

~~TOP SECRET~~



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

March 8, 2003, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure

- You asked whether we need to do anything with respect to the memorandum from General Hayden, attached.
- Answer - I do not recommend you do anything further.
- Normally, NSA files a crimes report with the Department of Justice (DOJ) when an NSA report or equity is referenced in the media, to enable DOJ to investigate and take appropriate action. In this case, NSA elected not to file a crimes report, because there is no reference that the information in the (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024 article came from NSA sigint, intercept or other NSA source. Notifying DOJ would have had little value because NSA has so little information to offer.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Attachments:

As Stated

Prepared by: Robert L. Deitz,

(b)(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/15378

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



September 11, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transcript

*000.7 SD*

I have to get a cleaned up copy of this quote from the airplane. They have to do a better job. Can you produce it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Draft transcript

DHR:dh  
091103-3

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/03

*11 Sep 03*

U21846 /03

*Not cleaned up yet. First draft.*

Q: Criticizing the positions you and the President made on Iraq, criticizing the job that you're doing and I'm watching all of that. How does that complicate your effort to get this (inaudible) you're trying to get out on Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terrorism.

Rumsfeld: It makes it complicated it makes it more difficult but I guess that's life. I don't know what one could do about it. It doesn't make it enjoyable but what we have to do is think through to the best we can what it is we believe is in the best interest of the country, explain it to the extent we can to the American people and there's no question that, that - take the force level. There's a (inaudible) building up, more forces, more forces, more U.S. forces in Iraq and so you take a month of (inaudible), another month of (inaudible) planning and work with people and you explain what you're trying to do and you explain why it's important to go from to 55,000 Iraqis and why it's much better to have Iraqis take responsibility for their security and finally it gets through. Eventually if it doesn't - if the ~~the~~ argument doesn't sell, people stop using it because it doesn't resonate and it'll stop. Now in the process you take a lot (inaudible) over a period of time but when it's over if the critics are right then you learn more yourself (inaudible) what it is you're doing. And if the critics are wrong ultimately the people in the media will stop repeating what they have ~~suddenly discovered~~ ~~not suddenly but~~ eventually discovered to be arguments that lack merit because they've heard ~~the way and~~ the reasons that lacks merit and if they don't stop repeating that stuff then the American people will turn them off and (inaudible) serve people in the Navy to have people turn it off.

Q: (Inaudible) efforts on the ground or is this your political efforts?

Rumsfeld: I don't have any political efforts.

Q: Does this complicate the war on terrorism on the grounds?

Rumsfeld: Sure to the extent that there's no doubt but that terrorist - we know for a fact that people studied Somalia, terrorist studied Somalia and they studied instances when the United States was dealt a blow and tucked in. And persuaded themselves that they could in fact cause us to act (inaudible) in whatever it is they wanted to do. The United States is not going to do that, President Bush isn't going to do that.

Now to the extent that the terrorist are given reason to believe he might or that if he is not going to that the opponents might prevail in some way and they take heart in that and that leads to more money going into these activities or that leads to more recruits or that leads to more encouragement or leads to more staying power, obviously it makes our task more difficult. That does not mean there should not be a debate on these (inaudible), there should be a debate in discussion on these things, we can live with that. We can live with a healthy debate as long as it is as elevated as possible and as civil as possible.

*9/9 -  
SecDef - here is the text  
of the question on "debate".  
Have discussed with Scott McLellan &  
and shared the text with Bartlett.  
D. R. L.*

OB  
9/22

September 12, 2003

SUBJECT: Talk to Bremer

I want to talk to Jerry Bremer about what is happening with respect to the money the military has for projects. We want to make sure they still have flexibility.

DHR:dh  
091203-5

020 CPA

U21847 /03

12 Sep 03

TO: David Chu  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
 DATE: September 8<sup>th</sup> 2003  
 SUBJECT: Bonus

*Handwritten initials: DR, Chu*

*Handwritten: 240*

My recollection is that the Navy is offering bonuses to folks if they will sign up for extended tours. I wonder why the Army doesn't consider something like that?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 090803.03

Please respond by:

*Handwritten: 9/25/03*

*Handwritten: 12 Sep 03*

U21848 /03

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
DATE: September <sup>12</sup> 8, 2003  
SUBJECT: Travel

3335D

I find that I am going to the exact same countries that Myers and Wolfowitz have been to or are going to. Further, I find I am going to the exact same places in those countries that Myers and Wolfowitz went to.

It seems crazy to me that the three of us go to the same places. It's a big world, we have to expand our reach. I would like your staffs to start giving attention to that problem. It's a waste. I have asked my folks to be alert to it.

Thanks.

*OB*  
*10-16*

DHR/azn  
090803.08a

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *THE*

125903

U21849 /03

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8<sup>th</sup>, 2003

SUBJECT:

The lack of clarity as to who the enemies are, and what the problems are from an intelligence standpoint in Afghanistan and Iraq is serious.

I keep reading IC intel. It leaves one with the impression that we know a lot-who the people are, what they are doing, why they are doing it, where they are going, when they are meeting, and the like.

However, when one pushes on that information it is pretty clear we don't have actionable intelligence. Further, I wish we had better information about the enemies so we could design a better approach.

I don't feel I have good data on the people we have been capturing and interrogating in either country. I don't feel I am getting information from the interrogations that should be enabling us as to the answer to the questions I've posed.

What do we do about it? We need more visibility.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.27a

*OB*  
*12/12*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*35005*

*12 Sep 03*

U21850 /03

September 12, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/DCI

*Gave  
advanced  
copy to Col Quercia*

*337014*

I need to have a lunch or a meeting with George Tenet sometime next week.  
Maybe instead of waiting until Friday, let's do it early in the week if we have time.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
091203-11

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/03

U21851 /03

*12 Sep 03*

September 12, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Why

Please look at this "E-mail of the week" from Andrew Sullivan. It is powerful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated "E-mail of the week"

DHR:dh  
091203-8

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*088.7*

*12 Sep 03*

U21852 /03

I will make them know who is Dessalines

After, we will let them go and send them back to Brooklyn"

Maybe Mr. Dean likes the rhythm or sound of the song. Maybe he doesn't understand the lyrics. But it's still worth asking: Is that the kind of message we need in a multi-racial society of immigrants? And why, of all the conceivable songs available to Howard Dean, did he pick that one? Is he trying to expand his base among African Americans? Or just white kids in the suburbs with dreadlocks? I thought he had that constituency locked up already.

### E-mail of the week

"Why bother with Iraq? Why fight terrorism? Try this from Richard Hillary's classic World War II autobiography written after months of surgery following being shot down:

In a train compartment on the way to Scotland Hillary asked Peter Pease, another young pilot, his reasons for fighting. 'Well, Richard,' he said, 'you've got me at last, haven't you?'

I don't know if I can answer you to your satisfaction, but I'll try. I would say that I was fighting the war to rid the world of fear — of the fear

of fear is perhaps what I mean. If the Germans win this war, nobody except little Hitlers will dare do anything. . . All courage will die out of the world — the courage to love, to create, to take risks, whether physical or intellectual or moral. Men will hesitate to carry out the promptings of their heart or brain because, having acted, they will live in fear that their action may be discovered and themselves cruelly punished. Thus all love, all spontaneity, will die out of the world. Emotion will have atrophied. Thought will have petrified. The oxygen breathed by the soul, so to speak, will vanish, and mankind will wither."

Peter Pease was killed in action.

Richard Hillary returned to the RAF and was killed in a plane crash during night training. He was 23."

### Sontag award nominee

"Biden says we must win the war. This is precisely wrong. The United States must learn to lose this war — a harder task, in many ways, than winning, for it requires admitting mistakes and relinquishing attractive fantasies. This is the true moral mission of our time (well, of the next few years, anyway)." — Jonathan Schell, saying out loud what many on the Left believe, and have long believed.

What's doubly remarkable about Schell's diatribe is that he obviously thinks that if we did exactly as he wants — withdraw from Iraq, from

September 12, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Alternatives

370

At the meeting we had yesterday, I forgot to mention that if we do extend tours longer than they had been told, we ought to use financial incentives, as the Navy is doing for those who are required to be involved in extended tours. We also ought to think about volunteers.

When you have a major regional conflict underway, as we do in Iraq, we cannot continue to have business as usual. I need you to be aggressive in forcing people to think fresh on these things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091203-7

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

12 Sept 03

U21853 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: End Strength Memo

320.2

Attached is a letter from Barry Blechman with some good ideas on the end strength memo I sent him. Let's edit the memo to reflect these thoughts.

What do you think about his idea of giving some incentives to the Services and offer an additional combat unit if they are able to deliver the kinds of reductions we are talking about?

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/26/03 Blechman memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
091503-34

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

15 Sep 03

U21854 /03

133  
030

C9/12  
9/13



DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman  
CEO and Founder

August 26, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Army DIRM  
9/12

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks very much for your letter of August 19<sup>th</sup> and the attached draft working paper on end-strength. I agree completely that given the endless costs of adding to uniformed strength, it is a step best avoided if at all possible. And I agree further that much could be done to utilize Defense manpower more efficiently, making possible additional strength in combat and combat support forces without adding to overall totals. The working paper of course has an extensive list of ways to improve manpower efficiency, covering most of those with which I am familiar. I'd stress restructuring the active/reserve mix and finding innovative ways to utilize reservists on a more selective and purposeful basis among the most important of these ideas, along with getting uniformed personnel out of jobs performed more efficiently by government civilians or contractors.

Among the ideas that I didn't see in the draft are: (i) reducing the amount of time military people spend in formal training and educational institutions by increasing on-the-job training, particularly with the help of computerized learning techniques; and (ii) lengthening typical tours of duty to reduce time lost in transitional billets.

The Sunday New York Times account of the paper and the process surrounding it suggested that you are going to direct the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to find greater efficiencies in manpower. It is the Services, of course, who know better than anyone where the inefficiencies can be found. Given the right incentives, they might be more cooperative than under other circumstances. One idea, perhaps apocryphal, has been attributed to Jim Schlesinger when he was Secretary. The idea is to offer additional combat units for the delivery of a multiple number of reductions in non-combat slots. For example, the Army could be offered an additional brigade (and the budget necessary to equip it), if it could reduce certain categories of manpower by a multiple of the number of people required to man an incremental brigade. It's tricky to execute such a strategy, but it at least gets everyone's interests aligned more closely.

(A)

I also notice in the paper a variety of policy-related changes that could reduce manpower requirements - e.g., more use of international police and peacekeeping forces, reductions in certain long-term commitments, etc. This is an area in which we've done a variety of studies and would be happy to provide some inputs if you could point me in the right direction.

Sincerely,

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Third ID

2003

We ought to think through what we do about this unit citation for the Third ID.  
Who else ought to get one?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-21

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

15 Sep 03

U21855 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Traveling w/Dept. of State

CC  
CC  
CC

Until further notice, I do not want anyone from the Joint Staff traveling with the Department of State until we figure out how we want to do this. There is no one from OSD on DoS flights, and there is no one from DoS on SecDef flights. Is there anyone from DoS on CJCS flights?

Let's sort this out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-18

.....  
*Please respond by 9/19/03*

*15 Sep 03*

U21856 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Views of Iraq

*Iraq*

We need a plan to get more press people out of Baghdad into the countryside talking to our people—the Coalition Provisional Authority and the military people.

We need to do the same thing for Congressmen and Senators, Cabinet members, and the talking heads. We might want to consider some other groups we could get over there to stem this flood of news stories that are off the wall.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-13

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*9/15 ✓ 9/15*

*So def -*

*Agree. When members of Congress are there,*

*The standard program gets them around the country quite a bit. Need to keep it up.*

*15 Sep 03*

**U21857 /03**  
11-L-0559/OSD/19506

*D. Pitt*

September 15, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Drones

*452R*

I notice that someone named Bob Boyd, a senior Air Force intelligence analyst, is commenting in the *Wall Street Journal* on the drone issue. Do you know what that is about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-11

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*1500P 03*

U21858 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Chuck Yeager

What do you think about using Chuck Yeager in the Middle East somehow?  
Please take a look at the attached letter and see me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/6/03 D' Angelo ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
091503-70

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*Middle East*

*15 Sep 03*

U21859 /03

19  
Dress

calls

★ **General Chuck Yeager Foundation**

PO Box 579  
Penn Valley, CA 95946

calls  
Secretary Don Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
Washington, DC

August 6, 2003

Dear Rummy,

Thanks for your letter to Chuck re his birthday party May 1 in Texas - he enjoyed hearing from you. Sorry you couldn't be there - it was a blast!

Thought this press release would interest you re the French honouring Chuck. It's America's turn - maybe now is the time to give Chuck Yeager an honorary second (third or fourth) star!

Also, Don, are you aware that Chuck spent 1971-73 in Pakistan directing the war against India? More importantly, he hunted with some of the tribal leaders along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border - those friendships might be useful today.

Chuck also brings fantastic morale and goodwill wherever he goes, especially to American troops and it lasts for months.

Given the above, perhaps you might want to utilize him over in the Middle East....

Thought this all might be food for thought for you....

We'll be in Washington, DC October 15 for his annual talk at the National Air & Space Museum. Perhaps we can meet then.

Sincerely:

Tori

Victoria D'Angelo (we met at (b)(6) weekend long wedding in Idaho)

The General Chuck Yeager Foundation  
A California Non-Profit Public Benefit Corporation

11-L-0559/OSD/19509

# ★ General Chuck Yeager Foundation

PO Box 579  
Penn Valley, CA 95946

In a spectacular ceremony in the ancient village of Feterne, France, situated in the hills above Lake Geneva with a wonderful view of Mont Blanc, on June 18, General Chuck Yeager, the American hero, World War II fighter ace, and the first man to break the sound barrier, received the distinguished title, "Officer of the Legion of Honour" of France, by the order of French President Jacques Chirac.

In a wonderful display of friendship and gratitude, Yeager received this title for his courage and sacrifice during World War II and on behalf of his fallen comrades. A 12.5 victory fighter ace, Yeager has strong ties to France stemming from his World War II service. On March 5, 1944, during his eighth mission, he was shot down south of Bordeaux, France, by German fighters and parachuted to safety. He spent the ensuing several weeks with the Maquis, the French resistance, and taught them how to use explosives to blow up bridges before he crossed the Pyrenees on foot, for Spain.

As the French Air Force Band played both the U.S. national anthem and the French national anthem, General Vingiguerra of the French Air Force, pinned Yeager with a red rosette ribbon signifying his new title. A crowd of 10,000, including many of the wartime Maquis, witnessed this incredible event. Also present were Col. Bud Anderson, Yeager's friend since their flying days in World War II and also an ace, and Bob Price, the World War II radio operator and a gunner on "Denny Boy," an American B-17 that was damaged during a mission over Munich and crash landed in Feterne in 1944. The French underground helped "Denny Boy's" crew to reach safety.

In his remarks after receiving the title, Yeager, with his typical combination of seriousness and great humour, thanked those in attendance and especially praised General Vingiguerra for not pinning the award to his skin! He went on to share his remembrances of his secret December 1944 trip to Lake Annecy, France, when his advice was sought regarding a plan to evacuate interned American airmen from the neutral countries of Switzerland and Spain. As a former evadee, Yeager contributed unparalleled expertise.

Yeager also recalled the story of his last mission during World War II. On January 14, 1945, he and Anderson flew as spares on a mission to Germany. After no aircraft in their squadron aborted, Yeager and Anderson decided against returning to base and, instead, went on a tour of Europe. Yeager showed Anderson Lake Annecy and Switzerland, and, at one point, Yeager dropped his fuel tanks on Mont Blanc and Anderson shot at them. When they returned to base, they found that they had missed the biggest air battle of the war as their squadron had shot down 56 German planes that day. The crowd roared upon hearing Yeager's accounts. More stories like those he shared, as well as a detailed account of his storied life are now documented on his new web site at [www.chuckyeager.com](http://www.chuckyeager.com).

By their outward signs of respect, the French recently showed Yeager that they have not forgotten their past, nor the Americans, without whom, they would be speaking German today.

**The General Chuck Yeager Foundation  
A California Non-Profit Public Benefit Corporation**

11-L-0559/OSD/19510

September 15, 2003

337

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up from Tank

I came out of the meeting in the tank with the feeling that we still need to get our eyes up off our shoelaces. We need to get the big picture.

There are too few pieces on the table. We have to get the Iraqis on the table, we have to get exercises canceled, and we have to find other things that relieve the stress that nobody mentioned in the context of that briefing.

Personally, unless I hear some good arguments to the contrary, my instinct is to use the Old Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-69

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

15 Sep 03

U21860 /03

September 15, 2003

333

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cabinet Secretaries' Letters

If I have not written Thompson, Abraham, Martinez, Veneman, Snow and Ashcroft suggesting they go to Iraq, I would like the letters drafted to go out today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-62

.....  
Please respond by 9/15/03

15 Sep 04

U21861 /03

September 15, 2003

O20 AF

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Barrett

Let's make sure we press ahead with the White House to get a bootleg copy of Barrett's financial papers up to John Warner, so he can get the questions drafted. The Senate committee can then give us the financial paper request, and we can get this thing done simultaneously.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-53

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

*OB*  
*10-16*

15 Sep 03

U21862 /03

September 15, 2003 <sup>OB</sup> 9.20

032

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Testimony

This issue of testimony on the \$87 billion before Armed Services and Foreign Relations in addition to Appropriations is a new thought. I think we ought to find out if that is really what Frist says is going to happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-52

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

15 sep 03

U21864 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Warner's Schedule

032

The way I heard John Warner, he said Tillie Fowler's report comes out on September 22, he has a hearing on September 25 and he has Roche's hearing on Tuesday, September 30.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-51

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 Sep 03

U21865 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Arleigh Burke

20004

Please check on Arleigh Burke and see how many years he was brought back for an extension—was it one or two?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-50

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*✓ 9/29*

*C 9/29*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/  
CDR Nosenzo*

*15 Sep 03*

U21866 /03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
9/29

INFO MEMO

September 23, 2003 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W. Haynes*

SUBJECT: ADM Arleigh Burke's Tenure as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

- You asked about ADM Arleigh Burke's service as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
- ADM Burke served 3 consecutive two-year terms, from 17 August 1955 to 1 August 1961, as CNO. (ADM Burke served 42 consecutive years on active duty.) See David Rosenberg, p. 298, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Robert W. Love Jr ed. 1980). After World War II and until 1967, it was the practice of the President to appoint CNOs for terms of only two years. See *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Robert W. Love Jr ed. 1980). Except for ADM Burke, no CNO who served during this period was appointed for three terms or otherwise served more than a total of four years as the CNO. Id.
- The statutory charter for the CNO during ADM Burke's tenure was 10 U.S.C. § 5081(a)(amended 1969 and repealed 1986). It provided, in pertinent part: "There is a Chief of Naval Operations, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, *for a term of not more than four years. . . .*" Id. (emphasis added). This provision permitted the President to appoint CNOs for two-year terms (or any time period that was not greater than four years). Because this provision was silent on the issue of reappointment, the President was free to appoint the same CNO to consecutive terms so long no one term exceeded four years.
- We know this, in part, because Congress specifically amended § 5081(a) in 1967 to limit the President's discretion in this area. The conference committee that recommended adoption of the 1967 amendment to § 5081(a), and similar amendments affecting the other service chiefs, provided the following analysis in its report:

"Existing law authorizes the appointment of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations for a



11-L-0559/OSD/19517

term of *not more than 4 years*, unless reappointed by the President. Under title IV, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations will be appointed for a *specific term of 4 years* and they may not be reappointed unless Congress hereafter declares a state of war or national emergency. . . .”

H.R. Rep. No 270, p. 8-9 (May 22, 1967)(emphasis in original text)(reprinted in *Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1968*, PL 90-22 S.666, Legislative History).

- In the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, this provision was repealed and replaced by the current law concerning the CNO's term of service. However, the basic substance of the 1967 amendment remains in force: “The Chief of Naval Operations shall be appointed *for a term of four years . . . .* He serves at the pleasure of the President. *In time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress, he may be reappointed* for a term of not more than four years.” 10 U.S.C. § 5033(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Prepared by Captain TJ Cluff, USAF (b)(6)

September 15, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Clark

We have to get the letter up on General Clark, and then we have to press John Warner to go to Frist and the floor and get it pushed through.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-47

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

15 Sep 03

U21867 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Personnel System

230

We have to figure out what we want beyond Homeland Security in the personnel system, so that we can get it out of Collins. Now is the time to move.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-46

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

15 Sep 03

U21868 /03

OB  
9.20

September 15, 2003

032

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief Deputy

Please be sure you brief Paul Wolfowitz on the meeting with Warner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-45

.....  
Please respond by 9/16/03

15 Sep 03

U21869 /03

September 15, 2003

03  
9.20

400.136

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: "Buy America" Language

Please be sure you move fast on clearing the "Buy America" language with Special Trade Rep, OMB, White House, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-44

.....

Please respond by 9/19/03

15 Sep 03

U21870 /03

03  
9.20

September 15, 2003

320.2

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hunter

John Warner wondered if we couldn't find some sort of camouflage on the end strength issue that we could work out for Duncan Hunter. We would have to do it fast. He hopes to do the whole thing this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-43

.....  
Please respond by 9/18/03

15 Sep 03

U21871 /03

September 15, 2003

311 CCC

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper to POTUS

Should I tell the President anything about that paper I just signed to go over to him, anything about the nuclear weapons status?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-42

.....  
Please respond by 9/16/03

*✓ 9/17*  
SecDef -  
You ~~decide~~ decided yesterday to wait with this until after Adm Ellis briefs you Friday on the Nuclear Command and Control System - Annual Report.  
I will combine talking points from both - relevant to what the President needs to know - for next week's one-on-one.

15 Sep 03

U21872 103 *9/17*



September 15 2003

380.01

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Clearances

Please give me an updated report on how we stand in the backlog on clearances. I am told we are a year behind on getting nuclear clearances for folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-40

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*Response Attached*

*@ 12/24  
Forid to Toss*

U21873 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000  
INFO MEMO

INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 23 2003

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Clearances *gc*

*This is not a  
good story.  
I'll give it my  
attention.*

In response to the subject, the following is provided:

- Through FY03 both Defense Security Service (DSS) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducted background investigations for DoD. Beginning in FY04 all investigations will be conducted by OPM.
- During FY03, Defense Security Service (DSS) averaged the following case completion times:
  - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 150 days
  - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 300 days
  - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 385 days
- During FY03, OPM averaged the following case completion times:
  - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 250 days
  - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 374 days
  - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 477 days
- The FY04 DoD goal is:
  - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 75-90 days
  - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 90-120 days
  - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 180 days
- There are currently approximately 416,000 DoD investigations pending
- With regard to the nuclear/restricted data priority investigations:
  - ✓ DSS currently has 632 nuclear/restricted data priority investigation pending. The average lapse time for FY03 ranged from 93 to 512 days for these cases.

- ✓ OPM currently has 638 initial Top Secret investigations pending for which 35-day processing was requested. The average FY03 case completion time was approximately 100 days.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Charleen Wright, ODUSD (CI&S), (b)(6)

**COORDINATION SHEET**

not required  
General Counsel, DoD

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\* [Signature]  
Director, Administration and  
Management

10.3.03  
Date

\*As revised (see attached)

September 15, 2003

OS  
9-20

020 SD

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Responsibilities

Here is a redo of the paper on who does what.

John, let's set a meeting to talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/15/03 version of responsibilities

DHR:dh  
091503-37



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 Sep 03

U21874 /03

DRAFT

September 15, 2003  
10:27 AM

<b>Order</b>	<b>Secretary</b>	<b>Deputy</b>	<b>Both</b>
1	End Strength	Acquisition	Iraq
2	Contingency Plans	Comptroller	Public Affairs
3	Afghanistan	PA & E	Legislative Affairs
4	SRO	Air Force	SLRG
5	Deployment Orders/ Force/Rotation/Morale	Navy / Marines	Outreach Meetings
6	Army	Medical	Defense Policy Board
7	Special Ops/SOLIC	C2	Personnel
8	Footprint	SROC	OMB
9	Intel – Steve Cambone	Mil. Commissions	
10	PC with Doug Feith as +1	Detainees	
11	General Counsel	Inspector General	
12	Defense Business Council	Defense Science Board	

September 15, 2003

EF-6864  
03/012910

UN

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping etc.

Your folks are working on peacekeeping, reducing long-term commitments and international police. Here is a note from Barry Blechman saying his folks have some ideas on that. Would you please connect with him and see that we know what he knows?

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/26/03 Blechman memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
091503-35

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

✓  
10/20 C 10/15

Sir,  
Response attached.  
Original attachment  
included behind.  
vr/  
CDR Nosenzo  
10/15

15 Sep 03

U21875 /03

17-09-03 09:29 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19531

INFO MEMO

✓  
USD/P *[Signature]* OCT 15 2003 *12/20*

EF-6864  
I-03/012910

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict *OC 10/10/03*

SUBJECT: DFI Studies on Peacekeeping

- In response to an August 26 letter from Dr. Barry Blechman at DFI, you asked that we contact him to exchange ideas on peacekeeping, reducing long-term commitments, and international police (Tab A).
- COL Dallas Brown, Director for Peace Operations within SO/LIC, met with Dr. Blechman and two of his staffers on October 7 to exchange ideas. They described DFI's capabilities and gave him copies of the following products:
  - "Toward an Operational Strategy for Peace Enforcement," December 1995
  - "Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace," September 1997
  - "Civilian Policing in Peace Operations," June 2001
  - "Foreign Military Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," May 2001
- These studies were all commissioned by SO/LIC's Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance in the previous Administration. They have been part of our library and collective data base.
- DFI has a wealth of talent and experience in the Stability Operations field, and we will examine ways to work with them as we move forward with the Global Peace Operations Initiative and other initiatives. ||

Attachment:  
As stated

DASD Stability Operations *OC 10 Oct*  
Prepared by: COL Dallas Brown, SO/LIC Stability Operations. (b)(6)

14-10-03 16:31 IH  
11-L-0559/OSD/19532



C911  
5/11

DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman  
Chairman

August 26, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Army DDPW  
9/12

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks very much for your letter of August 19<sup>th</sup> and the attached draft working paper on end-strength. I agree completely that given the endless costs of adding to uniformed strength, it is a step best avoided if at all possible. And I agree further that much could be done to utilize Defense manpower more efficiently, making possible additional strength in combat and combat support forces without adding to overall totals. The working paper of course has an extensive list of ways to improve manpower efficiency, covering most of those with which I am familiar. I'd stress restructuring the active/reserve mix and finding innovative ways to utilize reservists on a more selective and purposeful basis among the most important of these ideas, along with getting uniformed personnel out of jobs performed more efficiently by government civilians or contractors.

Among the ideas that I didn't see in the draft are: (i) reducing the amount of time military people spend in formal training and educational institutions by increasing on-the-job training, particularly with the help of computerized learning techniques; and (ii) lengthening typical tours of duty to reduce time lost in transitional billets.

The Sunday New York Times account of the paper and the process surrounding it suggested that you are going to direct the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to find greater efficiencies in manpower. It is the Services, of course, who know better than anyone where the inefficiencies can be found. Given the right incentives, they might be more cooperative than under other circumstances. One idea, perhaps apocryphal, has been attributed to Jim Schlesinger when he was Secretary. The idea is to offer additional combat units for the delivery of a multiple number of reductions in non-combat slots. For example, the Army could be offered an additional brigade (and the budget necessary to equip it), if it could reduce certain categories of manpower by a multiple of the number of people required to man an incremental brigade. It's tricky to execute such a strategy, but it at least gets everyone's interests aligned more closely.

(\*)

I also notice in the paper a variety of policy-related changes that could reduce manpower requirements - e.g., more use of international police and peacekeeping forces, reductions in certain long-term commitments, etc. This is an area in which we've done a variety of studies and would be happy to provide some inputs if you could point me in the right direction.

///

Sincerely,

September 15, 2003

Image

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Jessica Lynch

I just read Joe Schmitz's Inspector General report on the Jessica Lynch rescue. I wonder if we ought to go back at the BBC on this. What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/2/03 IG memo to SecDef re: Jessical Lynch Rescue

DHR:dh  
091503-33

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

15 Sep 03

U21876 /03

9/5  
0803

SECRET

2003 SEP -4 11 9:42

✓  
9/15



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704  
**INFO MEMO**

September 2, 2003, 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Allegations Concerning the Rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch,  
U.S. Army

ATTN: DI RITA  
9/12

- We recently addressed allegations that the rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch at a hospital in Iraq was a "premeditated fabrication" and that Service members involved in Private Lynch's rescue may have acted dishonorably.
- An inquiry conducted by the Inspector General, U.S. Central Command, under our oversight did not substantiate the allegations. No evidence was found to indicate that the rescue was conducted improperly. We concur with results of that inquiry.
- We initiated the inquiry in response to requests from Congresswoman Louise Slaughter and Congressmen Rahm Emanuel and Pete Stark, who referenced media reports that criticized the rescue operation as "one of the most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived."
- An unclassified summary that we provided to Members of Congress is attached.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Joseph E. Schmitz (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	8/10
SR MA CRADDOCK	6/12
MA BUCCI	5/5/11
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	9/4

11-L-0559/OSD/19535

U14792 / 03

*Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense*

***EXECUTIVE SUMMARY***

**ALLEGED PREMEDITATED FABRICATION AND INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT  
OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE RESCUE  
OF PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JESSICA LYNCH, U.S. ARMY**

**I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

We initiated a preliminary inquiry to address allegations that the rescue of former Prisoner of War (POW), Private First Class (PFC) Jessica Lynch, U.S. Army, may have been a “premeditated fabrication” and that “our armed forces involved in Private Lynch’s rescue acted dishonorably . . . .” The allegations were referred to this Office in a joint letter dated May 21, 2003, from Congressman Rahm Emanuel and Congresswoman Louise Slaughter, who cited news articles published by the British Broadcasting Corporation as the source of those allegations. The Members of Congress indicated that an investigation was necessary “to ensure that their [referring to Service members who participated in the rescue] selfless act of heroism is never questioned again.”

Based on the results of a preliminary inquiry conducted by the Inspector General (IG), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), we concluded that the allegations were not substantiated and that no further investigation was warranted.<sup>1</sup> During the inquiry, the IG, USCENTCOM, reviewed numerous classified operational documents that were not available to the media and interviewed over 30 witnesses, many of whom had first-hand knowledge of events at issue. The results of the USCENTCOM inquiry were provided in a classified report dated July 17, 2003. The information set forth in this Executive Summary is unclassified.

We reviewed the USCENTCOM report using standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency as set forth in the publication, “Quality Standards for Investigations,” dated September 1997. With respect to investigative reporting, the publication states that “reports must thoroughly address all relevant aspects of the investigation and be accurate, clear, complete, concise, logically organized, timely, and objective.” In addition, we examined whether the preponderance of evidence supported the conclusions drawn by USCENTCOM. We concluded that the USCENTCOM preliminary inquiry met established standards for such work and that the evidence supported its conclusions that the allegations were not substantiated.

---

<sup>1</sup> Following our policy and standard practice, we requested the Inspector General (IG), Joint Staff, to initiate a preliminary inquiry into the matter. In turn, the Joint Staff requested that the IG, USCENTCOM, conduct the inquiry under our oversight.

## II. BACKGROUND

PFC Lynch was captured outside Nasiriyah, Iraq, on March 23, 2003, after her company convoy was ambushed by the Iraqi military. U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) rescued PFC Lynch on April 1, 2003, at a hospital in Nasiriyah, Iraq. The successful rescue of PFC Lynch was the subject of intense media coverage and on May 18, 2003, the British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasted allegations that the rescue of PFC Lynch was a "premeditated fabrication" produced by the U.S. military for television audiences and that the U.S. military exaggerated the danger of the mission.

## III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

### A. Was the rescue of PFC Lynch a "premeditated fabrication?"

Short Answer: USCENTCOM found no evidence that the rescue mission of PFC Lynch was a staged media event but determined that the rescue operation constituted a valid mission to recover a U.S. POW under combat conditions.

The USCENTCOM inquiry found that U.S. military personnel planned and executed the rescue of PFC Lynch in accordance with all pertinent military procedures. Many factors influenced the planning and conduct of the rescue mission including: the ever-changing situation on the battlefield, an incomplete knowledge of enemy force disposition, the concern about being lured into a trap, and the time needed to marshal the forces necessary for the mission. Taking into account all the planning factors used by U.S. Special Forces (USSOF) during the rescue mission, there did not appear to be any unnecessary delay in the execution of the mission nor did there appear to be any inappropriate influence exerted on the planners or executors of the mission.

The rescue was filmed by a combat cameraman and a member of USSOF in accordance with standard procedures used by USSOF. The filming of the mission followed standard procedures used by task force personnel during the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. USSOF routinely films high priority missions per verbal order of a USSOF leader; however, no public affairs personnel were involved in the planning or filming of the operation.

USSOF anticipated facing 200-300 Baathist/paramilitary forces in the hospital. Several enemy units were also located near the hospital complex and could reinforce the units in the hospital with an estimated 2000-3000 soldiers in a matter of minutes. These units had armor, artillery, air defense, and infantry available to respond to a Coalition attack.

The forces selected to conduct the mission were based on the anticipated enemy threat and had to be able to counter all enemy capabilities within and near the hospital complex. The level of force used by USSOF to perform the mission was consistent with the anticipated resistance and established doctrine. USSOF received conflicting information regarding the number of enemy personnel in the hospital but fully expected to meet stiff resistance including guards on PFC Lynch's room.

No member of the rescuing force carried or used any blank ammunition during the mission. The task force members carried standard munitions for this type of operation.

USSOF personnel initially breached locked doors in the hospital compound by using the shotgunning technique (shooting the hinges with a shotgun) or linear charges. Later during the mission an Iraqi doctor offered keys to some of the rooms to members of the task force. After they received the keys from the doctor, USSOF did not breach any doors that could be unlocked using keys.

**B. Did Service members exhibited inappropriate or dishonorable behavior during the rescue mission?**

Short Answer: The USCENTCOM IG found no evidence that any U.S. military member exhibited inappropriate or dishonorable behavior in connection with the PFC Lynch rescue mission.

USSOF conducted a personnel recovery mission, during wartime, in a nonpermissive environment, to rescue a U.S. POW from a hostile enemy location. During the mission USSOF received enemy fire from the hospital building, the surrounding complex, and nearby areas. They successfully engaged the enemy forces they encountered, neutralizing them without sustaining any casualties of their own. USSOF members entered the hospital complex fully expecting to meet further enemy resistance.

During the conduct of the mission, members of USSOF followed the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) relevant to the mission. None of the USSOF personnel saw or heard of any mistreatment of Iraqis during the rescue. USSOF personnel could have used more force than they did and still have been in keeping with their TTP and ROE.

USSOF found no indication that any service member was "acting for the camera" during the rescue mission. In fact, all USSOF members were offended when questioned about such an accusation.

September 15, 2003

000.775D

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

CC: Col. Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Omaha

It may be that we ought to do an Omaha regional media. Also, we might want to go there sometime and do an editorial board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-30

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

15 Sep 03

U21877 /03

EF- FILE COPY

✓ 11/29

September 15, 2003

EF-6844  
I-03/012835

Iraq

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: City/Town Councils

Please find out how many city councils there are for villages, towns and cities all across Iraq. We are able to say that 90 percent of the Iraqi people are living under a locally representative governing council, but I don't know how many there are numerically.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-24

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

COMPLETED  
23 Sep 03

15 Sep 03

U21878.../03

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *X/JS 9(21)03*

SUBJECT: Local (Municipal and Provincial) Councils in Iraq

You asked how many city councils there are for villages, towns, and cities across Iraq.

- There are 266 administrative units (municipalities and villages) in Iraq.
  - The preponderance of those councils are elected or otherwise locally representative. CPA does not have a precise count.
  - Based on CPA data, we estimate that at least 75% of Iraqis live under such councils.
- At the governorate (province) level, all but one of Iraq's eighteen governorates has an elected or representative council or legislature. A council selection process is planned for the last governorate, Al Muthanna.
- Therefore, with the exception of some residents of Al Muthanna (a small province containing about 2% of Iraq's people), all Iraqis live under an elected or representative local or provincial council.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: C. Straub (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19541

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*CJF by LA  
9/20/03*

SUBJECT: Iraq City/Town Council Data

My staff is collecting data on city and town councils in Iraq. For instance, in Baghdad, there are 88 neighborhood councils, 9 district councils, and 1 city council. Together, this represents 100% of the Baghdad population.

We are working on getting you nation-wide data. Right now, we only have data on 15 of the 18 provinces. (We are missing data on the three Kurdish provinces.) We will get this to you ASAP.

540

September 16, 2003

326

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Reserves

With respect to Reserve elements, there was no mention of when the last time Reserve elements that might have to go into Iraq had been previously called up— was it one year, two years, four years, six years, ten years?

My understanding is we were going to try to use the ones who had not been called up recently. Is that the case?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 091603-17

.....  
 Please respond by 9/26/03

16 Sep 03

U21879 /03

CLOSED  
SMA  
10-20

September 16, 2003

191

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz  
 David Chu

CC: Powell Moore  
 Pete Geren  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reserve Health Benefit Issue

Here is a memo from Bill Winkenwerder on a potential new benefit for the reservists that may be getting a lot of interest in Congress. We need a plan to engage early on this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 9/12/03 ASD(HA) memo to SecDef re: Reserve Health Benefit Issue

DHR:dh  
 091603-13

.....  
 Please respond by 9:26/03

U21880 /03

16 Sep 03

115  
1200

✓  
9/16



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEP 12 2003

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Reserve Health Benefit Issue

- Groups of lawmakers (a significant number of Democrats and some Republicans) want to expand the Defense Health Program, creating a new health benefit entitlement for Reserve and National Guard members.
- One proposal, just announced by Sen Daschle (D-SD) and Sen Graham (R-SC) (Tab-A) is planned for attachment to the \$87 billion supplemental to pay for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- This proposal follows other action to expand the reserve health benefit in May 2003 when the Senate, against the wishes of Sen Warner (R-VA), passed an amendment to the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill (Tab-B, page 3). The House had no such legislation. House Armed Service Committee Chairman Hunter was supportive of the DoD position of no further benefit expansion.
- You sent a letter to Congressional leaders in July saying this reserve benefit expansion would cost \$5.1 billion per year and force cuts in other areas. You also said you would recommend the President veto the authorization if it included TRICARE for non-activated Reserve and Guardsmen.
- The Daschle-Graham proposal would:
  - Require DoD to pay for continuation of civilian health plan coverage for reservists and their dependents that are called or ordered to active duty or during periods of war or national emergency.
  - Activated reservists could elect continued coverage under their civilian health plan, or coverage under TRICARE.
  - Permit any non-activated reservist and his/her dependents to enroll in TRICARE with a monthly premium equal to 28% of the amount for such coverage.

- **I recommend that you strongly oppose this legislation, and make the following points with Congress and others:**
  - CBO cost estimate \$4.7B/5 years; DoD estimate \$35B/5 years.
  - Defense Health Program already facing a \$14.2B shortfall through FY-09.
  - Would force DoD to create a large new bureaucracy to pay thousands of private health insurance plans across the country.
  - Creates unique entitlement for family members of Reservists unavailable to families of Active Duty and Retirees.
  - Government funded windfall to employers now providing insurance benefits to reservists. It replaces private insurance!
  
- **The current reserve benefit is excellent.** The argument by Daschle that, "There is no difference between active-duty personnel on the front lines in Iraq or Guard and Reserve personnel on the front lines," is correct. We agree. When Guard and Reserve are activated, they, and their families, receive the exact same TRICARE benefit as active duty.
  
- The current reserve health benefit is commensurate with service required by reserve personnel and their family members relative to that of active duty personnel.
  
- Bottom line...the proposed increase of reserve health benefits creates an inequity with active duty personnel, would be very costly, and would have the effect of, for hundreds of thousands of reserve personnel, replacing existing private insurance plans, thereby putting the federal government in the business of subsidizing private business.

cc:

USD (P&R)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Ed Wyatt, PD OASD (HA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19546

ArmyTimes.com  
September 11, 2003

## Lawmakers Will Tie Guard, Reserve Health Care To Iraq Payment

By Mike Madden, Gannett News Service

A bipartisan group of lawmakers who want to let National Guard and Reserve troops buy into the Pentagon's health care system will try to attach their proposal to an \$87 billion bill to pay for operations in Iraq.

More than 170,000 Guard and Reserve members were serving on active duty Wednesday, and the Army announced this week that call-ups for service in Iraq would now last as long as a year.

But reservists and Guard members don't have access to the same benefits as regular military personnel, and advocates for the citizen-soldiers say they need them. A recent General Accounting Office study found that 20 percent of Guard members don't have any health coverage at all, except when they are serving on active duty.

*Not so!*

"There is no difference between active-duty personnel on the front lines in Iraq or Guard and Reserve personnel on the front lines," said Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., a co-sponsor of the measure.

*We agree!*

The health care proposal passed the Senate overwhelmingly earlier this year, but the Bush administration, concerned about the cost, threatened to veto a Pentagon budget bill if it was included in the final version.

Attaching the proposal to the Iraq bill might give it a better shot of becoming law. The administration wants to pass that bill as quickly as possible, and lawmakers think the urgency will give them more leverage for putting some of their own projects into the measure.

The \$400 million per year plan would let Guard members and reservists buy health coverage for themselves and their families through the Pentagon's TRICARE system, which covers active duty forces. Participants would pay a premium of 28 percent of actual health care costs — the same rate federal employees pay for their insurance.

*Wrong!  
First year phase-in cost.  
Full cost \$4.7 billion per year!*

Supporters said the program would cost less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the Pentagon's overall budget, calling it a pittance compared with the massive cost of President Bush's budget request for Iraq.

"We need them more than ever, and now we need to support them more than ever," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who met dozens of reservists serving on active duty while visiting Iraq and Afghanistan last month.

Lawmakers are still working out the details of the \$87 billion bill Bush requested Sunday to pay for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Supporters of the health care proposal said they hoped to see it included in the original draft of the Iraq legislation. Lawmakers from both parties are negotiating with the administration over the proposal.

OB  
9.20

September 16, 2003

Image

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: More Info for Op-ed

Here is another paper on the subject of the historical record on these two countries for that op-ed piece you are working on. Please see if you can weave it in.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/8/03 USD(P) Milestones

DHR:dh  
091603-10

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

16 Sep 03

U21881 /03

C 9/12

EF-6744  
IO3/012390/85

TO: ~~Down~~

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT: Milestones

Please have somebody promptly, that is to say within five working days, get back to me with a piece of paper that shows ten or twelve key indicators, such as Jerry Bremer's put on the left side of his paper, and then show how long it took to achieve them in Germany, in Japan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It is important that this get done accurately and promptly.

Thanks.

Dir,  
Response Attached  
11/00/03  
9/12

DHR/asm  
090803.09

Attach: Milestones

Please respond by: 9/15/03

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Milestones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo

- You asked for a table comparing milestones in the reconstruction of Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Attached is our initial response.
- The matrix summarizes the milestones with three caveats:
  - Japan was excluded from the comparison because General MacArthur held near-absolute authority and kept the entire Japanese government and bureaucracy in place. Thus, Japan was not considered comparable to the other cases.
  - Endnotes explain subjective decisions and missing entries.
  - We will continue to research and refine the data.

## Iraq and Afghanistan Compared with Historical Reconstruction

*(The data within refers to the length of time from cessation of major combat operations)*

	Afghanistan	Iraq	Germany	Bosnia
Training of new military begins	8 months	3 months	10 years	--- <sup>1</sup>
Local police patrols begin	1 month <sup>3</sup>	2 months	14 months	In place <sup>4</sup>
Local governance established	1 month <sup>5</sup>	2 months	8 months <sup>6</sup>	In place
National elections	Pending	Pending	4 yrs	10 months <sup>7</sup>
New constitution	Pending	Pending	4 yrs	6 yrs
Cabinet seated	1 month <sup>9</sup>	4 months	13 months <sup>10</sup>	--- <sup>11</sup>
Independent central bank	In place	2 months	3 years	21 months
New currency	11 months	2.5 months	3 years	3 years

11-L-0559/OSD/19551

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Separate militias in place within Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Sprska when Dayton Accords concluded. IFOR/SFOR mandate did not include establishing a unified military force.

<sup>2</sup> Kosovo is formally an autonomous province of Serbia, and thus it is not entitled to a separate national military.

<sup>3</sup> Local militia-based forces began performing some police functions almost immediately after the Taliban was displaced. The impartiality and effectiveness of these forces were highly questionable.

<sup>4</sup> Local, ethnically-based, police resumed patrolling immediately after the Dayton Peace Accords. However, the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) charged with reforming the Bosnian police was still struggling to influence local police forces after more than four years in operation.

<sup>5</sup> Village Elders selected groups of electors, who met in late May and early June 2002 on a regional basis to choose district representatives for the *loja jirga*.

<sup>6</sup> Elections for communities of less than 20,000 occurred in January 1946, with elections for larger communities occurring over the next few months. In French and British zones local elections occurred more slowly, but active local political life had resumed by late 1946.

<sup>7</sup> Early nation-wide elections in Bosnia resulted in the return to office of ethnic separatists responsible for the 1992-1995 war, and thus were widely perceived as a failure.

<sup>8</sup> As an autonomous province of Serbia, Kosovo does not have a separate constitution. However, by the end of 2000, Kosovo had its own commercial code, and a criminal and civil code different from those of Serbia.

<sup>9</sup> The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 created an Afghani Government.

<sup>10</sup> The Office of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) set up a Council of Ministers-President (*Länderrat*) in November 1945, which did not begin to perform substantial executive functions until June 1946.

<sup>11</sup> Bosnia remains two separate ethnically derived entities, each with its own government and military, with few joint institutions.

<sup>12</sup> The KLA quickly installed its own chosen ministers, mayors, and other officials throughout Kosovo. These individuals were gradually, and with difficulty, replaced by UN-appointed successors.

September 16, 2003

✓ 9/17

Sec Def:  
Sir,

(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3507

Colombia

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: FBIS

This FBIS report says that these folks work for the State Department. I thought they were DoD contractors. What is the truth?

Thanks.

Attach.

"Colombia: Cromos Magazine Reveals Photos of US Citizens Held by FARC," September 12, 2003.

DHR:dh  
091603-7

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/03

DL

(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3507

✓ 9/17

(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3507

16 Sep 03

Sec Def -  
I talked to Gen Hill -  
DoD contractors - State had  
nothing to do w/ them. Another

CDR Nosenzo  
9/16

ATTN: 0559/OSD/19553 @ 9/16 U21882 103

✓ 9/16



# Text

**Colombia: Cromos Magazine Reveals Photos of US Citizens Held by FARC – PHOTOS**

*LAP20030912000086 Bogota Caracol Television in Spanish 1730 GMT 12 Sep 03*

[Corrected version: Adding closing bracket in jpg image notations; last minute news report; from the "Caracol News" program]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Good afternoon. Pay attention: Cromos magazine has disclosed the first proof of life in Colombia of the three US citizens who are in the hands of the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] after their plane fell in Caqueta on 12 February.




Photo of US hostages




Photo of US hostages

The photos show the three US citizens dressed in fatigues. They appear to be in good health condition.




Photo of US hostages



Photo of US hostages

The US citizens worked for the State Department in a mission of reconnaissance. The journalist who traveled to the area where they are being held captive said that the US citizens regularly send messages to their relatives.



Photo of US hostages

The US Government is preparing to make a pronouncement on this topic this very afternoon.

[Description of Source: Bogota Caracol Television in Spanish -- private television station owned by Bavaria Group and Santodomingo family]

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DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.***

September 16, 2003

✓ 9-20

ORO ICG

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: L. Jean Lewis

What about this Whitewater hire? Please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Defense's Whitewater Hire," *Newsweek*, September 22, 2003.

DHR:dh  
091603-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

9/17

→ SecDef -

Joe hired her in Spring 2002, first as a consultant based on her professional expertise. After about 3 months working some projects very capably, Joe processed her through the "system" (Witt Liaison, Presidential Personnel, etc.) for a Schedule C position, which was approved.

16 Sep 03

U21883 /03

Larry Di Rita

9/17-1-L-0559/OSD/19557

The individual was brought to Joe's attention by Marty Hoffmann, evidently. Di Rita

downtown museum between April 9 and April 12 as U.S. forces entered Baghdad in the waning days of the war against the government of Saddam Hussein. The looting was a public relations disaster for the United States, which was sharply criticized for ignoring the pillagers as they charged through the museum.

Bogdanos, however, defended U.S. actions, saying the soldiers were being attacked even as mobs breached the museum's gates. He said his team found an Iraqi sniper position in a second-floor museum storeroom, as well as two firing positions in the front and back of the main building and a rocket mount -- along with two boxes of unexpended rocket-propelled grenades -- atop the nearby children's museum.

"This was combat," Bogdanos said in an interview. "It's remarkable that 19-, 20- and 21-year-old young men exercised such restraint in not returning fire."

Critics of U.S. handling of the looting as well as reporters who covered it at the time, however, have said that the museum area was clearly under U.S. control when the looting took place. "Absolutely, they could have stopped it," said McGuire Gibson, an Iraq specialist at the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute, who visited Baghdad in early May to help with the investigation.

Gibson did not fault the soldiers, however, but the high command, which had been warned before the war that the museum would probably be a prime looting target. "The people doing the fighting had another task," Gibson said. "They didn't know about the museum."

Bogdanos's team, composed of four military members and nine U.S. Customs agents, arrived in Baghdad on April 21. Museum staff members, still incensed at the initial military response to

the looting, were standoffish, he said.

"There wasn't antagonism; there was a lack of trust," he said. "You have to let people know you're conducting an investigation and you're in control, but you have to do it slowly, because this isn't your culture."

Gibson said that by the time he arrived, the staffers knew Bogdanos "was an honest guy," and they had started to come clean. It was not as bad as it looked, they said. Weeks before the war, the staff had emptied the display cases of 8,366 mostly priceless artifacts and had taken them to a "secret place."

It took the staff another month to tell Bogdanos where the cache was and take him for a visit. The material was intact. Instead of thousands of items missing from the display collection, there were 40. Also intact were the museum's 39,453 manuscripts, stashed in a bomb shelter in western Baghdad.

Bogdanos and the team got all the information they could from the staff and visiting volunteers such as Gibson, but the rest was police work. The Warka Vase was returned after step-by-step negotiations with a "friend of a friend" of its possessor, Bogdanos said.

"You're sitting there, trying not to let on that you know what he's got, and you can hear the museum folks breathing next to you," he said. Although the vase was returned in pieces -- as it had been discovered in the 1880s -- Bogdanos said it can be fully restored.

Ninety items were recovered when "an informant told us he knew a house where a guy's selling antiquities along with weapons," Bogdanos said. "We did a drive-by, checked it out, picked a time when there was nobody on the street and hit the building from all four sides."

The greatest piece of luck, and the greatest misfortune, occurred when thieves with

knowledge of the museum's catacombs broke into a basement storeroom during the looting and went straight to a line of cabinets filled with cylinder seals and the world's finest collection of Greek, Roman, Islamic and Arabic gold and silver coins.

They had a set of keys they had stolen from elsewhere in the museum, "but they dropped them" in the dark, Bogdanos said: "It's the Keystone Cops. Boxes are thrown in every direction. They lit the foam padding so they could see. Can't you imagine two or three of them screaming at each other, 'Where are the keys?'"

The cabinets were intact, but the thieves emptied 103 plastic boxes containing beads, pieces of jewelry, cylinder seals and glass bottles worth a fortune -- and, unlike the world-famous artifacts from upstairs, almost impossible to trace.

"It would all fit in a large backpack," Bogdanos said.

Newsweek  
September 22, 2003  
Periscope

### 17. Defense's Whitewater Hire

The Bush administration has quietly installed a surprising figure in a high-level Pentagon post: L. Jean Lewis, the former federal fraud investigator who kicked up major controversy in the '90s over her allegations about the Clintons' Whitewater dealings.

Although there's been no public announcement of her return to government, Lewis has been given a \$118,000-a-year job as chief of staff in the traditionally nonpartisan

Defense Department's inspector general office. With 1,240 employees and a budget of \$160 million, this office is the largest of its kind in the government. It investigates fraud and audits Pentagon contracts, including the billions of dollars being awarded in Iraq to companies

like Halliburton and Bechtel.

As an investigator for the now defunct Resolution Trust Corp. in 1993, Lewis drafted a criminal referral alleging illegal Whitewater dealings that eventually became the basis for Ken Starr's probe. Republicans praised Lewis as a whistle-blower; Democrats blasted her as a partisan. (In a private letter on her computer, she once called Bill Clinton a "lying bastard.") Lewis told NEWSWEEK she got her new job last year after interviewing with top administration officials at Defense. Although they were aware of her background, she says, "I would prefer to think it was my ability and skills they were interested in."

— Michael Isikoff

Washington Post  
September 14, 2003  
Pg. 1

### 18. Iraq Takes A Toll On Rumsfeld

*Criticism Mounts With Costs, Casualties*

By Thomas E. Ricks and  
Vernon Loeb, Washington Post  
Staff Writers

Since he returned to the Pentagon three years ago, Donald H. Rumsfeld has been one of the most activist secretaries of defense in a generation, challenging the uniformed brass to modernize the nation's military into a 21st century fighting force and leading the armed services through two major wars in 18 months.

Along the way, Rumsfeld has rankled many in the military with his aggressive style and far-reaching agenda for "transforming" the military, even as he has won acclaim for his leadership of the Pentagon through the trauma of the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the building and ensuing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terrorism. Now, less than five months after he helped formulate and execute a bold plan in which a U.S. invasion force drove to

September 16, 2003

000.5

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Sex Offenders

Is it true as this article suggests that the military has sex offenders?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jaspin, Elliot. "Military Has Sex Offenders," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, September 14, 2003.

DHR:dh  
091603-5

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

16 Sep 03

U21884 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19559

efforts by the 122,000 troops deployed there.

"I suspect he will be saved by the strong backs and the creativity of the Army soldiers in Iraq," one White House aide said. "And that's an incredible irony."

New York Times  
September 13, 2003

## 19. Wolfowitz Retreats On Al Qaeda Charge

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — The second-highest official at the Pentagon retreated today from his assertion that high-ranking lieutenants of Osama bin Laden are plotting with remnants of Saddam Hussein's government to kill Americans in Iraq.

In a television interview on Thursday's anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said "a great many" operatives of Al Qaeda were working to link up with Iraqis loyal to Saddam's regime to attack Americans.

But today Mr. Wolfowitz, an architect of American policy in Iraq, said he had misspoken. He said American military forces were still trying to identify foreign fighters flowing into Iraq and whether they are collaborating with Iraqis to resist the American-led occupation forces.

On the subject of bin Laden deputies, Mr. Wolfowitz said today that he was referring to only one man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of the few people that Bush administration officials have cited previously to assert links between Al Qaeda and Iraq before the war.

Mr. Zarqawi allegedly helped train Iraqis in the use of poisonous chemicals and once received medical care in Baghdad, American officials have said.

Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
September 14, 2003

## 20. Military Has Sex Offenders

By Elliot Jaspin, Cox  
Washington Bureau

Washington -- Registered sex offenders are serving in the U.S. armed forces, in some cases in the Middle East, law enforcement records show.

A reporter's check of sex offender registries in five states turned up eight men listed as serving in the Army or Marine Corps. One was pictured on the Web site of the Texas registry in his Army uniform with the notation "deployed to Kuwait."

The four service branches say they bar the enlistment of convicted sex offenders. Military officials acknowledged the presence of sex offenders and said screening procedures are being tightened to prevent such enlistments.

The Army said it was not certain how many sex offenders are in its ranks. The Army issued a statement saying "preliminary inquiries" indicate the number is "relatively small."

In its statement, the Army said any enlisted sex offenders who conceal their convictions could be dismissed from the service or charged with fraudulent enlistment under military law.

However, Martha Rudd, an Army spokeswoman, said that if a person were added to a sex offender registry after enlistment, the soldier would not be automatically dismissed. She said decisions were made on a "case-by-case" basis.

The Army said it had granted 2,379 felony waivers since 2001. A spokesman said none of the waivers involved sex crimes.

Citing privacy concerns, Army officials said they could not comment on the cases of any of the men found in the newspaper check of sex offender registries in Georgia, Florida, Texas, Ohio and New York.

Alonzo Wilson, a police detective in Xenia, Ohio, said

that as part of a sting operation in 2000 he came across Sgt. Benjamin Schroeder, 27, in an Internet chat room used by pedophiles to swap pornography.

After Schroeder, who lives in Texas, sent him a movie of a girl about 10 years old performing a sex act, Wilson said he notified Texas police. Schroeder's home in Copperas Cove was raided, and he pleaded guilty to the possession and promotion of child pornography.

Still, Schroeder continues to serve in the military. On a Web registry of sex offenders maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety, he is shown in his Army uniform with a notation that he has been "deployed to Kuwait."

Lori Hix, a detective with the Copperas Cove police who handled the Schroeder case, said her department immediately notified the Army that Schroeder had been arrested.

The Army statement says that in situations in which it becomes aware "that a soldier has been convicted of a sex offense while a member of the Army ... appropriate action will be taken." It could not be determined whether the Army took any action with regard to Schroeder.

Besides Schroeder, two other registered sex offenders found in the newspaper survey are listed as serving in the Middle East.

Georgia's sex offender database says that Douglas C. Lawson, 27, of Thomasville, is "in Iraq gone to war." Lawson, who pleaded guilty in North Carolina in 1997 to indecent liberty with a 14 year-old girl, was a Marine at the time of the incident and part of his sentence was to be confined to barracks for six months.

A Marine Corps spokesman said Lawson was discharged in 2000. It was unclear whether he had since enlisted with another branch of the service, or whether the Georgia database listing was

erroneous.

Florida records say Thomas Collins, 31, of Marianna was convicted in Jackson County in 1995 of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under 16.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement said there is a note in Collins' file dated last March that says he was being deployed to Turkey with the Army.

New York Times  
September 15, 2003

## 21. Army Pushes Human (And High-Tech) Spying

By Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 — Violence against American forces and the nascent government in Iraq is prompting the Army to consider new, more efficient ways to use specialists who gather information from Iraqis and scour intercepted communications among attackers, the Army's top officer for intelligence says.

The emphasis on high-resolution images of Iraqi military positions collected by satellites and spy planes to guide the war effort has shifted to human intelligence gathering, communications intercepts and analysis, the officer, Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, said in a recent interview.

But the need for more specialists in human and communications intelligence "doesn't mean we need a greater force structure," said General Alexander, who was promoted in July to become the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence.

As part of an effort under way throughout the Pentagon to relieve the strain on ground forces by assigning troops in units more carefully tailored to individual assignments, General Alexander said, Army intelligence is asking, "Can we build it more modular, to get teams that we can send in

September 16, 2003

Iraq

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Weekly Standard*

Please do something about the *Weekly Standard*. They seem to be on a weekly campaign against our work in Iraq. Why don't you talk to them.

Don't wait. Do it soon.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Kagan, Frederick. "Now You See It, Now You Don't," *Weekly Standard*, September 22, 2003.

DHR:dh  
091603-4

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

16 Sep 03

U21885 /03

military contract, Mr. Forgeard said Airbus would need to team with a major American defense company. He said talks are "ongoing," but no agreements have been reached. Under such a deal, Airbus would supply an aircraft, to which the U.S. company would add equipment, such as electronics. In the meantime, Mr. Forgeard said, Airbus is working to "establish our credibility in the Pentagon," by explaining its products.

Weekly Standard  
September 22, 2003  
**46. Now You See It,  
Now You Don't**

*Resorting to magical thinking  
about defense obligations.*  
By Frederick W. Kagan

It's odd: A secretary of defense in charge of vital counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations that have stretched the armed forces to the breaking point is fiercely fighting increases in the size of those forces. Despite calls for more troops from senators John McCain, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Joe Biden, and many others, Donald Rumsfeld has developed plans that rely on magic to cover over the reality that our armed forces are too small. When, inevitably, the magic fails, the United States may find itself in a terrible position in Iraq and in the world.

At first, Rumsfeld appeared to accept the premise that there were not enough combat troops available for the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. He proposed a plan to increase the number of soldiers in combat formations by "civilianizing" Defense Department jobs currently held by active-duty soldiers. At the same time, he proclaimed that larger forces really are not necessary because superior intelligence capabilities will allow the United States to predict our enemies' actions and enable us to send precisely

tailored forces to threatened areas just in time. Both of these proposals conceal the risks and costs that they entail.

Uniformed personnel whom civilians might replace come from two categories: the intellectual parts of the armed forces devoted to long-range planning, concept development, education, and training, and the logistical system that is one of our greatest advantages over allies and enemies. Excluding uniformed personnel from the intellectual activities of the armed forces would exacerbate a trend toward anti-intellectualism in the services. In the worst case, it would leave the United States with uniformed military technicians executing plans and concepts designed by civilian contractors. Given Rumsfeld's interactions with the military to date, there is reason to suspect that this is, indeed, his goal. The Defense Department, moreover, has already gone far toward entrusting its military thinking to civilians, as the proliferation of projects run by outside think tanks attests. This unfortunate development should be reversed, not reinforced.

Turning the multifarious logistical positions now occupied by uniformed personnel over to civilians is even more misguided. Civilian personnel differ from military personnel in two critical respects. First, they are bound by contracts that specify precisely the duties they are to perform and the circumstances under which they are to perform them. Military personnel are on call 24/7 and their duties are whatever their superiors order them to do. Second, civilians are not expected to face personal danger and do not have the same protection as military personnel. It is neither reasonable nor just--nor in many cases legal--to expect them to place themselves in harm's way.

These differences have

consequences for military activities. When things absolutely have to get done at a certain time, it is possible to order uniformed personnel to do whatever it takes to accomplish them. Civilian contractors cannot be so ordered--their supervisors are legally obliged to abide by the terms of their contracts. Even at critical times, then, civilian contractors may not get things done, and the military personnel relying on them may have no recourse.

This problem is acute in theaters of war, where contractors may become targets of enemy missiles and bombs. Civilian contractors may be no less brave or willing to bear risks than soldiers, but they are neither trained nor equipped to do so. Nor do they have the health care and insurance benefits that help make facing those risks acceptable to the uniformed military or the family support structures that make prolonged deployments tolerable for their families.

One could design contracts for these personnel, to be sure, that put them on call 24/7, provide training and equipment, supply medical and insurance benefits and access to family support structures. But when one has done all of that, one has simply created soldiers without uniforms, and eliminated all of the cost benefits that Rumsfeld sees in "civilianizing" the armed forces.

Further reliance on technology and its supposed efficiencies is equally unacceptable. The notion that U.S. security should depend on the ability of our intelligence technology to warn us of attacks or threats suggests bankruptcy of thought at the senior levels of the Pentagon. It should be enough to list the most recent intelligence failures--notably the September 11 attacks and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq--to show the absurdity of this idea.

More important, this proposal completely misses the current crisis facing the U.S. military. American forces are not overstretched by the danger from potential new crises, foreseen or unforeseen. They are stretched to the breaking point by our current requirements in Iraq alone. Even completely eliminating the U.S. deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would not save enough troops to make the current deployment in Iraq sustainable. It would free up perhaps 4 of the 12 combat brigades needed to maintain our current force levels in Iraq for more than a year. Perfect clairvoyance about future crises would neither alleviate the current situation nor, for that matter, help us meet new crises, for which we have no forces available.

Recently, Rumsfeld and others have begun to argue that American forces in Iraq can be largely replaced by troops drawn from the international community and by Iraqis themselves, thus obviating the need for any change in the American military structure at all. Considering Rumsfeld's focus on the need for perfect intelligence, this notion is amazingly shortsighted. The single most important source of intelligence in Iraq--as in any peacekeeping, nation-building, or counterinsurgency situation--is the troops on the ground. Those troops interact with the local population, learn which sources they can trust, and are trusted in turn by the locals to act promptly and intelligently on good information. Replacing American troops with Iraqis will reduce the amount and accuracy of the intelligence we receive.

For one thing, the Iraqis' traditional solutions to internal disorder involved torture and execution more than the painstaking gathering of intelligence for surgical raids. It will take more than the few months Rumsfeld and others

September 16, 2003

*Iraq*

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Op-ed

We have to get an op-ed piece or something that responds to all these allegations that the planning was imperfect. They have taken a series of items here and listed them—that oil would fund reconstruction, that Iraqi troops would help keep the peace, that resistance would fade quickly, etc. I think we ought to get a decent piece that goes at their allegations hard.

Let's do it fast; let's not wait. Put some real beef on it. Please try to get back to me by Thursday or Friday with a draft.

Thanks.

Attach.  
*Early Bird* articles

DHR:dh  
091603-3

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

*16 Sep 03*

**U21886 /03**

from Karbala. His employer is not paying his salary and with what he is earning for his military service, he estimated the couple was losing \$2,000 a month. His wife had to leave their apartment and move in with her father, he said.

"They told us when we first got deployed it would be six months — the whole thing," he said. "I thought I could handle that, I wasn't aware of my wife's situation and I thought I could suck it up and drive on, as the soldiers say."

But Mr. Preston said he felt ill-prepared for his assignment with the 870th, never having been trained for military police work — riot control, arrest procedures, how to convoy and how to protect the convoys — receiving only two months training at Fort Lewis before being sent to Iraq. He said he would leave the National Guard as soon as he could.

"I'm trying to do a job that I'm not qualified to do," he said. "But when you tell your superiors, they're looking at you like none of that matters. They just need the bodies, they just need the numbers."

Of his wife, he said, "I feel like I owe her the complete rest of my life."

As the leader of the 870th's "family readiness group," — each company has one under a program that General Monroe enhanced before his troops were sent to Iraq — Mrs. Gorski is dealing with a lot of the frustrations that the families are enduring. Leading the group was a job her husband had planned to do until he was deployed to Iraq, she said.

Her telephone rings constantly, and she has an \$11,000 credit card bill, from charges for postage, care packages, telephone calls to Iraq and food for the family support meetings and dinners, she said.

"I'm in a way fighting my own war on the home front," she said. "I don't know what

day it is. I wake up and there are phone calls that need to be made, meetings need to be planned, people need help or if they don't have questions they need to be consoled. I have to tell them everything is going to be O.K."

Mrs. Gorski said that while the 870th and its four sister companies were in Fort Lewis, there were five divorces, two attempted suicides, several bankruptcies and a lot of depression among soldiers and their spouses. Her central mission now, she said, is to make sure that "nobody dies on my watch, nobody ends up in the loony bin, that all the heads stay above water."

Even when, she says, all she feels like doing is staying in bed or staring at the distant San Francisco skyline from her bedroom, even when she is so unable to concentrate that the study guide for her real estate test "might as well be in Swahili," she forces herself to be a cheerleader for the others.

Mrs. Gorski encourages them to go to counseling, and has started going herself, she said. She organizes potluck dinners and picnics and has set up a phone tree to keep the families informed about the soldiers, using 10 volunteers, including her mother and her mother-in-law.

On Tuesday, when the news broke that reservists and National Guard troops would probably stay longer, she asked the volunteers to activate the phone tree, telling them that she did not know how that would affect the 870th but to ask the families how they were holding up.

It was still unclear over the weekend if the 870th would have to stay for the full year. For the families, it was a roller-coaster week. On Tuesday, Mrs. Gorski heard that the company was in limbo. On Thursday, she heard that the company would have to stay, and she planned a meeting with the other families to talk about taking their case to elected officials. Then, on

Friday, Mrs. Martin said she heard from her husband that the 870th was not staying, but on Saturday she said he told her that they were.

Through it all, Mrs. Gorski said she was forcing herself to believe that her husband would return safely, whenever that might be.

"I couldn't be one of the women who could deal with losing their husbands, so God can't do that to me," she said. "Whether it's irrational, that's the way my brain reasons it, and I feel like we have way too many guardian angels who have gotten us this far."

Time  
September 22, 2003  
Pg. 26

## 7. Facing Reality

*George Bush gambled that overthrowing Saddam without the U.N.'s help and boxing out Arafat would pay big dividends. Now all bets are off as the Administration adjusts its strategy. Here are the new calculations — and risks.*

By Michael Elliott

Just before 8:46 a.m. on Sept. 11—the moment that, two years ago, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center — President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and their wives stepped onto the lawn of the White House for a moment of silence. During that long day of remembrance, the President's only public engagement was at St. John's Church on Lafayette Square, across the street from the White House. A year ago, Bush spent 14 hours visiting all three sites of destruction and death — downtown Manhattan, the Pentagon and Shanksville, Pa. He ended that pilgrimage with a speech at Ellis Island — the Statue of Liberty and the wounded New York City skyline providing a backdrop both poignant and uplifting. This year, by contrast, a White House aide said before Sept. 11, "the message is low key." It could hardly have been lower.

In brief and halting remarks after the service at St. John's, the President remembered those who lost their lives two years ago, and the heroism, decency and compassion shown by Americans on that "sad and terrible day." Sept. 11 is worth remembering for all those reasons and for one other, which is now proving impossible to forget. In his response to the attacks, Bush launched the U.S. on an unprecedented and hugely ambitious campaign to rid the world of terrorism, to remove those regimes that aided terrorists in the past or might do so in the future, and to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not leach into the hands of terrorists or their sympathizers. But to do that, Bush set out an even grander effort to pacify an arc of crisis running from Marrakesh to Bangladesh. Hence, two wars so far — in Afghanistan and Iraq — plus a concerted U.S. effort to set Israelis and Palestinians on a road map to a peaceful settlement. In the most hopeful version of the Administration's strategy, these objectives come together in a virtuous circle — and peace breaks out all over. Having seen that the U.S. was a "strong horse" in Afghanistan and Iraq, Palestinian radicals would realize — by some process never quite explained — that there is no point continuing to use violence as a way of advancing their political goals.

All this may yet come to pass. The Bush Administration remorselessly reminds anyone who will listen that it never promised a quick and easy consummation of its policies. But it has not come to pass yet, and Bush was forced to reckon last week with the reality of the enormous task he has set himself and to acknowledge that it is messier, more daunting and more complicated than he ever imagined. Bush needs help, and he has admitted as much by calling on the U.N. Security Council to

pass a new resolution to encourage the flow of more money and armed forces into Iraq. How he copes with the new reality on the ground and whether he gets the help he seeks will determine the fate of his presidency.

#### The Big Picture

For a few weeks, as the anniversary of Sept. 11 approached, the White House was thinking how best to advance the Administration's goals. Aides knew the news from Iraq was unsettling the public, and they knew too that it would take more than a few presidential homilies to calm everyone's nerves. "There was a time," said a White House aide, "when we could just give a speech, and that would take care of an issue. We can't do that now." The new strategy was to "big-picture Iraq" and place the struggle there in the larger context of the global war on terrorism. Bush was pleased with his reception at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention on Aug. 26, and it was on that day that the idea of giving a televised speech to the nation began to take shape. So on Sept. 7, after the NFL games, Bush, the go-it-alone ranger, turned reluctant multilateralist. He called on other countries, whatever their "past differences" with the U.S., to step up to their "present duties" in what the Administration likes to call the "central front" in the war on terrorism. "Members of the United Nations," said Bush, "now have the opportunity — and the responsibility — to assume a broader role in assuring that Iraq becomes a free and democratic nation." Bush said he would ask Congress for \$87 billion in the current fiscal year for the military and for reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. That breathtaking figure constitutes 11% of the entire discretionary spending in the federal budget.

But the grim reality in the arc of crisis was unchanged by his speech. Two days after the President spoke, suicide

bombers from Hamas, the radical Palestinian group, killed 15 Israelis in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The Israeli government responded by announcing that it had made a decision to expel Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, from the West Bank. Then al-Jazeera, the Arab satellite-TV channel, showed a videotape of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri — the leader and ideologist, respectively, of al-Qaeda — strolling around a boulder-strewn mountainside with the insouciance of a couple of friends hiking in the Adirondacks, a sobering reminder that those who lead the network responsible for the worst terrorist attacks in history remain at large. On Friday U.S. forces in Iraq were involved in a fire fight at Fallujah in which they killed eight Iraqi policemen, and the same day, two American servicemen died in another battle. "The forces of reality have set in," said Senator Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in what may be the year's finest understatement.

#### Looking for Leverage

When it comes to Israel and Palestine, it seems as though the U.S. can do little more than hope for the best. A senior State Department official grimaced last week as he watched TV pictures of Palestinians rallying to Arafat's compound in Ramallah. "Ignoring him is better than making him the center of attention," said the official. There was little the State Department could do. After 2 1/2 years of trying — and failing — to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a glum official admitted, "We have no weight with the Israelis." Yet Sharon still fears the White House, so on Thursday night National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called a senior Israeli official to try to get Jerusalem to back down from its pledge

to eject Arafat. Washington has kept in constant touch with Ahmed Qurei, better known as Abu Ala, appointed Palestinian Prime Minister by Arafat on Sept. 7. A Palestinian official claims that the U.S. has told Abu Ala, "Don't worry, the Israelis won't kick Arafat out."

But if the White House still has some muscle with the Israelis, it has less and less with the Palestinians. Washington pressed Abu Ala to appoint an emergency Cabinet that would take control of the Palestinian security apparatus and crack down on Hamas and other radical groups, but Abu Ala backed down under pressure from Arafat and others. Some in the Administration wondered whether the new Prime Minister was already compromised. "The U.S. has made it pretty clear," says this official, "that we won't support someone who is the voice of Yasser Arafat."

#### Iraq: Help Wanted

In the case of Iraq, the administration is dealing with the new reality by trying to internationalize the task of reconstruction. Inevitably, given the scarcely disguised disdain that some in the Administration have shown for the U.N., the decision to seek a new Security Council resolution was branded a reversal of policy. And inevitably, members of the Administration, who would not admit to error if the Inquisition put them through an auto-da-fe, scoffed at the very idea, stressing their flexibility, reminding skeptics — how could anyone have thought otherwise? — that they have been multilateralists all along. "We've been making course corrections virtually on a weekly basis," said Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz last week. Surprisingly, given the animosity between Washington and Paris this year, that view is endorsed by a senior French diplomat. "They very pragmatically see that the

situation has got to change," this diplomat says, "and they're trying to fix it."

It was plain that Iraq needed fixing months ago. With continued attacks on U.S. troops and mounting pressure to bring them home, the Administration started looking for ways to bring in more foreign soldiers. They first sought to get troops from India, Pakistan and Turkey, among others, into the theater of operations. But since none of these nations would commit without a new Security Council resolution, desultory discussions took place in July on the possibility of a new U.N. mandate. They didn't get very far. Bush left for his vacation in Crawford, Texas, calling for a greater international presence in Iraq but avoided saying whether the U.N. would have more authority there.

It was not until the bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad on Aug. 19 that an interagency group in Washington began working on a draft resolution. On Sept. 2, Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Bush to discuss the broad outlines of a proposal that would reinforce an international pledge to Iraq's security and encourage other nations to commit funds to the country's reconstruction. (A donors' conference to rustle up money for Iraq has already been scheduled for Madrid in October.) Powell told Bush that under the terms of the draft resolution, the U.S. would continue to run the military operation in Iraq. "This works," said the President as the meeting ended.

It may — but there's hard pounding to be done before that's certain. Detailed talks started on Saturday, when Powell met in Geneva with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Foreign Ministers of China, Britain, Russia and France — the other permanent members of the Security Council — to discuss a new U.N. mandate for Iraq.

that haven't panned out.

### Oil Would Fund Reconstruction

Although war planners knew that Iraq's oil infrastructure would need fixing, they drastically underestimated just how much. In March, Wolfowitz told Congress that Iraq would generate anywhere from \$50 billion to \$100 billion in oil revenues over the first two to three years. Now it turns out that the ramshackle oil industry (much of its technology dates back to the 1970s) will make hardly any money this year from exporting oil, and only \$12 billion next year. From 2005 onward, oil revenues could pull in \$20 billion a year, but that would require buoyant oil prices and a halt to the widespread sabotage of wells and pipelines.

Oil production isn't the only problem. The Pentagon's plans assumed that Iraq's industrial base and utilities were in working order. Instead, they're in a sorry state. And without basic utilities, factories aren't generating very much of anything — including badly needed jobs that would help win hearts and minds. The new Electricity Minister, Ayham al-Samaraie, estimates it will cost \$18 billion just to fix the power grid.

### Iraqi Troops Would Help Keep the Peace

A large American peacekeeping deployment in Iraq was the last thing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted when he was planning the war. He and his deputy, Wolfowitz, hoped to bolster postwar security by redeploying elements of Iraq's 400,000 troops to supplement the relatively small invading force. With Saddam gone, the plan was for Iraq's civil servants and police to step in to help run the country while a U.S.-chosen governing council handled the nitty-gritty of administration until democracy blossomed.

The first miscalculation was based on another faulty

assumption — that Iraqi troops would stick around to surrender. As it turned out, only a tiny fraction of Iraq's military surrendered to coalition forces. The majority simply melted away. But the plan to use the few remaining Iraqi troops for peacekeeping was scrapped, and the way it was done boomeranged on the occupying authorities. Soon after arriving in Iraq, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), ordered Iraq's military dissolved. He argued that this was merely a symbolic act, but it infuriated Iraqi troops who had put up little resistance to the invasion — as encouraged by leaflets dropped by the U.S.-led coalition. Some of those ex-soldiers are presumably among those who continue to attack the American occupiers. Bremer agreed to keep paying roughly half the troops he had dismissed, and he is now training volunteers to staff the new Iraqi military, which should have 12,000 soldiers within a year. A new police force is being trained, but those currently working for the CPA are targets for harassment and even assassination. The Iraqi Governing Council, appointed by the U.S., has little authority, and its members are seen by many Iraqis as collaborators with the occupying power.

### Resistance Would Fade Quickly

The Pentagon did anticipate a certain amount of postwar resistance — a small amount that wouldn't last long. But the Pentagon didn't envision that thousands of American troops would be under almost constant attack by guerrillas or that so many of the fighters would be foreigners who regard the U.S. occupation of Iraq as the Super Bowl of jihad. The Pentagon apparently calculated that as the country settled down and its oil spigots opened and helped finance reconstruction, resistance would quickly be marginalized. Even after it

became clear this summer that attacks on allied troops were intensifying,

Rumsfeld described them as the exertions of a few Baathist "dead-enders." Yet a pair of Army studies published before the war cautioned that the goodwill of Iraqis would be fleeting and violent nationalism rife — that things, in short, could quickly become messy. "There were a lot of people in the Army who were aware of what the occupation might require," says Conrad Crane, an Army War College scholar who co-wrote both reports on Iraq's postwar challenges. "That message didn't seem to get to Central Command or the Defense Secretary's staff."

By *Unmesh Kher.*  
Reported by *Mark Thompson*  
and *Douglas Waller/Washington*  
and *Vivienne Walt/Baghdad*

USA Today  
September 15, 2003  
Pg. 9

### 9. Soldier Killed 2 Days After 'Friendly Fire' Incident

*Iraqis say U.S. apology is not enough*

By Glen C. Carey, Special for USA Today

FALLUJAH, Iraq — A U.S. soldier was killed and three were wounded Sunday in an attack outside a city that two days earlier was the scene of one of the most serious "friendly fire" incidents involving U.S. forces in Iraq.

Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division stationed at a nearby base said a Humvee was destroyed by an improvised explosive device. Sunday's death brings to 155 the number of soldiers killed since President Bush declared an end to major conflict on May 1.

Fallujah is a city of 200,000 in the "Sunni Triangle," an area known to harbor supporters of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. military was subjected to nearly daily attacks over a two-month period beginning in April when U.S. soldiers fired on protesters, killing 18 and injuring 78.

Now, residents of this town 30 miles west of Baghdad are seething with anger again over the deaths of eight Iraqi policemen and a Jordanian security guard.

The incident occurred early Friday when about 25 uniformed Iraqi policemen in two pickups and a sedan were chasing a white BMW known to have been used by highway bandits near Fallujah, said Asem Moharumed, a police sergeant who was wounded.

The police turned around after losing sight of their quarry at a U.S. checkpoint near the Jordanian Hospital. A nearby American patrol opened fire, Mohammed said. At least nine people were injured.

The U.S. military issued a statement Saturday expressing regret and offering condolences to the victims' families.

But the apology didn't satisfy many residents, some of whom called for revenge attacks against the U.S. military.

Angry mourners marched through the city on Saturday. They brandished Kalashnikov machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades as they followed the Iraqi-flag-draped coffins of the eight policemen who died.

"The mourners passed by the mayor's office out front here," Adnan Jumaili, 35, a Fallujah police force commander, said Sunday. "They were armed with machine guns. We felt that we would be shot at because we work with the Americans, but it was more a display of force. They were protesting the American presence."

Firas Najib, 20, a resident of Fallujah who sells cold sodas and cigarettes at a stand on a highway that runs from Fallujah to Baghdad, also said the city was in an uproar over

September 17, 2003

340

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruitment of Hispanics

I announced today, as you requested, that you are in charge of the effort to recruit more Hispanics. I want to know what you are doing, so I can have a sense of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-30

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

17 Sep 03

U21887 /03

September 16, 2003

334 Decowits

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

Joyce tells me that three people are leaving DACOWITS and we need more people. I want to get involved in it before people have been interviewed and talked to. One of the people I think ought to go on is Margaret (Muggy) Hoffmann, Marty's wife.

Please don't let it get so far down the track as it did last time with a lot of people selected when I don't have a voice in it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091603-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

16 Sep 03

U21888 /03

ADVANCE  
UNSIGNED

September 17, 2003

03  
9.20

000.7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pelosi and Murtha Press Briefing

Someone said that Pelosi and Murtha have called for my resignation. Please get the text. I haven't seen it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-21

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/03

9/17

C 9/18

→ SecDef -

The news reports say that they did not name names. I'll get a transcript.

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita  
9/17

17 Sep 03  
EO 12812

U21889 /03

9/1/7/03  
11:25am

Sir,

Congressman Duke Cunningham called to speak with you. He simply wanted you to know, with all the Pelosi talk going on, you have him as a staunch warrior...and damn the torpedos!

He would like to talk to you for 15 seconds, when you have time.

I can connect you in the car if you wish.

Cell: (b)(6)

V/r,

(b)(6)

*→ Get Pelosi's March  
Cell text - Hill msg - -*

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH HOUSE MINORITY LEADER NANCY PELOSI (D-CA) AND  
REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MURTHA (D-PA) RE: POST-WAR IRAQ LOCATION: ROOM H-206, U.S.  
CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C. DATE: TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

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REP. PELOSI: I'm pleased to be here this morning with Congressman Jack  
Murtha of Pennsylvania, the ranking Democrat on the Defense Appropriations  
Subcommittee.

Mr. Murtha is a decorated Vietnam veteran. Among his awards is the  
Purple Heart. For 30 years in Congress, he has championed the interest of our  
military men and women. I've seen the esteem in which Mr. Murtha is held by our  
military when I had the opportunity of joining him on a visit to our troops at  
the beginning of March, just before the beginning of hostilities. We visited  
the theater. I saw the respect, esteem, regard that our troops had for him, as  
well as the generals.

During that visit, Mr. Murtha raised questions about the military's  
ability to sustain this force for an extended period of time. I've also seen  
firsthand the personal concern that Mr. Murtha has for the brave Marines and  
Naval personnel when we visited Bethesda Naval Hospital. He has visited, of  
course, the Walter Reed Hospital, as well. But I saw firsthand at Bethesda his  
personal concern that he'll tell you about.

Under Mr. Murtha's leadership, Democrats in Congress will be sure that  
our troops will have what they need to successfully accomplish their mission and  
to return home safely.

I'm pleased to present Mr. Murtha for some comments. Thank you for  
your leadership, Jack Murtha.

REP. MURTHA: Thank you.

Let me say that Nancy and I went to the jumping-off place three or four  
days before the war. And we saw the troops -- and she wanted to go on her first  
foreign trip to make sure that even though she was against the resolution, that  
the troops understood she was for them, and she would do everything she could as  
a Democratic leader to support the troops that are overseas.

We got as good a briefing as I've ever seen: detailed, comprehensive,  
about the war itself. The planning, even with the contingency of not getting  
through Turkey, worked out well. It was well-planned and well-executed. And we  
learned that there was a red line. And that red line, if we crossed that red  
line, they would attack us with biological and chemical weapons. We also heard  
from the commanders that if Saddam Hussein was cornered, they would fire these  
weapons at us. I believed that. And since that time, I believe we have been  
discredited internationally because of that misinformation.

11-L-0559/OSD/19571

I don't care what they find now when they talk about these programs. And I think they're making a big mistake when they try to change the direction they're going and the justification for going to war.

There's \$87 billion in front of us right now as a package.

They miscalculated the opposition after the war -- when I say "after the war" I use the defining moment as when the president said the war was over. There was a miscalculation of opposition, there was a miscalculation of the infrastructure. And I think we were overly optimistic nationally, or internationally, about what we were going to do, and how we could do it. So the Iraqi people had to understand we got -- you know, they're going to come in here a wave a wand, this thing's going to be all over. And, of course, they miscalculated in what they needed.

Two years ago, one of my staffers asked the Army "Do you have enough kevlar inserts for the flak jackets?" We all understand what the flak jackets are that they wear when they're in combat. The kevlar are the heavy ceramic inserts that protect them. Every single wounded person I met at Bethesda or Walter Reed after Afghanistan or after Iraq, if they were wounded, said the flak jackets with kevlar saved them. One fellow said, "If I'd had a kevlar in my flak jacket" -- his stomach was opened up, and I was trying to kid with him. I said, "You know, there's some guys like -- shaped like Mark Shields that -- they would pay for an operation like that -- pay big money." (Laughter.) And the kid started to laugh, and then it hurt him to laugh. And he said, "I can't laugh." But, at any rate, he said, "If I'd had kevlar, this wouldn't have happened to me."

Now, that is unconscionable. It's only the Army. But they should have ordered these things before -- every single person -- and you know what the Army told us, just a year ago? They said, "All the front line troops will have kevlar in their vests." But there's no blank-blank front lines in Iraq. You see that there are so many of them that are being hurt that aren't -- being wounded that aren't in the front lines.

Second thing they didn't have is a jammer. A jammer is a little device that jams the signal between the telephone that they're using to detonate the bombs. And, of course, they had one in the first -- in the brigade that I visited, and they needed a lot more. I think they needed 70 or 80 of them. And in the division they only had nine. In other words, what I'm saying is, you ride down the road and there's a bomb on the side of the road, and it's detonated by a jammer -- or detonated by a telephone, and the jammer will stop that signal. And they don't have them.

Tracks for Bradleys. One-third of the Bradleys are deadlined because of lack of spare parts, and a big part of that are tracks. I mean, this is things you think about before you go. These Bradleys are traveling a thousand miles a month, and they normally travel a thousand miles a year. It costs \$22,000 to refurbish these Bradleys, every single one of them. All these costs were miscalculated.

The spare parts problem. When General Schwarzkopf, in the '91 war, said -- when he introduced General Pagonis, he said, "This is the guy that won the war, the logistics guy." He did a phenomenal job, Pagonis did, and he gave him complete credit for what happened.

This time we've had all kinds of problems, not necessarily because of the Army logistic system; because of the bureaucrats back here took it upon themselves to say they don't need them; the frontline troops only need them. They don't need this equipment.

We put money in -- and I see that they have put money in the supplemental, in this \$65.5 billion, which is the military part of the supplemental, they've put money into this program.

Now, miscalculation. Now, let me read something that Bush One said after the war; he says it in his book. Bush One says, "Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into the occupation of Iraq would have violated our guidelines about not changing objectives in mid-stream, engaging in mission creep, and would have incurred incalculable human, political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible."

This is George Bush talking about Saddam Hussein.

"We had not been able to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq."

Bush One said this.

Now, don't tell me they didn't know there was going to be a problem. General Abizaid said to Nancy and myself, when we were in Iraq, "Indications are the military problem will not be as tough as the aftermath."

Somebody has to go. Somebody has to be held responsible. I went out to Bethesda not long ago. I see a young fellow without a hand. He has a thumb and a finger missing. He's going to lose his foot, probably. He's blind -- he's been blinded in one eye. He was defusing bomblets. We dropped the bomblets; the bomblets -- a percentage of them don't go off. I've heard anywhere from 10 to 25 percent don't go off. He defused thousands of them.

Beverly Young, Bill Young's wife, angel of mercy, she goes to the hospitals all the time to minister to the wounded, to help them with morale and talk to them, and raises and money and does everything she could. As a matter of fact, they presented her with a medal because she's done so much.

She called me and said, "We've got this one young Marine who's losing hope. You've got to talk to him." This is the young fellow I'm talking about. So I went in to talk to him. He said to me, he said, "Do you think what happened to me is worthwhile?" And I explained to him, I said, "Let me tell you something. You defused" -- after he told me he was a demolitions expert. He had defused thousands of mines. He saved thousands of lives, this young fellow. And I told him that, and I hope that he felt better about what had happened to him.

The other fellow that was doing this same -- well, another fellow was killed right behind him, so, you know, this is a serious business, and he paid a heavy price. And some bureaucrat in Washington has to start paying the price before we can get this thing straightened out. We can't allow the bureaucrats to get off while these young people are paying such a heavy, heavy price.

Internationally -- I get a progress report almost every couple days about what's going -- well, I read in the paper how well things are going.

Well, internationally, I don't see this -- the perception is, and if perception is reality, this is not going well. The perception in Iraq is it's not going well. The perception in the United States, 60 percent of the people are against the \$87 billion.

Now, what can change this? The first thing you got to do is hold the people responsible that were responsible for not having the equipment out there, for miscalculation of this post-war -- when I say post-war, a guerrilla war is the most difficult kind of war to fight. Now, you can talk all you want to about the progress you're making. Can anybody believe when Russia went into Afghanistan that the Afghanistan guerrillas would drive them out, one of the most powerful nations in the world? Would anybody believe we were going to be driven out of Vietnam eventually, out of Beirut? I mean, this is what a guerrilla war is all about.

There is an X factor, an X factor in the spirit of the enemy. Until you overcome that X factor, you're not going to win the war. For instance when somebody fires an RPG and they disappear into the crowd, does that look like that 80 percent of the people in that area are in favor of you? They're either afraid -- and obviously, because there's no security, and because the police chief was killed -- the last time I was in Iraq, they told me that one of the most important things they had done was they had one of the Shi'ite leaders who was all for them, and he was a moderate leader and he was talking for them. A couple days later, he was killed.

I kept telling Bremer, every time I went, "Well, you've got to ask for more money. You've got to put more money up front." And that's the crux of this news conference. I believe we're sitting on our fat backsides here in the United States, going on vacation, working two, three days a Goddamn week and we ought to be funding this program the way it should be funded! They have less electricity than they had before we went in there. We've got 60 percent unemployment; they used to have 40 percent unemployment. All these problems, (where all ?) of them could be solved by money, and we've got to put the money up front early, or we're not going to win it. We're not going to overcome the X factor, because when you've got 60 percent unemployment, when you've got people that are on the street and they're afraid because of the security problems, you're not going to win this war.

I support 100 percent what they're trying to do. It's going to take more money. This is just a down payment. But my feelings are so strong that I would hope -- okay, you have hearings. But you work, for crying out loud! You work, and you have the hearings, get them over with, and get the damn money out there to these troops so that we can change it. We're not going to change it until we overcome the X factor. And the X factor, as Mao Tse Tung knew, as Chou En-Lai knew, they knew one damn thing; that you've got to have the people on your side. And if they're not on your side, you're not going to win; you're not going to prevail. And I'm 100 percent for it, but I want to get the thing done as quickly as we can.

And I'd be glad to answer any questions that you have.

Q (Inaudible) -- you saying that someone -- somebody had to go? Could you tell us specifically who you would like to be held accountable for this?

REP. MURTHA: The architect of this post-war planning has to go.

Q Put a name on that for me, sir. The secretary of Defense?

REP. MURTHA: I've never known the secretary of Defense to set the policy. I mean, he recommends the policy.

Q But you have a name inside your head, sir, is that correct? REP. MURTHA: I'm just saying the policy's set by the White House; always is. The administration sets it. So, they've got to decide. They've got to say -- they made recommendations, but we made the decision. And who made the recommendations -- I had one guy call me, and he was upset because I had made some comments. And he said he had nothing to do with it.

So, you know, this is up to the White House. The White House has to make that decision. This -- the administration is ultimately responsible. The secretary of Defense just carries out the policy. I mean, that's the way I've always known it.

Q Condi Rice?

REP. MURTHA: Well, I'm just saying -- you know, I can't tell you who. I'm just telling you that they've got to make a decision -- until this happens, we're not getting international support. You know, they said they're going to get \$55 billion one day. Next day, they say we'll get 10 (billion dollars). Then, they say we're going to have thousands of troops to replace our troops. Now, they say it will be less than 15,000. You're not going to get cooperation from the international community.

I was chairman of the committee during the '91 war. Sixty billion dollars came from the coalition forces. It went through our committee, is the reason I know the figure. George Bush I was one of the finest foreign policy presidents we ever had. And he built a coalition. And I remember asking Schwarzkopf, "Do you want a declaration of war?" He said, "No, no. I just want you to support the U.N. resolution, because this is a coalition. We don't want to be out there by ourself." Now, this was 10 years ago, 12 years ago, for crying out loud.

Yes, ma'am.

Q (Off mike) -- the 87 billion (dollars) wasn't necessarily enough. I mean, how --

REP. MURTHA: It won't be enough. It's a down payment.

Q How much is enough?

REP. MURTHA: Well, I don't know if I have a figure. It's going to -- it depends on all kinds of things. It -- the infrastructure --

Let me tell you about the GDP. The GDP in Iraq is either 25 or 35 billion. I don't think anybody can give you an exact figure. But having said that, we put \$6 billion in at first: completely inadequate. Completely inadequate. And then we said the oil revenues would make up the rest. Well, even if you add up a billion dollars a month, you still only get \$18 billion. So you're completely inadequate from the GDP, whether there's 25 (billion dollars) or \$35 billion. So, you know, we're talking about \$16 billion to take care of the electricity alone.

And let me tell you, every person in their district's got problems with sewage and water. So, this is no easy decision for members of Congress. But we're in this thing. And we've got to put the money up front.

Q Is it important for the U.S. to win this war, and is it winnable?

REP. MURTHA: Well, I'll tell you, if they don't get the money up front soon -- John Hamre and we -- we got copies of the Hamre report and the Lugar report. You ought to read those. You ought to get copies of those when you go out. John Hamre gave them three months. I give them six months. If they don't face up to the fact that we've made some mistakes -- and I'm part of it. I mean, I admit it -- we are not going to win this thing. You got to win international support, and you have to win, you have to restore hope for the Iraqi people. That's what it's all about. And --

Yes, sir.

Q Are you saying that poor planning by the administration put the lives of American troops in jeopardy?

REP. MURTHA: That's exactly what I'm saying.

Q Could you elaborate on that just a little bit more?

REP. MURTHA: Well, let me put it this way. When you go into an operation, you should realize after what George Bush I said, and what Abizaid said, that when this thing ends, you still got a problem. And if you got 40 percent unemployment before the war, you're going to have people out in the street. And you fire -- you get rid of all the military, and prisoners are released, all these kind of things, and you don't get it under control security-wise, you encourage a guerrilla war.

Q Congressman, how does sending more money win the X factor?

REP. MURTHA: Well, it's simple; you put people to work.

You fix the electric grid. Ninety percent of the GDP came from the government, from oil revenues. We've got to put people to work. We've got to get people off the street so that they have confidence that -- you know, the Lugar report says that 80 percent of the people favor this in Iraq. I don't know where he got the figures, but let's say it is 80 percent. But they're not helping us any, and they're not helping us -- these guys are firing and disappearing into the crowd. And until you convince them that they've got to help us, we aren't going to win. That's all there is to it. So we've got to turn this thing around right now.

Q Mr. Murtha, President Bush is responsible to the voters, and that policy most probably won't change until the next election --

REP. MURTHA: No, no. I think you're wrong about that. I think it's changing right now. Let me tell you, I've been screaming about international policy. I think now he's starting to go in the right direction. No, no, I don't think -- I think he's gonna make a change; I think he's gonna see that there were some mistakes made, some recommendations that failed. So no, you're seeing a change in the policy right now. They won't admit it, but you're seeing a change in the policy.

Q But you're -- if I could follow. You're obviously very upset about this. You want somebody's head to roll.

REP. MURTHA: Well, I mean, I don't think you're going to convince the international community that we're serious until somebody goes. It's like anything else, if you've got a miscalculation, and this is -- a miscalculation that's costing us a lot of lives, you got to hold somebody responsible.

You know, what did they say before -- right before the war started? We're going to be liberators; they're going to run to us. I don't think they said roses, but they said we're going to be liberators and it's going to be -- nothing to it. That's what they were saying.

Matter of fact, Shinseki was trashed because he was saying we need more people. Zinni -- Zinni was called unpatriotic. I talked to Zinni not long ago. There was nothing -- he said, "Here I am spending my whole life in the military, trying to tell them the truth, and they trash me, say I'm hurting the war effort." That's what they say when you bring up an objection, they say you're hurting the war effort. Well, I mean, how are you going to get these things done if you don't say what you think and try to get something done by publicly accusing them of they've got to make a change? And I think they'll make a change. I think you'll see it change. And I think, hopefully, they won't have a constitution and election, as I've heard, and then get out of there. I mean, this is not a short-term thing.

Yes, sir?

Q Sir, when you say you were part of this, as you did, what exactly do you mean? I mean, what mistakes do you think you Democrats --

REP. MURTHA: Well, I was one of the ones that said I think -- I didn't say there was imminent danger, but I thought there was danger and I thought it was -- we should have gone to war. And I don't -- I don't see any justification that I believe was true come to reality.

In other words, I thought that there was some possibility of our troops being attack. I thought there was destabilization the Middle East, all those kind of things. Can you imagine if we leave there now -- whether I was right or wrong, whether we leave right now, the disaster we would have? We suffered from Vietnam for 10 years when we left there, and we were in there for 20 years, if you take the period of time where we put money in it. It would be an absolute disaster to our foreign policy if we were to leave there now.

So, this thing's got to be solved. We're in there now. Whether I was right or wrong, we're in there now; whether Nancy was right or wrong, we got to get this thing solved, and we got to do it now, as if it's serious, for Christ sakes.

Q To follow up though, when you say that people need to be held accountable, you were speaking specifically of the planning, the reconstruction of Iraq. But what about holding people accountable for who made this case that you now think was wrong?

REP. MURTHA: Well, that's part of it. That's -- I said there were three -- there were three mistakes. One mistake was that we didn't realize what the opposition would be, and part of that came because maybe we didn't have enough troops to immediately get it under control. Second was the

infrastructure's much worse, which means you've got to have infrastructure, electricity to put people to work. You can't put them to -- then we were so optimistic about how it was going to -- they were just going to fall in place, that the government would -- there were reports that they would find people to run that government, and we would be able to get out of there right away. That was the optimistic predictions that they were making.

Q But don't you think that it was Secretary Rumsfeld who was primarily responsible for building the case?

REP. MURTHA: (Let me tell you ?), the administration is the one that is responsible for foreign policy. They're the ones that tell the Defense Department -- in all the 30 years that I've been here, I've never known the Defense Department to run foreign policy, I've never known the Defense Department to make policy. It's the president of the United States and the people in the White House that make the foreign policy.

Q Congresswomen, do you agree that there should be high-level resignations of some sort? REP. PELOSI: Yes, I do. I don't think that you're ever going to have the appropriate change in policy unless you have the change in thinking. It's the president's decision to make. It's his policy, his advisers, his miscalculations, and I think that it falls to him to decide whose heads should roll.

Mr. Shields, I think, has a question.

REP. MURTHA: Let me -- let me just say, you remember Somalia? Who went in Somalia? They made a decision. That was much less miscalculation than this, because -- and Garrison, the commander in the field, took complete responsibility, and still the secretary of Defense went. I don't know who's responsible. I'm just telling you, somebody -- the architect should be held responsible.

Q So do you think Mr. Wolfowitz should be on that list?

REP. MURTHA: Well, the White House has got to make that decision. They're the ones that ultimately make the decision. Wolfowitz can make the recommendation; they make the decision.

Q Mr. Murtha, this -- (off mike) -- is the equivalent of firing the third-base coach, I mean, for the team just collapsing. I mean, basically you could say we have been discredited internationally by misinformation. That misinformation came right from the top. The president of the United States, the vice president of the United States, the secretary of Defense, the secretary of State, they were the ones who made the case. They made it to you, they made it to the American public.

REP. MURTHA: Well, you can't fire the president, unless you're in California. (Laughter.) I mean, what I'm saying is we're not going to turn this policy around unless the president -- somebody recommended this policy to him. He took the recommendation. So somebody has to be held responsible, and he's got to make the decision who it was.

REP. PELOSI: I might say further to that point, earlier this year, before the summer, the administration made a request of \$79 billion, \$65 billion of which was for military support in Iraq. Whatever their plan was, it hasn't worked. That \$65 billion has not adequately provided force protection or

mission success. So there has to be an accountability for why that did not work.

We certainly are going to provide the resources for our military as we go forward, but we cannot pile tens of billions of dollars more onto tens of billions of dollars without some better plan on how to go forward. And that's why we have to have accountability, and that's why there has to be a change of policymakers, because this has failed.

I think Mr. Murtha has given us a master class on this issue, and I'm grateful to him for it. Our members will be expecting accountability from the administration and an accounting of the 65 (billion dollars) we just spent, the 89 (billion dollars) they're asking for, and that's not the end of the day. They will be asking for more. Mr. Murtha says it's going to cost more to end this, but it will be endless unless there's a real plan and a realistic approach to bringing stability and security to Iraq. Q Ms. Pelosi, how do you get that accountability without slowing the process down? From Mr. Murtha's comment, it sounds quite urgent that the military money get over there. Are you going to try to strip out the military money from the overall --

REP. PELOSI: That may be one approach, that we would do that, or we may make the appropriation contingent upon getting the plans.

REP. MURTHA: Let me just say this reconstruction money is just as important. If you want to overcome the X factor, you've got to get people to work. You've got to energize; in other words, get the electric grids going. You've got to show them that there's something -- there's less electricity than there was before. Sixty percent unemployment now, versus 40 (percent) before this happened. So this is just as important. So, you know, I want a plan, too. I want to see a plan. But it is imperative that we do this quickly.

REP. PELOSI: Mr. Murtha has spoken to our caucus about this issue and said we've got to internationalize, and he spoke to those issues now. We've got to Iraqitize; we've got to bring many more Iraqis into the process for the transition for our eventual exit strategy.

And you have to energize, because without the energy, the lights, the water, et cetera, the country is not going to be able to function.

Mr. Murtha has made a compelling case about what is going wrong in Iraq. For too long the Bush administration approach to bring stability has relied on U.S. troops taking almost all the risk and U.S. taxpayers paying almost all the bills. It's clear that whatever plan existed for dealing with post-war Iraq, that plan has failed. That failure is the result of miscalculations, as he said, and faulty assumptions by the administration. These miscalculations have been extremely costly -- yes, in lives, and certainly in dollars.

One week into the war Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told Mr. Murtha's Appropriations subcommittee on Defense, "We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." How long that was. The administration, while our military men and women prevailed in battle through their exceptional courage and skill, bringing stability and security to Iraq is far from accomplished.

As we have seen in recent weeks, there are enormous problems in Iraq. The condition of Iraq's infrastructure is worse than expected, as was indicated.

Unemployment is much higher, and opposition is much more intense. On September 7th the president presented American taxpayers with another bill for his miscalculations: \$87 billion in additional spending. It's only a matter of a short time before more money will be required; we know that. We are already facing nearly a half a trillion dollar deficit, and the American people deserve to know how this spending will affect our ability to address the unmet needs of our own country. Congress will not hand the president a blank check. President Bush and the architects of this failed policy must tell the American people the truth.

Having said that, on behalf of my caucus, I fully subscribe to Mr. Murtha's contention that we are -- time is running out for us in Iraq. If we don't get a plan and get the resources to match the plan to accomplish the mission and protect our troops, matters can only get worse. So whether it's a question of dealing with President Bush in the next election, that's a year away, over a year away. Too many lives will be lost, too much money will be squandered, too many opportunities will be foreclosed for the American people unless the policy and the personnel who recommend it are changed.

Any other questions for Mr. Murtha? Any other questions? Yes. Q Mr. Murtha, do you intend to try to amend the \$87 billion request to address some of these shortcomings that you see?

REP. MURTHA: What I said was I think in the end it will cost more, but I think \$20 billion will take care of the early stages of it. I don't think -- we should have -- the difference between the former GDP and the amount of money they're getting from oil revenue are way short. Even now it's short. But I think that \$20 billion will -- it will take -- the first couple years, and it will take some time, but you get the Corps of Engineers in there, you start spending this money, we'll get -- the electric grid is the most important thing to get back because that puts people to work. And \$20 billion is enough for the first six months or so.

Q What happened to the oil? I thought this was all going to be self-financing.

REP. MURTHA: You -- you heard what Wolfowitz; he said it was going to be self-financing. And there's a lot of problems happened with the oil. One is, it took a lot longer than they anticipated. Another miscalculation. And the other, they're interrupting the pipeline.

Q Excuse me, but I'm still a little confused about how do you reconcile doing this quickly and getting the kind of accounting you want to get? I mean, I don't see how you accomplish both of those things.

REP. MURTHA: Let me tell you this, if we don't do it quickly, it's not going to be able to be turned around. So you don't have to worry about accounting. It has to be done quickly. We have to do a little goddamn work up here. I mean, instead of talking about it, we've got to do the work; have the hearings, if they want to have hearings. Get the money out to the field to get people back to work to get the X factor overcome to get them on our side so we quit killing American young people over there. That's what I'm saying.

You ought to go out to the hospital. You'll see why I want to get the money out there. See these young people who have been hurt so badly -- a thousand people wounded or injured in this conflict.

Q But there does seem to be some difference in your views, then.

REP. PELOSI: No, there's no difference in our views. Mr. Murtha has pointed out very clearly that the miscalculations by the administration have cost the American people in many terms, in many respects. What we expect from the administration, and what the American people deserve is an accounting for what happened to the money that we just spent all summer, so that we know what's going to -- what -- the money they're asking for is going to be well spent in the future. That shouldn't take very long.

So, when we talk about this, our process is moving. We come in on Tuesday night and leave before Thursday at lunch. This can be done. The information should exist. We are appropriators -- well, I used to be -- and justification is what the administration always presents for an appropriation request. So, this information is available to them. We would like to see it. My colleagues, who represent the American people, want to be able to answer for that.

So this isn't a matter of taking time to get the information, that figure came from someplace.

And we want to see what that is, because we need to know that our forces will be protected, and our Democrats will support our men and women in uniform to accomplish their mission and to protect them. But we are serving notice to the administration that that's what we expect this money to do. Now show us the report.

So there's nothing about anything that is -- that happens consecutively. This can all happen right away, and we can get this information, we can move, because as Mr. Murtha said, I think if there's something you take home from this is, time is running out.

REP. MURTHA: Yeah, let me mention one thing too. Sustainability. We have a third less troops than we had during the former Gulf War. We can't sustain this deployment. We have a couple hundred-thousand Reservists. The Reservists' families are writing to all of us saying, you know, this is a draft. We're supposed to be drilling, and we're called up and we're drafted to stay a year now because the regulars -- there's not enough regulars. Forty-eight percent of the regular force is deployed worldwide right now; 30 percent of the Reserves and Guard are deployed right now. So we've got a sustainability problem. We are we going to replace these people with? That's why we have to get international help and we have to go to them with a plan. And the first thing is, you got to change the team.

REP. PELOSI: This amount of money that they're requesting and Mr. Murtha's insistence that we move quickly, in my view, is not an endorsement of the policy and of the spending that has gone before. It is a recognition that what has been happening has in some cases made matters worse, and we must expeditiously address that problem or more lives will be lost, more opportunities will be lost, and ultimately, the cost to the taxpayer will be greater and the threat to our security will be increased.

Q Should the \$87 billion move before the Defense appropriations bill, or does that matter?

REP. MURTHA: Well, we suggested that the other day, and of course that's a decision the leadership has to make. I'm not sure what they anticipate

there. We'd like to see it move right with the Defense bill. We hope to finish the Defense bill this week. But we hoped that they'd move together, but there obviously got to be hearings, and people have to hear what they're going to use the money for. To me, I want to get it out there. REP. PELOSI: Well, I would have hoped that it would have been part of it, because, you know, we're going into a half-a-trillion-dollar deficit without the cost of Iraq -- a half-a-trillion-dollar deficit. So it should be part, in my view, of the formal appropriations process.

You've been wonderfully attentive. Thank you all for very much for coming. I hope that you appreciate that we have received a master class today from a master on our defense issues and on meeting the needs of our men and women in uniform. I once again want to thank Mr. Murtha -- a great patriotic American, as they say, a decorated Vietnam purple heart -- (laughs) -- he's leaving the room -- (laughter) -- for his leadership, and thank you all for your participation today. Thank you.

END.

END

September 17, 2003

Colombia

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Colombia and the Supplemental

Here are your talking points on Colombia. The basic decision was made to keep the Supplemental totally limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. It was the right decision. You cannot add Colombia. That will have to be something in FY05. It's too bad, but that's life.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/17/03 Talking Points on Colombia for VP/C/C lunch

DHR:dh  
091703-24

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

17 Sep 03

U21896 /03

**Talking Points for Cheney, Rice and Powell Lunch  
on FY04 Supplemental Funding to Support Colombia Initiatives**

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Colombia is a critical partner in the Global War on Terrorism.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We included \$90 million in our FY04 Supplemental request to pay for additional assistance that the Principals believe is necessary to help Colombia in its War on Terror.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ OMB rejected our \$90 million request.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ It is extremely important to continue assisting Colombia in its fight against narcoterrorists.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ President Uribe's aggressive leadership and Colombia's recent military successes provide a window of opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the narcoterrorists.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ President Uribe only has a few years left to complete this task.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Maintaining US support to Colombia is consistent with the administration's position on Colombia and the war against terrorism.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ I request your help in influencing OMB to restore the \$90 million to the President's Supplemental request.

