dh
100405-11

.....

Please Respond By October 27, 2005

5 OCT 05

FOUO

OSD 20159-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52788



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4/7/05

05 APR 2005 2005 APR -5 PM 4:47

INFO MEMO

1420
Paul Butler
4/6
Pub
DIRECTOR, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 4/5/05

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Update

- o Attached is the current Directives Review Update, depicting the breakout of revisions and cancellations by OSD Component. Data is current as of March 25, 2005.
- o **Analysis: Since our January 31, 2005 update, total revisions increased from 65% to 70% with 97 directives not yet in formal coordination.** Nineteen of these directives are charters under DA&M requiring significant OSD Component input. **Total cancellations improved from 87% to 91%.**
- The next steps in our directives review are to continue working with the OSD Components to:
 - o Revisit the 243 directives certified current in 2003, prior to establishing the standard for a two-year review cycle
 - o Revise or cancel the remaining 104 directives to reach 100%
 - o Conduct a review of the entire-directives process to make it more responsive, efficient, and less administratively bureaucratic
- I will keep you advised of our progress. Next update as of June 25, 2005.

COORDINATION: None

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
All OSD Components Listed

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Edward J. Burbol (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD	24/7	
TSA SD	SA DSD	4/6	
EXEC SEC	M4/6	13/5	
ESR MA	E 4/6	12/30	

OSD 06487-05

REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES REPORT

4/5-

REVISIONS

COMPONENT	REPORTED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION	% SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION	SIGNED BY DSD
USD(AT&L)	45	44	98	26
USD(P)	43	16	37	1
USD(P&R)	86	72	84	36
USD(C)	7	7	100	2
USD(I)	47	16	34	1
ASD(NII)	10	8	80	3
ASD(PA)	3	3	100	2
ASD(LA)	3	2	67	0
DPA&E	1	1	100	0
DOT&E	1	1	100	0
DNA	1	1	100	1
IG, DoD	7	7	100	4
GC, DoD	16	15	94	9
DA&M	45*	26	58	5
WHS	8	8	100	7
TOTALS	323	227	70%	97

CANCELLATIONS

USD(AT&L)	30	30	100	22
USD(P)	11	9	82	0
USD(P&R)	14	14	100	11
USD(C)	1	1	100	1
USD(I)	6	4	67	3
ASD(NII)	14	12	86	10
ASD(PA)	0	0	NA	0
ASD(LA)	0	0	NA	0
DPA&E	0	0	NA	0
DOT&E	0	0	NA	0
DNA	0	0	NA	0
IG, DoD	0	0	NA	0
GC, DoD	1	1	100	1
DA&M	10*	8	80	1
WHS	0	0	NA	0
TOTALS	87	79	91%	50

* Of the 55 DA&M directives identified for revision/cancellation, 49 are charter directives requiring significant input from OSD Components.



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT 11 PM 5:05
10 OCT 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT: Status of DoD Directives

- In response to the attached snowflake, the most current monthly DoD Directives Review Update is provided at Tab A. Data reflected tracks the progress to either revise, reissue as an Instruction, cancel, or consolidate 184 Directives currently in coordination. This is our immediate, near-term objective.
- Since you approved the Phase II direction of effort under DepSecDef lead (see Tab B), these monthly updates have been provided to your office and to the OSD Components. This practice will continue.

COORDINATION: None

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared by: Mr. Edward Burbol, WHS/ESD, (b)(6)

3008

10 Oct 05

5 Oct 05

OSD 20159-05



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

06 OCT 2005

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management *MBD*

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review – Phase II Update

- Working with your Phase II policy guidance and newly established Focal Points in OSD offices, fully half of the DoD directives in coordination will be converted to DoD instructions (signed out by Undersecretaries or other senior officials), cancelled, or consolidated.
- Current status of the 184 Directives pending coordination:
 - 37 of the 184 Directives in coordination (20.1%) have been completed.
 - Below is a summary of Directive Work Plans submitted by OSD staff:

	Course of Action			
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directives)
Oct 4	90	71	21	2
%	48.9%	38.6%	11.4%	1.1%

- A summary of status by staff element is attached.
- Focal Points are preparing their list of Directives planned for completion over the next month and this data will be included in our November update.

COORDINATION: None

**cc: Secretary of Defense
All OSD Components Listed**

Prepared By: Ed Burbol (b)(6)

DoD Directives Program, Phase II – Directive Pending Coordination, Component Summary

Proponent (OPR)	Evaluation on Type of issuance				Number/Percentage Completed
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directive(s))	
ASD(LA)	0	2	0	0	0/0%
ASD(NII)	3	1	5	0	3/133.33%
ASD(PA)	0	2	0	0	1/150%
DA&M	24	6	2	1	7/121.21%
DOD GC	5	1	0	0	0/0%
DOT&E	0	1	0	0	1/1100%
IG, DOD	0	3	0	0	0/0%
USD(AT&L)	11	13	4	0	7/25%
USD(C)	2	0	2	0	1/25%
USD(I)	13	10	1	0	4/116.67%
USD(P&R)	9	32	6	1	8/16.67%
USD(P)	23	0	1	0	2/8.3%
Total (184)	90				
Total (184)		71	21	2	37
Percentage	48.9%	38.6%	11.4%	1.10%	20.1%

630
1600



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 30 PM 12:32

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

Robert Rangel
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD** 30 JUN 2005

SUBJECT DoD Directives Review

- The Directives Review you initiated in October 2003 generated measurable progress. Of the initial 653 directives, 62% are certified as current or are revised/cancelled; 25% are in coordination; and 13% are still being worked. This Phase generated forward momentum and Principal's involvement. It is time to advance our effort.
- The Deputy Secretary and I have discussed a "Phase II" overhaul of the Directives System to:
 - o Focus Directives on their intended purpose: assignments of authority and responsibility that only you and the Deputy can make, such as organizational charters for OSD staff and DoD components, and other non-delegable responsibilities based in statute, Executive Order, or Presidential Directive. This will further reduce the total number of Directives by pushing some down to DoD Instructions and other Issuances approved by your Principal Staff Assistants.
 - o Strengthen my role as the DA&M from accounting and monitoring to management and enforcement of the Directives System.
 - o Modernize the directive process and introduce new technology.
 - o Publish or eliminate within 60 days the -180 directives languishing "in coordination."
 - o Introduce a 45-day standard for coordination and approval of new Directives.
 - o Move primary responsibility for oversight of this process to the Deputy consistent with your division of labor.
- As you initiated the Directives review, I want to confirm that you are comfortable with reinvigorating this project as outlined above, and with moving oversight under the Deputy. I would copy you on my monthly progress reports to the Deputy.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve by initialing below:

- The Direction of effort in Phase II: Approve *MD* Disapprove _____
- The DepSecDef lead: Approve *MD* Disapprove _____ *570 6/30*

COORDINATION: NONE

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense

MA SD	6/7/1	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	6/6/30	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	6/6/30	1450	
ESR MA	6/6/30	1045	

Prepared by: Mr. John Krysa, WHS/ESD (b)(6)

OSD 12697-05


Handwritten initials

*0805
10/7*

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gordon England
ADM Mike Mullen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Dependents to Bahrain



292

I think it is time to **get** the dependents back to Bahrain and go normal. There is always going to be a risk anywhere in the Middle East, **but** it seems to me it has been plenty long enough. Unless there is a good reason not to, let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100405-15

.....
Please Respond By 10/25/05

405705

OSD 20174-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52795

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2005

TO: Robert Rangel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Radio Frequency Spectrum

This memo from Lin Wells doesn't & it fix me. After reading it, I don't know what to do when I get up in the morning. I am concerned about it. I don't think he is on the mark, and I need somebody to tell me what they think I ought to do.

Please talk to Steve Cambone or somebody with some savvy, and see what they think.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/12/05 ASD(NID) memo to SecDef [OSD 20175-05]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

DHR:dh
102105-01 (TS).doc

-12/13 - 7/2 GRIMES

.....
Please respond by November 17, 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52796

OSD 20175-05 |

413.77

21 OCT 05

21 NOV 05

10/26
1580

10/17
1730

10/18
1500



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2005 OCT 17 PM 2:40

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

Robert F. ~~Francis~~ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AL
10/18

FROM: Lin Wells *[Signature]* 10/14/05

SUBJECT: Concern About the Radio Frequency Spectrum

- In response to your note of September 26 (Tab A), regarding Dr. Schlesinger's concerns of the "GPS noise floor" and the potential impact to the radio frequency spectrum used by GPS, this office continues to work this issue through the inter-agency process.
- Dr. Schlesinger was expressly concerned with the potential "sacrifice" of some part of the GPS noise floor by the Department of Commerce to allow other applications and technology to be developed.
- A "GPS Protection Plan" is required by the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-79), "U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy," 8 Dec 2004. This NSPD is the source of the Secretary of Commerce's responsibility to "seek to protect the radio frequency spectrum used by the Global Positioning System and its augmentations" that Dr. Schlesinger referenced.
- The GPS protection plan will outline measures necessary to protect present and future applications of GPS without unduly inhibiting development of new technologies. DoD participants in its development include the Air Force Frequency Management Agency, the GPS Joint Program Office and this office.
- Industry (private sector) continuously pressures the Department of Commerce, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Congress for more of the government spectrum. Commerce and the other federal agencies have agreed not to make recommendations on the protection of GPS spectrum until sound technical studies have been completed on the impact of the GPS noise floor.
- If the GPS spectrum becomes an irresolvable inter-agency issue, a letter to the Secretary of Commerce from you may be required to protect this vital national security and defense service.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachment:
As stated

MA SD	10/13	SMA DSD	10/18
TSA SD	10/13	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/17/05	10/18	
ESR MA	20/10/17/15/15		

Prepared by: Badri Younes (b)(6)

OSD 20175-05



AM-74

(Hide) Snowflake Information:

[View Signed Snowflake](#)  

 [Edit Snowflake](#)

[Redacted]

Suspense Date: October 13, 2005

[Redacted]

Classification: **FOUO**
Handling Instructions:
Keywords:

Created on: September 26, 2005
Created by: (b)(6)

Action Type: BUSINESS
Closeout Type: HARDCOPY
Closeout Date: October 18, 2005

Subject: Concern About the Radio-Frequency Spectrum

(Hide) Snowflake Distribution:

Status	Address	Access?	Sent Date	Suspense	Completion Date	Distribution Type	Response Re Req?
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED TO:	LINWELLS	<input type="checkbox"/>	09/27/05	10/13/05	10/18/05	INBOX	YES
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED CC:	GORDON ENGLAND	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	09/27/05	10/13/05	10/18/05	INBOX	NO

(Hide) Attachments/Comments:

Show All Documents

Document Type	Sent By	Created On	Subject
 ATTACHMENT	LtCol Greg Lengyel	09/27/05 14:24:04	sf
 RESPONSE	John Grimes	10/12/05 16:05:49	Concern About Radio Frequency Spectr
 COMMENT	Robert Rangel	10/17/05 18:08:34	Info memo dtd 17 Oct 05 fm Wells to [Redacted] (OSD 20175-05).

FOUO

SEP 27 2005

TO: Lin Wells
 CC: Gordon England
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Concern About the Radio-Frequency Spectrum

Here is a note from Jim Schlesinger evincing concern about encroachment on the portion of the Radio-Frequency spectrum used by the Global Positioning System. Please get your head into it and let me know how serious it is, and what we should be doing about it.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/23/05 Message from James Schlesinger to SecDef

DRE:as
092605-36

.....
 Please Respond By October 13, 2005

10/18
1600

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten notes: DR - 10/21, Get an Answer, DR]

[Handwritten note: DR 10/18]

10/18

[Handwritten notes: Sin, Response attached]

FOUO

2

MacNeil, Kevin, CPT, OSD

From: Lengyel, Greg, Lt Col, OSD
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:44 PM
To: SecDef Cable ESO
Subject: FW: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schiesinger

Cables,
Please forward to SecDef at (b)(6)
thanks,

Greg Lengyel, Lt Col, USAF
Military Assistant to SecDef
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Padgett, Carol T. [mailto:cpadgett@nsa.gov]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:37 PM
To: Greg.Lengyel@osd.mil
Subject: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schiesinger

The following message is from the Secretary on behalf of James Schiesinger:

Don:

This constitutes a heads-up with respect to possible trouble regarding the spectrum.

After 9/11, the industry apparently decided that aggressiveness with respect to the national security spectrum was no longer opportune. But, of late, there is a reemergence of interest and pressure.

In its recent "spectrum protection" proposal, NTIA appears eager to see "how much of the GPS noise floor can be sacrificed for the benefit of other applications and technologies." (emphasis added)

In its response to comments on its proposal, Commerce seems to wish to stress its charge to:

"facilitate cooperation between the United States Government and U.S. industry as appropriate to identify mutually acceptable solutions that will preserve existing and evolving uses of space-based PNT services, while allowing for the development of other technologies and services that depend on use of the RF spectrum" to the detriment of its responsibility to protect the RF spectrum used by GPS."

One may reasonably speculate that industry has renewed its pressure both on Commerce (NTIA) directly and on members of Congress and the FCC.

JRS

9/23/2005


AS₂

1114-3

FOUO

27
27
25

SEP 27 2005



TO: Lin Wells
CC: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Concern About the Radio-Frequency Spectrum

413m7

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Thanks.

