

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
c. Reserve/Active Force Balance	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the 18 Aug SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R) and Secretary of Army</b> – work with PA&amp;E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” &amp; high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Work with USD(P&amp;R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>CDR JFCOM:</b> In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM's roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
f. Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Work with USD(P&amp;R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)-</b> with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p><b>CJCS:</b> With Services, identify each Services need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces <b>are</b> actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	<b>USD (P&amp;R), CJCS, Service Secretaries</b> – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04).  <b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		<b>USD(AT&amp;L)</b> – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03)
i. Deployments	<b>CDRJFCOM</b> - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	<b>CJCS</b> – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	<b>Service Secretaries</b> - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		<b>USD(P)</b> – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Non-Military Jobs	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions (Oct 03).	<b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Continue progress toward achieving the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divesture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&amp;R) and USD(AT&amp;L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)</p> <p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	<b>USD(C)</b> – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	<b>USD(P)</b> – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
d. Education	<b>CICS</b> – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	<b>Dir, OFT</b> – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces		<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
f. Allies	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Reserve Forces	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)  <b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on reengineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command.
j. Volunteers	<b>Service Secretaries</b> – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT Oct 03.	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)  <b>CDRJFCOM:</b> Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)
k. Holidays		<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)
l. Call Ups	<b>CDRJFCOM</b> – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04)  <b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)

<b>Action Item</b>	<b>Near-Term' Actions</b>	<b>Mid-term Actions</b>
m. Incentives	<b>USD(C) and USD(P&amp;R)</b> - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		<b>USD(P)</b> – Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) <b>USD(P)</b> – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	<b>USD(I)</b> – Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in our ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	<b>USD(I)</b> - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04)

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	<u>ASD(NII)</u> – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	<u>ASD(NII)</u> – with <u>CJCS</u> , conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of <b>C4</b> systems on reducing U.S.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	<u>USD(AT&amp;L)</u> - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov 03)	<u>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</u> – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04)  <u>CJCS</u> – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		<u>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</u> - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	<u>Secretary of the Army</u> - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDM I, FY04-09. (1 <sup>st</sup> Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	<u>USD(AT&amp;L) and Service Secretaries</u> – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. <b>U.S.</b> and Coalition Transformation	<u>CDRJFCOM</u> – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	<u>USD(P)</u> - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	<u>Service Secretaries</u> – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	<u>CDRJFCOM</u> – with CJCS and F. OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	<u>Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders</u> – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	<u>USD(P)</u> – With ASD (NII) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	<u>CJCS</u> – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	<u>CDRJFCOM</u> – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun 04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo).  <u>USD (P&amp;R)</u> – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)
d. Procurement	<u>Services</u> – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	<u>USD(AT&amp;L)</u> - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04)  <u>USD(P)</u> – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Strategic Lift	<p><b>CJCS</b> – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).</p>	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b> – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p><b>Service Secretaries.</b> Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).</p>
f. Rotation Ratio	<p><b>CJCS</b> – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force.(Oct 03)</p> <p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – work with D,PJA&amp;E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ration by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)</p>	<p><b>Service Secretaries</b>- assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)</p>
g. Headquarters Layering	<p><b>CJCS, USD(P&amp;R), USD(P)</b> – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03.</p> <p><b>USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS</b> – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> –with USD(P&amp;R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03).</p> <p><b>CJCS</b> – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)</p>
h. Best Practices		<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Propose options to establish a process to identity and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov 03).</p> <p><b>CDRJFCOM</b> - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03</p>	<p><b>USD(P)</b> – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p><b>CJCS</b> - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. (Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p><b>USD(D)</b> – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(D)</b> – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p><b>CJCS</b> - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p><b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department’s mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p><b>USD (P&amp;R)</b> – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p><b>USD(P&amp;R)</b> – Work with USD(AT&amp;L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03)</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. US Foreign Commitments	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its presence. Brief SECDEF by Dec 03.	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
b. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03)  <u>USD(P)</u> - Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
c. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		<u>USD(P)</u> - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004

October 4, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
Powell Moore  
Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Regulations during 'Wartime

Here is an excellent cable from Ambassador Negroponte in Iraq concerning the difficulties he faces as a result of constrictive rules and regulations governing acquisition.

Let's get a team of people together and take this on, using concrete examples from the Ambassador's cable. We can do some real good here.

Thanks.

Attach.  
UNCLASS AMEMBASSY Baghdad Cable (P 031705Z OCT 04 ZDK)

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Please respond by 10/29/04

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1772  
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001220

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: AMGT, PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: PEACETIME RULES IN A WARTIME ENVIRONMENT

1. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE, IN EFFORTS TO REBUILD IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE, DUE TO ACQUISITION REGULATIONS ILL SUITED FOR EFFORTS IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT. I ASK THAT AND DEFENSE ESTABLISH A TEAM OF PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS AND LAWYERS TO REVIEW THE SUGGESTIONS BELOW AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROVIDE RELIEF FROM THESE RULES. THIS CABLE OUTLINES PROSPECTIVE RELIEF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES UNDER COM AS WELL AS MNF-I AND ITS MNSTC-I

2. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING DEPARTMENT OF EFFORTS TO INCREASE SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION THRESHOLD PROCUREMENT IN IRAQ FROM USD 500,000 TO USD 1 (MODIFICATION TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT PROGRESS). STATUTORY CHANGE TO 41 U.S.C. - 403 ET SEQ REQUIRED, AFFECTING FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION AND PART 13 (MNSTC-I).

3. REFERENCE FAR 13.301 (G) (1) THE CURRENT MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IS USD 15,000. RECOMMEND MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD BE INCREASED TO USD 25,000 FOR IRAQI FREEDOM REQUIREMENTS (PCO AND MNSTC-I).

4. REFERENCE FAR 5.203 (A) "PUBLICIZING AND RESPONSE TIME". THE FAR CURRENTLY READS THAT THE SYNOPSIS MUST BE PUBLISHED AT LEAST 15 DAYS PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF A SOLICITATION. RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI FREEDOM THE SYNOPSIS PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT BE REDUCED TO SEVEN DAYS. (PCO)

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5. REFERENCE FAR 6.304(A)(1) (APPROVAL OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION). RECOMMEND CONTRACTING OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION SERVE AS APPROVAL FOR UP TO USD 1 MILLION DOLLARS OR THE LIMIT OF HIS OR HER WARRANT, WHICHEVER IS LOWER (USACE).

6. REFERENCE FAR 28.102-1 (REQUIRING PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS EXCEEDING USD 100,000). THESE REQUIREMENTS SEVERELY RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE MARKET ON THE PART OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL FIRMS (AS THEY CAN NOT OBTAIN INSURANCE AND BONDS) AND SHOULD BE WAIVED. (USACE)

7. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFORT TO MODIFY FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.249-14 AND ADD TERRORIST ACTS AS A REASON FOR EXCUSABLE DELAYS. (MNF-I)

8. REFERENCE FAR 46.805 (A)(4) AND 52.246-25 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY BE LIMITED TO REPLACING COMPONENTS AND NOT THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES (E.G. ELECTRICITY OR WATER NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE THE WORK CAN NOT BE COMPLETED). (MNF-I)

9. REFERENCE FAR 28.309 (B) AND 52.228-4 WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION FOR EACH PROJECT SHALL BE LIMITED TO USD 10,000 DUE TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ. (MNF-I)

10. REFERENCE FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.228-7 THIRD PERSON LIABILITY. THE CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY SHOULD BE LIMITED. (MNF-I)

11. REFERENCE FAR PART 12 AND 2.101 AND 15.4 COMMERCIAL ITEM/CERTIFIED COST DATA APPLY THE DEFINITION OF "COMMERCIAL ITEMS" TO CONSTRUCTION FOR THE REMAINDER OF IIRP. IF CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE DEFINED AS A "COMMERCIAL ITEM," WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR "CERTIFIED COST DATA" BASED ON PERFORMANCE OF DETAILED PRICE ANALYSIS ON ALL NON-COMPETED ACQUISITIONS AND CHANGES. (USAID)

12. REFERENCE FAR 52.245-2 ALT 1 (5) EQUIPMENT RISK OF LOSS ADDITIONAL WAR RISK INSURANCES DEEMED REIMBURSABLE IF SUCH INSURANCE IS AVAILABLE. IF INSURANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE (AND IT HAS NOT BEEN TO DATE), THEN U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT RISK OF LOSS ONCE EQUIPMENT CROSSES THE IRAQ BORDER. (USAID)

13. REFERENCE DEFENSE BASE ACT, 42 USC 1651-1654; FAR 52.228-3, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE (DEFENSE BASE ACT)"; FAR 28.309, "CONTRACT CLAUSE FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE"; AND FAR 52.228-4, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WAR HAZARD INSURANCE OVERSEAS". THESE PROVISIONS TOGETHER PROVIDE THAT (WHERE THE SECRETARY OF LABOR HAS WAIVED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BASE DEFENSE ACT)

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WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE OR ITS EQUIVALENT SHALL BE SUCH AS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE NATION OF WHICH THE EMPLOYEES ARE NATIONALS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT EACH NATION'S OWN SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY STANDARDS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ITS CITIZENS. THE BASE DEFENSE ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO APPLY THIS STANDARD WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A "WAIVER" BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. (USACE)

14. REFERENCE FAR 33.201 ET SEQ., "DISPUTES AND APPEALS." THE FAR CURRENTLY PROVIDES FOR THE CONTRACTING OFFICER TO PROVIDE A CONTRACTOR WITH A "FINAL DECISION" REGARDING ANY DISPUTES THE CONTRACTOR HAS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE CONTRACTOR MAY APPEAL A CONTRACTING OFFICER'S FINAL DECISION TO EITHER **THE** ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS OR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS. IRAQI CONTRACTORS **HAVE** LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH OR ACCESS TO EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPELLATE BODIES. RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI CONTRACTORS, **THEIR** APPEALS FROM CONTRACTING OFFICER FINAL DECISIONS BE DECIDED WITHIN THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN IRAQ. (USACE)

15. REFERENCE FAR 6.304, "APPROVAL OF THE JUSTIFICATION". THE FAR REQUIRES JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL (J&A) ACTIONS FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION TO BE APPROVED BY OFFICIALS AT HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVELS WITHIN THE PROCURING AGENCY AND ABOVE THE AGENCY, DEPENDING UPON THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF THE PROCUREMENT. RECOMMEND THAT, FOR J&A ACTIONS RELATED TO CONTRACTS **TO BE** PERFORMED IN IRAQ, THE APPROVAL OFFICIAL BE THE HEAD **OF THE** CONTRACTING ACTIVITY FOR THE IRAQ PCO. (USACE)

16. REFERENCE FAR 28.306, "INSURANCE UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS". THE FAR SHIFTS THE RISK OF LOSS TO CONTRACTORS UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS; THE FAR LEAVES IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO BUY **AND** MAINTAIN INSURANCE COVERAGE AGAINST MOST RISKS. IN IRAQ, SUCH INSURANCE IS EITHER IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN OR VERY COSTLY. RECOMMEND THE FAR BE AMENDED TO **ADD** A "WAR RISKS" PROVISION TO ALL CONTRACTS IN IRAQ THAT **MAKES** CONTRACTOR LOSSES **DUE** TO HOSTILE ACTIONS COMPENSABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT. (USACE)

17. REFERENCE FAR 15.404-3, "SUBCONTRACT PRICING CONSIDERATIONS." THE FAR IMPOSES COST AND PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS AGAINST ALL CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS WHEN THE CONTRACT PRICE (OR ADJUSTMENT TO THE CONTRACT PRICE) **REACHES** A CERTAIN AGGREGATE THRESHOLD. **MANY** SUBCONTRACTORS **IN** IRAQ ARE LOCAL FIRMS OR INTERNATIONAL FIRMS, LACKING EXPERIENCE WITH U.S. COST STANDARDS AND HAVING COST ACCOUNTING **SYSTEMS THAT DON'T** MEET US STANDARDS. RECOMMEND THAT IRAQI OR INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTORS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN IRAQ MERELY HAVE TO MEET THE MORE RELAXED PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS IMPOSED BY FAR 12.209, "DETERMINATION OF PRICE REASONABLENESS." (USACE)

18. REFERENCE FAR PART 12.404 WARRANTY. WHILE WE ARE ASKING FOR A RULING THAT ALLOWS CONSTRUCTION AS A COMMERCIAL ITEM, WE ARE ALSO SUGGESTING THAT COMMERCIAL STANDARDS BE APPLIED WHICH EXCLUDE WARRANTY FOR MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE. (USAID)

19. USG VS. MINISTRY/GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ PROPERTY- EITHER DECLARE MINISTRY PROPERTY USG PROPERTY OR AGREE THAT CONTRACTORS WHO INADVERTENTLY DAMAGE MINISTRY PROPERTY ARE ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT TO REPAIR/RESTORE IT. FAR PART 46 THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED THROUGHOUT RELATE TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, WE ARE SEEKING A RULING THAT SUCH PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THE FAR WILL TREAT IRAQI PROPERTY AS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF INADVERTENT DAMAGE. (USAID)

20. ADDITIONAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT INSURANCE- SUPPLEMENTAL WAR RISK INSURANCE OVER AND ABOVE WHICH DEFENSE BASE ACT (52.228-3) PROVIDES AND COVERS. DBA COVERAGE DOES NOT IN AND OF ITSELF COMPENSATE FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY AND UNPRECEDENTED PERSONAL RISKS OF SERVICE IN IRAQ. FURTHER, UNLIKE THE SITUATION IN OTHER USAID-ASSISTED COUNTRIES WHERE DBA IS DEEMED SUFFICIENT, EMPLOYEES IN IRAQ LOSE ALL THEIR EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE DUE TO STANDARD WAR RISK EXCEPTION IN THEIR INSURANCE COVERAGE. ALLOW PURSUANT TO COST PRINCIPLES FAR 31.205-19. (USAID)

21. FAR CITATION - LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EQUAL TO VALUE OF THE SUBCONTRACT, EXCLUSIVE OF LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY CLAIMS ARISING FROM INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS AND LOSSES ARISING FROM WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL. THIS IS NOT A FAR REQUIREMENT AS SUCH-WE ARE SEEKING A BLANKET AUTHORIZATION TO INCLUDE THIS LIMITATION AS IT IS A COMMERCIAL PRACTICE UTILIZED INDUSTRY WIDE IN SITUATIONS WITH EXCESSIVE RISK. (USAID)

JEFFREY

\*\*\*\* RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(U,6)

1

INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS2(\*)  
SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*)  
USDAT:ENVS-ATLIE(\*) USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
DIR:PAA-RAM(\*) USDP:ESC(\*) ESC-SMTP(\*)  
OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

1

#1220

NNNN

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/22539

~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Meeting with Brownlee and Schoomaker

Please arrange a meeting for me with Les Brownlee and GEN Schoomaker to discuss this memo on Defense Attaches.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/12/04 Acting SecArmy Memo to SecDef re: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attaches

DHR:ss  
 101504-5

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*h.1.0*

*15oct04*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22540

OSD 02408-05



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

October 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attachés

The following is provided reference your inquiry regarding the Army's processes for selecting officers to serve as the Defense Attachés (DATT) to Russia and China.

The DATT billets in China and Russia are currently the only validated, joint general/flag officer requirements for defense attachés. Although not mandated for fill by a general/flag officer in Title 10, these two billets have historically been held by general/flag officers due to the nature and scope of associated duties and the attendant political significance. Of note, before being repealed by the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act, § 714, Title 10 specifically required that the DATT - France billet be filled with a general/ flag officer. This legislation was enacted to overcome the Department of Defense's long-standing practice of filling the DATT - France with a colonel or Navy captain.

No

Each of the DATT billets are filled on a rotating basis by the Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure ability to train and select officers with the right skills and experience, while also precluding over-representation of officers with a potentially limited skill set among the Services' general/flag officer ranks. The Army is scheduled to fill the DATT - China billet in 2006 and the DATT - Russia in 2007. Accordingly, the Army Competitive Category Brigadier General Promotion Boards in FY05 (DATT - China) and FY06 (DATT - Russia) will need to select one officer (each) with the needed background to represent the Department and the Nation well in these critical positions.

No  
Silly

Historically, Army colonels selected to serve as DATTs in China, Russia (and France) have possessed advanced degrees in area studies, regional experience and language skills that were consistent with the specific country for which a general officer DATT was required. This notwithstanding, and given precedents demonstrated by the other Services, I am confident that this year's Brigadier General, Army Competitive Category Promotion Board will select the best-qualified officer from among the 121 colonels eligible for consideration who possess the requisite background to serve as a DATT (Army officers holding this specialization are termed Foreign Area Officers). Accordingly, in the Memorandum of Instruction to the board members, I intend to provide generic guidance to select the best officer to serve as the DATT-China, vice specific guidance requiring that the selected officer be one whose foreign area of concentration is China. This is especially prudent given that the selected officer must possess the skills and attributes needed to continue serving the Army and Department of Defense in a variety of other billets upon completion of his duties as the DATT - China.

No

R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

11-L-0559/OSD/22541

OSD 02408:05

0914

12 OCT 04

15 OCT 04



~~FOUO~~

file

OCT. 27 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces Updates

In the future, on the Afghan Security Forces Update, they ought to put a mark for the April elections, so people will know where the forces will be for the April elections. We may also want to put a mark on the Iraqi Security Forces Update for the January 30 elections, and the other sequenced elections later next year, when the votes are going to occur.

On the Afghan Security Forces Update, page 5, it reads *MoD/GS*. I'd prefer not to use acronyms like that on the update, if you can avoid it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102604.9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Not sent to  
Chairman..  
These changes already  
accomplished.*

*v/r  
H. Col. King*

OSD 02412-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22542

*AFGHANISTAN*

*27 OCT 04*

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Schoomaker and Brownlee

322

I would like a meeting with Gen Pete Schoomaker and Les Brownlee on the subject of the Location of Civil Affairs.

I'd like the attached memo given to me for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/27/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Location of Civil Affairs

DHR:ss  
100404-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

4 OCT 04

OSD 02415-05

APR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042304-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/04

*(D)*  
*DR*

*closed  
9/15/04 Memo  
to SecDef promising  
future brief.*

OSD 13900-04



30 August 2004

**INFORMATION PAPER**

**Subject:** *Army* "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.
  - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
    - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US **Army** Special Operations Command (USASOC). Reassigning CA to Army Forces Command would not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the **Army** Campaign Plan.
    - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US **Army** Forces Command and USASOC.
    - Operations **would** benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level **Civil** Military Operations [**CMO**] planning/coordination capability.
    - The **Army** should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
    - USASOC must redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structure for modularity **and use** Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC mix.
    - Extending the Reserve Component CA branch to the Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote **the** management, professionalism and availability of those **officers**.
  - VCSA approved the **findings and** gave the following guidance:
    - Continue to **work** the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
    - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per **the** Army Campaign Plan. This should include Combat **Training** Centers.
    - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation **plan**.

11-L-0559/OSD/22546



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
201 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations  
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also analyzed two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the Army Staff, selected Army major commands, and **selected** outside agencies. It ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues were reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces **could best support** the Army by remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will be assigned **down** to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and **relook the AC/RC mix**.
3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team **review** and assessment **the following** three concepts were **developed**:
  - a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC, with **all** currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support **modularity**.
  - b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC **with** all CA and **PSYOP** Forces reassigned to JFCOM.
  - c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses Concept 1 by **utilizing** the comparison criteria of *Training/Readiness*, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with **FORSCOM** to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

11-L-0559/OSD/22547



Recycled Paper

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of **this Tiger Team**, **the members are** available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to **build on** the momentum **gained thus far**. Furthermore, USASOC's pursuit of **branches for CA** and PSYOP will help to increase professionalism, management, and **avallibility of the officers** in **those branches**.

6. The POC ~~for~~ this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Comm: (b)(6)

  
RICHARD A. CODY  
General, United States Army  
Vice Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/22548

**TAB D**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: Jim McDougal  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: October 6 Letter from Sergey

RUSSIA

I assume this letter of Oct 6 from Sergey to me, which I just received, has been answered by our meeting and the things we hand-delivered to him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/6/04 Letter from Ivanov to SecDef re: Tule Radar Station

DHR:ss  
101404-44

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*T 10/25*

ISACT 01

OSD 02417-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22550

6 October 2004

Mr. D. Rumsfeld  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
Washington D.C. United States of America

Dear Mr. Secretary

I would like to thank you for your letter of August 19, 2004 in which you responded to the Russian concerns in connection with the plan to modernize the missile strike early-warning radar station, located in Tule, Greenland.

At the same time, it would be appreciated if you could provide the Russian side with more complete information concerning the purpose, function, and capabilities of this station. Such information would help to bring the relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to a new level.

I hope that the productive work on all issues connected with the cooperation between our countries in the military sphere will continue. The Russian side is prepared for such a dialog.

Respectfully,

<signature>

S. Ivanov  
Minister of Defense  
Russian Federation

11-L-0559/OSD/22551

OSD 15847-04

A118-4

October 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accomplishments

020000

I think we've got to come up with a calculation of all the things that were done:

- the millions of people that move back and forth
- the millions of tons
- the millions of meals
- all of the weapons that were captured

The military is getting a bum rap and they've done a great job. Someone needs to go out there and explain what's been done and how magnificent it's been done. I need data for that, so let's get it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102904-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/3/04

2900704

OSD 02418-05

~~FOUO~~

file

October 19, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Druyun Statement

Please mark on this Darlene Druyun paper the things she admitted to, so I can just read it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Druyun plea

DHR:ss  
101904-7

*FAST*

*452T*

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lengyel 10/19*

*19 OCT 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02419-06

11-L-0559/OSD/22553

10/19

To: SecDef

October 19, 2004

From: Paul Butler *sub*

Re: Druyn Plea

Druyn admitted to influencing 4 separate deals on behalf of Boeing (outlined in numbered paragraphs 1-4 on pages 2 and 3). *Marked and highlighted* She claims she did so in exchange for her job with Boeing and for Boeing's favorable treatment of her daughter and hiring of her son-in-law. The 4 deals are:

1. The KC 767A tanker lease deal. Druyn admits she agreed to a higher price and passed proprietary info to Boeing.
2. NATO AWACS program. Druyn admitted to influencing a decision to make an inflated \$100 million payment to Boeing in connection with a restructuring of this deal.
3. Upgrade of C 130 avionics. Druyn admitted that her selection of Boeing for this contract was influenced by Boeing having hired her son-in-law and that another contractor could have been selected absent this influence.
4. Settlement of C 17H22 contract. Druyn admitted that her decision to pay \$412 million to Boeing to settle this dispute was also influenced by Boeing's decision to hire her daughter's then boyfriend.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	
	)	
v.	)	Criminal No. 04-150-A
	)	
DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is agreed by and between the parties that the following facts are true and that they supplement the Statement of Facts filed in the above referenced case.

The Defendant's Post-Plea Admissions

On April 20, 2004 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 208(a) in the Eastern District of Virginia. As a part of that plea, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. That agreement required the defendant to provide full, complete and truthful cooperation to the government. Prior to entering the plea agreement with the United States, the defendant entered into a proffer agreement with the United States to formulate an appropriate resolution of this case. On December 2, 2003 the defendant was interviewed by agents of the government as part of the proffer agreement. On April 23, 2004 the defendant was again interviewed by government agents as part of the cooperation required by her plea agreement. The defendant now acknowledges that she provided false, misleading and untruthful information to government investigators at both of those sessions.

On July 28, 2004 the defendant was reinterviewed by government agents and acknowledged, as a result of the government's investigation, that she had not been truthful in her prior cooperation. The defendant had previously maintained that she had always acted in the best interest of the United States during her negotiations with the Boeing Company while she was employed by the Air Force. She acknowledged a conflict of interest in negotiating employment with Boeing while at the same time negotiating with Boeing on behalf of the Air Force. However, the defendant had maintained that her relationship with Boeing did not influence her official actions or harm the government.

The defendant, since July 28, 2004, now acknowledges that she did favor the Boeing Company in certain negotiations as a result of her employment negotiations and other favors provided by Boeing to the defendant. Defendant acknowledges that Boeing's employment of her future son-in-law and her daughter in 2000, at the defendant's request, along with the defendant's desire to be employed by Boeing, influenced her government decisions in matters affecting Boeing.<sup>1</sup> That as a result of the loss of her objectivity, she took actions which harmed the United States to include the following:

1. In negotiations with Boeing concerning the lease agreement for 100 Boeing KC 767A tanker aircraft, the defendant agreed to a higher price for the aircraft than she believed was

---

<sup>1</sup> The defendant also acknowledges contacting a senior official of Boeing in 2002 concerning the continued employment of her daughter by Boeing. The defendant had been told by her daughter that she feared termination by Boeing for employment performance issues. The defendant contacted a senior official of Boeing, with whom she was negotiating the KC 767A tanker lease, to prevent any adverse action by Boeing against her daughter. The daughter was not terminated and instead was transferred to a new position. This same senior Boeing official routinely updated the defendant concerning the daughter's employment with Boeing, for example advising the defendant of pay increases received by the daughter.

appropriate. The defendant did so, in her view, as a "parting gift to Boeing" and because of her desire to ingratiate herself with Boeing, her future employer. The defendant also now acknowledges providing to Boeing during the negotiations what at the time she considered to be proprietary pricing data supplied by another aircraft manufacturer.

2. During 2002 the defendant, as chairperson of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program Management Board of Directors, was involved in negotiations with Boeing concerning a restructuring of the NATO AWACS program. The defendant negotiated a payment of 100 million dollars to Boeing as part of that restructuring. The defendant now acknowledges that at the time she believed a lower amount to be an appropriate settlement and she did not act in the best interest of the United States and NATO. Her agreement to the 100 million dollar settlement was influenced by her daughter's and son-in-law's relationship with Boeing and the employment negotiations.

3. The defendant was the selection authority in 2001 for the C 130 AMP which was an Air Force procurement of more than four billion dollars to upgrade the avionics of C-130 aircraft. The defendant selected Boeing from four competitors, and now acknowledges that she was influenced by her perceived indebtedness to Boeing for employing her future son-in-law and daughter. The defendant believes that an objective selection authority may not have selected Boeing.

4. During 2000 the defendant negotiated a settlement with Boeing concerning the C-17 H22 contract clause with a senior executive of Boeing. These negotiations occurred at the time the defendant was seeking employment at Boeing for her daughter's boyfriend. The defendant's decision to agree to a payment of approximately 412 million dollars to Boeing in connection with


the C-17 H22 clause was influenced by Boeing's assistance to the defendant.

The defendant has also acknowledged since July 28, 2004 that ~~her~~ earlier cooperation with the government was untruthful and misleading in other respects. For example, the defendant has revealed that a notebook she had provided to government investigators had been altered by her. This notebook contained what purported to be contemporaneous notes written by the defendant when she was employed by the Air Force. The defendant now acknowledges secretly adding notations to the notebook, before providing it to the government for the purpose of supporting her version of events.


Respectfully submitted,

Paul J. McNulty  
United States Attorney


By:

  
Robert Wiechering  
Assistant United States Attorney

After consulting with my attorneys and pursuant to the Supplemental Plea Agreement entered into this day between me and the United States, I hereby stipulate that the above Supplemental Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter proceeded to trial, the United States could have proved the same beyond a reasonable doubt.

  
Darleen A. Druyun  
Defendant

I am Darleen Druyun's attorney. I have carefully reviewed the above Supplemental Statement of Facts with her. To my knowledge, her decision to stipulate to these facts is an informed and voluntary one.

  
John M. Dowd  
Counsel for the Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	
	)	
v.	)	CRIMINAL NO. 04-150-A
	)	
DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,	)	
Defendant.	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL PLEA AGREEMENT

Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Robert W. Wiechering, Assistant United States Attorney, the defendant, Darleen A. Druyun, and the defendant's counsel have entered into a Supplemental Plea Agreement pursuant to paragraph 14 of the original plea agreement (hereinafter plea agreement) in criminal case 04-150-A. The terms of the Supplemental Agreement are as follows:

1. The defendant agrees and stipulates that she breached the plea agreement by not providing full, complete and truthful cooperation as required by paragraph 11 of the plea agreement. The Supplemental Statement of Facts filed with this Supplemental Plea Agreement outlines the nature of that breach and constitutes a stipulation of facts for purposes of Section 1B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

2. The defendant agrees that the United States is entitled to exercise it's remedies for the defendant's breach under the provisions of paragraph 13 of the plea agreement and as set forth in the Supplemental Plea Agreement.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of the plea agreement, the defendant agrees that the government may use information provided by her under the provisions of the plea agreement to enhance the defendant's guidelines range. Further, the defendant agrees to waive the provisions of the proffer agreement with the government dated November 25, 2003 and agrees to permit the government to use the information and statements provided by her to the government in this criminal case.

4. The parties agree to the preparation of a revised Presentence Report in this case and further agree to the following guideline calculation in this case:


- a. A base level of 6 under the provisions of § 2C1.3(a) and a 4-level increase for actual or planned harm to the government under the provisions of § 2C1.3(b).
- b. An increase of 2 levels in the offense level pursuant to the provisions of § 3C1.1 Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.
- c. No reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the provisions of § 3E.1.
- d. This results in an offense level total of 12, Criminal History Category I, and a sentencing range of 10-16 months. The defendant agrees that there exists no mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from the range determined by the court. Accordingly the defendant agrees not to seek or support any downward departure from the applicable guideline range.

5. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial on Sentencing Factors.


The defendant also waives the right to have facts that determine the offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines (including facts that support any specific offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment) (1) charged in the indictment, (2) proven to a jury, or (3) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant explicitly consents to be sentenced pursuant to the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, to have the sentence based on facts to be established by a preponderance of the evidence before the sentencing judge, and to allow the court to consider any reliable evidence without regard to its admissibility at trial. The defendant explicitly acknowledges that her plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence that is authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines up to and including the maximum sentence set forth in the United States Code. The defendant also waives all challenges to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.

6. In all other respects the plea agreement between the defendant and the United States remains in full force and effect.

Paul J. McNulty  
United States Attorney

By:   
Robert W. Wiechering  
Assistant United States Attorney


APPROVED:

  
John Klein  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Supervisor Fraud Unit


Date of Approval:

9-28-2004

Defendant's Signature: I have read this Supplemental Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand this agreement and voluntarily agree to it.

Date: 8/27/04   
Darleen A. Drayun  
Defendant

Defense Counsel Signature: I am counsel for the defendant in this case. I have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, the defendant's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Date: 8/28/04   
John M. Dowd  
Counsel for the Defendant

10/20/04

~~FOUO~~

file

USDP Copy

October 15, 2004  
ES-1065  
04/013844

TO: Jim MacDougall  
9 CC: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

R  
U  
S  
S  
I  
E

Here is the letter Ivanov gave me on Orlov. You will recall it came up in my meeting with him.

Please handle it from here.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Ivanov Letter to SecDef re: Orlov  
DHR:ss  
10140443

Paul Butler ..... Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 18 2004

10/21  
→ TB See def  
Mr. Secretary:

15 OCT 04

In your meeting, Ivanov reported Orlov was in custody in Prague and that Ukraine asked the Czech Republic to extradite him. I have passed this on to CIA and State and will continue to follow up on this with them, the Russians and the Ukrainians.

OSD 02420-05

Respectfully,  
15-10-04 18:55 IN

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/22564

JIM MAC DOUGALL

Moscow, October \_\_\_\_ , 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Let me express my gratitude to you for the information released regarding the complicity of Oleg Orlov in an attempted smuggling operation involving an IGLA-type man-portable air defense system to be illicitly shipped into Iran.

We have undertaken a preliminary investigation in regard to the said person, which brought us to a conclusion that the person indicated has no affiliation with state-run, or any other, structures involved in military and technical cooperation with foreign states on behalf of the Russian Federation.

The information furnished by you in regard to the activities pursued by Oleg Orlov has been promptly forwarded to the relevant law enforcement agencies with an object of undertaking investigative work as appropriate. Any credible information worthy of interest will be forwarded to you through military diplomatic channels.

Respectfully yours,

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

S.Ivanov

Attn. The Rt. Hon. D.Rumsfeld  
US Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C., US

OSD 02420-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22565

Russia

15 OCT 04

15 OCT 04



Москва, 13 октября 2004 г.

Уважаемый господин Министр.

Позвольте выразить Вам мою признательность за предоставленную информацию о причастности гражданина Олега Орлова к попытке организовать по нелегальным каналам поставку ПЗРК типа «Игла» в Иран.

Мы провели предварительное расследование в отношении этого гражданина, в результате которого пришли к выводу о том, что указанный фигурант не имеет никакого отношения к государственным или другим структурам, осуществляющим военно-техническое сотрудничество с иностранными государствами от имени Российской Федерации.

Ваша информация о деятельности Олега Орлова была оперативно адресована соответствующим правоохранительным структурам с целью проведения необходимых следственных действий. При получении от этих структур какой-либо заслуживающей внимания информации, направим ее Вам по военно-дипломатическим каналам.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

 С.Иванов

Господину Д.Рамсфельду  
Министру обороны США 11-L-0559/OSD/22566  
г.Вашингтон, США

720

TAB

SECRET  
2004-01-27 10:53

29  
January 27, 2004

676

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, "Oh the Joint Staff is connected."

I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-20

.....

Please respond by 2/4/04

OSD 02430-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22567

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1532-04  
18 February 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/18*

SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

- **Question.** "In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, 'Oh the Joint Staff is connected.' I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is."  
(TAB)
- **Answer.** It is my understanding that DOD is not currently involved, and potential involvement will be based on the Commission's request. To date, my staff has not been tasked or requested to respond to any of its findings or deliberations, nor asked to attend meetings. I am not aware of any other participation within the DOD.
- **Analysis.** The President created the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba on 30 November 2003 via NSPD-29 to identify additional means by which the United States can assist the Cuban people to bring about an expeditious end of the dictatorship. The Commission is co-chaired by the Secretaries of State and Housing and Urban Development. Other members include: the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce and Homeland Security; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Administrator of the US Agency for International Development. NSPD-29 states that DOD participation is required only if requested by the co-chairs to address issues pertaining to specific areas of responsibility.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22568

OSD 02430-04

TAB

29  
January 27, 2004

676

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commission on Post-Castro Cuba

In a meeting with the President and the combatant commanders yesterday, the President asked if we are linked into the Commission on Post-Castro Cuba. I said I had never heard of it. Dick, you said you had never heard of it. Condi said, "Oh the Joint Staff is connected."

I want to know precisely if the Department of Defense is in any way connected to it and in what way it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
(12704-20)

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

OSD 02430-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22569

Tab

7/10  
1800

720

Feb

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

CC: Adm. Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Attached is a memo from SecNav, Chief of Naval Operations on some legislation that is needed.

I hope we will provide every assistance to this memo, assuring this gets passed by Congress.

Please keep me posted as to the progress of this legislation.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604E.01ts

Attach: Depr. Navy note re: Alternative Crewing Concepts for Warships 2/13/04

Please respond by:

*TO: See Def*

6/30

*9/17*

*Sir*

*Response Attached*

*Col B*

*7/12*

OSD 02431-04

8012

(to NCF)

13 Feb 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF THE DEFENSE

Via: *Sec Nav*  
FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations

*MC 2-18-04*  
*ZE Olson 2/13/04*

SUBJECT: Alternative Crewing Concepts for Selected Warships

- Mr. Secretary, Navy will conduct a demonstration of alternative crewing concepts for selected categories of warships. Project seeks to reduce military members involved in other than duties directly related to combat.
- Barriers exist in current International and U.S. laws:
  - o Only a warship may conduct belligerent operations, and a warship must be manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline.
  - o Under US law, civilian crewmembers could be subject to UCMJ in a time of declared war.
  - o If a warship engages in hostilities, civilian crewmembers may be deemed unlawful combatants and denied protections under the Geneva Conventions, even if subject to the UCMJ.
- Navy will introduce legislation to gain greater flexibility in the use and protection of civilians and will pilot a program on USS CORONADO to modify international law with respect to the status of civilians performing non-combatant functions on certain categories of warships performing belligerent operations.
- Beginning Feb 04 and ending with her decommissioning by 30 Sep 05, 350 of the 450 USN crew on the command ship USS CORONADO will be replaced by 150 CIVMARS. CIVMARS will perform only functions not directly related to combat (navigation, engineering, deck/stewards department). Commanding Officer will be active duty Navy. 100 active duty Sailors and embarked fleet commander's staff will perform command and control functions and any assigned belligerent operations.
- During this period, CORONADO will deploy in support of 7th Fleet operations. Risk of CORONADO's engaging in belligerent operations in this timeframe is low, but she will participate in international exercises and port visits. We gain the opportunity to socialize the concept of non-combatant civilians serving as crewmembers of some categories of warships with the international community, while reducing the cost of operations by \$5M.
- Follow on candidates for similar crewing concepts include other command ships, submarine tenders, Afloat Forward Staging Bases, Maritime Prepositioning Force Future.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Captain S. DeLong, N42, (b)(6)

0 SD 02431 - 04

Cc: CJCS

11-L-0559/OSD/22571

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF USE OF CIVILIAN MARINERS ON SELECTED  
WARSHIPS

Summary. USS CORONADO will retain designation as warship and be partially crewed by civilian mariners (CIVMARS) in a pilot program as the Seventh Fleet flagship. However, under international law, a warship must be manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline and civilians must not directly participate in hostilities. To comply with these requirements, legislation authorizing activation of CIVMARS as naval reservists will satisfy the legal requirements.

Discussion.

1. The transition of CORONADO from a military to a partial CIVMAR crew presents two legal issues under international law:

a. First, under international treaties and customary international law, only warships may engage in belligerent activities (generally, these include engaging in combat, and other offensive activities in which the entire crew is considered to participate, including visit and search, blockade, interdiction, and convoy escort operations). To be classified as a warship, two of the four requirements for a ship include being under the command of a commissioned officer, and manned by a crew under an armed forces discipline system.

CORONADO will be under the command of a commissioned officer. CIVMARS can be subject to regular armed forces discipline through a requirement of naval reserve affiliation, and enacting legislation that will activate them upon designation by the Secretary of Defense. Alternatively, legislation could subject them to the Uniform Code of Military Justice upon designation by the Secretary of Defense without reserve affiliation. Navy will introduce these legislative proposals, which will provide greater future flexibility in the use and protection of civilians.

b. Second, civilians who directly participate in hostilities may be deemed to be unlawful combatants, and do not have the protections under the Geneva Conventions. The proposed legislation authorizing reserve activation will have the added benefit of protecting the CIVMARS on this issue (unlike the UCMJ alternative) since, as military members, they will be lawful combatants during hostilities.

2. Utilization of CORONADO in the pilot program will precede enactment of legislation. To gain international acceptance that civilian members of a warship's crew may perform various shipboard functions (engineering, navigation, support services, etc.) as long as they do not participate in activities that cause direct and immediate harm to the enemy, this concept will be introduced through actual practice, diplomatic clearance requests, and publication to the international community.

Prepared by: RADM M. F. Loh (b)(6)  
Mr. J. E. Baggett,

**COORDINATION**

**Military Sealift Command**

**VADM Brewer**

**7 Jan04**

**OJAG**

**RADM Lohr**

**7 Jan04**

7/6  
1800

9/17



LEGISLATIVE

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 6, 2004 5:00 PM

801.2

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 060603E.01ts

- This responds to your request that we provide "every assistance" to the Navy in advancing their proposed legislation for Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS) assuring it gets passed by Congress.
- The Navy did not submit any new legislative initiatives concerning CIVMARS to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance as part of its Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) and Navy are continuing to resolve issues internally before preparing and submitting proposed legislation.
- Legislation will not be ready in time to be considered for Fiscal Year 2005.

(6 JUL 04)

Attachments:  
SECDEF Snowflake w/attachments

Prepared by Tom Jones (b)(6)

13 FEB 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22574

OSD 02431-04



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 28, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell A. Moore", written over a horizontal line.

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding SECNAV Memo on CIVMAR  
Legislation # 060604E.01ts

No change in status, from my previous memo dated July 6, on proposed legislation concerning CIVMARS.

11-L-0559/OSD/22575

0243' 06

FOUO

December 8, 2004

I-04/016582

ES-1616

TO: Doug Feith  
 CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 FROM:  
 SUBJECT: Expressing Gratitude

We need to thank the people who were involved in helping us prevail in Afghanistan. Now that the President of Afghanistan has been inaugurated, it is the time, for example, to write Karimov and MoD Gulomov in Uzbekistan, and send them something or thank them. We couldn't have done it without Uzbekistan.

I need a list of the people like that -- Pakistan, the Brits, and others who were helpful. We need to get a full list, and then we need to develop a terrific letter. Also, let's think about sending them some memorabilia or something and marking the historic event that took place.

Thanks.

DFIR:db  
120804-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

*An Afghan  
 Letter should  
 go to ~~the~~ the  
 rather the D/S  
 Preliminary  
 decisions.*



*Sir,  
 Response Attached*

*VJF, Col B/S  
 2/8*

OSD 02458-05

03-12-04 P12:00 12

11-L-0559/OSD/22576

Afghanistan

8 Dec 04

720  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SECRET  
20170115 01:03:31

TAB A

January 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Spain

Spain

At the January 14 White House dinner, President Aznar of Spain talked to me about the fact that apparently the U.S. Navy has agreed to sell Tomahawk missiles to the Spanish Navy. He said now it needs a political push, so I need someone to tell me what that is about.

He mentioned the new frigates with Aegis and how important that will be.

He mentioned that the submarine construction is getting started, and they are going to want US combat systems. He asked me to be helpful if I could.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011504-8

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

15 Jan 04

OSD 02513-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22577

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



SECRET  
2004 FEB 11 11:00 AM

February 8, 2004

**TO:** David Chu  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld   
**SUBJECT:** Individual Ready Reserve

I think we need to rethink the Individual Ready Reserve and their availability or lack of availability, the extent to which we track them and how we ought to value them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-53

.....  
Please respond by 2 / 18 / 04

OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22578



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 FEB 19 04:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

February 19, 2004 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - SNOWFLAKE

- We have begun rethinking the use and management of the IRR.
- Over 30,000 IRR members were mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, which constituted 11.5% of the total Reserve force called up. For the current operation, about 6,500 have been mobilized—or about 2% of the Reserve force called up.
- IRR members are required to keep their Service informed of their address and other personnel information. Although the Services use both public and commercial locator services, some have had difficulty tracking IRR members. We have a legislative proposal for FY05 that would allow the IRS to provide DoD with address information on IRR members.
- The Marine Corps has placed a higher value on its IRR force than the other Services, and as a result has had more success in using that force—both in peacetime and wartime.
- Pilot programs in the areas of Arabic linguists and Spectrum Management (Wireless Engineers) have been undertaken to test innovative management and use of the IRR concepts.
- Other concepts for enhanced management and use of the IRR are being developed by the Services and the OSD staff. We plan to complete this work at the annual IRR conference scheduled for July, so the first ideas can be used to support OIF 3.
- We will include an update on IRR in the next “rebalancing” SLRG.

INFORMATION ONLY

Prepared by: Dan Kohner, OASD/RA (M&P) (b)(6)



OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22579

February 8, 2004

**TO:** David Chu

**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** Individual Ready Reserve

I think we need *to* rethink the Individual Ready Reserve and their availability or lack of availability, the extent *to* which we track them and how we ought *to* value them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-53

.....  
Please respond by

2 / 18 / 04

OSD 02514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22580



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

020 1 19 04 6:21

**INFO MEMO**

February 19, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 19 Feb 04*

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components - SNOWFLAKE

- In your July 9, 2003, memo you had indicated a planning factor of not involuntarily calling up Reserve members more than one year out of every six. Our recommendation to you reflected a judgment as to what might be sustainable. As is evident, it implies approximately three years active service in a 20-year service career.
- Though there has been some discussion regarding flexibility in implementing this guidance, it has been widely reported and is generally accepted as approximately right by the Military Departments and Reserve Components.
- What really counts is what Reservists think. Reserve member expectation management is critical.
- We are undertaking an evidentiary process using survey research, empirical data, and modeling to determine the effect of activation on recruiting and retention-- some results are expected this year. In our April status of forces surveys we will ask about the frequency of call up, which will give us a better basis for judging the appropriateness of one in six.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

OSD 02515-04



11-L-0559/OSD/22581

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in 50 years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-55

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

SECRET

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in **50** years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-55

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

OSD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22583



7:35 PM

TO: George Tenet  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Gen. Hayden**

I talked to Mike Hayden today. He has agreed to stay on from September '04 to September '05.

He said he would like to meet with the three of us and talk about what he would like to get accomplished over the next 18 months.

Let's have him to lunch **at** the next meeting. Steve, why don't you include him if that is OK with George.

Thanks

*Cathy*  
*Burnan 2/19*

DHR/azn  
021804.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*OSD NSA*

*18 Feb 04*

OSD 02521-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22584

2/13  
1300

72

February 8, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**  
SUBJECT: End Strength Language

I want to see the proposed legislation we have to get new end strength language.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-52

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

*Don't know*  
*2/17*

320.2

*✓*  
*2/20*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*rr/cdr Nosen*  
*2/19*

8 Feb 04

12 Feb 04

OSD 02523-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22585

Rec'd 11 Feb  
-FC



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

*Handwritten initials: JH*

INFO MEMO

February 12, 2004, 5:11 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*  
SUBJECT: New Legislation concerning End Strength

- This responds to your request to see the proposed legislation on getting new end strength language.
- The Department has not submitted any major new legislative initiatives concerning end strength to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance as part of its Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) is reviewing options for new legislation, including re-submission of the bold proposal eliminating end strength in favor of average strength that the Department submitted last year as part of the Department of Defense Transformation Bill. (TAB A)
- Last year, the Senate supported the Department's average strength proposal, but the House did not. The ensuing Conference Committee agreed upon an amendment requiring the Department to submit planned end-of-quarter strength reports in addition to the existing annual end strength report. (TAB B) The final provision enacted by Congress last year did not include the Department's average strength proposal.
- I expect to deliver the Department's OMB-cleared Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program to Congress at the beginning of March. USD(P&R) is aware of this time frame.

*Handwritten notes and circled text:*  
Per [unclear] [unclear]  
320.2  
12 Feb 04

Attachments: As stated

COORDINATION: (1) USD(P&R) B. Loo 2/12/04  
(2) ASD(LA) D. Stanley 2/12/04

Prepared by Vic Bernson (b)(6)

OSD 02523-04



**SEC. 131. MEASURING PERSONNEL STRENGTHS.**

1 (a) **STRENGTH ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENT.**—section 115 of title 10, United States Code.

2 is amended—

3 (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

4 "(a) Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for  
5 each of the following:

6 "(1) The average strength for each of the armed forces (other than the  
7 Coast Guard) for active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds  
8 appropriated for active-duty personnel.