Keep clear -  
10.6 at 10-05

September 17, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Annual Defense Report

Who in the building is responsible for the Annual Defense Report? Let's assign somebody, probably Ken Krieg.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-14

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

110.01 HNGS

17 Sep 03

U21897 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Annual Report

What happened to the Defense Annual Report? Did it ever get sent in? I never saw the final draft. Isn't it late?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-14

.....  
Please respond by 9/19/03

*✓ 9/17*

*SecDef -*

- The draft provided to you has been reviewed internally
- It is to be sent to OMB & NSC for interagency coord Thursday
- Once IA coordination complete, a final draft will be sent to you for approval
- Ken Krieg is targeting 1 October as a completion date
- Last year's report was submitted in late September (it was "due" in March)

11-L-055910 SQ110586

*9/16*

September 17, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jordan

*OB  
10/13*

*Jordan*

When I met with King Abdullah, he said Jordan wants to help with a lot of things.  
Please get the list from Peter Rodman—he was in the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-12

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*17 Sep 03*

U21898 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19587

September 17, 2003

320.2

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pulling Out

Let's get a list of all the places we would like to pull out of around the world and then apply the appropriate multiplier figure. Let's get it over to the President, Condi and Colin, and tell them we need help getting these folks out—Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, Iceland, Korea, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

17 Sep 03

U21899 /03

September 17, 2003

03  
9.20

461

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Midge Decter's Book

People have advance copies of Midge Decter's book, apparently for the purpose of writing book reviews. Why don't you see if you can get a copy, so we can have someone read it and see if there are any issues or problems we have to be attentive to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-19

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

17 Sep 03

U21900 /03

September 17, 2003

110.01 HUGS

TO: Ken Krieg

CC: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Annual Defense Report

Ken, each year the Annual Defense Report has been due in March and delivered in September and October. I want you to be responsible for getting the next Annual Report out by March 1. That means you have to get started on it immediately.

Please get a schedule and plan it so that it gets done, and allow for all the delays.

If you are not the right person to do it, please let me know who is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-15

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

17 Sep 03

U21901 /03

September 17, 2003

Iraq

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legal Definition

I do need a legal definition for the people we are picking up in Iraq, and I need it soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-10

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

17 Sep 03

U21902 /03

September 17, 2003

092.3

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: MoD Conference

I really do think we should put off this Ministers of Defense meeting. We just have too many important things we are working on. Let's take a look for next February and see where we are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

17 Sep 03

U21903 /03

September 17, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Civil Defense Force

I read Vines' piece. I suppose we should talk to General Myers about getting the civil defense force implemented in Afghanistan, given his enthusiasm. Where do we get the money? Who takes responsibility?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/22/03

✓  
9/29

SECRET —

As we discussed

• Responsibility is CENTCOM — they must ID resources needed for that capability

• CENTCOM must pay for it re identify to you as an "uninsured requirement" for DoV to work on.

17 Sep 03

C 9/20

September 17, 2003

Kuwait

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reducing Stress

Another thing is that we have to start pushing to get people to backfill us in Kuwait. We have tens of thousands of people there who are not in a war zone who could be backed up by other countries.

We need to get CENTCOM and the Department of State focused on that and make it a different deal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

17 Sep 03

U21905 /03

September 19, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Statistics

0005

Please have someone get for me the number of people killed per year in the states of Senators on the Senate Armed Services Committee, like Levin, Kennedy and Reed, down the line, and Byrd in West Virginia. Then tell me the populations of their states. Then how many killings per thousand population in their states.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091903-22

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

19 Sep 03

U21906 /03

September 20, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Semantics

*Mr. Secretary -  
NSA is repeating an  
AP/Reuters news report.  
The NSA did not write  
this.*

I notice the NSA is saying these are "guerillas."

1. How do they know they are guerillas?
2. How do they define guerillas?

*U/R  
Belmont*

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/19/03 SIRO Press Review

*Iraq*

DHR:dh  
092003-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*OB  
10-16*

*20 Sep 03*

U21907 /03

✓ 9/20

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**(U) SIRO Press Review for FRIDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 2003**

(U) This SIRO Press Review was compiled in the National Security Agency's National Security Operations Center (NSOC) by the Senior Information Resources Officer (SIRO) for use as background information by analysts and to serve as an indicator of significant worldwide events which may be reflected in SIGINT.

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

11-L-0559/OSD/19598

545

September 20, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Bedard

Why don't we get General Bedard to go over to Iraq for a year. He is a star. I didn't realize he was retiring.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-22

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

Closed per  
SMA  
9.25

Iraq

20 Sep 01

U21908 /03



September 22, 2003

✓ 9/30  
9/30

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
 FROM: Reuben Jeffrey  
 CC: Secretary Wolfowitz  
 SUBJECT: Meet with Scooter Libby

9/29  
 9/29

You suggested that we meet with Scooter Libby.

Secretary Wolfowitz and I will be meeting Scooter again this evening. We all met together last week, as well.

Our intent is to conduct weekly coordination meetings.

U21909 /03

TEN  
9.30

September <sup>22</sup> 19, 2003

000.715D

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/Moseley

I would like to have a cup of coffee with Moseley and just see what his impressions of the Pentagon are, having come in from the war fight.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
091903-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

U21910 /03

22Sep03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

ob  
9.24

230.02

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Cunningham

We have to keep Duke Cunningham posted. He wants to be helpful to me. He called and is eager to weigh in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

22Sep03

U21911 /03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

Centcom

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keeping Tom Franks Informed

Please be sure Tom Franks is on the list of people we keep informed. He ought to be on the regular blast fax list, so he knows what is going on. He needs to get regular things on an unclassified basis, because he is going to be asked to go on television and comment on things, and he has to know what we are up to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-5

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

U21912 /03

22 Sep 03

544

22  
September 28, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Marines in Rotation

I would like to see the Marines back in the Iraq rotation, for a lot of reasons.  
However, every time I look at the rotation, I find it is all Army. What is going on?

Please come back to me with two or three ways the Marines could be re-factored  
into the second and third rotations, then let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*closed SMA  
10-20*

025003

U21913 /03

✓ 9/26

September <sup>22</sup> 19, 2003

Liberia

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Liberia

When we move the ARG/MEU away, we ought to take a very hard look at who is going to be left for Liberia. If we take it down to level X, it will be very hard to move it below that later.

Therefore, you ought to screw your head into it, and we ought to think very carefully about each human being there. Everyone we leave there is going to have to stay there for a while, and I am inclined not to get a big new commitment there.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091903-25

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

22SEP03  
U21914 /03

September <sup>22</sup> 19, 2003

331

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Washington Times*

I think we should go to the *Washington Times*—they seem to be tough on us lately, and there is no reason for that. We may just need to get to know them better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091903-23

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

9/22 -

Recall that we devoted an enormous amount of time and energy immediately thereafter on a piece Gertz was working on regarding Cambone/Special Ops. All for naught. It was a bad start to a new footing.

We might do an ad board. FYI, I ~~made~~ made a point when I started in PA to reach out to Gertz & Scarborough and tell them that whatever perception they may have going forward we want to work with them as fully as with other organizations, etc.

cassep03

Larry Di Rita

9/22

111-0559/OSD/19607

U21915 /03

September <sup>22</sup> 28, 2003

325

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Guard

Somebody from the Army probably ought to get up there and talk to Senator Nelson of Florida and possibly the Congressmen and Senators from the other two states where, in their view, the Guard is being treated slightly differently.

You may want to get some folks up there—you or whoever—and talk to them, so they understand the logic.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-8

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

225ep03

U21916 /03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Regional Markets

Let's get going on getting into the regional markets. Let's do a couple of them each night and do them live. Let's just start working—Miami, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Omaha, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-12

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

020.77

22 Sep 03

U21917 /03

9/22/03

MR. Abell

September 20<sup>22</sup>, 2003

334 DACOWITS

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Office Moving?

*10/24*

Is your office moving? Is DACOWITS being moved? Someone asked me about it. I am curious to know why. Is it because of the building renovation?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*10/23*

*✓ 10/24*

*Separately, I reinforced with Dr. Chu your strong desire to be involved early in identifying candidates for DACOWITS memberships. He understands and will comply.*

*D, Rumsfeld*

*10/24*

11-L-0559/OSD/19610

U21918 /03

aaSep03

10/23

✓  
10/24



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

DATE: 10/16/03  
TIME: 9:08 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2003, 9:08 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 27 Oct 2003*

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Office Moving

- You asked for information on the "move" of the DACOWITS office (TAB A). There is a pending physical move of the DACOWITS office and also the earlier organizational realignment of the five military spaces from OSD to the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA).
- In regards to the physical move, the DACOWITS support office will relocate on December 4, 2003 to room 2C548, as part of the Pentagon renovation. The new space is renovated and offers upgrades and a larger working area for the committee and support staff.
- Additionally, as a result of the OSD Headquarters Reduction effort in July 2002, the DACOWITS support staff was realigned under the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA). DACOWITS along with other "operational / non-policymaking" entities in P&R were realigned to the DHRA, which is a Field Operating Agency of P&R. The movement of these spaces is transparent to the field and supervision of DACOWITS remains under the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	10/24
SR MA CRADDOCK	10/24
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/23

Prepared by: Denise Dailey, DACOWITS, (b)(6)

U17581 03



September ~~20~~<sup>22</sup>, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Statistics for Comparison

IRAQ

We have to start knowing how many people are getting killed in the United States in accidents and in homicides in various cities and in the country overall, so we can compare it to what is going on in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-15

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

U21919 /03

22Sep03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Kadish Advisory Group

Please find out if there is a Kadish advisory group. I think there is and that Bill Graham is on it. I would like to add J.D. Crouch to it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

334

22 Sep 03

U21920 /03

TAB A

Snowflake

628  
December 16, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
SUBJECT: Death Investigation

293

Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/20/03 Hull letter to POTUS

DHRL:dh  
121603-3

.....  
Please respond by 12/23/03

16 Dec 03

U21921 / 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/19614

Snowflake

8:19 AM

TO: Doug Feith

EF-7892

03/217344

DATE: December 19, 2003

SUBJECT:

I think I need a letter to the Turkish MoD, thanking him for the use of Incirlik.

Thanks.

DHR/uzn  
121903.01

Please respond by:

1/8/04

✓  
1/21

Sir,  
New response below.  
Original response is  
@ the blue tab.

vr/CDR Noseny  
1/21

✓  
C/12 1/13  
C/12

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Noseny  
1/12/03

22-12-03 09:59 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19615

U21925 1/03

9

MCFP  
per PD  
JBL  
24 Dec

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: December <sup>23</sup>~~19~~, 2003  
SUBJECT: Ft. Bragg Troop Visit

Please talk to General Motors. Find out what their policy is. We were told by the widow of a soldier killed in OIF that GM gives a \$750 rebate on the purchase of a GM vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Her husband was wounded and died two weeks before their car purchase. She did not get the rebate. See if you can figure out what the policy is. We will want to get back to her. at some point. I believe her name is (b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
121903.02@com

Please respond by: 1/10/04

123

23 Dec 03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

000.715D

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Admiral Clark

I need a meeting with Vern Clark for the following subjects:

1. How to discuss his plans.
2. His personnel planning over the next period.
3. His ideas on a 21<sup>st</sup> century human resources structure for the Department of Defense and the Navy. We should have David Chu in for that period, possibly. He is already doing some pilot projects that point in that direction.
4. His thoughts on transformation momentum and direction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*OBE  
12/15*

22SEP03

U21930 /03

OB  
8-29  
September 22, 2003

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kellogg and Bedard

*READ*

Please let me know after you have pushed hard on Kellogg and Bedard, the two people I talked to you about. I don't understand why these things don't happen. Those two are world-class talents.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

U21931 /03

*22 SEP 03*

September 22, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Russian Cards

*RUSSIA*

Please see if you can get a set of these Russian cards for me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
*New York Times* reprint, September 20, 2003, p. A27

DHR:dh  
092203-6

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

*22 SEP 03*

U21932 /03

R+R

The Washington Post \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New York Times A27  
 Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Washington Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 USA Today \_\_\_\_\_  
 Los Angeles Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date SAT. 20 SEPT. 2003

## From Russia, Without Love

Evidently inspired by the United States military's Iraqi most-wanted playing cards, a newspaper and a television program in Russia have teamed up to produce their own deck featuring American political figures. "The United Cards of America," as they are called, portray 36 Washington power brokers - along with some, um, pointed commentary. In an interview in *The Moscow Times*, the creators said their deck was mostly for educational purposes, not for "providing material for the Foreign Intelligence Service." Apparently so. Here are some examples:



George Bush Jr., "Bushie, W,"  
 president of the United States since 2001.  
 He is sure that God has a plan for him.

Richard Cheney, vice president.  
 The pupil of Rumsfeld  
 and a friend of Bush Sr.



Donald Rumsfeld, "Rummy,"  
 secretary of defense.  
 The face of the struggle  
 against terrorism.

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Petri Sarvamaa

000, 7/50

I ran into this Finnish broadcasting man. He would very much like to have an interview with me. He seemed very friendly. Why don't we think about doing it sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Business card: Petri Sarvamaa

DHR:dh  
092203-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Petri Sarvamaa  
Bureau Chief

Finnish Broadcasting Company  
2000 M Street, NW, Suite 890  
Washington, D.C. 20036

(b)(6)

*10/3*  
→ *Bryden Whitman*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/3*

YLE

22 SEP 03

U21933 /03

September <sup>22</sup> 20, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Murtha

032

I think I ought to have a sit down with Murtha. I would prefer to do it at the Pentagon, and I would prefer to do it without Lewis. My purpose would be to try to walk through the planning and the situation in Iraq, so he at least is working off facts.

Before I do that, I need to see what he actually said, and there ought to be some way we could get stuff like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

22 SEP 03

U21934 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Marc Thiessen

*Advance copy sent*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony

032

On the testimony we are preparing, it seems to me the big issues we need to address are:

1. The argument that we are going it alone should be dismissed. We should emphasize the number of countries involved and the efforts we are making to get more.
2. The argument that the planning was imperfect. We ought to give some sense of the scope of the planning—through the NSC role, when we were asked to assume responsibility, and all the different plans that existed.
3. The punch line for the planning issue is to show accomplishments—all the things that have been done compared to Kosovo, Bosnia, Germany, Japan and Afghanistan, how fast things have happened.
4. The question of U.S. troops versus Iraqis. We need to discuss and analyze that and explain why we believe a major effort on Iraqis is best from the standpoint of achieving the goals we are trying to achieve and being able to move U.S. forces out of there eventually.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-13

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

22 SEP 03

September 22, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tomb of the Unknowns During Hurricane

100

I am told that the guards at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier were told they could secure because of the hurricane, but they refused to do it. Do you want to check on that? Someone said there was a story about it. Maybe Larry Di Rita's people could find it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-15

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

22 SEP 2003

U21936 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19624

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jeff Shane

There is someone named Jeff Shane I think at the Department of Homeland Security who is supposed to be very good. We ought to think about him for DoD sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

230.02

9/25

Jim O'Beirne -

Please get a  
CV and see what you  
think.

*Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita  
9/25

22 Sep 03

U21937 /03

Thanks

September 22, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Daniel James *Yes*

Chappy James's son, I think Daniel James is his name, was introduced at the football game. Please find out if he lives in Washington, DC now and what his job is and give me his name, address and phone number.

095

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-19

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

*Sir,*

*- Lt Gen Daniel James III*

*Dir ANG*

*NGB\CF 1411 Jefferson Davis Highway*

*Arlington VA 22202-3231*

*DSN (b)(6)*

(b)(6)

22 Sep 03

*Get his home address & phone #*

*C 9/22*

*vr / CDR Nosecco*

U21938 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hearing

*Advance copy sent*

We need to see who from CPA is going to be in my hearing with Abizaid and whether or not Myers ought to come.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-22

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/03

0005

225803

U21939 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Q&As on Contracting

*Advance  
copy sent*

Please make sure I get the Q&As on contracting. We may want to have Oliver there for my hearing to answer Senator Byrd.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-25

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/03

160

QA 5 ep 03

U21940 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bremer's Testimony

*Advance copy sent*

Please give me a copy of Jerry Bremer's testimony and the attachment he plans to submit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-42

.....  
Please respond by 9/22/03

*Iraq*

*22 Sep 03*

U21941 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 CC: Col. Steve Bucci  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Meet w/Bremer, Abizaid and Wolfowitz

*Advance copy sent*

*000,7150*

Paul Wolfowitz and I would like to sit down for about 45 minutes with Gen. Abizaid and Jerry Bremer together, and talk through some issues to make sure we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

*Done 9/23*  
*✓ 9/24*  
*C 9/23*

DHR:dh  
092203-39

.....  
 Please respond by 9/23/03

*22 Sep 03*

U21942 /03

September 22, 2003

*John at 2:10 PM* **DONE**

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: OMB Statement, Bremer Paper

I have to see OMB's statement on the question of loan versus grant, and I need Bremer's five pages on the \$21 billion and what it is about.

*IR 9*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-27

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/03

*22 Sep 03*

U21943 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Debrief of Hearings

*Advance copy sent*

I think we need to have someone in all these hearings, like Bill Luti, who can then give me a dump and a debrief immediately afterward, so I know what is going on up there and how the hearings are going. Bremer is today, and then any others on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday. We need to get very rapid feedback to me, not the way it has been working.

*000.5*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-46

.....  
Please respond by 9/22/03

*22 Sep 03*

U21944 /03

22  
September 19, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/O'Connell

I wonder if I ought to see Tom O'Connell about once every six weeks, just to make sure he is telling me what he is doing and what I don't know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091903-18

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*000.71 SD*

*22 Sep 03*

U21945 /03

013  
9.29

September <sup>22</sup> ~~19~~, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Monitoring Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

Paul—

Please monitor this and see that this gets done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/19/03 SecDef memo 091903-13

DHR:dh  
091903-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

092.2

2250003

U21946 /03

September 19, 2003

TO: Peter Rodman  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

Attached is a memo I received from Peter Rodman. It is interesting. What concerns me is: Have we really carefully thought through what we need in these SOFAs and ACSAs for the future? I am afraid we are simply going around getting agreements that are too much like the ones we already have, rather than fashioning them for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I would like to be reassured that we have put together a team of people to really think these things through. They have to connect with Doug Feith and Andy Hoehn on all the work being done on the footprint.

Please dig into that.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 8/5/03 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) [U14949/03]

DHR:dh  
 091903-13

.....  
 Please respond by 10/17/03



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

AUG - 1 2003

9/19

INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

1-03/010620-INRA

EF-6433

FOR: ~~UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY~~

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

05 AUG 2003

SUBJECT: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

In response to your request, attached at Tab A is a list providing the status of DOD's ACSA program. We have concluded ACSAs with many countries during the past year and have recently succeeded in accelerating our effort to secure agreements with certain key countries.

As you may recall, during the summer of 2002 we developed a priority list for pressing ahead with ACSAs based on SecDef's interest. In light of significant differences among Policy, the Combatant Commanders, and the Comptroller as to a "priority" designation and our conclusion that seeking to rank order countries that appeared on one of the submitted lists would not serve us well, we proceeded to combine all countries named on a submitted list into one priority list. We then set out to conclude ACSAs with those 27 priority countries as well as others.

Tab B provides you with an updated status of those 27 "priority" ACSA countries. As you can see, we have signed ACSAs with 7 of them since then, 3 are at State for approval, 2 have completed negotiations and we are awaiting signature, and 5 are in or about to engage in negotiations. In short, we have made significant progress with 17 of those 27. On the negative side, 5 countries have, in essence, ignored us, 3 have interposed some legal constraint, 1 (Egypt) has told us it will not sign, and on 1 (Eritrea) State is holding up the eligibility.

You may notice that we did not designate Afghanistan a "priority" ACSA country last summer. As you may recall, we had problems getting State to allow us enter into a SOFA then. In any event, even though it was not designated a "priority" ACSA, we recently concluded the negotiations on the Afghanistan ACSA and expect State's approval possibly as early as today, August 1, 2003.

↳ Subsequently, approved by State. Dari translation under review by Gov of Afghanistan.

Prepared by: Dan Haendel, PD, ISA/INRA (b)(6)

PDASD ISA

*cut*

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA  
SPI SAC COMDOCK  
IAA BUCCI

11-L-0559

49 / 03

*Copy DI B...*  
*9/12*

*9/1/03*  
*→ SB*  
*Interests*  
*Boysen.*



# Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) List

## EUCOM (36)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Albania	8 Nov 00
Austria	15 Mar 00
Azerbaijan	02 Jul 03
Belgium	6 May 82
Bulgaria	21 Feb 01
Croatia	02 Aug 02
Czech Republic	19 Nov 96
Denmark	8 Jan 98
Estonia	21 Oct 98
Finland	25 Jul 98
France	23 Feb 87
Germany	21 Jan 83
Greece	5 Aug 96
Hungary	9 Dec 96
Israel	10 Feb 98
Italy	15 Apr 01
Latvia	30 Mar 98
Lithuania	30 Apr 96
Luxembourg	12 Jun 96
Macedonia (FYROM)	23 Sep 98
NAMSA	23 Mar 99
Netherlands	21 Jan 99
Norway	20 Aug 82
Poland	22 Nov 96
Portugal	14 Jan 98
Romania	May 02
Senegal	14 May 01
SHAPE	25 Feb 85
Slovakia	15 Dec 98
South Africa	8 May 01
Spain	11 May 99
Switzerland	6 Dec 01
Tunisia	29 Apr 94
Turkey	12 Aug 96
UK	11 Oct 84
Ukraine	19 Nov 99
● Sweden	Pending signature
● Moldova	Pending signature
● Slovenia	Pending signature
● Russia	Pending signature

## EUCOM (Con't)

● Botswana	Pending signature
● Georgia	Pending EON
● Armenia	Pending signature
● Cape Verde	Pending signature
<b>PACOM (11)</b>	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Australia	9 Dec 98
Fiji	14 Apr 98
Japan	28 Apr 98
Korea	2 Jun 88
Malaysia	18 Mar 97
Mongolia	1 May 03
New Zealand	2 Nov 00
Philippines	21 Nov 02
Singapore	1 Apr 00
Thailand	20 Sep 93
Tonga	11 Jun 97
● Sri Lanka	Pending signature
● Maldives	Pending signature
<b>SOUTHCOM (9)</b>	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Argentina	15 Jan 99
Chile	17 Oct 00
Colombia	July 02
Dominican Republic	10 Jun 03
Ecuador	18 Oct 00
El Salvador	Jul 02
Honduras	21 Apr 03
Peru	01 Feb 01
Uruguay	21 Mar 00
<b>JFCOM (2)</b>	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Canada	22 Oct 99
18 Dec 97	
<b>SACLANT</b>	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
<b>CENTCOM (9)</b>	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Bahrain	20 Jan 94
Djibouti	13 Feb 02
Ethiopia	17 Jul 02
Jordan	29 Feb 00
Kazakhstan	10 Jul 03
Pakistan	9 Feb 02
Tajikistan	11 Mar 02
Qatar	27 Jul 02
Uzbekistan	26 Mar 03
● Kyrgyzstan	Pending signature

## Existing ACSAs - 67

11 New ACSAs Pending Conclusion

ACSA Eligible = 62

11 Countries in negotiations / 7 Countries for Eligibility

<u>Eligibility Date</u>	<u>Eligibility Date</u>
Afghanistan	Jul 02
Algeria	22 Aug 02
Antigua	20 Apr 93
Bahamas	29 Aug 00
Bangladesh	6 Feb 96
Barbados	22 Mar 99
Belize	29 Aug 00
Benin	26 Jan 98
Bolivia	29 Aug 00
Bosnia	25 Apr 02
● Brazil	9 Mar 01
Brunei	2 Nov 01
Cameroon	26 Jan 98
Chad	26 Jan 98
Côte d'Ivoire	6 Feb 96
Cyprus	20 Apr 93
● East Timor	@ OSD
● Egypt	21 May 87
Equatorial Guinea	26 Jan 98
● Eritrea	@ DOS
Gabon	6 Feb 96
Ghana	6 Feb 96
● Guatemala	29 Aug 00
Guinea	26 Jan 98
Guinea-Bissau	26 Jan 98
Guyana	29 Aug 00
● Iceland	25 Aug 99
● India	6 Feb 96
Indonesia	1 Nov 93
Ireland	26 Jan 98
Jamaica	20 Apr 93
● Kenya	5 Sep 00
Kuwait	20 Apr 93
Lesotho	26 Jan 98
Madagascar	02 Jun 03
Malawi	26 Jan 98
Mali	26 Jan 98
Malta	13 Apr 02
Mauritania	26 Jan 98
Mauritius	02 Jun 03
Mexico	13 Apr 02
Morocco	20 Apr 93
Mozambique	26 Jan 98
Namibia	6 Feb 96
● Nepal	24 Aug 98
● Nicaragua	21 Mar 01
Nigeria	20 Dec 00
● Oman	29 Mar 88
Paraguay	29 Aug 00
● Papua New Guinea	@ OSD
Rwanda	26 Jan 98
● Samoa	@ OSD
Saudi Arabia	29 Mar 88
Seychelles	5 Sep 00
● Solomon Islands	@ OSD
St Kitts/Nevis	29 Aug 00
Swaziland	26 Jan 98
Tanzania	26 Jan 98
Trinidad-Tobago	22 Mar 99
Turkmenistan	6 Feb 96
● UAE	20 Apr 93
● Uganda	@ EUCOM
United Nations	4 Feb 00
● Vanuatu	@ OSD
Venezuela	29 Aug 00
● Vietnam	@ OSD
● Yemen	4 Apr 02
Zambia	26 Jan 98
Zimbabwe	26 Jan 98

Prepared by: Lt Col Mark Talley

Joint Staff, J-4, JLOC DSN: (b)(6)

As of: 16 July 03

● Indicates an ACSA is in Negotiations

● Indicates an Eligibility request is pending

11-L-0559/OSD/19637

**STATUS OF DOD PRIORITY DESIGNATED (SUMMER 2002)  
COUNTRIES AS OF AUGUST 2003**

**COUNTRIES THAT SIGNED ACSAs**

1. Philippines (signed 21 Nov 2002)
2. Uzbekistan (signed 2 March 2003)
3. Azerbaijan (signed 2 July 2003)
4. Kazakhstan (signed 10 July 2003)
5. Georgia (signed 26 August 2002)
6. Qatar (signed 27 July 2002)
7. Dominican Republic (signed 10 June 2003)

**AT STATE FOR APPROVAL PRIOR TO SIGNATURE**

8. Sweden
9. Kyrgyzstan
10. Botswana

**COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS AND AWAITING SIGNATURE**

11. Slovenia
12. Russia

**COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, AND NEGOTIATIONS  
BEGUN OR EXPECTED IN NEAR TERM**

13. Oman (expected to agree to ACSA)
14. Ghana
15. Algeria
16. India (problem on wording of financial area)
17. Nigeria

**COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT NON-  
RESPONSIVE TO U.S. REQUEST TO NEGOTIATE**

18. Yemen
19. Kenya
20. Guatemala

- 21. Nicaragua
- 22. Paraguay (has raised lack of funding for its military as rationale)

COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT HAVE RAISED LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AS IMPEDIMENT TO CONCLUDING ACSA

- 23. Brazil (MOD has rejected ACSA because of legislative restrictions)
- 24. Mexico (Mexican Army may be precluded from entering into ACSA, but Mexican Navy -- not part of MOD-- may consider it)
- 25. Iceland (JFCOM passed ACSA to EUCOM who is reviewing)

COUNTRY ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT HAS SAID 'NO'

- 26. Egypt

COUNTRY WHERE STATE IS HOLDING UP ELIGIBILITY WHERE CENTCOM STRONGLY SEEKS APPROVAL AND READY TO NEGOTIATE

- 27. Eritrea

In reply refer to EF and I numbers

EF-6896 11/3  
I-03/013080

September 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2003

TO: Peter Rodman  
Jim Haynes  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

Attached is a memo I received from Peter Rodman. It is interesting. What concerns me is: Have we really carefully thought through what we need in these SOFAs and ACSAs for the future? I am afraid we are simply going around getting agreements that are too much like the ones we already have, rather than fashioning them for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I would like to be reassured that we have put together a team of people to really think these things through. They have to connect with Doug Feith and Andy Hoehn on all the work being done on the footprint.

Please dig into that.

Thanks.

Attach  
8/5/03 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) [U14949/03]

DHR:dh  
091903-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

✓ 11/3  
11/3  
Sir,  
Reply from  
policy  
v/R

(b)(6)

092.2

22 Sep 03

U21947 /03



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

11/3

EF-6896  
I-03/013080

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
(Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6))

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (STRATEGY)  
(Andrew Hoehn, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Status of International Agreements

PD KSDP *[Signature]*

OCT 30 2003

*[Signature]*

OCT 29 2003

- (U) A reexamination of our defense agreements is underway per your guidance. We have a team of negotiators, lawyers, and strategists examining our defense agreements, identifying limitations or weaknesses, and proposing revisions for relief.
- (U) The review team is working through three essential tasks:
  1. Review existing agreements and provide a comprehensive summary of whether the agreements are favorable for implementation of our defense strategy;
  2. Develop priorities for revising these agreements, starting with countries designated as power projection hubs and forward operating sites; and
  3. Integrate the review of international agreements into the ongoing revision of the Security Cooperation Guidance, particularly in determining countries of emphasis.
- Tasks one and two will be accomplished within the next three weeks. Task three will be accomplished in parallel with the development of the revised Security Cooperation Guidance. Our goal is develop revised guidance for your signature no later than January 2004. Additionally, we will integrate the review of international agreements into the ongoing analysis of global posture proposals.
- Accomplishing these tasks will ensure that the continuing effort to develop favorable international agreements supports transformation of our overseas presence and proceeds in a logical, prioritized fashion.



In reply refer to EF and I numbers

EF-6896  
I-03/013080

September <sup>22</sup>19, 2003

TO: Peter Rodman  
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

Attached is a memo I received from Peter Rodman. It is interesting. What concerns me is: Have we really carefully thought through what we need in these SOFAs and ACSAs for the future? I am afraid we are simply going around getting agreements that are too much like the ones we already have, rather than fashioning them for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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Please dig into that.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/5/03 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) [U14949/03]

DHR:dh  
091903-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

11-L-0559/OSD/19642



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

EF-6896  
I-03/013080

PD USDP *R*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
(Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6))

*[Handwritten signature]*

OCT 30 2003

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (STRATEGY)  
(Andrew Hoehn, (b)(6))

*[Handwritten signature]*

OCT 29 2003

SUBJECT: Status of International Agreements

- ~~(S)~~ A reexamination of our defense agreements is underway per your guidance. We have a team of negotiators, lawyers, and strategists examining our defense agreements, identifying limitations or weaknesses, and proposing revisions for relief.
- ~~(S)~~ The review team is working through three essential tasks:
  1. Review existing agreements and provide a comprehensive summary of whether the agreements are favorable for implementation of our defense strategy;
  2. Develop priorities for revising these agreements, starting with countries designated as power projection hubs and forward operating sites; and
  3. Integrate the review of international agreements into the ongoing revision of the Security Cooperation Guidance, particularly in determining countries of emphasis.
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- Accomplishing these tasks will ensure that the continuing effort to develop favorable international agreements supports transformation of our overseas presence and proceeds in a logical, prioritized fashion.



September <sup>22</sup>~~19~~, 2003

TO: Peter Rodman  
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

Attached is a memo I received from Peter Rodman. It is interesting. What concerns me is: Have we really carefully thought through what we need in these SOFAs and ACSAs for the future? I am afraid we are simply going around getting agreements that are too much like the ones we already have, rather than fashioning them for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I would like to be reassured that we have put together a team of people to really think these things through. They have to connect with Doug Feith and Andy Hoehn on all the work being done on the footprint.

Please dig into that.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/5/03 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) [U14949/03]

DHR:dh  
091903-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

*OS*  
*10-16*



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

AUG - 1 2003

9/19

INFO MEMO

I-03/010620-INRA

BF-6433

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

FOR: ~~UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY~~

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *in Peter* 05 AUG 2003

SUBJECT: Status of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

In response to your request, attached at Tab A is a list providing the status of DOD's ACSA program. We have concluded ACSAs with many countries during the past year and have recently succeeded in accelerating our effort to secure agreements with certain key countries.

As you may recall, during the summer of 2002 we developed a priority list for pressing ahead with ACSAs based on SecDef's interest. In light of significant differences among Policy, the Combatant Commanders, and the Comptroller as to a "priority" designation and our conclusion that seeking to rank order countries that appeared on one of the submitted lists would not serve us well, we proceeded to combine all countries named on a submitted list into one priority list. We then set out to conclude ACSAs with those 27 priority countries as well as others.

Tab B provides you with an updated status of those 27 "priority" ACSA countries. As you can see, we have signed ACSAs with 7 of them since then, 3 are at State for approval, 2 have completed negotiations and we are awaiting signature, and 5 are in or about to engage in negotiations. In short, we have made significant progress with 17 of those 27. On the negative side, 5 countries have, in essence, ignored us, 3 have interposed some legal constraint, 1 (Egypt) has told us it will not sign, and on 1 (Eritrea) State is holding up the eligibility.

You may notice that we did not designate Afghanistan a "priority" ACSA country last summer. As you may recall, we had problems getting State to allow us enter into a SOFA then. In any event, even though it was not designated a "priority" ACSA, we recently concluded the negotiations on the Afghanistan ACSA and expect State's approval possibly as early as today, August 1, 2003.

↳ Subsequently, approved by State. Dari translation under review by Gov of Afghanistan.

Prepared by: Dan Haendel, PD, ISA/INRA, (b)(6)

PDASD ISA *ah*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	49 / 03
SR MA CRADDOCK	5 / 11 / 03
IAA BOCC	070

11-L-0559

*Copy Di Rita  
9/19*

*9/19  
SB  
Inaccuracy  
Dag...*



# Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) List

## Existing ACSAs - 67

11 New ACSAs Pending Conclusion

ACSA Eligible = 62

11 Countries in negotiations / 7 Countries for Eligibility

### EUCOM (36)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Albania	8 Nov 00
Austria	15 Mar 00
Azerbaijan	02 Jul 03
Belgium	6 May 82
Bulgaria	21 Feb 01
Croatia	02 Aug 02
Czech Republic	19 Nov 96
Denmark	8 Jan 98
Estonia	21 Oct 98
Finland	25 Jul 98
France	23 Feb 87
Germany	21 Jan 83
Greece	5 Aug 96
Hungary	9 Dec 96
Israel	10 Feb 98
Italy	15 Apr 01
Latvia	30 Mar 98
Lithuania	30 Apr 96
Luxembourg	12 Jun 96
Macedonia (FYROM)	23 Sep 98
NAMSA	23 Mar 99
Netherlands	21 Jan 99
Norway	20 Aug 82
Poland	22 Nov 96
Portugal	14 Jan 98
Romania	May 02
Senegal	14 May 01
SHAPE	25 Feb 85
Slovakia	15 Dec 98
South Africa	8 May 01
Spain	11 May 99
Switzerland	6 Dec 01
Tunisia	29 Apr 94
Turkey	12 Aug 96
UK	11 Oct 84
Ukraine	19 Nov 99
• Sweden	Pending signature
• Moldova	Pending signature
• Slovenia	Pending signature
• Russia	Pending signature

### EUCOM (Con't)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
• Botswana	Pending signature
• Georgia	Pending EON
• Armenia	Pending signature
• Cape Verde	Pending signature

### PACOM (11)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Australia	9 Dec 98
Fiji	14 Apr 98
Japan	28 Apr 98
Korea	2 Jun 88
Malaysia	18 Mar 97
Mongolia	1 May 03
New Zealand	2 Nov 00
Philippines	21 Nov 02
Singapore	1 Apr 00
Thailand	20 Sep 93
Tonga	11 Jun 97
• Sri Lanka	Pending signature
• Maldives	Pending signature

### SOUTHCOM (9)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Argentina	15 Jan 99
Chile	17 Oct 00
Colombia	July 02
Dominican Republic	10 Jun 03
Ecuador	18 Oct 00
El Salvador	Jul 02
Honduras	21 Apr 03
Peru	01 Feb 01
Uruguay	21 Mar 00

### JFCOM (2)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Canada	22 Oct 99
18 Dec 97	

### SACLANT

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
20 Jan 94	

### CENTCOM (9)

	<u>Conclusion Date</u>
Bahrain	13 Feb 02
Djibouti	17 Jul 02
Ethiopia	29 Feb 00
Jordan	10 Jul 03
Kazakhstan	9 Feb 02
Pakistan	11 Mar 02
Tajikistan	27 Jul 02
Qatar	26 Mar 03
Uzbekistan	Pending signature
• Kyrgyzstan	Pending signature

	<u>Eligibility Date</u>		<u>Eligibility Date</u>
Afghanistan	Jul 02	Madagascar	02 Jun 03
Algeria	22 Aug 02	Malawi	26 Jan 98
Antigua	20 Apr 93	Mali	26 Jan 98
Bahamas	29 Aug 00	Malta	13 Apr 02
Bangladesh	6 Feb 96	Mauritania	26 Jan 98
Barbados	22 Mar 99	Mauritius	02 Jun 03
Belize	29 Aug 00	Mexico	13 Apr 02
Benin	26 Jan 98	Morocco	20 Apr 93
Bolivia	29 Aug 00	Mozambique	26 Jan 98
Bosnia	25 Apr 02	Namibia	6 Feb 96
• Brazil	9 Mar 01	• Nepal	24 Aug 98
Brunei	2 Nov 01	• Nicaragua	21 Mar 01
Cameroon	26 Jan 98	Nigeria	20 Dec 00
Chad	26 Jan 98	• Oman	29 Mar 88
Côte d'Ivoire	6 Feb 96	Paraguay	29 Aug 00
Cyprus	20 Apr 93	• Papua New Guinea	@ OSD
• East Timor	@ OSD	Rwanda	26 Jan 98
• Egypt	21 May 87	• Samoa	@ OSD
Equatorial Guinea	26 Jan 98	Saudi Arabia	29 Mar 88
• Eritrea	@ DOS	Seychelles	5 Sep 00
Gabon	6 Feb 96	• Solomon Islands	@ OSD
Ghana	6 Feb 96	St Kitts/Nevis	29 Aug 00
• Guatemala	29 Aug 00	Swaziland	26 Jan 98
Guinea	26 Jan 98	Tanzania	26 Jan 98
Guinea-Bissau	26 Jan 98	Trinidad-Tobago	22 Mar 99
Guyana	29 Aug 00	Turkmenistan	6 Feb 96
• Iceland	25 Aug 99	• UAE	20 Apr 93
• India	6 Feb 96	• Uganda	@ EUCOM
Indonesia	1 Nov 93	United Nations	4 Feb 00
Ireland	26 Jan 98	• Vanuatu	@ OSD
Jamaica	20 Apr 93	Venezuela	29 Aug 00
• Kenya	5 Sep 00	• Vietnam	@ OSD
Kuwait	20 Apr 93	• Yemen	4 Apr 02
Lesotho	26 Jan 98	Zambia	26 Jan 98
		Zimbabwe	26 Jan 98

Prepared by: Lt Col Mark Talley

Joint Staff, J-4, JLOC DSN (b)(6)

As of: 16 July 03

• Indicates an ACSA is in Negotiations

• Indicates an Eligibility request is pending

STATUS OF DOD PRIORITY DESIGNATED (SUMMER 2002)  
COUNTRIES AS OF AUGUST 2003

COUNTRIES THAT SIGNED ACSAs

1. Philippines (signed 21 Nov 2002)
2. Uzbekistan (signed 2 March 2003)
3. Azerbaijan (signed 2 July 2003)
4. Kazakhstan (signed 10 July 2003)
5. Georgia (signed 26 August 2002)
6. Qatar (signed 27 July 2002)
7. Dominican Republic (signed 10 June 2003)

AT STATE FOR APPROVAL PRIOR TO SIGNATURE

8. Sweden
9. Kyrgyzstan
10. Botswana

COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS AND AWAITING SIGNATURE

11. Slovenia
12. Russia

COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, AND NEGOTIATIONS  
BEGUN OR EXPECTED IN NEAR TERM

13. Oman (expected to agree to ACSA)
14. Ghana
15. Algeria
16. India (problem on wording of financial area)
17. Nigeria

COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT NON-  
RESPONSIVE TO U.S. REQUEST TO NEGOTIATE

18. Yemen
19. Kenya
20. Guatemala

- 21. Nicaragua
- 22. Paraguay (has raised lack of funding for its military as rationale)

COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT HAVE RAISED LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AS IMPEDIMENT TO CONCLUDING ACSA

- 23. Brazil (MOD has rejected ACSA because of legislative restrictions)
- 24. Mexico (Mexican Army may be precluded from entering into ACSA, but Mexican Navy -- not part of MOD-- may consider it)
- 25. Iceland (JFCOM passed ACSA to EUCOM who is reviewing)

COUNTRY ELIGIBLE, BEEN BRIEFED, BUT HAS SAID 'NO'

- 26. Egypt

COUNTRY WHERE STATE IS HOLDING UP ELIGIBILITY WHERE CENTCOM STRONGLY SEEKS APPROVAL AND READY TO NEGOTIATE

- 27. Eritrea

Binder- **FILE COPY**

In reply refer to EF-6895 and  
I-03/013074

EF-6895  
I-03/013074

September <sup>22</sup> 19, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Response to Article

Attached is some material I received from Ryan Henry. Please prepare a note to *Foreign Affairs* magazine responding to this article by Campbell.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/25/03 PDUSD(P) memo to SecDef re: Kurt Campbell's article on global posture [u14736/03]

DHR:dh  
091903-12

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

092

22 Sep 03


**COMPLETED**  
OCT 14 2003

U21948 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19649



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

PDUSD(P)  9 2003

INFORMATION MEMO

EF-6895  
I-03/013074  
October 8, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: ~~(U)~~ Response to Kurt Campbell's article in *Foreign Affairs*

- In response to Campbell's article, I am preparing a letter that rebuts Campbell's claim that our global posture effort is proceeding in a vacuum and absent consultation with our allies and Congress.
- Separately, as part of our Public Affairs plan, we will develop a feature-length article, perhaps for your signature, that will accurately reflect the breadth of our efforts to transform global posture. The article, like my letter, will drive home the point that we are undertaking this effort to strengthen our alliances, not weaken them.

9/14  
7600-1

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

✓  
9/19



POLICY

INFORMATION MEMO

I-03/011797-STRAT  
August 25, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Barney*

SUBJECT: Kurt Campbell's article on global posture in *Foreign Affairs*

- 9/12
- Kurt Campbell's article "New Battle Stations?" appears in the September/October 2003 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (attached). It is neither highly provocative nor overly critical of DoD's posture review.
  - Kurt highlights the strategic imperatives that are driving our posture review, saying "many changes are long overdue."
  - His critique centers on the lack of a highly visible diplomatic effort to explain the rationale and details of our potential posture changes.
    - He stresses the need to undertake a "sustained diplomatic campaign" to accompany the changes—something we certainly envision.
  - He also hints that military/operational decisions are being made in a vacuum, without regard to significant political and diplomatic ramifications in the affected countries. His quote: "So far, the military planning has advanced far beyond the supporting political and diplomatic process."
    - He ignores the fact that we have indeed consulted with and provided an appropriate level of information to our close allies and to interested third countries—and also to Congress—without getting into the details of specific changes, since no decisions have yet been made.
  - Given the prominence of *Foreign Affairs*, you may receive questions on the article. Suggested talking points are attached.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RTA	9/14
SR MA CRADDOCK	9/17
MA BUCCI	9/12
EXECSEC MARROTT	9/4

U14736<sup>TM</sup>/03

11-L-0559/OSD/19651

## TALKING POINTS

### Kurt Campbell's Article on Global Posture in *Foreign Affairs*

- Kurt Campbell is absolutely correct in his assertion that we must undertake a sustained diplomatic campaign to accompany our potential changes in global posture.
- Consultations with Allies already are underway in some areas. As we come nearer to decisions—and none have been made yet—those discussions will broaden to other countries and become more detailed.
- And we have been consulting with Congress, and will continue to do so, every step of the way.

Prepared by: Mike Brown, Strategy (b)(6)

# New Battle Stations?

*Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward*

## BASE FIDDLING

THE PENTAGON is now contemplating dramatic changes in where and how U.S. armed forces are based overseas. As Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, described the process, "everything is going to move everywhere. ... There is not going to be a place in the world where it's going to be the same as it used to be." Changes being considered include moving forces away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in South Korea and shifting large numbers of forces out of Germany. American defense planners want to create a global network of bare-boned facilities that could be expanded to meet crises as they arise. Taken together, the adjustments now under consideration—in where bases are located, in the arrangements Washington makes with host countries, in troop and ship deployments, and in theaters of operation—will constitute the most sweeping changes in the U.S. military posture abroad in half a century, greater even than the adjustments made after Vietnam and at the end of the Cold War.

Such an enormous transformation is necessary, American officials argue, because the way U.S. military assets overseas are currently configured does not address the nation's evolving security challenges. American forces should be moved closer to where threats are likely to arise. The military's flexibility and agility should also be improved, these officials say, by diversifying access points to crises and stationing troops in nations more likely to agree with U.S. policies. Such changes

---

KURT M. CAMPBELL is Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Director of the Aspen Strategy Group. CELESTE JOHNSON WARD is a Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.

*Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward*

would have the side effect of reducing the friction caused by the large U.S. deployments in places such as Okinawa, Japan; Seoul, South Korea; and Germany.

If the planners get their way, the United States will shift people and assets from safe, secure, and comfortable rear-echelon facilities to jumping-off points closer to the flame, with all the attendant advantages and disadvantages such forward positions would imply. The shifts would have a compelling military logic. But they would also carry significant human, financial, and diplomatic costs. Because of the great size of the U.S. armed forces, any moves they make send ripples throughout local populations, economies, and security architectures. To ensure that the costs of changing to the new posture do not overwhelm the benefits, the Bush administration needs to carefully think the plans through, in all their dimensions. But so far, the military planning has advanced far beyond the supporting political and diplomatic process.

#### LILY PADS AND WARM BASES

AS IN A GAME of musical chairs, the position of U.S. forces abroad at any given time largely reflects where they happened to be when the last war stopped. Each strategic period thus begins with the infrastructure and deployments inherited from the last one. At the end of World War II, for example, the United States had bases around the globe left over from its fight against the Axis powers. Many of these bases were soon put to use for a different strategy, namely hemming in the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the early 1990s, the U.S. global military posture reflected Cold War priorities but came to be used for the Clinton administration's national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement." The roughly 200,000 troops stationed in Europe and Asia, originally meant to limit Soviet ambitions, were, after an initial reduction, put to use to provide regional stability and help "shape" the international security environment.

In the post-September 11 world, the Pentagon has new objectives. U.S. forces are now responsible for fighting terrorism and curtailing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and so the Defense Department wants to change the U.S. basing posture accordingly. Some of the moves being contemplated reflect genuinely new thinking.

### *New Battle Stations?*

For example, General James Jones, commander of the U.S. European Command, envisions creating a set of what he calls "lily pads": small, lightly staffed facilities for use as jumping-off points in a crisis. These "warm bases," as they have also been called, would be outfitted with the supplies and equipment to rapidly accommodate far larger forces. These small, expandable bases would be linked like spokes to a few large, heavy-infrastructure bases (such as Ramstein in Germany and Misawa and Yokosuka in Japan). At the margins, "virtual" bases would be established by negotiating a series of access rights with a wide range of states. Much more equipment would be prepositioned at land and sea, with an increased focus on specialized units for rapid base construction.

The Pentagon is already preparing a range of specific proposals for Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Already, Washington and Seoul have agreed to consolidate U.S. bases in South Korea, and then the Second Infantry Division and other supporting units will be moved south. The United States will increase its prepositioned equipment at air and sea hubs at the bottom of South Korea, so that forces can be rapidly reinforced in the event of a conflict. In Japan, the United States will likely seek to maintain most of its major air and sea bases as hubs, but it is considering moving some marines either out of Okinawa or to less-populated areas in the north of the island.

The U.S. air and naval presence in Asia will likely be increased, meanwhile, with Washington arranging for greater access, joint training, and other activities in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. This larger Asian deployment will be facilitated by the forward basing of bombers and attack or cruise-missile submarines on the islands of Guam or Diego Garcia, along with the prepositioning of more equipment there. Access to naval facilities in Vietnam might also be sought at some point in the future. And the United States and India are steadily improving relations, including military-to-military consultations. In all likelihood, Indo-U.S. defense cooperation will expand and may lead to American access to South Asian bases, facilities, and training grounds.

Whereas the changes being made to the U.S. military posture in Asia are gradual, those contemplated for Europe are radical and abrupt. Reports are now widely circulating that, after its tour of duty in Iraq, the U.S. Army's First Armored Division will return to the

United States rather than Germany, where it has been based. Other U.S. units may be moved from Germany to bases in NATO's new eastern European members. Poland, for example, has large training grounds and ranges not subject to the civilian encroachment or heavy regulations that have bedeviled U.S. forces in Germany. And Bulgaria and Romania offer ports and airfields on the Black Sea, closer to potential instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

The U.S. European Command's responsibility extends to Africa, where enormous change is also in the offing. During the last several months, 1,800 U.S. personnel have been deployed to Djibouti and have been given responsibility for counterterrorism planning and training in the Horn of Africa, and U.S. military planners contemplate a similar arrangement for western Africa.

In the Middle East, the United States will soon remove its forces from Saudi Arabia and transfer the major functions now performed at Prince Sultan Air Base to bases in Qatar. Other changes will depend on developments in Iraq and in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process but may also be forthcoming. And finally, new U.S. bases in Central Asia, established to assist the Afghanistan campaign, may end up serving longer-term aims, such as prosecuting the war on terrorism or, perhaps, checking a rising China.

#### IN WITH THE NEW

BEHIND THE DRIVE for change lies a complex mix of hard-nosed strategic assessments and political objectives. Pentagon officials believe that threats to U.S. security are likely to emerge from regions where there is a high risk of failed states, Islamic radicalism, drug trafficking, and other forms of volatility. Together, these regions form an arc of instability that bends from the triborder region of South America through most of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia.

Many of the underlying concepts and objectives for changing the U.S. military posture have been identified in documents such as the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, the Defense Department's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, and speeches and remarks by the president and administration officials.

### *New Battle Stations?*

These documents emphasize the need for military forces that are deployed to strike rapidly in unexpected places.

Another impetus for change is apprehension among U.S. officials about the reliability of traditional allies. Many in Washington find unsettling the signs of strategic drift in Berlin and Seoul and worry that policy disagreements could lead to crippling restrictions being placed on U.S. forces by host nations. In today's security environment, such officials believe, the United States cannot risk being denied unfettered access to key regions, and so they want to expand and diversify the list of places from which operations can be launched.

Other possible motivations might be at work as well. The plans bear the unmistakable imprint, for example, of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has been determined to transform the way the U.S. military does business. And some analysts suspect that one of the aims of the new military posture is to encourage a radical redesign of the army's force structure. Early in the Bush administration, officials discussed eliminating at least one of the army's ten active divisions, and over the past three years, the army has borne the brunt of the administration's plans to transform the military into a lighter, more mobile, and more nimble force. To some defense reformers, tank divisions seem a glaring anachronism in the face of twenty-first-century threats. So it is no accident, in the view of some in uniform, that the units most affected by the new global reorientation of forces may be the army units currently based in Germany and South Korea.

#### WHAT PRICE FLEXIBILITY?

MILITARY PLANNING and the day-to-day management of global military operations are clearly the Pentagon's responsibility. But changes of the magnitude now envisioned would also have significant foreign policy implications, and so other parts of the U.S. government, not to mention the various allies in question, need to be included in the planning process. Such consultations do not seem to be taking place, however.

This is not to deny that changes may be needed in the global U.S. military footprint; indeed, many changes are long overdue. For example, it is hard to justify maintaining approximately 100,000 personnel and

*Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward*

over 400 military facilities in Europe today when the region faces no imminent threat. Similarly, the strategy and posture of U.S. forces in South Korea have not changed much for a decade, even as the rest of the U.S. military has been transformed. With the advent of greater speed and lethality, American troops no longer need to sit at the border in order to deter, and if necessary halt, a North Korean attack. In general, the changes planned would offer U.S. forces overseas greater mobility and flexibility, allowing them to respond more effectively to the threats of the post-September 11 world.

Still, the most serious potential consequences of the contemplated shifts would not be military but political and diplomatic. Any change in U.S. overseas deployments, even on the margins, attracts enormous attention abroad and raises questions about Washington's intentions. The United States' foreign military presence remains a compelling symbol and bellwether of U.S. attitudes and approaches to foreign and defense policy, and so it is watched closely. Unless the changes that the Pentagon is contemplating are paired with a sustained and effective diplomatic campaign, therefore, they could well increase foreign anxiety about and distrust of the United States.

A key premise behind the U.S. global footprint in the 1990s was that American forces helped maintain regional stability. The new posture, deliberately optimized for flexible war fighting, will be viewed as supporting a very different and more controversial strategy, one based on preemption and armed intervention. As the military analyst Andrew Bacevich of Boston University has observed, "the political purpose [of U.S. troops abroad] is [now] not so much to enhance stability, but to use U.S. forces as an instrument of political change."

The new posture would also represent a different kind of relationship with host states. In the past, U.S. forces were based in other countries in order to protect them from invasion or hostile action by others. The host and the United States shared the same risks and the same foe. Washington's new vision, however, hearkens back to U.S. policies of a century ago, when many host states served largely as staging points and "coaling stations" for operations elsewhere. Although it is still possible to argue that, under the proposed changes, the U.S. presence in foreign countries will serve local interests, and that fighting terrorism and containing the spread of WMD will increase host countries'

### *New Battle Stations?*

security, the link (at least for many foreign publics) may appear less clear, and this could pose problems down the road.

There are also practical considerations associated with the proposed deployments. Moving forces around is not a simple process and requires the negotiation of status of forces agreements with host nations. These agreements provide extraordinary legal guarantees to U.S. soldiers, essentially giving them local "get out of jail free" cards—as a result, as one might imagine, they prove very unpopular in many countries. Negotiating even modest revisions of existing agreements can sometimes take years, and getting a raft of new ones arranged in short order will be difficult.

A widely distributed U.S. global presence, finally, may lead to a widely distributed set of U.S. commitments and engagements. At the same time that the new posture would reflect and be designed to deal with a particular set of existing or foreseeable threats, it could also by itself generate new and unforeseen problems that would have to be dealt with in turn. Thus the proposed changes could increase the likelihood that the United States gets dragged into future local and regional conflicts, simply because its forces will already be on the ground.

#### DUE PROCESS

GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY of the issues involved, several steps should be taken before and during the rollout of any new military posture. The first is ensuring that everything about the move is vetted carefully by all major relevant actors. Attention to process will not solve every problem, but it will certainly affect the receptivity of other countries to any changes. How allies such as South Korea and Japan respond, for example, will depend not just on the substance of the modifications themselves, but also on how well the United States consults with their governments, takes their reservations into account, and allays their various anxieties. In fact, rather than being seen as a routine obligation or a nuisance, consultations over the posture changes should be seen as an important opportunity to solidify, strengthen, and redefine those alliances for the future. In Europe, similarly, countries are likely to be more receptive to changes if they take place in the context of a revitalized NATO and a reinvestment in

the Atlantic alliance by the United States, rather than being seen as an expression of impatience or unconcern with "old Europe."

During the consultations, the United States should explain the purpose and rationale behind its actions, making it clear that the changes are global and not driven by any particular regional dynamic. Because of the timing, international observers will be prone to view the changes in the context of recent events, particularly the lead-up to and conduct of the war in Iraq. Without guidance from the United States, they will put their own spin on what is happening, which will not necessarily be accurate and could adversely affect other U.S. interests.

U.S. officials should also underscore repeatedly the fact that the United States has no intention of stepping back from its traditional security commitments. Getting the signals right will be critical to preempting unnecessary negative consequences. Despite much evidence to the contrary, some allies continue to worry about U.S. commitment and staying power and may read the new plans as an indicator of what the most powerful nation on earth thinks is important. They need to be assured that any moves are being driven by military concerns and do not reflect a significant change in diplomatic priorities.

The changes, moreover, should not be rushed or hyped, and they should be explained as evolutionary movements rather than radical departures. Particularly in delicate situations such as on the Korean Peninsula, abruptness is unlikely to pay dividends. For that reason, in fact, the United States should consider delaying the movement of the Second Infantry Division out of the DMZ. It is true that there may never be an ideal time for such a change. But with the threat from North Korea unabated and perhaps even heightened recently, now would be an especially inopportune moment. However the move might increase the effectiveness of any military response to North Korean provocations, it would be a difficult sell in the region. Politics would inevitably overshadow strategic realities, and the result could be greater resentment of the United States in South Korea, greater concern in Japan, and greater anxiety throughout the region. When moves are ultimately made—as they should be—they should be done delicately and slowly, and with a close eye on regional perceptions and concerns.

The Bush administration's contemplated military redesign will be the first true overhaul of the United States' global military posture since

### *New Battle Stations?*

it was gradually built up during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Washington's current forward positions are undergirded by an extremely complex set of legal, political, operational, and practical arrangements, some of which have evolved over decades and exist in delicate balance with each other and with various other aspects of American foreign policy. The Bush administration is now proposing to shift virtually every aspect of this armed presence in a sort of military "big bang." This is a bold and audacious proposition, especially given that there has not been a major push for such an overhaul either at home or abroad. Indeed, most Democrats and Republicans who follow defense-related issues, as well as most U.S. allies, have essentially supported maintaining the current posture while tinkering on the margins. So the stakes for this endeavor are high, and it is important that what is being proposed gets a thorough and reflective hearing.

Perhaps there is no good way to engineer changes of this magnitude without stirring up considerable controversy. But unlike during the Cold War, when most U.S. friends and allies shared a relatively common view about the dangers posed by Soviet adventurism, currently no international consensus exists about what the pressing threats are or how to deal with them. Major shifts now are therefore likely to be particularly unsettling and contentious.

All the changes outlined by the Pentagon have commonsensical explanations in terms of operational dynamics and military efficiencies, and the U.S. government should indeed gradually implement many of them over the years to come. But as it does so, it must take greater care than it has so far to avoid collateral damage to long-standing arrangements and relationships that have served the country well for decades and might continue to do so for decades to come. It makes no sense to gain marginal benefits for possible future operations at the cost of undermining close existing alliances or causing important countries to question their security ties to the United States—or, even worse, to consider other options, such as new military expenditures, new regional relationships, or the development of nuclear weapons. Borrowing from Clausewitz, military basing often involves politics by other means. The failure by Washington to understand that truth or to take it into account would be a grave mistake and could have lasting repercussions for the United States and the world. ●



Snowflake

EF-6898

September <sup>22</sup>~~19~~, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Krauthammer Article

Please give me a copy of the Krauthammer article that Andy Hoehn has on our basing plans. I would like to reread it.

I may wish to send it to the President if I have not already.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
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Please respond by 9/26/03

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Charles Krauthammer

# The Sleepy Superpower Awakes

The U.S. is on the move again around the globe, and it's about time

**T**HE GREAT WALL OF CHINA, ROUGHLY DEFINING THE northern contours of the Chinese empire, has stood in the same place for 2,200 years. The Great Wall of America—the barrier of bases set up around the world to define the contours of the free world and hold back the Soviet empire—is about to disappear after just 50 years.

We are living a revolution, and hardly anyone has noticed. In just the three months since the end of the Iraq war, the Pentagon has announced the essential evacuation of the U.S. military from its air bases in Saudi Arabia, from the Demilitarized Zone in Korea and from the vast Incirlik air base in Turkey—in addition to a radical drawdown of U.S. military personnel in Germany, the mainstay of the Great American Wall since 1945.

For a country that is seen by so much of the world as a rogue nation, recklessly throwing its weight around, this is a lot of withdrawing. The fact is that since 9/11, when America awoke from its post-cold war end-of-history illusions, the U.S. has not, as most believe, been expanding. It has been moving—lightening its footprint, rationalizing its deployments, rearranging its forces, waking from a decade of slumber during which it sat on its Great Wall, oblivious to its immobility and utter obsolescence.

Why, after all, are we in Germany 60 years after the fall of the Nazi regime and more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union? Because it took a decade—and 9/11—for the U.S. to see the obvious. It took that long to dispose of the colossal anachronism known as the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which made sense in a world of two antagonistic superpowers but made no sense in a world of rogue states and proliferating missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, it took a decade to recognize the craziness of stationing 15,000 U.S. troops as a sacrificial trip wire just yards from North Korea's million-man army.

Iceland is a perfectly nice place, and Icelanders are perfectly nice people. But what exactly are the U.S. Air Force jets stationed there protecting the Icelanders from? (The Pentagon is in talks to finally remove them.) And what is the point of our huge investments in air bases in Saudi Arabia and Turkey? We were forbidden to fly combat missions out of them at the most critical of times, during a war against an Iraqi tyrant who threatened the entire neighborhood. The war in Iraq also made plain that our 68,000 troops in Germany are totally out of place, far from the action. They were unable to get to Iraq by land be-

cause Austria, with classic old Europe self-righteousness, refused to allow our troops to cross its territory to join the fight.

We are in the midst of a revolution, and it has two parts. The first is leaving places where we are not wanted. America is moving out of old Europe, which sees its liberty as coming with the air it breathes, and being welcomed in the new Europe of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, which have a living memory of tyranny and a deep understanding of America's role in winning their liberty. South Koreans regularly demonstrate against the U.S. presence in their country. Since the reason for that presence is for Americans to die in defense of Seoul, one

has to ask oneself at what point strategic altruism becomes strategic masochism.

The second part is leaving places that mark the battle lines of a long-dead war. The great threat today is not Soviet attack but radical Arab-Islamic terrorism and instability in that part of the world. Hence the redeployment of American forces from the plains of Europe, Korea, perhaps next Japan, to the battleground of today: the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf.

The world talks in ominous terms about the new American empire. But the U.S. was far more of an empire in, say, 1949, when it sat behind its great

wall of tank armies and nuclear bombers in static defense of large territories in Western Europe and the Pacific Rim. That empire we are in the process of dismantling. The Soviets are gone, and those places, having risen from the ashes, are quite capable of defending themselves. The threat from North Korea, for example, is no longer the spread of communism but of nuclear weapons. The response should be not a sitting-duck standing army but a quick and light air-sea reaction force.

Moreover, many don't want us. So we're shifting into the far more difficult and dangerous game of containing and ultimately destroying the new enemy—nimble, mobile and undeterrable. That requires an entirely new strategy: small bases in new places, some simply forward staging areas with supplies awaiting the arrival of highly mobile troops in an emergency.

Less plodding, less heavy, less static, less fixed. This is the new American strategy: Empire Lite. Its assembly, having been announced piecemeal, has largely been missed. Make no mistake, however. We are in the midst of a great redeployment that will not only redraw the map of the world but also mark the ground to which history itself has moved. ■



OB  
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22  
September 19, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Marin Strmecki

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: More on Afghanistan

Attached is an interesting article on Afghanistan.

Thanks.

Attach.

Moore, Perry. "The Soviet Nadir: Cataclysm at Shawar, April 1986," *Against the Odds*,  
December 2002

DHR:dh  
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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Afghanistan

22 Sep 03

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# THE SOVIET NADIR

## CATACLYSM AT ZHAWAR, APRIL 1986

BY PERRY MOORE

✓ 9/1/9

Against the Odds  
magazine  
Dec 2002

### THE ASSAULT

In February, 1986, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Ministry of Defense and their Soviet patrons decided to destroy Zhawar. Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province in the eastern part of Afghanistan. It was located four kilometers from the Pakistan border and 15 kilometers from the major Pakistani forward supply base at Miram Shah. Zhawar was a Mujahideen training center and a major combat base for supply, training and staging. The base was located inside a canyon surrounded by Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar mountains. The canyon opens to the southeast facing Pakistan.

The Mujahideen had built at least 11 major tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of Sodyaki Ghar Mountain. Some tunnels reached 500 meters and contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops, a garage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasoline generator provided power to the tunnels and the hotel's video player.

Defending this key logistical base was the "Zhawar Regiment", some 400 strong that were permanently based there. This regiment was primarily responsible for logistics and for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK) groups in other provinces of Afghanistan. The regiment was not fully equipped for combat, but was a credible combat force. The regiment had a Soviet D30 122mm howitzer, some six-barrel Chinese BM-12 multiple rocket launchers (MRL), three 30mm Oerlikon AA, numerous 12.7mm machine guns, SA-7 SAMs and 13 Blowpipe. Some indicate a Stinger SAM was present. An air defense company defended Zhawar with five ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 14.5 mm antiaircraft heavy machine guns. These were positioned on high ground around the base. All ground approaches were protected by AT mines, mortars, anti-tank RCL weapons and the infamous RPG-7. Many positions had communications linked with telephone or walkie talkie radios.

The approaches to the base were the responsibility of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA), and two Islamic

Party factions (HIH and HIK). These amounted to another 400 or so men. Twenty percent of all the Mujahideen supplies came through the Zhawar. The overall Mujahideen commander of Paktia Province, including Zhawar base, was Jalaluddin Haqani, a tall, blackbearded, 50 years old.

### THE PLAN

The Soviets felt that the DRA should now take the leading combat role against the Mujahideen and urged the DRA to again attack Zhawar. This urging was to show how a DRA/Soviet planned offensive could be a success after the dismal failure of an earlier DRA Zhawar attack in September 1985. The DRA plan was classic on paper: DRA ground troops would attack from Tani and Borkikehel, both south of Khost. Artillery units would be based near Lezhi. As this occurred, the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Air Assault brigade (some 400-500 Soviet/DRAmen) would descend from their Mi-8s atop of the 2180 meter high Manay Kandow. The thought was to trap the Mujahideens blocking the ground forces, and open a corridor to Zhawar.

The general of the Soviet Army, Vartnikov, gave his blessing and the high command developed the plan for a combined operation. The plan would commit 54 under-strength DRA maneuver battalions (these battalions averaged 300-400 men) plus DRA artillery and 32 Mi-8s to the assault (plus Mi-24s and Su-25s). The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps) moved from Kandahar, the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (1<sup>st</sup> Army Corps) moved from Kabul, the 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps) moved from Gazni, the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps) moved from Khost, the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade, and the 666<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Regiment "Commando" (3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps) from Khost were committed.

These units came under the 3<sup>rd</sup> Afghan Army Corps, under General-Major Mohammad Asef Delavar. His Soviet adviser was Deputy to the Senior Military Adviser for Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.

The eastern combat group was comprised of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions and the 666<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Regiment. The

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western combat group consisted of the 8<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions. The commando group had little, if any, experience in air assault missions, and the first lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise as the ground assault began.

## THE CATAclysm AND NADIR

Sometime around midnight on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April, the DRA began a two-hour artillery and aviation preparation of the target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter transport ships flew in to insert the initial assault group of the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade (60 men). The commandos landed without opposition, but the ground assault ran into heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending Dawri Gar mountain. Already, something had failed. The 7<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry divisions tried to link up. They could not break through the defenses. These divisions would try for three days, until their entire supply of ammunition was expended. By the 10<sup>th</sup>, these divisions pulled back to their start points. The 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, located in the second echelon, covered the western flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear area. It did nothing the whole time (The DRA continued to fight for the possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for ten days following the air landing mess. The Mujahideen would attack the DRA LOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay Kandow checked their advance).

The command post for the operation at Tani was in radio contact with the initial air assault group. The air assault group commander reported that the enemy firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern slope of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see the round?" The Commandoes replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about 15 kilometers from us!" For some odd reason, the CP thought nothing odd about this! The DRA then fired another illumination round five kilometers further away on the southern side of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see this round?" The commandos replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about ten kilometers from us". It was finally clear to the CP that the commandos had landed some five kilometers inside Pakistan - far beyond the base at Zhawar! The Commandoes tried to withdraw but after an hour were surrounded and locked in deadly combat.

Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her border. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense

against helicopter gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not effective. Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take out attacking aircraft with the Blowpipe missiles and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountain and firing thirteen Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and his NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.

Mawlawi Haqani was in the Zadrana area when he saw approximately 20 Mi-8 helicopters flying over. He radioed the commanders at Zhawar to warn them. He thought they would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio message, he saw another group of helicopters, including some Mi-24s gunships flying the same direction. These were escorted by SU-25 jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. The hornet's nest was stirred.

The Mujahideen were caught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to tip them off and the helicopters landed the rest of the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. The DRA/Soviets then committed the rest of the brigade to combat, not onto the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone, which was well-populated with Mujahideen, *but onto the open areas around Zhawar itself.* This was a very bad move.

## INTO THE HORNET'S NEST

The first lift was comprised of 15 helicopters, which landed at 0700 hours on the Spin Khawara plain. More lifts followed in rapid succession. Mi-24s gunships protected the convoy on the way in. Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border. Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed many helicopters while they were on the ground. RPGs, SA-7s and Blowpipes all took their toll. The Soviets had not expected this. Following the air assault, Soviet SU-25 jet aircraft bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defenses had no effect against them, but did take a severe toll on the Mi-8s.

The Mujahideen, instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bomber aircraft, began assaulting the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and captured many of the DRA commandos. This was another totally unexpected event. Further, Mujahideen reinforcements moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to

Zhawar and took the commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured 530 commandos from the 38th Brigade (Soviet sources indicate 312 landed and only 25 survived).

Thus, the classic "A Bridge Too Far" scenario was repeated. This time, the DRA ground forces failed to reach the LZs and the commandoes became easy, stranded targets.

Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with KAB 1500 precision guided missiles made runs on the caves. Soviet aircraft made numerous violations flying over Pakistani air space. The Zhawar caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, forcing the Soviet aircraft overfly Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with the smart weapons. Smart missiles were usually launched from 5-7,000 ft, up to 2 miles away. One cave was hit and the explosion killed 18 Mujahideen. Smart missiles hit another western cave, collapsing it and trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long and was used as the radio transmission bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just arrived from Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave. The jets easily evaded the defensive SA-7s. The Pakistanis sent in a small team armed with 13 Blowpipe SAMs. These were wire-guided and required extensive training to be effective. The Pakistani team fired 13 missiles at the Soviet SU-25s. None hit their targets. Pakistani General Akhtar (who led the team) was now convinced the Blowpipe was too complicated of a weapon, and would soon replace it with the American Stinger.

Other SU-25s dropped tons of bombs, blasting away the rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen nonetheless managed to escape. The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. One group of commandos on high ground held out for three days before they were finally overrun. The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one of the commando battalions managed to lead 24 of the commandos to the safety. This took eight days. Of the 32 helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight survived!

## CONSEQUENCES

General Varrenikov criticized the leadership of the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Commander. In his secret report to the Marshal of the USSR, General Sokolov, the following reasons were cited:

All the forces were poorly or untrained for the operation, poor and erroneous intel-

ligence of the area and enemy, unexpected events, leadership tolerated false situation reports and helicopter pilots were poorly oriented on the terrain of the landings. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense, responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to prepare for resumption of the operation.

The failed attack had ended in fiasco, and now the Soviets were in damage control mode. A reinforcing regiment each from the DRA 11<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions and the DRA 21<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Infantry Brigade arrived along with the DRA 203<sup>rd</sup> Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (special forces). The DRA 37<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade arrived. Varrenikov authorized five Soviet battalions sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April. Soviet forward air controllers (in their Mi-4s) were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air Controllers. Soviet unit commanders were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders.

From Kabul, orders were issued to arrest the helicopter regiment commander, but the commander had vanished. The helicopter pilots who landed the commandos in Pakistan said that the commander had ordered them to land there. The Chief of Staff, 40<sup>th</sup> Soviet Army, General-Major Yu. P. Grekov, took command of the five Soviet battalions. General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan) assumed overall coordination of all the forces. The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600 men. Varrenikov himself arrived at the battlefield to make sure no more fiascos occurred.

## THE SECOND ATTEMPT

The renewed attack began on the morning of April 17. The DRA 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry division led the assault in the west and the DRA 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division led the assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen, a diversion was created. The eastern group began its attack at 0630 and the western group began at 1030. The DRA 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was concentrated at Lezhi. Meanwhile, the Mujahideen had fortified the Dawri Gar mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes with accurate fire. Multiple prior Soviet/DRA attacks on the mountain had failed. When the artillery fire preparation began, the Mujahideen took shelter in caves and when the barrage ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions and repulsed the attack. To avoid a repeat, during the night of April 16<sup>th</sup>, troops silently positioned themselves near the summit and, at dawn, launched

an attack on the Mujahideen without artillery preparation. The regiment captured the summit in a matter of minutes. The surprised Mujahideen fell back in disorder from the Lezhi area and into higher mountains. The DRA/Soviet force moved through the Manay Kandow pass.

Simultaneously, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking attack from the Lezhi area that moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. As the DRA column neared, the Mujahideen HIH regiment withdrew without a fight! At the same time, leader Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. Rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani was dead. Panic took hold. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar, moving into surrounding mountains as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar. These rumors were untrue; he had suffered only minor wounds.

Most of the stores in Zhawar were found in tact. The two T-55 tanks in the possession of the Mujahideen were moved out of their caves and fought the advancing column before being abandoned. LTC Kulenin, the adviser to the commander of the DRA 21<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a T-55 round. The Soviet and DRA forces would finally enter Zhawar on April 19, 1986.

One eyewitness account of the Soviet arrival follows from Colonel Kutsenko, Engineer Demolition:

*After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers. Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall. The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with powerful iron doors, which were painted in bright colors. There were 41 caves in all. All had electricity.*

More amazing material was to be found by Soviet troops:

A hospital with new modern medical equipment made in the USA, nickel plated furniture, a library with English and Farsi books, a bakery, shelves of ammo and small arms, mines of all sorts from Italy, France, Germany, an operational T-34 tank, and a hotel with many rooms untouched by the Soviet bombs.

The Afghan soldiers looted the base. The Soviet troops did not stop them. Even the six

foot high brick facing wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division at Khost! The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar. Their troops were quite nervous and leery of the Mujahideen. They knew the enemy would organize a counter-attack. The Mujahideen had already moved MRLs up to the Pakistan border to fire on the communist forces. Nobody, including the Soviets, wanted to be trapped! Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time curtailed a thorough job of destroying the base. It is a strong testament to the ability of the Mujahideen to threaten their enemies' lines of communication.

Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar. The Soviet high command had given him four hours to do so! The sappers of the 45<sup>th</sup> Engineer Regiment, 40<sup>th</sup> Army went to work. Privately, he knew that it was an impossible task in the available time. Above each cave was a 90 foot thick layer of rock. There was no time to drill a one to two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, then cram that full of explosives to cause a collapse. So the sappers stacked 200 anti-tank mines in the caves and rigged them for simultaneous electric detonation.

As the 45<sup>th</sup> attempted to do this, the combat soldiers were withdrawing! The sappers had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours, the command was given to the engineers to evacuate and head for Tani. The Mujahideen were hot on the Soviet heels. Anyone who fell behind would face a gruesome death. Kutsenko and his men hurriedly left as the Mujahideen MRLs fired with greater accuracy.

## THE END AT ZHAWAR

After 19 days, the DRA/Soviet troops held Zhawar for five hours. In addition to the standard mines and booby traps, the Soviet forces planted seismic-detonated mines and sprinkled aerial-delivered butterfly bombs over the area. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on the 20<sup>th</sup>. The Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and other areas. Only the cave entrances were destroyed. The weapons stored in some of the caves were still intact and useable.

Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and Soviet losses are unknown, but the Mujahideen reportedly destroyed 24 helicopters, shot down two jets and captured 530 personnel of the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the 38<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade and another colonel who landed with the brigade as artillery spotters. There were

78 other officers among the prisoners. They were given a chance to confess to their crimes from different battles. All 78 officers were executed. All soldiers were given amnesty. The amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor service in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, were "reeducated" and released after two years.

The DRA/Soviets celebrated the fall of Zhawar with parades and medals as a major victory. The Kabul press indicated that the enemy had lost 2000 men and another 4000 wounded! Pure propaganda. Zhawar was in full operation within weeks of the attack! The Mujahideen had learned to make connecting tunnels between caves. The caves were improved and lengthened to 400-500 meters long.

The region later fell to the Taleban militia in the mid-1990s, and the area became a training center for various mujahideen groups affiliated with them. The site suffered some damage from American cruise missiles in 1998, but remained in use. The Zhawar complex saw action most recently beginning on January, 3, 2002, enduring a two-week American bombardment of remaining Taleban elements in the region, following the larger action at Tora Bora in December 2001. Four B-1B bombers, four F-A/18 Hornets and an A/C-130 gunship were involved in the air action at Zhawar. Afterwards, Navy SEAL teams detonated on-ground explosives to seal as many of the caves as possible, presumably far more thoroughly than the Soviet sappers did in 1986. They found that "the complex had proven to be more extensive than previously thought" according to the US DoD.

Because of its close proximity to the tribal areas of Pakistan's North West Province, the Zhawar region will likely continue to be a staging area for insurgency into Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.



### Order of Battle for April 3-10<sup>th</sup>

#### Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (1<sup>st</sup> echelon)  
 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (reserve)  
 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (rear area)  
 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (1<sup>st</sup> echelon)  
 666<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Commando  
 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps attachments  
 = 54 infantry battalions (each bn = 300-400 men)  
 38<sup>th</sup> mixed DRA/Soviet Commando Brigade (530 men)

#### Soviet

32 Mi-8s  
 6+ Mi-24s  
 One SU-25 squadron

### Additional forces For 11-19<sup>th</sup> offensive

#### DRA

1 reg/11<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division  
 1 reg/18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division  
 21<sup>st</sup> Mech Inf brigade  
 203<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Spetnaz Bn  
 37<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade

#### Soviet

1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Bns/345<sup>th</sup> Ind. Parachute Reg  
 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Bns/56<sup>th</sup> air assault Brig  
 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn/191<sup>st</sup> Ind Mot Reg  
 45<sup>th</sup> Engineer Sapper Reg ♦

September <sup>22</sup> 19, 2003

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Timing

Please see if you can have somebody figure out when the President asked me to get a war plan for Iraq and when I first talked to Tom Franks about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091903-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/2/03

U21951 /03

22SEP03

September 23, 2003

IRAO

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Pam Hess

Please set a meeting for me with Pam Hess for 20 minutes. I would like to have someone from the Joint Staff or the legal shop to help figure out how we pay people in Iraq who have been harmed. She has deep concerns.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

9/25

*9/23*  
*Cal Bucci*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*9/25*

~~SecDef -  
Can't we work  
this without her  
meeting you? She  
gave me a download on the issue,  
D. Rita~~

23SEP03

U21952 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19670

✓ 9/24

September 23, 2003

110.01

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

*Advance copy sent*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Testimony Questions on Budget

Who is going to be there with me to answer the budget questions? Dov? Larry Lanzilotta? David Oliver? Or David Oliver plus Dov?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-14

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/03

*Sec Def —  
Dov and David Oliver  
are to be at the  
hearing.*

*9/23*

U21953 /03

23 SEP 03

September 23, 2003

0200CPA

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>D</sup>  
SUBJECT: Bremer Testimony

I thought the Bremer testimony was excellent—who did it with him?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-13

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

23 SEP 03

U21954 /03

September 23, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr.*  
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Snyder

*Done*

*Iraq*

Please review the attached draft letter to Congressman Snyder, and attach a copy of the unclassified NIE before returning to me with any edits.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Draft ltr to Cong. Snyder

DHR:dh  
092303-11

.....  
Please respond by 9/30/03

*Sic.*

*Letter OK*

*NIE attached.*

*SC*  
*9/26*

*23 Sep 03*

U21955 /03

DRAFT

The Honorable Vic Snyder  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515 -0402

Dear Representative Snyder,

Thank you for your letter regarding the August 10<sup>th</sup> *Washington Post* article. I regret I did not have the opportunity to read the article when it appeared.

The Administration made a case with respect to Iraq based upon, among other things, intelligence that was made available to several committees of Congress.

It would be best not to attempt to deconstruct a lengthy newspaper article based on unnamed sources and leaked information. The President decided recently to release a particular National Intelligence Estimate on the matter, and people are free to make their own judgments.

Excerpts from

The existing public sources that bear on the subject discussed in the article are the following:

- The President's speech to the United Nations.
- Secretary Powell's speech to the United Nations.
- Director of Central Intelligence Tenet's presentations to the relevant House and Senate committees.
- The enclosed unclassified <sup>Excerpts from the</sup> National Intelligence Estimate.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/19674

September 23, 2003

334 NSC

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*Advance copy of report to be sent*

*Done*

SUBJECT: MEK

The Thursday PC is going to be on the MEK. I have to have a pre-brief on it sometime Wednesday. We have to get our act together and know where we are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-8

.....  
Please respond by 7/24/03

23 Sep 03

U21956 /03

September 23, 2003

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CPA Info

DONE

020CPA

I need the statement Jerry Bremer uses in his testimony about how many non-Americans are involved with him in CPA and the total number of people in CPA.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-7

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03

23 SEP 03

U21957 /03

September 23, 2003

RUSSIA

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Pre-Brief for Russian Visit

I will need some sort of a pre-brief on Friday before I meet with Putin and Ivanov this weekend. Please see if you can get the President's talking points or whatever they are using over there, and we can use that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/25/03

23 SEP 03

U21958 /03

September 23, 2003

000.77

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**  
SUBJECT: Dan Rather

I do want a tape of the Dan Rather interview that actually appeared. I would also like to see the transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092303-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

9/25

~~Chynedance~~

9/27

✓ 9/30

Di Rita

Sec Def -

CBS Ran 2 Segments:  
September 5 and September 8.

Larry Di Rita  
9/24

Both Tapes are here, with  
the transcripts of those segments.  
Attached to this sheet is the full  
transcript of the interview.

U21959-103

11-L-0559/OSD/19678

23SEP03

Updated 05 Sep 2003



United States Department of Defense

## News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?><http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030905-secdef0649.html>Media contact: [media@defenselink.mil](mailto:media@defenselink.mil) or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Friday, September 5, 2003

### Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Dan Rather, CBS News

(Interview with Dan Rather, CBS News, at Camp Victory, Iraq.)

Q: First of all, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I do not know of any American who doesn't admire what you did in helping secure the battlefield victory that resulted in the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. I don't know of anybody who doesn't appreciate your service.

Rumsfeld: Thank you.

Q: (Inaudible.) a lot of people are worried. Are you worried about what's happening here?

Rumsfeld: Worried isn't the right word. I'm impressed with the accomplishment that's taken place. The 23 million Iraqi people are free. City councils are sprouting up all across this nation. A governing council's been formed. A cabinet's been formed. Ministries have been formed. You can feel the economic activity changing since I was here several months ago. It's been only four and a half, five months since then.

Is it a perfect picture? No. Are there terrorists active? Yes. Are there criminals active? Yes. Are there still people being killed? That's for sure. We just had a terrible attack on a mosque very recently as you know.

It is a mixed picture. There's going to be some setbacks as we go forward, but the economic progress, the political progress and certainly the military progress I think is impressive.

Q: We've been here half a year. What's the exit strategy?

Rumsfeld: You know it would be wonderful if you could answer that question. I don't think you could have answered that question about Germany or about Japan or about Bosnia or about Kosovo. Once you start saying that there's a timetable I think it's a mistake. These are things that are event-driven.

The goal, as you know, is to have the governing council come up with a proposal for a constitution, a process for developing and drafting a constitution leading to elections.

At that point when the process has moved far enough that the Iraqi people assume more and more responsibility for their lives, then clearly we have the ability to change our circumstance as well. The same thing is true in terms of the Iraqi security forces. We've gone from zero five months ago to 55,000 Iraqis who are engaged either in the army or in the police or in the border patrol. That's an amazing accomplishment.

Now is that enough? No. It's going to have to continue to go up and as that happens the Iraqi people will take on more and more of not just the political responsibilities but also the security responsibilities.

Q: As Americans can we afford that in terms of blood and money to get there?

Rumsfeld: To get that far?

Q: Uh huh.

Rumsfeld: First of all there are a variety of places where the funds are coming from. To be sure the United States is a major factor. There are also dozens of countries that are making contributions as well. In addition there is the U.N. Oil for Food Program that has resources. There are Iraqi frozen assets that exist around the world and have been paying for some of these things. The Iraqi people have oil which can be sold and benefit the Iraqi people. So it isn't as though it's all coming out of one pocket. Indeed, it's expensive. The viciousness of the Saddam Hussein regime in this country -- look at this roadway, this palace. That's where the money went. The money went for the military and the money went for palaces and for the very small group of elite supporters of Saddam Hussein. It's a terrible tragedy what was done to the Iraqi people.

The people here are intelligent, they're energetic, they're industrious, they're educated, and this can be a very successful economy in the region.

Q: Let me read you something that retired U.S. Marine General Anthony Zinni, who know well --

Rumsfeld: I don't know him well. I've met him.

Q: (Inaudible.) diplomacy and military --

Rumsfeld: I've met him but I don't know him.

Q: He spoke to a large crowd of career officers yesterday. I'd be surprised if you haven't heard about it.

Rumsfeld: I haven't.

Q: Let me read you this quote. He said, "My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities, were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam where we heard the garbage and the lies and we saw the sacrifice, and I ask you, is it happening again?" That's a quote from General Zinni.

Is it?

Rumsfeld: Of course not. There are a lot of people who were affected by Vietnam and will see everything through that prism. I think that would be a misunderstanding.

Q: He also said, there's another way to put it, that (Inaudible.) the post-war handling hear in Iraq -- and he said, and this was a direct quote, that "The present handling lacks a coherent strategy, a general plan, and sufficient resources." Insufficient resources. It lacks all of that.

Rumsfeld: Well, everyone can have an opinion. I don't know him well and I don't know his views well, but he has been a person who has been generally in disagreement with U.S. policy involving this region of the world as I recall. So what you're saying doesn't surprise me.

The fact remains that the major combat operation ended in this country, as I recall, on May 1st. It is now mid September. That's a handful of months. What's taken place? City councils have been growing all across this country. Dozens of towns, dozens of villages, here in Baghdad. A governing council has stood up. The governing council has selected ministers, a cabinet and ministers.

In a country that has no experience with democracy, with no experience with representative government in recent decades, that's impressive changes that are taking place.

Q: You're not worried?

Rumsfeld: Of course one has to worry because life isn't perfect. Life's tough and this is a difficult situation. We have a group of people here who, as I say, have no background in representative government. They have no background in private enterprise. This has been a Stalinist type economy governed by the central government. There's no private sector in this country. All's been government-owned.

Now does that mean that it's going to be a tough transition? You bet it's tough. It's very tough. And you have to worry about it.

The idea that there's no plan is belied by the fact that Jerry Bremer has testified before Congress on the plan for the coalition provisional authority.

Q: So you think it's inaccurate and it's fair to say unfair criticism?

Rumsfeld: I haven't read it in context and I haven't had a chance to talk to him so I wouldn't go around casting aspersions on his views. He's a person of some experience.

Q: We have a clock running. I have to ask you about, and I'm going to ask you about today's Washington Post story which in essence says that the military top brass and the State Department in effect went around and got a change in policy. Is that story true?

Rumsfeld: No.

Q: What is one to make of it?

Rumsfeld: You've never seen an article in the newspaper that isn't true? You're a grown adult. You know better than that.

Q: But it's my job to ask the question.

Rumsfeld: Of course it is, and you can ask it, and I can answer it.

Q: But the story is not true?

Rumsfeld: Of course not. It's been knocked down by everybody who was asked. It's been knocked down by the people who were named in it.

Q: Then we can move on. I'm asking you, is it true?

Rumsfeld: I said no. It's nonsense.

Q: We can proceed. No one accuses [him] of not being a Republican. No one accuses him of not being a supporter of President Bush. I want to give you a chance to answer his criticism, and there's no other way to say it.

Rumsfeld: You really reached in the duffel bag, Dan.

Q: Not a duffel bag. It's in the newspapers every day. Maybe you haven't seen it.

Rumsfeld: I have.

Q: It's his quote.

Rumsfeld: You've told me three things I haven't seen.

Q: My job as a newsman might be secure for another day.

(Laughter.)

Q: Bill Kristol, you know him?

Rumsfeld: I do know him.

Q: He says, quote, "Rumsfeld lost credibility with the White House because he screwed up post-war planning." His words, not mine. "For five months they let Rumsfeld do what he liked and for five months Rumsfeld said everything is fine. He wanted to do the post-war with fewer troops than many people advised and that turned out to be a mistake."

Mr. Secretary, you know I don't have any joy in putting this quote in front of you, but what are the American people to make of it?

Rumsfeld: I don't know. I guess what I would say is that the combatant commander, Tom Franks, succeeded by General John Abizaid, and General Sanchez, here with the responsibility for this particular country of Iraq, all have indicated that the level of troops are exactly what they believe is appropriate, what they requested. They have not had a single request that hasn't been approved for forces. They believed it then, they've proved to be right. General Sanchez believes it today and I believe he will prove to have been correct. I therefore would suggest that it's possible at least that the individual you're quoting will prove to have been wrong.

The forces here are of a variety of types. They're U.S. forces, they are coalition forces, and they are Iraqi security capabilities. What's been growing has been the Iraqi forces. The Iraqis have gone over five and a half months from zero up to 55,000. Now that does not happen -- These are police, border patrol, army, civil defense capabilities. That does not happen without a plan. That does not happen without well-organized people bringing in trainers, working with them, funding them, and going from zero to 55,000 Iraqis engaged in security activities in this country today. And the number's growing every single day.

Q: I understand that. But I also understand that's what's not on the table is a request that a United Nations Resolution get passed that would bring additional countries' troops into Iraq who are not here now and/or not here in large numbers.

Rumsfeld: Uh huh.

Q: Now correct me if I'm wrong, that the proposal is something on the order of a division, 10,000 to 15,000 troops.

Rumsfeld: Uh huh.

Q: But I want to check with you, that even if that is approved, that's the addition of these new troops, headlines this week are saying going to the U.N., okay, now we want to put in some other people. But even if that's approved you can't --

Rumsfeld: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Now we're going to pull in some new people.

There are 30 countries already involved on the ground. That's not one. It's 30. There are another dozens that are involved in humanitarian assistance, in various types of support financing. So this is no go-it-alone for the United States. It hasn't been from the beginning.

Before this conflict started, when the President went to the United Nations he began involving other countries. Secretary Powell did. Combatant commander Tom Franks did. And they formed a very broad coalition.

What's going on now at the U.N. is that the President went to the U.N., he got a resolution. From the very beginning he wanted to broaden that coalition. He has now decided to go back up to the U.N. because there are a handful of countries that suggested that an additional resolution might be helpful for them in their parliaments and their congresses to get additional troops. Will it be a major number? I doubt it. It could be another division --

Q: Well perhaps --

Rumsfeld: -- which is a good thing.

Q: I didn't mean to step on your answer. Perhaps I'm misstating the question. I was really seeking some information, and you said it could be as much as a division. I said maybe 10,000 to 15,000 troops. Is that in the ballpark? Ballpark.

Rumsfeld: That's a guess. We don't know, but that's a guess. It could be less, it could be more.

Q: I understand. And I do understand that there is, you've described them for us a broad coalition, and we're talking about other countries who are not part of the coalition joining.

All right, now what I'm seeking is whether it's true or not that if these additional troops are approved and get on-line, that they can't be here, won't be here before sometime in January. Does that sound right?

Rumsfeld: Oh, it's hard to know. Some could respond more rapidly than that but I wouldn't want to predict because I don't know what countries they're going to be.

Q: Here's the question. If we need those troops, what do we do between now and whenever they can arrive?

Rumsfeld: Look, General Sanchez is the senior coalition military person in Iraq. It's a complicated process. He's got U.S. forces, he's got coalition forces, and he's got this rapidly growing number of Iraqi forces. How he arranges them and in what way the United States and/or coalition countries rotate forces in and out over, depending on how long we take, is a very complicated matter.

The implication that the 15,000 plus or minus that might come if there is a second resolution would leave a gap if it didn't come, or would leave a gap if it came two or three or four months later than someone thought, I think is a misunderstanding of the situation.

They're not pieces on the table that they have to be moved around in an orderly way.

I should also add that it's not simply the total numbers. People get fixed on numbers. It's also who they are and how they're arranged, what their skills and capabilities are. And as the situation on the ground changes the needs on the ground change for the types of people.

Q: I understand.

Mr. Secretary, you know that overwhelmingly Americans support our troops here, they support the effort here.

Rumsfeld: Uh huh.

Q: But just this week in the paper the phrase was used (Inaudible.) politicians (Inaudible.). Not the military. (Inaudible.) American (Inaudible.) situation, are we in the quicksand, is this going to be another quagmire, have you bitten off more than we can chew? This is the way people talk around coffee in the morning. I'll give you an opportunity to respond to those deep concerns.

Rumsfeld: Well, time will tell. Twenty-three million people have been liberated in an important country in an important part of the world, and that was about five and a half months ago. Not five and a half years, but five and a half months.

Has it been a perfectly smooth road? No. Will it be a perfectly smooth road going forward? Is five and a half months a quagmire? Well, everyone can look it up in the dictionary. They said quagmire about the war after about two weeks. Was it a quagmire? No. Will this be? I think not. I think that it's tough.

I think that we have 23 million people here who have no experience with representative government, they have no experience with private enterprise, and yet they're intelligent, they're educated, they're industrious, and I think they'll find their way and Ambassador Bremer is doing an absolutely first-class job. I think that General Sanchez and General John Abizaid and the coalition partners from as I say dozens of countries are dealing with a difficult situation about as well as it could be dealt with.

Can anyone predict exactly where we'll be in a month or two months or three months or six months? No. You can't predict it. It's simply there are too many variables that you have to deal with. There are too many audibles that have to be called by Ambassador Bremer and by General Sanchez. But I've got a lot of confidence in them. I'm hopeful that we'll be successful. And I think the American people have a very good center of gravity and a good understanding. I also think they have the patience because they understand how important what's being done here is, and it is important.

The work that's being done by these young men and women in uniform is so critically important to this part of the world, and they're doing such a wonderful job that they've earned the support they're getting from the American people.

Q: Let's talk about Saddam Hussein. Any prospect of getting him? Any news on that front that you can share with us?

Rumsfeld: Oh, goodness. We see bits and scraps of information all the time, but no, he hasn't been captured, he hasn't been killed. Will he eventually? Yes.

Q: Can you meet the goals of your mission here if he isn't found dead or alive?

Rumsfeld: Sure.

Q: You don't agree or do agree that as long as he's out there a lot of Iraqis won't fully commit.

Rumsfeld: I think that there is that issue for awhile, but I think it will fade. He isn't functioning effectively. He's running, he's hiding. He just hasn't been caught or killed yet.

Q: You're rather disappointed about that.

Rumsfeld: I'm not disappointed about it. It's tough to find single people. Look at the FBI Most Wanted List. Some of those folks have been on there for 10 or 15 years. It's hard.

The Department of Defense was organized, trained and equipped to fight armies, navies and air forces, and finding any one single human being is a very difficult task. Look how long it took to find that fellow from Georgia.

Q: Do you or do you not think Saddam Hussein has a hand in such things as the U.N. bombing, the mosque bombing in An Najaf last week?

Rumsfeld: You know, we don't have hard evidence on that. We don't have any reason to believe he does or doesn't.

Q: You've been very patient with your time and I appreciate it. What question have I not asked you that I should have asked you?

Rumsfeld: Oh, goodness. You know, I haven't read all the papers you're read so I don't know what other stories you could have dug up and heaved at me like that.

Q: I have to believe you saw the Washington Post story.

Rumsfeld: I did not. I was briefed on it by somebody coming over on the airplane, I laughed and dismissed it. I'm told that the folks back there who were referenced -- Colin Powell and someone else, I've forgotten who else -- laughed and dismissed it.

Q: Do you get along all right with Secretary Powell?

Rumsfeld: Of course I do.

Q: That's the easiest question I've asked you.

Rumsfeld: He's a good man.

Q: (Inaudible.)

Rumsfeld: You're as old as I am. You've been round listening to this nonsense, too.

Q: (Inaudible.) Secretary Powell disagrees with (Inaudible.) strategy. Now this week (Inaudible.). This week he scored quite a big victory.

Rumsfeld: Well there are a lot of people who like to see winners and losers. It sells newspapers, it keeps the ratings for the television people, but the real world is that I deal with him every single day. He's a friend and he's a very talented guy and he's doing a good job for the country.

Q: I appreciate your time. Thank you.

Rumsfeld: You bet.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030905-secdef0649.html>

3:29 PM

✓ C9/30  
10/2

TO: Dr. David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 28, 2003  
SUBJECT:

We've got to get that letter up to the hill on Gen. Clarke. What in the world is the problem? Is something going on that I don't understand?

Thanks.

293


DHR/azn  
092303.03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,  
Copies of the letters  
are attached (sent  
out on 25 Sep).  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
9.30

2354903

U219607/03



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SEP 25 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

The Honorable John W. Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050


Dear Mr Chairman:

Thank you for your June 4, 2003, letter regarding the death of Private First Class Barry Winchell, United States Army and the President's nomination of Major General Robert T. Clark, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. Enclosed is a response to the questions posed by Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles, Private First Class Winchell's parents.

In this tragic situation, the Department of the Army Inspector General's Assessment concluded that Fort Campbell's Commanders responded appropriately, to include holding the two soldiers involved accountable for their heinous criminal acts. Immediately following Private First Class Winchell's death, Major General Clark instituted extensive, comprehensive, and thorough corrective and remedial actions. Many of these actions were in place well before the Department of Defense issued updated guidance on the Homosexual Conduct Policy. In these difficult circumstances, Major General Clark did his very best to care for soldiers and to serve the Army and the Nation in an exemplary and forthright manner.

We trust this response will enable the Committee to continue processing the nomination of Major General Clark. A similar letter is being sent to Senator Levin.

Sincerely,

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy

Enclosure:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/19688



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SEP 25 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Senator Levin:

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We trust this response will enable the Committee to continue processing the nomination of Major General Clark. A similar letter is being sent to Senator Warner.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy

Enclosure:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/19689

## Responses to Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles' Questions and Concerns

The responses below address questions and concerns taken from correspondence forwarded by Mr. and Mrs. Wally Kutteles. An undated letter contained questions regarding the nomination of Major General Clark. Additionally, the May 28, 2003, letter expressed further concerns regarding the nomination. The questions and concerns have been restated and answered below.

### **UNDATED LETTER**

**Question 1: Has anyone spoken to the prosecuting attorney, Captain Engler? All of the information we were told about the General's statement came from him. The Associated Press several months earlier had quoted him as stating "... that Private (PVT) Glover murdered Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell and there is no doubt about that." Yet before the trial, he told us that the forensics sucks and that they needed Fisher's testimony because "the General wanted to get the Batman."**

#### **Answer:**

(1) On May 21, 2003, the Office of the Department of the Army Inspector General contacted Captain (CPT) Gregg Engler, former Senior Trial Counsel, 101st Airborne Division. While the precise contours of the above question are not clear, the following information may be useful. The Office of the Inspector General determined that CPT Engler had extensive discussions with Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles concerning the pre-trial agreements (PTAs). Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) James Garrett, former Chief, Criminal Law, 101st Airborne Division, and CPT Engler documented their conversations with Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles in two memoranda for record dated January 11, 2000.

(2) In July 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles were informed about how the military justice system functions, including the roles of key individuals in the system. Additionally, they were advised of their rights as victims within the system. From September through December 1999, CPT Engler had numerous conversations with Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles concerning potential PTAs. Specifically, he discussed three separate offers to plead guilty (OTP) submitted by PVT Glover. The first OTP was in exchange for a sentence cap of 45 years. Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles recommended disapproval and stated their desire for as close to a life sentence as possible. Following their request, Major General Clark refused this offer. PVT Glover's next OTP was in exchange for a cap of 65 years. Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles recommended approval of this offer. However, Major General Clark also rejected this offer because he thought it was too lenient for such a heinous murder. Finally, PVT Glover submitted an OTP in exchange for a sentence cap of life imprisonment. CPT Engler presented this offer to Mr.

and Mrs. Kutteles, who again recommended accepting this offer. Subsequently, Major General Clark accepted the offer and entered into a PTA under those terms.

(3) On November 19, 1999, at the same time PVT Glover was submitting his second OTP, Specialist (SPC) Fisher submitted an OTP in exchange for the Government dropping two charges and a sentence cap of 12.5 years imprisonment. CPT Engler presented this offer to Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the Government's case against SPC Fisher. Based on a proffer of testimony from PVT Glover, which limited SPC Fisher's involvement in the murder, CPT Engler recommended accepting the OTP. Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles stated they needed time to discuss the offer between themselves. They subsequently called CPT Engler and stated they recommended accepting the offer. Major General Clark then accepted the offer and entered into a PTA under those terms.

**Question 2: What steps were taken to address the issue of gay discharges at Fort Campbell when they increased from 4 percent to 28 percent in the year following PFC Winchell's death?**

**Answer:**

(1) On January 10, 2000, the Secretary of the Army directed a Special Assessment/Investigation of Allegations of Violations of the Department of Defense (DOD) Homosexual Conduct Policy [hereinafter the DOD Policy] at Fort Campbell. The Department of the Army Inspector General Special Assessment was completed on July 20, 2000. The Assessment reflected a significant increase in the Soldiers discharged under Chapter 15, Discharge for Homosexual Conduct, Army Regulation 635-200, Enlisted Personnel. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, the Army discharged 274 Soldiers under the DOD Policy, of whom 17 or (6 percent) were from Fort Campbell. In FY 2000, The Army discharged 567 Soldiers, of whom 152 or (23 percent) were from Fort Campbell.

(2) On October 14, 1999, one month into FY 2000, in an effort to ensure the safety of any homosexual Soldiers serving at Fort Campbell, Major General Clark published a new policy for the processing of requests for administrative separations under Chapter 15 of Army Regulation 635-200. This policy called for greater emphasis on: the role of the chain of the command and the legal advisors in the process, expediting the processing of requests, the safety and privacy of the Soldier making the request, and the prevention of any harassment of Soldiers pending separation. Major General Clark's policy also reminded commanders that they would not initiate a fact-finding inquiry before coordinating with their legal advisor and that only the Secretary of the Army could authorize an investigation into whether or not a Soldier made a statement regarding his or her homosexuality for the purpose of seeking separation.

(3) The Special Assessment found that in the four months between the issuance of Major General Clark's memorandum and the Assessment team's arrival at Fort Campbell,

not a single commander conducted an inquiry to determine whether a Soldier had made an admission of homosexuality for the purpose of seeking separation. In interviews, commanders indicated a belief that command guidance at Fort Campbell required them to expeditiously process the Chapter 15 separations of Soldiers without inquiry, even if they believed that the statement of homosexuality was fraudulent. As a result, commanders admitted a belief that many of the Soldiers who requested and received separation under Chapter 15 in FY 2000 were not, in fact, homosexuals.

(4) There has been some speculation that some of the increase in Chapter 15 separation actions stemmed from homosexual Soldiers' fear of violence or harassment at Fort Campbell. The Assessment reviewed 45 Chapter 15 separation actions at Fort Campbell from the period of January 11, 1999, to March 3, 2000, and found that 15 of the packets contained allegations of harassment. Twelve of these 15 used a form letter created by the Fort Campbell Legal Assistance office that included an allegation of harassment. An attempt was made to contact the 15 ex-Soldiers; however, only five responded. Three of five ex-Soldiers interviewed by the Assessment stated that they were not harassed, and had merely signed the statement because it was part of the standard form. The remaining two of the five ex-Soldiers said that they had been the target of harassment or threats.

(5) On July 21, 2000, based on the findings of the Special Assessment, the Chief of Staff, Army, implemented the Army's anti-harassment policy. Additionally, he reiterated his January 10, 2000, message to the force that all Soldiers would be treated with dignity and respect and that harassment of or threats to Soldiers, to include threats based on perceived sexual orientation, would not be tolerated. Commanders would ensure that their Soldiers were trained to standard on the policies.

**Question 3: General Clark states that the graffiti, cadences, and harassment were "isolated incidents." Are there any other "isolated incidents" that they know of in the military?**

**Answer:** There are isolated incidents of homosexual harassment in the military; however, there is currently no DOD- or Army-wide mechanism to track these incidents throughout the world. The Army has many avenues for Soldiers to report incidents of harassment. The Army policy is to deal with these incidents at the lowest possible level. Often, these situations are dealt with immediately and effectively with on-the-spot corrections and counseling.

**Question 4: Why in the military-wide report did they find 80 percent of those in the military had seen or experienced homosexual harassment, but Fort Campbell was an oasis of lack of harassment?**

**Answer:** There is no Department of the Army or DOD assessment or review that has characterized Fort Campbell as "... an oasis of lack of harassment." The March 16, 2000, DOD Evaluation Report on Military Environment with Respect to the DOD Policy did find that 80% of the respondents stated they had heard offensive speech, derogatory names, jokes, or remarks about homosexuals in the last 12 months.

**Question 5: Why did it take 4 months for the order on training "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" to be implemented?**

**Answer:** The training on the DOD Policy was completed in only 90 days. On January 10, 2000, the G-1, Headquarters Department of the Army directed that training on the DOD Policy would be accomplished no later than April 10, 2000. The training on the DOD Policy complied with DOD guidelines and implemented Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 654. In FY 2000, there were 484,551 active duty Soldiers, 206,682 Army Reservists, and 351,078 members of the Army National Guard. Given the large number of Soldiers, and considering that the Reserve Components only trained two days a month, 90 days was a reasonable time in which to complete the training.

**Question 6: Barry was harassed daily for 4 months. Why did his Commanders do nothing about his sergeants? The Army's Inspector General (IG) report found that anti-gay slurs occurred on a "regular basis" at Fort Campbell. How could General Clark claim that there was no "climate of harassment"?**

**Answer:**

(1) The Special Assessment did not establish that PFC Winchell was harassed daily for four months. Instead, the Assessment established that two noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in PFC Winchell's chain of command and a fellow Private asked about PFC Winchell's sexual orientation. In addition, at least one NCO in PFC Winchell's company referred to him in a derogatory manner. The evidence demonstrated, however, that the chain of command was proactive in addressing the sporadic incidents of derogatory comments with immediate on-the-spot corrections and counseling.

(2) The Department of the Army Inspector General Special Assessment and the Department of the Army Inspector General Investigation determined the command neither promoted, condoned, nor permitted harassment of Soldiers. Further, the Assessment found that the chain of command took appropriate steps whenever incidents of harassment were brought to their attention.

**Question 7: As we have been told, the IG is a General's eyes, ears, and conscience. Why did the IG send PFC Winchell back to the people who were harassing him? Did the IG report the harassment to the General?**

**Answer:** The Fort Campbell IG Office properly responded to the matter, as they followed standard Army IG policy, in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, by recommending PFC Winchell provide his Commanders the opportunity to resolve his complaint prior to direct IG intervention. Immediately after an NCO called PFC Winchell a derisive term, another NCO responded to assist PFC Winchell and escorted him to the Fort Campbell IG office to file a complaint. Upon being advised that he should provide his Commander the first opportunity to address the issue, PFC Winchell was then escorted to his Company Commander. The evidence indicated that PFC Winchell's Company Commander counseled the NCO regarding his inappropriate remarks. Since this matter was appropriately addressed at the lowest possible level, Major General Clark was never informed about PFC Winchell's complaint.

**Question 8: Why did General Shinseki, during IG press conference exonerating Fort Campbell's Commanders of any culpability for our son's death, admit that The Army was fully responsible?**

**Answer:** General Shinseki's statement concerning the Army's responsibility in this case reflects official Army policy, which provides that Commanders at all levels are accountable for everything their command does or fails to do. This means that Commanders' actions at every level may be reviewed to determine whether they executed their responsibilities appropriately. In this tragic situation, the IG report concluded the Commanders at Fort Campbell responded appropriately, to include holding the two Soldiers involved accountable for their criminal acts.

**Question 9: Why did General Clark not reach out and meet with us on his own initiative? If he was worried about bias on his part, he could have met with us after the trials.**

**Answer:** On June 11, 2003, Major General Clark provided the Department of the Army Inspector General a statement that reflected in retrospect he wished he had met with Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles in 1999. He met with the Kutteles on May 13, 2003, and told them he was sorry he had not met with them earlier.

**Question 10: Why did the Pentagon refuse to consider our military claim based on its merits?**

**Answer:**

(1) Mrs. Kutteles' claim filed on April 26, 2000, failed to state a claim upon which relief could legally be granted under applicable Federal law. Mrs. Kutteles alleged that her son was murdered on July 5, 1999, due to the perception that he was gay and that the chain of command was negligent in failing to prevent his death. The claim was filed seeking compensation under the Military Claims Act (MCA).

(2) Although the claim was filed under the MCA, the claim was also considered under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On September 27, 2000, the claim was denied under both statutes. Specifically, the claim was denied because the FTCA was the exclusive remedy for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions by the U.S. or its employees (including military personnel) within the U.S. The preemptive nature of the FTCA was addressed in the MCA. Accordingly, the MCA could not be a basis for recovery on the claim. Furthermore, the FTCA provides no legal basis to pay the claim. In U.S. v. Feres, the Supreme Court held that injuries to service members that arise out of or in the scope of their duties incident to their service are outside the scope of the FTCA. The Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Shearer, has specifically held that even claims of negligent supervision and discipline involving a service member's murder by another service member are barred by the *Feres* doctrine.

(3) On November 1, 2000, Mrs. Kutteles appealed the denial of her claim. On March 1, 2001, a recommendation to deny the appeal was forwarded to the Secretary of the Army's designee. Additionally, the Secretary of the Army's designee personally briefed Mrs. Kutteles that her appeal was denied.

**Question 11: Did anyone talk to Sergeant Kleifgen about his harried phone calls to us? The tapes of interrogation he told us about in the spring of 2000 and the order not to talk to us from the General? As per statements to us, the General admitted to us that he had a casual conversation with Sergeant Kleifgen while sitting on a log. General Clark claims that he spoke with Kleifgen for several hours, but denies any knowledge of the tapes, including Sergeant Dubielak's.**

**Answer:**

(1) Yes. A representative of the Department of the Army Inspector General interviewed Staff Sergeant (SSG) Kleifgen during the Department of the Army Inspector General investigation in the Spring of 2000. Additionally, the investigation substantiated an allegation against SSG Kleifgen for violating the DOD Policy.

(2) Numerous times following the murder of PFC Winchell, SSG Kleifgen was instructed not to discuss his statements or testimony concerning the cases. Immediately following the criminal attack on PFC Winchell, the Command and law enforcement agents began a criminal investigation. This investigation led to the preferral of charges and subsequent court-martial of the two Soldiers responsible for these heinous crimes. Following their convictions, the Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General to examine allegations of violations of the DOD Policy that surfaced during the criminal proceedings. From the night of the murder until August 1, 2000, there was an unbroken chain of investigations and court-martial proceedings. During all of these processes, it was Army policy to admonish witnesses (including SSGs Kleifgen and Dubielak, in this case) not to discuss their statements or testimony with

anyone other than the investigators, their own attorneys, or other attorneys involved in the case.

**Question 12: The General stated that he spoke at the Rotary and Kiwanis clubs making statements. What were they?**

**Answer:**

(1) Because Major General Clark was the General Court-Martial Convening Authority in the criminal cases related to Private First Winchell's murder, Major General Clark had a duty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to maintain a fair and impartial stance while the court cases were pending. It was not only appropriate, but it was also required under law that he refrain from making public comments about the specific issues of the pending cases. Once he was free to speak publicly about PFC Winchell's murder, he made multiple public statements to various community groups in an effort to educate the public on his strategy for ensuring positive steps were taken to teach and train Soldiers on dignity and respect for others in a constant ongoing effort to ensure that this type of tragedy was never repeated.