Attach 9/23/05 Message from James Schlesinger to SecDef

DHR.ss
092605-36

.....
Please Respond By October 13, 2005

27 Sep 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52801

OSD 20175-05

MacNeil, Kevin, CPT, OSD

From: Lengyel, Greg, Lt Col, OSD
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:44 PM
To: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: FW: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger

Cables,
 Please forward to SecDef at (b)(6)
 thanks,

Greg Lengyel, Lt Col, USAF
 Military Assistant to SecDef

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Padgett, Carol T. [mailto:cpadgett@mitre.org]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:37 PM
To: Greg.lengyel@osd.mil
Subject: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger

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JRS

9/23/2005

A-52



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

2005 10 17 10 2:39

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells *Lin Wells 10/12/05*

SUBJECT: **Concern About the Radio Frequency Spectrum**

- In response to your note of September 26 (Tab A), regarding Dr. Schlesinger's concerns of the "GPS noise floor" and the potential impact to the radio frequency spectrum used by GPS, this office continues to work this issue through the inter-agency process.
- Dr. Schlesinger was expressly concerned with the potential "sacrifice" of some part of the GPS noise floor by the Department of Commerce to allow other applications and technology to be developed.
- A "GPS Protection Plan" is required by the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-79), "U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy," 8 Dec 2004. This NSPD is the source of the Secretary of Commerce's responsibility to "seek to protect the radio frequency spectrum used by the Global Positioning System and its augmentations" that Dr. Schlesinger referenced.
- The GPS protection plan will outline measures necessary to protect present and future applications of GPS without unduly inhibiting development of new technologies. DoD participants in its development include the Air Force Frequency Management Agency, the GPS Joint Program Office and this office.
- Industry (private sector) continuously pressures the Department of Commerce, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Congress for more of the government spectrum. Commerce and the other federal agencies have agreed not to make recommendations on the protection of GPS spectrum until sound technical studies have been completed on the impact of the GPS noise floor.
- If the GPS spectrum becomes an irresolvable inter-agency issue, a letter to the Secretary of Commerce from you may be required to protect this vital national security and defense service.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Badri Younes (b)(6)

OSD 20175-05

11-L-0559 OSD/52803

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

September 26, 2005

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Concern About the Radio-Frequency Spectrum

Here is a note from Jim Schlesinger evincing concern about encroachment on the portion of the Radio-Frequency spectrum used by the Global Positioning System. Please get your head into it and let me know how serious it is, and what we should be doing about it.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/23/05 Message from James Schlesinger to SecDef

DHR:as
092605-36

.....
Please Respond By 10/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52805

OSD 20175-05

MacNell, Kevin, CPT, OSD

From: Langyel, Greg, Lt Col, OSD
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:44 PM
To: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: FW: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger

Cables,
Please forward to SecDef at (b)(6)
thanks,

Greg Langyel, Lt Col, USAF
Military Assistant to SecDef

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Padgett, Carol T. (mailto:cpadgett@mitre.org)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 4:37 PM
To: Greg.Langyel@osd.mil
Subject: Message for Sec Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger

The following message is sent to the Secretary on behalf of James Schlesinger:

Don:

This constitutes a heads-up with respect to possible trouble regarding the spectrum.

After 9/11, the industry apparently decided that aggressiveness with respect to the national security spectrum was no longer opportune. But, of late, there is a recrudescence of interest and pressure.

In its recent "spectrum protection" proposal, NTIA appears eager to see "how much of the GPS noise floor can be sacrificed for the benefit of other applications and technologies." (emphasis added)

In its response to comments on its proposal, Commerce seems to wish to stress its charge to:

"facilitate cooperation between the United States Government and U.S. industry as appropriate to identify mutually acceptable solutions that will preserve existing and evolving uses of space-based PNT services, while allowing for the development of other technologies and services that depend on use of the RF spectrum" to the detriment of its responsibility "to protect the RF spectrum used by GPS."

One may reasonably speculate that industry has renewed its pressures both on Commerce (NTIA) directly and on members of Congress and the FCC.

JRS


9/23/2005

A-52

~~FOUO~~

1416
27 Sep 05

SEP 27 2005



TO: Ken Krieg
Gordon England

cc:

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Using Diesel Fuel in Gasoline Engines

Here's a note that we should look into. I don't know if it makes any sense or not.
Let me know what you find out after you talk to the folks involved.

463

Thanks.

Attach: James Bauernschmidt letter to SecDef: SecDef response to James Bauernschmidt

DHR:ss
092605-37

.....
Please Respond By 10/13/05

27 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20176-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52807

James Bauernschmidt

(b)(6)

Sept. 15, 2005

Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

Is there any chance you **can** direct the **military** to **require** all future equipment with **an** internal combustion engine to be made using the **Sonex** technology (see enclosed article)?

Sonex can help the military reach the goal of switching to a **uniform** fuel like **JP5** within a few years. Furthermore, Sonex also makes much higher **fuel** efficiency and environmental standards achievable.

Mr. Rumsfeld, your issuing such a directive would **serve our** nation well.

Sincerely,

James Bauernschmidt

PS. You are more than welcome to visit the Sonex laboratory located in Annapolis, Maryland.

11-L-0559/OSD/52808

#73 January/February 2005



Washington's Independent Journal of News, Ideas & Culture

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FREE THOUGHTS

FIRST WORD by Doug Collins
[Home of the Timid](#)

READER MAIL
[Insurance bloodsuckers. Thanks for Strikes" should be struck down. The silence of the politicians](#)

NORTHWEST & BEYOND
[Olympians resist Iraq war. Land returned to WA tribes. Flame retardants give off toxic dust. Many problems with US elections. Women in Iraq face many threats. Action demanded on Sudan. Coca-Cola threatens water supplies](#)

CONTACTS

NORTHWEST NEIGHBORS
[contact list for WA progressives](#)

DO SOMETHING CALENDAR
[Northwest activist](#)

WAR

[Seattle appearance: Michael Ruppert Explains 'Peak Oil' and 9/11](#)
by Ridger Herbst

[Widespread Abuse by US Marines](#)
from the ACLU

MEDIA BEAT by Norman Solomon
[A distant mirror of hoiv war](#)

POLITICS

[EB! Spying Illegally on Political and Religious Groups](#)
from the ACLU

[Gonzales: Attorney General for the Country or for Bush?](#)
by Domeniw Maceri

WORKPLACE

Can a gas engine use diesel fuel *with* less pollution?

by James Bauernschmidt

Anyone concerned with rising oil prices and pollution from fossil fuel might like to know about a new technology, which addresses both problems. Its application will put an end to the days of sooty smoke seen from accelerating diesel trucks and buses. The technology involves a slight modification to an engine part that can be mass-produced on existing manufacturing lines.

The technology is the result of over thirty years R&D conducted by Dr. Andrew Pouring, a former professor and chairman of the Dept. of Aerospace Engineering at the US Naval Academy. Through his company Sonex Research, Inc. in Annapolis, MD (see www.sonexresearch.com), his work focused on improving the process of combustion through a combination of chemical and fluid dynamic effects. The technology is manifested in the new design of piston heads inside the engine. The Sonex pistons have uniquely shaped chambers with holes in them which bring about a more complete combustion through the turbulence created by high speed air flows emitted from the chambers. (See diagram below).

The new piston can be used in one of two ways in a direct-injected (DI) engine.

A standard DI diesel engine at compression ratios greater than 16:1 can be equipped with the Sonex piston, enabling overall soot reduction of approximately 50% and a reduction in NOx of 10% without exhaust gas recirculation. This application has little affect on fuel economy. These results were positively evaluated by the world-famous laboratory, Ricardo Consulting Engineers in England.

Unfair Suspension of Sound Transit Security Officer
from SEIU Local 6

A Lockout That Boxed Employers In
by David Bacon

ELECTIONS

How the Grinch Stole me White House-again
by Alan Waldman

Bush Lost
by Margie Bums

Reform Coalition Offers IRV to Solve WA Election Mess
from IRVWA

SAN FRANCISCO USES IRV FOR FIRST TIME
from the Center for Voting and Democracy

ENVIRONMENT

TOWARD A TOXIC-FREE FUTURE
from WA Toxics Coalition

WA State Unveils Plan to Phase Out Toxic Flame Retardants
by Brancie Smith

Addiction to oil: Mother Nature vs me Hummer
by Linda Averill

Can a gas engine use diesel fuel with less pollution?
by James Bauernschmidt

HEALTH

A User-Friendly Vaccination Schedule
by Donald W. Miller, Jr., MD

NATURE DOC by John F. Ruhland, ND
Pressured back to health: hyperbaric oxygen therapy

RELIGION

GOD KNEW(S)
by Hammond Guthrie



But the most advantages come when applying the Sonex piston in a DI gasoline engine with compression at 12.5:1 or lower, while using a variety of fuels. This design is called Sonex Controlled Auto Ignition (SCAI). The SCAI process is basically controlled HCCI (Homogeneous Charge Compression Ignition), which manufacturers world wide are seeking to control because of its low emissions and good fuel economy. The beauty of the SCAI process is that it enables a gas engine to run with no spark plugs using either a heavier fuel such as diesel or military fuel JP5 or lighter alcohol fuels with greater efficiency and cleaner exhaust. Using JP5 in a single cylinder engine, the Sonex laboratory measured an overall soot reduction of approximately 90% and NOx reduction of approximately 80%. The need for elaborate aftertreatment of the exhaust is minimized. The result is a much lighter and more fuel-efficient engine which can run on heavier or lighter fuels, including gasoline. Sonex has recently successfully applied their SCAI process to a six-cylinder Subaru gas engine using JP5 fuel under a DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) contract and is confirming its single cylinder results.

Diesel fuel offers several advantages over gasoline. Diesel is easier to make at our overworked refineries. MTBE contamination from gas tanks is not an issue. Diesel fuel is also not explosive (it will extinguish a burning match), so transporting it to gas stations would not attract terrorist activity. For several years, the US military has been trying to switch to using only a uniform kerosene based fuel (JP5) similar to diesel. Problems of attacks on convoys transporting gasoline have already confronted our forces in Iraq and reaffirmed the need for improvement. Also, because diesel is a heavier fuel, it contains more energy. The US Marine Corps has already applied another version of Sonex technology in their UAVs (unmanned aviation vehicles) with success. The same UAVs are now able to fly 20% farther using heavy fuel thanks to the Sonex technology.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11/0

11/31
8:00



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

2005 OCT 31 PM 1:49

ACTION MEMO

21 OCT 2005

[Handwritten signature]

HOMELAND DEFENSE
Robert Rangel
11/10

*ACTING
DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
GE APPROVED
NOV 17 2005*

DepSecDef

USD(P)

I#-05/013013

23-1307

[Handwritten signature]

Peter F. Verca
Principal Deputy

325

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Mahle, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: D.C. National Guard Command and Control

- You asked for options to modify the command and control alignment of the D.C. National Guard (TAB A).
- The current alignment dates from a 1969 memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense Laird (TAB B). That memo delegates:
 - To the Secretary of the Army for the Army National Guard, and to the Secretary of the Air Force for the Air National Guard, authority to supervise, administer, and control their respective National Guard elements.
 - To the Secretary of the Army for the Army National Guard and to the Secretary of the Air Force for the Air National Guard, command of National Guard operations conducted while in militia status. This command is to be exercised through the Commanding General of the D.C. National Guard.
 - As an exception, if the operations conducted while in militia status involve aid to civil authorities, **only** the Secretary of the Army commands the National Guard forces, through the Commanding General. **This** exception applies even if some, or all, of the forces are members of the Air National Guard.
 - The Secretary of the Army is required to consult with SecDef prior to employing the D.C. National Guard to suppress riots.
 - In the past few years, the practice of the Secretary of the Army has been to consult with ASD(HD) and with SecDef **prior** to employing the D.C. National Guard to provide **any** aid to civil authorities.
 - Use of the D.C. National Guard to provide aid to civil authorities also must be coordinated with the Department of Justice.
 - In general, options for re-aligning the command and control structure of the D.C. National Guard include:
 - Option 1: No change.

21 Oct 05

27 Sep 05

MA SD	<i>11/1</i>	SMA DSD	<i>10/31</i>
TSA SD	<i>11/3</i>	SA DSD	<i>16 NOV</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>11/31</i>	ISSO	<i>11/11/05</i>
ESR MA	<i>1/50</i>		

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 20177-05


10-25-05 A08:43 IN

11-L-0559 D/52811

- Option 2: Formalize the policy and procedures to provide that the Secretary of the Army will consult with ASD(HD) and SecDef prior to employing the D.C. National Guard to provide aid to civil authorities.
- Option 3: Revoke the delegation to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force to command the D.C. National Guard. Responsibility for commanding the D.C. National Guard would then fall to SecDef.
- Option 4: Revoke all delegations to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. Responsibility for the command and staff functions of the D.C. National Guard would then fall to SecDef.
- Any realignment would pose policy, organizational, legal, and resource issues that would need to be considered.

RECOMMENDATION: ASD(HD) coordinate with other interested offices to review the options, assess implications, and provide you with a recommendation within 60 days.

SecDef Decision:

Approved 

Disapproved _____

COORDINATION: General Counsel 1/17

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Mitchell, OASD(HD)/FP & E, (b)(6)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

OCT 10 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Supervision and Control of the National Guard of the
District of Columbia

The President, by Executive Order Number 11485, October 1, 1969 (copy attached) authorized and directed me to supervise, administer and control the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "National Guard") while in a militia status except as provided in Section 3 of the Executive Order. The President also directed that I command (through the Commanding General of the National Guard) the military operations, including training, parades and other duty of the National Guard while in militia status and authorized me to delegate to subordinate officials any of the authority conferred upon me by the Executive Order.

I hereby direct the Secretary of the Army to act for me in the above matters pertaining to the Army National Guard and the Secretary of the Air Force to act for me in matters pertaining to the Air National Guard. The Commanding General of the National Guard shall report to the Secretary concerned for their respective elements of the National Guard and the Secretaries will exercise this authority through the Commanding General of the National Guard while the National Guard is in militia status.

As to the use of the National Guard in militia status to aid civil authorities, I hereby direct the Secretary of the Army to command, through the Commanding General of the National Guard, all operations of the Army and Air National Guard elements as an exception to the above. The Secretary of the Army, after consultation with me and subject to the direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief, and

11-L-0559/OSD/52813

in accordance with the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbance, may order out the National Guard under title 39 of the District of Columbia Code to aid the civil authorities of the District of Columbia.

The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force are authorized to delegate the foregoing authority to the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of their respective military departments. ✓

Secretary of Defense memorandum, subject: District of Columbia National Guard dated 2 February 1949 is rescinded. 2:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. M. ...", written over a horizontal line.

U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

www.archives.gov

February 17, 2004

Executive Order 11485—Supervision and control of the National Guard of the District of Columbia

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 11485 of Oct. 1, 1969, appear at 34 FR 15411, 15443, 3 CFR, 1966-1970 Comp., p. 813, unless otherwise noted.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and the National Guard of the District of Columbia under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 6 of the Act of March 1, 1889, 25 Stat. 773 (District of Columbia Code, sec. 39-112), and section 110 of title 32 and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense, except as provided in section 3, is authorized and directed to supervise, administer and control the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "National Guard") while in militia status. The Commanding General of the National Guard shall report to the Secretary of Defense or to an official of the Department of Defense designated by the Secretary on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. Through the Commanding General, the Secretary of Defense shall command the military operations, including training, parades and other duty, of the National Guard while in militia status. Subject to the direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the Commanding General shall exercise authority over the National Guard under title 39 of the District of Columbia Code to aid the civil authorities of the District of Columbia.