9 "(2) The average strength for each of the armed forces (other than the  
10 Coast Guard) for active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty  
11 personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

12 "(3) The average strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve  
13 component of the armed forces.";

14 (2) in subsection (b)—

15 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

16 and

17 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

18 (3) in subsection (c)—

19 (A) in paragraph (1)—

20 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting

21 "strength"; and

22 (ii) by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)"; and

1 (B) in paragraph (2)—

2 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
3 "strength"; and

4 (ii) by striking "(a)(1)(B)" and inserting "(a)(2)"; and

5 (C) in paragraph (3)—

6 (i) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
7 "strength"; and

8 (ii) by striking "(a)(2)" and inserting "(a)(3)";

9 **(4)** in subsection (d)—

10 (A) by striking "end-strengths" and inserting "strengths";

11 (B) by striking "subsection (a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of  
12 subsection (a)";

13 (C) in paragraph (9)(B), by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)";

14 (5) in subsection (e), by striking "subsection (a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1)  
15 and (2) of subsection (a)";

16 (6) in subsection (f)—

17 (A) by striking "end strength" both places it appears and inserting  
18 "strength"; and

19 (B) by striking "(a)(1)(A)" and inserting "(a)(1)"; and

20 (7) in subsection (g), by striking "end strength" both places it appears and  
21 inserting "strength".

22 **(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.** —(1) Subparagraph (A) of section 168(f)(1) of such title

1 is amended—

2 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength"; and

3 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)" and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of section  
4 115(a)".

5 (2) Subsection (f) of section 691 of such title is amended by striking "section 115(a)(1)"  
6 and inserting "paragraphs(1) and (2) of section 115(a)";

7 (3) Subsection (b) of section 3201 of such title is amended by striking "section 115(a)(1)"  
8 and inserting "paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 115(a)";

9 (4) Paragraph (4) of section 12310(c) of such title is amended—

10 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

11 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)(B) and 115(a)(2)" and inserting "section  
12 115(a)(2) and 115(a)(3)";

13 (5) Subsection (d) of section 16132 of such title is amended—

14 (A) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength"; and

15 (B) by striking "section 115(a)(1)(B)" and inserting "section 115(a)(2)".

16 (6) Section 112 of title 32, United States Code, is amended—

17 (A) in subsection (e)—

18 (i) in the heading, by striking "END-STRENGTH" and inserting  
19 "STRENGTH"; and

20 (ii) by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";

21 (B) in subsection (f)—

22 (i) in the heading, by striking "END-STRENGTH" and inserting

- 1 "STRENGTH"; and
- 2 (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking "end strength" and inserting "strength";
- 3 and
- 4 (C) in subsection (g)(1), by striking "end strengths" and inserting "strengths".

### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

This section would change the method DoD uses to measure the strength for active duty and Reserve component personnel from strength at the end of the fiscal year to average strength throughout the year.

Managing by average strength is consistent with the process used to budget personnel appropriations and is a more realistic approach to managing active duty and Reserve personnel effectively. This approach would improve readiness by allowing DoD to better meet manning requirements rather than planning for a specific number on one day at the end of the year. Managing for a one-day strength encourages poor strength management practices, particularly in the 4th quarter where manning surges such as delaying retirements and other losses, and increasing recruiting takes place. These practices negatively impact real force readiness and quality.

This section would allow DoD to sustain adequate personnel over the entire year

on maintenance conducted from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003.

(4) **An** itemization of improved corrosion repair processes for KC-135E and KC-135R aircraft used between fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 2003 which resulted in a decrease in the number of manhours required for control and treatment of corrosion.

(5) **An** analysis of the relationship between manhours for corrosion repair as set forth under paragraph (2) and the processes set forth under paragraph (4).

(6) **An** analysis of major structural repairs required due to corrosion for KC-135E and KC-135R aircraft annually from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003.

## TITLE IV—MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

### Subtitle A—Active Forces

- Sec. 401. End strengths for active forces.  
Sec. 402. Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum levels.  
Sec. 403. Personnel strength authorization and accounting process.

### Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

- Sec. 411. End strengths for Selected Reserve.  
Sec. 412. End strengths for Reserves on active duty in support of the reserves.  
Sec. 413. End strengths for military technicians (dual status).  
Sec. 414. Fiscal year 2004 limitations on non-dual status technicians.  
Sec. 415. Permanent limitations on number of non-dual status technicians.

### Subtitle C—Authorizations and Appropriations

- Sec. 421. Military personnel.  
Sec. 422. Armed Forces Retirement Home.

## Subtitle A — Active Forces

10 USC 115 note. SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy,
- (3) The Marine Corps,
- (4) The Air Force,

SEC. 402. REVISION IN PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS.

Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

- (1) ARMY.—Paragraph (1) is amended by striking “480,000” and inserting “482,400”.
- (2) NAVY.—Paragraph (2) is amended by striking “375,700” and inserting “373,800”.
- (3) AIR FORCE.—Paragraph (4) is amended by striking “359,000” and inserting “359,300”.

SEC. 403. PERSONNEL STRENGTH AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTING PROCESS.

(a) QUARTERLY STRENGTH LEVELS.—section 115 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (e), (e), and (g) as subsections (e), (g), and (c), respectively, and by transferring—

(A) subsection (e), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (d);

(B) subsection (g), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (f); and

(C) subsection (c), as so redesignated, so as to appear after subsection (b);

(2) by transferring subsection (d) to the end of such section and redesignating that subsection as subsection (h); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (c), as redesignated and transferred by paragraph (1), the following new subsection (d):

“(d) **END-OF-QUARTER STRENGTH LEVELS.**—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President’s budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary’s proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary’s proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

“(2)(A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

“(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

“(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Services of the House of Representatives of that strength or of that modification, as the case may

(b) **CONFORMING AND STYLISTIC AMENDMENTS.**—Such is further amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting “ACTIVE-DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.—” after “(a)”;

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “LIMITATION ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL.—” after “(b)”;

(3) in subsection (c), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(1), by inserting “MILITARY TECHNICIAN (DUAL STATUS) END STRENGTHS TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.—” after “(c)”;

(4) in subsection (e), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(1), by inserting “AUTHORITY FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VARIANCES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS.—” after “(e)”;

(5) in subsection (f)—

(A) by inserting “AUTHORITY FOR SERVICE SECRETARY VARIANCES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTHS.—” after “(f)”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (e)(1)” and inserting “subsection (e)(1)”;

(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(1), by inserting “ADJUSTMENT WHEN COAST GUARD IS OPERATING AS A SERVICE IN THE NAVY.—” after “(g)”; and

(7) in subsection (h), as redesignated and transferred by subsection (a)(2), by inserting “CERTAIN ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL EXCLUDED FROM COUNTING FOR ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTHS.—” after “(h)”.

(c) CROSS REFERENCE AMENDMENTS.—Section 10216 of such title is amended by striking “section 115(g)” each place it appears and inserting “section 115(c)”.

10 USC 115 note.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (d) of section 115 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(3), shall apply with respect to the budget request for fiscal year 2005 and thereafter.

## Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

10 USC 12001 note.

### SEC. 411. END STRENGTHS FOR SELECTED RESERVE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for Selected Reserve personnel of the reserve components as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 350,000.

(2) The Army Reserve, 205,000.

(3) The Naval Reserve, 85,900.

(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 39,600.

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 107,030.

(6) The Air Force Reserve, 75,800.

(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 10,000.

(b) ADJUSTMENTS.—The end strengths prescribed by subsection (a) for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by—

(1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at the end of the fiscal year; and

(2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at the end of the fiscal year.

# REPORT LANGUAGE

681

Service	FY 2003 authorized	FY 2004		Change from	
		Request	Recommendation	FY 2004 request	FY 2003 authorized
Air Force .....	359,000	359,300	359,300	0	300
<b>DCO Total .....</b>	<b>1,389,700</b>	<b>1,388,100</b>	<b>1,390,500</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>800</b>

***Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum levels (sec. 402)***

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 402) that would establish new permanent active duty end strength minimum levels in section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, for the Army and Air Force as of September 30, 2004.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recesses with an amendment that would set the following minimum end strengths: Army, 482,400; Navy, 373,800 and Air Force, 359,300.

***Personnel strength authorization and accounting process (sec. 403)***

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 421) that would authorize a change to the method used by the Department of Defense to measure the strength for active duty and reserve component personnel from strength at the end of the fiscal year to average strength throughout the year.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The House recesses with an amendment that would require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe quarterly end strength levels for each service and permissible maximum variances of actual strength at the end of each quarter. The levels and variances established by the Secretary should be such that they support maintenance throughout the year of the personnel strengths necessary to achieve the annual authorized end-strength levels.

Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

***End strengths for Selected Reserve (sec. 411)***

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 411) that would authorize the following end strengths for the selected reserve personnel, including the end strength for reserves on active duty in support of the reserves, as of September 30, 2004: Army National Guard, 350,000; the Army Reserve, 205,000; the Naval Reserve, 85,900; the Marine Corps Reserve, 39,600; the Air National Guard, 107,000; the Air Force Reserve, 75,800.

The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 413) that would authorize an end strength for the Air National Guard of 107,030.

The House recesses.

The conferees' recommended Selected Reserve end strengths for fiscal year 2004 are set forth in the following table:

Service	FY 2003 authorized	FY 2004		Change from	
		Request	Conferee recommendation	FY 2004 request	FY 2003 authorized
Army National Guard .....	350,000	350,000	350,000	0	0

2/24  
0600  
43  
1500

2/24

~~Handwritten initials in a circle~~

We could schedule  
a Town Hall with them, and  
have Hayes brief on election  
year ethics  
other topics.

C92  
3/17

2305 Supergrades

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

D. Rita  
Larry Di Rita  
311

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

Reg Dubors:

4  
1/30

Please provide SD w/a  
list of PAS + Sched e + SES (Att)  
appointees here today.

Thanks,  
Jaymie

Suspense: 2/4/04

OSD 02562-04

(20 Feb 04)

2/24  
2840

3/17



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 20 PM 5:25

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

INFOMEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois* 2/20/04

SUBJECT: DoD Team - Breakout of Personnel

2305 Supergrades

- In the attached snowflake, dated January 12, 2004, you requested a list of personnel you selected for your DoD team. Per clarification with Jaymie Durnan, we understood that you would like a listing of Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation, Non-Career SES members, and Schedule C appointees that **are** here today.
- We have also included the Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees who are members of your DoD Team.
- Tab A lists 38 Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation; Tab B lists 87 Non-Career SES Members; Tab C lists 113 Schedule C appointees; and Tab D lists 12 Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees. In sum, they constitute the **250** members of your DoD Team that are presently serving in the Department.
- Lists, which **are** arranged in alphabetical order, include names of personnel and their position titles, with separate breakouts for OSD and the Military Departments.

COORDINATION None

Attachments:

**As** stated

Prepared By: Linda Roper

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT IN CHARGE	
SR MA CANNON	
MA BUCK	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/24

OSD 02562-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22596



2DF604

**PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES/SENATE CONFIRMATION**

**Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Name	Position Title
✓ ABELL CHARLES S.	DUSD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
✓ CAMBONE STEPHENA.	USD (INTELLIGENCE)
✓ CHRISTIE THOMAS P.	DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
✓ CHU DAVID S. C.	USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
✓ FEITH DOUGLAS J.	USD (POLICY)
✓ HALL THOMAS F.	ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ HAYNES WILLIAM J. II	GENERAL COUNSEL
✓ HENRY CHRISTOPHER R.	PDUSD (POLICY)
✓ KLEIN DALE E.	ATSD (NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, & BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM)
✓ MCHALE PAUL F.	ASD (HOMELAND DEFENSE)
✓ MOORE POWELL A.	ASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
✓ OCONNELL THOMAS W.	ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS & LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)
✓ RODMAN PETER W.	ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
✓ SEGA RONALD M.	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
✓ SCHMITZ, JOSEPH	INSPECTOR GENERAL
✓ <del>STENBIT JOHN P.</del>	ASD (NETWORKS & INFORMATION INTEGRATION)
✓ WINKENWERDER WILLIAM JR.	ASD (HEALTHAFFAIRS)
✓ WOLFOWITZ PAUL D.	DEPUTYSECRETARYOFDEFENSE
✓ WYNNE MICHAEL W.	DUSD (ACQUISITION& TECHNOLOGY)
✓ <del>ZAKHEM DON C.</del>	USD (COMPTRROLLER)

**Department of the Army**

Name	Position Title
BOLTON CLAUDE M. JR.	ASA (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS & TECHNOLOGY)
BROWN REGINALD J.	ASA (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ BROWNLEE LES R.	UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
MORELLO STEVEN J.	GENERAL COUNSEL
WOODLEY JOHN P. JR.	ASA (CIVIL WORKS)

Name	Position Title
✓ AVILES DIONEL M.	ASN (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & COMPTRROLLER)
✓ ENGLAND GORDON R.	SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
✓ JOHNSON HANSFORD T.	ASN (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
✓ MORA ALBERTO	GENERAL COUNSEL
✓ NAVAS WILLIAM A. JR.	ASN (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
✓ YOUNG JOHN J.	ASN (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)

### Department of the Air Force

Name	Position Title
DOMINGUEZ MICHAEL L.	ASAF (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
GIBBS NELSON F.	ASAF (INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT & LOGISTICS)
MONTELONGO MICHAEL	ASAF (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ROCHE JAMES G.	SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
SAMBUR MARVIN R.	ASAF (ACQUISITION)
TEETS PETER B.	UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WALKER MARY L.	GENERAL COUNSEL

## NONCAREER SES EMPLOYEES

### Office of the Secretary of Defense & Defense Agencies

Name	Position Title
BEEHLER ALEX A.	ADUSD (ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH)
BERKSON BRADLEY M.	DIRECTOR, STUDIES & ANALYSIS
BERNSON VICTOR E. JR.	DIRECTOR, DOD LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
BOYANTON EARL B. JR.	ADUSD (TRANSPORTATION POLICY)
BRZEZINSKI IAN J.	DASD (NATO & EUROPE)
BUTLER PAUL W.	DASD (SPEC OPS PROG SUPPORT)
CEBROWSKI ARTHUR K.	DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
COHEN BENEDICT S.	DEP GEN COUNSEL (ENVIRONMENT & INSTALLATIONS)
COHEN ROBERT S.	SR HOMELAND DEFENSE ADVISOR FOR CIVIL SPT
COLLINS JOSEPH J.	DASD (STABILITY OPERATIONS)
DAVIS LISA A.	PADUSD (INDUSTRIAL POLICY)/DIR INDUSTRIAL BASE MGT INITIATIVE
DECAIN VINCENT F.	PADUSD (INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY SECURITY)
DEGRAFFENREID KENNETH E.	DUSD (POLICY SUPPORT)
DELL'ORTO DANIEL J.	PRINCIPAL DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRITA LAWRENCE	PDASD(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)/THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DUBOIS RAYMOND F. JR.	DIR ADMIN & MGT/DIR WHS/DUSD(INST & ENVRN)
DUEHRING CRAIG W.	PDASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DURNAN JAYMIE A.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY & DEPUTY SECRETARY DEFENSE
ESPER MARK T.	DASD (NEGOTIATIONS POLICY)
ESPERNE JEANINE V.	DASD (HOUSE AFFAIRS)
FLORY PETER C W	PDASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
FORD NELSON M	DASD (HEALTH BUDGET & FINANCIAL POLICY)
GALBRAITH EVAN G.	DEFENSE ADVISOR, US MISSION TO NATO
GRONE PHILIP W.	PADUSD (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
GUTHRIE PRISCILLA E.	DASD (DEPUTY CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER)
HAAVE CAROL A.	DUSD (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SECURITY)
HARTFORD JOHN A. JR.	SPEC ASST FOR INTEL MATTERS & SPEC ACTIVITIES
HOPPS JOHN H. JR.	DDDR&E/DUSD (LABORATORIES & BASIC SCIENCE)
JENNINGS JERRY D.	DASD (POW/MISSING PERSONNEL)/DIRECTOR, DPMPD
KRIEG KENNETH J.	DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
LANZILLOTTA LAWRENCE J.	PDUSD (COMPTROLLER)/DUSD (MGMT REFORM)
LAWLESS RICHARD P. JR.	DASD (ASIA & PACIFIC)
LUTI WILLIAM J.	DUSD (SPEC PLANS & NEAR EAST/ASIAN AFFA)
MARSHALL ANDREW W.	DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
MAYBERRY PAUL W.	DUSD (READINESS)
MOFFITT STEPHEN R.	DASD (SENATE AFFAIRS)
MOLINO JOHN M.	DUSD (MILITARY COMMUNITY & FAMILY POLICY)
NICHOLAS DAVID R.	SECRETARY DEFENSE REP TO OSCE
NORQUIST DAVID L.	DUSD (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
OBEIRNE JAMES H.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR WHITE HOUSE LIAISON
PARDO MAURER ROGELIO IV.	DASD (WESTERN HEMISPHERE)
PATRICK SUZANNE D.	DUSD (INDUSTRIAL POLICY)

Name	Position Title
PATTERSON JACK D.	SPEC ASST TO THE SECRETARY & DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAYTON SUE C.	DUSD (ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS)
PENN BUDDIE J.	DIRECTOR, INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT
RAMOS FRANK M.	DIRECTOR, SMALL & DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
RICARDEL MIRA R.	PDASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
ROOD JOHN C.	DASD (FORCES POLICY)
ROWELL SCOTT W.	DASD (STRATEGY, PLANS, RESOURCES)
RUFF RICHARD N.	SPEC ADV TO DEFSECDEF FOR COMMUNICATIONS STRGY
SCHROEDER WAYNE A.	DUSD (RESOURCE PLANNING/MANAGEMENT)
SHAW JOHN A.	DUSD (INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY SECURITY)
STANLEY DANIEL R.	PDASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
TETHER ANTHONY J.	DIRECTOR, DARPA
<del>THIESSEN MARG</del>	SPEC ASST FOR SPEECHWRITING
THOMAS JAMES P. JR	SPEC ASST TO USD (POLICY)
TORNBERG DAVID N.	DASD (CLINICAL & PROGRAM POLICY)
WELLS LINTON II	PDASD (NETWORKS & INFORMATION INTEGRATION)
WESTPHAL MICHAEL A.	DASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS & COMBAT TERRORISM)
WILLCOX CHRISTOPHER P.	DASD (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLANNING)
WINKLER JOHN D	DASD (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)

#### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
ARMBRUSTER WILLIAM A.	DASA (PRIVATIZATION & PARTNERSHIP)
DENNING DANIEL B.	PDASA (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DUNLOP GEORGE S.	PDASA (CIVILWORKS)/DASA (LEGISLATION)
KELLEY THOMAS E. II	SPEC ASST TO SEC OF THE ARMY (SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY).
KROHN CHARLES A.	PRIN DEP TO THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (MEDIA RELATIONS)
PROSCH GEOFFREY G.	PDASA (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
SHEARER RUSSELL H. C.	SPEC ASSISTANT TO THE ASA (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT)
WHITE SARAH	DASA (FORCE MGMT, MANPOWER & RESOURCES)
WILLIAMS AVON N.	PRIN DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
<b>SES Noncareer Presidential Appointees that do not require Senate confirmation</b>	
WHERLEY DAVID F. JR.	DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GUARD
SCHWARTS ERROLL	DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD
	Noncareer Detailee from NASA

#### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
ARNY WAYNE	DASN (INSTALLATIONS & FACILITIES)
BARNUM HAR	DASN (RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT)
BLAIR ANITA K.	DASN (MIL PERSONNEL PROGRAMS)
EARL ROBERT L.	SPEC ASST TO THE SEC OF THE NAVY
KRANZ THOMAS K.	DEP GENERAL COUNSEL (LEGISLATION & SPECIAL COUNSEL)
KUNESH NICHOLAS J.	DASN (LOGISTICS)

SCHREGARDUS DONALDR.	DASN (ENVIRONMENT)
SMITH ROGER M.	DASN (LITTORAL & MINE WARFARE SYSTEMS)

**Department of the Air Force**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>
BODIE WILLIAM C.	SPEC ASST FOR POLICY AND PLANNING
CRAVEN KELLY F.	DASAF (FORCE MANAGEMENT & INTEGRATION)
DICKMAN ROBERT S.	DEPUTY FOR MILITARY SPACE
KOETZ MAUREEN T.	DASAF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH)
MARTINEZ SHIRLEY A.	DEPUTY FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
RAMOS DANIEL J.	PRIN DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
TRUESDELL JOHN C.	DASAF (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

**SCHEDULE C EMPLOYEES**  
**Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies**

Name	Position Title
ANDERSON JAMES H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
BARBER ALLISON B.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
BAUER GREGG E.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
BECKER JOHN B.	STAFF SPECIALIST
BECK WILLIAM G.	DEFENSE FELLOW
BINKERT NICOLE C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (COMMUNICATIONS)
BLUMENTHAL DANIEL A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
BOEHM JOSHUA M.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
BROOKS COREY D.	DEFENSE FELLOW
BURMEISTER CHRISTINA	DEFENSE FELLOW
CHAFIN CLAUDE H.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
CICIO KRISTEN K.	STAFF ASSISTANT
CRONAUER ADRIAN J.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DASD(POW/MP)/DIRECTOR, DPM
CROWDER SUSAN E.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CURCIO SHARON D.	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DAVIS BARBARA M.	PERS SEC TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DAVIS LINDA C.	PERS CONF ASSISTANT TO ASD(RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DICKOW JOANNE M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
DOWLEY AENGUS D.	STAFF ASSISTANT
ELLIS MARK	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PDUSD (POLICY)
ERICKSON NELSON V.	STAFF ASSISTANT
FEENEY SCOTT R.	STAFF ASSISTANT
FERKO JON GARY	STAFF ASSISTANT
FLANIGAN TIMOTHY	DEFENSE FELLOW
GLANCY DAVID A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
GODWIN ASHLEY D.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
HAMAR LISA M.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO GENERAL COUNSEL
HARRISON KRISTOFER L.	STAFF ASSISTANT
HARVIN CHRISTOPHER	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
HAUKEDAHL JOHN H	PROTOCOL OFFICER
HEMENWAY MARGARET C.	DEPUTY WHITE HOUSE LIAISON
HENDERSON HEDY D.	RESEARCH ASSISTANT
(b)(6)	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HENRY DONALD P.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT
HEWITT MARK S.	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTINUITY PROGRAM OFFICE
HORN MATTHEW	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
HOLLAND ERIC W.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
JONES THOMAS L.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
KARRE MEREDITH A.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)
KATZAMAN JENNIFER M.	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
KOERNER JO ANN	PERS AND CONF ASSISTANT TO ATSD (NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS)
KONKLER MATHEW J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
KYGER TIMOTHY B.	STAFF ASSISTANT

Name	Position Title
LAWRENCE GAYLE A.	COORDINATOR OF RESERVE INTEGRATION
LAWRENCELILIAN I	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
LESTER SUSAN C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
LEWIS L. JEAN	CHIEF OF STAFF
LOVE KAREN A.	PERS AND CONF ASSISTANT TO TASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
LUKACH TERESA A.	SPEECHWRITER
MAINARDI CATHERINE A.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MAKOVSKY MICHAEL S.	STAFF ASSISTANT
MARLO FRANCIS H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
MARSLENDER JULIA D	DEFENSE FELLOW
MARTINEZ ROMAN	STAFF ASSISTANT
MASON JEB J.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MCGINN JOHN G.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PDUSD FOR POLICY
MCNIFF JAMES M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MEYER DONALD W.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
MILLER MICHAEL W.	DEFENSE FELLOW
MOBBS MICHAEL H.	SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE USD (POLICY)
MURPHY MARGARET	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
MURPHY MARY CLAIRE	DIRECTOR, PROTOCOL
NADANER JEFFREY M.	STAFF ASSISTANT
NESTEL ARLENE Z.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFF ELEANOR B.	STAFF ASSISTANT
ORTIZ ALCIDES	DEFENSE FELLOW
PASCO BRANDT J. C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
PLATA NANCY D.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
REID JAMES H.	DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
ROSTOW VICTOR A. D.	STAFF ASSISTANT
RUBIN MICHAEL A.	STAFF ASSISTANT
RUNKLE BENJAMIN G.	STAFF ASSISTANT
SADOWSKA MALGORZATA M.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SCHENKER DAVID K.	STAFF ASSISTANT
SCIARRTO BONNIE L.	PROGRAM SUPPORT SPECIALIST
SENR DANIEL S.	SENIOR ASSOCIATE DIR, OFC OF GLOBAL COMM
SEWARD PAMELA J.	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT TO PDUSD (POLICY)
SHAW ROBERT G.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
(b)(6)	CONF ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SHERRILL WILSON N.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SHOCKEY HEATHER	PERS & CONF TO THE ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
SHORT SIDNEY F.	DEFENSE FELLOW
SMITH ROBERT FRANCIS	SPEECHWRITER
SOULEYRET MARGARET Y.	CONF ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ST. JULIEN CECILE FRANCES	EXEC ASST TO ASD (SR&R)
THOMPSON BARBARA W.	PERS & CONF ASST TO ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
TIMPERLAKE EDWARD T.	DIRECTOR OF ASSESSMENTS
TOMB MARK C.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT

11-L-0559/OSD/22603

Name	Position Title
TULBAH ALI H.	DEFENSE FELLOW
TURENNE WILLIAM J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
TURNER MARY E.	CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
VALENTE CLAUDIA B.	PERS & CONF ASST TO USD (COMPTROLLER)
VICTORY BERNARD C.	STAFF ASSISTANT
VONGLIS JOHN G.	DIRECTOR, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
WALKER MARK M.	STAFF ASSISTANT
WATSON PAUL H.	STAFF ASSISTANT
WHEELER HOLLEN J.	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
ZEMEK ALEXANDER F.	DEFENSE FELLOW

### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
ALRIDGE MADELINE C.	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
HAGELINE JOHN A	ASSISTANT FOR WATER RESOURCES POLICY
REISMAN DAVID A.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY GENERAL COUNSEL
ROSS SUZANNE K. L.	CONF ASSISTANT
SMITH JUDY	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WALKER ERNEST J.	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
WYRO ALICE	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT

### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
DRENNAN JOANN	STAFF ASSISTANT
DENNY ELIZABETH	SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DAVIS ELIZABETH	CONF ASSISTANT
ROWAN JEAN C.	CONF ASSISTANT
WRIGHT DANIELLE A.	CONF ASSISTANT

### Department of the Air Force

Name	Position Title
PATTERAKIS CHRIS	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS
RANDALL SEAN	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT
TONI DOLORES	PERS & CONF ASSISTANT

## SES LIMITED TERM/LIMITED EMERGENCY

### Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies

Name	Position Title
ADAMS, NANCY	SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR, TMA
GEREN, PRESTON	SPEC ASS'T TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
KRAEMER, SVEN	SPEC POLICY ADVISOR TO THE USD(POLICY)
McGRAW, RICHARD	SPEC ASS'T TO THE DA&M FOR SPECIAL EVENTS
PUDAS, TERRY	DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
SHULSKY, ABRAM	SPEC POLICY ADVISOR TO THE USD(POLICY)
WAX, CHARLES	DIRECTOR, UNIFIED EXCHANGE TASK FORCE

### Department of the Navy

Name	Position Title
GILPIN, RICHARD	PRINCIPAL ASS'T FOR ACQUISITION, PROGRAMMING & BUDGETING
LEADMON, JOHN	PRINCIPAL ASS'T FOR SUBMARINE/SUBMERSIBLE DESIGN SYSTEMS
SOWA, FRANK	FOC DIRECTOR, ITR, SOURCING
WIKENHEISER, DAVID	SPEC ASS'T FOR INFO MANAGEMENT/INFO TECH

### Department of the Army

Name	Position Title
VON BERNEWITZ, CARLA	DIRECTOR, BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION TASK FORCE

### Department of the Air Force

No Limited Term/Limited Emergency Appointees

Note: Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees recruited to serve during this Administration.

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 2/20/2004

Handwritten: JR (S) 022304

DOCUMENT TYPE: INFO MEMO

OSD CONTROL OSD 02562-04

DOC 2/20/2004

DOR 2/20/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM ADM DUBOIS

TO SECDEF

SUBJECT W D TEAM -BREAKOUT OF PERSONNEL

KEYWORDS DUBOIS, R

COMMENTS

FN 250 *System reader*

SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT

AGENCY

ACTION ASSIGNED

I&R

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1

ENCLOSURES 1

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

INFO MEMO

CREATED BY reynolds

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DSD RWI

ADC RWI

11-L-0559/OSD/22606

113  
KCO

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
DI 1204-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

Ray Dibors:

4  
1/30

Please provide SD w/a list of PAS + Sched e + SES (bit) appointees here today.

Thanks,

Jaymie

Suspense: 2/4/04

OSD 02562-04

0205D 230 Superjackets

30 JAN 04

20 FEB 04

'SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL.

SM23Feb04



Print Date: 2/20/2004

DOCUMENTTYPE QUESTION/NOTE

OSD CONTROL **OSD 02562-04**

DOC 1/12/2004

DOR 2/20/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM TSA DI RITA

TO ADM DUBOIS

SUBJECT PLEASE PROVIDE SECDEF WITH A LIST OF PAS AND SCHEDULE C AND SES (POLITICAL) APPOINTEES  
HERE TODAY

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL. CAF

FN **230 Superpages**

SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

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QUESTION/NOTE

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ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/22608

113  
1502

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Team

I have to talk to the team I picked for DoD, get a list of the people I brought in and take a look at it. Please supply me the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-25

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

Ray Dubois:  
Please provide SD w/a  
list of PAS + Sched e + SES (bit)  
appointees here today.

4  
1/30

Suspense: 2/4/04

Thanks,  
Jaymie  
85D 02562-04

2305uearomdes

12Jan04

20Feb04

**SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL**

Print Date: 8/9/2006

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC      ATTACHMENT:  
OSD CONTROL    **OSD 02562-04**    DOC 1/12/2004      DOR 5/13/2005      SIGNATURE CASE

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD      TO **TSA**

SUBJECT DODTEAM

KEYWORDS DI RITA, L LIST SNOW **FLAKE**

COMMENTS NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION W/O FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL

FN 230 **SUPERGRADES**      SEC U      OCN 011204-25

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE      DECISION      DECISION DATE      PRIORITY ACTION REPORT

AGENCY      ACTION ASSIGNED      SUSPENSE      DOC SUSPENSE

SUSPENSE COMPLETE      ACD      COORDINATION

PAGES      ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

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INFO MEMO  
QUESTION/NOTE  
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**RUM** Q

11-L-0559/OSD/22610

**OSD 02562-04**  
**\*02562/M04BB45407\***

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

Action Agency:  
Action Required: **INFORMATION AND RETENTION**  
Coordinate With:  
References:  
Remarks:  
Document Type: **INFO MEMO**

Suspense Date:

Routing Date: **February/20/2004**

OSD CONTROL #: **OSD 02562-04**

## INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

⋮



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

204 FEB 23 PM 5:25

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Team – Breakout of Personnel

- In the attached snowflake, dated January 12, 2004, you requested a list of personnel you selected for your DoD team. Per clarification with Jaymie Duman, we understood that you would like a listing of Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation, Non-Career SES members, and Schedule C appointees that are here today.
- We have also included the Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees who are members of your DoD Team.
- Tab A lists 38 Presidential Appointees requiring Senate confirmation; Tab B lists 87 Non-Career SES Members; Tab C lists 113 Schedule C appointees; and Tab D lists 12 Limited Term/Limited Emergency appointees. In sum, they constitute the 250 members of your DoD Team that are presently serving in the Department.
- Lists, which are arranged in alphabetical order, include names of personnel and their position titles, with separate breakouts for OSD and the Military Departments.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Linda Roper

(b)(6)

OSD 02562-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22612



26 Jan 04

plans

January 26, 2004

72

01/26/04 11:04

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability

Thanks for the update. Please keep pushing hard on this.

Are there other areas of language expertise we should be thinking about!

Attach.

1/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: 8<sup>th</sup> Report [OSD 00771-04]

DHR:dh  
012204-2

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

0914

26 JAN 04

OSD 02581-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22613



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OSD 00771-04  
2004 JAN 10 PM 5:29

✓  
1/22

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2004, 1:25 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Status of our Efforts to Employ Nearly Bilingual Managers and Provide Language Capability - Eighth Report

This is my eighth report on our efforts to recruit and employ nearly bilingual managers. I am adding to this update a summary of our efforts to assist in providing language capability to deployed forces and the CPA.

- As of December 29, 2003, we have received 1,636 interest forms and 530,347 hits on our web site. Americans are continuing to apply. We have established a database that lists applicants and their skills, and have provided that data base and appropriate resumes to the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority Representative. I understand that about 20 of our applicants have been hired by the CPA. All told, to date about 60 individuals have been hired by CPA or by other Defense interests.
- To facilitate the screening and hire of the Invitation to Serve candidates, we have engaged a contractor, Chugach-McKinley Incorporated (CMI). CMI has contacted all those who applied and is engaged in screening those who indicate a continued interest in employment. CMI has completed the screening of individuals from the Washington, DC area and has identified what they believe are eighteen excellent candidates. The candidates' skills include from pharmacy, civil engineering, banking, business, and architecture. Chugach is prepared to hire and deploy these individuals at our direction.
- The Army continues to make progress with the implementation of the Direct Entry Individual Ready Reserve program. This program targets the enlistment of Arabic heritage speakers. Since August of 2003, the Army has successfully recruited 156 native Arab speakers. The vast majority of recruits have advanced Arabic speaking skills. The Army has set a monthly recruiting goal of 21 people and is currently meeting that goal. We anticipate the first O9L "Translators" to be ready for deployment in April 2004. The success of this program has improved the Army's penetration of the Arabic-speaking market, in general. While initially skeptical about the program, the Army has now embraced it and its possibilities. We will need to monitor this program as the recruits are deployed in the field, but the overall

TSA SD	✓
SA DSD	✓
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	✓

11-L-0559/OSD/22614

OSD 00771-04

assessment at this point is that the initiative has tremendous potential as a model for building the Department's language capability.

- Although not related to our efforts to hire bilingual managers, you may be interested to know that since early December my Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy has worked with the CPA staff, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to identify Department of Defense civilians who have critical expertise needed for positions in Baghdad and the Washington, DC area. These detailees will be TDY for at least 6 months. For Baghdad, CPA is paying for transportation and providing billeting and food; the Components are covering salary and all other TDY expenses.

CPA provided a brief description of the functions of the positions; e.g., Information, Contracting, Logistics; expertise required; estimated series and grade of the duties; and, proposed a number of employees by Component. In turn, we asked the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, through the Human Resources Directors, to submit names and resumes of volunteers.

- To date, we have forwarded 49 names for the Baghdad positions and 17 names for positions in Washington, DC. For the Baghdad, 2 are filled, 3 are pending confirmation, and 5 employees are under consideration. For the local positions, one employee is under consideration. All employees identified thus far are volunteers.

This has been a successful collaboration between the CPA staff and the human resource community throughout the Department to put needed staff in place.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

Prepared by: Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

**INFO MEMO**

02/11/04 11:03

February 11, 2004, 9:30 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*  
*20 Feb 04*

SUBJECT: Snowflake: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability (TAB A)

- As a result of your pronounced interest in this critical subject, I have developed a defense-wide language plan whose goal is to comprehensively transform the way language and regional area expertise is valued, developed, and employed within the Department (TAB B).
- To effectively execute this undertaking, I have established a limited term (six-month duration) language transformation team that includes Service and Agency representation, headed by my Deputy Under Secretary for Plans. The team is fully engaged in executing the language plan. The focus is on the set of "investment" languages and regions referenced in the plan and attached at TAB C.
- On February 6, 2004, I hosted a meeting with Steve Cambone, Ryan Henry and Major General Maples (Vice Director, Joint Staff), in which we clarified governance issues with respect to this matter and articulated a unified way ahead on this subject.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by Mr. John G. Vonglis, Director, Management Initiatives, P&R,

(b)(6)



OSD 02501-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22616

# TAB

# A

P1400

January 26, 2004

26 Jan 04

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Bilingual Managers and Language Capability


Thanks for the update. Please keep pushing hard on this.

Are there other areas of language expertise we should be thinking about?

Attach.

1/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: 8<sup>th</sup> Report [OSD 0077 1-04]

DHR:dh  
012204-2



Please respond by 2/12/04

OSD 02581-04

  
11-L-0559/OSD/22618



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

01/06/04 11:25 AM  
370 100 10 00 5:29

1/22

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2004, 1:25 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Status of our Efforts to Employ Nearly Bilingual Managers and Provide  
Language Capability - Eighth Report

This is my eighth report on our efforts to recruit and employ nearly bilingual managers. I am adding to this update a summary of our efforts to assist in providing language capability to deployed forces and the CPA.

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TSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/21



OSD 00771 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22619

assessment at this point is that the initiative has tremendous potential as a model for building the Department's language capability.

- Although not related to our efforts to hire bilingual managers, you may be interested to know that since early December my Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy has worked with the CPA staff, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to identify Department of Defense civilians who have critical expertise needed for positions in Baghdad and the Washington, DC area. These detailees will be **TDY** for at least 6 months. For Baghdad, CPA is paying for transportation and providing billeting and food; the Components are covering salary and all other TDY expenses.

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This has been a successful collaboration between the CPA staff and the human resource community throughout the Department to put needed staff in place.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

Prepared by: Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans) (b)(6)

**TAB**

**B**



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

August 26, 2003, 3:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Signature & Date

**SUBJECT:** Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs, and a "Transformation Plan" for DoD's Language Capability

- You asked me about my plans for Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs (TAB A).
- I believe both of these programs need to be viewed in the larger context of how language and regional area expertise are valued, developed and employed, a subject on which you have pressed me on several occasions for a "transformation plan" (TAB B). I propose that we:
  - Work with the Combatant Commanders to integrate language capability needs into the operational planning process. Assign a foreign area officer to their personal staffs.
  - With the Military Services, work toward every newly commissioned officer having an educational background in an "investment language and region" (see attached list at TAB C). The curricula at the Service Academies and educational requirements in the Reserve Officer Training Corps should be aligned with this goal.
  - Take steps to provide adequate language ability to operational units:
    - (1) Ensure that the Defense Language Institute is capable of addressing our demand for numbers and types of highly proficient language speakers. Ensure that the graduates are assigned to jobs using the skill they acquired.
    - (2) Develop a "crash course" of basic language training for non-language trained Service members in preparation for deployment (DLI has developed a concept for 1-, 3-, and 6-month courses that General Casey and I are discussing).
    - (3) Assess the feasibility of offering "extra credit" to recruiters who recruit personnel who are bi-lingual in an investment language.
    - (4) Establish a Direct Entry Individual Ready Reserve program for all Services to take advantage of native language speakers in the United States (already underway as a pilot program in the Army).

11-L-0559/OSD/22622



0107301

- Revise Foreign Language Proficiency Pay to ensure that it adequately rewards those with investment language ability and is sufficient to encourage the development and maintenance of language ability within the force.
- The Olmsted Scholar **Program**, of course, is a voluntary program administered by a private foundation. The foundation prefers candidates who are in combat or combat arms specialties. I will **ask the Services** to encourage applications from combat and combat arms specialties and encourage the completion of a related graduate degree as a part of the program. I will also direct the assignment of graduates to an appropriate utilization tour that takes advantage of the foreign language and regional expertise gained.
- We will meet with the Deputy Secretary to review this plan. Steve Cambone and General Pace agree with it. Steve has also forwarded to me a draft language strategy compiled by his staff that we will incorporate.
- In order to do all this in an expeditious manner, I **am asking the military** services to designate a full time member of a time-limited (six month) Language Transformation Team.
- To truly accomplish transformation, it will be necessary to have the American educational system engaged for the long term. **If you agree, I will engage national language associations in discussion of our plan and how we might work together to improve language capability.**

COORDINATION: VCJCS; USD (I) (at TAB D)

Prepared by: Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (P), (b)(6)

**TAB**

**C**

## INVESTMENT LANGUAGES/REGIONS

- Arabic \*
- Chinese\*
- Spanish
- Korean
- Farsi
- Indonesian\*
- Philippino\*
- Kurdish
- Turkish
- Hindi
- Central Asia\*
- Russian
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Serbo-Croatian

\* Multiple Dialects

10 MAR 04  
(1845 MRS)



**From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz**

Powell Moore -

- ① Please get back to me with the details on what the SASC plans for March 31.
- ② Is it the right format for us or should we recommend they structure it differently?
- ③ Talk to Robert Rangel and see if the HASC would like to do something similar.

NO OSD 02583-04

326

(8 Feb 2004)

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Senior Military Assistant**

10 March 2004 - 2130 Hours -HC 3/11

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. POWELL MOORE, ASD / LA

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

Sir:

The Deputy forwards the attached SecDef snowflakes with the following guidance:

- (1) Please get back to me with the details on what the SASC plans for March 31.
- (2) Is it the right format for us or should we recommend they structure it differently?
- (3) Talk to Robert Rangel and see if the HASC would like to do something similar."

Very respectfully,



William B. Caldwell, IV  
Major General, USA  
Senior Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments:

SD # 022104-11, 21Feb04  
SD # 020804-95, 8Feb04  
SecAF 28Feb04 Comments on Rebalancing

Suspense: Monday, 15 March 2004

Copy to: Mr. Chu, USD/P&R  
Mr. Di Rita, PDASD / PA  
LTG Craddock, SMA / SD  
Mr. Peter Geren, SATSD

326

11-L-0559/OSD/22627

OSD 02583-04

Handwritten initials



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

FEB 26 2004

Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington DC 20301-4000

326

Dear Mr. Wolfowitz:

*Paul,*

I agree it is a good idea to address the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve forces with the Congress. The Air Force is certainly looking into the necessary steps to ensure post OIF/OEF that our total force team is still viable and balanced. We stand by to support the Department in whatever means necessary or desired when engaging Congress.

Sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*

26 FEB 04

8 FEB 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22628

OSD 02583-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

powell.<sup>8</sup>  
SD looking  
for your  
input.

Thanks  
Jayin

Purnan 2/24

OSD 02583-04

326

24 Feb 04

8 Feb 04

11 Feb-0730  
scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

What do you think about asking the Congress to hold a hearing on the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve? We could do it once we think we know where we want to go, so we can let the air out of it before all the people in the country get concerned about it and start calling their representatives and senators.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-05

.....

Please respond by 2 / 17 / of

2/12

C 2/18

SecDef -

It is a good idea.  
I'll discuss with Powell about  
how to go about it.

(Army?)

*L. Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita  
2/13

11-L-0559/OSD/22630

OSD 02583-04

OSD 02583-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

777 000 000 0000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 20, 2004, 7:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Hearing-- SNOWFLAKE *20 Feb 04*

- The Senate Armed Services Committee will be holding a hearing on this subject 31 March.
- In the meantime, we have delivered the Department's Rebalancing Report to the major committees and their staffs. We also briefed the principal staff of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. We have reached out to the applicable associations, and we have posted the Report on the Reserve Affairs web site, where it is available to every Member and staff person on the Hill.
- For the House, we are offering a briefing from Tom Hall to every Member who indicated an interest during the Secretary's 4 February testimony, adding others who have since expressed interest (the list is growing, and now includes two Senators— see Tab **B**).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

OSD 02583-04



11-L-0559/OSD/22631

**TAB**

**A**

11 Feb-0730  
scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

What do you think about asking the Congress to hold a hearing on the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve? We could do it once we think we know where we want to go, so we can let the air out of it before all the people in the country get concerned about it and start calling their representatives and senators.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-95

.....  
Please respond by

2 / 17 / 04

OSD 02583-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22633

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**Military Assistant**

11 February 2004 - 1200

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Chu (USD P&R)

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

Sir,

The Deputy asks that you take the attached SecDef snowflake for action. Please coordinate with PA, LA, and the Joint Staff.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hagerott  
Commander, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

**SUSPENSE:** 17 Feb 04

cc: DJS, ASD/PA, ASD/LA

11-L-0559/OSD/22634

**TAB**

**B**

Follow-up Rebalancing Briefings to Congressional Members

Congressman Simmons	Connecticut	Completed
Congressman <b>Schrock</b>	Virginia	Completed
Congressman Kline	Minnesota	
Senator Ensign	Nevada	
Senator Sessions	Alabama	
Congressman Wilson	South Carolina	
Congressman Thornberry	Texas	
Congressman Baldwin	Wisconsin	



February 21, 2004

TO: Tillie Fowler  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Healthcare

*D.A.*

*701*

I think it would be a terrific idea if you set up a little group to look at Department of Defense healthcare. Newt Gingrich has some interesting ideas.

Why don't you ask him to chair it and have him choose one or two other people so they can get to work on it. It is conceivable we could save a good deal of money.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-13

.....

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*21 February*

OSD 02592-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22637

February 21, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: 2001 Press Comments

*D.R.*

In a February 2001 press briefing, I said the things you will see here on this page.  
We might want to include that in our 9/11 testimony.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/2/01 Transcript of press briefing

DHR:dh  
022104-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.750

21 Feb 04

OSD 02593-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22638

during the campaign in, I think, in July or something in Washington at the Press Club, maybe. In any event, he did. And he has asked us to do that and that is just beginning. I am now in my fourteenth day.

Q: Is that principally a Defense Department review?

Rumsfeld: Yes. That process is taking place. He's indicated a desire to review the quality of life issues and address that, and as part of the strategy review, you would **look** at offensive and defensive weapons, including missile defense. You would look at numbers of weapons, as he indicated in some of his speeches, and you would look at transformation issues, which he has indicated an interest in, as to how you transform this force into a force that is appropriate to the 21st century. We are also looking at a few other things in the process. I have got a group of people that are starting to look at financial management issues. You may recall Senator Byrd raised those questions in the hearing. And we are looking at quality of life issues with a different group of people. We are looking at defense strategy, transformation and missile defense, and acquisition reform. And we are just getting started on some of those.

Q: Does this take precedent over the QDR?

Rumsfeld: I think it is really different people, and I think as our thinking clears and as we get our brains wrapped around some of these things, very likely those inputs -- we would find a way in the QDR process to implant them down into that process so that you would not wait until the end and have a disconnect, but I expect that the things I am talking about, while they may not reach full flowering in 30 or 60 days, nonetheless, we are expecting that we want to get in a month or two or three depending on which one of these things they are, pretty well down the road so that we have some good idea of what we think about those things and then we would probably plug them into the QDR, some of them, for the kind of refinement of thought you get by engaging people who are really into the details of things.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in your confirmation hearing you talked about the dangers of ~~cyber-terrorism~~, weapons of mass destruction, and I guess that this should be something that you will be talking about with the folks you will be meeting tomorrow. What kind of a message are you delivering to them? What do you want to accomplish with them?

Rumsfeld: It was one of the things that the president mentioned, as you will recall, during the campaign and subsequently. I do not plan to get into it in detail in my brief remarks. We are still messing with them, and they are too long. But what I have in mind is the reality that as you move out of the Cold War and you go into a relaxed environment and you see an acceleration in proliferation, and simultaneously, almost in the same time period, earlier in the last decade you had the Gulf War, which taught people that contesting Western armies, navies and air forces, is not a good idea. It is expensive and you would probably lose, which suggests that because of the proliferation that is taking place, and their interest in things other than armies, navies and air forces, and cheaper and easier ways to do things, that people look for so-called asymmetrical responses to dissuade people from attempting to have them not do what they would like to do in their neighborhoods to their neighbors. Obviously, those things include all across the spectrum from terrorism through cyber attacks to information warfare to cruise missiles to short-range ballistic missiles to longer range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Now, those are the kinds of things that are increasingly attractive to various nations of the world. We know from watching them that they are taking steps to not just be interested in them, but to develop

11-L-0559/OSD/22639

February 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Authorities

350.09

Today I raised the question on authorities you asked me to raise with George Tenet. He said he is working on it and will get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-23

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

20 Feb 04

OSD 02603-04

February 20, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keeper of the Flame

I just saw your invitation from Frank Gaffney for the Keeper of the Flame Award.  
It is a good outfit, and they have been consistently helpful to us.