(2) On July 25, 2003, Major General Clark stated he was the guest speaker at the Hopkinsville, Kentucky Rotary Club meeting on March 7, 2000. He also addressed meetings of the Clarksville, Tennessee and Hopkinsville, Kentucky Kiwanis Clubs on 21 and 30 March, respectively. On these occasions, he specifically addressed the tragic murder of PFC Winchell and allegations of anti-gay harassment on post. He described new policies he had initiated which emphasized treatment of all Soldiers with dignity and respect and specifically outlawed anti-gay harassment. He also described new procedures in place for expeditiously handling discharges for homosexual conduct, and he explained his role as the general court-martial convening authority and the limitations on public statements that imposed during the military justice process. He further described the resourcing of barracks upgrade initiatives. In each of these presentations, MG Clark assured the audience of the positive command climate that existed on Fort Campbell. He also emphasized the quality of our young Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers. Major General Clark described the remarkable performances and achievements of Soldiers and units on deployments and exercises. He spoke about the modernization efforts underway on post, including the construction of new barracks and facilities. These speaking engagements were opportunities Major General Clark deliberately sought out and scheduled for the purpose of informing and reassuring the local communities about the outstanding young Americans in the ranks and the actions they took in the wake of the tragic and senseless death of PFC Winchell.

**Question 13: Why was the 911 emergency telephone number not installed until after PFC Winchell's death?**

**Answer:** There was no evidence that indicated 911 responsiveness was raised as an issue prior to PFC Winchell's murder. After the murder, Major General Clark appointed his Assistant Division Commander to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the barracks. During the assessment, a review of the 911 dial-in capabilities was conducted and measures were taken to improve the emergency responsiveness.

**Question 14:** Why was underage drinking rampant throughout Fort Campbell, and why were Soldiers allowed to keep alcohol in their rooms? We have learned that this was stopped for a 2-week period, but began again with the stipulation that the men had to be 21. Do you think fellow Soldiers would card each other? How could this bad policy be sanely condoned? Ask any veteran what would have happened if such a policy had occurred during their time of service.

**Answer:**

(1) Seven months before PFC Winchell was murdered, Major General Clark published Campbell Pamphlet 600-1, known as *The Blue Book*. The pamphlet set out the basic standards for all Soldiers assigned to the 101st Airborne Division in terms of individual discipline, appearance, conduct, and military courtesy. It addressed consumption of alcoholic beverages and age requirements. The pamphlet specifically stated:

"Soldiers should keep themselves physically and mentally prepared. Overindulgence of alcohol affects Soldiers' readiness, health, and possibly their career. The deglamourization of alcohol consumption is strongly encouraged."

With regards to age requirements, the pamphlet stated:

"According to state laws, alcohol beverages are not sold or served to persons under the age of 21 in facilities located in Kentucky or Tennessee or on post. Therefore, consumption or possession of alcohol on or off post by Soldiers under the age of 21 is illegal. Soldiers over 21 who provide beverages to those under 21 are committing a criminal offense."

(2) On August 19, 1999, Major General Clark directed his Assistant Division Commander to conduct a comprehensive review of the health, welfare, and safety of barracks life. The review culminated in the publication of Major General Clark's December 15, 1999, policy entitled *Command Responsibilities for Single Soldier Safety, Security, and Living Standards in the Barracks*. This memorandum refined existing barracks policies and addressed the importance of safety in the barracks. It required various personal safety measures including safety lights, locks, improved stairwells and hallways, all designed to improve Soldier safety. This comprehensive review led to immediate repairs to Fort Campbell's barracks. Over \$7 million were committed to this

effort. This memorandum also required Commanders continuously to deglamourize alcohol consumption through education and training programs, and specified that the alcohol consumption policy was punitive in nature and that violations could be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

### **LETTER DATED 28 MAY 03**

**Concern: First, we are very concerned that Major General Clark's command had multiple, serious climate deficiencies...command-wide low morale, inadequate delivery of health care to Soldiers and their families, and wide-spread, leader-condoned underage drinking in the barracks.**

**Answer: (restated from Question 14)**

(1) On January 1, 1999, seven months before PFC Winchell was murdered, Major General Clark published Campbell Pamphlet 600-1, known as *The Blue Book*. The pamphlet set out the basic standards for all Soldiers assigned to the 101st Airborne Division in terms of individual discipline, appearance, conduct, and military courtesy. It addressed consumption of alcoholic beverages and age requirements. The pamphlet specifically stated:

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effort. This memorandum also required Commanders to continuously deglamourize alcohol consumption through education and training programs, and specified that the alcohol consumption policy was punitive in nature and that violations could be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**Concern: Second, as we discussed with you on May 14, 2003 evidence gathered by the Army IG, as well as presented during the criminal proceedings following Barry's death, shows that Major General Clark's command tolerated hateful, anti-gay behaviors before the murder...**

**Answer: (restated from Question 6) The Department of the Army Inspector General Special Assessment and the Department of the Army Inspector General Investigation determined the command neither promoted, condoned, nor permitted harassment of Soldiers. Further, the Assessment found that the chain of command took appropriate steps whenever incidents of harassment were brought to their attention**

**Concern: Third, following our son's death, Major General Clark did practically nothing to address the hateful conditions that contributed to Barry's death...**

**Answer:**

(1) After the murder, the evidence established Major General Clark gave appropriate guidance to his staff and subordinate commanders concerning any form of harassment of Soldiers. Specifically, he directed his subordinate commanders to conduct an assessment of any graffiti, cadences, comments, or anything else that would lead them to believe there was anti-gay bias in their organizations. Major General Clark directed his subordinate commanders to review cadence calls, which might demean others. Major General Clark personally talked to PFC Winchell's company shortly after the murder and addressed the importance of treating all people with dignity and respect. Additionally, Major General Clark gave guidance about how to handle harassment complaints and how they should proceed with Chapter 15 discharge actions.

(2) During the six-months following the murder, Major General Clark was personally involved in talking to commanders at all levels about the anti-gay harassment. Major General Clark directed his Assistant Division Commanders and Command Sergeant Major to conduct a barracks assessment. He emphasized the importance of Charge of Quarters (CQs) in the barracks, as well as Duty Officers and Duty Noncommissioned Officers at the battalion level. Major General Clark directed his Chief of Staff to obtain briefings in greater detail on the DOD Policy and disseminated them to subordinate units through a series of leader and chain teaching briefings. The evidence indicated Major General Clark personally taught the initial DOD Policy chain teaching brief to ensure it was presented correctly, with compassion, taught with integrity, and without any bias.

(3) Major General Clark directed his Chief of Staff to review the *Eagle Values Education Program* to ensure it properly addressed dignity and respect. The evidence indicated Major General Clark's major focus was not solely directed at homosexuals, but discussing the whole notion of treating each other with dignity and respect. While the homosexual issue was the motive for the review, the larger issue was treating Soldiers, regardless of ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religious beliefs, with dignity and respect. Major General Clark was adamant to ensure all Soldiers within the division realized that any conduct resembling harassment or ridicule would not be condoned and would be corrected and punished immediately.

(4) Because Major General Clark was the General Court-Martial Convening Authority in the criminal cases related to PFC Winchell's murder, he had a duty to maintain a fair and impartial stance while court cases were pending. It was not only appropriate, but also required under law that he refrain from making public comments about the specifics of pending cases. Thus, Major General Clark did not make public comments specifically relating to the cases. The evidence established he took prudent and reasonable measures to prevent any future incident.

**Concern: Finally, we remain mystified with Major General Clark's refusal to meet with us following Barry's death...**

**Answer:**

(1) There was no evidence that Major General Clark was ever informed by his staff or anyone that Mrs. Kutteles requested to meet with him personally. All witnesses interviewed had no knowledge such a request was made. Additionally, the witnesses testified that the command was proactive in addressing Mrs. Kutteles' concerns. Witnesses testified that every effort was made to meet each request of Mrs. Kutteles.

(2) The evidence established that the battalion commander, battalion command sergeant major, every company commander and first sergeant in the battalion, and most of the Soldiers in PFC Winchell's company provided assistance to meet the needs of Mr. and Mrs. Kutteles. The company took up a collection amongst the Soldiers that was used to pay for the Kutteles' lodging, airfare, local transportation, groceries, phone calls, and other needs, every time the Kutteles' returned to Fort Campbell. Additionally, the unit had two Soldiers on 24-hour immediate standby in case the Kutteles' needed any additional assistance during their stay at Fort Campbell. Numerous organizations outside the battalion also provided assistance in dealing with both the emotional effects of the tragic event (e.g., Chaplain's office) and the logistical and administrative needs that had to be addressed (e.g., Staff Judge Advocate's Office, Casualty Assistance Office, Housing Office, Transportation Office, etc.).

(3) Major General Clark did meet with Mr. And Mrs. Kutteles on May 13, 2003.

5120

September 23, 2003

415-434-2191

IRAA

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Bob Gardner

Bob Gardner runs an advertising firm. He is a possibility for some help on marketing and advertising in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-61

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

7/25

9/30  
Whitman

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

Bryon - ple fax this out to Dorrance Smith and ask Dorrance if he is interested. Tax.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

Larry Di Rita  
10/1

Larry Di Rita  
7/25

U21961 /03

23 Sep 03



**BOB GARDNER**

*President*

*Executive Creative Director*

Bob Gardner may be the only creative director in the country who has a Wharton MBA. This seeming dichotomy has shaped his career and the agency he founded and heads. He believes strongly that the best creative is derived from the most rigorous strategic thinking. And that philosophy is embedded throughout the agency.

A Bay Area native, Bob went East to college and received a BA in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, prior to attending Wharton. He began his career in the New York office of J. Walter Thompson as a junior copywriter and was promoted to Creative Supervisor in two years.

Seeking a change, Bob moved to Washington in 1972, and became chief speechwriter to Donald Rumsfeld and Roy Ash, two prominent members of the Nixon Cabinet.

In 1974, he returned to JWT as Vice President and Creative Director of the San Francisco office. During his tenure there the office more than doubled its billings, and in 1976, Bob won more Clio awards than any other creative director in the country. In 1977, he founded his own agency, Gardner Communications, which is now called Gardner Geary Coll.

Bob is one of the few "Madison Avenue" types called on to do political races and has been part of the national ad teams for Presidents Ford and Bush. He also handled all of Dick Cheney's Congressional races in Wyoming and is a frequent writer and television commentator on political advertising.

Active in civic and community affairs, Bob's present and recent board affiliations include the Commonwealth Club, the Thacher School, Four Winds Camp, Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, the American Association of Advertising Agencies, and the Republican Jewish Coalition.



## Robert K. Gardner

### Political Experience

- **Chief Speechwriter to Donald Rumsfeld, Director of Cost of the Living Council**  
(Nixon administration wage and price controls)
  
- **Chief Speechwriter to Roy Ash, Director of OMB**
  
- **Associate Creative Director, President Ford's Campaign**  
Created much of the TV and radio campaign for the general election. Wrote music and lyrics to "I'm Feeling Good About America," the centerpiece of the TV campaign. Helped close a 35-point gap in the polls, which almost led to victory.
  
- **Cheney for Congress**  
Media Consultant to Dick Cheney in all his Congressional races in Wyoming.
  
- **The November Company (President George Bush's Campaign)**  
One of a small team of advertising "all stars" who worked on the Bush general election campaign.
  
- **Dole For President**  
Hired to be one of four key people for the Dole 1996 general election campaign. Campaign manager fired group leaders and the group disbanded.
  
- **Lazio for Senate (2000)**  
Called in late in the campaign to do a series of anti-Hillary spots. The New York Times termed the commercials the best of "positive negative."
  
- **Romney for Governor (2002)**  
TV ads targeted at Romney's opponent.

548

September 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>D</sup>  
SUBJECT: Taiwan

CHINA (MITS)

I talked to the Vice President. He would like to see the Taiwan brief, and then we can figure out how we approach the President. Do you want to arrange to have someone do that? I don't need to be there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-57

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

Complete

23 SEP 03

U21962 /03

September 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: VP Assistance

032

I talked to the Vice President. He is going to talk to Stevens about control. He is going to talk to Warner about tilting toward the House version instead of Collins' version.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-56

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*LD*  
9/24  
Larry Di Rita

23 SEP 03

U21963 /03

September 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dual Appearances

Why did you have both Dick Myers and me see the advertising people? It seems to me that that is overkill. Why shouldn't one or the other of us do it, instead of both?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-55

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

600.77

23 SEP 03

U21964 /03

Done

September <sup>24</sup> 22, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Current Figures

1849

Please have someone get me the latest figures for Iraq on the casualties and on the number of troops from which countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-51

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/03

24 SEP 03

U21965 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19707

24  
September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

335 SD

Please have someone prepare a letter from me to Tillie Fowler thanking her profusely for her work on the commission, and also a letter to each one of the seven participants. I would like to sign them personally.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-50

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

*9/25*  
*Fowler - pls draft*  
*DR*

Larry Di Rita  
9/25

24 SEP 03

U21966 /03

September 24, 2003

05  
9.29

TO: Jerry Bremer  
Reuben Jeffery

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Claude M. (Mick) Kicklighter

12A2

There is a retired three-star by the name of Kicklighter who is supposed to be terrific. He is currently an Assistant Secretary at Veterans Affairs and wants to get involved with Iraq. He is available, and he has done lots of things very well.

Thanks.

Attach.  
June 2003 biography of The Honorable Claude M. (Mick) Kicklighter)

DHR:dh  
092403-6

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

U21967 /03

21 SEP 03

# Biographies of VA Officials

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*Department of Veterans Affairs*

## **The Honorable Claude M. (Mick) Kicklighter**

Claude M. "Mick" Kicklighter was sworn in August 10, 2001, as the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning. He was nominated by President Bush on June 27, 2001, and confirmed by the Senate August 3, 2001. He previously served as the Deputy Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs and Acting Assistant Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs.

After the tragic attack on September 11, 2001, Mr. Kicklighter was selected to direct VA's Crisis Response Team and to establish and direct a new Office of Operations, Security and Preparedness. On March 7, 2003, Secretary Principi approved the addition of Readiness, Emergency Preparedness and Security and Law Enforcement to the Office of Policy and Planning, making Mr. Kicklighter the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy, Planning and Preparedness.

In his current role, Mr. Kicklighter serves as senior advisor to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on strategic planning, policy research and analysis, and program evaluation. With his new responsibilities, he now also serves as senior advisor to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on Department-wide emergency operations, preparedness and security and law enforcement.

Mr. Kicklighter was born and raised in Glennville, Georgia. He graduated from Mercer University with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in biology and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Field Artillery. He earned a Masters of Arts Degree in Management of National Resources from the School of Business Administration, George Washington University, and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His overseas tours include France, Germany, Iran, the Netherlands, and two tours in Vietnam.

Mr. Kicklighter commanded at every level from Company through Division. He commanded the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, from 1984 to 1986. He served in staff assignments from Battalion to Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. From 1987 to 1989 Mr. Kicklighter served as the Director of the Army Staff at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. From 1989 to 1991, he commanded the US Army Pacific, and upon completion of this assignment, he retired from active duty as an Army Lieutenant General. In July 1991, he became the Director of our Nation's effort to thank and honor World War II veterans as we commemorated the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of WWII. He served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs from September 1995 until July 1999.

Mr. Kicklighter's military honors include the Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Bronze Star. His civilian awards include the Presidential Citizen Medal, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, and the Distinguished Civilian Service Award. He was a member of the Habitat for Humanity, International, Board of Directors for five years (three years as Chairman). He left the Board in November 2001.

*June 2003*

24  
September 22, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking

205

I think we may need to have a complete record—a master computer system—of every unit in the military, AC and RC, so we can keep track of how often these people get called up, how often they are deployed, how long it takes them to be mobilized, how long to be demobilized, and how long to execute relief in place—so we know the critical times. The Services seem not to know. Their job is to organize, train and equip, but I don't have a sense that they have a firm grip on it.

Please consider this and, if you agree, see me with a draft proposal as to how this could be done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-10

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

24 SEP 03

U21968 /03

6940  
03/013270

24  
September 22, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

1020

Please draft a memo by Thursday of this week that urges the interagency process to go to work on oil for food money for Bremer. We have to get that process moving. It is disgraceful.

Thanks.

CLOSED  
PER SMA  
see last page

DHR:dh  
092203-30

.....  
Please respond by 9/25/03

24 SEP 03

U21969 /03

USDP *PMZ* <sup>26</sup> SEP 2003  
I-03/012990-NP

EF-6969

INFO MEMO

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. Crouch *JDC* SEP 25 2003

SUBJECT: Results of Oil-for-Food (OFF) Contract Review

- The Oil-for-Food contracts review is complete; 759 (10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts that had not been delivered by March 20, 2003 were examined. Executive Summary is at Tab B.
  - Those contracts, valued at \$6.9B, represent 60% of committed OFF funds.
- The Task Force found potential overpricing in at least 48% of the contracts evaluated.
  - Inadequate contract specifications and lack of contract pricing detail precluded evaluation of a number of high-dollar Electrical, Oil Spares and Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Contracts.
- The key Task Force findings and recommendations are summarized at Tab A. Potential savings from implementing the recommendations could be significant:
  - Up to \$656M saved if overpriced contracts are renegotiated;
  - \$3.1- 4.2B saved if overpriced and questionable contracts are cancelled; and
  - More value for each dollar spent for future non-OFF contracts (by not using middlemen and paying excessive transportation costs).
- We have been working closely with CPA staff, who have advised Ambassador Bremer that they intend to implement our findings and recommendations.
  - CPA plans to defer existing OFF contracts that are substantially overpriced rather than seek to renegotiate price.
- OFF is scheduled to transfer its functions and most of its remaining unencumbered funds (\$2.5 billion plus) to the CPA by November 21.

Attachment  
a/s

23-09-03 13:53:11

Prepared by: Sally Horn, Senior Director

Approved by: Mark T. Esper, DASD *MTE*

## OFF TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Findings

- 759 contracts were reviewed, representing 10% of the number of contracts and 60% of the value of contracts approved and funded but not delivered as of March 20, 2003.
- At least 48% of the reviewed contracts were assessed to likely be overpriced. Food commodity contracts were the most consistently overpriced, with the potential overpricing identified in 87% of the contracts, averaging 22% of the contract value.
- The total value of the contracts assessed to be overpriced is approximately \$3.1- 4/2B; potential overpricing in the contracts evaluated is \$656M.
- More than half of the reviewed contracts from Egypt, India, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam were assessed to be potentially overpriced.
- Illicit surcharges/kickbacks were difficult to identify in contracts, but officials from the former Iraqi ministries indicated that illicit payments of 10-20% were standard.
- The OFF program reflects heavy dependence on old technology, particularly in the electrical sector; significant variability in prices for identical items; and little itemization of training, spare parts, and transportation costs.
- Contracts of questionable value were identified, such as for Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls and larger-than-expected quantities of spares and maize headers.

### Recommendations Regarding OFF Contracts

- Request additional documentation from suppliers for all potentially overpriced and inconclusive OFF contracts.
- Require pricing adjustments, including deletion of Iraqi "service charges" on all overpriced contracts where the overpricing cannot be adequately explained by the supplier.
- Advise the UN not to proceed with overpriced contracts or suppliers who refuse to adjust their prices downward.
- Assess the need for the large quantity of spares and training. Remove contract requirements and adjust contract prices downward for unnecessary items.
- Assess whether contracts for "old technology" or items of questionable value are essential for immediate needs.

- Engage a transportation expert to determine differences for shipping and transport costs due to changed circumstances.

**Recommendations for Post-OFF Contracting**

- Require that future contracts itemize transportation, insurance, and all deliverables, including spare parts, services, or other items.
- Require suppliers to provide detailed specifications on items being supplied and detailed cost data for unique (sole source) items.
- Require competitive bidding for commodity items.
- Limit the use of middlemen.

## OFF TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Findings

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

September 29, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

I now understand what has happened on the Oil-for-Food situation—my apologies.

I am not happy where it came out, but I can certainly understand how we got from where we were to where we are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-29

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

September <sup>24</sup>~~22~~, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Plan for Recruiting and Retention

340

We need a plan for recruiting and retention for next year when the economy improves, which I believe it will.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-34

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

24 SEP 03

U21970 /03

9/24  
09:20

24  
September 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

Do I write a letter to all the families of people who are killed in Iraq, Afghanistan  
or the War on Terror? Do I do anything about the families of the wounded? If  
not, who does?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-41

293

.....  
Please respond by 9/26/03

9/25

- Yes to KIA.
- No to WIA

↑  
 We look at this again. We considered/decided against earlier.  
*DHR* 50009/17

U21971 103

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/19719

9/25

September <sup>24</sup> 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Debrief Thiessen

*Advance copy sent*

We should have had Marc Thiessen in that meeting Sunday. Please make sure he gets a sense of urgency into the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-26

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*032*

*24 Sep 03*

U21972 /03

September 25, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony Prep Book

The book that was prepared for my testimony on Wednesday, September 24, wasn't helpful. It was too dense. The writing was too small. It wasn't at the level that I need. I hate to see people waste time like that. It just wasn't worthwhile.

How do we fix that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092403-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*032*

*20 Sep 03*

U21973 /03

September 25, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: John Hamre

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/2*

At the hearings, they said Hamre had said something in the press Wednesday.  
What did he say?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092403-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*032*

*9/29*  
*Col Rumsfeld* *SR*

- ① Hearing at Foreign Relations committee
- ② Wash Post story about that hearing
- ③ Hamre Op-Ed

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*9/30*

*25 Sep 03*

U21974 /03

success, in my mind, have to be achieved if we are going to win the global war on terrorism.

I believe that there is no doubt that our military forces are up to the task.

There is no doubt that we must achieve success politically with Iraqis, but we also must show political will to stay the course, in my mind, in order to achieve success there, and I think it's possible that we can.

SEN. HOLLINGS: But, General, get my point. Deputy Secretary Hamre -- and we all have high respect, and I think you've got high respect for him -- he's just in the morning paper saying it's not you, it's the political entity, namely us -- the Congress, the State Department, AID and everything else ought to be doing what you're doing. That's my point. That's what I'm talking about politically. I don't see how in the world you're going to ever get really good security because two Republican Guard units folded back into the city of 5 million; you can't find them. You can't go door-to-door and deweaponize them and everything else of that kind. So we got a problem, a real problem on there. And the quicker we can get it over, as the secretary says, to the Iraqis, I agree with you on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. STEVENS: Senator Specter is recognized for eight minutes. Senator Domenici. Pardon me. (Laughter.) Senator Domenici.

SEN. PETE DOMENICI (R-NM): (Off mike) -- push my button. I'll tell you, my button's been pushed already today. The problem is, I'm not going to let it push me, I'm going to just forget about a few things I've heard today that would cause me to get off the path of what I came here today to do.

First, I would tell you, and tell Senator Byrd, I'm not a member of the Greatest Generation, I would like you to know, I'm a member of a much lesser generation than you, for I'm too young to be a member of the Great Generation. But I've been here 33 years, and I believe, I believe I'm entitled to my time, just as you're entitled to yours -- no more, and no less for both of us.

Now, let me say to you, we voted here October 12th -- 11th or 12th, late at night, and we gave the president authority to go to war, if war we had to have with Iraq. When did we invade? When did the bombardment start? Anybody remember?

GEN. MYERS: March 19th.

SEN. DOMENICI: March 19th. Both events, the voting by 77 senators, and the invasion of the country, are less than one year old, and we already have people here, and across this land, and media people, who see no success other than they don't want to say to the military, "You did a bad job," because they wouldn't dare do that because they did a tremendous job. But other than that, all of a sudden, from October the 11th and March to this date, a few months later, everything has gone wrong; we are doing everything wrong.

Well, to all four of you, and to anyone that's listening, I think those who say that are wrong. I believe we're doing a tremendous job.

September 23, 2003 Tuesday

**SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY**

**LENGTH: 1177 words**

**COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**HEADLINE: REVIEW OF IRAQ POLICY AND ISSUES**

**TESTIMONY-BY: JOHN J. HAMRE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**AFFILIATION: CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**BODY:**

Statement of **John J. Hamre** President and Chief Executive Officer Center for Strategic and International Studies

Before the Committee on Senate Foreign Relations

September 23, 2003

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor to be able to testify before you today on the issue of next steps in Iraq. This is a critical hearing. There must be next steps for Iraq. America is now a Middle East power. We cannot forsake our responsibilities or avoid our obligations. We must succeed in rebuilding Iraq in order to help create a government that is representative of its people, at peace with its neighbors, and offers a future of hope and promise for its citizens. CSIS post-conflict assessment trip to Iraq

This past July, I was privileged to be able to testify before this committee after my colleagues and I returned from our assessment trip to Iraq on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld. We returned with two broad suggestions we need to dramatically irindiginizele the security program in Iraq and we need to expand the international base of support for the operation. At that time, we indicated that the Coalition Provisional Authority was rapidly running out of money and would soon need supplemental funds. We also stated that the security situation in Iraq remained problematic and, without dramatic improvements, the remainder of the rebuilding effort would be substantially impeded.

In the 10 weeks since we visited Iraq, I believe there have been some security improvements in areas that do not get coverage in the American media, especially in the northern and southern portions of the country. We receive reports from friends and acquaintances in Iraq that attest to this, despite the attacks on our forces. Even with these advances, the country is still far from having a secure environment. Just last week the major pipeline from the oil fields north to Turkey was attacked yet again. Assaults on our

10

11-L-0559/OSD/19724

troops have become more sophisticated and daring. The economic plundering of the country continues.

We continue to believe that the highest priority for enhancing security should rest with expanding the role of Iraqi security personnel. The Administration has launched new efforts to recruit security personnel, as contract security officers for specific installations, as policemen, and, increasingly, as border guards. These actions are a step in the right direction, even more so because it does not appear, at this point, that there will be significant contributions of foreign military personnel. We have to continue to build the Iraqis own capacity to bring security to the country.

#### President's request for supplemental funds for Iraq

President Bush has requested that Congress appropriate an additional \$87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan. I know that there is a great deal of controversy associated with this request. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the Congress appropriate these funds. As I said at the outset, for better or worse, America is now a Middle East power.

We now own this problem. We cannot walk away from it; rather we must now shoulder it. The American people need to know that this investment is necessary, that the plans are well conceived, and the budget meets critical unmet needs. Here I believe the Administration has not followed through adequately.

To date, there has not been a satisfactory accounting of how funds are being spent or how these additional funds are being planned for. I used to be the Comptroller at the Defense Department and I know full well that we live in a world of estimates. The best, planned estimate will always be 3 wrong. I know this from first hand experience. But I also know, from the same experience, that the sharpest critic would accept estimates so long as I offered a complete accounting of the facts upon which I based them and the assumptions I had to make to get there. Congress will accept estimates so long as they understand how they are made and if they can conclude that they are reasonable.

I have full confidence in the current DoD Comptroller, Dr. Dov Zakheim. I have worked with him for years and I know he is a thoroughly honest man. Unfortunately, over the past two years, a general level of distrust has developed between the Administration and the Congress on budget matters and on defense issues. The lack of trust is limiting the development of an enduring consensus to the long-term challenges we face.

Therefore, I strongly encourage the Defense Department to provide as complete and comprehensive an assessment as possible of the costs that they are incurring and are forecast to incur during the coming year on its Iraq operation. This assessment will enable the Congress to become more directly engaged in supporting the Administrations efforts to help bring security to the region and ultimately to America.

#### Assigning responsibility for next steps in Iraq

I continue to believe that we have too narrow an institutional base to support the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. I think it was an excellent idea for Ambassador Bremer to establish a liaison office here in Washington, headed up by Mr. Ruben Jeffries. But, I also believe Mr. Jeffries has too few people to support him and too little authority. In general, the efforts to enlist a wider base of support in the federal government for the reconstruction effort remain insufficient.

This raises the question whether or not the federal responsibilities for rebuilding Iraq should be assigned exclusively to the Defense Department. I understand and appreciate Secretary Rumsfeld's view that the Defense Department would overwhelmingly field the assets required for reconstruction, and therefore the Department should have complete authority to undertake the task.

In theory I agree with this point. But, in practice it has not worked. The patterns of cooperation inside the government broke down during the past year. DoD now has to manage tasks for which it has no background or competence, and it has not been effective in inviting the support of others in the government who have that background and competence. Either DoD needs a new approach for collaboration with others, or the President needs to change the assignment of responsibilities. The challenge of rebuilding Iraq is enormous and our ability to be effective in this effort is being eroded by the bureaucratic struggles here in Washington.

#### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, distinguished Senators, we must succeed in our task to rebuild Iraq. This isn't a matter of America's credibility. This is a question of our security. We will be substantially less secure as a nation if we fail. We have made important progress during the past four months. The task of rebuilding Iraq is challenging, but it is not hopeless. We have the capacity to succeed, and I join you in offering my full efforts to make this possible.

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at the appropriate time.

Washington Post  
September 24, 2003  
Pg. 25

## U.S. Urged To Modify Approach To Postwar Iraq

### *Experts Favor Stripping Pentagon of Control*

By Peter Slevin, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration should end Defense Department control over Iraq's civilian reconstruction effort and rethink other aspects of the U.S. occupation, a panel of specialists told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

"Proceeding on the current path will mean throwing good money after bad," testified J. Brian Atwood, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the Clinton administration. "We already have wasted precious moments. The only way to overcome the very poor beginning we have made in Iraq is to fundamentally change our approach."

Atwood favors giving the United Nations responsibility for key civilian operations and transferring control over reconstruction from the Pentagon to the State Department and USAID. Reconstruction and political and economic development, he said, "are not part of the Pentagon's playbook."

John J. Hamre, a deputy defense secretary during the Clinton administration, agreed that the Pentagon is managing tasks "for which it has no background or competence." He said "cooperation inside the government broke down," and the Defense Department has not effectively invited support from agencies that have the necessary skills.

Citing Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's argument for Pentagon authority over reconstruction, Hamre said, "In theory, I agree with this point. But in practice, it has not worked. . . . Either DOD needs a new approach for collaboration with others, or the president needs to change the assignment of responsibilities." 

President Bush in January gave the Defense Department control over the military and civilian aspects of war and reconstruction. The State Department has complained for months about being given too small a role in the civilian reconstruction effort and too little access to critical administration decision-making.

By many accounts, including some of its own senior officials, the civilian leadership of the Defense Department made a series of poor assumptions about conditions in postwar Iraq and what would be needed to secure and rebuild the country.

James Dobbins, a former U.S. emissary to Bosnia, Somalia and Afghanistan, called the Defense Department's responsibility for civilian efforts an "obstacle" to the international contributions the administration wants.

"On the civil side," Dobbins told the committee, "this is preeminently a job for the State Department, assisted by Treasury, AID, Justice and others."

The witnesses also echoed the views of a number of foreign leaders in New York yesterday who said

international support for the postwar mission would grow if the Bush administration shifted more influence to the United Nations and Iraqis.

The U.S. effort is plagued, Atwood said, by a lack of clarity. He accused the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority of "constant shifts in position" that are confusing to Iraqis.

"No one knows whether we are building the nation from the top down or the bottom up," said Atwood, a dean at the University of Minnesota. "Is the United States really interested in creating an Iraqi democracy, or are we fearful that giving power to the Iraqi people will produce policies counter to our interests?"

Aviation Week & Space Technology  
September 22, 2003  
Pg. 66

## Intel Plus 'Group Think' Equaled Weapons Of Mass Destruction In Iraq

By John J. Hamre

As I reflect on my time as the deputy secretary of Defense, I am often reminded of how isolated I was in that position. I had a fabulous staff. I was never denied anything I requested. Organizations and individuals actively sought to get on my calendar to tell me of their work. Having said that, anyone who serves in these positions is very isolated. This is a product of several factors.

First, the volume of material that comes to the secretary or deputy secretary is enormous. It has to be channeled for efficiency. Someone who works for you is deciding if you need to see it and when you need to see it. This is not a bad thing. This is just a fact of life. Second, everyone who meets with you or sends you a piece of paper is trying to create a positive impression. This means that subconsciously, and even consciously, everyone who briefs you wants to be seen in the best light. Before they walk in the door, they ask their colleagues and themselves, "What is he interested in? What sets him off? How do we discuss this so as to get a constructive outcome from the meeting?"

I found that I had to be careful not to distort the intelligence I received by the ways I asked questions and reacted to information. If I reacted harshly when presented with bad news, future meetings could be tempered with overly optimistic perspectives. If I expressed interest in one subject, the briefer would take note and that aspect of a problem was always emphasized in future briefings. I do not believe it is intentional, but the information you get is affected by the attitude you adopt. I don't know that this shapes analysis, but it does affect the way it is presented to you.

Another observation I would make concerns what philosophers call epistemological questions: How do we know what we know, and how good is the information that comprises this knowledge? It is reliable? Is it true? This is the core of the intelligence community's problem. The intelligence analyst is always working with fragmentary information. The question is a fragment of what? Is it a key fact that unlocks an understanding of a development, or is it unrelated to the hypothesis under consideration?

In relationship to this quest for certainty, I noticed that fragments of information gained greater certainty the farther away they were from the intelligence professional. The intelligence analyst is usually careful to note the reliability and timeliness of the intelligence "fact," but the qualifiers are often summarized and dropped as the intelligence briefing moves up the decision-making ladder. Alternative hypotheses are often omitted. A data element of questionable reliability can gain credibility as it rises through the intelligence hierarchy until it becomes authoritative evidence. This does not mean the intelligence fact was wrong. It does mean there is a tendency to bestow greater credibility to the data the more removed it becomes from the intelligence professional.

I also noticed that once a general proposition was accepted as valid, it was usually repeated without question in subsequent analyses. Group consciousness develops in the intelligence and policy world when basic propositions are accepted as true. As we saw recently, the entire intelligence community and the policy community--and I include myself here--were convinced we would find major stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. We have not. This demonstrates that a group consciousness, and the

- failure to adequately explore alternative hypotheses, can overcome the intelligence and policy world in the quest for certainty in what is inherently an uncertain enterprise.

In light of these phenomena, what should we do? How do we insulate ourselves from the problems that we confront as a consequence of these factors? One of the most important ways is to ensure competition among analysts. To accomplish this, we need redundant analytic capabilities in our intelligence community. We need competing organizations that report to different bosses in the federal government so we profit from the competition that is inherent in bureaucratic politics. This will not ensure that no mistakes will be made--witness the errors we made concerning WMD in Iraq. But, it is one of the important steps we can take to bring as much dispassionate analysis as possible to inherently uncertain questions.

Second, to counter the instinct toward "group think," we must augment the intelligence process through so-called open-source methods. We must, of course, have classified research. But, I believe open-source methods serve to broaden the perspectives of those who work within the confines of classification. The intellectual community advances through open competition of ideas. Analysts in the intelligence community need to interact with the wider ideas community, and the only feasible way to do that is for the intelligence community to create open-source disciplines to parallel classified work.

Third, all of us in the policy community have to realize we do shape the quality of ideas that come to us from the intelligence community by the way we interact with that group. This is not to say we should be passive consumers of intelligence product. Far from it. Intelligence analysts need to be asked to explicitly discuss the quality and depth of data that underlie their analysis. They should be explicit in identifying gaps and contra-proofs of their reasoning. These elements of introspection should be explicit annotations to the reports themselves, so policymakers are aware of analysts' constraints.

The years that lie ahead for America will be very challenging, and we will be very dependent on a healthy and vibrant intelligence community to chart these dangerous waters. We must take appropriate steps to ensure that this community remains healthy and vibrant.

*John J. Hamre, president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, was deputy secretary of Defense from 1997-99. He recently testified before the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.*

7/24  
1230 Snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Give me a complete schedule of how we plan to use the regional media. Lay it out over a two or three week period while we engage in this campaign of reaching out to the country. Show me what cities, what stations, how we are going to do it, how long on each one. Is it going to be live, which is important, if it is not going to end up on the cutting room floor, etc.

337

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.06

Please respond by: 10/8 9/25

25 Sep 03

9/29  
Tony Dolan -  
He remains interested.  
Let's pull it together. Ready when  
you are.  
*D. Rita*

→ Se del

- Working on it.  
- Want to brief Dan Bertlett,  
too, because this would be  
good to consider administration  
wide.  
- Yesterday was just a start in  
the absence of a plan, which  
is taking too long but coming  
together. *D. Rita*

Larry Di Rita  
9/30

U21975 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19731

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*given to  
M. Thiessen to  
review transcript &  
return to  
SD -*

Get me a transcript of the hearing I had before the Senate Appropriations Committee. I want to send the President some excerpts of what Myers and Abizaid said.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.11

*032*

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*25 Sep 03*

U21976 /03

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

We ought to make sure that Feinstein did in fact get an answer to the letter she mentioned yesterday.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.12

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *9/30*

*032*

*25 Sept 03*

U21977 /03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Pete Dominici thinks we need to have a 30-minute presentation to the press about what our plan is – all these parts, here's the pieces, give it to them and see if we can't implant on the minds of the world that we have a plan.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*DR*

*25 Sep 03*

U21978 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19734

TO: LTC Craddock  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Ted Stevens made a plea at the end of the meeting. He needs to know what the bumper sticker is; what the message is, when he has to carry this message on the floor. We've got to get the best language we can. Let's get the White House engaged.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.14

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/5*

*091.42*

*25 Sept 03*

U21979 /03

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Get someone to dig out the Iraq Liberation Act and let's see what the vote was in the house and the senate, what it actually says. It in fact supports democracy according to Braumbach. The message has to be about security in the Middle East.

*DRH*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.15

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*10/5*

*25 Sep 03*

U21980 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19736

9/25  
1025 Snowflake

ADVISOR  
2003 SENT  
C 9/25

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Did you get back to Secretary Principi in connection with that letter he called about? Somebody has to do it today.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.16

Please respond by: 9/25

333

Decided 9/25  
I spoke with him.  
He is very enthusiastic, and would probably ask some of the leaders of the Veterans Groups to go with him. He thought he might want to go around Thanksgiving if that were all right with you. Will work this.  
Larry Di Rita 9/25

25 Sep 03

U21981 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19737

TO: Amb. Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

*05  
9.29*

My guess is we could get some help from Chris Galvin who just left Motorola or Case, who left AOL. They are talented people.

Thanks.

*230.02*

DHR/azn  
092503.17

Please respond by: 10/10

*25 Sep 03*

U21982 /03

TO: Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

RE: *Defense News Article 9/22/03*

Here is an article that allegedly represents an interview General Wald gave about the subject of our global footprint. It would be unfortunate if it represents an accurate portrayal of the interview.

I don't know what he really said, but statements like, "I can see the United States potentially having a forward-operation location in Sao Tome," before we have made decisions, briefed Congress, briefed allies, etc., seems most premature.

*092*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.19

*Attach: Defense News, "Oil to Drive US Basing" 9/22/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*25 Sep 03*

U21983 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19739

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# Oil To Drive U.S. Basing

By VINCE CRAWLEY

Oil — where it's drilled and how it's shipped — will be a prime factor when the Pentagon selects austere, forward-operating locations in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, said a top U.S. military official.

The U.S. European Command is looking at a more meaningful military presence in Africa and the Caspian; in many cases, that means following oil routes, said U.S. Air Force Gen. Chuck Wald, deputy chief of the command.

During a recent meeting with defense reporters, Wald talked about a possible U.S. military presence in Entebbe, Uganda, and Sao Tome off the coast of oil-producing Nigeria, as well as patrols of new oil pipelines in Azerbaijan.

Wald also favors retaining Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, not because of an oil connection but because it could be used as a training and staging area for future Balkans missions.

The European Command — which includes nearly all of Africa as well as parts of the Middle East and former Soviet Union — is trying to make the case for a radical restructuring of how its 100,000 troops are deployed. Wald has said command officials are discussing

transferring large numbers of those troops back to U.S. bases, then deploying them for six-month tours to austere locations that would be closed to families.

Wald discussed some of those possible locations Sept. 2. One of the most interesting, he said, is the island nation formally known as Sao Tome and Principe, about 125 miles off Africa's West Coast.

The main island, Sao Tome, a former Portuguese colony, is about 20 by 25 miles. Its main attraction, said Wald, is that it is relatively stable and lies about 300 miles from the coast of Nigeria. The United States imports up to 15 percent of its oil from Nigeria, Wald said. That figure could reach 25 percent in the next decade.

"We're going to have to have some kind of stability in the region," Wald said. "I can see the United States potentially having a forward-operation location in Sao Tome."

On a recent trip, Wald found Taiwanese and South African delegations also scouting out the island. "They're after it," he said of other governments expressing interest in alliances with Sao Tome.

Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic on the Caspian Sea, is another oil region of interest to the

United States and NATO.

A U.S.-backed oil pipeline is being built between Azerbaijan and the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Once oil starts to flow in a few years, impoverished Azerbaijan might end up with the world's fifth-highest per capita income, Wald said. Most of the oil and natural gas is destined for Western Europe, so protecting this shipping route would be in the interest of the United States and NATO, he said.

"To me, that's a mission for NATO," he said, adding that providing stability in the Caspian area is as much a NATO interest as a U.S. interest. In addition, the alliance is "looking for other work" outside its traditional role of defending the borders of its 19 member nations, Wald said.


He and his boss, Marine Gen. James Jones, have made it clear they plan to keep the major air base in Ramstein, Germany, because of its ideal distance from the United States.

"It's... one strategic flight without refueling for an airlifter" traveling from the United States, Wald said.

Heading south into Africa, a long-haul aircraft starts running out of fuel in the middle of the continent, where the United States has no bases.

## FUTURE U.S. BASES?

As U.S. European Command contemplates changes in its basing structure, it is looking at possible sites in Africa and Central Asia. Among them:



Entebbe, Uganda, was used as a temporary base in the 1994 Rwandan crisis. More recently, the Pentagon has trained Ugandan troops as peacekeepers, and the government is relatively stable. Entebbe, just south of the capital of Kampala, could serve as a remote op-

erating location, Wald said.

Wald visited Entebbe in mid-August and saw that military forces at the old airport included troops from South Africa, Britain and France, as well as a U.N. force. ■

E-mail: [vcrawley@defensenews.com](mailto:vcrawley@defensenews.com).

TO: Amb. Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT: CPA

*DL  
8-29*

You might want to see this report from Dov Zakheim on page 2 where it talks about the CPA Program Management office. Are you comfortable with that?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.30

*Attach: Weekly Report from D. Zakheim 9/19/03*

*020 CPA*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *10/5* \_\_\_\_\_

*25 Sept 03*

U21984 /03



9/12/03  
0800

C 9/24

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

**INFO MEMO**

September 19, 2003, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Dov S. Zakheim** 

**SUBJECT: Weekly Report 09/19/03**

- **FY 2004 Supplemental:** The FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental, covering both military operations and Iraq/Afghanistan reconstruction efforts, was formally submitted to Congress late Wednesday. The total is \$87 billion, \$65.6 billion for military operations and \$21.4 billion for reconstruction efforts. The military operations include \$51 billion for Iraq, \$11 billion for Afghanistan and nearly \$4 billion for Operation Noble Eagle and coalition support. The \$21.4 billion includes \$20.3 billion for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, \$800 million for Afghanistan acceleration initiatives, and \$140 million for State Department operations. Virtually all questions from congressional staff and the press have focused on the \$20.3 billion for the Iraq reconstruction effort. A number of congressional hearings have been requested for next week, starting with a Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) hearing with Ambassador Bremer tentatively scheduled for Monday. The tentative schedule has you and General Abizaid appearing before the SAC on Wednesday.
- **FY 2004 Budget Request:** I had lunch on Monday with the Defense appropriations subcommittee staff directors (Sid Ashworth, Kevin Roper, Charlie Houy and Dave Morrison) to emphasize our views on the FY 2004 budget and explain the need for the FY 2004 emergency supplemental. They noted that the FY 2004 conference committee was scheduled to conclude this week. It did, resulting in an apparent FY 2004 topline of \$368 billion. The conference concluded Wednesday evening behind closed doors. Few details are available. There appears to be about a \$2 billion reduction in our FY 2004 operation and maintenance accounts. I am sure there will be a rescission of at least \$2 billion from the FY 2003 Iraq Freedom Fund. The FY 2004 conference agreement is scheduled to go to the floor next week. I will send you a separate note when I have more details.
- **Iraq and Afghanistan "Tin Cup":**
  - Yesterday, I met with the French MoD Director of Strategic Affairs, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. He made a number of points regarding France's position on Iraq. He stated that with respect to the UNSCR that is being negotiated, France hopes that the resolution will be similar to the approach that was taken for Afghanistan, i.e.: that Karzai took over in name far before he took over in practice. He stated they were flexible on the timetable associated with this turnover. He also told me that the French are prepared to contribute to reconstruction. The French have designated an official within the Prime Minister's office to handle reconstruction

11-L-0559/OSD/19742

in Iraq. This person will also control reconstruction funds for Iraq. He also asserted that the European Wall Street Journal had reported this morning that German Prime Minister Schroder stated that Germany would contribute to reconstruction in terms of both money and training.

• Today I made calls to the United Kingdom and German Ministries of Defense, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar regarding donations for Afghanistan. On Wednesday, I spoke to the Prime Minister of Kuwait on the same matter.

• **CPA Program Management Office (PMO):** On Wednesday, I met with RADM David Nash, Ray Dubois and LTG Jerry Sinn to discuss the establishment and funding of a CPA Program Management Office. The office will be headed by David Nash and will exercise executive oversight of all U.S. government-funded construction projects in Iraq. Its role is envisioned as: 1) oversight, coordination, and de-confliction; 2) management of projects through designated project managers; 3) management of the contracting process. Within the next few days, David Nash will draft a concept paper that outlines the CPA PMO's roles and relationships to the various agencies. He is already working closely with a number of agencies, to include Wendy Chamberlin at USAID. In addition to signing a memorandum of agreement, USAID will be asked to provide a senior representative to the office.

• **DCAA:** Mr. Bill Reed, Director of DCAA, reports:

- DCAA is auditing a very short turnaround \$98 million, cost-type proposal by Titan Corporation for 1200 additional "bicultural linguists" to support activity in Iraq. The Army has a September 22, 2003 objective to finalize pricing on this delivery order, based on a contract previously awarded to Titan.
- DCAA has been coordinating with AMC, DCMA and Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) to establish firm proposal dates and audit plans on the LOGCAP III contract. KBR pricing backlog of undefinitized task orders has grown to 27, with a total estimated value of \$4.2 billion (\$2.8 billion in Iraq). Requirements continue to be added to existing undefinitized task orders, complicating the process of setting firm dates for contractor proposals. For example, Task Order 59 for troop support has recently increased in value (ROM estimate) from \$884 million to \$2.4 billion, primarily due to the added requirement of 17,000 modular housing units for coalition forces.
- An audit of Science Applications International Corporation's (SAIC) \$51.3 million, cost-type, Option 2 proposal on the Iraq Free Media Contract was completed. SAIC could not provide support for \$7.0 million of \$36.7 million costs proposed as Open Market (Commercial) Items. Additionally, the report pointed out that the \$1.6 million handling fee (profit) applied by SAIC for all Open Market Items does not comply with Federal Acquisition Regulations.

COORDINATION: NONE

9/25  
→ Sec Def  
From Zakheim  
Interesting  
LARRY D. RICE  
9/24

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Have policy give us a proposal whether they think we ought to do anything for Robertson, like a lunch or something. Might be a nice thing to do. Also, whether we want to give him a defense medal.

Thanks.

*9/25*  
*Cathy M / MCM*  
*for Sked? Let's*  
*Discuss*

DHR/azn  
092503.26

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*10/5*

*9/29*  
*200.6 SD DRSM*

*What else for*  
*Snowflake is P.C.*  
*Dinner?*

*9/25*  
*Secret - We're*  
*drafting the Defense*  
*Outstanding Public Service*  
*Medal for you to present*  
*at an appropriate occasion*  
*in Colorado.*

*JLH*

*85 Sep03*

C9/24

PTTUZYUW RUEHNOA0967 2671345-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 241345Z SEP 03  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5411  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
BT  
UNCLAS USNATO 000967

FOR SECRETARY POWELL, SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICE

FROM AMBASSADOR NICK BURNS

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: NATO, (ROBERTSON, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: MEDAL OF FREEDOM FOR NATO SECRETARY GENERAL ROBERTSON

1. I WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND THAT NATO SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGE ROBERTSON BE AWARDED THE MEDAL OF FREEDOM WHEN HE TRAVELS TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HIS NOVEMBER 12 FAREWELL CALL ON THE PRESIDENT.

2. ROBERTSON HAS BEEN A GREAT ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ONE OF NATO'S FINEST SECRETARY GENERALS. AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, IT WAS AT ROBERTSON'S INITIATIVE THAT NATO INVOKED ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE, SENDING NATO AWACS TO PATROL OUR SKIES. IT WAS ROBERTSON WHO PROPELLED THE ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION FROM A STATIC FORCE, DESIGNED ONLY TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE, TO ONE THAT IS EXPEDITIONARY AND ABLE TO DEPLOY TO MEET CURRENT THREATS, AS IS HAPPENING IN AFGHANISTAN. WHEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES TRIED TO DENY TURKEY ARTICLE 4 SUPPORT BEFORE THE IRAQ WAR, IT WAS ROBERTSON'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND TENACITY THAT HELPED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. AND NOW, AS SOME IN EUROPE QUESTION THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND EVEN THE WISDOM OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK, IT IS ROBERTSON WHO IS LEADING THE WAY IN SPEAKING OUT FOR NATO. HE HAS DEFENDED AMERICAN INTERESTS PUBLICLY WHEN SOME OF OUR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES NOTABLY HAVE NOT.

3. THERE IS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR THIS AWARD. PRESIDENT NIXON

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF:   X   DEPSEC:   /   EXECSEC:   /    
C&D:   /   CCD:   /   CABLE CH:        FILE:         
USDP:   /   DIA:        OTHER:         
USDI:   /   PER SEC:        COMM:

AWARDED THE MEDAL TO FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL MANLIO BROSIO IN 1971 AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AWARDED IT TO JOSPEH LUNS IN 1984 AND LORD CARRINGTON IN 1988. LORD ROBERTSON DESERVES TO BE HONORED WITH THESE SECRETARY GENERALS OF NATO. AS HE MAKES HIS LAST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AS SECRETARY GENERAL IN NOVEMBER, I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER WAY TO HONOR HIM THAN FOR PRESIDENT BUSH TO AWARD HIM THE MEDAL OF FREEDOM.

4. ROBERTSON, NATURALLY, IS HONORED TO HAVE BEEN INVITED TO HAVE A MEETING AND LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12. AS A FURTHER TRIBUTE TO ROBERTSON, I SUGGEST THAT HE ALSO HAVE EVENTS WITH SECRETARY POWELL AND SECRETARY RUMSFELD ON NOVEMBER 11-13. I PROPOSE EITHER A DINNER IN HIS HONOR OR PUBLIC EVENTS, YOUR SCHEDULES AT STATE AND THE PENTAGON PERMITTING.

CAI

5. THERE ARE MANY IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE WHO WILL WANT TO RECOGNIZE ROBERTSON DURING HIS VISIT, AND WE WILL SEPARATELY LOOK INTO WHAT MIGHT BE ARRANGED ON THE HILL. ONE FINAL SUGGESTION, AS THE TIMING OF HIS VISIT COINCIDES WITH NOVEMBER 11, WOULD BE TO INVITE ROBERTSON TO PARTICIPATE IN A VETERAN'S DAY EVENT IN WASHINGTON. VETERAN'S DAY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ARMISTICE DAY IN EUROPE, NOVEMBER 11 HAS STRONG SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC AND SERVES AS A REMINDER OF WHAT IS AT STAKE IN KEEPING THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP STRONG. HAVING SECRETARY GENERAL ROBERTSON PARTICIPATE IN AN EVENT WITH ONE OF THE SECRETARIES OR, INDEED, WITH THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, WOULD SEND A STRONG MESSAGE ABOUT TRANS-ATLANTIC UNITY AND BE A FITTING FAREWELL TO A GREAT NATO SECRETARY GENERAL.

3

SECDEF V2

2

ACTION

(U,6)

INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) USSOCOMWO(\*) CHAIRS(\*)  
CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS DA(\*) SECDEF-C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) USDAT:ENVS-ATLIE(\*) USDAT:STS(\*)  
ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) DIR:PAE-NATO(\*)  
ESC-SMTP(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP:ESC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

#0967

NNNN

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*9/26*

I probably ought to get a briefing from Dov Zakheim on the progress on the financial management front.

*0055*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.25

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *9/28*

*SecDef —  
is in the "to  
schedule" stack.  
Will be on your upcoming  
schedule shortly.*

*9/26  
55  
54  
53*

U21986 /03

TO: J. D. Crouch  
CC: Col. Bucci

In reply refer to EF-6980 and  
I # 03/013436-ES

DATE: September 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Your memo is attached. I agree with it except we need to add the Vice President so let's get it scheduled, and do it over here some time soon.

323.3

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.25

Attach: JD Crouch Memo re: global Presence Roll-Out

Please respond by: 10/10

Mem,

Don't know if you actually needed a written response to this... but here it is just in case.

S/E  
C2101C

Done. PC was 10/2 and V.P. was present.

J.D.

OCT 6 2003

25 Sep 03

U21987 /03

DepSec copy PROVIDED  
USDP copy PROVIDED  
11/9/24/05

To: Secretary of Defense  
From: J.D. Grouch SEP 24 2005  
Subject: Global Presence Roll-out

- The next step in the global presence project is to bring cost and scheduling data back to you for decision.
- Once that is completed, I recommend that you invite Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell to a briefing by the three CoComs.
  - You might also invite Andy Card.
- This will give you an opportunity to seek their buy-in early, and Secretary Powell in particular should be receptive to four-star views.
  - Once they see the changes and continuities overall, I think it will be hard to argue with the logic and substance.
  - Their blessing on the substance will reduce the potential for interagency carping.
- Key questions they might have will be:
  - Timing?
  - Who is responsible for negotiating with Allies?
- We need to be prepared to argue the advantages of moving out now and the importance of using the South Korea model, i.e. DoD lead with State Department support.
  - In Europe, in particular, it will be important to get the local commanders - who the local Germans, Italian, etc. trust - engaged in the process.
- Andy Hoehn is preparing a decision sequence and meeting schedule to get us to the point where you could invite principals to such a meeting.

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

I think it might be useful for Schoomaker if we pull together the memos I've sent to White, Les Brownlee and Shinseki since I've come in. We could look through them, and then package them up so I can send them to Schoolmaker and eventually to Roche. Let's look and see if that might be a useful thing to do.

*3/10.1*

I also think maybe I ought to send Gordon England copies of memos that I've sent to H.T., Verne Clarke, Jim Jones and Hagee since Gordon left.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.32

*Let me take a look - You need out state that were personal or OBE*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*10/8*

*Done  
10/3  
C*

*25 Sep 03*

U21988 /03

Snowflake

10/25  
0800  
10/25/03  
10/25/03

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

LARRY D. EVANS  
10/26

I do think you ought to get a comprehensive look at pay and benefits for active reserve, guard and retired so that we can force any proposals in these areas to be tested against the template as to where we have the need. Why don't you think that through and see if it is doable.

2003

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.35

Please respond by:

10/8

✓ 10/17

OK  
JR

T  
||| 5

25 Sep 03

U21989 /03

97 0800



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

✓ 10/17

SECRET

2003 OCT -3 PM 5:25

INFO MEMO

October 3, 2003 - 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 8 Oct 03*

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Template for Military Pay and Benefits—  
SNOWFLAKE

- You asked if we could develop a “comprehensive template” for military pay and benefits against which proposals for change could be tested (**attached**). I think we can, but urge that we approach this as an iterative task, rather than hoping that our first draft will be either definitive or enduring.
- I will attempt to have that first draft in hand for you by early November. My plan is to organize it against outcomes we desire to achieve, rather than by categories of compensation. Our standard will be the one you have consistently reiterated: we must offer exactly what we need to attract, retain and motivate the talent the nation needs—no less, no more.
- As we develop this “template”, I believe that we should invite the Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation to help us assess present compensation against it, as well as proposals for change. (By law, we must start that review this year.)

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

~~Attachment: As stated~~

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 10/16
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARROTT	10/6

U16378 / 03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 25, 2003

*OB*  
*9.12*

SUBJECT:

There's some organization that is calling for my resignation and they are running ads. It is a former congressman from Vermont or New Hampshire. He was on FOX. Please get me the ad he is running.

*020 SB*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.36

*9/28*  
*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*25 Sep 03*

U21990 /03

9/29 Snowflake

3:52 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 26, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Get a copy of the transcript from Zinni on *Ted Koppel* last night. They say it was really terrible. I would like to see it soon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092603.12

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 10/1

*7/29*  
*Col Rhyndance*

*arrv Di Rita*  
*9/29*

*000.77*

*26 Sep 03*

U21991 /03

7/29  
→ SecDef

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ABC News Transcripts

SHOW: NIGHTLINE (11:35 PM ET) - ABC

September 25, 2003 Thursday

LENGTH: 3870 words

HEADLINE: NIGHTLINE THE GENERAL

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI, FORMER HEAD OF US CENTRAL COMMAND



I'm worried about a lack of planning, how we've gotten into this war.

TED KOPPEL, ABC NEWS

A voice, critical of the Administration he once served.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Any strategy, any plan, has three elements. It's ends, ways, and means. \$87 million is means. Show me the ends and the ways.

TED KOPPEL

On pre-war intelligence.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Either the intelligence was so bad and flawed. And if that's the case, then somebody's head ought to roll for that. Or the intelligence was exaggerated or twisted in a way to make a more convenient case to the American people.

TED KOPPEL

On post-war management.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

He's the backup quarterback thrown in in the third quarter. And now asked to, while in the middle of the game, create the game plan.

TED KOPPEL

On the future of Iraq.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Unless we take all these approaches and solve the security problem first, we'll never get to the political and economic issues.

TED KOPPEL

Tonight, "The General," a conversation with Anthony Zinni.

ANNOUNCER

From ABC News, this is "Nightline." Reporting from Washington, Ted Koppel.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) In his interview with Brit Hume the other evening, President Bush made it abundantly clear that he doesn't read newspapers or watch the news on television. His point was, he doesn't need to. He has immediate access to the Colin Powells, the Donald Rumsfelds, the Condoleezza Rices of this world. Why would he need to read or hear what they or their subordinates are leaking to us in the media? And that's a fair point, as far as it goes. What they and the President's top domestic advisers are less likely to be passing on to him, of course, is the negative stuff. They may give him some of the flavor of what's in the press. But, having a friend or a staffer tell you what your critics are saying doesn't have quite the same impact as seeing it on the front page of "The Washington Post," or hearing it, for that matter, on "Nightline." But in a moment, you'll be able to judge that point for yourselves. My guest tonight is a retired, if not always retiring, four-star Marine Corps general. He's the former Commander in Chief of CentCom, which gave him military responsibility for an area which includes Iraq and most of the Middle East. Earlier on in his military career, he was the commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. After he left the Marine Corps, General Anthony Zinni served as the Bush Administration's peace envoy in the Middle East. He doesn't speak in public often. But when he gives his occasional speeches, he tends to make waves. Three weeks ago, for example, speaking to the US Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, General Zinni recalled what happened in Vietnam. "We heard the garbage and the lies and we saw the sacrifice," he said, "and he swore never again would we allow it to happen. And I ask you, is it happening again?"

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) It sounds like a rhetorical question, to which I must say, no, I don't think it is. I can see a lot of differences between Iraq and Vietnam. But you wouldn't have posed it if you didn't think there were some similarities. What do you think they are?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I'm worried about the lack of planning. I'm worried about how we've gotten into this war. There's similarities with the Gulf of Tonkin incident and maybe the credibility behind the weapons of mass destruction, association with terrorism.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me stop you on that point for a moment. 'Cause there are a lot of young people watching who may not remember Gulf of Tonkin. Gulf of Tonkin was a resolution that was passed after an alleged attack by North Vietnamese gun boats on what, US Navy destroyers?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

On two Navy destroyers.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Turned out later, that never happened.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, it turned out later that they weren't in international waters and they weren't attacked for no reason. They were actually supporting, in territorial waters, an operation that was being conducted against the North Vietnamese.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) But the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was passed by the US Senate by an overwhelming majority was then used by President Johnson as a justification for what ultimately became a huge involvement in Vietnam.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Yes.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, having now spent a couple of minutes on that, what you're suggesting is what, that the whole notion of the weapons of mass destruction, the connection with al-Qaeda, that that was as phony as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I'm suggesting that either the intelligence was so bad and flawed. And if that's the case, then somebody's head ought to roll for that. Or the intelligence was exaggerated or twisted in a way to make a more convenient case to the American people. I think in the case of Vietnam, there was a strategic decision to get more involved in Vietnam because a belief in the domino theory, that all the countries in Southeast Asia would begin to fall to Communism if you didn't stem the tide in Vietnam. If there's a strategic decision for taking down Iraq, if it's the so-called neo-conservative idea that taking apart Iraq and creating a model democracy, or whatever it is, will change the equation in the Middle East, then make the case based on that strategic decision.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That, indeed, is what the Administration is starting to argue. Now, more and more as the weapons of mass destruction argument and the terrorism argument seems to fade away. You don't buy the argument?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I think it's a flawed -like the domino theory, it's a flawed strategic thought or concept in dealing with it. But if that's the reason for going in, that's the case the American people ought to hear. They ought to make their judgment and determine their support based on what the motivation is for the attack.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me give you another theory, if I may. And you would know one whole Hell of a lot about this because you were CentCom commander at the time. My theory is that, after 9/11, after the attack on the World Trade Centers and the -Pentagon, what had not been possible back in 1998, when you might have wanted to conduct just that kind of an attack against Iraq, suddenly became politically feasible.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, that's fine. But then, I think, we should have looked at the timing. After 9/11, when we took on the war against the extremists, the war on terrorism, we were involved in Afghanistan. We had problems with the Middle East peace process. We had relationships in the region that were coming apart, that were strained and needed to be repaired. We had other issues like North Korea and the economy. You have to look at Iraq and say, is the timing right? Is the threat imminent? I did not believe, and I still do not believe, that Saddam was an imminent threat, that he posed an imminent case of threatening our forces or our nation and couldn't be dealt with later. So, there's a question of timing. Then, there's a question of, if you still elected to do it at that time, why not wait for the UN? Why not give the inspectors a chance to play out? The history of the inspectors in the UN has always been that, eventually the inspectors, Richard Butler, Rolph, had done their thing and had come out and said that we no longer have any cooperation, we can't continue. And then, there was a UN support in resolution for taking action. It happened in the bombing in '98 when we conducted Operation Desert Fox and it happened before in the early '90s.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You were telling me before, when you and I were sitting in my office, that there actually was a plan for a ground invasion, kind of similar to the one that was carried out just this past spring, back in late '98, early 1999. What was it about that plan that you think was actually a little bit superior, perhaps, to the plan that has now been implemented?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, of course, ever since the Gulf War, the first Gulf War, we've had a plan. I mean, military commanders, the unified commands, formally called the syncs, always have a set of war plans. One of the war plans that existed and was required for CentCom to maintain was the possible takedown of the regime in Iraq. That plan has existed and has been modified ever since General Schwarzkopf's conduct of Desert Storm, about every couple of years. In 1998, after we conducted the bombing, Desert Fox, of some of the facilities inside Iraq as a result of Richard Butler and the inspectors being unable to accomplish their mission, we began to receive reports from inside Iraq that the government was shaken, the regime was shaken. They were not coming across with the same rhetoric. They didn't have the same sort of activity. They seemed to go lethargic and seemed to be shaken by the attacks on the intelligence headquarters and the Baath party headquarters. And -I began to think that if Iraq imploded, if actually the government was fragile enough that something could happen inside or, if for some reason Saddam struck out, say against Kuwait again or did something that was unacceptable that required us to execute that war plan, that we would have to deal with this post-Saddam Iraq. I began to hear from -friends in the region, from the Kuwaitis, the Jordanians and others, that they were deeply concerned about what would happen inside of Iraq. Some of their concerns had to do with refugees, humanitarian problems, but also about the turmoil, the revenge, the potential for civil war. If you pull the plug on a sort of a centrally controlled authoritarian regime like that, what might happen to the people, to the infrastructure, to the institutions?

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, you began to plan back then for what would happen in the wake of the Saddam era. The reason I'm interrupting you is because you and I have to take a quick break and then we'll come back with what was in that plan. And why what was in that plan seems to have been lost.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Yes.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Back in a moment with General Anthony Zinni.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) And we're back, once again, with General Anthony Zinni. So here we are, late '98, early 1999. And you are contemplating two possibilities. One, an invasion, a ground invasion into Iraq. Two, the possibility that Saddam Hussein's regime might implode. But either way you're saying, we've gotta plan for what happens after Saddam goes, right? And what did you do?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, first of all, the actual part of the plan that dealt with the military operation to defeat the Republican Guard and the military structure inside Iraq had more forces in it then. We had more divisions. Not so much that we needed it for the defeat. But we needed those troops on the ground to immediately freeze the situation, worry about the aftermath of security.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) How many more troops? Now we have about 140,000.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

We had considerably more. We had at least two more divisions in there.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, about another 40,000 troops?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

And the plan was criticized, later on by this Pentagon, as overestimating the amount of troops, it was far too large. But actually, the plan had those troops built into it because we looked at the security requirements immediately afterward.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) As you think back on that plan now, did it address some of the issues that seem to be a big problem in Iraq today? Did it address the no power, no water, lots of looting, stealing of national treasures, that kind of thing?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

It listed the potential for these kinds of things to happen. And it talked about some things that had to be understood about this government, that half the paychecks are coming from Saddam. So, immediately when you take the regime out, you have 50 percent of the population out of work.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me ask you, this Administration, shortly after coming in, first thing it did was take the 400,000-man army and say, you guys are out of work, you're gone.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Big mistake.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) What about your plan?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, we had conducted a series of psychological operations in my time, and going back before my time, when we would -bomb Iraq for whatever reason, we would put leaflets down or we would communicate to the regular army that they were not the problem. We saw the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard ...

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) We did the same thing this time. When I say we, the US Army did the same thing.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

For maybe ten years, sending messages to them, that they would not be -if they did not fight, they were not the enemy. That we saw them as innocent conscripts. I gave several interviews on television out in the region, al-Jazeera and several other stations. And we always subtly made sure that message got out. The regular army was not our enemy. And we looked at needing these regular Army formations. If they stayed in garrison, if they didn't fight, not taking them apart. Decapitating them, possibly, taking the leadership out, the general officers or the senior officers that might have supported Saddam or been Baathists. But to keep the unit cohesion together and then use it as a base for retraining and for local security.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) One of your former Marine Corps colleagues, a Marine Corps general, said yesterday, if we do not get foreign troops to go in there, we're going to have to bring a lot more US reservists. I want to raise that issue with you in a moment. But we have to take another break. Back in a moment.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I'm back once again with General Anthony Zinni. General Pace said yesterday, if we don't get some foreign troops in there and get them in there pretty fast, I think he said within the next four to six weeks, we're going to have to bring a lot of US reservists in. It doesn't look, from what happened at the United Nations yesterday, as though we're going to get those troops. Certainly not in the next four to six weeks. What is that going to do to the US military?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I think we're going to end up with a period of time that we're going to be in there that's going to be considerable. We're gonna require to have units rotate in and out of there. Brigades, or regimental level at least. That's gonna put a big strain on our active duty forces because they're committed so many places around the world. It will require reserve and Guard call up. That 's a well you can't go to too many times.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) How long do you think US troops, in large numbers are gonna have to be in Iraq? Is that even predictable at this point?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I don't think it's predictable. But I think we ought to think in terms of three to five years. Now, I would -hope that maybe we could get Iraqi units in the field faster. I would hope that we could get international participation that would lower that, that it wouldn't be that many troops for that period of time. But I think we're gonna have to be in charge for at least that period of time on the security side and the military side.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Lead story in "The New York Times" today, sourcing that David Kay, who was the chief weapons inspector for a long time, was sent back by President Bush to check for those weapons of mass destruction. That when he comes back, he's essentially coming back with little or nothing. How bad is that?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, it is bad for credibility. I mean, we -made the case to the American people. We made to the case to the UN that we couldn't wait for them and the inspectors because this threat was imminent. We've seen the effects of this in the United Kingdom. And I think it becomes a credibility issue. It's really a moot point in regards to Iraq. We still have to fulfill our commitment there. Saddam being gone is a good thing. But I think it's a credibility issue with the leadership here and with the American public and with our soldiers.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I raised this question the other day with Condoleezza Rice. She wasn't altogether forthcoming in her response. Let me raise it with you. Either those weapons didn't exist at the time that we thought that they did, in which case as you suggested earlier on, very bad intelligence and we need to consider the consequences of that. Or they did exist, but they're not to be found now. In which case, it seems to me, that one of the options is that Saddam distributed them to the very people that we were most concerned would get them in the first place. People, possible terrorists in Syria, in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia, in Turkey. In other words, in any of the neighboring, the contiguous countries to Iraq. Is that a possibility in your mind? Or do you just think the weapons simply weren't there?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I believe that what Saddam had was the framework for a weapons of mass destruction program that could be quickly activated once sanctions were lifted. He had the scientists. He had the documentation. He had the dual use facilities like pesticide plants or pharmaceutical plants that could be rapidly turned over. He had programs that he was allowed to have, like the short-range al-Samoud missiles. But within that

program, was doing the experimentation, the research and development, so he could quickly expand range and delivery systems. He was fooling around with unmanned aerial vehicles, with tanks on the bottom of them. They -were very crude and not very effective. But he had this framework. And I think what he did not want to have happen is to get caught with the smoking gun. So, I think somewhere along the line, he made the decision not to have it so that he could be freed from the sanctions by getting the good report card from either Richard Butler or Hans Blix. What I think the inspectors knew though, this is what I think Butler and Blix understood, it wasn't that there was a smoking gun, that there were going to be bunkers full of artillery rounds or rocket shells or something like that. Where they were probing was into this framework that he had cleverly hidden. And that's why they wanted to interview scientists. That's why they wanted to get them out of the country to talk to them.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) When Colin Powell spoke before the UN, he wasn't sketching out that kind of a picture. He was sketching out a picture, as was the President, of real weapons, existing weapons, dangerous poisons, chemical, biological. Were they just terribly misinformed?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I don't think there was a basis to say -now, I don't doubt that at some point in time somebody might find some leftover artillery rounds or rocket shells. But it seemed to me, this was not the direction Saddam was going. I think that the case for WMD should have been made on this framework program and what the inspectors were saying, that the scientists were there. That the documentation was there. That the capability to restart this program was there. He had all the elements. He needed to tune them up a little bit, maybe. But instead of going after the questionable issue, as to whether he actually had weapons at the ready and positioned. Certainly ones that could threaten or affect us, that were more than just tactical or short range. We didn't even find those yet. I think the case could have been made for WMD. But it was a little bit more complex and maybe harder to sell.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) But the notion, General Zinni, of an imminent threat, as the British government was saying at one point, 45 minutes?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

No. I was asked at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a month before the invasion if I thought Saddam was an imminent threat and I told Senator Lugar and the Committee, no, I did not believe they were an imminent threat.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) We're just about out of time. But the President has asked Congress for \$87 billion. You have said what we really need is a Marshal Plan-sized project in Iraq. Isn't \$87 billion a Marshal size plan?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, you know, any strategy, any plan has three elements. It's ends, ways, and means. \$87 billion is means.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That's the means.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Show me the ends and the ways, which means planning. Which means a very detailed, exhaustive set of plans.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You don't think we've got that?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I think we're trying to work it out in a huddle right now. I think Bremer is scrambling to get one in place. Ambassador Bremer in Baghdad.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You described him as a quarterback to me earlier when we were talking earlier.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, he's the backup quarterback thrown in in the third quarter. And now asked to, while in the middle of the game, create the game plan. You know, this should have happened before and it should have been more robust. And I do believe that we should support this. I do believe -we can't fail in Iraq. We have to live up to this commitment.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) General Zinni, we could keep going for a long time but we're out of time. I thank you very much for coming in.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Thank you, Ted.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I'll be back with a Closing Thought in a moment.

ANNOUNCER

The "Nightline" Closing Thought, brought to you by ... Log on with your comments to abcnews.com.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, there was a plan for dealing with a post-war Iraq. And if the Bush Administration had referred to it, a lot of the problems now confronting them might have been avoided. Surprising? Not really. We like to believe that we have the best system of government in the world, and we probably do. But one of its great weaknesses is the loss of continuity that occurs every time a new administration comes into power. It's almost axiom in Washington that if a previous Administration favored plan A, the new guys will incline toward plan B. It happens time after time, especially at the White House where no one but the telephone operators and the stewards in the White House mess are carried over from one Administration to the next. Our government is rejuvenated by fresh blood but it depends on institutional memory. Too much of one at the expense of the other can lead to disaster.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here at ABC News, good night.

3:35 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 26, 2003

SUBJECT:

Have Rachel give me the dates of all of the NSC meetings where the President attended, since September 11<sup>th</sup> to the present.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092603.10

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/10*

*334NSC*

*26SEP03*

U21993 /03

11:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
DATE: September 26, 2003  
SUBJECT:

I want to think about how we want to handle Rowan Scarborough. Apparently he is doing a book on me. Find out what it is about and then I ought to think about how I want interact with him.

Thanks.

*OB  
10/15*

*461*

DHR/azn  
092603.08

*2650803*

U21994 /03

9/29  
10/28  
9/29 1730  
Snowflake

7:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 26, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*9/29*

*France*

I would like a copy of the letter I sent to the Defense Minister of France, asking her where she got her views that she is expressing about me. I have never received an answer, and I would like to have it when I go the Colorado Springs NATO Ministerial.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092603.07

Please respond by: 10/4 ✓ *9/30*

*9/29*  
*Exec -*  
*Please see what you can find.*  
*→ D Rita*  
*letter attached*  
*VR*  
*J. Herrod*  
*C 9/30*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*9/29*  
*M 9/30*

*alosep03*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 11 2003

The Honorable Michèle Alliot-Marie  
Minister of Defense  
14 Rue St. Dominique  
00450 Armees  
Paris, France

Dear Madame Minister:

I have seen several references from *Le Monde* where you are quoted as having said, "The American Defense Secretary believes the United States is the only military, economic and financial power in the world. We do not share this vision."

If you did make such a statement, I want you to know it is inaccurate. I would be curious to know if you said it and, if so, how you got that misimpression.

Sincerely,

11/11/03

11/11/03

U10975 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19769

## UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received your letter this summer and once again, I welcome the great candor that characterizes our relations. I am delighted to learn that you follow the French press and that you are interested in my interviews.

You indicated that you never felt you had expressed a desire for American hegemony. Allow me to tell you that some of your phrases or attitudes, both in Warsaw and in Brussels, and your statements during the Iraqi crisis asserting your conviction that America could and should resolve—alone if necessary—the crises facing the world can sometimes give that impression.

That vision is evidently based on the remarkable capabilities of the United States, notably in the military sphere, but I personally believe in the usefulness of a collective approach to problems, and in the need for close cooperation among allies. I am certain that we are stronger when we stand united. If that is also your view, I take note of it and sincerely welcome it, as I have learned through experience that our remarks are not always properly interpreted and that nothing is better than a direct explanation. Perhaps we may have the opportunity to continue this discussion in a few weeks in Colorado Springs.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurance of my highest regards.

[handwritten] Yours sincerely,

Michèle Alliot-Marie

7:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 26, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Playing Cards**

*OB  
9.12*

The guy who wrote the book on the theory that the plane never hit the Pentagon on 9/11, that we did it ourselves, has a deck of playing cards with the "enemy" Americans on it, and I am the ace of spades. See if you can get a set of them.

Thanks.

*000.5*

DHR/azn  
092603.06

*10/8*

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*26 SEP 03*

**U21996 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/19771

7:00 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
DATE: September 26, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*received*  
SEP 29 2003  
8:00am

Please give me that Marshall Plan paper you showed me in the hearing.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092603.02

*Iraq*

Please respond by:

*9/29*

*✓ 9/30*

*9/29*

*Sir,*

*Response attached.*

*uv / CDN Neserzo  
9.29*

*2659903*

U21997 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

✓  
9/30

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

September 29, 2003 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Marshall Plan

- Attached is the Marshall Plan paper that I showed you in the hearing.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/19773

**MARSHALL PLAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE--Comparisons to FY04 Iraq Supplemental**

COUNTRY	1948 dollars							2004 dollars		
	Grants	Loans	Total Economic Assistance (\$ millions)	% of 1948 US GDP	FY04 Iraq Supp (CPA) % of FY04 GDP	% of 1948 US DoD Budget	FY04 Iraq Supp (CPA) % of FY04 DoD Budget	Grants	Loans	Total Economic Assistance (\$ millions)
Austria	677.8	0.0	677.8	0.26%		5.74%		4,560.7	0.0	4,560.7
Belgium-Luxembourg	491.3	68.0	559.3	0.22%		4.74%		3,305.8	457.6	3,763.4
Denmark	239.7	33.3	273.0	0.11%		2.31%		1,612.9	224.1	1,837.0
France	2,488.0	225.6	2,713.6	1.06%		23.00%		16,741.1	1,518.0	18,259.1
Germany, Federal Republic	1,173.7	216.9	1,390.6	0.54%		11.78%		7,897.5	1,459.5	9,357.0
Greece	706.7	0.0	706.7	0.28%		5.99%		4,755.2	0.0	4,755.2
Iceland	24.0	5.3	29.3	0.01%		0.25%		161.5	35.7	197.2
Ireland	19.3	128.2	147.5	0.06%		1.25%		129.9	862.6	992.5
Italy (Including Trieste)	1,413.2	95.6	1,508.8	0.59%		12.79%		9,509.0	643.3	10,152.3
Netherlands	916.8	166.7	1,083.5	0.42%		9.18%		6,168.9	1,121.7	7,290.6
Norway	216.1	39.2	255.3	0.10%		2.16%		1,454.1	263.8	1,717.9
Portugal	15.1	36.1	51.2	0.02%		0.43%		101.6	242.9	344.5
Sweden	86.9	20.4	107.3	0.04%		0.91%		584.7	137.3	722.0
Turkey	140.1	85.0	225.1	0.09%		1.91%		942.7	571.9	1,514.6
United Kingdom	2,805.0	384.8	3,189.8	1.24%		27.03%		18,874.1	2,589.2	21,463.3
Regional	407.0	0.0	407.0	0.16%		3.45%		2,738.6	0.0	2,738.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,820.7</b>	<b>1,505.1</b>	<b>13,325.8</b>	<b>5.20%</b>	<b>0.19%</b>	<b>112.93%</b>	<b>5.53%</b>	<b>79,538.3</b>	<b>10,127.6</b>	<b>89,665.9</b>

	year	\$ billions
<b>GDP</b>	1948	256.4
	2004	11,303.1
<b>DoD Budget</b>	1948	11.8
	2004	379.6

11-L-0559/OSD/19774

3:16 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 27, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*OB  
9-17*

I think it would be a nice thing to have a dinner for Robertson the next time he comes to town. I think the President is going to have a lunch for him. Why don't we think about doing it, trying to find a date, and if there's a chance to invite a bunch of Congressman and include them, we could have it here at the Pentagon or do it at my house; either one. I think he's coming for his final visit October or November. Let's do something like that. Come up with a concept.

*096 71 52*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092703.08

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/5*

*27 Sep 03*

U21998 /03

8:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
DATE: September 27, 2003 |

SUBJECT:

What shall we do with Arny Punaro. Should we engage him? He has so much energy and we could use it. Is there something he could do with Krieg or with Pete Aldridge's project?

*230.02*

Check with Gen. Myers and see what he thinks.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092703.05

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/8*

*27 Sep 03*

U21999 /03

7/30  
0700

2:58 PM

010/2


TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 27, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Larry Di Rita  
10/2

DONE

I said some positive things about Saudi Arabia in a Q&A this past week. Would you dig it out? I may want to show it to Bandar when I see him.

Thanks.



Saudi Arabia

DHR/azn  
092703.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

Attached.

Also some  
Bremer hostage excerpts  
D Rita

9/30  
Col Rumsfeld  
Please see that you  
can dig up  
D Rita

Larry Di Rita  
9/30

27 Sep 03

U22000 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19777

**House Appropriations Committee Testimony - 30 September 2003**

**SEC. RUMSFELD:** Let me respond to several of those questions. First, you're right, there was a big difference between the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Gulf War in 1990 and '91. In 1990 and '91, Saudi Arabia -- Kuwait was invaded and Saudi Arabia was threatened, and they provided, overwhelmingly, the amount of money that was provided by other nations. And -- 16 billion, eight hundred and fifty-four for Saudi Arabia, and 16 billion, fifty-nine for Kuwait. And there were three other countries that stepped up quite smartly, and they were Germany, Japan and the UAE, the UAE also being somewhat threatened.

**REP. MORAN:** And the last I looked, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are still Iraq's neighbors, and Saddam would seem to be more of a threat to them than the United States.

**SEC. RUMSFELD:** And second, as to your -- so it was a different situation.

Second, the debt that was incurred by Saddam Hussein, I agree completely, ought not to be paid by the American taxpayers.

**REP. MORAN:** But you're asking them to pay it --

**SEC. RUMSFELD:** We are not!

**Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Peter Barnes, Hearst-Argyle**

Q: How active are Syria and Iran in trying to undermine the U.S. occupation you think?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I don't know how to characterize it. They're certainly not helpful. We're getting good cooperation from Turkey and Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – the other neighbors. Syria has been a problem; the flow of people down through the Syrian border into Iraq has been a problem. We've arrested something in excess of 200 foreign fighters who've come in and an overwhelming majority of them are Syrian. The situation in Iran is different, in a sense, but one of the biggest problems is the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group that was in Iran has moved back into Iraq and that is notably unhelpful, so we're not getting the kind of cooperation from either of those countries that is notable at the moment.

Senate Appropriations Committee Testimony - 24 September 2003

**SEN. PATRICK LEAHY (D-VT):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm struck by -- as I hear the little bit of testimony we're getting up here on these matters, that the talking points seem to always be on the Marshall Plan, the Marshall Plan and so on. Let's just make sure we understand a few of the facts. Much of the Marshall Plan was on a dollar-for-dollar match by the European nations. It wasn't direct out from us; much was dollar-dollar match.

I keep hearing about what it did for Germany. Germany was not the largest recipient. They were about 11 percent. England was around 25 percent.

Loans made up almost 10 percent of the Marshall Plan. Now Secretary Rumsfeld has testified -- and very accurately -- that about \$200 billion is owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I would hope that we're not paying off loans to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, especially, I remind everybody that keeps trying to tie Saddam Hussein to September 11th -- and I commend the president finally stopping that by saying there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11th -- there is a major connection between Saudi Arabia and September 11th. Most of the hijackers came from Saudi Arabia. Most of them were protected and funded from Saudi Arabia.

And there are a lot of al Qaeda, we both know, still in Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding some of the crackdown done by Saudi Arabia after attacks in their own -- but there are still members of al Qaeda that are protected by the Saudi royal family, and they are still getting funded there. So, I would hope we're not going to be paying off loans to Saudi Arabia.

... (more comments about other topics)

**SEC. RUMSFELD:** May I respond to some of the points you made? First, let me say that you're quite right, we have no interest in paying off anyone else's debts -- or loans that they had to Saddam Hussein's regime. All debt payments have been deferred until 2004 through an international agreement and understanding. And clearly, with that kind of debt, the country is going to require substantial debt restructuring.

With respect to Saudi Arabia, you're correct, there were a great many of the 9/11 terrorists who happened to be Saudis. It is also correct, however, to say that the Saudi government has been working increasingly closely with us, and that, in fact, this week they either arrested or killed an additional high-level al Qaeda, and they have been focusing on that problem, to our benefit.

... (more comments about other topics)

seems to me that if Kuwait and Saudi Arabia want to collect a debt incurred by Saddam Hussein, they ought to go find Saddam Hussein and present him with a bill. It doesn't seem to me like the people of Iraq ought to bear the burden of that debt, number one. And number two, if they do not, then the Iraq oil revenues will be sufficient to pay for the reconstruction of Iraq.

And let me make one more point. Ambassador Bremer also said this: They're constructing a mechanism inside Iraq to begin funding for their government. And he's very proud of the fact they've constructed an income tax which will impose a top rate of 15 percent on those in Iraq with the highest incomes. Once again, a circumstance would exist where Americans paying 39 percent tax rate at the top will be paying money to reconstruct Iraq, that has a tax system with a top tax rate of 15 percent. And it will also be the case, if what Ambassador Bremer said is the case, that the oil revenues will be used to pay the nations that hold the debt instruments -- or, credit instruments, rather; particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. None of that makes any sense to me.

... (more comments about other topics)

**SEN. CRAIG:** Thank you, Senator Byrd. I don't mean to boast, but I have had lunch, and it was excellent. (Laughter.)

Mr. Secretary, again, General Myers, thank you much for your obvious diligence here and your effort at full disclosure. I think all of us are not surprised, but we do grow frustrated over Iraq and especially the Baghdad area and others becoming the collection point for the world's terrorist crowds, if you will, or perpetrators of terrorist acts. It certainly appears that that is happening and that we're falling a bit of a victim to some of that at the moment.

It is obvious that the borders are amazingly porous, or I know we're dealing with a large landscape out there. What provisions are being made in this request for -- if any -- for greater border policing and interdiction, if you will, at the border to try to gain control of the Iraqi borders as best as we possibly can?

**SEC. RUMSFELD:** The funds in here of course are for all military operations relating to Iraq and Afghanistan. You're quite right, the borders are porous. We are doing a series of things with respect to the borders. One is we're working with friendly countries to try to cooperate with them to have a much closer arrangement as to border protection, for example with Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.

With respect to the borders of Iran and Syria, we have -- we've seen terrorists come in from both countries, and in some cases, in relatively large numbers, and we have

demarched them, as they say in the foreign policy business, allowing as how we thought that was enormously unhelpful.

We are also focusing a higher degree of military effort attempting to deal with the borders, and it's a combination of manpower as well as technical capabilities, which I don't want to get into.

And last, we're dealing with some Iraqi forces to train them to assist with the borders. And in addition, there are some negotiations and discussions taking place with some of the tribal elements that are in those areas, relevant areas to solicit their cooperation.

So there's a recognition of the problem you've cited, and there are a variety of things underway to try to cope with it.

...(more comments about other topics)

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So there's a recognition of the problem you've cited, and there are a variety of things underway to try to cope with it.

## Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with The News Hour with Jim Lehrer

Q: Now, two questions. Let's start at the end and work back. Why can't our forces stop these people, these foreign types from coming into Iraq?

Rumsfeld: Well, that's like asking do you think our borders with Mexico and Canada are sealed or are they porous? Do people move back and forth across them that we don't know about?

Q: Now Mr. Secretary, you know that's not a good analogy, the United States and Canada.

Rumsfeld: The United States and Mexico. I mean a border is a problem.

Q: Right. Okay.

Rumsfeld: Look at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Look at the border between Iran and Afghanistan. The borders between Iran and Iraq are porous. The borders between Syria --

Q: And we can't do anything about it.

Rumsfeld: Of course we can do some things about it and we are doing some things about it but can you make them sealed? Not likely. Think of the borders. You have got Kuwait. You've got Saudi Arabia. You've got Jordan. You've got Turkey. You've got Iran.

Q: And they're coming from all of those, all of those places?

Rumsfeld: Very likely. And of course these folks are very skilled at fake passports and they bribe, they pay money.

Q: But are they coming in large numbers?

Rumsfeld: No.

...

Q: On this issue we were talking about a minute ago, the borders, General Sanchez was asked the same question I asked you. Why don't you shut the borders? He said I don't have enough troops to do that.

Rumsfeld: Think what it would take. Think what it would take in our country. Oh, my goodness. The question is: how do you want to use your troops? What we want to do is get the neighbors to help patrol the borders in Kuwait, in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia and they're going to do that. We've got some ways that we can do a better job along Iran and Syria. We're hiring more and more Iraqi border guards, training them and putting them there. There's some other things we can do to make the border -- but in terms of making it -- sealing it, not likely.

Q: I'm sure you know, you're taking some heat on this troops issue. Tom Donnelly, the American Enterprise Institute, avid advocate and supporter of the military action wrote in the Weekly Standard that -- he referred to you as the secretary of stubbornness on this issue.

Rumsfeld: Well, look, I happen to be the one who has asked to respond to questions. I'm not the one who decides how many troops we need there. The commanders, the military commanders -- you talk to every single one of them, that's their recommendation. I happen to agree with them. And then I articulate it.

And the implication that I'm stubborn, we would be happy to increase the number of troops or reduce the number of troops. And I haven't heard substantively any good arguments from the critics, from those people. They do not marshal arguments in a way that is persuasive. Now, if I heard a persuasive argument from anyone, I'd listen to it. And so would the commanders, but we haven't heard one.

September 29, 2003 ✓

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Wilhelm Letter

You may want to let Ed Eberhart know what Wilhelm had to say.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/29/03 Wilhelm ltr to CJCS

DHR:dh  
092903-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*201.22*

U22001 /03

*29SEP03*



**General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Retired)**

(b)(6)

29 August 2003

General Richard B. Myers  
Office of the Chairman of  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
9999 Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20318

Dear *Dick* General Myers:

Since retiring I have attempted to maintain close contact with our armed forces and to assist in whatever ways I can as you, the combatant commanders and the services execute increasingly complex and demanding post-cold war missions. I have just concluded a two-week stint with U.S. Northern Command during which I served as an observer and senior mentor for Exercise Determined Promise 2003. The performance of Ed Eberhart and his joint team was, in a word, remarkable. I felt compelled to share some observations with you.

What General Eberhart and his team have accomplished in the short space since the command was created and established its initial operating capabilities should be a source of encouragement and reassurance to all who are concerned about the security of our homeland. During Determined Promise, confronted with what can best be described as a "Pandora's Box" scenario, the Northern Command Staff demonstrated its capability to mount near simultaneous, effective responses to a wide range of terrorist acts and natural disasters. I was delighted that you were able to observe first-hand the activities of the command and Joint Task Force Civil Support as they assisted the State of Nevada, Clark County and the city of Las Vegas in responding to a simulated biological attack. As you know, while the Nevada event was unfolding the command was also responding to air threats in Alaska, maritime threats to the ports and airfields that support force deployment, a train derailment that involved sensitive materials, a major tropical storm in the Gulf of Mexico, suspected cyber attacks and an assortment of threats to critical infrastructure. Exposed to an array of threats and a series of events that exceeded anything they could reasonably expect to confront in the real world, the command kept its composure, thoughtfully established priorities, skillfully applied constrained resources and remained within the boundaries that you and the Secretary have established for support of these kinds of contingencies.

After action reports should emphasize that a total of 56 non-Department of Defense agencies and activities representing both the public and private sectors participated in

11-L-0559/OSD/19787

Determined Promise. The men and women of Northern Command who executed the exercise, and the troops at Joint Forces Command who designed and controlled it, should be commended for the leadership role they played in providing an opportunity for the interagency community, writ large, to test its people and its procedures in the most demanding of synthetic operating environments.

In my opinion, Northern Command demonstrated convincingly its attainment of full operational capability. I know you would have been pleased to hear Ed Eberhart's comments and guidance to his troops at the final after action review. Ed made it clear to one and all that while Determined Promise has been referred to by many as a graduation exercise, in his estimation it is but one in an unending succession of way points leading to progressively greater levels of preparedness by Northern Command to carry out what is arguably the most complex and demanding mission assigned to any of our combatant commands.

Dick, please feel free to share these thoughts with the Secretary. He has every reason to be pleased and gratified over the progress made by one of his combatant commands.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Wilhelm

September 29, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Army Training

I saw Ivanov up at Camp David over the weekend. He said they would be willing to help with some equipment and spares for the Afghan Army training, but they would need some financial assistance, since his budget is only \$10 million for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-8

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

*AFGHANISTAN*

*29 Sep 03*

U22002 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Col. Steve Bucci  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kazakhstan

Sometime I ought to go back to Kazakhstan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-7

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*KAZAKHSTAN*

*29/9/03*

U22003 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19790

September 29, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr.*  
SUBJECT: GPS Jammers

Please see if we can buy one of those Russian GPS jammers, and then we will give it to Colin Powell. He wants to actually show it to the Russian, so they help us stop the sale of them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-6

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03


*413.77*

*OB  
10.16*

*29 Sep 03*

U22004 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraq

IRAQ

Attached is an interesting article that says a great deal about what we are dealing with in Iraq.

Attach.  
Leo, John. "Atrocities Trade-off."

DHR:dh  
092903-4

295803

U22005 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19792

## JOHN LEO

John Burns, the great New York Times reporter, offers us a brutally blunt assessment of how badly Western correspondents covered Saddam Hussein's regime. His report, excerpted by the Wall Street Journal and Editor & Publisher, is spreading rapidly on the Internet and is bound to have an impact on the public's already low respect for most journalists.

The compulsively candid Mr. Burns, until recently the New York Times bureau chief in Iraq, wrote his comments for the new book "Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq" (The Lyons Press), a collection of first-person accounts by journalists in Iraq.

Mr. Burns, who has covered China, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Bosnia, says the terror of Saddam Hussein's Iraq was unmatched anywhere in the world, except perhaps by North Korea today. Iraq was a vast slaughterhouse, he says, but most Western reporters worked hard to keep the news from getting out because they were afraid of losing access or getting expelled from Iraq. The monstrous savagery of life under Saddam—the vast tortures and up to a million dead—was "the essential truth that was untold by the vast majority of correspondents," he writes.

Burns laid some of this out earlier in the Times—the bribes and gifts from journalists to Saddam's henchmen, with reporters turning over copies of their stories to show how friendly they were to the regime. "A rigorous system for controlling and monitoring Western journalists has been in place in Iraq for decades, based on a wafer-thin facade of civility," he wrote in the Times last April 20.

In his "Embedded" article, Mr. Burns is more caustic about the payoffs by journalists. He says big shots at the Information

BAGHDAD SPRAWL



# Atrocities trade-off

Ministry took hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes from TV reporters, "who then behaved as if they were in Belgium." Will these unnamed TV reporters be called to account?

As an example of evasive non-coverage, Mr. Burns cites the reluctance of most reporters to say anything about Abu Ghraib Prison, the heart of Saddam's reign of terror. Mr. Burns says he couldn't find a single colleague in journalism who had read the human-rights reports about butchery at the prison. Last October, when President Bush's pressure caused Saddam to announce a limited amnesty at Abu Ghraib, the BBC didn't think it was worth sending anyone to the prison. Mr. Burns writes: "You had the BBC thinking it was inappropriate to go there because it means that it causes trouble." Of the reporters who did go to the prison, he says, "Ninety-eight percent of them had never heard of Abu Ghraib. Had no idea what it was."

After the amnesty turned into a mob scene and a near-riot and unofficial jail break, some groups marched to the Intelligence Ministry. Mr. Burns says this was a phenomenal story, an actual protest in a terrorized land, but "some of my colleagues chose not to cover that." No use reporting real news if it's going to cause any inconvenience.

"There is corruption in our business," Mr. Burns writes. "In the run-up to this war, to my mind, there was a gross abdication of responsibility." The usual rationalization by wayward correspondents is that Saddam's horrors couldn't be reported without jeopardizing the lives of sources and reporters. CNN's chief news executive, Eason Jordan, offered that lame excuse in a notorious New York Times Op-Ed piece on April 11. It was a devil's handshake: CNN got to stay in Iraq; Saddam Hussein got good press.

Mr. Eason said he knew all about the beatings and electroshock torture. One woman who

talked to CNN was beaten daily for months in front of her father, then torn limb from limb. Her body parts were left in a bag on her family's doorstep. But CNN's viewers hadn't been told.

Mr. Burns has no patience with excuses like Mr. Eason's. He is a reporter who was jailed for six days for his reporting in China and who risked being killed by Saddam's regime in its dying days. At one point, he wondered whether he would wind up in Abu Ghraib himself.

He says of Iraq: "We now know that this place was a lot more terrible than even people like me had thought. They [reporters] rationalized it away."

Though President Bush chose to make weapons of mass destruction his principal argument against Saddam, Mr. Burns writes, "This war could have been justified any time on the basis of human rights alone. This was a grotesque charnel house, and also a genuine threat to us. We had the power to end it, and we did end it."

Even if as many as 5,000 Iraqis died in the war, Mr. Burns writes, that's fewer than would have died if Saddam's killing machine had gone on as usual during the six weeks of battle. The war should have been justified on this basis, he says, "but you'd never have known it by reading most of the coverage of the war by those correspondents."

Criticisms like this are often shrugged off as sour outbursts by conservatives who don't understand the press. What happens now that the outburst is coming from the best reporter to serve in Iraq?

*John Leo is a contributing editor and columnist with U.S. News & World Report and is nationally syndicated.*

September 29, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Deportation Issue

Please get me the information on Juan Espalante, the serviceman who served in Iraq and is being deported.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-29

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

*014.33*

*29 Sep 03*

U22006 /03

September 17, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Deportation Issue

Please get me the information on Juan Espalante, the serviceman who served in Iraq and is being deported.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091703-29

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 31, 2003, 4:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W. Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Fraudulent Enlistment, PV2 Juan Escalante

- PVT Juan Escalante used a fake alien green card to enlist in the Army in July 2002. After completing his training requirements, Escalante deployed with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (ID) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in April 2003.
- PVT Escalante's parents filed for legal alien residency in late April 2003.
  - PVT Escalante's family illegally entered the U.S. from Mexico 15 years ago. They petitioned the immigration court for green card status based on their record of good moral character.
  - PVT Escalante's parents informed the immigration court of PVT Escalante's military service in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  - The immigration court denied the parents' residency request. They are appealing this decision.
- Media articles on the Escalante family's plight brought PVT Escalante's enlistment to official notice. The subsequent recruiting investigation found enlistment procedural errors, but did not substantiate that the military recruiter knew PVT Escalante's alien green card was fake. Escalante admitted to the Inspector General, 3<sup>rd</sup> ID, that he used a fake green card to enlist in the Army.
- The 3<sup>rd</sup> ID chain of command considers PVT Escalante a valued member of the unit and is supporting his effort to establish residency. Current policy prohibits the Army from permitting undocumented aliens to enlist. The command has not initiated fraudulent enlistment discharge proceedings to date.
- Media interest includes CNN, Newsweek, Univision, and Hispanic Link.

COORDINATION: Fort Stewart PA; Army PA; OASD/PA; Army GC

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed



11-L-0559/OSD/19796

September 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Please make sure I sign each of the letters thanking Tillie Fowler and her panel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*335 SD*

*29 Sep 03*

U22007 /03

9/29  
1530

September 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow-up to USAFA Report

000.5

Who is in charge of follow-up on Tillie Fowler's report? I need to have a meeting and assign responsibility to see that things happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-19

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

9/29

**DONE**

9/29

(b)(6)



please do a summary  
to DR Chm.

"Please go through the Fowler report and develop a plan for each of the panel's recommendations. It would be best if you assigned ~~responsibility~~ someone to be in charge of each ~~recommendation~~ tracking each recommendation to conclusion, and establish pretty tight timelines. Please review this quickly. Once you have done so, we can meet to ~~do~~ review your proposal."

U22008 103

Larry Di Rita  
9/30

11-L-0559/OSD/19798

29 Sep 03

September 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on France

Please set a meeting for me to discuss France. I want to talk about the billets.

We will need Dick Myers, Doug Feith, probably J.D. Crouch, and Pete Pace. I have my own file for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

*Cathy M*  
Larry Di Rita  
9/30

FRANCE

29 Sep 03

U22009 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Congressional Breakfast

What do you think about having the Members of Congress who were here for breakfast on September 11, 2001 back for breakfast someday before the session ends?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/11/03 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) [091103-13]

DHR:dh  
092903-22

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

000.7150

29 Sep 03

U22010 /03

9/22

September 11, 2003

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: September 11, 2001 Meeting w/Members

Please give me the list of the Members of Congress I was meeting with here at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. I know Mark Kirk was one of them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091103-13

.....  
Please respond by 9/22/03

*Sir,  
Response Attached.  
vr/  
CDR Nosenzo  
9/22*



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

September 19, 2003 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Legislative Affairs) (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake #091103-13 regarding 9/11/01  
Meeting with Members

- You had breakfast with the following members:
  - Rep Doug Bereuter (R-NE)
  - Rep Chris Cox (R-CA)
  - Rep Randy 'Duke' Cunningham (R-CA)
  - Rep Kay Granger (R-TX)
  - Rep Robin Hayes (R-NC)
  - Rep John Hostettler (R-IN)
  - Rep Mark Kirk (R-IL)
  - Rep John Mica (R-FL)
  - Rep John Shimkus (R-IL)
  - Rep William 'Mac' Thornberry (R-TX)
  - Rep Roger Wicker (R-MS)

Attachment:

Read Ahead for September 11, 2001 SecDef Breakfast with House Supporters

11-L-0559/OSD/19802



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

FILE

September 10, 2001, 6:00 PM

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD**  
**SecDef Breakfast with House Supporters**

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

*Powell Moore*

Tuesday, September 11, 8:00 AM, in the SecDef Dining Room

Attendees: Key House Republicans as well as key DoD / OSD officials and I will join you.

- This breakfast is an opportunity to seek the continued support and active promotion of Department priorities by House Republicans who have indicated a willingness to support your efforts.
- Members who have accepted: Rep. Bereuter, Rep. Cox, Rep. Cunningham, Rep. Granger, Rep. Hayes, Rep. Hostettler, Rep. Kirk, Rep. Mica, Rep. Shimkus, and Rep. Wicker. Bios are at Tab A. *+ Rep. Thornberry*
- The House FY '02 National Defense Authorization Act is scheduled for Floor Debate the week of September 10th, 2001. You should ask the invited members to assist you explain the importance of key provisions in the President's defense request including missile defense, pay raise, military construction and family housing, transformation, and other priority defense issues.
- Talking points on missile defense and public affairs materials on key aspects of the Departments' FY02 Defense Authorization Bill issues are at Tab B.

HOUSE SUPPORTERS  
INVITED TO BREAKFAST  
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

TAB A



**Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb)**  
Elected: 1978 (12<sup>th</sup> term)  
Committees: Financial Services; International Relations; **Select Intelligence**  
- vice chairman (**Intelligence Policy & National Security** - chairman);  
Transportation & Infrastructure  
Military Service: Army, 1963-65  
Military Bases: None



**Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Texas)**  
Elected: 1992 (5th term)  
Committees: Appropriations (FDA & Related Agencies - chairman;  
Defense;)  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: Fort Bliss, (shared with the 16th District); Laughlin AFB



**Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Calif.)**  
Elected: 1992 (5th term)  
Committees: **Armed Services** (DOE Reorganization - vice chairman;  
Military Installations & Facilities; Military Research & Development;  
Terrorism Oversight); Resources (Water & Power - chairman); Science  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: None



**Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.)**  
Elected: 1988 (7th term) **Note:** Policy Committee Chairman  
Committees: Energy & Commerce; Financial Services  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: None



**Rep. Randy 'Duke' Cunningham (R-Calif.)**  
 Elected: 1990 (6th term)  
 Committees: Appropriations (Defense); Select Intelligence  
 Military Service: Navy, 1966-87  
 Military Bases: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar



**Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.)**  
 Elected: 1994 (4th term)  
 Committees: Appropriations (Defense)  
 Military Service: Army, 1969-71  
 Military Bases: Picatinny Arsenal (Army)



**Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.)**  
 Elected: 1988 (7th term) Note: Will retire at end of current term  
 Committees: Rules; Select Intelligence - chairman  
 Military Service: Army, 1960-62  
 Military Bases: None



**Kay Granger (R-TX)**  
 Elected: 1996 (3rd term)  
 Committees: Appropriations (Vice Chairman, Military Construction); Budget  
 Military Service: None  
 Military Bases: Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Fort Worth



**Rep. Robin Hayes (R-N.C.)**  
 Elected: 1998 (2nd term); Defeated Mike Taylor, D, to succeed Rep. W.G. "Bill" Hefner, D, who retired  
 Committees: Agriculture; Armed Services (Military Installations & Facilities - vice chairman; Military Research & Development; Morale, Welfare & Recreation; Terrorism Oversight); Transportation & Infrastructure  
 Military Service: None  
 Military Bases: Fort Bragg (Army); Pope Air Force Base



**Rep. J.D. Hayworth (R-Ariz.)**  
Elected: 1994 (4th term)  
Committees: Resources; Ways & Means  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: None



**Rep. David L. Hobson (R-Ohio)**  
Elected: 1990 (6th term)  
Committees: Appropriations (Defense; Military- chairman)  
Military Service: Ohio Air National Guard, 1958-63  
Military Bases: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (shared with the 3d District)



**Rep. John Hostettler (R-Ind.)**  
Elected: 1994 (4th term)  
Committees: Armed Services (Military Installations & Facilities; Military Research & Development; Terrorism Oversight - vice chairman); Judiciary  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: Naval Surface Warfare Center



**Rep. John L. Mica (R-Fla.)**  
Elected: 1992 (5th term)  
Committees: Government Reform; House Administration; Transportation & Infrastructure (Aviation - chairman)  
Military Service: None  
Military Bases: None



**Rep. John Shimkus (R-Ill.)**  
Elected: 1996 (3rd term)  
Committees: Energy & Commerce (Environment & Hazardous Materials - vice chairman)  
Military Service: Army, 1980-86; Army Reserve, 1986-present  
Military Bases: None



**John Sununu (R-NH)**

**Elected:** 1996 (3rd term)

**Committees:** Appropriations (Foreign Operations & Export Financing; Treasury, Postal Service & General Government; VA, HUD & Independent Agencies); **Budget** - Vice Chairman

**Military Service:** None

**Military Bases:** None (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard does employ some of his constituents)



**William M. 'Mac' Thornberry (R-TX)**

**Elected:** 1994 (4th term)

**Committees:** Armed Services (DOE Reorganization - chairman; Military Personnel; Military Procurement); **Budget**; Resources

**Military Service:** None

**Military Bases:** Sheppard Air Force Base



**Rep. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.)**

**Elected:** 1994 (4th term)

**Committees:** Appropriations

**Military Service:** Air Force, 1976-80; Air Force Reserve, 1980-present

**Military Bases:** None



**Rep. Heather A. Wilson (R-N.M.)**

**Elected:** 1998 (2nd full term)

**Committees:** Armed Services (DOE Reorganization; Military Procurement; Military Readiness); Energy & Commerce

**Military Service:** Air Force, 1978-89

**Military Bases:** Kirtland Air Force Base

## Why The Missile Defense Program Should Be Fully Funded

TAB B

- North Korea has demonstrated a capability for intercontinental reach with its rockets. Iran has hundreds of short-range missiles and is building the Shahab -3 which will reach Israel, most of Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The Shahab -4 and -5 are on the drawing boards, the latter with intercontinental range.
- Building missile defenses takes time and persistence. Opportunities lost today cannot be regained later, once vulnerabilities become more pressing.
- The Ballistic Missile Defense Program is a balanced and responsible program. Failure to fund the program could produce potentially grave consequences to our national security. Given that we have no defense whatsoever against medium and long range ballistic missiles, those consequences could be severe.
- A layered system of defenses is necessary to protect against the potentially catastrophic consequences of letting a hostile missile through. The BMD system is designed to create just such layers by enabling interception of a hostile missile along its entire flight path, maximizing opportunities and chances of success. Reduced funding could leave gaps in those defenses that could perhaps be exploited by those with hostile intent, or at least minimize the challenges facing those with threat missiles.
- Rigorous and realistic testing is an essential component for developing a missile defense system with demonstrable capability. Failure to fund these rigorous testing requirements could result in either deployment delays or deploying systems with greater risk.
- The current program engages in multiple paths to reduce risk, combined by rigorous annual reviews to assess progress and to decide on what should be stopped, truncated, kept on course, or accelerated. Shortchanging funding for these efforts could increase both program and security risk.
- Failure to create conditions for flexibility in the program could unnecessarily delay schedule, sub-optimize performance, and raise costs in the nation's BMD effort.
- Missile defenses are an important tool in the national security toolbox, one for which we do not now have other alternatives.
- Because of the increasing threat, we cannot afford a reduction in funds which would ultimately delay fielding an effective ballistic missile defense system.



## Upcoming Issues

### AUGUST 13-17, 2001

Office of  
Public Affairs  
703-697-9312

#### Missile Defense

- We must defend ourselves, our friends and allies against the real and growing threat of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction.
- Several nations including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran and Syria are developing ballistic missiles.
- For 2002, \$8.3 billion is proposed for missile research & development. The funding for missile defense is approximately 2.5% of the total defense budget. By comparison:
  - The United States spent approximately \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, nearly twice last year's missile defense research costs.
  - For 2002, \$17 billion is proposed for Department of Defense health care.
  - \$9.3 billion is proposed for building ships.
  - \$8.3 billion is proposed for building aircraft.
- Leaders from several nations including the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Italy, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Georgia have acknowledged the need for new defenses to counter 21<sup>st</sup> century threats.

#### A New Relationship With Russia

- We will continue to seek cooperation with Russia to move beyond the ABM treaty to a new framework for peace and security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- On Aug. 7-8, senior U.S. and Russian advisors met at the Pentagon for consultations that grew out of talks in Genoa last month between President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin on developing the U. S./Russian relationship. The delegations discussed a broad range of issues related to strategic stability and international security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The focus was on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems.
- As a continuation of these discussions, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld meets with Russian Defense Minister Ivanov in Moscow in the coming week to discuss cooperation on a new political, economic and strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia.
- These talks pave the way for future consultation between Presidents Bush and Putin on a strategic framework between the U.S. and Russia for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## POCKET CARD ON MISSILE DEFENSE

### MISSILE DEFENSE: TO PROTECT OURSELVES, OUR ALLIES AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

- **No system exists to defend Americans against missile attack.**
  - 64% of Americans believe we already have missile defenses (*CBS/NYTimes poll, 3/01*).
  - 11 years ago in the Persian Gulf War, a SCUD missile killed 28 Americans & wounded 99.
  
- **The missile threat is real and growing.**
  - Nations with nuclear weapons programs: 12.
  - Nations with ballistic missiles: 28.
  - Countries with missile programs include Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, China and Syria.
  - For the first time in history, political leaders with no political structure around them or free press to temper a decision to launch will soon possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the means to deliver them.
  
- **The U.S. is engaged in robust research & development to deploy missile defenses.**
  - With July's test, missile defense "hit-to-kill" technology has been successfully tested a dozen times.
  - 20 more intercept tests are scheduled between now and 2006.
  
- **Missile defense is part of a broader deterrent strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.**
  - To counter a real and growing threat.
  - To deter or defend against rogue states.
  - To establish a strategic relationship with Russia based on trust and cooperation.



# Upcoming Issues

## September 9-15, 2001

Office of  
Public Affairs  
703-697-9312

### Department of Defense 2002 Amended Budget Proposal

- A total of \$328.9 billion is proposed for DoD in 2002. This request represents a \$32.6 billion increase over 2001. The budget begins to reverse a decade of overuse and under-funding, and fulfills the President's pledge to stop the decline of our armed forces and begin building a 21<sup>st</sup> Century military that will deter aggression, extend peace & sustain prosperity.