Sec. 2. The Commanding General is responsible for: (1) advising the President with respect to the alternatives available pursuant to law for the use of the National Guard to aid the civil authorities of the District of Columbia; and (2) for establishing after consultation with the Secretary of Defense law enforcement policies to be observed by the military forces in the event the National Guard is used in its militia status to aid civil authorities of the District of Columbia.

Sec. 3. The commanding General and the Adjutant General of the National Guard will be appointed by the President. The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Commanding General, shall at such times and in such manner as may be appropriate submit to the President recommendations with respect to such appointments.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of Defense and the Commanding General are authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective Departments any of the authority conferred upon them by this order.

Sec. 5. Executive Order No. 10030 of January 26, 1949, is hereby superseded.

 TOP OF PAGE


Page URL: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/codification/executive_order/11485.html

U.S. National Archives & Records Administration
700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20408 • 1-866-NARA-NARA • 1-866-272-6272

FOUO

SEP 27 2005

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Fran Harvey _____
Gordon England _____
Eric Edelman



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: D.C. National Guard Command and Control

Please get back to me with some options to square away the alignment issues with the D.C. National Guard. Something there doesn't quite make sense.

325

DHR:ss
092605-33

.....
Please Respond By 10/11/05

27 Sep 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52816

OSD 20177-05

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

I'm a little concerned about the condolence letters. Specifically, the portion that reads, "military service involves great danger in times of peace as well as in war." It seems *so* obvious -- isn't there a better way to phrase it?

Thanks.

D:HR.ss
100605-23

.....
Please Respond By 10/13/05

293

604505

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20180-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52817

A

~~FOUO~~

SEP 23 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Supplemental Numbers for Senator Bunning

Jim Bunning asked about the supplemental numbers. Can we get someone from the White House who works on the supplemental to talk to him and answer the question on our behalf, and you be involved?

Thanks.

DHR:db
092205-05



Please Respond By 10/13/05


FOUO

Handwritten initials and "XTRA"

0730
9/23

SEP 23 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Supplemental Numbers for Senator Bunning

Jim Bunning asked about the supplemental numbers: Can we get someone from the White House who works on the supplemental to talk to him and answer the question on our behalf, and you be involved?

110.00

Thanks.

DHR.dh
092205-05



Please Respond By 10/13/05

23 Sep 05

OSD 20181-05

11-L-0569/OSD/52819

FOUO



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1003 OCT 13 PM 6:00

INFO MEMO

October 13, 2005 1:30 PM

FOB: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake Response regarding Supplemental Numbers for
Senator Bunning

- You asked if someone from the White House would contact Senator Bunning and field his questions regarding Supplemental numbers.
- The Comptroller's office, after consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, called the Senator's staff, discussed the cost of the war since 9/11, and explained that DoD has not begun work on a Fiscal Year 2006 Supplemental.
- Once the FY 2006 Appropriations Bill is complete, with the amount and composition of the bridge fund known, then DoD will work with OMB to formulate the next Supplemental.
- The Senator's staff appreciated the September 28 call and relayed that the Senator is satisfied and expects follow-on discussions.

Attachments:

Snowflake #092205-05 (Tab A)

Cost of the War (Tab B)

Prepared by: Rebecca Schmidt, OSD(C), (b)(6)

OSD 20181-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52820

A

~~FOUO~~

17 SEP 23 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Supplemental Numbers for Senator Bunning

Jim Bunning asked about the supplemental numbers. Can we get someone from the White House who works on the supplemental to talk to him and answer the question on our behalf, and you be involved?

Thanks.

DHR:db
092205-05

.....

Please Respond By 10/13/05

11-L-0559/OSD/52821

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20181-05

Cost of the War

Since the attacks of 9/11, DoD has spent \$224 billion on the Global War on Terror (data through June 2005).

- \$224 billion breakdown by operation:

Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)	\$23 B	(homeland defense)
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	\$47 B	(Afghanistan)
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)	<u>\$154 B</u>	(Iraq)
TOTAL	\$224 B	



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2005 NOV 07 PM 4:21

CM-0038-05
7 November 2005

JRPAQ

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *Mr. R. Pace 5 Nov 05*

SUBJECT: Answer for Senator Warner (SF 092205-03) (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Answer. In response to your request (TAB A), Iraqi Army units, regardless of their Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) level (1-4), operate with embedded **military transition teams**. Iraqi units remain "independent" (level 1), **even** though they have embedded transition teams -- the teams **remain to** continue assessing and mentoring. At some point in the future, with conditions determined by the Joint Committee on Iraqi Transition to Security Self-Reliance, these embedded teams will be removed.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Analysis. Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, testimony before the Senate and House Armed Service Committees on 29 September addressed the critical importance of embedded military transition teams and their relationship in **jointly** assessing the TRA levels of Iraqi Army units.

7 NOV 05

(U) RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign the letter to Senator Warner at TAB B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

(U) COORDINATION. TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Victor E. Renuart, USAF; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

OSD 20182-05

23 SEP 05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FORM 0550 OSD 02023



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
Committee on **Armed** Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the **opportunity** to respond to your inquiry regarding Iraqi Security Forces and how we grade them with reference to embedded military transition teams.

Iraqi Army units, regardless of their Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) level (1-4), operate with embedded military transition teams. Iraqi units remain "independent" (level 1), even though they have embedded transition teams—the **teams** remain to continue assessing and mentoring. At some point in the future, with conditions determined by the Joint **Committee** on Iraqi Transition to Security Self-Reliance, these embedded teams will be removed.

General Casey's testimony before the Senate and House Armed Service Committees on September 29 addressed the critical importance of these embedded **military** transition teams and their relationship in jointly assessing the TRA levels of Iraqi Army units.

Sincerely,

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION

OSD/LA

Mr. Stanley

2 November 2005

USCENTCOM

Col Gullekson

12 October 2005

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/52825

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

DJS

SEP 23 2005

TO Gen Dick Myers
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Answer for Senator Warner

Let's get an answer to John Warner's question as to how we grade these Iraqi troops. His question was: if we have 6, 7, or 12 people imbedded with a Unit, does that mean they are no longer independent, or are they independent even if they have imbeds?

Then we need to footnote that paper and get a specific answer to Senator Warner.

Thanks.

DHR,dk
092205-03

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

OSD 20182-05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/52826


FOUO

Gen
X'DEA

0730
9/23

SEP 23 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT Answer for Senator Warner



Let's get an answer to John Warner's question as to how we grade these Iraqi troops. His question was: if we have 6, 7, or 12 people imbedded with a unit, does that mean they are no longer independent, or are they independent even if they have imbeds?

Iraq

Then we need to footnote that paper and get a specific answer to Senator Warner.

Thanks.

DHR:jk
092205-03

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

23 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

TAB A.

SEP 13 2005

2220

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article by Richard Sisk

Please have someone take a look at the attached piece by Richard Sisk that quotes Krepinevich, and tell me ~~what~~ they *think* of it and *why*. I would like to bring it up with Abizaid or Casey, when we talk. ~~Please~~ see that they *get* a copy of it.

Thanks.

Attach: Article by Richard Sisk "Military Expert Urges New Plan In Iraq War"

DHR:ss
091205-13

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52828

OSD 20188-05

25

New York Daily News
September 11, 2005

Military Expert Urges New Plan In Iraq War

By Richard Sisk, Daily News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - To win in Iraq, President Bush **must scrap** his faltering "stay the course" strategy **and** commit to a new plan that would stress protecting Iraqis **over** killing militants, **according** to a respected military **analyst**.

Retired **Army** Col. Andrew Krepinevich said that **his** detailed **proposal** was a long shot on two levels: Bush would have to own up to mistakes, and the plan **might** not work **anyway**.

"**This** is the **best** of a bad **set** of options," Krepinevich said, but "it's the **best** chance of **achieving** our war objectives."

Krepinevich laid out **his** "oilspot" strategy last **month** in a "How to **Win** in Iraq" article for Foreign Affairs that caught the eye of Vice President **Cheney** and midlevel Pentagon officers.

Under **the** oilspot plan, **U.S. troops** and reconstruction **efforts** would be targeted in **peaceful** areas **and** major cities. The current military **search-and-destroy sweeps through** the lawless zones of Sunni western Iraq would mostly cease.

The idea is **the** oilspots would expand **until** **democracy** can be sustained in Iraq, allowing **U.S. troops** to begin withdrawing.

But "even if **successful**, **this strategy** will require at **least** a decade of **commitment** and hundreds of billions of dollars, and will result in **longer U.S.** casualty rolls," said Krepinevich, the West Point-trained executive **director** of the Center for Strategic **and** Budgetary Assessments.

"**This** isn't any **radical** new idea," he added. "The basic concept is the same" as the "hearts and **minds**" strategy refined **by U.S.** Marines in Vietnam.

The Marines called it their "inkblot" plan to integrate a **squad** with Vietnamese forces. The mixed force would protect **and stabilize** a Village, and stability would **spread**. But then-Defense **Secretary** Robert McNamara told the **Marines** their inkblot strategy was "a good idea but too **slow**."

If **Americans** won't pay the price for **an** oilspot plan, Krepinevich said the **U.S.** will have to "settle for a much **more** modest goal."

Washington would be left to "leveraging its waning **influence** to outmaneuver the **Iranians** and the **Syrians** in creating **an ally** out of **Iraq's next** despot."

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

CH-0005-05
11 October 2005
2005 OCT 12 PM 12:46

INFO MEMO

Iraq

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *11/8/05*

SUBJECT: (SFs 091205-13 and 082905-31) *New York Times* Article on Strategy in Iraq and Article by Richard Sisk

- Answer. In response to your issues (TAB A), we agree with Andrew Krepinevich's conceptual approach (TAB B) and are already implementing many of his recommendations in Iraq. Editorial comments in David Brooks' (TAB C) and Richard Sisk's (TAB D) articles quote and echo Mr. Krepinevich's argument that US Armed Forces lack a strategy, despite our executing much of his proposed strategy. This indicates that the US government is not effectively communicating its strategy or successes in Iraq to the American public.
- Analysis. Brigadier General Jones, J-5, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Middle East, and Colonel Walker, J-5, Middle East-Iraq, Division Chief, met with Mr. Krepinevich on 20 September. Mr. Krepinevich was unaware that the United States is using a similar approach and that Multi-national Force-Iraq has a campaign plan for executing much of his proposed strategy. We agree with Mr. Krepinevich's assessment of the enemy and the situation; however, we disagree with his assertions that US **Armed** Forces have overly concentrated on hunting and killing insurgents; that the US government has issued muddled signals about US withdrawal and turning security responsibility over to the Iraqis; his oilspot- approach application; and that US rotation of leaders is pernicious.

11 Oct 05

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

13 Sep 05

OSD 20188-05

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

TAB A.

SEP 13 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Article by Richard Sisk

Please have someone take a look at the attached piece by Richard Sisk that quotes Krepinevich, and tell me what they think of it and why. I would like to bring it up with Abizaid or Casey, when we talk. Please see that they get a copy of it.

Thanks.

Attach: Article by Richard Sisk "Military Expert Urges New Plan In Iraq War"

DHR:as
091205-13

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52832

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

AUG 31 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
ADM Ed Giambastiani
GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gordon England
Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: *New York Times* Article on Strategy in Iraq

Here is an interesting article that apparently is based on a longer analysis by Andrew Krepinevich that appeared in this month's *Foreign Affairs*. I have not had an opportunity to read either article.

It sounds to me like it recommends doing largely what we've already been doing - gradually turning over larger and larger segments of the country to the Iraqi Security Forces. I would appreciate your own thinking on it. Sooner would be better.

Thanks.

Attach.
NYT article: *Winning in Iraq* by David Brooks

DHR:as
082905-31

.....
Please Respond By 09/14/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 17712-05
A-15-10

11-L-0559/OSD/52833

TAB

B

TAB 3

How to Win in Iraq

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

A FALTERING EFFORT

DESPITE THE Bush administration's repeated declarations of its commitment to success in Iraq, the results of current policy there are not encouraging. After two years, Washington has made little progress in defeating the insurgency or providing security for Iraqis, even as it has overextended the **U.S.** Army and eroded support for the war among the American public. Although withdrawing now would be a mistake, simply "staying the course," by all current indications, will not improve matters either. Winning in Iraq will require a new approach.

The basic problem is that the United States and its coalition partners have never settled on a strategy for defeating the insurgency and achieving their broader objectives. On the political front, they have been working to create a democratic Iraq, but that is a goal, not a strategy. On the military front, they have sought to train Iraqi security forces and turn the war over to them. **As** President George W. Bush has stated, "Our strategy can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But the president is describing a withdrawal plan rather than a strategy.

Without a clear strategy in Iraq, moreover, there is no good way to gauge progress. Senior political and military leaders have thus repeatedly made overly optimistic or even contradictory declarations. In May of 2004, for example, following the insurgent takeover of

ANDREW E. KREPINEVICH, JR., is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. He is the author of *The Army and Vietnam*.

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Fallujah, General Richard Myers, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, "I think we're on the brink of success here." **Six** months later, before last November's offensive to recapture the city, General John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, said, "When we win this fight—and we **will** win—there **will** be nowhere left for the insurgents to hide." Following the recapture, Lieutenant General John Sattler, the Marine commander in Iraq, declared that the coalition had "broken the back of the insurgency." Yet in the subsequent months, the violence continued unabated. Nevertheless, seven months later Vice President Dick Cheney claimed that the insurgency was in its "last throes," even as Lieutenant General John Vines, commander of the multinational corps in Iraq, was conceding, "We don't see the insurgency expanding or contracting right now." Most Americans agree with this less optimistic assessment: according to the most recent polls, nearly two-thirds think the coalition is "bogged down."

The administration's critics, meanwhile, have offered as their alternative "strategy" an accelerated timetable for withdrawal. They see Iraq as another Vietnam and advocate a similar solution: pulling out U.S. troops and hoping for the best. The costs of such premature disengagement would likely be calamitous. The insurgency could morph into a bloody civil war, with the significant involvement of both Syria and Iran. Radical Islamists would see the U.S. departure as a victory, and the ensuing chaos would drive up oil prices.

Instead of a timetable for withdrawal, the United States needs a real strategy built around the principles of counterinsurgency warfare. To date, U.S. forces in Iraq have largely concentrated their efforts on hunting down and killing insurgents. The idea of such operations is to erode the enemy's strength by killing fighters more quickly than replacements can be recruited. Although it is too early to tell for sure whether this approach **will** ultimately bring success, its current record is not good: even when an attack manages to inflict serious insurgent casualties, there is little or no enduring improvement in security once U.S. forces withdraw from the area.