I hope you can give them a hand!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-27

*DOI 104*

*20 Feb 04*

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 22, 2004  
SUBJECT: Attached Article

Attached is a paper that Bing West wrote that might be of interest.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022104a.05ts

*Attach: "Change the Strategy in Iraq" by Bing West*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 02606-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22642

IRAQ

22 Feb 04

NYT tomorrow

February 4, 2004

## Change the Strategy in Iraq

By F.J. Bing West

TAKRIT. We were several blocks inside Takrit, the northern city where Saddam was captured, when Captain Deel showed me where an IED, or Improvised Explosive Device, had blown a large hole in the cement sidewalk. It was late January and I was back in Iraq on my third visit with our soldiers. The patrol of three American and nine Iraqi soldiers moved with practiced ease, showing an outsider their city by starlight. Captain Jason Deel of the 22d Infantry – whose motto is “Regulars, by God!” – had invited me on a night patrol with his combined Iraqi-American platoon. Iraqi Lt. Uday Nofan led us down the dark streets while Deel pointed out the sites of recent bombings – a gouge in the sidewalk near a kabob stand with colored lights and farther on, shattered cement next to an internet café.

Last August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz quietly urged the organization of such combined units, which had been successful in Vietnam. By January, professionals like Captain Deel had trained 30 local Iraqi battalions and were turning the patrolling over to eager leaders like Lt. Nofan. After several months of on-the-job training with American soldiers, these Iraqi units, called the Civil Defense Corps, are beginning to stand on their own. By late spring, there will be 40,000 soldiers like Lt. Nofan serving in these quasi-National Guard units.

At the same time, the nature of the war has changed. The insurgents rarely shoot at Americans any more, because they learned that to exchange rifle fire meant death. Instead, the extremists' weapons are now car bombs and IEDs, detonated with murderous caprice. This is a war requiring police rather than soldiers to track down the bombers. In a society where every family has a weapon, where extremists and criminals mingle in the marketplaces and where kidnappers and car-jackers prey on the people, restoring law and order is essential to the credibility of the coalition and the emerging Iraqi government.

The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps can provide the security umbrella, but the police have to make the arrests. Therein lies the rub. Under Saddam, the army and the dreaded Mukhabarat Security Service imposed order through torture and killing. The local police were at the bottom of the security barrel, ill-led, poorly equipped and specializing in petty extortion. In the Balkans, under UN and NATO auspices, hundreds of police advisers instructed the local cops in how to restore civil order. But in Iraq, the very bombings which require detective work have deterred civilian advisers from coming into the country. In the areas where they are most urgently needed, the Iraqi police are least effective, a defect well understood by our battalions on the ground.

After Takrit, I visited the city of Kirkuk, inhabited by over a million Kurds and Arabs whose mutual distrust periodically spills over into bloody riots. LtCol Dominic Caraccilo, commanding the 2d Battalion of the 503<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade, brought me to the Maghreb Police Station in the heart of the city, where he had stationed an American infantry

11-L-0559/OSD/22643

platoon alongside two hundred Kurdish and Arab police officers. The police chief, Abu Turham, told me his biggest regret was that the 503<sup>rd</sup> was leaving. The American soldiers had set the example for his men by patrolling with them. He said "extreme Islamists" were as intent on killing Iraqi police as Americans. His station had been attacked four times and he expected bombings to go on for years, because the terrorists could drive wherever they wanted and set off an explosion.

Iraq is beset by blood feuds, religious and ethnic strife, porous borders and a desire for revenge after decades of torture and mass murder. Even if Iraq achieved the same level of normalcy as, say, Rio de Janeiro, there would still be more than 12,000 homicides a year. Worse still, terrorists are incited by some Islamic clerics untouchable by American military power. Police chief Turham said that he was urging, with limited success, the 117 mullahs in Kirkuk to preach against terrorism. Only Iraqis can resolve the sectarian violence and the nexus between religion and hate. The primary military mission of the coalition should not be to continue offensive operations until there is a cessation of violence, because that is not going to happen. A military security umbrella without an effective police force is what exists in Iraq today, and it is insufficient for the threat.

Three new US divisions deploy to Iraq in March under guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Replacing coalition troops with Iraqis qualified to provide internal security is the key to defeating the threat. Priority should be given to building up the Iraqi forces, with the initiative of Mr. Wolfowitz to train via combined units extended to the police. Each American division is already conducting a three-week police training course. In addition, mentoring of police on-the-job by US soldiers will be required. Our military will also need budget authority to purchase rapidly equipment for the Iraqis.

It took six months for our divisions to mentor and train 40,000 Iraqi National Guard soldiers; it will take another six months to mentor 50,000 or more police, as well as additional Iraqi soldiers. This means a large fraction of the soldiers in every US battalion will be operating with Iraqis. This requires a shift in strategy emphasizing training and combined action rather than unilateral offensive operations.

This strategy isn't open-ended. By next September, US battalions should conduct tests to certify that Iraqi military and police units are qualified to take control and stand on their own in the areas of highest crime and terrorist activity. This will enable US and coalition forces to pull back to regional redoubts as a deterrent against external aggression, while Iraqis take responsibility for their own internal security and law and order.

*Mr. West, a former assistant secretary of defense and former Marine in the Vietnam conflict, is the author of books about both combined action forces and the war in Iraq.*

7:46 AM

TO: Amb. Jerry Bremer  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: Constitutions

I received a call today from a constitutional law expert at AEI named (b)(6)  
(b)(6) He has spent decades studying the U.S. Constitution and other  
constitutions. He says he is no expert on the Spanish Constitution, but he recalls  
that the Spanish Constitution has some provisions relating the autonomy, semi-  
autonomy or elements of autonomy that might be worth considering for the Iraqi  
Constitution, given the position of the Kurds.

He said there used to be a professor at Yale names (b)(6) who knows a lot  
about the Spanish Constitution. He doesn't know if the man is still there, or even  
alive, etc. but he believed he might be worth consulting.

This is something that ought to be looked into. If you have your constitutional  
experts look into it, please let me all know if there is anything of interest.

Thanks so much.

DHR/azn  
022104.02ts

OSD 02607-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22645

Iraq  
21 Feb 04

TAB A

28  
January 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

Please take a look at this Tom O'Connell memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and tell me where you think we are and **what** needs to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/03 ASD(SOLIC) memo Re: NDU Stabilization and Reconstructions Operations Study

DHR:dh  
012604-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

Iraq

28 Jan 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 FEB 23 09:10:52

INFO MEMO

CH-1547-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 2/21*

SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

- In response to your request (TAB A) regarding Tom O'Connell's memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and your inquiry on where we are and what needs to be done, the following information is provided.
- The Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), is in the process of an effort to rebalance the force, create modular capabilities and convert conventional combat units to have greater utility throughout the spectrum of conflict. Insights from the Operational Availability 04 (OA 04) Study will further define capabilities for Phase IV and Stability Operations. Recommend we support the CSA ongoing initiative while we continue to study this issue in greater detail.
- The CSA is assessing the conversion of six Division Headquarters to a more modular design that improves capabilities for stability and special operations. The Army proposes converting the existing brigades to a mobile light brigade design. These converted units would be lighter and more mobile, and have a higher density of infantry formations than the brigades they would replace. Other Army conversions include 149 Military Police, 8 Civil Affairs, 4 PSYOP, and other units that provide support for stability operations to the Active Component by FY 2009.
- Initial insights from the OA 04 Study, to be completed 31 March 2004, indicate that development of forces specifically for stability operations is not an efficient means of addressing the current capabilities gap. The Services are evaluating solutions for potential shortfalls through task organization and are not considering development of specialized units. In addition to the OA 04 Study, the USD(P)-led Stability Operations Study, due 30 June 2004, will assess Service proposals and make recommendations for additional force alignment solutions.
- Creation of specialized units introduces a low density/high demand problem. Given the duration of stability operations, force rotation will be a management challenge. The limited number of specific stability units and the regional focus of civil affairs and psychological operations units may preclude global sourcing.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; DJ-8 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22647

OSD 02610-04

TAB A

28  
January 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Stabilization and Reconstruction

Please take a look at this Tom O'Connell memo on stabilization and reconstruction, and tell me where you think we are and what needs to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/03 ASD(SOLIC) memo Re: NDU Stabilization and Reconstructions Operations Study

DHR:dh  
012604-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

**TAB B  
COORDINATION**

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Army	BG Ryan	6 Feb 04
USMC	COL A. E. Van Dyke	4 Feb 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1544-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

- 1 March - USJFCOM delivers OIF Operational MCO Lessons Learned Report to Joint Staff.
- 8 March - Joint Staff provides final OIF EXSUM and USJFCOM MCO combined report to OSD for review.
- 31 March - OIF EXSUM

*And Sec Def*

*Iraq 24 Feb 04 23 Feb 04*

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Submit to Congress the combined OIF Strategic Lessons Learned EXSUM and USJFCOM OIF MCO Lessons Learned Report as a classified interim response on 31 March.

Approve DA Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

FEB 24 2004

b. Provide classified and unclassified OIF final reports in July.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: NONE

3

OSD 02612-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 FEB 23 11:12:57

ACTION MEMO

CW-1544-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Defense Authorization Conference Report

- **Issue.** You asked for a timetable for putting together a response to the Defense Authorization Conference Report requirement
- **Answer.** Deliver the Joint Staff prepared Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Strategic Lessons Learned Executive Summary (EXSUM) combined with US Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) OIF Major Combat Operations (MCO) Lessons Learned Report on 31 March as an interim response.
- Proposed Timeline:
  - 26 February - Brief OIF Strategic Lessons Learned EXSUM to DepSecDef and USDP.
  - To be determined on 26 February - Brief SecDef.
  - 1 March - USJFCOM delivers OIF Operational MCO Lessons Learned Report to Joint Staff.
  - 8 March - Joint Staff provides final OIF EXSUM and USJFCOM MCO combined report to OSD for review.
  - 31 March - OIF EXSUM and USJFCOM MCO classified report submitted to Congress by OSD as interim response.
  - July - Final classified and unclassified versions of OIF reports delivered to Congress, with responses to congressional requirements not previously addressed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Submit to Congress the combined OIF Strategic Lessons Learned EXSUM and USJFCOM OIF MCO Lessons Learned Report as a classified interim response on 31 March.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

*SecDef edited + on a*

b. Provide classified and unclassified OIF final reports in July.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

*copy. JS*

COORDINATION: NONE

**Attachment:**  
**As stated**

**copy to:**  
**Dep SecDef**  
**USDP**

**Prepared By: Colonel(P) Thomas Maffey, USA; Vice Director, J-7;** (b)(6)

February 8, 2004

691

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: LTG John Craddock  
Powell Moore

FROM: *Dave Patterson*   
Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Authorization Conference Report

I would like to see a timetable pulled together **as to** how we respond to this Defense Authorization Conference Report requirement.

In my view there is practically no way in the world we can respond by March 31. Maybe the first thing to do would be to ask for an extension.

In any event, let's try to get it done, since it is already February 8 and I just saw this thing. We have a problem. Put together a team to do it, create a timetable and let me see it.

John Craddock, please schedule me sometime this week to get briefed on who is going to do what to respond to this.

Thanks.

Attach.

FY04 Defense Authorization Conference Reoport 108-354 pp. 764-765

DHR:dh  
020804-76

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04 <sup>12</sup>

*Sir,  
Snowflake response  
attached.  
w/r. LTC Swope* 2

11-L-0559/OSD/22653

OSD 02612-04

SECDEF - For Your Information  
CJCS has action lead to pull together  
C

**FY04 Defense Authorization Conference Report 108-354 pp. 764-765**  
**Section 1202. Report on the Conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom**

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.** (1) Not later than March 31, 2004, the SECDEF shall submit to the *congressional defense committees and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate* a report on the preparation for and conduct of military operations under Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 19, 2003, to May 1, 2003.

(2) The report shall be prepared in consultation with the CJCS, the commander of US CENTCOM, and such other officers and officials as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(b) **CONTENT.** The report shall include a discussion, with a particular emphasis on accomplishments and shortcomings and on near-term and long-term corrective actions to address those shortcomings, of the following:

- (1) The military objectives of the international coalition conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military strategy selected to achieve the objectives, and an assessment of the execution of the *military strategy*.
- (2) The deployment process, including *the adaptability* of the process to unforeseen contingencies and changing requirements.
- (3) The effectiveness of the reserve component forces used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the reserve component mobilization process, the timeliness of mobilization notification, training, operational effectiveness in theater, and subsequent demobilization.
- (4) The use and performance of major items of US military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions (including items classified under special access procedures and items drawn from prepositioned stocks) and any expected *eff* — of the experience with the use and performance of those items on the doctrinal and tactical employment of such items and on plans for continuing the acquisition of such items.
- (5) The effectiveness of joint air operations, including the doctrine for the employment of close *air support* in the varied environments of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the effectiveness of attack helicopter operations.
- (6) The use of special operations forces, including operational and intelligence uses classified under special access procedures.
- (7) The scope of logistics support, including support from other nations.
- (8) The incidence of accidental fratricide, together with a discussion of the effectiveness of the tracking of friendly forces and of the combat identification systems in mitigating friendly fire incidents.
- (9) The adequacy of spectrum and bandwidth to transmit all necessary information to operational forces and assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles, ground vehicles, and individual soldiers.
- (10) The effectiveness of information operations, including the effectiveness of Commando Solo and other psychological operations assets, in achieving established objectives, together with a description of technological and other restrictions on the use of psychological operations capabilities.
- (11) The adequacy of the US and coalition intelligence and counterintelligence systems and personnel, including contributions regarding bomb damage assessments

and particularly including the US tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) programs and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMP), as well as the adequacy of such support to facilitate searches for weapons of mass destruction.

(12) The rapid insertion and integration, if any, of developmental but mission-essential equipment during all phases of the operation.

(13) The most critical lessons learned that could lead to long-term doctrinal, organizational, and technological changes (including new equipment, weapons, systems, and munitions) and the probable effects that an implementation of those changes would have on current visions, goals, and plans for transformation of the Armed Forces and for joint and combined operations.

(14) The role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by US forces and the other coalition forces and the effects on operations of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with the law of armed conflict.

(15) The policies and procedures relating to the media, including the use of embedded media.

(16) The results of a study, carried out by the Secretary of Defense, regarding the availability of family support services provided for the dependents of members of the National Guard and other reserve components of the Armed Forces who are called or ordered to active duty.

(17) The direct and indirect cost of military operations, including an assessment of the total incremental expenditures made by the DoD as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

(c) FORMS OF REPORT. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, if necessary,

6

Tab

TAB

February 8, 2004

691

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: **LTC** John Craddock  
Powell Moore

FROM: *Dave Patterson*   
Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Defense Authorization Conference Report

I would like to see a timetable pulled together **as** to how we respond to **this** Defense Authorization Conference Report requirement.

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John Craddock, please schedule me sometime this week to get briefed on who is going to do what to respond to this.

Thanks.

Attach.

FY04 Defense Authorization Conference Report 108-354pp. 764-765

DHR:dh  
020804-76

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

*ITR 09*

*8 Feb 04*

*23 Feb 04*

OSD 02612-04  
Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22656

SECDEF - For your Information  
CJCS has action lead to pull together

**FY04 Defense Authorization Conference Report 108-354 pp. 764-765**  
**Section 1202. Report on the Conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom**

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.** (1) Not later than March 31, 2004, the SECDEF shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the preparation for and conduct of military operations under Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 19, 2003, to May 1, 2003.

(2) The report shall be prepared in consultation with the CJCS, the commander of US CENTCOM, and such other officers and officials as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(b) **CONTENT.** The report shall include a discussion, with a particular emphasis on accomplishments and shortcomings and on near-term and long-term corrective actions to address those shortcomings, of the following:

- (1) The military objectives of the international coalition conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military strategy selected to achieve the objectives, and an assessment of the execution of the military strategy.
- (2) The deployment process, including the adaptability of the process to unforeseen contingencies and changing requirements.
- (3) The effectiveness of the reserve component forces used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the reserve component mobilization process, the timeliness of mobilization notification, training, operational effectiveness in theater, and subsequent demobilization.
- (4) The use and performance of major items of US military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions (including items classified under special access procedures and items drawn from prepositioned stocks) and any expected effects of the experience with the use and performance of those items on the doctrinal and tactical employment of such items and on plans for continuing the acquisition of such items.
- (5) The effectiveness of joint air operations, including the doctrine for the employment of close air support in the varied environments of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the effectiveness of attack helicopter operations.
- (6) The use of special operations forces, including operational and intelligence uses classified under special access procedures.
- (7) The scope of logistics support, including support from other nations.
- (8) The incidence of accidental fratricide, together with a discussion of the effectiveness of the tracking of friendly forces and of the combat identification systems in mitigating friendly fire incidents.
- (9) The adequacy of spectrum and bandwidth to transmit all necessary information to operational forces and assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles, ground vehicles, and individual soldiers.
- (10) The effectiveness of information operations, including the effectiveness of Commando Solo and other psychological operations assets, in achieving established objectives, together with a description of technological and other restrictions on the use of psychological operations capabilities.
- (11) The adequacy of the US and coalition intelligence and counterintelligence systems and personnel, including contributions regarding bomb damage assessments

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(12) The rapid insertion and integration, if any, of developmental but mission-essential equipment during all phases of the operation.

(13) The most critical lessons learned that could lead to long-term organizational, and technological changes (including new equipment, systems, and munitions) and the probable effects that an implementation of changes would have on current visions, goals, and plans for transformation of the *Armed Forces* and for joint and combined operations.

(14) The role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution military operations by US forces and the other coalition forces and the effects on operations of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with the law of armed

(15) The policies and procedures relating to the media, including the use of embedded media.

(16) The results of a study, carried out by the Secretary of Defense, regarding the availability of family support services provided for the dependents of members of the National Guard and other reserve components of the *Armed Forces* who are called or ordered to active duty.

(17) The direct and indirect cost of military operations, including an assessment of the total incremental expenditures made by the DoD as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

(c) FORMS OF REPORT. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, if necessary.

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22658



72  
2004 FEB 23 11:02  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CW-1546-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RCM/2/21*

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22659

OSD 02613-04

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where **do** we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we **are** today?

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
103104.12

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

2/12/04

300.8

31 Jan 04  
5 Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22660

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818  
SF-8656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy ~~Under~~ Secretary of Defense for Policy ~~Number~~ APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives.
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Pam Mirelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)  
Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

300.8

8 APR 07 23 FEB 04

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

**TO:** Pad Wolfowitz  
Doug Feitb

**DATE:** February 24, 2004

**SUBJECT:** Directives

Attached is a memo 1 sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.  
If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
0202404.01ts

*Attach: Info Memo from Gen Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

3/5

01-03-04 15:11 DA

11-L-0559/OSD/22662



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0000

INFO MEMO

CM-1546-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/21*

*DSD*  
*Fowler*

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** 'where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?'
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: MC Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff (b)(6)

3

OSD 02613-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22663

684 C-11

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Ray Dubois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DIR/ops  
100104.12

Respond by:

2/12/04

300.8

*Handwritten notes:*  
...  
...  
...

31 Jan 04  
5 Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

**Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD**

---

**From:** Archard, Darrell, TSgt, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 27, 2004 16:51  
**To:** Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD  
**cc:** DepSecDef Workflow  
**Subject:** FW: Priority Action Report 052704

2004 MAY 27 11:02 AM  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SECURITY INFORMATION

TSgt Bianco,

The items marked in red have been closed.

v/r  
TSgt Darrell L. Archard  
Admin Assistant  
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense  
(b)(6)

300.8

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 27, 2004 7:13 AM  
**To:** Archard, Darrell; Bryant, Michael; DSD Workflow  
**Subject:** Priority Action Report 052704

See attached,



par2\_dsd.rtf

26 FEB 04

23 FEB 04

Report Date: 5/27/2004

**Deputy Secretary of Defense Priority Actions Report**

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE ACTION</u>	<u>ACTION AGY</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>DOR</u>	<u>SUSPENSE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
OSD 04282-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: MEDIA STRATEGY - IRAQ	AMN	USI	312312004	3/24/2004	4/14/2004	ORIGINAL SUSPENSE WAS 03/29/04; ES APPROVED EXTENSION TO 04/07/04 ON 04/01/04; ES APPROVED EXTENSION TO 04/14/04 ON 04/09/04
OSD 04040-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: ARABIC MEDIA MONITORING	AMN	USI	3/18/2004	3/18/2004	4/8/2004	ORIGINAL SUSPENSE WAS 03/25/04; ES APPROVED EXTENSION TO 04/08/04 ON 04/05/04
OSD 04048-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: PROSECUTION OF MUNITIONS CRIMES	AMN	CPA	3/18/2004	3/18/2004	3/25/2004	
OSD 03987-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: SADR	AMN	USI	3/17/2004	3/17/2004	4/8/2004	ORIGINAL SUSPENSE WAS 03/23/04; ES APPROVED EXTENSION TO 04/08/04 ON 04/05/04
DSD 03770-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: LETTER TO MOC CONCERNING LACK OF FEDERAL RECOGNITION AS A BRIGADIER GENERAL BY GEORGE D. SHULL	AMN	LA	3/11/2004	3/15/2004	3/25/2004	
DSD 75703-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: TALKING POINTS FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESSES	AMN	USP	3/15/2004	3/16/2004	3/23/2004	
DSD 03698-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: METRICS AND MEASURES OF IMPROVEMENT	AMN	SN	3/12/2004	3/12/2004	3/24/2004	
DSD 03569-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: ZARQAWI TRAINING TAPE	ADN	USI	3/9/2004	3/10/2004	4/9/2004	ORIGINAL SUSPENSE WAS 03/26/04; ES APPROVED EXTENSION TO 04/09/04 ON 04/05/04
DSD 03379-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	ROLLOUT ON REBALANCING	AMN	UPR	3/8/2004	3/8/2004	3/24/2004	
DSD 03329-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: START-UP COMPANY	AMN	CPA	3/5/2004	3/8/2004	3/11/2004	
DSD 75625-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: LICENSES	AMN	USI	3/1/2004	3/1/2004	3/5/2004	
<u>DSD 02613-04</u>	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	DSD NOTE REF: DIRECTIVES	AMN	ADM	212612004	212612004	3/2/2004	

11-L-0559/OSD/22666



7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*How Feldell*

10:00 AM 2/18/04

701

DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and get me the precise details?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.09

a/a7

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

202-225-6216  
Brad Ayres -  
Medical POC

18 Feb 04

OSD 02616-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22667

February 21, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Assignment of a Headquarters Commandant for the Green Zone in Baghdad

Iraq

A consistent recommendation of the Assessment Teams that we sent to assist with transition planning has been to establish a Headquarters Commandant to integrate the Palace and Green Zone requirements, including resource accountability, billeting, dining, security and other housekeeping functions. CENTCOM could be tasked to provide a commander who would remain for some time beyond the June 30, 2004 transition to assist the Department of State facility managers.

I strongly endorse this recommendation, and will discuss this with you upon my arrival on Monday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-10

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

21 Feb 04

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** Rodriguez, Carlos R. [rodriguezr@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 21, 2004 11:01 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO; McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); Executive Secretariat CPA; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** RE: Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

*CPA-B received and will send in to LPB.  
Thanks*

SGT Carlos R. Rodriguez  
Executive Assistant  
Office of the Executive Secretariat  
Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:CablesESO@osd.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Sunday, February 22, 2004 6:07 AM  
**To:** McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); Executive Secretariat CPA; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld

**Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Sir, please find two memos from Secretary Rumsfeld attached.

v/r

MAJ Burley

**COMPLETED**



11-L-0559/OSD/22669

2/21/2004

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** Administrator [Administrator@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 21, 2004 10:03 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** Delivery Status Notification (Success)



ATT51399.TXT

Secretary Rumsf...

Your message

**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld  
**Sent:** Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:07:14 +0300

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:16 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Adler, Michael J. (FS-02) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:16 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Norwood, Scott on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:16 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

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**From:** Administrator [Administrator@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
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ATT51395.TXT Two Memos from  
Secretary Rumsf...

Your message

**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld  
**Sent:** Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:07:14 +0300

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

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Ponzini, Stephen M. (TSgt/E-6) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Fritschle, Elizabeth A. (FS) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Schneider, Caroline M. (CIV) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Bruno, Emily K. (FS-03) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Adler, Michael J. (FS-02) on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Clarke, Kethurah on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>

**UNCLASSIFIED**

2/21/2004 5:39:23 PM

**OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION**

**FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

**Telephone: Comm:**

**To: General Abizaid**

**Facsimile #:**

**From: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld**

**Office/Desk: SecDef Cables**

**Subject: Assignment of a Headquarters Commandant for the Green Zone in Baghdad**

**Number of Pages Including Cover: 2**

**Note:**

RECEIPT CABLES DISTRIBUTION					
SECDEF	OSD/SEC	INFL/ASST	SECDEF/SEC	OSD/	
USDI	OSD	CCD	CABLES		

\* \* \* TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) ( FEB. 21. 2004 5:45PM ) \* \* \*

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
FEB. 21.	5:43PM	COMPATIBLE	3-S	1'33"	P.	2 OK		194

*SGT DAWSON RCVD*

# : BATCH  
M : MEMORY TX  
S : STANDARD  
\* : PC  
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL  
L : SEND LATER  
D : DETAIL  
+ : ROUTING  
1- : MIL\_STB MODE

S : TRANSFER  
● : FORWARDING  
F : FINE  
O : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.  
3- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING  
E : ECM  
> : REDUCTION  
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

February 21, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Admiral Redd

*DR*

Jerry--

I just met with Admiral John Redd, who is coming out to take Keith Kellogg's place. He seems terrific. I think he is going to do a great job for you.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-11



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*DRD CPA*

*21 Feb 04*

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** Rodriguez, Carlos R. [rodriguez@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 21, 2004 11:01 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO; McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); Executive Secretariat CPA; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** RE: Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

*CPA-B received and will send in to LPB.  
Thanks*

**SGT Carlos R. Rodriguez**  
**Executive Assistant**  
**Office of the Executive Secretariat**  
**Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad**  
**DSN:** (b)(6)  
**Mobil:** [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Sunday, February 22, 2004 6:07 AM  
**To:** McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); Executive Secretariat CPA; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** Two Memos from Secretary Rumsfeld

**Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**


Sir, please find two memos from Secretary Rumsfeld attached.

v/r

MAJ Burley

**COMPLETED**

ICIN/



11-L-0559/OSD/22675

2/21/2004

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

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**From:** Administrator [Administrator@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 21, 2004 10:03 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** Delivery Status Notification (Success)



ATT51399.TXT

Secretary Rumsf...

Your message

**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)  
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Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

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**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
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<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Clarke, Kethurah on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 06:03:17 +0300  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>

TAB A



SPB  
AC  
30

DEC 8 9 2008

926

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: UAVs

I got the impression the Army needs more UAVs out in Iraq. Please see if that is true and, if it is, what do we do about it.

Thanks.

DDForm  
12204-20

.....  
Please respond by 1/21/05

Sir,  
Response Attached

2/8

452 R

27 DEC 07

OSD 02709-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22678

A27-2



**Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD**

**From:** Wittman, Gregory J, CDR, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:56 PM  
**To:** Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Subject:** RE: snowflake

*Handwritten:* 322

Jimmy,  
Close out this package. No action taken per SecDef. He readdressed the issue in snowflake 030204-25.  
Thanks.  
Slim

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2004 3:41 PM  
**To:** Wittman, Gregory J, CDR, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: snowflake

Package was tasked under 02766-04. As you can see on the attached, we received the JCS memo on 25 Feb. Our records show it went as far as ExecSec (which means it more than likely went on in to Mr. DiRita).

js

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wittman, Gregory J, CDR, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2004 3:32 PM  
**To:** Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Subject:** snowflake

Jimmy,  
See what you've got filed under snowflake # 011204-28 dated 1/12/2004 subject "Civil Affairs" from DR to CJCS. The CJCS responded with an action memo but the JS shows no indication of it coming back to them with a decision. Judd's office has hard copy files back to February, but not January.  
Thanks,  
Slim

**CDR Greg "Slim" Wittman**  
**Navy Military Assistant**  
**OSD Executive Secretariat**  
**Pentagon - RM 3D853**

(b)(6)

*Handwritten:* 02766-04  
*Handwritten:* 02776-04  
*Handwritten:* 21 FEB 04  
*Handwritten:* 04 FEB 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SE 11  
7 0 10 03

ACTION MEMO

GM-1555-04  
24 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMyers/24*

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA) as part of Special Operations Forces

- **Issue.** "Let's talk about whether or not all the Civil Affairs ought to be in SOF. I'm inclined to *think* not." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** We need to study first how CA will fit into transformation initiatives.
- **Analysis.** An executive *summary* is provided at TAB B for key points.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommend approval of the following steps:

- a. Continue current combatant command assignments of CA units and personnel.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

- b. Retain USSOCOM as the proponent for joint CA functional issues.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

- c. Direct a study, modeled on the PDM SOF study, of future command relationships and employment of CA in light of other transformation programs and concepts.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

20 February 2004

## POSITION PAPER - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Subject: Assigning Integration of Civil Affairs (CA) to USSOCOM

- US Code, Title 10, Section 167, assigns USSOCOM the responsibility for “organizing, training and equipping” special operations forces, including CA.
- In June 1987, then-CJCS ADM Crowe wrote to then-SecDef Weinberger, “While the missions of PSYOP and CA are broader than special operations, these forces should benefit from the resource advocacy that General Lindsay (first USSOCOM commander) will provide as a unified commander.... Additionally, the close relationship that PSYOP and CA forces have with special operations forces in area orientation and language training should foster mutual benefits.”
  - GEN Lindsay endorsed this position in a Tank session on 29 September 1987 and Secretary Weinberger approved assignment of CA forces to USSOCOM.
  - The reasons given by the CJCS and Commander, USSOCOM, in 1987 remain valid. By design, USSOCOM is more capable of providing operationally focused, unconventionally oriented military forces than either geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) or Joint Forces Command.
- The study of Special Operations Forces (SOF) directed by PDM FY 2004-09 found that “While the focus of CA differs from that of SOF ‘operators,’ CA contributes to the War on Terrorism best by remaining within USSOCOM.”
- GCCs retain responsibility for command of CA activities and missions in their AORs, unless the President or SecDef directs otherwise.
- The Services are currently studying their CA organizations, AC-RC mixes, and major force structure changes (such as the Army’s Unit of Action). A follow-on study should focus on how to best provide command and control for CA forces operating with these future forces; evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of CA units being under the combatant command of USSOCOM, USJFCOM, or GCCs; and consider the related issue of how best to provide CA staff to maneuver units and higher headquarters as they transform.
- Keeping CA as a part of SOF ensures that CA keeps its “unconventional” core. CA needs to continue cultivating innovative operators who possess skills outside normal military training, and think in terms of winning the war by finesse, not firepower. This is best done by leaving USSOCOM as the functional proponent for CA as well as the primary force provider for CA units.

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	Colonel Chappell	4 February 2004
USN	Captain Thompson	3 February 2004
USAF	Colonel Ball	3 February 2004
USMC	Colonel Brier	4 February 2004
USCENTCOM	MajGen Sattler	7 February 2004
USEUCOM	Captain Lindsay	6 February 2004
USJFCOM	Colonel Milburn	11 February 2004
USNORTHCOM	Mr. Johnson	26 January 2004
USPACOM	Colonel Wallace	5 February 2004
USSOUTHCOM	Captain Turner	5 February 2004
USSOCOM	Captain Bourne	6 February 2004
USSTRATCOM	Captain Oliver	22 January 2004
USSTRANSCOM	Mr. Smithey	28 January 2004
ASD(SOLIC)	Colonel Romano	23 January 2004

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/22682

TAB A

January 12, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Civil Affairs

Let's talk about whether or not all the Civil Affairs ought to be in SOF. I am inclined to think not.

Thanks.

DHR:sh  
011204-28

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

322

12 Jan 04  
24 Feb 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

MAY 21 2004

Lieutenant Colonel Philip Rivers  
791 EAES/CC  
PSC 2 Box 50000  
APO AE 09012

201.22

Dear Colonel Rivers:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your aircrew and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Lawrence Di Rita  
Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of Defense for  
Public Affairs

21 May 04

6 Feb 04

Enclosure: As stated



OSD 02797-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22684



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Fuller  
89 AS/CC  
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433

Dear Colonel Fuller:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your aircrew and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul by transporting him from Baghdad to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22685

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Fuller  
89 AS/CC  
Wright Patterson Air Force Base OH 45433  
~~Ohio 45493~~

Dear Colonel Fuller:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your aircrew and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul by transporting him from Baghdad to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22686

**Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD**

**From:** Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, May 10, 2004 8:15 AM  
**To:** Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

fyi

John Lohse  
Director, Executive Services

(b)(6)

Room 1A1071

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, May 10, 2004 7:50 AM  
**To:** Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

John and Monica please pass on to Carrie Sue. Last information I have received on letters to send to those who assisted the LA Times reporters.

C. Glenn Ayers  
LTC, USA  
Military Asst./ Trip Coordinator  
OSD EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Daly Judith Lt Col TACC/XOGA [mailto:Judith.Daly@scott.af.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 04, 2004 4:11 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Evans Clarence Col TACC/XOG; Boynton Sharon GS-14 TACC/XOG  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

Glenn

Here is the information that I have obtained. As per our conversation only one of the reporters traveled on an AMC mission (Christian Kraul). The mission number was **XLWRE60ER003** from Bagdad to Ramstein. The aircrew was from the 445 AW, 89AS at Wright Patterson. **The 89 AS/CC is Lt Col Frank Fuller.** The AE crew was from the 791EAES located at Ramstein. **The 791 EAES/CC is Lt Col Philip Rivers.** Hopefully this will help in the writing of those Congratulatory letters--these units do great jobs for us everyday.

Thanks

Judy

*Ohio*  
*Germany*  
*APP AE*

Judith M Daly, Lt Col, **USAF**, NC  
Chief, AE Division

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD [mailto:Carl.Ayers@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 29, 2004 3:03 PM  
**To:** Daly Judith Lt Col TACC/XOGA  
**Subject:** RE: LA Times Reporters

Judy,  
Glenn Ayers here thanks very much for the assist.

C. Glenn Ayers  
LTC, USA  
Military Asst./ Trip Coordinator  
OSD EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Cox, Sam, Col, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 29, 2004 3:31 PM  
**To:** 'Judith.Daly@scott.af.mil'  
**Cc:** Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD  
**Subject:** LA Times Reporters

Judy,

Thanks for helping to track down the info, The name are: Christian Kraul, Tracy Wilkinson and Ann Simmons,

LTC Glenn ~~Ayers will be running~~ with this ....he is CC'd above. His number is (b)(6)

Glenn....meet Lt Col Judy Daly -- DSN (b)(6)

Again, thank you.



**SC**  
*Col Sam Cox, USAF*  
*Deputy Executive Secretary*  
*Office of the SecDef*

(b)(6)

# The Birthplace, Home, and Future of Aerospace

## Wright-Patterson AFB,

Ohio 45433



- ASC
- 88 ABW
- 74 MDG
- 311 HSW
- HQ AFMC
- AI RL
- AFIT
- AFSAC
- NAIC
- AF Museum
- Weather

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<a href="#">Alerts &amp; Notices</a>	<a href="#">What's New</a>	<a href="#">Local Area</a>	<a href="#">Link</a>

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- Info Assurance
- Internet Policy
- Admin Guidance
- K-12 Educational Prgrms
- Common Access Card
- AF Climate Survey
- WPAFB Home

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 Email: [webmaster@wpafb.af.mil](mailto:webmaster@wpafb.af.mil)

(b)(6)

Last Updated: 10 May 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/22689



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Lieutenant Colonel Philip Rivers  
791 EAES/CC  
PSC 2 Box 50000  
APO AE 09012

Dear Colonel Rivers:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your aircrew and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22690

Lieutenant Colonel Philip Rivers  
791 EAES/CC  
PSC 2 Box 50000  
APO AE 09012

Dear Colonel Rivers:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your aircrew and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22691

**Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD**

**From:** Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, May 10, 2004 8:15 AM  
**To:** Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

fyi

John Lohse  
Director, Executive Services

(b)(6)

Room 1A1071

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**To:** Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

John and Monica pls pass on to Carrie Sue. Last information I have received on letters to send to those who assisted the LA Times reporters.

C. Glenn Ayers  
LTC, USA  
Military Asst. / Trip Coordinator  
OSD EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Daly Judith Lt Col TACC/XOGA [mailto:Judith.Daly@scott.af.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 04, 2004 4: 11 PM  
**To:** Carl.Ayers@osd.mil  
**Cc:** Evans Clarence Col TACC/XOG; Boynton Sharon GS-14 TACC/XOG  
**Subject:** FW: LA Times Reporters

Glenn

Here is the information that I have obtained. As per our conversation only one of the reporters traveled on an AMC mission (Christian Kraul). The mission number was XLWRE60ER003 from Bagdad to Ramstein. The aircrew was from the 445 AW, 89AS at Wright Patterson. The 89 AS/CC is Lt Col Frank Fuller. The AE crew was from the 791EAES located at Ramstein. The 791 EAES/CC is Lt Col Philip Rivers. Hopefully this will help in the writing of those Congratulatory letters--these units do great jobs for us everyday.  
Thanks

Judy

*Ohio*  
*Germany*  
*APD AE*

11-L-0559/OSD/22692

5/10/2004

Judith M Daly, Lt Col, USAF, NC  
Chief, AE Division

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD [mailto:Carl.Ayers@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 29, 2004 3:03 PM  
**To:** Daly Judith Lt Col TACC/XOGA  
**Subject:** RE: LA Times Reporters

Judy,  
Glenn Ayers here thanks very much for the assist.

C. Glenn Ayers  
LTC, USA  
Military Asst./ Trip Coordinator  
OSD EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

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**To:** 'Judith.Daly@scott.af.mil'  
**Cc:** Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD  
**Subject:** LA Times Reporters

Judy,

Thanks for helping to track down the info. The name are: Christian Kraul, Tracy Wilkinson and Ann Simmons,

LTC Glenn Ayers will be running with this .....he is CC'd above, His number is (b)(6)

Glenn....meet Lt Col Judy Daly -- (b)(6)

Again, thank you,

**SC**  
*Col Sam Cox, USAF*  
*Deputy Executive Secretary*  
*Office of the SecDef*

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22693

**Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD**

**From:** Sanchez Marco A Maj 791 EAES/SGC (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 17, 2004 10:04 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Information/Address

Hello Ms. Casey,

LTC Rivers' mailing address at Ramstein AB GE is

LTC Philip Rivers

(b)(6)

If you should have any questions, please don't hesitate to give me a call at (b)(6)

Thanks,  
M

MAJMARCO A. SANCHEZ, USAF

Director of Support Services

791st EAES, Ramstein AFB

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22694

5/18/2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Colonel Beverly Pritchett  
28<sup>th</sup> Combat Support Hospital  
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Dear Colonel Pritchett,

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with others, expertly assisted a group of *Times* correspondents in the military hospital at Ibn Sina in Baghdad.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22695

Colonel Beverly Pritchett  
28<sup>th</sup> Combat Support Hospital  
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Dear Colonel Pritchett:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with others, expertly assisted a group of *Times* correspondents in the military hospital at Ibn Sina in Baghdad.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/22696



# XVIII Airborne Corps & Fort Bragg

## XVIII Airborne Corps

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- [Bus Schedule](#)
- [Fort Bragg Sustainable](#)
- [Jump Schedule](#)
- [Map](#) 

## Welcome

*Our Mission is to maintain  
the XVIII Airborne Corps as  
a strategic crisis response  
force, manned and trained to  
deploy rapidly by air, sea and  
land anywhere in the world,  
prepared to fight upon arrival  
and win.*

Mailing Address  
Commanding General  
XVIII Airborne Corps & Fort Bragg  
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

*For Family and Media Information*

*Family Wellness*

**New! ITEMS**

**All American Week  
(24-28 May 04)**

**Tax Information Updated**

If you are a Military Person e-mailing  
a question/request please use your  
AKO Military e-mail Account. Please  
read message.

## Search

Fort Bragg Interactive Customer  
Evaluation 

New Deployment Center Available Online.

11-L-0559/OSD/22697

Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD

⑤ Col Beverly Pritchett (in Baghdad)  
CF-George  
by the unit hospital

From: Ayers, Carl G, LTC, OSD  
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:05 AM  
To: Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
cc: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD; Generous, Monica, CIV,  
Subject: FW: Information  
Importance: High

Folks  
per your request yesterday the below information is given  
Hospital (CSH) that helped the journalists.

More to follow on the Air Medevac Squadron who evacuated

C. Glenn Ayers  
LTC, USA  
Military Asst./ Trip Coordinator  
OSD EXEC SEC

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Information

COL Doby -- The 28th Combat Support Hospital from Fort Bragg, NC operated the hospital at Ibn Sina in Baghdad from Jun 03 until Feb 04. The Commander is Col Beverly Pritchett. You can probably get an address from the Fort Bragg Web Page.

I'm not sure about Lt Col Krivos, but will forward to our USAFAir Evac Liaison team. (Craig, can you identify Lt Col George Krivos) or thank you note.)

Hope this helps and thanks for this opportunity to have folks recognized.

Col Jim Bruckart, CJTF-7 Surgeon

LTC Shally,

Could you help me out with some information??

The Los Angeles Times sent a thank you note to the Secretary of Defense for the help our military provided to several journalists who either died or where injured in Iraq. Mark Fineman died of a heart attack in Iraq in Sep 03. The Chief of the emergency room was Dr. Fred Brennan. Do you know which CSH he is a part off and the name of the commander?

USAF staff in Baghdad and Lt Col George Krivos who helped transport the body. Which office or unit would this be?

Christian Kraul, Tracy Wilkinson and Ann Simmons all of the LA times

11-L-0559/OSD/22698

4/29/2004

were wounded on New Years eve. Once again treated at military hospital in Baghdad. Which CSH was this?

Finally, if you can find the Air Evac Squadron who did the trip to Landstuhl that would be great.

The Secretary would like to send some thank you notes.

Thank you!

KEVIN WESTBERG, TSgt, USAF  
Superintendent, CPO Immediate Office  
Baghdad, Iraq

(b)(6)

*Life is an echo. What you send out comes back!*

11-L-0559/OSD/22699

4/29/2004

March 3, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commendable Service

*5/19 1000  
Mr BURER*  
LTG CRADDOCK HAS APPROVED  
THESE. REQUEST SOM  
APPROVAL  
*Please lead for  
Dike signature  
as PA  
1/1/04*  
LETTY DI RINA  
5/19 5/20

All-

Here are the additional letters requested by the attached snowflake of 3/3/04. FYI I did not see this snowflake until 4/27. Have already written to:

- attached*
- 1) General Hbizaid
  - 2) General Schromaker
  - 3) John Camill

CSC - Find UNIT  
CDR's LETTERS TO  
- USE ESR  
to NSLP  
F, M

This packet includes

- 1) LTZ Ph CSC
- 2) LTZ F REBO FOR DIRITA'S SIGNATURE
- 3) Col B

Thank  
*NSC 5/18/04*

F, M  
**DONE CSC**  
5/21

*PTA Commanders  
ed here. do this  
needed?  
Thank*

NO  
CALL ME  
F, M  
CSC  
4/27

# Los Angeles Times

Secretary of Defense



SA0033992

JOHN S. CARROLL  
EDITOR AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

February 6, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Greetings from one of your old haunts, Tribune Company. I am writing to pass along our thanks for help we at the Los Angeles Times have received from the U.S. armed forces.

One of our correspondents, Mark Fineman, died of a heart attack last September, despite excellent emergency treatment at the military hospital. The chief of the emergency room team was Dr. Fred Brennan, who did an exemplary job. Centcom went beyond the call in offering to ship Mark's body home via the Air Force. Coalition spokesman Lt. Col. George Krivos and the USAF staff in Baghdad were instrumental in the repatriation of the remains. The staff at Dover AFB were extremely solicitous of Mark's family. We are grateful to all involved.

*L. Fisher + M. R.S.*

Three other Times correspondents, Christian Kraul, Tracy Wilkinson and Ann Simmons, were wounded in the New Year's Eve car bombing in Baghdad. They received outstanding treatment at the military hospital. Kraul underwent surgery that helped save a badly damaged eye. He was subsequently sent by military medevac to Germany.

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

There are undoubtedly many people to thank whose names did not make it to my desk, but let me mention a few. The head of the Landstuhl public affairs office, Marie Shaw, arranged for correspondent Tyler Marshall to be at the base when Chris arrived. Sgt. Phil Breedlove escorted the reporter to the emergency room. Capt. Fisher, a nurse on corridor 14, helped us deal with medical issues. Maj. Christopher Allen, the duty ophthalmologist, saw Chris within an hour of his arrival and made a quick decision to send him to the nearby eye clinic for special treatment--a decision that allowed us to transfer him home the following day.

We at the Los Angeles Times are grateful for all this and more. Our best wishes to you and your subordinates here and abroad.

Sincerely,

OSD 02797-04

202 WEST FIRST STREET / LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

(b)(6)

11- L-0559/OSD/22701

Mr. John S. Carroll  
Editor and Executive Vice President  
Los Angeles Times  
202 West First Street  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear <sup>John</sup> Mr. Carroll:

<sup>so much</sup> Thank you for your <sup>Thank</sup> kind letter regarding your <sup>folks</sup> experiences with our armed forces in Iraq. I am pleased that everyone was so helpful and will pass along your comments.

Sincerely,

*Respect*

*They are totally a superb group of young men and women.*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

MAY 21 2004

Colonel Beverly Pritchett  
28<sup>th</sup> Combat Support Hospital  
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

201.22

Dear Colonel Pritchett:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with others, expertly assisted a group of *Times* correspondents in the military hospital at Ibn Sina in Baghdad.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards

Lawrence Di Rita  
Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of Defense for  
Public Affairs

Almayor 6 Feb 04

Enclosure: As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/22703

OSD 02797-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 18 2004

201.22

General Peter J. Schoomaker  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310

Dear Pete:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that Ms. Marie Shaw, Sgt. Phil Breedlove, Capt. Fisher, and Maj. Christopher Allen, along with the other folks at Landstuhl, did fine work assisting some *Times* correspondents.

18 MAR 04

Please pass along my appreciation.

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated

6 FEB 04

OSD 02797-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22704



General Peter J. Schoomaker  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310

Caro Di Rita  
3/12

Dear General Schoomaker:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the Los Angeles Times. I understand that Ms. Marie Shaw, Sgt. Phil Breedlove, Capt. Fisher, and Maj. Christopher Allen, along with the other folks at Landstuhl, ~~job.~~


*did fine work assisting Bone Times correspondents*

~~I am pleased that everyone was so helpful. Keep up the good work.~~

*Please pass along my appreciation.*

Regards,

Enclosure: As stated



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. John S. Carroll  
Editor and Executive Vice President  
Los Angeles Times  
202 West First Street  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear John:

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter regarding your folks' experiences with our armed forces in Iraq.

I am pleased that everyone was so helpful and will pass along your comments. They are truly a superb group of young men and women.