#### Quality of Life

The DoD budget proposal includes critical funding for military quality of life: housing, military pay and health care. It includes:

- \$82.3 billion for a military pay increase and improved housing allowance, a \$6.9 billion increase over 2001.
- \$4.1 billion to improve family housing.
- \$17 billion for military health care, an increase of \$5.8 billion over 2001 – a 48% increase, the majority of which is mandated by Congress.

#### Training & Readiness

This budget will boost readiness, which has been strained by a high tempo of operations and escalating maintenance costs for aging equipment. Funding for training and readiness will climb from \$108 billion in FY 2001 to \$125.7 billion in FY 2002. The 2002 funding request includes:

- \$11.5 billion for aircraft operations.
- \$2.7 billion for Army operations.
- \$2.9 billion for ship operations.
- \$9.3 billion for depots.
- \$9.3 billion for training.

#### Maintenance & Repair

Included in the \$125.7 billion for training and readiness is funding for maintenance and repair, including:

- \$5.9 billion for military construction, up from \$5.3 billion in FY 2001. Funding will construct or renovate barracks, medical treatment facilities, schools, and physical fitness centers.
- \$20.7 billion for improving military bases and infrastructure.

#### Modernization, Transformation and R&D

Included in the budget are reforms that will help build the military of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, including:

- \$47.4 billion for R&D, an increase of \$6.3 billion over 2001. This funding will help restore the Department of Defense to its status as a technological leader. Research and development funding also includes a request for \$8.3 billion for missile defense.
- Reducing the fleet of B-1 bombers from 93 to 60 aircraft and concentrating those aircraft in two bases will free up \$1.5 billion to modernize the aging B-1 fleet over the next five years.
- Deactivation of the Peacekeeper missile system over a five-year period, saving \$320 million in the first year, and \$150 for each year thereafter.



# PRESS RELEASE

## House Armed Services Committee

### Bob Stump, Chairman

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
August 1, 2001

CONTACT: Ryan Vaart  
Meghan Wedd  
202-225-2539

### HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

#### COMPLETES FISCAL YEAR 2002 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

*Legislation strikes balance between quality of life, readiness, and modernization needs*

*The House Armed Services Committee tonight reported H.R. 2586, the fiscal year 2002 defense authorization bill, out of committee on a bipartisan 58 to 1 vote. Upon final passage, Chairman Bob Stump (R-AZ) issued the following statement:*

"With today's action, the committee endorsed the urgent need to rebuild the U.S. military after years of neglect and overuse. While the committee has been in possession of the President's amended budget request for only about one month, the urgency with which the committee considered and reported H.R. 2586 reflects the need to expedite the defense budget process to minimize the chances of an end-of-the-year defense budget train wreck.

"In crafting this bill, the committee largely followed the Administration's proposed defense budget blueprint. I commend the President for requesting the most significant increase to the defense budget since the mid-1980s – a nearly \$33 billion increase to the fiscal year 2001 spending level. While some have questioned whether this increase is adequate, it is critical that Congress approve every penny of this request as a vital first step toward placing the U.S. military on the road to recovery.

"In keeping with the Administration's request, H.R. 2586 targets two of the most critical elements of maintaining a healthy military – quality of life and readiness. In particular, the committee approved the largest military pay raise since 1982, significant construction efforts to improve the facilities in which military personnel live and work, and substantial increases to readiness accounts that support operations, maintenance, and training.

"The committee also expressed strong support for the President's missile defense program. The President's plans will ensure a realistic testing program that will hasten the day when Americans are protected against ballistic missile attack.

"Through careful scrutiny of the Pentagon's budget, the committee was also able to increase procurement accounts, by far the weakest link in the President's defense budget. The Department of Defense is soon expected to recommend changes in the shape and makeup of the U.S. military,

— continued —

v. 1.0

thus, the budget request largely placed modernization efforts on hold. By marginally increasing procurement accounts, the committee acted to slow the erosion of an already-aging force, and smooth the transition into tomorrow's military force.

"On a final note, while it is significant that this bill would provide for the second consecutive year of real growth in the defense budget, the fundamental problems facing the U.S. military are the product of more than a decade of neglect and decline. Reversing the effects of such long-term deterioration will require a sustained commitment from Congress and the Administration to supporting not only the funding levels contained in this bill, but sustaining similar levels of increases into the future."

###

*The funding level for H.R. 2586, \$343.3 billion in budget authority, matches the President's amended fiscal year 2002 defense budget request. A complete summary of H.R. 2586 as reported by the committee is available on the House Armed Services Committee website at: <http://www.house.gov/hasc>.*

September 29, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Phone Message

Mr. Hillman of the Defense Policy Board called me at home on an unclassified line with a message from what he said was the Crown Prince. Cables transferred the message to me.

Would you please call him and get the message. Make sure if he gives it to you that it is something that is okay to come in on an unclassified line. If not, please find a way to get it on a classified basis, and tell him I appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-24

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

Saudi Arabia

29 Sep 03

U22011 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19814

September 29, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*Advance  
copy sent*

SUBJECT: SOCOM Budget

I need an answer to this question Bill Young is going to ask me, and I need it tomorrow, so I can think about it and decide if I am satisfied with it. You should probably talk to Dov, and then someone ought to talk to SOCOM and find out what is going on. Someone ought to check with the Inspector General.

*5010M*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-26

.....  
Please respond by 9/30/03

*20 Sep 03*

U22012 /03

St. Petersburg Times  
September 28, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Military Stashes Covert Millions

*The Pentagon asks MacDill's Special Operations to tuck an extra \$20-million into its budget until it's needed.*

By Paul de la Garza, Times Staff Writer

TAMPA - The U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base inflated budget proposals at the Pentagon's request last year to hide \$20-million from Congress, according to documents obtained by the St. Petersburg Times.

Special Operations officials divided the money among six projects so the money would not attract attention. They also instructed their own budget analysts not to mention it during briefings with congressional aides, the documents show.

The Pentagon's inspector general has launched an investigation. House Appropriations Chairman C.W. Bill Young, R-Largo, said he will ask Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during a hearing Tuesday whether the Pentagon intentionally deceived Congress.

"That doesn't set well with me," Young said. "We don't operate like that."

The investigation centers on an agreement between the Pentagon comptroller's office in Washington and the Special Operations Command comptroller at MacDill.

The plan, according to defense officials and documents obtained by the Times, called for Special Operations to pad its proposed budget by \$20-million so the money could be used later by the Pentagon for some other purpose. The Pentagon initially wanted Special Operations to hide \$40-million. The Special Operations Command, which oversees the nation's secret commando units, refused.

It is unclear what the Pentagon intended to do with the \$20-million, or what became of the money. Young surmised that the money could have been used as a contingency fund, available to Rumsfeld to use at his discretion. While \$20-million is relatively modest in a Pentagon budget of almost \$400-billion, Young said, if all the armed services are doing it the amount could grow significantly.

"I don't know if it's been done before," he said, "or if it's common practice with the secretary."

Gen. Bryan D. "Doug" Brown, who became the Special Operations commander at MacDill earlier this month, declined to comment and cited the ongoing investigation. Brown, who had been the deputy commander, said he requested that the Pentagon inspector general investigate the allegations.

Col. Samuel Taylor, the Special Operations spokesman, said the command is cooperating with investigators.

"The only thing I can tell you is it is not a standard practice for SoCom to improperly utilize funding," he said, "and the IG investigation will determine if there is something inappropriate in this situation."

The agreement between the Pentagon officials in Washington and Special Operations officials in Tampa is spelled out in an e-mail distributed by SoCom comptroller Elaine Kingston to colleagues on Feb. 11, 2002.

In the e-mail, Kingston wrote that she received a call from someone in the Pentagon comptroller's office. The caller, who is not identified in the e-mail, asked if the Special Operations Command could "park" \$40-million of research and development money in its proposed budget for the 2003 fiscal year, which ends Tuesday.

"They needed an answer in 5 minutes," Kingston wrote. "The agency they had it parked with had a problem and couldn't do it."

Kingston wrote that "there was no way for us to park \$40M." She wrote that she and Deborah Kiser, SoCom's investment appropriations budget chief, found six programs where they could add \$20-million.

The programs listed in the e-mail include improvements to missile warning systems on Special Operations aircraft, infrared equipment on helicopters and radar systems. The \$20-million was distributed in amounts as small as \$2-million and as large as \$5-million.

In her e-mail, Kingston coached colleagues on how to account for the additional money and avoid attracting attention to it in congressional briefings.

"I just wanted to follow up with an e-mail to ensure that the staffer briefing slides for these programs DO include these funds and that the briefer not highlight or discuss them during the staffer briefings," she wrote.

"In other words, we can't say 'my original program was XX but OSD parked some money in it so now it's YY,' " Kingston wrote, using the abbreviation for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. "We are doing a favor for OSD which we hope will benefit the command if we should need additional (research and development) in FY03."

Special Operations chose programs that already were getting spending increases and added small amounts so they would not stand out, Kingston wrote.

Young said he is confident Special Operations got the additional \$20-million it requested. He said he would investigate what became of the money.

The Anti-Deficiency Act says money appropriated by Congress can only be used for the purpose authorized by Congress. There are other federal laws and regulations that prohibit submitting fraudulent budget documents to Congress.

Young said he plans to ask Rumsfeld about the case during a hearing Tuesday on President Bush's \$87-billion funding request for Iraq.

The Pentagon's inspector general began an audit, or a preliminary investigation, in August. In a letter dated Aug. 6 to Gen. Charles Holland, the Special Operations commander who has since retired, the inspector general said, "Our objective will be to review the allegations to the Defense Hotline concerning funds 'parked' at the U.S. Special Operations Command by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)."

Special Operations officials said inspector general investigators have visited MacDill.

Young said he did not know if "parking" money as described in the Special Operations e-mail is common throughout the Department of Defense or an unusual occurrence.

"What bothers me is that Congress wasn't notified," Young said. "Constitutionally, Congress needs to be notified of things like this."

But Kingston, the Special Operations comptroller, began her e-mail by assuring colleagues that the request by the Pentagon comptroller was not unusual.

"It is common practice for OSD comptroller to keep small withholds of funds in each appropriation to cover pop up emergencies throughout the year of execution," she wrote. "So OSD goes out to all of the services and (defensewide) agencies to ask for help in justifying these dollars against existing programs in the budget."

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, said it was not familiar with the practice outlined by Kingston.

Winslow Wheeler, an analyst with the Center for Defense Information and a former national defense analyst with the Senate Budget Committee, said Kingston's use of the term "park" to describe hiding Pentagon funds suggested it was common practice.

"It is the consequence of an overstuffed budget," Wheeler said.

He characterized Pentagon recordkeeping as "incompetent," with budget officials routinely unable to keep track of expenditures.

In the wake of 9/11, the special operations forces have become favorites of Rumsfeld and the White House. The 46,000 elite commandos have been at the forefront of the war on terror and played crucial roles in the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rather than relying on large armies, the Bush administration says unconventional forces are best prepared to fight terrorists. As a result, the SoCom mission is shifting, with more responsibility, more people, more weapons and a lot more money.

Announcing the changes earlier in the year, Rumsfeld said, "The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks around the world have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for the special operations forces."

Last year, special ops units operated in more than 150 countries. Often in concert with the CIA, special operators are chasing terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and drug runners.

September 29, 2003

DONE

*Not a review  
copy sent*

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman to Iraq

Please find out if Congressman Obey has been to Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, please find out for the Committee I am going to be testifying before this week who has been there and who has not.

*032*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-1

.....  
Please respond by 9/30/03

*29 Sep 03*

U22013 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Fear

Attached is an interesting "e-mail of the week" from Andrew Sullivan.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"E-mail of the Week"

DHR:dh  
092903-43

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

000.7

U22014 /03

21 Sep 03

# THE DAILY DISH

*andrewsullivan.com*

Friday, September 12, 2003

**EMAIL OF THE DAY:** "Why bother with Iraq? Why fight terrorism? Try this from Richard Hillary's classic WW2 autobiography written after months of surgery following being shot down.

In a train compartment on the way to Scotland Hillary asked Peter Pease, another young pilot, his reasons for fighting. 'Well, Richard,' he said, 'you've got me at last, haven't you?'

'I don't know if I can answer you to your satisfaction, but I'll try. I would say that I was fighting the war to rid the world of fear - of the fear of fear is perhaps what I mean. If the Germans win this war, nobody except little Hitlers will dare do anything... All courage will die out of the world - the courage to love, to create, to take risks, whether physical or intellectual or moral. Men will hesitate to carry out the promptings of their heart or brain because, having acted, they will live in fear that their action may be discovered and themselves cruelly punished. Thus all love, all spontaneity, will die out of the world. Emotion will have atrophied. Thought will have petrified. The oxygen breathed by the soul, so to speak, will vanish, and mankind will wither.' Peter Pease was killed in action.

Richard Hillary returned to the RAF and was killed in a plane crash during night training. He was 23."

September 29, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Mike Riordan

I would like to see Mike Riordan when he comes to town between October 14 and October 17. I would like him to meet Reuben Jeffery, and see if Reuben has a proposal for him for a post in Iraq for six or nine months. Also, I would like him to see somebody about Afghanistan, to determine if there is a spot there helping one of those ministries.

Mike is an M.D. from Johns Hopkins and an MBA from Harvard. He founded Gilead Sciences and is a very talented person. He retired and is only 47 or 48 years old.

John, please have (b)(6) work out through e-mail when we see him here. Please set up his appointments with the right people here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-42

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

230.02

29 Sep 03

U22015 /03

DONE

September 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Text for Keeper of the Flame

*Advanced  
copy sent*

I need the text for the videotape Tuesday for the Keeper of the Flame award.

*060*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-39

.....  
Please respond by 9/29/03

*29 Sep 03*

U22016 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Hillman's Paper

*Advanced  
copy sent*

*DB  
10/15*

*TRAA*

You have received a copy of the paper from Jerry Hillman. I have not read it.

Please read it and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/29/03 Hillman memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092903-38

.....  
Please respond by 10/1/03

*29 Sep 03*

U22017 /03

C 4171  
9/29

GERALD PAUL HILLMAN

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld	FROM: Jerry Hillman
COMPANY: Secretary of Defense	DATE: 9/29/2003
FAX NUMBER: (b)(6)	TOTAL NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 4
PHONE NUMBER: (b)(6)	SENDER'S REFERENCE NUMBER: Fax: (b)(6)
RE: IPSA	

URGENT

NOTES/COMMENTS:

Mr. Secretary:

The attached memo is about a new arrangement for use of an existing southern transportation route (IPSA) for Iraqi oil, to reduce the possibility of sabotage and interruption.

The arrangement can provide \$2.25-4.5 billion in upfront funds for use in Iraqi now, using a low-cost credit line that will not be subject to outstanding claims against the previous regime.

It provides a new cash-at-purchase outlet for the sale of Iraqi oil at market prices; these sales can be effectuated by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil with the approval of the CPA; and these sales will not be subject to any outstanding claims or liens against the previous Iraqi regime since Saudi oil will be swapped for Iraqi oil and Saudi Arabia will receive the Iraqi oil.

The arrangement (called *Ethos SCA*) helps build a relationship between Iraq and its neighbor, Saudi Arabia.

It will require minimal coalition security inputs, but it will require secrecy to assist in providing security for pipeline operations.

Please call me so I can arrange a call with Crown Prince Abdullah this week to express general support, so the arrangement can proceed.

Jerry Hillman

*These have been  
revised  
- JPH  
- CPA  
- [unclear]*

(b)(6)

✓  
9/29

IPSA Billions Available for Iraq Now

To: The Honorable. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

From: Gerald Hillman  
Defense Policy Board

September 28, 2003

Dear Mr. Secretary:

For the past year I have been recommending that we transport Iraqi oil through the IPSA pipeline from southern Iraq to Yanbu on the Saudi western coast, as an alternative route to avoid possible acts of pipeline sabotage on the North/South pipeline. IPSA, built by Iraq in two segments before its invasion of Kuwait, was confiscated and closed by the Saudis after the invasion. The IPSA pipelines were built with capacities of 800,000 and 1,200,000 barrels a day, respectively, and are intact. Finally this month, the CPA publicly stated its desire to use IPSA.

Last week while in Paris on other business, I was invited to a meeting with Prince Talal of Saudi Arabia at his home in Neuilly. I spoke to him about IPSA, and he called his brother, Crown Prince Abdullah. Three days of talks and work ensued. My impression is that they want to build a cooperative relationship with the new Iraq.

The Crown Prince has asked Prince Talal to form a consortium to buy Iraqi oil for IPSA. The consortium (called *Ethos SCA*) will finance all costs of readying the IPSA transportation system, including making any needed repairs to pipes or pumps and cleaning lines. On the Saudi side of the border, it will rent and operate the IPSA system, providing security, insurance, maintenance, use of export facilities, marketing, and shipping. On the Iraqi side, it will also provide financing, and whatever operating assistance or service is needed. *Ethos SCA* financing and operating costs will be charged against future payments for oil as agreed under a normal commercial sales contract.

To the maximum extent possible, the IPSA *Ethos* operation should be kept secret, to reduce security risks to the IPSA pipeline system and publicity in general. (In the KSA, even top Saudis, like their ambassador to the United States, are being kept in the dark; on the Iraqi side of the border, *Ethos SCA* wants to make quiet local security arrangements, managed by Kuwaitis and local tribes, although it needs, and wants, to cooperate fully with coalition forces.)

11-L-0559/OSD/19826

To sell oil through IPSA, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil will contract with *Ethos SCA*. Since this involves straightforward commercial sales contracts, negotiating the terms and executing the agreements is within the Ministry's purview. (Mr. Iyad Alawi, who will be the head of the Iraqi Governing Council next month, is being confidentially briefed in Paris on September 29th.)

*Ethos SCA* will be able to sell Saudi oil and replace it with Iraqi oil. This mechanism eliminates the chance that claim against the previous Iraqi regime will be asserted against the Iraqi oil sold.

*Ethos* will also be provided with the capacity to swap existing Saudi oil for future Iraqi oil to be sold to *Ethos*. It could therefore launch Iraqi sales immediately. Moreover the swap will extend out for at least six months while IPSA ramps up, so *Ethos* will obtain a significant credit line. Secured by Saudi oil, the cost of the credit line will be very low. The capital employed by *Ethos SCA* will simply be repaid over five years, debited from Iraqi sales to *Ethos*.

**The initial credit line should be at least \$2.25 billion.** At a \$25 per barrel price, this amounts to an immediate swap for Saudi oil equal to 500,000 barrels a day for six months. **The credit line could easily be twice that**--if the Ministry of Oil should decide to sell more barrels per day to *Ethos SCA*. This money can be made available as soon as October, upon signing of the contract with the Iraqi authority and before a drop of oil flows through IPSA.

Since *Ethos SCA* will be the borrower and not the Government of Iraq, what is drawn down against this credit line will not be subject to outstanding claims and liens against the previous Iraqi regime. The obligations of *Ethos* will be satisfied by the sale of Saudi oil which is later replaced by Iraqi oil.

The *Ethos SCA* credit line will be used at once to finance readying the pipeline. However, since the cost of readying the pipeline should be low, most of the funds can be used for such things as improving the non-coalition security regime (intelligence, surveillance, rapid response, contingency preparations) supporting the IPSA energy infrastructure, or actually **for any supportive developments or uses in Iraq** undertaken with the general approval and support of the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council.

*Ethos SCA* has arrangements with banks for financing, with operating entities for implementation, with oil companies to buy and distribute the oil at the same prices the Kingdom obtains in the market.


The next step is for *Ethos SCA* to complete a contract to purchase oil from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. *Ethos SCA* counsel wants to work with the Ministry on a contract next week.

The Crown Prince and Prince Talal want to talk to you about *Ethos SCA*. I believe that they expect their generosity in the current Iraqi situation to be acknowledged and they also want to know that the Department of Defense will, where it should, in matters of security, cooperate with *Ethos SC*.

I have been asked to put through a call to you on Thursday October 1<sup>st</sup> when the Crown Prince and Prince Talal will be together in Riyadh. Please let me know as soon as possible if and when you are available to receive this call. My office number is (b)(6)

(b)(6) my cell phone number is (b)(6)

Best regards,

Yours truly,  
  
Jerry Hillman

September 29, 2003

TO: *Larry DiLuz*  
~~Gen. Dick Myers~~  
 CC: ~~Gen. Dick Myers~~  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *A*

SUBJECT: Daily Briefings

The President told us he wanted a top guy like Vince Brooks in Iraq doing the daily briefing. Where do we stand on something like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-36

.....  
 Please respond by 10/17/03

337

29 Sep 03

U22018 /03

September 29, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Col. Steve Bucci  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bosnia

I may want to go to Bosnia when the last troops come out next year in April.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-34

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Bosnia*

U22019 /03

*29 Sep 03*

11/30

10/1  
→ SecDef  
↓ I.I.  
MATTIS  
yord  
D. W.  
LARRY DI RITA  
10/1

September 29, 2003

260

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Video of Gen. Mattis

Please have someone get for me the tape of the *Lehrer NewsHour* when General Mattis was on, whenever it was. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-32

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

9/30

→ Col Rhyndance

U22020 103 *DR*

Larry Di Rita

9/30

29 Sep 03



Newshour with Jim Lehrer  
Maj. Gen. Mattis Interview  
26 September 2003

DoD Public Affairs, Directorate for Defense Information Postages Room 2E765 Tel

(b)(6)

I-03/013611

EF-7010

September 29, 2003

Binder - FILE

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Websites

Should we be doing something like this in Afghanistan and Iraq, or are they too short of sites?

Thanks.

Attach.

9/27/03 SecState note to SecDef w/9/25/03 IIP memo re: Persian Language Website

DHR db  
092903-30

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03 2 OCT USDP SUSPENSE  
24 OCT SECDEF SUSPENSE

Distro To NG, KA, MS, File

Date BL, AH, FW

Time 1730 30 SEP 03

SD NOTE TO ~~SECDEF~~ STATE

COMPLETED

OCT 16 2003

U22021 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19832



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

OCT 15 2003

INFO MEMO

USDP *[Signature]*  
I-03/013611

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *[Signature]* 15 OCT 2003

SUBJECT: Websites

- You asked whether we should be doing something like the State Department's Persian-language website for Iraq and Afghanistan.
- One reason that State's Persian service is so valuable is that the United States has no official presence in Iran.
- In Iraq, this same function is currently being performed by the CPA's website in Arabic, and in Afghanistan in Dari/Farsi by the U.S. Embassy's website. There does not seem to be a need for a State Department-based website for Iraq and Afghanistan.

*f*  
DUSD(NESA) *[Signature]* 140803

PDSAD (ISA) *[Signature]* 15 OCT 2003

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

2/7/9

Memo to VP Cheney  
See Rumsfeld  
Andy Cas  
Cond. Rice  
George Tenet

FYI - Good stuff,



cc: C+D  
Col. Bucci



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9-28-03  
KJ  
9/29

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM  
S/ES

SME  
9/25/03

200324209 Rev. 1

W

UNCLASSIFIED  
DECL: N/A

SEP 25 2003

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: IIP - Stuart Holliday  
SUBJECT: Persian Language Website

Since the May 12, 2003 launch of IIP's Persian language website, hard evidence indicates substantive use.

- 2,000 to 3,000 page views are measured daily.
- A steady stream of new subscribers joins our listserv.
- Feedback in our mailbox listed on the site expresses audience appreciation.

An Iranian-American journalist who recently traveled to Iran told State officials upon his return that he saw indications that a number of major Iranian press organizations consult IIP's website daily. We have also seen evidence of this when we posted Iran-related press guidance, unused in the daily press briefing, on the site, which was then picked up in the Iranian press.

Because the U.S. has no official presence in Iran, the site serves in many ways as a virtual embassy and cultural center for the growing number of Iranians who have Internet access (currently 3.2 million and expected to grow by 120% per year).

The website includes both current policy texts and extensive publications on topics such as democracy, human rights, American institutions, and culture. Although the government in Tehran is critical of U.S. engagement in the Middle East and U.S. policies, its population is extremely open to learning more about U.S. democratic processes, open deliberation, free media and institutions.

Attachment:

Printout as of 9/10 in English and Persian

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/19835

Drafted by: IIP/G/NEA William Armbruster (202) 619-4133  
IIP/FO Dolores Hylander (202) 619-4765

Date: 9/12/03

Cleared by:	IIP/G/NEA	Rebecca Winchester	ok
	IIP	Frank Ward	ok
	IIP/G	Kathleen Davis	ok
	NEA/PPD	Anne Casper	ok
	NEA/NGA	Jillian Burns	ok
	R	Athena Katsoulos	ok
	F	Susan Suh	ok
	D	Lisa Bonner	ok

Document: G:\Share\IIPFront\Archive\Persiansite0912.doc

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/19836





USINFO.STATE.GOV

### اهم اخبار واشنگتن

- ایالات متحده میں گوہر لڑاکا کی دریافت پر ریاستہائے متحدہ امریکہ نے اپنے جیولوجسٹوں کو مبارکباد پیش کی ہے۔
- سائبر سکیورٹی کے لیے ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی



### ایر میں حفاظت و نشرویات

- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
- ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی

ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی
• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی	• ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی

ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی کے تحت ایف بی آئی کی نئی حکمت عملی



UNCLASSIFIED

September 29, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

I now understand what has happened on the Oil-for-Food situation—my apologies.

I am not happy where it came out, but I can certainly understand how we got from where we were to where we are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092903-29

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U22022 /03

29 Sep 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19839

September 30, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USAFA Report

Please go through the Fowler Report and develop a plan for each of the panel's recommendations. It would be best if you assigned someone to be in charge of tracking each recommendation to conclusion and established pretty tight timelines.

Please develop this quickly. Once you have done so, we can meet to review your proposals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
093003-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

352 USAFA

30 Sep 03

U22023 /03

September 30, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Letters to Entertainers

Let's make sure I get thank you letters out to all of the celebrities who visit the troops, like David Letterman, Darryl Worley and all those folks who do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
093003-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/2/03

9/30

*Col Rhyedance -*  
*If we can develop*  
*a list, I'll have*  
*The Writing Team do the*  
*letters.*

*D.R.L.*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/1*

*10/14*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/14*

30 SEP 03

U22024-103

## **Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA**

---

**From:** Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 09, 2003 5:41 PM  
**To:** Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Please don't forget that list of performers and celebrities that have gone to visit the troops.

**i'm working as fast as i can. will this due:**

### **Recent Entertainment Tours To South West Asia** (Celebrity and non-celebrity entertainers)

#### **October 2002**

- Joan Jett
- Robin Williams
- Kimberly Burns

#### **November 2002**

- Wayne Newton
- Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
- Redskins Cheerleaders
- Washington Wizards Cheerleaders
- Miss Universe
- Miss Teen Universe
- Trace Adkins
- Neal McCoy
- Aaron Tippin
- Dennis Haskins
- Kate Linder
- LeeAnn Tweedon
- Johnny Grant

#### **December 2002**

- David Letterman
- Drew Carrey
- Terri Bradshaw
- Daryl Worley
- Jacksonville Jaguars Cheerleaders
- Roger Clemens
- Kathy Griffin
- Karri Turner
- Craig Morgan
- Penney Gilley
- James Henderson
- Lee Gabler
- Paul Shaffer
- Dina Preston
- Jerry Nadeau
- Geoffrey Bodine
- Brett Bodine
- Gary Lewis
- Dave Goodman

#### **January 2003**

- Miami Dolphins Cheerleaders
- Jenn London Band

#### **May 2003**

- Conan O'Brian

- Jenn London Band

**June 2003**

- Wayne Newton
- Robert DeNiro
- Kid Rock
- Lec Ann Womack
- Gary Sinise
- John and Rebecca Stamos
- Deuce Staley
- Jason Taylor
- Washington Redskins Cheerleaders
- Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
- Spense Heywood
- Robert Lanier
- Chely Wright
- Neal McCoy
- Paul Rodriguez
- Cherokee Parks
- Nappy roots
- Bubba Sparx
- Troy Hudson
- Evin Johnson,
- Mark Madsen
- Shawn Marion
- Jay Williams
- George Gervin
- Jesse James
- Brittany Murphy
- Alyssa Milano
- Comedy Break
- Doug Shock Band
- Weekend Excursion Band

**July 2003**

- Arnold Schwarzenegger
- As Funny As It Gets
- WWE Wrestlers

**August 2003**

- Blink 182

**September 2003**

- Bruce Willis & His Band
- Lee Greenwood
- Drew Carey
- Laugh Factory
- Collective Soul Band
- Brian Dennehey
- Comics on Duty World Tour Blue- Comics on Duty World Tour Silver

**Upcoming Entertainment Tours (Celebrity and non-celebrity)**

**November 2003**

- Wayne Newton
- Jay Leno
- Gary Sinise
- Sean Astin
- Hack and Slash
- Dawn Kerlin Connection Band
- Mike Siscoe

**December 2003**

- Cindy Crawford
- Robin Williams
- Terri Bradshaw
- Roger Clemens
- Dayll Worley
- Joan Jett
- Jacksonville Jaguars Cheerleaders
- NASCAR drivers
- Al Franken
- Karri Turner
- Mark Wills
- No Illusion
- WWE wrestlers
- "Days of Our Lives" actors

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 09, 2003 5:07 PM  
**To:** Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Please don't forget that list of performers and celebrities that have gone to visit the troops.

Thanks.

GR

In reply refer to EF and I #'s

EF-7000  
I-03/013535

September 29, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Camp David Tasking

Here is the action list from Camp David. We need to get some folks working on these items and brief me. Then I will give some guidance as to what I think ought to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/27/03 Camp David Action Checklist

DHR:db  
092903-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/  
CDR Nosump  
10/30

Russia

29 Sep 03

U22025 /03

✓  
9/29

9/27/03 Final

### Camp David Action Checklist

The following list of agreed taskings may be revised by the two Presidents, working through the Strategic Dialogue Group.

#### Overall Relations

- **Basic Principles of U.S.-Russian Partnership.** Presidents to bless document. For internal use.

#### Security

- **Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.** Note that both sides have launched practical implementation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Treaty of Moscow). Finalize expeditiously issues related to the scope and procedures of the Bilateral Implementation Commission. Action: U/S Bolton and DFM Kislyak. Report back: November 30, 2003.
- **Transparency and Confidence-Building.** Continue efforts in the established working groups to increase transparency and predictability and to strengthen confidence related to nuclear reductions and missile defense. Action: Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and Ministers S. Ivanov and I. Ivanov. Report back: November 30, 2003. Action
- **Missile Defense Cooperation.** Ministers of Defense to develop a workplan to advance concrete cooperation on missile defense, including, but not limited to, consideration of the following: early-warning radar cooperation; enhancing ongoing NATO-Russia MD compatibility exercises; creation of conditions to launch JDEC and RAMOS projects; and possibilities and conditions for industry-to-industry cooperation. Action: Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister S. Ivanov. Report back: December 31, 2003. Action
- **Defense-Technical Document.** Complete work on the defense-technical document. Action: Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister S. Ivanov. Report back: December 31, 2003. Action
- **Military-to-Military Cooperation.** Ministers of Defense to oversee development of a workplan by their respective departments, including a Joint Staff-General Staff team, including, but not limited to, consideration of a proposal for a U.S.-Russian joint facility in a third country; counterterrorism; a joint military contact program; and a program of cooperation for at-sea and undersea rescue (perhaps in NATO-Russia context). Action: Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister S. Ivanov. Report back: December 31, 2003. ?
- **CT Cooperation.** (1) Implement CT Working Group agenda as agreed at Williamsburg. Action: Deputy Secretary Armitage and DFM Trubnikov. Report back: January 31, 2004. (2) Instruct special services to intensify cooperation and develop a workplan, including consideration of: accelerating terrorism/WMD exchange with expanded access to forensic information on suspect terrorists and exchanges on hazardous devices, e.g. Russian participation in the activities of the Bomb Data Center, including enrollment of Russians in the Hazardous Devices School. Action: DCI Tenet and FBI Director Mueller, and SVR Director Lebedev and FSB Director Patrushev. Report back: December 31,

2003. (3) Develop cooperative strategies for countering terrorist finance, including in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Action: Under Secretary Taylor and Chairman Zubkov. Report back: November 30, 2003.

- **MANPADS.** Increase cooperation to control the transfer of MANPADS. Action: Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister S. Ivanov. Report back: December 31, 2003. ✓
- **Interdiction of Transport of WMD.** Study possibilities for and limits on practical cooperation in this area. Action: U/S Bolton and DFM Kislyak. Report back: October 31, 2003.
- **Guantanamo Detainees to Russia.** Reach agreement on the disposition of detainees. Action: Attorney General Ashcroft and Prosecutor General Ustinov. Report back: October 31, 2003.

#### Science and Technology

- **International Space Station.** Develop plan and options to ensure, through cooperation, the viability of the International Space Station and its continued manned utilization. Action: Administrator O'Keefe and Director Koptev. Report back: December 31, 2003.
- **Sea Launch.** Discuss protection of technologies with regard to the Sea Launch project. Action: U/S Bolton and DFM Kislyak. Report back: January 31, 2004

#### Economic/Commercial Relations

- **World Trade Organization.** Note commitment to moving forward in negotiations. Encourage technical teams to work together closely (with next meeting in October) to make progress. Action: Ambassador Zoellick and Minister Gref. Report back: November 30, 2003.
- **Jackson-Vanik.** Remove Russia from the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Action: the White House. Report back: December 31, 2003.
- **Investment Projects.** Consider ways to advance current and future investment projects. Action: Secretaries Evans and Abraham and Ministers Gref and Yusufov for energy deals. Action: Secretary Evans and Minister Gref for other commercial deals. Report back: November 30, 2003.
- **Agricultural Issues.** Resolve poultry/sanitary and phytosanitary dispute. Action: Secretary Veneman and Minister Gordeyev. Report back: October 31, 2003.
- **Meat Tariff-Rate-Quota (TRQ) Issue.** Reach final agreement on meat TRQ parameters. Action: Ambassador Zoellick and Minister Gref. Report back: November 1, 2003
- **IPR Protection.** Advance U.S.-Russian cooperation in development of an effective IPR protection system. Action: Ambassador Zoellick and Minister Lesin. Report back: December 31, 2003.

- **High-tech Cooperation.** Develop mandate, structure and principles for high-tech cooperation group. Action: Secretary Evans and Minister Klebanov. Report back: December 31, 2003.
- **S&T Agreement.** Consider extension of, and/or a successor to, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology of 1993. Action: White House Science Advisor Marburger and Minister Klebanov. Report back: November 30, 2003.
- **Cooperation in Housing and Urban Development.** Implement Memorandum of Cooperation. Action: Secretary Martinez and Gosstroy Chairman Koshman. Report back: December 31, 2003.
- **Trade Barriers.** Recommend establishment of ad hoc committee under Russian-American Business Dialogue to submit recommendations to the two governments. Action: Secretary Evans and Minister Gref. Report back: November 30, 2003.

#### **Regional Issues**

- **Iran Nuclear Program.** Explore possibilities for converging approaches to the problem of Iran's nuclear program. Action: Secretary Powell and Minister I. Ivanov, Secretary Abraham and Minister Rummyantsev. Report back: October 31, 2003.
- **North Korea.** Consult on approaches to next six-party session. Action: Assistant Secretary Kelly and DFM Losyukov.
- **Afghanistan.** Consider further practical cooperation on Afghanistan. Action: NSC Blackwill, NSC Khalilzad, A/S Rocca and DFM Losyukov. Report back: October 31, 2003.

#### **Cooperation between Societies**

- **Youth Contacts.** Study capabilities of relevant U.S. and Russian organizations to facilitate contact between young people, including joint humanitarian actions in developing countries and, in this context, possible creation of a U.S.-Russian volunteer group. Action: DNSA Hadley, State Assistance Coordinator Pascual/USA Freedom Corps Director Bridgeland and Deputy National Security Council Secretary Chernov. Report back: December 31, 2003.
- **HIV/AIDS.** Launch U.S.-Russian HIV/AIDS Cooperation initiative, to include joint research initiative, and support public-private cooperation to combat HIV/AIDS. Action: Secretary Thompson and Minister Shevchenko. Report back: November 30, 2003. Finalize: Spring 2004.
- **Visas.** Study appropriate measures to improve visa-issuance procedures for American and Russian citizens. Action: Secretary Powell and Minister I. Ivanov. Report back: January 31, 2004.

\* \* \* \* \*

Office of the Secretary of the Navy  
1000 Navy Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20350-1000

Office of the Secretary of the Army  
101 Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-0101

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

18 DEC 2003

352

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake, Jointness in Military Schools (dated 28 Jul 03)

On 28 Jul 03 you wrote, "I would appreciate it if the three of you folks would get together and talk a bit about how we might improve jointness in the services by making some adjustments in how the services manage their military schools." This memorandum presents our collective product. If you agree with our thinking, we will take the next steps described, as well as initiate a dialog with the appropriate Members of Congress.

Our approach to your tasking was systematic and included multiple facets. First, we three met to scope the problem and define the vectors we wanted to explore. To follow up on our start, we formed a working group led by our three Assistant Secretaries (Manpower/Reserve Affairs) and the Joint Staff J7. The working group met weekly to review and refine the way ahead. In late August, VADM Cebrowski brought to Wyo River a diverse group of thinkers, military educators, business leaders, and DoD leaders including key players from our working group and Joint Forces Command. Together, these activities generated the ideas we three discussed and which we forward to you today.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has served us well. We are more joint today than ever before, but more needs to be done. The efforts of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to improve Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) are described in the memorandum at Attachment 1. Specific opportunities for us to improve Joint thinking through Service schools include:

- Incorporating into our company grade officer courses the Chairman's JPME 101 curricula;
- Increasing sister Service faculty representation at War and Command and Staff level schools; and
- Allowing CJCS the statutory authority to certify Service-delivered education as sufficient for JPME II qualification. (Under existing legislation, JPME II qualification can be obtained only through in-residence work at one of the colleges of the National Defense University.)

These are excellent ideas and we commit to their implementation. These efforts alone will not, however, yield the transformational breakthrough we need. To make really profound changes, we must build on recent advances in the science and practice of leader-development.

18 Dec 03

U22026 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19849

Specifically, we believe it possible to define "jointness" as demonstrated mastery of a set of competencies appropriate to an individual position (inside a Service or in the Joint community and grade). To aid in your understanding, Attachment 2 describes a model of leadership competencies now being applied to leader development in one of our military Services. (Joint competencies have yet to be defined.) While this is still theory for most of the DoD, we note that competency-based leader development schemes:


- Are in place in many of the most successful private sector companies;
- Were key to the successful transformation of the Internal Revenue Service;
- Are the foundation for the Air Force's approach to force development; and
- Have long been used by the Navy as a vehicle for establishing the technical qualifications of officers at sea.

Once we have shifted from an activity-based concept of jointness ("to be "joint" you must first go to this school and then go to this assignment"), we have opened the door to a world where experience counts as much or more than formal education. Interestingly, a recent study not directly associated with our effort recommended moving in this same direction. Each Service has numerous examples where our troops are performing in joint operations but do not receive joint credit. The 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division Commander and senior staff work closely with supporting Air Force airlift and close air support units. Indeed, there are airmen assigned to the Division. Similarly, the commander of a numbered Air Force and staff will often be involved in planning and execution of joint force exercises and operations, and during these exercises will frequently serve as the Joint Force Air Component Commander. Equally compelling examples exist for the Navy and Marine Corps. An officer development scheme based on mastery of joint competencies can recognize, account for, and reward the joint-officer skills developed through experience, and, most importantly, incorporate recognition of those demonstrated competencies into promotions and assignments.


Our military schools will continue to be critical participants in the creation of joint competent officers, but their role will change. First, it is our military schools that must accomplish the basic research and scholarship around joint competencies. Joint competencies have to be defined and described in ways they can be objectively tested. Then each assignment and each grade must be analyzed to determine the joint competencies with which it is associated. Next, the schools will need to help develop the criteria and standards for evaluating and assessing attainment of those competencies. As assignments will be associated with a defined set of competencies, schools must provide focused education to fill competency gaps in officers heading to their next assignments. Finally, our schools should continue providing robust in-residence education programs because focused, in-residence professional military education experiences will continue to be important in our force. Equally as important, however, a vibrant graduate education community is essential for maintaining a critical mass of scholarship that will support the enhanced role of our schools in broadening our understanding of joint competencies.

If you concur, we propose to meet with key Members of Congress to seek assistance and support for these ideas. We will, in addition, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, task the National Defense University and our Service schools, to begin developing, defining, and describing "joint competencies" for an initial set of senior leader positions.


We look forward to continuing this important discussi



Gordon R. England  
Secretary of the Navy



James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Air Force



Len Brownlee  
Under Secretary of the Army  
*acting*

Attachment:  
As Stated

11-L-0559/OSD/19851



TAB

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Linking to JROC

How do we link the CINCs and the DCINCs to the JROC?

Thanks.

DHR:dk  
 172703-36 (to computer)

.....  
 Please respond by 1/31/04

334

21 Dec 03

12/17/03 Snowflake

8:14 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: December 9, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Congressional Breakfast**

*C 12/19*

*Larry Di Rita  
12/18*

I want to get Mary Bono down here for breakfast some time. Who was she here with the last time? Was it with a group of women? Should we get her whole class down or something?

Thanks.

*C 9/2*

DHR/azn  
120903.09

Please respond by: 12/10

*12/18*

*[Handwritten signatures]*

*12/18*  
*Secret*  
*We will look for another opportunity to have her in.*  
*D. Rumsfeld*

*File*  
*Forward FWD 12/20/03*  
*TEN*

*9 Dec 03*

**U220330/03**

~~U220330/03~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

EF-7299  
03/014756

In reply refer to EF-7299 and I-03/014756

*Original answer  
provided 19 NOV 03*

October 23, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Kuwait

Kuwait wants to do more. They want to be talked to more, and they want to be appreciated more.

We ought to develop a plan to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
102503-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/4/03

21 Nov 03 Follow up: Kuwait Contribution to the Effort in Iraq

KUWAIT

✓  
12/9

Response attached  
C12/1

3 OCT 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74-10-03 10:08

U22034 / 03

~~SECRET~~

October <sup>20</sup>17, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Army Trainers

Afghanistan

I think your conclusion that that solves the problem on the attached matter may be wrong.

My understanding is that it clears up a gray area, but people will still want to stay inside of the gray area and may continue to be concerned about it.

Second, it apparently doesn't solve it for other parts of the world.

We should try to get it fixed. If you don't understand what I am talking about, please sit down with Doug Feith, and let's get a broad change in the law—unless I am wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/16/03 GC memo to SecDef re: Proposed Letter to Lindsey Graham

DHR:dh  
101703-8

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

20 Dec 03

U22036 / 03

~~SECRET~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/19856

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
10/17

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2003, 5 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*  
SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Lindsey Graham

- This letter is not necessary.
- We have confirmed with CENTCOM that we do not need legislation to train and operate with the Afghan Army.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
None

*Wrong*  
*That only helps for*  
*Aberration*



~~SECRET~~

4:24 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
DATE: October 15, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter to Lindsey Graham. He offered to help on this. Let's have you take it up and get him going on it. It is classified. I don't know why, but if it can get unclassified, let's get it done. At least the proposed law change is unclassified.

I suppose a copy of this should go to Senator Warner, if and when the letter goes to Lindsey Graham. He should look at them both.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101503.01

Attach: Draft letter to Senator

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Run this by  
The Gen Counsel  
before it goes to  
P. M.*

*Afghanistan*

*15 OCT 03*

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED  
11-L-0559/OSD/19858

U22037 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Honorable Lindsey O. Graham  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Senator Graham:

You mentioned to me that you would be interested in assisting with the problem that inhibits trainers from engaging in combat operations.

Attached is some draft legislation that would fix the problem, I believe.

I have asked Powell Moore to hand-deliver this to you along with some classified background so you will have that information as well.

Thanks so much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

*Attach.*

11-L-0559/OSD/19859

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

ENCLOSURE

## PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE PROVISION

“Notwithstanding section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761(c)), or any other provision of the law, United States military personnel performing training of the New Iraqi Army and the Afghanistan National Army are authorized to perform any duties of a combatant nature, including duties related to training and advising that may engage United States personnel in combat activities, as directed by the United States Combatant Commander and as operationally required to prosecute authorized missions of the United States in the fight against terrorism.”

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/19860

Tab C

~~SECRET~~

October 7, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Offers to Train

*Iraq*

Attached are some offers to train Iraqis that you might want to be aware of.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/2/03 DIA Defense Executive Intelligence Note: European Offers of Training for Iraqi Police

10/1/03 DIA Defense Executive Intelligence Note: Egypt: Willingness and Capability to Train Iraqis

DHR:dh  
100303-27

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*7 Oct 03*

~~SECRET~~

U22040 / 03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

EF-7177  
I-03/014312

C 11/4

October 15, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Countries to Work

I think we ought to be working Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. We don't want them to drift away.

092

DHR:dh  
101403-69

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

✓  
11/6

Response Attached

UK

CCB

11/4

15 OCT 03

In reply refer to EF-7300 and I-03/014757

EF-7300

03/014757

October 24, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Post-Phase IV

We need to design a post-Phase IV set of activities and relationships.

Thanks:

DER:db  
102203-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

12-22-03

Sir -  
response attached.  
Work in progress -  
current transition  
plan is attached  
as a draft working  
paper.

✓IK

Lt Col Linden

U22042 / 03

IFAG

24 OCT 03

NOV. 17. 2003 5:10PM

NO. 198 P. 2  
EF-7209  
I-03/014493

C 11/18

October 15, 2003

✓ 11/17

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pakistan Issues

Pakistan

We need to address the questions that the Pakistani Chief of Staff mentioned:

1. The helicopters with night capability.
2. Dedicated tactical UAVs.
3. Secure comms so they can talk together. There is no way we can put liaison officers in 300 separate posts along the border.

In addition, we need to monitor what the Russians, the Indians and Iranians are doing in Afghanistan, as he suggested.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-64

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

Response  
Attached.  
COLB  
11/17

15 OCT 03

2

9:59 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: December 17, 2003

SUBJECT: Haiti

631

You need to be thinking through what we do about our contingencies if Haiti goes bust and we start having more refugees and immigrants.

Haiti

Thanks.

DHR/wzn  
121303.15

Please respond by:

1/8/03

17 Dec 03

13 DEC 17 PM 4:19

U22041 10:1

11/3  
October 30, 2003

A-400.23

TO: Mike Wynne  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson

*Larry Di Rita*  
*11/20*

On the subject of my phone call to Congressman Hobson, here are the materials. I did it.

Two things came out:

1. He believes he has solved almost all these issues and that the word has not yet gotten to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy.
2. He wants us to send in the revised nuclear stockpile plan, which he says we have not done and he needs. I will leave that in your hands.

*See note attached*  
*PL1*

Thanks.

Attach.  
Budget appropriations

DHR:db  
103003-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

**FILE COPY**

U22046 103

3 NOV 03



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2003 NOV 20 11 09 31

INFO MEMO

November 18, 2003, 8:13 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (A/T&L)

SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson – FY03-07 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP)

- Item two of your October 30, 2003, snowflake (TAB A) indicates Congressman Hobson's desire for a copy of the revised NWSP.
- The aforementioned plan and the joint DoD/DOE transmittal memorandum to the President have been in your office for signature since early October. We are scheduled to brief you on the stockpile plan November 21<sup>st</sup>. It is anticipated you will sign the joint memorandum at the conclusion of the briefing.
- Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed NWSP, will go to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive.
- It would ~~not~~ <sup>premature</sup> be in ~~concomitant interest~~ to provide Congressman Hobson a copy of the plan before it has been approved by the President. Therefore, I have sent Congressman Hobson a letter (Tab B) explaining where the FY03-07 NWSP is in the production cycle, when I expect it to be approved by the President, and extend an offer to brief him on the plan once it is approved.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Col Danny S. Wilmoth (b)(6)

SM ASSISTANT DIR	
BR MA CHADDOCK	
MA AUCO	
EXEC SEC MARRIOTT	11/21



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

19 NOV 2003


The Honorable David L. Hobson  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3507

Dear Mr. Hobson,

Thank you for your recent request to Secretary Rumsfeld for a copy of the revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP). The plan you refer to is the FY03-07 NWSP. This plan is still in development. The Secretary should sign the joint Department of Defense/Department of Energy NWSP transmittal memorandum to the President this month. Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed plan, will be forwarded to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; any necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).

This new stockpile plan is only an initial step in downsizing the stockpile. It incorporates the initial decisions on nuclear force reductions made during the Nuclear Posture Review. The subsequent stockpile plan, due to the President late next year, will more accurately reflect the full scope of the planned reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the stockpile that we will need for the future.

I anticipate Presidential approval of the FY03-07 NWSP and the ensuing NSPD being issued sometime in January 2004. As soon as the new plan is approved by the President, I would be happy to have you briefed on the plan. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further assistance on this matter.

  
Michael W. Wynne  
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/19868

<sup>11/3</sup>  
~~October 31~~, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accelerate Security Force Development

I would like to see a proposal from Ablizaid as to how we can accelerate the development of security forces in Afghanistan in a manner of a kind with what we are doing in Iraq but appropriate to Afghanistan. In a few months in Iraq we have gone way past what Afghanistan has produced.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103103-21

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*OB*  
*12/15*

U22047 /03

3 NOV 03

11/3  
October 31, 2003

TO: Steve Herbits  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Larry Poe

I understand that a fellow named Admiral Larry Poe just retired from the Inspector General's office and that he may be able. Why don't you take a look at him and see what you think. Joe Schmitz knows about him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103103-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*✓*  
*11/21* *11/21*  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
*vr* / CDR Nosenzo  
*11/20*

23003

3 NOV 03

U22048 /03

November 14, 2003

✓  
11/21

**TO:** SecDef  
**FROM:** Steve Herbits  
**SUBJECT:** Larry Poe

I have spoken to both Joe Schmitz and Admiral Poe. Larry is interested in pursuing possible positions within DoD. He had hoped that he could have continued to get his full retirement and new pay, but that is not a barrier to his considering ways in which he can continue to help the government.

Jerry Jones and Al Karpinen have met with him. Staser or I will meet with him when he returns from Paris. We will then collaborate with Jim O'Beirne on possibilities.

~~HA~~

11-L-0559/OSD/19871

11/3  
~~October 31, 2003~~

000.5

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: IG and 9/11 Report

Please talk to the IG, Joe Schmitz, find out what he is talking about with respect to a 9/11 report, and come back to me with your recommendation.

I had no idea that he has read the report and no one else in the building apparently has. I would think you would have the action to see that the building responds to any recommendations that are in the report.

Please let me know what is up.

DHR:dh  
103103-17

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*03*  
*11.5*

3 NOV 03

U22049 /03

11/3  
October 31, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Piece on Vietnam

Viet

I do like the idea of doing a thoughtful piece on the differences between Vietnam and Iraq. Congressman Marshall is thinking about doing something like that. Tom Friedman has a good starting point in his op-ed piece from yesterday in the *New York Times*.

It seems to me that this is an opportunity to establish the context for the circumstance we are in, which is very different. There seem to be intuitive reactions of people, some with an agenda but many not, to try to connect it to Vietnam is not helpful.

Why don't you think about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103103-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

U22050 /03

3 NOV 04

11/3  
October 31, 2003  
EF-7403  
I-03/015154

Viet

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Piece on Vietnam

Attached is a note I sent Marc Thiessen. Why don't you think about it as well.

Thanks.

Attach.  
SD memo to Thiessen [103103-12]


DHR:dh  
103103-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

FILE  
COPY

**Policy ExecSec's Note**  
November 21, 2003  
COL Bucci/CDR Nosenzo,  

- ASD Rodman and Marc Thiessen gave the attached to SD during his Asia trip.

  
Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

3 NOV 03

U22051 /03

03-11-03 11:45 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19874

October 31, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Piece on Vietnam

I do like the idea of doing a thoughtful piece on the differences between Vietnam and Iraq. Congressman Marshall is thinking about doing something like that. Tom Friedman has a good starting point in his op-ed piece from yesterday in the *New York Times*.

It seems to me that this is an opportunity to establish the context for the circumstance we are in, which is very different. There seem to be intuitive reactions of people, some with an agenda but many not, to try to connect it to Vietnam is not helpful.

Why don't you think about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103103-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

11-L-0559/OSD/19875

DRAFT #1

**IRAQ IS NOT VIETNAM**  
**By Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
**[1,083 Words]**

Two weeks into Operation Iraqi Freedom, a cartoon appeared in one of the newspapers depicting a Pentagon news conference. All the reporters were clamoring around the podium, raising their hands and shouting the same question: "Is it Vietnam yet?" Coalition forces answered that question, taking Baghdad in 21 days – perhaps the fastest march on a capital in modern military history.

Today, as the Coalition battles regime remnants in Iraq, the allusions to Vietnam continue. The analogy was wrong in the first weeks of the war, and it is wrong today. Here is why:

Vietnam was a force-on-force war. Throughout the conflict, we faced not just irregular forces, but a strong and determined conventional army. The same is not true in Iraq today. Iraq's

DRAFT #1

conventional military was destroyed in less than a month. Today, the Coalition faces what is left: several thousand remnants of a defeated regime, as well as a few hundred foreign terrorists, and as many as 100,000 criminals whom Saddam Hussein released from prison before the regime fell to wreak havoc in the country – which they are doing. These adversaries are deadly, to be sure. But, unlike the North Vietnamese, they pose no military threat to the Coalition.

A second distinction: the insurgency in Iraq is not a popular uprising. Whereas the Vietnamese Communists had built up a significant following during the anti-colonial struggle against the French, our adversaries in Iraq enjoy no such widespread popular support. They are seeking to bring back a reviled regime, which cut off peoples' hands and heads and tongues, and piled the bodies of innocent Iraqis into mass graves. Saddam Hussein is not an Iraqi Ho Chi Minh. If anything, he is an Iraqi Pol Pot – a despised mass murderer, whom no

DRAFT #1

one wants to see return to power, except those few Iraqis who lost their privileged position in society when he was deposed.

A third distinction: our adversaries in Vietnam enjoyed substantial material support from two powerful countries – Communist China and the Soviet Union. The regime remnants in Iraq have no such outside benefactor – save the few hundred foreign terrorists who have entered the country to fight, and die, alongside them. In Vietnam, when our forces captured a North Vietnamese weapons cache, they had superpower patrons to turn to, to help them replenish their arsenal. The same is not true of our Iraqi adversaries.

A fourth distinction: in Vietnam, our adversaries controlled territory. The Vietcong had sanctuary in North Vietnam from which they could operate – as well as in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The remnants of the Iraqi regime have no reliable sanctuary – inside or

DRAFT #1

outside the country. Whereas Coalition forces operate freely across all of Iraq, the regime remnants are in hiding and under constant pressure, moving from safe-house to safe-house, trying to stay a step ahead of the Coalition – and often failing to do so. And while terrorists have entered the country from both Syria and Iran, Iraq's neighbors understand that allowing their territory to become a safe haven and base of operations for those fighting against the Coalition would be extremely unwise.

While the Iraqi insurgents may enjoy little internal or external support, there is substantial international support for the Coalition effort in Iraq – much more than we enjoyed in Vietnam. Thirty-three nations have troops in Iraq today – and more are considering deployments. The UN Security Council recently voted unanimously to pass a new resolution endorsing the Coalition mission in Iraq. And at the October donors' conference in Madrid, the international community

DRAFT #1

stepped forward, pledging between \$13-17 billion for rebuilding Iraq.

With a few notable exceptions, the free world is united behind the Coalition effort in Iraq.

Finally, the United States is *not* sustaining losses on anything near the scale we did in Vietnam. Every American casualty in Iraq is a tragedy. But, as one Iraqi recently put it, if the Iraqi people really opposed the Coalition, we would be losing hundreds of Americans each week.

In Vietnam we did lose, at the height of the war, about 400 Americans a week<sup>1</sup> – more at the height of the conflict. That is not the case in Iraq today.

In short, the Iraqi insurgents control no territory; they enjoy no reliable sanctuary, inside or outside Iraq's borders; they have no significant internal or external support; they face the opposition of a large

---

<sup>1</sup> We will check for the exact figure.

DRAFT #1

coalition of nations determined to see them defeated. Under such circumstances, they have no hope of success.

They cannot win militarily – the only way they can win is by a lack of will on our part. And that is the one area where Iraq is similar to Vietnam: it is a contest of wills. Iraq, like Vietnam, is a battle that is taking place in the context of a larger war – the global war on terror. And our ability to see the battle through in Iraq – our will to win – could well determine the course of that larger war.

My first tour as Secretary of Defense came in the wake of America's withdrawal from Vietnam. I vividly recall how that experience sapped our nation's confidence in our ability to prosecute the Cold War. It took years to recover. Our adversaries used that period to advance their interests aggressively across the world.

DRAFT #1

We cannot – and will not – repeat that experience today. Terrorists attacked us on September 11<sup>th</sup> because they thought America was weak – because they believed Americans did not have the stomach for a sustained response. They were dead wrong. In two years, we have removed two terrorist regimes from power, and captured or killed two-thirds of the known senior al-Qaeda leadership. We have demonstrated our resolve.

Today in Iraq, our resolve is being tested still. The insurgents hope they can outlast us – wear us down, and drive us out, by driving up casualties and waiting for the American people to lose confidence and heart. Were they to succeed, extremists would be emboldened everywhere.

That is why the stakes in Iraq are so high – and why President Bush is correct when he says that Iraq is now the central front of the war on

DRAFT #1

terror. It is a battle we must win. Victory will take time, and it will take patience – and it will come at a price in lives and treasure. But the alternative comes at an even heavier price – another attack, like September 11<sup>th</sup> – or an unconventional attack that could be far worse. Which is why we will stay the course in Iraq, and see the battle through to victory.

*Donald H. Rumsfeld is Secretary of Defense.*

11/3  
~~October 30~~, 2003

020ARMY

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: CID

Gentlemen—

Please give some thought to whether there are ways to improve the quality of the personal security activities of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division.

You might want to get an outside organization to take a look at CID, see how they do, and benchmark them against the Secret Service and possibly some other service.

Please see if there aren't some changes and adjustments that might be made to improve the quality of their service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-30

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

U22052 /03

3 NOV 03

11/3  
October 30, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Officer Firing at Prisoner

383.6

I need the facts on this fellow who is being charged because he fired off a weapon near a prisoner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

3 NOV 03

U22053 /03

11/3  
~~October 30~~, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Mentioning Women

We ought to mention women in the Arab world and in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any country that doesn't engage 50 percent or more of its population is denying itself opportunities that are too important.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-17

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3 NOV 03

U22054 /03

11/13  
1200  
Snowflake

11/15

11/3  
October 30, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Help from Congresswomen

The Congresswomen who were in today asked how they can help now that they are back. We need to figure out ways they can help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

11/5 ✓  
11/5

*DR*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*  
*... ..*

300003

U22055 /03

~~October 30, 2003~~  
11/3

461

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Responsibility

Please get with Reuben Jeffery and find out if the textbooks we are using teach people to take responsibility. Congresswoman Kelly asked that question.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-21

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

OB  
11/10

3 NOV 03

U22056 /03

<sup>11/3</sup>  
October 30, 2003

334

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Constitutional Committee

Has the Constitutional Committee been selected? If so, how many women are on it? If it has not been selected, we sure better make sure there are a good number of women. One of the most important things that can happen is to have women contributing to what takes place in that country.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
103003-23

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

Response  
ATTACHED  
V/R, COLB  
11/13  
11/14 →

10CT03

U22057 /03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

COALITION  
PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY  
REPRESENTATIVE

November 11, 2003

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Reuben Jeffery  
SUBJECT: Constitutional Committee

**You asked if the Constitutional Committee has been selected and how many women are included.**

The committee that will write the Constitution has not yet been identified. If we pursue the Constitutional Committee option, CPA will work with the Iraqis to build a committee that is balanced with respect to ethnicity and gender.

The Constitutional Preparatory Committee that currently exists will not have any formal role in writing the constitution. It was established only to identify ways in which the drafters of the constitution would be selected.

As you are aware, we are still exploring the best course of action.



11-L-0559/OSD/19890

11/3  
October 30, 2003

A-400.23

TO: Mike Wynne  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson

*Larry Di Rita*  
*11/20*

On the subject of my phone call to Congressman Hobson, here are the materials. I did it.

Two things came out:

*see note attached*  
*11/21*

1. He believes he has solved almost all these issues and that the word has not yet gotten to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy.
2. He wants us to send in the revised nuclear stockpile plan, which he says we have not done and he needs. I will leave that in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Budget appropriations

DHR:dh  
103003-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*SIR,*  
*Response attached*  
*w/CDR Noseny*  
*11/20*

*11/21*

*3 NOV 04*

U22058 /03



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

✓  
11/21

INFO MEMO

November 18, 2003, 8:13 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (A/ASD)

SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson – FY03-07 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP)

- Item two of your October 30, 2003, snowflake (TAB A) indicates Congressman Hobson's desire for a copy of the revised NWSP.
- The aforementioned plan and the joint DoD/DOE transmittal memorandum to the President have been in your office for signature since early October. We are scheduled to brief you on the stockpile plan November 21<sup>st</sup>. It is anticipated you will sign the joint memorandum at the conclusion of the briefing.
- Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed NWSP, will go to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive.
- It would ~~not~~ <sup>premature</sup> be in ~~our best interest~~ to provide Congressman Hobson a copy of the plan before it has been approved by the President. Therefore, I have sent Congressman Hobson a letter (Tab B) explaining where the FY03-07 NWSP is in the production cycle, when I expect it to be approved by the President, and extend an offer to brief him on the plan once it is approved.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Col Danny S. Wilmoth.

(b)(6)

SP1 ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SP1 MA CRADDOCK	C.11/21
MA ANCO	
EXECSEC MARIOTTI	11/21



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

19 NOV 2003


The Honorable David L. Hobson  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3507

Dear Mr. Hobson,

Thank you for your recent request to Secretary Rumsfeld for a copy of the revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP). The plan you refer to is the FY03-07 NWSP. This plan is still in development. The Secretary should sign the joint Department of Defense/Department of Energy NWSP transmittal memorandum to the President this month. Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed plan, will be forwarded to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; any necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).

This new stockpile plan is only an initial step in downsizing the stockpile. It incorporates the initial decisions on nuclear force reductions made during the Nuclear Posture Review. The subsequent stockpile plan, due to the President late next year, will more accurately reflect the full scope of the planned reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the stockpile that we will need for the future.

I anticipate Presidential approval of the FY03-07 NWSP and the ensuing NSPD being issued sometime in January 2004. As soon as the new plan is approved by the President, I would be happy to have you briefed on the plan. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further assistance on this matter.

  
Michael W. Wynne  
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/19893

October 1, 2003

337

*Advance copy sent to Col. Bucci*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Powell

I would like a meeting alone with Colin Powell sometime this week. I can go over to his office, or we could do it at the margins of one of the meetings in the White House. I need about 30 minutes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100103-10



Please respond by 10/3/03

10CT03

U22059 /03

October 1, 2003

Colombia

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ministerial in Colombia

The MoD of Colombia asked me if I was coming to a ministerial meeting in Colombia. I don't know anything about it. When is it and what is it?

Thanks.

DFIR:dh  
100103-8

.....  
Please respond by 10/6/03

1 OCT 03

U22060 /03

8:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

IRAQ

Should we develop some kind of a program where we have an open invitation to certain editors of key media outlets to go to Iraq so they can see for themselves what their reporters are writing about?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.06

Please respond by: 10/8

*10/2*  
*SecDef -*  
*We were actually*  
*thinking of a bureau chiefs*  
*trip out there that I*  
*might accompany them.*  
*Still developing the idea.*  
*Di Rita*

200703

11-L-0559/OSD/19896 **U22061 /03**

10/20  
1400 Snowflake

8:23 AM

C 10/21  
✓ 1/22

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Smith Barney Poll**

110.01

John Murtha mentioned a Smith Barney poll that says that support for the money for the defense is dropping in this hearing at the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. Can you find out what he's talking about and get a copy of the poll and let's look at it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.10

Please respond by: 10/8

10/20  
SecDef-

The relevant section is attached. The poll was produced by Harris Gelling and used by Smith Barney for a prospectus on defense-related stocks.


~~Call [Signature]~~ 10/18  
~~Please see that~~  
~~You can find~~  
[Signature]

Larry Di Rita

10/16  
U22062 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19897  
10/21

20 OCT 03



Note: Smith Barney used the Harris Poll to conduct its surveys.

## Aerospace & Defense

### Public Support Drops Sharply Again to 31%; Stocks Downgraded

September 22, 2003

#### SUMMARY

- The sharp drop in public support for increased defense spending, to 31% from 50% last year and 80% the prior year, was a surprise again. We believe we are in the eighth to ninth inning for defense budget increases. Consequently, we believe defense companies' earnings could peak as early as 2005 and multiples will decline further. As a result, we lowered our rating to Hold from Buy on six defense companies: LMT, LLL, NOC, RTN, EDO, and ATK. We lowered our rating on GD and ESLT to Sell from Hold.
- The collapse in public support for defense spending from 80% in 2001 to only 31% now is unprecedented. In 1965, it took three years for a similar drop, and in 1980, it took four years. Perhaps the Cold War prevented a faster drop in those periods, or the dramatic jump in the budget deficit or the quick military victories caused the current falloff.

George D. Shapiro

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george.shapiro@citigroup.com

Suzanne Muench

+1-212-816-3228

#### SUMMARY VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION DATA

Company (Ticker)	Price	Expected Returns			Rating	Div.(E)	Target	LTGR	Earnings Per Share		
		Price	Div.	Total					Current Yr	Next Yr	
Alliant Techsystems- (ATK)	\$48.66	13.0%	0.0%	13.0%	Curr	2H	\$0.00	\$55.1	7%	\$3.49E	\$3.75E
					Prev	1H	\$0.00	\$64.1	10%	\$3.49E	\$3.75E
Boeing (BA)	\$35.79	(19.0%)	1.9%	(17.1%)	Curr	3M	\$0.68	\$29.1	5%	\$1.00E	\$1.80E
					Prev	3M	\$0.68	\$31.1	6%	\$1.00E	\$1.80E
Rockwell Collins- (COL)	\$28.48	(24.5%)	1.4%	(23.1%)	Curr	3M	\$0.36	\$20.1	7%	\$1.42E	\$1.36E
					Prev	3M	\$0.36	\$22.1	10%	\$1.42E	\$1.36E
EDO Corporation (EDO)	\$21.93	4.9%	0.5%	5.4%	Curr	2H	\$0.12	\$23.1	10%	\$1.00E	\$1.20E
					Prev	1H	\$0.12	\$27.1	15%	\$1.00E	\$1.20E
Elbit Systems Ltd.- (ESLT)	\$17.07	(6.3%)	2.3%	(4.0%)	Curr	3H	\$0.40	\$18.1	5%	\$1.25E	\$1.35E
					Prev	2H	\$0.40	\$18.1	8%	\$1.25E	\$1.35E
General Dynamics (GD)	\$84.22	(16.9%)	1.6%	(15.3%)	Curr	3M	\$1.36	\$70.1	5%	\$5.00E	\$5.40E
					Prev	2M	\$1.36	\$85.1	8%	\$5.00E	\$5.40E
Goodrich (GR)	\$28.05	(30.9%)	3.1%	(27.8%)	Curr	3S	\$0.80	\$18.1	5%	\$0.79E	\$1.19E
					Prev	3S	\$0.80	\$18.1	8%	\$0.79E	\$1.19E
L-3 Communications- (LLL)	\$47.75	13.1%	0.0%	13.1%	Curr	2H	\$0.00	\$54.1	12%	\$2.65E	\$3.20E
					Prev	1H	\$0.00	\$64.1	20%	\$2.65E	\$3.20E
Lockheed Martin Corp- oration (LMT)	\$48.70	8.8%	1.8%	10.6%	Curr	2M	\$0.88	\$53.1	10%	\$2.20E	\$2.78E
					Prev	1M	\$0.88	\$68.1	13%	\$2.20E	\$2.78E
Northrop Grumman Cor-	\$83.24	7.3%	1.7%	9.0%	Curr	2M	\$1.60	\$100.1	10%	\$4.25E	\$5.00E

Smith Barney is a division of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (the "Firm"), which does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.

Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

Citigroup Global Markets

11-L-0559/OSD/19899

**SUMMARY VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION DATA**


p. (NOC)					Prev	1M	\$1.60	\$122.1	14%	\$4.25E	\$5.00E
Raytheon Company (RTM)	\$30.45	1.8%	2.6%	4.4%	Curr	2M	\$0.80	\$31.1	9%	\$1.79E	\$1.75E
					Prev	1M	\$0.80	\$38.1	12%	\$1.79E	\$1.75E

**OPINION**

Public support for increasing defense spending again dropped much more than we had expected from 50% last year and 80% the prior year, to 31% this year.<sup>1</sup> We again did the poll twice to verify the accuracy. We had expected a slight decline to around 45%-50%. We believe the key reasons for the drop were probably the military success in Iraq again demonstrating the overwhelming U.S. military strength and the sharply rising budget deficit. The weak economy could also be hurting public support. It is also possible that the problems in Iraq are causing some of the drop, as Iraq appears to us to potentially be similar to Vietnam. We believe support for increasing defense spending requires a combination of fear of a threat and the military being viewed as ineffective, as the public views it as a necessary evil.

The level of public support is the lowest since 1997 (see Figure 1). Historically, the cycles in the industry have generally been very long (around 20 years), with increases for seven or eight years and decreases for eleven or twelve years. With the additional decline in public opinion this year, we believe we are now in the eighth or ninth inning of the current up-cycle, where each inning is about a year. As a result, we believe this cycle, which started in 1999, will likely end by 2005 or 2006.

**Figure 1. Public Opinion for Increased Defense Spending, Year-to-Year Increase in Procurement Authority, and Relative P/E Ratio**



Source: Company reports and Smith Barney

We expect P/E multiples to contract further, as there has been a correlation with lower public opinion causing lower multiples. The thesis is that the market will anticipate weaker budgets as public opinion declines. The P/E contraction will probably offset the better than expected earnings growth, so defense stocks will probably not outperform the market over a twelve

<sup>1</sup> Our poll result is based on dividing the respondents "too low" answers by "too low" plus "too high".

10/10  
12:52

8:40 AM

C 10/16

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

~~ATTN: D. Rumsfeld~~  
10/16

IRAQ

What can we do to get more members of the House and Senate into Iraq?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.12

Please respond by:

10/10

✓  
10/17

20 OCT 03

U22063 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19901

0/13  
1830

✓  
10/17

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

October 10, 2003 5:25 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake on CODELS to Iraq -- snowflake #100203.12

- Members of the House and the Senate are currently visiting Iraq at a substantial pace. As of Sunday, October 12, 100 Senators and Representatives have been there since May 1, 2003, a period of less than six months. The snowflake, a list of these Members and a numerical summary are attached.
- There are currently three factors placing limitations on CODELS to Iraq:
  - 1) **The Congressional schedule** - when Congress is in session, CODELS must travel from Thursday night through Monday. They arrive in Kuwait or Amman, Jordan on Friday night and go in and out of Iraq on Saturday and Sunday and return on Monday in time for votes on Tuesday.
  - 2) **The second limitation is an understanding we have with CPA and CENTCOM that they will not be asked to support more than one CODEL a day.** Senator Dodd asked us to support a CODEL of four Democratic Senators while the Senate was in recess this week. He gave us three days notice and made the request after dropping out of CODEL McConnell because of a dispute between him and McConnell. CODEL McConnell was there on Sunday and Monday, CODEL Upton on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday and CODEL Saxton on Saturday and Sunday. He declined our offer to support his CODEL on Friday, October 10 or on Monday and Tuesday, October 13 and 14.
  - 3) **CENTCOM and CPA have asked us to limit the size to no more than nine Members.** They have requested this limitation because of the availability of armor-protected vehicles and helicopters. We have waived this limitation twice. CODEL Davis had 11 and CODEL Lewis had 17. We have asked CENTCOM (through CPA) to allow up to 12 Members at a time and that request is pending.

Attachments:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/19902

## CODEL TRIPS TO IRAQ 2003

**4 May** Rep David Hobson (R-OH) HAC-D  
Rep Eddie-Bernice Johnson (D-TX)  
Rep Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) HASC  
Rep Robin Hayes (R-NC) HASC  
Rep Ed Schrock (R-VA) HASC \*  
Rep Michael Rogers (R-MI)

**23-27 May** Rep Duncan Hunter (R-CA) HASC Chair  
Rep Terry Everett (R-AL) HASC  
Rep John McHugh (R-NY) HASC  
Rep Ed Royce (R-CA)  
Rep Vito Fossella (R-NY)  
Rep Stephen Lynch (D-MA)  
Rep Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) HASC  
Rep Anna Eshoo (D-CA)

**23 Jun** Sen Richard Lugar (R-IN)  
Sen Joseph Biden (D-DE)  
Sen Chuck Hagel (R-NE)

**30 Jun-2 Jul** Sen John Warner (R-VA) SASC Chair  
Sen Carl Levin (D-MI) SASC Ranking Member  
Sen Susan Collins (R-ME) SASC  
Sen Jack Reed (D-RI) SASC  
Sen John Rockefeller (D-WV)  
Sen Pat Roberts (R-KS) SASC  
Sen Ben Nelson (D-NE) SASC  
Sen Mark Dayton (D-MN) SASC  
Sen John Cornyn (R-TX) SASC

**7 Jul** Sen Bill Nelson (D-FL) SASC

**10 Jul** Rep Porter Goss (R-FL)  
Rep Jane Harman (D-CA)  
Rep James Gibbons (R-NV) HASC  
Rep Robert Cramer (D-AL) HAC

**2 Aug** Rep Tom Delay (R-TX) Majority Leader  
Rep Ander Crenshaw (R-FL) HAC

**3-4 Aug** Sen Jeff Sessions (R-AL) SASC

**11-13 Aug** Rep Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) \*  
Rep John Shadegg (R-AZ)  
Rep Jerry Moran (R-KS)  
Rep Earl Pomeroy (D-ND)

**18 Aug** Rep John Murtha (D-PA) HAC-D  
Rep John Larson (D-CT) HASC

**19-21 Aug** Sen John McCain (R-AZ) SASC  
Sen Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) SAC  
Sen Lindsey Graham (R-SC) SASC  
Sen Marie Cantwell (D-WA)  
Sen John Sununu (R-NH)  
Rep Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) HAC  
Rep Harold Ford (D-TN)  
Sen James Inhofe (21 August) (R-OK) SASC

**25-27 Aug** Rep Tom Davis (R-VA)  
Rep Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)  
Rep Marty Meehan (D-MA) HASC  
Rep Ed Schrock (R-VA) HASC \* ~~2nd Time~~  
Rep Chris Chocola (R-IN)  
Rep Bill Shuster (R-PA)  
Rep Christopher Shays (R-CT)  
Rep Mark Kennedy (R-MN)  
Rep Adam Schiff (D-CA)  
Rep Mike Rogers (R-AL) HASC  
Rep Michael Burgess (R-TX)

**10-11 Sep** Rep Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) \* ~~2nd Time~~

**13-15 Sep** Rep Randy Forbes (R-VA) HASC  
Rep Jeff Miller (R-FL) HASC  
Rep Ike Skelton (D-MO) HASC Ranking Member  
Rep John Spratt (D-SC) HASC  
Rep Gene Taylor (D-MS) HASC  
Rep Joe Wilson (R-SC) HASC  
Rep Jim Marshall (D-GA) HASC

**25-29 Sep**

Rep Jerry Lewis (R-CA) HAC-D  
Rep Norman Dicks (D-WA) HAC-D  
Rep James Walsh (R-NY) HAC  
Rep Ken Calvert (R-CA) HASC  
Rep Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA) HASC  
Rep Susan A. Davis (D-CA) HASC  
Rep Rick Larsen (D-WA) HASC  
Rep Henry Bonilla (R-TX) HAC-D  
Rep Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) HAC-D  
Rep George Nethercutt (R-WA) HAC-D  
Rep Todd Tiahrt (R-KS) HAC-D  
Rep Kay Granger (R-TX) HAC  
Rep Mark Kirk (R-IL) HAC  
Rep Don Sherwood (R-PA) HAC  
Rep Tim Holden (D-PA)  
Rep John Shimkus (R-IL)  
Rep Todd Platts (R-PA)

**5-6 Oct**

Sen Mitch McConnell (R-KY) SAC  
Sen Craig Thomas (R-WY)  
Sen Conrad Burns (R-MT) SAC  
Sen Larry Craig (R-ID) SAC  
Sen Lincoln Chafee (R-RI)

**7-9 Oct**

Rep Fred Upton (R-MI)  
Rep Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD)  
Rep Michael Castle (R-DE)  
Rep Amory Houghton (R-NY)  
Rep Jim Davis (D-FL)  
Rep Ron Kind (D-WI)  
Rep Greg Meeks (D-NY)  
Rep Greg Walden (R-OR)

**11-12 Oct**

Rep Jim Saxton (R-NJ) HASC  
Rep Jim Turner (D-TX) HASC  
Rep John McHugh (R-NY) HASC  
Rep Mike Turner (R-OH) HASC  
Rep John Kline (R-MN) HASC

**As of 12 Oct 03: 18 CODELs---100 Members  
(Reps Schrock and Hoekstra—2 trips each)**

	<b>HAC-D</b>	<b>Other HAC</b>	<b>HASC</b>	<b>Other Committees</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Republicans</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Democrats</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>75</b>

	<b>SAC</b>	<b>SASC</b>	<b>Others Committees</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Republicans</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Democrats</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>25</b>

8:45 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Mexico**

*Mexico*

I read your memo on Mexico. What I would like you to do is to fashion a memo from me to whoever you think it appropriate, possibly Al Gonzales, so that I can push this matter along. We ought to copy the Department of Justice and Colin Powell, Vice President, Condi Rice.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.12

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/10*

*200203*

U22064 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19907

8:46 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT: Detainees

383.6

Please consult with Policy and Inter-Agency on this issue of legislation on detainees and see what people think and then let me know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.14

*Attach: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 10/17

U22065A/03

200103

August 14, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detainees

I just read this piece from the *London Daily Telegraph* on Guantanamo. I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking for legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"The Guantanamo Solution," *London Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2003

DHR:dh  
081403-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/5/03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr / CDR Nosenzo  
9-29

9/29

11-L-0559/OSD/19909



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2003, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II *WJHaynes*  
SUBJECT: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees

- In light of the August 13, 2003 Daily Telegraph article entitled "The Guantanamo Solution" you asked whether we have thought about seeking legislation regarding how we should treat the detainees. Tab A.
- The disadvantages of seeking such legislation far outweigh the advantages of seeking such legislation. Nevertheless, more interaction with Congress and the public on this issue could help us and could be achieved through means other than seeking legislation.
- *Reasons to Seek Legislation.*
  - Seeking legislation offers the prospect of additional legitimacy for the continued detention and treatment of the individuals held at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).
  - The President acts at the height of his power when he acts with congressional authorization.
  - Legislation could reduce arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness in the detention and treatment of detainees.
- *Reasons Not to Seek Legislation.*
  - The President has the legal authority to detain those individuals currently being held at GTMO and to determine the course of their treatment without congressional authorization.
    - Determinations about the detention and treatment of enemies detained during an armed conflict are tactical determinations made in prosecuting a war. The Constitution vests in the President *alone* the ability to make such determinations.
  - Executive branch practice is an important factor in judicial determinations regarding the scope of presidential power. If the President seeks legislation



11-L-0559/OSD/19910

when he does not need to do so, he may limit his legal authority as well as the legal authority of future Presidents to act in a similar manner absent congressional authorization.

- Moreover, the President is already acting at the height of his authority in the current context.
  - Congress has authorized the President to detain individuals held at GTMO through its authorization of the use of force, permitting him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks and to prevent future such attacks against the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 Note (2001).
  - Even if Congress had not expressly authorized the President to detain such individuals, it has done so tacitly through similar authorizations and permitting unbroken executive practice of such detention. As a result, the President would still be acting at the height of his authority.
    - Through the Alien Enemies Act of 1789, 10 U.S.C. § 21, which remains in force today, Congress has authorized the detention and removal of enemy aliens.
    - There is an unbroken history of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants.
- As a matter of policy, seeking legislation would also bear substantial risks.
  - There is no way to predict the rules that Congress would impose.
  - The legislation potentially could limit the President’s ability to react to new intelligence and his ability to gather intelligence from those detained at GTMO.
  - Seeking legislation from Congress regarding the detention of those at GTMO may also expose the military commission process to legislative efforts to dictate the rules and procedures to be used by the commissions.
- *Alternative to Seeking Legislation.* The reduction of arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness can be accomplished through actions undertaken by the Department.
  - The Department could adopt a plan for the periodic review of the need for continued detention of those individuals detained at GTMO, which could reduce any arbitrariness present in the current system.
    - The appearance of arbitrariness could be reduced through making that plan public, to the maximum practicable.
    - As you may recall, I briefed you a few weeks ago on a concept for such a process. ~~Tab B~~. We are currently seeking views within the

Department on that concept, which we revised based on comments received in the briefing. ~~Tab C.~~

- o Reaching out to Congress in ways other than seeking legislation may be helpful to us.
  - We need not seek legislation in order to reach out to Congress.
  - There is value in going to the Hill and inviting their informal participation, such as in seeking their comment on any long-term detention plan that we might wish to adopt.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer L. Koester, DoD OGC (b)(6)

London Daily Telegraph  
August 13, 2003

## The Guantanamo Solution

President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, have been unfairly maligned in this country for their decision to put terrorist suspects on trial in Guantanamo Bay.

Paradoxically, their difficulties stem not so much from their alleged illiberalism as from a desire to maintain some measure of due process in a time of a new and horrific kind of asymmetric warfare.

The Bush Administration has been wrestling with the problem - not dissimilar to that faced by Whitehall during the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland - about whether to treat suspects as prisoners of war or common criminals. His dilemma was understandable. Had he called them PoWs, he would have been obliged by the Geneva Conventions to release them at the end of hostilities.

But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives PoWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

Mr Bush's liberal instincts told him that it was wrong to hold possibly innocent men for long periods without trial. But, equally, he knew that no ordinarily conducted criminal trial could be expected to result in a conviction, no matter how guilty the defendant might be.

So it was that the President hit upon the idea of treating them neither as PoWs nor as criminals, but as something in between. He decided to put them on trial by military tribunal, and instructed his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to draft special rules of evidence and procedure that would make convictions more likely than in a civilian court. In so doing, he landed himself in the worst of all possible worlds.

Mr Rumsfeld's rules, drafted on March 21, 2002, are not nearly as illiberal as his critics maintain. They include many safeguards of the rights of the defendant. But the fact is that they fall well short of the standards of justice required by civilian courts in both Britain and America.

By being as liberal and fair-minded as he dared, Mr Bush succeeded only in making himself look more authoritarian than he appeared before he suggested trials of any sort. The British Government, which has never wanted responsibility for British prisoners held in Camp Delta, has been forced into the hypocritical position of defending the rights of its citizens against Mr Bush.

Only a fool would dispute that Mr Bush was right to hold and interrogate prisoners while they might still have useful information about planned terrorist atrocities. But the longer their detention goes on, in this limbo between PoW and criminal status, the less justified it seems to many in this country.

The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantanamo Bay should be treated like that.

7:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

337

Mort Kondracke, at the roll call meeting, talked about getting a thermometer or something very simple to explain progress.

In addition, he said he would like to see the weekly unclassified version of the report. Would you please see that that both happen and notify me that in fact they have happened?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.17

Please respond by:

10/15

U22066 /03

20 OCT 03

11:17 AM

TO: J. D. Crouch

*Ref is*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*X03308-03*

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT:

Please give me your thoughts on how we can streamline NATO Ministerial meetings and get back to me before Colorado.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.42

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10 | 3*

*NATO 33N*

*200703*

**U22067 /03**

9:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

*(*

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT:

*230.02*

See me about the possibility of using Gordon England to kind of take over the job that Korologos has in servicing members of the House and Senate on Iraq and make sure he visits Iraq and gets knowledgeable and starts getting invited to meetings so that he can serve as an extra job. He's got a lot of friends up on the hill, and he can keep them in line and keep them helping us, and he can also maybe can move some people from the fence over to our side.

What do you think?

Thanks.

*OB  
10/15*

DHR/azn  
100203.19

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*28CT05*

U22070 /03

10:00 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*0914*

I don't think the idea of trying to figure out how we use the DATTS to more effect from intel standpoint is a very good idea.

At the current time I don't feel any personal benefit from their activities. I am sure they are contributing in various ways to the embassy and maybe to the DIA, but I don't see it.

Why don't you come up with a proposal?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.23

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/17/03*

*200103*

**U22071 /03**

10:04 AM

TO: J. D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*NATO 3337*

I do think we ought to have the NATO ministerial come up to talk about the need to increase the usability of NATO forces.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.24

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*10/12*

*20 OCT 03*

U22072 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19919

10:20 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT: Service Chiefs

*337*

I want to get a full report on your meetings with the Service Chiefs on all key issues.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.25

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *10/16*

*2003 OCT 03*

**U22073 /03**

10:51 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 2, 2003  
 SUBJECT: G/FO Ratios

210

Here's this memo on Flag Officer Ratios. My understanding is that they are going to come back to me with some ideas as to what a better metric is.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.30

Attach: G/FO Ratios 4/9/03 - Info Memo From Gen. Myers

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Sec Def -  
 Reviewed my notes  
 - Chiefs said a better metric would be scope and complexity of tasks G.O./F.O.'s perform  
 - CNO indicated Staser Holcomb was looking into this; one of the other Chiefs thought Staser was working this with Dr. Chu  
 - I will check w/ Staser & David to confirm and let you know.*

20 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19921 U22074 103 c 10/4

*MTG*

July 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Keane  
ADM Clark  
Gen. Jumper  
Gen. Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General and Flag Officer Ratios

I am told that the ratio of general and flag officers per 10,000 service members is as follows:

Air Force	7.49
Army	6.22
Navy	5.76
Marine Corps	4.59

I would be curious to know why the disparity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072303-16

.....  
Please respond by ~~8/8/03~~

*Sir,  
Response attached  
v/r CDR Nosenzo  
9/9*

08 JUL 24 09:42:23



*See [unclear]*

*old memo  
incl. [unclear]*

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1188-03

4 September 2003

*[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/3*

SUBJECT: General and Flag Officer (G/FO) Ratios

*other?*

- In response to your query why there is a disparity in the G/FO ratios per 10,000 Service members, the following is provided.
- To meet National Security Strategy objectives, the Services manage their G/FOs to match the demands of their operational and joint warfighting needs (including medical, legal and chaplains). Title 10 limits the number of G/FO on active duty to 889 billets: Army – 302, Air Force – 279, Navy – 216 and Marine Corps – 80; including 12 billets for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Since 1954, DOD has relied on studies to determine the number of G/FOs (TAB B). The FY03 NDAA directed DOD to conduct a review of active and reserve G/FO billets and submit a report to Congress. That review, conducted by the Logistics Management Institute, did a billet assessment and validation of current active and reserve G/FO requirements; did not recommend a change to the number of G/FO billets, but does recommend expanding the review to include senior civilians. The report was forwarded to Congress by PDUSD(P&R) on 28 March 2003 (TAB C).
- There is no direct correlation between the number of G/FOs and overall end strength. The unique roles, missions and force structure of each Service are factors that drive differences among the Service ratios.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated


Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>[initials]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>9/3</i>

U14956 /03

*G/FOs Over Time*

**General and Flag Officers 1951-2003**



Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



MAR 28 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

The Honorable John W. Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050


Dear Mr. Chairman:

The attached report responds to a Congressional request in Section 404(c) of the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Public Law 107-314), that the Secretary of Defense conduct a review of the existing statutory active and reserve general and flag officer authorizations and submit to the Congress the results of the review together with any recommendations for revisions to those authorizations.

The Department is not requesting, at this time, any change to the number of active or reserve general or flag officers authorized nor is this report requesting any specific legislative revisions. However, it does convey current thinking of the Department regarding the issues raised in the NDAA and is consistent with legislative proposals submitted through normal channels or proposals being considered for future submission. For example, the Department plans to pursue a legislative proposal to eliminate the 50 percent grade distribution for officers serving above the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half). Other possibilities suggested in the report, such as allowing the Army and Air Force to fill their reserve chief positions with active officers, reflect the Department's desire for personnel management flexibility rather than any intention to actually place an active officer in such a position. In fact, the Army and Air Force oppose filling such positions with other than reserve officers and at this time, the Department will not initiate legislation that would impose this change. As noted in the report, the Department intends to expand its review to include senior civilian positions and to explore innovative ways to manage its entire senior leadership corps to facilitate the transformation of the Department. That further review may prompt changes to the overall general officer inventory.

The NDAA requires any comments or recommendations from the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) be transmitted to Congress. The RFPB has not yet completed their review; however, to be responsive to Congress the Department is submitting the report now. As soon as the RFPB completes their review their comments will be promptly forwarded to Congress.

Sincerely,

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy

cc:

The Honorable Carl M. Levin  
Ranking Member



Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/19925

10:53 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT:

*IRAQ*

Make sure someone sends the weekly report on Iraq to Jerry Bremer so they have a copy of it and know what we are talking about out there.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.31

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*✓*  
*10/16*

*It will be sent  
each week to  
Amb Bremer*

*OB*

*CRB  
10/6*

*Forwarded 10/14  
w/CDR Nosenzo*

*2003*

U22075 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19926

10:57 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Afghanistan

I am told that the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq do not have the ability to relatively promptly pay some amount of money to innocent people who were injured, particularly in Afghanistan, Eikenberry mentioned.

Why don't you come up with a program and see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.34

Please respond by: 10/20 **OB**  
**10-29**

200310

U22076 /03

11:10 AM

TO: Jerry Jones  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 2, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

352 45M7

I think we ought to do some work on figuring out how to fix the process that appoints people to the military academy boards of trustees.

The Tillie Fowler report indicates that she doesn't feel that the boards of trustees are doing a good job of monitoring the academies, particularly from the standpoint of the subject she studied.

Tell me how they are picked and how we would go about fixing it so that they could be held accountable. We could check their attendance, we could make sure we have a voice on who gets appointed and it should not be strictly by the congress or the executive branch in terms of appointing friends and cronies.

Thanks.

*File copy of response*

DHR/azn  
100203.37


Please respond by: 10/18

200703

U22077 103

C 12/13

December 12, 2003, 1600

FOR: Don Rumsfeld  
FROM: Jerry Jones 

SUBJECT: Thought Piece on Governance of the Military Academies


Attached is a thought piece in answer to your snowflake, which lays out alternatives to the conventional wisdom solution to improved Academy governance through legislative reform of the Board of Visitors. I think the additional recommendations in this paper can be initiated by you or by each Service Secretary without further approvals. Please note that these recommendations have not been vetted in the building nor have I asked Jim Haynes to check into legalities.

If you are interested in the ideas, I'll vet them properly.

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2001, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: JERRY JONES



SUBJECT: Improving Governance at the Military Academies

I. BACKGROUND

- A. A Constant: One or another of the military academies is in a scandal or just overcoming one at all times.
- B. This being the case, the Boards of Visitors clearly are not providing leadership on these matters nor do they often respond effectively when an episode occurs.
- C. Unfortunately these Boards are the victims of their own prestige. Membership is perceived as high status – so the status seekers take over. Membership of the Boards and meeting schedules are not conducive to oversight.
- D. Worse yet, the allocation of the board's membership is fixed by legislation. The President appoints only 18 of the 45 slots; the Secretary of Defense appoints none of the members.
- E. However, when things go wrong, the Department of Defense is held responsible.
- F. This current crisis at the Air Force Academy gives the Secretary of Defense the opportunity to attempt a repair of the governance problem at the Academies.

II. GROUND TRUTH

- A. Frequent problems at the Academies

11-L-0559/OSD/19930

1. Rape
  2. Cheating
  3. Drugs/Alcohol
  4. Car Theft
  5. Hazing
- B. After sexual hazing and car theft at Naval Academy, Jim Cannon, then Chairman of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, cites a Naval Academy Administrator as saying that the Academy admits students from across the broad spectrum of America's population and can expect to address social pathologies within the student body which affect the American culture in general.
- C. If anything, the American cultural pathologies have worsened since then.
- D. It is inescapable: The Academies' administrators will be addressing the problems cited above and others as long as the American culture continues on its current trend line.

### III. PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

- A. There is no ongoing, day-to-day oversight of Academy Administrators. Some Administration teams are effective; some are not. Often disaster strikes before we realize there is inadequate leadership.
- B. The Boards of Visitors are not effective oversight mechanisms as currently constituted.
1. Boards meet two times a year
  2. These boards can work when effective Chairmen are in place who can spend the time necessary for Academy business (even full-time when required) and take on the governance tasks for the boards
  3. Selecting effective chairmen is hit or miss. Each board elects a chairman from its membership at the beginning of each term. If people of Chairmen quality are not appointed to the boards, then strong chairmen are not possible.
- C. There are no mechanisms for detailed study of specific aspects of the Academies' Missions.
- D. DoD has no Board of Visitor monitoring role.
1. The Department is blamed for the problems but does not have the power to control the work of the Boards of Visitors.

2. The Department needs mechanisms to assert governance direction when the Board of Governors' leadership is inadequate.

#### IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

- A. There must be effective day-to-day or week-to-week oversight of the Academies.
- B. There must be a mechanism to identify and solve problems before they become scandals.
- C. The Boards of Visitors must become more effective.

#### V. POTENTIAL ACTIONS

- A. Restructure Boards so they can provide more effective governance.
- B. Put in place a more effective day-to-day guidance mechanism for the Academy Superintendents.
- C. Establish the ability to look in depth at specific areas by establishing special oversight committees that would supplement the Board of Visitors.

#### VI. STEP A: Restructure Boards

- A. The Boards of Visitors can be improved particularly with provision for appointment of strong chairmen with adequate time to spend on Academy tasks.
  1. Boards have been effective in the past when the Chairman has been a concerned, experienced activist, e.g. Jim Cannon during the Naval Academy travails in the 90's.
  2. However, unless there is wholesale reform of the boards (membership, mission, number of meetings per year, etc.) they are unlikely to provide strong oversight.
- B. We can attempt to restructure the Boards by legislation to attempt to improve attendance, the quality of members, and the quality of the Chairman.
  1. This should be done, but the quality of the governance will only be as good as the appointing authorities, the appointees, and their willingness to devote the necessary time to oversight duties.
    - a. The two missed meeting rule

- b. Criteria for appointed officials
- c. Presidential authority to appoint the Chairman

- 2. These steps alone will probably be inadequate.
  - a. Too much political pressure to appoint cronies.
  - a. Congressional interference.
  - b. Lack of will to do it right; e.g. monthly meetings, intrusive subcommittee work requiring extensive time commitment.
    - 1. The prestige appointees will probably not spend the necessary time to do the oversight job.
    - 2. The Administrators will continue to run the Academies without the necessary oversight.
    - 3. "Business as usual" will prevail: note past record.

C. Conclusion: Reform of the Board of Visitors is needed, but it will not be enough. This is not the permanent fix.

VII. STEP B: Put in place a more effective day-to-day, or week to week guidance mechanism for the Academy Superintendents directed by Senior Executives in DoD.

- A. A good model for this option is the Harvard Corporation – a panel of five members that run the University on a day-to-day basis.
  - 1. Make up of the Corporation: The University President, three other members, and I believe, the Chairman of the Board of Overseers.
  - 2. These members usually meet weekly and together make the policy decisions for the Administration of the University.
  - 3. A similar set-up could be established for the Service Academies with the makeup of this senior group or Management Committee being something like this: the superintendent, the Secretary of the Service, the Chief of Staff of the Service, the Chairman of the Board of Visitors and the Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness.
    - a. This group would meet frequently, at least once a month, and delve into the details of the Academy's operations.
    - b. Its mission would be to identify problems early and start a problem-solving process quickly.
    - c. It would also involve itself in goal setting, strategy and metrics.
    - d. Finally, it would see the Academy Administrators frequently enough to evaluate their effectiveness and catch appointment errors early.

- B. The Management Committee could be required to report quarterly to the Secretary or Deputy about governance matters.
- C. The three Academies Management Committees could also meet together to exchange concerns, share trends and problems and provide case study solutions to each other.

VIII. STEP C: Establish the ability to look in depth at specific areas.

- A. When the Management Committee identifies a potential problem, it should require a visiting committee (appointed by the Service Secretary) be formed to investigate the problem or issue and provide a report including recommendations for solutions back to the Management Committee and to the Board of Visitors
- B. These visiting committees would be made up of DoD personnel – military and civilian – and civilian experts in the issue area.
- C. In order to rapidly identify potential problem areas, the superintendent would be required to provide derogatory communications and reports of troublesome events in a timely manner to the Management Committee. Waiting six months to respond to a letter reporting rapes is unacceptable as was the case at the Air Force Academy.
- D. The product of visiting committees studies would be available to the Secretary and the Department immediately and of course, would be available to the Boards of Visitors.

IX. The last two steps most likely can be ordered by the Secretary of Defense without legislation.

X. CONCLUSIONS

- A. The Academies do not have sufficient oversight from their Boards of Visitors.
- B. Reform of these boards would be helpful, but most likely would not be thorough enough to solve the problem.
- C. Other reforms can increase oversight, problem anticipation and problem solving.
- B. These reforms should be able to be made by the Secretary of Defense as administrative initiatives.

- C. DoD has not devoted the time and energy in the past to insure effective oversight on cultural, social and leadership problems at the Academies.
- D. Solutions are at hand if we have the "will to manage".

7:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

DONE

032

Check and see the House version of what Shinseki said. I think it was several hundred thousand he said. I want to then send it to both Obey and Moran.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
100203.03

Please respond by: 10/3

20 OCT 03

U22078 /03

7:27 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*DR*

*322*

*Strell*

I think we ought to get Dick Myers or someone to go up and brief on the Distress on the Forces Memo to Chairman Young. Maybe even get him down and have lunch with him some day and I do it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.01

Please respond by:

*10/10*

*20 OCT 03*

U22079 /03

143  
1400

11:16 AM

C 10/3

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

IRAQ

Where do we stand on getting the Cabinet to go to Iraq? Have we heard from any of them? Is it happening?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.41

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 10/10

10/2 ✓ 10/3

SecDef - Several have expressed desire. We are talking with them about timing, structure of delegation, etc. It will happen. Have to balance it with CODELs, too. Only so many planes to go around.

00CT03

11-L-0559 ~~1023080~~ 103 *Di Rita*

11:32 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*OB*  
*10/17*

*IRAD*

I received your memo on the training of the police from October 1. Abizaid's real concern is not with who does the training. He agrees that civilian police experts should do that.

His concern is that the CPA lacks the resources and administrative capacity at the present time to adequately support the activity - the police, the training and the like. Even those already on duty. Their equipment is old and inadequate. They need police cars, radios and the like. I am convinced that engaging Abizaid fast is the right thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.43

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*200203*

U22081 /03

TO: Andy Hoehn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 2, 2003  
SUBJECT:

1:55 PM

C10/2  
EF-7046  
I-03/013729

NATO 339

You are going to have to fashion some remarks for me to use for the NATO Ministerial meeting in Colorado Springs next week that fit what we kind of agreed to in the Principal's Committee meeting that you attended.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.51

Please respond by:


\_\_\_\_\_ 10/3

2 Oct. 03

✓  
10/3

Mr. Secretary,

J.D. Crouch and I are working on a set of draft remarks. Mark Thiessen is involved.

  
Andy Hoehn

TEN  
10-2

200503

02-10-03 14:50 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19940

U22082 /03

1:55 PM

TO: Andy Hoehn

In reply refer to EF-7046 and  
I-03/013729

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT:

You are going to have to fashion some remarks for me to use for the NATO Ministerial meeting in Colorado Springs next week that fit what we kind of agreed to in the Principal's Committee meeting that you attended.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
100203.51

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

10/3

**POLICY ExecSec's NOTE**

October 8, 2003

COL Bucci/CDR Nosenzo,


- ASD Crouch, DASD Hoehn, and Marc Thiessen prepared draft remarks for the Secretary in preparation for the NATO Ministerial in Colorado Springs. The remarks were included in SecDef's briefing book.



C.L. O'Connor  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

3 14:50 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19941



TAB A

October 3, 2003

311

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT: Soldiers' Communications

I am hearing that if we had improved video or telephone communications between soldiers and their families, it would just make an enormous difference.

I would like to know what the circumstance is, what we actually do provide, and what can be done to fix it and improve it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-6

.....<sup>15</sup>  
Please respond by 10/28/03

✓  
10/30

*Response attached.*

*- 2 issues from soldier's perspective*

- ① Access*
- ② Affordability once has access*

*- And - might be interesting to  
ask what the policy is - CENTCOM  
policy - for each soldier to call  
home free - how many calls for  
how long per month?*

U22083 103

11-L-0559/OSD/A994

*C 10/22*

3 OCT 03

✓  
10/30**SOLDIERS' COMMUNICATIONS**

**Purpose.** To provide an update of current efforts to support communications between Service members operating in Iraq and their families.

**Issue.** The Secretary of Defense has been hearing that improved video or telephone communications would make an enormous difference. He requested a summary of current efforts and possible improvements.

**Bottom Line**

- Telecommunications support to soldiers and their families improves daily.
- Planned improvements and enhancements will provide more services to a greater number of users.

**Background.** Telecommunications supporting soldiers and their families fall into two categories: official and unofficial.

- **Official.** Use of official telephone lines or information systems.
  - Defense Switched Network (DSN). Calls are netted to installations in the United States where they are switched to the commercial network designated by the patron. Policy for use varies by command. DSN service to remote tactical and fixed station switches is generally limited, although there are planned improvements.
  - Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). Government information system provides e-mail access, web surfing and file download capability if permitted by local commanders. NIPRNET circuits currently not sized to support morale voice teleconferences (VTCs). Infrastructure upgrades should enhance capacity.
- **Unofficial.** Telecommunications provided by commercial vendors through Armed Services exchanges.
  - Call Centers. Five of six previously approved call centers in Iraq operational (48 phones each) with 11 on the way. Shipboard telephone service in-theater provided by NEXCOM.

- Satellite Telephones. Over 600 phones distributed to forces not in proximity to a call center.
- Internet Cafés. 177 cafés have been procured to date. Seven scheduled to be installed by end of October. Each café includes 20 computers. Some cafés will provide streaming video and mini-VTCs as well as voice-over-Internet Protocol capability. 145 cafés scheduled to arrive in Iraq NLT mid-November 2003.

● **Other**

- "Troops Home Free Act of 2003". 108th Congress considering legislation that would provide a monthly allotment of free calling time to Service members directly supporting OEF and OIF. Proposal does not appear to be practical due to expected load and system capacity limitations.
- VMdirect Video e-mail. Proposal by VMdirect, LLC to donate service that will provide the opportunity for troops in Iraq to send video e-mail messages over 2003 holiday period. Currently being evaluated.
- **Costs.** Costs incurred by Service member for various telecommunications services vary with medium and provider.
  - Official phone lines. US domestic calling rates apply but vary based on payment option used by Service member.
  - Call Centers. Overseas rates vary based on payment option used by Service member. Rates of \$.35 per minute in Iraq and Afghanistan and \$1 per minute shipboard are significantly higher than rates charged in Bosnia and Korea. Pending restructuring of infrastructure, government buy down of rates appears to be the only immediate solution.
  - Satellite Telephones. Approximately \$.90 per min. Expected to be reduced to \$.38 per min by end of the year.
  - Internet cafés. Approximately \$.05 per min.

Prepared by: Nancy Brown, RDML, USN, VJ6, (b)(6)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

✓  
10/30

INFO MEMO

CH-1284-03  
21 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*SIR,  
RECOMMEND YOU GO  
DIRECTLY TO TAB B.  
VR [Signature]*

SUBJECT: Soldiers' Communications

- **Questions.** I am hearing that if we had improved video or telephone communications between soldiers and their families, it would just make an enormous difference. I would like to know what the circumstance is, what we actually do provide, and what can be done to fix it and improve it. (TAB A)
- **Answers**
  - Telecommunications support to soldiers and their families is improving daily.
  - US Service members operating in Iraq are currently able to communicate with family members anywhere in the world through official means (Defense Switched Network and the Non-secure Internet Router Network) and unofficial means (call centers and satellite telephones).
  - There are numerous efforts underway to expand telephone and e-mail services and make them available to a greater number of users. New capabilities such as streaming video, mini-voice teleconferences and voice-over Internet Protocol services will also be introduced by the end of October 2003.
  - **Analysis.** Telecommunications services supporting US Service members in Iraq can be categorized as either official or unofficial. While use of official means is generally on a not-to-interfere basis and therefore somewhat limited in certain areas, use of unofficial means provided by Armed Services exchanges is growing. Organizations are responding to this demand in a number of ways (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Nancy Brown, USN; Vice Director, J-6: (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	S. [Signature]
EXCESSES MARGOTT	

17514 / 03

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD (P&R)	Mr. Molino	14 October 2003
USCENTCOM	Col Gawler	11 October 2003
USA	Col Wright	14 October 2003

October 3, 2003

337

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press Briefing

DONE

George—

Attached is a copy of the transcript of a question I was asked at the press briefing yesterday and my response.

Do you folks have any better suggestions as to how I could answer these and similar questions?

Thanks.

We can discuss this w/ lunch

Attach.  
10/2/03 Press transcript

DHR:dh  
100303-10

3 OCT 03

U22084 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/19946

Faxed  
10/3/03  
10:20am

October 3, 2003

*W*

*OB  
10.29*

*326*

SUBJECT: Reserve and Guard

I need to brief the President, with Dick Myers, on the decision I made yesterday to not mobilize two additional Reserve/Guard enhanced brigades.

I should also mention the concern Murtha has expressed about getting beyond 50-50 Guard/Reserve versus active, towards 60 percent Reserves/Guard.

The reasons for not alerting and mobilizing the two Guard outfits now were several:

1. We may get a multi-national force (Pakistan, Turkey, India, others).
2. Abizaid may propose lowering the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq as the Iraqi forces continue to grow.
3. We may be able to further ramp up the number of Iraqis providing security of various types.
4. We may be able to use an active Army outfit (although I am not going to use the Third ID) or an active Marine outfit, or a combination of the two.
5. We may extend tours in Afghanistan from six to twelve months, so they are comparable to Iraq.
6. We may be able to use smaller division elements in Iraq and take the excess elements currently scheduled to be rotated in and combine them into a new division.
7. Last, we may be able to get some forces out of Okinawa. It could add slight risk to the Korea contingency plan, but it may be an acceptable risk.

DHR:dh  
100303-16

*Mix-US with others under 4/ US  
Spr / Pol / Korea / Pol / India / Turkey  
etc*

*USG AF + Navy to submit to Army*

*Use Contingency 559/OSD/19947*

U22085 /03

*30CT03*

October 6, 2003

020 DDD

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: EAs

Let's put together something like you suggested on EAs, or that was suggested in the meeting, and get on with it. Show me what you think we ought to do, what memo I ought to send. Dick Myers volunteered all of them from the Joint Staff. Why don't we try to get a little mix and get it going.

Please tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-31

.....  
Please respond by 11/03

U22086 /03

60CT03

1030 1230

11/5

October 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Canceled Leave

KUWAIT

**Larry Di Rita**

You are going to get back to me with an answer on this canceled leave for Reservists in Kuwait issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

Belluck, Pam. "A Canceled Leave for Reservists in Kuwait Distresses Families," *New York Times*, October 3, 2003.

DHR:dh  
100303-30

.....  
Please respond by 10/11/03

✓  
11/6

Sir,  
Response attached.  
UV/CDR Nosurzo  
10/5

600703

U22087 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1304-03  
29 October 2003

✓  
11/6

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RM 10/28

SUBJECT: Canceled Leave (U)

- **Question.** You are going to get back to me with an answer on this canceled leave for Reservists in Kuwait issue.
- **Answer.** The first group of 59 troops from US Army Reserve 368th Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) has already returned home via military airlift. The remainder of the unit will participate in the R&R program on a rotating basis as operational requirements allow.
- **Analysis**
  - The unit deployed to Kuwait on 15 April 2003 with 585 troops. In September 2003, the unit was notified that it would be required to stay in Kuwait for 365 days, making it eligible for the USCENTCOM Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program.
  - The 368th CEB Commander initiated a leave plan for his troops immediately. He approved leave in 15-day rotations with the understanding that the soldiers would have to pay their own way. This was based on a miscommunication of the military airlift priorities.
  - Unfortunately, 84 soldiers purchased commercial airline tickets before policy was clarified that commercial fares were not authorized for R&R. All 84 tickets were canceled and 59 soldiers received full refunds. The Army is diligently working refunds for the remaining soldiers.
  - The entire unit is now fully participating in the R&R military airlift program.

11

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: J. A. Bradley, Maj Gen, USAF, OCJCS/RM, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19950

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM	Mr. Hamilton	15 October 2003
USA	COL Chappell	15 October 2003

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/19951

we want to do that.

New York Times  
October 3, 2003

## 23. A Canceled Leave For Reservists In Kuwait Distresses Families

By Pam Belluck

BOSTON, Oct. 2 — Catherine Anzivino had excitedly told her son Michael the news. His father, Sgt. Scott Anzivino, who has been stationed in Kuwait for months, would be on a two-week home leave in November, there to celebrate Michael's fifth birthday.

"He misses him terrible," Ms. Anzivino said of her son. "He puts full Army gear on every day."

Then, on Monday, the call came in from Sergeant Anzivino. His unit, the 368th Engineer Combat Battalion, was no longer being allowed to go on leave. He and hundreds of other reservists in his unit were told that their commander had canceled their R & R.

This after Sergeant Anzivino and dozens of other members of his unit had spent their own money on expensive plane tickets because they were told there would not be room on the military's planes, relatives of the soldiers said.

Sergeant Anzivino and his family were crushed, his wife said from their home in Norfolk, a Boston suburb. She has not found the right words to break the news to her son. Her husband, as first sergeant of the battalion, found himself in a similar position.

"He's the one that had to tell the guys that they couldn't come home, she said. "He's looking at all his men and they're looking at him like 'Are you kidding?' His unit alone, they had \$43,000 worth of tickets. He's been up day and night trying to get refunds for these guys. It's really affecting their morale over there."

All week, wives, mothers and other relatives of soldiers

in the battalion, a group of Army reserve officers based in New England, have been in an uproar, pressing congressmen and senators and the White House to intervene and restore the leave.

"My husband was a very patriotic person," said Maria LaMonica of Revere, Mass. Her husband, Sgt. Daryle J. LaMonica, was injured when he served in Kosovo a few years ago with other members of his unit. "He could have fought going overseas this time because of his injury, but he wanted to go." Ms. LaMonica said.

Now, said Ms. LaMonica, who has written scathing letters to the White House and the defense secretary, among others, her husband, a police officer, is "completely disgusted."