Instead, U.S. and Iraqi forces should adopt an "oil-spot strategy" in Iraq, which is essentially the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security

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and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort—hence the image of an expanding oil spot. Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly.

THE FACE OF THE INSURGENCY

THE INSURGENCY plaguing Iraq has three sources. One is the inexplicable lack of U.S. postwar planning. The security vacuum that followed the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime gave hostile elements the opportunity to organize, and the poorly designed and slowly implemented reconstruction plan provided the insurgents with a large pool of unemployed Iraqis from which to recruit. The second source is Iraq's tradition of rule by those best able to seize power through violent struggle. Washington's muddled signals have created the impression that American troops may soon depart, opening the way to an Iraqi power struggle. (This is why the Shiite Arabs and the Kurds, even though they generally support the new government, have refused to disband their own militias.) The third source of the insurgency is the fact that jihadists have made Iraq a major theater in their war against the United States, abetted by the absence of security in Iraq and the presence of some 140,000 U.S. "targets."

The insurgency is dominated by two groups: Sunni Arab Baathists and foreign jihadists. Although it is difficult to measure their strength precisely, the former group is clearly larger, numbering perhaps 20,000, while the jihadists are estimated to number in the low hundreds. The Baathists—former members of Saddam's ruling elite hope to restore themselves to power. The jihadists want to inflict a defeat on the United States, deal a blow to its influence in the region, and establish a radical Islamist state in Iraq.

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Both insurgent camps know they cannot defeat the U.S.-led coalition militarily. Their best chance of success is to wait for a premature U.S. withdrawal and then spark a coup, in which a small, well-disciplined group with foreign backing seizes power from a weak, demoralized regime. Toward this end, the insurgents are fighting to perpetuate disorder and to prevent the establishment of a legitimate, democratic Iraqi government. By creating an atmosphere of intimidation, insecurity, and despair, they hope to undermine support for the government. Brazen attacks on its leaders and police send a chilling message to the Iraqi people: If the government cannot even protect its own, how can it protect you? Sabotage of Iraq's national infrastructure underscores the government's failure to provide basic services such as water and electricity and to sustain the oil production on which Iraq's welfare depends. By inflicting casualties on U.S. forces at the same time, the insurgents seek to raise the cost of continued U.S. involvement and weaken support for the war back home—thereby hastening a U.S. withdrawal.

The insurgents have proved themselves to be resilient and resourceful, but they have also shown serious weaknesses. Compared with the United States' opponents in Vietnam, they are a relatively small and isolated group; the Iraqi rebels number no more than a few tens of thousands, whereas the ranks of the Vietnamese Communists were composed of roughly ten times that number. Iraqi insurgents rarely fight in groups as large as 100; in Vietnam, U.S. forces often encountered well-coordinated enemy formations of far greater size. The Vietnamese Communists, veterans of over two decades of nearly continuous war against the Japanese, the French, and the South Vietnamese, were also far better trained and led than the Iraqi insurgents and enjoyed external backing from China and the Soviet Union. The support provided to the insurgents by Iran, Syria, and radical Islamists elsewhere pales in comparison.

The Iraqi insurgents are also relatively isolated from the Iraqi people. Sunni Arab Muslims comprise the overwhelming majority of insurgent forces but account for only 20 percent of Iraq's population, and the jihadists are mostly foreigners. Neither insurgent movement has any chance of stimulating a broad-based uprising that involves Arab Shiites and Kurds. Indeed, despite the hardships endured by the Iraqi people,

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there has been nothing even approaching a mass revolt against the U.S.-led forces or the interim Iraqi government. This is not surprising, for the insurgents have no positive message with which to inspire popular support. A Baathist restoration would mean a return to the **misery** of Saddam's **rule**, and the jihadists would do to Iraq what radical Islamists have done in **Afghanistan** and Iran: introduce a reign of terror and repression.

The insurgency's **success**, accordingly, depends on continued disorder to forestall the creation of a stable, democratic Iraq and erode the coalition's willingness to persist and prevail. The insurgents believe the coalition lacks staying power, citing as evidence the U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon following the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and from Somalia a decade later after 18 U.S. servicemen were **killed**. The Baathist insurgents hope that if they succeed in outlasting the Americans, support from Syria and other Arab states will enable them to topple the new regime. This would likely trigger a civil war, with Shiite Arab **Iraqis** supported **by** Iran. Radical Islamists would have perhaps their best chance of seizing power under such chaotic conditions.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

IN CONVENTIONAL warfare, the enemy's military forces and capital city are often considered its centers of gravity, meaning that losing either would spell defeat. In the Iraq war, for example, the coalition concentrated on destroying Saddam's Republican Guard and capturing Baghdad. But the centers of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare are completely different, and focusing efforts on defeating the enemy's military forces through traditional forms of combat is a **mistake**.

The current fight has three centers of gravity: the Iraqi people, the American people, and the American soldier. The insurgents have recognized this, making them their primary targets. For the United States, the **key** to securing each one is winning "hearts and minds." The Iraqi people must believe that their government offers them a better life than the insurgents do, and they must think that the government will prevail. If they have doubts on either score, they **will** withhold their support. The American people must believe that the

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war is worth the sacrifice, in lives and treasure, and think that progress is being made. If the insurgents manage to erode their will, Washington will be forced to abandon the infant regime in Baghdad before it is capable of standing on its own. Finally, the American soldier must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice and think that there is progress toward victory. Unlike in Vietnam, the United States is waging war with an all-volunteer military, which gives the American soldier (or marine) a "vote" in the conflict. With over 150,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers must rotate back into those war zones at a high rate. If confidence in the war wanes, veterans will vote with their feet by refusing to reenlist and prospective new recruits will avoid signing up in the first place. If this occurs, the United States will be unable to sustain anything approaching its current effort in Iraq. A precipitous reduction in U.S. forces could further undermine the resolve of both the American and the Iraqi people. At present, U.S. Army and Marine Corps reenlistment rates are strong. Army recruiting, however, is down substantially.

The insurgents have a clear advantage when it comes to this fight: they only need to win one of the centers of gravity to succeed, whereas the United States must secure all three. Making matters even more complicated for the coalition, a Catch-22 governs the fight against the insurgency: efforts designed to secure one center of gravity may undermine the prospects of securing the others. For example, increased U.S. troop deployments to Iraq—which require that greater resources be spent and troops be rotated in and out more frequently—might increase security for the Iraqi people but erode support for the war among the U.S. public and the military. This risk is especially great given the nature of the current U.S. operations against the insurgents. They put too great an emphasis on destroying insurgent forces and minimizing U.S. casualties and too little on providing enduring security to the Iraqi people; too much effort into sweeping maneuvers with no enduring presence and too little into the effective coordination of security and reconstruction efforts; and too high a priority on quickly fielding large numbers of Iraqi security forces and too low a priority on ensuring their effectiveness.

The key to securing the centers of gravity in the current war is to recognize that U.S. forces have overwhelming advantages in terms of

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combat power and mobility but a key disadvantage in terms of intelligence. If they know who the insurgents **are** and where **they are**, **they can** quickly suppress the insurgency. The Iraqi people are the best source of **this** intelligence. But U.S. forces and their allies can only **gain** this knowledge by winning locals' hearts and minds—that **is, by** convincing them that the insurgents' defeat is in their interest and that **they can** share intelligence about them without fear of insurgent reprisals.

HISTORY LESSONS

INSURGENCIES ARE nearly as old as warfare itself, so there is no shortage of past counterinsurgency strategies to draw on. The Romans suppressed rebellions with such ferocity and ruthlessness that it was said they would "create a desert and call it peace." The British often maintained order through a divide-and-conquer strategy. **They** would support one of several factions vying for power, and in return for this support the favored group would respect British interests in that part of the world. Neither of these strategies is attractive today. The Roman approach clearly conflicts with American values, and the British strategy would lead to a client-sponsor relationship with a **non-democratic regime**—hardly what the Bush administration hopes to foster in Iraq.

During the Vietnam War, **U.S.** strategy focused on **killing** insurgents at the expense of winning hearts and minds. This search-and-destroy strategy ultimately failed, but it evidently continues to exert a strong pull on the U.S. military, as indicated by statements like that of a senior army commander in Iraq who declared, "[I] don't think we will put much energy into trying the old saying, 'win the hearts and minds.' I don't look at it as one of the metrics of success." Having left the business of waging counterinsurgency warfare over 30 years ago, the U.S. military is running the risk of failing to do what is needed most (win Iraqis' hearts and minds) in favor of what it has traditionally done best (seek out the enemy and destroy him). Thus, **U.S.** forces have recently pushed forward with more offensive operations of this type in western Iraq, which has produced some insurgent casualties but had a negligible effect on overall security.

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The oil-spot strategy, in contrast, focuses on establishing security for the population precisely for the sake of winning hearts and minds. In the 1950s, the British used it successfully in Malaya, as did the Filipinos against the Huk insurgents. Given the centers of gravity and the limits of U.S. forces in Iraq, an oil-spot approach—in which operations would be oriented around securing the population and then gradually but inexorably expanded to increase control over contested areas—could work.

Coalition forces and local militias, such as the Kurdish Pesh Merga, now provide a high level of security in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces. These areas comprise the country's true "Green Zone" (the term normally used to describe the heavily fortified part of Baghdad where

Search and destroy failed in Vietnam, but it continues to exert a strong pull on the U.S. military.

U.S. headquarters are located). In these provinces, people lead relatively normal and secure lives. The rest of the country—the "Red Zone"—is made up of the generally unsecured provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Nineveh, and Salah ad Din, each of which has a sizable or dominant Sunni Arab population. The oil-spot campaign should start by enhancing security in the Green Zone.

The U.S. and Iraqi governments should also focus reconstruction efforts here, in order to reward loyalty to the government and to minimize "security premium" expenses on projects.

To start, U.S. and coalition forces must do much more to aid and develop the capabilities of their Iraqi counterparts in counter-insurgency operations: training them, embedding U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraqi units, and providing U.S. quick-reaction forces to support the Iraqis, if needed. The embedding effort should be far more extensive than currently planned, and some of the U.S. Army's best soldiers should be assigned to this initiative. It would involve some risk, since embedded U.S. personnel are likely to suffer more casualties than they would in all-U.S. units. But the payoff would be high as well.


The challenges associated with training Iraqi security forces are well documented, but the United States could still dramatically improve on its current efforts. Embedding more and higher-quality

U.S. soldiers in Iraqi units would be like inserting a steel reinforcing rod into hardening concrete. A higher number of embedded soldiers would support the training of Iraqi officers, as well as facilitate the identification and advancement of capable Iraqi leaders (and weed out substandard ones). Finally, by concentrating Iraqi forces in generally secure areas and in a few areas selected for security “offensives,” the oil-spot strategy would minimize the risk that newly trained Iraqi units will find themselves in over their heads and without adequate support.

The U.S. high command must **also** end the pernicious practice of rotating senior military and civilian leaders in and out of Iraq as though they are interchangeable. Generals who have demonstrated competence in dealing with insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been recalled to stateside duty. Such officers should be promoted and retained in Iraq for an extended period. Those who fail should be rotated back home and replaced. As history has shown time and again, capable leaders are “force multipliers”: they greatly enhance the effectiveness of the troops under their command.

The offensives in the oil-spot strategy should consist of efforts to expand the Green Zone by securing, over time, more and more of the Red Zone. In each phase, both security and reconstruction resources would go to areas selected for these offensives. Since forces and resources are limited—and because laying the foundation for enduring security in each currently unsecured area would take considerable time, likely half a year or longer—oil-spot offensives would typically be protracted in nature.

Each offensive would begin with Iraqi army units and their embedded U.S. advisers sweeping through the target area and clearing it



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of any major insurgent forces. These units would then break up into smaller formations and take up positions in towns (or, in the case of cities, sectors) of the cleared area, providing local security. National police would then arrive and begin security patrols and the vetting and training of local police and paramilitary security forces. As these efforts developed, Iraqi army units would switch to intensive patrolling along the oil spot's periphery to deflect insurgent threats to the newly secured area. A quick-reaction force made up of U.S. or Iraqi army units would deal with any insurgent penetration of the patrol zone. Iraqi and U.S. intelligence operatives would begin the process of infiltrating local insurgent cells and recruiting local Iraqis to do the same. Although current efforts at infiltration have produced spotty results, the oil-spot strategy would give U.S. and Iraqi intelligence forces the time needed to succeed by committing coalition forces to provide an enduring level of security.

These security operations would facilitate reconstruction, offering Iraqis the promise of a better life. Sustained security would also ensure that the benefits of reconstruction would endure, rather than be sabotaged by the insurgents. It would facilitate social reform—for example, enabling women to attend school without fear of retribution from radical Islamists. It would also provide time for the proper vetting and training of local security forces before they assumed their responsibilities. Finally, enduring security would help to convince the local population that the government is serious about protecting them. The overall objective, of course, would be winning their active support, whereupon they would presumably begin providing the government with intelligence on those insurgents who have "gone to ground" in the secured area. Once the population sees the benefits of security and reconstruction—and not until then—local elections could be held.

Given limited military and financial resources, the targets for oil-spot offensives would have to be carefully chosen. Two attractive targets would be Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul. Both are key political and economic centers that border relatively secure areas. As Iraq's capital, Baghdad has great symbolic value. And both areas are within the operational area of U.S. forces, the most capable in the coalition.

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U.S. and Iraqi forces should refine their choices by targeting those areas where they can find tribal allies—and should design reconstruction efforts to ensure that the cooperative local sheik receives “credit” for his help in the eyes of his tribe. Providing such credit would increase the incentives for the tribe to help ensure that reconstruction succeeds, and it might help persuade tribes to provide intelligence on potential acts of sabotage or even to actively support security operations.

Once local forces are ready to assume principal responsibility for local security, most of the Iraqi army units in the area, the national police, and their U.S. supporters should expand the oil spot further. Some quick-reaction forces, however, should remain in the initial oil-spot area to guarantee that the local security forces have prompt support if needed.

Although securing Green Zone targets as well key national infrastructure and previously secured areas should be the military’s first priority, the four unsecured provinces cannot simply be abandoned to the insurgents. Small, extended patrols of U.S. (and, with time, Iraqi) Special Operations forces in the Red Zone should be undertaken to provide intelligence and early warning of significant insurgent activities, while denying insurgents sanctuary and limiting their ability to rest, refit, and plan. If the insurgents attempt to occupy a major town or city, as they did in Fallujah, U.S. and Iraqi forces should mount a punitive expedition to drive them out. Such operations, however, must always remain subordinate to the overall oil-spot strategy, focused on protecting the population, not pursuing insurgent forces.