Regards,

11-L-0559/OSD/22707

Y OF

*Jm*

DATE

3/18

as follows:

"Don"

"DR"

Approved

Disapproved

"With best wishes"



William P. Marriott  
CAPTAIN, USN

02792-04

04021-04

CSC

CALL ME ON THIS

↑  
M 3/4

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Commendable Service

2

Here is a letter commending the service of a number of military personnel.

How do we pass along this expression of appreciation to their commanders?

Thanks.

Attach.

2/6/04 LA Times ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030304-11

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

3 MAR 04

Tom —

Pls see me as  
to how we "endorse"  
this to all the folks/  
units mentioned

Q 3/4

6 FEB 04

OSD 02797-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22709



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 16 2004

201.22

General John Abizaid  
Commander  
U.S. Central Command  
7115 South Boundary Boulevard  
MacDill, AFB, FL 33621-5101

Dear John:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that Dr. Fred Brennan and Lt. Col. George Krivos, along with his USAF Staff in Baghdad and many others, did a superb job in assisting some *Times* correspondents.

Please pass along my appreciation.

Regards,

16 APR 2004

Enclosure: As stated

OSD 02797-04

6 FEB 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22710

227111-05 02/03/04

# Los Angeles Times

Secretary of Defense



SA0033992

JOHN S. CARROLL  
EDITOR AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

February 6, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Greetings from one of your old haunts, Tribune Company. I am writing to pass along our thanks for help we at the Los Angeles Times have received from the U.S. armed forces.

One of our correspondents, Mark Fineman, died of a heart attack last September, despite excellent emergency treatment at the military hospital. The chief of the emergency room team was Dr. Fred Brennan, who did an exemplary job. Centcom went beyond the call in offering to ship Mark's body home via the Air Force. Coalition spokesman Lt. Col. George Krivos and the USAF staff in Baghdad were instrumental in the repatriation of the remains. The staff at Dover AFB were extremely solicitous of Mark's family. We are grateful to all involved.

Three other Times correspondents, Christian Kraul, Tracy Wilkinson and Ann Simmons, were wounded in the New Year's Eve car bombing in Baghdad. They received outstanding treatment at the military hospital. Kraul underwent surgery that helped save a badly damaged eye. He was subsequently sent by military medevac to Germany.

There are undoubtedly many people to thank whose names did not make it to my desk, but let me mention a few. The head of the Landstuhl public affairs office, Marie Shaw, arranged for correspondent Tyler Marshall to be at the base when Chris arrived. Sgt. Phil Breedlove escorted the reporter to the emergency room. Capt. Fisher, a nurse on corridor 14, helped us deal with medical issues. Maj. Christopher Allen, the duty ophthalmologist, saw Chris within an hour of his arrival and made a quick decision to send him to the nearby eye clinic for special treatment--a decision that allowed us to transfer him home the following day.

We at the Los Angeles Times are grateful for all this and more. Our best wishes to you and your subordinates here and abroad.

Sincerely,

OSD 02797-04

202 WEST FIRST STREET / LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

(b)(6)

11- L-0559/OSD/22711



# General John Abizaid



[Download High Res Portrait](#)

[Lt Gen Lance L. Smith](#)  
Deputy Commander

[MG R. Steven Whitcomb, Chief of Staff](#)

[CMSgt Curtis L. Brownhill, Command Chief](#)

[CDR's Strategy](#)

General Abizaid assumed duties as the Commander, U.S. Central Command on July 7, 2003.

General Abizaid was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in June 1973. He started his career with the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he served as a rifle and scout platoon leader. He commanded companies in the 2nd and 1st Ranger Battalions, leading a Ranger Rifle Company during the invasion of Grenada.

General Abizaid commanded the 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Battalion combat Team in Vicenza, Italy, during the Gulf crisis and deployed with the battalion to Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. His brigade command was the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. He served as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following that tour, he served as the 66th Commandant at West Point. Later, he commanded 1st Infantry Division, the "Big Red One," in Wurzburg which provided our first ground forces into Kosovo. He served as the Deputy Commander (Forward), Combined Forces Command, US Central Command during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Staff assignments include a tour with the United Nations as operations officer for Observer Group Lebanon and a tour in the Office of the Chief of the Staff, U.S. Army. European staff tours include assignments in both the Southern European Task Force and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe. General Abizaid also served as Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the Joint Staff and Director of the Joint Staff.

General Abizaid's military education includes Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, Armed Forces Staff College, and a U.S. Army War College Senior Fellowship at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In his civilian studies, he earned a Master of Arts degree in Area Studies at Harvard University, and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan.

His decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with five Oak Leaf Clusters and the Bronze Star. He earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge, Master Parachutist Badge with Gold Star, Ranger Tab and the Expert Infantryman's Badge

Commander United States Central Command



[Print version of this page](#)

11-L-0559/OSD/22712




# United States Central Command

General John Abizaid, Commanding, \* \* \* \*

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## Contact US



Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands assigned operational control of U.S. combat forces.

[Learn More About](#)

[MacDill Air Force Base](#)

[Unified Combatant Commands](#)

[Coalition Provisional Authority](#)

### Command Address

Commander  
U.S. Central Command  
7115 South Boundary Boulevard  
MacDill, AFB, FL 33621-5101

### Public Affairs

(b)(6)  
E-Mail:  
[pao@centcom.mil](mailto:pao@centcom.mil)

### Other Key Phone Numbers

CJTF-7 Coalition Joint Task Force Seven (Baghdad, Iraq)  
(b)(6)

[cpic.pressdesk.iraq@us.army.mil](mailto:cpic.pressdesk.iraq@us.army.mil)

Reserve Affairs  
(b)(6)

Base Info  
(b)(6)

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority (Baghdad, Iraq)  
(b)(6)

Command Center  
(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Defense Public Affairs  
(b)(6)

CENTCOM Chaplain  
(b)(6)

Enduring Freedom Coalition Public Affairs  
Coalition Partner OEF Inquiries Only (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

*The Enduring Freedom Coalition is not involved with Operation Iraqi Freedom*

EO 1.4

Humanitarian Assistance, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom

[External Link Notice](#) | [Privacy and Security](#) | [MacDill Air Force Base](#)

11-L-0559/OSD/22713



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 12 2004

201.22

Mr. John S. Carroll  
Editor and Executive Vice President  
Los Angeles Times  
202 West First Street  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear John:

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter regarding your folks' experiences with our armed forces in Iraq.

I am pleased that everyone was so helpful and will pass along your comments. They are truly a superb group of young men and women.

12 MAR 04

Regards,

6 FEB 04

OSD 02797-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22714

# Los Angeles Times

Secretary of Defense



SA0033992

JOHN S. CARROLL  
EDITOR AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

February 6, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Greetings from one of your old haunts, Tribune Company. I am writing to pass along our thanks for help we at the Los Angeles Times have received from the U.S. armed forces.

One of our correspondents, Mark Fineman, died of a heart attack last September, despite excellent emergency treatment at the military hospital. The chief of the emergency room team was Dr. Fred Brennan, who did an exemplary job. Centcom went beyond the call in offering to ship Mark's body home via the Air Force. Coalition spokesman Lt. Col. George Krivos and the USAF staff in Baghdad were instrumental in the repatriation of the remains. The staff at Dover AFB were extremely solicitous of Mark's family. We are grateful to all involved.

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We at the Los Angeles Times are grateful for all this and more. Our best wishes to you and your subordinates here and abroad.

Sincerely,

OSD 02797-04

202 WEST FIRST STREET / LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22715



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

MAY 21 2004

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Fuller  
89 AS/CC  
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433

Dear Colonel Fuller:

I am pleased to enclose a letter of appreciation from Mr. John Carroll, Editor and Executive Vice President of the *Los Angeles Times*. I understand that you, along with your **aircrew** and others, assisted the *Times* correspondent Christian Kraul by transporting him from Baghdad to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.

I commend you for a job well done.

Regards,

Lawrence Di Rita  
Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of Defense for  
Public Affairs

Enclosure: As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/22716

OSD 02797-04

201.22

21 May 04

6 Feb 04

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita *Kay Hibark*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Marty Hoffmann

Is Mrty Hoffmann getting paid anything by the Pentagon for all he is doing?'

Thanks.

DHR:JH  
011204-6



Please respond by 1/16/04



OSD 02804-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22717



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

201 FEB 09 11 51 AM

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. ~~DeBois~~, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Marty Hoffmann

*Ray DeBois 2/24/04*

- In the attached snowflake dated January 12, 2004, you asked if Marty Hoffmann was getting paid by the Department for all the work he is doing.
- He is not being paid for his work, nor has he filed vouchers to collect his travel expenses.
- He was appointed as an unpaid consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on January 10, 2001. The appointment expired at the end of one year (January 9, 2002) and was not renewed. *→ at his request.*
- I have asked my staff to work with him to ensure he is covered by an appropriate employment status. A number of different types of Federal appointments were discussed to include: Non-Career Senior Executive Service, Limited Term Senior Executive Service, and consultant/expert.
- He has expressed his desire to be appointed as a consultant (without compensation). Even though he will not receive pay under this arrangement, he will be entitled to reimbursement for travel and subsistence while working.
- His appointment has been vetted through the White House Liaison Office and has been approved. He is currently working on completing the necessary employment forms (e.g. financial disclosure, etc.). Once they are returned, he will be appointed immediately.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Linda Roper,

(b)(6)

OSD 02804-04



11-L-0559/OSD/22718

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita *Ray Hibors*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Marty Hoffmann

Is Mrty Hoffmann getting paid anything by the Pentagon for all he is doing?

Thanks.

DMR:dh  
011204-6

.....  
Please respond by 1/15/04



OSD 02804-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22719

2/11/04  
123  
0800

720

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Comparing Costs

Larry Di Rita  
3/1

As we gather data, we ought to know how much more expensive the Guard and Reserve are today relative to the Active force, because of Congressional add-ons to their compensation, retirement, health care and the like. We need to calculate that.

2/9/2

At some point, if it keeps going on, Congress could make it less desirable to have guard and reserve forces compared to the cost of Active forces.

Please develop a way to look at this that compares the usage of active forces vs. reserve and guard forces per dollars spent.

3  
2/11/04

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-100

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

2/27  
Sec Def - Charts & Data  
attached. Also, Zakheim  
has some interesting ones attached  
- Thought: Enclose charts in letter  
to Warner/Hunter and ask  
for ~~meeting~~ a  
meeting to discuss. D.R. G.

2/6  
2/6/04

osa 02931-04  
11-L-0559/OSD/22720

2/20/04

7:35 PM

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT:

Where are the charts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.08

Please respond by:

~~2/27~~ 2/23/04

292

18 Feb 04

26 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22721

OSD 02931-04

0/27  
1700

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 27 14:00:03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

Feb 26, 2004, 17:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)  
*David S. C. Chu*  
**SUBJECT:** Growth of Entitlements

- Last week we sent you a chart that displayed the growth of entitlements. Tab A contains a refined version of that chart (1) with additional charts (2-3) that enable a comparison of entitlements growth from recently enacted legislation, growth if the current legislation is extended, and potential growth if additional entitlements legislation is approved. Chart 4 cuts the data at a more macro level and shows the existing and potential costs.
- A major portion, about half, of the growth in entitlements derives from increased healthcare benefits. Tab B provides more detail on the growth of healthcare entitlements. Chart 4 shows a breakdown of Tricare growth generated from increased accruals, expanded benefits, and the growing number of claimants. Chart 5 displays the potential growth of the Reserve Healthcare benefits already enacted as well as those that may be enacted.
- Tab C shows the expansion of non-mobilized costs of Reserve personnel due to recently enacted legislation.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Col Mayo, (b)(6)

*2/27*  
Sec Def -  
A Thought. Short  
letter to Warner/Kevin, Hunter/Skeller  
Include charts. Ask for hearings.


*Note: See Related Zakheim charts,*  
*D. Rita*  
*attached.*

Sgt. ASSISTANT DI RITA	2/29
SEN MA DRADDOCK	
SEN BRIGGS	
SEN MARRIOTT	2/27



# Entitlements Growth from Congressional Action


Billions \$





- |                       |                                     |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| ■ Tricare for Life    | ■ Repeal of Mil Ret Reform Act 1986 |
| ■ Defense Healthcare  | ■ Family Separation Allowance       |
| ■ Social Security Doc | ■ Civilian nav - Cong Increase      |

11-L-0559/OSD/22723

# Entitlements Growth if Recent Congressional Action is Extended




# Entitlements Growth from Past and Potential Congressional Action



**Personnel & Readiness**


# Entitlements Growth Enacted vs Proposed



Cost of Non-DoD Proposed Entitlements - Includes TFL lowered pmts, TFL new claimants, OMB estimates for enhanced Res healthcare, FSA, Age 55 RA retirement, SBP offset, full concurrent receipt-change in accruals&outlays, & civ pay plus up.

Cost of Recently Enacted Entitlements - Includes TFL lowered pmts, TFL new claimants, estimates to extend currently enacted Res healthcare, 2004 NDAA concurrent receipt- change in accruals&outlays, & civ pay plus up.



# Growth of Tricare Entitlements




**Personnel & Readiness**

# Estimates for Reserve Health Care Expansion

\$ Billions



## Increasing Cost of Non-Mobilized Reserve Personnel



**Current Personnel Costs** – FY02 data based on FYDP as of March 03; FY03-09 based on CIS database as of Feb 2004.

**Cost of Enhanced Healthcare** - Estimated costs reflect extension of previously enacted benefits as well as potential approval of enhanced benefits.

**Cost of Age 55 Retirement** – Estimated cost of increased outlays due to change in Reserve retirement age.

2/24  
1400

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER  
2/25/04 3:03 PM



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

February 25, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Military Personnel Appropriation Funding Trends

- The attached charts group military personnel costs into nine categories and shows funding levels for these categories for fiscal years (FY) 2000 – 2005. FY 2003 and FY 2004 data excludes Supplemental costs.
- The charts highlight funding trends and illustrate the increasing size of Military Personnel appropriation costs. The most notable points include:
  - The Military Personnel cost per member grew 44.2% from FY 2000 to FY 2005. At the same time, the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers only increased 10.3% (Tab A).
  - Total Military Personnel costs grew by 45.7% during this time, while End Strength remained basically stable (Tab B).
  - Total base pay grew by 39.7%, and all other compensation grew by 51.6% from FY 2000 to FY 2005 (Tab C).

2/29

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:  
As stated


Prepared By: John Evans, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT TO RICE	
SR MA CASHIERS	
MA BUDG	
EXECUTIVE	2/26

11-L-0559/OSD/22730

OSD 02798-04

# Average MilPers Appropriated Funded Pay & Benefits *ACTIVE ONLY*




11-L-0559/OSD/22731

# Relationship of Funding and Manpower *ACTIVE ONLY*

\$ in B

Manpower in M




\*Total Active Military Appropriation Costs 11-L-0559/OSD/22732

# Military Personnel Appropriation Funded Pay & Benefits

**ACTIVE ONLY**

**Manpower in M**



8:30 AM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 25, 2004  
SUBJECT: Attached Article

Mr. President:

Attached is an article from *The New York Post* which is worth reading.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn  
022504.06

*Attach: New York Post 2/24/04 "The Best We've Got," by R. Peters*

*ITag*

*25 Feb 04*

OSD 02945-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22734

New York Post  
February 24, 2004

## The Best We've Got

By Ralph Peters

Over the coming weeks, a quarter of a million U.S. troops will move into or out of Iraq. The logistics of such a transfer would be formidable even under peaceful conditions in a country with Western-quality infrastructure. No other power in the world could do it in Iraq - or anywhere else.

Our military is going to execute the mission with such skill that it *won't* make headlines. There'll be brief reports buried in the back pages of our newspapers and a few human interest stories on TV. But the only way this massive event will get onto the front page will be if terrorists pull off a stunt during the operation.

They'll try. There are no guarantees of safety where peace is still being made. And the terrorists desperately want to be the lead story at the top of the hour again. But even if a bomb or a missile takes American lives, the real story will remain how much our military can do - and how much our troops have accomplished over the past year.

Recall how the pundits insisted that our troops were bound to fail, that Iraq was another Vietnam, a quagmire that would only worsen. Shamelessly, American ideologues who had been too good to serve in uniform themselves pretended that their only concern was the safety of our soldiers, who they wished to bring home immediately. Morale was going to break down, civilian "experts" insisted, our military would dissolve.

It wasn't just going to be Vietnam. It was going to be Oliver Stone's Vietnam.

Our soldiers' response? They broke the back of the Ba'athist insurgency. They captured Saddam. That deck of cards? Saddam and the boys were playing on credit - and G.I. Joe called 'em.

When our soldiers were attacked, they hit back with such ferocity, precision and determination that even hardline al Qaeda operatives in Iraq have admitted to the masters of terror that the U.S. Army cannot be dislodged.

But our soldiers didn't only fight. They built. The contractors with their snouts in the Iraqi trough have a mixed record, but our soldiers have been consistently effective - and economically efficient - in their own reconstruction efforts. And yes, damn it. Our soldiers *did* win hearts and minds. And they continue to do so.

Terrorists rushed to Iraq, dreaming of a quick triumph that would send the Great Satan fleeing back to America's shopping-mall Hell.

Well, al Qaeda's intelligence failure dwarfed any errors the CIA ever made. Far from discouraging anyone, the terrorists only stiffened the resolve of Iraq's Kurds, Shi'as and even many Sunnis not to let foreign assassins shape their future.

Operationally, the skills and fortitude of the American soldier quickly forced the terrorists to shift their efforts to targeting our allies - in an attempt to drive them from the Coalition - or to strike Iraqis

11-L-0559/OSD/22735

committed to rebuilding and reclaiming their own country.

That hasn't worked, either. Iraq is moving forward. Our Coalition allies have shown admirable resolve - and adaptability. After a few early successes against our partners, recent terrorist attacks have failed. A sophisticated suicide bombing a few weeks ago didn't even penetrate the Polish compound it targeted, but only killed civilians.

Does anyone imagine that the terrorists are winning hearts and minds?

Iraq remains a brutally dangerous place, a country that will struggle for years with its disastrous past. Progress will be imperfect. Success will be inconsistent. Disappointments will intoxicate the media. But, when all is said and done, Iraq is now the only major country in the Middle East with hope for a better future.

Our soldiers created that hope.

Far from the crude babykiller of campus legend, the American soldier has proved that he is as humane as he is competent, as creative as he is valorous, and as optimistic as the best traditions of his - or her - country. Our troops have tracked down war criminals, turned the tables on ambushers, faced countless roadside bombs - and built schools, created jobs, picked up garbage and set an example that even those Iraqis anxious for us to leave will not forget.

The American soldier has an immeasurably greater impact than American bombs.

For the soldiers themselves - including our superb Marines - conducting this massive "relief in place" in Iraq, the on-the-ground reality will often be frustrating. Especially to the soldier heading home, the complexities of such a huge transfer of forces will have a hurry-up-and-wait side that will draw out the enlisted man's blackest reserves of humor.

But the new troops will go in, the veterans will come home, intelligence and operational techniques will be handed off, the "newbies" will master the local environment and this great campaign for freedom will continue to march.

Iraq is working. Attacks on our troops and American casualties are down. No Iraqis argue about whether the old regime should return - only about the rules for future statehood. A broken country is recovering from a generation of shock and misery. Their hopes may take a number of different directions, but the peoples of Iraq *have* hope.

I only wish that those Americans so anxious to use our soldiers as political pawns in election campaigns actually *knew* our troops. Not as an abstract concept, but as people.

The American soldier is a historical anomaly - not a grasping conqueror, but a man or woman of courage and good heart who wishes only to do what must be done, and then go home. Our troops are inspiring in ways that no campaign speech or campus rally will ever rival. They live the virtues - courage, patriotism, love of freedom, self-sacrifice, honor - of which their critics are embarrassed to speak.

They have a wicked sense of humor. They're exuberantly politically incorrect. They're part of the most thoroughly integrated, representative American institution - our military. And when the American people and our leaders stand behind them, they can do any job on earth.

11-L-0559/OSD/22736

Defying countless predictions of disaster, our soldiers have accomplished more in Iraq than we had any right to expect. And they did it not because of some brilliant master plan - there was none - but because they took a look at the bloody mess they inherited, rolled up their sleeves and went to work to fix it.

They're the best we've got.

*Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of "Beyond Baghdad."*

11-L-0559/OSD/22737

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2004

701

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Team to Monitor Troops

I think we ought to put together a team to see that the Services take care of their troops after they're wounded, and when they return home and are discharged. We need to **see that** it happens.

The only way we are going to know it happens, is if we put together a team of people to monitor it, require reports, develop metrics, **fashion an ombudsman** system, and possibly develop a buddy system, **as** you suggested.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
121304-31

.....

Please respond by 1/6/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02949-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22738

20 Dec 04



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2005, 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Team to Monitor Troops

OBE  
not signed

701

- The Army established the Disabled Soldier Support System (DS3) Program in April 2003 to provide its severely disabled Soldiers and their families with a system of advocacy, follow-up, and personal support to assist in their return to duty or transition from the military service to the civilian community. The DS3 budget increased from \$1.3M in FY04 to \$8.3M in FY05.
- **Key Points:**
  - o Casualties are tracked from theater to the CONUS military treatment facilities. After the Soldier's condition is stabilized, a DS3 case manager meets with the Soldier and family to discuss the program and identify any immediate concerns. As rehabilitation progresses, DS3 personnel facilitate and coordinate Soldier/family desired outcomes with proper agencies.
  - o DS3 ensures coordination between military treatment facilities and the Department of Veterans Affairs for follow-on care. If transition to civilian employment is desired, available job opportunities in the federal government or corporate world are explored.
  - o November 1, 2004: DS3 Liaison Office opened at Walter Reed Medical Center between Wards 57 and 58 for access to Soldiers and families.
  - o November 3, 2004: DS3 staff increase from 6 to 47 personnel approved, with essential personnel to arrive by January 31, 2005.
  - o December 5, 2004: At your direction, DS3 program personnel began working with your staff and the other Services through Mr. John Molino, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy).
  - o Army G-1 established liaison with the Defense and Accounting System (DFAS) to develop extraordinary pay procedures to handle DS3 Soldier pay issues.

6 Jan 05

COORDINATION: F. L. HAGENBECK, LTG, G-1

Prepared By: COL Jacqueline E. Cumbo, Chief, DS3 Program (b)(6)

OSD 02949-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22739

20 Dec 04

2/25  
1000

2:30 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Jaymie Dornan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 24, 2004  
SUBJECT: Assessment Teams

IRAQ

I ought to write a letter to every person who served on one of our assessment teams thanking him. Please have Gen. Kicklighter set that up with the Executive Secretary.

I also ought to *thank* the key people who do big jobs in the CPA when they finish their tours and leave. I haven't been doing that. We ought to set up a system for me to do it.

Thanks.

*TO Mick Kicklighter  
For your action.  
V/R  
Jaymie*

DHR/azn  
0224034.04

Please respond by: 3/5

*Dornan  
2/25  
24 Feb 04*

04

February 3, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DoD Personnel Systems-

Can we cut the total number of different personnel systems DoD has with which to operate? What number ~~do we currently have and what number~~ can we go down to, given the new personnel system?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020204-25

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

*How many different personnel system does DoD have? What are they?*



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

March 1, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: DoD Personnel Systems - - SNOWFLAKE

- On February 18, you asked if we can cut the number of different personnel systems in DoD. You also asked how many we have and how many we can get down to. I believe we only need two systems: one for the military, one for civilians.
- The Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) will replace all existing military personnel and pay systems, integrating pay and personnel into a single system, improving accuracy. We currently have 93 separate military pay and personnel systems. These systems are redundant and poorly interfaced and require multiple inputs of the same data, increasing the possibility of error. The timeliness and accuracy of data vary considerably across the systems, often requiring manual reconciliation.
- DIMHRS tells us what skills people have so they can be efficiently used; track members in deployments; provide cross-Service support; streamline business processes; adopt best industry practices; and improve interfaces with Veterans Affairs and other agencies.
- DIMHRS is scheduled to be implemented in the Army in first quarter FY 2006 and DoD-wide in first quarter FY 2008. At your request, we are also looking into the feasibility of accelerating deployment of DIMHRS.
- The civil personnel system has already made this transition for personnel transactions and records. We completed the shift to the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) in the fall of 2002, replacing 10 separate systems. There is a single DoD payroll system for our appropriated fund civilians that interfaces with DCPDS. DFAS is working with my staff to develop a business case to support full integration of these two systems.

INFORMATION ONLY

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration  
Office, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/22742

OSD 03041-04

2/9/04

February 8, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Graham

I recall the questions I got from Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina in my hearing last week. Then I saw him in Munich at the Wehrkunde conference. He clearly needs time with the two of you. He is an officer in the National Guard. He is totally focused on the Guard and Reserve, mostly the Guard. I think he thinks much less about the active force, and I mentioned that to him. He wants to be helpful, but I think we are going to have to get him engaged and understanding what it is we are trying to do with the Guard and Reserve and rebalancing of the force.

Please have a session for him—~~maybe~~ bring him down for lunch. I would be happy to participate. It is important that we focus on him. We can save ourselves a lot of problems down'theroad.

Thanks.

*RA/2-29*

DHR:dh  
020804-37 (in computer).doc

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/22743



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

February 26, 2004, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

*David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) Snowflake 2/8/2004

- Secretary Hall as well as General Myers spoke with Senator Graham at the ROA Midwinter Conference, January 28, 2004. Senator Graham was the speaker for the formal banquet that evening. A transcript of his address is not available.
- Both Secretary Hall and General Myers engaged Senator Graham on his views and intentions to “sponsor legislation” lowering the retirement age for guardsmen/reservists from 60 to 55 and extending TRI-CARE health benefits to guardsmen/reservists at all times, even when not mobilized.
- Senator Graham acknowledged to both of them that he: “understood the department’s position” opposing these additional benefits; he understood without appropriated funds to support them the department would have to use other scarce funds to support the initiatives; but in spite of this, he intended to proceed since, in his view “we owed it to the guard/reserve” based on our extensive use of them in the war on terrorism.
- He announced his intentions to sponsor this legislation during his address to ROA.
- A summary of Senator Graham’s military service is attached.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment;  
As stated

Prepared By: Warren Grant, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED



11-L-0559/OSD/22744

OSD 03042-04

## Summary of Senator Lindsey Graham's Military Service

Jan 82 - Jul 83	Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Shaw AFB, SC (Active Duty)
Jul 83 - Jul 84	Area Defense Counsel, Shaw AFB, SC (Active Duty)
Jul 84 - Jul 88	Circuit Trial Counsel, European Circuit, Rhein Main, AFB (Active Duty)
Jul 88 - Apr 89	IMA attached to Holloman AFB (Reserve)
Apr 89 - Jan 95	Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, later Staff Judge Advocate, McEntire ANG Base, SC (Air National Guard). He served as Staff Judge Advocate at McEntire Air National Guard Base during Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm.
Jan 95 - Oct 03	Key Federal Employee Program, elected to Congress (Non Affiliated Reserve Status-Non Drilling (NARS-ND))
Oct 03 - Pres	Attached for training to AF Court of Criminal Appeals, Bolling AFB (NARS-ND) (This was effective Aug 03 but formally announced on 28 Oct 03 after final CSAF/SECAF coordination)
4 Nov 03	Enconced as Judge, AF Court of Criminal Appeals (Non Pay, Drilling for points only, similar to "Pro Bono")
Jan 03	Promoted to Colonel (Pinning on ceremony TBD)
Awards:	Meritorious Service Medal AF Commendation Medal w/2 OLC

2/7/04

February 8, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Graham

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Thanks.

*RA/2-29*

DHR:dh  
020804-37 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/22746

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

SENATOR GRAHAM  
OFFICE  
20540  
FEB 20 2004 2:17

February 20, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As elected representatives of thousands of Americans currently serving this nation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, we are keenly aware of the sacrifices made by these brave men and women and their families. In light of this fact, we believe it is vital that this nation demonstrate its recognition of and appreciation for all that these soldiers and their families do for America's security.

Consequently, we joined together last year to push for a permanent law that would ensure that all reservists and their families would have access to health care regardless of their deployment status. Our proposal received 85 votes in the Senate when it was offered on the FY2004 Defense Authorization bill, and 93 votes on the FY2004 Defense Appropriations bill. Unfortunately, in spite of this strong bipartisan support, your department strongly opposed our proposal. Ultimately, thanks in large measure to the efforts of Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens, the House and Senate agreed to incorporate a version of our proposal in the FY2004 Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill. In an effort to avoid a presidential veto, House and Senate conferees decided to limit our proposal to a one-par effort.

Our proposal would enhance our national security by aiding your department's efforts to recruit and retain quality soldiers and by improving unit readiness. The unprecedented utilization of our reserve forces has raised some concerns about whether our military services will be able to attract and retain the number and quality of troops needed to meet our security requirements. There have been a number of Warning signals on this front, and our proposal is consistent with statements made by you and other military leaders that we must deal with this issue in a proactive manner. In addition, the fact that so many of our reservists lack access to health care when not on active status means some require medical services before they can be declared fit for duty. Our proposal would help ensure that more soldiers would be medically fit and ready to serve when called.

Earlier this year, we reintroduced legislation that would again permanently provide access to health care for all reservists and their families regardless of deployment status. Although the President's FY2005 budget request did not contain our proposal, we strongly believe the need for and congressional support of our legislation have only grown. Therefore, we urge you to reconsider the Administration's position on this matter and request a meeting with you at your earliest convenience to discuss this important issue.


0 SD 02626-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22747

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
February 20, 2004  
Page 2

Thank you for your consideration and time. Given that we all share the goal of keeping this nation secure and meeting our obligations to our troops, we are hopeful you will lend your support to this worthy proposal.

Sincerely,



Tom Daschle  
United States Senate



Lindsey O. Graubert

March 1, 2004

cc: Reuben Jeffrey

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Economic Issues

Attached is an interesting letter from Dr. Arthur Laffer. I think we ought to give thought to his suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/18/04 Laffer e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030104-61

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Jeffrey*

*Im at dy*

OSD 03049-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22749

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

3/1

-----Original Message-----

From: Jax Schluederberg [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM  
To: Nancy (b)(6)  
Subject: Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffer

cc: L.D.P.ita  
LTG Craddock

(6)

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. *Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.*

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci  
Catherine Mainardi  
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer  
Laffer Associates  
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340  
San Diego, California 92121

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22753

March 1, 2004

TO: Jay Garner  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for your additional comment on missile defense. I will get together with Steve Cambone and talk through the thoughts you have provided.

I do appreciate it.

Warm regards,

DHR:dh  
030104-45

373,24

1 Mar 04



March 1, 2004

TO: Honorable John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury  
(International Affairs)

CC: Honorable John W. Snow

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

*Iraq*

Attached is a letter from Dr. Arthur Laffer that touches on work we have been discussing. I think you will find it interesting.

Regards,

Attach.  
2/18/04 Laffer e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030104.60

*1 Mar 04*

OSD 03051-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22755

✓  
3/1

-----Original Message-----

From: Jax Schluenderberg (mailto:(b)(6))  
 Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM  
 To: (b)(6)  
 Subject: Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffer

cc: L. D. Pita  
LTG Graddock

February 18, 2004

②

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 1000 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

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11-L-0559/OSD/22756

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These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.*
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Buccl  
Catherine Mainard  
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer  
Laffer Associates  
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340  
San Diego, California 92121

(b)(6)



~~February 27, 2004~~  
MARCH 1

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Hospital in Kabul

Please find out what is going on with that midwife hospital in Kabul. I am so disappointed and discouraged that it seems to not be going well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022704-12

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22760



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

151-27-200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update on Maternal and Child Health Care Project in Afghanistan

- The DASD (Stability Operations), OUSD (Policy), is the primary office for coordination of facility refurbishment at Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in support of Health and Human Services (HHS). My office has supported HHS efforts and participated in the Curriculum Committee, Equipment Committee, and Faculty Selection Committee for this project since their inception.
- HHS and DoD agreed that Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul would be the first training hospital in Afghanistan. Subsequently, DoD contracted for the initial renovation of Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital.
- Reports from faculty indicate the staff and trainees are making progress and improvement is being seen in hospital infection control, training, and administration. My office coordinated donation of excess DoD equipment and supplies to the program valued at more than \$100,000.
- HHS received \$5 million per year for three years to support the program (part of Omnibus Appropriations Bill).
- An expert assessment team from OSD Stability Operations and HHS traveled to Kabul in late September 2003 to review the obstetrical training program for physicians and midwives and to provide recommendations for further development by extending the program to provincial centers in using the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
- Despite initial refurbishment, Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital remains in poor condition. Additional DoD projects, funded by the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid account and the Commander's Emergency Response Program, will upgrade the electrical, water, and sewage systems of the hospital. A timeline for completing this work will be established after the Corps of Engineers finishes its assessment. We will press for this project to be quickly completed.

11-L-0559/OSD/22761

OSD 03074-04

- A janitorial and maintenance contract for Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital will be funded by DoD for the next year. The Afghan Ministry of Health will take on responsibility for maintenance after the DoD one-year contract ends.
- In January 2004, an interagency group consisting of Mr Bill Hoffman, representatives from HHS, Health Affairs, and Stability Operations, met to discuss the reconstruction situation in Afghanistan and how the agencies could **work** together to support Dr. Peter Saleh, the senior advisor to the Ministry of Health for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group Health Team, working under Ambassador Khalilzad.
- In summary, although the Rabia Balki project has achieved some success, the original goal of converting it to a teaching program for OB/GYN and nurse midwifery, which could then serve as the example for the rest of Afghanistan, will not be realized for some time, unless this effort is more focused and energized.
- Recommendations:
  - The above interagency group should identify areas where DoD can support HHS, the Ministry of Health and USAID, and ways in which the effort can be accelerated.
  - If you wish to personally direct and re-energize this effort, I recommend that you call together the interagency group to review its current plan of action.

COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments:

As stated

**TAB**

**A**

~~February 27, 2004~~  
MARCH 1

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Hospital in Kabul

Please find out what is going on with that midwife hospital in Kabul. I am so disappointed and discouraged that it seems to not be going well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022704-12

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22764

**TAB**

**B**

Update on Maternal and Child Health Care Project in Afghanistan

COORDINATIONS


OSD SOLIC/  
Stability Ops      COL Jones      email 2/24/04

DHHS      Thomas Maphilly      email 2/24/04

DASD (C&PP)      Dr. Tornberg      concur 2/25/04

CoS (HA)      CAPT Malone      concur 2/25/04

USD (P&R)      David S. C. Chu



David S. C. Chu

March 2, 2004

Haiti

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Dodd

Somebody might want to get to Chris Dodd fast and talk to him about Haiti, so he doesn't start opposing us.

DHR:dh  
030204-21

2 Mary

OSD 03086-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22767

March 1, 2004

RUSSIA

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Russia

Andy Marshall, our thoughtful friend here at the Pentagon, sent me the attached paper by Vladimir Shlapentokh.

It highlights an interesting point that, while President Putin's popularity remains high, many Russians are dissatisfied with the quality of their lives and are unhappy about specific public policy issues. The discrepancy appears to be explained by polling data that indicates that very few Russians see any viable alternative to Putin as a leader.

It is an interesting article.

Respectfully,

CC:

Vice President Richard B. Cheney

Attach.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "Anti-Liberal Perestroika: A New 'Transition' in Russia, undated

DHR:dh  
030104-66

OSD 03141-04

IMAR04

11-L-0559/OSD/22768

## **Anti-Liberal Perestroika: A New "Transition" in Russia**

Vladimir Shlapentokh

In late January 2004, Egor Gaidar, a prominent Russian democratic leader, was asked on television to assess the parliamentary election procedures and talk about the total debacle of his political party. Unlike many of his comrades-in-arms, Gaidar refused to speak pessimistically, and predicted instead that Fortuna would smile on the liberals in the next election. Gaidar was clearly mistaken. While the country's future is uncertain in many respects, there is one trend that is quite evident. A new *Zeitgeist* has emerged in Russia that will make the liberals' political life difficult in the next years.

Indeed, in spite of some progress (over the last years, the GNP has grown 5 to 7 percent per year), the country's economic prospects remain dubious. Many experts have pointed out that the current growth rate has been produced largely by the high price of oil, which provides the lion's share of the budget. At a recent conference in Moscow on the topic of Russia's future, a leading Russian economist, Evgenii Yasin, explained that it is difficult to predict which road the country will take in the next decade, because the process of modernizing the economy has not yet begun. Economic uncertainties are compounded by the ambivalence of the Kremlin's policy

toward big business. This concern heightened after the arrest of oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky and several of his colleagues from the Yukos company.

It is not easy to forecast the progress of the Russian military in the next 5 to 10 years. On one hand, the Kremlin has made enormous efforts to modernize the army and improve its material status. On the other hand, the actual progress is minimal, and the military continues to complain about the lack of funding for training pilots, feeding soldiers and housing officers. The future of the war in Chechnya is unclear. The Russians—ordinary people and experts alike—are divided in their attitudes toward this conflict.

The fate of the Kremlin's struggle against corruption and crime is also uncertain. While many people are skeptical about whether Putin's administration will curb the lawlessness in society, there are some optimists who believe that progress can be made. Russian foreign policy is even more difficult to predict, particularly in regard to the United States. Russia could emerge as an American adversary, ally, or play both roles simultaneously. Relations with China and the Muslim World are difficult to project in the long-term, as are Russian attitudes toward the former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Georgia in particular.

There is only one element of contemporary Russia that has demonstrated a steady trend: the country's move from nascent democracy to a society with autocratic political rule. Putin has been shaping this transformation since he took control of the country. In only three years he eliminated all traces of the division of power. He turned the parliament into a puppet institution, not unlike the Soviet Supreme Council of the past. The judicial system has become as obeisant to Putin as it was to the Soviet masters of the Kremlin. Putin has also reduced the independence of the media, which had been autonomous during the Yeltsin regime. Russian TV is now a direct

instrument of the Kremlin. Putin appears on TV no less than 5 to 7 times during a 30-minute news program. In fact, he makes more television appearances than comrade Brezhnev did in the Soviet times. In most cases, the president is portrayed as a great leader who takes care of everything in the country.

Putin has actually surpassed his icons, Stalin and Andropov, in some areas. For instance, never in the Soviet past did the KGB and the army play such a prominent role in the management of society as they do today. Asked in a recent poll about Putin's major constituency, 51 percent of the Russians said "people in uniform" (15 percent pointed to "ordinary people"). According to Olga Kryshantovskaia, a leading expert on Russian elites, officers and generals make up 58 percent of the people in the highest echelons of power (compared to 5 percent in 1988).

There are no serious grounds to suppose that full-fledged democracy will reenter the Russian political scene in the next decade. Only a few Russian liberals still display some hope for a better future. The liberal newspaper *Novaia Gazeta*, for instance, recently called on the people to join together under the old slogan borrowed from tsarist Russia, "Down with Autocracy!"

Putin's political course is supported by a majority of the population. The high level of political stability in the country, which is greatly valued by the people, contrasts with that of the previous regime and its flamboyant and often drunken president. As the prominent Russian sociologist Yuri Levada recently stated, while Putin has a high approval rating (it oscillates between 70 and 90 percent), many Russians are dissatisfied with several aspects of their everyday lives (material needs and physical security in particular) and unhappy about the way public problems are being handled (most notably the fight against crime and corruption and the

war in Chechnya). However, most people continue to see Putin as the guarantor of political order and a decent international status for the country.

Meanwhile, the Russians have lost respect for democratic procedures. Elections are perceived as instruments that legitimate the power grabbed by bureaucrats and rich people. The absolute majority of the Russians, including rich people and the intelligentsia (some with sadness, most with joy), sincerely believe that Western-style democracy has no future in the country in the next decades. As Levada recently formulated, "The democratic model turned out to be 'foreign' to the majority of the population." Only 10 percent of the Russians, according an October 2003 survey conducted by Levada's polling firm, said that the right to elect political leaders is important to them. Though indifferent to the governing of the country, many Russians, particularly young people, do support the maintenance of individual liberties, such as the right to own private property, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel abroad and throughout the country. So far Putin's regime tolerates several freedoms. Today, fear is spreading only among politicians and journalists, particularly those from the opposition, as well as among businesspeople, whose fear increased decisively with the arrest of Khodorkovsky.

The Russians link the emergence of capitalism and democracy to the great increase in disorder, crime and corruption. The meager advances in the standard of living, which are more important to the people than democratic institutions, have been associated with Putin's leadership and his retreat from the Western model of society. Irina Khakamada, a prominent Russian politician who wants to represent the liberals in the presidential election, said in January that "Putin gave us an offer to exchange our freedoms for bread ... and many Russians accepted this trade." ✓

In December 2003, a survey found that almost two-thirds of the Russians endorsed “the country’s current direction.” Russians simply do not see an alternative to Putin among other politicians. The December survey mentioned above found that less than 5 percent of the population could name someone to lead the country after Putin.

With the president’s encouragement, the Russian mind set is moving toward nationalism and exceptionalism, particularly among elites, and even among those who consider themselves liberals. In February 2003, according a survey conducted by the Fund of Public Opinion on the eve of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Stalin’s death, the number of people who regarded Stalin in a favorable light exceeded the number of those who spoke negatively about him by 30 percent. The last parliamentary election in December 2003, even if it was deeply influenced by the authorities, still reflected the mood of society. Taken together, the liberals garnered no more than 10 percent of the popular vote. At the same time, aggressive nationalists, who had become quite visible before 1999, achieved great success. They earned almost a quarter of all votes. In some ways, Putin has even tried to slow the country’s powerful anti-Western xenophobic momentum, as he demonstrated during a television interview in late December 2003.

The developments in Russia are similar to the circumstances in many other countries that began the transition to capitalism in the last two decades, but failed to develop liberalism, and maintained a brand of authoritarianism that merely imitated democracy. The phrases used by Russians to describe their political system—labels such as “managed democracy,” “virtual democracy,” and “facade democracy”—are also used by people in many other nations to portray their respective systems.

This is the third time in the last century that Russia changed the vector of its

development. The first shift occurred in 1917 when Russian society, after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, started moving toward the totalitarian regime, which took its final form under Stalin's leadership at the end of the 1920s. This regime existed until 1953 when Russia began to move back toward liberal society. By the beginning of perestroika, the Zeitgeist of liberalism pervaded the minds of a majority of the Russians, from top apparatchiks, many of whom were labeled "rosy" (or hidden liberals), to ordinary people who were fed up with the problems in society. With the exception of a few hardened Stalinists, everybody dreamed in one way or another about the liberalization of society. While some had only cosmetic changes in mind, others hoped for drastic changes, such as the right to run small private businesses, or even the establishment of real elections with a few candidates from the Communist Party. Nobody, including Andrei Sakharov, fantasized about the emergence of a true democracy or market economy, though the spirit for change was indeed strong in these years. Even Andropov, during his short rule, mused about the decentralization of the economy and a wider engagement of intellectuals in social life—ideas that later materialized during Gorbachev's perestroika as the country moved quickly toward democratic reforms.

The Russian train has switched tracks once again, but it would be wrong to blame Putin for this change. In fact, Putin is the instrument of a new, anti-democratic spirit in Russia. Although he presided over the anti-liberal perestroika, these changes were first initiated before his arrival to power. Ultimately he serves the forces that chose him, in the person of Yeltsin, to complete this new transition of Russia.

This reversal began in 1993 when Boris Yeltsin ordered the shelling of the freely elected leftist parliament, which had rebelled against Yeltsin's illegal decision to dismantle it. Whatever

the reasons for this fatal decision (for instance, the danger of a Communist restoration), it signaled a retreat from the giddy days of nascent Russian democracy in 1990-1993, and stimulated the withdrawal from genuine democracy. Since the bloody showdown with the parliament, Yeltsin's regime moved inexorably away from democratic principles, while enjoying the full support, either direct or indirect, of Gaidar and his friends. The fraudulent referendum on the constitution, endorsed in December 1993, provided the Russian president with power similar to that of a monarch. This authority allowed for Yeltsin's controversial reelection in 1996, which came in spite of his low rating.

Contrary to his numerous apologists, it was Yeltsin who ultimately betrayed democracy when he chose as his successor not a champion of liberal principles, but an obscure politician with a KGB past and sympathy for Stalin and the Soviet empire, who promised Yeltsin and his family immunity. Yeltsin was able to initiate this new trend toward authoritarianism because the same vector of change had dominated the minds of many Russians since the mid 1990s. Nostalgia for the past and the Soviet empire embraced people from all walks of life, from refined intellectuals to the uneducated Russian lumpen. Only 20 percent of the Russians gave a negative appraisal of the Communist system; only 21 percent praised the multiparty system of 1999-2000. Most Russians rejected the Western model of life, and supported the idea of Russia taking its own path in history.

With Vladimir Putin in power the shift toward the authoritarian state accelerated at the same rate as Gorbachev's famous move in the opposite direction. In 1986-1989, the general secretary managed to dismantle the foundation of the Soviet system. In the same amount of time, Putin was able to destroy most elements of the democratic system and restore certain aspects of

the society that existed prior to Gorbachev's perestroika.

There are some differences between the Soviet times and Putin's Russia. While the current regime has rejected much of the liberalism that emerged in the early 1990s, some elements of the liberal stage remain. Russia represents an exotic mix of its historical components, harking back to Hegel's famous law, "negation of negation." The liberal stage negated the totalitarian past, only to be negated by a new authoritarian stage, which has resulted in a sort of synthesis of the two previous stages in history.

In some cases, elections in Russia still look more legitimate than the pure show business of elections in the USSR. The recent reelection of the president of Bashkortan, for instance, was absolutely fraudulent, but the highly competitive mayoral election in Ekaterinburg was almost genuine. Unlike the Soviet past, private businesses play a crucial role in the Russian economy, even though they are at the mercy of the central and local administration.

The autocratic system that formed under Putin is still in a fluid state. Nobody knows how far the current regime will go in tightening down the bolts. Will Russians and foreigners be free to travel internationally in 2005 or 2008? Will the few liberal media that still exist, such as the newspaper *Moskovskii Novosti* and the radio station *Ekho Moskvy*, endure the next few years? Will the young journalist Yelena Tregubova, author of the recent sensational book *Tales of a Kremlin Digger*, be punished more severely in the future for her revelations about Putin? She has already been fired from her newspaper job. Moreover, the state-controlled NTV network canceled an interview with her after promoting it for days, and according to the *New York Times*, a small bomb exploded outside her apartment on February 2. Although Tregubova did not speculate about the perpetrator of the bombing, "she obliquely linked it to the presidential

election on March 14.”

There will be no radical change in the Russian political system in the next decade, or perhaps longer. No one has the slightest doubt that Putin, who has no serious rivals, will be reelected in March 2004. In fact, many are confident that he will stay in power after his second term ends in 2008. The best Russian minds have offered competing prognoses of what type of subterfuge Putin and his advisers will use to achieve this goal. No analyst, however, can be sure about what Putin will do, particularly in the international arena. Putin’s mind continues to puzzle Moscow experts. “We know very little about the president’s plans,” said the famous Russian politician and scholar Victor Sheinis at a recent conference in Moscow. Any leader with autocratic power has a wide variety of choices. In the next years, Putin can select among several different strategies in the foreign arena. Depending on what suits his needs, he may cooperate with the United States, or take a more hostile stance.