She said Sergeant LaMonica, whose unit left home on Valentine's Day, "wants out as soon as he gets home."

"He'll never re-enlist," she said. "He loves his country, but at this moment, he hates his government."

Master Sgt. John Henning of the 368th in New England, who has remained at his unit's base in Londonderry, N.H., said the 600 soldiers in his unit in Kuwait, who have been building shelters and roads and doing carpentry on Army bases, had been told they would be able to rotate through two-week leaves beginning this week.

That changed earlier this week. "For whatever reason," Sergeant Henning said, "the policy came under review and it was changed to only soldiers who were in Iraq could take leave."

One member of the battalion called a reporter from Kuwait on Thursday night and explained what had happened. "The leave thing was kind of like a fiasco right from the beginning," said the soldier, a Massachusetts resident who would not allow his name to be used.

He said a commander had told the reservists that they could go on leave, but that they would have to pay for their own tickets — at cost of \$1,200 to \$2,500 — because soldiers in Iraq were being given priority seating on military planes.

Then this week, he said, "we were told that everything was canceled and we have to return the tickets." No one, the soldiers were told, would be allowed to take civilian aircraft, he said.

"Our battalion commander was never supposed to put out that we had leave," he said.

Maj. Mike Escudie, a spokesman for United States Central Command, which oversees troops in Iraq, said relatives of soldiers in other units that are taking part in the largest home leave program since the Vietnam War have been concerned about home leave policies, too.

Major Escudie said he was not familiar with the situation with the 368th, but he said that in all cases involving home leave, the commander of a unit "has full discretion."

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who was contacted by many 368th families, issued a statement on Thursday saying: "It's far from clear that any military necessity justified the change. If not, the leave should be reinstated as soon as possible."

Sergeant Henning said he was told on Thursday that commanders in the field were considering allowing the soldiers based in Kuwait to get their leave after all. That is likely to be the only thing that would assuage family members, some of whom planned weddings or parties for the returning soldiers.

Carol McManus of Lawrence, Mass., had been expecting her 19-year-old son, Brandon, to be home on Wednesday at 4 p.m. "We were going to celebrate his birthday," which was in May, Ms. McManus said. "And we were going to celebrate

Christmas."

She said that when the home leave was canceled, her son had been "very depressed for a few days" and "that's not exactly good for morale."

Erin Bishop, of Falmouth, Mass., said that to welcome home her husband, Sgt. Scott Bishop, "I actually had a stretch limo booked with champagne, the whole nine yards, to pick him up at the airport."

She had planned a variety of activities to allow him to spend time with their 20-month-old daughter, who has changed so much since he saw her last.

"Am I sounding like a victim?" Ms. Bishop said. "Because I don't mean to be. We support our husbands and all these troops. But we all got angry, and it's now our mission to try and do something about it."

Washington Post  
October 3, 2003

Pg. 1

## 24. Justice To Begin Leak Interviews Within Days

By Susan Schmidt and Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writers

Justice Department investigators plan to begin interviewing Bush administration officials within days in an effort to swiftly identify anyone who may have leaked the identity of a covert CIA agent, a department official said yesterday.

"We will move quickly to interview likely suspects in the next few days," the official said. He declined to provide names, but said the first interviews will be with officials whose names have surfaced in news reports as possible sources of the information.


The move appears intended to short-circuit Democratic calls for the appointment of a special counsel and avoid what could

2A514B

6  
November 5, 2003

LTG Steven Blum

Gen. Dick Myers  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Thank you for your memo outlining the initiatives you are planning for the National Guard Bureau.

The issues we are wrestling with concerning the Reserve components are critical to shaping and arranging our force for the future. We must get to the 80% solution quickly, and then refine and improve over time.

It seems to me the transformation of the National Guard will have to be planned and conducted from two perspectives: first, internal transformation to move the Army and Air Force guard organizations into today's warfighting environment, and, second, external transformation to ensure adequate linkages to the joint and component forces they will operate with.

I look forward to receiving your briefing. The sooner the better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110503-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

U18498 : /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19956

# **NATIONAL GUARD INITIATIVES UPDATE ON SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S MEMO (30 JUL 03)**

- ✓ **“ADAPT TO BETTER SUPPORT THE WAR ON TERRORISM, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY”**
- ✓ **“ENHANCE THE AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF OUR NATIONAL GUARD FORCES”**
- ✓ **“WORK WITH THE SERVICES... TO ADJUST THEIR AC/RC MIX”**

(1)

# **“ADAPT”**

INTERNAL

- **REORGANIZED NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU ON THE JOINT STAFF MODEL (1 Jul 03)**
- **ELIMINATED 108 PREVIOUSLY EXISTING HQS AND ESTABLISHED A STANDING JOINT FORCE HQS IN EACH STATE/TERRITORY (1 Oct 03)**
- **ENHANCING WMD RESPONSE CAPABILITY WITHIN SELECT EXISTING NATIONAL GUARD UNITS (NLT 1 Oct 04)**

EXTERNAL

- **ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMBATANT COMMANDS**


(2)

12-Dec-03


11-L-0559/OSD/19958

# Enhanced WMD Response Capability

## Combatant Commander Capabilities Required



## National Guard Response Initiatives



(2a)

12-Dec-03

11-L-0559/OSD/19959

# National Guard

## State Partnership Program Activity

### PACOM

Alaska / Mongolia  
 Hawaii/Guam / Philippines  
 Washington / Thailand  
 Partnerships: 4

### SOUTHCOM

Arkansas / Guatemala  
 Connecticut / Uruguay  
 District of Columbia / Jamaica  
 Florida / Venezuela  
 Florida / Guyana  
 Kentucky / Ecuador  
 Louisiana / Belize  
 Massachusetts / Paraguay  
 Mississippi / Bolivia  
 Missouri / Panama  
 New Hampshire / El Salvador  
 Puerto Rico / Honduras  
 Puerto Rico / Dominican Republic  
 West Virginia / Peru  
 Wisconsin / Nicaragua  
 Partnerships: 15

### EUCOM

Alabama / Romania  
 California / Ukraine  
 Colorado / Georgia  
 Georgia / Georgia  
 Illinois / Slovakia  
 Indiana / Slovakia  
 Kansas / Armenia  
 Maryland / Romania  
 Maryland / Romania  
 Michigan / Romania  
 Minnesota / Romania  
 New Jersey/New York / Albania  
 New York / South Africa  
 North Carolina / Moldova  
 Ohio / Hungary  
 Oklahoma / Azerbaijan  
 Pennsylvania / Lithuania  
 Tennessee / Bulgaria  
 Texas/Neb / Czech Republic  
 Utah / Macedonia  
 Vermont / Macedonia  
 Partnerships: 21

### CENTCOM

Arizona / Kazakhstan  
 Louisiana / Uzbekistan  
 Montana / Kyrgyzstan  
 Nevada / Turkmenistan  
 Virginia / Tajikistan  
 Partnerships: 5

### Bilateral

Iowa/Russia  
 Minnesota/Norway  
 Oregon/Austria

### Potential Partners

Ghana EUCOM  
 Tunisia EUCOM  
 Indonesia COM  
 Malaysia PACOM  
 Pakistan CENTCOM  
 Trinidad SOUTHCOM

### TOTALS

Partnerships	44
Bilateral	3
Potential	6

12-Dec-03

(2b)

11-L-0559/OSD/19960

# **“ENHANCE ACCESSIBILITY”**

INTERNAL / EXTERNAL


- **DIRECT DEPLOYMENT FROM HOME STATION**
- **HOME STATION MOBILIZATION/DEMOBILIZATION**
- **EXPANDING VOLUNTEERISM (UNITS)**
- **21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY MINUTEMAN (TRAIN, ALERT, DEPLOY)  
MODEL FOR THE “HOME GAME”**
- **TRAIN, ALERT, MOBILIZE, DEPLOY: MODEL FOR “AWAY  
GAME”**

↑  
**“SQUISH”**

(3)

Joint Exp Home  
(Constitution)  
"Home Game"

Joint Exp OCONUS  
"Away Game"



12-Dec-03

11-L-0559/OSD/19962

# **“WORK WITH...ADJUST”**

**EXTERNAL**

- **CLOSE AND FULL COLLABORATION IN BOTH ARMY AND AIR FORCE AC/RC REBALANCING INITIATIVES**
- **TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL GUARD FOR BOTH THE JOINT AND EXPEDITIONARY WARFIGHT AND THE HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION**

**INTERNAL / EXTERNAL**


- **OPTIMIZING FOR BOTH “HOME AND AWAY” GAMES**
- **WE ARE COMMITTED TO “DOING WHAT IS RIGHT FOR AMERICA”**

(4)

# STRUCTURING THE FORCE

reflects the full of the Army's . It acknowledges ment for it and rotational ell as combat ) continuing t for Homeland d Defense forces icted.

nal symbology is illustrative in all inclusive depiction of il requirements.



(4a)


11-L-0559/OSD/19964

# **NEW RELATIONSHIPS**

## **EXTERNAL**

- **STRENGTHENED THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGB AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE, AND THE STATES/TERRITORIES**
- **EXPANDING EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMBATANT COMMANDERS**
- **ESTABLISH NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DOD AND THE STATES/TERRITORIES FOR NATIONAL GUARD MATTERS**
- **BOTTOM LINE: NEED TO “CODIFY AND INSTITUTIONALIZE” THIS RELATIONSHIP**


(5)



11 Sept 01

(1986) Goldwater-Nichols Act

(1947) National Security Act



12-Dec-03

(5a)  
11-L-0559/OSD/19966

EF-7075  
03/013875

6  
October 4, 2003

NATO 0337

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Big Issue for NATO

Let's make sure we focus on the big issue for NATO—that is the EU role and the risk it can damage NATO. I want to bring that up in my bilaterals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-29

.....

Please respond by 10/6/03

OCT 6 2003  
1520 RECEIVED IN ISP

OCT 8 2003

TALKING POINTS WERE DRAFTED  
AND INCLUDED IN SECDEF BRIEFING  
BOOK FOR NATO INFORMAL BILATERALS  
IN COLORADO.

- MIRA RICARDEL  
(ACTING ASD)

06-10-03 12:03 IN  
Forwarded 10/14  
vr/CDR Nosenzo

U22105 /03

60203

October 6, 2003

250

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Ethics Agreement and Senator Lautenberg

Apparently Senator Lautenberg requested a copy of my ethics agreement. I am curious to know if that is all he gets. My recollection is I have done a number of things well beyond the ethics agreement required by the Office of Government Ethics. Specifically, I am referring to the things I have agreed to do with the Senate that have supplemented the things I have done for the Office of Government Ethics. If that is true, and Lautenberg asks for just the ethics agreement and doesn't ask for the full file or the supplements, then he would not know that I had done those additional things. Therefore, my circumstance would be presented to him in a manner that is incomplete.

Please see if what I am saying is correct and show me what he would get on each basis, so we can decide what we want to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 100603-1

.....  
 Please respond by 10/14/03

6 OCT 03

U22106 /03

October 6, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Col. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Toys for Iraq

Here is an e-mail from a friend of ours, (b)(6) Please look into the organization referenced in the e-mail and see if we can find out if it is legitimate. If it is, let's connect him and urge him on, and then let (b)(6) know what we have done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/30/03 (b)(6) e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
100603-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

U22107 /03

6002703

**Joyce Rumsfeld**

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: "Joyce", "See her", "DA"]*

**From:** (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)@net>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 30, 2003 6:26 PM  
**Attach:** Fwd US soldier's online campaign for toys, school supplies.eml  
**Subject:** from (b)(6) Fwd: US soldier's online campaign for toys, school supplies

Dear Joyce,

I am forwarding this note from a very good friend (b)(6) I have great respect for him and his family. His uncle, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) is very excited about this idea, Toys for Iraqi Children, and wants to help in a big way...he thinks his cousin (b)(6) could do a lot for the program through the internet, with no profit, of course.

As you can see from his email, (b)(6) wants to know if this program is bonafide and approved by the U.S. Army.

Please let me know what you think.

I will share more details when we speak.

Love to all...

(b)(6)

10/3/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/19994

October 6, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Military Academies

352 Academies

Please look into the military academies. I understand professors can get tenure, and that deans are chosen only from tenured professors. If so, it appears that people who have real world experience are unlikely to be a part of the process.

I also have questions about the Boards of Trustees. Are they properly monitoring the academies?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100603-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

60CT03

U22108 /03

566

October 6, 2003

370

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rotation

In thinking more about the rotation, some additional thoughts come to mind:

1. How will each of the replacement units be configured and equipped? Will the configuration and equipment relate to the area they will be going into, since there are such differences in the various areas?
2. Second, have we given careful thought about the units that will be rotating in, as to how well each particular unit will fit into the areas where they are going? I have not been given any indication our people have been thinking about this.
3. Third, does it make sense to have several of the top people from the units rotating in to go in early, to get the lay of the land and think through how they want their unit to be equipped, organized and configured and whether or not their training is appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100603-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

U22109 /03

602753

October 6, 2003

Belgium

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Media in Brussels

When I go to Brussels in December, I would like to spend some time with the European media there and maybe some of the senior media people.

We ought to get some creative work going to think who in Belgium are the real thoughtful people—the Jim Hoaglands, George Wills and the Tom Friedmans—and see some of those folks.

Let's get a plan pulled together now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100603-21

.....  
Please respond by 11 / 10 2003

*OS*  
*10-29*

6 OCT 03

U22110 /03

October 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keeping Tom Franks Informed

*Centcom*

I don't think we are keeping Tommy Franks well informed.

I talked to somebody last night who said he talked to Tom Franks, and Tom was concerned about troop rotations and a series of other things. He is out there giving speeches, talking to the press and talking to important people. I think it is critical that we have someone assigned on the Joint Staff to keep him informed and tuned in as to what is going on and what we are doing, so he is positive, not negative.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100603-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

*OB*  
*10-29*

U22111 /03

*60 OCT 03*

6  
October 3, 2003

200.4

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Military Families Moving

I was asked a question today about the problem people have moving so much when their kids are in high school. I know the Army has a policy on that. Is there some way we can do something about that?

Thanks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

600CT03

U22112 /03

October <sup>6</sup>/~~4~~, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Briefing

CENTCOM

My understanding is that I am due a briefing sometime soon from CENTCOM and Bremer on all security efforts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-32

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

*Wed*

6 OCT 03

U22113 /03

October <sup>6</sup> / 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock *JA*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Combined Joint Task Force

I certainly agree that what we need is a combined joint task force in Iraq.

Please let me have a proposal along the lines we discussed in the Round Table.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-33

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*05*  
*10-25*

6 OCT 03

U22114 /03

October <sup>6</sup>/~~4~~, 2003

020NRO

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NRO

Please come back to me with a proposal coordinated with CIA as to what we do about NRO. We have to fix the lack of continuity, we have to get clarity as to purpose, we have to get the right leadership, and we have to figure out a way to get some Reserves for their work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-36

*OB*

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*10-29*

6004703

U22115 /03

October 6, 2003

*Handwritten initials and signatures: G.L., [unclear], [unclear]*

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: NRO

Please come back to me with a proposal coordinated with CIA as to what we do about NRO. We have to fix the lack of continuity, we have to get clarity as to purpose, we have to get the right leadership, and we have to figure out a way to get some Reserves for their work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-36

*Handwritten: 10/15*

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*Handwritten: checkmark, 10/15*

Sir -

I will see (b)(6) CIA, on 17 Oct.

I have talked to (b)(6). I told him we needed to review our decisions related to NRO based on The Space Commission Report.

He agreed, with enthusiasm. He acknowledges the current structure, assignments, tasks, etc. are not optimal.

It is important this review and any recommendations and changes not be seen as a lack of confidence in (b)(6) else all that is being done well - and there is - will be lost.

*Handwritten: SC, 10/13/03*

11-L-0559/OSD/20003

Forwarded 10/14  
✓/CDR Nazareno

October 4, 2003

781

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tricare

Here is an e-mail from Newt Gingrich on Tricare. You might want to get briefed on that.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/3/03 Gingrich e-mail to Winkenwerder re: A Consumer Driven System for Tricare

DHR dh  
10/04/03

.....  
Please respond by 10/13/03

60CT03

U22116 /03

✓  
194

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

cc: Craddock  
DiRita

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Friday, October 03, 2003 5:12 PM  
**To:** william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil  
**Cc:** ronald.e.bachman@us.pwcglobal.com; dpavey@aei.org; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil;  
(b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Subject:** a consumer driven system for tricare

I was briefed wednesday by ron bachman (email above) at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, on a model of consumer driven health insurance that he thinks could bring down costs by significant amounts.

He thought a consumer driven model might save the state of Georgia over \$1 billion over the next five years.

that would imply a potential savings of at least \$1 billion a year for tricare.

this is an optional insurance system that allows individuals to choose and relies on being so desirable with health reimbursement accounts and other incentives that it builds market share in a positive way.

you might want to have ron brief you on the ideas he is implementing

newt

October 4, 2003

C119  
✓  
1/8

IRAQ

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Help from Library of Congress

Jim Billington of the Library of Congress is anxious to get over to Iraq and help the librarians deal with the libraries in Iraq. Please report back to me what happens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100403-10

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

Sir,  
A follow up on a previously answered memo. The original response is last under.

vr/  
CDR Nosunzo  
/e

U22117. /03

CPA 00155-03

60CT03



THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS

4/8  
1/8

December 15, 2003

Dear Mr. Jeffery:

Thank you for your letter of October 15, 2003, offering to assist the Library of Congress team that was going to Baghdad between October 25 and November 4. Your office was very helpful in providing logistical support to the team, including air tickets and accommodations in Kuwait.

The trip was successful, and the team returned and prepared a report that was sent to Baghdad. It assisted CPA advisors and the Ministry of Culture in proceeding with a plan to preserve existing collections, care for damaged materials, and begin planning to move the National Library to new quarters.

We really appreciate all the help the CPA gave the Library of Congress team. CPA's help was critical. Together we made possible the reconstruction of a small but vital part of Iraqi culture and society.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James H. Billington".

James H. Billington  
The Librarian of Congress

Mr. Reuben Jeffery III  
Representative and Executive Director  
CPA Washington  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000



COALITION  
PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY  
REPRESENTATIVE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

October 15, 2003

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

CC: Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz  
Undersecretary for Policy Doug Feith

FROM: Reuben Jeffery III  
Representative and Executive Director, CPA Washington

SUBJECT: Help from Library of Congress

This is to reply to your memo dated October 6 regarding the interest expressed by Dr. James Billington, Librarian of Congress, in providing assistance to CPA in building a national library in Iraq. I am pleased to report that Dr. Billington is getting the full assistance of various CPA staff, including the two relevant ministries in Iraq: Culture and Higher Education. A small delegation will be traveling to Iraq next week to prepare an assessment of needs and to return with advice for Dr. Billington on how his time and services can best be spent in Iraq.

We will be pleased to keep you apprised of progress.

570

October <sup>6</sup> 2003

W  
E  
J

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: TPFDD

Apparently there is a TPFDD conference going that you briefed me on today. I thought those things were behind us. Do you want to call it a "force flow" discussion or something?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100403-15

.....  
Please respond by ~~10/17/03~~ 10/21/03

✓  
10/16

Ⓒ 10/16

Sir,  
Per DJS the conference is  
a "Force Flow Conference" now.

vr/  
CDR Nosenzo  
10/16

600CT03

U22118 /03

October <sup>6</sup> / 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Haj

I talked to Prince Bandar about Haj and the importance of our handling it right, both with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq. He agreed and wants to put together a group to think through how we manage it in a way that we can avoid having terrorists moving back and forth or money moving back and forth and the like.

John, you should start thinking about working with your Saudi counterparts on that. If I can be helpful, please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100403-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*OB*  
*10-20*

6 OCT 03

U22119 /03

October 6, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Weekly Report on Afghanistan

We simply have to get a weekly report on Afghanistan. Would you please drop what you are doing and get at it, and let's get it done, just like we did on Iraq.

Please fax me a dirty first-go at it no later than Thursday.

Thanks.

D11R:dh  
100603-35 (fs computer)

.....  
Please respond by 10/9/03

U22120 /03

60CT03

October 6, 2003

350.001

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keane's Speech

Please get General Jack Keane's speech, where he says, "The soldiers don't want to die, but they are willing to." It is a brilliant speech. You ought to think about that, and we ought to credit him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100603-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

600703

U22121 /03

October <sup>6</sup>~~7~~, 2003

322

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>  
SUBJECT: Approval Authority for Joint Service

We should make sure we get the delegation changed, so Charlie Abell no longer has approval authority—I do.

Also have them get an indication of who is getting waivers and how many they are as a percentage of something.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/21/03

U22122 /03

602103

6  
October 3, 2003

292  
eb2

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tuition

I need an update on how we are doing on getting states to give in-state tuition, even though military families have just moved there. Nation-wide, no one would lose any money if they did that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

10 OCT 03

U22123 /03

10/17

*[Handwritten scribbles]*

October 6, 2003

IRAN

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iran

*China*

Before you do anything about Iran and DATTs, please let me know what you are thinking.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

6 OCT 03

*Sik:*

*2 thoughts:*

- 1.) Beijing post is a lister billet  
There are no suitable listers or individuals  
chosen for promotion.  
There are very suitable O-6s, one of  
whom is now at the Embassy and was  
passed over for promotion.  
Alternative is to give an O-6 a brevet  
to O-7, which President can do.  
I'm looking into this; will have a proposal.*
- 2.) Give Jacoby to relook the entire DATT  
program.  
More to follow.*

*SC  
10/6/03*

U22124 103

*ASU-2*

✓  
10/16

Two thoughts:

1. Beijing post is a one-star billet. There are no suitable one-stars or individuals chosen for promotion. There are very suitable O-6s, one of whom is now at the Embassy, but was passed over for promotion. Alternative is to give an O-6 a brevet to O-7, which the President can do. I'm looking into this; will have a proposal.
2. I've asked Jacoby to re-look at the entire DATT program.

More to follow

U22124 /03

-STEVE CAMBONE

---

October <sup>6</sup> / 2003

337 WH

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>  
SUBJECT: Next POTUS Meeting

For my next weekly meeting with the President, please see if we can schedule two meetings, back-to-back, one for my meeting with the President, and one adding in DCI George Tenet (if his schedule permits it) and Josh Bolton to talk about the intel budget situation.

Please talk to Steve Cambone and have Steve try to set it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-22

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

6 OCT 03

U22125 /03

7  
October 7, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Joint Service and Cong. Skelton

We ought to make sure we schedule a lunch in November with Ike Skelton after we get the assumptions fashioned on Joint Service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100303-23

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

U22126 /03

323

100303

10/9

October 9, 2003

Netherlands

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Dutch Issues

Arrived before  
my meeting  
was over

You should follow up with the Dutch on the following items:

1. The F-16 assistance.
2. The six years to get precision-guided munitions.

I will take care of the other problem on the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-20 (is computer)

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓ 10/9

SecDef-

I have spoken with my Dutch  
colleagues. They were unable to answer my  
basic questions on these issues. They  
said they would provide me with papers  
on these topics. I will then follow-up  
with Mike Wynne's folks.

90CT03

U22127 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20019 J.D.

October 9, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report

I want to start sending Geoff Hoon the weekly report on Iraq, so he sees that data.  
We ought to do it with the MoD of Poland also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-22 (fs computer)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
10/27

SecDef —

We send this to the Brits (Hoon)  
via secure fax right now —  
soon to use e-mail.

For the Poles, we currently  
send it to their embassy &  
they send forward. We should  
soon have secure ~~an~~ e-mail to  
our Defense attache' in Poland  
and will send it to him to distribute  
(more timely).

9 OCT 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/20020 022128 103 (10/25)

In reply refer to EF-7137 and I# 03/014133

October 9, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch

SUBJECT: Usability Index

I want to see that usability index that apparently was sent around by the Secretary-General.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-4 (ts computer)

.....  
Please respond by 17 OCT 03

OCT 10 2003  
1120 RECEIVED IN ISP

*Done*

U22129 /03

10-10-03 09:44 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20021

NATO 332

9 OCT 03

October 9, 2003


3538

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Olympics

Do we need to talk about what we might want to propose to do for the Olympics as a country and whether or not we want to have the NATO Response Force used?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-17 (ts computer)



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*OB  
10-21*

9 OCT 03

U22130 /03

October 9, 2003

322

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Local Issues

In the future, let's get the advance people to do a better job of briefing me on local military issues before I go into an area.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-15 (ts computer)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*SecDef* \_\_\_\_\_

*✓*  
*10/29*

*- you are right*

*- will add a task to the  
checklist the advance people  
use when they prep the local  
brief*

*- We will do better on this*

*C* <sup>10/28</sup>

900503

U22131 /03

October 9, 2003

060

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Films

You ought to take a look at the Transformation and NATO Response Force films. Some folks think we ought to circulate them in and out of DoD. You ought to look at them and decide.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-7 (ts computer)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*SecDef*

*10/9*

*✓ 10/9*

*Will do. I agree; they were both quite good. Will consider how to use them.*

*Di Rita*

90CT03

U22132 /03

October 14, 2003

C 11/24  
✓  
11/24

IRAQ

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Jerry Bremr  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*  
SUBJECT: US Sponsors

Why don't you test the idea with Jerry about the possibility of having American cities sponsor Iraq cities with populations of 100,000 or more.

Also look at the possibility of American universities sponsoring Iraqi universities.

I suppose we could also request US professional organizations—athletic, theatrical, musical, etc.—to help provide instruction for Iraqi children.

Why don't you look into that for me.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
101403-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

Sir  
Response attached  
✓/cmr Nasir  
11/24

14 OCT 03

U22133 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20025



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

COALITION  
PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY  
REPRESENTATIVE

November 5, 2003

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

CC: L. Paul Bremer III  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Reuben Jeffery III

SUBJECT: US Sponsors

This is to respond to your October 14<sup>th</sup> memo in which you suggest that we investigate a number of partnerships involving American associations and institutions. We now have a Director of Social Program Coordination and Civic Outreach, Don Eberly, working in our CPA Washington office, and his responsibility is to pursue a variety of private donations and partnership initiatives designed to help advance our reconstruction aims in Iraq. Our view is that we must do far more to explore private donations, in-kind contributions, and civic partnerships of the kind you have suggested.

For each Iraqi association – athletic, academic, scientific, musical, journalistic – there is an American counterpart that can be approached to provide support in one form or another. Web-based ties will be explored and wherever security and other practical considerations allow we will arrange travel to Iraq. The Librarian of Congress, for example, will likely be going to Iraq to help build a national Iraqi library.

On the educational front, we are investigating the possibility of major exchanges with professors and administrators as well as recruiting American universities to support, or adopt, Iraqi Universities.

In the sports category, we have already delivered 60,000 privately donated soccer balls to the children of Iraq, using U.S. troops for distribution. We are exploring other possibilities involving U.S. sports manufacturers and athletic leagues. We will be partnering with the NBA to bring basketball players, coaches and trainers to the U.S. to participate in training clinics that will be offered by three U.S. professional teams.

We are also pursuing opportunities to have American cities and urban management organizations team up with city leaders in Iraq. We will keep you informed of progress.



11-L-0559/OSD/20026

October 14, 2003

Iraq

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Business Development Committee

*DB  
10/20*

My recollection is you have some sort of a business development committee.

Is it designed to establish ground rules to rapidly approve and give permission for foreign companies to work in Iraq? It seems to me that we need to find a way to facilitate that to get some stimulus to the economy and also provide models for Iraqi businesses.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

14 Oct 03

U22134 /03

OCT 14 2003

TO: Gen Myers  
Doug Feith

381

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Defense Strategy and Military Strategy

Defense strategy and military strategy provide necessary context for the efforts of the Defense Department. Given that it has been two years since we did the Quadrennial Defense Review work on strategy, I direct the following:

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall prepare a defense strategy for my review, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare a military strategy for my review, in consultation with the Combatant Commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Within the next ten days, I would like to review your plans for completing this assignment.

Thanks.

101403-00

Please respond by 10/24/03

OB  
10-21

14 OCT 03

U22135 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

✓ 10/14  
✓ 10/14

ACTION MEMO

EF-7043  
CM-1239-03  
1 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/9/30*  
Douglas Feith, USD(P) *DF 10/10/03*

*Combination = need for DOD*

SUBJECT: Defense Strategy and Military Strategy

- At last Friday's tank session, which included Steve Cambone and Andy Hoehn, the Chiefs discussed the need for a separate defense strategy and military strategy to guide their efforts.
- The Joint Staff and Services have been drafting a military strategy based on lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, there is pending legislation, which would require the Chairman to produce a military strategy every two years.
- The discussion also was prompted by your question regarding the number of planning documents needed to guide this department (e.g., Contingency Planning Guidance, Defense Planning Guidance, Unified Command Plan, Joint Operating Concepts, etc.).
- In the end, all the participants in the meeting recommended against new legislation, but they agreed the department would benefit from a defense strategy, approved by you but distinct from the QDR report, that would provide overall direction and orientation.
- The participants also recommend development of a military strategy that would provide specific operational content to your defense strategy.
- Given our experiences over the past several years, the participants thought this would be a propitious time to produce a defense strategy and military strategy.
  - It would allow us to reflect on the conclusions we drew in the 2001 QDR.
  - It would also provide a sound basis for the next QDR.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached snowflake directing preparation of a defense strategy and military strategy.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: General Richard B. Myers, USAF, CJCS, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20029

571

October 14, 2003

322

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
 CC: LTG John Craddock  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Command for Sub-Saharan Africa

We ought to think about a command for sub-Saharan Africa. Its role might be military support and their other problems in the same command, with some sort of connection to the rest of the USG via a standing interagency committee.

We are likely to be drawn in militarily, as we were in Liberia, and the military alone is not going to solve their problems. We need to have all elements of the USG tied into a single, integrated plan—military requirements plus the post-military aspects.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 101403-4

.....  
 Please respond by 11/13/03

*Response Attached  
 4/1 COL B*

*11/13 →*

*14 Oct 03*

**U22136 / 03**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1343-03  
10 November 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 11/10*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	11/12

SUBJECT: Command for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

- **Question.** You requested we think about a command for SSA
- **Answer.** There could be significant benefit in establishing a joint interagency task force (JIATF) under USEUCOM to focus on SSA. A JIATF would provide the USG-wide integration you mention and a commitment of interagency manpower and resources – a prerequisite to that integration.
- **Analysis.**
  - Our staffs have considered alternate area of responsibility alignments for Africa in the ongoing Unified Command Plan (UCP) review. It does not appear that simply transferring responsibility for SSA away from USEUCOM will solve the problems you cite. The information paper (TAB B) highlights our review of options ranging from a unified command to a separate directorate at USEUCOM, including how they could be supported by a joint interagency coordination group.
  - Any of the proposed commands for Africa will have limited impact unless accompanied by a shift in USG priorities, resources, and personnel. SSA receives 0.06 percent of the foreign affairs budget. The Foreign Operations Budget for FY04 allocates SSA only \$23M in foreign military finance and \$12.5M in international military education and training funds.

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA, Director, DJ5: (b)(6)

*Mr Secretary,*  
*We will continue*  
*to assess all sub-*  
*Saharan options in*  
*the ongoing UCP review.*  
*WBS*

U18644 03

TAB B

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Options for Command for Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Purpose. To provide potential options for establishing a command for Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. Key Points

- The primary DOD concerns in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are failed states and weak governance that provide opportunities for:
  - Terrorist and criminal sanctuaries, including the training and operations against the United States and allies interests they support.
  - Instability resulting in requirements for US military intervention.
- DOD Security Cooperation Guidance (April 2003) sets DOD near-term SSA priorities to deal with these concerns.
- Limited infrastructure and weak governance in SSA often prevent DOD military-military initiatives from providing a meaningful return on investment. Integrated USG efforts are often required to deal with these challenges.
- Any change to DOD organization in SSA should therefore support:
  - USG-wide efforts to improve the capabilities of SSA states.
  - Counter-terrorist operations by US forces.
  - Planning and execution of USG stability operations.
- The options for such organizational changes include:
  - Joint interagency coordination group (JIACG).
  - Separate SSA directorate within USEUCOM.
  - Standing joint task force headquarters (SJFHQs).
  - Joint task force (JTF).
  - Joint interagency task force (JIATF).
  - Subunified command.
  - Separate unified command.
- The attached slides list advantages and disadvantages for each option.

Prepared by: Marc Dalton, CDR, USN  
Policy, J-5, (b)(6)



# *Options for Sub-Saharan Africa Command*

**CAPT John W. Miller  
J-5 Policy Division  
30 October 2003**

# *Sub-Saharan Africa Command Options*

---

**Possibly options for a command for Sub-Sahara include:**

- **Joint Interagency (IA) Coordination Group (JIACG)**
- **Separate SSA directorate within EUCOM**
- **Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) at Souda**
- **Joint Task Force (JTF)**
- **Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)**
- **Sub-Unified Command**
- **Separate Unified Command**

# ***JIACG***

---

## **PRO**

- **JIACG can be paired with other organization options**
- **Can expand existing EUCOM JIACG**
- **Can establish dedicated JIACG**
- **Flexible organization**
- **Can be used for both operational and mil-mil efforts**
- **Minimal resources needed to implement**

## **CON**

- **Not appropriate as a stand-alone organization – JIATF instead**
- **Large EUCOM span of control causes competition for attention**
- **Requires support from IA and additional funding from DoD**
- **Provides primarily reachback – requires support of IA**

# *Separate directorate within EU*

---

## PRO

- Improved focus and integration – especially for mil – mil
- Leverage EUCOM staff and resources
- Minimizes seam with EUCOM
- Could obtain support from EUCOM's JIACG
- Minimizes resources and time needed to implement

## CON

- Still affected by EU's large span of control
- Must compete with other agencies for resources
- Must utilize existing processes
- Any IA improvements must be consistent with EUCOM initiatives
- Impact on SSA proliferation will be limited

# *SJFHQ*

## PRO

- Improved focus and integration – especially for crisis response
- Some ability to leverage EUCOM staff and resources
- Limited seam with EUCOM
- Could obtain support from EUCOM's JIACG
- Highly operationally focused
- Limited resources needed to implement

## CON

- May still be affected by EUCOM's large span of control
- May need to compete within EUCOM for resources
- SJFHQs not mature – developmental distractions
- If so, any IA improvements tied to EUCOM initiatives
- Not well-suited to coordinate SSA mil – mil efforts

---

## PRO

- **Significantly improved focus and integration – especially for crisis response**
- **Robust stand-alone capabilities to direct operations**
- **Can establish a JOA to deal with cross-AOR problems if desired**
- **Could obtain support from EUCOM's JIACG**
- **Highly operationally focused**
- **Moderate resources needed to implement**

## CON

- **May be under-utilized without increased USG operations and resources to manage**
- **Requires support from EUCOM – but less than others**
- **Limited ability to leverage EUCOM staff and resources**
- **If so, any IA improvements tied to EUCOM initiatives**
- **May not be well-suited to coordinate SSA mil – mil efforts**

# ***JIATF***

## **PRO**

- **Significantly improved focus and integration – especially for crisis response**
- **Dedicated IA organization, resources and effort**
- **Signals national level attention domestically and globally**
- **Robust stand-alone capabilities to direct operations**
- **Can establish a JOA to deal with cross-AOR problems if desired**

## **CON**

- **May be under-utilized without increased USG operations and resources to manage**
- **Requires support from IA and national-level funding**
- **Limited ability to leverage EUCOM staff and resources**
- **Not previously used for mil – mil or IA crisis prevention efforts**
- **Requires support from EUCOM – but less than others**
- **Existing JIATFs are dedicated counter-drug organizations only**

# *Sub-unified Com*

## PRO

- Dramatically improved focus and integration
- Complete stand-alone capabilities to direct operations and mil-mil efforts
- Signals national level attention domestically and globally
- Can establish dedicated JIACG or support from EUCOM's
- Mitigates EUCOM span of control

## CON

- Creates an operating PACOM concern with
- Under-utilized with increases in DoD of resources to manage
- Requires major DoD allocation to establish
- Competes or requires and additional DoD
- Requires additional from new command and to CENTCOM v

# *Unified Com*

## PRO

- Dramatically improved focus and integration
- Maximum possible capabilities to direct operations and mil-mil efforts
- Signals national level attention domestically and globally
- Can establish dedicated JIACG at new command
- Mitigates EUCOM span of control

## CON

- Creates three way s – EUCOM, CENTCOM
- Under-utilized with increases in DoD o resources to mana
- Requires major DoI allocation to establ
- JIACG requires IA s additional DoD func
- Increases number c commanders repor

October 14, 2003

Iraq

TO: Col. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Toys for Iraqi Children

Attached is an e-mail from a friend of ours (b)(6) She has a friend named (b)(6) who has been in the process of trying to get toys over to Iraqi children.

Could you please have someone take a look at this and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach. (b)(6) e-mail  
10/9/03

DHR:dh  
101403-15

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

14 Oct 03

U22137 /03

✓  
10/14**Joyce Rumsfeld**

---

**From:** (b)(6) AND COMPAN" (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 09, 2003 2:02 PM  
**Subject:** (b)(6)

chief wiggles just posted a note asking to stop shipping boxes of toys for iraqi children to him!...he said the army told him they cant handle the volume!...as you know, i think this program is going to be huge and the first ten days volume proves it so far...i think this issue is , at this moment, a huge liability for the DOD...if the wiggles program gets the national attention it deserves now because the army cut off the shipping, the new york times will have a field day criticizing the DOD...i can see it now" \$87b and they cant even ship toys to kids?!"...the army needs to find a way to handle the volume... i just spoke to my cousin (b)(6) and he is saying he will offer free shipping to iraq for all stuff bot on the overstock site, and that overstock will pay to deliver it there outside APO cchannels despite this causing ostk to lose money.....he is going to speak to wiggles to talk about this, but i think DOD sould solve this before the nyt finds out...

TAB A

December 27, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Getting Joint

Do you feel we are pursuing these "getting joint" items I mention in the attached memo?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/30/02 SecDef MFR [073002-1]

DHR:dh  
122703-35 (to computer)

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

322

21 Dec 03

U22139 / 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/20044

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. B. ...' with a large flourish at the end.

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.

Some thoughts:

1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.
2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.
3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.
4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.
5. Ask Buck Kernan to give us a series of suggestions.

DHR:dh  
073002-1

Tab A

October 14, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hospital Meals

240

People are reading in the press that soldiers wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan and being treated at military hospitals (Walter Reed, for example) have to pay for their meals while they are in the hospital.

My understanding of the situation is that when soldiers are at their bases, they are not charged for meals, but when they are off-base they are given an allowance for meals wherever they are, except when they are on leave. Therefore, when they are in the hospital, they have been given the money for their meals, so they pay the hospital for their food. The press is reporting that the hospitals are charging them for their food, which technically may be true, but it is also true that the USG gives them the money to pay for their food.

Why don't you look into it. Maybe it would be better if the wounded were not given meal allowances when they are in the hospital, so the hospital would not charge them for meals, and we wouldn't have to take the hit in the press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

14 OCT 03

U22140 /03

October 14, 2003

Iraq

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Justification

Here are some interesting points that should be woven into what we are doing.  
They came out of a discussion I had with George Tenet.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/4/03 SecDef MFR: Discussion w/George Tenet [100403-12]

DHR:dh  
101403-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 Oct 03

U22141 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20047

October 4, 2003

Iraq

SUBJECT: Discussion w/George Tenet

1. "Imminent danger"—we let that completely get away from us. No one in the Administration ever said the word "imminent." They always said "gathering" problem.
2. The fair question is would you have changed anything if you had known then what you know now, and the answer is, "No." The only difference is we know they had a bio-surge capability.
3. Would the analysts have come to any different assessment today knowing what we know, than they did then. The answer is, "No."

DHR:db  
100403-12

4 Oct 03

U22142 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20048

October 14, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Garner Memo

*Garner*

Attached is a memo Jay Garner sent me, which I found interesting and compelling. Why don't you take a look at it and tell me what you think. Let's talk about it.

Regards,

Attach.  
9/29/03 Garner memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101403-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*GEN. MYERS  
BCC: PAUL WOLFSHITZ  
Doug Ferrit  
GEN. PACE*

*OB  
1/2/09*

*14 Oct 03*

U22143 /03

MTG

✓  
10/14

September 29, 2003

Mr Secretary,

As I look at our problems in Iraq I place them in three major categories: Security, Sovereignty, and Time Available. For what it's worth here are my brief thoughts starting with the Time Available.

- **Time Available:** It appears that most of the projects we have planned for Iraq are on a time table to be completed in a year or less. This is excellent considering the magnitude of the tasks. However, when viewed in the same sandbox as the coming Presidential election, that time table is too short. By March, we need to have, at least, the appearance of completion or near completion of major tasks. In other words, let's develop a six month strategy of "near completion" for those areas that are the most politically volatile, i.e., government, and security/ law enforcement. If we take this approach and attack with robust, dedicated Tiger Teams we can achieve remarkable results by March. I believe that any decision after March, no matter how good or how viable, will be criticized as "an Administration decision made under duress and pressure".
- **Sovereignty:** I believe Jerry Bremer's 7 step plan for government is logical and correct... but it is too slow and we can take a half-step now. Continue with Jerry's plan but by December declare the Committee of 25 a "Provisional Government." The Provisional Government would remain under the oversight of the U.S. but would have increased power and authority such as: A budget, (which is visible and auditable), nomination and approval of Reconstruction projects, and prioritization of security areas (to include selection of restationing locations of the new Iraqi Army) etc. Provisional status while keeping us in charge gives them a mantle of real authority but more importantly a voice in their own future and makes them directly responsible for its outcome.
- **Security:** Take a modular approach with both the National Police and the Iraqi Army. There are 18 Provisional areas in Iraq (17 provinces plus Baghdad). The

three Kurdish provinces are not a security problem, so the focus should be the remaining 15. Immediately begin a program that upgrades and provides individual training to police and regular Army (one Infantry battalion per province) in 5 provinces per quarter. The training won't be great, but it will be sufficient. Upon completion of each 5 provinces, put the U.S. Forces into garrison and only use them as emergency reaction forces. Let the Iraqi police and Army be the visible security force. Contract this effort, make it a turn key operation with award fees for achieving the desired time table. Use a proven contractor such as MPRI, who does this type thing world-wide, on short notice and with superb results. After the contractor has finished each of the five provinces, place a small contingent of U.S. military advisors with each Army company and each police detachment. The advisors would be responsible for their collective training gained through daily operations.

If we do this, by end of March we'll have a credible governmental structure that is recognizable to the Iraqi people and we'll have Iraqi faces on the security effort for the two-thirds of the country. All of this is doable, it simply means that we need to: Sharply focus our effort, change from the tightly centralized over controlling process we now have, and finally, we need to trust that the Iraqis can do this. As I stated previously T.E. Lawrence had it right, "It is better that they do it imperfectly than that you do it perfectly. For it is their country and your time here is limited." Over to you, thanks for the opportunity to correspond.

Jay

October 14, 2003

335 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bob Bell

*Done*  
10/17

Please don't forget you are supposed to be getting me a letter thanking Bob Bell for his work at NATO.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-8

.....

Please respond by 10/17/03 *10/15*

*I have not forgotten.  
Thanks.*

*Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita *10/15*

14 Oct 03

U22144 /03

October 14, 2003

Middle East

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Niger Yellowcake

This material from Krauthammer's piece is interesting. You might want to use it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Krauthammer, Charles. "Middle East: The Realities," *Washington Post*, July 25, 2003, p. 25.

DHR:dh  
101403-18

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

14 Oct 03

U22145 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20053

intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." The country the British were referring to was the former French colony of Niger.

The British dossier went on to caution that even if Iraq did obtain uranium, "while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they [sanctions] were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously."

"This was a program on ice," explains one Iraq expert, "which would have been restarted the moment sanctions were lifted and inspections ended." That time frame was entirely missing from Bush's speech.

Third, the British intelligence cited by the president was almost certainly based on reporting by the French government. French intelligence sources say that their spy service closely monitors Niger's uranium production, and France is known to be the most accurate source of information about Niger.

The British focused partly on a report that an Iraqi trade delegation had visited Niger in 1999. Because 70 percent of Niger's exports are uranium, and because Iraq had bought more than 500 tons of uranium from Niger in the 1980s, the British concluded that the Iraqis were considering renewed uranium purchases. This view was reinforced by additional, post-1999 intelligence, which also almost certainly came from France. The British didn't tell the United States, because sharing such sensitive information with a third country is an intelligence no-no.

Finally, neither the British dossier nor Bush's reference to it had anything to do with documents that surfaced last year alleging that the Iraqis had

actually purchased uranium from Niger. They were later branded "crude forgeries" by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, who were given a copy by the United States. The British were unaware of the documents when they prepared the September dossier and learned of them only after the president's State of the Union speech.

Where those crude forgeries came from remains a mystery. I should note that this column may have erred last April in stating that France had put the documents in circulation. While I am confident that France was the main source of information about Niger's uranium, I don't know who created the forgeries or why.

None of these details excuses the outrageous White House attempt to shift blame in the affair to CIA Director George Tenet. Laudably (albeit late), Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley stepped forward this week to confess that he had received two memos and a phone call from Tenet in early October warning that the CIA regarded the intelligence about Niger as suspect. Somehow he forgot about Tenet's warnings by State of the Union time in late January.

But in fairness, neither Bush nor the British were crazy to be worried about the Iraqi nuclear program. Iraq had aggressively tried to build a bomb in the 1980s, following three separate technological paths to produce its own enriched uranium. The British believe that after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq decided to concentrate on one technique known as "gas-centrifuge enrichment."

Evidence that this program was indeed "on ice" came last month from Iraqi scientist Mahdi Obeidi. He said that when U.N. inspections began in 1991, he had been ordered to bury the plans and equipment for gas centrifuges in the

garden of his house in Baghdad. There they remained, apparently untouched amid the rose bushes, until Obeidi disclosed their existence in May. He had withheld the information when he was interviewed by the IAEA last year.

The more you know about the 16 words, the more you realize how murky the intelligence business is. Politicians want to mold such caveats and uncertainties into stirring speeches. That's where the trouble begins.

Washington Post  
July 25, 2003  
Pg. 25

#### 45. Middle East: The Realities

By Charles Krauthammer

Amid the general media and Democratic frenzy over Niger yellowcake, it is Bill Clinton who injected a note of sanity. "What happened often happens," Clinton told Larry King. "There was a disagreement between British intelligence and American intelligence. The president said it was British intelligence that said it... British intelligence still maintains that they think the nuclear story was true. I don't know what was true, what was false. I thought the White House did the right thing in just saying, 'Well, we probably shouldn't have said that.' Big deal. End of story. End of scandal.

The fact that the Democrats and the media can't seem to let go of it, however, is testimony to their need (and ability) to change the subject. From what? From the moral and strategic realities of Iraq. The moral reality finally burst through the yellowcake fog with the death of the Hussein brothers, psychopathic torturers who would be running Iraq if not for the policy enunciated by President Bush in that very same State of the Union address.

That moral reality is a little hard for the left to

explain, considering the fact that it parades as the guardian of human rights and all-around general decency, and rallied millions to prevent the policy that liberated Iraq from Uday and Qusay's reign of terror.

Then there are the strategic realities. Consider what has happened in the Near East since Sept. 11, 2001:

(1) In Afghanistan, the Taliban have been overthrown and a decent government has been installed.

(2) In Iraq, the Saddam Hussein regime has been overthrown, the dynasty has been destroyed and the possibility for a civilized form of governance exists for the first time in 30 years.

(3) In Iran, with dictatorships toppled to the east (Afghanistan) and the west (Iraq), popular resistance to the dictatorship of the mullahs has intensified.

(4) In Pakistan, once the sponsor and chief supporter of the Taliban, the government radically reversed course and became a leading American ally in the war on terror.

(5) In Saudi Arabia, where the presence of U.S. troops near the holy cities of Mecca and Medina deeply inflamed relations with many Muslims, the American military is leaving -- not in retreat or with apology but because it is no longer needed to protect Saudi Arabia from Hussein.

(6) Yemen, totally unhelpful to the United States after the attack on the USS Cole, has started cooperating in the war on terror.

(7) In the small, stable Gulf states, new alliances with the United States have been established.

(8) Kuwait's future is secure, the threat from Saddam Hussein having been eliminated.

(9) Jordan is secure, no longer having Iraq's tank armies and radical nationalist influence at its back.

(10) Syria has gone quiet, closing terrorist offices in Damascus and playing down

its traditional anti-Americanism.

(11) Lebanon's southern frontier is quiet for the first time in years, as Hezbollah, reading the new strategic situation, has stopped cross-border attacks into Israel.

(12) Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations have been restarted, a truce has been declared and a fledgling Palestinian leadership has been established that might actually be prepared to make a real peace with Israel.

That's every country from the Khyber Pass to the Mediterranean Sea. Everywhere you look, the forces of moderation have been strengthened. This is a huge strategic advance not just for the region but for the world, because this region in its decades-long stagnation has incubated the world's most virulent anti-American, anti-Western, anti-democratic and anti-modernist fanaticism.

This is not to say that the Near East has been forever transformed. It is only to say that because of American resolution and action, there is a historic possibility for such a transformation.

But it all hinges on success in Iraq. On America's not being driven out of Iraq the way it was driven out of Lebanon and Somalia -- which is what every terrorist and every terrorist state wants to see happen. And with everything at stake, what is the left doing? Everything it can to undermine the enterprise. By implying both that it was launched fraudulently (see yellowcake) and, alternately, that it has ensnared us in a hopeless quagmire.

Yes, the cost is great. The number of soldiers killed is relatively small, but every death is painful and every life uniquely valuable. But remember that just yesterday we lost 3,000 lives in one day. And if this region is not transformed, on some future day we will lose 300,000.

The lives of those as yet

unknown innocents hinge now on success in Iraq. If we win the peace and leave behind a decent democratic society, enjoying, as it does today, the freest press and speech in the entire Arab world, it will revolutionize the region. And if we leave in failure, the whole region will fall back into chaos, and worse.

Washington Post

July 25, 2003

Pg. 24

#### 46. Help Our Soldiers Now

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS are about to take off on their month-long August break. Barring a last-minute change, they will leave behind a shamefully unfinished piece of business: a tax bill to help members of the armed forces and National Guard. No one in Congress opposes the measure, which would make death payments for military survivors tax-free, extend tax deadlines for service members deployed in potential military actions and make it easier for service members transferred away from home to avoid paying capital gains taxes on house sales. All of this was the right thing to do even before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq. More than 230 members of the armed forces so far have been killed there, and with more than 200,000 reservists called up for active duty, it is even more fitting now.

Yet the sad and frustrating truth is that Congress has been unable to get this done for years. A procedural foul-up stopped the law in the final moments of the last Congress. This time around, the House measure was festooned with an array of unrelated tax breaks, for everyone from foreign gamblers to fishing tackle producers. When that wouldn't fly, the House passed a "clean" version of the bill on March 20, without a single dissent. The Senate, voting 97 to 0, approved its measure one week later.

Since then, it's been stalled, and there is a festival of finger-pointing about who is at fault. We would mediate this playground squabble, but the fundamental fact is this: There are minor, entirely reconcilable differences between the two bills. Before skipping town, Congress should settle them -- and give service members in Iraq the benefits that everyone agrees they deserve.

Los Angeles Times

July 25, 2003

#### 47. A Gust Of Realism In Iraq

In his briefings to the president and Congress and his appearances on talk shows and at press conferences, the top U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq this week accurately reflected the need to act quickly to make postwar reconstruction a success.

The realistic assessment of L. Paul Bremer III echoed the views of other experts who have visited Iraq recently and concluded that the window of opportunity won't stay open long. His reports also represented a refreshing change from the Bush administration's heedlessness of past advice on what would be needed in Iraq when major combat ended.

He said that security remains the top priority. Iraqis are killing U.S. soldiers nearly every day; the combat death toll exceeds 150, more than were killed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Streets are not safe for civilians, either. To improve security, Bremer said that in the next 60 days he would recruit hundreds of soldiers for a new Iraqi army and thousands of officers for a new police force. His plans also call for reestablishing a border guard and resuming court trials.

The occupation forces also need to get utilities operating at prewar levels as soon as possible. Bremer spoke Thursday of a plan to put small generators atop 36 pumping stations, because when the

electricity fails, so does water service. That kind of results-oriented planning should produce success, but only if it is executed efficiently and quickly.

Bremer said that decades of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship left Iraq in worse shape than U.S. officials expected. That's another intelligence lapse; allied nations kept embassies in Baghdad until shortly before the war and could have reported on the failure to upgrade 1950s electrical equipment and 1960s textile mills.

Last week, a five-person team from two Washington think tanks concluded after an 11-day Iraq visit that Washington had wrongly assumed that the war would cut off the head of the Iraqi government but keep the rest operating.

Instead, entire ministries collapsed. Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, said Wednesday that the Pentagon also wrongly expected many Iraqi army units to defect to U.S. forces; his comments were another salutary acknowledgment of error from an administration that was overly confident about war results.

Bremer has been both optimistic and realistic in his speeches this week. He stressed the many billions of dollars required for long-term rebuilding and the problems ahead: Prewar electricity levels will still leave the country about one-third short of its needs.

Bremer has long-range plans, but right now it is the quick fixes, like keeping the water-pumping stations operating around the clock, that will show Iraqis the invaders are trying to make life better and will further diminish support for die-hards firing guns and grenades at U.S. troops.

Dallas Morning News

October 14, 2003

333 SD

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Protocol

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Notes

We need to get thank you notes off to the people from the host committee for the reception in Colorado Springs—the Chairman of the El Palomar Foundation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/24/03

*Done  
TEN  
12/10*

14 Oct 03

U22146 /03

LAST	FIRST	TITLE	SALUTATION	SPOUSE/GUEST	CMTE	OrgTitle
Allard	Wayne	Sen.	Wayne	Mrs. Allard	Honorary Cmte	
Beauprez	Bob	Rep.	Bob	Claudia Beauprez	Honorary Cmte	
✓ Benson	Bruce	Mr.	Bruce	Marcy Benson	Co-Chair	President and CEO
Brown	Hank	Sen.	Hank	Nan Brown	Cmte	President and CEO
Campbell	Ben Nighthorse	Sen.	Ben	Linda Campbell	Honorary Cmte	
Celeste	Richard	Amb.	Dick	Jacqueline Lundquist	Cmte	President
Coors	Peter	Mr.	Peter	Marilyn Coors	Cmte	Chairman
DeGette	Diana	Rep.	Diana	Lino Lapinsky	Honorary Cmte	
Dietler	Cortlandt	Mr.	Cort	Mrs. Dietler	Cmte	Chairman
Donovan	Kristin	Ms.	Kristin	and Guest	Cmte	Vice President, National C
Garcia	Joseph	Mr.	Joe	Claire Garcia, PhD	Cmte	President
Hall	Nechie	Ms.	Nechie	Jim Hall	Cmte	President and CEO
Hayes	James	Mr.	Jim	and Guest	Cmte	
Hefley	Joel	Rep.	Joel	Rep. Lynn Hefley	Honorary Cmte	
Hoffman, PhD	Elizabeth		Betsy	Brian Binger	Cmte	President
(1) ✓ Hybl	William J	Mr.	Bill	Kathy Hybl	Co-Chair	Chairman & Chief Execut
Hybl, Jr.	William J.	Mr.	B.J.	Kristel Hybl	Cmte	Vice President, Developm
Loo	Gary	Mr.	Gary	Jane Loo	Cmte	President and Chairman
McInnis	Scott	Rep.	Scott	Lori McInnis	Honorary Cmte	
Musgrave	Marilyn	Rep.	Marilyn	Steve Musgrave	Honorary Cmte	
Musgrave	Marilyn	Rep.	Marilyn	Steve Musgrave	Honorary Cmte	
Norton	Jane	Lt. Governor	Jane	Tom Norton	Cmte	
✓ Owens	Bill	Governor	Bill	and Guest	Honorary Chair	

twice

✓ Palenchar	Dave	Mr.	Dave	Victoria Palenchar	Executive Coordinator	Executive Vice President
Ritchie	Daniel	Chancellor	Dan	and Guest	Cmte	Chancellor
✓ Rivera	Lionel	Mayor	Lionel	Lynn Rivera	Honorary Cmte	Mayor
Schuck	Steve	Mr.	Steve	Joyce Schuck	Cmte	Chairman
Seaman	John	Mr.	John	Kim Seaman	Cmte	Owner
Shaw	Mike	Mr.	Mike	Nancy Shaw	Cmte	President
Shockley-Zalabak	Pam	Chancellor	Pam	and Guest	Cmte	Chancellor
Tancredo	Tom	Rep.	Tom	Jackie Tancredo	Honorary Cmte	
Tutt, Jr.	R. Thayer	Mr.	Thayer	Melani Tutt	Cmte	President and Chief Invest
Udall	Mark	Rep.	Mark	Maggie Fox	Honorary Cmte	
Williams	Carl	Mr.	Carl	Lisa Williams	Cmte	Chairman
Yates, PhD	Albert		Al	Mrs. Yates	Cmte	President

## RICHARD MCGRAW THANK YOU LETTERS

Mrs. Marilyn Baker  
General Lance Lord  
Second Lieutenant Allen  
Major General Henry Obering  
Special Agent Jim Mowry  
Mr. Tom Baxter  
Mr. Clarence Juhl  
Mr. Craig Wilson  
Colonel David S. Brackett  
Mr. Dave Palenchar  
Lieutenant Colonel Don Adams  
Lieutenant Colonel Doug Pavak  
Dr. Jim Armstrong  
Colonel Timothy C. Shea  
Colonel Ulysess Middleton  
Lieutenant Colonel Inge Gedo  
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Wade  
Ms. Carrie Sue Casey  
Admiral Ian Forbes  
Mr. Scott Schless  
Mr. Bran Ferren  
Mr. Ian Brzezinski  
Dr. Sam Grier  
Mr. Robert Yorke  
Dr. Harlan Ullman  
Mr. Ron E. Perron  
Colonel Robert A. Mansfield  
Dr. Hans Binnendijk  
Ms. Rachel Decker  
Brigadier General Bjorn Kristiansen  
Captain P.J. Pelkington  
Mr. William J. Hybl  
Technical Sergeant Greg Jensen  
Colonel Donald Jordan  
Mrs. Anna Landry  
Lieutenant Colonel Gary Keck  
Lieutenant Colonel Monika Tanedo  
Lieutenant Colonel Al Kemmett  
First Lieutenant Mark Snoddy  
Mr. Eric Angelson

SECDEF THANK-YOU LETTERS

Adams, Don LTC Peterson  
Allen, Jodi LT Peterson  
Ans, Matt MAJ DATT Latvia  
Armstrong, Jim JNIC  
Baker, Marilyn NATO  
Bass, Carla COL DATT Bulgaria  
Baxter, Tom USAVIC  
Beisel, Larry LTC DATT Lithuania  
Bennett, Shelley COL-R EUCOM  
Benson, Bruce Benson  
Binnendijk, Hans NDU  
Boyd, Rick COL DATT Canada  
Brackett, David COL NATO  
Brzezinski, Ian OUSDP  
Casey, Carrie NATO  
Decker, Rachel NATO  
Drach, Joseph ARMY G3  
Folkerts, Jerry COL DATT Portugal  
Forbes, Ian ADM SHAPE  
Fox, Jimmy Broadmoor  
Gagnon, John COL DATT Belgium  
Gallagher, Ed COL DATT Czech Republic  
Gedo, Inge LTC NATO  
Grier, Sam JNIC  
Gross, John COL DATT Netherlands  
Hoskins, Wayne Broadmoor  
Hrycaj, Roman COL DATT Turkey  
Hybl, William El Pomar  
Jensen, Greg TSGT Peterson  
Jordan, Donald COL AF  
Juhl, Clarence NATO  
Kemmet, Al LTC Peterson  
Kierans, Lisa DATT Iceland  
Klein, Mark Broadmoor  
Kristiansen, Bjorn DCofS  
Landry, Anna AFIS  
Little, Gary SCPO NATO  
Lord, Lance GEN AFSPC  
Mammano, CPT Peterson  
Mansfield, Robert COL Peterson  
Mastronardi, Lia MAJ Aerospace  
McClellan, Richard COL DATT Romania  
Meacham, Laurie Broadmoor  
Middleton, Ulysses COL Peterson

Miranda, Joni LTC Peterson  
Mowry, Jim SA OSI  
Nadolski, Alan CAPT DATT Norway  
Nowak, Henry COL DATT Poland  
Obering, Trey BG MDA  
Olson, Eric CDR DATT Estonia  
Owens, Bill GOV-CO  
Pack, Geoffrey CAPT DATT Denmark  
Palenchar, Dave El Pomar  
Pavek, Doug LTC JNIC  
Pelkington, PJ CPT Peterson  
Perron, Ron Peterson  
Preston, Steve MAJ DATT Luxembourg  
Reed, Hank  
Rivera, Lionel MAYOR Colorado Springs  
Runner, Rick LTC DATT Slovenia  
Saffold, Dave COL DATT Greece  
Schless, Scott NATO  
Shea, Timothy COL George Marshall Center  
Snoddy, Mark LT Peterson  
Steinke, Rick COL DATT France  
Sweeney, Bruce COL DATT Hungary  
Tanedo, Monica LTC Peterson  
Ullman, Harlan DC  
Vennet, Elise LTC CJCS  
Wade, Stephen LTC AF  
Warner, Jim BG JFCOM  
Wenberg, Jeffrey MAJ DATT Slovakia  
Wenceslao, Daniel CAPT DATT Spain  
Wilson, Charles LTC J5  
Wilson, Craig, JFCOM  
Wilson, Robert MG Fort Carson  
Wirt, David CAPT DATT UK  
Yngve, Rolf CAPT DATT Italy  
Zedler, Don COL DATT Germany

October 14, 2003

010

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Post-Academy

I saw Congressman Joel Hefley in Colorado Springs. He offered to help get the law changed, if the law currently says that a superintendent of a military academy cannot take an additional job after that.

Please first tell me what the law is, and then I will figure out how I would like it to be changed. Then we will get Hefley and others to try to help us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-34

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

14 Oct 03

U22147 /03

October 14, 2003

000.5

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USAFA Report Recommendations

Please study carefully the report of the panel to review sexual misconduct allegations at the Air Force Academy.

I have read it. I have seen the recommendations. They look very sensible to me. I would like you to put together a group to think through how all of our schools, academies, colleges and the like might benefit from those recommendations and then see that they are communicated properly to those organizations.

Also, please get back to me with a report as to what you have done, and then track it in six months to see what has been done by the organizations you communicated to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

14 Oct 03

U22148 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20063

October 14, 2003

323.3

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Overseas Base Closure

We have to figure out how to stop this idea of an overseas base closure commission. That could delay us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-35

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

10/20 -  
→ Sec Def - You wrote once opposed it and we're still pressing on it. Don't know current status but will check.  
*D. Rumsfeld*

14 Oct 03

U22149 /03 10/20  
11-L-0559/OSD/20064 TEW/10/20

October 14, 2003

350.001 WH

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Speeches

Here are some excerpts from the President's speeches last week. There is some excellent material here that we certainly ought to start using, quoting and paraphrasing. We need to carry this message.

Thanks.

Attach.

Draft POTUS speeches: 10/9—New Hampshire National Guard; 10/9—Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce

DHR:dh  
101403-36



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

14 Oct 03

U22150 /03

pages 1-2, 4-8

Remarks to New Hampshire National Guard  
October 9, 2003  
Draft #4

Thank you very much. I am pleased to be in New Hampshire again. And I am honored to be with the Army and Air National Guard, and with reservists from every branch of our military. You are demonstrating that duty and public spirit are alive and well in New Hampshire. You stand ready to defend your fellow citizens, and your fellow citizens are grateful.

All of you are balancing jobs, and lives, and public service. You care about your communities, and you care about your country. So today I will talk about two great priorities for America. We will build the momentum of our economy, so every American can find work. And we will wage the War on Terror until it is won.

**Acknowledgments**

- [TK]
- 

New Hampshire has had citizen-soldiers since before America was a country. Militia, and volunteers, and guardsmen have served from the Revolution, to the Civil War, to World War Two to Desert Storm. Honor and service and courage are great New Hampshire traditions – and you are upholding those traditions in our time.

We live in an era of new threats, and the citizens of New Hampshire are stepping forward to meet those dangers. Citizen-soldiers have performed mid-air refueling missions for Coalition forces in Iraq. You are training members of the Afghan National Army. You are guarding suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. You are preparing for homeland security missions. Citizen-soldiers are serving on every front of the War on Terror, and you are making New Hampshire proud.

Serving your country can bring sacrifice and uncertainty and separation. Your lives can be changed in a moment, with a sudden call to duty. Thank you for your willingness to heed that important call. And I also thank your families – who share your sacrifice, and stand behind you.

You are serving at a time of testing for our country. And we are meeting the tests of history. We are defeating the enemies of freedom. We are confronting challenges to build the prosperity of our Nation. Every test of America has revealed the character of America. After the last two years, no one in the world – friend or enemy – can doubt the will and strength of the American people.

When you become President, you cannot predict all the challenges that will come. But you do know the values you bring to the office – and they should not change with time or polls. I took this office to make a difference – not to mark time. I came to this office to confront problems directly and forcefully – not to pass them to other presidents and other generations. The challenges of our time cannot be met with timid actions and bitter words. They will be overcome with optimism, and resolve, and confidence in the ideals of America.

Because we believe in our free enterprise system, we can be confident in our economy's future. Our economy has been through a lot. When I took office, the stock market had been declining for nine months, and the economy was headed into recession. Just as we started to recover, September 11<sup>th</sup> did serious harm to our economy. Then investor confidence was shaken by scandals in corporate America – dishonesty we cannot and will not tolerate in a free economy. And then we faced the uncertainty that preceded the war.

We have acted to overcome these challenges, and we have acted on principle. Government doesn't create wealth. The role of government is to create the conditions where risk-takers and entrepreneurs can invest and hire new workers. And we know how to create those conditions. When Americans have more take-home pay to spend, save, or invest, the whole economy grows, and people are more likely to find jobs. So I twice led the Congress to pass major tax relief for the American people.

We wanted tax relief to be as broad and fair as possible – so we reduced taxes on everyone who pays income taxes.

It doesn't make sense to penalize marriage in the tax code – so we reduced the marriage penalty.

We are moving forward, but we are not satisfied. We can't be satisfied as long as we have fellow citizens looking for work. Here in New Hampshire, one out of every five jobs you have lost has been in manufacturing. We must act boldly to help America's workers. So I am asking Congress to join me in carrying out a six-part plan for jobs and growth.

We must help small businesses grow and hire by controlling the high cost of health care. We must confront the junk lawsuits that are harming a lot of good and honest businesses. We must have a sound national energy policy – to keep the lights on, and make America less dependent on foreign sources of energy. We must continue to cut useless government regulations that choke job creation. We must work for free trade, so New Hampshire companies can sell more products overseas.

And we need to make sure that all the tax relief we have passed doesn't disappear in future years. Because of a quirk in the legislation, the tax cuts are scheduled to go away unless we act. When we passed tax relief, Americans did not expect to see higher taxes sneak in through the back door. If Congress is really interested in job creation, they will make every one of our tax cuts permanent.

As we overcome challenges to our economy, we are answering great threats to our security. September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, moved our country to grief, and moved our country to action. We made a pledge that day, and we have kept it: We are bringing the guilty to justice, and taking the fight to the enemy.

We now see our enemy clearly. The terrorists plot in secret, and target the innocent, and defile a great religion, and hate everything this Nation stands for. These committed killers will not be stopped by negotiations. They won't respond to reason. The terrorists who threaten America cannot be appeased – they must be found, and fought, and defeated.

In this new kind of war, America is following a new strategy. We are not waiting for further attacks. We are striking our enemies before they can strike us again. We have taken unprecedented steps to protect the homeland. Yet wars are won on the offensive – and America and our

friends are staying on the offensive. We are rolling back the terrorist threat, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power.

We are hunting the al-Qaida terrorists wherever they still hide, from Pakistan, to the Philippines, to the Horn of Africa. Nearly two-thirds of al-Qaida's known leaders have been captured or killed. Our resolve is firm, and clear: No matter how long it takes, all who plot against America will face the justice of America.

We have sent a message understood throughout the world: If you harbor a terrorist, if you support a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, you are just as guilty as the terrorists – and the Taliban found out what we meant. Thanks to our great military, Afghanistan is no longer a haven for terror, and the people of America are safer from attack.

And we have fought the war on terror in Iraq. The regime of Saddam Hussein possessed and used weapons of mass destruction ... and sponsored terrorist groups ... and inflicted terror on its own people. Nearly every nation recognized and denounced this threat for over a decade. Finally, the UN Security Council – in Resolution 1441 – demanded that Saddam disarm, and prove his disarmament to the world. The choice was up to the dictator – and he chose poorly.

I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by, and wait, and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein. So our coalition acted, in one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history. And six months ago today, the statue of the dictator was pulled down.

Since the liberation of Iraq, our investigators have found evidence of a clandestine network of biological laboratories ... advanced design work on prohibited, longer range missiles ... and an elaborate campaign to hide these illegal programs. There is still much to investigate. Yet it is now undeniable that Saddam Hussein was in clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. It is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a deceiver and a danger. The Security Council was right to demand that Saddam disarm, and we were right to enforce that demand.

Who can possibly think that the world would be better off with Saddam Hussein still in power? Surely not the dissidents who would be in

his prisons, or end up in mass graves. Surely not the men and women who would fill Saddam's torture chambers and rape rooms. Surely not the families of victims he murdered with poison gas. Surely not anyone who cares about human rights and democracy and stability in the Middle East. The people who would like to see Saddam Hussein in power are the terrorists – and they will not get their wish.

Now our country is approaching a choice. After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. But the danger has not passed. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, the terrorists have taken lives in Casablanca, Mombasa, Jerusalem, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Karachi, New Delhi, Ball, and Jakarta. The terrorists continue to plot and plan against our country, and our people. America cannot retreat from our responsibilities and hope for the best. Our security will not be gained by timid measures. Our security requires constant vigilance and decisive action. America has one determination and one option: We will fight this war until the work is done.

We are fighting on many fronts, and Iraq is now the central front. Saddam holdouts and foreign terrorists are trying desperately to undermine Iraq's progress and throw that country into chaos. The terrorists in Iraq believe their attacks on innocent people will weaken our resolve. They believe we will run from a challenge. They are mistaken. Americans are not the running kind.

The United States did not run from Germany and Japan following World War Two. We helped those nations to become strong, and decent, and democratic societies, that no longer waged war against America. And this is our mission in Iraq today. We are rebuilding schools, and reopening hospitals, and returning water and electricity to the Iraqi people. Americans are providing this help – not only because our hearts are good – but because our vision is clear. A stable, and democratic, and hopeful Iraq will no longer be a breeding ground for terror, tyranny, and aggression. Free nations are peaceful nations. Our work in Iraq is essential to our own security – and no band of murderers and gangsters will stop that work, or shake the will of America.

Nearly every day in Iraq, we are launching swift, precision raids against the terrorists. Helped by intelligence from Iraqis, we are rounding up the enemy, and taking their weapons. And we are working our way

through that famous deck of cards. We have already captured or killed 43 of the 55 most wanted former Iraqi leaders – and the other 12 have a lot to worry about. Anyone who seeks to harm our soldiers can know that our soldiers are hunting for them.

Our military is serving with courage – and some of our best have fallen. We mourn every loss. We honor every name. We grieve with every family. And we will always be grateful that liberty found such brave defenders.

In defending liberty, we are joined by more than 30 nations now contributing military forces in Iraq. Great Britain and Poland are leading two multinational divisions. We are in this cause with fine allies – and that includes the good people of Iraq. Last week, the first battalion of the New Iraqi Army completed its training. Within a year, Iraq will have a 40,000 member military force. Tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens are also guarding their own borders, and defending vital facilities, and policing their own streets. Six months ago, the Iraqi people welcomed their liberation. Today, many Iraqis are armed and trained to defend their own liberty.

Our goal in Iraq is to leave behind a stable, self-governing society – which will no longer be a threat to the Middle East, or to the United States. And we are following an orderly plan to reach this goal. Iraq now has a Governing Council, which has appointed interim government ministers. Once a constitution has been written, Iraq will move toward national elections. We want this process to go as quickly as possible – yet it must be done right. The free institutions of Iraq must stand the test of time. And a democratic Iraq will stand as an example to all the Middle East. We believe – and the Iraqi people will show – that liberty is the hope and right of every land.

Our work in Iraq has been long and hard, and it is not finished. Americans have sacrificed in the cause of freedom and security – and that cause goes on. Beyond Iraq, the War on Terror will continue. This war is not the commitment of a year or two – it is the commitment of a generation. There will be no quick victory in the War on Terror – but if we persevere, our victory is certain.

I am confident of victory because I know the character of our military – shown in people like Master Sergeant Jake Negrotti of Plaistow, New

Hampshire. Jake is a member of the New Hampshire Air National Guard who has volunteered for overseas deployments three times since September 11<sup>th</sup>. He has served in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Right now, Master Sergeant Negrotti is an airport manager at Baghdad Airport – helping make sure our military and humanitarian operations move ahead. People like Jake are showing what it means to be a patriot and a citizen. We are honored to have Jake's wife Donna, and his children, Alicia and Christopher, with us here today. The next time you talk to Jake, please tell him that the President and the country are grateful.

The war on terror has brought hardship and loss to our country, beginning with the grief of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Let us also remember that the first victory in this war came that same day, on a hijacked plane bound for the Nation's capital. Somehow, those men and women on Flight 93, knowing they would die, found the courage to use their final moments to save the lives of others. In those moments, and many times since, terrorists have learned that Americans will not be intimidated. We will fight them with everything we have.

Few are called to show the kind of valor seen on Flight 93, or on the field of battle. Yet all of us do share a calling – to be strong in adversity, and in danger unafraid. We Americans have come through so much together. We have much yet to do. And if we are patient, and united, and determined, our Nation will prosper, and our Nation will prevail.

Thank you.

*Drafted by: Michael Gerson, Office of Speechwriting*

Office: (b)(6)

Cell:

pages 1, 6-10

Remarks at Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce  
October 9, 2003  
Draft #6

Thank you very much. I am pleased to be in New Hampshire again, and to see so many friends. Manchester is a popular destination these days – and not just because the leaves are changing. This city was the scene of my first great victory in 2000 – that perfect flip at the Presidential Pancake Flip-Off. I can think of nine people who are practicing with their spatulas every morning.

I thank the Chamber of Commerce and the Business and Industry Association for inviting me today to talk about the two great priorities of our country: to create jobs for Americans, and to win the war on terror. I wish I could have brought the First Lady, who sends her good wishes. She is back home after an official trip to Russia ... and to France. I'm sure you saw the picture in the paper. The last time I was in France, I got a nice welcome, but nothing like that. Laura is a gracious representative of the American people, and America is proud of her.

**Acknowledgments**

- Governor Craig Benson (R)
- Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH)
- Senator John Sununu (R-NH)
- Others TK

Since I was last here, New Hampshire lost one of its finest citizens, Governor Hugh Gregg. He loved his country, and served it well. He loved this state, and believed in the common sense and wisdom of its people. And this tradition continues in his good family. We honor Hugh's memory, and I was proud to be his friend.

I began my visit this morning at Pease Air Guard Base, with New Hampshire Army and Air Guardsmen and reservists from every branch of our military. New Hampshire guardsmen have served on every front on the War on Terror – from Afghanistan, to Iraq, to protecting our homeland, to guarding the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. They are showing what it means to be patriots and citizens, and our country is grateful.

But most of all, Brian is an optimist because he believes in the people of this country. Here is what he says: "After September the 11th, everybody collectively held their breath ... But our confidence has grown ... We've turned a corner. "

Confidence like that is well founded. We live in a country that rewards big dreams and honest effort. Men and women who put their faith in America will not be disappointed.

As we overcome challenges to our economy, we are answering great threats to our security. September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, moved our country to grief, and moved our country to action. We made a pledge that day, and we have kept it: We are bringing the guilty to justice, and taking the fight to the enemy.

We now see our enemy clearly. The terrorists plot in secret, and target the innocent, and defile a great religion, and hate everything this Nation stands for. These committed killers will not be stopped by negotiations. They won't respond to reason. The terrorists who threaten America cannot be appeased – they must be found, and fought, and defeated.

In this new kind of war, America is following a new strategy. We are not waiting for further attacks. We are striking our enemies before they can strike us again. We have taken unprecedented steps to protect the homeland. Yet wars are won on the offensive – and America and our friends are staying on the offensive. We are rolling back the terrorist threat, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power.

We are hunting the al-Qaida terrorists wherever they still hide, from Pakistan, to the Phillippines, to the Horn of Africa. Nearly two-thirds of al-Qaida's known leaders have been captured or killed. Our resolve is firm, and clear: No matter how long it takes, all who plot against America will face the justice of America.

We have sent a message understood throughout the world: If you harbor a terrorist, if you support a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, you are just as guilty as the terrorists – and the Taliban found out what we meant. Thanks to our great military, Afghanistan is no longer a haven for terror, the Afghan people are free, and the people of America are safer from attack.

And we have fought the war on terror in Iraq. The regime of Saddam Hussein possessed and used weapons of mass destruction... and sponsored terrorist groups... and inflicted terror on its own people. Nearly every nation recognized and denounced this threat for over a decade. Finally, the UN Security Council – in Resolution 1441 – demanded that Saddam disarm, and prove his disarmament to the world. The choice was up to the dictator – and he chose poorly.

I acted because I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by, and wait, and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein. So our coalition acted, in one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history. And six months ago today, the statue of the dictator was pulled down.

Since the liberation of Iraq, our investigators have found evidence of a clandestine network of biological laboratories ... advanced design work on prohibited, longer range missiles ... and an elaborate campaign to hide these illegal programs. There is still much to investigate. Yet it is now undeniable that Saddam Hussein was in clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1441. It is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a deceiver and a danger. The Security Council was right to demand that Saddam disarm, and we were right to enforce that demand.

Who can possibly think that the world would be better off with Saddam Hussein still in power? Surely not the dissidents who would be in his prisons, or end up in mass graves. Surely not the men and women who would fill Saddam's torture chambers and rape rooms. Surely not the families of victims he murdered with poison gas. Surely not anyone who cares about human rights and democracy and stability in the Middle East. There are some who would like to see Saddam Hussein back in power. They are terrorists – and they will not get their wish.

Now our country is approaching a choice. After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. But the danger has not passed. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, the terrorists have taken lives in Casablanca, Mombasa, Jerusalem, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Karachi, New Delhi, Bali, and Jakarta. The terrorists continue to plot and plan against our country,

and our people. America must not forget the lessons of September 11<sup>th</sup>. America cannot retreat from our responsibilities and hope for the best. Our security will not be gained by timid measures. Our security requires constant vigilance and decisive action. I believe America has only one option: We will fight this war until the work is done.

We are fighting on many fronts, and Iraq is now the central front. Saddam holdouts and foreign terrorists are trying desperately to undermine Iraq's progress and throw that country into chaos. The terrorists in Iraq believe their attacks on innocent people will weaken our resolve. They believe we will run from a challenge. They are mistaken. Americans are not the running kind.

The United States did not run from Germany and Japan following World War II. We helped those nations to become strong, and decent, and democratic societies, that no longer waged war against America. And this is our mission in Iraq today. We are rebuilding schools, and reopening hospitals, and returning water and electricity to the Iraqi people. Americans are providing this help – not only because our hearts are good – but because our vision is clear. A stable, and democratic, and hopeful Iraq will no longer be a breeding ground for terror, tyranny, and aggression. Free nations are peaceful nations. Our work in Iraq is essential to our own security – and no band of murderers and gangsters will stop that work, or shake the will of America.

Nearly every day in Iraq, we are launching swift, precision raids against the terrorists. Helped by intelligence from Iraqis, we are rounding up the enemy, and taking their weapons. And we are working our way through that famous deck of cards. We have already captured or killed 43 of the 55 most wanted former Iraqi leaders – and the other 12 have a lot to worry about. Anyone who seeks to harm our soldiers can know that our soldiers are hunting for them.

Our military is serving with courage – and some of our best have fallen. We mourn every loss. We honor every name. We grieve with every family. And we will always be grateful that liberty found such brave defenders.

In defending liberty, we are joined by more than 30 nations now contributing military forces in Iraq. Great Britain and Poland are leading

two multinational divisions. We are in this cause with fine allies – and that includes the good people of Iraq. Last week, the first battalion of the New Iraqi Army completed its training. Within a year, Iraq will have a 40,000 member military force. Tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens are also guarding their own borders, and defending vital facilities, and policing their own streets. Six months ago, the Iraqi people welcomed their liberation. Today, many Iraqis are armed and trained to defend their own liberty.

Our goal in Iraq is to leave behind a stable, self-governing society – which will no longer be a threat to the Middle East, or to the United States. And we are following an orderly plan to reach this goal. Iraq now has a Governing Council, which has appointed interim government ministers. Once a constitution has been written, Iraq will move toward national elections. We want this process to go as quickly as possible – yet it must be done right. The free institutions of Iraq must stand the test of time. And a democratic Iraq will stand as an example to all the Middle East. We believe – and the Iraqi people will show – that liberty is the hope and right of every land.

Our work in Iraq has been long and hard, and it is not finished. Americans have sacrificed in the cause of freedom and security – and that cause goes on. Beyond Iraq, the War on Terror continues. There will be no quick victory in this war – but if we persevere, our victory is certain.

I am confident of victory because I know the character of our military – shown in the conduct of young men like Army Sergeant Matthew DeWitt of Hillsborough, New Hampshire. While serving in Iraq, Sergeant DeWitt stepped forward to volunteer on a dangerous mission to root out Saddam loyalists. In the fighting, Matthew was seriously wounded. He is now receiving care at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where I was honored to visit him not long ago. Matthew DeWitt was awarded the Purple Heart, but does not consider himself a hero – he says, “I was just doing my job.” Yet it is brave people like this 26-year-old from New Hampshire who protect America. We count on them, and we're proud of them.

The war on terror has brought hardship and loss to our country, beginning with the grief of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Let us also remember that the first victory in this war came that same day, on a hijacked plane bound for the Nation's capital. Somehow, those men and women on Flight 93, knowing they would die, found the courage to use their final moments to

save the lives of others. In those moments, and many times since, terrorists have learned that Americans will not be intimidated. We will fight them with everything we have.

Few are called to show the kind of valor seen on Flight 93, or on the field of battle. Yet all of us do share a calling – to be strong in adversity, and in danger unafraid. We Americans have come through so much together. We have much yet to do. And if we are patient, and united, and determined, our Nation will prosper, and our Nation will prevail.

Thank you.


*Drafted by: Mike Gerson, Office of Speechwriting*  
*Office: (b)(6)*  
*Cell: [REDACTED]*

11/2/25.  
0800

October 14, 2003

ITraq

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Updates



These "Updates from the Field" should have dates on them

Thanks.

Attach.  
CPA Newsletter

DHR:dh  
101403-40

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*10/20* *??* *George* *TR* *There was still no weekly report from Joint Staff and about that report we wanted around just this week?*

*Col Rhynedance*  
*Sgt. I think it just got cut off on his version.*  
*D. Rita*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/21*

*D. Rita*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*10/24*

U22152 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/20079

14 OCT 03



**Update From the Field**

**Security Update**

- Saddam supporters continue sporadic hit-and-run attacks; persistent sabotage and looting still complicate recovery efforts.
- Coalition forces have conducted broad sweeps and quick reaction combat missions, registering significant success in eliminating Saddam's sons on 22 July.
  - Efforts continue to add at least 30K Coalition military forces in Iraq in the next several months.
  - 36 of 55 "most wanted" killed or captured.
- 148,000 US service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops are serving in Iraq.
- More than 8,200 tons of ammunition has been seized throughout Iraq—much of which was stored by the Hussein regime in hospitals, schools and mosques.

**Operation Soda Mountain (ended July 17):**

- 141 Raids by US forces
- 611 individuals captured including 62 former regime leaders
- 4,297 mortar rounds, 1,346 rocket-propelled grenades and 635 other weapons captured.

**Operation Sidewinder (ended July 7):**

- 282 individuals detained
- 96 AK-47 rifles, 3 heavy machine guns, 217 rocket propelled grenades, 33 grenades, 200 60 mm-mortar rounds, other military equipment, documents, weapons and ammunition.

**Operation Desert Scorpion (Ongoing):**

- 6 raids
- 29 detainees
- \$8 million worth of Iraqi dinar, and a large sum of British pounds, sterling and Euro.

**Operation Ivy Serpent (Ongoing):**

- 27 raids
- 226 detainees
- 800 82-mm mortar rounds
- 50 AK-47s
- 26 rocket-propelled grenades and 3 hand grenades
- 6 detainees are former regime leaders.

**Key Points**

The United States and its Coalition partners are continuing a major offensive against the remnants of Saddam's regime. The deaths of Saddam's sons and the success the forces have realized capturing former Ba'athist officials are helping to build trust with the Iraqi people, who are coming forward to volunteer information about former regime officials.

- The Coalition's aggressive patrols and search and attack missions are paying off. Captured regime members are providing information.
  - Three Key figures, including a bodyguard, were captured near Tikrit. The 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division also netted documents in the raids
  - Saddam remains a critical target for the Coalition. Troops continue to focus on their mission to kill or capture him. There is a \$25 million reward.
- The demise of Uday and Qusay Hussein is important to make Iraqis feel more secure that the Ba'athist tyranny will never return.
- Iraqis suffered under Saddam's regime for 35 years, and their fear of the regime is still pervasive. As more regime remnants are captured and killed, the fear of the Iraqi people will subside.
- The Iraqi people are providing vital assistance and information to bring members of the former regime to justice.
- In the days following Uday and Qusay's death, Iraqis came forward about dead-enders and weapons caches.

**Important Transcripts**

**DoD News Briefing – Mr. Di Rita and Lt. Gen. Schwartz: 7/29/03**

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030729-0465.html>

**For Press Secretary or MLA Inquiries on Iraq:  
Call Legislative Affairs (703) 697-6210**

**Or Refer To:**

**[www.cpa-iraq.org](http://www.cpa-iraq.org) or [www.Defendamerica.mil](http://www.Defendamerica.mil)  
To be added to this electronic mailing list, e-mail [claud.chafin@osd.mil](mailto:claud.chafin@osd.mil)**

October 14, 2003

SUBJECT: Lord Robertson

I have to close the loop with Lord Roberston about the issue I raised with Dick Myers about putting all US forces under NATO in Afghanistan.

DHR:dh  
101403-59

OS  
10/15

Afghanistan

14 Oct 03

U22153 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20081

October 14, 2003

Bosnia

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Weapons in Bosnia

Someone told me that seven years after the war ended in Bosnia, they found a cache of 40 tons of weapons. Could we check out that fact? If so, it shows how hard it is.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
101403-55

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

14 Oct 03

U22154 /03

October 14, 2003

350.09

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Intel Briefings

When I do those intel briefings in the House and the Senate, what do you think about having Colin and me do them together, given all the flap that is going on?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-49

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/03

14 Oct 03

U22155 /03

October 14, 2003

✓ 10/21  
10/22

Iraq

Larry Di Rita  
10/21

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Local Network Anchor

We ought to remember who that anchor was in California who has been to Iraq so many times and see if we can be helpful to him over there. He clearly knows what he is talking about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-45

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

10/20 -  
Secdef - He's  
going out on the  
next group we're  
putting together  
Nov 4-6. (David  
Jackson KABC)

14 Oct 03

*Di Rita*

U22156 /03 Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/20084

10/21

Snowflake

October 14, 2003

463.2

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Electrical Generators

I read your September 23 memo on electrical generators. Please check in a month on what is going on and report back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/23/03 DSD memo to SecDef re: Your Snowflake on Electrical Generators

DHR:dh  
101403-60

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

14 Oct 03

U22157 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20085

10/16  
10/14

**MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld**

**DATE: September 23, 2003**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz**

**CC: Ambassador Bremer  
General Myers  
General Abizaid**

**SUBJECT: Your Snowflake on Electrical Generators**

Don,

We contacted Brent Scowcroft's office, who identified the Kuwaiti gentleman you spoke with as (b)(6). We got in touch with Mr. (b)(6) and he explained that there were several 3-5MW portable generators available in Kuwait and other nearby countries and they could be transported to Basra, if we needed them.

(b)(6) gave us the name of the Minister of Electricity in Kuwait who would be the point of contact – Mr. (b)(6)

We will pass this information to the Army Corps of Engineers through CTJTF-7 to explore with the Kuwaiti's if we could, and how best we to use the generators.

22  
September 28, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Electric Generators

As I think I mentioned to one or both of you, I was told that Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries in the Gulf have five-megawatt portable, movable electric generators that would light up a whole city. They are there in the region, they are not being used, and if we went to them and told them we needed them, they could be available. I was told this by a fellow from Kuwait in a meeting Brent Scowcroft had.

Please tell me what we can do to help you track that down and figure it out, if in fact it is something we ought to take advantage of.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092003-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/3/03

DF

October 14, 2003

SUBJECT: Center in Italy

Ivanov told me he negotiated some deal with Condi about a center in Italy, which I have no knowledge of.

Russia

DHR:dh  
101403-64

OB  
11.5

14 Oct 03

U22158 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20088

October 14, 2003

Iraq

SUBJECT: Poland and Spain in Iraq

The Spanish and Polish MoDs said they need a public works program in their area in Iraq, so people can visualize progress, possibly relating to electricity generators.

One possibility might be the Kuwait generators.

They also said they need more CPA people there. They want to put Poles and Spanish people into the CPA activities. How do we do that?

They are worried about the border with Iran. They only have four or six helicopters with night vision—the rest don't have it. The Ukraine helicopters don't have night vision. Chairman Myers is working on it.

OB  
10-29

DHR:db  
101403-65

14 Oct 03

U22159 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20089

574

✓  
11/10

October 14, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: PRTs

We are going to have to think about each PRT in Afghanistan having a separate memorandum of understanding off some template that we fashion and a liaison officer, as we discussed with Lord Robertson or Peter Struck (I forgot which one it was).

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-62

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

Response Attached

v/r  
COLB 11/13  
TEN

14 Oct 03

U22160 103

A19-2



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-6000

INFO MEMO

CH-1350#9310 PM 5:49  
10 November 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 11/10*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRAIGDOCK	C/11/13
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/12

SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

- **Question.** You observed we are going to have to think about each PRT in Afghanistan having a separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) based on a template that we fashion and, additionally, a liaison officer as discussed at the NATO ministerial
- **Answer.** There are several ongoing initiatives to enhance PRT coordination and unity of effort across international seams:
  - CJTF-180 has cross-servicing and implementing arrangements with the New Zealand and United Kingdom-led PRTs. CJTF-180 also has *in extremis* concept plans for extracting and reinforcing those PRTs. Finally, USCENTCOM has a memorandum of agreement with NATO addressing respective support requirements for CJTF-180 and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) including logistics, intelligence sharing, close air support, emergency assistance, and medical evacuation.
  - A PRT steering committee operates under CJTF-180.
  - The Department of State currently has a representative/liaison at all PRTs and is coordinating development of an MOU with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) that will assign responsibilities and arrange support for USG personnel currently assigned to foreign PRTs.
  - CJTF-180 and the Department of State have an MOU establishing relationships and roles between civilian and military PRT members.
  - As the ISAF expands and NATO assumes responsibilities for some PRTs, the ISAF MOU will be refined to address these developments and serve as the template for future PRTs.

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

U18642 03

A19-3

574

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: LTG John Craddock *JK*  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
 SUBJECT: PRTs

We are going to have to think about each PRT in Afghanistan having a separate memorandum of understanding off some template that we fashion and a liaison officer, as we discussed with Lord Robertson or Peter Struck (I forgot which one it was).

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 101403-62

.....  
 Please respond by 10/31/03

*Response Attached*  
*Y/R*  
*COLB*  
*11/13 →*

4:12 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 15, 2003  
SUBJECT:

334

If we have not asked Jack Keane to join the Defense Policy Board, I want to send the following letter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101503.05

*Attach: SD letter to Jack Keane*

Please respond by: 10/20

15 OCT 03

U22161 /03

Draft

Gen. Jack Keane, USA (Ret.)

Dear Jack:

Thanks so much for your recent note. As always, you are generous and I am appreciative.

I would very much like to have you join the Defense Policy Board. We do not currently have a retired army officer as a member of the Board and you would be a superb candidate.

Do let me know if you are able to do so. It would be a pleasure and privilege for me to be able to continue to work with you.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/20094

4:02 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 15, 2003  
SUBJECT: **9-11 Commission**

000.5

Attached is a statement by the 9-11 Commission. I hope you are on top of this and making sure that DoD is fully responsive.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101503.04

*Attach: Statement by 9=11 Commission*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*OB  
12/12*

15 Oct 03

U22162 /03



→ Sec Def

### Statement by the 9-11 Commission

**October 15** – As we have previously stated, the general level of cooperation by Executive Branch agencies with the Commission has improved over the last several months, and the Commission now has many of the documents it needs. Over the past two weeks, however, as a result of field interviews conducted by our staff, the Commission has learned of serious deficiencies in one agency's production of critical documents.

On May 7, the Commission requested from the FAA all documents related to the FAA's tracking of hijacked airliners on 9-11, including without limitation all communications with NORAD. As of early September, the Commission was assured that the FAA's document production was complete, and therefore scheduled interviews in New York, Boston, Cleveland, and Indianapolis. Over the course of these interviews the Commission learned that various tapes, statements, interview reports, and agency self-assessments highly material to our inquiry had been inexplicably withheld from the FAA's production. Once this issue came to light—just in the past few days—the FAA provided the Commission with dozens of boxes and materials that they now claim satisfy our request. While the staff has not yet had the opportunity to digest these materials fully, it is clear that the FAA's delay has significantly impeded the progress of our investigation and undermined our confidence in the completeness of the FAA's production.

This disturbing development at one agency has led the Commission to re-examine its general policy of relying on document requests rather than subpoenas.

We have voted to issue a subpoena to the FAA for the documents we have already requested. This will not only underline our specific concerns about the serious problem created for the Commission by the FAA's failure to respond fully to our document requests, but will also put other agencies on notice that our document requests must be taken as seriously as a subpoena, and that they must review the efforts they have made so far to assure full compliance. In the absence of such assurances, additional subpoenas will be issued.

Finally, we want to express our growing concern about whether delays such as that we have encountered at the FAA will prevent the Commission from completing its work and issuing its report within the time frame set by statute. The Commission will continue to evaluate whether it will be necessary to ask the Congress to extend the statutory deadline.

AL FELZENBERG, DEPUTY FOR COMMUNICATIONS  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States  
Office: (b)(6)

afelzenberg@9-11commission.gov  
11-L-0559/OSD/20096

I am told  
the Commission  
got what it  
needs from  
NORAD, but  
isn't checking.  
D. Kelly

10/16  
0900

October 15, 2003

Iraq

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Outreach to Iraq

Should we think about sending a couple of local anchors to Iraq? Or some talk radio folks?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101403-42

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

10/16



?



Larry Di Rita  
10/17

15 Oct 03

U22163 /03

6:24 PM

TO: Tom O'Connell  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 15, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

353.8

I think we ought to think about using the NATO response force to the extent we can to help Greece with the Olympics. We would be a part of that but to the extent we can avoid doing too much given the stress on the force, I would like to try to do that.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 101503.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 10/30 \_\_\_\_\_

15 Oct 03

U22164 /03

October 15, 2003

352 Academies

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Legislation re: Superintendents of Academies

Attached is a copy of a memo from Jim Haynes and a copy of my memo to him. Please get to work with Joel Hefley, and let's find a way to get this law repealed. If you can do it in the current legislation, it would be wonderful.

It is not right. That is like saying the President doesn't have enough sense to nominate the best people for key jobs, and that the Senate doesn't have enough sense to confirm the best people for the most important jobs.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/03 SecDef memo to GC [101503-30]  
10/9/03 GC memo to SecDef re: Retirement of Air Force Academy Superintendent

DHR:dh  
101503-31

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

15 Oct 03

U22165 /03

October 15, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legislation re: Superintendents of Academies

I do want to repeal that legislation that prohibits a person who serves as a superintendent of an academy from going to a new post.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/9/03 GC memo to SecDef re: Retirement of Air Force Academy Superintendent

DHR:dh  
101503-30

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/21/03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
10/15

INFO MEMO

October 9, 2003, 2:45 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJHaynes*

SUBJECT: Retirement of Air Force Academy Superintendent

- This responds to your request that I provide my legal opinion as to whether the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy must retire after completing his detail to the position.
- The answer is yes. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8921 and 9333a require the retirement of an officer detailed to the position of Superintendent of the Air Force Academy. Similar statutory provisions also exist for the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Naval Academy.
- These provisions of law were added for all three academies by section 532, FY00 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 106-65, October 5, 1999). Section 532 also amended 10 U.S.C. § 525(b) to exclude from general and flag officer grade strength limitations officers serving in the grade of O-9 as the Superintendent of a service academy.
- These requirements could be eliminated by repealing 10 U.S.C. §§ 3921, 4333a, 6371, 6951a, 8921 and 9333a. Such repeals would leave intact the authority to exclude from general and flag officer grade strength limitations officers serving in the grade of O-9 as the Superintendent of a service academy.
- Please advise if you want me to draft a legislative package to repeal the retirement requirements.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/20101

7:07 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 15, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*Europe*

Here's a couple of thoughts on the discussion we had today about your preparing a memo on Europe and that we faced a choice. This may give you some ideas or you may just want to edit it, or you may have a much better idea.

Get me a draft soon, though.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101503.15

*Attach: Draft: Europe*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*10/25*

*OB*  
*12/16*

*15 Oct 03*

U22166 /03

Draft

October 15, 2003

SUBJECT: Europe

The United States faces a problem that is growing. There is not a visible crisis in the Atlantic alliance as yet, but it could become a crisis, if it continues to move in ways disadvantageous to the U.S.

Specifically, European countries are attempting to become Europe. At present the real estate known as Europe still consists of many nation-states. It has been moving forward since after World War II.

The U.S. needs to consider U.S. interests, the options we face and make a decision as to the direction we believe is in our national interest.

There are several options, including:

1. Continue on our present course, with France defining itself by its opposition to the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship. The result will be to allow Europe and the U.S. to continue to drift apart, on the theory that that is acceptable to the U.S. or inevitable and that it could be alright that we will ultimately deal with a single entity in Europe, as we deal with other nations.

The option means we will allow the transatlantic relationship to be strained through a series of modest annual concessions, year after year, which cumulated will move us farther and farther away from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we have known and which has and is benefiting greatly, or

2. Make a decision that the Atlantic relationship has been, is now and can be a powerful force for good in the world in the decades ahead, and resolve to energetically provide leadership to resist France's effort to destroy it. The effect here would be to encourage Europe to continue to unite, but to keep the defense component in NATO on the basis that it is in Europe and North America's interest to stay closely linked in our efforts to contribute to world peace.

Europe and the United States cannot have it both ways. We cannot continue to allow Europe to compromise with France in ways that damage the relationship and, at the same time think that we are going to have an effective alliance. We have to make a choice.

DHR:dh  
101503-57

October 15, 2003

Iraq

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article

Attached is an article by a professor from National Defense University that I found interesting. I think there is merit to some of his thoughts.

Regards,

Attach.  
Mokhtari, Fariborz. "Creatign a New Iraq"

DHR:dh  
101503-15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 Oct 03

U22167 /03

By Fariborz Mokhtari

**N**o one expected Iraq's reconstruction to be an easy task, yet after a few months in the trenches it has proven even more difficult than anticipated. While nearly every political quarter is offering opinions on the procedure and the timetable to transfer sovereignty, a proven model for success seems to have been innocently overlooked.

The model is a former colony that gained independence by reliance on a militia of farmers facing a superior force of well-trained, well-disciplined and well-equipped European troops. Consider a former colony that established a successful representative government, created a constitutional regime and devised a Bill of Rights. Consider a former agricultural economy that industrialized, promoted commerce and created an impressive service sector without neglecting agriculture. Would that experience present a useful model for Iraq?

If the model fits our aspirations for Iraq, it could not possibly be more familiar to us. That model is indeed the United States of America. It would be ironic if we ignore the vast heritage we share with the less-developed countries. Those countries have often viewed the United States with a sense of inspired admiration. The urge to send their young to the United States for an American college education should be enough to highlight the sentiment. It is not unreasonable to argue that the hard feelings expressed by the developing countries stem from their perception that the United

# Creating a new Iraq

## America can be a role model

States has betrayed its former colonial brethren by making common cause with colonial interests.

All current planners and commentators want for Iraq an effective central government, a fair constitution, a representative republic and adequate safeguards to protect minorities. What seems overlooked is that our model did not begin with a strong central government or a federal constitution to impose governance upon every state, every town and every village. The path of our model to success was indeed the opposite. Government began at the localities. Self-governing villages and towns became the building blocks of state governments and inspired state constitutions. The states and their representatives in turn constructed the federal government and the U.S. Constitution, and did so through trial and error.

Most Iraqis maintain strong attachments to their tribes and local origins. Ethnic, tribal and rural loyalties of the Kurds in Northern Iraq are well-publicized. Arabs of the south and central regions have similar attachments. Rural societies have reason to fear political domination of major cities with concentrated populations. Striking a political balance between major cities and the rest of the country will go a long way to allay rural concerns, but may not be

enough. Rural self-government, however, may instill sufficient confidence in the population to persuade it to buy into a national government. Iraq's aspiring national leaders may not support rural empowerment, as it will challenge their own. Yet, the road to cohesion must start from small localities, where everyone knows everyone else and oppos-

**What seems overlooked is that our model did not begin with a strong central government or a federal constitution to impose governance upon every state, every town and every village.**

ing a fairly elected government of aldermen (inevitably tribal sheikhs and local notables) by sabotage or assassination would be impractical, if not unthinkable.

Such self-governing villagers will not require external security forces for their internal safety and will enable coalition troops to become less visible. Rural governance may require advice, training and assistance. The assistance should come in

the form of construction materials and equipment to avoid fostering dependence.

Self-governed, self-secured villages and towns could initiate drafting provincial constitutions and establishing provincial governments before contemplating a national government. National governments of most former colonies after independence failed, perhaps because they tried to impose order on their nations, rather than allowing governance to take root from within.

To be fair, many post-colonial national leaders had admirable intentions. Good intentions, however, are not reliable shields against riots, coups, revolts and violence. Experiencing the responsibility of self-governance at the lowest levels of society may provide the self-confidence, self-respect and loyalty necessary to preserve the national government. Vermonters will get together in their towns and villages in March to vote on all local concerns — from property taxes and school budgets to salaries and snow removal in a single day every year. Showing the town meetings at work to the Iraqi sheikhs may be more than instructive. It will be an eyeopener for all of us.

*Fariborz Mokhtari is a professor at the National Defense University.*

October 15, 2003

000.3

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Jerry Bremer  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ramadan

Attached is a note from Jim Schlesinger that raises some useful questions.

Thanks.

*DM  
10-20*

Attach.  
10/10/03 Schlesinger memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101503-37

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Gholl*

15 Oct 03

U22168 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20107

✓  
10/15

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld  
FROM: James Schlesinger *JS*  
DATE: 10 October 2003

Don:

Are you ready for Ramadan?

More importantly, are your troops, contractors, and CPA ready for Ramadan?


This is the first post-Saddam Ramadan and, thus, will be less controlled.

The faithful must fast all day and, thus, may be more irritable and difficult to control during the day. At night, they go out—they pray, shop, visit friends, etc. Thus, the public will be less disciplined at night. Curfews must be reexamined.

Finally, Saddam distributed food to the poor, also the troops might be distributing candy, crayons, etc. to the children.

More if you want.

cc: *Dr. Rita*  
*LTG Craddock*



October 15, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Jim Schlesinger  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Jim—

Thanks for your note on Ramadan etc. I appreciate it. We are working the problem.

You said, "More if you want." I do want—give me all you have. I need it all!

Regards,

DHR:dh  
101503:36

000,3

15 Oct 03

U22169 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20109

October 15, 2003

373.24

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense Memo

Your memo on missile defense is first-rate. You are making good progress.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
101503-35

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

03  
11.5

15 Oct 03

U22170 /03

October 15, 2003

2nd Irag

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Andrews

I got some bounce on a CPA man named Andrews who apparently is in the province where the Dutch have forces. The issue is whether he can make decisions.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-54

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

15 Oct 03

U22171 /03

October 15, 2003

Syria

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Syria

Please look at this note from *Time* magazine that Newt sent me. That is a disaster that Syria is doing that. With decent efforts, we ought to be able to stop it. Let's pour it on.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/14/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
101503-49

.....  
Please respond by 10/14/03

15 Oct 03

U22172 /03

October 15, 2003

200.63

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Medals

Should I be giving more medals? There is no question but that the Pakistani Chief of Staff was touched and surprised by the medal Dick Myers gave him. We have that ability, and I have never done it. We should get cracking on it and think about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-67

..... *OB* .....

Please respond by 11/7/03

*10.29*

15 Oct 03

U22173 /03

October 16, 2003

Iraq

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Grievances

CPA may already have done this, but if not, they might give some thought to having the Governing Council organize grievance cells for each provincial capital, and establish a process whereby both the committee of 25 and the CPA could respond quickly to the grievances registered by the Iraqi people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-3

OB

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

10-27

16 Oct 03

U22174 /03

October 16, 2003

334

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

Jim Schlesinger called. He said that some members of the 9/11 Commission are thinking about taking elements from DoD and moving them to CIA—such as NRO, NIMA and NSA.

He suggested we talk to Lehman and some other members of the commission. That is a good idea.

Please think of how we do that, and come to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-61

*File copy*

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

NOV 25 2003

*Sir-*

*CFCS has initiated a discussion within the Joint Staff and Services.*

*I have invited Lehman to suggest who among the Commissioners to invite.*

*I have discussed the outlines of a major re-organization with George Tenet. We should encourage Tenet to further develop his own thoughts.*

16 Oct 03

Forwarded.  
11/25  
Core Nosing

11-L-0559/OSD/20115 *1122175 103 8c*

576  
October 16, 2003

Iraq

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Briefing

Please schedule me for the briefing on Iraqi security forces—civil defense, site protection, border guards, the army and the police.

I want to see a full briefing as to what we have, what has been done, in what period of time, who is doing it, what the current projection is as to the plans and the possible ways we could ramp them up.

I would like that briefing on Friday or Saturday, if possible.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-60

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Closed  
per  
SMA

16 Oct 03

U22176 /03

16  
October 15, 2003

ITrac

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

Advance  
copy sent

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Timetable

When we have our meeting later this week, we are going to have to think through a timetable from now through the next year and see where we are and how that lays out with respect to movement of security, economics and sovereignty.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-63

.....  
Please respond by 10/17/03

OB  
10-29

16 Oct 03

U22177 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20117

October 16, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Town Halls and Press Conferences

000.7 SD

Please give me a list of the town halls I have held and the open press conferences I have had since I have been here, so we can respond to Tom Friedman.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Friedman, Thomas L. "On Listening," *New York Times*, October 16, 2003.

DHR:dh  
101603-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

OB  
10-29

16 Oct 03

U22178 /03

the United States," Boykin told an Oregon congregation. "He was appointed by God."

All Americans, including those in uniform, are entitled to their views. But when Boykin publicly spews this intolerant message while wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army, he strongly suggests that this is an official and sanctioned view — and that the U.S. Army is indeed a Christian army.

But that's only part of the problem. Boykin is also in a senior Pentagon policymaking position, and it's a serious mistake to allow a man who believes in a Christian "jihad" to hold such a job.

For one thing, Boykin has made it clear that he takes his orders not from his Army superiors but from God — which is a worrisome line of command. For another, it is both imprudent and dangerous to have a senior officer guiding the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan who believes that Islam is an idolatrous, sacrilegious religion against which we are waging a holy war.

And judging by his words, that is what he believes.

In a speech at a church in Daytona, Fla., in January, Boykin told the following story:

"There was a man in Mogadishu named Osman Atto," whom Boykin described as a top lieutenant of Mohammed Farah Aidid.

When Boykin's Delta Force commandos went after Atto, they missed him by seconds, he said. "He went on CNN and he laughed at us, and he said, 'They'll never get me because Allah will protect me. Allah will protect me.'"

"Well, you know what?" Boykin continued. "I knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an idol." Atto later was captured.

Other countries, Boykin said last year, "have lost their morals, lost their values. But America is still a Christian nation."

The general has said he has no doubt that our side is the side of the true God. He says he attends prayer services five times a week.

In Iraq, he told the Oregon congregation, special operations forces were victorious precisely because of their faith in God. "Ladies and gentlemen I want to impress upon you that the battle that we're in is a spiritual battle," he said. "Satan wants to destroy this nation, he wants to destroy us as a nation, and he wants to destroy us as a Christian army."

Since 9/11, the war against terrorism has become almost exclusively a special operations war, melding military and CIA paramilitary and covert activities with finer and finer grained integrated intelligence information. Hence, the creation of Boykin's new job as deputy undersecretary of Defense for intelligence.

The task facing Boykin, Rumsfeld insiders say, is to break down the wall between different intelligence collectors and agencies and quickly get the best information and analysis for American forces in the field.

But even as he begins his new duties, Boykin is still publicly preaching.

As late as Sept. 27, he was in Vero Beach, Fla., speaking on behalf of Visitation House Ministries.

In describing the war against terrorism, President Bush frequently says it "is not a war against Islam." In his National Security Strategy, Bush declared that "the war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations." Yet many in the Islamic world see the U.S. as waging a cultural and religious war against them. In fact, the White House's own Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World reported this month that since 9/11, "hostility toward America has reached shocking levels."

"Arabs and Muslims

respond in anger to what they perceive as U.S. denigration of their societies and cultures," the report stated.

The task for the U.S., the report said, is to wage "a major struggle to expand the zone of tolerance and marginalize extremists."

Appointing Jerry Boykin, with his visions of holy war in the Islamic world, to a top position in the United States military is no way to marginalize extremism.

*William M. Arkin is a military affairs analyst who writes regularly for The Times.*

New York Times

October 16, 2003

#### 44. On Listening

By Thomas L. Friedman

There was a headline that grabbed me in *The Times* on Saturday. It said, "Cheney Lashes Out at Critics of Policy on Iraq."

"Wow," I thought, "that must have been an interesting encounter." Then I read the fine print. Mr. Cheney was speaking to 200 invited guests at the conservative Heritage Foundation — and even they were not allowed to ask any questions. Great. Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein issue messages from their caves through Al Jazeera, and Mr. Cheney issues messages from his bunker through Fox. America is pushing democracy in Iraq, but our own leaders won't hold a real town hall meeting or a regular press conference.

Out of fairness, my newspaper feels obligated to run such stories. But I wish we had said to the V.P.: If you're going to give a major speech on Iraq to an audience limited to your own supporters and not allow any questions, that's not news — that's an advertisement, and you should buy an ad on the Op-Ed page.

Such an approach would serve both journalism and the nation, because it might actually force this administration to listen to

someone other than itself. And learning to listen may be the only way the Bush team is going to muster and sustain the support it needs to succeed in Iraq.