An important advantage to the oil-spot strategy, given growing concerns over U.S. Army recruiting problems and declining U.S. public support, is that it should be possible to execute the strategy, including the Baghdad and Mosul offensives, with fewer than the 140,000 U.S. troops now in Iraq—120,000 might be sufficient. This 20,000 troop reduction would be possible for several reasons. Substantially increasing the number of U.S. advisers in newly formed Iraqi units would enable these units to become more capable more quickly, and curtailing ill-advised sweep operations would enable U.S. forces to be employed more productively. Retaining

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capable senior U.S. generals in Iraq for extended periods, meanwhile, would dramatically enhance military effectiveness, even at somewhat lower force levels.

THE GRAND BARGAIN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL Sir Gerald Templer, Britain's high commissioner and director of operations during the Malayan insurgency in the 1950s, observed that the political and military sides of counter-insurgency must be "completely and utterly interrelated." So, too, must they be in Iraq. While U.S. military operations take the form of the oil-spot campaign, political efforts should aim to strike a grand bargain with the Iraqi people. This grand bargain would lay the foundation for the gradual development of the broad base needed to sustain an Iraqi democracy.

The grand bargain would cut across key Iraqi religious and ethnic groups and across key tribal and familial units. Its underlying assumptions would be that there are significant elements of each major ethnic and religious group willing to support a democratic, unified Iraq; that a sufficiently broad coalition can be formed, over time, to achieve this end; and that the United States is willing to undertake a long-term effort, lasting a decade or longer, to ensure the grand bargain's success. The Kurds would likely be the easiest to win over. They want the insurgency defeated and a long-term U.S. presence to protect them against Shiite dominance or a Sunni restoration, as well as against external threats from Iran and Turkey. A small, but significant, Sunni element may also want the insurgency defeated, if it can be assured of a long-term U.S. presence to hedge against both Shiite domination (and retribution) and Iranian domination of a Shiite-led government. Like the Kurds, most Shiites want the insurgency defeated. Some are also wary of Iranian attempts to subvert Iraqi independence. These Shiites may also accept a long-term U.S. presence to guard against Iranian subversion and to minimize the risks of a civil war that would threaten their natural advantage in numbers in an Iraqi democracy.

This grand bargain would not seek to win over any one of the principal Iraqi groups entirely, only a substantial portion of each, which

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combined would provide a critical mass in support of the common objectives mentioned above. Since defeating the insurgency is but one step toward achieving these objectives, each group would have an incentive to have Iraq retain some U.S. forces beyond the insurgency's defeat—something critical to achieving the United States' broader security objectives. Under the grand bargain, in short, Iraqis may find that although having U.S. "occupiers" offends their sense of nationalism, with the existence of a sovereign Iraqi regime they are willing to tolerate a much smaller force as "guests."

Stitching this coalition together would require a *good* understanding of Iraqi tribal politics. In many areas of Iraq, the tribe and the extended family are the foundation of society, and they represent a sort of alternative to the government. (Saddam deftly manipulated these tribal and familial relationships to sus-

tain his rule.) There are roughly 150 tribes in Iraq of *varying size* and influence, and at least 75 percent of Iraqis are members of a tribe. Creating a coalition out of these groups would require systematically mapping tribal structures, loyalties, and blood feuds within and among tribal groups; identifying unresolved feuds; detecting the political inclinations of dominant tribes and their sources of power and legitimacy; and determining their ties to tribes in other countries, particularly in Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

To this end, the United States should help the Iraqi government establish an Iraqi Information Service to gather intelligence on the insurgents and penetrate their infrastructure. The service should divide Iraq into regions, sectors, and local grids to focus their efforts, with priority going to those areas that have been secured by or targeted for oil-spot operations. Although U.S. and other coalition forces should monitor and support this effort, the Iraqis themselves, given their superior understanding of local culture, must lead it. Given the unsettled state of Iraqi politics, however, American "Iraqi affairs officers" should also be embedded in Iraqi Information Service units to monitor their activities.

Accurate tribal mapping could guide the formation of alliances between the new Iraqi government and certain tribes and families, improve

Military action is only one element of an overall strategy to defeat the insurgency.

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the vetting of military recruits and civil servants, and enhance intelligence sources on the insurgency's organization and infrastructure. Most important, it would facilitate achieving the grand bargain by identifying the Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite tribes that would be most likely to support a unified, independent, and democratic Iraqi state. In return, tribal allies should receive more immediate benefits, such as priority in security and reconstruction operations.

There are risks in making allies of tribal groups. Tribal alliances are often ephemeral, and the coalition must be prepared to shift its allegiance back and forth between rival tribes rapidly. There is also the risk of tribes emerging as alternatives to the government. Taking on one tribe as an ally may make enemies out of rival tribes that heretofore were neutral. It will take diligence and expert diplomacy to make this element of the strategy work.

As progress is made in crafting the grand bargain and the first oil-spot offensives are concluded, the strategy would enter its second phase. Phase II would see a significant reduction in U.S. force levels—perhaps to as few as 60,000—reflecting the growing strength of the Iraqi government and security forces and the declining strength of the insurgents. U.S. advisers would begin to be phased out of the most capable Iraqi units. Over time, as the insurgent threat shrank to an insignificant problem, the third phase of the strategy would be implemented: the withdrawal of the U.S. military units and most advisers, save for a residual U.S. military presence numbering perhaps 20,000 troops to deter predators such as Iran and Syria. This U.S. security umbrella would also eliminate Baghdad's need to pursue costly nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs. In addition, a residual U.S. presence would discourage any internal Iraqi faction from attempting to overthrow the government.

BETTER METRICS

TO DATE, the Bush administration and its critics alike have often focused on the wrong metrics for measuring progress in the Iraq war. Critics, for example, often use insurgent strength to gauge progress. But it is notoriously difficult to assess accurately insurgent force levels, especially because many Iraqi insurgents are neither full-time

[100] FOREIGN AFFAIRS .Volume 84 No. 5

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/52848

How to Win in Iraq

participants in the conflict nor true believers in the Baathist or the radical Islamist cause. Rather, they have been **forced** to support the insurgency or have been co-opted by insurgents, who pay unemployed Iraqis to plant improvised explosive devices (**IEDs**).

It is also tempting to use the number of combat incidents as a sign of insurgent **strength** and the lack thereof as a sign of insurgent weakness. This must be done with care. A lack of insurgent activity does not necessarily mean success for the counterinsurgent forces. The number of combat incidents around Fallujah in the summer of **2004** was quite low. Yet this was hardly a measure of the Iraqi government's success. Rather, it was a clear signal of its **impotence**, since the insurgents were in full control of the city at that time. Conversely, a large number of attacks may reflect the insurgents' weakness. A rash of attacks might result from insurgents' fears that they are losing the war and must do something dramatic to reverse their fortunes. Consider, for example, the spike in violence around the time of the January **2005** elections—violence motivated by the insurgents' fear of the elections, not their growing strength.

Nevertheless, it is **worth tracking** insurgent activity, not to get a sense of whether progress is being made but to understand the insurgents' priorities and to recognize trends in their behavior. For example, tracking combat incidents could provide insights into trends in the scale of enemy attacks, their level of success, and the insurgents' targeting **priorities**. These data may **also** signal a shift in the insurgents' strategy. For example, signs that insurgents were moving away **from** attacks on government officials could indicate that efforts to protect **key** government officials were paying off.

To the extent that U.S. casualties erode support for the war among American soldiers and the American public, they are an important metric in gauging progress. But the current casualty rate is well below that suffered in Vietnam, and support among those most in danger—American soldiers and marines—remains strong. Both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are exceeding their reenlistment rates. It is the army's recruitment efforts that are experiencing difficulties, an indication that Americans in general are increasingly reluctant to serve.

More important than casualties when it comes to securing the two American centers of gravity is the "gee-rider problem." If Americans

Tab B

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *September / October 2005*

[101]

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

think that the Iraqis do not want to fight for their own freedom against undemocratic insurgent movements, U.S. soldiers (and the American people) may become increasingly reluctant to make sacrifices on the behalf of those they perceive to be ungrateful beneficiaries.

There are other, less problematic metrics that could prove useful in measuring the war's progress and taking the pulse of the war's centers of gravity. One is the **number** of assassinations of government officials and religious leaders. **From** the population's perspective, if the government cannot **even** protect its officials, it is difficult to **see** how it can protect individual citizens. Correspondingly, if the insurgents cannot protect their leaders from being killed or captured, it would **likely** discourage prospective recruits, who would infer that the rebels could not shield them **either**. Success **here** would be a **clear** indication that the counterinsurgent forces were winning the intelligence battle. Since victory in **this** sense would very **likely** mean that individual citizens were stepping forward to provide information, it would also mean that the coalition and the Iraqi government were winning over the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people and thus securing a crucial center of gravity.

Another useful metric is the percentage of contacts with the enemy that are initiated **by** coalition forces. **This** measurement can gauge progress in the intelligence war, which is a surrogate for popular support in Iraq. A positive trend in **this** metric would indicate that the population was providing "actionable" intelligence and that the initiative was passing **from** the insurgent to the counterinsurgent forces. A subset of **this** metric, the percentage of contacts with the enemy initiated by Iraqi forces, is far superior to counting Iraqi troops in determining the Iraqi security forces' effectiveness. If the percentage of contacts with the enemy that are initiated by Iraqi forces were to increase, and if their share relative to that of other coalition forces were to *grow*, this would indicate that Iraqi forces **are** assuming more of the burden for Iraq's security and also winning the people's support. Positive trends in this metric could also encourage greater U.S. popular support, since it would also enable reductions in the number of **U.S.** troops in Iraq.

Still another useful measure is the percentage of "actionable" intelligence tips received from the population relative to the percentage **gained** through military surveillance (reconnaissance aircraft or **security**

How to Win in Iraq

forces patrols, for example) and government intelligence operatives. **An** increase in this ratio would indicate that the people share the coalition's objectives and feel secure enough to volunteer information on the insurgents.

Then there are "market metrics." Insurgents have exploited both the unemployed and criminals in seeking support. They often pay Iraqis to plant IEDs and declare bounties for the killing of government officials. Such measures indicate that the insurgency is struggling to expand its ranks and must buy support. It would be helpful to keep track of the "market" in this aspect of the conflict. What are the insurgents offering to those who **will** plant an IED? What kind of bounty are they placing on the lives of their enemies, and how does that price change over time? The assumption behind these market metrics is that the higher the insurgents' price, the fewer people there are who are willing to support them. Such a reduction in support could indicate success on the part of the coalition and the Iraqi government in improving security, reducing unemployment, and strengthening the popular commitment to the new regime, **all** of which would leave fewer people vulnerable to persuasion or coercion by the insurgents.

PAYING THE PRICE

No **STRATEGY will** bring about an end to the insurgency quickly or easily. In that sense, the strategy presented here is the best of a bad lot. It is superior to the current "stay the course" strategy and to following an arbitrary timetable for withdrawing from Iraq, the solution advocated by many of the Bush administration's critics. Its chief **virtue** is that it reflects **an** understanding of the war's centers of gravity and attempts to balance the sometimes competing demands of these centers while also securing them.

There **will** of course be great difficulties in carrying out such a plan. First, creating a coalition for a grand bargain will prove challenging, given the long-standing animosities between segments of the Iraqi population, the Iraqis' suspicions of **Americans**, and the cultural ignorance of U.S. forces and policymakers. Second, the U.S. **military** must walk a fine line between risking the increased casualties that extended embedding of American soldiers in Iraqi units will produce and risking

Andrew E. Krepinevich, Jr.

a collapse of recruitment and retention efforts that could result from a continued reliance on large U.S. troop deployments. Third, setting up effective Iraqi security forces will be a **fitful**, long-term process, and oil-spot operations could **pro**w frustrating to a U.S. military that prefers to take the fight to the enemy **through** traditional offensive operations. Finally, coordinating and integrating security intelligence, and reconstruction operations **will require** a level of **U.S.-Iraqi** cooperation and an integrated **U.S.** effort far beyond what the interagency process in Washington has produced—including strong central coordination and leadership from the senior political official on the scene) the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad.

Even if successful, this strategy will require at least a decade of commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars and will result in longer U.S. casualty rolls. But this is the price that the United States must pay if it is to achieve its worthy goals in Iraq. Are the American people and American soldiers willing to pay that price? Only by presenting them with a clear strategy for victory and a **full** understanding of the sacrifices required can the administration find out. And if Americans are not up to the task, Washington should accept that it must settle for a much more modest goal: leveraging its waning influence to outmaneuver the Iranians and the Syrians in creating an ally out of Iraq's next despot. 

TAB

C

New York Times
August 28, 2005

TAB C

Winning In Iraq

By David Brooks

Andrew Krepinevich is a **careful**, scholarly **man**. A graduate of **West** Point and a **retired** lieutenant colonel, **his** **book**, "The **Army** and Vietnam," is a classic on how to fight **counterinsurgency** warfare.

Over the past year or **so** he's been asking **his** friends and former colleagues in the military a **few** simple questions: Which of the several known strategies for fighting insurgents are you guys employing in **Iraq**? What metrics are you **using** to measure **your** **progress**?

The **answers** have been **disturbing**. There is **no** clear strategy. **There** are no clear metrics.

Krepinevich **has** now published **an** essay in the new issue of Foreign Affairs, "**How to Win in Iraq**," **in** which he proposes a strategy. **The** article **is** already a phenomenon among the people **running** this war, **generating** discussion in the Pentagon, **the** C.I.A., the American Embassy in Baghdad and the office of the vice president.

Krepinevich's proposal is hardly new. He's **merely** describing a classic **counterinsurgency** **strategy**, which was **used**, **among** other places, in Malaya by the British in the **1950's**. The same approach was pushed by **Tom Donnelly** and **Gary Schmitt** in a **Washington** Post essay back on **Oct. 26, 2003**; by **Kenneth Pollack** in Senate testimony **this** July **18**; and by dozens of midlevel **Army** and Marine **Corps** **officers** in Iraq.

Krepinevich calls the approach the oil-spot strategy. The core insight is **that** you **can't** win a **war** like this by **going** off on search and destroy missions trying to **kill** insurgents. There are always more enemy fighters waiting. **You** end up **going** back to the same **towns** again and again, because the insurgents just pop up after you've left and kill anybody who helped **you**. **You** alienate civilians, who **are** the **key** to **success**, with **your** **heavy-handed** raids.