In the next years, the United States will be faced with a Russia that combines autocracy with state capitalism. In this context, American officials have no chance at influencing the political processes in the country. The intervention of high U.S. officials into the Russian political process will only irritate Russian-American relations. Today, such attempts will prove even less effective than Washington’s efforts to help Soviet dissidents defend human rights in the 1970s.

In an article published in *Izvestia* (January 26, 2004), Collin Powell implored the Russians to follow the rules of democracy in the country. In spite of the article’s considerate tone, it did not resonate even slightly in the minds of Russian elites. A deeply negative image of the American political system, which has been created by the Kremlin-controlled media in the

last years, has blunted the U.S. critique of Russian politics. The country today is not a place where America can impose its political values. Asked on the eve of Putin's visit to the U.S. in September 2003, "What do you associate with America?" only 3 percent of the Russians pointed to its political system (14 percent pointed to its wealth, and 10 percent said the economy). As a leading Russian pollster, Nikolai Popov, noted in *Kommersant Daily*, it is "not politically correct" in the country to say something good about the United States.

The U.S., as any other nation, pursues its national interests by pressuring other countries when common goals are not strong enough to achieve full cooperation. There is, however, a specific limit to the effectiveness of this strategy in the case of Russia, and any other country. The U.S. and Russia have many common objectives, including the fight against international terrorism, the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the enhancement of economic relations, particularly on the sale of Russian oil to the United States. However, there are still several disagreements between the two countries on how to achieve these and other goals. It is not reasonable to pester the Kremlin with public complaints about the internal political developments in the country. There is no chance to change the Kremlin's stance toward democratic ideals. As its primary strategy, Washington should encourage Putin to regard good relations with the United States as useful to both Russia and him personally.

*Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Joshua Woods for his editorial contribution to this article.*

March 2, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Peace Corps in Afghanistan and Iraq

What do you think about getting the Peace Corps into Afghanistan and Iraq? I am told that at the present time they are not allowed in Afghanistan because they think it is too dangerous. There are an awful lot of folks doing fine work in there.

Maybe it is time to change that policy. Unfortunately, I don't know where the Peace Corps is connected.

DHR:dh  
030104-95

2 March 04

OSD 03145-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22779



March 2, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Service in Iraq and Afghanistan

What do you suppose might be done to make service in Afghanistan or Iraq a career-enhancing move for Agency for International Development (AID) employees?

My understanding is that at the present time it is not considered career-enhancing. I don't know that to be true, but that is what I am told by people.

DHR:dh  
030104-93

2 March

OSD 03140-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22780



March 1, 2004

TO: Zal Khalilzad  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Contractors and Vocational Education

What about getting the contractors who do work in Afghanistan to agree that they will do some sort of a vocational education project to train Afghans to do some of the work?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-88

*Afghanistan*

*IM ac 04*

OSD 03148-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22781

February 8, 2004

689

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Discussion at the Combatant Commanders  
Conference

The more I listened to Ed Eberhart, the more I agreed with him that we need to know precisely what forces we would use for homeland security tasks in the event of **an** emergency. I am not talking about assigning forces. But, as we have forces rotating in and out of the **US** or permanently located here, we need to have an inventory available and have thought through how we would use them. We will need some exercises where we consider various scenarios and how we would react to them.

Doing so may give us clues as to how we ought to be restructuring the Guard and Reserve, and where our forces ought to be distributed around **the US** and what skills **are** needed. We need a single point of contact for this. My **guess** is it has to be Joint Forces Command.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-48 (ts computer).doc

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1576-04  
3 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Discussion at the Combatant Commanders' Conference

- **Issue.** Emergency homeland defense forces for US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
- **Discussion.** In response to your memorandum (TAB A), the following comments are provided for your consideration.
  - Standing orders provide USNORTHCOM with an inventory of land and maritime forces under emergency conditions. The command may also obtain forces through the request-for-assistance process when providing emergency support to a lead federal agency.
  - Annual exercises like DETERMINED PROMISE and UNIFIED DEFENSE provide training for various scenarios. In addition, we continue to work closely with USNORTHCOM to ensure the Defense Planning Scenario for Homeland Defense includes appropriate variables to validate both the responsiveness and the structure of our emergency forces.
  - Monitoring the availability of the force is an ongoing task requiring constant adjustments and improvements. Our maturing global force management initiatives will provide additional resolution and insight into the administration of force availability. I agree that USJFCOM should be the joint force provider and am prepared to brief you on our concept at your earliest convenience.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22783

OSD 03175-04

February 8, 2004

689

**TO:** Gen. Dick Myers  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Homeland Defense Discussion at the Combatant Commanders Conference

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Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-48 (ts computer).doc

.....  
**Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_**

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

USJFCOM

INFORMATION ONLY

20 February 2004

USNORTHCOM

COPY PROVIDED

26 February 2004

December 18<sup>19</sup>, 2003

311CCC

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at &hHHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121803-11

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

19 Dec 03

1 Mar 04

OSD 03192-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 MAR -3 PM 5:22

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois 2/1/04*

SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

- Based upon your positive impressions during a visit to Secretary Thompson's Command Center, I visited the facility to determine the potential use of their capability in your new Unified Command Center.
- While the **HHS** Command Center is limited in scope and size, they have done an impressive job constructing it in **59** days at a cost of **\$3.7M**. Essentially, they use two large video walls with one wall having four large screen monitors tuned to live news TV stations (domestic and international), and the other wall having ten projector screens in a two-down and five-across matrix as a "knowledge wall."
- **On** the knowledge wall, each projector can display a single image or multiple images, such as video teleconferencing images, multiple health crises, multiple hospital statuses during an event, etc. **This** would be similar to you concurrently tracking information and talking to multiple Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, other Department Secretaries, the President, etc.
- I have directed my IT team, responsible for developing and implementing your Unified Command Center, to meet with Secretary Thompson's IT staff to better understand how we can utilize the HHS Command Center's capability and their expertise in integrating a "knowledge wall" into the new Unified Command Center, your new office on the Mall Terrace in **2005**, and other areas occupied by you.
- If desired, I am available to discuss further at your convenience.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Michael R. Sullivan, (b)(6)

OSD 03192-04



11-L-0559/OSD/22787

December <sup>19</sup>~~18~~ 2003

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at the HHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121803-11

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

---

11-L-0559/OSD/22788

March 3, 2004

TO: Zal Khalilzad

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*

SUBJECT: Prison Issue

Thanks so much for pushing ahead on the prison issue. We will work it from this end

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030304-4

383.6

3 Mar 04

OSD 03194-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22789

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
257 110 -4 PM 18 30

March 1, 2004

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Gordon England  
Gen. Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Health Issues Related to Haiti

Please take a look at this **DIA** piece on Haiti and health, and **make** sure that you are on top of the issues that the Marines ought to be aware of and sensitive to in connection with their deployment to Haiti.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

2/27/04 Defense Analysis Report: "Haiti: Disease and Environmental Health Risks, Medical Capabilities"

DHR:dh  
030104-54

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

Haiti

Mar 04

OSD 03233-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22790



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SECRET  
NOFORN  
CONFIDENTIAL

HEALTH AFFAIRS

March 2, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Health Issues Related to Haiti – Response to Snowflake, dated March 1, 2004

- This memo is in response to your snowflake, subject as above (TAB A). I have reviewed all the Defense Intelligence Agency reports on the health issues related to Haiti, and personally conveyed my concerns and yours regarding Force Health Protection activities in preparation for deployment to the Navy Surgeon General, VADM Mike Cowan, and the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps, RADM Robert Hufstader.
- Attached at TAB B is a brief summary from the Navy Surgeon General on Force Health Protection activities that are being undertaken by deploying Marines.
- I spoke with RADM Hufstader, and requested that he speak directly with the Task Force Surgeon for the Haiti operation to ensure that all appropriate precautions and preparations are being undertaken.
  - I specifically emphasized the importance of direct counseling of the leadership and the individual service members on the importance of compliance with directed medical countermeasures.
  - Further, I requested a report from RADM Hufstader, by next week, on all the perceived threats and their risk-mitigation strategy for each. A weekly report will follow on their execution of activities in accordance with this strategy. I will forward these reports to keep you informed.
- You also inquired about our experience in Haiti in 1994 (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY). We did experience an outbreak of 30 cases of Dengue Fever in the first 6 weeks of the operation. Otherwise, disease and injury incidences occurred in expected ranges. A more detailed summary of that experience is provided at TAB C.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *David S. Chan*

*3 Mar 02*

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22791

0 SD 03233 - 04

# TAB

# A

March 1,2004

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Gordon England  
Gen. Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Health Issues Related to Haiti

Please take a look at this **DIA** piece on Haiti and health, and make sure that you are on top of the issues that the Marines ought to be aware of and sensitive to in connection with their deployment to Haiti.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/27/04 Defense Analysis Report: "Haiti: Disease and Environmental Health Risks, Medical Capabilities"

DHR:dh  
030104-54

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22793

**TAB**

**B**

**INFO MEMO**

March 2, 2004, 13:00 P M

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE****FROM VADM M. L. Cowan, Surgeon General of the Navy** **SUBJECT: Force ~~Health~~ Protection For USMC Personnel Deployed in Support of Haitian Operations**

- To support the successful accomplishment of our current mission to Haiti, the following health threats have been evaluated by operational commanders:
  - Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center rates Haiti as HIGH RISK for infectious diseases and mission effectiveness will be seriously jeopardized without effective countermeasures.
  - Greatest vector borne infectious disease threats include malaria, dengue, and leptospirosis.
  - Significant threats from diseases linked to poor sanitation, food and water.
- CJCS, USSOUTHCOM and MARFORSOUTH published comprehensive FHP guidance for Marine forces deploying to Haiti.
- Countermeasures implemented by Marine Expeditionary Brigade Surgeon:
  - Unit is current for all immunizations (Hepatitis A, typhoid)
  - Doxycycline issued to all Marines as a chemoprophylactic against malaria.
  - Pre-deployment health assessments completed.
  - Permethrin treated uniforms and bed nets issued.
  - DEET containing insect repellent purchased and issued.

**COORDINATION None****Attachments: None****Prepared By: CAPT E. M. Kilbane** (b)(6)

**TAB**

**C**



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

March 2, 2004 2:00PM

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

FROM: Ms. Ellen Embrey, **DASD** (Force Health Protection and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Force Health Protection Issues – Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

- In September through November 1994, approximately 20,000 US troops deployed into Haiti. Review of medical after action reports indicates no major health related outbreaks that adversely impacted operations. Summary of disease and non-battle injury incidence follows:
  - Febrile Illness: The Army instituted an aggressive surveillance system early in the deployment due to risks of Malaria, Dengue Fever, and other tropical illnesses. Patients with fevers, without an obvious source, were admitted to the 28\* Combat Support Hospital.
    - In the first 6 weeks of the operation, fevers accounted for 25% of admissions; all patients with fevers recovered without complications.
    - A total of 30 patients had Dengue and 0 had Malaria. Most cases of Dengue are self-limited illnesses treated with bed rest, Tylenol, and oral fluids. However, these patients are at risk for developing the potentially life-threatening form of the disease called Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (although no cases materialized).
    - Following the first cases of Dengue, interventions included the re-emphasis of use of personal protective measures (DEET, Permethrin, Bed nets, etc.) and vector-control measures (mosquito spraying and elimination of old tires that served as breeding grounds for the responsible mosquito species in troop areas).
    - There is no vaccine or medicine to prevent Dengue.
  - Malaria: Troops used Chloroquine and Doxycycline for Malaria prophylaxis. No US cases of Malaria was identified; there was one case in a multi-national soldier.
  - Diarrhea: There were a few small outbreaks, but no bacterial sources isolated. Following Tropical Storm Gordon there was an increase in diarrhea cases. Hand washing and field sanitation measures, especially at kitchens and latrines, were used to control these outbreaks.

11-L-0559/OSD/22797

- Mental Health Issues:
  - During the last week of September 1994, there was an increase in mental health admissions (25% of all admissions that week)—this coincided with the first soldier suicide death. This was widely covered in the media, and was closely monitored for the duration of the deployment.
  - There was a total of 3 confirmed suicides, by self-inflicted gunshot (2 Army soldiers from same infantry battalion, and 1 Marine).
- Disease and Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) Surveillance: With exception of Dengue, disease and injury incidences occurred in expected ranges during the deployment. As expected, DNBI rates were higher early in the deployment, and gradually fell as soldier living conditions improved.
- HIV: There was a very large concern for HIV going into Haiti, and considerable emphasis was placed on barrier precautions in the medical settings and warning soldiers about high HIV-positive rates in the local women. There are no known HIV conversions from this deployment.
- Conclusion: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was generally free from any major force health protection related problems. There were some cases of tropical diseases endemic to the Caribbean. Use of personal protective measures and strong support for preventive medicine efforts kept disease rates generally within expected ranges.

Prepared by: LTC Steve Phillips, FHP&R (b)(6)

12/12/03

2003 DEC -11 PM 4:55

December 11, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Ruinsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentives

*210 Navy*

Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to Reuben Jeffery. He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5.

Thanks.

DHR:JH  
121103-18

*DR*

.....  
Please respond by 1/5/04

*11 Dec 03*

OSD 03235-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22799



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

3 MAR 2004 11:50 AM  
3 MAR 2004 11:50 AM

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

March 3, 2004 - 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Mandatory Retirement--SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- There are several remedies applicable to Captain Jeffrey and others like him:
  - He can be recalled to active duty. The Secretary of a Military Department may order most retired officers to active duty (10 U.S.C. §688). No more than 25 officers can serve concurrently and they cannot serve more than 12 months in a 24-month period. (During periods of national emergency these restrictions are lifted, which is the current situation.)
  - If selected by a selection board, an officer who would otherwise be required to retire following completion of 30 years service may have retirement deferred and be continued on active duty for up to 5 years or until age 62, whichever is sooner (10 U.S.C. §637).
- The real problem is that officers like Captain Jeffrey may not wish to be retained, because there is little financial incentive to stay. Indeed, it could be argued the current incentive is negative, since delayed retirement may damage second career earnings.
- We are pursuing a set of legislative remedies to this dilemma for flag officers (raising maximum age to 68, and providing for an increased pension if they serve beyond 30 years). Your speaking out in support will help us, since we failed to win their acceptance last year.
- RAND is helping us evaluate alternatives for officers below flag rank. To enable us to try these out without having to justify each in advance, we are seeking military personnel demonstration authority. OMB has not yet cleared this, but I am hopeful they will soon do so. (I will let you know if by the end of next week we have not yet succeeded.)

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Francine Blackmon, ODUSD(MPP/OEPM); (b)(6)



0 SD 03235 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22800

**TAB**

**A**

12/12/03

December 11, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentives

Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to Reuben Jeffery. He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5

Thanks.

DHR:db  
121103-18

*DR*

.....  
Please respond by 1/5/04

OSD 03235-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22802

**TAB**

**B**

Coordination

General Counsel

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Principal Deputy  
1/20/04

Prepared by: Lt Col Francine Blackmon, (b)(6)



1:08 PM

TO: Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 4, 2004  
SUBJECT: **New York Times Editorial**

The New **York** Times editorial on Haiti is just terrible. Somebody ought to go back at it, hard. Possibly you or Colin.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.02

*000.7*

*ymw dy*

OSD 03240-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22805

TAB

65.6

February ~~7~~ 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CINC Conferences

On the CINC Conferences, you might want to **think** of doing it in two and a half **days**, instead of three days. You could have **the** SLRG meeting with the CINC's **take place** just in the morning of **the third** day, so **people** can **get out**.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
020704 11 (S) computer.doc

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22806

OSD 03249-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

15 1 15  
11 1 13  
11 1 13

INFO MEMO

CM-1580-04  
5 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/5*

SUBJECT: CINC Conferences

- **Issue.** "On the CINC Conferences, you might want to think of doing it in two and a half days, instead of three days. You could have the SLRG meeting with the CINCs take place just in the morning of the third day, so people can get out."  
(TAB)
- **Discussion.** The Strategic Planning Council (SPC), consisting of the members of the Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG) and the combatant commanders, has great value. I agree that it should be scheduled for the third morning of each of the Combatant Commanders' Conferences.
- The next SPC is planned for 26 May, following 2 days of Combatant Commander/Joint Chiefs meetings. Our staffs will work closely to develop an agenda that will complement the ongoing Joint Planning Guidance efforts.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen James Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22807

OSD 03249-04



TAB

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 9, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Beyond Goldwater Nichols**

Attached is John Hamre's preliminary report. I think he's got some good ideas. What do you say we get you, Gen. Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and possibly Steve Cambone and whoever else you would like; possibly Adm. Keating.

We can sit down with Hamre and whoever he wants to bring and have him give us a report. We will see what we think.

Thanks.

DHR/a2n  
030904.07

*Attach: Hamre 2/3/04 memo Re: Progress on study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"*

*Please*

---

OSD 03250-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22808



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR **THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

From: John J. Hamre   
Date: February 3, 2004  
Subject: Progress on our study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

---

Mr. Secretary, a year back we met **with you** at the outset of **a study we** planned to undertake in order to examine concepts for the next phase of **reform** for the Defense Department. Throughout the past year **we** have met extensively with **experts in and outside the Department**. We have met with the individuals **you directed us** to contact, as well as each of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries, **and many members of your** senior leadership team. We are now in the process of briefing our findings. **We anticipate** issuing a public report in March.

I would **like** to use this memo to briefly **indicate some** of the more significant ideas we will be proposing. If at any time you wish to be briefed in more detail, however, **we** would be honored to do **so**.

#### **integrating OSD and the Joint Staff**

We **started** with a threshold question: Has the Joint Staff **evolved to the extent** that its capabilities overshadow that of the OSD staff? **Our conclusion was that we are** now at a **stage** where **we** need to integrate **aspects of the Joint Staff and OSD**.

It is **our** view that there **needs to be an** independent Joint Staff in **key operational** areas, but that others can be **integrated**. We already **have an integrated OSD-Joint Staff** in one **key area—the J2**. The J2 is the operational intelligence arm for both **you and the Chairman**. In the other J directorates, however, there **is some duplication with OSD**. We understand that some duplication **is** desirable as we need divergent perspectives in **key areas**, but in several other areas the duplication is wasteful, counterproductive **and inefficient**. We will, therefore, recommend that you retain the J2, J3, J5, and J8. We believe that the J7 should be disbanded, since most of **its** functions now **logically** belong to the Joint Forces Command. Our proposal for **the J6 is contained** in the next section of this memo.

When it comes to the J1 and the J4, we believe that **these staffs can be integrated** into OSD (USD, Personnel and Readiness and IISD, Acquisition, Technology and

logistics respectively). In these instances, the general/flag officer would become a military assistant to the under secretary. The **J4** has **always** been a capable officer with modest duties. By contrast, it **has always** been hard to recruit a **talented** individual to head up logistics in the acquisition directorate of OSD. We feel that these **are** logical ways to integrate.

### **Remove Title 10 authority from the Military Departments**

Our second major recommendation concerns the need for **true** enterprise-wide solutions for command, control and communications. **We know** that 25 years of pushing interoperability has still not corrected the problem of inter-service communication on the battlefield. **We argue** that it will not be possible to get truly seamless communications as long as the acquisition process for C3 systems remains a service-specific authority.

We believe that **you** should create a new **program 12** that is for enterprise-wide C3. The acquisition of C3 would be assigned to a Joint Battle Management C2 Command. The **J6** would be disestablished and assigned the **JBMC2** Command leadership. The **JBMC2** would be given the **same** kind of acquisition authority that the Special Operations Command or the ballistic missile defense directorate have. The Commander, **JBMC2** would report to you through **USD C31**. (I know **you** will not agree with this, but we believe that **USD** Intelligence should be reconfigured as **USD C31**.)

**We** understand that this recommendation will engender a good deal of controversy with junior **offices** and retired senior **officers**, but **we** believe that the senior leadership of the military departments is genuinely open to this **idea**.

### **Unification of Secretariats in Military Departments**

We understand that there **has** been considerable **progress in this area**, but **we** believe that the staffs for the service chiefs and the service secretaries can be **completely** integrated, with one Very important exception. The general counsel should be accountable **only to the Service Secretary**.

### **Revitalizing civilian leadership in the Department**

We were surprised to find the widely held view that the professional cadre of civilians in the Department is **weak** and deteriorating. We found a strong desire among military personnel to want to strengthen their civilian counterparts. In general, military officers believe that their **ideas are now** seriously impeded by weakness in OSD and in the military secretariats. **We** have developed a series of recommendations to help strengthen civilian **leaders**. **We also** believe that **you need** the authority to **deploy** civilians and will have some recommendations in this regard in our final report.

### **Improving Interagency Coordination**

Tab

We believe that there are serious deficiencies in the interagency process. The non-defense departments lack the capacity to support their obligations. There are inadequate mechanisms for coordination and follow up to ensure that we have the resources and actions we need in order to follow through. I know that there are developments under way to strengthen the various department capabilities, but we need to learn more about those initiatives before we go final on our report.

#### **Second Phase of the Study**

Let me reiterate that we are prepared to meet with you at any time in order to review these ideas, as well as others that go beyond the major recommendations I have summarized above. We have also deferred some topics to the second phase of this study. In the second phase we intend to examine new missions and new organizational concepts for operations. I am aware that you have done a lot to advance new organizational concepts for operational missions. We have not yet had a chance to examine these ideas, but will do so this spring. We also intend to examine the questions regarding the role and structure of the National Guard and Reserve components, a topic that virtually everyone has argued that there is an urgent need to examine. We will accelerate our efforts in this area. I would especially welcome any perspective you have in this regard.

**END**

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22811



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1579-04

5 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

*SP/ADM 3/5*

SUBJECT: Beyond Goldwater Nichols

- **Issue.** Dr. John Hamre's preliminary report, "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" and your inquiry, ". . . What do you say we get you, Gen. Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and possibly Steve Cambone and whoever else you would like; possibly Adm. Keating. We can sit down with Hamre . . . and have **him** give us a report. We will see what we think." (TAB)
- **Discussion**
  - Mr. Secretary, thank you for the opportunity to review Dr. Hamre's preliminary report. On 18 February 2004, Dr. Hamre briefed the JCS Tank and outlined the ideas listed in this report as well as others. The JCS did not fully support his staff consolidation approach and we await his final draft report for further comment.
  - Gen Pace, VADM Keating and I look forward to meeting with you, your staff and Dr. Hamre to discuss the report in greater detail. My staff will coordinate with your schedulers for a meeting time.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Walter L. Sharp, LTG, USA; Director, J-5

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22812

OSD 03250-04

TAB

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: February 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **Beyond Goldwater Nichols**

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We can sit down with Hamre and whoever he wants to **bring** and have him give us a report. We will see what we think.

Thanks.

DHR:azn  
030904.07

*Attach: Hamre 213104 memo Re: Progress on study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 3/1 \_\_\_\_\_


OSD 03250-04 Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22813



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: John J. Hamre   
Date: February 3, 2004  
Subject: Progress on our study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

Mr. Secretary, a year back we met **with** you at the outset of **a study we planned to undertake** in order to examine concepts for the next phase of **reform** for the Defense Department. Throughout **the past year we have met extensively with experts in and outside the Department.** We have met with the individuals you directed **us** to contact, as well as each of the Service Chiefs **and Secretaries**, and many members of your senior leadership team. We are now in the **process** of briefing our findings. We **anticipate** issuing a public report in March.

I would **like** to use this memo to briefly indicate some of **the more significant ideas we will be proposing.** If at any time you wish to be briefed in more detail, however, we would be honored **to do so.**

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We started with a threshold question: Has the Joint Staff **evolved to the extent** that its capabilities overshadow **that of the OSD staff?** Our conclusion **was that we are now at a stage where we need to integrate aspects of the Joint Staff and OSD.**

It is **our view** that there **needs to be an independent Joint Staff** in key operational areas, but that others can be **integrated.** We already have an **integrated OSD-Joint Staff** in one **key area—the J2.** The J2 is the operational intelligence **arm for both you and the Chairman.** In **the other J directorates, however, there is some duplication with OSD.** We understand that some duplication is desirable **as we need divergent perspectives in key areas, but in several other areas the duplication is wasteful, counterproductive and inefficient.** We will, therefore, recommend that you **retain the J2, J3, J5, and 18.** We believe that the **J7 should be disbanded,** since most of its functions **now logically** belong to the Joint Forces Command. Our proposal for **the 36 is contained in the next section of this memo.**

When it comes to the J1 and the J4, we believe that **these staffs can be integrated** into OSD (USD, Personnel **and Readiness and IISD, Acquisition, Technology and**

Logistics respectively). in these instances, the general/flag officer would become a military assistant to the under secretary. The JA has always been a capable officer with modest duties. By contrast, it has always been hard to recruit a talented individual to head up logistics in the acquisition directorate of OSD. We feel that these are logical ways to integrate.

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Our second major recommendation concerns the need for true enterprise-wide solutions for command, control and communications. We know that 25 years of pushing interoperability has still not corrected the problem of inter-service communication on the battlefield. We argue that it will not be possible to get truly seamless communications as long as the acquisition process for C3 systems remains a service-specific authority.

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We understand that this recommendation will engender a good deal of controversy with junior officers and retired senior officers, but we believe that the senior leadership of the military departments is genuinely open to this idea.

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We believe that there are serious deficiencies in the interagency process. The non-defense departments lack the capacity to support their obligations. There are inadequate mechanisms for coordination and follow up to ensure that we have the resources and actions we need in order to follow through. I know that there are developments under way to strengthen the various department capabilities, but we need to learn more about those initiatives before we go final on our report.

#### **Second Phase of the Study**

Let me reiterate that we are prepared to meet with you at any time in order to review these ideas, as well as others that go beyond the major recommendations I have summarized above. We have also deferred some topics to the second phase of this study. In the second phase we intend to examine new missions and new organizational concepts for operations. I am aware that you have done a lot to advance new organizational concepts for operational missions. We have not yet had a chance to examine these ideas, but will do so this spring. We also intend to examine the questions regarding the role and structure of the National Guard and Reserve components, a topic that virtually everyone has argued that there is an urgent need to examine. We will accelerate our efforts in this area. I would especially welcome any perspective you have in this regard.

**END**

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22816

TAB

February 9, 2004

693

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Jointness" in the WSG

Years back Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols. It has had a favorable effect. It may be **time** to review and possibly adjust it, but it has led to jointness in a number of respects. To do **so**, each of the Services **gave up** something to achieve the greater **good** - jointness. It has been a good **thing**.

It could be that it is time to **consider** a Goldwater-Nichols type **exercise** for the USG and the **interagency** process.

It is conceivable **that** if each department and agency gave up **something** for the greater **good** of speed, unity of command on policy and execution, etc. - the effect might be to achieve greater effectiveness for **the USG**. In effect, there might be a **way** to **rearrange** authority and responsibilities to fit **the 21<sup>st</sup> century** in a way that would reduce **the time** currently needed for coordination and improve clarity for our interaction **around** the world.

Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dk  
020804-49

.....  
Please respond by

2 / 20 / 04

*J-7  
called  
J-5*

OSD 03264-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/22817



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1574-04  
2 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 3/2*

SUBJECT: "Jointness" in the USG

- **Issue.** "...It could be that it is time to consider a Goldwater-Nichols type exercise for the United States Government (USG) and the interagency process..." (TAB).
- **Discussion**
  - I concur in your assessment concerning the need for reforming the interagency process.
  - DOD has achieved favorable results by developing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the combatant command level. There is still more to gain by improving the interagency process. I look forward to further discussing possible ways to rearrange authorities and responsibilities within the interagency arena to attain greater effectiveness for the USG.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Walter L. Sharp, LTG, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22818

OSD 03264-04

**ACTION MEMO**

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 MAR 03 11:12  
I-04/002703-EP

USDP

copy [unclear]  
3/4/04

293

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Ricardel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Acting) *[Signature]* MAR 3 2004

SUBJECT: Letter of Sympathy to Estonian Minister of Defense

- Estonia suffered its first casualty in Iraq on 28 February 2004.
  - o Sergeant Andres Nuiamae, a 21-year old soldier, was on a foot patrol in Baghdad when a buried improvised explosive device (IED) exploded, killing him instantly.
  - o The Estonians have an infantry platoon deployed to the U.S. sector in Iraq.
- At the official press conference on February 29, Prime Minister Parts and Defense Minister Hanson reiterated the Estonian government's unwavering commitment to the mission in Iraq.
  - o Defense Minister Hanson stood firm that, although this incident was a painful tragedy that affects the entire nation, the mission was necessary and must continue.
  - o The Government of Estonia does not expect to change its policy on Iraq in the wake of this tragedy.
- The letter at TAB A expresses your sympathy to the Estonian Minister of Defense.

3 Mar 04

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you sign the letter at TAB A.

Attachments:

As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/16
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/5

13 Mar 04

Prepared By: COL Peter Podbielski, ISP/EUR (b)(6)

**Coordination**

Acting Director, Europe

Jim Hursch

DASD for Europe and NATO

Ian Brzezinski

*John for 2/1*  
*[Signature]*  
*3/1*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Margus Hanson  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Sakala 1  
15094 Tallinn, Estonia

3/8

Larry Di Rita

Dear Minister Hanson:

I was saddened to hear of the death of Sergeant Andres Nuiamae who was serving with the Estonian Armed Forces in Iraq. The loss of a soldier is tragic; but he fell in the name of a vital mission — the liberation of the Iraqi people.

~~caused~~ for a vital cause: freedom.

I extend my sympathies to you and to his family, colleagues and friends.

Sincerely,

The removal of a dangerous tyrant with a thirst for and destruction programs aimed at developing or obtaining weapons of mass destruction was in the interest of ~~the~~ more free nations who joined the coalition to liberate Iraq.



11-L-0559/OSD/22821 OSD 032 66-04

G: 0519282 MAR 04

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : COL PODBIELSKI ACTION OFFIC  
Office/Phone : EUR POL, (b)(6)  
Releaser's Info : DONALD RUMSFELD, SECDEF  
Action Prec : ROUTINE  
Info Prec : ROUTINE  
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//  
To: AMEMBASSY WARSAW//  
Info: USDAO AMEMBASSY WARSAW//  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON//USDP//ADMIN//EUR//ISP//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//  
USEUCOM STUGGART GE//

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO ESTONIA'S MOD HANSON

SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAS SIGNED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MOD HANSON.  
REQUEST THAT THE TEXT OF THE LETTER BE PROVIDED TO MINISTER HANSON  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL, SIGNED LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED VIA  
DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE MARGUS HANSON  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
KALA 1  
0094 TALLINN, ESTONIA

DEAR MINISTER HANSON:

PARA) I WAS SADDENED TO HEAR OF THE DEATH OF SERGEANT ANDRES NUIAMAE  
WHO WAS SERVING WITH THE ESTONIAN ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ. THE LOSS OF A  
SOLDIER IS TRAGIC; BUT HE ~~FELL IN THE NAME OF A VITAL~~ ~~OPERATION OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE.~~

PARA) I EXTEND MY SYMPATHIES TO YOU AND TO HIS FAMILY, COLLEAGUES  
AND FRIENDS.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED

*but he fell for a  
vital cause:  
Freedom. The  
removal of a dangerous  
tyrant with programs  
aimed at developing  
or obtaining weapons  
of mass destruction  
was in the interest  
of the more than thirty  
nations who joined the  
coalition to liberate  
Iraq.*

3/5  
1630  
3/8

March 1, 2004

293

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Letter to Estonian MoD

We ought to write a letter to the Minister of Defense of Estonia. I think he lost one of his soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan this week.

Please check on it for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-51

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Fit*  
3/8  
Larry Di Rita

1 Mar 04

OSD 03266-04

13 Mar 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22823



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 13 2004

293

The Honorable Margus Hanson  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Sakala 1  
15094 Tallinn, Estonia

Dear Minister Hanson:

I was saddened to hear of the death of Sergeant Andres Nuiamae who was serving with the Estonian Armed Forces in Iraq. The loss of a soldier is tragic, but he fell for a vital cause: freedom. The removal of a dangerous tyrant with programs aimed at developing or obtaining weapons of mass destruction was a worthy mission, and I am proud of Estonia's involvement in a coalition of more than thirty nations that are dedicated to helping restore sovereignty and freedom to the Iraqi people.

I extend my sympathies to you and to his family, colleagues and friends.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/22824

OSD 03266-04

13 Mar 04

RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 030304

CREATION TIME: 19270000

SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03

MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU

HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU

DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD RUMSFELD

ORG: OUSDP/EUR POL/ISP

OFFICE: OSD

PHONE: (b)(6)

TOC FILE CRC: 3359

FILENAME	MSG PREC ACTION		DATE/TIME	FILETIME		TOT/ TOR	SPECAT	
	TYPE	CLASS		GROUP	SSN		CIC	CRC
LANSON	DD173	RR UU	REDF	161813Z	MAR04		ZYUW N	27511

e

OUSDP/EUR POL/ISP  
 ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL OSD (b)(6)  
 /PHONE NUMBER



DONALD RUMSFELD

OSD 03266-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22825

Drafter's Name : COL PODBIELSKI ACTION OFFIC  
Office Phone : EUR POL, (b)(6)

Releasee's Info : DONALD RUMSFELD SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE  
Info Prec : ROUTINE  
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//  
To: AMEMBASSY TALLINN//  
Info: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON//USDP//ADMIN//EUR//ISP//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRFS  
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//  
USEUCOM STUGGART GE//  
USDAO AMEMBASSY TALLINN//

TEXT FOLLOWS  
-----

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO ESTONIA'S MOD HANSON

.. SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAS SIGNED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MOD HANSON.  
REQUEST THAT THE TEXT OF THE LETTER BE PROVIDED TO MINISTER HANSON  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED VIA  
DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

1. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE MARGUS HANSON  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
SAKALA 1  
.5094 TALLINN, ESTONIA

DEAR MINISTER HANSON:

(PARA) I WAS SADDENED TO HEAR OF THE DEATH OF SERGEANT ANDRES NUIAMAE  
WHO WAS SERVING WITH THE ESTONIAN ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ. THE LOSS OF A  
SOLDIER IS TRAGIC, BUT HE FELL FOR A VITAL CAUSE: FREEDOM.  
THE REMOVAL OF A DANGEROUS TYRANT WITH PROGRAMS AIMED AT  
DEVELOPING OR OBTAINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WAS A  
WORTHY MISSION, AND I AM PROUD OF ESTONIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN A  
COALITION OF MORE THAN THIRTY NATIONS THAT ARE DEDICATED TO HELPING  
RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

(PARA) I EXTEND MY SYMPATHIES TO YOU AND TO HIS FAMILY, COLLEAGUES  
AND FRIENDS.

SINCERELY,

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 03266-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22826

IG: 161813Z MAR 04

PAGE 02 of 02

SIGNED) DONALD H. RUMSFELD

. END OF TEXT

. POC FOR THIS CABLE IS COLONEL PODBIELSKI, EUR POLICY/ISP.

COMMERCIAL:

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/22827

RAAUZYUW RUEWMFU3310 0762204-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS3310 0762204  
R 162203Z MAR 04  
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHTL/USDAO TALLINN EN  
RUFQNOA/EUCOM FWD  
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP ISP//

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO ESTONIA'S MOD HANSON

1. SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAS SIGNED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MOD HANSON.  
REQUEST THAT THE TEXT OF THE LETTER BE PROVIDED TO MINISTER HANSON  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED VIA  
DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:  
THE HONORABLE MARGUS HANSON  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
SAKALA 1  
15094 TALLINN, ESTONIA

DEAR MINISTER HANSON:

(PARA) I WAS SADDENED TO HEAR OF THE DEATH OF SERGEANT ANDRES NUIAMAE  
WHO WAS SERVING WITH THE ESTONIAN ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ. THE LOSS OF A  
SOLDIER IS TRAGIC, BUT HE FELL FOR A VITAL CAUSE: FREEDOM.  
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DEVELOPING OR OBTAINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WAS A  
WORTHY MISSION, AND I AM PROUD OF ESTONIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN A  
COALITION OF MORE THAN THIRTY NATIONS THAT ARE DEDICATED TO HELPING  
RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

(PARA) I EXTEND MY SYMPATHIES TO YOU AND TO HIS FAMILY, COLLEAGUES  
AND FRIENDS.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) DONALD H. RUMSFELD

3. END OF TEXT

4. POC FOR THIS CABLE IS COLONEL PODBIELSKI, EUR POLICY/ISP.

COMMERICAL: (b)(6)

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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11-L-0559/OSD/22828

JOINT STAFF V1 1  
ACTION (U,8)  
INFO NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) JSAMS(\*)  
JCSOINNIPRDA(\*) JCSONSIPRDA(\*)

SECDEF V2 1  
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(\*) (U,6,8,F)  
INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*)  
USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*)  
USDCOMP(\*) OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

#3310

NNNN

TAB A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Lithuania

*Lithuania*

Here is a cable from Lithuania. We certainly want to get the early deployment of their SOF group I would think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 AMEMBASSY VILNIUS Cable P 3014372Z JAN 04

DHR:dk  
020704-3

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*2 Feb 04*

OSD 03309-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/22830

Tab A

220

**TAB A**

20040208-5 PM 4:24

February 8, 2004

697

**TO:** Mike **Wynne**  
 Gen. **Dick** Myers  
 Gen. John **Handy**

**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
 Jaymie Durnan  
*Kew Kries*

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** ~~XEM~~ Type Approach

1/10.01

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich and an article.

Please take a look at it and tell me what you think we ought to **do**. Come **back** with a single paper with some recommendations through Jaymie Durnan.

**Thanks.**

**Attach.**  
1/7/04 Gingrich ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
020804-81

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

8 Feb 04

OSD 03315-04

Tab A



## NEWT GINGRICH

January 7, 2004

For Secdef, ~~depsecdef~~

Saving **\$15 billion** a year in waste and **lost value**

The attached article from Forbes "Back on the Chain **Gang**" outlines **how IBM cut \$3 billion a year** in year from its \$80 billion budget. With declining component prices the savings hit **\$5.6 billion**

There has been a lot of reshuffling and talking inside the **system** about acquisition, logistics and maintenance **but I think there is still \$15 billion a year** that could be recovered **with an IBM like** approach.

This can only occur if Winn or someone **has direct access to you and a direct mandate** to make decisions and enforce them.

Policy discussions and general policy patterns will never break the **logjam** of the traditional systems.

I urge you to read the article and **think** about a much more aggressive overhaul of the acquisition-maintenance-logisticssystem

*PS Newt  
You might invite Palmisano  
and Moffat to brief your  
Senior TEAM-*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22832

# Back on the Chain Gang

These guys slashed \$3 billion  
in costs by overhauling the  
massive supply chains of IBM.  
Can they do it for you?

ROBERT W. MOFFAT JR. IS IBM'S CLARK Kent. A lumbering guy who still revels in his past as a college track star, he has worked there since 1978, toiling in backwaters like manufacturing and operations. Last year Moffat won another unsung role, overhauling IBM's massive supply chains. Suddenly he was Superman, whacking an astounding \$5.6 billion in annual cost—or so IBM claims. More amazing, Moffat did it in his spare time, while running IBM's Personal Systems business.

That \$5.6 billion includes a couple billion in savings from falling component

prices unrelated to any makeover. A better figure: \$3 billion or so, still remarkable in a company with just over \$80 billion in revenue. Moffat did it by selling off three factories, shifting manufacturing to cheaper locations such as China and Ireland and simplifying product designs.

In the process IBM has reduced inventories by a third, slashed its suppliers by half to 33,000 and pinched pennies at every turn; it now packages PCs in cheaper cardboard boxes and recycles components from old mainframes. Now IBM's chief executive, Samuel J. Palmisano, wants to do more. "The big prize now—and the really

hard work—comes from transforming the entire end-to-end operation," Palmisano says in an e-mail exchange. "You cannot hope to thrive in the IT industry if you are a high-cost, slow-moving company. Supply chain is one of the new competitive battlegrounds. We are committed to being the most efficient and productive player in our industry."

Palmisano has made Moffat the supply-chain czar, ruling Integrated Supply Chain (ISC), IBM's fourth-largest division, with 19,000 employees and a \$40 billion purchasing budget. Oh, and one more thing: This year Palmisano wants Moffat to cut

# IBM

costs by \$400 million more than last year.

No problem, Moffat avers. Harnessing the brainpower of IBM Research and what used to be PricewaterhouseCoopers Consulting, which IBM acquired last year for \$3.5 billion, Moffat is aiming at loftier goals. Like revolutionizing the very concept of a supply chain and infusing it into every part of IBM's business. The future, as Moffat sees it, won't be so much a battle among companies as one among supply chains.

If you are not part of this world, you need to know something about the hgo. The "chain" in question stretches all the way from the raw materials at one end of a manufacturing operation to the customer's inventory at the other. In its broadest sense, it includes distribution and logistics; in its grandest aspirations, it contemplates having a customer's order trigger an instantaneous response in every ingredient.

Moffat's job isn't just to trim expenses at his employer. He's also trying to help IBM's consulting arm win some of the \$35 billion that Forrester Research expects U.S. firms to spend on supply-chain projects in the next five years. "Bob spends as much time calling on customers as he does working on IBM's supply chain," says Murray Mitchell, the vice president who runs the supply-chain practice in IBM Business Consulting Services, part of IBM's \$36.3 billion Global Services unit.

This "end-to-end" approach to the chain is now seen as a competitive edge, a

feature so sexy it inspires extra ogling on Wall Street. Dell Computer and Nokia already get higher stock valuations because of their superior operations, says Lehman Brothers Managing Director J. Stuart Francis. "In a market where prices are declining, supply chain is vital to remaining competitive," he says.

"What makes Dell and Wal-Mart successful? It's the business model, and supply chain is an enabler. That's why you're seeing this growing importance of supply chains. People realize this is the weapon of the future," Moffat says.

"Let's face it: All tires are round and black," says George McAfee, supply-chain manager for \$3.3 billion (2002 sales) Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. The way we differentiate ourselves is through execution and fill rate." IBMers are waging a four-year global makeover of Cooper's supply and distribution network.

Like IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Lucent Technologies have named their own supply-chain czars. Lucent claims it now delivers more products on time, after reducing warehouses from 540 to 50 and cutting suppliers from 1,500 to 300. HP says it saved \$1.5 billion through supply-chain projects over the past year. "We can get to market faster. We can deliver better products at a better price. We've gained a significant competitive advantage," says Jeffrey Clarke, executive vice president at HP.

Hewlett execs are quick to criticize the \$5.6 billion savings figure that IBM uses. But even if you strip out the effect of component prices over which IBM does not have control, you find impressive gains. Last year, in Moffat's rookie season, IBM's inventories plunged 30% to \$3.1 billion, a 20-year low. The PC division turned a full-year profit for the first time in its history and managed to achieve a "negative cash conversion cycle," collecting money from customers 28 days before paying suppliers—one of the tricks upon which Michael Dell built his fortune. In storage devices and Unix servers, IBM's leaner cost structure let it cut prices without hurting margins. This enabled IBM to steal business from Sun Microsystems and EMC and drive them into the red.

Palmisano's boast We are not winning business by slashing prices and sacrificing margins, as many of our competitors have been forced to do. We have been taking down the actual cost of doing business. Our gross margins are up. The fundamentals of our business operations are stronger than they've ever been."

Those market share gains soften some awfully hard times. On its top line, IBM is simply not the growth company it once was. The price of anything silicon is collapsing inexorably. That means that a computer company has to enjoy an explosive increase in unit volume to see its revenue line go up at all. There is only so much unit growth

## Pennies Saved

A million here, a million there starts to add up. IBM's cost-cutters are slashing freebies, reusing parts, redesigning products to save on shipping costs. Next: Sloppy

Jobs in the cafeteria at Armonk H.Q. (Er ... maybe not.)

### Series (mainframe) servers.

CHANGE: Toolbox eliminated. Processors recycled. SAVING: \$2,000 per toolbox.

### LCD monitors.

CHANGE: Redesigned to fit in slim, cheaper-to-ship "pizza" box. SAVING: \$3.50 per unit, or \$1.6 million a year.

### Personal computers.

CHANGE: Replaced four-color packing box with two-color. SAVING: 5 cents per box, \$350,000 a year.

### Model x335 Intel-based server.

CHANGE: Redesigned to use same backplane as PC. SAVING: \$60 per server, or \$1.1 million a year.

that a giant like IBM is going to see. How many servers do you need?

This year Palmisano told Wall Street analysts to forget about IBM's earlier vow to deliver double-digit revenue growth—yet he reiterated the target of double-digit growth in earnings. The way to do that is to cut costs, such as with a sleeker supply web.

"We took ourselves to the gym. Now we are a much more formidable player," says Moffat.

IBM's overhaul was conceived in December 2001 at a meeting of senior executives. The mood was grim. Revenues in 2001 declined 3% to \$83 billion—IBM's fiscal sales drop in nearly a decade. Worse, the painful slowdown in tech spending showed no sign of abating. "It was clear that the environment would continue to be difficult. Our strategy was to use that environment to gain share," says William Zeitler, senior vice president of IBM's Systems Group, which makes servers and storage devices. "But to do that, we knew we would have to take cost and expense activity to a new level."

The computer maker needed to rebuild its back office on an epic scale. IBM is laden with mind-boggling complexity. It runs 16 manufacturing plants in 10 countries, buys 2 billion parts a year from 33,000 suppliers and offers 78,000 products available in 3 million possible variations. IBM's factories crank out a new Intel-based product—laptop, desktop, server or peripheral—every 1.5 seconds. In North America the company processes 1.7 million customer orders a year and keeps 6.5 million records, updating 350,000 every day.

Bob Moffat was the ideal choice to lead the effort. He had run the Personal Systems Group, where narrow margins and ruthless competition have been the order of the day, from 2000 to 2002. (That is the period now under scrutiny in a Securities & Exchange Commission investigation of revenue-recognition practices at the division. IBM won't comment further.) Sales sagged during Moffat's tenure, but he earned a reputation as a cost-cutter.

IBM had endured tumultuous restructuring since its near-death experience in

the early 1990s. Its rescuer, chief executive Louis V. Gersmer Jr., transformed the place from a stodgy maker of bulky computers into a sleek seller of consulting services. But remnants of the old IBM still slowed things down. Not long after Gersmer retired in March 2002, his successor, Palmisano, imposed a new round of reshaping, selling off IBM's disk-drive business, shuttering parts of its semiconductor operation and hiring off 15,000 workers. For this IBM took a \$2.1 billion writedown.

"People realize this is the weapon of the future. This isn't just about cutting costs."

This time around IBM wanted Moffat to go beyond squeezing a few pennies out of various product lines. In the past each IBM division—PCs, servers, storage devices and still others—operated its own supply chain, running distinct manufacturing lines, negotiating its own deals with component suppliers and using its own billing systems and ways of naming parts and products. Moffat's mission was to smash those "silos" and build a single integrated chain that would handle procurement, manufacturing, logistics and customer fulfillment across all of IBM.

That required division leaders to give up control of sourcing, manufacturing and even design of some products. "It may not sound radical," says Zeidler, the server chief, "but the notion of putting in this new group and having decisions made on your behalf by someone else was a bit of a leap, organizationally."

This has forced some divisions to take a hit for the team, as happened to the PC division after Moffat's group struck a cozy component deal with the Korean firm LG Electronics last year. The pact gives IBM better prices on liquid crystal diode monitors and optical drives in return for shifting more volume to LG. IBM has made similar deals with a handful of component makers and now concentrates 80% of its spending on just 2% of its suppliers.