To begin with, listening might actually force the Bush team to frame its vision of U.S. foreign policy and its rationale for the Iraq war on our hopes for the world, not just our fears of it. Every other word out of this administration's mouth now is "terror" or "terrorism." We have stopped exporting hope, the most important commodity America has. We now export only fear, so we end up importing everyone else's fears right back.

Yes, America faces real threats, and this administration, to its credit, has been serious about confronting them. But America also has many more friends, actual and potential, and nurturing them is also part of our national security. We cannot spend so much time talking about our enemies that we forget to listen to our friends, because without them, ultimately, we cannot win either a war of terrorism or a war of ideas.

Had this ingrown administration ever exposed itself to people even mildly opposed to its policies, let alone foreigners, it might have avoided some of its most egregious errors. Had it listened to its own Army chief of staff, who had served in Bosnia, it might have put more troops into Iraq, as he advocated. Had it listened to its own State Department, it might not have recklessly disbanded the Iraqi Army without having enough U.S. troops to fill the security vacuum.

Listening is also a sign of respect, and it is amazing how much people will allow you to say to them, by way of criticism, if you just bother to go listen to them first. I heard Richard Brodhead, the dean of Yale College, give some very smart advice along these lines to incoming freshmen the other day. He should have been

October 16, 2003

334

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

Please get back to me after you have had a chance to talk to the Chiefs of Staff about the 9/11 Commission thinking about moving NSA, NIMA and NRO to the CIA. I would be curious to know what their thoughts are.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
101603-11

*OB*  
*10-29*

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

16 Oct 03

U22179 /03

October 17, 2003

335 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

We ought to be sending thank you letters to those people who do things for the CPA, like Phil Carroll and Walt Slocombe, when they finish their work. I ought to have a way to do that on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101703-14

.....

Please respond by 10/24/03

*OB*  
*10-24*

17 Oct 03

U22180 /03

October 17, 2003

Iraq

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
  
SUBJECT: Iraq

You folks were going to get back to me with two things:

1. The way forward that we see in Iraq in terms of sovereignty, the economy and security.
2. As an overlay to that you are going to provide an approach we might take to begin transferring responsibility to the Department of State, as responsibility is moved from the CPA to the Iraqis.

I would like to see a first cut Friday or Saturday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-59

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

17 Oct 03

U22181 /03

DONE

October 17, 2003

350.001 SD

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR  
SUBJECT: Helms Event

6 copies sent  
copy

(Sent  
Rumsfeld)

Here is the material on the read-ahead for the Helms event. I think you do need to do a better job up front of mentioning people.

We ought to mention:

- The Reverend Joe Brown.
- Thank those supporters of the Helms activities.
- The former governor, Martin.
- Reverend clergy.
- The singers.

Let's be gracious in this thing.

After you put in all that, let's keep the thing down to about 13 or 14 minutes.

Thanks.

Attach.  
~~Helms Event Read-ahead~~

DHR:dh  
101703-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/18/03

17 OCT 03

U22182 /03

TO: Steve Cambone  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 18, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

383.6

I am told we've got some AI prisoners and I am curious to know if you can dig in and get results of the interrogation of those people, and see what linkages they have with the Iraqis. The intelligence today suggests that there is a linkage between AI and the Sunnis if I am not mistaken.

Please give me some information that will clarify in my head what is actually going on.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 101803.09

Please respond by: 10/31

18 Oct 03

U22183 /03

10:42 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*Advance copy provided*

DATE: October 18, 2003

SUBJECT:

*334 NSC*

Let the NSC know that I am not going to be available, nor Bremer or Abizaid all day Monday or Tuesday morning, and that Bremer is going to leave on Wednesday. Therefore, they ought to point towards an NSC meeting on Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning so that the President will have a chance to talk to both of them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101803.07

*✓ 10/22*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Sec Def —  
Talked to Steve Hadley on this. He agreed — no PC's/NSC's Monday or Tuesday NSC Wednesday morning w/ Bremer and Abizaid. We are asking for your time with the President immediately after the*

*18 Oct 03*

**U22184 103 NSC.**  
11-L-0559/OSD/20125

*C 10/22*

9:24 AM

TO: Rueben Jeffrey  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 18, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Iraqi Ambassador**

*Iraq*

Do we have any plans to get an ambassador from Iraq to the U.S. as a good spokesman and can speak up for the Iraqi governing council here in the U.S.?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101803.05

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *10/30* \_\_\_\_\_ *OB*  
*10-27*

*18 Oct 03*

**U22185 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/20126

9:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 18, 2003  
SUBJECT: Iraq

*Iraq*

I think you can use Phil Carroll with some press on the oil situation. He's thoughtful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
101803.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*Oct 03*

**U22186 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/20127

October 20, 2003

000.5

TO: David Chu

CC: Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
Jim Haynes  
Joe Schmitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on USAFA

This weekend I again reviewed the report of the Panel to Review Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy. I consider it a good report.

I would like you to develop tasking for the Services and OSD to see that, where appropriate, any schools we have take into account the recommendations contained in this report and the problems it highlights for the Department.

Please report back to me in four months as to the steps that have been taken by each of the Services and any other schools in the Department where these recommendations might be appropriate and any recommendations they may have, so we can see that this problem is dealt with appropriately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-30

.....  
Please respond by 2/20/04

20 Oct 03

U22187 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20128

October 20, 2003

320.2

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Mix of Force and Capabilities

Please don't forget that Gen. Abizaid owes me a piece of paper on the mix of the force and why the capabilities will go up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-41

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

- Sec Def —
- Initial response attached.
- Not full telling
- I told CENTCOM Chief of Staff this was same info that we heard on SVTC
- more details / granularity needed
- waiting for follow-up.

20 Oct 03

10/22

U22188 /03

No Classification in Message Body

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

---

**From:** Whitcomb, MG Steven R [whitcosr@centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 21, 2003 2:17 PM  
**To:** John LTG Craddock (E-mail)  
**Cc:** Reynes COL Joseph Jr *← Larry Di Rita 10/24*

**Importance:** High

General Craddock...We look at OIF II and expect that we could possibly come down to about 95-100K troops given the right security environment, Iraqi security force contributions and continued Coalition contributions...Approximately 50% of the reduction of forces are combat forces--the others are combat support and combat service support (engineers, transportation, hospital units and logistics) being replaced by contract services and the hiring of Iraqis to perform non combat services...Can not put specific numbers to types of unit reductions yet, but it is based on being able to maintain required capabilities versus a type unit--for example, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units that currently provide much of the logistics support for the force will be reduced through increased contracting in areas such as engineering support, food services and bath and laundry services ...The number of medical facilities can be reduced as we gain efficiencies and effectiveness with where our troops are positioned and combining dispersed service specific support at those hubs...The maintenance requirements for a heavy force will be mitigated by lighter, more mobile and less heavy equipment to maintain...And logistics resupply that can flow directly into bases in Iraq versus currently moving into and then from Kuwait by road into Iraq could reduce troop other troop requirements...We continue to refine requirements versus capabilities ...Very Respectfully--Whitcomb

No Classification in Message Body

1

11-L-0559/OSD/20130

October 20, 2003

DONE

337 MH

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS

We have to get the President and the Vice President primed tomorrow. That means we have to get our act together on Sadr today, so we are ready to brief him wherever he is in the world tomorrow.

I think we probably ought to give the Vice President a briefing over here on what we are thinking about, and then the two of us could get on the phone with the President and lay it out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-14

.....

Please respond by 10/20/03

20 Oct 03

U22189 /03

October 20, 2003

II  
Nag

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outreach

On outreach, why don't we bring in the top national security professors, writers and thinkers and give them a briefing on where we are and what we have done on transformation and lessons learned on Iraq. I just read a piece by Krepinevich saying there should be a study of lessons learned. We have just done it, and he doesn't even know it.

Instead of having those thoughtful folks writing things like that, let's get them in. Please show me the list you are thinking of inviting before doing it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*OB*  
*10.29*

20 Oct 03

U22190 /03

October 20, 2003

230.02

TO: Jim O'Beirne  
 CC: Reuben Jeffery  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Volunteer for Iraq

Here is the card of a fellow I met down at the Jesse Helms center who volunteered to go to Baghdad. I think he is a former Ranger. My guess is he would be good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/20/03

*OB*  
*10-23*



**REPRESENTATIVE JOHN M. BLUST**  
 NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 62<sup>ND</sup> DISTRICT

STATE LEGISLATIVE BUILDING  
 16 W JONES STREET ROOM 1420  
 RALEIGH NC 27601-1096  
 919-733-5806 TELEPHONE  
 919-754-3134 FAX  
 JOHNBL@UNCLES.NET

(b)(6)

20 OCT 03

U22191 /03

October 20, 2003

*Afghanistan*

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Report

We are going to need an unclassified version of the Afghanistan weekly update, as well as the classified version. Please see that this gets done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/1/03

*20 Oct 03*

U22192 /03

October 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pause for Applause

We ought to think through what might get applause in a speech, and in that portion, we ought to write in "applause" so that I pause and allow it to happen rather than walking over it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-21

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

350.001 SD

20 Oct 03

U22193 /03

October 20, 2003

704

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 CC: Col. Steve Bucci  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Hospital Visits

I would like to keep going out to Bethesda and Walter Reed. We are still getting people killed and wounded. I would like to try to get out there on Saturdays or Sundays. If I am gone on a weekend, I might like to try to go during the week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 102003-20

.....  
 Please respond by 10/24/03

*OB*  
*11.5*

20 Oct 03

U22194 /03

October 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld, *DR*  
SUBJECT: Not Forgetting

In the song, "Proud to be an American," there is a line that says, "I can't forget the men who died to save that right for me"—the right being freedom and liberty.

Would you please look that up and think about using it. That is a very good statement. We cannot forget those people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-19

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

350.001 SD

20 Oct 03

U22195 /03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF-7671  
03/016378  
11:04 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: War on Terror

004-5

Take a look at this War on Terror, Holy War 101. Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
113003.06

Attach: Media Highlights 11/24/03 "War on Terror: Holy War 101"

Please respond by: 12/8

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*Original attachment*  
*included behind TAB A.*  
*vr/CDR Nosenzo*  
*12/11*

*12/30* *@ 12/11*

29 NOV 03

U22199 /03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Media Highlights  
Monday, 24 November 2003

(D) Unclassified

Has some glimpses  
into Pakistan's madrassas,  
may help draw attention  
to the problem.

## 9. War on Terror: Holy War 101

*Next wave: Rumsfeld frets that radical Islamic schools are training a new army of jihadists--that 'the harder we work, the behinder we get.' He's right to worry*

Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzal and Zahid Hussain, Newsweek, 1 December 2003

Abdul Bari's school day begins at 4 a.m. The freckle-faced, outgoing 9-year-old, an Afghan poppy farmer's son, wakes up on the tile floor he shares with four dozen other students at the Jamia Uloom Islamia religious academy, in the untamed mountains of Pakistan's tribal areas. After morning prayer services, he fixes tea for the older boys and himself, eating a bit of bread before classes start at daybreak. Students spend most of the day reciting the Qur'an; memorizing every one of its 6,666 verses is the main requirement for graduation. Still, this madrassa is the only formal schooling most of these boys will ever have. So they learn civics from a white-bearded scholar named Amanullah, 65, who teaches them about the Taliban. "There was a real Islamic regime," the old man says. "They fixed 25 years of problems in no time, using Islamic laws."

ANOTHER FACULTY member, Mullah Taj Mohammad, 40, gives a current-events lesson, warning of the evils that lurk in non-Islamic lands: "I've heard that many Muslim girls have infidel boyfriends--and clink glasses of alcohol with Jews." That's not the worst of it, he says: "Americans are killing Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they are busy trying to poison Muslim minds everywhere with films, music and television." Abdul is an eager learner. He dreams of enlisting in the jihad against Afghanistan's U.S.-backed president, Hamid Karzai. "Karzai is a killer of Muslims," the boy says. "When I grow up I'll fight him, and then we'll see who's a man and who's a woman."

The Afghan war, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom, is getting nastier. In the last six months--the bloodiest period since the Taliban's fall in late 2001--hundreds of people have been killed, many of them civilians, including two foreign relief officials and nearly a dozen Afghans working for international agencies. Last week the United Nations announced that it was suspending its refugee-repatriation program and pulling all foreign workers out of southeastern Afghanistan. "We're going to have to refight Enduring Freedom because we didn't finish the job," predicts retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, former head of U.S. Central Command.

Even among senior Bush aides, concern is rising over the mess that festered in Afghanistan while the White House fixated on Iraq. The war's No. 1 target, Osama bin Laden, is still in business. His Taliban friends have regrouped and are doing their best to sabotage the reconstruction. Two weeks ago, in the old Taliban stronghold of Spin Buldak, a new audiotape was released, purportedly of the group's leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, rallying his followers. "If you claim to be among the faithful, why can't you be ready for sacrifice?" the voice on the tape demands.

Abdul hears such calls to arms incessantly. Hardscrabble madrassas like his, in the north Waziristan town of Mirali, are where many Taliban leaders got their start two decades ago during the Soviets' war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Today, those jihad academies continue to indoctrinate new generations of holy warriors, passionately loyal to the banner of radical Islam and inured to lives of hardship. Such schools pose a grave challenge to the Bush administration's plans for the region. "How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?" asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a recently leaked memo. "Is our current situation such that 'the harder we work, the behinder we get?'" More than a year ago Pakistan's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, promised to defang the madrassas. Instead, he formed a political alliance with the schools' radical Islamist supporters against the mainstream secular opposition. "Musharraf talks a lot, but nothing happens," says Maulana Abdul Qadr, principal of the Darul Uloom Zuberia madrassa, near Peshawar.

That may be changing. Last week Musharraf's security forces went after six previously banned militant groups, closing down dozens of their affiliated madrassas and promising to deal harshly with any that tried to defy the order. Musharraf's interior minister, Faisal Saleh Hayat, announced that new regulations on religious schools will be issued this week, at the end of Ramadan. "There will be no compromise," Hayat told NEWSWEEK before the announcement. "We are totally committed to madrassa reforms and will not be deterred by political expediency." Nevertheless, Musharraf's Islamist partners of convenience are threatening to organize street protests against

him, and the country's leading hard-line schools, such as the Darul Uloom Islamia in Karachi, swore to resist any moves to control them.

Musharraf's job often seems hopeless. Not even the mullahs know how many madrassas Pakistan has. The government's latest guess is 27,000 or more. Many are peaceable institutions wishing only to train devout Muslims, not warriors or terrorists. But others steep their students in the doctrine of holy war and function openly as jihad enlistment centers. Many youngsters take inspiration from older schoolmates. Zahidullah, 31, a grad student in Islamic law at the Bahrul Uloom madrassa in Pakistan's northern mountains, boasts of how many recruits he has gained for the outlawed Kashmiri guerrilla force Harkatul Mujahedin: "Many youths here are anxious to join the jihad when I tell them stories of our heroic Islamic resistance against Indian aggression."

Some schools provide far more than recruitment services, providing safe havens, supply depots and clandestine meeting sites. Last summer, according to Pakistani intelligence sources, a group of senior Taliban leaders secretly gathered to discuss strategy at a madrassa some 20 miles south of Peshawar. The Afghans told their local contacts that Mullah Omar was calling for new recruits to intensify the war against America. In September Pakistani security forces raided another madrassa in Karachi, hauling in more than a dozen Indonesian and Malaysian students, including Rusman Gunawan, younger brother of the notorious Qaeda lieutenant Hambali. Gunawan remains in custody without charges under Pakistan's antiterror laws.

In recent months, thousands of young Afghan men have swarmed to madrassas just inside Pakistan. In Baluchistan's Chaman district, directly across the border from the Taliban's home province of Kandahar, at least 300 madrassas are filled to bursting. Pakistan's Army has lined the desolate frontier with high earthen berms, concertina-wire fences and watchtowers, but nothing stops the traffic of fighting-age Afghans--in either direction. "There is a constant stream of them," says Hafiz Hameedullah, head of a seminary in the town of Chaman, right on the border. "It's hard to find accommodations for all the newcomers." On the Afghan side, meanwhile, the influx of madrassa students and graduates has helped to produce Taliban battle units as large as 100 fighters, where a year ago the guerrillas were mustering squads of barely a half-dozen men.

Musharraf's latest moves aren't likely to inconvenience the holy warriors much. His aides have said the new law will ban the teaching of sectarian hatred and violence. But mostly it lays out a program for the voluntary registration of madrassas, offering financial aid to schools if they submit to financial audits and accept a government-recommended curriculum that includes secular courses like English and computer science. Even many militant schools have begun offering those subjects already, to help their students find jobs after graduation. They still draw the line at letting their pupils use the Internet. "Weak students could look at pornography," Qadr explains.

Any effort to combat radical teachings is complicated by the fact that Pakistan desperately needs its madrassas. Without them, an estimated 1.5 million young Pakistanis would get no formal education at all. According to a recent analysis by the U.S. Agency for International Development, Pakistan spends only 2.2 percent of its GDP on public education, the tiniest share for any country in South or Southeast Asia. And Pakistan's jihadis are more than ready for a fight. "If Musharraf tries to crack down on madrassas, there will be a flood of blood in the streets," says Maulana Anwar Ali Shah, principal of one of Pakistan's biggest schools, the Jamia Islamia Taalemutqiran madrassa in Peshawar.

A far greater worry, at least in the West, is the blood that will be spilled if the madrassas keep on teaching violence and hate. Sitting below a poster of --himself holding the Qur'an in his right hand and a Kalashnikov in his left, Samiul Haq says he fully supports what he calls "the real freedom fights" in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir. He's the principal of the Darul Uloom Haqqania mad-rassa, 20 miles east of Peshawar, one of the biggest religious schools in Pakistan. He and his 3,000 students proudly call it "the University of Jihad." Its alumni include at least eight senior Taliban leaders, and Mullah Omar sent a personal message to every graduating class until his regime's collapse two years ago. Without a trace of irony, Haq denies that his school teaches extremism. "I challenge Musharraf to find any extremism here," he says. "This madrassa is not a military base. It has no guns or tanks." He adds: "We teach jihad because the holy Qur'an teaches jihad, which is the defense of Islam."

UNCLASSIFIED

Media Highlights  
Monday, 24 November 2003

A NEWSWEEK reporter attended the school's commencement ceremony a few weeks ago. About 1,000 white-turbaned graduates and thousands of relatives jammed the madrassa's courtyard under banners depicting AK-47s and anti-aircraft guns. The crowd seemed uncontrollable until Haq's eldest son, Rashidul Haq, took the microphone and announced: "If you are a friend of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, please sit down. But if you are a friend of Bush, keep standing." Everyone immediately sat, and a mullah delivered the invocation. "I request that almighty Allah protect the Taliban and our popular leaders Mullah Omar and Osama," he prayed. "They are living in caves and suffering. We pray for their assistance and health."

Ten miles closer to Peshawar, in the tiny village of Qumber Khen, tribesmen recently greeted a homecoming student with jubilant bursts of AK-47 fire in the air. Talawat Shah, 28, was arriving from his graduation at the Darul Uloom Sapia madrassa, not far from the Khyber Pass. Shah told the crowd that he was dedicating the day to Mullah Omar. "If we forget the jihad, God will forget us," Shah said. "But if we return to jihad, God will lift us up." His first priority is to start a madrassa in Qumber Khen. He's eager to spread the message of jihad to his students.

With Michael Hirsh in Washington

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UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/20141

Page 26 of 53

Snowflake

TO: Dong Feith

In reply refer to EF-7566 and  
I# 03/015887

2:08 AM

EF-7566

C 12/9

DATE: November 17, 2003

SUBJECT:

Here's a memo I sent to Dick Myers on the subject of sub-Sahara in Africa. Why don't you take a look at it and let me know what you think.

AFRICA

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111203.06P

Please respond by:

11/25

✓  
12/30

Sir,  
Respon attached. DoD  
strategy for sub-Sahara Africa  
included behind.  
vr/CDR Noseny  
12/9

17NOV03

10-11-03 09:02 IN

U222001/03



EF- 7535  
I - 03/015716  
November 12, 2003

✓  
12/10

(11/26/03 assigned)

NATO AREA

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: NATO Allocation of Flags to Post

It seems to me that Italy has as much of a right to the Deputy SACEUR position as Germany does.

With respect to Martino's other point, it seems to me that usability of forces might be a proper measure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-15

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

11/26

Sir,  
Response attached. Original policy memo included behind.  
vr/cdr Nosumpr  
11/26

12 NOV 03

U22201 / 03



UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

3:25 PM

✓ 11/25

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 18, 2003  
RE: News Article

KOREH (Rumsfeld)

Please see how accurate this article is on North Korea for me, please?

Thanks.

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

DHR/azn  
111803.17

*Jake -  
Over to you -  
SK  
11/19*

Attach: Jap

Please respo

NOV 22 2003

*response at yellow tab*



18 Nov 03

# Korea tunnel worker reveals Pyongyang's subterranean plotting

Los Angeles Times

SEOUL — Like so many worker ants, the North Korean soldiers spent their days underground in a vast labyrinth of tunnels.

Ki, a North Korean now in his 30s, was recruited at age 17 into an elite military unit working for the agency responsible for weapons production in North Korea. He took an oath to work underground for the rest of his working life and was assigned to a cave in remote Musan County in North Hamgyong province, about 24 km from the Chinese border.


"This is how we hide from our enemies. Everything in North Korea is underground," said Ki.

North Korea is riddled with caves like the one where Ki worked. In that most paranoid of countries, virtually everything of military significance is manufactured underground, whether it be buttons for soldiers' uniforms or enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

A South Korean intelligence source estimated that there are several hundred large underground factories in North Korea and more than 10,000 smaller facilities. Joseph Bermudez, the author of three books on the North Korean military, puts the total number between 11,000 to 14,000.

The North Koreans began tunneling after the Korean War, when U.S. bombing destroyed most of their industrial base and infrastructure. The late North Korean founder Kim Il-Sung is believed to have been so awed by American air power that he directed key industrial facilities be built underground.

"The entire nation must be made into a fortress," Kim wrote in 1965. "We must dig ourselves into the ground to protect ourselves." North Korea's mountainous topography, inhospitable for agriculture and transportation,



proved to be singularly well-suited to become what Bermudez calls "the most heavily fortified country in the world." North Korea, a country of a mere 22 million people, developed the fifth-largest army in the world, while the mountains provided natural cover when the North Koreans looked for ways to conceal their military infrastructure. In the countryside, small entryways can be seen dug into the sides of steep hills with slabs of concrete covering

them. Above the Demilitarized Zone that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula, the North Koreans have put an estimated 13,000 heavy artillery pieces into mountain bunkers. The doors face to the north — the artillery is mounted so that it can quickly slide in and out on rails — so that South Korean and U.S. troops stationed south of the DMZ cannot reach them with return fire.

The North Korean tunneling activity hasn't stopped at the border. Over the years, four infiltration tunnels have been discovered in South Korean territory. Based on defector testimony, South Korean investigators believe there could be as many as 20 more still hidden beneath the earth.

Because so much happens below the surface of the earth, the North Koreans are able to conceal their military infrastructure from the prying eyes of surveillance satellites and reconnaissance.

For example, confusion reigns over the question of whether North Korea has, as it claims, extracted plutonium from 8,000 nuclear-reactor fuel rods and, if so, where this has taken place.

The North Koreans help maintain the extreme secrecy of the underground facilities by keeping their personnel virtually locked inside.

"Once you go in, you don't go out," said Ki, the North Korean who worked at the Musan County facility until, though a combination of bribery, guile and family connections, he escaped in 1999.

Had he remained, Ki said, he would have been expected to find a wife from among the women assigned to his unit and to raise a family within the compound, which had schools, canteens and other facilities.

And so extreme was the secrecy that even inside employees had little idea what was being produced.

## more

and few Sinhalese. From about 900 people in and go out number dropped Sri Lankan police check point at

ges lie along the road, once thriving now little more

Jaffna the road Pass, an isthmus military garrison, war, once stood. The road, opened last year and the government-backed but most of it has been bringing life into the

LOWES/GETTY IMAGES

10  
November 7, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transcripts of Interrogation

I would like to see the Tariq Aziz interrogation transcripts if you have them in English.

Thanks.

*Please control*

*Iraq*

DHR:dh  
110703-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*Reply to: X04911 / 03*

*Response Attached  
CJA  
11/18*

*10 NOV 03*

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

17  
November 12, 2003

2003 MAR -3 PM 2:52

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Training Offers

*approved  
to send*

Who offered to train police or army—was it Romania or Hungary? Bremer tells me that Hungary finally turned us down. Someone recently told me they would be happy to do it—was it Romania?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-11

*OB  
12/6*

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*UCB*

*What is U#  
"T" "  
111203-11*

*Time*

*Iraq*

*17 Nov 03*

October 20, 2003

TO: Steve Herbits  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Robby George

Would this fellow, Robby George, be a potential General Counsel for the Pentagon?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Merritt, J. I. "Heretic in the Temple," *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, 10/8/03

DHR:dh  
102003-29

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

020 GC

20 OCT 03

U2220701/03

Robby George once worked for George W. Bush; now he's the  
hero of the intellectual right. By J. I. Merritt '66

# Heretic in the temple

The lecturer in Politics 315 - Constitutional Interpretation, or "Coninterp," as generations of students have called it - came to class, as usual, wearing a dark three-piece suit, a white shirt, and a tie, and he carried his papers in a black attaché case. Professor Robert P. George invariably dresses as though arguing a case before the U.S. Supreme Court - out of respect for the subject matter, the students, and the scholars who preceded him, he says. But his self-imposed dress code has another purpose, as well: to encourage civility. In a course that requires students to think through their approach to controversial topics like abortion and affirmative action - for starters - George says he wants "to set an elevated tone, because we are discussing divisive and emotionally engaging issues."

Coninterp is one of Princeton's most venerable courses - it's been taught since the 1890s by a long line of distinguished constitutional scholars, starting with Woodrow Wilson 1879 and followed by W. F. Willoughby, Edwin S. Corwin, Alpheus T. Mason, and George's mentor and immediate predecessor, Walter F. Murphy, all holders of the McCormick Professorship of Jurisprudence.

George, the professorship's current holder, is something of an anomaly at Princeton: a devout Catholic and social conservative on a faculty generally viewed as liberal. A hero of the intellectual right, George champions traditional values rooted in family and religion as a member of government advisory panels, and in the media. He began one campus program, the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, that has brought conservative scholars and officials to campus (and, with them, some protesters), and he has taken administrators to task when he felt their decisions offended religious values. Civil speech and lawyerly clothes are part of his means and his message.

George's Coninterp is known as one of the toughest courses on campus, but also one of the most satisfying. The quasi-official Student Course Guide rated his lectures 4.9 on a scale of 1 to 5, noting his "distinctive style of teaching - mostly employing the Socratic method." Once you speak up, the guide warns prospective class members, "George will keep pushing you to defend your points and argue against other students." In an era of grade inflation, says George, "an A isn't given that often and requires genuine originality and insight. It takes more than simply doing a good job."

The course poses fundamental questions about the nature



of the Constitution: Is it limited to the document drafted in Philadelphia in 1787, or should it include, at least in spirit, the Declaration of Independence? Who should have the authority to interpret the Constitution, and what are the limitations in interpreting it?

In one lecture last fall, George focused on the principle of legal protection under the law. Enrollment is capped at 100, and nearly all of the students appeared to be present, along with a score of gray-haired auditors in the more remote seats. The week's reading assignment consisted of primary sources – for example, judicial opinions rendered in seminal cases relating to race, gender, and sexual orientation – and scholarly commentary on equal-protection issues. The students would probe the cases in detail in their seminars later in the week.

George dispensed with introductory remarks and launched immediately into a discussion, conducting the session as a kind of giant precept, as he ranged back and forth in front of the lectern, peppering the audience with questions.

"Today's topic is the Equal Protection Clause," he said. "Where is that clause in our Constitution?"

A student answered, "In the 14th Amendment."

"Why there? Why not in the Bill of Rights? We don't get the 14th Amendment until after the Civil War."

When another student answered, "Because the Founding Fathers for the most part didn't want equal protection," George feigned astonishment. "They didn't want equal protection? Does everybody agree with that? Disagree?" He advanced the notion that most of the framers of the Constitution regarded equality as fundamental – after all, "we fought a revolution on the principle that all men are created equal." They and others in succeeding generations, he suggested, believed that the equality espoused in the Declaration of Independence was strongly implicit in the Bill of Rights. "There's a long and controversial history to the idea of the Declaration of Independence as a kind of preamble to the preamble of the Constitution, and that the Constitution has to be read in light of the Declaration. What's to be said pro and con about that?"

For the next hour and 20 minutes, the class explored the meaning and implications of equality as embodied in constitutional law. Discussion lit upon Madison's Tenth Federalist, the Dred Scott decision, and the views of Jefferson and Lincoln on natural rights, among other matters. Finally, George steered the talk to the 14th Amendment itself and "its three great clauses" about privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection for all U.S. citizens, concluding with a discussion of the 15th Amendment, which granted the vote to former slaves.

Many students are aware of George's role as Princeton's leading conservative intellectual, but that doesn't shape class discussion. In both *Coninterp* and *Civil Liberties*, another course he teaches regularly, he challenges the assumptions and logic of liberal and conservative students with equal force.

Landon Y. Jones III '97, a liberal on most issues who took *Civil Liberties* and is now completing a law degree at the University of Michigan, recalls George's course as the first time he thought "like a lawyer," which proved instrumental in his decision to pursue law and a career in public policy. "The

rational, logical way he presented an argument challenged my thinking by drawing a distinction between the wisdom of some policy I happened to agree with and its constitutionality, which are not necessarily the same."

Like many so-called neoconservatives, Robert Peter "Robby" George started out as a Democrat. The grandson of Italian and Syrian immigrants and the eldest of five brothers in a close-knit Catholic family, he grew up in Morgantown, West Virginia, where he attended public and parochial schools. Morgantown had two main industries: coal-mining and the University of West Virginia. Some of young Robby's friends were the children of professors; more often, their fathers worked in the mines. His own father was in the commercial real-estate business, but his grandfathers were miners. "We saw Democrats as the people who worked in the mines and Republicans as the people who owned the mines," he recalls. "Both sides of the family were New Deal Democrats who viewed Roosevelt as a savior." His maternal grandfather was a "great union man" who, during the 1932 presidential campaign, lost his job for refusing to put a Hoover poster in his window, George remembers.

As a high school senior in 1972, George headed the West Virginia Democratic Youth Conference and worked in the presidential campaign of George McGovern. His political conversion began the following year, when he went off to Swarthmore College, one of the nation's most liberal campuses, and "encountered Marxist professors who viciously attacked the free-market system and praised the most extreme forms of socialism." George recalls that he began "to sense on the left a hostility to America itself and a tendency to view the United States as the bad guy in international politics." He also fell under the sway of James Kurth, a young political-science professor and former atheist who had converted to evangelical Christianity. Kurth, who remains a close friend, "was reacting to what would later be called political correctness. He urged us to question the campus orthodoxy and the herd mentality of faculty and students."

George always had held conservative views on issues "pertaining to the sanctity of human life and marriage and sexual morality," he recalls. But over the years, his liberal views on issues such as the role of government in economics and social welfare grew more conservative as well. At Swarthmore he majored in the humanities, with a focus on religion and philosophy, and graduated Phi Beta Kappa, in 1977. His next stop was Harvard, where he earned a law degree and a master's degree in theological studies. He married in 1982 and today has an ecumenical family: His teenage son and daughter are, like George, Catholic, and his wife, Cindy, is Jewish.

George initially wanted to be a lawyer who did some teaching on the side, but by graduate school those priorities had switched, and he moved on to Oxford for a doctorate in the philosophy of law. He arrived at Princeton in 1985 and immediately started precepting in *Constitutional Interpretation* under Walter Murphy. In 1995, upon Murphy's retirement, he took over the course.

George, holder of the McCormick chair since 1999, is the



Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas swears in Robert George as a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1993.

only one of the six McCormick professors to hold a law degree. (Wilson attended law school at the University of Virginia but withdrew after a year; he briefly practiced law without a degree.) Today, George's law degree and other framed diplomas hang in his Corwin Hall office, along with a certificate of membership in the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court; two documents – one from each President Bush – naming George to government panels; and a framed copy of the Ten Commandments.

Among scholars George probably is best known for his efforts to infuse legal theory with a moral philosophy based on natural law, a school of thought holding that basic moral principles are inherent in human consciousness and discernible through a God-given ability to reason. As a legal concept, natural law usually is associated with conservatives; liberals pilloried Clarence Thomas during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings for his advocacy of natural law as a guide to adjudicating cases. But George points out that some conservatives, notably Robert H. Bork, view it as a philosophical relic inapplicable to contemporary issues.

"There's been a long debate about the role of natural law and natural rights in interpreting the Constitution," he says. As did his predecessor Edwin Corwin, George believes that the framers of the Constitution took natural law and its corollary, natural rights, as givens, and that these concepts are essential to understanding their intentions. "Natural law goes way back, into classical thought. Plato and Aristotle wrote about it, and Sophocles' *Antigone* is a reflection on the conflict between a citizen's obligations under natural law and the commands of the sovereign," George explains. He adds that natural law was central to the ideas of thinkers such as Saint Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr.

Writings by George and his mentor John Finnis, a legal philosopher now at the University of Notre Dame who supervised George's dissertation in the philosophy of law at Oxford, have helped insert natural law into many of today's most contentious debates about abortion, stem-cell research, physician-assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage.

Stacked on the floor in front of George's desk are copies of

his most recent book, *The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis* (2001), a conservative critique, broadly speaking, of what its author calls "secularist orthodoxy" and an exploration of the "proper relationship of moral judgment to law and public policy." In it, George argues that secularism, which he dates to the 18th century and Scottish philosopher David Hume's assertion that human nature is fundamentally just a bundle of desires begging to be gratified, implicitly denies our free will to choose between right and wrong.

By George's reckoning, secularism and the moral relativism that stems from it are rooted in sand. In contrast, natural law is grounded in a bedrock set of inherently knowable truths representing, in the words of Madison, "the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God." George notes that natural law is fundamental to the Judeo-Christian tradition and says that its "principal institutional exponent" today is the Catholic Church. His positions square with Church teachings as represented by Pope John Paul II's encyclicals on faith, reason, and the sanctity of human life. In George's view (and the Pope's), faith isn't at odds with reason, but depends on it to expose truths about the inherent dignity of individuals and their fundamental right to be treated justly and equally under the law.

Because a right to life is fundamental, George believes that both legally sanctioned abortion and euthanasia are morally wrong, as they end lives prematurely. He believes that human life begins with conception because embryos "are whole, living members of the human species who – unless prevented from doing so – are actively developing themselves to the next more mature stage along the continuum of development of a single, unitary human organism." The same principles apply whether conception occurs inside or outside the womb. It is also wrong, therefore, to kill discarded embryos produced in fertility clinics in order to "harvest" their stem cells for research, he says.

His views often reflect mainstream conservatism, but not always. George, in line with John Paul II, differs from most conservatives and believes that the state should not execute a person, even for murder, when incarceration could prevent repetition of the crime. Still, George insists that the purpose of incarceration is fundamentally retributive. "We deprive those convicted of felonies of their freedom because justice demands it," he says. "A morally serious society holds people responsible for their criminal acts." He uses natural law to champion traditional notions of marriage and sex: "Good" sex is genital sex between spouses, while "bad" (i.e., immoral) sex is defined as sex between unmarried partners, masturbation, or sex between spouses other than the genital-to-genital variety. He writes in *The Clash of Orthodoxies*, "The plain fact is that the genitals of men and women are reproductive organs all of the time – even during periods of sterility . . . Insofar as the point or object of sexual intercourse is marital union, the partners achieve the desired unity (i.e., become 'two-in-one-flesh') precisely insofar as they mate . . . or, if you will, perform the type of act – the only type of act – upon which the gift of a child may supervene." For the sake of setting a moral standard, George would leave state laws prohibiting adultery, fornication, and sodomy on the books, even while acknowledging the difficulty and wisdom of enforcing them.

Not surprisingly, George's public positions reflect his personal views. As a member of the President's Council on Bioethics, George voted with the majority in a July 2002 report that called for a four-year moratorium on cloning for purposes of reproduction and biomedical research, laying out his reasons in a personal statement (available at [www.bioethic.gov](http://www.bioethic.gov)). "I agreed to the idea of a moratorium to further debate the issue," he says. "I myself believe, at least for now, that we should permanently ban all cloning." The first President Bush had appointed him to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, where George initiated a report on religion and public life focusing on religious expression in public schools. While he is opposed to officially sponsored prayer in public schools, he says, schools should not bar religious organizations from using their facilities when they are available for political groups and student clubs. "I agree with President Clinton that our schools should not be religion-free zones," he says.

At Princeton, George is adored by conservative students, who credit him with widening the diversity of public dis-

### At Princeton, George is adored by conservative students, who credit him with widening the diversity of public discourse on campus.

course on campus. Three years ago, he initiated the James Madison Program, which is supported financially by Steve Forbes '70 and by the John M. Olin Foundation and the Lynne and Harry Bradley Foundation, both known for underwriting conservative causes. This fall, the program is hosting a program on pluralism and faith in politics. While George says the program does not have a conservative agenda, and notes that liberal scholars such as James E. Fleming '88, of Fordham University, and George's friend and Princeton colleague Stanley N. Katz have participated in its events, many speakers are widely known for their traditional views, including Robert Bork; Christopher DeMuth, president of the American Enterprise Institute; Lynne Cheney, chairwoman of the National Endowment for the Humanities in the first Bush administration and wife of the vice president; and William Kristol, editor of *The Weekly Standard*.

Many Catholic students hold George in especially high regard. Anti-Catholicism, George writes in *The Clash of Orthodoxies*, "remains a fact of American life — especially among American elites." In May, when Catholic students protested an art exhibit at the Woodrow Wilson School that they perceived as demeaning to their faith, Princeton's most visible Catholic professor rallied to their support, suggesting to a writer for the *National Review* that Princeton considered it acceptable to offend Catholics, and would never target other faiths or lifestyles in a similar way.

"I think it's great what he does," says Dylan Hogarty '06, coeditor of the right-leaning opinion journal *The Princeton Spectator*. George, he adds, "is viewed very favorably by many members of the student body, particularly by conservatives but also by moderates and liberals."

Although George thinks students are no more conservative

now than they were when he arrived at Princeton, left-leaning professor Stanley Katz has a different take: "In the last election something like 54 percent of students supported Gore, but 20 years ago it would have been 80 percent."

George's widening influence on the campus and in academia generally, as well as in the halls of power, makes some of his liberal colleagues uneasy. "Robby increasingly tends to exacerbate rather than transcend the culture wars," asserts Jeffrey L. Stout '76, professor of religion. *The Clash of Orthodoxies*, he adds, "reinforces the notion that the country is basically divided between the good, religious, moral conservatives and the bad, secularist, amoral liberals." Stout points out that while campus conservatives may regard themselves as an oppressed minority, George holds one of the university's most prestigious chairs and "exercises as much influence in Washington as any Princeton professor." George, he says, "is the exact opposite of a victim. He's part of a ruling elite that has held massive power for more than two decades. How many candidates who declare themselves liberals or nonbelievers can win an election in this country?"

Few, however, take issue with George's scholarship or teaching. Though Stout disagrees with "many, if not most" of George's stands on moral and political issues, he considers him an excellent colleague who has informed his department's discussions of Christian ethics and natural law. George, he adds, "is a world-class debater, and has the strengths and weaknesses of that kind of mind. You can always learn something when he picks apart your arguments, even if you sometimes suspect that he'd bite any bullet to avoid conceding an inch on behalf of his theory."

Says Katz, who calls himself "a garden-variety liberal" on most social issues: "I have high regard for Robby's scholarship and his teaching. I think the campus could use more conservative intellectuals, although we don't need ideologues of any stripe."

George admits to "a certain frisson one experiences with being a heretic" on a campus that remains predominantly liberal. It's clear that he enjoys tweaking liberal pieties. Although he's not a member of the National Rifle Association, for example, an N.R.A. sticker is displayed at eye level on the door to his office. When a liberal colleague placed it there as a joke, he says, he decided to keep it. Realizing that sooner or later someone offended by the sticker probably would tear it off, he wrote to the N.R.A. asking for an extra. Sure enough, one day the original disappeared, and he replaced it with the spare.

However people may react to his positions, George makes no apologies for his beliefs. "The United States isn't perfect," he says, "and our history includes sin and shame, especially slavery and segregation. But our founding principles and constitutional ideals are, in my opinion, profoundly good and true."

"I don't force students to accept those principles, but I do want students to understand them," George continues. "I see my role as that of a teacher rather than a preacher. At the same time, I believe that if students understand our nation's principles, they will grasp their wisdom and goodness." ■

Jim Merritt '66, a freelance writer and editor, is a former editor of PAW.

October 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Please prepare letters for me thanking Jesse Helms, Governor Martin for his nice remarks, and Dodd, the fellow who is President or Executive Director of the Foundation down there, for how much we enjoyed the nice evening, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-27

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

335 SD

20 OCT 03

U22208 /03

October 20, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Phrase

Senator Helms' use of the phrase, "the miracle of America," has a nice ring. You might want to think about using that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-26

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

350.00180

20 OCT 03

U22209 /03

October 20, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
ADM Ed Giambastiani  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

*Iraq*

Here is an article that may or may not be accurate. It might be helpful if you have lessons learned studies going on in your department to feed those results into either the Joint Staff or JFCOM comprehensive reviews talking place.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jaffe, Greg. "U.S. Army Finds No signs Hussein Planned to Wreck Key Iraqi Infrastructures,"  
*Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 2003.

DHR:dh  
102003-34

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*Sir,  
SecAF response attached.  
w/CDR Nosenje  
11/21/03*

*2005103  
11/21*

**U222104/03**



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
11/29

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of Air Force

NOV 21 2003

SUBJECT: Air Force Lessons Learned

- Shortly after 9/11, the Chief and I initiated what became Task Force Enduring Look (TFEL). TFEL charter:
  - Provide superior support to the warfighter, tell the Air Force story, and properly recognize lessons learned from recent operations and the Global War on Terrorism.
- TFEL hosted JFCOM team for exchange visit prior to deployment to SWA
- TFEL deployed five people to the COMAFFOR (Gen Moseley's HQ at PSAB AB, KSA) to focus on theater lessons learned collection.
  - The deployed team actively collaborated with the JFCOM Joint Lessons Learned Collection Team at the Coalition Air Operations Center
  - TFEL is supporting requests for briefings/ information from the JFCOM team and providing information for IDA studies supporting JFCOM.
  - TFEL works closely with the Joint Staff/J-7, Army Center for Lessons Learned, Navy Deep Blue, and Marine Combat Assessment Team.
- Current Status: TFEL is producing four volumes on IRAQI FREEDOM
  - Will address preparations, combat phase, post-hostility operations, and compendium of facts on global AF operations. Complete by 31 Dec 03
    - Most major issues very consistent with JFCOM briefing
    - Will be distributed to Joint Staff, JFCOM, Service partners
  - Original TFEL effort will stand down 31 Dec 03 and transition to warm storage.
  - A new organization under AF/CV (Lessons Learned Champions) will work insertion of lessons learned through JFCOM and JROC for funding and inclusion into CSAF's CONOPS Template

COORDINATION: AF/CVA, AF/CV, and AF/CC

Prepared by: MARK E. BONTRAGER, COL, AF/CVAX, DSN (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20156

October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AT&T

*Larry Di Rita  
11/24*

At a town hall at Fort Carson, I was asked about the AT&T prepaid phone cards in Iraq. Some of the Servicemen complained about the rates.

Here is a letter I received from AT&T. I have not read it.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/16/03 Addeo (AT&T) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102003-33

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

311.1

20 OCT 03

U22211 /03

11-8  
1800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2003 NOV 13 AM 9:43

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

October 30, 2003 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 11 Nov 03*

SUBJECT: Snowflake — AT&T

- You requested information on AT&T prepaid phone card rates (**Attached**). AT&T won a competitive bid as the contractor for all unofficial phones.
- US Central Command provides two phone services that enable Service members to call anywhere in the world — *Health, Morale and Welfare (HMW)* calls using official phone lines and *unofficial telecommunications* provided by Armed Services Exchanges.
- Service members are responsible for commercial charges they incur with HMW calls and unofficial calls. Payments can be made by using prepaid phone cards, telephone calling cards, credit cards, or collect calls. HMW callers may use any prepaid phone card; however, the unofficial callers may only use AT&T prepaid calling cards.
- The cost per calling minute is more expensive for unofficial calls than for HMW calls. HMW calls to the United States are charged U.S. domestic rates, while unofficial calls are charged at various international rates.
- The multiple billing rates for different phone services have led to confusion and complaints among Service members. Rates range from \$.32/per minute to \$1.00/per minute.
- On November 13, PDUSD(P&R) will meet with Mr. Louis Addeo, President – AT&T Government Solutions, to discuss the company's communication support to Service members serving in the OEF and OIF theaters.

*(P)*

RECOMMENDATION: None. For Information Only

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: George McNamara, Resale Activities & NAF Policy, ODUSD (MCFP)

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	11/18

*for*  
*11/12/03*

11-L-0559 OSD/20158

U18953 /03

**COORDINATION**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 116.03



Louis M. Addeo  
President - AT&T Government Solutions

Suite 800  
1800 Gaffers Road  
Vienna, VA 22182

(b)(6)

October 16, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On Wednesday, October 7 at a Fort Carson Town Hall Meeting you were asked about the AT&T prepaid card rates for U.S. soldiers stationed in Baghdad. I would like to meet with you to answer any questions you may have and to discuss what AT&T is doing to assure that our troops receive the best value and most reliable service while they are serving in Iraq.

As you may know, AT&T is an official provider of personal telecommunications services to members of the U.S. Military through competitively-bid contracts with AAFES. Since mid-December 2002, AT&T teams have been working around the clock to meet the growing needs of our forward-deployed troops, first in Kuwait and Afghanistan, and now in Iraq and Kyrgystan. AT&T offers military service members personal telephone service through satellite technology. We have been working to make communications accessible in an environment where, as you know, there is virtually no telecommunications infrastructure.

For example, AT&T has taken the following steps in partnerships with military organizations to provide communications capability to our troops in Iraq:


- Distributed more than 600 mobile satellite phones to military units
- Established five Calling Centers, with 48 telephones each, in various locations in Iraq

- Working to establish 14 additional calling centers to req per orders received in September
- Donated 160,000 prepaid phone cards valued at \$1 million to the USO in April, in addition to other donations of prepaid cards to military hospitals and military aid societies.

AT&T is proud to serve the military. We believe this issue is central to the quality of life for the men and women serving our country. We would like to meet with you at your convenience to discuss the AAFE contract, military communications for service members calling from OEF/OIF and to describe steps that DOD and AT&T can take together to best serve the interest of the troops.

Thank you for your time. I can be reached at (b)(6) and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter.

Sincerely,



October <sup>20</sup> 17, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Awards

Please find out why when they read these awards, it doesn't have the name of the person issuing it at the end. For example, the Defense Public Service Medal is something I think the Secretary of Defense has to authorize, and yet when they read the citation it doesn't ever say, "signed by the Secretary of Defense" or "the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld" or something. I think it should, so it is clear who is giving it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101703-10

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

10/24

*John Craddock*  
I told him we would do it.  
*D. Rumsfeld*

Larry Di Rita  
10/27

U22212 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20162

200.6

20 OCT 03

10/22

October 20, 2003

TO: Col. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intern Program

Please sit down with Secretary England at my request, walk through this intern situation with him and tell him I would like him to see if he could sort it through.

I would like him to come back to me with a recommendation. Please give him the attached memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/20/03 SecDef memo to SecNAV re: Intern Program

DHR:dh  
102003-17

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

230.02

To: SecDef  
Sir,

✓  
10/23

20 OCT 03

I spoke with SecNav England (together with his Senior MA and his personnel guy). I delivered your memo to him and gave him the background on this issue. He understood your request and has agreed to attempt to cut the Coalition Knot for you. He will inform me when he has a good answer for submission.

V/R,  
COLB

U22213 /03

P.S.: I will continue 11-L-0559/QSD/20163 ODB's' people also. <sup>TEN</sup> 10/22

October 20, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Gen. Pete Pace  
 Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Larry Di Rita  
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Media

*000.7 SD*

I understand there will be requests in the next week or two to schedule some time for media opportunities around the country via satellite.

I intend to make time for it, and I hope you are able to, as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-1

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*015*  
*10-23*

*29 Oct 03*

U22214 /03

October <sup>20</sup> 17, 2003

TO: Bill Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board

334 DSB

What do you think about getting our friend J.D. Crouch on the Defense Science Board? He is a terrific fellow, and he is leaving the Department, much to my dismay.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
101703-11

20 OCT 23

U22215 /03

October <sup>20</sup>~~17~~, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Fact Sheet

Here is the Iraq fact sheet. I don't know who does it, but a couple of thoughts:

1. There should be page numbers.
2. On the second unnumbered page, it says "Pre-Desert Storm Peak." That should be deleted. We don't need to tell people what that was. That is not the standard. That is not the measurement.
3. On the sixth unnumbered page, it says "GC prepared to open embassies in US." I would like a report as to what that means and when.
4. This should say who produced it. Please tell whoever did it to put it on there.

*Iraq*

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/13/03 Iraq Fact Sheet

DHR:dh  
101703-6

*05  
10-23*

*20 OCT 03*

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

U22216<sup>44</sup>/03




# IRAQ

fact sheet

2


✓ 1-17

## Power



### Electrical Generation

Pre-War	3,300	Megawatts (MW)
01 May 03	200	MW
21 Sep 03	3,678	MW
05 Oct 03	4,417	MW (met initial goal of 4,400MW)



- Weekly Baghdad power consumption average: 1,401 (7% increase from last week)
- TF-Restore Iraqi Electricity is tracking 26 Power Generation, Transmission, and Management Control Projects worth 1.1 Billion dollars. 23 of 26 projects are started




# IRAQ

fact sheet

# Oil

*AD*



## Crude Oil Production

- Pre-Desert Storm Peak: 3.5M BPD in Jul 90
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5M BPD in Feb 03
- Post-War Peak: 1.96M BPD (27 Sep 03)
- 7-day Daily Average: 1.91M BPD
- Iraq Domestic Need/Storage: 0.61M BPD
- Mid-Term Target (Dec 03): 2.1M BPD (2002 Pre-War Avg)
- Long-Term Target (Dec 04): 3.1M BPD (Pre-War Capacity)

## Crude Export

- Jun 03: 6M Barrels
  - Jul 03: 14M Barrels
  - Aug 03: 22M Barrels
  - Sep 03: 28M Barrels
  - Oct 03: 10M Barrels
  - 7-day Daily Ave: 1.3M BPD (3-9 Oct 03)
- Cash Received: \$ 1084.0M
  - Receivable: \$ 693.0M  
\$1,777.0M



# Schools

## Functioning Educational Institutions

- 01 Oct: Primary and secondary schools opened to some 5.5 million students
  - 20 Major Universities
  - 43 Technical Schools
- } Graduated 2,500 students in 2003




## Impact on Employment

- Primary Schools employ 160,000 and Secondary Schools 62,000 teachers
- 35,000+ Iraqis (64 Iraqi subcontractors) working to rehabilitate 1,500 schools by 30 Sept 03. USAID contractors developed methodology to select schools

## Textbooks and Supplies

- UNICEF-printed textbooks will be delivered in November 03
- Saddam Hussein's image removed from texts
- Ministry of Education distributing 1.5 million bookbags with basic supplies to secondary school students



# IRAQ

fact sheet

## Health Care

### Functioning Hospitals & Primary Health Care Clinics (Sept 03)

- All 240 hospitals open
- 90% of primary health clinics are open nationwide (100% in the north)
- Ministry of Health vaccinated 3 million children under age 5



### FY 04 SUPPLEMENTAL

- Childrens' Hospital
- Refurbishment of clinics, primary health care centers and hospitals
- Medical equipment replacement and repair



### Pre-war underinvestment led to substandard health care system

- Only 4% of Iraqi medical facilities were rehabilitated over the past 14 years
- Infant mortality rate (108 per 1,000 births) was more than twice Turkey's
- 13% of Iraqi children died before age 5



# IRAQ

fact sheet

So




<u>Iraqi Security Force</u>	Operating	Required
Border Police	6.4K	11.6K
Police	59.0K	75.0K
Civil Defense Corps	3.6K	22.0K
Facilities Protection Service	19.4K	22.7K
New Iraqi Army	0.7K	40.0K
<b>Total</b>	<b>89.1K</b>	<b>171.3K</b>

- 33 Coalition Countries currently providing ~24,000 personnel
- US forces conducting over 1,700 patrols per day
- Only ~1/10 of 1% of patrols result in US casualties
- Taking average of 113 detainees per day; ~1,700 Security Internees in months
- ~80% of attacks and casualties occurring in Baghdad and Central region  
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as the predominant method of

13 Oct 2003 Update

11-L-0559/OSD/20171



# IRAQ

fact sheet

## Governance

### MILESTONES

- 02 Oct: GC President Chalabi addresses UN GA
- 08 Oct: OIC agrees to seat GC reps at Kuala Lumpur meeting
- GC prepares to name delegation to Madrid Donor's Conference
- GC prepared to open embassies in US, UK and 5 Arab nations

### LOCAL GOVERNANCE

- Baghdad has 88 neighborhood councils, 9 district councils, and 1 city council
  - First time in 35 years people of Baghdad have direct, meaningful say in community affairs
  - Represent all 5.5 million citizens in city of Baghdad
  - Councils are interim and advisory
  - Basic public services and social issues
  - Work with Baghdad municipal employees, Iraqi ministries, GC, and coalition officials
- Local governance workshops on democratic processes are taking place in South-Central region



# **IRAQ**

*fact sheet*

## **Economics**

- **New law allows six foreign banks to enter Iraq over next 5 years**
  - **No limit after 2008**
  - **No more than 50% of other banks can be foreign-owned**
- **Economic policy slashes tax rates from 45% to 15%**
  - **Past taxes not effectively collected**
- **Reconstruction tariff of 5% on all new imports for next two years**
- **Small and Medium-sized Enterprises:**
  - **World Bank proposes facility for small business development to include \$30M for technical assistance and \$70-100M for investment financing**
  - **CPA to award \$15M for National Micro and Small Enterprise Credit Program**
- **CPA assessed 139 state-owned enterprises and determined disposition plan for each**

### **CURRENCY EXCHANGE**

**New currency being delivered to 110 bank branches**  
**Exchange begins 15 Oct; target completion date 15 Jan 04**  
**Approximately 2 billion banknotes expected to be exchanged**

I-03/014648

EF-7263

October 21, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: NATO Summit in Istanbul

Let's get some bold proposals for the NATO Summit in Istanbul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102103-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

NATO 337

✓ 11/12 C 11/10  
Sir,  
Policy response  
to two similar  
snowflakes attached.  
vr/  
CDR Nosey  
11/10  
21 OCT 03

U22217 /03

I-03/014649  
EF-7264

October 21, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Istanbul-NATO Summit

I agree with Blackwill that we ought to try to have some big proposals or accomplishments for the Istanbul-NATO Summit. We ought to be thinking about what kinds of things we can do to get ready for it now that I can push in December.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-43

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

NATO 337

21 OCT 03

U22218 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20175

October 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missouri Delegation

I think when you communicate with Senator Talent and Congressman Aken, please mention that I was asked questions in my press avail about their comments expressing concern about Iraq. Let them know I wanted to make sure they had the facts, that we have been sending these papers to their offices, so they have a very straightforward approach to the situation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102103-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

*Iraq*

*21 OCT 03*

**U22219 /03**

EF-7270  
I-03/014666

C 12/10

October 21, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: NATO and Iraq

We ought to think about NATO's way ahead in Iraq and try to sketch it out over a year and half.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102103-8

✓ 12/10

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

DEC 9 2003

This issue was addressed at the December NATO Defense Ministerial. Will keep you apprised of follow up discussions among NATO Perm Reps, etc. Could also be addressed at informal meeting of NATO Defense Ministers tentatively planned for February.

210103

- Mira

U22220 /03

Received & Forwarded 12/10/03 L-0559/OSD/20177

October 21, 2003

TO: Gen. George Casey  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Murtha

032

I would like a report back after you have talked to Congressman Murtha.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-42

*OB*

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*10-29*

2104 03

U22221 /03

October 22, 2003

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Tax-Free Industrial Park

Have you thought of a tax-free industrial park in Iraq to encourage small businesses?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102203-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

OB  
10-27

Iraq

22025 03

U22222 /03

12/12/03

December 11, 2003

TO: David Chu  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Incentives

*210 Navy*

Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to Reuben Jeffery. He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121105.13

*DRP*

.....  
Please respond by 1/5/04

*11 Feb 03*

621

December <sup>9</sup>/<sub>8</sub>, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Joint Assignment List

J-1

211

I have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it.

What do we have to do to get it done?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120603-12 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/19

9 Dec 03

U22225 / 03

3110 730

C 11/17

DOSD

December 18, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Dr. Baxter  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tamiflu

*Durham*  
*1/13*

What is the drug Tamiflu for? Is it a prophylactic way to avoid the flu? Are we using it at all?

440

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121803-4

.....  
Please respond by 1/2/04

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/ *COA Nasry*

18 Dec 03

October 29, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS on Military Voting

Please prepare for me a brief (one-page) memo to the President explaining what has been done by the Department of Defense on absentee ballots and voting for military personnel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

014.35

*Tom -  
Pls see if this  
ever was done.  
I don't recall seeing  
it - he wants  
it to inform the  
POTUS*

*C 3/13*

29 OCT 03

October 6, 2003

Q  
C  
C

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting on Ethics Agreement

Please see me on this ethics agreement.

John Craddock, please set it up. Here is the material I want for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/3/03 Dell'Orto memo to SecDef re: Release of Your Ethics Agreement to Senator Lautenberg

DHR:dh  
100603-10

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

U22236 /03



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 3, 2003 (6:13pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

*DJ Dell'Orto*

SUBJECT: Release of Your Ethics Agreement to Senator Lautenberg

- Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from Senator Lautenberg, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) released a copy of your complete ethics agreement today (Tab A). Your financial disclosure report was neither requested nor released (Tab B).
- Senator Lautenberg also requested the ethics agreements of Secretaries Chou and Snow, and the Vice President.
- The General Counsel at OGE advises that Senator Lautenberg's staff have been investigating deferred compensation agreements, and they question whether such agreements create a financial interest.
- You have deferred compensation agreements with Kellogg Company, The Tribune Company, and Sears. Because they are Defense contractors, to ensure your official actions could not affect your deferred compensation, you obtained sureties to guarantee this benefit in case these companies were unwilling or unable to satisfy this obligation. You also have a deferred compensation agreement with Allstate Corp. Because Allstate is not a Defense contractor, no surety is required by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
- OGE has released your ethics agreement approximately seven times previously in 2001 and 2002 pursuant to FOIA to media representatives.

*Del  
r 90*

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENT: a/s

Prepared by Steve Epstein

(b)(6)

Rumsfeld, Donald H.

**ETHICS AGREEMENT**

If confirmed by the United States Senate for the post of Secretary of Defense, I will take the following actions to avoid potential conflicts of interest or appearances of a conflict of interest:

**POSITIONS HELD OUTSIDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT**

After confirmation, but not later than 30 days after appointment, I will resign from the following entities:

<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Relationship</u></b>
Gilead Sciences, Inc.	Director/Chairman of the Board
ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd	Director
Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	Director
Tribune Company	Director
OverX, Inc.	Director
Investor AB	Advisor
Metricom, Inc.	Member, Advisory Board
Nvidia	Business Advisor
Salomon Smith Barney	Chairman, International Advisory Board
The Hamilton Group	Member, Advisory Board
Transaction Information Systems	Member, Advisory Board
TheScience.Com	Member, Advisory Board
Chicago Historical Society	Trustee
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships	Trustee
Empower America	Director
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace	Board of Overseers
Japan Center for International Exchange	Trustee
Rand Corporation	Director
RAND (Russian-American Business Leaders Forum)	Member
Smith Richardson Foundation	Director
The National Security Funders Institute	Member, Advisory Board
University of Chicago	Member, Chairman's Council, Dept. of Economics
First Flight Centennial Foundation	Member, National Advisory Committee
The Marsh Institute	Member, Honorary Committee
Alexis de Tocqueville Institution-National Security Program	Member, Senior Advisory Board
Center for Strategic and International Studies -	
The Global Organization on Crime	Member, Steering Committee

Committee for the Common Defense	Member, Senior Advisory Board
George Washington University	Member, Committee for Democracy in Russia
International Rescue Committee	Member, International Advisory Board
The Jamestown Foundation	Member, Advisory Board
John E. Moss Foundation	Member, Congressional Advisory Committee
FLC XXX Partnership	General Partner
Llano Hot Springs Partnership	General Partner
YBR Associates, L.P.	General Partner
Bretton Woods Committee	Member
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations	Member
International Institute for Strategic Studies	Member
National Strategy Forum	Member
42 <sup>nd</sup> Ward Republican Organization	Member
Outstanding Americans Selection Committee, National Wrestling Hall of Fame	Member
The 410 Club	Member
Capitol Hill Club	Member
Friends of Princeton Water Polo	Member
Friends of Princeton Wrestling Committee	Member
Princeton Club of Chicago	Member

Where applicable, upon appointment, I will request full and complete payment to be accomplished within 90 days of appointment, for all services I rendered to these companies prior to my appointment. In the interim, I will not participate as a Government official in any particular matter having a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of these companies.

As defined by §2635.502(b)(1)(iv) of title 5 of Code of Federal Regulations, I will have a "covered relationship" for a year starting from the date of my resignation from these entities as well as the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs from which I resigned in October, 2000. Therefore, where circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question my impartiality in a particular matter involving these specific parties or persons represented by these parties, I will not, for a period of one year from the date of my resignation, participate in such particular matter, unless in accordance with section 2635.502(d), it is determined that my participation in a particular matter outweighs the concern over an appearance of a loss of impartiality.

I intend to retain my affiliation with the following:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Relationship</u>
American Academy of Diplomacy	Member

Council of American Ambassadors	Member
Former Members of U.S. Congress	Member
National Academy of Public Administration	Member
Alfalfa Club	Member
Bohemian Club and Hill Billies Camp	Member
Castle Park Platform Tennis Association	Member
Commercial Club	Member
88 <sup>th</sup> Congressional Club	Member
The February Group	Member
Fourth Presbyterian Church	Member
Princeton Club of New York	Member
Reagan Alumni Association	Member
Racquet Club of Chicago	Member
SOS Club	Member

None of these entities are defense contractors and my continued membership will not create a conflict or the appearance of a conflict of interest with my official duties.

#### **OTHER POSITIONS**

After confirmation, but not later than 30 days after appointment, I will resign from the following positions:

<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Relationship</u></b>
Congressional Policy Advisory Board	
Republican Policy Committee	Advisory Board Member
Congressional Leadership National Security Advisory Group	Chairman
Senator Peter Fitzgerald Business Advisory Committee	Member
National Park Foundation	Trustee
Lt. Governor Corinne Wood Business Advisory Committee	Member
Washington Inst. Study Group on U.S. Middle East Policy	Member, Steering Committee
Central Intelligence Agency	Consultant

#### **DHR FOUNDATION**

The DHR Foundation is a section 501(c)(3) corporation that makes charitable contributions to qualified charities. After confirmation, but not later than 30 days after appointment, I will relinquish all investment management responsibilities associated with the DHR Foundation. However, I will retain my position as President and will remain on the Board of Directors. The new investment manager will be given strict guidelines not to invest in any

companies that do business with the Department of Defense. If the DHR Foundation currently owns interests in an entity that does business with the Department of Defense, those interests will be divested within 90 days of my appointment. I will retain the ability to make charitable contributions to the DHR Foundation and will retain the ability to designate those charities to which the DHR Foundation makes contributions. Until divestiture of those companies that do business with the Department of Defense is accomplished, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that may have a direct and predictable affect on any defense companies in which the DHR Foundation is invested.

#### **GERALD R. FORD FOUNDATION**

I intend to remain an uncompensated trustee of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation. I have no investment management responsibilities nor is the foundation a DoD contractor. Therefore, the position will not create a conflict or appearance of a conflict of interest with my Government responsibilities.

#### **SHOTPUT HOLDINGS, INC.**

I am the sole owner of Shotput Holdings, Inc., a company that owns fractional interests in two aircraft. I intend to remain an uncompensated member of the Board of Directors and President of the company. Executive Jet Aviation, the company that operates and maintains the aircraft, has informed me that they do not have any contracts with the Department of Defense and that none of the aircraft in the program are part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

#### **YBR ASSOCIATES, L. P.**

As noted above, I will resign as a general partner of YBR Associates, L. P. (YBR) within 30 days of being appointed but will remain as a limited partner. Within 90 days of appointment, YBR will take actions to divest its interests in Kingsbury Capital Partners, L. P. and Kingsbury Capital Partners, L. P. II, both of which hold an interest in a DoD contractor. At this time, YBR intends to retain all of its other underlying portfolio investments as they are not DoD contractors. The General Partners have agreed that they will not invest in any company that does business with the Department of Defense. If a current holding of the limited partnership enters into a contract with the Department of Defense, I will consult with my Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate remedial action.

#### **KINGSBURY CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. III**

I intend to retain my limited partnership interest in Kingsbury Capital Partners, L. P. III. The limited partnership is not invested in any company that does business with the Department of Defense and will not create a conflict or an appearance of a conflict of interest with my Government responsibilities. If the limited partnership invests in a company that does business

with the Department of Defense or a current holding enters into a contract with the Department of Defense, I will consult with my Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate remedial action.

**DONALD H. RUMSFELD REVOCABLE TRUST u/a/d October 6, 1978, as amended.**

I intend to remain an unpaid trustee of the Donald H. Rumsfeld Revocable Trust u/a/d October 6, 1978, as amended. The Trust is comprised solely of real estate, and its holdings do not create a conflict or an appearance of a conflict of interest with my Government responsibilities. As the trustee, I will not invest in any company doing business with the Department of Defense.

**DONALD H. RUMSFELD 1998 GRANTOR RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST**

I intend to remain an unpaid trustee of the Donald H. Rumsfeld 1998 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust. The trust is not invested in any company doing business with the Department of Defense, and its current holdings will not create a conflict or an appearance of a conflict of interest with my Government responsibilities. As the trustee, I will not invest in any company doing business with the Department of Defense.

**SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO.**

Until the following is accomplished, I will not participate personally and substantially as a Government official in any particular matter that would have a direct and predictable effect on Sears.

**Deferred Compensation Plan**

Within 90 days of appointment, I will either request accelerated payments to completely extinguish my accumulated balance in the deferred compensation plan or, I will guarantee this benefit with an insurance company to sever my reliance on Sears' future ability to pay my benefit. If I guarantee this benefit with an insurance company, I will request a waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §208(b)(1) for this interest.

**Defined Benefit Plan**

I am a participant in a defined benefit plan maintained by Sears. My benefit is \$30,000 annually for life. Within 90 days of appointment, I will guarantee this benefit with an insurance company to sever my reliance on Sears' future ability to pay my benefit. In addition, I will request a waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §208(b)(1) for this interest.

### **Stock Options**

Within 90 days of appointment, I will take action to divest myself of my Sears stock options.

### **KELLOGG COMPANY DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN**

Until the following is accomplished, I will not participate personally and substantially as a Government official in any particular matter that would have a direct and predictable effect on my financial interests in the Kellogg deferred compensation plan.

Within 90 days of appointment, I will either request accelerated payments to completely extinguish my accumulated balance in the deferred compensation plan or, I will guarantee this benefit with an insurance company to sever my reliance on Kellogg's future ability to pay my benefit. If I guarantee this benefit with an insurance company, I will request a waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §208(b)(1) for this interest.

### **OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS AND CONTINUING COMPENSATORY INTERESTS**

I have deferred compensation plans with Allstate, Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Tribune Company, none of which do business with the Department of Defense. In addition, I have stock options with Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc; Gilead Sciences, Inc.; OverX, Inc.; Tribune Company; Metricom Inc.; Nvidia; Transaction Information Systems, Inc.; and USTADI.com, Inc. If any of these companies enter into a contract with the Department of Defense, I will consult with my Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate remedial action.

### **AGEWAVE, INC.**

I intend to retain my interest in Agewave, Inc., a corporation formed to make investments in companies providing services to the seniors market. Agewave is not invested in any company that does business with the Department of Defense and will not create a conflict or an appearance of a conflict of interest with my Government responsibilities. If the company invests in an entity that does business with the Department of Defense or a current holding enters into a contract with the Department of Defense, I will consult with my Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate remedial action.

### **Other**

I am aware of the requirements of the Federal criminal statute concerning personal

financial interests, 18 U.S.C. § 208, concerning my financial interests, as well as the executive branch impartiality regulations contained in Subpart E of 5 C.F.R. part 2635. I understand that I am personally responsible for being aware of my financial interests. Further, should I have any question as to the application of any of the conflict of interest statutes or regulations to a specific asset or situation, I recognize the need to immediately seek advice from the Designated Agency Ethics Official.

**DIRECT STOCK HOLDINGS**

Within 90 days of appointment, I will divest myself of direct holdings in defense contractor stocks. These holdings are:

**William Blair & Company - Account A**

Cisco Systems, Inc.  
JDS Uniphase Corp.

**William Blair & Company - Account C**

American Management Systems, Inc.  
Baxter International, Inc.  
Cintas Corp.  
Comcast Corp.  
General Electric Co.  
Intuit  
Iron Mountain, Inc.  
Johnson & Johnson  
Pharmacia Corp.  
Qwest Communications  
SBC Communications, Inc.  
Solectron Corp.  
Staples, Inc.  
Tellabs, Inc.  
Unifirst Corp.

**Lombard Odier & Cie Account**

ABB Ltd.

**Other**

Fetch Technologies

**Parametric Portfolio Associates**

3Com Corp.  
Abbott Labs  
Acxiom Corp.  
Advanced Digital Information  
Aeroflex Inc.  
Air Products & Chemicals Inc.  
Alcoa Inc.  
Alliant Energy Corp.  
America Online Inc.  
American Electric Power Inc.  
American Home Products  
American International Group  
American Standard Companies  
Anheuser Busch Companies Inc.  
Apogee Enterprises Inc.  
Applied Materials Inc.  
AT&T Corp.  
AT&T Corp. Lib Group A  
AT&T Corp. Wireless Group  
AVX Corp.  
Bank of America Corp.  
Barnes Group Inc.  
BEA Systems Inc.  
Bellsouth Corp.  
Best Buy Inc.  
BMC Software Inc.  
Boeing Company  
Bristol Myers Squibb  
Broadvision  
Cabletron Systems Inc.  
Cacheflow Inc.  
Cadence Design Systems Inc.  
Cardinal Health Inc.  
Caterpillar Inc.  
CDW Computer Centers Inc.  
Cendant Corp.  
Centurytel Inc.  
Chevron Corporation  
Cintas Corp.  
Cisco Systems Inc.

Citigroup Inc.  
Citrix Systems Inc.  
CMS Energy Corp.  
Coastal Corp.  
Coca Cola Company  
Colgate Palmolive Company  
Comcast Corp.  
Commerce Once Inc.  
Compaq Computer Corp.  
Computer Associates International  
Concurrent Computer  
Conoco Inc.  
Consolidated Edison  
Cooper Cameron Inc.  
Corning Inc.  
Cox Communications  
Crown Castle International Corp.  
Cummins Engine Inc.  
Cytex Industries Inc.  
Danaher Corp.  
Deere & Company  
Dell Computer Corp.  
Dow Chemical Company  
Du Pont E. I. De Nemours  
Duke Energy Corp.  
Dynergy Inc.  
EMC Corp.  
Eastman Chemical Company  
Edison International  
Electronic Data Systems  
Emerson Electric Company  
Enron Corp.  
Exelon Corp.  
Exxon Mobil Corp.  
FMC Corp.  
Fedex Corp.  
FEI Company  
Ford Motor Company  
Foster Wheeler Corp.  
General Electric Company  
General Motors Corp.  
Gillette Company

GPU Inc.  
Guidant Corp.  
Hartford Financial Services  
Hawaiian Electric Industries  
Health Net Inc.  
Hercules Inc.  
Hewlett Packard Company  
Hercules Inc.  
Home Depot Inc.  
Honeywell Inc.  
Host Marriott Corp.  
Hubbell Inc.  
I2 Technologies Inc.  
Ibis Technology Corp.  
Illinois Tool Works Inc.  
Ingersoll Rand Company  
Intel Corp.  
International Business Machine  
International Paper Company  
Intuit Corp.  
Iron Mountain Inc.  
Johnson & Johnson  
Kansas City Power & Light Company  
Keane Inc.  
Laclede Gas Company  
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.  
Lexmark International Group Inc.  
Lockheed Martin Corp.  
Lowe's Companies  
Lucent Technologies  
Masco Corp.  
MCN Energy Group Inc.  
Medtronic Inc.  
Merck & Company Inc.  
Mercury Interactive  
Meristar Hospitality Corp.  
Micron Technology Inc.  
Microsoft Corp.  
Microvision Inc.  
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company  
Motorola Inc.  
NCR Corp.

Netegrity Inc.  
Network Appliance Inc.  
Niagra Mohawk Holdings Inc.  
Northrop Grumman Corp.  
Novell Inc.  
Oracle Corp.  
Parametric Technology Corp.  
Parker Hannifin Corp.  
Peoplesoft Inc.  
Pepsico Inc.  
Pfizer Inc.  
PG&E Corp.  
Pharmacia Corp.  
Philip Morris Companies  
Potomac Electric Power Company  
Power-One Inc.  
PPG Industries Inc.  
Pride International Inc.  
Procter & Gamble Company  
Public Service Enterprise  
Puget Sound Energy Inc.  
Qwest Communications International  
R&B Falcon Corp.  
RGS Energy Group Inc.  
RalCorp. Holdings Inc.  
Rational Software Corp.  
Raytheon Company  
Rockwell International Corp.  
Safeguard Scientifics  
Sara Lee Corp.  
SBC Communications Inc.  
Schering Plough Corp.  
Sci Sys Inc.  
Scientific Atlanta Inc.  
SDL Inc.  
Sears Roebuck & Company  
Servicemaster Company  
Siebel Systems  
Sierra Pacific Resources  
Silicon Graphics Inc.  
Silicon Valley Group Inc.  
Smart & Final Inc.

Solectron Corp.  
Southern Company  
Southwest Airlines Company  
Sprint Corp.  
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide  
Stewart & Stevenson Services  
Sun Microsystems Inc.  
Symbol Technologies  
Synopsys Inc.  
Target Corp.  
Tektronix Inc.  
Tellabs Inc.  
Texaco Inc.  
Texas Instruments Inc.  
Thermo Electron Corp.  
Time Warner Inc.  
TMP Worldwide Inc.  
TXU Corp.  
UGI Corp.  
Ultratech Stepper Inc.  
United Technologies  
Verisign Inc.  
Veritas Software Company  
Verizon Communications  
Viacom Inc.  
Vicor Corp.  
Vishay Intertechnology  
Waste Management Inc.  
Wells Fargo & Company  
Western Resource Inc.  
Weyerhaeuser Company  
Williams Companies  
Wind River Systems Inc.  
Worldcom Inc.  
Xcel Energy Inc.

**Sanford Bernstein IRA**

American Standard Companies  
AETNA Inc.  
Bank of America Corp.  
American Electric Power Company

PG&E Corp.  
Puget Sound Energy Inc.  
Bergen Brunswig Corp.  
Philip Morris Companies  
Supervalu Inc.  
Whirlpool Corp.  
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company  
International Paper Company  
Westvaco Corp.  
Dow Chemical Company  
Eastman Chemical Company  
FMC Corp.  
Praxair Inc.  
Cooper Industries Inc.  
Arrow Electronics Inc.  
Avnet Inc.  
Union Pacific Corp.  
Conoco Inc.  
Occidental Petroleum Corp.  
Phillips Petroleum Company

**William Blair & Company - IRA - Account E**

Citigroup Inc.  
Hewlett Packard Company  
Intel Corp.  
Oracle Systems Corp.  
Siebel Systems Inc.  
ABB Ltd.

Where applicable, I will request a Certificate of Divestiture from the U.S. Office of Government Ethics. Until divestiture is complete, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that may have a direct and predictable effect on any of these companies. In addition, if any other company in which I am invested enters into a contract with the Department of Defense, I will consult with my Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate remedial action.

**INVESTMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS**

Within 90 days of appointment, I will take action to divest myself of the following limited partnership interests.


Deerfield Partners, L.P.  
Compass I, L.P.  
Maverick Fund USA, Ltd.  
Flag Venture Partners IV, L.P.  
Flag Growth Capital, L.P.  
Astoria Capital Partners, L.P.  
Thomas H. Lee Fund V, L.P.  
Cerberus Institutional Partners, L.P.  
SCF-III, L.P.  
SCF-IV, L.P.  
Summit Ventures IV, L.P.  
Brentwood Associates VII, L.P.  
Brentwood Associates VIII, L.P.  
Brentwood Associates IX, L.P.  
CCG Investment Fund, L.P.  
OCM Opportunities Fund, L.P.  
OCM Opportunities Fund III, L.P.  
Polaris Venture Partners III, L.P.  
M-L Silver Lake Special Trust  
Transpac Capital 1996 Investment Trust  
R. Chaney & Partners III, L.P.  
R. Chaney & Partners IV, L.P.  
Vector Later-Stage Equity Fund II, L.P.  
Stinson Capital Partners, L.P.  
Chengwei Ventures Fund I, L.P.  
Hamilton Technology Ventures, L.P.  
Tiger  
Option Advantage Partners, L.P.  
TWP CEO Founders' Circle (QP), L.P.  
Washington Capital Partners, L.L.C.  
Summit Ventures VI, L.P.

Where applicable, I will request a Certificate of Divestiture from the U.S. Office of Government Ethics. Until divestiture of the investment partnerships is complete, where I have knowledge of the underlying holdings of the limited partnerships' portfolios, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that may have a direct and predictable effect on those holdings.


**Qualified Blind Trust**

I am considering establishing a Qualified Blind Trust, including a Qualified Diversified Trust, as a means to avoid potential conflicts of interest or the appearance thereof.

If confirmed by the United States Senate for the office of Secretary of Defense, I agree to take the actions discussed above to avoid potential conflicts of interest or appearances thereof.



Donald H. Rumsfeld  
January 18, 2001



David J. Dell'Aceto  
January 18, 2001



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 15 2003

The Honorable Amy Comstock  
Director, U.S. Office of Government Ethics  
1201 New York Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20005-3917

SUBJECT: Public Financial Disclosure Report SF 278

Attached is the required financial disclosure report for this period.

I have spent a considerable amount of money to have an accountant prepare it. However, I have not been able to personally go back over the material item-by-item to verify its accuracy.

I have worked with the accountant for about two decades and have found his work to be accurate. Nonetheless, in submitting it, I do want to note the above. If you have questions, please let me know.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. H. Rumsfeld".


Donald H. Rumsfeld

Attach.  
SF 278



11-L-0559/OSD/20202

# Executive Branch Personnel PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Date of Appointment, Candidacy, Election, or Nomination (Month, Day, Year)	Reporting Status (Check Appropriate Boxes)	Incumbent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Calendar Year Covered by Report 2002	New Entrant, Nominee, or Candidate <input type="checkbox"/>	Termination Filer <input type="checkbox"/>	Termination Date (If Applicable) (Month, Day, Year)	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Fee for Late Filing</b></p> Any individual who is required to file this report and does so more than 30 days after the date the report is required to be filed, or, if an extension is granted, more than 30 days after the last day of the filing extension period, shall be subject to a \$200 fee. <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Reporting Periods</b></p> Incumbents: The reporting period is the preceding calendar year except Part II of Schedule C and Part I of Schedule D where you must also include the filing year up to the date you file. Part II of Schedule D is not applicable.                 Termination Filers: The reporting period begins at the end of the period covered by your previous filing and ends at the date of termination. Part II of Schedule D is not applicable. <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Nominees, New Entrants and Candidates for President and Vice President:</b></p> Schedule A--The reporting period for income (BLOCK C) is the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year up to the date of filing. Value assets as of any date you choose that is within 31 days of the date of filing.                 Schedule B--Not applicable.                 Schedule C, Part I (Liabilities)--The reporting period is the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year up to any date you choose that is within 31 days of the date of filing.                 Schedule C, Part II (Agreements or Arrangements)--Show any agreements or arrangements as of the date of filing.                 Schedule D--The reporting period is the preceding two calendar years and the current calendar year up to the date of filing.
Reporting Individual's Name	Last Name		First Name and Middle Initial				
	Rumsfeld		Donald H.				
Position for Which Filing	Title of Position		Department or Agency (If Applicable)				
	Secretary		Department of Defense				
Location of Present Office (for forwarding address)	Address (Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code)			Telephone No. (Include Area Code)			
	1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC 20301			(b)(6)			
Position(s) Held with the Federal Government During the Preceding 12 Months (If Not Same as Above)	Title of Position(s) and Date(s) Held						
Presidential Nominees Subject to Senate Confirmation	Name of Congressional Committee Considering Nomination		Do You Intend to Create a Qualified Diversified Trust?				
	Not Applicable		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No				
Certification	Signature of Reporting Individual			Date (Month, Day, Year)			
I CERTIFY that the statements I have made on this form and all attached schedules are true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.				5/15/03			
Other Review (if desired by agency)	Signature of Other Reviewer			Date (Month, Day, Year)			
Agency Ethics Official's Opinion	Signature of Designated Agency Ethics Official/Reviewing Official			Date (Month, Day, Year)			
On the basis of information contained in this report, I conclude that the filer is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (subject to any comments in the box below).				6/2/03			
Office of Government Ethics Use Only	Signature			Date (Month, Day, Year)			
Comments of Reviewing Officials (If additional space is required, use the reverse side of this sheet)							
(Check box if filing extension granted & indicate number of days _____) <input type="checkbox"/>							
(Check box if comments are continued on the reverse side) <input type="checkbox"/>							
Agency Use Only							
15 May 2003 							
OGE Use Only							

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Form SF-278 Schedule A Attachment

	Valuation of Assets as of December 31, 2002											Income: type and amount.																					
	Block B											Block C																					
												Type	Amount										Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honorary										
None (or less than \$1,001)	\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Excepted Investment Fund	Excepted Trust	Qualified Trust	Dividends	Rent and Royalties	Interest	Capital Gains	None (or less than \$201)	\$201 - \$1,000	\$1,001 - \$2,500	\$2,501 - \$5,000		\$5,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	Over \$5,000,000	Other Income (Specify Type & Actual Amount)		
3) Fund, L.P., partnership in, TX, Tucson, 6). (31)(32)			x																												Partnership	\$ 8,953	
NY, a ann Little & e strategic 1 has an interest																																	
. New York, NY. capital of FLC rest in Yankee				x																											Partnership	\$ 92,343	
Economic right Equity McLeod USA.	x																	x													Partnership	\$ 0	
ll), San Diego, to invest in the ctors (Interest				x									x																		Partnership	\$ 0	
ship, Chicago, IL, take nvestments.																																	

	Valuation of Assets as of December 31, 2002											Income: type and amount.																							
	Block B											Block C																							
	None (or less than \$1,001)	\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Excepted Investment Fund	Excepted Trust	Qualified Trust	Type	Amount										Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honorary								
															Dividends	Rent and Royalties	Interest	Capital Gains	None (or less than \$201)	\$201 - \$1,000	\$1,001 - \$2,500	\$2,501 - \$5,000	\$5,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	Over \$5,000,000	Other Income (Specify Type & Actual Amount)					
A limited e investments to the seniors	x												x																		Limited Liability Company	\$ 0			
A corporation companies s market	x																		x																
X. A limited es in New 5.42%).				x																											Partnership	\$ 923			
San Diego, ad to invest in gy sectors																																			
go, CA, a loping a new	x																			x															
, CA, A private icovery.																																			
, II, San Diego, ad to invest in gy sectors.																																			
go, CA, a loping a new	x																			x															
	x																																		
			x																																
stock	x														x					x															







Notes to Schedule A Attachment	
Note 1 -	Reserved
Note 2 -	Account is held in the Donald H. Rumsfeld 1998 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust.
Note 3 -	Secretary Rumsfeld is entitled to the economic benefit of the fair market value of the stock in excess of \$20,000.
Note 4 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received escrow hold back of \$3,701 in 2/02.
Note 5 -	Reserved
Note 6 -	Reserved
Note 7 -	Reserved
Note 8 -	Reserved
Note 9 -	Reserved
Note 10 -	Reserved
Note 11 -	Reserved
Note 12 -	Reserved
Note 13 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received the 1st out of 10 annual payments from his Tribune Company Directors' Deferred Compensation Plan account.
Note 14 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received the 6th out of 10 annual installments from his Allstate Deferred Compensation Plan account.
Note 15 -	Reserved
Note 16 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received the 4th out of 10 annual installments from his Kellogg Company Deferred Compensation account.
Note 17 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received the 4th out of 5 annual installments from his Sears, Roebuck and Co. Non-Employee Director Deferred Compensation account.
Note 18 -	Secretary Rumsfeld received the 2nd out of 10 annual installments from his Tribune Company Directors' Deferred Stock Compensation Plan.
Note 19 -	Valuations estimated by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Note 20 -	Property is owned by the Donald H. Rumsfeld Revocable Trust dated 10/6/78.
Note 21 -	Gross Rental Income is provided. Income is not reduced by rental expenses.
Note 22 -	Property is mortgaged and reported on Schedule C.
Note 23 -	Reserved
Note 24 -	Reserved
Note 25 -	Reserved
Note 26 -	Reserved
Note 27 -	Reserved
Note 28 -	Reserved
Note 29 -	Reserved
Note 30 -	Reserved
Note 31 -	Estimated asset valuation and estimated income as of 12/31/02.
Note 32 -	Secretary Rumsfeld's investment is a limited partnership interest.
Note 33 -	Secretary Rumsfeld's interest is in an escrow account established for on going litigation cost.
Note 34 -	As of the reporting date, Secretary Rumsfeld's interest in the partnership is not available.
Note 35 -	Estimated income as of 12/31/02.
Note 36 -	D.H.R. Foundation is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois. Secretary Rumsfeld serves as President of D.H.R. Foundation, as well as, on the board of directors. The Secretary and Mrs. Rumsfeld have made 100% of the contributions to the D.H.R. Foundation.
Note 37 -	Upon retirement in 1998, Secretary Rumsfeld began receiving a pension benefit of \$30,000 per year, for life.

Reporting Individual's Name <b>Rumsfeld, Donald H.</b>	<b>SCHEDULE B</b>	Page Number <b>15</b>
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**Part I: Transactions**

Report any purchase, sale, or exchange by you, your spouse, or dependent children during the reporting period of any real property, stocks, bonds, commodity futures, and other securities when the amount of the transaction exceeded \$1,000. Include transactions that resulted in a loss.

Do not report a transaction involving property used solely as your personal residence, or a transaction solely between you, your spouse, or dependent child. Check the "Certificate of divestiture" block to indicate sales made pursuant to a certificate of divestiture from OGE.

None

	Identification of Assets	Transaction Type (x)			Date (Mo., Day, Yr.)	Amount of Transaction (x)													
		Purchase	Sale	Exchange		\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Certificate of divestiture		
	Example Central Airlines Common	x			2/1/99			x											
1	See attached schedule.																		
2																			
3																			
4																			
5																			

\*This category applies only if the underlying asset is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the underlying asset is either held by the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, use the other higher categories of value, as appropriate.

**Part II: Gifts, Reimbursements, and Travel Expenses**

For you, your spouse and dependent children, report the source, a brief description, and the value of: (1) gifts (such as tangible items, transportation, lodging, food, or entertainment) received from one source totaling more than \$260, and (2) travel-related cash reimbursements received from one source totaling more than \$260. For conflicts analysis, it is helpful to indicate a basis for receipt, such as personal friend, agency approval under 5 U.S.C. § 4111 or other statutory authority, etc. For travel-related gifts and reimbursements, include travel itinerary, dates, and the nature of expenses provided. Exclude anything given to you by the U.S. Government; given to your agency in connection with official travel; received from relatives; received by your spouse or dependent child totally independent of their relationship to you; or provided as personal hospitality at the donor's residence. Also, for purposes of aggregating gifts to determine the total value from one source, exclude items worth \$104 or less. See instructions for other exclusions.

None

	Source (Name and Address)	Brief Description	Value
Examples	Nat'l Assn. of Rock Collectors, NY, NY	Airline ticket, hotel room & meals incident to national conference 6/15/99 (personal activity unrelated to duty)	\$500
	Frank Jones, San Francisco, CA	Leather briefcase (personal friend)	\$300
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

Rumsfeld, Donald H.

**Part I: Transactions**

	Identification of Assets	Transaction Type (x)			Date (Mo., Day, Yr.)	Amount of Transaction (x)											
		Purchase	Sale	Exchange		\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Certificate of divestiture
1	<b>EQUITIES</b>																
2	Sanford Bernstein - IRA																
3	Mead Corp		X		01/30/02	X											
4	Meadwestvaco Corp	X			11/07/97	X											
5	Bernstein International Value Portfolio II	X			12/06/02	X											
6																	
7	<b>William Blair - Account A</b>																
8	Nvidia Corp		X		Various						X						
9	Security Capital		X		02/26/02		X										
10	Prologis		X		8/2/02			X									
11	Tribune		X		Various					X							
12	Washington ST G/O	X			5/28/02								X				
13	Illinois ST G/O Rfdg-First Ser	X			5/29/02								X				
14	Illinois Med Dist Office	X			6/12/02					X							
15	Indiana ST Office Bldg Commn	X			6/6/02						X						
16	Illinois Dev Fin Auth Rev	X			5/30/02								X				
17	Prologis	X			7/10/02			X									
18	<b>William Blair - Account B</b>																
19	Amylin Pharmaceuticals Com		X		6/28/02		X										
20	Tribune Co		X		Various						X						
21	<b>William Blair - Account C</b>																
22	UnitedHealth Group Inc		X		12/12/02				X								
23	<b>William Blair - Account E</b>																
24	Tribune Co		X		Various					X							
25	Federal Home Ln Mtg Corp	X			5/28/02								X				
26	Federal National Mtg Assn		X		5/28/02						X						
27	<b>William Blair - Account F</b>																

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ns

	Transaction Type (x)			Date (Mo., Day, Yr.)	Amount of Transaction (x)											
	Purchase	Sale	Exchange		\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Certificate of divestiture
ation of Assets																
rice	X			6/12/02					X							
Investments																
convertible Debt		X		Various					X							
s Inc	X			6/28/02		X										
	X			9/18/02						X						

Reporting Individual's Name <b>Rumsfeld, Donald H.</b>	<b>SCHEDULE C</b>	Page Number <b>18</b>
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**Part I: Liabilities**

Report liabilities over \$10,000 owed to any one creditor at any time during the reporting period by you, your spouse, or dependent children. Check the highest amount owed during the reporting period. Exclude

a mortgage on your personal residence unless it is rented out; loans secured by automobiles, household furniture or appliances; and liabilities owed to certain relatives listed in instructions. See instructions for revolving charge accounts.

None

Creditors (Name and Address)		Type of Liability	Date Incurred	Interest Rate	Term if applicable	Category of Amount or Value (x)															
						\$10,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000					
Examples	First District Bank, Washington, DC John Jones, 123 J St, Washington, DC	Mortgage on rental property, Delaware Promissory note	1991 1999	8% 10%	25 yrs. on demand			x													
1	See attached schedule.																				
2																					
3																					
4																					
5																					

\* This category applies only if the liability is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the liability is that of the filer or a joint liability of the filer with the spouse or dependent children, mark the other higher categories, as appropriate.

**Part II: Agreements or Arrangements**

Report your agreements or arrangements for: (1) continuing participation in an employee benefit plan (e.g. pension, 401k, deferred compensation); (2) continuation of payment by a former employer (including severance payments); (3) leaves

of absence; and (4) future employment. See instructions regarding the reporting of negotiations for any of these arrangements or benefits.

None

Status and Terms of any Agreement or Arrangement		Parties	Date
Example	Pursuant to partnership agreement, will receive lump sum payment of capital account & partnership share calculated on service performed through 1/00.	Doe Jones & Smith, Hometown, State	7/85
1	See attached schedule.		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

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Rumsfeld, Donald H.

Part I: Liabilities						Category of Amount or Value (x)										
Creditors (Name and Address)	Type of Liability	Date Incurred	Interest Rate	Term if applicable		\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000
						1	Liabilities:									
2	Herbert L. and Fidella Garcia, Taos, NM	Promissory note-Paid in full 9/28/02	2000	7.000%	3 years					X						
3	Benton and Arabella Bond, El Prado, NM	Promissory note-Paid in full 1/4/02	2001	N/A	1 month			X								
4	Artstar Partners, Ltd., Dallas, TX	Line of Credit	2000	N/A	On demand		X									
5	Capital Commitments:															
6	TWP CEO Founders' Circle (QP), L.P., San Francisco, CA	Capital Commitment	1997	N/A	On demand			X								

Schedule C		
Part II: Agreements and Arrangements		
Status and Terms of any Agreement or Arrangement	Parties	Date
1 Allstate Corporation will continue to pay Secretary Rumsfeld's deferred directors fees balance over a period of 10 years ending in June 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld earned and deferred the directors fees during his years of service on the Allstate Board of Directors. Secretary Rumsfeld retired from the Allstate Board of Directors in May 1996.	Allstate Corporation, Northbrook, IL	May-96
2 As a former Advisor, Secretary Rumsfeld is a party to a compensation agreement(s) with certain affiliates of Forstmann Little & Co. The timing and amount of the compensation is directly tied to the actual performance of certain Forstmann Little sponsored investments including: Community Health Systems, Yankee Candle, McLeodUSA, and escrow proceeds associated with disposition of General Instrument.	FLC Partnership XXIX, New York, NY; FLC Partnership XXX, New York, NY	Various
3 Kellogg Company will continue to pay Secretary Rumsfeld's deferred directors fees balance over a period of 10 years ending in January 2008. Secretary Rumsfeld earned and deferred his directors fees during his years of service on the Kellogg Board of Directors. Secretary Rumsfeld retired from the Kellogg Board of Directors in April 1999.	Kellogg Company, Battle Creek, MI	Apr-99
4 As with other Directors, upon Secretary Rumsfeld's death, Kellogg Company will contribute \$1 million, in 5 equal annual installments, to qualified charitable organizations which have already been selected and notified by Secretary Rumsfeld.	Kellogg Company, Battle Creek, MI	Nov-91
5 Secretary Rumsfeld is a participant in the Donald H. Rumsfeld Simplified Employee Pension (SEP). This plan is a non-qualified, defined contribution plan. Secretary Rumsfeld is not currently receiving distributions from the plan, but withdrawals must commence by age 70 1/2.	Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chicago, IL	Various
6 Sears, Roebuck and Co. will continue to pay Secretary Rumsfeld's deferred directors fees balance over a period of 5 years ending in May 2003. Secretary Rumsfeld earned and deferred the directors fees during his years of service on the Sears Board of Directors. Secretary Rumsfeld retired from the Sears Board of Directors in May 1998.	Sears, Roebuck and Co., Hoffman Estates, IL	May-98
7 During Secretary Rumsfeld's lifetime, Sears, Roebuck and Co. will continue to pay him a \$30,000 annual pension, payable quarterly.	Sears, Roebuck and Co., Hoffman Estates, IL	May-98
8 As with other retired Directors, during Secretary Rumsfeld's lifetime, Sears, Roebuck and Co. will continue to make available the Sears merchandise discount.	Sears, Roebuck and Co., Hoffman Estates, IL	May-98
9 Secretary Rumsfeld will continue to receive social security benefits from the United States Social Security Administration and Caisse Suisse de Compensation (Swiss social security administration). Secretary Rumsfeld earned these benefit as a result of paying social security taxes to the United States and Swiss social security programs. The United States Social Security Administration factors in the benefit paid to Secretary Rumsfeld by Caisse Suisse de Compensation when calculating Secretary Rumsfeld's United States Social Security benefits.	Social Security Administration, Chicago, IL; Caisse Suisse de Compensation, Geneva, Switzerland	Various

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Schedule C			
Part II: Agreements and Arrangements			
	Status and Terms of any Agreement or Arrangement	Parties	Date
10	Tribune Company will continue to pay Secretary Rumsfeld's deferred directors fees balance over a period of 10 years ending in January 2011. Secretary Rumsfeld earned and deferred the directors fees during his years of service on the Tribune Board of Directors. Secretary Rumsfeld retired from the Tribune Board of Directors in January 2001.	Tribune Company, Chicago, IL	Dec-92
11	Tribune Company will continue to pay Secretary Rumsfeld's deferred stock compensation over a period of 10 years ending in January 2011. Secretary Rumsfeld earned and deferred the stock awards during his years of service on the Tribune Board of Directors. Secretary Rumsfeld retired from the Tribune Board of Directors in January 2001.	Tribune Company, Chicago, IL	May-96
12	Secretary Rumsfeld has accrued pension benefits from the United States Government earned for his executive, legislative and military service.	United States Government, Washington, DC	Various

Reporting Individual's Name Rumsfeld, Donald H.	<b>SCHEDULE D</b>	Page Number 22
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**Part I: Positions Held Outside U.S. Government**

Report any positions held during the applicable reporting period, whether compensated or not. Positions include but are not limited to those of an officer, director, trustee, general partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise or any non-profit organization or educational institution. Exclude positions with religious, social, fraternal, or political entities and those solely of an honorary nature. None

	Organization (Name and Address)	Type of Organization	Position Held	From (Mo., Yr.)	To (Mo., Yr.)
Examples	Nat'l Assn. of Rock Collectors, NY, NY Doe Jones & Smith, Hometown, State	Non-profit education Law firm	President Partner	6/92 7/85	Present 1/00
1	See attached schedule.				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					

**Part II: Compensation in Excess of \$5,000 Paid by One Source**

Report sources of more than \$5,000 compensation received by you or your business affiliation for services provided directly by you during any one year of the reporting period. This includes the names of clients and customers of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, or any other non-profit organization when you directly provided the services generating a fee or payment of more than \$5,000. You need not report the U.S. Government as a source. Do not complete this part if you are an Incumbent, Termination Filer, or Vice Presidential or Presidential Candidate.  
None

	Source (Name and Address)	Brief Description of Duties
Examples	Doe Jones & Smith, Hometown, State Metro University (client of Doe Jones & Smith), Moneytown, State	Legal services Legal services in connection with university construction
1	Not applicable.	
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

Schedule D					
Part I: Positions Held Outside of U.S. Government					
	Organization	Type of Organization	Position Held	From (Mo., Yr.)	To (Mo., Yr.)
1	D.H.R. Foundation, Chicago, IL	Not for Profit	Director and President	Dec-85	Present
2	Gerald R. Ford foundation, Grand Rapids, MI	Not for Profit	Trustee	Sep-81	Present
3	American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington, DC	Association	Member	Oct-83	Present
4	Council of American Ambassadors, Washington, DC	Council	Member	Aug-83	Present
5	Former Members of the U.S. Congress, Washington, DC	Association	Member	1975	Present
6	National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), Washington, DC	Academy	Member	Sep-81	Present
7	The February Group, Alexandria, VA	Alumni Group	Member	Apr-91	Present
8	Reagan Alumni Association, Alexandria, VA	Alumni Group	Member	1990	Present
9	Alfalfa Club, Washington, DC	Dinner Club	Member	1976	Present
10	Bohemian Club, San Francisco, CA	Social Club	Member	Dec-86	Present
11	Commercial Club, Chicago, IL	Luncheon Club	Honorary Member	Jan-01	Present
12	88th Congressional Club, Washington, DC	Association	Member	1965	Present
13	Fourth Presbyterian Church, Chicago, IL	Church	Member	Sep-90	Present
14	Princeton Club of New York, New York, NY	Association	Member	Apr-93	Present
15	Racquet Club of Chicago, Chicago, IL	Athletic Club	Non-resident member	Jan-01	Present
16	Shotput Holdings, Inc., Chicago, IL	Corporation	President and Director	Nov-95	Present
17	SOS Club, Washington, DC	Association	Member	1964	Present
18	American Society of Naval Engineers	Association	Honorary Member	Feb-01	Present

Schedule D					
Part I: Positions Held Outside of U.S. Government					
	Organization	Type of Organization	Position Held	From (Mo., Yr.)	To (Mo., Yr.)
19	Donald H. Rumsfeld Revocable Trust, Chicago, IL	Trust	Fiduciary	1978	Present
20	Donald H. Rumsfeld 1998 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust, Chicago, IL	Trust	Fiduciary	1998	Present
21	Biotechnology Venture Partners, L.P., San Francisco, CA	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1995	Present
22	FLC XXX Partnership, New York, NY	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1998	Present
23	Kingsbury Capital Partners III, L.P., San Diego, CA	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1998	Present
24	Lazy O Ranch Ltd. Partnership, Schaumburg, IL	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1988	Present
25	LCOR, Inc., Schaumburg, IL	Corporation	50% Shareholder	1996	Present
26	Llano Hot Springs Partnership, Taos, NM	Partnership	Limited Partner	Jan-01	Present
27	MutualFunds.com, Boston, MA	Limited Liability Company	LLC Member	1999	Present
28	Robertson Stephens Residential Fund, L.P., San Francisco, CA	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1994	Present
29	Rocker Limited Partnership, New York, NY	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1994	Present
30	Tecolote Land LLC, Schaumburg, IL	Limited Liability Company	LLC Member	2000	Present
31	Tiger, New York, NY	Trust	Beneficiary	Jan-02	Present
32	TWP CEO Founders' Circle (QP), L.P., San Francisco, CA	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1999	Present
33	YBR Associates, L.P., Chicago, IL	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	Feb-01	Present
34	YBR Associates, L.P. II, Chicago, IL	Limited Partnership	Limited Partner	1992	Present

October 6, 2003

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TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: D.H.R. Foundation

Please take a look at this private foundation material that has been requested by Rowan Scarborough. The issues, of course, are:

1. What are the investments?
2. What are the gifts we have made?
3. How do the expenses look?

Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 2001 IRS Return of D.H.R. Foundation

DHR:dh  
 100603-11

.....  
 Please respond by 10/24/03

66CT03

U22237 /03





















(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6105 (Internal Revenue Code)



(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6105 (Internal Revenue Code)

(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103,  
6105 (Internal Revenue Code)

11-L-0559/OSD/20242

29

(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6105 (Internal Revenue Code)

(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103,  
6105 (Internal Revenue Code)

11-L-0559/OSD/20243















































(b)(3):26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6105 (Internal Revenue Code)

Complete Part III on page 2 to figure the penalty. If there are no entries on line 17, no penalty is owed.

112801  
02-01-02

JWA

For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate Form 2220.

FILE 0559/OSD/20267

Form 2220 (2001)













**FILE COPY**

EF-7138  
I-03/014134

October 9, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch

SUBJECT: Portugal and Missile Defense

Please get back to me on the question of why Portugal is undecided on missile defense and are with Germany and France. I cannot believe it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-5 (in computer)

.....

Respond by 17 Oct 03

OCT 10 2003  
1120 RECEIVED IN ISP

*Date:*

**COMPLETED**  
14 OCT 03

**U22238 /03**

10-10-03 09:44 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20274

Portugal

9 OCT 03

12:28 PM

TO: Col. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Pentagon Memorial Fund**

*602-  
DR*

*Call  
11/11  
0004*

I would like to have a letter drafted for me to approve that would go to all the former Secretaries of Defense and Deputy Secretaries of Defense who are still alive, giving them a report on the Memorial Fund and how much has been raised, and some material on the Memorial, what it's going to look like, and saying basically that I know they would want to be aware of this effort.

Whoever is managing the Memorial Fund, however, and the finances of it, should make sure that if they've already given, then we don't want them on the list. We do not want to re-solicit. Du Bois should know, or whoever is managing it should know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.29

Please respond by: 10/31

*To: Sec Def*

**U22239M/03**

*SIC*

*Attached is Mr DuBois' response to an earlier snafu. The letter that Sec Brown and Sec L... have agreed to send out (GC said you could not do it yourself) is at the Back of the...*

114-0559/OSD/20275

*VJR, CCB 11/10*

*(22OCT03)*



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

✓  
11/11

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising

*Ray DuBois* 11.10.03

- In the attached snowflake, you inquired about the status of the Pentagon Memorial Fund and how former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries might contribute to this Fund.
- As of November 7, 2003, \$303,938 has been collected via the DoD employees' campaign and \$56,432 was received in unsolicited donations for a total of \$360,370. In addition, over the first two weeks of the Combined Federal Campaign, \$12,500 was raised for the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc., the 501(c)3 established by the families.
- As you directed on October 16, 2003 (second under), I have contacted former Secretaries Melvin Laird and Harold Brown, and they have agreed to correspond with the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries regarding this effort.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Howard Becker (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20276

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: September 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Please find out what the status of the Pentagon Memorial Fund Raising is.

One thought would be to make sure that the former Secretary's of Defense and Deputies have an opportunity to contribute. We might want to have someone draft a letter to them as appropriate.

I need a report on where we stand.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
092503.21

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

9/30

11-L-0559/OSD/20277



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
 1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



**ACTION MEMO**

077 OCT -7 01 4: 03

October 6, 2003 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising

*Ray DuBois* 10.6.03

- In the attached snowflake you asked about the status of Pentagon Memorial fundraising and also inquired about informing the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense of the opportunity to contribute.
- As of today, DoD has received a total of \$350,000 in gifts from all sources. In addition, the families of 9-11 victims have established the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF) as a nonprofit organization, to actively raise funds on a broader basis. The PMF is listed as a participant in this year's Combined Federal Campaign.
- Should you wish to communicate with the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, a draft letter is attached (Tab B) for your consideration. However, Jim Haynes has concerns about the appearance of you writing to solicit the former Secretaries and recommends against this. (Tab C)
- As an alternative, Jim suggests that you might consider approaching one or more of the former Secretaries, and ask that they write their fellow former Secretaries, as well as the former Deputies, and inform them about the opportunity to make contributions for the Pentagon Memorial. Former Secretaries Harold Brown and Melvin Laird both served on the design selection jury for the Memorial and might be willing to undertake such an effort.

*Ray should.*

RECOMMENDATION: That I contact Secretaries Brown and Laird to request their assistance on your behalf.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 OCT 16 2003

COORDINATION: DoD GC - See Tab C

Attachments:  
 As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becke (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>2/15</i>
MA BUKAN	
EXECSEC MARHOTI	<i>10/8</i>

DRAFT

**Draft Letter to Former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense:**

The Pentagon has been an enduring symbol to the world of our country's might and resolve. The September 11, 2001, attack on the building was a tragic event for the nation, the victims and their families, and for the institution we have all revered, but it did not deter us. Within a year, the building was made whole again, and we are now embarking on the daunting task of creating a Memorial to honor those who were lost at the Pentagon that day.

It is quite fitting that Congress authorized the establishment of a Pentagon Memorial to honor these victims and has also specifically authorized DoD to accept contributions for its costs. The Department has completed an extensive concept design competition and recently awarded a phased, design-build contract for construction of a Memorial on the grounds near the southwestern side of the Pentagon, across from Arlington Cemetery.

The Department hopes to complete the Pentagon Memorial by the Fall of 2005. Construction will cost around \$12 million, with the expectation that it will be built entirely with private contributions. To date, \$360,369 in private gifts, including contributions from DoD personnel, has been collected. In addition, the Combined Federal Campaign raised \$12,500 for the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc., through the 501(c)3 established by the families. While almost \$373,000 is a good beginning, construction cannot start until we receive significantly more funding.

As a former Secretary [Deputy Secretary], you may desire to contribute to this effort. If so, donations may be sent to the Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Budget and Finance in the addressed envelope we have provided for your use. Checks should be made payable to "U.S. Treasury – Pentagon Memorial."

Attached for your information is a brochure describing the architectural concept for the Memorial. In addition, there is a very informative web-site at <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>. If you wish to know more, please let us know, and we will arrange a briefing for you.

We hope that you will take this opportunity to honor our coworkers and fellow citizens who perished as a result of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

Mel Laird



**UNITED IN MEMORY**  
Pentagon Memorial Fund

We need your immediate help to raise in excess of a million dollars from Department of Defense personnel in the National Capital Area, to construct at the site of the attack, a Pentagon Memorial Park honoring those lost on September 11, 2001 here at the Pentagon. We need to reach this fund-raising goal by August 15, 2003. Your donation is needed now to finance final design costs and to begin construction in September. We estimate the Memorial will be completed in June 2005 at a cost of approximately \$10 Million. Only contributed funds will be used to build the Pentagon Memorial--no taxpayer funds will be used. We can lead the way to ensure our fallen comrades and fellow Americans and their families will never be forgotten. For detailed memorial information visit the Pentagon Memorial Website at: <https://private.ref.whs.mil/pentagonmemorial/>

*Please give generously now to your organizational contact to help us create a lasting memorial for those lost on September 11, 2001 or mail your donation to:*

**Washington Headquarters Services**  
Directorate for Budget & Finance  
Attn: Pentagon Memorial Fund  
Room 3B269, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-2255

*Contributions are tax deductible.*

**Campaign Managers**

Maj Phredd Evans	DODIG
Dan McGinty	DCMA
Thelma Jones	US Army
COL Karla Torrez	Joint Staff
Willie Wright	Navy
Sheron Richardson	Air Force
Lewis O'Bryant	DTRA
Rich Dooley	PFPA
John Guardiani	DLA
Diane Worthington	OSD(PA)
Suellen Raycraft	DSCA
Yolanda Holmes	DISA
Don Nau	DIA
Claire Gilstad	DSS
Janice Siemsen	MDA
Veronda Powell	WHS
Dwayne Lehman	USUHS
Ernie Peters	NIMA
Carla Little-Kopach	DARPA
Bethany Williams	DFAS

(b)(6)

*Richard McGraw*  
Richard McGraw  
On behalf of the DoD Personnel  
for a Pentagon Memorial



# Pentagon Memorial

*The Pentagon Memorial is a memorial commemorating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the 184 innocent lives lost in the Pentagon and on American Airlines Flight 77*


memorial  
pentagon.mil  
information  
about



Washington Headquarters Service

About the designers: Julie Beckman  
Keith Kaseman  
New York, New York

Beckman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, and a bachelor's degree in the growth and structure of cities from Bryn Mawr College. Kaseman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation and a bachelor's degree in architecture from Arizona State University. The pair founded their New York City design studio, Kaseman Beckman Amsterdam Studio, in 2001.