Instead of trying to kill insurgents, Krepinevich **argues**, it's **more** important to protect civilians. You set up safe havens where you can establish good security. Because you don't have **enough** manpower to do **this** everywhere at **once**, you select a **few** key cities and **take** control. Then you slowly expand the **size** of your safe havens, like an oil spot **spreading** across the pavement.

Once you've **secured** a town or city, you throw in all the economic and political resources you have to make that place grow. The locals see the benefits of working **with** **you**. **Your** own troops and **the** folks back home watching on TV can see concrete **signs** of progress in **these** newly regenerated neighborhoods. You **mix** your troops in with indigenous security forces, **and** **through** intimate contact with the locals you **begin** to even out the intelligence advantage that otherwise **goes** to the insurgents.

If you **ask** **U.S.** officials why they haven't adopted **this** strategy, **they** say they have. But if that were **true** the road to the airport in Baghdad wouldn't be a death trap. It would be within the primary **oil** spot.

The fact is, the **U.S.** didn't adopt **this** **blindingly** obvious **strategy** because it violates some of the key Rumsfeldian notions about how the **U.S. military** should operate in the 21st century.

Tab C

First, it requires a heavy **troop** presence, not a light, **lean** force. **Second**, it doesn't play **to our strengths**, which **are** technological **superiority**, mobility **and** firepower. It acknowledges that while we **go with our strengths**, the insurgents exploit our **weakness**: the lack of usable **intelligence**.

Third, it means we have to **think in** the long term. For fear of **straining** the **armed** forces, the **military brass** have conducted **this** campaign with one eye **looking** longingly at **the** exits. A lot of the **military planning** **has** extended only **as far as** the next **supposed** tipping point: the transfer of sovereignty, the election, and **so on**. We've been **rotating** successful commanders **back to Washington** after **short stints**, which is **like** pulling Grant back home before the battle of Vicksburg. The oil-spot strategy would **force us** to acknowledge that **this will** be a long, gradual **war**.

But the **strategy** has **one** virtue. It **might** work.

Today, **public opinion** is **turning** against the war not because people have given up on the goal of advancing **freedom**, but because they **are not sure** **this war** is winnable. Why should we **sacrifice more** American lives to a lost **cause**?

If President **Bush** is going to rebuild **support** for the war, **he's** going to have **to** explain specifically how it can be **won, and** for that he needs a strategy.

It's not **hard** to find. It's right **there** in Andy Krepinovich's essay, and in the **annals** of **history**.

Tab C

TAB

D

TAB D

New York Daily News
September 11, 2005

Military Expert Urges New Plan In Iraq War

By **Richard Sisk**, Daily News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - To win in Iraq, **President Bush** must scrap his faltering "stay the course" strategy and commit to a new plan that would stress protecting Iraqis over killing militants, according to a respected military analyst.

Retired Army Col. Andrew Krepinevich said that his detailed proposal was a long shot on two levels: **Bush** would have to own up to mistakes, and the plan might not work anyway.

"This is the best of a bad set of options," Krepinevich said, but "it's the best chance of achieving our war objectives."

Krepinevich laid out his "oilspot" strategy last month in a "How to Win in Iraq" article for Foreign Affairs that caught the eye of Vice President **Cheney** and midlevel Pentagon officers.

Under the oilspot plan, U.S. troops and reconstruction efforts would be targeted in peaceful areas and major cities. The current military search-and-destroy sweeps through the lawless zones of Sunni western Iraq would mostly cease.

The idea is the oilspots would expand until democracy can be sustained in Iraq, allowing U.S. troops to begin withdrawing.

But "even if successful, this strategy will require at least a decade of commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars, and will result in longer U.S. casualty rolls," said Krepinevich, the West Point-trained executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

"This isn't any radical new idea," he added. "The basic concept is the same" as the "hearts and minds" strategy refined by U.S. Marines in Vietnam.

The Marines called it their "inkblot" plan to integrate a squad with Vietnamese forces. The mixed force would protect and stabilize a village, and stability would spread. But then-Defense Secretary **Robert McNamara** told the Marines their inkblot strategy was "a good idea but too slow."

If Americans won't pay the price for an oilspot plan, Krepinevich said the U.S. will have to "settle for a much more modest goal."

Washington would be left to "leveraging its waning influence to outmaneuver the **Iranians** and the **Syrians** in creating an ally out of Iraq's next despot."

Tab D

TAB

E

TAB E
COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

Gen Abizaid

5 September 2005

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2005

091.3

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Train and Equip

I need talking points on train and equip. I had several opportunities yesterday to push it before Foreign Relations folks and I didn't have any facts.

Thanks.

DHR.ss
092905-15



*Please Respond By **October 11, 2005***

29 Sep 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20242-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52860



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 OCT 12 PM 3:53

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 5, 2005, 6:00 P.M.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dan Stanley", written over a horizontal line.

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response - Talking Points for Train and Equip #092905-15

- You stated the following: "I need talking points on train and equip."
- Attached at TAB 2 are talking points on these two sections of the FY06 NDAA.

Attachments:

Snowflake #092905-15 (TAB 1)
Section 1201/1204 Talking Points (TAB 2)

Prepared by: Col Alan R. Metzler, Military Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52861

OSD 20242-05

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Train and Equip

I need talking points on train and **equip**. I had several opportunities yesterday to push it before Foreign Relations folks and I didn't have any facts.

Thanks.

DIR_{ss}
092905-15

.....
Please Respond By October 11,2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52862

**TALKING POINTS
SECTIONS 1201 AND 1204
FY06 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT**

- Victory in the GWOT cannot be achieved through military means alone. To win, the U.S. **needs** to accomplish three key tasks:
 - Protect the homeland.
 - Destroy terrorist cells and networks.
 - Counter ideological support for terrorism.
- DoD has two legislative proposals to help achieve these goals:
 - Building Partnership Security Capacity (Section **1201** of FY06 Defense Authorization Act).
 - DoD transfer authority to support S/CRS (Section **1204** of FY06 Defense Authorization **Act**).
- Section **1201** will help build the capacity of partner nations to enable them to fight along side of or instead us in the GWOT.
- Section 1204 will enable the deployment of critical civilian expertise alongside military personnel in complex reconstruction and stabilization operations.
- Together these proposals will increase civilian and partner nation capacity to take up their fair share **of** the GWOT fight, **relieving** the burden on US servicemen and women.

TALKING POINTS:
SECTION 1201
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY:

- This proposal is critical for the President to create security capabilities (e.g., counter-terrorism, law enforcement, or border security) that will allow other countries to fight alongside of us or instead of us in the GWOT.
- Currently, our train and equip efforts often require the cobbling together of various authorities between State and DoD – a process that adds months to the effort to get a capacity-building program started.
 - For example, the President promised Georgia critical counterterrorism training and equipping in 2001: it took almost eight months to reconcile different authorities and get started.
- The President needs to be able – with Congressional notification – to launch such efforts in weeks rather than months.
- The Sec 1201 Legislative Proposal would accomplish this with a \$750M contingency authority.
 - A program started under this authority, and with Congressional notification should transition to a long-term authority, such as FMF, with the next supplemental or regular budget cycle.
 - For DoD to implement this authority the Secretary of State must concur. It is important for a coherent, coordinated US government approach that the Secretary of State be a full partner in implementing this authority.
 - If DoD is unable to conduct a security capacity building initiative, DoD could transfer funds to State or another US department or agency to do so.
- Without this authority we may miss counter-terrorism opportunities and increase the burden on American servicemen and women that other countries could assume.

TALKING POINTS
SUPPORT FOR SECTION 1204
DoD – S/CRS TRANSFER AUTHORITY

- The U.S. cannot win the GWOT by military means alone. Effective civilian reconstruction and stabilization activities are critical to long-term military success.
- As the President has noted, our military can **deploy** in days, but U.S. civilians often take months to get critical stabilization and reconstruction tasks underway.
- State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a civilian response capacity to deploy quickly and give our armed forces vital support.
- We hope Congress will provide S/CRS the **funding it needs** to get going. However, if an unforeseen crisis hits in the near-term, S/CRS will need flexible, intra-governmental assistance as it deploys **to support** stabilization and reconstruction activities. Otherwise, it will not play the role the **President** wants and DoD needs.
- The President's Section 1204 Legislative Proposal for the **FY06** Defense Authorization Bill would allow DoD to transfer up to \$200 million in **goods, services, and funding** to S/CRS (or other U.S. Departments and Agencies) through FY06 to help fill gaps in civilian stabilization & reconstruction activities.
- These funds would be used for stabilization and reconstruction missions when the Secretary of Defense determines it **to** be in U.S. national security interests and receives a Secretary of State request.
- DoD cannot do this right now: we lack the express statutory authority to transfer goods or services to another U.S. Department or Agency on a non-reimbursable basis.
- Current emergency authorities lack speed and flexibility:
 - The Economy Act provides support on a reimbursable basis and only for activities that DoD has the authority to do itself.
 - Drawdown is slow and does not allow the transfer of funds or the ability to contract – both vital for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Also, only goods currently in stock can be transferred.
 - The Conflict Response Fund is for emergency relief programs – it will not help S/CRS with deployment or logistics.

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Eric Ruff

CC: Larry DiRita
DAN STANLEY

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislation Supported by The Administration

Please get with Dan Stanley and *the* General Counsel on that legislation that you said the Administration supports to find out what is going on. If it is as bad **as** it sounded, **we** have got to do something about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093005-18

.....
Please Respond By 10/11/05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52866

OSD 20246-05

463

302105

FOUO

OCT 04 2005

463

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Dan Stanley
Phil Grone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Department of Interior Issue

In the hearing last week, Senator Bill Nelson said there is some serious Department of Interior oil and gas issue that is going to impair the military's ability to train, **and** that it is coming very fast.

Do you know anything about it? I need someone to fill me in on it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100305-18

.....
Please Respond By 10/27/05

10/27/05

11-L-0559/OSD/52867

OSD 20249-05

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Environmental Issue

463

Senator Nelson raised an issue on the environment that he said was going to come at us within days or weeks.

Could you please look into that and quickly tell me what's up? I need some information on it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
093005-25

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

3 Oct 05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52868

OSD 20250-05



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

2005 OCT 20 11:40

INFO MEMO

October 20, 2005 9:00 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Senator Nelson's issue regarding the Lease Sale of 181 off the Florida
Panhandle coast (Snowflake Numbers: 093005-25 to LA; 093005-18 to PA;
and 100305-18 to AT&L at Tab A)

- Senator Nelson (D-FL) opposes Lease Sale and pending development of offshore oil and gas leases for the areas off the Florida Panhandle coast. The proposed sale covers almost six million acres in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico off Florida and Alabama. The northern boundary extends to within 17 miles of Florida's northwest coast. The Lease Sale is opposed by virtually every politician in the state of Florida (including Gov. Jeb Bush).
- The Department of Interior has refused to cancel the sale and is allowing drilling to move forward.
- Currently, Senator Nelson has taken the tactic of arguing that aircraft training ranges used by Eglin Air Force Base will be restricted.
- Senator Martinez (R-FL) has joined Senator Nelson in introducing a Sense of the Senate that would use military training as a support for their argument. (Tab B)
- Senator Nelson raised the issue with both Mike Wynne and Don Winter at their confirmation hearing at the SASC on October 6. Both nominees agreed to look into the matter.
- The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed Senator Nelson on 19 Oct 05, relaying that the Joint Chiefs' are concerned with encroachment on our training ranges and that the Department will develop a position on the lease sale. OSD AT&L intends to have a position to the committee on or about 7 Nov in response to a letter from Senators Warner and Levin on the issue.

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared by: Howard Snow, Special Assistant, OASD (Legislative Affairs) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52869

OSD 20250-05

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Environmental issue

Senator Nelson raised an issue on the environment that he said was going to come at us within days or weeks.

Could you please look into that and quickly tell me what's **up?** I need some information on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
093005.25

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52870

OSD 20250-05

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Eric Ruff
CC: Larry DiRita
DAN STANLEY
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legislation Supported by The Administration

Please get with Dan Stanley and the General Counsel on that legislation that you said the Administration supports to find out what is going on. If it is as bad as it sounded, we have got to do something about it.

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DHR:ss
093005-18

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Please Respond By 10/11/05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52871

OSD 20246-05

~~FOUC~~

OCT 04 2005

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Dan Stanley
Phil Grone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Department of Interior Issue

In the hearing last week, Senator Bill Nelson said there is some serious Department of Interior oil **and** gas issue that is going to impair the military's ability to train, and that it is coming very fast.

Do you h o w anything about it? I need someone to fill me in on it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100305-18

.....
Please Respond By 10/27/05

~~FOUC~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52872

OSD 20249-05

SA 1533. Mr. MARTINEZ (for himself and Mr. Nelson of Florida) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1042, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place insert the following:

SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

(A) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:

(1) Whereas the U.S. Air Force and Navy conduct vital and critical national security preparedness missions in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico

(2) Whereas the U.S. Air Force and Navy have had to move their live-fire training operations from Vieques, Puerto Rico

(3) Whereas these training operations are critical for the battle-preparedness of military personnel

(4) Whereas the training areas for these live-fire missions are restricted to an increasingly limited area

(5) Whereas a oil and gas exploration operations in the vicinity of U.S. military training operations poses a risk to human life and

[Page: 58882] GPO's PDF

an accident could threaten and impact coastal communities and beaches

(6) Where as military personnel have expressed concerns with oil and gas operations impeding on their training in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico

(B) The Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that oil and gas exploration operations should not interfere with the training missions and operations of the Department of Defense.

HR 3918

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO POSITION ON THIS BILL

Sponsor:

Peterson, J. (R-Pa.)

Official Title:

A bill to terminate the effect of all provisions of existing federal law prohibiting the spending of appropriated funds to conduct natural gas leasing and pre-leasing activities, to revoke presidential withdrawals from disposition of areas of the Outer Continental Shelf with respect to natural gas, and for other purposes.

Introduced:

September 27, 2005

Committees:

House Resources

Cosponsors:

22 Total (5 Democrats, 17 Republicans)

Abercrombie (D-Hawaii)	Flake (R-Ariz.)	Mica (R-Fla.)
Bishop, R. (R-Utah)	Green, G. (D-Texas)	Osborne (R-Neb.)
Cole (R-Okla.)	Hall, R. (R-Texas)	Pearce (R-N.M.)
Cubin (R-Wyo.)	Istook (R-Okla.)	Regula (R-Ohio)
Doolittle (R-Calif.)	Jefferson (D-La.)	Wicker (R-Miss.)
Duncan (R-Tenn.)	Johnson, Sam (R-Texas)	Young, D. (R-Alaska)
Edwards, C. (D-Texas)	King, S. (R-Iowa)	
Emerson, J. (R-Mo.)	Marshall (D-Ga.)	