The LG deal in effect raised compo-

nent prices for the PC unit, which otherwise could have bought LCD monitors and optical drives from a different supplier at lower prices. "Before this the PC guy would optimize his own business; the server guy would optimize his. Now we're trying to save money for the overall organization," Moffat says. "Some tradeoffs that are for the better good of IBM might not optimize people personally."

Another way Moffat has smashed silos has been by moving people around, forcing some to work in new areas. Martha Morris, a vice president who had run server manufacturing, now has a top job in procurement. Stuart Reed, a vice president who previously worked on supply-chain strategy, now has Morris' old job in servers.

Overall, the \$3 billion in real cost cuts (unrelated to declining prices) were made in three big areas. Eliminating unnecessary expenses and improving processes saved an estimated \$900 million; changing product designs to use more common parts and shifting manufacturing to cheaper locations saved \$1 billion; and \$1 billion came from striking better deals with component suppliers. IBM used to run 300 procurement centers now it has 9.

A "product-simplification" task force pushes divisions to use standardized parts, even if that means a redesign. A new low-end, Intel-based server, the x335, was redesigned to accommodate the same "backplane" (the rear panel where cords connect) used in IBM's PCs instead of the specialized backplane used in its predecessor. Eliminating the customized part saves \$50 per unit on these servers, which cost from \$2,100 to \$2,300; IBM sells 22,500 of these machines in a year. IBM made a hundred such moves across the company.

IBM used to give away a \$2,000 toolbox with low-end mainframes (now part of the zSeries server line) and included such luxuries as a silver-plated hammer and a Bausch & Lomb magnifying glass. One customer had eight of these freebies stacked up, unopened. IBM put an end to that. Saving two grand on a machine that can cost several million dollars doesn't sound like much, but Moffat insists it's important "It's not the money; it's the mind-set," he says.

And it happens dozens of times throughout the empire. IBM saved \$5 mil-

# IBM

lion by replacing a specialized user console for the Series mainframe with a regular ThinkPad laptop. Another skinflint move: Today, when a Series machine comes off lease, some of its parts (including the central processor) get ripped out and recycled into new machines.

ally lived the experience," says Daniel Garst, a Philips vice president.

IBM is trying to get more creative in refashioning its "front end," that is, its interaction with customers. And for good reason. For years IBM has lagged behind Cisco Systems and Dell in customer satis-

electronic form when dealing with the server group, another when talking to the PC group. Worse yet, folks in one IBM division sometimes didn't know what was going on inside the others.

Building a unified system for the front and back ends will be a first step toward

## "We took ourselves to the gym. Now we are a much more formidable player."

In PCs, IBM replaced its four-color packaging box with a two-color blue-and-black box that costs a nickel less, saving \$350,000 a year. Engineers redesigned LCD monitors so they could fit into smaller boxes, reducing shipping costs. That saved \$3.50 apiece on 450,000 units, or \$1.6 million. In Global Services, instead of discarding (and writing off) non-IBM gear that gets swapped out of a customer site when Global Services installs IBM gear, IBM now saves the rejected equipment and offers it as an alternative to customers who want another brand.

IBM has outsourced the manufacturing of PCs and low-end servers to Sanmina-SCI Corp., which bought IBM factories in North Carolina and Mexico, where that work is done. Today IBM owns 16 factories, down from 34 a decade ago. IBM shifted ThinkPads from plants in Scotland and Mexico to a lower-cost plant in Shenzhen, China operated by a joint venture between IBM and Great Wall Computer Group, a state-owned firm.

The company's iSeries (formerly the AS/400) and pSeries (formerly the RS/6000) midrange servers for the Asia-Pacific market used to be made in Rochester, Minn. but now are made in IBM's plant in Dublin, Ireland to save on labor and shipping. Further savings on shipping came from a deal letting IBM buy dedicated space on UPS flights from Asia and pay a lower rate in exchange for a bigger commitment.

Moffat has hit the road to sell the story. Last year he spent 80% of his time traveling to spread the faith among IBMers, suppliers and customers. At Philips Consumer Electronics, IBM consultants use techniques developed on IBM's own product lines to analyze and streamline Philips' operations. IBM even sent its own internal supply-chain experts to work alongside its consultants at Philips. "IBM brought in a lot of real-world, nonconsulting types, people who had actu-

ally lived the experience," says Daniel Garst, a Philips vice president. IBM is trying to get more creative in refashioning its "front end," that is, its interaction with customers. And for good reason. For years IBM has lagged behind Cisco Systems and Dell in customer satisfaction ratings. "It's a frustration for us," Moffat admits. He believes his team can help. IBM's biggest problems involve fulfillment. Orders fall through the cracks, some parts of an order get lost or customers get billed for things they didn't order. Sales reps take the heat. "I make the sale, and then my nightmare begins," is what Moffat's team heard over and over from them.

A lot of IBM orders involve a combination of products—servers, desktops, laptops, data storage devices, software—and each of those divisions has its own system for tracking orders. So the poor sales rep has to know one dialect of computerese to track servers, another to track PCs, and soon. "Our salespeople end up spending almost as much time on fulfillment-related issues as they do selling to customers," Moffat says. "Just think what would happen if you could take that time and give it back to that salesperson to be in front of customers." Gaining even a single point in customer-satisfaction ratings versus its rivals, says Moffat, would be worth billions of dollars in revenue.

Moffat's long-term aim is to create a single system that all divisions will use for tracking customer orders. He already has started doing the same on the back end, where IBM buys components. In the past each division has had its own system for ordering parts. So a supplier who sold hard drives to IBM used one

Moffat's larger goal of creating a system in which 90% of orders can be processed, built, shipped and billed without

### Practical Genius

WHEN IBM WANTS TO BUILD 100 COMPUTERS, IT KNOWS IT will need 100 microprocessors, 100 hard drives and so on—it's simple to "explode" out the litany of needed parts. But sometimes IBM works backward, asking: With the parts we have in stock, which products should we build for the best profit? IBM calls this "implosion," and though it sounds simple, in fact it is a complex linear programming problem with tens of thousands of variables. IBM makes 78,000 different products in 3 million possible versions. "Mathematically, it's interesting. You have a very large number of variables, and you have to think of them all simultaneously," says Brenda Dietrich, director of mathematical sciences at IBM Research.

And so Dietrich and other IBM-ers created—and patented—Watson Implosion Technology (WIT), named for IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, N.Y. WIT starts by considering what parts IBM has in stock or is about to buy. Then it charts which products those parts could make. For each possibility WIT figures out which other parts IBM would need to buy. If most are in stock, great. If not, that combination becomes less attractive. It also factors in demand, parts availability and the effect of holding inventory.

IBM first tried this in 1989 to help decide which circuit cards it should build. Late last year IBM started using WIT to tell sales reps which high-end servers they should push. Dietrich says WIT helped IBM's server group reap \$64 million in extra sales in the fourth quarter of 2002. She hopes IBM will start using it in other areas.

—D.L.

COURTESY OF IBM

labA

**“It doesn’t sound sexy, but there are some really challenging math problems.”**

human intervention. Every order will ripple back to suppliers, who will automatically replenish the relevant parts. That new system will involve not only manufacturing but other parts of IBM, such as service, accounting and billing, sales and shipping, even design. “This is not just putting tops and bottoms on things, it’s this whole end-to-end system,” he says.

In Moffat’s dream system, when a customer orders 100 ThinkPads, the order would flow automatically to IBM’s plant in Shenzhen, where the laptops would be built overnight and shipped the next day, while 60 suppliers would already be shipping parts to replace the depleted inventory. That is tricky enough with laptops. It


will be even harder to pull off with orders that involve multiple products being made at different plants in different countries.

IBM has mathematicians working on this tricky matter (see box, ‘Practical Genius’). “It doesn’t sound sexy, but there are some really challenging math problems,” says Brenda Dietrich, director of mathematical sciences at IBM Research.

The researchers’ solutions are being applied outside the walls of IBM, too. Grace Lin, a Ph.D. scientist at IBM Research, developed a “sense and respond” system that uses intelligent software agents and complex algorithms to help manage production at IBM’s new cutting-edge chip factory in Fishkill, N.Y. Earlier this year Lin left the labs in Yorktown Heights, N.Y. and joined IBM’s Business Consulting Services, where she spends most of her time on the road, helping customers use her stuff in their own chains. It

## Doing More With Less

IBM inventories reached a 20-year low in 2002.



is all part of a ramping up at IBM’s Business Consulting Services group to go after supply-chain engagements. Since 1999 the group has grown from a few hundred consultants who specialized in supply chain to several thousand.

A decade ago IBM looked like a dinosaur doomed to extinction. Now the company has not only recovered but is finding ways to package and sell its own miracle cure. Pretty clever, those dinosaurs. **F**

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/22837



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1582-04 031205 04 07  
5 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/3/5*

SUBJECT: IBM Type Approach

- **Issue.** "Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich and an article. Please take a look at it and tell me what you think we ought to do. Come back with a single paper with some recommendations through Jaymie Durnan." (TAB A)
- **Discussion.** As requested, OSD(I&MR), Joint Staff/ J-4, and USTRANSCOM have prepared a consolidated response for you. Mr. Wynne will submit it to you in a memorandum through Jaymie Durnan. A coordinated draft of the memo is attached (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

0 SD 03315 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22838

**TAB A**

February 8, 2004

697

TO: Mike Wynne  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. John Handy

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jaymie Duman  
Ken Kries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** IBM Type Approach

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich and an article.

Please take a look at it and tell me what you think we ought to **do**. Come back with a single paper with some recommendations through **Jaymie Duman**.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
1/7/04Gingrich ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
020804-81

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

OSD 03315-04  
Tab A



NEWT GINGRICH

January 7, 2004

For Secdef, ~~depsecdef~~

Saving \$15 billion a year in waste and lost value

The attached article from Forbes "Back on the Chain Gang" outlines how IBM cut \$3 billion a year in year from its \$80 billion budget. With declining component prices the savings hit \$5.6 billion

There **has** been a lot of reshuffling **and talking** inside **the** system about acquisition, logistics **and** maintenance **but I** think there is still \$15 billion a year that could be recovered with **an IBM like** approach.

This can only occur if Winn or someone **has** direct access to you **and a** direct mandate to **make** decisions and enforce them.

Policy discussions and general policy patterns will never break the logjam of the traditional systems.

I urge you to read the article and **think** about a much more aggressive overhaul of the acquisition-maintenance-logisticssystem

*PS Newt  
You might invite Palmisano  
and Moffat to BRIEF your  
Senior TEAM.*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22840

DA 513



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010**

FEB 27 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**THROUGH: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
(Mr. Jaymie Durnan)**

**SUBJECT: IBM Type Approach**



The FORBES' article "Back on the Chain Gang" states that IBM designated a single individual as a "supply chain czar," overhauling its supply chain, and thereby saving \$3 billion. Your designation of me as the Defense Logistics Executive is a similar act. Moving out on this new focus, I established a Defense Logistics Board (DLB) to help me overhaul the DoD Global Supply Chain. Gen Handy, as the Distribution Process Owner, is a member as well as General Pace.

NO. 01

There are a number of good ideas in the article that the Department is already pursuing and will reduce overall costs. The initiatives below are already underway, with the Services and DLA projecting savings/cost avoidances of \$18.9 billion from FY01 through FY05 and an additional \$31 billion through FY09.

- Outsourced supply management of commercial items (fuel, food, pharmaceutical) to commercial supply chains, thus reducing the number of suppliers and streamlining our delivery process.
- Reduced the number of suppliers for common parts within our competition and small business constraints through strategic contracting and prime vendor contracts.
- Integrated supply chains for selected weapon systems, increasing performance contracting, thus reducing our internal infrastructure and drawing upon industrial supply chains.
- Adopted commercial business systems consistent with our financial management modernization effort that embed best business practices.

27 Feb 04

We are also aggressively tackling a series of initiatives that support the IBM model.

- Structuring the USCENCOM Deployment/Distribution Operations Center to streamline theater logistics.
- Assessing long-term partnering with world-class commercial providers of transportation services to synchronize material movement.
- Executing universal identification and radio frequency identification; providing visibility and management of the entire logistics pipeline.

8 Feb 04

OSD 03315-0401



11-L-0559/OSD/22841


- Implementing regional material handling processes further streamlining material handling and reducing the number of "touches."
- Increasing integrated supply chains for weapon system support for all appropriate Category I and II weapon systems by FY06.
- Infusing lean-manufacturing principles into all our organic industrial facilities through a coordinated program.
- Expanding and implementing commercial business solutions to improve forecasting and reduce inventory.
- Incorporating Sense and Respond Logistics principles (similar to IBM) via an integrated logistics transformation roadmap. Ongoing efforts will be fused with the future vision of Force Transformation.

My focus will be on driving the Services and DLA to realize their savings/cost avoidance projections as well as pursuing, with your concurrence, two recommendations contained in the IBM approach.

First, IBM smashed "those 'silos' (of supply) and built a single, integrated chain that would handle procurement, manufacturing, logistics and customer fulfillment across all of IBM." The DLB should evaluate consolidating the four Service supply chains into a single or even federated DoD supply chain and recognize the subsequent cost savings associated with eliminating excess redundancy and duplication.

Second, follow IBM's efforts integrating procurement and logistics through strategic supplier management. We could gain greater leverage in these areas by solidifying our purchasing through commodity councils across our acquisition and logistics processes.

I will ask the DLB to review these two initiatives for application across the Department. Additionally, we will benchmark with IBM on these efforts. This is a coordinated paper with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander USTRANSCOM. In summary, I expect an article next year acclaiming DoD's supply chain successes.

  
 Michael W. Wynns  
 Acting

cc:  
 DEPSECDEF  
 D, PA&E  
 CJCS  
 CC USTRANSCOM

11-L-0559/OSD/22842

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Andy Hoehn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Innovative Approaches

*Evcom*

As a follow-up to the briefing you gave me yesterday, I wonder if there are innovative approaches that might be combined with the options you presented.

For example, have you given thought to putting major Army and Air Force elements on the same installation? Are there opportunities for such an approach that may not get considered due to long-held Service preferences?

For example, I wonder if it makes sense to move 2 F-16 squadrons from Spangdahlem and leave only an A-10 squadron. Is there a possibility to co-locate it with the Army element it may support. Does that make more sense? It seems to me such an approach might generate savings in force protection resources as a minimum.

Please look into this, and make sure what others might consider "out of the box" approaches are considered in a fair manner.

Thanks

*8 Mar 04*

DHR:dh  
030304-20

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

OSD 03334-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22843

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Troop Rotation

Iraq

In the future, I don't think we should move 115,000 in and 115,000 out at roughly the same time.

We have to put some daylight in between. I don't think it is a good way to do business.

If there is a good reason for it, let me know. Otherwise, I will expect a proposal sometime in the next month explaining how we are going to do it next time.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-6

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

8 Mar 04

OSD 03335-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22844

TAB A

February 8, 2004

690

DSS

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Budget for Guard and Reserve Equipment

Is Guard and Reserve equipment on a separate line item? Is that one of the reasons there are differences?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-32 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

'04 FEB 9 PM 4:55

11-L-0559/OSD/22845

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-1583-04  
8 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 3/7*

SUBJECT: Budget for Guard and Reserve Equipment

- **Question.** Is Guard and Reserve equipment on a separate line item? Is that one of the reasons there are differences? (TAB A)
- **Answer.** No, National Guard and Reserve equipment is procured within the Service line item. However, each year Congress adds a line to the appropriation that allocates money specifically for Guard and Reserve equipment.
- **Analysis**
  - Services procure all equipment for the forces without regard to Active duty, Guard or Reserve status.
  - National Guard and Reserve component commands submit equipment requirements through their respective Service for resourcing. The Service consolidates these requirements into a single procurement request.
  - Congress adds funding yearly to the Services' procurement accounts on behalf of the Guard and Reserves to spend on priority issues.
    - A separate procurement appropriation titled "National Guard and Reserve Equipment" is a congressional "add" that is independent of Service budget requests. For reference, the FY 2004 "add" was \$400 million (TAB B).
    - The procurement line also provides a list of items that the Guard and Reserve should give "priority consideration" for procurement.
  - Equipment procured from the congressional "add" is specifically earmarked for Guard and Reserve forces and may not be used by Active duty components.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen J. E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22846

OSD 03361-04

TAB A

February 8, 2004

690

DJS

**TO:** Gen. Pete Pace  
**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Budget for Guard and Reserve Equipment

Is Guard and Reserve equipment on a separate line item? Is that one of the reasons there are differences?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-32 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

04 FEB 9 PM 4:55

11-L-0559/OSD/22847

Tab A

# TAB B

227

## NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT

The conference agreement on items addressed by either the House or the Senate is as follows:

	Budget	([In thousands of dollars])		
		House	Senate	Conference
<b>NATIONAL GUARD &amp; RESERVE EQUIPMENT</b>				
<b>RESERVE EQUIPMENT</b>				
ARMY RESERVE MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	15,000	80,000	45,000
NAVY RESERVE MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	15,000	50,000	45,000
MARINE CORPS RESERVE MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	15,000	50,000	45,000
AIR FORCE RESERVE MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	15,000	50,000	45,000
<b>TOTAL, RESERVE EQUIPMENT .....</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>60,000</b>	<b>200,000</b>	<b>180,000</b>
<b>NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT</b>				
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	20,000	240,000	100,000
AIR NATIONAL GUARD MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT .....	---	20,000	260,000	120,000
<b>TOTAL, NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT .....</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>40,000</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>220,000</b>
<b>TOTAL, NATIONAL GUARD &amp; RESERVE EQUIPMENT .....</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>700,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>

Tab B

## AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The Senate recommended a specific increase of \$20,000,000 for F-15 Engine Kits within the amounts provided to the Air National Guard. The House concurs and the conferees agree to provide \$20,000,000 for F-15 Engine Kits.

## ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

The conferees agree that the National Guard and Reserve equipment program shall be executed by the heads of the Guard and Reserve components with priority consideration for miscellaneous equipment appropriations given to the following items: Air National Guard Threat Emitter, Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System, Lightweight Maintenance Enclosure, Intelligence Infrastructure, Improved Target Acquisition System, F-16 Block 42 Re-engining Program, RAID Helicopter Electro-Optical Sensor Upgrade, Common Bridge Transporter, Extended Cold Weather Clothing System, F-16 and A-10 LITENING AT Targeting Pod, M-COFT XXI, Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System, Expandable Light Air Mobility Shelters, Movement Tracking System, Laser Marksmanship Training System, Bladefold Kits for Apache Helicopters, Engineer Mission Modules for PLS, Tactical Firefighting Equipment, HMMWV, Up-Armored HMMWV, Construction Equipment SLEP, AN/PVS-7, AN/PVS-14, LITENING II, A-FIST XXI Simulation Trainers, A-FIST, AB/FIST Simulation Trainers, F-16 TARS/SAR, DFIRST, Abrams Sidecar, Sidecar Embedded Diagnostic Systems for M1A1 tanks, Combined Support Function Module Replacement Test Equipment for DSESTS (CSFM), Self-Loading Trailer, M-109A6 Paladin Rebuild, EST 2000, AF Reserve Command and Control Communications Systems Upgrade, JSTARs NRE for procurement of Re-engining, and FMTV.

Tab B

7:35 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **JIATF South**

Let's sort out the **JIATF** South and whether we want to combine it with El Paso and create a hemispheric JIATF. I think we've got too **many** seams.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.01



*322*

*18 Feb 04*

Tab A

03362-04

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Name	Agency	Date
Mr. Wetzel	USSOUTHCOM	23 Feb 04
Col Mingo	USNORTHCOM	25 Feb 04
CAPT Welch	USPACOM	24 Feb 04
Col Ball	USAF	25 Feb 04
Col Hooker	USA	25 Feb 04
Col VanDyke	USMC	24 Feb 04
CAPT Dossel	USN	24 Feb 04
Mr. Kravinsky	USDP	23 Feb 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-1584-04  
8 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/7*

SUBJECT: Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South

- **Issue:** "Let's sort out the JIATF South and whether we want to combine it with El Paso and create a hemispheric JIATF. I think we've got too many seams." (TAB A)
- **Discussion**
  - Both USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM agree in principle that a hemispheric JIATF-Western Hemisphere (WHEM) is the right approach to eliminating seams. A phased approach and **further** study will likely lead to establishment of JIATF-WHEM.
  - USNORTHCOM has been pursuing a related concept for several months and intends to brief the Joint Chiefs in the Tank in the near future.
  - USNORTHCOM intends to stand-up a JIATF-South type organization using existing organizations located in El Paso, Texas (possibly to be called JIATF-North). USNORTHCOM believes that establishing JIATF-North prior to JIATF-WHEM allows the Department of Defense to build on existing law enforcement and DOD relationships in El Paso, Texas, and will facilitate implementation of JIATF-WHEM.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Vice Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22852

OSD 03362-04

TAB A

7:35 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **JIATF South**

Let's sort out the **JIATF South** and whether we want to **combine it** with **El Paso** and create a hemispheric JIATF. I think we've got too **many** seams.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *2/27* \_\_\_\_\_

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22853

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Name	Agency	Date
Mr. Wetzel	USSOUTHCOM	23 Feb 04
Col Mingo	USNORTHCOM	25 Feb 04
CAPT Welch	USPACOM	24 Feb 04
Col Ball	USAF	25 Feb 04
Col Hooker	USA	25 Feb 04
Col VanDyke	USMC	24 Feb 04
CAPT Dossel	USN	24 Feb 04
Mr. Kravinsky	USDP	23 Feb 04

March 8, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UCP Change

I do hope you can break loose the Unified Command Plan change to put Syria and Lebanon in CENTCOM instead of EUCOM.

Soon

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-67

322

8 Mar 04

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. John Abizaid

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan Prisons

383.6

Let's get a timeline where we can get Afghanistan to provide the prisons necessary to house the GTMO detainees who are Afghans. One would think we ought to be able to get the right kind of an arrangement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-17

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

8mar 04

OSD 03387-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22856



March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Location of South Korean Troops

Do you think the location of the Koreans in Kirkuk is a good place for them, or is it a bit too much of a flashpoint?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-9

.....

Please respond by 3/19/04

*Korea*

*8 Mar 04*

OSD 03388-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22857

March 8, 2004

TO: ~~John~~ John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PRTs

We need to get a glide path on these PRTs, so we know where they are going to end up.

For example, are they going to be:

- Ended at some point.
- Migrated into something else.
- Transferred to the Afghan government.
- Moved from military to civilian NGO/State Department/AID-type staffing.
- Other.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-14

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 03389-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22858

Afghanistan  
8 Mar 04

March 2, 2004

C 3/4

TO: **LTG** John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

**Thanks.**

**Attach.**

2/12/04 J-3 response to SecDef snowflake

1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica(012704-17)

DHR:dh  
030204-14

.....  
Please respond by

3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22859

OSD 03398-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

207 APR -5 10:42:00  
CH-1668-04  
5 April 2004

INFO MEMO

353

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 4/3*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like Operation Deep Freeze. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Staff, combatant command and Service staffs have examined all standing execution orders (EXORDs). Operation DEEP FREEZE (ODF) is the only EXORD that had not been cancelled, reviewed or modified since 11 September 2001. I anticipate that a further evaluation of outstanding memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and understanding with other agencies may highlight areas that do not have a direct bearing on the War on Terrorism. A review of these memorandums will be forwarded by 30 April.
- **Discussion.** EXORDs dating back to 1992 were analyzed to determine if they had undergone periodic review and approval since 11 September.
  - Before July 2001, ODF was executed under an MOA with the National Science Foundation. USTRANSCOM supports several such MOAs pre-dating September 2001 that are now under evaluation.
  - Combatant commander and Service staffs were encouraged to continue their review of all EXORDs that require use of DOD assets in light of their applicability to current operations.

5 APR 04

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

2 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22860

OSD 03398-04

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	COL Hooker	17 March 2004
USN	CAPT Thompson	18 March 2004
USAF	Col Murphy	17 March 2004
USMC	Col Van Dyke	17 March 2004
USCENTCOM	Col Hiebert	16 March 2004
USEUCOM	COL Rogers	17 March 2004
USJFCOM	CAPT Smith	17 March 2004
USNORTHCOM	CAPT Jacobs	15 March 2004
USPACOM	Col Murphy	17 March 2004
USSOCOM	Mr. Eichenberger	16 March 2004
USSOUTHCOM	Col Gurney	15 March 2004
USSTRATCOM	CAPT Oliver	17 March 2004
USTRANSCOM	Col Pedersen	17 March 2004



March 1, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: **KIA** Statistics

I do want to get the "killed in action" figures for Afghanistan and Iraq by month and since the beginning, and I would like it soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-46

.....  
Please respond by 3/5/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22862



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administrative and Management

SUBJECT: Killed in Action (KIA) Statistics

- In the attached snowflake dated March 1, 2004, you requested the KIA figures for Afghanistan and Iraq by month, since the beginning of operations.
- The attached table reflects Service deaths from October 1, 2001 through March 4, 2004 for Operation Enduring Freedom and from March 19, 2003 through March 4, 2004 for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- These KIA statistics will be updated and provided to you on a monthly basis.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22863

OSD 03444-04

March 1, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: **KIA** Statistics

I do want to get the "killed in action" figures for Afghanistan and Iraq by month and since the beginning, and I would like it soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
03010446

.....  
Please respond by 3/5/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22864

**KILLED IN ACTION**

MO/YR	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM				Operation IRAQI		
	Total	Afghan KIA*	Afghan Non-Hostile**	Other OEF**	Total	KIA	Non-Hostile
<b>2001</b>							
Oct 01	3	0	2	1	0	0	0
Nov 01	4	0	1	3	0	0	0
Dec 01	4	3	0	1	0	0	0
<b>2002</b>							
Jan 02	10	1	9	0	0	0	0
Feb 02	12	0	1	11	0	0	0
Mar 02	9	8	1	0	0	0	0
Apr 02	4	4	0	0	0	0	0
May 02	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Jun 02	3	0	3	0	0	0	0
Jul 02	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aug 02	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sep 02	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Oct 02	3	0	0	3	0	0	0
Nov 02	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Dec 02	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
<b>2003</b>							
Feb 03	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
Feb 03	6	0	0	6	0	0	0
Mar 03	11	2	6	3	61	54	7
Apr 03	2	2	0	0	77	55	22
May 03	1	0	1	0	37	8	29
Jun 03	3	1	1	1	30	18	12
Jul 03	1	0	1	0	46	27	19
Aug 03	4	4	0	0	36	14	22
Sep 03	2	1	0	1	30	18	12
Oct 03	3	1	0	2	43	33	10
Nov 03	6	6	0	0	82	70	12
Dec 03	1	0	0	1	40	25	15
<b>2004</b>							
Jan 04	9	8	1	0	45	41	4
Feb 04	2	1	0	1	22	12	10

	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM				Operation IRAQI FREEDOM		
Thru Mar 4,04	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>376</b>	<b>174</b>

\* Deaths in support of our military operation in Afghanistan (includes deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan)

\*\* Other deaths in support of the Global War on Terrorism (includes deaths in the Philippines, Djibouti, Southwest Asia and Guantanamo)

SOURCE: Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS)

120  
**INFORMATION RETENTION**

7:35 PM

LACy

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↙

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **Malaysia**

Have we invited Najib, the MoD from Malaysia to the U.S.? If not, should we?

Thanks.

Malaysia

DHR/azn  
021804.06

2/27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

→ PWR 2/23/04  
→ Lawless/Allen  
Comment?  
DJF

18 Feb 04

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

OSD 03446-04

11-L-0559/OSD/2286720-02-04 12:50 001

200405010

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON**

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

2004 MAR -9 PM 1:59

March 8, 2004

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: Colin L. Powell 

SUBJECT: USAID Folks in Afghanistan

Don: Enclosed is a note from Andrew Natsios responding to your note on this subject.

As you will see from the enclosures, USAID is filling up its positions in Afghanistan and providing incentives and career recognition to those who serve.

Not sure, but we hear you might have gotten the impression from some PRT people who are waiting for their USAID complement. It will be there shortly.

Enclosure:

Memorandum from Andrew Natsios dated March 4, 2004.

cc: Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council Advisor

OSD 03464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22868



U.S. AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

*The Administrator*

March 4, 2004

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM  
S/ES

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary

FROM: Andrew S. Natsios *ASN*

SUBJECT:

We recently discussed Secretary Rumsfeld's trip to Afghanistan and his finding that service in USAID Missions in conflict zones was not career enhancing.


Our Senior Foreign Service assignment cycle was just completed. I thought you might like to know that, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our directors and deputy directors each received their first-choice follow-on assignments. These assignments included U.S. Ambassador to Swaziland (the one ambassadorial position set aside for a senior USAID officer), USAID Representative to the World Food Programme in Rome, Director for West Bank/Gaza in Tel Aviv, and Deputy Director for the Caucasus Region.

I do not know how Secretary Rumsfeld might have formed his opinion, but we are "walking the walk" on rewarding officers for serving in hardship posts, and are widely publicizing this result in order to encourage more volunteers for tough assignments.

1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

11-L-0559/OSD/22869

USAID/Afghanistan Staffing\* 01/2002-03/2004



\*Kabul Staff includes US Direct Hires, Personal Services Contractors and Sector Specialists

11-L-0559/OSD/22870

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**Date:** 10/24/2003

**Subject:** Agency Support for Staffing Iraq and Afghanistan

**Type:** Executive Message

**Agency Notice Message:**

This message was released on 10/24/2003, as an Executive Message.  
This Notice is being posted to the intranet for record purpose.

ADMINISTRATOR

USAID/General Notice

ES

10/24/2003

E X E C U T I V E   M E S S A G E

**SUBJECT:** Agency Support for Staffing Iraq and Afghanistan

During the recent Worldwide Mission Directors' Conference, I requested the assistance of all USAID employees in supporting the establishment of our new missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These new programs constitute an Agency priority, and the involvement of employees at all levels, worldwide, will be required to assure the success of USAID operations in these countries. Until the new missions have recruited and trained sufficient staff, the help of experienced USAID employees from Washington and from other countries will be needed, and calls for volunteers for temporary duty assignments to Iraq and Afghanistan will be issued in the following weeks. We will be searching for seasoned U.S. direct hire employees, U.S. personal services contractors, and foreign service national employees to volunteer for six-month TDYs to either Iraq or Afghanistan.

To be successful, this effort will require not only the dedicated efforts of volunteers, it will also require the continuing support of Agency managers to assure that employees are made available for temporary duty assignments. I expect that every effort will be made to shift workloads and to reward and encourage employees who are ready to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan.

11-L-0559/OSD/22871

Foreign Service Officers are also strongly urged to pursue regular assignment opportunities in these posts. These essential positions must be filled, and there is no more important or rewarding work in the Agency. The Office of Human Resources is working closely with their counterparts in the Department of State to develop allowances and incentives suitable for these difficult postings. Further, it is my intention to assure that service in Iraq and Afghanistan is recognized when onward assignment decisions are made and when individual performance is reviewed by the Selection Boards, and I have instructed HR to work with AFSA and AFGE to this end.

The exceptional dedication and professionalism of our workforce is much appreciated, and I extend my thanks to USAID employees worldwide for their unflagging support for our reconstruction work in these posts.

Andrew S. Natsios

Point of Contact: Any questions concerning this Notice may be directed to Gail Ulrich, ANE/AMS, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/22872

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**Date:** 01/06/2004

**Subject:** Temporary Duty (TDY) Support for USAID Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

**Type:** Personnel

**Agency Notice Message:**

PERSONNEL	USAID/W Notice M/HR 01/06/2004
-----------	--------------------------------------

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty (TDY) Support for USAID Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

The USAID Administrator has requested the assistance of all employees in supporting the USAID program in Afghanistan through TDY opportunities. The ANE Bureau is now searching for seasoned U.S. direct hire employees and U.S. personal services contractors to volunteer for temporary duty assignments in special Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

The ANE Bureau is developing a roster of U.S. direct hire and U.S. PSC employees willing to volunteer for temporary duty assignments. The duration of the TDY assignments may vary according to need, but prospective volunteers must be prepared for temporary duty assignments of six months.

The mission is seeking employees interested in serving as Field Program Officers (FPO) in Afghanistan, working on joint civilian/U.S. military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), based in provincial cities. PRTs are located throughout Afghanistan and are involved in a wide range of activities related to security and reconstruction. FPOs serve as the primary representatives of USAID in their areas. The FPOs act as liaison with local officials, UN agencies and NGOs, and are involved with collecting and analyzing information on actual and potential USAID projects and will manage projects implemented through the PRTs. Living and working conditions are rustic and challenging.

The allowances and incentives available include the 25% Post Differential (retroactively paid after serving beyond 42 days at

11-L-0559/OSD/22873

post) and 25% Danger Pay, which begins upon arrival in-country. In addition, USAID plans to apply the provisions of the special Afghanistan Service Recognition Package which was recently approved by the Department of State. The package includes the following allowances and benefits:

**Post Differential Pay Cap Lifted:** For employees assigned or detailed to Afghanistan, the hardship differential pay cap, currently established at \$154,700, will be lifted so that the statutory aggregate pay cap of \$171,900 would apply to salary plus benefits. NOTE: The Chief of Mission (COM) and the SFS Pay Caps would still apply.

**Rollover of benefits:** Danger pay, post differential payments and special differential can roll over to the following calendar year if an employee reaches the statutory aggregate pay cap of \$171,900 (EX-1, 5 USC 5307) in a given year. Retirements immediately after Afghanistan Service: Payments withheld because of the cap are payable when an employee leaves service. NOTE: the COM pay cap does not have rollover provisions, while the SFS pay cap allows for rollover of post differential.

**Special Differential:** FS-01s to FS-04s, who are assigned to Afghanistan or working extended details there of 180 consecutive days or more, will earn an additional 18 per cent of their basic pay to help compensate for long hours worked.

**Permit continuation of differential pay for up to 30 days out of country:** Employees assigned or detailed to Afghanistan will continue to receive differential pay while in the U.S. for up to 30 days during their employment in Afghanistan. NOTE: Danger pay ceases upon departure from Afghanistan and re-starts immediately upon re-entry. Employees must still meet the 42-day eligibility requirement before they can receive post (hardship) differential.

TDY support will be required on an intermittent basis until the Mission has recruited and trained sufficient staff. Interested employees should send expressions of interest, through their supervisors, to Nick Marinacci, Field Program Office Coordinator, USAID/Afghanistan.

**Point of Contact:** Any questions concerning this Notice may be directed to Trent Thompson, ANE/Afghanistan, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/22874

March 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Service in Iraq and Afghanistan

*→ Colin  
over to you  
CR*

What do you suppose might be done to make service in Afghanistan or Iraq a career-enhancing move for Agency for International Development (AID) employees?

My understanding is that at the present time it is not considered career-enhancing. I don't know that to be true but that is what I am told by people.

DER:dh  
030104-93

11-L-0559/OSD/22875

TAB A

February 20, 2004

705

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Runsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: POTUS Letter to Colonel (b)(6)

Please make sure we get a draft letter from the President to Colonel (b)(6) about his son being killed in Iraq,

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-18

.....  
 Please respond by 2/26/04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 MAR -9 PM 2:54

INFO MEMO

CH-1594-04  
9 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/4*

SUBJECT: Letter to Colonel (b)(6)

- **Issue.** Please make sure we get a draft letter from the President to Colonel (b)(6) about his son being killed in Iraq (TAB A).
- **Answer.** Mr. (b)(6) of the White House Presidential Correspondence Office received information regarding the death of 2LT (b)(6) and prepared a letter from the President (TAB B) for Colonel and Mrs. (b)(6), his parents. The President signed the letter on 25 February.
- **Analysis**
  - 2LT (b)(6) deployed to Iraq with Company C, 1st Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. He was conducting a dismounted patrol when an improvised explosive device exploded. He was pronounced dead at the scene. Colonel (b)(6) is the Chief of Staff at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
  - The White House Presidential Correspondence Office is notified of the casualties via the White House Military Liaison Office and sends a letter to the next of kin for OEF and OIF deaths (except homicides and self-inflicted) and non-theater training deaths.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria. C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22877

OSD 03488-04

TAB A

February 20, 2004

705

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Letter to Colonel (b)(6)

Please make sure we get a draft letter from the President to Colonel (b)(6) about his son being killed in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-18

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

(b)(6)



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 25, 2004

**DRAFT COPY**

Colonel and Mrs. (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

I am deeply saddened by the loss of your son, Second Lieutenant (b)(6) USAR.

(b)(6) noble service in Operation Iraqi Freedom has helped to preserve the security of our homeland and the freedoms America holds dear. Our Nation will not forget (b)(6)'s sacrifice and unselfish dedication in our efforts to make the world more peaceful and more free. We will forever honor his memory.

Laura and I send our heartfelt sympathy. We hope you will be comforted by your faith and the love and support of your family and friends. May God bless you.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

White House  
Correspondence Office

Mr. (b)(6)

24 February 2004



March 8, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Militia Guard Holy Sites

*Iraq*

What do you think about having one of the militias become the guards for the Shia holy sites?

Think of it like the Swiss Guard at the Vatican, that has guarded the Vatican for decades.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-71

.....

Please respond by 3/26/04

*8 Mar 04*

OSD 03543-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22881

3/5/04

72

March 4, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Number

Please get back to me with that number I asked you for, the percentage—the one I guessed was something like .012.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-30

.....  
Please respond by 3/12



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000**  
**INFO MEMO**



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

March 8, 2004, 1200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R) *David S. C. Chu 10 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Number of Reserve Component Members Serving in the Balkans

- Based on an inquiry from Congressman Roy D. Blunt, you asked for the number and percentage of Reserve component members who served in the Balkans.
- 

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	Total
Bosnia	8,114	7,776	1,378	1,754	1,965	4,614	2,808	3,041	31,450
Kosovo	0	0	0	5,576	1,527	960	842	2,529	11,434
<b>Total-Balkans</b>	<b>8,114</b>	<b>7,776</b>	<b>1,378</b>	<b>7,330</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>5,574</b>	<b>3,650</b>	<b>5,570</b>	<b>42,884</b>
% of Selected Reserve*	0.87%	0.85%	0.15%	0.83%	0.40%	0.64%	0.41%	0.63%	
% of Ready Reserve*	0.53%	0.54%	0.10%	0.57%	0.28%	0.46%	0.30%	0.48%	

- Reserve component call-ups for Bosnia operations began December 8, 1995 (Presidential Executive Order 12982) and for Kosovo operations April 27, 1999 (Presidential Executive Order 13120).
- The annual totals represent less than 1% of the Selected Reserve force for each year, and, at the highest, slightly more than 1/2 of 1% of the Ready Reserve.
- COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P) (b)(6)



**TAB**

**A**

### Mobilized Reserve Members in Support of Balkan Contingencies

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02*	FY03*
Bosnia	8,114	7,776	1,378	1,754	1,965	4,614	2,808	3,041
Kosovo	0	0	0	5,576	1,527	960	842	2,529
<b>Balkans - Total</b>	<b>8,114</b>	<b>7,776</b>	<b>1,378</b>	<b>7,330</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>5,574</b>	<b>3,650</b>	<b>5,570</b>

SelfRes Pop	928,033	909,740	889,078	879,027	873,207	875,398	882,142	882,792
Mob'd for Balkans - % of SelfRes	0.87%	0.85%	0.15%	0.83%	0.40%	0.64%	0.41%	0.63%

IRR Pop	608,607	541,234	464,350	409,817	378,245	348,723	317,179	284,309
---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------

Ready Reserve Pop (SelfRes + IRR/ING)	1,536,640	1,450,974	1,353,428	1,288,844	1,251,452	1,224,121	1,199,321	1,167,101
Mob'd for Balkans - % of Ready Reserve	0.53%	0.54%	0.10%	0.57%	0.28%	0.46%	0.30%	0.48%


Bosnia	PRC via EO 12982 - 8 Dec 95
Kosovo	PRC via EO 13120 - 27 Apr 99

Cumulative RC		
	Bosnia	31,450
	Kosovo	11,434

\* Includes Reserve members in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE in Balkan countries as well as Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD/FORGE (Bosnia) and JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo)

Does not include volunteers.

### RC Members Mobilized for Balkan Operations (Depicted as % of SelfRes and IRR)



- RC members mobilized for Balkans - % of SelfRes force.
- RC members mobilized for Balkans - % of Ready Reserve force.

11-L-0559/OSD/22885

**TAB**

**B**

3/5/04

March 4, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Number

Please get back to me with that number I asked you for, the percentage—the one I guessed was something like .012.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-30

.....  
Please respond by 3/12



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CW-1601-04  
10 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS <sup>Fok</sup> *12 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: New Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) Structure

- **Issue:** In response to your memorandum regarding thoughts on soliciting Arab/Muslim forces for the new MNF-I, the following is provided.
- **Discussion:** MNF-I provides an opportunity to solicit Arab/Muslim contributions. Since contributing countries would be represented in the headquarters staff, the MNF-I would be a multinational organization and force. This could encourage participation by Arab/Muslim countries previously unwilling to be a component of a US combat command.
- As an example, protecting UN or NGO facilities would be palatable to Arab/Muslim countries; e.g., the Pakistanis advertised that they were in DESERT STORM to guard the Muslim Holy sites. We should give troop-contributing nations the flexibility to characterize their contributions, while allowing General Abizaid to control their employment.
- It is important that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) support our requests for contributions of troops from Muslim countries. The existing interagency mechanism to secure troop contributions provides for such an IGC review.
- The Iraqi military/security leadership should be encouraged to develop military-to-military relationships with regional countries that will endure after transition to sovereignty.
- **Recommendation:** My staff develop a Course of Action for securing contributions from Arab/Muslim countries in coordination with USD(P), USCENTCOM and DOS.

Approve *DLM* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

BPL ASSISTANT DIR	X
DIR MA CRAP	1-3/10
MA BUC	
EXECSEC MARTINI	3/10

11-L-0559/OSD/22888

OSD 03587-04

3/12

Iraq

10 March 04

8 February

✓  
3/12

February 8, 2004

698

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: New CFC Structure

John Abizaid thinks that movement towards a new CFC structure allows us to shift focus from occupation to partnership.

He also feels it gives us an opportunity to solicit help from Muslim countries. He indicated that the Yemeni foreign ministers believe that an **Arab** contribution for a specific purpose, such as protecting UN facilities or securing the airport, might work.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
020804-71

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

Sir,  
Snowflake response  
attached.  
V/R.  
LTC. Scovpe



March 10, 2004

TO: Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Capital Case

Attached is a brief memo on a legal situation here at the Pentagon that I will be mentioning to the President, probably tomorrow, and I wanted you to be aware of it.

000.5

Attach.  
3/9/04 Talking Points on Capital Case

DHR:dh  
031004-14

10 m a r o y

OSD 03603-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22890

TALKING POINTS  
CAPITAL CASE – COURT MARTIAL FOR MURDER

9 MARCH 2004

- On 2 March, the Commander at Ft Bragg, NC, referred capital murder charges against Sgt Hasan Akbar
- The charges against Sgt Ankbar stem from his alleged grenade attack on members of his own unit – 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division – on 22 Mar 03 in Kuwait
- 2 officers were killed and 14 other servicemembers wounded in the incident
- As a capital case
  - Jury is comprised of 12 officers or enlisted soldiers (if requested by the accused)
  - Must use “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
  - Must unanimously agree on death sentence
- Death penalty may only be ordered executed by the President after appellate review by
  - Army Court of Criminal Appeals
  - The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
  - Potentially, the United States Supreme Court
- Impact on the President -- minimal to none in the near future
  - POTUS involved only if death sentence adjudged and after all appeals completed
  - Duration of trial coupled with the time it will take to complete the appeals process in a capital case makes any Presidential decision very unlikely in CY 04.
- The President should not offer an opinion on Sgt. Ankbar’s possible guilt or innocence, or an opinion on an appropriate sentence in the event of a conviction. //

11-L-0559/OSD/22891

~~SECRET~~

September 22, 2004

ES-0849

04/012725-ES

384

TO: Paul McHale.  
CC: Jim Haynes  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Vern Clark

FROM:

SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it **makes** sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board - combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

22 Sep 04

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092204-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/30/04



HOMELAND  
DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INFO MEMO

9 FEB 2005

DepSecDef

TDUSD(P)

I-04/012725-ES

ES-0849

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities and Relationship

- In response to your inquiry (TAB A), this memorandum addresses Navy and Coast Guard authorities and their relationship.
- Your authority to conduct Maritime Homeland Defense missions is not restricted by any geographic boundary.
  - In the Unified Command Plan, the President has directed you to conduct DoD maritime operations to defend the U.S. from national security threats within and beyond U.S. territorial seas.
- Navy forces operate globally under the control of the combatant commanders.
  - You have provided guidance to the combatant commanders for the use of Navy forces (and other Services' forces, as appropriate) in maritime defense operations by approving three execute orders (EXORDs), since January 2004.
  - These EXORDs provide the combatant commanders with authorities and procedures related to (a) maritime homeland defense, (b) expanded maritime interception operations, and (c) maritime WMD threats.
- The Coast Guard serves as the primary U.S. maritime law enforcement agency and, as a branch of the armed forces, operates concurrently as a military service and law enforcement agency (Title 10 and Title 14).
  - Coast Guard forces exercise their broad law enforcement authorities globally, including in U.S. internal waters, territorial seas, and international waters.
  - In addition, Coast Guard forces routinely provide operational support to overseas combatant commanders, as coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security.



11-L-0559/OSD/22893

89-0000-000-0000-0000

OSD 03614-05

- For homeland security and defense operations, Navy and Coast Guard forces provide mutual support to each others' operations.
  - Coast Guard forces conduct routine homeland security patrols and boardings in the approaches to the U.S. and in U.S. territorial seas.
  - Navy forces, supporting the Coast Guard and their embarked law enforcement detachments, conduct maritime law enforcement interception and counterdrug operations.
  - During a maritime homeland defense event, on-scene Coast Guard forces will operate under the control of the combatant commander, augmenting his Navy homeland defense forces.
- DoD and DHS (including the Navy and the Coast Guard) will continue to improve their maritime operational roles and capabilities through the development and implementation of a number of on-going initiatives. Most notably, a presidential directive on maritime security policy was signed on December 21, 2004 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13). It directs DoD and DHS to develop a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting plans by the end of June, 2005. As directed by the President, DoD and DHS will also co-lead the development of plans for Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Threat Response, and Global Maritime Intelligence Fusion. Through these initiatives, we will continue to evaluate DoD's authorities, roles, and responsibilities, as well as our relationship with DHS and the Coast Guard, and update you as these efforts progress.
- TAB B provides more detailed information regarding Navy and Coast Guard authorities and the list of current DoD/DHS maritime initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Soloduk and CDR Kuepper, OASD(HD), (b)(6)

# TAB

# A

~~FOUO~~

September 22, 2004  
ES-0849  
04/012725-ES

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Jim Haynes  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: . . .  
SUBJECT: Navy – Coast Guard Authorities

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it makes sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board – combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092204-5

.....  
Please respond by 11/30/04

---

**TAB**

**B**

## **Additional Information Regarding the Navy and Coast Guard**

- In the Unified Command Plan, the President has recognized your responsibility to direct the execution of military missions in defense of the homeland, including missions within the maritime domain. Therefore, when a threat emerges within the maritime domain for which you determine a military response is required, you have the authority to direct DoD forces to interdict that threat.
- The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act established the current combatant command structure, which directs the responsibility for maritime warfighting to the combatant commanders rather than the Services. As a result, the Navy no longer has direct operational responsibility, but remains responsible for organizing, training, and equipping maritime forces.
- DoD support to the Coast Guard's homeland security and counter-narcotics missions includes essential communications, intelligence, surveillance, detection, and sea control capabilities. Coast Guard support to the DoD and combatant commanders' maritime defense roles, including maritime interception operations, proliferation security initiative boardings, and force protection includes vessels and personnel, as well as specific expertise in maritime law enforcement and port security operations.
- The Coast Guard supports the combatant commander and DoD's global maritime operations while simultaneously performing traditional homeland security missions, including: port, waterway, and coastal security; drug and migrant interdiction; marine safety; and environmental protection. For example, the Coast Guard provides support directly to the combatant commanders, with patrol boats and port security units within USCENTCOM's AOR. Also, a Coast Guard officer recently served as a maritime component commander to USSOUTHCOM during Haitian stability operations.
- Both DoD and the Coast Guard have global maritime authorities and capabilities. It is reasonable to anticipate, however, that operations on the high seas and in forward regions will likely be led by DoD, employing its greater resources and global reach capability. Similarly, the Coast Guard will likely respond to terrorist threats within U.S. navigable waters, U.S. territorial seas, and international waters, when deemed appropriate due to the presence of their operational assets. As both DoD and DHS organizations work to draft the National Strategy for Maritime Security, we anticipate that DoD and DHS maritime responsibilities will be further clarified and coordinated.