**Architectural details:**

One hundred eighty four innocent lives were lost in a single moment at the Pentagon - one hundred eighty four individuals forever tied together through the horrific events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

Collective contemplation through silence, a tactile field of sensuous experience and an intimate setting are the objectives that fostered the birth of the concept for the chosen Pentagon Memorial design. The design sets out to permanently record and express the sheer magnitude of loss through an architectural experience of a place radically different than what we encounter in our daily lives. In this light, the space itself serves as the memorial at all scales of experience and engagement - from within, driving by, and from above.

A Memorial Park is inscribed with one hundred eighty four Memorial Units. Each unit is dedicated to an individual victim - its placement and place within the collective field are a unique instance. The field is organized as a timeline of the victims' ages, spanning from Dana Falkenberg, 3 years old, to John D. Yamnicky, 71. While each memorial unit locates itself on its respective age-line, the units are then organized by birth-date along the age line. The highly specific and qualitatively objective organizational strategy yields seemingly random results. Inherent tendencies - the clustering of certain age groups, the gap between the children and adults - are clearly evident and meaningful, though infinitely interpretive.

Personal interpretation is further sparked by embedding layers of specificity into the orientation of each memorial unit within the expansive site. Fifty nine memorial units face one way, one hundred twenty five face the other - thus distinguishing victims on board American Airlines flight 77 from those who were inside the Pentagon. When visiting a memorial dedicated to a victim who was in the Pentagon, the visitor will see the engraved name and the Pentagon in the same view. Conversely, one would see the engraved name of a victim on flight 77 with the sky. Though highly

specific, this distinction is quite subtle when deployed consistently throughout the site. It adds a level of difference to the visual and spatial field, thus provoking visitors' curiosity, while simultaneously telling the story of those involved in the events that took place here that day.

Elegant in its self-supporting form, the memorial unit is at once a glowing light pool, a cantilevered bench and a place for the permanent inscription of each victim's name. Using Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) technology common to the aerospace industry, the cast, clear-anodized aluminum memorial unit is easily mass-produced and incredibly articulate. The cast aluminum prototype/detail model was fabricated in this manner. Its structural cross-section not only reflects radiant light from the glowing pool of water onto the surrounding gravel field, but also allows that field to be continuous. A polyester composite, matrix-gravel mix is poured into the memorial unit, thus acting as glue to support and float the gravel above the light pool. This surface is polished to attain a "terrazzo" seating finish at the horizontal bench portion of the memorial unit. As the memorial unit grows out of the ground, the stabilized gravel field is interrupted only by moments of glowing light and water, and the engraved names float above these moments.

Though loose enough to hear and feel footsteps upon it, stabilized gravel is a hard, ADA-compliant surface. Disbursed throughout the entire site, the porous stabilized gravel field is contained within two perimeter benches that serve as planters for ornamental grasses. These grasses act as a soft screen demarcating the boundary of the memorial park. Further, the combined length of the perimeter benches plus the bench portion of each memorial unit provides more than 2,100 linear feet of polished "terrazzo" seating surface. Birth years, used to locate the age lines, are inlaid aluminum numbers set flush with the "terrazzo" finish of the perimeter benches. The birth years are flanked by the aluminum age lines that permeate the whole site.

The western edge of the site is defined with the AGE Wall - a wall that "grows" in height one inch per year relative to the age lines that organize the site at large. As one moves deeper into the site, the wall gets higher - it grows from 3 inches above the perimeter bench (at Dana's memorial age-line) to 71 inches above the bench (at John's). Strategically, this wall grows as a barrier is needed between the memorial park and the delivery lane that encroaches the site at its northwestern edge. Experientially, this wall communicates the organizational strategy to the drivers passing by the free way, while allowing them to peer into the site from afar. From within the site it provides a shadow backdrop for the lacy ornamental grasses that are planted along its base.

A vivid canopy of color and light provides shade throughout the site, as trees are clustered in conjunction with the disbursement of memorial units. Three varieties of maple trees could serve this scheme well - the Trident Maple, Field Maple (in renderings) and the Paper Bark Maple. All three exquisite trees are late falling, retaining their beautiful fall foliage well into the winter months - this suspension of time will contribute to the sublime beauty of this place. On an intimate level, the interplay between leaves, light, bark, gravel, grasses, water, and the senses will be greatly enchanted with any of these elegant trees.

November 3, 2003

800.5

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Sexual Misconduct Memo

I mentioned this memo from Schmidt to the Service Secretaries, but I didn't give it to them. I couldn't tell from this note what I was supposed to do with it. I didn't have copies for everybody, so I didn't pass it out.

Someone else better take care of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/31/03 IG Discussion Draft memo to Service Secretaries, "Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies"

DHR:dh  
110303-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*Sec Def. 11/6*  
*Memo has been distributed*  
*Done.*  
*C 11/5*

U22240 /03

November 3, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Sexual Misconduct Memo

I mentioned this memo from Schmidt to the Service Secretaries, but I didn't give it to them. I couldn't tell from this note what I was supposed to do with it. I didn't have copies for everybody, so I didn't pass it out.

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Thanks.

Attach.

10/31/03 IG Discussion Draft memo to Service Secretaries, "Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies"

DHR:dh  
110303-20

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/14/03

11-L-0559/OSD/20284

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies

The survey my staff administered at the Air Force Academy in May 2003 was designed in part to provide a baseline for a more refined survey at all three Academies, which we are tentatively planning to administer in January 2004. During the next weeks and months, I hope to work closely with each of you, and with your respective Inspectors General and Academy leaders, to maximize the value of the upcoming three-Academy survey.

In developing the three-Academy survey, as part of our overall assessment of sexual assault-related leadership challenges at the Service Academies, we will be focusing not only on the minimum standards of conduct for cadets and midshipmen, which criminal activities obviously violate; our survey will also focus on the other end of the spectrum, the aspirational standards of leadership established by Congress for officers of all three Services, including legislation enacted over the past decade in response to sexual misconduct and related disciplinary challenges in the Armed Forces. This memorandum: (a) encourages your consideration of these recent statutory tools that might be utilized, directly or indirectly, both to develop officer character traits and to suppress sexual misconduct; and (b) explains how these statutory tools might be worked into our forthcoming survey to address "root causes" and, hopefully, to derive useful recommendations for suppressing sexual misconduct at the three Academies.

A. STATUTORY TOOLS

1. "Exemplary Conduct" Leadership Standard

Statutory Leadership Standard: In 1997, Congress legislated the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard for "commanding officers and others in authority" in each of the Services:

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices; and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge. [10 U.S.C. §5947; 10 U.S.C. §3583 (Army) and §8583 (Air Force)]

Background: The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the above legislation "note[d] that these standards have applied to the Naval and Marine Corps officers since they were first drafted by John Adams and approved by the Continental Congress in 1775." (see <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/liberty.pdf>, p. ii) The Report explained the purpose behind of the 1997 legislation: "This provision will not prevent an officer from shunning responsibility or accountability for an action or event. It does, however, establish a very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services. The committee holds military officers to a higher standard than other members of society. The nation entrusts

its greatest resource, our young men and women, to our military officers. In return, the nation deserves complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct." (*Id.*)

Even before our upcoming three-academy survey, you might consider discussing with your Service and Academy leadership: (a) how the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard has been promulgated and/or implemented within your Service and at your Service Academy (*see, e.g.,* <http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGPolicy/OIGLeadershipStd.pdf>, implementing this Exemplary Conduct standard within the Office of Inspector General); and (b) whether this standard is being as fully utilized as it could be, e.g., as required reading (or even memorization) for all cadets and midshipmen, to inspire within those officer candidates the character traits identified in the Senate Committee Report accompanying the 1997 legislation: "complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct"?

## 2. Physically Separated Housing & Privacy For Basic Training

Recitation of the following statutory standard is not intended to suggest that Congress has already explicitly required you to provide "Physically Separate Housing" and "Privacy" for "male and female" cadets and midshipmen at your Service Academies and respective Prep Schools. Rather, my intent here is to suggest that you might wish to reconsider these statutory standards -- considering their remedial nature and purpose<sup>1</sup> -- as tools for suppressing sexual misconduct.

### Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: separate housing for male and female recruits":

- (a) Physically Separate Housing. - (1) The Secretary of the Air Force shall provide for housing male recruits and female recruits separately and securely from each other during basic training. (2) To meet the requirements of paragraph (1), the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for male recruits shall be physically separated from the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for female recruits by permanent walls, and the areas for male recruits and the areas for female recruits shall have separate entrances. (3) The Secretary shall ensure that, when a recruit is in an area referred to in paragraph (2), the area is supervised by one or more persons who are authorized and trained to supervise the area. . . .
- (d) Basic Training Defined. - In this section, the term "basic training" means the initial entry-training program of the Air Force that constitutes the basic training of new recruits.<sup>2</sup>  
[10 U.S.C. §9319; similar provisions at 10 U.S.C. §4319 (Army) and §6931 (Navy)]

### Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: privacy":

The Secretary of the Air Force shall require that access by military training instructors and other training personnel to a living area in which recruits are housed during basic training shall be limited after the end of the training day, other than in the case of an emergency or other exigent circumstance, to military training instructors and other training personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area or to superiors in the chain of command of those recruits who, if not of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area, are accompanied by a member (other than a recruit) who is of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area.

<sup>1</sup> [cite U.S. Supreme Court authority for the rule of construction that remedial statutes should be construed broadly to achieve their intended purpose.]

<sup>2</sup> Neither the statute nor any DoD implementing regulation/directive restricts the definition of "basic training of new recruits" to enlisted recruits; considering the remedial nature of the statute, an argument could be made that the term "basic training of new recruits" should encompass at least "Cadet Basic Training," aka "Plebe Summer." See discussion of the rule of construction for remedial statutes in the previous footnote.

[10 U.S.C. §9320; 10 U.S.C. §4320 (Army) and §6932 (Navy)]

Background: The 1997 Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense recommended “that female and male recruits be housed in separate barracks. This would decrease disciplinary problems and reduce distractions from training. The committee has reviewed the layout and surge numbers at the training installations, and believes this change can be accomplished at marginal cost, if any.” (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html>); see GAO/NSIAD 99-75, “Military Housing: Costs of Separate Housing for Male and Female Recruits in Basic Training,” March 1999 (which “determined that the services would not incur additional construction costs if they housed male and female recruits in separate barracks.”) (<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99075.pdf>).

## B. HOW THESE STATUTORY TOOLS MIGHT FIT INTO OUR FORTHCOMING SURVEY

I have asked my staff to consider each of the above statutory tools as we develop our more refined sexual assault survey instrument for administration at each of your Service Academies early next year. For instance, we will likely endeavor to measure:

- how aware cadets and midshipmen are with the core values of their Service and with the statutory “exemplary conduct” standard, which the Senate Armed Services Committee Report has describes as the “very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services”;
- how well cadets and midshipmen understand the potential constructive role of inspectors general, whose statutory duties focus on “discipline, efficiency, and economy.” See 10 U.S.C. §§3020 (Army), 5020 (Navy) & 8020 (Air Force); and
- whether cadets and midshipmen consider the Academy chaplains required by law (see 10 U.S.C. §§ 4337, 6031 & 9337) to be part of the solution vis-à-vis guarding against and suppressing sexual misconduct, which of course is antithetical to the character development missions of each Academy. See generally [www.usafa.af.mil/hc/](http://www.usafa.af.mil/hc/) (“The Cadet Chapel is the architectural and spiritual centerpiece of our academy. As such, it plays a vital role in developing and nurturing the character of our cadets. It is a reminder that we are a nation under God dedicated to the promotion of peace and goodwill among all nations of the world. The young women and men who come to study here do so in order to prepare themselves to protect freedom - freedom which is God's gift to all people.”).

I look forward to continuing dialogue on these issues of vital importance to our Armed Services and to our nation.

Joseph E. Schmitz

11-L-0559/OSD/20287

3 NOV 03 JSA

November 3, 2003

IRAO

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I thumbed through the Army War College brief, "Iraq and the Future of Warfare," last weekend.

I am curious to know if you have read it and what you think of it. If it is sound, then some of Admiral Giambastiani's lessons learned may not have been sound. Conversely, if the Army War College brief is not sound, you might want to look into it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Iraq and the Future of Warfare," U.S. Army War College 8/18/03

DHR:dh  
110303-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/28/03

*✓*  
*12/15*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*Original enclosure*  
*included behind.*  
*✓*  
*CDR Nelsey*  
*12/12*

3 NOV 03

U222417/03

12/10  
1730



UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

2 OCT 2003

INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
200 570-9 FM 3-23

✓  
R/K

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army *Brownlee*

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff Army *Schoomaker*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
12/12

- This memo is in response to your question regarding differences between the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) lessons learned report and the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) brief, *Iraq and the Future of Warfare*. The Army concurs with the JFCOM study findings, which are generally consistent with the conclusions of the CSA-chartered Army OIF Study Group (OIFSG). In concert with the other Services and the JFCOM team, OIFSG conducted an extensive review of actions during major combat and continues to gather information from the ongoing operation.
- Concurrently, the SSI is analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom from the beginning of the war through the conclusion of major hostilities. The study team's lead author, Dr. Stephen Biddle, posits that "jointness" and speed may not have played a significant role in the coalition's low-cost rapid victory, rather citing the skill of U.S. forces and Iraqi ineptitude as the principle reasons for the coalition's success. While this work highlights issues important to the Joint Force – the crucial role of training and leadership, as well as the caution to avoid equating the OIF battlefield with possible future wars – it reaches a number of conclusions that are at odds with the Army position.
- This SSI study does not benefit from the depth and breadth of real time access to wartime decision makers and supporting data, as well as ongoing analysis of OIF actions, that underpin the findings of both the Army and JFCOM reports. However, there is continued value in our academic institution's analysis of operations. It should be noted that in subsequent versions of this study, the author has modified many of his conclusions, to include those regarding the importance of "jointness" as additional academic rigor is applied. The leadership at Carlisle has active oversight of this ongoing effort and does not currently intend to distribute this study beyond an internal Army analytical audience.

SPL ASSISTANT IN CHIEF	12/12
BR MA CRADDOCK	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCC	
EXECSEC MARIOTTI	12/10

U19985 / 03

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

- COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments:  
As Stated


Prepared By: BG Mark O'Neill / (b)(6)

Coordination Sheet

Joint Forces Command

BG Cone

(b)(6)



**U.S. Army War College**

**Strategic Studies Institute**

---

# ***Iraq and the Future of Warfare***

## **Implications for Army and Defense Policy**

**Dr. Stephen Biddle, Study Director**  
**COL James Embrey, Project Coordinator**  
**COL Edward Filiberti**  
**COL Stephen Kidder**  
**Dr. Steven Metz**  
**Dr. Ivan C. Oelrich**  
**LTC Richard Shelton**

**August 18, 2003**

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11-L-0559/OSD/20292

# Agenda

- Research Question
- Sources
- Contrasting Views
- Evidence and Analysis
- A Different View
- Conclusions and Implications

# Research Question

- Explain OIF outcome – Saddam toppled with:
  - Low US losses
  - No scorched earth
  - No WMD use
  - Moderate collateral damage
- Focus is on high-intensity operations, 19 March to 9 April
- Scope limited to military cause and effect, implications for defense policy



# Findings

- Early accounts have often emphasized:
  - Speed
  - Precision and situation awareness
  - Jointness
  - Coalition skill
  - Iraqi shortcomings
  - Luck
- Evidence suggests:
  - Speed and luck played smaller roles than early accounts imply
  - Jointness was valuable, important, but not a necessary precondition for low-cost victory
  - Key determinant: synergy between advanced Coalition technology and major Coalition-Iraqi skill imbalance

# Speed

- Accounts seeing speed as decisive and the numbers as declining usually hold:
  - Iraqis unable to track fast-moving, unpredictable Coalition movements
  - Iraqis unable to communicate well enough to resist
  - Speed of advance demoralized defenders; helped breach “Fortress Baghdad”
  - Iraqi scorched earth, WMD use preempted by rapid Coalition advance
- Was this so?

# Speed and Iraqi C4ISR

- Iraqis used low-tech means to assemble picture sufficient to move paramilitaries, multiple RG divisions in ways that imply timely knowledge of our whereabouts
  - Scouts in civilian clothes reconnoitred US positions continuously; reported via cell/sat phones, landlines, couriers
  - Reporting apparently reached high command but compartmented narrowly
    - Division commanders and below have no situation awareness beyond immediate environs – several captured in inadvertent contact with US formations
    - Corps commanders and above have clearer picture; use it to orchestrate response
  - RG redeployed elements of 4 divisions directly across V Corps axis of advance; blocking movement completed 1-2 days before US contact
    - Hammurabi div moved from NW of Baghdad to S and W of city
    - Adnan brigade moves NW along Hwy 6 from Al Kut to SE of Baghdad
    - Nebuchadnezzar elements move > 250 km from Green Line opposite Kurds to OBJ Murray S of Baghdad
    - Medina div shifts west to concentrate vs. 3 ID, I MEF
  - Paramilitary Reinforcement of Najaf, Nasiriyah
    - 10,000 Fedayeen moved south from Baghdad after G-day via undefended routes
    - Najaf: threaded needle via sole undefended route into city; little/no accidental contact with US blocking forces – combat was overwhelmingly deliberate assaults from within city, not accidental contact with Iraqis trying to infiltrate
    - Nasiriyah: USMC captures detailed, accurate sandtable of US positions

# Speed and Iraqi Morale

- Speed does not appear central in Iraqi morale breakdown
- RA morale largely broken before G-day; SRG, paramilitary resistance continues long into the war
  - Baghdad: SRG, paramilitary resistance did not collapse when 3 ID arrived at outskirts; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban center
    - Apr. 5, 2 BCT “Thunder Run:” every vehicle hit by RPG fire
    - Apr. 7, 2 BCT advance from BIAP to Tigris: heavy fire from all directions; Iraqis reoccupy destroyed positions behind US advance; emergency resupply must fight through to advance position after nightfall, losing 2 fuel, 1 ammo truck, 2 KIA, 30 WIA en route
    - Not clear that “Fortress Baghdad” would have been much more formidable if encountered later, reached more slowly
  - Basra: paramilitary resistance continues for two weeks; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban center
  - Nasiriyah, Najaf, Samawah: Iraqi resistance continued long after Coalition forces bypassed cities; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban centers

# Speed and Scorched Earth


- Little evidence that speed preempted an imminent scorched earth campaign
  - Rumaila Oil Field
    - Of 250 total oil wells, only 22 actually prepared for demolition – of these, only 9 detonated, creating 7 fires
    - No GOSPs, pumping stations, pipelines prepared for demolition
    - No evidence of ongoing preparations for additional demolitions
    - Field not secured until 1500Z, D+2; Iraqis had ample time to destroy entire field if actually prepared for detonation
  - Kirkuk Oil Field
    - Iraqis held field for 3 weeks after hostilities initiated; no wells destroyed
    - No evidence of preparations for demolition uncovered when Coalition took control of field
- Scorched earth threat as bluff for deterrent effect?
  - Evidence is consistent with thesis that Iraqis meant to create credible threat to deter us from invading but with no intent of mass destruction
  - Little positive evidence that slower advance would have yielded significant increase in damage

# **Speed and Iraqi WMD non-use**

- **Unlikely that speed preempted Iraqi WMD use**
  - No Iraqi WMD located close enough to delivery systems for near-term employment
  - No hard evidence that Iraqis were within days or weeks of effective WMD use; little evidence that slower Coalition advance would have made a difference here

# Luck

- Implies that with different breaks, Iraqis could have hurt us much more gravely
- Yet plausible “what ifs” had been anticipated and planned against – few seem likely to have caused serious, strategic-level setbacks
- Where breaks favored Iraqis, their tactical shortcomings prevented exploitation



–OBJ Montgomery, Apr. 4:

- RG reinforced tank battalion in prepared positions on ground of own choosing eluded air attack, met US ground advance at full strength
- Apache Trp, 3-7 Cav advanced directly into prepared kill sack
- Iraqis engaged from flanks at 800-1000m range, fired >16 125mm rounds: none hit
- US return fire annihilated the battalion

–If Iraqis’ poor training left them unable to take advantage of breaks, not clear that more breaks would have made a decisive difference

# Jointness

- For jointness to be *necessary* condition for low-cost victory implies that without it, cost would have been much higher
- Yet in 1991, less-joint Coalition offensive with smaller technology edge defeated Iraqis at *lower* loss rate
  - Coalition forces were larger in 1991, but local assaults at parity or worse still annihilated dug-in, actively-resisting RG opposition at very low cost
    - 73 Easting: 2 US Cav troops annihilated RG brigade without loss to enemy fire
    - Wadi al Batin: US battalion annihilated RG brigade in frontal assault, killed 160 Iraqi AFVs losing only 6
    - Medina Ridge: US brigade annihilated RG brigade in frontal assault, suffered no casualties
- In 2003, Coalition ground forces sometimes fought without tightly integrated CAS, yet still prevailed at very low cost
  - Through D+3, few CAS sorties flown, yet 3 ID, I MEF advance up to 350 km, fight through stiff resistance at Talil, Samawah, OBJ Rams
  - OBJ Montgomery, Apr. 4: single Cav troop decimates dug-in RG battalion by direct fire without loss
- Jointness clearly strengthened Coalition forces in 2003 – and could be decisive advantage in future warfare – but little evidence that OIF low-cost victory is attributable to a significant increase in jointness


# **Skill-Technology Synergy**

- Technological sophistication enabled a skilled Coalition force to punish Iraqi errors with unprecedented severity
  - To survive vs. modern weapons requires very high tactical proficiency, ability to exploit complex terrain
  - Iraqis very poorly trained and led
  - Resulting mistakes, ill-prepared fighting positions, poor marksmanship, flawed dispositions left them fatally exposed to Coalition technology
  - Enabled relatively small Coalition force to prevail in short, relatively low-cost campaign
- If Iraqis' poor skills were necessary for our technology to produce these results, then dangerous to assume we can obtain similar results against better-skilled enemies

# Iraqi Ineptitude

- **Extremely Poor Marksmanship**
  - Most Iraqis fired little/no live ammunition in past year:
    - Baghdad RG div: 1 live fire exercise/year, 10 rds each
    - 2<sup>nd</sup> div RA: zero live fire in past 12 mos
    - 3<sup>rd</sup> div RA: 1 live fire exercise/year, 4 rds each
  - Vs. 3BCT, Baghdad: RPG hit rate < 10% at ranges of 100-500m
  - Vs. 3-7 Cav at OBJ Montgomery: 16 125mm rounds, ranges of 800-1000m, zero hits; nearest miss falls 25m short
- **Self-defeating tactics**
  - Repeated, exposed, frontal assaults by paramilitaries in NTVs
  - Sought out Coalition combat forces; avoided soft targets, LOC interdiction
- **Poor leadership**
  - Officers abandoned troops in heat of battle
  - Radical, mutual, mistrust between leaders and led
- **Poor equipment maintenance:**
  - 10% ORR for Iraqi HETTs on 3BCT front
- **Poor fighting position preparation**
  - Some success at concealment, but limited ability to provide cover
  - No ability to combine cover, concealment, field of fire

**Afghanistan**



**Republican Guard,  
Iraq**



# Iraqi Ineptitude, cont'd

- Iraqis systematically unable to exploit potential of urban terrain
  - Only SRG given any conventional MOUT training – RA, RG totally untrained in MOUT; paramilitaries given little/no conventional military training of any kind
  - RG, RA denied access to city centers; deployed in rural areas, urban outskirts
  - Paramilitaries in urban areas sortied into open; prior to Apr. 5, Iraqis on tactical offense in most urban fighting
  - No interior building prep
  - Prepared fighting positions typically outdoors, exposed
  - No obstacles, mines, barriers
  - Disaffection of Iraqi public with Ba'athist regime facilitated SOF targeting of otherwise concealed urban assets



# Iraqi Ineptitude: Consequences

- RG, SRG, RA exposed to LRPE
- Lightly-armed paramilitaries exposed to overwhelming direct fire from armored vehicles
- Paramilitary command, support infrastructure targetable even when concealed
- Coalition able to fight mounted in cities, engage exposed urban defenders from standoff
- Poor Iraqi marksmanship, fire control, vehicle/weapon maintenance left them unable to exploit (rare) opportunities
- Result:
  - Maximum scope for US technological advantages to affect outcome
  - Combination of 21<sup>st</sup> c. technology and Iraqi exposure yields radical lethality – enabling small, well-trained Coalition force to succeed at very low losses
  - *But requires advanced technology and skill mismatch: either alone insufficient*

# Counterfactual: What if Iraqis had been skilled?

- Actual Iraqis forfeited most advantages of urban terrain; skilled urban defense would negate important US technological advantages
  - Many fewer exposed targets for LRPE
  - Much harder to avoid dismounted assault to clear properly-prepared buildings
  - Higher rate of larger-caliber Iraqi hits vs weaker US side, rear, roof, floor armor
  - 1:1 LER not implausible in MOUT vs skilled defenders – possible US losses of multiple thousands
- Actual Iraqis avoided LOC interdiction; skilled partisan warfare would've required large US troop diversion to support MOUT campaign, reducing MOUT force ratio and increasing losses
- US could besiege cities rather than assault them, but:
  - Lacked troops to invest multiple urban areas while defending 500 km LOC – important parts of country would have to be left under Ba'athist control
  - A motivated, prepared opponent could hold out under prolonged siege: Milosevic held out under 78 days of bombing in 1999
  - Survival of Baathist control apparatus would inhibit civilian HUMINT assistance, reduce Coalition's ability to find concealed urban command, logistical targets
  - Barring decapitation via lucky shot, could be very long war; political pressure for eventual assault would be difficult to resist
  - Hard to rule out eventual requirement for direct assault

# Conclusions

- Central finding: synergistic interaction between advanced technology and Iraqi ineptitude was necessary and sufficient for low-cost victory
  - Without 2003 precision, situation awareness, survivability, even inept Iraqis could have inflicted much heavier casualties
  - Without Iraqi ineptitude, even 2003 technology could not have enabled a force this size to prevail at this cost
  - 2003 technology punishes ineptitude very severely, but cannot guarantee similar results vs. adept enemies
- Can speed, precision, information now substitute for mass?
  - In Iraq, speed less important than precision, information
  - Effects of precision, information critically dependent on Iraqi exposure – against less-exposed opponent, results could be very different

# Strategy and Policy Implications

- To assume that precision and information will always permit small forces to succeed would be high risk
- But to assume that precision and information will never again permit small forces to succeed would be over-conservative
- Campaign planners must be able to tell the difference – in advance – between skilled and exposed enemies
  - Routine worst-case campaign planning is unsustainable
  - To do better requires knowledge we don't have today: explaining the determinants of skill is a critical national research requirement
  - Civil-military relations as promising avenue
- Title 10 force providers must ensure preparedness for skilled enemies – would be dangerous to assume Iraqi-style scenarios as the future norm

I-03/014655  
EF-7265  
22  
October 28, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Report

*DBE*  
*C 11/7*

Please follow up with Blackwill to come up with an improved Afghanistan report, and let's get ours polished up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-36

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

November 7, 2003

COL Buccì/CDR Nonsenzo,

- SecDef reviewed the attached Afghan report today in detail and provided his guidance for further refinement.
- Policy will prepare a revised report for the Secretary's review next week.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

*Forwarded*  
*11/7*  
*CDR Nam*

22 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20312

U22242 /03

11:29 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 22, 2003  
 SUBJECT: **WSJ Article - 10/21/03**

0001

Attached is an excellent article by Brian Mulroney. You ought to think about incorporating some of that material.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.27

*Attach: Leading From the Front, WSJ, 10/21/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

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**U22243 /03**

R &amp; R

W5J

## Leading From the Front

By Brian Mulroney

The new and overriding predicate of American policy—foreign, defense, security, domestic—is to ensure that 9/11 never happens again. If the terrorists managed to mount a second such attack anywhere in the U.S., the consequences would be destructive for the nation and calamitous for the administration. The dominant unspoken thought of the president of the U.S. must therefore be: "I will take whatever action is required to protect America from attack so that it will not be said of me 50 years from today that I was asleep at the switch at a seminal moment in our history."

It is out of these new realities that the doctrine of unilateral pre-emption—so condemned by many allies—emerged. I believe an accurate translation of the doctrine is this: "If the U.S. has persuasive evidence that a country is either contemplating an attack on the U.S. or its allies, or harboring terrorists who might strike out at the U.S. or its allies, then the U.S. will—with Security Council approval or without—pre-emptively act to remove the offending government from office." And why is this doctrine so offensive to so many? Some fear the precedent, others the erosion of multilateralism, and others still a negative impact upon the United Nations.

Although the *reality* of pre-emptive action is new, so was the terrorist strike on America. What is also new is the suggestion that Security Council approval is—and has been—a sacrosanct precondition to action against a hostile state. The historical record is to the contrary. In any event, I would never have agreed to subcontract Canada's international security decisions and our national interest to 15 members of the Security Council. This would be a surrender of national sovereignty to which I'd never consent.

In fact, a coalition of nations—including France, Germany and Canada—mounted a massive air war against Serbia a few years ago without Security Council authorization, under President Clinton's leadership. There was no "imminence" of attack on any allied nation, nor did Serbia represent a threat to anyone outside her own borders. Why the reversal of policy when Iraq was involved, with the same nations piously insisting that Security Council approval had to be obtained before any military action could be initiated—and that the absence of any such approval had rendered illegitimate any military action against Saddam Hussein?

Some Security Council members opposed intervention in Yugoslavia, where many innocent people were dying, on the grounds of national sovereignty. Quite frankly, such invocations of the principle of national sovereignty are as offensive to me as the police declining to stop family violence simply because a man's home is supposed to be his castle. We must recognize that

there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess—and that, sometimes, the international community must act to defend them. This is precisely what happened in Iraq and no amount of Monday morning quarterbacking will change the fact that the U.S.-led coalition acted in defense of the values contained in Security Council Resolution 1441, and the previous 16 resolutions, all of which Saddam had flouted.

It is obvious that the U.S.- and U.K.-led alliance is now in difficulty in Iraq. The quality of planning for the invasion clearly surpassed that of the occupation. But President Bush cannot, will not, and should not walk away from Iraq. The removal of Saddam and the threat he posed is a signal accomplishment, but more hard work and sacrifice than anticipated is still required.

Nothing is gained from non-participant allies smirking on the sidelines, whispering "I told you so." The recent Security Council resolution marked a promising beginning, introducing both realism and support into the equation at the council level for the first time since hostilities began. America now greatly needs allies who can re-establish a basis of mutual trust and candor. Not fair-weather friends who are on its side when times are easy but invisible when the great challenges come. True allies must now—in spite of some legitimate misgivings—come to the assistance of the U.S.-led alliance by showing cooperation both at the U.N. and in Iraq. After all, the U.S. has come frequently to the assistance of these very same countries in the past, and as Canada's founding prime minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, once said, only partly in jest: "I need friends with me not when they think I'm right but when they think I'm wrong."

The Cold War glue that gave resolve to the Western alliance has cracked, especially, but not exclusively, over differences on Iraq, and is undermining the capacity for multilateral solutions to the problems of the new century. As we look for a more secure world, the one constant is the pressing need for full engagement by the United States, not by itself but in the company of friends and allies with common concerns. Regrettably, the U.N. has become less relevant and less effective in harnessing the means for conflict resolution, prompting many to predict that it may go the way of the League of Nations.

What is needed first and foremost to help retain both the leadership and the full engagement of the U.S. is a new sense of partnership and commitment with nations holding similar values.

\* \* \*

Fifty-eight years ago, in San Francisco, statesmen gathered from around the world, facing decisions every bit as momentous as those we face today. Yet now, the U.N. is like a sheriff without a police force, unable to respond effectively to global conflict, even genocide; constrained by decision-making structures which were designed for a different age; and extending status and rights universally but with little regard to compliance with its own principles and resolutions. We know from history that international institutions which fail to act in the face of global crises gradually wither away. To help maintain world order the U.N. needs more than a low common denominator consensus for action. It needs a decision-making structure that works and resources to give meaning and force to its resolutions.

In my judgment, the U.S. should instigate and lead a "San Francisco II," a major reform effort to establish new multilateral approaches that respect the principles of the U.N. Charter. It is vital for Europe, for Japan, for Canada and the world as a whole that the U.S. remains fully engaged as the bulwark for multilateralism. Without U.S. engagement,

there can be no truly effective multilateral effort. But, without close support and unwavering counsel from its key allies, the U.S. will inevitably exercise its own will and choose the course of least resistance.

During the Cold War, the allies found common cause in the form of a clearly defined threat—the Soviet Union. The threat today of global terrorism may be as difficult to define as it is to locate but it should, nonetheless, provide sufficient scope for commitment by all concerned. Above all, we must not allow our most precious values—openness and equality—to become a source of weakness in the battle against terrorism. And so, today, because the world needs strong leadership to deal with an enemy as diabolical as the world has ever known, the U.S. must reignite the power of international solidarity to ensure a world order that strengthens freedom and security for people everywhere.

*Mr. Mulroney was Canada's prime minister from 1984-93. This is adapted from a speech he gave last night to the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation, at Texas A&M University.*



TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT:

000.75D

Bremer and Abizaid are both going to be in. My instinct is to go down and take one, one day, and another the other day and have two press briefings.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.26

Please respond by: 11/5

*→ Secret*  
*Not sure I agree. IF they go together, you don't need to go at all.*  
*10/23*  
*J. Di Rita*

22OCT03

1:56 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: LTG John Craddock  
Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 22, 2003

SUBJECT: **Governorate Support Teams in Iraq**

I  
R  
A  
Q

I've seen no publicity at all on this idea of Governor Support Teams from Abizaid. Do you want to look into it and see if it something we should be promoting, expanding, discussing, elaborating on, informing people about, tracking by metrics?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.21

*Attach: PRTs Memo to SD from Abizaid*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

11/3

22  
OCT  
03

U22245 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20316



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GEN ABIZAD

CC: GEN MYERS

SUBJECT: PRTs in Iraq

Mr. Secretary, you asked me if we should do something like the PRT program we are building in Afghanistan in Iraq. We took this lesson learned forward into Iraq planning early on and developed what we call the Governorate Support Team (GST) concept for Iraq. General Franks directed the establishment of 18 GSTs (one for each governorate) in April and the fielding of these teams is complete. Jerry Bremer endorsed and expanded the concept in June to add CPA, USAID contracted advisors and Iraqi leadership to construct. These last three elements are still being fielded.

I have attached an information paper on the concept and status as well as a copy of Jerry's directive published in July. Concept is solid but the execution continues to be a challenge on the civilian side.

Very Respectfully,  
John

*A* 9/13

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USDI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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**INFORMATION PAPER**  
**STATUS OF GOVERNORATE TEAMS (GTs)**

**Executive Summary.**

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept is seen to be an effective means of promoting and synchronizing national and international reconstructive efforts in Phase IV in Afghanistan. The PRT concept was integrated into the Iraq Phase IV planning in the form of the "Governorate Team (GT)" concept. The GT concept establishes PRT-like support teams in all 18 Iraqi Provinces and ties them to CPA and Iraqi goals and resources across Iraq. Each GT consists of four basic elements; a military "Governorate Support Team" comprised of military security, communications and civil affairs soldiers, a Local Governance Teams (LGTs) comprised of civilian consultants that provide training and mentoring to local officials, CPA policy representatives, and local Iraqi emerging leadership. The concept also encourages international participation. Today, there are GSTs established in each of the 18 governorates with the other elements in various degrees of deployment. The GTs network will become the principal means by which CPA bridges their national and regional strategies and promotes government and reconstruction at the local level.

**Background.**

- GT concept was developed at US Central Command in March 2003.
- Land Component Commander was directed to field the GSTs in April while CENTCOM was the CPA.
- AMB Bremer endorsed the GT concept in June and directing 18 GTs be in place by 1 Sep 03.

**Components of the Governorate Team (GT).**

- Military Component (GST)
  - In direct support to Governorate Coordinator.
  - Provides initial security, communications and transportation until the civilian components develop sustainable capacity.
  - Provides an integrated PSYOP and information campaign capability tailored to the needs of the government and consistent with national strategic communication themes and messages.
- Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
  - Provides Coalition civilian personnel that provides political and policy guidance.
  - Internationalization of the CPA can be optimized by offering positions within governorates to Coalition members (Deputy Governorate Coordinators).
- Local Government Teams (LGTs)
  - RTI contractors providing professional training and mentoring to interim Iraqi governorate and local officials.
- Local Iraqi populace and expats
  - Iraqi's hired or identified as emergent local leaders that will understand CPA positions and assist in quicker transition to Iraqi control.
  - Expats that can bridge cultural, linguistic and tribal gaps.

**Current Status of GTs.**

- There are eighteen GSTs (military component) established throughout Iraq
- There are four Local Governance Team (LGT) hub offices established in Iraq. They are in Basra, Hillah, Erbil, and Baghdad. The LGTs operate from their four hub offices and travel to all eighteen governorates. Research Triangle Institute (RTI), the contractor for the LGTs, will continue to work from the four hub offices until they can develop a presence in all 18 governorates.

**Recommendations.**

- CPA push RTI to source the Local Governorate Teams as contracted.
- CPA seek and integrate international participation into the GTs.

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**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY**

**BAGHDAD**

**From: Coalition Provisional Authority**

**TO: Commander, Coalition Forces  
Chief of Staff, CPA  
CPA Directors  
CPA Regions**

**SUBJECT: Governorate Team Concept**

1. To ensure that the Governorate Teams' (GT) concept is implemented effectively, it is essential that all concerned in its implementation are working to achieve the same goal. This memo articulates a general vision of the GTs and provides instructions for implementation.
2. **Vision.** The GTs are designed to extend the work of the CPA to the Governorate level and provide an advisory capability to the Governor. The GT will bridge the gap between national government administration and local government within Iraq. It will serve to synchronize the efforts of the coalition military, the Iraqi police and the CPA Local Governorate Teams (LGTs) as they execute CPA directives throughout the country. They will ensure that CPA guidance is communicated to and implemented at all levels of Iraqi governance. At the same time, the GTs will be instrumental in identifying local Iraqi leaders for roles in future Iraqi government structures. The GTs will assist in improving local living conditions and opportunities for economic improvement by coordinating public services with local governments.
3. Each GT will consist of four separate elements, led by a CPA Governorate Coordinator (GC), who will be a senior coalition government representative. The GC will be the counterpart and senior CPA advisor to the Iraqi Interim Governor. Each element of the GT, including the GST, will be in direct support of the GC. The GC will be responsible to the CPA Administrator through the Director of Operations for integrating and coordinating the GT elements' efforts. The GT elements are:
  - a. **CPA/GC:** provides overall direction, political and policy guidance on behalf of the CPA. Identifies governance and other needs within the governorate. Synchronizes local programs and policies with national structures. **NOTE:**

<sup>1</sup> The term "Governorate Support Team" was the name originally given to the overall team that will coordinate CPA activities in the eighteen Iraqi governorates. The term was supposed to apply to a multi-faceted team, but because the military element was the first to arrive in the governorates, they started being called GSTs. To avoid confusion, the term Governorate Team (GT) is now used to describe the overall team. This team will be led by a CPA Governorate Coordinator and will be comprised of four elements: military (GST), a CPA element, Iraqi nationals and a USAID Local Government Team.

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Initially, and on a temporary basis only, the CPA may appoint a senior coalition military officer to perform this role until a GC is assigned. This will be done on a case by case basis through a specific order from the CPA and coordinated with CJTF-7.

- b. LGT: provides professional training and mentoring to interim Iraqi government officials.
  - c. Iraqi adviser: links administration initiatives with requirements identified by local town/city councils. Assists in timely transition to Iraqi control.
    - i. Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council (IRDC - Iraqi expatriates from coalition countries): bridges linguistic and other cultural/ethnic gaps between GT and local Iraqi leadership. NOTE: IRDC contractors are advisors to the GT and possess no direct authority over local Iraqis or other elements of the GT.
  - d. GST: Military (primarily Civil Affairs personnel): provides initial security, communications and transportation and effects civil-military coordination. Tailors Information Operations to the needs of the governorate, consistent with national themes and messages.
4. A GT coordination cell has already been organized in the CPA Directorate of Operations. This office will oversee GT implementation and will coordinate subsequent GT activities.
  5. Implementing instructions. As the GTs deploy, the regional CPAs will provide initial oversight. When individual GTs are fully functional, the GC will report directly to the CPA instead of through the regional CPA. The regional CPAs will, however, remain in place to provide coordination and advisory services. Until a governorate is assigned a GT, and where there has not been a Military Officer assigned the GC responsibility, the regional CPA will perform the GT functions for the uncovered governorates. The CPA goal is to have GTs functional in all eighteen governorates by 1 September 2003.
  6. By mid-July 2003, a CPA team will have traveled to each governorate and regional CPA to articulate this new vision. This task is the responsibility of the GT Coordination Cell in the Directorate of Operations. By 1 August 2003, the eighteen GCs will have been appointed by the CPA and the IRDC Coordinator will have assigned IRDC personnel to each GT.
  7. The basic principles of the system will apply throughout Iraq, but the particular circumstances of each area will be taken account of in detailed planning and implementation.
  8. The government of Iraq must be a representative one that meets the needs of all its citizens. The Governorate Teams will be instrumental in achieving that goal.

  
 Lt. Paul Bremer, Administrator  
 Coalition Provisional Authority

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

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# Governorate Team (GT) Concept



- **Bridges the gap between national and local government within Iraq.**
- **Serves to synchronize the efforts of the CPA, coalition military, the Iraqi populace, and the local governance teams (LGTs).**
- **Assists in improving local living conditions and opportunities for economic improvement by coordinating public services with local governments.**



NO. 112

HQ USCENICOM FWD

SEP. 13. 2003 11:19AM



UNCLASSIFIED

# Components of a GT




## Governorate Support Team (GST):

**Provides initial security, communications, transportation and civil-military coordination. Tailors information operations to the needs of the governorate, consistent with national themes and messages.**



## CPA:

**Representation from CPA synchronizes local programs and policies with regional and national structures.**




## Iraqi Emergent Leadership:

**Local leaders link initiatives with needs and requirements determined by local town and city councils.**



## Local Governorate Teams (LGTs):

**RTI consultants provide training and mentoring to interim Iraqi government officials.**



● - Governorate Coordinator

NO. 112

HQ USCENTCOM FTU

SEP. 13. 2003 11:19AM

9:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Legislative Authorities**

Here is a long memo, page after page, from Jim Haynes. I have not read it. I don't have time. Get somebody with some judgment to read it and do what should be done off of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.20

*Attach: Haynes Info Memo to SD: 10/10/03 Re: Legislative Authorities*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 11/3 \_\_\_\_\_

9:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Legislative Authorities**

Here is a long memo, page after page, from Jim Haynes. I have not read it. I don't have time. Get somebody with some judgment to read it and do what should be done off of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.20

*Attach: Haynes Info Memo to SD: 10/10/03 Re: Legislative Authorities*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*11/3*

11-L-0559/OSD/20325

Cobles



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 10, 2003 1:06 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities (to overcome legal and fiscal impediments in Afghanistan/Iraq)

- You asked on September 9, 2003 to include legislative authorities we may need in order to overcome impediments to how we spend money when we pull the supplemental appropriations request together.
- Immediately upon receipt of your snowflake, the Joint Staff polled all of the Combatant Commands, including SOCOM and CENTCOM, and compiled a list of possible new legislative authorities. USD (Policy) also compiled a list.
- The USD (Comptroller), working closely with my office, reviewed the lists, determined that many of the items had already been included in the draft Supplemental that was then being finalized, and took action to add or amend language to address other requested authorities that were legally supportable and politically feasible at this time. (OMB was limiting the Supplemental to matters directly related to Iraq and Afghanistan.) TAB A contains a summary (and current legislative status) of authorities that were included in the President's Supplemental Request, and information on other authorities requested by CENTCOM and SOCOM.
- We ~~personally~~ advised both the Joint Staff and USD (Policy) to review the balance of the concepts on their lists, determine whether any of the new authorities might still be useful in the long-term, and submit new legislative proposals for inclusion in the FY 2005 DoD Legislation Program.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC Michael Fucci (b)(6)



## Legislative Authorities for Supplemental

The formal supplemental request included the following, all of which address CENTCOM's and SOCOM's needs:

- \$1.4 billion of additional authority to reimburse countries providing support to U.S. military ops. (HAC mark includes \$1.3B; SAC mark includes \$1B)
- Increase Afghanistan Freedom Support Act drawdown authority by \$300 million. (HAC and SAC both increased by \$150M)
- Increased authority (\$500M) to carry out construction projects overseas to meet urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature in connection with operations in Iraq or GWOT. (SAC included at \$150M level; HAC provided authority to use up to \$500M in O&M for this purpose – language that we have been negotiating with HAC staff)
- Lift and Sustain authority – authority to provide in kind support to coalition forces in Iraq (HAC and SAC both included)
- Train and Equip authority – authority to use up to \$200 million to train and equip foreign forces to for purpose of combating terrorism. (Both HAC and SAC included, although both limited to Iraq and Afghanistan, and HAC limited to \$100M)
- \$15 million increase in CIF (CINC Initiative Fund) authority. (Both HAC and SAC included.)

The following were also requested by CENTCOM and/or SOCOM in response to the Snowflake:

- Authorize replenishment of CERP program with DoD O&M funds. (Language passed informally to committees. We have discussed with committee staff and explained need for the provision)
- Authorize use of O&M for low level source operations, including cash payments and bartering. (SOCOM advised that we have an established practice in place, using EEE authority, that is recognized and supported by Congress, works well, and should not be tampered with)

- Airlift and Medivac of troops from Troop Contribution Nations (Covered by above authorities)
- Use of DoD O&M to support fielding of ANA (Covered by above authorities and Rice memo)
- Use of O&M to support PRTs in Afghanistan. (Funded in State portion of Supp.)
- Bailment of U.S. Military equipment to Coalition Forces (Covered by above authorities)
- Travel and Per Diem for Coalition Planning Groups. (Covered in FY04 Authorization Act)
- Greater simplification of Federal Acquisition Procedures. (To be worked as part of FY05 Legislative Program)
- Extend existing tax relief measures applicable to federal civilian employees to military and contractors (Currently covered in pending legislation)
- Reimburse humanitarian efforts from other countries (Covered by State Dept. authorities)
- Update rules on unit purchase thresholds. (Legislation not required)

10/4

GC-

(\*)

Did we do any of this?

Dilate

TAB A

534

C10/2

Good rundown -  
September 9, 2003

See tabs also

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Doug Feith  
Dov Zakheim

CC: Jim Haynes  
Powell Moore  
Pete Geren  
LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

When we pull the supplemental appropriations request together, we must include whatever legislative authorities we need. Several times during my recent trip I heard from both the civilian and the military leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq that there are impediments to how we spend money.

We simply must go after those restrictions. It will involve the State Department, so we should get the right people involved early.

Thanks.

Sir,  
CJCS response attached.  
Dr Zakheim and Gen Abizaid  
previously routed.

DHR:dh  
090903-13

or /CDR Nasir  
10-2

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/03  
24

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/20329

11-05-03

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TAB B

29 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: General Authorities Sought by Department of Defense in FY 04 Supplemental Appropriations Bill

1. Purpose. Provide information about general legislative authorities sought by the Department of Defense in the FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE (OIF, OEF and ONE).

2. Key Points

- On 17 September, the Department of Defense sent to Congress, through the OMB, a request for \$65.6 billion in FY 04 to finance incremental costs of OIF, OEF and ONE. The request also proposed "general provisions." A general provision in an appropriations act applies to one or more appropriations and may provide special legislative authority in addition to funding.
- Key Requested General Provisions
  - Drawdown. Increase the amount of Presidential drawdown authority under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 from \$300 million to \$600 million.
  - Contingency Construction. Authorize transfer of \$500 million appropriated to Department of Defense into the contingency construction account to carry out projects not otherwise authorized by law. Continues requirement that temporary requirements formerly completed with O&M be funded with these contingency construction funds.
  - Intelligence Activities. Deem that funds appropriated for intelligence activities are specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of Sec 504 of the National Security Act of 1947.
  - Defense Cooperation Account. Authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer amounts credited to the Defense Cooperation Account to other accounts consistent with the purposes of contributions.
  - Ill or Injured Service Members--Family Member Expenses. Continue existing travel and transportation allowances for family members of

11-L-0559/OSD/20330

Tab B

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

# ~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

ill or injured OIF, OEF and/or ONE Service members and augment with per diem to family members traveling to and from hospital and while at site during visits. Also authorize civilian attire suitable for wear by Service member during hospital stay and travel to home station (i.e., jogging outfits and sports shirts—not to exceed \$250).

- Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance. Increase Imminent Danger Pay from \$150 to \$225 per month and increase Family Separation Allowance from \$100 to \$250.
- Hardship Duty Pay. Increase Hardship Duty Pay from \$300 to \$600 per month.
- Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). Enable prudent management of the balance of the DERF, created by Congress in aftermath of the 11 Sept attacks and scheduled to expire 31 Oct 2003.
- Lift and Sustain Coalition Forces. Authorize use of O&M funds to provide supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq.
- Train, Equip and Assist Counter-Terrorist Forces. Authorize up to \$200 million of O&M to be used by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of SECSTATE, to provide assistance to military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- General Authorities Elsewhere in the Request. Though not styled as "general provisions," the following authorities are sought in the DOD request under individual appropriation headings:
  - CINC Initiative Fund. Authorize an additional \$15 million of Defense-Wide O&M (augmenting \$35 million requested for FY04) to be used for Iraq and Afghanistan-related initiatives.
  - Coalition Support. Authorize \$1.4 billion of Defense-Wide O&M for reimbursements of key cooperating nations for logistic and military support to US military operations.
  - Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). Fund USEUCOM and USCENTCOM projects for Iraq, Afghanistan and related areas.

11-L-0559/OSD/20331

B-2

Tab B

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

# ~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

- Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF). Fund the IFF that was created in the April 03 supplemental with an additional \$1.99 billion. Authorized transfer from IFF into military personnel, OHDACA, procurement, MilCon, Defense Health Program and working capital funds.

Prepared by: Mark Martins, LTC, USA  
LC, OCJCS, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20332

Tab B

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

✓  
10/4



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 OCT -1 PM 5:37

INFO MEMO

CH-1241-03  
1 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*7/21/03/30*  
*WMM*

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

- In response to your inquiry, provided is a summary (TAB B) of the DOD legislative authorities we have requested.
- There are additional authorities not in the supplemental (TAB C) that are still required. Of chief concern is the replenishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and the creation of a similar program for use in Afghanistan.
- Two other concerns involve extending to Afghanistan the authority to transport and sustain coalition forces and seeking a full \$50M of authority for the CINC Initiative Fund.
- I am also greatly interested in seamlessly blending title 10 and title 22 authorities so that problems such as those in Afghanistan are solved.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Copy to:

OUSD(C)

OUSDP

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED without attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/20333

U16228 703

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

29 September 2003

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Legislative Authorities Required

1. Purpose. To respond to SecDef direction that the Department of Defense pursue legislative authorities in the FY04 emergency supplemental budget request to remove impediments to how the Department spends money.

2. Key Points

- Joint Staff Action in Reference to Snowflake/534
  - DJ-8 initiated a legislative authorities call to the combatant commanders and the J-code directors.
  - All combatant commander and J-director submissions were addressed to OSD (Comptroller) and OSD Office of General Counsel (OGC).
- Background
  - The Secretary of Defense desires broad authorities in this supplemental. The package submitted by the President and OMB to Congress reflects an approach targeted to specific, demonstrated requirements.
  - SecDef desire is mirrored by the CDRUSCENTCOM request that the WOT be resourced from a "single, ready source of funding." USCENTCOM also urges the creation of a DOD-led interagency task force dedicated to resourcing the WOT.
  - Although new authorities will not be granted if they are never requested, much work already done to obtain progressively more authority from Congress could be jeopardized by an over-strident or arguably unjustified push for broad measures.
- Summary
  - FY2004 emergency supplemental budget requests legislative authorities to match the wartime requirements for the fight against global terrorism.
  - FY2004 supplemental authorities provide a means to satisfy most combatant command WOT requests.

- FY2004 supplemental authorities ride on and flow from prior DOD success in adapting peacetime authorities to the WOT.
- The progressive approach to authorities, from the first post-9/11 emergency supplemental through two President's budgets and two subsequent supplementals, has produced significant gains.
- PB05 is the next iteration. A call for legislative proposals for PB05 was made last week.
- Combatant command authorities requests not satisfied in this supplemental fall into three categories: better addressed in other ways (pending legislation, etc.); substantially met by existing legislation; or already being considered by Authorization Committees with jurisdiction and would jeopardize the supplemental.
- In summary, FY04 supplemental authorities provide the combatant commanders most of what they want without risking a fight having significant downsides, but much work remains in seeking additional authorities.
- Exceptions. Six authority issues remain to be worked now and in subsequent submissions of legislative proposals. The first five of these are significant.
  - Replenishing CERP Accounts With O&M. The Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), currently funded with seized assets of the former Iraqi regime, provides tactical commanders with a flexible means to complete small reconstruction projects. **Ensure CERP continuity through the use of appropriated funds** because Iraqi seized assets are nearly exhausted. A program like CERP would also be invaluable in Afghanistan.
  - Title 22 versus Title 10 in Afghanistan. US Army training teams today do not accompany their Afghan National Army charges on operations because reporting for these two sources of funds is encumbering to the point of being disabling. **Policy changes within the Department of Defense could perhaps cure this problem.** **However, rendering inoperative in Iraq and Afghanistan a title 22 prohibition on US trainers engaging in combat would ensure this prohibition no longer poses a risk to operations.**
  - Lift and Sustain. The FY 2004 proposal restricts this authority to Iraq. **It should also include Afghanistan.** The proposal would fund coalition transportation and sustainment from O&M without any specific monetary ceiling. It could cover both countries easily. Including Afghanistan will provide a more straightforward and timely means of addressing matters that have proved troublesome to

11-L-0559/OSD/20335

USCENTCOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. We need this authority to encourage potential coalition partners such as Bulgaria and Romania to join the effort in Afghanistan.

- Contingency Construction. **Broader authority requested** by the Joint Staff and OSD addresses many combatant command complaints of unresponsive military construction funding. Congressional staff indicate willingness to relax restrictions of FY03 Supplemental.
- Train and Equip. Introduced in both the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Service Committee, then reintroduced at Conference on the Authorization Bill and now introduced in a less flexible form in the supplemental; **this issue continues to be a worthy effort.**
- CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) Authority. **The supplemental request should be boosted by \$5M.** The request incorrectly presumed that the outcome of appropriations conference action on the FY04 President's Budget would be \$35M for CIF. In fact the outcome is \$30M. \$50M is needed for FY04 combatant command support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. In the course of a year \$50M is the right level to accommodate unforeseen, emergent joint warfighting opportunities.

### 3. Recommendations

- Pursue methodical increases in authority in this supplemental.
- Continue the methodical approach in PB05
- Argue for above CERP, title 22 and title 10 adjustments, lift and sustain, contingency construction and train-equip authorities.

Prepared by: Rich Snead, CAPT, USN  
PBAD, J-8, (b)(6)

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

OUSDC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OGC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OUSDP	Copy provided	23 September 2003
USCENTCOM	Copy provided	23 September 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 22, 2003  
 SUBJECT: **Attached E-Mail**

*292*

Take off who this e-mail is from and draft a memo from me to whomever you think it ought to go to, including David Chu on the childcare issue.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 102203.19

*Attach: LTG Craddock E-mail Re: "The Iraq War"*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*11/1*

*OB*  
*10.29*

*22 OCT 03*

U22247 /03

SECDEF - I spoke to a Battalion  
Commander in the 3d Infantry Division  
about post-war soldier attitudes.

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

Subject:

FW: RE: RE: "The Iraq War" -- personal for LTG Craddock

*For your information*

(D)

*C 10/18*

To: Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

Subject: Re: RE: RE: "The Iraq War" -- personal for LTG Craddock

Sir,

Quick SITREP on some of the questions you asked below. I have spoke with many soldiers over the past week to 10 days. Many were called into my office to discuss re-enlisting in the Army. Those who have told their company commanders they don't want to re-enlist or need my help with getting the assignment they want -- I take the time to call them in and talk with them. Obviously, these are the soldiers we want to re-enlist.

I have spoken with about 25 soldiers in the rank of SPC to CPT. Most have truly enjoyed serving their country and like the Army way of life. Most agree the pay raises have helped significantly (not one complaint from the officers or more senior NCOs) -- except one group. For those SGTs and below with a wife and kid(s), it hasn't gone far enough and most still need assistance from WIC. This is professionally embarrassing for them and they figure the only way to improve their life (financially) is to get out and seek civilian employment. For those enlisted soldiers SGT and below who are single, they are fine with their pay. But -- most of the soldiers ETSing today are of the rank of SPC or SGT and have a family.

Bar none -- the single most complaint about the Army today is the number of deployments. The perception is we are being asked to do way too much with the size force we have on active duty. Most are fearful of another deployment in a year from now and cite that as a major reason for ETSing from the Army (officer and enlisted). Case in point, I have one SGT who is absolutely phenominal and could easily become a CSM one day. He is that good. I have spoken with him at length over re-enlisting. He won't. He plans to ETS, go back to school and do ???? and raise his 6 month old baby. Meanwhile, his wife plans to enlist in the Air Force. Their logic is the AF doesn't deploy as often as the Army and if they do deploy, they are usually the first ones sent back home. It doesn't make sense but that is their decision and I cannot change their mind. But the Army is losing one hell of a soldier.

Other issues of concern to the soldiers. Equipment readiness -- this was mentioned several times. Most see these tanks needing a major overhaul soon and they see nothing getting done. Child Care -- the cost of child care is outrageous. Add this to your expenses for a junior enlisted soldier and they don't see much of that pay raise. And finally training. All agree we must train hard and often but for the train to move out so soon after just getting back is a mystery to them. Several of the soldiers point out that we still don't have our mechanics tool boxes or diagnostic equipment from our connexes that were on the boat -- but we begin gunnery in two weeks. This simply reinforces the perception that the DIV will redeploy to IRAQ soon which significantly increases PERSTEMPO and those I spoke with are in looking to shift to lower gears for a little while.

Sir, I hope this helps. I will continue to ask these questions to soldiers and will forward you another update in the future. I hope all is well. Will talk with you soon.

v/r  
LTC Roth

*WIC - A Dept of Agriculture program which provides food vouchers for new mothers, young children of low income families. It is a nutrition / child development program.*

11-L-0559/OSD/20339

10/23  
1750

Snowflake

8:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Schlesinger Recommendation**

000.715D

Should I meet (b)(6) A woman that Jim Schlesinger recommended I see? She has traveled all over Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.16

Please respond by: 11/2

*10/23*  
*Se chief -*  
*I'm trying to get her in here and see if she has anything to offer. Perhaps you can drop by.*  
*D, Rita*

2200503

U22248 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/20340  
Larry Di Rita  
10/24

8:11 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Congressman Wolf**

032

Do I have to get back to Congressman Wolf? Have I gotten back to him? I am a little worried that I promised to do something and there was no one else in the room at his request and I don't have any follow up for it.

Have I followed up already?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.12

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *11/2* *OB*  
*10-24*

22 OCT 03

U22249 /03

621

December <sup>9</sup>/<sub>6</sub>, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Joint Assignment List

J-1

211

I have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it.

What do we have to do to get it done?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120603-12 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/19

9 Dec 03

U222504/03

Tab A

11/3  
1800

Snowflake

11/15

October 22, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Michael Ledeen

231.2

Larry Di Rita

11/05

Please find out if Ledeen ever was a Pentagon staff consultant during our tenure, as the newspaper today suggests.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102203-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Mr D:

YOU ASKED ME TO FIND OUT. CHECKED MR LEDEEN'S BIO (AND HAD OUR PERSONNEL FOLKS CHECK). LOOKS LIKE HE WAS ONLY HERE AS A CONSULTANT FROM 82-86

vr,  
m

✓  
11/15

11/4

Sec Def - Reaffirmation that Ledeen has not consulted during our tenure.  
D. R. A.

22 OCT 03

U22252 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20343

TEN 11.5



**Section Search**

Find **Advanced Search**

**Scholars & Fellows**

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
- Specific Research Area
- Broad Research Area

Home > Scholars & Fellows > Michael A. Ledeen

**Michael A. Ledeen**

Print Mail

Resident Scholar in the Freedom Chair



Ledeen is an expert on U.S. foreign policy. His research areas include state sponsors of terrorism, Iran, the Middle East, Europe (Italy), U.S.-China relations, intelligence, and Africa (Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe). A former consultant to the NSC and to the U.S. State and Defense Departments, he has also written on leadership and the use of power. His latest book is entitled *The War against the Terror Masters*.

**Professional Experience**

- Commissioner, U.S.-China Commission, 2001-
- Consultant, NSC, State and Defense Departments, 1982-1986
- Senior fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1982-1986
- Special adviser to the Secretary of State, 1981-1982
- Senior staff member, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977-1981
- Rome correspondent, *The New Republic*, 1975-1977
- Visiting professor of history, University of Rome, Italy, 1975-1977
- Instructor and assistant professor of history, Washington University, 1967-1974

**Education**

- Ph.D., history and philosophy, University of Wisconsin
- M.S., history and philosophy, University of Wisconsin
- B.A., Pomona College

**Articles and Short Publications**

- The CIA and the War on Terror
- Defeating Fascism, Again
- Into the Quagmire
- [List All]

**Research Areas**

- Italy
- Africa (Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe)
- Europe
- Intelligence
- Middle East
- U.S. Foreign Policy
- Iran
- Leadership and the Use of Power
- Terrorism
- U.S. - China Relations

**Downloads**

- High-Resolution Photo
- Fact Sheet

**Contact Information**

Michael A. Ledeen  
 American Enterprise Institute  
 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.  
 Washington, DC 20036  
 Phone: 202-862-5823  
 Assistant: 202-862-5855  
 Fax: 202-862-5924  
 E-mail: mledeen@aei.org

**Latest Book**



**The War against the Terror Masters**

*The War against the Terror Masters* is a riveting guide to the terrorist crisis. [Read More]

**Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD**

---

**From:** Roper, Linda, , WHS/PSD  
**Sent:** Monday, November 03, 2003 12:10 PM  
**To:** Dupont, Cris, CIV, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: FACA appointment of a Michael Ledeen

Capt. Marriott: Please see note below from our Army POC. It doesn't look they have him on their rolls at this time. If the question relates to his appointment since Mr. Rumsfeld came to work, I would say that the answer is NO.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Kasper, John M Mr OAA-RPA [mailto:John.Kasper@hqda.army.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 03, 2003 12:05 PM  
**To:** Roper, Linda WHS/PSD  
**Cc:** Riley, Sandy R Ms AA  
**Subject:** FACA appointment of a Michael Ledeen

Linda

I checked my records and there is no indication that a Michael Ledeen is, has been, or is in process of becoming, a member of an Army FACA committee.

I checked with Sheri Ward, OAA Director of Human Resource Management and she has no employment records for him.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

John M. Kasper

(b)(6)

12:36 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Gordon England**

032

You've got a conference going on. You ought to get Gordon England cocked and up there on the Hill, talking to the conferees, talking about how important the personnel changes, how important the environmental changes are. You should start using him as a resource. He's available and interested, and good at it.

Please give me a report back in two days, telling me precisely what you've done.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.31

Please respond by:

10/25

OB  
10-29

U22253 /03

222253

12:36 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Gordon England**

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/29*

You've got a conference going on. You ought to get Gordon England cocked and up there on the Hill, talking to the conferees, talking about how important the personnel changes, how important the environmental changes are. You should start using him as a resource. He's available and interested, and good at it.

Please give me a report back in two days, telling me precisely what you've done.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.31

Please respond by:

*10/25*

*✓ 10/29*

*SS Forwarded 10/29*  
*ur/CDR Nosing*

11-L-0559/OSD/20347



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
10/29

October 24, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake 102203.31 regarding Gordon England

- Secretary England has been on the Hill this week speaking with Senate conferees on the defense authorization bill urging support for the National Security Personnel System. He met with the key conferee, Senator Susan Collins, and reports to me that he believes he made headway with her, especially on the point of revitalizing the federal workforce by giving us greater flexibility in managing that workforce.
- He also met with Senator Saxby Chambliss, Chair of the SASC Personnel Subcommittee, and Senator Bill Nelson.
- His return adds substantially to our congressional relations capability and we will work closely with him.

Attachment:  
Snowflake

11-L-0559/OSD/20348

Snowflake

7:39 AM

584

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Ken Krieg  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 22, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Capability**

W  
R  
P

Do you think there ought to be a measurement we use where we look at our usable military capability by service from year to year and measure it whether it is getting better or worse?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.03

Please respond by: 10/31

*Response Attach  
VR/COCTB*

2  
2  
2  
2  
2

U22254 /03

3 OCT 27 AM 9:20

L-0559/OSD/20349



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8000

INFO MEMO

CM-1341-03

10 November 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/10*

SUBJECT: Military Capability

- **Question.** Do you think there ought to be a measurement we use where we look at our usable military capability by service from year to year and measure it whether it is getting better or worse?
- **Answer.** Yes, and the department is moving forward with complementary efforts that will provide the leadership with such a measurement.
- **Analysis.** The Joint Staff, Services and combatant commanders are developing a Global Force Management (GFM) procedure, which will be ready by June 2004. This procedure will provide comprehensive insight into the global availability of US forces. Supporting GFM, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Services and combatant commanders will also establish a consistent way to organize force structure data to permit data integration across Service lines by October 2004. This initiative will enable us to populate appropriate data elements into the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). DRRS is currently scheduled to achieve initial operating capability in October 2004. Once GFM and its associated data initiative are online and fully able to bring Service data into DRRS, it will be possible to create a number of key metrics to track and provide the leadership with a measurement of our usable military capability.

Attachments:  
As stated

*Mr Secretary,  
We are also reviewing  
near term, the issue*

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC, DJ-8; (b)(6)

*you have raised about  
rotation force availability  
versus 1.4 million active  
duty and strengths.*

*VR  
Doek*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARWOTT	11/12

U 18643 03

7:29 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 22, 2003  
 SUBJECT: **Congressman Kind Letter**

*326*

Here's a letter that was handed me at the meeting that Congressman Kind wrote to the President. We should have somebody prepare the appropriate answer to him.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.01

*Attach: 10/21/03 Letter to President Bush from Con. Kind*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*11/2*

*OB*

*10-29*

*220CT03*

**U222550/03**

RON KIND  
THIRD DISTRICT, WISCONSIN  
CHIEF DEPUTY WHIP  
BUDGET COMMITTEE

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE  
COMMITTEE

RESOURCES COMMITTEE  
SENIOR DEMOCRAT  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND  
MINERAL RESOURCES



1406 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 225-5506 FAX: (202) 225-5739

WEBSITE: [www.house.gov/kind](http://www.house.gov/kind)

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

Washington, DC 20515

October 21, 2003

President George W. Bush  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I recently traveled with seven other members of Congress to Iraq to visit our troops, meet with military and civilian leaders, and get a first-hand assessment of the security and reconstruction activities in Iraq. It was inspiring to see our military men and women performing their duties in difficult and often dangerous conditions without complaint. Their selfless service to our nation during this difficult time is critical to America's success in the international war on terrorism, and in ensuring a secure and stable Iraq. I join you in commending their sacrifice.

In Wisconsin's 3rd Congressional District, we have two Army National Guard units and one Army Reserve unit currently serving in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The families of these approximately 400 Guard and Reserve members are proud that their loved ones are serving in defense of our nation. They hope, as we all do, that our military missions in Iraq can be completed successfully and as soon as possible so that service members can return home to their families and resume their lives.

While the soldiers I talked to are proud to serve their country and perform their duties in Iraq, I join the families of the National Guard and Reserve members of western Wisconsin with serious concern over the lack of certainty in deployment length. This was demonstrated by the Army's recent change in rotation schedule imposed on National Guard and Reserve units serving in support of OIF.

It is understandable that changing circumstances can demand additional service from our National Guard and Reserve units beyond their original end date. However, the difficulties such action places on the service members and their families, both financially and emotionally, are serious and must not be ignored. Further, extending rotation schedules and requiring reserve component members to serve on active duty for longer than one year may have significant consequences on future retention and recruitment efforts.

LA CROSSE OFFICE  
205 5TH AVENUE SOUTH, SUITE 226  
LA CROSSE, WI 54601  
(414) 782-2558 FAX: (414) 782-4598

DISTRICT TOLL FREE NUMBER  
1-888-442-8040

EAU CLAIRE OFFICE  
131 SOUTH BARNSTOW STREET, SUITE 301  
EAU CLAIRE, WI 54701  
(715) 831-9214 FAX: (715) 831-9272

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11-L-0559/OSD/20352


Predictability in mobilization and deployment times is of crucial importance to the men and women of the Guard and Reserve and their families. Given their commitment to the defense of our nation, we owe them dependable information on how long their service is required whenever possible.

As a member of Congress, I am committed to ensuring our armed forces have every resource they need to successfully complete their missions. I am also committed to ensuring that their quality of life while serving overseas is the best that can be provided, and that when serving alongside our active forces, Reserve and Guard troops are treated to equal attention and resources. This is particularly important regarding access to satellite phones and other means of contacting their families back home.

I was very impressed with what I saw happening in Iraq and the ability of our service men and women to adapt and respond to the challenges around them. By ensuring predictability in rotation schedules for our Guard and Reserve units, and providing all our armed forces the materials needed to fulfill their mission, we can make sure that the mission in front of them stays the primary focus.

Thank you for your attention to these important issues.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ron Kind', written over the word 'Sincerely,'.

Ron Kind  
Member of Congress

cc: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
General Richard Myers, JCS Chairman  
General John Abizaid, US CENTCOM

11-L-0559/OSD/20353

TO: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 22, 2003  
 SUBJECT: **HASC Report Re: National Guard & Reserve**

326

Here's a letter that Rob Simmons gave me, a congressman from Connecticut who is a reservist. I've read it and I think we ought to get the Army to answer it. I would like to see a copy of the answer.

Thanks.

*↑ attached*

DHR/azn  
 102203.01

*Attach: 10/17-21/03 HASC Congressional Delegation to Iraq: Nat'l Guard/Reserve*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*10/30*

*✓ 12/30*

~~*Forward to Col. [unclear] 10/23*~~

U222564/03



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

# 3

1 2 NOV 2003

The Honorable Robert R. Simmons  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

Dear Representative Simmons:

Thank you for providing to the Secretary of Defense a copy of the House Armed Services Committee report from its recent trip to Iraq. He has asked that I respond to you.

I appreciate your concern on the length of deployments for our Reserve Component Soldiers supporting operations in the War on Terror. We share your concern and want to assure you that the Army is taking appropriate measures to alleviate the stress currently placed on our Soldiers.

In responding to the tactical needs of the commander on the ground, the Army revised its rotation policy. The dynamic operational environment of Operation Iraqi Freedom and our ability to meet future requirements will remain a challenge. The plan for Reserve Component units currently supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom is that they can remain in theater for up to one year unless the Theater Commander determines that the unit is no longer needed. The revised policy gives Soldiers and their families predictability while providing the necessary force levels to the Combatant Commander to accomplish his mission. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs will review each requirement from the Theater Commander to extend a unit's mission; and, as soon as a unit has completed its mission, it will come home. The Army is currently formalizing the mobilization extension of Guard and Reserve units to ensure Soldiers, family members and commanders have clear, accurate expectations.

All Soldiers, both Active and Reserve Component, are authorized Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) with Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI). The original fielding plan prioritized OTV and SAPI for the dismounted fighting Soldier, and excluded aviators who had their own body armor, and combat vehicle crewmen who were already protected by their armored vehicles. In June 2003, the Army authorized all Soldiers in theater to have OTV and SAPI. This increased the overall requirement to over 80,000 sets. To meet this requirement as quickly as possible, three more vendors were contracted and production was accelerated. On October 28, 2003, the Army provided a thorough briefing on this effort to key Professional Staff Members of the House Armed Services Committee. Current OTV and SAPI production is being maximized and is fully funded at a rate of 25,000 OTV and 25,000 SAPI sets per month. At this accelerated rate of

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11-L-0559/OSD/20355

production, every Army Soldier deployed to Iraq will have both OTV and SAPI by the end of December 2003. In the interim, commanders in Iraq make the decision to distribute OTV and SAPI based on risk assessments, and are taking every precaution to ensure that Soldiers conducting high-risk missions such as patrols, checkpoints, and convoys are wearing IBA. The Army is providing IBA to all Soldiers—active and reserve—and to civilians as quickly as possible.

To counter the evolving threats of ambush attacks from improvised explosive devices, conventional small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and other low-technology weapons, the Combatant Commander determined that Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs) are necessary to meet the mobility requirements of operations in urban terrain and provide adequate ballistic protection for our Soldiers.

The Army directed the Army Component of Central Command in Kuwait to review its requirement for Up-Armored HMMWVs and ASVs. Based upon that review, the Army has made movement of these vehicles into the Central Command area of operations a top priority. To anticipate the requirements and to expeditiously meet the needs of Soldiers, the Army is moving Up-Armored HMMWVs and ASVs to theater, diverting the vehicles from units not in the current rotation flow, such as transferring vehicles from the Balkans. As units redeploy, their Up-Armored HMMWVs will remain in theater.

Several Army National Guard units have equipment that has been in the inventory for many years and are at least one generation older than the equipment used by their Active counterparts. Although considered deployable, supportable, and compatible, this equipment is often less capable and unreliable. Equipment that is not plentiful in the Army inventory is hard to maintain because of the shortage of repair parts. All National Guard equipment was inspected and accepted as serviceable prior to deployment at each Army mobilization site.

The 247<sup>th</sup> Engineer Company equipment, as with other National Guard engineer units, is often very reliant on commercial sources for repair parts and the older or outdated equipment is especially hard to maintain and repair. The National Guard is very concerned about its units' capabilities and is working with the Army leadership to ensure that modern, supportable equipment is procured.

The Army continues to examine and develop ways to mitigate the costs of sustaining on-going operations. The examination process includes evaluating the benefits of redeploying unit personnel, but not equipment, to save the significant costs associated with transporting like equipment to and from theater. The National Guard is working with the Army leadership to plan for situations such as these and will attempt to backfill equipment when the unit redeploy.

When the Army submitted the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, no decisions have been made regarding leaving equipment in theater. The Army has not fully

developed the unit rotation plan for the 1109<sup>th</sup> AVCRAD and we are still determining whether the unit will be required to leave any of its equipment in theater. That decision will depend on the specific unit that replaces it and what that unit would be able to bring on its own in order to meet the theater AVCRAD maintenance requirement. The Army is aware of the requirement to maintain an AVCRAD maintenance facility in theater and will resource the requirement once the supporting decisions have been made.

Recognizing the realities of the Post-9/11 threat, the Army is working numerous initiatives to restructure the current force to provide ready and relevant forces, and the depth necessary to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. Resourcing decisions resulting from the Total Army Analysis conducted in 2001 identified approximately 19,500 spaces of Army force structure for conversion to high demand units. These conversions are currently on going and will begin the process of alleviating the imbalance referenced in your trip report. In addition to these conversions, the Army National Guard is in the process of activating 18 additional Military Police companies, some of which will be available for deployment by mid-2004.

The Army is making a concerted effort to build the depth required to support anticipated, long-term rotational requirements. In response to a directive issued in Secretary Rumsfeld's July 9, 2003, Memorandum on Rebalancing Forces, the Army proposed converting approximately 10,000 spaces of additional force structure to build additional depth in several high demand organizations. Pending DOD approval, the Army will immediately begin implementing these rebalancing initiatives, completing the preponderance by the end of fiscal year 2006.

In September, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness authorized the initiation of a Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave program for forces deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Under the program, Soldiers deployed between their 3<sup>rd</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> month may be authorized 15 days of chargeable leave and a flight, at government expense, to and from an Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD), either in Germany or the United States. Personnel may travel onward from the APOD at their own expense.

During deployment, leave is subject to approval by the local commander who may or may not be able to grant leave based on the current operational environment. Once the unit returns, Soldiers are allowed to take their accrued leave. The Army has extended the deployed Soldiers' annual leave accrual limit from 60 to 90 days to ensure they have the opportunity to take all their accrued leave.

Security and morale remain the top concerns for commanders at every level. The Department of Defense leadership acknowledges the problem of economic hardship of our Soldiers and their families and is aggressively pursuing

means to lessen the strain. The Army is grateful for the sacrifices all Soldiers are making in service to our nation. They are serving their country with distinction.

Thank you for your continued interest and support of all our soldiers and their families.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "R.L. Brownlee". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "R".

R.L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

**House Armed Services Committee  
Congressional Delegation to Iraq  
October 17-20, 2003**

**MILITARY**

**National Guard and Reserve**

One of the objectives of the trip was to visit individual members of the National Guard and Reserve units activated and deployed into Kuwait and Iraq as a consequence of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Of specific concern were reports that they were encountering personnel and equipment problems that needed to be addressed.

Generally speaking, individual soldiers who were met by members of the CODEL appeared to be in good health and spirits. Nonetheless, overall morale appeared to be affected by certain systemic issues summarized below:

- a. **DEROS:** One of the most important dates for a member of the Guard or Reserve who is called to active duty is the Date Estimated Return from Overseas Service or DEROS. Most soldiers interviewed were told that their DEROS date would fall within six months from deployment. After the fact, however, most have now been told that they will be gone for one year "boots on the ground". This means that they will be required to stay one year in country in addition to the time they used to activate, train and deploy, which can be as many as 90 days. Furthermore, some have been told that due to "stop loss" policies they may not be released from active duty on their return back to the Continental United States (CONUS). Although LTG Sanchez confirmed the one-year "boots on the ground" policy, he recognized that this issue was causing some morale problems among those soldiers who, with their families, anticipated a shorter tour. We owe it to our soldiers and their families to provide them with timely notification for deployments and predictability of the length of these deployments
- b. **Personnel Equipment:** There was a general concern among soldiers who were met that the shortage of Outer Tactical Vests (OTV), Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI,) Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UA-HMMWV) and other equipment that is either outdated or unavailable. Many soldiers complained that the Active component was routinely issued or possessed OTV, SAPI and UAHMMWV while the Guard and Reserve did not; and

that supplies were slow in coming. This placed Guard and Reserve soldiers who were performing the same missions as the Active component at undue and unfair risk of injury or death.

- c. **Unit Equipment:** On a related equipment matter, some guard units complained that their mission related equipment was slow in getting in country or was damaged beyond repair, and, as a result, they could not perform their assigned mission. For example, the 247<sup>th</sup> Engineer Company from New London, CT, deployed to Mosul, Iraq, which drills wells, has outdated and damaged equipment, which cannot be fixed in theater. As a result, they are not able to perform their primary mission and are now assigned to "escort duty". The 1109<sup>th</sup> Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot (AVCRAD) from Groton, CT, assigned in Kuwait, arrived six weeks before their equipment, and was assigned guard duties. While currently scheduled to rotate back the CONUS early next year, there is no plan to replace \$10,823,608 of 1109<sup>th</sup> AVCRAD unit equipment currently in Kuwait. This means they will be unable to perform their basic mission stateside. Funds for replacement of this equipment were not requested in the recent urgent supplemental.
- d. **Shortage of Certain MOS:** A number of soldiers reported there is a shortage of certain types of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the Active Component meaning that Guard and Reserve units are subject to longer and more frequent deployments. Those specialties include Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, Military Police and Engineer (Well Drilling). Apparently all eleven well drilling units in CONUS are Guard units. Unless the Active component is able to rapidly train and deploy soldiers in these MOSs, the Guard and Reserve units will continue to be over tasked.
- e. **R&R Leave Policy:** While the R&R Leave Policy is a welcome effort to improve soldier morale, its implementation has created some policies. First of all, unlike the R&R program used in Vietnam, the soldier must take annual leave to qualify for the program. Second, the soldier pays for travel costs from the point of arrival in CONUS or elsewhere to the leave point. On these two points, then, the R&R Leave is not "free" to the soldier. Thirdly, some Guard units complained that scheduled leave was reallocated to larger, Active component units even though initially scheduled for the Guard soldiers.
- f. **Pay Inequities:** A number of soldiers complained that dramatic pay loss due to the difference between high civilian wages and low military pay because of their low military rank created real

hardships for their families over longer deployments. One soldier complained that he could only pay for his mortgage by liquidating his family savings. Another stated that although he was a federal employee at the GS-14 level, his E-7 Guard rank also resulted in a dramatic wage loss that affected his family's life style.

- g. **Morale:** All members of the Guard and Reserve visited appeared to be in good health and spirits. Nonetheless, the problems they identified have a substantial impact on soldier morale. While this may not affect combat readiness and combat efficiency over the short term, it will probably have longer-term negative effects on the total force. A number of soldiers indicated they could not afford to stay in the Guard or the Reserve, and would probably not re-enlist. If true, this could create long-term problems for these important military programs.

America has always valued her citizen soldiers, from the first Minutemen at Concord Bridge to the men and women of the Guard and Reserve currently deployed in the Middle East in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Now more than ever, these citizen soldiers are being deployed at an operational tempo that is unprecedented in war zones that are highly lethal. Failure to address some of the problems they face that are substantially different from those of the Active counterparts may degrade this historic capability in the future. At the very least, the House Armed Services Committee must convey its concern over these matters to the President as Commander in Chief and the Defense Department. The committee should also consider a hearing devoted exclusively to the Guard and Reserve Forces, and their unique problems

YIK SIMILANS  
CT/2  
21 OCT 2003

10/24  
0930

Snowflake

October 23, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press on CODELs

000.7

Why don't we think about sending press people with the CODELs? I think it is a good idea. Maybe from the big city press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-15

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*10/23 -* ✓ *10/24*  
*We'll look at it.*  
*J. Rita*  
Larry Di Rita  
*10/24*

03OCT03

U222570/03

October 23, 2003

KUWAIT

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Info on Kuwait Comment

Please find out which Congressmen said a bunch of his people were activated and sitting on their tails watching Kuwaitis go by, making \$50 an hour driving trucks. It was in the House hearing.

Please get that information and let's look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

OB  
10-29

U22258 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20363

10/28 1:20

October 23, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Info on Kuwait Comment

LARRY DI PIERO  
10/29

Please find out which Congressmen said a bunch of his people were activated and sitting on their tails watching Kuwaitis go by, making \$50 an hour driving trucks. It was in the House hearing.

Please get that information and let's look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

Sir,  
Forwarded.  
10/29  
✓  
10/29  
CDR Nossup  
10/29



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
10/29

October 28, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake # 102303-14 regarding Info on Kuwait Comment

- When you briefed the House of Representatives last Tuesday, October 21, there were five Members who raised issues either during the briefing or as an aside after the briefing about problems that units containing their constituents were having in connection with their deployment.
- I personally called all five of them the next day to indicate our intentions to follow up and to get greater clarity about their concerns. All of them appreciated it and we are looking into the issues that they raised.
- The Members included Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D - North Dakota), Rep. Jim Cooper (D - Tennessee), Rep. Steve King (R - Iowa), Rep. John Spratt (D - South Carolina) and Rep. Jim Langevin (D - Rhode Island).

Attachment:  
Snowflake

11-L-0559/OSD/20365

October 23, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Info from Interrogations

I have no visibility into what kind of intelligence we are getting from the interrogations of the 35 or 40 of the top 55 Iraqis we have captured. Please get me some information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

OB  
12/12

.....

U22259 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20366

In reply refer to EF-7298 and I-03/014754

EF-7298 ✓  
03/014754 ✓  
12/8

October 23, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Identification at Border

What are people using for identification Iraq's borders—do they have passports or some kind of visas?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-10

.....

Please respond by 10/31/03

12/8

Response attached.


vr/  
CDR Nosey  
12/8

U222604/03

24-10-03 10:08

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

USDP  5011 02  
I-03/014754  
EF-7298

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:  William J. Luti <sup>10/24/03</sup>

SUBJECT: Identification Required at Iraqi Borders

- You asked what people are using for identification at Iraq's borders.
- CPA requirements are as follows:
  - All non-Iraqis entering Iraq must have valid passports.
  - Iraqis wishing to enter Iraq will be admitted even if holding expired Iraqi passports.
  - Iraqis leaving Iraq must have valid passports in order to return to Iraq.
  - CPA will evaluate each Iraqi passport holder before validating his or her passport.
    - Should CPA find an individual to be an undesirable citizen, such as a former high Baath Party official, it will not validate that person's passport.
- You should know, however, that the borders are porous and there is significant traffic which avoids formal border crossings:
  - Border police are not trained to detect fraudulent documents.
  - Iraqi Border Police enforcement of the borders is sporadic.
  - If security improves at official checkpoints, one might expect more crossings at other points along the border.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/20368

- To stem illegal cross border traffic, CPA is standing up the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), an arm of the Ministry of the Interior.
  - Comprised of Border Police, Customs Inspectors, Immigration Inspectors, Port of Entry Security, Passport, Nationality and Civil Affairs personnel.
  - Missions include interdiction of terrorists and smugglers, refugee repatriation and regulation of religious travel.
  - There are currently over 12,000 DBE personnel on duty – planned strength is about 25,000.
  - Training is currently provided by Coalition forces but it will transition to civilian training in coming months.

October 23, 2003

L  
R  
H  
W

TO: Jim Haynes  
Powell Moore  
Dov Zakheim

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces

If we are going to get these folks trained up, we are going to have to have the money. We don't have the flexibility in the current House or Senate bill—therefore, we have to get it in Conference.

No later than Monday we have to decide what flexibility we need and what funds we would like to shift. We need to get up there on the Hill and see that the Conference knows how important it is for us to be able to move that money around.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/27/03

*OB*  
*10.30*

U22261-103

October 23, 2003

326

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

I told Senator Sessions that I thought the best thing to do on helping the Guard and Reserve was to have hearings, as opposed to reaching in and trying to do a quick fix.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-8

.....  
*Please respond by 11/7/03*

031105P

U222624/03

October 23, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

384

SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Byrd

Let's make sure we get Senator Byrd a piece of paper on what it costs to train each category: border patrol, site protection, army, civil defense and police.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*OB*  
*10-29*

2500-1-1

U222631/03

10/26 1330

Snowflake

October 23, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Larry Di Rita  
10/29

SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Byrd

Let's make sure we get Senator Byrd a piece of paper on what it costs to train each category: border patrol, site protection, army, civil defense and police.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

✓ 10/29  
C 10/29

Sir,  
Forwarded.  
10/29 VV/CDR Nason



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
10/29

October 28, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake # 102303-7 Answer to Senator Byrd

- Senator Byrd was provided with the information he sought about the costs associated with security forces in Iraq the day following the briefing. This led to additional questions. The information that we provided is attached.

Attachments (2):

Snowflake

Costs of security forces

11-L-0559/OSD/20374

Response to questions from Senator Byrd:

**1. What is the total amount of money being spent for 80,000 Iraqi Security forces?**

- a. The Iraqi Security Forces are expected to grow to just under 200,000 personnel. Approximate numbers follow:
  1. 75,000 in the General Police Forces
  2. 36,000 Facility Protective Service guards
  3. 13,600 in the Department of Border Enforcement
  4. 5,200 Traffic Police
  5. 40,000 in the New Iraqi Army
  6. 30,000 in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
- b. The Supplemental Request contains \$5.136B for the Security Sector apportioned as follows:
  - i. Public safety - \$2.141B
    1. Border Police - \$150M
    2. National Police Force - \$150M
    3. International Police Training Mission - \$800M
    4. Traffic Police - \$50M
    5. Fire and Civil Defense - \$500M
    6. Facility Protective Services - \$67M
    7. Public Safety Training - \$274M
    8. Nat'l Sec Comms Network - \$150M
  - ii. National Security - \$2.076B
    1. New Iraqi Army - \$2B
    2. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps - \$76M
  - iii. Justice - \$919M
    1. Tech asst for investigation of crimes against humanity - \$100M
    2. Security for Judges and Prosecutors - \$200M
    3. Witness Protection Program - \$100M
    4. Other tech investigative methods - \$10M
    5. Prison System Tech assistance - \$10M
    6. Reconstruction and Modernization of 26 prison and detention facilities - \$99M
    7. Two new maximum security prisons - \$400M

**2. How much were Security Forces paid under Saddam?**

- a. All pay was in Iraqi Dinars – the dollar value of which fluctuated wildly.
- b. Conscripts were paid roughly \$3/month. Senior officers were fairly well compensated at current exchange rates, but much of their income was in the form of 'off the books' compensation, special bonuses, perks, privileges, etc.
- c. The security forces of free Iraq are volunteer organizations with correspondingly higher levels of pay than under Saddam's dictatorship.

- d. Pay for probationary police constables, private soldiers, entry-level ICDC members, and FPS guards is about the same pay as a day laborer; roughly \$50-60/month. Officers are now, effectively, paid less than they were during the Saddam era.

**3. Who set the pay scales?**

- a. The Security Sector pay scales were set and harmonized by a working group from across the CPA working under the general guidelines established by the Iraqi-led Ministry of Finance Public Sector Pay Task Force. The results of this effort are captured in CPA Order #30, "Reform of Salaries and Employment".

**4. How will we pay all of this in 2004?**

- a. Police, Border Guard, and Military Salaries will be paid with Iraqi funds under the 2004 Iraqi National Budget.
- b. \$26M in salaries for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps are provided in the Supplemental as are \$24M in salaries for FPS guards.

**CORRELATION OF RANKS BY PAY GRADES**

GRADE	NIA / ICDC enlisted	NIA / ICDC commissioned	IPS	BORDER GUARD	FPS
SUPER A					
SUPER B					
1		LG	National Commissioner	Director of Border Enforcement	
2		MG	Commissioner	Deputy Director	
3		BG	Dep Commissioner	Bureau Chief	
4		COL	Superintendent	Region Chief	Colonel
5		LTC	Inspector	Asst Chief	
6	SGM / CWO	CPT / MAJ	Lieutenant / Captain	Lieutenant / Captain	Major
7	SFC / MSG / WO	2LT / 1LT	Sergeant	Sergeant	
8	SGT	OFC	(Senior) Constable	(Senior) Agent	Captain
9	CPL		Constable	Agent	Sergeant
10	PVT / PFC		Constable (Probation)	Agent (Probation)	Guard
11	RCT		Trainee	Trainee	

**COMPARISON OF RANKS (SHOWING INITIAL STEP INCREMENT)**

<b>GRADE</b>	<b>NIA / ICDC enlisted</b>	<b>NIA / ICDC commissioned</b>	<b>IPS</b>	<b>BORDER</b>	<b>FPS</b>
<b>SUPER A</b>					
<b>SUPER B</b>					
<b>1</b>		LG 1	National Commissioner 1	Dir of Border Enforcement 1	
<b>2</b>		MG 1	Commissioner 1	Deputy Director 1	
<b>3</b>		BG 1	Dep Commissioner 1	Bureau Chief 1	
<b>4</b>		COL 1	Superintendent 1	Region Chief 1	Colonel 1
<b>5</b>		LTC 1	Inspector 1	Asst Chief 1	
<b>6</b>	SGM / CWO 1 2	CAPT/MAJ 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Major 1
<b>7</b>	SFC/MSG/WO 4 7 8	2LT / ILT 6 7	Sergeant 6	Sergeant 6	
<b>8</b>	SGT 6	OFC 8	(Snr) Constable 6	(Snr) Agent 6	Captain 1
<b>9</b>	CPL 7		Constable 5	Agent 5	Sergeant 1
<b>10</b>	PVT / PFC 4 8		Constable (Probation) 4	Agent (Probation) 4	Guard 1
<b>11</b>	Recruit 1		Trainee 4	Trainee 4	

**ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR NEW IRAQI ARMY / IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS**

		STEPS										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
G R A D E	Enlisted											
	Commission											
	1	LG	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587		
	2	MG	382	393	403	413	424	434	444			
	3	BG	296	304	312	320	328	336	344			
	4	COL	228	234	241	247	253	259	265			
	5	LTC	176	181	185	190	195	200				
	6	MAJ						154	158	161	165	
	6	CWO		139	143							
	6	CPT	136	139	143							
	6	SGM	136	139								
	7	WO								125	128	130
	7	1LT							122	125	128	
	7	MSG							122	125	128	
	7	2LT					116	119	122			
7	SFC				113	116	119					
8	OFC								99			
8	SGT						95	97	99	101		
9	CPL							79	81	83		
10	PFC								66	68	69	
10	PVT				60	62	63	65	66			
11	RCT				50							

**ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR IRAQI POLICE SERVICE**

**STEPS**

**G  
R  
A  
D  
E**

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	National Commissioner	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587	600	613
2	Commissioner	382	393	403	413	424	434	444	455	465	475
3	Dep. Commissioner	296	304	312	320	328	336	344	352	360	368
4	Superintendent	228	234	241	247	253	259	265	271	278	284
5	Inspector	176	181	185	190	195	200	204	209	214	219
6	Captain						154	158	161	165	169
6	Lieutenant	136	139	143	147	150					
7	Sergeant				113	116	119	122	125	128	130
8	Constable (Senior)						95	97	99	101	104
9	Constable					75	77	79	81	83	84
10	Constable (Probation)				60	62	63	65	66	68	69
11	Trainee				50						

**ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE**

		STEPS										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
G R A D E	4	FPS Colonel	228	234	241	247	253	259				
	5											
	6	FPS Major	136	139	143	147	150	154				
	7											
	8	FPS Captain	83	86	88	90	92	95				
	9	Guard Sergeant	68	70	72	73	75					
	10	Guard	56	57	59	60						

October 23, 2003

I  
R  
A  
Q

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Referencing Report and Plan

Lamar Alexander suggests that when we are talking about the situation in Iraq, we should say, "In our weekly report, we say OTC \_\_\_\_\_," so people know we have a weekly report. Then we should say, "In our plan, \_\_\_\_\_," so people know we have a plan. If we start doing that regularly, people will get it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U22264 /03

.....

October 23, 2003

383.6

TO: Doug Feith  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: GTMO Detainees

I understand Tony Blair is concerned about the detainees in GTMO. He says we have to have a solution.

Would one of you please put some structure into this problem and get it pushed forward?

I really believe it is our responsibility to put some structure into it, get it elevated and get the interagency and the entire government tied up into a single position. We have not done it. We owe it to everybody.

Let's do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*OB*  
*11.5*

2003-10-23

U22265 /03

October 24, 2003

Belgium

TO: Doug Feith  
 CC: Jim Haynes  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Belgium's War Crimes Statute

We have to decide how to handle Belgium in the next December ministerial.

Please take a look at this update on their war crimes statute. It seems to me they still don't have it together. What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/03 GC memo to SecDef re: Update on Belgium's War Crimes Statute [U17547/03]

DHR:dh  
102403-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*03*  
*11.5*

2400103

U22266 /03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

370 OCT 22 11 10 30

10/24

INFO MEMO

October 21, 2003 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*  
SUBJECT: Update on Belgium's War Crimes Statute

10/24

I met today with Ambassador Franciskus Van Daele at his request. We covered three main topics.

- o Remaining appeals. The lawyer who brought the case against General Franks continues to pursue various appeals. With respect to his appeal to the Court of Cassation, the federal prosecutor has promised to push the court for a prompt resolution, and the Ambassador suggested that a decision is expected shortly. The attorney may continue pursuing appeals in various venues, but these are unlikely to be successful.
- o Instructions to prosecutors. As I requested at a previous meeting, the Belgians are preparing a set of instructions for local prosecutors on how to handle cases filed under the new law. The instructions will be a reminder to local prosecutors about procedures for promptly disposing of improper cases.
- o Notification of new suits. Under the former statute, foreign defendants in some cases did not receive notification until well after suit had been filed. The ambassador reported that a new procedure requires the Ministry of Justice to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of any case that is forwarded to an investigator. This procedure should provide foreign defendants with earlier notification of any case that proceeds to formal investigation.
- As expected, the Ambassador also mentioned that Belgian officials hope that the United States will move forward on policy issues that became linked to reform of the former law. For example, Belgium hopes that approval will be forthcoming for funding the new NATO headquarters building. In the coming weeks we should expect additional pressure on this issue. On a related note, we understand that the State Department has indicated its support of Belgium's OSCE chairmanship in 2006.

We will contact General Franks to advise him of the status of the appeals.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

cc: None

Prepared By: Robert Easton, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC) (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	10/23
SR MA CRADDOCK	10/24
MA RUCCI	10/24
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/22



October 24, 2003

322

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force

Please draft up that note from me to the Chairman asking when we are going to have a Standing Joint Task Force. Please convey my concern that it has been two and a half years since the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense Planning Guidance, and there is continued, persistent resistance to it. We are now replacing one corps headquarters in Afghanistan with another and one corps headquarters in Iraq with another, and not going to a Standing Joint Task Force, as I thought we had all agreed.

What is the story?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102403-7

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

24 OCT 03

U22267 /03

October 27, 2003

240

*Advance copy sent*

TO: Les Brownlee  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Specialist Johnson

What is the basis behind the recent reports concerning Specialist Shoshana Johnson? Here is a letter I recently received about her.

Please get back to me very soon on this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/24/03 Congresswoman Jackson Lee ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102703-15

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

240

U22268: /03

4/19/27

SHEILA JACKSON LEE  
18TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
2435 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 225-3816

DISTRICT OFFICE:  
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6719 WEST MONTGOMERY, SUITE 204  
HOUSTON, TX 77018  
(713) 691-4882

HEIGHTS OFFICE:  
420 WALLET 18TH STREET  
HOUSTON, TX 77008  
(713) 861-4070

# Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

- COMMITTEES:
- SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
- SUBCOMMITTEES:
- INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
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- CRIME
- RANKING MEMBER
- IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
- SCIENCE
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- SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
- MEMBER
- DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS POLICY AND STEERING COMMITTEE
- 1ST VICE CHAIR
- CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

October 24, 2003

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I was recently disturbed to hear the story of Army Specialist Shoshana Johnson who is on the verge of being discharged from the Army after serving in the war in Iraq. She served in the same unit as Jessica Lynch that was ambushed by Iraqi soldiers, killing six members of their unit. Shoshana suffered gunshot wounds in both legs and was held prisoner in Iraq for twenty-two harrowing days.

Despite her valiant service in Iraq and her sacrifice in battle, which resulted in multiple physical and mental injuries, Shoshana was recently told that she will only receive a 30 percent disability benefit from the Army. This decision is disconcerting because Jessica Lynch was discharged from the Army with 80 percent disability benefits despite serving in the same unit, in the same war as Shoshana Johnson. This fact demonstrates a troubling double standard by those who decided to give Shoshana Johnson such minimal disability benefits. While Jessica Lynch was hailed as a national hero and given proper respect for her service, Shoshana has had to recover from her traumatic experience in anonymity. Celebrity should not be apart of the decision-making process when it comes to assigning disability benefits. Shoshana Johnson and her family do not begrudge Jessica Lynch her celebrity or her disability benefits, they only insist on equal treatment. Indeed, both Shoshana and Jessica should be entitled to full disability benefits for the sacrifice they made while serving their country.

It is inconceivable that Shoshana Johnson after having served her country in Iraq would not be given the proper disability benefits for injuries she suffered while in active duty. The long captivity that Shoshana had to endure has now caused her to suffer post-traumatic stress disorder. In addition, she walks with a limp and has trouble standing due to the gunshot wounds she suffered at the hands of Iraqi soldiers. Her current level of disability benefits would leave her well short of the funds needed to pay for her extensive rehabilitation treatments. It is unacceptable for Shoshana or her family to endure this burden after she has already given so much for her country.

I am asking you to remedy this unjust situation that Shoshana and her family are having to suffering through. I hope that you will take immediate action on this important matter.

Sincerely,



Sheila Jackson Lee  
Member of Congress

October 27, 2003

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Captured and Killed

We have a problem. The world doesn't have any idea how many people we are capturing or killing. We are not telling them. The impression is that our people are getting killed and we are not doing anything about it. What are we doing about it? It is something that the American people seem to want to know.

Any suggestions?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102703-10

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

*DR*  
*11.5*

27 OCT 03

U22269 /03

October 27, 2003

383.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detainee Issue

The detainee issue is still not settled. I would like all of you to focus on it until this is sorted out, I am presented a proposal, the interagency is presented our paper and the U.S. Government has a unified position.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102403-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*OB*

*11-10*

21 OCT 03

U22270 /03

October 27, 2003

Horea

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Report on Korea

I think Admiral Fargo owes us a report, or LaPorte does, on what we are going to do with respect to Korea in the various respects.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102403-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

27062703

U22271 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20392

October 28, 2003

381

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Unusual Initiatives

*Sec Def*

We ought to think through all the things we have done that have been unusual. transformation

Such as:

- Pete Pace, the first Marine Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Jim Jones, first Marine to become SACEUR.
- Jim Jones, first member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go on to an additional assignment.
- Vern Clark, reappointing him beyond his four-year tour.
- Pete Schoomaker, bringing him in from retirement.
- ~~Upgrading Communications~~ *Special AssT/PA: Making Communications a*
- Etc. *seamless component of executing*

*(Public/Internal/Legislative)*

~~Departmental~~ *actions*

Please come up with some other items.

Thanks.



*D. Rumsfeld*

DHR:dh  
102803-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

2800703

U22272: /03

591

October 28, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Forces

*closed  
 per  
 SMA/DSS  
 1/02*

*W  
 22  
 22*

This past Friday's deployment order briefing was a revelation. I discovered:

- CJTF-7 is not a joint task force. It is an Army corps headquarters with a smattering of folks from other services. The other Service components in Iraq and Kuwait report directly to CENTCOM.
- We have not organized a standing joint task force to assume that mission when the time comes.
- We have a similar situation in Afghanistan.

It has been 2 ½ years since we published the Quadrennial Defense Review. At that time we agreed to form a standing joint task force.

It's time to get on with this. Please let me know:

- How we are going to form a SJTF?
- When it will have full operational capability?
- Options for using it

Or – convince me otherwise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 102803-2

.....  
 Please respond by 11/21/03

*2800703*

U22273 /03

October 29, 2003

UK

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: MoD Hoon

I talked to Geoff Hoon, the UK Defense Minister, today. He is going to try to see you when you are in London.

One thought he is going to mention, which I think is a good idea, is to possibly get together some of the commanders and share best techniques and practices around the country as to how to deal with the current problems there.

He also offered to assist with any kind of training or other things they might be able to help us with, so he is leaning forward and being cooperative.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
102903-21

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

29 OCT 03

U22274 /03

October 29, 2003

11/25  
✓  
11/25  
IRAD

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: General Clapper

Should I get a briefing by Clapper on his contention that the Iraqis moved the WMD into Syria? I notice he is talking about it in the press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/1/03

Sir -  
No. I have discussed  
with Jim.  
RC

2900703

U22275 /03

FORWARD  
11/25  
COR Navy

11-L-0559/OSD/20396

New York Times  
October 29, 2003

## **Iraqis Removed Arms Material, U.S. Aide Says**

By Douglas Jehl

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 — The director of a top American spy agency said Tuesday that he believed that material from Iraq's illicit weapons program had been transported into Syria and perhaps other countries as part of an effort by the Iraqis to disperse and destroy evidence immediately before the recent war.

The official, James R. Clapper Jr., a retired lieutenant general, said satellite imagery showing a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria, just before the American invasion in March, led him to believe that illicit weapons material "unquestionably" had been moved out of Iraq.

"I think people below the Saddam Hussein-and-his-sons level saw what was coming and decided the best thing to do was to destroy and disperse," General Clapper, who leads the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, said at a breakfast with reporters.

He said he was providing a personal assessment. But he said "the obvious conclusion one draws" was that there "may have been people leaving the scene, fleeing Iraq, and unquestionably, I am sure, material." A spokesman for General Clapper's agency, David Burpee, said he could not provide further evidence to support the general's statement.

But other American intelligence officials said General Clapper's theory was among those being pursued in Iraq by David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is leading the American effort to uncover the weapons cited by the Bush administration as the major reason for going to war against Iraq.

General Clapper's comments came as the Central Intelligence Agency prepared to defend its prewar assertions that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and that it sought to reconstitute its nuclear program. The director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, has written a letter to the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence saying the agency will be ready to provide an assessment by late November.

In the letter, the contents of which were described by several intelligence officials on Tuesday, Mr. Tenet proposed that a team headed by John McLaughlin, the deputy director of central intelligence, provide a briefing for the committee after Nov. 20, when the agency's internal review is expected to be completed.

General Clapper's agency is responsible for interpreting satellite photographs and other imagery. He declined to answer a question about whether he believed that illicit Iraqi weapons material might have been smuggled into any other country.

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI**

---

**From:** Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 29, 2003 9:18 AM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Patterson, Jack D, CIV, OSD; Cambone, Stephen, CIV, OSD-USDI; Jeffery III, Reuben, CIV, OSD; Korologos, Tom, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: (ai) Spy Agency Chief Suggests Iraqis Shipped Out Weapons

-----Original Message-----

From: Richard Forno [mailto:rforo@infowarrior.org]  
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2003 6:49 PM  
To: access  
Subject: (ai) Spy Agency Chief Suggests Iraqis Shipped Out Weapons

Spy Agency Chief Suggests Iraqis Shipped Out Weapons  
By DOUGLAS JEHL

Published: October 28, 2003

ASHINGTON, Oct. 28 < The director of an American spy agency said today that he believed that material from Iraq's illicit weapons program had been transported into Syria and perhaps other countries as part of an effort by Iraqis to disperse and destroy evidence immediately before the war last spring.

Advertisement

The official, James R. Clapper, Jr., a retired lieutenant general, said that satellite intelligence showing a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria just before the American-led invasion in March had led him to conclude "unquestionably" that illicit weapons material was moved outside of Iraq.

"I think people below the Saddam Hussein-and-his-sons level saw what was coming and decided the best thing to do was to destroy and disperse," said General Clapper, who heads the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

General Clapper, speaking at a breakfast with reporters, said he was providing a personal assessment. But other American intelligence officials said his theory was among those being pursued in Iraq by a former United Nations weapons inspector, David Kay, who is heading what has so far been an unsuccessful American effort to uncover the weapons cited by the Bush administration as the major reason for going to war against Iraq.

General Clapper's comments come as the Central Intelligence Agency prepares to mount a vigorous defense of its prewar assertions that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was seeking to reconstitute its nuclear program. The director of central intelligence, George Tenet, has written a letter to the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence saying that agency will be ready by late November to provide detailed assessments for members of the panel.

In the letter, whose contents were described by several intelligence officials today, Mr. Tenet proposed that a team headed by the deputy director of central intelligence, John E. McLaughlin, provide a briefing for the committee sometime after Nov. 20, when the agency's own internal review is expected to be completed.

The Senate and House intelligence committees are both preparing critical

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

11-L-0559/OSD/20398

## Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

reports about the intelligence community's performance on Iraq, with Congressional officials saying that the Central Intelligence Agency had overstated the case for believing that Iraq had an active illicit weapons program in the months before the war. But the C.I.A. has vigorously objected to that assessment, saying that on the basis of evidence available before the American invasion last March it would have been foolhardy for the agency to have reached any other conclusion.

General Clapper echoed that defense today, but in offering what he called his own "educated guess" about what might have happened to any illicit Iraqi weapons went beyond what any other senior American intelligence official has said publicly.

"I think probably in the few months running up to the onset of the conflict, I think there was probably an intensive effort to disperse into private hands, to bury it, and to move it outside the country's borders," General Clapper said. He said he believed that "at the level below the senior leadership" of Iraq there were officials who "saw what was coming and went to extraordinary lengths to dispose of the evidence."

Mr. Kay, who is serving in Iraq as a special adviser to Mr. Tenet, issued an interim report this month acknowledging the American failure so far to find illicit weapons or weapons material in Iraq. Mr. Kay has cautioned that his search is far from complete, and senior intelligence officials say they still expect him to find weapons material.

But Mr. Kay said that his team was considering a number of theories, including the prospect that Iraq moved weapons material to third countries and that weapons and other weapons material was destroyed before the war, and perhaps in the period immediately preceding it.

General Clapper's agency is responsible in particular for interpreting satellite intelligence. He said that the heavy volume of traffic leading from Iraq to Syria before and during the American-led invasion had persuaded him "inferentially" that illicit weapons material was smuggled outside the country. He declined to answer a question about whether he believed illicit Iraqi weapons material might have been smuggled into any other country, including Iran.

\*

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Aerospace Daily  
October 29, 2003

## **NIMA To Develop 'Cadre' Of Analysts Who Will Deploy With Forces**

Coming off its experience deploying imagery analysts to Iraq, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) now plans to develop a regular "cadre" of personnel that would stand ready to go into theater with U.S. military forces.

The deployment of approximately 90 NIMA employees to Iraq at the height of the war was an "unprecedented" move for the agency, but one that proved very rewarding to the troops and the employees themselves, according to NIMA Director Lt. Gen. James Clapper (USAF, ret.)

"There's just no substitute for having a small cadre of professionals forward deployed, who are in the environment of the warfighter, who can see what his or her needs are, and say, 'You know, we can build you a product that will satisfy that need,'" Clapper said at a Defense Writers Group breakfast in Washington Oct. 28. "And we did a lot of that in Iraqi Freedom."

The employees were organized into 26 small teams of three or four stationed at various strategic points within the theater of operations. Operating at the division or special forces team level, they were able to communicate directly with NIMA headquarters in the U.S., Clapper said. This reachback capability "made a huge difference" in comparison with Operation Desert Storm, according to Clapper.

The planned cadre would have to be trained in weapons, chem/bio threats and the rules of engagement, Clapper said.

"There's a lot of training and preparation that has to go on in order to qualify people so they can deploy," Clapper said. "So that's one thing I'm clearly trying to organize, so that when the balloon goes up and we need to deploy people, we have a fairly large cadre of people we can draw on."

Although it may not be a "fixed number," the cadre probably would consist of 200-300 people to support the rotation of deployed personnel on a standard schedule of 120 days to six months, Clapper said.

When NIMA personnel return from theater, "invariably they come back and say it was one of the most rewarding experiences they've ever had in their whole career," Clapper said. "They really understand, up front and personal, what the combat user needs. They bring that insight back to the rest of the workforce."

NIMA employees participated in the race to Baghdad with the Third Infantry Division and one employee was wounded recently in the al-Rashid hotel bombing, according to Clapper.

"I think intelligence is a hazardous business, and to the extent that we're out there at the pointy end of the stick with the troops, that carries risk with it," he said.

-- *Jefferson Morris*

11-L-0559/OSD/20400

<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031029228882.html>

10/29/2003

October 29, 2003

D14.35

TO: David Chu  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS on Military Voting

Please prepare for me a brief (one-page) memo to the President explaining what has been done by the Department of Defense on absentee ballots and voting for military personnel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

U22276 103

2706403

October 29, 2003

33550

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: College Recommendations

I cannot write a letter of recommendation for someone to go to a college if the college receives federal or Department of Defense funds, can I?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*✓ 11/6*      *11/5*  
*11/5*

Sir,

Response attached.