Sept. 27, 2005 — Read twice and referred to: House Resources. *Congressional Record*, H8387

Sept. 27, 2005 — Original cosponsor(s): 18

Abercrombie (D-Hawaii)	Edwards, C. (D-Texas)	Mica (R-Fla.)
Bishop, R. (R-Utah)	Emerson, J. (R-Mo.)	Osborne (R-Neb.)
Cole (R-Okla.)	Flake (R-Ariz.)	Pearce (R-N.M.)
Cubin (R-Wyo.)	Green, G. (D-	Regula (R-Ohio)

Texas)
Doolittle (R-Calif.) Istook (R-Okla.) Wicker (R-Miss.)
Duncan (R-Tenn.) King, S. (R-Iowa) Young, D. (R-Alaska)

Sept. 28, 2005 — Additional cosponsor(s): 4

Hall, R. (R-Texas) Johnson, Sam (R-Texas)
Jefferson (D-La.) Marshall (D-Ga.)

Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to shift to another subject about Iraq -- Captain Scott Speicher.

But before I do, General Myers, thank you for your public service. You've been at this for 40 years. I, too, was commissioned 40 years ago but my public service took a different path. And on the occasion of your retirement, Grace and I look forward to seeing you and Mrs. Myers socially.

MYERS:

I hope so, too, Senator, thank you.

BILL NELSON:

Yes, sir.

Also, before we get to Captain Speicher, Mr. Secretary, it needs to come to your attention -- as I spoke with one of your assistant secretaries, Grone, you are about to have the threat of taking away the entire Gulf of Mexico off of Florida as one of the most significant training areas that you have, where you're not only training the F-22 and the F-35 pilots, but also you're shooting a lot of your more exotic warfare that you need plenty of airspace.

BILL NELSON:

And what Mr. Grone did not understand was, he thought he had the luxury of several years to work this out with the Minerals Management Service in the Department of Interior on the expansion of oil and gas leasing on the surface of the Gulf below; when, in fact, you've got a matter of days or at least weeks to register how this would impair the training capability for the United States military if you are denied that area. Because yesterday a bill was marked up in a House committee that, in fact, takes all of the area, except for 25 miles from shore, and opens it to oil and gas leasing.

And I've been the one that has been raising this, trying to protect the interests of the United States military. And I *think* the department has had the idea, "Well, we can work this out with the Department of Interior."

Well, there is a freight train that is starting to move in the aftermath of Katrina and the fear of the shortage. And in this atmosphere, I don't want your United States military preparedness to get hurt by you being denied all of that area because you can't be shooting things down there on the surface of the water if they've got oil and gas rigs all over there.

2005 OCT 18 6:02

463

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

10/18

TO - DAN STANLEY

- PER CONVERSATION
- I DO NOT BELIEVE BULLET #5 IS ACCURATE.
- ALSO SHOULD MENTION WARRIOR-LEVIN HR. AND ATL ROLE.

OSD 20250-05
Robert Rangel R.

18 Oct 05

3 Oct 05



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

OCT 12 PM 4:07

INFO MEMO

October 12, 2005 9:00 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Senator Nelson's issue regarding the Lease Sale of 181 off the Florida Panhandle coast (Snowflake Numbers: 093005-25 to LA; 093005-18 to PA; and 100305-18 to AT&L at Tab A)

- Senator Nelson (D-FL) opposes Lease Sale and pending development of offshore oil and gas leases for the areas off the Florida Panhandle coast. The proposed sale covers almost six million acres in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico off Florida and Alabama. The northern boundary extends to within 17 miles of Florida's northwest coast. The Lease Sale is opposed by virtually every politician in the state of Florida (including Gov. Jeb Bush).
- The Department of Interior has refused to cancel the sale and is allowing drilling to move forward.
- Currently, Senator Nelson has taken the tactic of arguing that aircraft training ranges used by Eglin Air Force Base will be restricted.
- Senator Martinez (R-FL) has joined Senator Nelson in introducing a Sense of the Senate that would use military training as a support for their argument. (Tab B)
- The Air Force briefed the Senator last month on training related to Eglin. Both the Navy and Air Force have stated that this is not an impediment to training.
- Senator Nelson raised the issue with both Mike Wynne and Don Winter at their confirmation hearing at the SASC on October 6. Both nominees agreed to look into the matter.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Howard Snow, Special Assistant, OASD (Legislative Affairs) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52878

OSD 20250-05

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Environmental issue

Senator Nelson raised an issue on the environment that he said was **going to** come at us within days or weeks.

Could you please look into that and quickly tell **me** what's up? I need **some** information on it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
093005-25

.....
Please Respond By October 06, 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52879

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005

TO: Eric Ruff
CC: Larry DiRita
 DAN STANLEY
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legislation Supported by The Administration

Please **get** with Dan Stanley and the General Counsel on that legislation that **you** said the Administration supports to find out what is going on. **If it is** as bad **as it** sounded, we have got to do something about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093005-18

.....
Please Respond By 10/11/05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52880

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2005

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Dan Stanley
Phil Grone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Department of Interior Issue

In the hearing last week, Senator Bill Nelson said there is some serious Department of Interior oil and gas issue that is going to impair the military's ability to train, and that it is coming very fast.

Do you know anything about it? I need someone to fill me in on it.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
100305-18

.....
Please Respond By 10/27/05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52881

SA 1533. Mr. **MARTINEZ** {for himself and Mr. **Nelson** of Florida) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1042, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year **2006** for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and **For** defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for **the** Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At **the** appropriate place insert the following:

SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION ON
MILITARY OPERATIONS

(A) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:

(1) Whereas the U.S. Air Force and Navy conduct vital and Critical national security preparedness missions in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico

(2) Whereas the U.S. Air Force and Navy have had to move their live-fire training operations **from** Vieques, Puerto Rico

(3) Whereas these training operations are critical for the battle-preparedness of military personnel

(4) Whereas the training areas for these live-fire missions are restricted to an increasingly limited area

(5) Whereas a oil and **gas** exploration operations in the vicinity of U.S. military **training** operations poses a risk to human life and

[Page: 58882] GPO's PDF

an accident could threaten and impact coastal communities and beaches

(6) Where as military personnel have expressed concerns with oil and **gas** operations impeding on their training in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico

(B) The Sense **of** the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that oil and **gas** exploration operations should not interfere with the training missions and operations of the Department of Defense.

HR 3918

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO POSITION ON TWS BILL

Sponsor:

Peterson, J. (R-Pa.)

Official Title:

A bill to terminate the effect of all provisions of existing federal law prohibiting the spending of appropriated funds to conduct natural gas leasing and pre-leasing activities, to revoke presidential withdrawals from disposition of areas of the **Outer** Continental Shelf with respect to natural gas, and for other purposes.

Introduced:

September 27, 2005

Committees:

House Resources

Cosponsors:

22 Total (5 Democrats, 17 Republicans)

Abercrombie (D-Hawaii)	Flake (R-Ariz.)	Mica (R-Fla.)
Bishop, R. (R-Utah)	Green, G. (D-Texas)	Osborne (R-Neb.)
Cole (R-Okla.)	Hall, R. (R-Texas)	Pearce (R-N.M.)
Cubin (R-Wyo.)	Istook (R-Okla.)	Regula (R-Ohio)
Doolittle (R-Calif.)	Jefferson (D-La.)	Wicker (R-Miss.)
Duncan (R-Tenn.)	Johnson, Sam (R-Texas)	Young, D. (R-Alaska)
Edwards, C. (D-Texas)	King, S. (R-Iowa)	
Emerson, J. (R-Mo.)	Marshall (D-Ga.)	

Sept. 27, 2005 — Read twice and referred to: House Resources. *Congressional Record* p. H8387

Sept. 27, 2005 — Original cosponsor(s): 18

Abercrombie (D-Hawaii)	Edwards, C. (D-Texas)	Mica (R-Fla.)
Bishop, R. (R-Utah)	Emerson, J. (R-Mo.)	Osborne (R-Neb.)
Cole (R-Okla.)	Flake (R-Ariz.)	Pearce (R-N.M.)
Cubin (R-Wyo.)	Green, G. (D-Texas)	Regula (R-Ohio)

	Texas)	
Doolittle (R-Calif.)	Istook (R-Okla.)	Wicker (R-Miss.)
Duncan (R-Tenn.)	King, S. (R-Iowa)	Young, D. (R-Alaska)

Sept. 28, 2005 — Additional cosponsor(s): 4

Hall, R. (R-Texas)	Johnson, Sam (R-Texas)
Jefferson (D-La.)	Marshall (D-Ga.)

Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

BILL NELSON:

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Im going to shift to another subject about Iraq -- Captain **Scott Speicher**.

But before I do, General Myers, thank you for your public **service**. You've been at **this** for **40** years. I, too, was commissioned 40 years ago but my public **service** took a different path. And on the occasion of your retirement, **Grace** and I look forward to seeing you and Mrs. Myers socially.

MYERS:

I hope so, too, Senator, thank you.

BILL NELSON:

Yes, sir.

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BILL NELSON:

And what Mr. Grone did not understand was, he thought he had the **luxury** of several years to work **this** out with the Minerals Management **Service** in the Department of Interior on the expansion of oil and gas leasing on the surface of the Gulf below; **when**, in fact, you've got a matter of days or at least weeks to register how **this** would impair the training capability for the United States military if you are denied that area. **Because yesterday a bill was marked up in a House committee that, in fact, takes all of the area, except for 25 miles from shore, and opens it to oil and gas leasing.**

And I've been the one that has been raising **this**, trying to **protect** the interests of the United States military. And I **think** the department has had the idea, "Well, we **can** work **this** out with the Department of Interior."

Well, there is a freight train that is **starting to** move in the aftermath of Katrina and the fear of the shortage. And in this atmosphere, I don't want your United States military preparedness to get **hurt** by you being denied all of that area because you can't be shooting things down there on the surface of the water if they've got oil and **gas** rigs all over there.

FOUO

June 14, 2005

701

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Health Care

Please take a look at this e-mail from Newt Gingrich and tell me what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/13/05 Gingrich e-mail: "HSA's Changing the Face of Health Care" w/Michael Barone article attached

DHR:dh
061305-49

.....
Please respond by 7/7/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52886

OSD 20306-05

H

JUN 14 ENT'D

14 JUN 05

06/13

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2005 3:59 PM
To: (b)(6)@OSD.Mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil
Subject: Fwd: HSA's Changing The Face of Health Care

everyone in dod sh
everyone in dod ... could have a mandatory health reimbursement account (hra) and an option for a health savings account (hsa)
the following article by Michael Barone explains why

there is no substitute for getting people involved in heir own lives

obviously the combat and homeland security components of defense are different but all the other health components (by far the greatest expense) are as susceptible to this approach as the public sector

the buildup over the years for your younger and healthier soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines would be amazing

they are among the healthiest people in the country

done properly hras and hsas could help motivate your pre-Medicare retiree population and give them some additional economic options
newf

CC: LARRY DIRITA
VADM STAVRIDIS
STEVE BUCCI
ROBERT RANGEL
COL GRIMSLEY

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Canfield, Sally [Sally.Canfield@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2005 12:43 PM
To: Newt Gingrich (Thirdwave2@aol.com)
Subject: HSA's Changing The Face of Health Care

June 13, 2005

By *Michael Barone*

How many times have you heard that health care costs are rising at record rates? Well, they aren't any more.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that health care costs rose 7.5 percent in 2004, well under the 11.4 percent rise in 2002. The BLS also reports that costs for employers for health insurance per employee per hour worked has slowed down even more. From March 2001 to March 2002, it rose 11 percent; from March 2002 to March 2004, it rose 9 percent each year. But from March 2004 to December 2004, it rose only 3 percent.

Something is going on out there. Politicians and political commentators always assume that government must do something new and different if health care costs are to be held down to bearable increases. But the evidence is that health care costs are being held down, by the workings of the marketplace, partly in response to health care legislation passed in the last four years.

One thing that is going on is that employers are offering and employees are choosing health savings accounts and high-deductible health insurance in greater numbers. HSAs were given a big boost in the Medicare prescription drug bill passed in November 2003; indeed that was the reason that most Republicans voted for a bill that also included the biggest new entitlement program since Medicare was passed in 1965.

HSAs seem to be gaining in popularity. A survey by Watson Wyatt and the National Business Group on Health found that 8 percent of employers are offering health savings accounts in 2005, and 18 percent plan to offer them in 2006. Large majorities of employers believe that HSAs will help lower overall health care costs and that they will expand options for employees.

The number of people covered by HSAs and high-deductible insurance policies increased from 438,000 in September 2004 to 1,031,000 in March 2005. Nearly half of these are people over 40 -- though some predicted that such policies would not be attractive to them.

One thing that HSAs and high-deductible health insurance help do is to make employees more cost-conscious when it comes to health care decisions. HSAs allow employees to keep money they don't spend on health care this year and to roll it over to next year, and on and on -- therefore, there is an incentive not to fritter it away. High-deductible health insurance operates the same way high-deductible auto insurance does: It does not pay for the equivalent of your oil change but does pay you when your car is totaled.

For many years, the World War II decision to make health insurance coverage tax-deductible for employers and non-taxable to employees has driven health insurance to a different model, one that pays for virtually every procedure but in a surprising number of cases does not cover catastrophic costs.

But increasingly that makes no sense.

As *Wall Street Journal* columnist Holman Jenkins points out, the tax subsidy to employees, while worth a lot to high-income earners, is worth very little to those whose income tax liability is low or, as in the case of Earned Income Tax Credit recipients, nonexistent. To them, it is hardly worthwhile to pay an insurance company to process their claims for predictable items like annual checkups and routine pediatric care, yet to be left with a policy that, to hold down employers' costs, doesn't provide catastrophic coverage.

The other interesting development is the emergence of health insurance policies that encourage healthy behavior. Health care experts note that the increasing incidence of diabetes and other obesity-related diseases threatens to hugely increase health care costs in future years.

Old-style health insurance policies provide no incentive to behaviors that tend to reduce the incidence of such disease. In a previous column, I looked at one company that provides such policies, including health club membership for employees. These policies may provide a long-term answer to problems that health care analysts of all political stripes are concerned about.