- The National Fleet Policy Statement, first prepared in 1998 and updated in 2002, is a Chief of Naval Operations and Coast Guard Commandant document that commits their Services to work together to integrate acquisition, platforms, infrastructure, and operations to ensure their forces mutually complement each other's roles and missions. The commitment to build multi-mission capabilities across all maritime missions has been demonstrated through cooperation on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship project.
- Both Services continue to coordinate policy at the headquarters level and coordinate operations at the local command center level. To increase seamless DoD - Coast Guard operations, the Maritime Homeland Defense MOA recently signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security provides for the rapid transfer of Coast Guard forces to commanders of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for maritime homeland defense operations. We are examining the benefits of a similar arrangement for providing rapid DoD support to the Coast Guard for time-critical maritime homeland security activities.
- DoD and Coast Guard interoperability is reinforced through regularly scheduled exercises and real-world operations. A recent CJCS exercise demonstrated, however, that we must consider the assets of other agencies in our maritime response. In the scenario, when threatened with a terrorist vessel carrying WMD, we saw the need to integrate USSOCOM and both the FBI and CIA into our operational task force. They joined DoD and Coast Guard assets, forming an integrated interagency task force under the control of a combatant commander to interdict the vessel, conduct an opposed boarding, render-safe the WMD device, and conduct immediate forensic and investigative activities.
- Executing an active, layered maritime defense-in-depth requires the full integration of our national maritime capabilities. The draft *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, coordinated with the Coast Guard, directs the Commander, USNORTHCOM, to further assess the maritime requirements of his AOR with a focus on providing a unified concept of combined maritime operations, including recommendations for integration of appropriate Coast Guard capabilities and those of other agencies.
- DoD and DHS, including the Navy and Coast Guard, are working with other U.S. Government agencies on the following initiatives:
  - You and Secretary Ridge recently signed a MOA that provides for the rapid transfer of Coast Guard forces to the commanders of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for maritime homeland defense operations. We are engaged with DHS on the possibility of a similar

arrangement for providing DoD support for DHS/Coast Guard activities.

- o National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Maritime Security Policy was signed on December 21, 2004. It directs DoD and DHS to jointly develop a National Strategy for Maritime Security and additional supporting plans for maritime domain awareness, maritime threat response, and global maritime intelligence integration. DoD played a significant role in the drafting of the NSPD/HSPD, which does not impinge on your exclusive authority to command and control DoD forces, engage in cooperative activities with foreign militaries, and conduct global maritime defense operations.
- The Deputy Secretary of DHS and ASD(HD) co-chair an interagency Maritime Domain Awareness Steering Group to improve and better integrate our ability to deploy maritime surveillance capabilities. A National Maritime Surveillance and Awareness Plan will be developed and incorporated into the National Strategy for Maritime Security as required by the NSPD/HSPD.
- To summarize, the relationship between DoD and the Coast Guard is based on complementary capabilities and appropriate authorities. The staffs of OSD, The Joint Staff, and the Navy and Coast Guard are working to build a more effective, layered maritime defense using the complementary maritime capabilities of DoD and the Coast Guard.

**TAB**

**C**

## COORDINATION SHEET

### Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

Office	Representative	Date
Department of the Navy	CDR Dykes CDR Watts	Dec 6,2004
US Coast Guard	CAPT Baumgartner Mr Teriberay	Dec 6,2004
Joint Staff	CAPT Gray CDR <del>Banks</del>	Dec 6,2004
General Counsel	Mr Dell'Orto	Dec 6,2004
USNORTHCOM	CDR Sulley	Dec 6,2004



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

ACTION MEMO

2004 MAR 01 11:09 AM

DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE  
IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

March 1, 2004, 8:19 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Gus Pagonis, Chairman, Defense Business Board (DBB)

*Pagonis* 1 MAR 04

SUBJECT: Appointment of DBB Task Force to Provide Recommendations on the Creation of a Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management and/or Other Options for Management of Business Transformation Initiatives

020

- In several of its recommendations and deliberations over the past two years, the DBB has made reference to the need for a senior official who has the time and authority to direct the implementation and integration of business transformation initiatives such as Business Management Modernization, Human Capital Reform, Balanced Scorecard, and Supply Chain Integration.
- A prospective solution, among others, is to appoint a Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management (PUSD (M)). The PUSD(M) would report to the Secretary through the Deputy and would have authority to direct action throughout the department but only on key business transformation initiatives.
- In principle, creating a PUSD(M) has received strong support from several Board members and official observers including David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. However, concerns also have been expressed by some Board members and senior DoD officials regarding the negative effects of creating another potential layer of management.
- The DBB is anxious to evaluate this concept in further detail in order to validate it, or to present alternate structures that could accomplish the same

for Mar

11-L-0559/OSD/22903

OSD 03685-04

1 of 3



objective. Special emphasis will be placed on developing recommendations that avoid the potential for duplicative management oversight and balkanization of DoD decision making processes. The use of a focused DBB task group for this effort will ensure a quick turnaround and a set of recommendations on the following:

1. Management structure and designation of leadership position(s) as required.
  2. Chartered roles and responsibilities
  3. Authority and accountability vis a vis the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the Service Secretaries.
  4. If a PUSD (M) is recommended as an option:
    - a. Desired characteristics of the PUSD (M) with respect to skills, experience, and expertise.
    - A list of prospective PUSD (M) candidates.
  5. Proposed next steps for implementation
- The Under Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller, AT&L, and P&R) have been informed of this proposed task group. However, since this is a study effort, we have not sought formal coordination from them. Summaries of Mr. Wynne's and Dr. Chu's respective reactions are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you direct the creation of the PUSD (M) task group with the mandate to report back to the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days.

Attachments :  
As stated.

CC: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: T.Modly/Executive Director, DBB/2E314/ (b)(6) March 2, 2004

Summary of Feedback on P DBB t

■ **Mike Wynne (from e-mail on February 7,2004):**

“I am a dissenter on this question. I do not believe we need a distinct PUSD (Management) to execute management reform or business transformation in the Department. I fear the erection of a new organization within OSD for this purpose will lead inevitably to duplication and conflict - without regard to whatever conclusion a study may come. The resource issues are real; the policy questions are real. Our focus ought to be on implementing existing efforts more efficiently. Those who have functional responsibility for a policy area ought to be - and in many instances are - at the forefront of management reform in the building. Making this a staff function could undermine ongoing actions, and instilling change is all about leadership, not staffship. The impediments come from the occasionally chaotic manner we implement; in some cases, there are too many organizations who think they have - or should have - the responsibility.

Many authors have endorsed the notion that business leaders need to lead change management and be empowered, with accountability, to do so. The proposal would undermine that principle. At what point does a business transformation effort become the purview of the PUSD(Management)? Moreover, we have the Aldridge study out there

with a series of needed reforms imbedded within it. Shouldn't we be spending our time implementing options that improve the joint look, the programming process, and policy outcomes? Why would we divorce "management" from those efforts? Why do we need yet another study?

Likely an IG study, or a study that provides the present leadership with more action oriented approaches to achieving their vision, but one that will result in no smarter action than re-organization is questionable. The clock is running and we don't need another stovepipe. My vote is to thanks them for the suggestion, and if they agree, offer an action oriented effort to assist present management. Else, drop this."

■ **David Chu (as paraphrased by Bob Hale from conversation on February 24,2004):**

- Disagrees with PUSD(M) concept.
- Concerned that processes would be balkanized and that an additional layer of management would be unproductive.
- Agrees that some arrangement for continuity of major management projects when Administrations and senior officials change.
- Supports the Board looking at other potential approaches as alternates to the PUSD(M) solution.

March 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
c c : David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Mike Wynne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Proposal for PUSD for Management

Here is a proposal from Gus Pagonis. Please get your head into it and come back to me with your own thoughts on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/1/04 Pagonis Memo to SecDef w/feedback from AT&L and P&R attached

DHR:dh  
031504-20

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22908

OSD 03685-04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

03/16/04 14:12

INFOMEMO

March 16, 2004, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: PUSD for Management

- Gus Pagonis' proposal regarding a PUSD for Management reflects numerous discussions that he and I have had on the subject, as well as discussions between myself and David Walker, and various talks among Dave Walker, Paul, and Gus.
- Dave Walker pushed for a second DepSecDef. Paul, Gus and I all thought this was not the right way to go. PUSD creates a primus inter pares among the under secretaries, while retaining the chain of command through the Deputy Secretary. I think Gus is right on with his proposal.

COORDINATION: NONE

11-L-0559/OSD/22909

OSD 03685-04

3/12  
1730

3/15



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET  
2004 MAR 12 AM 10:26

ACTION MEMO

DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE  
IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

March 1, 2004, 8:19 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Gus Pagonis, Chairman, Defense Business Board (DBB)

*Pagonis* 1 MAR 04

SUBJECT: Appointment of DBB Task Force to Provide Recommendations on the Creation of a Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management and/or Other Options for Management of Business Transformation Initiatives

- In several of its recommendations and deliberations over the past two years, the DBB has made reference to the need for a senior official who has the time and authority to direct the implementation and integration of business transformation initiatives such as Business Management Modernization, Human Capital Reform, Balanced Scorecard, and Supply Chain Integration.
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- The DBB is anxious to evaluate this concept in further detail in order to validate it, or to present alternate structures that could accomplish the same

11-L-0559/OSD/22910



SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRABSTOCK	03405-0
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARROTT	1013 3/12

objective. Special emphasis will be placed on developing recommendations that avoid the potential for duplicative management oversight and balkanization of DoD decision making processes. The use of a focused DBB task group for this effort will ensure a quick turnaround and a set of recommendations on the following:

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**RECOMMENDATION:** That you direct the creation of the PUSD (M) task group with the mandate to report back to the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days.

Attachments:  
As stated.

CC: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: T.Modly/Executive Director, DBB/2E314/(b)(6) March 2, 2004

## Summary of Feedback on Proposed DBB Study

### ■ Mike Wynne (from e-mail on February 7,2004):

"I am a dissenter on this question. I do not believe we need a distinct PUSD (Management) to execute management reform or business transformation in the Department. I fear the erection of a new organization within OSD for this purpose will lead inevitably to duplication and conflict - without regard to whatever conclusion a study may come. The resource issues are real; the policy questions are real. ~~Our~~ focus ought to be on implementing existing efforts more efficiently. Those who have functional responsibility for a policy area ought to be - and in many instances are - at the forefront of management reform in the building. Making this a staff function could undermine ongoing actions, and instilling change is all about leadership, not staffship. The impediments come from the occasionally chaotic manner we implement; in some cases, there are too many organizations who think they have - or should have - the responsibility.

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 MAR 19 10:51 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

March 19, 2004 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: Proposal for PUSD for Management — SNOWFLAKE

- Gus Pagonis' attachment fairly summarizes my views.
- I do believe we need a mechanism to ensure continuity of attention to management improvement.
- But appointing a separate official to “manage” management detracts from our actual and potential efforts. It tells those now charged with specific management processes and actions that they can leave improvement to someone else, and gives them (and their staffs) little incentive to take responsibility for change. This could lead to less improvement rather than more.
- Instead, I would concentrate on the “balanced scorecard” Ken Krieg is trying to create. Each of us should be meeting with you periodically to review results. (Ken could decide, based on the scorecard's values when a meeting with you is opportune.) The drive for better results should motivate management improvement. Continuity would come from publicizing the scorecard (as you're doing with the Annual Report). Publicizing the scorecard creates a marker for continued attention to management improvement, as a matter of focus for us and our successors.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

cc: Dr. Zakheim (USD/C)  
Mr. Wynne (Acting USD(AT&L))  
Mr. Krieg (DPA&E)

OSD 03685-04



11-L-0559/OSD/22915

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Mike Wynne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Proposal for PUSD for Management

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Thanks.

Attach.

3/1/04 Pagonis Memo to SecDef w/feedback from AT&L and P&R attached

DHR:dh  
031504-20

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22916

1730

3/15



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2004 MAR 12 AM 10:26

DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE  
IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

March 1, 2004, 8:19 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Gus Pagonis, Chairman, Defense Business Board (DBB)

*Pagonis* 1 MAR 04

SUBJECT: Appointment of DBB Task Force to Provide Recommendations on the Creation of a Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management and/or Other Options for Management of Business Transformation Initiatives

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11-L-0559/OSD/22917



SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRANDOCK 03485-04	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	1 of 3 3/12

objective. Special emphasis will be placed on developing recommendations that avoid the potential for duplicative management oversight and balkanization of DoD decision making processes. The use of a focused DBB task group for this effort will ensure a quick turnaround and a set of recommendations on the following:

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Attachments:  
As stated.

CC: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: T.Modly/Executive Director, DBB/2E314/(b)(6) March 2, 2004

## Summary of Feedback on Proposed DBB Study

- **Mike Wynne (from e-mail on February 7,2004):**

“I am a dissenter on this question. I do not believe we need a distinct PUSD (Management) to execute management reform or business transformation in the Department. I fear the erection of a new organization within OSD for this purpose will lead inevitably to duplication and conflict - without regard to whatever conclusion a study may come. The resource issues are real; the policy questions are real. Our focus ought to be on implementing existing efforts more efficiently. Those who have functional responsibility for a policy area ought to be - and in many instances are - at the forefront of management reform in the building. Making this a staff function could undermine ongoing actions, and instilling change is all about leadership, not staffship. The impediments come from the occasionally chaotic manner we implement; in some cases, there are too many organizations who think they have - or should have - the responsibility.

Many authors have endorsed the notion that business leaders need to lead change management and be empowered, with accountability, to do so. The proposal would undermine that principle. At what point does a business transformation effort become the purview of the PUSD(Management)? Moreover, we have the Aldridge study out there

with a series of needed reforms imbedded within it. Shouldn't we be spending our time implementing options that improve the joint look, the programming process, and policy outcomes? Why would we divorce "management" from those efforts? Why do we need yet another study?

Likely an IG study, or a study that provides the present leadership with more action oriented approaches to achieving their vision, but one that will result in no smarter action than re-organization is questionable. The clock is running and we don't need another stovepipe. My vote is to thanks them for the suggestion, and if they agree, offer an action oriented effort to assist present management. Else, drop this."

■ **David Chu (as paraphrased by Bob Hale from conversation on February 24,2004):**

- Disagrees with PUSD(M) concept.
- Concerned that processes would be balkanized and that an additional layer of management would be unproductive.
- Agrees that some arrangement for continuity of major management projects when Administrations and senior officials change.
- Supports the Board looking at other potential approaches as alternates to the PUSD(M) solution.

3/17  
1400



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2004 MAR 16 PM 11:19

020

INFOMEMO

March 16, 2004, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: PUSD for Management

- Gus Pagonis' proposal regarding a PUSD for Management reflects numerous discussions that he and I have had on the subject, as well as discussions between myself and David Walker, and various talks among Dave Walker, Paul, and Gus.
- Dave Walker pushed for a second DepSecDef. Paul, Gus and I all thought this was not the right way to go. PUSD creates a primus inter pares among the under secretaries, while retaining the chain of command through the Deputy Secretary. I think Gus is right on with his proposal.

COORDINATION: NONE

3/25

→ To: Wynne ]  
→ Chu ]  
You

Thoughts  
D. Kelly

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/17

Larry Di Rita  
3/25

24  
10-04  
1 many

11-L-0559/OSD/22922

OSD 03685-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

12 23 10:05

February 23, 2004, 10:48AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

SUBJECT: Writing to the Military - SNOWFLAKE

- (b)(6) of Tupelo, Mississippi sent you a letter asking DoD to reinstate the any Service member mail programs (Tab A).
- After the anthrax incidents in 2001, DoD canceled Any Service Member mail programs to ensure force protection from anonymous mail sources.
- Service members are able to identify, prior to opening, mail received from known mailers such as family members and friends. Receiving mail from unknown sources leaves our forces vulnerable to all kinds of biological and chemical hazards that can be transported via the U.S. and Military Postal Systems. The February 2004 ricin incident on Capitol Hill reminds us that the mail system is still vulnerable to the mailing of hazardous materials.
- Alternatives exist -- unprecedented Service member access to internet allows use of web-based initiatives such as:
  - <http://anyservicemember.navy.mil/> This Web site drives Operation Dear Abby. Individuals send messages to Service members. Service members with Internet access may read those messages via "OperationDearAbby.Net". Service members without Internet access may still read messages as follows: Company Commanders that have Internet access have the ability to download bulk messages that can be printed and distributed according to Service branch and location. It also allows individuals to send an email to the troops.
  - <http://www.operationuplink.org/> This Web site allows individuals to sign on and request prepaid phone cards be sent to active duty military personnel or hospitalized veterans.
  - <http://www.defendamerica.mil/rmam.htm> This Web site allows individuals to sign on and "Send Your Thanks To the U.S. Military."
- We have responded directly to (b)(6) and provided her with these alternate options (Tab B).

COORDINATION: Tab C



11-L-0559/OSD/22923

OSD 03705-04

**ATTACHMENTS:**

As stated

PREPARED BY: George Schaefer, ODUSD(MC&FP), at


(b)(6)

Thank you for doing all you do  
for our Military. I am very  
proud of them and the actions  
they do. I started writing to the  
"Any Military Member" program in  
1990. It was discontinued after  
anthrax. I'm still writing some of  
the friends I made before the  
program was stopped. I hope you  
will be able to reinstate the program  
in 2004. Have a happy holiday  
season.



Best wishes  
for a happy holiday season.

(b)(6)



12/26/03

December 27, 2003

PR received  
5 Feb 04

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Writing to the Military

Here is a letter from a woman asking us to reinstate the program of writing to the military. Why don't you have someone look at that, now that the anthrax scare has calmed down—if it has.

Thanks.

Attach. Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:db  
121703-14 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

*TO Charlie Abell:  
Please respond.*

*V/R  
Jaymie  
Durnan  
23*



THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FEB 07 2004

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thank you for your inquiry concerning the possibility of reinstating the Any Service member mail programs. We regret the delay is responding to your letter to the Secretary of Defense.

After the anthrax incidents in 2001, the Department of Defense canceled Any Service Member mail programs to ensure force protection from anonymous mail sources. Unfortunately, we must continue this policy due to the fact that the threat of a terrorist attack via the mail has not diminished. We recognize that these mail programs were important morale boosters for our Service members. However, protecting our men and women in uniform **and** our fighting units is paramount. The Department of Defense took this action reluctantly and sincerely appreciates the efforts of citizens who have, in the past, supported America's military forces through these programs.

Our troops appreciate your continued support and due to unprecedented Service member access to the internet, alternatives now exist for the public to express their support through the use of web-based initiatives such as:  
<http://any Servicemember.navy.mil/>; <http://www.operationuplink.org/>;  
<http://www.defendamerica.mil/nmam.html>

Thank you again for your support to our troops.

Sincerely,

*for Jane Burke*

John M. Molino  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Military Community and Family Policy)

cc:  
ADUSD(TP)  
MPSA



11-L-0559/OSD/22927

**COORDINATION**

<b>ORG</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>REMARK</b>	<b>DATE</b>
Deputy Director, MPSA	Mr. Ed Pardini	concur	2/10/04
ADUSD(Transportation Policy	Mr. Earl Boyanton	concur	2/11/04
PDUSD(P&R)	Mr. Charles Abell	<i>Concur</i>	<u>2/13-4-04</u>



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

30 OCT 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE AGENCY

**SUBJECT:** Suspension of the Dear Abby and Any Service Member Mail Programs

In response to your recent memorandum, I approve your request to cancel the subject programs for the immediate future effective this day. I recognize that these mail programs are important morale boosters for our service members. However, the safety of our service members is paramount and in view of recent mail attacks, service member mail from unknown sources must be suspended. Please coordinate with the appropriate Defense offices to inform the mail program sponsors that the Department of Defense takes this action reluctantly and sincerely appreciates their past support of America's military forces.

Alan F. Estevez  
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary  
(Transportation Policy)  
Acting

cc: ASD(PA)  
USD(P&R)





720  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

March 8, 2004 (12:00 pm)

*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/2*  
TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*  
SUBJECT: Request for Information Concerning Tamiflu

- You asked if you should divest your financial interest in Gilead because on December 18, 2003, you asked Dr. John Baxter, Commander, Pentagon Flight Medicine Clinic, what the drug Tamiflu is used for and whether the Department is using it.
- Gilead created Tamiflu and receives a 17% royalty from Roche Pharmaceutical Co., the distributor, for sales of Tamiflu.
- Consequently, you may not knowingly take official actions that will directly and predictably affect your financial interests in Gilead. Your request for information concerning Tamiflu and whether the Department uses it does not trigger that prohibition.
- Because Gilead is not a Defense contractor, you have not been required by the SASC to divest your interest in Gilead. If, in the future, the Deputy is unable to take necessary action affecting the financial interests of Gilead, you may either assign the action to another official, or, once you have divested your interest in Gilead, take official action yourself.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Gail Mason (b)(6)



2 Jan 04


TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: John Baxter, Colonel, USAF, MC

SUBJECT: Response to Inquiry Regarding the Drug Tamiflu

1. The drug Tamiflu is an oral medication made by Roche Pharmaceuticals. It is effective in shortening the duration of flu symptoms once a person has acquired the flu. It can also be given to prevent a person from being infected with the influenza virus after exposure to a person with the flu. If given prophylactically in this way it significantly reduces the likelihood of the exposed person coming down with the flu. It can be given prophylactically for at least one week but up to six weeks.
2. The Department of Defense is using it in small amounts. It is not routinely carried in our military pharmacies. However, it can be specially procured for patients with unique indications for the drug. Also, military providers can write prescriptions, which can be filled in retail pharmacies that are part of our managed care support contractor (MCSC) network. DoD HA data from 1 Sep through 12 Dec this year indicates that 9,231 prescriptions were written for DoD beneficiaries at an average cost of around \$44 per course of therapy. (Total cost of around \$400,000).
3. There is a much older oral medication called Amantidine which works in a similar way. It is much cheaper, costing around \$5 for a course of therapy. Military providers are encouraged to use Amantidine instead of Tamiflu in their patients who require oral influenza medications.
4. DoD relies primarily on the flu vaccination to prevent influenza. Regular use of alcohol hand wash solution during the cold and flu season is also effective in reducing one's risk of contracting these ailments.

Respectfully submitted,



John S. Baxter, Colonel, USAF, MC, SFS  
Commander, Pentagon Flight Medicine Clinic (11 WG)

11-L-0559/OSD/22931

C 117

TO SD

December 18, 2003

*Durham*  
*1/13*

TO: Dr. Baxter  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Tamiflu

What is the drug Tamiflu for? Is it a prophylactic way to avoid the flu? Are we using it at all?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121803-4

.....  
Please respond by 1/2/04

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nasry

11-L-0559/OSD/22932

U22231 / 03

TEN  
113

3/3/04

720

March 2, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Freedom To Compete"

Please tell me what role, if any, the Department of Defense has in this task force called "Freedom To Compete."

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/27/04 EEOC ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030204-1

.....  
Please respond by

3/12/04

3/10

11-L-0559/OSD/22933



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

11 10 04

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

March 10, 2004, 3:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu 11/10/04*

SUBJECT: Freedom to Compete - Snowflake

- The 27 February letter (attached) that prompted your note, was intended to invite DoD to participate in an interagency meeting that will determine what role, if any, that DoD and other Federal agencies might play in a year-long celebration of the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the founding of the EEOC.
- EEOC staffers have yet to set an agenda for the 29 March 2004 meeting mentioned in the letter. An agenda is promised by the end of next week.
- Members of my Equal Opportunity staff will attend the initial interagency task force meeting on 29 March and will report the results to me. We will collaborate with the Services and the Joint Staff as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: Jerry Anderson, ODUSD(EO) [redacted] (b)(6)

*Jerry Anderson  
3/10/04*



11-L-0559/OSD/22934

OSD 03718-04

Freedom to Compete - Snowflake

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 3-11-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22935

3/3/04

March 2, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Freedom To Compete"

Please tell me what role, if any, the Department of Defense has in this task force called "Freedom To Compete."

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/27/04 EEOC ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030204.1

.....  
Please respond by

3/12/04

3/10



U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION  
Washington, OC 20507

FEB 27 11 08 47

Office of the Chair

FEB 27 2004

Letter being sent via facsimile  
and regular mail

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to request your support of and participation in the "Freedom To Compete" Interagency Taskforce. In his Inaugural Address, President Bush made one solemn pledge. He said: "I will work to build a single nation of justice and opportunity." We now have an opportunity to showcase the work he has done to fulfill his pledge.

As you know, this year our Nation is observing the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1954 landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education, and the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These two historic events transformed our society not only by reaffirming our values of justice and equality, but also by affording everyone the freedom to compete on a level playing field, be it in education, housing, or employment.

Like yours, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is an agency that is proud of its role in making the promise of equal opportunity a reality for many. We are proud of our partnerships with sister agencies in ensuring the protection of civil rights. Yet, we recognize that, while much progress has been made, much remains to be done.

We would like to take the rare opportunity that these two anniversaries afford us to properly celebrate, honor and share the history of civil rights in America while showcasing the impressive efforts of our executive branch agencies to make justice and equality a reality. To this end, we have created the "Freedom to Compete" Inter-Agency Taskforce. The purpose of the Taskforce is to promote and coordinate events throughout the United States, highlighting the role of federal agencies, like yours, and including other agencies, such as the Departments of Justice, Education, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development, in ensuring the protection of each individual's civil rights.

D. Rumsfeld  
Page 2

Your agency's participation is vital to the success of this effort. We hope we can call on you and other members of your senior management team to join us. Lisa Fisher, Acting Director for EEOC's Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs, will be directing this initiative on our behalf. Please have your designated representative contact Ms. Fisher at (202) 663-4556 or [lisa.fisher@eoc.gov](mailto:lisa.fisher@eoc.gov) for further information. The first Taskforce meeting will be held on Monday, March 29, 2004 at EEOC headquarters building, 1801 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, from 10 AM to 12 PM.

Our President has much to be proud of -- from launching the New Freedom Initiative to expand opportunities for people with disabilities, to leading the charge in protecting the civil rights of Muslims, Sikhs, and Arab-Americans post 9/11, to restoring opportunities for women and religious minorities, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, to vigorously enforcing civil rights laws and executive mandates. I look forward to working with you in putting a spotlight on the Administration's successful efforts to further the mission of justice and opportunity.

Sincerely,

  
Cari M. Dominguez  
Chair

7:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 7, 2004  
SUBJECT: Article Attached

Let's get a letter drafted to the mayor of Comfort, Texas where Specialist Kiehl is from. Also write a letter to the editor of the local paper or write a letter to the mayor with our comments on this demonstration of support for him. Let me see it.

Thanks.

*George Rhyndance*  
*Thanks.*

DHR/azn  
010704.07

Attach: "Soldier's Funeral, Texas Style" Article

Please respond by:

~~1/21/04~~ 1/11/04

*Purnell*  
*2/13*

*7 Jan 04*

*3/11*

*SecDef - these took  
too long, but still  
worth doing; I think*

*There is no mayor,  
so we did head of  
the chamber. OSD 03732*

1/5/04

secret - This story is going around the Internet.  
 Worth looking at. DiRitz (President may find interesting)

## SOLDIER'S FUNERAL, TEXAS STYLE



Specialist James Kiehl, age 22, from Comfort, Texas, was killed, along with six other soldiers at the same place and the same day that Jessica Lynch was taken prisoner. His body was one of those that our special forces heroes dug up with their bare hands near the hospital in Iraq. They held the funeral service in Comfort at the Baptist Church, and then took him ten miles to Center Point, Texas, and buried him.

A friend visited his grave July 4th, and it was a moving experience. He was compelled to offer a salute, and a simple "thank you, son" over the small grave (since he was cremated). There is no head stone as yet, only the metal funeral home tag. At his head are two fairly large American flags, and surrounding the grave are a dozen or more small ones, on sticks stuck in the ground. People have left mementos to honor his life.

The most remarkable thing at the grave is a rather crude sign, evidently made hastily from whatever could be found in a car or van. It reads: To the parents of Spc. James Kiehl. Thank you for your son. His acts of heroism make this a better country and a better world. It is signed by the Boy Scout Troop of East Bernard, Texas. some 200 miles distant.

What follows is a message from Vicki Pierce about her nephew James' funeral:

"I'm back, it was certainly a quick trip, but I have to also say it was one of the most amazing experiences of my life. There is a lot to be said for growing up in a small town in Texas.


The service itself was impressive with wonderful flowers and sprays, a portrait of James, his uniform and boots, his awards and ribbons. There was lots of military brass and an eloquent (though inappropriately longwinded) Baptist preacher. There were easily 1000 people at the service, filling the church sanctuary as well as the fellowship hall and spilling out into the parking lot.

I've attached some pictures, some are blurry (we were moving), but you can get a small idea of what this was like. Thanks so much for all the prayers and support."


11-L-0559/OSD/22940



However, the most incredible thing was what happened following the service on the way to the cemetery. We went to our cars and drove to the cemetery escorted by at least 10 police cars with lights flashing and some other emergency vehicles, with Texas Rangers handling traffic.




11-L-0559/OSD/22941



When we turned off the highway suddenly there were teenage boys along both sides of the street about every 20 feet or so, all holding large American flags on long flag poles, and again with their hands on their hearts. We thought at first it was the Boy Scouts or 4H club or something, but it continued .... for two and a half miles.

11-L-0559/OSD/22942



Construction workers stopped their work, got off their equipment and put their hands over their hearts, too. There was no noise whatsoever except a few birds and the quiet hum of cars going slowly up the road.

11-L-0559/OSD/22943



Hundreds of young people, standing silently on the side of the road with flags. At one point we passed an elementary school, and all the children were outside, shoulder to shoulder holding flags ... kindergartners, handicapped, teachers, staff, everyone. Some held signs of love and support.

11-L-0559/OSD/22944



Then came teenage girls and younger boys, all holding flags. Then adults. Then families. All standing silently on the side of the road. No one spoke, not even the very young children. The last few urns found people crowded together holding flags or with their hands on their hearts. Some were on horseback.

11-L-0559/OSD/22945



11-L-0559/OSD/22946




11-L-0559/OSD/22947



Shop keepers came outside with their customers and did the same thing.

11-L-0559/OSD/22948



Everyone on the road who was not in the procession, pulled over, got out of their cars, and stood silently and respectfully, some put their hands over their hearts, some had small flags.

11-L-0559/OSD/22949



The military presence...at least two generals, a fist full of colonels, and representatives from every branch of the service, plus the color guard which attended James, and some who served with him ... was very impressive and respectful, but the love and pride from this community who had lost one of their own was the most amazing thing I've ever been privileged to witness.

11-L-0559/OSD/22950



FALLEN HEROES MEMORIAL  
ARMY SPC. JAMES M. KIEHL  
11-L-0559/OSD/22951

<http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/profiles/kihjamesm.html>

	 BACK
---	---



TO HEAR "TAPS" -CLICK ON THIS SMALL BOX 

11-L-0559/OSD/22952



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 12 2004

Ms. Pam Duke  
Editor  
**Comfort News**  
Post Office Box 218  
Comfort, TX 78013

Dear Ms. Duke:

Recently, I read about the special tribute that Comfort, Center Point, and the surrounding areas in Texas paid Specialist James M. Kiehl on the day of his funeral last April.

I extend my thanks to these fine Americans for honoring Specialist Kiehl in this way. I can only imagine that this tribute was a source of great comfort and support to his family and friends.

Please convey my appreciation to your fellow Texans. We at the Department of Defense salute this community, and join them in honoring Specialist Kiehl's memory.

Sincerely,

335 SD

12 Mar 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 12 2004

Mr. Fred Langston  
President  
Comfort Chamber of Commerce  
Post Office Box 777  
Comfort, TX 78013

Dear Mr. Langston:

Last April, the citizens of Comfort, Center Point, and the surrounding areas in Texas paid an extraordinary tribute to Specialist James M. Kiehl on the day of his funeral.

After reading about this event, I want to thank these fine Americans for honoring Specialist Kiehl in such a fitting way. I imagine his family and friends found it to be a source of great comfort and support.

Please convey my appreciation for their efforts. The Department of Defense salutes this community, and joins your fellow Texans in honoring Specialist Kiehl's memory and service to our nation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal line extending from the end.

11-L-0559/OSD/22954

OSD 03732-04



15  
March 12, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Border

*Afghanistan*

How do you think we are doing strengthening Afghanistan's border controls? I am told there are just 400 border police with a goal of 6,000 by June.

Why not screw your head into it and let me know what you think we should be doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031204-14

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

*15 Mar 04*

March <sup>15</sup> 12, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

Attached is the Colin Powell material he mentioned in the meeting yesterday that you may not have seen.

Regards,

Attach.  
3/10/04 Gingrich fax to SecState plus attached articles

DHR:dh  
031204-13

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Iraq*  
*15 Mar 04*

**American Enterprise  
Institute****Fax****To:** Secretary Colin Powell**From:** Newt Gingrich**Fax:** (b)(6)**Pages:** TEN (including this one)**Phone:****Date:** 3/10/2004

from newt  
3/10/04

Claude Hanks-Drielsma (the man who uncovered the Nobel scandal in Sweden and negotiated the South African debt crisis) is convinced the UN oil for food program was the largest financial scandal in history.

he is also convinced it reaches into France, the UN, Jordan, and a host of other countries.

finally he is convinced it will inevitably show up as corruption in our efforts to modernize Iraq because the depth and habit of corruption are so deep.

it is vital that we get ahead of this corruption scandal by appointing a special investigative task force both to help uncover past corruption and to root out current corruption.

Given the scale of corruption KPMG is uncovering it is almost certain a lot of very clever experts in bribery and false accounting are doing business with CPA.

former Deputy Attorney General Ed Schmults (sp?) is in Iraq now as Advisor to the Justice Ministry. He could be reassigned immediately to head an anti-corruption task force with a counterpart from Iraq.

Either we will be the people rooting out corruption or we will be the people presiding over corruption.

This could explode this summer and fall and be very much to our disadvantage unless we get ahead of the curve and very loudly meet it head on.

I am forwarding a few of the number of already published articles which make clear how big this is. Hanks-Drielsma is back in town next week and I am certain this will get bigger. Someone fairly senior should be assigned to work with him. Please have him or her contact Bill Sanders at the American Enterprise Institute (b)(6) Hanks-Drielsma's contact and scheduling information.

your friend, newt

11-L-0559/OSD/22957

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Financial Times (London, England)  
February 21, 2004 Saturday

## Two firms named to probe Iraq graft claim

By THOMAS CATAN

Iraq's Governing Council has appointed KPMG accountants and Freshfields, the international law firm, to investigate allegations of corruption under the United Nations' oil-for-food programme - set up to alleviate the impact on ordinary Iraqis of sanctions against Saddam Hussein.

The IGC opened the investigation last month after compiling a list of some 270 people from 45 countries who allegedly received crude oil contracts from Mr Hussein's regime under the UN programme.

The Iraqi oil minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, said last week that his ministry would sue anyone found to have taken bribes from Mr Hussein's regime.

The UN has strongly denied accusations of corruption within its operations and said it was requesting documentary evidence.

**Claude Hankes-Drielsma**, a British adviser to the IGC, said yesterday: "The concerns and questions put to the UN are serious and warrant an independent investigation by the UN ...I think what will shock everybody is the extent of it (the corruption) . . .

"The amounts involved and the blatancy of it is beyond anything that certainly I've seen," he added.

Some former weapons inspectors in Iraq have made similar allegations.

David Kay, former head of the US Iraq Survey Group, told the AP news agency last week that his team had found widespread corruption in the oil-for-food programme.

"There are going to be red faces among a lot of our allies and friends as to this," he said.

The US Treasury and the customs service are also investigating whether international sanctions against Iraq were violated.

###

Copyright 2004 News World Communications, Inc.  
The Washington Times  
February 20, 2004

## Saddam's fan club

By Ariel Cohen

SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The latest revelations that the deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used oil sales under the U.N. oil-for-food program to buy friends and influence policy around the world should turn on an alarm in Washington, New York, Paris and other capitals. Saddam's influence buying is only a part of a broader phenomenon. Other oil-producing countries are engaged in similar activities on an even larger scale.

Several important lessons arise from discovery of Saddam's buddy list. First, this is just the beginning: There are thousands of documents in Baghdad that American and Iraqi intelligence officers need to catalog, translate, analyze and investigate. The precedent - the Eastern German intelligence service STASI archives, which exposed hundreds of spies in Europe and America.

Second, the U.N. may have done more damage than good in Iraq - and may do so again. The U.N. oil-for-food officials knew about the global bribery effort and did nothing to stop it. Moreover, it is possible the officials in that august body facilitated and benefited from at least some of the transactions.

A key question is whether a "Mr. Sevan" who allegedly received oil export vouchers in Panama is the same person as the U.N. Assistant Secretary General Benon V. Sevan, who ran the oil-for-food program. So far, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has refused an internal investigation, and the U.N. bureaucracy has stonewalled and resisted an external investigation of the oil-for-food program.

This is not the first time the U.N. has bungled major policy undertakings: The U.N. aid effort in the West Bank and Gaza called United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA] only perpetuated the refugee problem and has been thoroughly penetrated by Hamas and other terrorist organizations.

Third, persistent rumors are worth checking. Stories about Saddam's global payola have been in circulation for years, with nobody investigating. Similar stories are in circulation about Saudi and Chinese influence-buying. It is high time the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe cooperated in investigating.

The documents uncovered in Baghdad by the Iraqi Oil Ministry and published in Al Mada, an independent Iraqi newspaper, are a jackpot of embarrassing information. Their veracity is confirmed by Naseer al-Chaderji, a senior member of the Iraqi Governing Counsel [IGC], and by **Claude Hankes-Drielsma**, the British chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and an adviser to the IGC.

The documents list dozens of organizations and individuals in more than 50 countries who were instrumental in orchestrating pro-Saddam policies, and point to a spider web of allies, from the pro-Saddam British back-bencher Member of Parliament George Gallaway to President Jaques Chirac's friend Patrick Maugein, an oil trader, and to highly influential former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, who has denied any connection to Iraq. While Bernarde Merimee - France's ambassador to the United Nations - who is on Saddam's buddy list, denied accusations, can banking details available in Baghdad exculpate the French diplomat?

The list includes Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the highly influential Russian Orthodox Church, Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization and Jordanian Islamic radical leader Layth Shbeilat. Some of those fingered have denied the accusations. Others, like Mr. Maugein, have announced they "did nothing wrong."

There are a few surprises on the list. The extent to which Russia benefited from doing business with Saddam is mind-boggling. While others received several millions of barrels, Russia got the lion's share of 1.3 billion barrels.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky's "Liberal Democratic Party" is listed as receiving a whopping 80 million barrels. A senior official in that extremist party complained to the author in a 2002 meeting at the Duma that Washington's military action against Saddam would "destroy the most lucrative business" they ever had.

President Putin's United Russia party was equally well-oiled. Russian politically influential oil companies received close to a billion barrels with market value of more than \$20 billion. "Our Foreign Ministry is for sale as far as the Russian oil companies are concerned. A department chief receives about \$200 a month - you do the math," a Moscow-based Russian Middle Eastern expert told me.

Many names and positions on the list require further investigation and clarification: Who is the anonymous "director" of the Russian Presidential Administration? The recently retired Alexander Voloshin, Mr. Putin's chief of staff, or a lower-level official, possibly still in place? Undeniably, Moscow's resistance to the war against Saddam was as implacable as it was shrill.

Did the millions of barrels earmarked for the "Ukrainian Social Democrat Party" benefit President Leonid Kuchma's Chief of Staff Alexander Medvedchuk, the leader of that party or go directly to the president who allegedly sold arms to Baghdad?

Just as Saddam's oily revenues corrupted presidential chancelleries and newsrooms, funds from other major Middle Eastern oil suppliers with ambitious religious and political agendas may wreak even more havoc.

At stake is the integrity of the foreign policy process, which is supposed to, but often does not, reflect national interests - not the size of bribes in ministers' bank accounts. However, an ugly reality is emerging, one that should be investigated by U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.

Consumer countries have to strive to turn oil suppliers into what they should be: commodity providers, not power peddlers corrupting global political systems, media and academia. National agendas should be set at the ballot box and in legislatures, not in desert tents. Global bribery may be as dangerous to the West as global terrorism. Saddam's buddy list is just the tip of the iceberg.

*Ariel Cohen is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. His expertise is in international energy security.*

###

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Financial Times (London, England)  
February 6, 2004

## Saddam oil bribe claims probed in US

By THOMAS CATAN, CAROLA HOYOS and MARK TURNER

US authorities are investigating claims that hundreds of people received oil contracts from Saddam Hussein when US sanctions were in force in return for supporting his regime.

The US Treasury's office of foreign assets control and immigrations and customs enforcement are examining whether any oil contracts violated international sanctions. Iraq's Governing Council (IGC) has also launched an investigation since a local newspaper listed 270 people from more than 40 countries alleged to have received oil contracts, including foreign politicians, officials, companies and activists.

Senior United Nations officials will shortly discuss a response to related charges of corruption in connection with the oil-for-food programme, which the UN administered for Iraq during Mr Hussein's rule.

The UN meeting will also study a series of allegations made by members of the Governing Council, a UN official said.

In a letter this week to the UN, obtained by the FT, IGC adviser **Claude Hanks-Drielsma** detailed "serious transgressions" in the oil-for-food programme. He said the original list of oil contracts "demonstrates beyond any doubt that Saddam Hussein bought political and other support under the aegis of the UN". Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, has said the programme was satisfactorily audited many times.

According to Mr Hanks-Drielsma, the UK chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and a former chairman of the management committee at Price Waterhouse and Partners, at least 10 per cent was added to the value of all invoices under the UN-run programme.

He calculated that the scheme would have provided Mr Hussein's regime with more than Dollars 4bn (Pounds 2.2bn).

UN officials said they were aware that Mr Hussein's regime had found ways to circumvent the sanctions and raise cash through kickbacks.

"Everybody knew this was going on but it was not going on under our noses because it was not part of the procedures we were involved in," said a UN official. "Certainly a lot of people and companies got involved in illicit transactions but these were not part of the oil-for-food programme."

Mr Hanks-Drielsma said he was "absolutely certain" the document was legitimate. "I know how it was compiled and I'm totally satisfied that it's genuine." He said the list was compiled on IGC orders mainly from existing oil ministry records.

Mr Hanks-Drielsma has long known Mr Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and chairman of the IGC finance committee, which is investigating the allegations. Mr Chalabi began pursuing the charges against the UN at least eight months ago, according to a person who spoke to him last summer.

"There are many indications there's a huge amount of corruption as regards this programme," said a spokesman for Mr Chalabi.

*Additional reporting by Mark Turner and Carola Hoyos*

###

Copyright 2004 The Financial Times Limited  
Financial Times (London, England)  
February 5, 2004

## Monitoring panel for Iraq spending yet to start work

By THOMAS CATAN

An independent watchdog set up by the United Nations nine months ago to monitor spending of Iraqi revenues by occupying powers has yet to begin work, plagued by long disagreements over its scope.

In the meantime, the occupying powers continue to spend billions of dollars in Iraqi funds without the independent oversight ordered by the UN Security Council last year.

"There's been all of this time, all these revenues, without any independent verification - which is in breach of UN resolutions," said John Davison of UK charity Christian Aid.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is due to be dissolved in around five months' time, when it is scheduled to hand over power to an Iraqi government. It is unclear what will happen to both the fund and the international panel supposed to monitor it after that time.

The situation has fuelled suspicions that the CPA is deliberately dragging out the process to avoid independent scrutiny of its spending in its final months of existence - something it strongly denies.

"One is never quite sure what the actual hold-up is," said **Claude Hanks-Drielsma**, a British adviser to Iraq's Governing Council. "The lack of transparency and adequate consultation has at times contributed to that perception. It's quite disgraceful and unnecessary that it hasn't started work yet."

The UN Security Council set up the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) last May to oversee spending from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) - a newly created account containing Iraqi oil revenues, frozen assets and funds left over from the UN's oil-for-food programme.

Under the terms of the UN resolution, the watchdog is made up by representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. They spent much of last year engaged in disagreements over the watchdog's remit.

"One of the issues that held it up is that the US didn't want it to have any real teeth," said an official from one of the watchdog's member organisations. "(The members) said wait a second, we are not in the business of rubber-stamping things here."

After months of wrangling, the IAMB was finally set up in October, and has held two procedural meetings since then. But it is still waiting for the CPA to nominate accountants, which the IAMB is meant to then approve or reject.

"The institutions presented a work programme to the CPA in December and are still waiting for a final commitment by CPA," said the official from an IAMB member organisation.

A CPA official, however, said they were waiting for the "statement of work" to be finalised before any accountants could be selected. According to CPA figures, Dollars 10.5bn has flowed into the DFI account in New York, of which just over Dollars 3bn has been spent. The CPA says it has used funds from the account to, among other things, buy wheat, pay Iraqi salaries, rebuild essential services and print the new currency.

As time goes by, there is a growing sense among critics that they will simply have to take occupying forces at their word.

"Five months from now, the CPA is supposed to dissolve," said Nathaniel Hurd, who is preparing a report on spending by the occupying powers for Iraq Revenue Watch, a watchdog funded by financier George Soros. "So this whole thing may have been some giant window-dressing exercise and all of this money may be spent with minimal external oversight," said Mr Hurd.

###

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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH(LONDON)  
October 16, 2003

## **Taylor Nelson creates new role for Lowden**

ROLAND Berger Strategy Consultants have appointed **Claude Hankes-Drielsma** as chairman. He is chairman of the Windsor Leadership Trust.

###

Copyright 2003 The Financial Times Limited  
Financial Times (London,England)  
October 15, 2003

## **And finally... Claude Hankes-Drielsma**

By RUTH SULLIVANBODY:

\* Roland Berger Strategy Consultants has appointed **Claude Hankes- Drielsma**, former chairman of Price Waterhouse's management committee, as chairman.