*J/R*

(b)(6)

290CT03

U22277 /03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
11/6

INFO MEMO

November 3, 2003 (4:00pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter of Recommendation

- You asked "I cannot write a letter of recommendation for someone to go to college if the college receives federal or Department of Defense funds, can I?"
- The ethics rules prohibit you from writing such a letter in your official capacity.
- The rules do allow government employees to write a letter of recommendation solely in their personal capacities, which means that you could not use your official title, position, or stationery.
- There is a potential appearance issue here, however, because you are so widely identified as the Secretary of Defense. If a college receives Department of Defense funds, a college official might conclude, albeit unreasonably, that rejection of the recommended person may cause the Department to treat the college adversely.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Gail Mason (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/20403

October 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lydia Khalil

000.7150

I would like to meet with Lydia Khalil, a woman from the White House who is working in Baghdad, when she comes back in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

29 OCT 03

U22278 /03

October 30, 2003

334

TO: Steve Cambone  
LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Meetings

I need a briefing on what has been done and what our timetable is to deal with this letter from the 9/11 Commission. It reads as though I would have to spend what looks to me to be weeks preparing for the meetings.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/20/03 9/11 Commission ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
103003-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

*Done  
12/15*

3005703

U22279 /03



②

Thomas H. Kean  
CHAIR

October 20, 2003

Lee H. Hamilton  
VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste

Max Cleland

Frederick F. Fielding

Jamie S. Gorelick

Slade Gorton

John F. Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer

James R. Thompson

Phillip D. Zelikow  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-1010

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As you know, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (better known as the 9-11 Commission) is directed by statute to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including the nation's preparedness for, and immediate response to, the attacks. The Commission is also chartered to identify and evaluate lessons learned and provide recommendations to prevent future acts of terrorism upon our nation.

Public Law 107-306 authorizes the Commission to secure needed information directly from any agency. Thus far, with the strong support of you and your Department, the Commission has compiled an extensive written record numbering more than 2 million pages. Building on this record, meetings with senior policymakers are essential to developing an authoritative narrative of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Your perspective is vital to the Commission's understanding of 9-11 and its immediate aftermath, and we are therefore writing to request a meeting with you during the week of February 2, 2004.

⊙

The Commission wishes to discuss a wide range of topics with you, including (but not limited to) your description, analysis, and assessment of:

- The Department of Defense's role in the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy from January 20, 2001 through September 20, 2001, including your participation in relevant Principals' Committee meetings. *Get page*
- The Department's counterterrorism responsibilities and the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy, including your discussions with White House officials and other principals about the proper strategic and tactical responses to the al Qaeda threat. *Get 197*
- The effectiveness of interagency coordination on the al Qaeda threat, including an analysis of guidance provided by the Department for relevant national security presidential directives.

301 7th Street SW, Room 5125

Washington, DC 20407

(b)(6)

www.9-11commission.gov

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
October 20, 2003  
Page 2

- The Department's response to the 2000 attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, including the various options requested, considered, rejected, or approved.
- Military options requested, considered, rejected, or approved in response to al Qaeda from January 1, 2001 to September 20, 2001, including paramilitary or special forces missions, steps taken by the Department in preparation for a possible order to strike al Qaeda or Taliban targets, and your assessment of the military's readiness to carry out any such orders.
- The handling of counterterrorism issues during the Clinton-Bush transition period, including a detailed discussion of briefings given and recommendations offered.
- Intelligence support to the military on the al Qaeda threat, including the cooperation between the CIA and Defense in responding to that threat and discussions on the use of UAVs.
- The Department's efforts to ensure international military cooperation against al Qaeda, including efforts with the government of Uzbekistan.
- The discussions that took place from January 1, 2001 to September 11, 2001 on possible al Qaeda attacks on U.S. soil and the Department's preparations for homeland defense.
- The Pentagon's immediate response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and your personal involvement in that response.

You may wish to review notes and other documents to refresh your recollection of these matters prior to the meeting.

We are, of course, interested in any other issues you deem relevant to the Commission's understanding of 9-11 specifically and counterterrorism policy generally, as well as your thoughts on policy recommendations for the future. Members of the Commission and select staff will attend, and it is the general policy of the Commission to record such meetings.


This proposed meeting is separate from your requested participation in a public hearing to be held in Washington, DC, on March 22, 2004. You will receive a separate invitation to testify in the coming weeks, and we hope that you will agree to appear before the Commission for this important public forum. ✓

Please have a member of your staff contact Daniel Leopold at (b)(6) to indicate your availability for such a meeting and to relay any questions you or

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
October 20, 2003  
Page 3

your staff may have. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation with the Commission and its staff in this important matter.

Yours sincerely,



Thomas H. Kean  
Chair



Lee H. Hamilton  
Vice Chair

cc: Daniel Levin, U.S. Department of Justice  
Pat Downs, U.S. Department of Defense

October 30, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Captured/Wounded/Killed

092

I do need some way to keep track of the number of people we are capturing, wounding and killing in Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't have any visibility into it.

I don't want to do it in a way that it is toted up, but I need something. I got the impression from Norty Schwartz down there this morning in the briefing that you already have that information and everyone else has it but me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

30 OCT 03

U22280 /03

October 30, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Friedman Piece

Here is an interesting Tom Friedman piece.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Friedman, Thomas L. "It's No Vietnam," *New York Times*, 10/30/03.

DHR:dh  
103003-8

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U22281 /03

30 OCT 03

New York Times  
October 30, 2003

## It's No Vietnam

By Thomas L. Friedman

Since 9/11, we've seen so much depraved violence we don't notice anymore when we hit a new low. Monday's attacks in Baghdad were a new low. Just stop for one second and contemplate what happened: A suicide bomber, driving an ambulance loaded with explosives, crashed into the Red Cross office and blew himself up on the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. This suicide bomber was not restrained by either the sanctity of the Muslim holy day or the sanctity of the Red Cross. All civilizational norms were tossed aside. This is very unnerving. Because the message from these terrorists is: "There are no limits. We have created our own moral universe, where anything we do against Americans or Iraqis who cooperate with them is O.K."

What to do? The first thing is to understand who these people are. There is this notion being peddled by Europeans, the Arab press and the antiwar left that "Iraq" is just Arabic for Vietnam, and we should expect these kinds of attacks from Iraqis wanting to "liberate" their country from "U.S. occupation." These attackers are the Iraqi Vietcong.

Hogwash. The people who mounted the attacks on the Red Cross are not the Iraqi Vietcong. They are the Iraqi Khmer Rouge — a murderous band of Saddam loyalists and Al Qaeda nihilists, who are not killing us so Iraqis can rule themselves. They are killing us so they can rule Iraqis.

Have you noticed that these bombers never say what their political agenda is or whom they represent? They don't want Iraqis to know who they really are. A vast majority of Iraqis would reject them, because these bombers either want to restore Baathism or install bin Ladenism.

Let's get real. What the people who blew up the Red Cross and the Iraqi police fear is not that we're going to permanently occupy Iraq. They fear that we're going to permanently change Iraq. The great irony is that the Baathists and Arab dictators are opposing the U.S. in Iraq because — unlike many leftists — they understand exactly what this war is about. They understand that U.S. power is not being used in Iraq for oil, or imperialism, or to shore up a corrupt status quo, as it was in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Arab world during the cold war. They understand that this is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched — a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.

Most of the troubles we have encountered in Iraq (and will in the future) are not because of "occupation" but because of "empowerment." The U.S. invasion has overturned a whole set of vested interests, particularly those of Iraq's Sunni Baathist establishment, and begun to empower instead a whole new set of actors: Shiites, Kurds, non-Baathist Sunnis, women and locally elected officials and police. The Qaeda nihilists, the Saddamists, and all the Europeans and the Arab autocrats who had a vested interest in the old status quo are threatened by this.

Many liberals oppose this war because they can't believe that someone as radically conservative as George W. Bush could be mounting such a radically liberal war. Some, though, just don't believe the Bush team will do it right.

The latter has been my concern. Can this administration, whose national security team is so divided,

effectively stay the course in Iraq? Has the president's audacity in waging such a revolutionary war outrun his ability to articulate what it's about and to summon Americans for the sacrifices victory will require? Can the president really be a successful radical liberal on Iraq, while being such a radical conservative everywhere else — refusing to dismiss one of his own generals who insults Islam, turning a deaf ear to hints of corruption infecting the new Baghdad government as it's showered with aid dollars, calling on reservists and their families to bear all the burdens of war while slashing taxes for the rich, and undertaking the world's biggest nation-building project with few real allies?

I don't know. But here's what I do know: If Mr. Bush doesn't treat the next year as his second term, when he must do all the right things in Iraq without regard to politics, it is the only second term he's going to see.

On Oct. 23, when I cited 900 wounded in action in Iraq, I was referring to the period since Mr. Bush declared major fighting over on May 1. I was still wrong. Pentagon data shows 1,059 U.S. soldiers wounded in action from May 1 to Oct. 22.

October 30, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz      *LTG John Craddock*      *Marc Thiessen*  
      Doug Feith            *Larry Di Rita*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Future Iraqi Political System

Here is an interesting poll from the Department of State on attitudes in Iraq. It seems to me there is material in there you could use in fashioning how we approach things.

Regards,

Attach.

"Iraqi Public Has Wide Ranging Preferences for a Future Political System," DoS Office of Research Opinion Analysis, M-151-03, 10/21/03

DHR:dh  
103003-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U22283 /03

30 OCT 03

Review

10/30

<b>OFFICE OF RESEARCH</b>	<b>OPINION ANALYSIS</b>
-------------------------------	-------------------------

October 21, 2003

M-151-03

## Iraqi Public Has Wide Ranging Preferences for a Future Political System

*This Office of Research survey among urban residents of Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymania and Erbil reveals a wide range of political aspirations. At the same time, the results show strong consensus on the importance of good governance and pluralism. The value Iraqis attach to these ideals provides guidance to emerging leaders as they seek to gain public acceptance, rebuild civic trust and establish and a new government.*

### Key Findings

- Iraqis in these seven cities divide on whether a democracy, an Islamic state or a mix of the two is best for Iraq's future. But regardless of their preferences for a political system, large majorities emphasize the importance of free and fair elections, the rule of law, the right to criticize the government and inclusiveness in politics.
- The main difference between those who support a democracy and those who support an Islamic state is their views on the appropriate role of religion in politics.
- Historical experience has sullied the image of political parties, especially outside of Northern Iraq where no more than one-third express confidence in parties. In addition, when asked to volunteer the name of a leader they trust most, two-thirds do not name anyone.
- In the new political environment, emerging leaders are still relatively unknown. Majorities have not heard enough to evaluate most members of the Governing Council, and religious leaders have better name recognition and ratings. But Iraqis place greater value on expertise and experience in staffing their government than they do on sectarian or ethnic interests.


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*This report is based on a total of 1444 interviews conducted in the urban areas of Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymania, and Erbil between August 20 and September 5, 2003. The Office of Research commissioned ICRSS in Baghdad to carry out the fieldwork. Results from an Office of Research in-depth interview project are also incorporated in this analysis, as are findings from a Gallup poll in Baghdad (1,178 interviews, field dates August 18 - September 4, 2003).*

### Strong Consensus on Value of Free Elections and Fair Representation

In all seven cities in the Office of Research poll, large majorities support what are generally considered to be democratic values. Nine in ten think it is very or somewhat important that people vote in free and fair elections (95%), that people abide by the law and criminals are punished (94%), that people can criticize the government (86%), and that major nationality (89%) and religious groups share power (87%). Majorities also value media that are independent of government censorship (78%) and rights for women that are equal to those of men (71%) [Figure 1]. There is very little, if any, variation among the cities on these components, and there are only minor differences between men and women in their attitudes toward gender equity.

Figure 1. Importance of Selected Political Values in Iraqi Society, Combined Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Falluja, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymania, and Erbil



Source: Office of Research, August 20 - September 5


### Some Groups More Welcomed Than Others

A smaller majority (56% overall) favor a role for religious leaders in politics, and these attitudes vary widely by region [Figure 1 above and Appendix, Figure 1]. Disapproval is highest among residents of the northern cities (34% Suleymania, 20% Erbil), while approval is highest in Najaf (78%). In a similar pattern, residents of Najaf are far more likely than others to support the inclusion of Iraqi clerics (95% vs. 75% overall) and formerly exiled religious leaders (87% vs. 52% overall) in a future Iraqi government [Appendix, Table 1 and Figure 2, next page].

There is some hesitance among Iraqis to include other groups in a government. Overall, no more than a third approve of including formerly exiled politicians (36%) and Christian leaders (32%), military leaders (24%) and descendents of the royal family (20%). There is muted approval for including formerly exiled clerics (52%), women (60%) and businesspeople (42%) [Figure 2, next page].

Residents in Sunni-dominated Fallujah and Ramadi stand out in their support for including military leaders and their opposition to formerly exiled politicians and formerly exiled clerics. Residents of Najaf are far more likely than others to support a role for women in politics [Appendix, Table 1].

**Figure 2. Support for the Inclusion of Various Groups in Future Iraqi Government, Combined Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymania, and Erbil**



Source: Office of Research, August 20 - September 3


### Wide Ranging Preferences for Future Political System

While there is widespread endorsement for the values of inclusiveness, rule of law and accountability, there is no public consensus on what type of political framework is best for Iraq. The public divides among those who support a democracy based on human rights, those who support an Islamic state based on Sharia law, and those who support a mix [Figure 3, next page]. Preferences tend to differ geographically:

- In Erbil and Suleymania, half to two-thirds prefer democracy.
- In Basra, a plurality prefers democracy.
- In Baghdad, the public is evenly divided.<sup>1</sup>
- A plurality in Fallujah and about half in Ramadi show support for an Islamic state.
- In Najaf, there is overwhelming support for an Islamic state.

<sup>1</sup> The Gallup survey in Baghdad finds a similar spread of opinion [Appendix, Table 2].

Figure 3. Preferred Political System for Iraq



Source: Office of Research, August 20 - September 5

**Appropriate Role for Religion Differentiates Preferences**

Data analysis shows that what differentiates Iraqis who support a democratic state from those favoring an Islamic state is whether they support a role for religious leaders in government. As Table 1 on the following page shows, just 35 percent of those Iraqis who prefer a democratic state endorse a role for religious leaders in politics compared to 75 percent among those who support an Islamic state.<sup>2</sup> However, those who favor an Islamic state are no less supportive of democratic values than those who prefer a democracy. This same pattern holds across all seven cities [figures not shown].

Taken together, the data suggest that Iraqi citizens have different ideas of what democratic and Islamic political systems mean on a functional level. They also show that support for the involvement of religious figures in government does not necessarily preclude support for leadership accountability and responsiveness to the Iraqi people through such mechanisms as elections and free speech.

<sup>2</sup> Those supporting an Islamic state are also more likely than others to identify themselves as Shia (versus Sunni or “just Muslim”), and to look toward Iran or conservative Sunni states as political models. When respondents were asked to select from a list the country they viewed as having the best political model for Iraq, about a third of those preferring an Islamic state chose Iran as a model and 16% selected Gulf states (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or UAE) as models [Appendix, Figure 2].

**Table 1. Support for Political System by Support for Various Political Values\***

And support each below:	Those who prefer a:		
	A Democracy	A Mix of Democracy and Islam	An Islamic State
Religious Leaders Involved in Politics	35%	58%	77%
Free and Fair Elections	98	95	95
Law and Order	94	94	94
Criticize Government	86	86	87
Nationalities Share Power	92	89	87
Major Religious Sects Share Power	87	89	88

Source: Office of Research, August 20-September 5

\* Percentages reflect those viewing the political vales as "important" or "very important."

### Parties Distrusted as Legacy of Past

The new Iraqi leadership will have to overcome disdain for political parties and politicians. About half in Erbil and Suleymania but no more than a third elsewhere express confidence in the political parties in Iraq today "to represent people like me" [Appendix, Figure 3]. In addition, when asked which leader in their country they trust most, two-thirds (64%) could not volunteer a single leader, and no one single leader was named by more than 12 percent [Appendix, Table 3].

Office of Research in-depth interviews underscore the poor image of politicians among average Iraqis, who tend to see them as self-serving. "At first they call for home and freedom and after that they all become like Saddam," a 49-year old male from Kirkuk comments. A 30-year-old male from Baghdad has similar fears: "I see that there are too many parties, and I fear that they might act against the people like the Ba'ath party."


### Iraqis Want Leaders with Expertise and Compassion, Sectarian Affiliation Less Important

The perceived inability of political parties to represent ordinary Iraqis is a major failing, since nine in ten Iraqis say that it is important for their leaders to "represent people like me" [Figure 4, next page]. While a large majority also says that qualifications and experience are important, the public places relatively lower value on nationality and sectarian interests.<sup>3</sup>

For the most part, average Iraqis seem careful not to draw attention to the Shia-Sunni power struggle that is often described in international media. Large majorities in every city endorse the representation of major religious groups in government [Appendix, Figure 6]. But perhaps as a signal that these tensions between Sunni and Shia lie under the surface, many Iraqis are uncomfortable identifying themselves as Sunni or Shia, preferring to describe themselves as "just Muslim" [Table 2, next page].

<sup>3</sup> Across all cities, no more than a third places a premium on a leader who "represents my sect." There is more variation among those who value a leader who "represents my nationality," with a higher percentage valuing nationality traits in Najaf (88%) – perhaps in reaction to the influence of foreign countries, such as Iran – and in Suleymania (59%) – probably a desire to express their Kurdish identity and autonomy [See Appendix, Figures 4 and 5].

**Figure 4. Important Leadership Characteristics,  
Combined Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymania, and Erbil**



Source: Office of Research, August 20 - September 5


	Shia	Sunni	Just Muslim
Baghdad	32%	3%	62%
Basra	53	2	44
Najaf	87	0	13
Fallujah	0	33	65
Ramadi	0	9	89
Suleymania	1	44	51
Erbil	0	26	73

\*Other religious categories are not included. The overall percentage of respondents identifying themselves as Christian was 1.5 percent.

**New Leadership Not Yet Known to Public**

In addition to suspicions of political parties and politicians, the transitional nature of the current Iraqi leadership and the overall political environment contributes to a general lack of awareness of emerging leaders. Between 69 and 85 percent in the Office of Research survey have not heard enough to voice an opinion on 18 of 25 Governing Council members [Figure 5, next page; interviews collected before death of Council member Akila al-Hashimi].

Figure 5. Awareness of Governing Council Members




Results of in-depth interviews touch on Iraqis' unfamiliarity with new politicians, although some people interviewed say that over time parties may be able to gain public trust. In Karbala, a male age 21 asks: "Who are they? Where did they come from? We know nothing about their past." Another young man of 20 in Kirkuk observes: "I don't know anything about these new parties because we were afraid to even whisper... about any other parties except for the Ba'ath party...I think we need a lot of time to get used to so many parties."

At present, among council members, Shia religious leaders who have returned from abroad tend to have better name recognition and favorability ratings than others. Just over half in the Office of Research survey give Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (58%), Sayyed Muhammed Bahr al-Uloum (57%), and Ibrahim Jafari (54%) a favorable rating [Figure 6, next page]. The ratings of these three figures, however, vary greatly by region, and are stronger in Najaf and Basrah, moderate in Baghdad, Erbil and Suleymania, and weaker in the Sunni-dominated areas of Ramadi and Fallujah.

In-depth interviews show that religious figures are appreciated in communities for being "closer to the people" and "for looking after people's needs." These interviews also attribute the appeal

of the religious figures to their dissident status under Saddam. Two men in their thirties from Basra comment: "They were the most persecuted group during the ex-regime;" "The former regime's behavior against religious men makes them popular now."

Figure 6. Popularity of Governing Council Members



**Governing Council Considered a Positive Step, but Its Independence is Questioned**

While the individual members have yet to make themselves known, Office of Research in-depth interviews show that many consider the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council "the beginning of a positive change," "a good step forward" and "ideal for these circumstances. In addition, a Gallup survey in Baghdad (August 18-September 4) finds that six in ten residents of the capital have a favorable opinion of the Council (61% vs. 13% unfavorable; 27% don't know). But three-quarters think the policies of the Governing Council are "mostly determined by the coalition's own authorities" (versus 16% who say the IGC is "fairly independent").

In-depth interviews conducted in Samara were unusually negative toward the Governing Council; several participants questioned its independence. A 46 year-old Shia male states: "The CPA brought those leaders and the Iraqi people did not choose them." A female resident of

Samara, age 25 (Sunni) has the same complaint: *"The Iraqi people should choose their own leaders."* Another male, age 25 (Sunni) sums up: *"He who shakes hands with the Americans is not one of us."*

Many in-depth interviews also touched on the ethnic and religious composition of the council. For the most part, Iraqis seem to feel the makeup of the council is fair. A Sunni male, age 51, from Baghdad, gives his view: *"The representation of the Governing Council is good. Even if the Sunni are in the minority – it is fair."* While a Kurdish participant in Kirkuk is satisfied that the Kurds *"have a strong voice in the council;"* a fellow Kirkuk resident complains that *"there is only one representative for the Turkmeni and we are a great sect."* Another Sunni male, age 29, also from Kirkuk, has a big picture view: *"The Governing Council is a collection of Sunni and Shia – more Shia than Sunni, but the most important thing is that this is a new government and it will not be like the last one."*

Prepared by Dina Smeltz and Jodi Nachtwey (b)(6)  
Issued by The Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (b)(6)

## METHODOLOGY

### Office of Research

#### **Survey:**

Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,444 Iraqi adults residing in the cities of Baghdad, Najaf, Basrah, Ramadi, Fallujah, Erbil and Suleymania. Interviews were carried out between August 20 and September 5. The overall response rate was 89 percent, ranging from 93% in Baghdad to 100% in Suleymania and Erbil. Eleven percent of those selected refused to participate in the study.

A multi-stage probability-based sample was drawn, utilizing residential listings from Iraq's 1997 Population and Housing Census. Census sub-districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs), with 80 PSUs being selected using probability-proportional-to-size procedures. Due to the size of Baghdad, the city was stratified by neighborhood to ensure that all city areas were represented in the sample. Interviewers were given all address details for households at four sampling points within each PSU. Five interviews were conducted at each sampling point. Within each selected household, one respondent was randomly selected using the last birthday method.

The margin of error, assuming a 95% confidence level and the clustering effects of a multi-stage design, is approximately  $\pm 3.4\%$  for the overall sample. The margin of error varies across the samples of the individual cities as follows:

City	Sample Size	Margin of Error
Baghdad	680	$\pm 4.9\%$
Basrah	235	$\pm 8.5\%$
Najaf	193	$\pm 9.7\%$
Ramadi	87	$\pm 13.7\%$
Fallujah	49	$\pm 17.7\%$
Erbil	100	$\pm 13.7\%$
Suleymania	100	$\pm 13.7\%$
Total	1444	$\pm 3.4\%$

#### **In-depth Interviews:**

Approximately 260 in-depth interviews were carried out in the cities of Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Kirkuk and Samara from roughly August 25 to September 20. Questions asked respondents about their attitudes toward Iraq's image, CPA performance, the Governing Council, and Iraq's future political system. Respondents comprised a mix of men and women from various ages and with differing educational and religious backgrounds.

Gallup


Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,178 adults who resided in urban areas within the governorate of Baghdad. Interviews were carried out between August 28 and September 4. The response rate was 97 percent; 3 percent of those selected refused to participate in the study.

A probability-based sample was drawn utilizing 1997 census data. Census districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs). A total of 122 PSUs were chosen using probability-proportional-to-size methods. About 10 interviews, one per household, were conducted at each location. Interviewers were given all relevant address details for each PSU. Within each selected household, respondents were selected using the Kish method.

For the results based on this sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error is approximately  $\pm 2.7\%$ .

## APPENDIX

**Appendix Figure 1. Importance of Religious Leaders Playing Large Role in Politics**



**Appendix Table 1. Regional Variations in Support for the Inclusion of Various Groups in Future Iraqi Government (%)**

	Baghdad	Basrah	Najaf	Fallujah	Ramadi	Suleymania	Erbil	Overall
Iraqi clerics	78%	72%	83%	82%	76%	54%	45%	75%
Christian religious leaders	39	40	23	12	22	17	20	32
Formerly Exiled Politicians	34	50	43			42	35	36
Formerly exiled religious leaders	53	60	83	16	32	36	28	52
Military officers	23	36	12			8	11	24
Descendents of the royal family	24	23	4	22	37	13	14	20
Women	62	58	77	35	43	59	54	60
Businesspeople	46	46	24	45	46	37	33	42
			14					
Sample Size	680	235	54	49	87	100	100	1444

Source: Office of Research, August 20 - September 5

\* Less than 1 percent.


**Appendix Table 2. Gallup Survey in Baghdad: Preferred and Expected Political Models**

	Acceptable	Preferred	Likely
Multi-parliamentary democracy, such as in most European nations, the US, and some Asian countries	53%		42%
An Islamic system, based on <i>Shura</i> (mutual consultation)	53		17
An Islamic theocracy in which religious leaders or mullahs have a strong influence, such as in Iran	23		7
A constitutional monarchy, such as the one which prevailed in Iraq before 1958	23		7
A conservative Islamic kingdom, such as that in Saudi Arabia	18		3
An Islamic democracy, such as that in Pakistan	11		2
Conservative Islamic theocracy, such as that which existed in the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan	4		*
Don't Know/No Response	1		22

~ Respondents were allowed multiple responses to express their opinion on each political system. Figures therefore do not add up to 100%.

\* Figure is less than 1 percent.


**Appendix Figure 2. Preference for Political System by Country Model**



NOTE: The "don't know" and "no answer" categories have been excluded from the chart for ease of read. Therefore the categories comprising each bar do not add up to 100 percent.

**Appendix Figure 3. Confidence in Political Parties to Represent the Views of Iraqis**


*How much confidence do you have in political parties to represent Iraqis like you?*




Appendix Table 3. Leader Trusted Most	Percentage
Ibrahim Jafari	12%
Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim	4
Jalal Talabani	4
Saddam Hussain	3
Masood Barzani	2
Adnan Pachachi	2
Moshen Abdul Hameed	1
Muktada Al-Sader	1
Sayyed Muhammed Bahr al-Uloum	1
Ahmad Chalabi	1
Al-Sharif Ali Bin al-Hussein	1
Abdul Karim Qasim	1
Other	4
<b>Don't Know/No Response</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>101*</b>

\* Due to rounding, figure does not add to 100 percent.

Appendix Figure 4. Importance of Nationality as Leadership Characteristic



Appendix Figure 5. Importance of Sect as Leadership Characteristic



~~SECRET~~

EF-7452  
03/015381

November 5, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Weekly Report

The Afghanistan weekly report is coming along. On page 14, we might want to mention NATO.

On page 20, I would not use the word "politics."

You need a lot more data and a lot more refining. Please get Blackwill involved if you can.  
5 Feb 2004

Thanks.

ATTACHMENT NOT PROVIDED

Attach.  
11/1/03 Dra

REF X04805-03

DHR:dh  
110503-15

.....

Please resp

U22284 /03

05-11-03 17:33 IN

SNOWFLAKE

~~SECRET~~  
11-L-05597/OSB/20429

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

November 3, 2003

320.2

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Hearings

I think we ought to prepare for Congressional hearings on managing the force. It is important that we show the Congress the current cost and projected cost of all the Congressional add-ons for pay and benefits for active, Reserve and retired personnel that have been added to the DoD budget—often without hearings, without study or analysis, without justification and/or without determining the inequities or perceived inequities that would result.

We need to point out that, because it is done without hearings, it creates inequities and imbalances, which then need to be corrected, which add still additional costs.

We need an understanding with Congress so that the committees of the House and Senate can test their ideas for added benefits against a template, one that will show what the effects of a proposal will be before they add billions of cost.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

3 NOV 03

U22285 /03

November 3, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

The UN reported last month that to their knowledge more than 2.5 million Afghans have returned to Afghanistan. That says something must be going right in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-11

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OB  
11.5

-----

U22286 /03

November 3, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Col. Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel

*Advance copy sent*

*33350*

I think it is time for us to solidify the trip to the ministerials. I would also like to see a firm schedule on the trip to Asia in November. I need to get both of those straightened out the way I want them and clear in my mind.

Let's set an hour to go over that, and do it sometime early this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/03

*OB  
11.5*

*34003*

U22287 /03

November 3, 2003

33350

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bases in Far East

When I go to Asia, I want to have someone physically with me who can take me around to the different bases in Japan, Korea, Okinawa and Guam and tell me authoritatively what our current thinking is on each of those bases.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/03

*OB*  
*11-5*

3 NOV 03

U22288 /03

November 3, 2003

IRAN

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Paper on Iran

Please give me the piece of paper on Iran that you said was edited and they didn't accept any of your recommendations. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-21

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
12/8  
C 11/5

Sir,

- TAB A - Policy Edits
- TAB B - ARMITAGE Prepared Remarks
- TAB C - The actual ARMITAGE Testimony.

vr/  
CDR Nasunzo  
A-5

3 NOV 03

U22289 /03

10/25/03  
Iran testimony 2

Tab A

Margin  
comments =

OSS Policy  
mark up.

They did not  
take our edits.

**DRAFT**  
**Statement for the Record**  
**By Richard L. Armitage**  
**Deputy Secretary of State**  
**U.S. Policy Toward Iran**  
**Senate Foreign Relations Committee**  
**October 28, 2003**  
**DRAFT**

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, as always, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this body to discuss the foreign policy priorities and challenges of the day. I particularly appreciate this opportunity to discuss Iran, given the high stakes of this very fluid situation and the importance and influence of U.S. policy on this matter. I look forward to a dialogue with you.

*PROFOUND CRISIS*

Iran is a country in the midst of a ~~tremendous transformation~~, and I believe American policy can have a direct effect on the direction Iran will take. This is a complex situation, but if you will allow a simplification: today in Iran, there is a struggle between destructive elements of Iran's society and leadership, who want to keep the country mired in a violent, corrupt, and insular past, and a forward-looking popular movement, which wants a more engaged and modern Iran to emerge. The fact that the Nobel Peace Prize was just awarded to an Iranian citizen is no aberration; rather it is a sign of the sweeping desire for change across Iranian society. Indeed, all Iranians stand to benefit from a modern state, one that draws on the strengths of free minds and free markets, and American and international security and prosperity also stand to benefit. United States policy is, therefore, to support the Iranian people in their aspirations for a democratic, prosperous country that is a trusted member of the international community.

Given the complexities of the situation, it is no surprise that there is a range of views – including on this Committee – about how to best implement that policy. That is entirely appropriate. Indeed, a single, static, one-size-fits-all policy would not be appropriate in the circumstances. In order to best protect and advance US interests, our policy needs to be flexible, dynamic, and multifaceted. That is why the President and this Administration are pursuing a policy that weighs the full range of options available to us, both through bilateral and multilateral means. We seek to counter the government of Iran's negative and destructive policies and actions, while encouraging constructive policies and actions and engaging in a direct dialogue with the Iranian people about the freedoms they want for their own country.

As President Bush noted about Iran last week, not every policy issue needs to be dealt with by force. In the case of Iran, we will continue to enforce measures for nonproliferation and other controls whenever necessary, but as Secretary Powell said last week, we do not seek conflict with Iran. Military options will have to remain on the table, however, given the lack of clarity about Iran's future direction and ultimate destination. At the same time, we are prepared to engage in limited discussions with the government of Iran about areas of mutual interest, as appropriate. We ~~have~~ <sup>WILL</sup> not, however, entered into any broad dialogue with the aim of normalizing relations.

*AND WILL DO SO WITHOUT DEMORALIZING THE FREEDOM-SEEKING IRANIAN PEOPLE.*  
*WITH THIS CLERICAL REGIME, WHICH IS DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF ITS PEOPLE.*  
L-0559/QSD/20435

10/25/03  
Iran testimony 2

There is no question that Iran is engaged in a number of destructive policies and actions. Our most pressing concerns are Iran's nuclear weapons program, as well as chemical and biological weapons programs, support for terrorism, poor human rights record, and interference in regional politics, particularly in the Arab-Israeli peace process. These behaviors, along with the government's oppressive and corrupt centralized economic policy, have isolated Iran from the international community and denied the Iranian people the quality of life commensurate with the country's rich human and natural resources. These behaviors also undermine regional stability and have ripple effects across U.S. and international security.

Across the board, the United States is actively countering such Iranian activities through a variety of tools, including sanctions, interdiction, law enforcement, diplomacy, public pressure, and military measures. When necessary, we will act alone. The United States, for example, has comprehensive unilateral sanctions on Iran. This includes some \$23 million in blocked assets, prohibitions on a broad array of exports and assistance, particularly to the military and to the oil industry, and targeted sanctions against specific entities in other countries that aid Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.

We believe, however, that broad international and multilateral responses – if sustained – will be especially effective in meeting the challenges Iran poses to regional stability, disarmament and nonproliferation regimes, and the rights of its own citizens. As President Bush said last week, we have confidence in the power of patience and the collective voice of the international community to resolve disputes peacefully.

We believe a united international front is especially critical in dealing with Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, about which there is widespread concern across the international community. These efforts include bilateral discussions with allies and friends, such as President Bush's meeting with Russian President Putin at Camp David, where the two leaders agreed on the goal of an Iran free of nuclear weapons. We consistently have urged our friends and allies to condition any improvements in their bilateral or trade relations with Iran on concrete, sustained, and verifiable changes in Iran's policies in these areas of concern. We think it is appropriate, for instance, that the European Union has conditioned progress in its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran on movement in these areas.

Our international efforts also include the use of innovative and established multilateral tools. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, is a new eleven-nation partnership to interdict weapons of mass destruction-related shipments of concern to and from Iran and elsewhere. We are, of course, also working through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve critical international concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Indeed, our close cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and a host of other countries has led to two very strong IAEA Board of Governors' resolutions on Iran. Last week, the French, German, and British Foreign Ministers traveled to Iran in support of those resolutions. As a result of that mission, Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), provide full cooperation to the IAEA, and suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. We welcome this progress, but as British Foreign

10/25/03

Iran testimony 2

Minister Straw said, "the proof of the value" of the European agreement with Iran will depend "above all on the implementation of what has been agreed."

We are also using bilateral and multilateral pressure, from sanctions to direct appeals, to put a stop to Iran's support for terrorist organizations, which may include al-Qaida. We believe that elements of the Iranian regime have helped al-Qaida transit and find safehaven in Iran, despite Iran's official condemnation of the group. Despite public statements that they would cooperate with other countries, the Iranians have refused repeated requests to turn over or share intelligence about al-Qaida members and leaders they claim to have in custody. As the President made clear last week, Iran must change its course on this front; ~~resolution of this issue would be an important step in U.S.-Iranian relations and we cannot move forward without this step.~~ <sup>AND AUSARI AL-ISLAM</sup> We will continue to exercise direct pressure on this issue at the highest levels of our government, as well as to encourage our friends and allies to press the Iranians.

In its support for terrorism, including by arming violent factions, Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Iraq, and especially in the internal affairs of Palestinians. Indeed, Iran continues to be the world's foremost state supporter of terrorism, offering financial and logistical support to both Shia and Sunni terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Through these abhorrent groups, Iran destabilizes the region and tries to stymie any movement toward peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict.

<sup>SIGNIFICANT</sup> On the other hand, Iran says it wants a stable, unified neighbor in both Afghanistan and Iraq and ~~despite some~~ unhelpful interference, has taken a few steps in that direction. This includes rhetorical support, by welcoming the end of the oppressive regime of the Taliban, which exported drugs, violence, and millions of refugees across the border into Iran. Iran also welcomed the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council. The Iranians have backed up that rhetoric with pledges of material support at both the Bonn and Madrid Donors' Conference and they continue to work constructively in regional counter-narcotics and refugee repatriation efforts.

Although we have no illusions that Iran actually wants strong democratic neighbors, we have encouraged Iran's constructive behavior by engaging in direct dialogue on issues of mutual and immediate concern. This dialogue has been limited in scope and produced some success in the Afghanistan context. The last such meeting was canceled after the May 12 Riyadh bombings, however, due to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate on the al-Qaida issue. The Secretary made clear at the time that we canceled only a meeting, not the process of discussing these issues with Iran. We are prepared to meet again in the future, but only if that would serve U.S. interests. Of course, any country can graduate off the list of state supporters of terrorism or countries of concern. Indeed, the list is intended to be a policy mechanism to create pressure for change. We are always prepared to respond if Iran changes its ways, in particular ceasing its support for terrorism and abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs, by making corresponding changes in our punitive economic and political policies.

An important aspect of ongoing U.S. efforts to influence the direction of Iranian policy is encouraging the healthy development of Iran's civil society. We see many signs that the people of Iran want a different life and a more responsive government, and we believe we can

→ AND NOT MISLEAD ANYONE INTO CONCLUDING THAT WE ARE NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THIS REGIME.

11-L-0559/OSD/20437

10/25/03

Iran testimony 2

encourage such developments through direct engagement with the Iranian public. This can be a somewhat delicate proposition, given our history with the country. On the other hand, an estimated 70 percent of the 68 million people in Iran are under the age of 30, and they are far more concerned about Iran's chronic unemployment than they are about Iran's past. Iranian displays of sympathy after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and polls showing overwhelming desire for improved relations with the U.S. reflect strong popular sentiment, as do demonstrations and elections in support of reform. And while the government tries to blame any sign of dissent on outside agitators, and the United States in particular, I believe the regime is giving us too much credit, and too little to its own people. Consider that thousands of ordinary Iranians spontaneously flocked to the airport to greet Shirin Ebadi two weeks ago when she returned to Tehran after the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

We believe we can encourage the triumph of public resolve by engaging in a direct dialogue with the people of Iran. We are doing this through Radio Farda, which operates 24 hours a day, and Voice of America radio and television broadcasts into Iran. Last year, the State Department brought on line a Website in Persian and we continue to explore opportunities to incorporate Iran-related projects into our broader Middle East Partnership Initiative. Our Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau also supports cultural and person-to-person educational and professional exchanges.

We know our message is getting through. The Persian Website, for example, averages about [need number] hits per day. And while we have no way to measure the audience for our television and radio programming inside Iran, we do have some evidence of a solid consumer base for our broadcasts. The United States has no direct diplomatic presence in Iran, but we do have what we call a "virtual embassy" in the surrounding nations. Foreign Service Officers talk to Iranian citizens living and travelling around the region, collecting and sharing with us their observations. Based on such anecdotal evidence and on the direct contacts we get, particularly through the Internet, we know we have an attentive audience in Iran.

I firmly believe that our strategy will succeed in pushing Iran in the right direction, particularly with the close cooperation of other nations. But it is not up to the United States to choose Iran's future. Ultimately, I am most hopeful for that future because it is the people of Iran themselves who are providing the key impetus for change. Despite living under a regime that limits or denies its people even basic human rights, Iranians are engaged in a very rich and lively debate about the kind of society they want for themselves and for their children. They have made it clear that they want democratic and economic reform, accountability and transparency from their government, an end to corruption, and reintegration with the international community. The Iranian people should know of our support for their aspirations, but also that the full rewards of that support will only be realized once their government ends its destructive external and internal policies. We look forward to the day when the will of the people of Iran prevails.

→ ONCE THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN HOW IRAN IS RULED AND HOW IT CONDUCTS ITS FOREIGN POLICY,



TAB B

## U.S. Policy and Iran

**Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State**  
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Washington, DC  
October 28, 2003

### *As Prepared*

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, as always, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this body to discuss the foreign policy priorities and challenges of the day. I particularly appreciate this opportunity to discuss Iran, given the high stakes of this very fluid situation and the importance and influence of U.S. policy on this matter. I look forward to a dialogue with you.

Iran is a country in the midst of a tremendous transformation, and I believe American policy can affect the direction Iran will take. This is a complex situation, but if you will allow a simplification: today in Iran, there is a struggle between destructive elements of Iran's society and leadership, who want to keep the country mired in a violent, corrupt, and insular past, and a forward-looking popular movement, which wants a more engaged and modern Iran to emerge. The fact that the Nobel Peace Prize was just awarded to an Iranian citizen is no aberration; rather it is a sign of the sweeping desire for change across Iranian society. Indeed, all Iranians stand to benefit from a modern state, one that draws on the strengths of free minds and free markets. American and international security and well being also stand to benefit. United States policy is, therefore, to support the Iranian people in their aspirations for a democratic, prosperous country that is a trusted member of the international community.

Given the complexities of the situation, it is no surprise that there is a range of views – including on this Committee – about how to best implement that policy. That is entirely appropriate. Indeed, a single, static, one-size-fits-all policy would not be appropriate in the circumstances. In order to best protect and advance U.S. interests, our policy needs to be flexible, dynamic, and multifaceted. That is why the President and this Administration are pursuing a policy that weighs the full range of options available to us, both through bilateral and multilateral means. We seek to counter the government of Iran's negative and destructive policies and actions, while encouraging constructive policies and actions and engaging in a direct dialogue with the Iranian people about the freedoms they want for their own country.

As President Bush noted when talking about Iran last week, not every policy issue needs to be dealt with by force. Secretary Powell also noted last week that we do not seek conflict with Iran. We will continue to pursue nonproliferation and other such control measures as necessary and we must keep all available options on the table, given the lack of clarity about Iran's future direction and ultimate destination. At the same time, we are prepared to engage in limited discussions with the government of Iran about areas of mutual interest, as appropriate. We have not, however, entered into any broad dialogue with the aim of normalizing relations.

There is no question that Iran is engaged in a number of destructive policies and actions. Our most pressing concerns are Iran's poor human rights record, nuclear weapons program, as well as chemical and biological weapons programs, support for terrorism, and interference in regional politics, particularly in the Arab-Israeli peace process. These behaviors, along with the government's oppressive and corrupt centralized economic policy, shake the confidence of the international community and deny the Iranian people the quality of life commensurate with the country's rich human and natural resources. These behaviors also undermine regional stability and have ripple effects across U.S. and international security. We are taking and will take the necessary measures to protect U.S. interests.

Across the board, the United States is actively countering such Iranian activities through a variety of tools, including sanctions, interdiction, law enforcement, diplomacy, and international public opinion. When necessary, we will act alone. The United States, for example, has a broad array of sanctions on Iran. This includes prohibitions on a range of exports and assistance, particularly to the military and to the oil industry, strict regulations on economic transactions, and targeted sanctions against specific entities in other countries that aid Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.

We believe, however, that international and multilateral responses – if sustained – will be especially effective in meeting the challenges Iran poses to regional stability, disarmament and nonproliferation regimes, and the rights of its own citizens. As President Bush said last week, we have confidence in the power of patience and the collective voice of the international community to resolve disputes peacefully.

We are working with the international community to effect change in Iran's abysmal human rights record, for example. According to our own documentation and to international organizations, the government of Iran uses torture, excessive and lethal police force, and arbitrary detention to repress free speech, freedom of association, and religious freedom, among other abuses. We are actively seeking a resolution on the human rights situation in Iran in the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee or at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

We believe a united international front is especially critical in dealing with Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, about which there is widespread concern across the international community. We also remain concerned about Iran's biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs. Our efforts to counter these programs include bilateral discussions with allies and friends, such as President Bush's meeting with Russian President Putin at Camp David, where the two leaders agreed on the goal of an Iran free of nuclear weapons. We consistently have urged our friends and allies to condition any improvements in their bilateral or trade relations with Iran on concrete, sustained, and verifiable changes in Iran's policies in this and other areas of concern. We think it is appropriate, for instance, that the European Union has conditioned progress in its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran on movement in these areas.

Our international efforts also include the use of innovative and established multilateral tools. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, is a new counterproliferation initiative to interdict weapons of mass destruction-related shipments to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The nations involved in this initiative have singled out Iran and North Korea as countries of particular concern. We are, of course, also working through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve critical international concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Indeed, our close cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and a host of other countries has led to two very strong IAEA Board of Governors' resolutions on Iran. Last week, the French, German, and British Foreign Ministers traveled to Iran in support of those resolutions. As a result of that mission, Iran declared its intention to sign an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, provide full cooperation to the IAEA, and temporarily suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. We welcome this progress, but as British Foreign Minister Straw said, "the proof of the value" of the European agreement with Iran will depend "above all on the implementation of what has been agreed." We are waiting to see if the information Tehran provided the IAEA last week will substantively meet the IAEA Board of Governors' October 31<sup>st</sup> deadline for coming clean on its nuclear program. Our consultations with our allies on this matter are continuing.

We are also engaged in bilateral and multilateral efforts, from sanctions to direct appeals, to put a stop to Iran's support for terrorist organizations, which we believe includes al-Qaida. We believe that elements of the Iranian regime have helped al-Qaida and Ansar al-Islam transit and find safehaven in Iran, despite Iran's official condemnation of these groups. Despite public statements that they would cooperate with other countries, the Iranians have refused repeated requests to turn over or share intelligence about all al-Qaida members and leaders they claim to have in custody. As the President made clear last week, Iran must change its course on this front; resolution of this issue would be an important step in U.S.-Iranian relations and we cannot move forward without this step. We will continue to press this issue from the highest levels of our government, as well as to encourage our friends and allies to press the Iranians.

In its support for terrorism, including by arming violent factions, Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Iraq, and especially in the fate of the Palestinian people. Indeed, Iran continues to be the world's foremost state supporter of terrorism, offering financial and logistical support to both Shia and Sunni terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad. Through these abhorrent groups, Iran destabilizes the region and tries to stymie any movement toward peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict.

On the other hand, Iran says it wants a stable, unified neighbor in both Afghanistan and Iraq and despite significant unhelpful interference, has taken a few steps in that direction. This includes rhetorical support, by welcoming the end of the oppressive regime of the Taliban, which exported drugs, violence, and millions of refugees across the border into Iran. Iran also welcomed the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council. The Iranians have backed up that rhetoric with pledges of material support at both the Bonn and Madrid Donors' Conferences and they continue to cooperate with regional counter-narcotics and refugee repatriation efforts.

Although we make no conclusions about the nature of Iranian intent, we have encouraged such constructive behavior by engaging in direct dialogue on issues of mutual and immediate concern. This dialogue has been limited in scope and produced some success in the Afghanistan context. The last such meeting was canceled after the May 12 Riyadh bombings, however, due to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate on the al-Qaida issue. The Secretary made clear at the time that we canceled only a meeting, not the process of discussing these issues with Iran. We are prepared to meet again in the future, but only if that would serve U.S. interests. Of course, we can remove any country from the list of state supporters of terrorism if that country is prepared to take the necessary steps. We are always prepared to respond if Iran changes its ways, in particular ceasing its support for terrorism and abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs, by making corresponding changes in our own policies.

An important aspect of ongoing U.S. efforts to influence the direction of Iranian policy is encouraging the healthy development of Iran's civil society. We see many signs that the people of Iran want a different life and a more responsive government, and we believe we can encourage such developments through direct engagement with the Iranian public. An estimated 70 percent of the 68 million people in Iran are under the age of 30, and they are far more concerned about Iran's chronic unemployment than they are about Iran's past. Iranian displays of sympathy after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and polls showing overwhelming desire for improved relations with the U.S. reflect strong popular sentiment, as do demonstrations and elections in support of reform. The government tries to blame any sign of dissent on outside agitators, but it is clear that the agitation in Iran is a genuine expression of a homegrown desire for change. Consider that thousands of ordinary Iranians spontaneously flocked to the airport to greet Shirin Ebadi two weeks ago when she returned to Tehran after the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

We believe we can encourage the triumph of public resolve by engaging in direct communication with the people of Iran. We are doing this through Radio Farda, which operates 24 hours a day, and Voice of America (VOA) radio and television broadcasts into Iran. VOA has recently instituted a daily Persian television news program to Iran, in addition to its two weekly television feature programs. In May, the State Department brought on line a website in Persian and we continue to explore opportunities to incorporate Iran-related projects into our broader Middle East Partnership Initiative. Our Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau also supports cultural, educational, and professional exchanges.

We know our message is getting through. An average of 3,000 people already views our Persian website every day, for example. It is challenging to come by concrete measures of the audience for our television and radio programming inside Iran, but we do have evidence of a broad consumer base. The United States has no direct diplomatic presence in Iran, but we do have what we call a "virtual embassy" in the surrounding nations and beyond. Foreign Service Officers talk to Iranian citizens living and traveling across the region and around the world, collecting and sharing with us their observations. Based on such anecdotal evidence and on the direct contacts we get, particularly through the Internet, we know we have an attentive audience in Iran.

I firmly believe that our strategy will succeed in helping to push and pull Iran in the right direction, particularly with the close cooperation of other nations. But it is not up to the United States to choose Iran's future. Ultimately, I am most hopeful for that future because it is the people of Iran themselves who are providing the key impetus for change. Despite living under a regime that limits or denies its people even basic human rights, Iranians are engaged in a very rich and lively debate about the kind of society they want for themselves and for their children. They have made it clear that they want democratic and economic reform, accountability and transparency from their government, an end to corruption, religious moderation, and reintegration with the international community. The Iranian people should know of our support for their aspirations, but also that the full rewards of that support will only be realized once their government ends its destructive external and internal policies. We look forward to the day when the will of the people of Iran prevails.

Panel 1 Hearing of SFRC w/ Deputy Sect State Armitage

**Publication: FNS-Transcript Wire Service**

Date: 10/28/2003

**PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS  
COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: IRAN, SECURITY THREATS & U.S. POLICY CHAIR:  
SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN)**

**WITNESS: RICHARD ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE**

216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

10:22 A.M. EST, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2003



**MR. ARMITAGE:** Thank you.

I just want to make a few comments, and first of all to echo what Mr. Biden said in your absence. Your op ed piece in the LA Times was spot on, as far as I can see. When Mr. Reagan used to say about the Russians, "trust but verify," this is beyond that now. I think we ought to be skeptical and verify, and that's the burden of your super inspections regime. And I want to tell you that we all took careful note of it.

I actually lived in Iran during a time which was considered the good old days, back under the Shah. And I worked for the Defense Department at the time. And I was struck at the time with a number of ironies or contradictions that existed in Iranian society and with Iranians. And as I was preparing for this testimony, just this morning, when I saw you earlier, sir, I was sitting up here writing down some of these ironies. And I'll just go through them because they just occurred to me this morning.

The first is that I don't think you could find more charming people individually than Iranians -- and hospitable. And yet in a group, they can be unbelievably ethnocentric. It's one of those ironies. We have a revolution in 1979, which was brought about, in very large measure, by women; by women. And yet it is women who now suffer the most under that very revolution, from repressive practices. You've got a nation that's awash in natural resources. And yet, the government rates of unemployment are 16 percent, and we all know it's much higher than that, and particularly when you consider underemployment. And the poverty rate is 40 percent. You have a nation which is the second-largest in terms of gas reserves, and yet they're a net importer of gas because they can't or won't make the necessary decisions regarding infrastructure. You've got a country which has a bit of a democratic process, but the neck of that democratic process is being throttled by unelected theocracies, and this leads to an almost unbelievable cynicism, if you look at the turnout for the most recent municipal elections, which was about 30 percent. You've got a country now which is speaking openly about the problems in their own society -- drug abuse, prostitution, domestic violence -- and yet still has those repressive policies against women and denies basic human rights to many of their citizens. You've got a country which has been, I think, widely known as the leading state supporter of terrorism in a nation which has a hunger for weapons of mass destruction.

And yet -- and there -- and in that regard, they act as a -- pardon the term -- rogue state. And yet it appears that it was fear of being seen in the international community in rogue terms that actually made them try to reach out on the recent visit of the three EU ministers and try to come to -- at least verbally and perhaps more come to some sort of open declaration about the length and breadth of their programs.

You've got a country that used to be called Persia, 69 million people, and yet Persians are on the verge of becoming a minority in their own country, as Azeris and Turks and Kurds and others increase their own percentage of the population. Persians are now 51 percent.

You have a country as old as time, and yet of those 69 million people, about 70 percent of them are under 30.

And finally, you've got kind of the most recent irony -- and it was referred to by you and by Senator Biden, sir -- you have a woman who thrived under the monarchy, was imprisoned under the present regime, and just recently was awarded the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, Shirin Ebadi, the woman who is now giving hope and sustenance, I think, to the aspirations of the Iranian people.

So in sum, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here. This is a fascinating, troubled and troubling country. It's full of political and intellectual ferment and schizophrenia.

So I'm delighted to be here, so thanks.

**SEN. HAGEL:** Mr. Chairman, thank you. And Mr. Secretary, as always, welcome. I am sorry I missed your formal eloquence, but I did peruse your statement.

**SEN. LUGAR:** It's fairly brief.

**SEN. HAGEL:** Was he? Well, then I'm not sorry.

**MR. ARMITAGE:** But I won't subject you to it again, sir.

**SEN. HAGEL:** I wanted the full Armitage projection here. But, nonetheless, I've lived with disappointments before and I'll have to just accept this, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Regime change in Iran -- is that our policy?

**MR. ARMITAGE:** No, sir.

**SEN. HAGEL:** What is our policy?

**MR. ARMITAGE:** Our policy is to try to eliminate the ability of Iran to carry forward with disruptive policies, such as the development of WMD, such as the abandonment of human rights, such as repression against minorities, such as religious oppression against the Bahais, and to try to get them to eschew their state sponsorship of terrorism.

And in this regard, our policy is to continue to support openly and publicly the aspirations of the people of Iran for transparency, anti-corruption and democracy.

**SEN. HAGEL:** I noted in your written statement, which I did have an opportunity to look at, you mentioned areas of common interest where we need to pursue those. I know Secretary Powell has said on various occasions the same thing and talked a little bit about possibilities of dialogue. And that's the question.

When, where could you envision some official dialogue beginning with Iran?

**MR. ARMITAGE:** Let me say that we've had some dialogue generally under the U.N. auspices. And, of course, we carry on a continued exchange of information through the Swiss, who are protecting power force.

Certainly the two things that -- three that come to mind immediately are continued efforts in Afghanistan, where to some extent we share common interests.

The second is obviously in Iraq, where, as we've seen -- and I'll be glad to go into it later -- they're somewhat schizophrenic about our activities.

And third, one that we, I think, share an almost absolute commonality of views is on the question of narcotics. They have a large and growing product. They are the transportation

route from Afghanistan, one of them, up through to Central Europe. And it's something that, at the proper time, when we feel it's in our interest, we could engage them.

**SEN. HAGEL:** How would you envision that might happen? I know we've had, as you noted, some dialogue through the U.N. third party, the Swiss, other approaches, vehicles. But you might even frame this up a little bit, Mr. Secretary, in experiences, recent experiences we've had with North Korea, how this might develop. Or is it worthy of pursuit with Iran?

**MR. ARMITAGE:** This is an unsatisfactory answer, Mr. Hagel. I think it's probably something that will be decided at the time and the place, certainly in consultation with the president. He's going to want to be involved in this decision.

I think initially my own view is that it should be somewhat multilateral. We have, I think, recently found the effectiveness of that approach, and I think we would continue that at some point in time on one off issues. We should deal with them, but that's a decision the president and the secretary will make. I tried to make the point in my opening statement that we're not opposed to that. We're not saying no. We realize that there are areas in which our interest can be served by dialogue.

*The president  
Armitage said*



C 1116

November 3, 2003

✓ 11/7

Algeria

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Algeria

Do you think there is anything we could learn from talking to folks from Algeria or anywhere else? Think about it and let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-22

.....  
Please respond by 11/17/03

15 NOV 03

FOR SECDEF \_\_\_\_\_

YES, SIR. I WILL ASK GEN. JONES TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS RECOMMENDATION TO LINK FOLKS FROM ALGERIA WITH FOLKS FROM CENTCOM, JFCCOM, JOINT STAFF, AND OSD TO CAPTURE AND ACT UPON RELEVANT LESSONS LEARNED.

VR / *[Signature]*

COPY TO : DEPSECDEF  
CSJS  
GEN JONES  
GEN ADRAID  
DJS

U22290 /03

A173-2

3 NOV 03

November 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Washington Post* Editorial

UN

This says, "Despite the president's declared intention to seek a larger U.N. role, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and his staff openly campaigned against it . . ."

Please find out precisely what they are referring to, ask them for a quote. It is totally untrue. I have no recollection of anything like that.

Thanks.

Attach.

"A Lonely Fight." *Washington Post*, November 4, 2003. p. A24.

DHR:dh  
110403-10

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

U22291 /03

4 NOV 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20448

# The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

## A Lonely Fight

**T**WO MONTHS after the Bush administration embarked on an effort to attract greater international support for its mission in Iraq, it faces the latest surge of violence on the ground from a position that is more isolated than ever. No fresh foreign troops are on their way to help fight the Iraqi insurgents and foreign terrorists who have lately redoubled their attacks. Far from expanding its mission, the United Nations has all but withdrawn from Iraq, removing its remaining international staff from Baghdad. Other international aid groups, from the International Red Cross to Doctors Without Borders, are reducing their operations or pulling out. Rather than look for further help from India, Pakistan or Russia, or even NATO allies, the Bush administration has abruptly embraced a new strategy—"Iraqification," a rapid buildup of local police and paramilitary forces under U.S. tutelage. Maybe this policy will produce better results, but it's worth considering why the attempt at multilateralism has proved a failure.

Part of the explanation must account for U.S. enemies in Iraq, who seem to have achieved just the aim they were seeking in bombing U.N. and Red Cross facilities. Saddam Hussein and his allies clearly hope to strip all international cover from the occupation; it is far easier to mobilize popular resistance to a Western superpower that can be portrayed as an imperial occupier than to an international coalition led by the United Nations. The bombers took advantage of longstanding vulnerabilities in U.N. security procedures, as an internal investigation has shown. But the attacks also exploited continuing tensions between the Bush administration and the U.N. leadership. Despite the president's declared intention to seek a larger U.N. role, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and his staff openly campaigned against

it; they succeeded in blocking any weakening of the Pentagon's monopoly over power in Baghdad. This prompted governments that had been considering contributions of troops to pull back, and it caused senior U.N. officials to question why they should risk the lives of their staff to play a peripheral role. Officials hostile to the United States, whether inside the U.N. secretariat or in the French and German governments, had a ready pretext to deny support to the United States. Like the Iraqi insurgents, they wish to see the U.S. mission isolated and punished—and the Bush administration's intransigence has played into their hands.

It will now fall almost exclusively to U.S. soldiers to fight the insurgents in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle, and the United States will have to pay most of the cost of humanitarian relief and reconstruction in the coming year. The administration says the help it was seeking from foreign governments will instead come from Iraqis: Tens of thousands of police, security guards and militia are now serving, and tens of thousands more are to be rapidly trained. Yet some of the same challenges that crippled the hunt for international help will also test the latest strategy. The new police and security forces already have come under a concentrated assault by ambush and car bomb—will their slight training and fragile morale prove adequate to withstand the pressure? If U.S. troops do not stay and fight with them, but instead are drawn down during an election year, that seems unlikely. Iraqi recruits also will want to know what they are fighting for. If the answer seems to be a dominating U.S. occupation regime, as opposed to a rapidly emerging Iraqi sovereignty, the commitment of our new comrades in arms may not be much greater than that of the international agencies and allies who lately have been slipping away.

## To the Polls

11-L-0559/OSD/20449

**T**HE ARMCHAIR political analysts and schools with fast-growing enrollments attract

November 4, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Summary

*Advanced copy sent*

In the Iraq summary every week, we need to have a chart that shows total forces in the country, with a line for total, a line for Iraqi, a line for U.S., and a line for coalition.

IRAQ

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/11/03

*Rechel,  
Can you please  
coordinate for us.  
Done  
12/15  
vr / Nose*

420003

U22292 /03

42  
013

November 4, 2003

00015

TO: Larry Di Rita



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D

*Advise  
copy sent*

SUBJECT: Tape CNN

Please get somebody to tape CNN and CNN International today and run it for 24 hours, from 12:01 this morning until 12:00 tonight. Have them count the number of times CNN mentions Americans being killed, missiles, IEDs and the like—how much time they spend on these subjects compared to other news, exempting ads and the like.

Thanks.

U22293 /03

4 NOV 03

DHR:dh  
110403-9

November 13, 2003

◀ INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: 24 Hours of CNN and CNN International Coverage about the War on Terrorism

Summary: On any given day, what kind of coverage do CNN and CNN International (for North America) provide about the war on terrorism and related topics? This memorandum provides a content overview of the 24 hours beginning November 6 at noon. The "real time" events during that time included a just concluded major policy address on the Middle East by the President, the DoD force rotation policy briefing, the memorial service for the servicemembers killed in the crash of an Army Chinook helicopter days earlier; the crash of a Blackhawk helicopter, and the deaths of two other U.S. and one Polish soldier in another incident.

**CNN:**

The coverage day began with 25 minutes of the Rumsfeld/Myers briefing and 20 minutes of analysis of that and the President's Middle East policy speech, followed by 10 minutes of viewer questions to CNN analysts. That turned out to be the single longest chunk of coverage of the day. The words "attack," "ambush," and "incident" were used as descriptive terms in connection with casualty incidents. CNN was careful not to label an event an attack or ambush in its initial reporting. More value-laden and negative terms were used by commentators in "Crossfire" type segments. These included one call for the Secretary's resignation, one use of the term "imminent threat" and one use of the term "IED" during this coverage day.

Overall, CNN cited these and other events as follows:

- President's Middle East speech: 20 news segments lasting a minute or more and numerous other brief mentions. This topic led the news until reporting began on the Blackhawk crash.
- Crash of Blackhawk helicopter: 20 news segments (some of these, especially the first reports, were very short)
- Deaths of US/Polish servicemembers in other incidents: 15 segments
- Force Rotation Policy (usually cited as "troop deployment changes:" 12 segments, most featuring tape of the Secretary, General Myers, or General Schwartz ("Ladies and gentleman, we are at war ...").
- Chinook deaths memorial service: 10 news segments with videotape
- President signs \$87.5 authorization bill: 8 segments
- Dereliction of duty charges against Army Sergeant Pogany: 5 segments
- Did Saddam seek a last minute peace deal? 4 segments

- Kite festival lifts spirits of children: 3 segments
- “On patrol” with U.S. forces in Falujah: 3 news segments (with CNN reporter accompanying a unit)
- US forces conduct raids/make arrests: 3 segments
- Was Massoud’s assassination linked to 9/11? 2 news segments

**CNN International (CNN/I):**

Despite CNN International’s different emphasis, Iraq/war on terrorism items, especially the President’s Middle East speech, lead most of the newscasts. The state of emergency in Sri Lanka supplanted that in some CNN/I newscasts. Even with this more international outlook, Secretary Powell’s trip to the Sudan prompted coverage only once during the 24 hours.

Overall, CNN/I cited war on terrorism related events as follows. The fact that the number of news segments is generally higher than for CNN is due to CNN/I’s continuing live overnight news programming compared to CNN’s taped rebroadcasting of earlier programming.

- President’s Middle East speech: 40+ news segments
- Crash of Blackhawk helicopter: 22 segments
- Deaths of US/Polish servicemembers in other incidents: 21 segments
- Force rotation/troop deployment policy: 20 segments
- President signs \$87.5 authorization bill: 10 segment
- Was Massoud’s assassination linked to 9/11? 9 news segments
- US forces conduct raids/make arrests: 8 segments
- Chinook deaths memorial service: 7 segments
- Did Saddam seek a last minute peace deal? 7 segments
- “On patrol” with U.S. forces in Falujah: 2 news segments (with CNN reporter accompanying a unit)
- Kite festival lifts spirits of children: 1 segment
- Dereliction of duty charges against Army Sergeant Pogany: 3 segments (including an entire edition of the 30 minute program, “Insight”)

November 4, 2003

383.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Detainees

I need to have a briefing on detainees in both Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. I am concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

4 NOV 03

U22294 /03

October 31, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee  
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson

080.915D

I had a talk with Congressman Dave Hobson of Ohio, a member of the House Appropriations Committee—who serves as Chairman of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, which deals with our nuclear issues. He also is a member of the Defense Subcommittee. Apparently he had some meetings with David Chu that he did not feel closed the loop for him. I told him I would ask the two of you give him a call and meet with him soon to walk through the things he is concerned about.

He has concerns about Guard and Reserve quality of life issues that he feels are adversely affecting us. He believes deeply that we are not doing the right things. I am persuaded that the two of you are working very hard to do the right thing and that a meeting with him would be mutually beneficial.

Please let me know how the meeting comes out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 103003-27

.....  
 Please respond by 11/21/03

3102T03

U22295 /03

November 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Report on Security Organizations

Please fashion a weekly report with some granularity as to what is happening in each of the five security organizations in Iraq—whether they are getting paid, properly equipped, etc.

We are staking a lot on their success. I need to know what is going on. Please put together such a report and see that I start getting it weekly. I was amazed when we were told they weren't getting paid.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-3

*OB*  
*11/20*

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

4N8004

U22296 /03

November 4, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Supplemental

110.01

How can we accelerate the money coming from the Supplemental?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

U22297 /03

4 NOV 03

NOVEMBER 4, 2003

000.7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Russert

Please get me the quote from *Meet the Press* and the citation—the actual article where Tim Russert quoted I believe Congressman Wolf and Charles Hagel on Sunday. I want to see the actual quote. I think it was from the *Washington Post*, but I am not sure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03 *OB*  
*11/6*

49004

U22298 /03

November 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Intel

1. I want to know what exists as to France and Russia advising Saddam Hussein pre-war, according to the Tariq Aziz interview and others' interrogations.
2. I also want to know about the seized Iraqi intel files.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110403-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

400003

U22299 /03

Snowflake

November 6, 2003

Call  
11/10  
380.01

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Sweep House

*Advance copy sent*

Should our house be swept occasionally? I don't believe it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110603-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

Sir,

Info attached.

V/R (b)(6)

U22300 /03

6 NOV 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20460

7 Nov 2003

✓  
11/10

**MEMO FOR SECDEF**

**SUBJECT: Technical Sweeps**

Sir,

We conduct comprehensive semi-annual technical inspections of your residence. This normally takes 2-3 days. As it is comprehensive and somewhat intrusive, we normally conduct these inspections when you and Mrs Rumsfeld are traveling. The last comprehensive one was conducted between 12-13 Sep 2003 while you and Mrs Rumsfeld were in New York City.

In addition to the comprehensive inspections, we also conduct periodic technical monitoring at your residence at events that you host that we think might be lucrative targets for a technical attack. The last two events that we monitored were two dinners that you hosted in Mar 2003.

As of this date, nothing of significance has been noted during the inspections.

(b)(7)(E)

We also had a tech team conduct an initial assessment on the property at St Michaels and they will periodically perform inspections at that residence. Additionally, they conduct inspections at the Taos property prior to your arrival on planned visits.

V/R

  
(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20461

November <sup>6</sup>~~5~~, 2003

0914

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Arabic Language Training

I would like a report on the extent to which the Services and DoD have accelerated Arabic language training since 9/11 and what the current status is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110503-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

6 NOV 03

U22301 /03

November <sup>6</sup> 8, 2003

334 NSC

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PC and NSC Meetings

I would like to see some aggregation of what Rachel has, to show how egregious what has been going on really is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110503-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*Done  
12/15*

608003

U22302 /03

DEC. 5. 2003 4:34PM 5PM 6969

In reply refer to EF-7728 and I# 03/016593

December 4, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Nagorno Problem in Azerbaijan

The new President of Azerbaijan points out that the Nagorno problem is not getting solved with the three-headed committee with three chairs—namely, the US, France and Russia. It is a formula for nothing to happen, and he says that is basically what has been going on for ten years—nothing happening.

It seems to me that if we get the right kind of diplomatic effort, it is at least worth a try to see if the potential booming economic circumstance of Azerbaijan might be enough to solve the problem.

Please think about it and see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dk  
120463-16 (in comment)  
120403-16

Please respond by

1/17/04

Response attached

C 12/23

422304-03

A118-2

Azerbaijan  
4 Dec 03

November 6, 2003

✓  
IRAQ

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Internet to Iraq

Do we have a system whereby we are using the internet to communicate in Arabic with Iraqis and with people in the neighboring countries around Iraq?

I assume we are doing something like that. I would be curious to know what we put on there and what it looks like, and maybe get some person to evaluate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110503-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Noseny  
11/19*

6 NOV 03

U22305 /03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

COALITION  
PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY  
REPRESENTATIVE

November 19, 2003

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Internet to Iraq

You asked if we have a system whereby we are using the Internet to communicate in Arabic with Iraqis and with people in neighboring countries around Iraq.

We know of four U.S government Internet sites in Arabic:

- The State Departments' international web page (<http://usinfo.state.gov>) covers U.S. policy worldwide, but is organized geographically. The English sections on the Middle East and Iraq drew just over 500,000 page views last month while the Arabic pages had about 40,000 page views.
- The State Department's magazine pointed at Arabic youth, "Hi," has a parallel website, [www.himag.com](http://www.himag.com). By design, it is not policy oriented. Page view data is not readily available.
- USAID has a website in Arabic ([www.usaid.gov/iraq](http://www.usaid.gov/iraq)). It draws about 24,000 page views monthly. About 75 percent of them go to the Contracts and Grants page.
- The CPA website ([www.cpa-iraq.com](http://www.cpa-iraq.com)) brings in about 1.1 million page views per month. Everything on the site since mid-October also appears in Arabic, but current site organization does not permit us to tell how many are reading the Arabic (we are changing that). We do know that we get 40,000 hits a month from Jordan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, but have no measure of hits from Iraq. Our top four destinations are: Solicitations, Orders and Regulations, Fulbright Scholarships and Business Center.

Overall assessment: The CPA website is where people look for Iraq information. Most of them look for technical information, but with content expansion and improvement we can increase the number of visitors and attract their interest to other, "freighted," material.

November 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Status Report

*IRAQ*

Please make sure all members of the Cabinet get the unclassified Iraq status working papers every week.

In the bump slip to them, suggest they might want to pass it around to their spouses or officemates, people they work with, and if they would like other copies to let us know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110603-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*6100003*

U22306 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20467

NOVEMBER 0, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Force Rotation

The force rotation meeting was a real disappointment for me yesterday. The idea that taxpayers pay for 1.4 million men and women in uniform on active duty and another 800,000 plus Guard and Reserve, and that with only 128,000 forces in Iraq we have to send 2,000 to 3,000 Marines back who have only been out of Iraq for seven months is inexcusable.

The fact that we don't have more usable, more deployable forces out of 2.2 million active and Reserve and that we have to send several thousand Marines back for the second time when we only have 128,000 over there is beyond comprehension. There is something fundamentally wrong with the way we are organizing and managing our force.

What do you propose?

DHR:dh  
110603-8

*U*

*OB*

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*12/15*

6 NOV 03

U22307 /03

November 6, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Helicopters

Do our helicopters in Iraq have defenses?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110603-15

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

OB  
H/20

620003

U22308 /03

November 6, 2003

Hungary

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Hungary

Why aren't we training people in Hungary? Couldn't we increase the output if we did?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110603-14



Please respond by 11/14/03

6 NOV 03

U22309 /03

November 10<sup>10</sup> 7, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Navy Nuclear 4-Star

I think it is time to end the 8-year assignment for the Navy nuclear 4-star and possibly move it to a 3-star.

Please talk to Vern Clark and Gordon England, and see what we might want to propose next year by way of legislative change.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-8

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

210NAVY (384)

10NOV03

U22310 /03

November 12, 2003

006

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Marine Corps Birthday

Why did Paul Wolfowitz know about the Marine Corps birthday party yesterday and I didn't?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-9

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*✓*  
*11/12*

*SecDef —*  
*Response attached.*

*C 11/10*

10 NOV 03

U22311 /03

SP3  
11/14  
Cillis

10  
November 7, 2003

✓ 11/17

Centcom

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commanders Reporting

You heard Paul Wolfowitz suggest there be some sort of a report from commanders to Abizaid telling him what they are trying to accomplish between now and the time they leave the country. Is that a good idea?

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
110703-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

14 NOV 03

FOR SECDEF —

SIR,  
JOHN ABIZAID WILL BE DISCUSSING  
THIS TOPIC WITH HIS COMMANDERS BOTH  
DURING HIS COMMANDER-COMMANDER  
CONFERENCE IN TAMPA NEXT WEEK  
AND WITH THEM IN THEATER.

VR/  
T.E.

U22312 /03

COPY TO: DEARBORN, C5C3, GEN ABIZAID

A127-2

10 NOV 03

November <sup>10</sup>7, 2003

319.3

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Warwick Study

Please get me a copy of the Warwick Study—all the materials, who was on it, what it was about. I have to get my arms around this. We are just getting creamed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-13

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

U22313 /03

10 NOV 03

November <sup>10</sup> 7, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore  
 Larry Di Rita

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Senator McCain

I would like to set up another meeting with Senator McCain in the next week or two to talk about stress on the force. We will need about 45 minutes.

I would like to go through my stress on the force memo and have Pete Schoomaker brief on all the things we are doing in the Army—how we are reducing stress, etc.

We would probably need Mike Hagee and Pete Pace or Dick Myers there as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-14

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

18 NOV 03

U22314 /03

C 11/10

November 10, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Film from Iraq

We have to get more film showing what is going on in Iraq and make it available here for television.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/18/03

11/11 ✓  
11/11

SecDef -

Agree. Soon, we will have our own broadcast quality satellite capability. That will help. Also, we are adding combat camera teams, to work with close direction from BG Kimmitt, who is going out as a new spokesman for military ops. We are relaxing rules on use of our future, where appropriate, too.

10NOV03

U22315 /03 11-L-0559/OSD/20476

D. Rita

November 10, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Breakfast w/McCain

Please don't forget that we want to have a breakfast with McCain and go over the end strength memo and talk about stress on the force.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111003-12

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/03

320.2

16 NOV 03

U22316 /03

November 10, 2003

000.715D

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: MI-5

When the head of MI-5 comes to the U.S again, I would like to meet with her. I am told it would be smart if you did as well.

Let's try to set that up when she is back here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111003-14

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/03

*Response Attached*

*COLTS*

*11/13*

*11/14 →*

10 NOV 03

U22317 /03

11/12/2003 2:18 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone 

SUBJECT: MI-5

Sir,

In response to your memo of 10 November 2003 (attached):

- I had dinner with her when she was here
- I am trying to arrange meetings in London in early December to followup on the paper on Iraq the UK gave Condi
- Will keep you posted

11-L-0559/OSD/20479

November 10, 2003

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq and Afghanistan Reports

Please send Marty Hoffmann the unclassified Iraq and Afghanistan weekly reports on a regular basis. Please send Jim Denny one copy of each just this one time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111003-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/18/03

*Done  
12/15*

10 NOV 03

U22318 /03

November 10, 2003

✓ 11/25

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Phone Call w/Jay Garner

*Advance copy sent (scheduling for 11/19)*

000.7

I would like to talk to Jay Garner on the phone sometime. Please don't tell him, but I want to talk to him about the *New York Times Magazine* piece.

Please set it up for today or tomorrow. *(Jay Garner is on travel 11/10-11/14)*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111003-10

.....  
Please respond by 11/11/03

(b)(6)  
*is this OBE?*  
*C 11/22*

*Sir, Mr. Di Rita will work this. Not required @ this time.*  
*rr/cdr N 11/24*  
*C 11/24*

U22319 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/20481

Snowflake

**FILE**

Snowflake # 03/015643  
Congressional # 03/015370  
EF-7521

November 10, 2003

U18353-03

WSD.09

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Response to SSCI

Here is a letter from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence saying you still owe some information. It seems to me you ought to wrap this up pretty soon and provide what you said you would.

Please discuss this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/30/03 SSCI ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
11003-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/18/03

Policy ExecSec's Note

December 15, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- Mr. Feith discussed this issue with SecDef at today's round table.
- USDP will meet w/ DepSecDef to review the draft responses to Sen. Rockefeller's questions.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

**COMPLETED**

DEC 15 2003

12-11-03 13:03 IN

**U22320 /03**

10 NOV 03

PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

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SABRY CHAMBLISE, GEORGIA  
JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN  
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
EVAN BATH, INDIANA  
JOHN EDWARDS, NORTH CAROLINA  
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND

# United States Senate

SSCI#2003-5051-A

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476

BILL Frist, TENNESSEE, EX OFFICIO  
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA, EX OFFICIO

BILL DURRKE, STAFF DIRECTOR  
CHRISTOPHER K. MELLON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KATHLEEN P. MCNEIL, CHIEF CLERK

December 5, 2003


The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On October 30, 2003, Chairman Roberts and I wrote to you requesting your assistance in obtaining responses to questions-for-the-record submitted to Undersecretary Douglas Feith after his July 10 appearance before the Committee. This appearance was part of the Senate Intelligence Committee's ongoing review of prewar intelligence on Iraq. Subsequently, I spoke with Undersecretary Feith who expressed concern about the breadth of the information identified in the questions. The Committee's Minority Staff Director, Chris Mellon, contacted the Legislative Affairs Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss ways to narrow the scope of the request. Mr. Mellon has received no response to this offer.

I am willing to work with Undersecretary Feith's office to reach an accommodation, but the lack of responsiveness is unacceptable. I ask that you intercede to ensure that the Committee receives the answers as soon as possible. The Committee inquiry will be incomplete without this information and we will be unable to assure the nation that we have explored every avenue of inquiry. Thank you for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,



John D. Rockefeller IV  
Vice Chairman

Snowflake # 03/015643  
Congressional # 03/015370  
EF-7521

November 10, 2003

U18353-03

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Response to SSCI

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Please discuss this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/30/03 SSCI ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
111003-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/18/03

12-11-03 13:03 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20484

PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH  
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EVAN BAYH, INDIANA  
JOHN EDWARDS, NORTH CAROLINA  
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476

SSCI#2003-5051-A

BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE, EX OFFICIO  
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA, EX OFFICIO

BILL DUNNICK, STAFF DIRECTOR  
CHRISTOPHER K. MELLON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

December 5, 2003

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Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

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Sincerely,



John D. Rockefeller IV  
Vice Chairman

11-L-0559/OSD/20485

November 10, 2003

W  
W  
W

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Geren on a CODEL

If he has never been to Baghdad, Pete Geren would be a good one to go along with one of these CODELs. I think it is helpful to get more people out there like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111003-17

.....  
Please respond by 11/28/03

11/24

————— Pete Geren  
fy1

Larry Di Rita  
11/24

10 NOV 03

U22321 /03

Snowflake

EF-7508

12/10

In reply refer to EF-7508 and I# 03/015610

November 7, 2003

Germany

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Germany

Here is a plea from Germany for a request. Please take a look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

AFP Story: "Germany Willing to Train Iraqi Soldiers, Police" 20031030

DHR:dh  
110703-10

.....  
Please respond by 11/28/03

Ref X04364-03

✓  
12/12

Attached.  
Attachment included

DR Nossy  
12/10/03

U22322 /03

10-11-03 15:53 IN

16 NOV 03

UNCLASSIFIED

✓  
117

DOCUMENT\_ID: OW42330513  
DOCCLASS: U  
VENDOR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
DOR: 20031030  
TOR: 160330  
TITLE: Germany willing to train Iraqi soldiers, police: minister  
PUBNAME: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
PUBLISHR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
PUENO: e0781  
ORIGDATE: 200310301926  
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH  
TOPLINES:

TUNIS, Oct 30 (AFP) - Germany is willing to provide military and police training to Iraqi personnel but will not deploy any of its own troops in the war-shattered country, Defence Minister Peter

HEADER:

e0781 tm--p  
r i Iraq-Germany 10-30 0260

TEXT:

Germany willing to train Iraqi soldiers, police: minister

TUNIS, Oct 30 (AFP) - Germany is willing to provide military and police training to Iraqi personnel but will not deploy any of its own troops in the war-shattered country, Defence Minister Peter Struck said here Thursday.

"The aim is to enable the Iraqis to take charge of their own destiny," Struck told journalists at the end of a 24-hour visit to Tunis.

The minister reiterated his government's opposition to sending troops to Iraq and to the US-led military intervention. Germany, France and Russia were among the most vocal opponents of the invasion.

Struck said his country was always willing to train military or police personnel as a contribution to stabilising Iraq. But so far it had received no such request.

Struck signed a military cooperation accord Thursday with Tunisian Defence Minister Dali Jazi covering technology, training, health, sport and cooperation in dealing with natural disasters.

He also held talks with Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. He and the president were agreed on the need to "give more responsibility to the United Nations in Iraq so that the country can have an elected government," Struck said.

He said the two sides had also agreed to exchange information in the fight against international terrorism.

Germany is cooperating with Tunisian authorities in investigations into a bomb attack last year at a synagogue at Djerba in Tunisia that claimed 21 lives, including those of 14 German tourists.

bsh/da/jah  
Iraq-Germany  
AFP 301926 GMT 10 03

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1

11-L-0559/OSD/20488

November 11, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congress

Please get me the material on Lacy Clay. He and some others are calling for my resignation now. I have never heard of him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111103-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/03

032

111103

U22323 /03

November 11, 2003

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Detainees

I need a meeting on detainees both in Iraq and in GTMO to figure out who is in charge of what. I am concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111103-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

**OB**  
**12/8**

U22324 /03

11 NOV 03

November <sup>11</sup>/~~6~~, 2003

000.7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Press

We need a list of people we can tell people in the press to call, instead of calling Frank Wolf and Chuck Hagel. They could call people like Tom Lantos, Jeff Sessions, Mac Thornberry or Mark Kirk—a lot of those.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110603-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

11NOV03

U22325 /03

SecDef guidance →

11/15

Set up meeting w/ Abizaid / CJCS et al to have A4 brief his "war plan" to prevail in this low intensity conflict - a "Franks-Cake" war plan briefing - Thursday, 20 November.

November 12, 2003

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: POTUS Briefing

Advance (unsigned)

(Fax this back to Col Pucci inform CENTCOM, CJCS, VCJCS, DSD)

11/15

I asked Dick Myers and John Abizaid to have that briefing for the President for me and then the President last week. He said they would have it in two weeks, so I cannot believe it is two weeks from yesterday, as you told the PC.

11/16

11/17

I would like to see that they have it ready for me by Wednesday, when I get back from Asia, and then have it ready for the President on Thursday.

Thanks.

Tally

DHR:dh  
111203-9

Please respond by 11/18/03

14 Nov 03

FOR SECDEF

SIR,  
DID NOT WANT TO PUT YOU IN TOO TIGHT A BOX. YOU RETURN ON THE 18TH AND POTUS DEPARTS ON THE 18TH. FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF PRESIDENT WITH YOU PRESENT IS "TWO WEEKS FROM YESTERDAY" WHICH IS MONDAY, 23 NOVEMBER.  
JOHN ABIZAID IS PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU NEXT WEEK PER YOUR GUIDANCE. HE WRAPS UP A COMPONENT COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE ON WEDNESDAY THE 19TH CAN TRAVEL TO DC LATE THAT DAY, AND CAN BRIEF YOU LATE WEDNESDAY OR EARLY THURSDAY. HE COULD ALSO BRIEF A THURSDAY PC IF YOU WANT. HE THEN DEPARTS FOR QATAR AND WOULD BRIEF POTUS VIA VTC ON MONDAY THE 23RD.  
REGARDLESS OF WHEN AND WHO HE BRIEFS, JOHN KNOWS THIS IS THE MILITARY PART OF WHAT WILL GROW TO BE AN INTEGRATED BRIEF ON SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMY, INTELLIGENCE, AND DIPLOMACY.

COPY TO 2 DSD, CJCS, CENTCOM

VR

U22326 103

11/15

November <sup>17</sup>~~12~~, 2003

W  
e  
e

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Footprint Statement

*approved  
to send*

The President has decided to delay a week until he is back from Europe to do the footprint statement. Condi swears he will do it when he gets back. Ugh!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

022327 /03

11NOV03

November <sup>17</sup>~~12~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: MoD Invitations

*approved  
to send*

*092*

Please give me a list of all the pending MoDs invitations to visit countries I have received. I know it is Norway. I believe it is Denmark. I am almost sure it is Romania. I know it is Vietnam and PRC—they were just within the last week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/03

*Done  
12/15*

*11 NOV 03*

U22328 /03

November <sup>17</sup>~~12~~, 2003

*Approved  
to send*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: History of Insurgency

Please find someone in the building who is a historian who can tell me where the classic insurgency has been where the good guys have won—is it Malaysia or the Philippines? Let's find out and see what the lessons learned are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-6

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/03

Malaysia

19 NOV 03

U22329 /03

17  
November 12, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: CIA Briefing

*Approved  
to send*

(b)(3):50 U.S.C § 3024(i),(b)(3):50  
U.S.C § 3507,(b)(6)

of the CIA gave a terrific briefing yesterday on the Iraqis and on  
terrorist jihadists. I want to talk to her someday about how we fashion a solution.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-7

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/03

17 NOV 03

U22330 /03

2:43 AM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Steve Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November <sup>17</sup>~~12~~, 2003

SUBJECT: NSC

334NSC

The National Security Council has developed a pattern of tasking you, Sanchez and individuals in your combatant command directly for participation in meetings, for information and the like. I have advised them that all such contacts with your combatant command should be through John Craddock.

If you receive direct requests, please refer them to LTG John Craddock for handling.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
11/20/03 05P

*OB*  
*11/20*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

19 NOV 03

U22331 /03

✓ 11/2A

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 18, 2003  
RE: Iraq Task List

Please set a meeting for me to meet with Wolfowitz and Pace and whomever else they want to over this Iraqi task list soon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.07

Please respond by: 11/25

SecDef -

Scheduled for Monday,  
8 December, 2:00 - 2:45pm

Ref X04875-03

11/22

18NOV03

U22332 /03

3:25 PM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: November 18, 2003

RE: **Congressional Contacts**

032

The material you give me on congressional contacts is useful but not usable. It is interesting, I am glad to have it, but there is nothing I could summarize in a paragraph or two. I need some bumper stickers that characterize the amount of contact in two or three or four bullet point lines. Please give them to me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.06

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 11/28 \_\_\_\_\_

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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

November 11, 2003, 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Congressional Contacts for 2003

- Attached is a current summary of your congressional contacts during calendar year 2003.

Attachments:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/20500

**SECDEF Contacts with Members of Congress (for CY 2003)**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Members Attending</b>	<b>Other DOD attendees</b>	<b>Duration</b>
Jan 8	Ops/Intel Briefing	RHOB-2118	HASC - 40 Members (Invitations extended - 50)	CJCS, Moore, Geren, Craddock,	1 ½ hrs
Jan 9	Breakfast	Pentagon	Wamer, Levin, Hunter  (Invitations extended - 4)	DepSec, CJCS, Aldridge, Zakheim, Chu, Feith, Moore, Geren, Cambone, Krieg	1 hr
Jan 9	Meeting	H-140 Capitol	Lewis, Murtha	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	1 hr
Jan 15	Hearing	S-407, Capitol	SASC - Warner, Levin, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Coryn, Kennedy, Reed, Akaka, Nelson, Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Landrieu, Bingaman (Invitations extended - 25)	Moore, Clark, Luti	2 hrs
Jan 16	Breakfast	Pentagon	Chambliss, Dole, Ensign, Graham (Invitations extended -9/4)	SecArmy, SecAF, VCJCS, Chu, Moore, Geren, Cambone, Lanzillota, DiRita	1 hr
Jan 23	Breakfast - Congressional contacts, legislative package, nominations	S-230, Capitol	Frist	Moore, Steve Biegun - Frist	1 hr
Jan 23	Briefing - Update on GWOT	S-407, Capitol	72 Senators  (Invitations extended to full Senate)	SecState, DepDCI McLaughlin, Moore, Clarke, Craddock, Luti	1 ½ hr
Jan 27	Briefing	Pentagon	43 House Freshmen  (Invitations extended - 55)	DepSec, SecArmy, SecAF VCJCS, Aldridge, Feith, Chu, Moore, Geren, Zakheim, Livingstone, DiRita	1 hr

Jan 29	Briefing -- Update on GWOT	House Floor	Approximately 360 Members	SecState, DepDCI, Moore	1 hr
Jan 30	Breakfast -- CentCom AOR	Pentagon	Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye, Hunter, Skelton, Murtha (Invitations extended -- 8)	DepSec, CJCS, VCJCS, Franks, Feith, Craddock, DiRita, Moore	1 hr
Feb 3	Briefing -- Budget Roll Out	Pentagon	Warner, Hunter, Young, Lewis (Invitations extended -- 11)	Chu, Zakheim, VCJCS, Moore, Geren, Stanley	2 hrs
Feb 5	Hearing -- Budget	RHOB-2118	Full HASC - 52 Members (Invitations extended -- 61)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	2 ½ hrs
Feb 8	Codel - Wehrkunde	Germany	McCain, Lieberman, Reed, Graham, Dicks, Larson, Dooley, Tauscher, Hamman, Moran, Abercrombie, Udall	Moore	1 ½ hr
Feb 11	Gaming Exercise	NDU	Akin, Andrews, Barrett, Forbes, Frelinghuysen, Frost, Meek, Nethercutt, Nunes, Platts, Tanner, G. Taylor, Turner, Myrick, S. Davis (Invitations extended -- 18)	DepSec, Geren, Moore	45 min
Feb 12	Briefing -- Update on GWOT	RHOB-2212	HAC- D -- J Lewis, Murtha, Young, Hohson, Bonilla, Nethercutt, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiaht, Wicker, Obey, Dicks, Sabo, Moran Invitations extended -- 15)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	3 hrs
Feb 13	Hearing -- Budget	SH-216	SASC -- Warner, Levin, Inhofe, Allard, Sessions, Ensign, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Nelson (FL), Nelson (NE), Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor (Invitations extended -- 25)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	3 hrs

Feb 25	Breakfast – Legislative Package	Pentagon	Kyl	Feith, Moore	40 min
Feb 26	Briefing -- Update on Global War on Terrorism	S-407	63 Senators (Invitations extended to full Senate)	VCJCS, Moore	1 hr
Feb 26	Briefing – Update on Global War on Terrorism	House Floor	Approximately 275 Members Invitations extended to full House	VCJCS, Moore	1 hr
Feb 27	Breakfast – Legislative Package, Cost of War	Pentagon	Cochran, Ensign, Nickles, Sessions (Invitations extended - 12)	DepSec, CJCS, Aldridge, Zakheim, Chu, Moore, Krieg, DiRita	45 min
Mar 4	Breakfast - Force Sizing Construct, Legislative Package	Pentagon	Hunter	DepSec, VCJCS, Cambone, Cartwright, Geren, Moore	1 ½ hr
Mar 18	Meeting – weapon system	Pentagon	Hunter	Moore, Geren, Wynne	10 min
Mar 20	Briefing – War in Iraq	RHOB-2118	More than 250 Members	CJCS, Moore, Esperne, Interagency Briefing Team	1 hr 20 min
Mar 20	Briefing – War in Iraq	S-407	69 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Skardon Interagency Briefing Team	1 hr
Mar 25	Briefing – War in Iraq, Supplemental decision	S-212	Big 8 - Stevens, Inouye, Levin, Warner, Lewis, Murtha, Hunter (Skelton - Missouri)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	45 min
Mar 26	Briefing – War in Iraq	House Floor	More than 300 Members	CJCS, Moore, Geren, Craddock, Esperne, Luti,	55 min
Mar 26	Briefing – War in Iraq	S-407	60 Members	CJCS, Moore, Craddock, Luti, Skardon,	90 min
Mar 27	Hearing - Supplemental	SD-106	SAC - Stevens, Cochran, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Shelby, Gregg, Bennett, Hutchison, DeWine, Brownback, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Durbin, Johnson	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Cartwright, Moore, Clarke	1 hr

Mar 27	Hearing – Supplemental	RHOB-2359	HAC-D- Lewis, Young, Hobson, Bonilla, Nethercutt, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiahrt, Wicker, Murtha, Dicks, Visclosky, Moran	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Cartwright, Moore, Clarke	1 hr
April 1	Meeting - Operation Iraqi Freedom, Supplemental	H-C-6	Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye, Hunter, Skelton, Lewis (Murtha-Pennsylvania)	CJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore	1 ½ hr
April 2	Briefing War in Iraq	S-407	65 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Clarke, Craddock Luti	1 hr 15 min
April 2	Briefing - War in Iraq	House Floor	More than 125 members	CJCS, Moore, Clarke, Craddock	1 hr
April 9	Briefing – War in Iraq	S-407	53 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Clark, Moffit	1 hr
April 9	Briefing - War in Iraq	House Floor	More than 200 members	CJCS, Moore, Clark, Espem	1 hr
April 10	Meeting - War in Iraq, Supplemental, Transformation package	H-230, Capitol	House Leadership – Hastert, DeLay, Blunt, Pryce, Cantor, Pelosi, Hoyer	CJCS, Moore	1 hr
April 24	Meeting – Transformation Package	Pentagon	Warner	DepSec, CJCS, Moore, Wynne, Abell, Lanzillotta	45 min
April 25	Lunch	Pentagon	Kirk	Durnan	25 min
May 7	Breakfast – Mark-up Issues	RHOB-2212	Hunter, Weldon, Hefley, Saxton, McHugh, Everett, McKeon, Skelton, Ortiz, Taylor, Meehan, Reyes, Snyder	Moore, Clarke	45 min
May 8	Meeting – Iraq	S-230	Frist, Daschle, Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye	Franks, Moore,	20 min
May 8	Briefing – Iraq	S-407	48 Senators	Franks, Moore	45 min
May 8	Meeting – Iraq	H-323	DeLay, Pelosi, Blunt, Hoyer, Pryce, Menendez, Hunter, Skelton, Lewis, Murtha	Franks, Moore	20 min
May 8	Briefing – Iraq	House Floor	More than 150 Members	Franks, Moore	45min
May 15	Meeting	Pentagon	Davis, Tom	DepSec, Chu, Geren, Moore	½ hr

May 20	Briefing – Transformation Package	HC-7	Tuesday Group – Bass, Bradley, T. Davis, Dunn, Ehlers, English, Frelinghuysen, Gilchrest, Gillmor, Hobson, Houghton, Kirk, Kolbe, Nethercutt, Quinn, Saxton, Shays, Simmons, Visclosky	Dubois, Chu, Moore, Clarke Geren, Esperne	1/3 hr
May 20	Briefing – Transformation Package		Senate Policy - Alexander, Allard, Allen, Bennett, Bond, Brownback, Bunning, Burns, Campbell, Chafee, Chambliss, Cochran, Coleman, Collins, Cornyn, Craig, Crapo, DeWine, Dole, Domenici, Enzi, Frist, Graham, Grassley, Gregg, Hatch, Hutchison, Inhofe, Kyl, Lott, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski, Nickles, Roberts, Santorum, Sessions, Shelby, G Smith, Specter, Stevens, Sununu, Talent, Thomas, Warner	Moore, Moffitt	½ hr
May 20	Constituents fly in	LJ162	LaHood	Moore	½ hr
May 21	Briefing – Transformation Package	H-230	House Rep. Leadership - Hastert, DeLay, Blunt, Pryce, Cantor, Cox, Tauzin, Ney, Nussle, Young, Feeney, Ose, Doolittle, Kingston, Myrick, Reynolds, Portman, Drier, Hoyer	CJCS, CNO, Chu, Moore, Dubois, Geren, Esperne	½ hr
May 21	Meeting – Transformation Package	H-122	House Rep. Policy - Beauprez, Blackburn, Burgess, Camp, Cole, Collins, Cox, Cunningham, Davis, Ehlers, Flake, Graves, Harris, Hayes, Hunter, Kennedy, King, Rohrabacher, Royce, Schrock, Shadegg, Shuster, Tiberi, Vitter, Walden, Weldon, Wicker, Roger	Moore	40 min

May 30	Meeting – Syria	Pentagon	Lantos	Moore	½ hr
June 3	Meeting – BRAC, Conference Issues	Pentagon	Hunter	CJCS, Chu, DuBois, Moore, Geren	45 min
June 4	Meeting – Update on Iraq	H-118	SOS/Chowder & Marching Group – Bass, Ehlers, Frelinghuysen, Goss, Lewis (CA), Johnson, Regula, Shays, Shimkus (17 former members)	Geren	1 hr
June 4	Hearing – NSPS	SD-342	Senate Gov't Affairs – Collins, Voinovich, Specter, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Sununu, Stevens, Levin, Akaka, Durbin, Carper, Lautenberg, Pryor	CJCS, CNO, Chu, Clarke	½ hr
June 5	Meeting – Defense Bill	Pentagon	Blunt	Moore, Geren	½ hr
June 5	Meeting – Defense Bill	Pentagon	Delay	Moore, Geren	½ hr
June 5	Briefing – Ops/Intel	RHOB-2118	60 Members	CJCS, Moore, Cartwright	1 hr 45 min
June 19	Breakfast – Conference Issues & Confirmations	Pentagon	Warner	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	45 min
June 24	Breakfast – Conference Issues	Pentagon	Warner, Levin, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Nelson (FL), Dayton, Nelson (NE), Graham (SC), Talent	DepSec, Chu, Moore, CJCS, Gen. Keane, CNO, General Myers, General Keane, Admiral Clark, Gen. Foglesong, DuBois, Lanzilotta, Geren, Moffitt	1 ½ hr
June 24	Meeting – DoD Issues	S-128	Stevens	One on one	45 min
June 24	Meeting – DoD Issues	S-239	Inouye	One on one	45 min
June 26	Breakfast – Conference Issues	Pentagon	Hunter	DepSec, CJCS, Chu, Cambone, Wynne, Moore, Geren	30 min
June 26	Meeting – Conference Issues	Capitol – STM-2	Warner, Levin, Hunter, Skelton	CJCS, Chu, Zakheim, Wynne, Moore, Geren	45 min

June 27	Briefing -- Ops/Intel	S-407	Frist, Stevens, Allard, Burns, Hutchinson, Sessions, Craig, Warner, Bennett, Voinovich, Bond, Levin, Bingaman, Reed, Akaka, Kennedy, Dayton, Corzine	CJCS, Dep DCI, Moore	1 ½ hr
Jul 9	Hearing – Operation Iraqi Freedom	SH-216	Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambiss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Nelson (FL), Nelson (NE), Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor	Franks, Moore	4 hrs
Jul 10	Breakfast – ITAR Exemption for UK, Train and Equip	Pentagon	Hyde	DepSec, VCJCS, Zakheim, Crouch, Moore	45 min
Jul 11	Signing Ceremony	Pentagon	Brown (SC), Michaud, Reyes	SecLabor, VCJCS, Chu, Abell, Moore	15 min
Jul 23	Briefing - Ops/Intel	House Floor	More than 65 Members	CJCS, Keane, Moore	1 ½ hr
Jul 24	Breakfast – Iraq, Appropriations	Pentagon	Lewis, Murtha	DepSec, Lanzillotta, Cartwright, Moore	45 min
Jul 30	Briefing - Ops/Intel	S-407	36 Senators	VCJCS, Gen. Keane, Moore, Moffitt	1 ½ hr
Jul 30	Meeting – NSPS	S-128	Stevens	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	40 min
Jul 30	Meeting – NSPS	S-239	Inouye	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	30 min
Jul 31	Breakfast – SecAF nomination	Pentagon	McCain	DepSec, VCJCS, Wynne, Moore	40 min
Aug 4	Breakfast – Iraq	Pentagon	Lugar	CJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore	40 min
Sept 10	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	63 Senators	SecState, OMB Director, CJCS, Zakheim, Jeffery Moore	1 hr

Sept 10	Briefing Ops/Intel	RHOB-2118	More than 90 Members	DepSec, DepSecState, CJCS, OMB Director, Zakheim,, Moore	1 hr
Sept 11	9/11 Commemoration	Pentagon Chapel	Frist, Hastert, Daschle, Pelosi, Hoyer	CJCS, Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moore and others.	1 hr
Sept 15	Lunch – nominations	Pentagon	Warner	DepSec, VCJCS, Cambone, Moore	45 min
Sept 16	Breakfast -- Defense Authorization Bill	Pentagon	Ben Nelson	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	45 min
Sept 21	Meeting w/Leadership on FY04 Supplemental	Pentagon	Frist, Warner, Stevens, Murtha	Bremer, Moore, Lanzillota, Korologos, Jeffrey	1 hr
Sept 24	Hearing -- Supplemental	SD-106	SAC-Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Shelby, Bennett, Campbell, Craig, Hutchison, Brownback, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Reid, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Durbin, Johnson	CJCS, Gen Abizaid, Zakheim, Moore	6 hrs
Sept 25	Meeting – Supplemental	RHOB-2168	Defense Study Group - Thornberry, Snyder, Bartlett, Cooper, Gerlach, Hart, Israel, Kennedy, Langevin, Meehan, Myrick, Pearce, Cunningham, Burgess	Zakheim, Moore	45 min
Sept 29	Meeting – Iraq	Pentagon	Wolf	One - on - One	30 min
Sept 30	Breakfast – Supplemental	Pentagon	Bond, Bennett, Alexander	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	1 hr

Sept 30	Hearing – Supplemental	RHOB-2359	HAC/D – Lewis, Young, Hobson, Bonilla, Nethercutt, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiahrt, Wicker, Obey, Murtha, Dicks, Sabo, Visclosky, Moran	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore, Stanley	2 hrs
Oct 2	Breakfast- Supplemental	Pentagon	Lewis, Murtha	DepSec, CJCS, Moore, Lanzillotta, Oliver	45 min
Oct 16	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	McConnell, Thomas, Craig, Chafee,	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Feith, Moore, Korologos	45 min
Oct 21	Briefing Ops/Intel	RHOB-2128	45 Members	VCJCS, Luti, Craddock, Moore, Esperne	2 hr
Oct 22	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	Upton, Saxton, Houghton, Kline, Turner-TX	CJCS, Feith, Lanzillotta, Moore, DiRita	45 min
Oct 22	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	39 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Moffitt	1 hr
Oct 24	Lunch	Pentagon	Warner		45 min
Oct 30	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	Pryce, Ros-Lehtinen, Dunn, Kelly-NY, Blackburn, Harris, Hooley, McCarthy	DepSec, CJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore	45 min
Nov 4	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	Royce, Lantos, King-NY, Chabot, Bums	DepSec, VCJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore, DiRita	45 min
Nov 5	Meeting – Roche Nomination	SR-225	Warner	Moore	15 min
Nov 6	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	Thornberry, Snyder, Cole, Barrett, King-IA, Bordallo	DepSec, VCJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore, Geren, DiRita	45 min
Nov 7	Breakfast – Iraq, Troop Strength	Pentagon	McCain	VCJCS, Schoomaker, Hagee, Moore	30 min

**Total - 94**

**Briefings – 30**

**Breakfasts – 24**

**Meetings – 23**

**Hearings – 9**

**Lunch – 3**

**Other - 5**

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: November 18, 2003  
 RE: **Child Development Center Fee Schedule**

600

What do the categories "I through VI" mean on the left column of the attached

Is this for one child or any number of children? If you have three children, and the weekly rate is \$107.00, that is prohibitive, if it is the same for all three.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.12

*Attach: Child Development Center Schedule*

Please respond by: 11/21

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**Child Development Center Fee Schedule School Year 2004**

Category	Total Family Income	Weekly Rate	Hourly Rate	1 <sup>st</sup> and 15 <sup>th</sup> Bi-monthly Rate
I	\$0-28,000	\$64.00	\$1.28	\$138.67
II	28,001-34,000	78.00	1.56	169.00
III	34,001-44,000	94.00	1.88	203.67
IV	44,001-55,000	107.00	2.14	231.83
V	55,001-70,000	124.00	2.48	268.67
VI	70,001+	142.00	2.84	307.67

Provided by Lt Gen Chandler - Child  
Care Cost @ Elmerford AFB  
C 11/18

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

✓ 11/20

TO: Brett Kavanaugh, Staff Secretary

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 18, 2003

RE: **Draft Speech in London - Draft #3**

350.001

Generally, the speech seems good to me, but I do have these few thoughts:

1. Page 2, at the top of draft #3 reference is made to the "puritans". My recollection is that the puritans were driven from England as religious fanatics. So while it sounds fine in a speech, it may have historical implications that are not desirable and could undermine the point he is trying to make.
2. At the bottom of page 2, draft #3, I am uncomfortable linking Dresden with Munich and Auschwitz. It is a bad fit.
3. On page 7, in the second paragraph, the last few sentences could leave the impression that he is calling some of our Arab allies tyrants. That could be dropped without losing anything.
4. Page 8, in the second full paragraph, the second line, the word "jihadists" is used. It has a negative connotation when we use it. The problem with using it, however, is that it tends to have a positive connotation in the Muslim world. Therefore, you may want to not use it.
5. In the next to the last paragraph on page 8, I've been using 23 million people for the population. You may want to check it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.20

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/20512

**Remarks at the Banqueting House  
Whitehall Palace, London  
Wednesday, November 19, 2003 //  
Draft #3**

**Mr. Prime Minister, Lords, Members of the House of Commons, distinguished guests: Thank you for the very kind welcome you have given to me and to Mrs. Bush. I thank you, Rear Admiral Cobbold, for the introduction, and the Royal United Services Institute for hosting us today. We are honored to be in your country, and we bring the good wishes of the American people.**

**It was pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit London stayed in a glass box dangling over the Thames. A few might have been happy to provide similar arrangements for me. I thank the Queen for interceding, and we are honored to be staying at her house.**

**Laura and I have been to London a number of times, but never before in this grand building – the very place where Charles the First lost his crown, and more. I appreciate the history. I have my doubts about the symbolism.**

**Americans traveling to England always observe more similarities to our country than differences. I have been here only a short time, but I've noticed that the tradition of free speech, exercised with enthusiasm, is alive and well in London. We have that at home, too. And, Mr. Prime Minister, I hear they now have that right in Baghdad as well.**

**The people of Great Britain might also see some familiar traits in Americans. We are sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error, it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists, who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island – by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, and the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy to fight and end the trade in slaves. It is rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That is in part because the Good News was translated by Tyndale, and preached by Wesley, and lived out in the example of William Booth. At times, Americans are even**

said to have a Puritan streak. And where might that have come from? Well, we can start with the Puritans.

*Puritans were  
Driven  
from  
England  
as  
religious  
fanatics*

To this fine heritage Americans have added a few traits of our own over two centuries: the good influence of our immigrants and the spirit of the frontier. Yet there remains an image of England in every American. So much of our national character comes from you, and we are glad of it.

This fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in open societies, ordered by religious and moral conviction. We believe in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that reward effort ... and communities that protect the weak ... and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and rights of all. And whether one learns these ideals in County Durham or in west Texas, they instill mutual respect, and they inspire common pursuits. More than an alliance of security and commerce, the British and American peoples have an alliance of values. And this old and tested alliance is strong.

The deepest beliefs of our nations set the direction of our foreign policy. We value our own civil rights, and so we stand for the human rights of others. We affirm the God-given dignity of every person, and so we are moved to action by poverty, and oppression, and famine, and disease. The United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the cynical pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom, and the peace that freedom brings. Together, our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal, in a distant land, at this very hour. And America honors the courage and idealism of the sons and daughters of Britain.

The last President to stay at Buckingham Palace was an idealist without question. At a dinner hosted by King George the Fifth in 1918, Woodrow Wilson made a pledge. With typical American understatement, he vowed that right and justice would become, quote, "the predominant and controlling force in the world." President Wilson had come to Europe with his Fourteen Points for peace. The Prime Minister of France complained that even God Himself only had Ten Commandments. You see, back then the French were actually critical of American policy.

At Wilson's high point of idealism, however, Europe was one short generation from Munich, and Auschwitz and Dresden. Looking back, we

*morally equivalent?*

*A183-4*

see the reasons why. The League of Nations, lacking both credibility and will, collapsed at the first challenge of the dictators. Free nations failed to recognize, much less confront, the aggressive evil in plain sight. And so dictators went about their business, feeding resentments and anti-Semitism ... bringing death to innocent people in this city and across Europe ... and filling the last century with violence and genocide.

Through World War and Cold War, we learned that idealism, if it is to do any good in this world, requires common purpose, and moral courage, and patience in difficult tasks. And now our generation has need of these qualities.

On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country. With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, and understandable, and false. The attacks on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Mombassa, Najaf, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul were not dreams. They were part of a global and systematic campaign by terrorist networks to intimidate and demoralize all who oppose them. These terrorists target the innocent and kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished.

The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists and the dictators who aid them. The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial. Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and thereby defeat them.

The peace and security of free nations now rest on three pillars:

First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world – from lifting up failed states to opposing proliferation. The United States and Great Britain have labored hard to make the United Nations what it is supposed to be – an effective instrument of our collective security. We sought and gained two resolutions on Iraq – Resolutions 1441 and 1511 – precisely because global dangers demand a global response.

*historic*

*There were other good UNSCRs, too: 1483, 1500. A183-5*

The United Nations has no more compelling advocate than your Prime Minister, who at every turn has championed its ideals and appealed to its authority. The course that others have sometimes chosen – the course of delay and deadlock – was less helpful. It is fair to ask: Who are the true friends of the United Nations – those who seek to enforce its resolutions, or those who contrive to obstruct them? After all, the credibility of the United Nations depends on a willingness to keep our word, and to act when action is necessary. America and Great Britain have done, and will do, all in our power to prevent the United Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance, and inviting the fate of the League of Nations. It is not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions – we must meet those dangers with resolve.

Like 11 presidents before me, I believe in the international institutions and alliances that America helped to form and helps to lead. In this century as in the last, nations can accomplish more together than apart. For 54 years, America has stood with our partners in NATO. Because we are committed to this great democratic alliance, we believe it must have the will and capacity to act beyond Europe, wherever threats emerge. America is also cooperating with many nations to meet the dangers posed by North Korea and Iran. Our first choice, and our constant practice, is to work with other responsible governments. We understand as well that the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to the forms alone – by the tidiness of the process – but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure.

The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to restrain aggression and evil by force. There are principled objections to the use of force in every generation, and I credit the good motives of all who desire peace. Those in authority, however, are not judged only by good motivations. The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force alone.

Most in the peaceful West have no living memory of that kind of world. Yet in some countries, the memories are recent. The victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans – those who survived the rapists and death squads – had few qualms when force was applied to rid them of Milosevic. The women of Afghanistan – imprisoned in their homes, beaten in the

streets, and executed in public spectacles – did not reproach us for routing the Taliban with our Special Forces and your Royal Marines. The inhabitants of Iraq's Ba'athist hell – with its lavish palaces and its torture chambers, its massive statues and its mass graves – do not miss their fugitive dictator. And when the dictator's sons, who brought so much violence and grief to others, met a violent end, the nation of Iraq rejoiced.

In all these cases, military action was preceded by diplomatic initiatives, and negotiations, and ultimatums, and final chances until the final moment. In Iraq, the dictator was given year after year to account for his weapons programs and end the nightmare for his people. Now the resolutions he defied have been enforced. And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he was arming? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just place, and less dangerous, without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world? And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes instead of committing more.

It has been said that those who live near a police station find it hard to believe in the triumph of violence. In the same way, some Europeans might be tempted to take for granted the peaceful and orderly societies they have come to know. European unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there is an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us never forget how Europe's unity was achieved – by armies of liberation and armies of defense. And let Europe never forget: Beyond these borders, in a world where oppression and violence are very real, liberation is still a moral goal, and freedom and security still need defenders.

The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability, hatred, and terror. We cannot rely on military power, by itself, to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance. In democratic and successful societies, people have better things to do than wallow in old hatreds and resentments. In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not fund terrorist groups, shelter terrorist camps, or attack their peaceful neighbors. In our

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