The overriding assumption in much commentary on health care finance is that individuals and companies are helpless automata waiting for government action before anything can be done anything about health care costs. But recent developments suggest that, in fact, employers and employees are active players, and that provisions of recent legislation that were not much noticed by the commentariat have enabled them to take action that reduces costs and provides increased benefits and incentives for healthier behavior.

We have problems, yes, but we are not helpless.

~~FOUO~~

September 19, 2005

I-05/012451
ES-4255

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Disposition of Debris


Please find out from the Corps of Engineers what can be done with the debris.

I would think it could be landfill. Everyone seems to be concerned about it. There are going to be mountains of it. Goodness knows they are going to need landfill in New Orleans.

Thanks.

DHR dh
091905-55

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05



000.92

19 Sept 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20313-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52890



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600
INFO MEMO

QDUUSD? *[Signature]* OCT 11 2005

11 OCT 2005 DepSecDef
USD(P) *[Signature]* OCT 13 2005

I-05/012651
ES 4255
VIA *[Signature]*
Peter F. Varga
Principal Deputy

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: Disposition of Debris

- You asked me work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regarding the disposition of debris in the areas struck by Hurricane Katrina (TAB A). The Corps of Engineers has developed a Debris Management Plan that will assist the States of Louisiana and Mississippi with the disposal of debris.
- The Plan calls for the disposal of debris at landfills. The cubic amount of debris placed into landfills will be reduced by burning, chipping, salvaging or recycling the various types of debris. The Plan has incorporated environmental safeguards to ensure the protection and safety of personnel involved, as well as the long-term environmental recovery of the areas.
- It is estimated that over 1.5 billion board feet of soft timber and 800 million board feet of hardwood are available for reclamation. Items such as concrete, structural steel, automobiles, and tires can be used in the reconstruction of infrastructure (roadways) or recycled. Lastly, woody vegetative debris and other biomass materials can be recycled into mulch or burned and used in an energy recovery processes.

070-92

COORDINATION: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Mark S. Roupas, OASD(HD)/FP & E, (b)(6)

11 Oct 05

OSD 20313-05

10-11-05 P12:03 IN

19 Sep 05

FOUO

September 19, 2005

TO: Paul McHale

I-05/012651

cc: Eric Edelman

ES-4255

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Disposition of Debris

Please find out ~~from~~ the Corps of Engineers what can be done with the debris.

I would think it could be landfill. Everyone seems to be concerned about it. There are going to be mountains of it. Goodness knows they are going to need landfill in New Orleans.

Thanks.

DHR dh
091905-55

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52892

FOUO

September 28, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman
CC: Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi

I-05/013137
E3-4328

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jalali

If Jalali comes to Washington, I would like to see him. Please work that out. I am told he resigned from Karzai's government for some reason, and he's a good man.

Thanks.

DHR:es
092805-16

.....

Afghanistan

DR
Squor

FOUO

OSD 20314-05
25-09-05 15:42 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/52893

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

LA

October 5, 2005

I-05/013 137-NESA
ES-4328

A/DepSecDef
USD(P)
PDUSD
OCT 11 2005

INFO MEMO

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman (b)(6)

[Handwritten signature] 17 OCT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Jalali

- You asked to meet with former Minister Jalali if he comes to Washington (Tab A).
- Mr. Jalali resigned from his position as Minister of Interior in the Karzai Administration on September 28. The NESA Center at the National Defense University confirms that he will join their faculty in late October or early November.
- Dr. Michael Yaffe, Academic Chairman at the NESA Center, is aware of your desire to meet with Mr. Jalali.

Afghanistan

Way Ahead:

- A meeting will be scheduled as soon as practicable after he assumes his new position.

5 Oct 05

DIR (SA) *[Signature]* PD (NESA) *[Signature]* PDASD/ISA *HS*

Prepared by: COL Robert G. Tregaskis, ISA/NESA (b)(6)

29 Sept 05

12-10-25 12:10 PM
-15 10:27 AM
OSD 20314-05
11-12-05 09:27 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/52854

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman

I-05/013137

c c : Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi

E3-4328

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.R.

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jalali

If Jalali comes to Washington, I would like to see him. Please work that out. I am told he resigned from Karzai's government for some reason, and he's a good man.

Thanks.

DER:SS
092805-16

.....

~~FOUO~~

20-10-05 15:42 LN

11-L-0559/OSD/52896

~~FOUO~~

J05/012641
ES 4252

- . SEP 20 2005

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Philadelphia Inquirer* Article

Please take a look at the attached article from the *Philadelphia Inquirer* and give me the facts.

Thanks.

Anach: Article: "Key Military Units' Hurricane Aid Was Stalled For 3 Days"

DHR:ss
091905-06

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

DR. 92

DR 09/29/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52897

OSD 20315-05



HOMELAND
DEFENSE

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600
INFO MEMO

11 OCT 2005

POHSD OCT 11 2005

USD(P) *S* OCT 13 2005
I# 05/013069-HD/*105/01264/*
ES-4252

1/2 *AA*
Verga
Principal Deputy

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *F* Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: *Philadelphia Inquirer* Article

- On September 20, you asked me to “take a look at the attached article from the *Philadelphia Inquirer* and give me the facts.” (TAB A)
- The article incorrectly states that Active Duty forces were not assigned to support Hurricane Katrina relief operations until September 4— five days after the storm hit the Gulf Coast. Title 10 forces were assigned to the area on August 26, when Defense Coordinating Officers and their support elements deployed to Florida and Alabama. A summary of DoD support is at TAB B.
- The *Inquirer* article also states that it “took just eight hours for 3,600 troops from the 82nd Airborne to be on the ground in Louisiana and Mississippi”, with an “additional 2,500 troops arriving from the 1st Cavalry Division shortly thereafter.” On September 3, the President directed the deployment of 7,200 personnel from the 82nd Airborne, the 1st Cavalry, and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force. Elements of these units arrived in Louisiana the same day, but did not go to the affected areas until it was determined that State and local emergency personnel were unable to conduct appropriate disaster relief and recovery activities.

000-92

11 Oct 05

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
A DepSecDef
CJCS
ASD(PA)

Prepared by: CDR Zelvin, USN, OASD(HD)/P&J (b)(6)

OSD 20315-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10-11-05 12:09

11-L-0559/SD/52898

10-11-05 12:03 IN

TAB A

FOUO

J05/012641
ES 4252

- - SEP 20 2005

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Philadelphia Inquirer* Article

Please take a **look** at the attached article from the *Philadelphia Inquirer* and give me the facts.

Thanks.

Attach: Article: "Key Military Units' Hurricane Aid Was Stalled For 3 Days"

DHR:ss
091905-06

.....
Please Respond By 09/29/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52900

Philadelphia Inquirer
September 17, 2005
Pg. 1

Key Military Units' Hurricane Aid Was Stalled For 3 Days

By Drew Brown, Seth Borenstein and Alison Young, Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - Two days after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, President Bush went on national television to announce a massive federal rescue-and-relief effort.

But orders to move did not reach key active military units for an additional three days, and Bush administration officials could not explain the delay.

Once they received the orders, it took just eight hours for 3,600 troops from the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., to be on the ground in Louisiana and Mississippi with vital search-and-rescue helicopters. An additional 2,500 soon followed from the First Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas.

"If the First Cav and 82d Airborne had gotten there on time, I think we would have saved some lives," said retired Army Gen. Julius Becton Jr., who was the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency from 1985 to 1989, under President Ronald Reagan. "We recognized we had to get people out, and they had helicopters to do that."

Federal officials have long known that the active-duty military is the only organization with the resources and effective command structure to handle a major catastrophe.

In a 1996 Pentagon report, the Department of Defense acknowledged its large role in major disasters. From 1992 to 1996, the Pentagon provided support in 18 disasters and developed five training manuals on how to work with FEMA and civilians in natural disasters.

The delay this time in tapping the troops, helicopters, trucks, generators, communications and other resources of the First Cavalry and the 82d Airborne is the latest example of how the federal response to Katrina lacked organization and leadership. And it raises further questions about the government's ability to rapidly mobilize the active-duty military now that FEMA has been absorbed into the huge, terrorism-focused Department of Homeland Security.

Addressing the nation Thursday from New Orleans, Bush said the storm overwhelmed the disaster-relief system.

"It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces, the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice," he said.

Several emergency-response experts questioned whether Bush and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff understood how much authority they had to tap all the resources of the federal government - including those of the Defense Department.

"To say I've suddenly discovered the military needs to be involved is like saying wheels should be round instead of square," said Michael Greenberger, a law professor and the director of the University of Maryland's Center for Health and Homeland Security.

During another devastating hurricane - Andrew in 1992 - the failure to get food, water and shelter to Florida and to victims highlighted the importance of quickly engaging the Department of Defense.

"For such disasters, DOD is the only organization capable of providing, transporting and distributing sufficient quantities of items needed," the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, wrote in a 1993 report. It noted that the military had storehouses of food and temporary shelters, contingency-planning skills, command capability - as well as the helicopters and other transportation needed to get them to a disaster scene fast.

Indeed, the new National Response Plan - the nation's blueprint for responding to disasters that was unveiled with much fanfare in January by Chertoff's predecessor, Tom Ridge - includes a section on responding to catastrophic events.

"Unless it can be credibly established that a mobilizing federal resource... is not needed at the catastrophic incident venue, that resource deploys," the plan says.

Chertoff, who aides said has been engaged in the response to Hurricane Katrina, went to Atlanta the day after Katrina hit for a previously scheduled briefing on avian flu. Aides also concede that Washington officials were unable to confirm that the levees in New Orleans had failed until midday Aug. 30. The breaches were first discovered in Louisiana about 32 hours earlier.

Greenberger, the Maryland homeland security expert, said he wondered whether Chertoff and other top federal officials understood the National Response Plan or even had read it before Katrina.

"Everything he did and everything he has said strongly suggests that that plan was never read," Greenberger said of Chertoff.

Chertoff was in Gulfport, Miss., yesterday, and took no questions from reporters. Homeland Security officials did not return calls for comment.

TAB B

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Early Active Duty Participation in Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts

- Well in advance of landfall by Hurricane Katrina, Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs were deployed to State emergency operations centers to coordinate DoD support. DoD installation commanders in the Gulf region also executed mutual aid agreements with local governments.
- On August 28, several US Navy ships and US Air Force aircraft were alerted to support requests for aid from civil authorities. Additionally, US Northern Command's Joint Task Force (Forward) deployed to Camp Shelby, MS.
- On August 29, when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, additional US Navy ships were either in the vicinity of, or en route to, the disaster area. Active Duty helicopters conducted the first damage assessments of the areas.
- On August 30, Deputy Secretary England directed that DoD "lean forward." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Commander, USNORTHCOM, directed the movement of helicopters, search and rescue teams, amphibious ships, hospital ships, and medical teams to the disaster area prior to receiving formal requests from FEMA. Other Active Duty assets were also alerted.
- On August 31, as Active Duty forces continued to flow into the region, CJCS directed that they be aggressive in their support of FEMA relief operations.
- 3,000 Active Duty forces were deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina by September 1, with a peak of over 22,000 on September 12.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/52904

June 14, 2005

IRAO

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Steve Hadley

Please take a look at this memo that came over from Hadley on how we are doing on filling those ministry positions.

Thanks.

Anach
6/5/05 Memo on Iraq Staffing

DHR:ss
061305-31

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

OSD 20317-05
JUN 14 ENTN

MF

14 JUN 05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JUNE 13, '05
8:20AM

FAX COVER SHEET

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
COUNCIL**

From: Steve Hadley
To: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
Fax Number: (b)(6)

Date/Time: June 13, 2005

No. of pages to follow: 2

Message:

17th & Penn, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20504

Did you get a complete,
clear transmission? If not
please call:

(b)(6)

Don,
Per my comment to you on the morning call.
Steve

ASB 6/13



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

www.state.gov

June 2, 2005

CR

*Please make available
to NSA Hadley
FYI*

IST
/2
==

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: M - W. Robert Pearson, Acting *RP*

SUBJECT: **Staffing Iraq**

EA
/DGHR
/ES

Nick Burns suggested I update you on our progress in staffing State positions in Iraq. To date, we have approved all the Embassy and regional positions NEA has requested and have made superb progress filling them. We have 13 entry-level positions, all of which have been filled or will be filled from new classes. ~~Of~~ the 128 senior and mid-level positions we need to fill through next spring, 108 are filled, including all senior positions. Only 4 mid-grade positions have no bidders. A recent review by the IG gave HR and NEA high marks for staffing Embassy Baghdad and regional requirements.

*6-3-05
HKLW*

We are working to fill vacancies in the Embassy's Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). We are at 100 percent staffing in several key areas (e.g., consultants for the Ministry of Defense). Overall, IRMO staffing is around 80 percent, and we have taken steps to improve it, including a new recruiting website, hiring additional recruiters and advertising.

While positions outside Baghdad have thus far been filled with TDYers (regional offices and positions embedded with the military), we will convert these to regular assignments in the 2005-2006 cycle. This should assist in recruiting personnel for these positions. We also have a large number of TDY staff on the ground staffing special requirements (e.g. hostage coordination, legal, refugee support.)

On June 1 we spoke with Charge Satterfield who confirmed the major challenge now is to shift personnel assets (primarily reconstruction activities from USAID, IRMO and DOD's Project and Contracting Office (PCO)) from Baghdad to the regions to assist the Provincial Support Teams, and not to add new positions.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

In *the* wake of the most recent Baghdad Accountability Review Board report, the Deputy Secretary has ordered a zero-based review of all *agency* staffing to assure, given the security situation, we have only mission-critical personnel on the ground. We have *this* on a fast track, and will have our "first cut" NEA and HR assessment to the Deputy on June 3. (We will share that assessment with your staff.) This assessment will of course be vetted by Ambassador-Designate Khalilzad, who had already requested a thorough staffing review, and in *the* interagency process, with other agencies.



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

JUN 29 2005

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-1903

Dear Senator Snowe:

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs requested that I respond directly to you regarding Ms Carole Whelm's e-mail to you concerning the building of permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq.

The United States has not built permanent military bases in Iraq. Coalition forces are utilizing former Iraqi regime bases *or* operating from provisional camps throughout the country. These locations remain the property of the Iraqi people.

President Bush has stated that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq only as long as it takes for the Iraqi Government to assume responsibility for security in the country.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Grone
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)



11-L-0559/OSD/52909

e-
20317-04