###

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The Times (London)  
October 7, 2003

## **The College of St George Windsor Castle**

Mr **Claude Hankes-Drielsma** was elected Honorary Fellow and Special Adviser, The College of St George, at the meeting of the General Chapter on September 29, 2003.

###

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## WEASEL ALERT

# Saddam's Global Payroll

It's time to take a serious look at the U.N.'s oil-for-food program.

BY THERSE RAPHAEL

Monday, February 9, 2004 8:00 a.m. EST

On Dec. 5, during a trip to Baghdad, Claude Hanks-Drielsma faxed an urgent letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Mr. Drielsma, the U.K. Chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, had recently been appointed to advise Iraqi Governing Council. What he saw in Baghdad left him shocked. "As a result of my findings here, combined with earlier information," he wrote, "I most strongly urge the U.N. to consider appointing an independent commission to review and investigate the 'Oil for Food Programme.' Failure to do so might bring into question the U.N.'s credibility and the public's perception of it. . . My belief is that serious transgressions have taken place and may still be taking place."

Just how serious these transgressions were became clear late last month, when the Iraqi daily Al Mada published a partial list of names, compiled by Iraq's ministry, of those whom Saddam Hussein rewarded with allocations of Iraqi oil. Mr. Hanks-Drielsma, who says he was among the first to see the list in early December, says it is based on numerous contracts and other detailed documents and was compiled at the request of the Iraqi Governing Council.

The list, a copy of which has been seen by the Journal's editorial page, is in spreadsheet format and details (in Arabic) individuals, companies and organizations, grouped by country, who oil ministry and Governing Council officials believe received vouchers from the Iraqi regime for the purchase of oil under the oil-for-food program. Mr. Hanks-Drielsma said the recipients would have been given allocations at below-market prices and then been able to pocket the difference when a middleman sold the oil on to a refinery; 13 time periods are designated and with indications of how much crude, in millions of barrels, each recipient allegedly received.

The list reads like an official registry of Friends of Saddam across some 50 countries. It's clear where his best, best friends were. There are 11 entries under France (totaling 150.8 million barrels of crude), 14 names under Syria



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(totaling 116.9 million barrels) and four pages detailing Russian recipients, voucher allocations of over one billion barrels. Many of the names, transliterated phonetically from Arabic, are not well-known or are difficult to identify from the information given. Others stand out. There's George Gallo the Saddam-supporting British MP recently expelled from the Labour Party, has always denied receiving any form of payment from Saddam. Other notable include Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (also listed separately the "daughter of President Sukarno"), the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Russian Orthodox Church, the "director of the Russian President's office" and former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. Some--including Mr. Pasqua, the Russian Church and Ms. Megawati--have denied receiving anything from Saddam. Patrick Maugein, a close friend of Jacques Chirac and head of Soco International oil company, says his dealings were all within "the framework of the oil-for-food program and there was nothing illegal about it."

The list's breadth, and the difficulty in reading and interpreting it, has slowed its exposure. There's also the question of authentication. Mr. Hanks-Driels (who is not an Arabic speaker) is convinced it is authentic and will be followed by more detailed evidence as the Iraqi oil ministry and Governing Council conduct further investigations. "I've seen the documents that have satisfied beyond any doubt that we're dealing with a genuine situation," he told me.

One of the most eye-catching names on the list is easy to miss as it's the only entry under a country one would not normally associate with Iraq--Panama. The entry says: "Mr. Sevan." That's the same name as that of the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Benon V. Sevan, a Cyprus-born, New York-educated career U.N. officer who was tapped by Kofi Annan in October 1997 to run the oil-for-food program.

When I tried Mr. Sevan for comment, a U.N. spokesman wouldn't put me through to him directly but offered to pass on e-mailed questions. In an e-reply to questions about Mr. Sevan's apparent inclusion on the list and interest in the Panama-based business that allegedly received the discounted oil, the spokesman quoted Kofi Annan's statement Friday: "As far as I know, nobody at the Secretariat has committed any wrongdoing. If there is evidence, we will investigate it very seriously, and I want those who are making the charges to give the material they have to me so that we can follow up to determine if there has been any wrongdoing and I would take necessary action. So far, no statements are being made but we need to get facts." The pro forma U.N. response certainly seems inadequate. Mr. Sevan should take the opportunity to defend himself against the inference that the presence of his name on this list could help explain how Saddam was able to get by with so much influence-buying around the world with little apparent objection from the U.N.

In the seven years that Oil-for-Food was operational, (it was shut down in November and its obligations are being wound up) Saddam was able to skim funds for his personal use, while at the same time doing favors for those who supported the lifting of sanctions, supplied him with his vast arsenal of weapons, and opposed military action in Iraq. Indeed, it was clear from the outset that Saddam would be able to use the program to benefit his friends. The 1995 U.N. resolution setting out the program--Resolution 986--bends backwards to reassure Iraq that Oil-for-Food would not "infringe the

11-L-0559/OSD/22968

sovereignty or territorial integrity" of Iraq. And to that end it gave Saddam power to decide on trading partners. "A contract for the purchase of petrole and petroleum products will only be considered for approval if it has been endorsed by the Government of Iraq," states the program's procedures. Predictably, Saddam exploited the program for influence-buying and kickba and filled his coffers by smuggling oil through Syria and elsewhere. With Oil for-Food and smuggling, he was able to sustain his domestic power base ar maintain a lavish lifestyle for his inner circle.

The system was ripe for abuse, in part because a divided Security Council g Saddam far too much flexibility within the program. Oil-for-Food not only g Iraq the power to decide with whom to deal, but also freedom to determine official price of Iraqi oil, revenues from which went legally into the U.N.'s Oi for-Food account. U.N. rules did not allow it to order Iraq to deal directly wi end-users and bypass all those lucky middlemen who got deals from Sadda Nor was the U.N. allowed to view contracts other than those between the oi ministry and the first purchaser, so it had no way of verifying that surcharg were being imposed by the middlemen on end-users. That enabled him to a surcharges to finance his own schemes while still making the final price competitive.

U.N. rules were ostensibly devised to prevent pricing abuses, but in one of 1 many indications of administrative failure, those safeguards appear not to f been enforced. In response, the U.S. and Britain tried often from 2001 to impose stricter financial standards, but Russia blocked changes. Then the U and Britain instituted a system of retroactive pricing--delaying approval of t Iraqi selling price so that they could take account of the market price when giving their approval. This too met with grumbling from Friends of Saddam while it reduced oil exports, it didn't end the corruption.

Throughout most of the program's life, Mr. Sevan's office seemed to see no evil. When overwhelming evidence finally surfaced that Oil-for-Food had become a gravy-train for the Iraqi regime, U.N. officials acknowledged som the abuses but refused any of the blame. Criticism is routinely portrayed as politically motivated. "The [program] has existed in a highly politicized environment from day one," explains the U.N. Web site. "The scale of these operations has also made it a rather large target." Its last line of defense w to punt to the Security Council, whose sanctions committee (authorized by 1990 sanctions resolution and composed of Council members) was meant to oversee the program, receive reports and review audits.

The record of systemic abuse of the program lends credence to claims that oil-ministry list is genuine and should be investigated. The Iraqi Governing Council says it's considering legal action against anyone found to have profi illegally from Oil-for-Food. The U.S. Treasury's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is investigating possible violations of U.S. law. But th U.N. has resisted calls for an independent investigation into abuses. Says M Hankes-Drielsma: "I would urge the U.N. to take the high moral ground anc instigate a truly independent investigation."

---

To this end, he wrote a second letter to the U.N. secretariat on Feb. 1, this addressed to Hans Correll, Under Secretary for Legal Affairs and Legal Cour of the U.N., with a copy to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. He catalog:

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questions on areas "which need urgent investigation," e.g. "Why did the U.I approve oil contracts to non-end users?" His letter alleges that "not less than 10% was added to the value of all invoices to provide cash to Saddam . . . was this not identified and prevented?" The letter also asks "What controls in place to monitor BNP [the French bank] who handled the bulk of the LCs, total value of which may have [been] in the region of \$47 billion?"

In a June 2000 statement on Oil-for-Food, Mr. Sevan said, "As [Mr. Annan] it recently, we, as international civil servants, take our marching orders from the Security Council." It might have been more accurate to acknowledge that the U.N. took its marching orders from Saddam.

*Ms. Raphael is editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe.*

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11-L-0559/OSD/22970

TAB A

January 27, 2004

671

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Legislation on Numbers

At the first day of the CINC conference, there was the discussion about end strength and the need for greater flexibility.

Let's get a proposal fashioned to recommend to the Congress to relieve us of the burden of having to be at a certain number—not above, not below—once each year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-11

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

04 JUN 29 AM 7:10

OSD 03774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22971

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

82  
7:00 PM 11:07

INFO MEMO

CM-1613-04  
12 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS <sup>FOIA</sup> *JR/12 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: Legislation On Numbers

- **Issue.** "Let's get a proposal fashioned to recommend to the Congress to relieve us of the burden of having to be at a certain number - not above, not below - once each year." (TAB A)
- **Discussion.** I concur in OSD(P&R)'s proposed language (TAB B) to change United States Code, title 10, section 105 (Personnel Strengths: Requirement for ~~Annual~~ <sup>substantive</sup> Authorization), eliminating DOD's requirement to report end strength by ~~stating~~ average strength. OSD(GC) will deliver the proposal in March (TAB C) as part of DOD's OMB-cleared Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program to Congress.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22972

OSD 03774-04

TAB A

January 27, 2004

671

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

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Let's get a proposal fashioned to recommend to the Congress to relieve us of the burden of having to be at a certain number—not above, not below—once each year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-11

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

04 JAN 29 AM 7:10

11-L-0559/OSD/22973

Tab A

## TAB B

### Sec. 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

**(a) ACTIVE-DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.**—Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

**(1)** The average strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for:

**(A)** active-duty personnel (other than members of a Reserve component described in subsection (b)(2)) who are to be paid from funds appropriated for active-duty personnel, and

**(B)** active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel in connection with organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components of the armed forces to perform duties as prescribed in section 12310 of this title.

**(2)** The average strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces.

**(b) CERTAIN RESERVES ON ACTIVE DUTY TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.**—Except as authorized under subsection (a)(1), Congress shall authorize the maximum average strength for members of a Reserve component on active duty (other than for training) or full-time National Guard duty (other than for training) who are paid from funds appropriated for—

**(1)** reserve personnel; or

**(2)** active duty personnel, to include funds reimbursed to reserve appropriations for reserve or National Guard personnel to perform active duty or full-time National Guard duty provided—

**(A)** the period of duty is for three years or less; and

**(B)** the cumulative periods of active duty (other than for training) and full-time National Guard duty (other than for training) performed by the member in the previous 1460 days is less than 1095 days.

**(c) LIMITATIONS ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL.**—No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for—

**(1)** the use of active-duty personnel or full-time National Guard duty personnel of any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) unless the average strength for such personnel of that armed force for that fiscal year has been authorized by law; or

**(2)** the use of the Selected Reserve of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the average strength for the Selected Reserve of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

**(d) MILITARY TECHNICIAN (DUAL STATUS) AVERAGE STRENGTH TO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW.**—Congress shall authorize for each fiscal year the average strength for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be used for the pay of a military technician (dual status) during that fiscal year unless the technician fills a position that is within the number of such positions authorized by law for that fiscal year for the reserve component of that technician. This subsection applies without regard to section 129 of this title. In each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the average strength

requested for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force shall be specifically set forth.

**(e) STRENGTH LEVELS.**—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President's budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary's proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each quarter of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary's proposed fiscal-year average-strengths for that fiscal year. Such strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (d). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the average-strengths as submitted.

(2) Whenever the Secretary establishes that the average strength level under paragraph (2) will not be achieved in a manner that the Secretary determines will impact national security objectives, the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of that strength level and its projected impact on national security objectives.

**(f) AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF RESERVES ON ACTIVE DUTY.**—Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may increase the strength authorized pursuant to subsection (b), notwithstanding the restrictions of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2), for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to—

(1) the number of members of a reserve component of that armed force on active duty in support of a contingency operation,

(2) the number of members of the National Guard called into Federal service under section 12406 of this title,

(3) the number of members of the militia called into Federal service under chapter 15 of this title, and

(4) the number of members of a reserve component called to or retained on active duty under sections 12301(g), 12301(h) or 12322 of this title.

**(g) ADJUSTMENT WHEN COAST GUARD IS OPERATING AS A SERVICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.**—The authorized strength of the Navy under subsection (a)(1) is increased by the authorized strength of the Coast Guard during any period when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Department of the Navy.

**(h) DEFINITION.**—The term "average strength" shall be the average of the month-end strength levels for the fiscal year.



GENERAL COUNSEL

TAB C

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
2/12

INFO MEMO

February 12, 2004, 5:11 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel  
SUBJECT: New Legislation concerning End Strength

- This responds to your request to see the proposed legislation on getting new end strength language.
- The Department has not submitted any major new legislative initiatives concerning end strength to the Office of Management and Budget for clearance as part of its Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) is reviewing options for new legislation, including re-submission of the bold proposal eliminating end strength in favor of average strength that the Department submitted last year as part of the Department of Defense Transformation Bill. (TAB A)
- Last year, the Senate supported the Department's average strength proposal, but the House did not. The ensuing Conference Committee agreed upon an amendment requiring the Department to submit planned end-of-quarter strength reports in addition to the existing annual end strength report. (TAB B) The final provision enacted by Congress last year did not include the Department's average strength proposal.
- I expect to deliver the Department's OMB-cleared Fiscal Year 2005 legislation program to Congress at the beginning of March. USD(P&R) is aware of this time frame.

Handwritten notes: "per 2/12" with a circle around the third bullet point.

Attachments: As stated

COORDINATION: (1) USD(P&R) B. Loo 2/12/04  
(2) ASD(LA) D. Stanley 2/12/04

Prepared by Vic Bernson, (b)(6)

OSD 02523-04



Tab C

TAB D  
COORDINATION

OSD(GC)

William J. Hayes II

6 February 2004

OSD(P&R)

Bill Carr

6 February 2004



TAB

February 6, 2004

TO: **Gen. Dick Myers**  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone  
Ken Krieg

CC: Les Brownlee, Gordon England, Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Metrics on "Usability of Forces"

We need metrics that track the usability of US forces—in the aggregate, by Service, and by categories within the Services. The metrics need to be agreed and tracked. This is **as** important as tracking readiness metrics.

Ken Krieg, please take the lead. Work with the Service Secretaries and the other addressees to develop agreed-upon metrics. You may need to use **an** outside consultant to help. We will then set up a tracking mechanism to measure progress, with quarterly reports.

When we get that task done, we then ought to **try** to back our metrics into **the NATO** countries and into NATO. Metrics can be a source of embarrassment, but they are a powerful incentive to get right with the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
D20504-11 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

OSD 03775-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22978

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 MAR 12 11:07

INFO MEMO

CM-1612-04  
12 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *FIR R/BM 12 MAR 04*

SUBJECT: Metrics on "Usability of Forces"

- **Issue.** You stated that we need metrics to track the usability of JS forces, and tasked Ken Krieg to take the lead in developing agreed-upon metrics (TAB).
- **Answer**
- My staff is fully engaged to support Mr. Krieg's efforts. Ken Krieg formed a panel from OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and US Joint Forces Command to develop metrics. The panel met on 26 February 2004 to start the process.
- At a follow-up meeting on 4 March 2004, my staff presented a Global Force Management (GFM) briefing, describing where we are now and the capabilities-based objectives of GFM. Mr. Krieg has tasked OSD(P&R) to develop supporting briefings that describe how DOD tracks usability of forces today and how the Defense Readiness Reporting System will support GFM in the future.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22979

OSD 03775-04

TAB

February 6, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
**Paul Wolfowitz**  
Gen. Pete **Pace**  
**Doug Feith**  
Steve Cambone  
Ken Krieg

CC: Les Brownlee, Gordon England, **Jim** Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Metrics on "Usability of Forces"

We need metrics **that** track the usability of US forces—in the aggregate, **by** Service, and by categories within the Services. The metrics need to be agreed and tracked. **This** is as important **as** tracking readiness metrics.

Ken Krieg, please take the **lead**. Work with the Service Secretaries and **the** other addressees **to** develop agreed-upon metrics. **You** may need to use **an** outside consultant to **help**. We will then set up a tracking mechanism to measure progress, with quarterly reports.

When **we** get that **task** done, we then ought to **try** to back our metrics into the **NATO** countries and into NATO. Metrics can be a source of embarrassment, but they are a powerful incentive to get right with **the** world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020504-11 (1s computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22980

Tab

March 15, 2004

TO: Gus Pagonis  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Proposal



230.02

I received your proposal about the creation of a new management position. We'll wash it around and get back to you.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-19


.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15m 04

March 15, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Visa Interviews for Saudi General Officers

The problem of the US requiring Saudi Arabian general officers be interviewed at the US Embassy is serious. These are individuals we are inviting to the US for military-to-military meetings. They will not come if they have to go to our embassy to be interviewed, or if they have to be interviewed in their own facilities.

What can I do to help?

DHR:db  
 031504-22

Saudi Arabia

15 Mar 04

January 26 2004

~~JOS~~ 207  
~~SPS~~  
~~BSA~~  
P.L. fute.

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Governance for Military Academies

Please draft up a memo from me implementing Gordon England's recommendations for the military academies, unless you have reason to believe we should do something else. Then see that it is properly coordinated before I sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/22/04 SecNav memo to SecDef re: Governance for Military Academies

DHR:dh  
012204-6

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

- GC  
- PDGC  
→ RHP

11-L-0559/OSD/22983

OSD 03911-04

(66) 11-44-11



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

DATE: 3/11/04

March 11, 2004, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Legislation for the Governance for Military Academies

- o Working with USD (P&R), we have drafted legislation (Tab A) consistent with the recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy (Tab B) and as recommended by the Fowler Commission concerning Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the Air Force Academy. The proposed legislation would apply to all the Military Academies, as follows:
  - o Repeal the statutory requirement that Service Academy Superintendents retire after their assignment;
  - o Expand the pool of potential candidates for the position of Dean of the Faculty and Dean of the Academic Board, to include both civilian employees and military officers;
  - o Restructure the composition, nomination allocations, duties and responsibilities of the Board of Visitors with mandatory meeting and report requirements.
- OMB has cleared these legislative initiatives and they ~~should be~~ <sup>have been</sup> forwarded to Congress, ~~within the week.~~ *WJH*

COORDINATION: None.

cc: USD(P&R)

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP),

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/22984

OSD 03911-04

**TAB**

**A**

**SEC. \_\_\_\_ . DEAN OF THE FACULTY; DEAN OF ACADEMIC BOARD**

1 (a) UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY.—Section 9335 of title 10, United States Code,  
2 is amended to read as follows:

3 **“§ 9335. Dean of the Faculty**

4 “(a) There shall be a Dean of the Faculty at the Academy responsible to the  
5 Superintendent for developing and sustaining the curriculum and overseeing the faculty.  
6 Notwithstanding any other provision in law, the qualifications, selection procedures, training,  
7 retention, and determinations of appropriate pay grade of the Dean of Faculty shall be prescribed  
8 by the Secretary of the Air Force. Candidates for Dean of Faculty shall be serving officers or  
9 retired or former officers with terminal degrees. The Dean may be either a military officer or a  
10 civilian.

11 “(b) While serving as Dean of the Faculty, **an** officer incumbent who holds a grade lower  
12 than brigadier general shall hold the grade of brigadier general, if appointed to that grade by the  
13 President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. **The** retirement age of **an** officer so  
14 appointed is that of a permanent professor of the Academy. **An** officer so appointed is counted  
15 for purposes of the limitation in section 526(a) of this title on general officers of the Air Force on  
16 active duty. A civilian incumbent will be designated as a member of the Senior Executive  
17 Service.”

18 (b) UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY.—section 4335 of title 10, United States Code,  
19 is amended to read as follows:

20 **“§ 4335. Dean of Academic Board**

March 8, 2004 386(1)

11-L-0559/OSD/22986

1           “(a) There shall be a Dean of the Academic Board at the Academy responsible to the  
2 Superintendent for developing and sustaining the curriculum and overseeing the faculty.  
3 Notwithstanding any other provision in law, the qualifications, selection procedures, training,  
4 retention, and determinations of appropriate pay grade of the Dean of the Academic Board shall  
5 be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. Candidates for Dean of Faculty shall be serving  
6 officers or retired or former officers with terminal degrees. The Dean may be either a military  
7 officer or a civilian.

8           “(b) While serving as Dean of the Academic Board, an officer incumbent who holds a  
9 grade lower than brigadier general shall hold the grade of brigadier general, if appointed to that  
10 grade by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The retirement age of  
11 an officer so appointed is that of a permanent professor of the Academy. An officer so appointed  
12 is counted for purposes of the limitation in section 526(a) of this title on general officers of the  
13 Army on active duty. A civilian incumbent will be designated as a member of the Senior  
14 Executive Service.”

### Section-by-Section Analysis

This proposal would implement recommendations from the Fowler Commission established to review sexual misconduct allegations at the Air Force Academy. Specifically, this proposal would expand the available pool of potential candidates for the position of Dean of Faculty/Dean of the Academic Board to include both civilian and military officers at both the U.S. Air Force Academy and the U.S. Military Academy. The Naval Academy does not have a statute that deals with the Dean of Faculty.

March 8, 2004 386(1)

11-L-0559/OSD/22987

**SEC. \_\_\_\_ . REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT THAT SERVICE ACADEMY  
SUPERINTENDENTS RETIRE AFTER ASSIGNMENT.**

1 (a) REPEAL.—Sections 3921, 4333a, 6371, 6951a, 8921 and 9333a of Title 10,  
2 United States Code, are repealed.

3 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—

4 (1) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 367 is amended by  
5 striking the item relating to section 3921.

6 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 403 is amended by  
7 striking the item relating to section 4333a..

8 (3) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 573 is amended by  
9 striking the item relating to section 6371.

10 (4) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 603 is amended by  
11 striking the item relating to section 6951a.

12 (5) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 867 is amended by  
13 striking the item relating to section 8921.

14 (6) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 903 is amended by  
15 striking the item relating to section 9333a.

**Section-by-Section Analysis**

This proposal would implement the Fowler Commission Recommendations concerning Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the Air Force Academy and apply them to all of the service academies. This proposal addresses the Fowler recommendations to change the requirement that assignment as the Academy Superintendent by a terminal position.

This proposal eliminates the requirements that the Secretary of each Military Department retire the officer serving as the Superintendent of that Department's Service Academy upon the completion of the officer's detail to the Superintendent's position and that an officer acknowledge the obligation to retire as a condition precedent to being detailed to the Superintendent's position. This section permits the Secretaries of the Military Departments to exercise the greatest flexibility with regard to future utilization of talented senior officers following their tours of duty as the superintendents of service academies.

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7 striking the item relating to section 4333a.

8 (3) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 573 is amended by  
9 striking the item relating to section 6371.

10 (4) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 603 is amended by  
11 striking the item relating to section 6951a.

12 (5) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 867 is amended by  
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**Section-by-Section Analysis**

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This proposal eliminates the requirements that the Secretary of each Military Department retire the officer serving as the Superintendent of that Department's Service Academy upon the completion of the officer's detail to the Superintendent's position and that an officer acknowledge the obligation to retire as a condition precedent to being detailed to the Superintendent's position. This section permits the Secretaries of the Military Departments to exercise the greatest flexibility with regard to future utilization of talented senior officers following their tours of duty as the superintendents of service academies.

**SEC. \_\_\_\_ . BOARD OF VISITORS; UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY;  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY; UNITED STATES NAVAL  
ACADEMY.**

1 (a) UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY. . . . Section 9355 of title 10, United States Code,  
2 is mended to read as follows:

3 **“§ 9355. Board of Visitors**

4 “(a) A Board of Visitors to the Academy is constituted annually of—

5 “(1) two members of the Senate designated by the Vice President or the President  
6 pro tempore of the Senate;

7 “(2) one person, who is not a member of the Senate, as designated by the Vice  
8 President or the President pro tempore of the Senate;

9 “(3) three members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of  
10 the House of Representatives;

11 “(4) one person, who is not a member of the House of Representatives, designated  
12 by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

13 “(5) eight persons designated by the President, or his designee.

14 “(b) All Board members will pledge full participation in executing their responsibilities to  
15 the Board. The persons designated by the President serve for three years each except that any  
16 member whose term of office has expired shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed.  
17 The President shall designate replacement members each year to succeed the members appointed  
18 by the President whose terms expire that year. At least two persons designated by the President  
19 shall be graduates of the Air Force Academy.

March 8, 2004 385(1).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22990

1           “(c) If a member of the Board dies or resigns, a successor shall be designated for the  
2 unexpired portion of the term by the official who designated the member. If a member fails to  
3 attend or fully participate in two successive Board meetings, Board membership will be  
4 automatically terminated, unless granted prior excusal from those meetings, for good cause, by  
5 the Board Chairman.

6           “(d) When possible, the Board should meet at least four times a year, with at least two of  
7 those meetings at the Academy. The Board or its members may make other visits to the  
8 Academy in connection with the duties of the Board.

9           “(e) Board meetings should last at least one full day. The Board shall inquire into the  
10 morale, discipline, and social climate, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal  
11 affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to  
12 consider and receive candid and complete disclosure, consistent with applicable laws concerning  
13 disclosure of information, by the Secretary of the Air Force and Academy Superintendent of all  
14 institutional problems, and to recommend appropriate action. Board members shall have  
15 unfettered access to Academy grounds and cadets.

16           “(f) Within 30 days after any meeting, the Board shall submit a written report to the  
17 Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Air Force, with its views and  
18 recommendations pertaining to the Academy.

19           “(g) Upon approval by the Secretary, the Board may call in advisers for consultation.

20           “(h) While performing duties, each member of the Board and each adviser shall be  
21 reimbursed under Government travel regulations for travel expenses.”.

22           (b) UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY.—section 4355 of such title is amended to read

March 8, 2004 385(I).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22991

1 as follows:

2  
3 **“§ 4355. Board of Visitors**

4 “(a) A Board of Visitors to the Academy is constituted annually of—

5 “(1) two members of the Senate designated by the Vice President or the President  
6 pro tempore of the Senate;

7 “(2) one person, who is not a member of the Senate, as designated by the Vice  
8 President or the President pro tempore of the Senate;

9 “(3) three members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of  
10 the House of Representatives;

11 “(4) one person, who is not a member of the House of Representatives, designated  
12 by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

13 “(5) eight persons designated by the President, or his designee.

14 “(b) All Board members will pledge full participation in executing their responsibilities to  
15 the Board. The persons designated by the President serve for three years each except that any  
16 member whose term of office has expired shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed.  
17 The President shall designate replacement members each year to succeed the members appointed  
18 by the President whose terms expire that year. At least two persons designated by the President  
19 shall be graduates of the United States Military Academy.

20 “(c) If a member of the Board dies or resigns, a successor shall be designated for the  
21 unexpired portion of the term by the official who designated the member. If a member fails to  
22 attend or fully participate in two successive Board meetings, Board membership will be

March 8, 2004 385(1).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22992

1 automatically terminated, unless granted prior excusal from those meetings, for good cause, by  
2 the Board Chairman.

3 “(d) When possible, the Board should meet at least four times a year, with at least two of  
4 those meetings at the Academy. The Board or its members may make other visits to the  
5 Academy in connection with the duties of the Board.

6 “(e) Board meetings should last at least one full day. The Board shall inquire into the  
7 morale, discipline, and social climate, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal  
8 affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to  
9 consider and receive candid and complete disclosure, consistent with applicable laws concerning  
10 disclosure of information, by the Secretary of the Army and Academy Superintendent of all  
11 institutional problems, and to recommend appropriate action. Board members shall have  
12 unfettered access to Academy grounds and cadets.

13 “(f) Within 30 days after any meeting, the Board shall submit a written report to the  
14 Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Army, with its views and recommendations  
15 pertaining to the Academy.

16 “(g) Upon approval by the Secretary, the Board may call in advisers for consultation.

17 “(h) While performing duties, each member of the Board and each adviser shall be  
18 reimbursed under Government travel regulations for travel expenses.”.

19 (c) UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY.—Section 6968 of such title is amended to read as  
20 follows:

21 **“§ 6968. Board of Visitors**

22 “(a) A Board of Visitors to the Naval Academy is constituted annually of—

March 8, 2004 385(1).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22993

1           “(1) two members of the Senate designated by the Vice President or the President  
2           pro tempore of the Senate;

3           “(2) one person, who is not a member of the Senate, as designated by the Vice  
4           President or the President pro tempore of the Senate;

5           “(3) three members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of  
6           the House of Representatives;

7           “(4) one person, who is not a member of the House of Representatives, designated  
8           by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

9           “(5) eight persons designated by the President, or his designee.

10          “(b) All Board members will pledge full participation in executing their responsibilities to  
11          the Board. The persons designated by the President serve for three years each except that any  
12          member whose term of office has expired shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed.  
13          The President shall designate replacement members each year to succeed the members appointed  
14          by the President whose terms expire that year. At least two persons designated by the President  
15          shall be graduates of the United States Naval Academy.

16          “(c) If a member of the Board dies or resigns, a successor shall be designated for the  
17          unexpired portion of the term by the official who designated the member. If a member fails to  
18          attend or fully participate in two successive Board meetings, Board membership will be  
19          automatically terminated, unless granted prior excusal from those meetings, for good cause, by  
20          the Board Chairman.

21          “(d) When possible, the Board should meet at least four times a year, with at least two of  
22          those meetings at the Academy. The Board or its members may make other visits to the

March 8, 2004 385(1).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22994

1 Academy in connection with the duties of the Board.

2 “(e) Board meetings should last at least one full day. The Board shall inquire into the  
3 morale, discipline, and social climate, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal  
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5 consider and receive candid and complete disclosure, consistent with applicable laws concerning  
6 disclosure of information, by the Secretary of the Navy and Academy Superintendent of all  
7 institutional problems, and to recommend appropriate action. Board members shall have  
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9 “(f) Within 30 days after any meeting, the Board shall submit a written report to the  
10 Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Navy, with its views and recommendations  
11 pertaining to the Academy.

12 “(g) Upon approval by the Secretary, the Board may call in advisers for consultation.

13 “(h) While performing duties, each member of the Board and each adviser shall be  
14 reimbursed under Government travel regulations for travel expenses.”.

### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

This proposal would implement recommendations from the Fowler Commission established to review sexual misconduct allegations at the Air Force Academy. Specifically, this proposal alters the composition and charter of the Board of Visitors (BOV) for the Military Academies.

More members of the Board would be appointed by the President. In addition, the Board would be required to meet four times each year, up from the current requirement of one meeting, and members may not miss two consecutive meetings without prior permission from the Board Chairman for good cause. Failure to meet this requirement would result in the automatic termination of the individual’s membership.

In addition, the charter of the Board would be expanded in this legislation to a more detailed inventory of Academy climate, culture, and procedures for review, and the requirement for Board reports would be increased from one per year to one per meeting, with the report due in

March 8, 2004 385(1).wpd

30 days instead of the existing 60 days.

The Fowler Commission considered these changes to be desirable due to the perceived lack of rigorous oversight of the U.S. Air Force Academy by its Board of Visitors. This proposal would ensure that future oversight is constant, meaningful, and consistent across the Military Departments.

March 8,2004 385(1).wpd

11-L-0559/OSD/22996

**TAB**

**B**

26  
January 22, 2004

~~JCS~~ 207  
~~OPES~~  
~~BSA~~  
Pl. file.

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Governance for Military Academies

Please draft up a memo from me implementing Gordon England's recommendations for the military academies, unless you have reason to believe we should do something else. Then see that it is properly coordinated before I sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 SecNav memo to SecDef re: Governance for Military Academies

DHR:dh  
012204-6

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

- GC  
- PDGC  
→ P&HP

11-L-0559/OSD/22998

(66) 11-44-11

✓  
1/22

January 22, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Governance for Military Academies

Mr. Secretary,

Three changes could be made to improve the governance of all services academies.

- (1) In regard to the makeup and operation of the Board of Visitors, universally apply the "Fowler recommendations" to all three academies.
- (2) The Board of Visitors should report to the respective service secretary (under your oversight) instead of to the President as is currently the case under 10USC § 9355.
- (3) Finally, service secretaries should consider creating an executive steering group to link the Secretary's office and the academy for day-to-day matters. These boards are either in place or being implemented now by each service secretary, and their governance responsibilities should be codified for consistency across the academies.



11-L-0559/OSD/22999

March 19, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intrepid Foundation Invitation for POTUS

Here is a letter from the Intrepid Foundation in New York. They want to honor the President in May.

It is an organization that does a good deal for the military, including providing scholarships to dependents. The Fisher family also funds the Fisher Houses, which are rooms military families can use while visiting loved ones undergoing treatment at military health facilities, including Walter Reed and Bethesda Naval Hospital.

It is worth your consideration.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/22/03 intrepid Foundation invitation to POTUS

DHR:dh  
031904-7

*001.1 WH*

*17 Mar 04 16 Mar 04*

OSD 03920-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23000



ARNOLD FISHER  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

December 22, 2003

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Intrepid Museum Foundation, it is my honor to invite you to receive the 2004 Intrepid Freedom Award, a special honor presented to selected world leaders for their leadership in the advancement of peace, freedom and democracy.

The Intrepid Freedom Award was created by the Board of Trustees in 1992 to recognize outstanding leaders who have stood tall in defense of the principles prized by people throughout the world. Past recipients have included Presidents Reagan and Yeltsin, and Prime Ministers Rabin and Thatcher, as well as then-Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Our board has recommended you for this Award in recognition of your pursuit of world freedom and democracy.

The Award will be presented at the Fleet Week Gala, hosted aboard the historic World War II aircraft Carrier *Intrepid* in New York City on the evening of May 27, 2004. The dinner will be part of the 17<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Fleet Week. Fleet Week, often referred to as "America's Premiere thank-you to the men and women of the Armed Forces," is hosted annually by the Intrepid Museum Foundation and the City of New York. Vessels from the United States Navy and Coast Guard, as well as from Allied nations from around the world, visit New York to join in the week's celebrations.

Since the inception of Fleet Week in New York in 1987, 300,000 American military personnel, from all five branches of the Armed Forces, have joined in the event. The Museum arranges a series of activities for them, including free crew parties aboard *Intrepid*, athletic competitions, and other special events. Other New York organizations join in as well: The New York Yankees and Mets each donate 5,000 tickets for the troops for baseball games; theatres offer Broadway show tickets, and many restaurants and stores offer discounts for servicemen and women in town. Fleet Week has become a true opportunity for American citizens to offer their thanks to those who serve in our nation's defense. This year 10,000 U.S. troops will be joined by sailors from other allied nations for our celebration.

The black-tie Gala is hosted on the hangar deck of the World War II - era carrier *Intrepid*, which serves as the centerpiece of the Intrepid Sea Air Space Museum. The Gala, which also honors the members of the Armed Forces of the United States and allied nations, is a military-themed event featuring patriotic entertainment. The event is scheduled to begin at six o'clock with a reception, followed by dinner in the carrier's hangar deck area. Senior Federal, State and City officials will be in attendance. Our nation's top corporate CEO's and national figures will be present as well.

05/03/1995 03:53

(b)(6)


INTREPID MUSEUM BVP; PAGE 0

Received: 17 0/04 16:59:  
01/09/04 FRI 17:24 TEL

005

I hope that you will join in what I promise will be an outstanding event. My office will provide all details required by your staff, and we are standing by to assist in any special arrangements that may be required. We hope that you will accept our invitation and that we will see you and the First Lady at the Gala.

Sincerely,



The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2009 MAR 17 AM 8:48

BILL WHIT  
President

*Background  
info only - Faxed  
file copy  
only -  
do not  
send*

Dear Mr. Se \_\_\_\_\_

I hope you are well. Attached please find a copy of an invitation letter that Arnold Fisher sent to The President. We would like to seek your support and counsel on the best way to proceed and would welcome the opportunity to discuss it with you at your earliest convenience.

With warmest regards to you and Joyce,

*Bill*

(b)(6)

*3/19*

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Enclosure

OSD 03920-04

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 MAR 17 AM 8:43

BILL WHITE  
President

*Faxed*

March 16, 2004

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The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
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Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Enclosure

OSD 03920-04



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08/03/1995 09:59

(b)(6)

PAGE 03

Received: 17 0/09 10:09

INTREPID MUSEUM SVP: PAGE 5

005

01/08/04 FRI 17:24 TEL

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Sincerely,



The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

11-L-0559/OSD/23006

March 17, 2004

014.35

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote

Andy—

Attached is a talking paper on what we are doing with respect to absentee voting. Also attached are some memoranda I have sent to the secretaries of the military departments and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders.

Regards,

Attach.  
3/16/04 Talking Paper re: Absentee Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections  
Memos to DoD

DHR:dh  
031704-4

OSD 03927-04

17 MAR 04

## TALKING PAPER

March 16, 2004 — 12:02 p.m.

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections

- The Secretary of Defense is the Presidential Designee [to carry out the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which covers the voting rights of the Uniformed Services and their family members - both CONUS and OCONUS - as well as all US citizens outside the United States.
- The Department publishes a biennial Voting Action Plan laying out programmatic responsibilities. Each Service has assigned a Senior Service Voting Representative (of General or Flag rank) and a Service Voting Action Officer, who is responsible for the program.
- There are more than six million potential voters: 3.7 million overseas civilians not affiliated with the Government; 1.4 million military; 1.3 million dependents of voting age; and .1 million federal civilian employees. Past Absentee voting:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uniformed</u>	<u>Federal Civilian</u>	<u>Civilian (non-federal)</u>
2000	69%	65%	37%

- The Federal Voting Assistance Program Office (FVAP) has been visiting mobilization sites (7 sites) and major installations. To date, 43 Voting Assistance Officer Training workshops have been completed at 41 installation sites. An additional 144 workshops are scheduled through August 2004. In addition, Voting Assistance Officer Training is offered on-line, on compact disc, and in book form.
- All States now accept the on-line version of the Federal Post Card application. We have been monitoring voting during the Primaries to detect problems and implement necessary corrective actions before the General Election.
- The NDAA FY02 directed the DoD to conduct an electronic voting demo (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)), for 2004. In view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes that would be cast in the Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the election results, the Department took immediate steps to suspend the use of the system to register or vote via the Internet.
- We have established September 3 – 11, 2004, as Armed Forces Voter Registration Week to ensure timely voter registration. Absentee Voter Week will be scheduled for October 11 – 15, 2004, to ensure absentee ballots are completed and mailed prior to the general election.

11-L-0559/OSD/23008



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

For the men and women of our Uniformed Services, the opportunity to register and cast their ballots in the 2004 elections will depend significantly on the assistance and support they receive from Service and command voting programs and from the Voting Assistance Officers assigned to their units. Those serving overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mobilized National Guard and Reserve units, will face the additional challenges of the availability of election information and materials and the lengthened time it takes to receive and return their absentee ballots through the mails. I want your support for the following:

- Ensure command support of the voting program at all levels of command. Personal involvement of commanders is crucial to effective implementation of the voting program. Assign quality officers the duty of Voting Assistance Officers and comment on their performance as a Voting Assistance Officer on their evaluation reports. Voting Assistance Officers must be given the time and resources needed for them to perform their duties effectively, including the opportunity to complete a Federal Voting Assistance Program Training Workshop.
- Publicize the identity and location of Voting Assistance Officers within each major command, on each installation, and within each unit. Service, command, installation and unit websites should maintain prominent voting information links for the benefit of Service members.
- Service Voting Assistance Officers must establish and maintain a directory of major command and installation Voting Assistance Officers and have the



11-L-0559/OSD/23009

means by which to effectively and rapidly communicate with them and their subordinates. I will be asking Dr. David Chu to meet with the Senior Service Voting Representatives regularly between now and election day to get updates and act quickly to resolve any problems.

- Voting materials, including the Federal Post Card Application and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot must be distributed to all units, and unit Voting Assistance Officers must be aware of the availability of such materials. These materials are available in book form, on CD and on the Internet at <http://www.fvap.gov>. I want to ensure each Service member is handed the Federal Post Card Application and is offered assistance in completing the form if needed.
- Use your command and public information capabilities to support the September 2004 Armed Forces Voter's Week and designate other special days to inform members and families of absentee voter registration and voting procedures ensuring that all voters are registered to vote by the end of September. I want each of you to designate the week of October 11-15<sup>th</sup> as Absentee Voting Week. If overseas voters complete and mail their ballots by October 15, their votes will reach any precinct in time to be counted.,

We will not recommend any party or candidate. Our mission is to ensure every Service member and their families have the opportunity to vote in the appropriate Primary, Special, Runoff and General Elections and to ensure that their votes are counted.

Voting is both a privilege and a responsibility of citizens in a democracy. It is our responsibility, as leaders of the Armed Services, to do everything we can to ensure that our Service members and their families exercise their right to vote.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David Chu". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "D" and "C".



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COMBATANT COMMANDERS**

**SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections**

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

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


11-L-0559/OSD/23011

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March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
 SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only after a period of serious problems with a DoD system or process have we realized that we were still in the industrial age, rather than the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

381

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for preparing them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Now we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict was broken. Now we are fixing it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component was clearly out of whack. Now we are rebalancing the AC/RC.
- Our SRO procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend per month and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

17 Mar 04

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that is broken. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need them and before we discover they are not suited to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-23

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION:

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- ASD(NII)
- SecArmy
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- SecAF
- CoS Army
- CoS Air Force
- CNO
- CMC
- COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,  
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM
- USFK



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

Ad 4/22

APR 26 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures (Your memo, 17 March 04)

General Jumper and I share your concern that Operational Support (OS) processes are lagging behind the needs of our Joint Warfighters. Our principal focus is on meeting the needs of our key customer – the joint warfighter.

To that end, we established the Commanders' Integrated Product Team (IPT). The IPT is chaired by our DCS, Warfighting Integration with the Air Force CIO as the Vice Chair. The team includes nine other Air Staff leaders and four vice commanders of our major commands – this team is making progress in providing integrated, cross-functional OS support. This renewed focus has already paid dividends – the ramp up in Air Force portal use shown in our Top Six report is a direct outcome of the push.

381

In addition, we have implemented a process whereby we receive feedback from our key customers on computer systems that have broad, negative impact to mission accomplishment. The worst of these become our "Top Six" which we continuously review and improve through a coordinated effort among functional leaders, support communities, users, and program managers until they are "well enough" to be removed from oversight, and other systems then take their place.

Our functional communities have embarked on a deliberate effort to adopt commercially-based business practices. These activities are aligned with the overarching direction provided and reviewed by the OSD Business Management team. Key examples include establishment of a foundational capability to share operational support data through a program called Global Combat Support System-AF (GCSS-AF), the restructuring of our logistic processes to make better use of commercial enterprise resource planning tools under an initiative called eLog21, and improved support to Airmen through a personnel and finance initiative called Customer Service Transformation. As a result of this last initiative, we are calling for acceleration of OSD delivery of DIHMRS to the Air Force, and expect to return a number of personnel in support functions to stressed expeditionary specialties.

26 Apr 04


We have also identified two key processes that need to be adapted. The first is an initiative to replace the current OMB competitive sourcing strategy (A-76) with a Strategic Partnership Campaign Plan. This plan will identify non-core competency activities for competitive sourcing enterprise-wide using a single strategic partner for a given activity. The goal is to reduce the patchwork nature of the way activities are currently performed across the Air Force. The second is to implement a process to better identify joint senior leader skill requirements and develop joint senior leaders. This would offer the Services a clearer opportunity to fill military and civilian positions with a wider base of best available senior leaders, thereby enhancing overall performance.

17 Mar 04

11-L-0559/OSD/23015

03937-04

The attachments to this memo list some of the detailed areas where we need to improve. We are pursuing several areas that build on one another as a means to orchestrate overall Operational Support. I would be happy to have our team share thoughts with your staff.



James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachments:

1. Operational Support Modernization, Systems and Procedures
2. Top Six Update, Mar 04
3. Joint Requirements Project

cc: ASD/PA&E

# TAB

# 1

**Operational Support  
Modernization  
(Systems and Procedures)**



**U.S. AIR FORCE**

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## **Part 1: DoD Initiatives**

## **AF Support of Business Management Modernization**

**Identified need:** Legacy financial management and associated feeder systems are unable to provide warfighters and decision-makers timely, reliable, and accurate financial and management information and are unable to process transactions at "Internet speed," because they are not integrated or they are incompatible.

**Processes to be addressed:** This gap or shortfall affects the following processes:

- Military pay
- Vendor and commercial payment
- Accounting
- Budget
- Cost performance

**Changes to systems/ personnel:** The DoD Business Management Modernization Program (and its Air Force equivalent, the Operational Support Management Program) is designed to address the bulk of this challenge by transforming business processes and developing integrated enterprise solutions. In support of this, PM has launched the following initiatives:

- Provide self-service internet-based pay and personnel customer service so that airmen anywhere at anytime can take care of their pay requirements.
- Implement seamless e-commerce for our vendor payment environment that maximizes discount opportunities, minimizes interest penalties, and assures billing costs are minimized.
- Develop performance-based budgets that link planning, programming, budgeting and execution to capabilities and performance so that we improve resource decision-making.
- Deploy a COTS accounting system (with cost functionality) so that it produces reliable and timely information and warfighters know the true cost of major processes and can make the proper trade-offs when confronted with unforeseen contingencies.
- Use data warehousing and business intelligence support tools to increase FM decision support capability.

**POC:** Lt Col Jones, /SAF/FMT, (b)(6)

## **Spend Plan/Strategic Sourcing**

**Identified need:** Ability to analyze spend data across the DoD Enterprise which is captured in contract writing systems in order to find and leverage strategic sourcing opportunities.

**Processes to be addressed:** AF Contractings' ability to gather information and create business intelligence will be enhanced by the AF's involvement with the OSD Acquisition Domain and the Rapid Acquisition Incentive - Net Centric (RAI-NC) programs' Acquisitions Spend Analysis Pilot (ASAP). The objectives of the ASAP are to:

- Automate the collection of spend data across the DoD
- Prove that it is possible, from a DoD-wide perspective, to reduce the complexity of data integration
- Increase the accuracy of information used to support DoD's strategic sourcing commodity efforts

This pilot will virtually link contracting data from the AF, Navy, Army and MDA to provide intelligence on strategic sourcing opportunities in a net centric environment. This pilot is scheduled for September 2004.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** This is a pilot effort. There will be a DoD opportunity analysis conducted in October 2004.

**AF POC:** Mr. Dan Bowman, SAF/AQC, (b)(6)

**OSD POC:** Ms Diane Morrison, Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy, Ebusiness Acquisition Domain, (b)(6)

## Expeditionary Contracting

**Identified need:** The Joint Forces Commander needs the capability to acquire supplies, services, and construction in a joint seamless end-to-end environment, providing the best value for taxpayer dollars by enabling aggregated buying and standardization (e.g. spend analysis). The resultant solution must operate at home base or in deployed/contingency environments. It must provide a procurement capability that anticipates expeditionary forces requirements and delivers contracting tools and information in a net centric environment.

**Processes to be addressed:** The Acquisition Domain is addressing current and programmed capability to accomplish the sourcing tasks across DoD under the full range of operating conditions. The capability resulting from the analysis will enable the DOD to acquire services, supplies, and construction in support of its mission in a standardized, seamless, end-to-end, shared data environment. The capability will provide DoD with a sourcing capability for services, supplies and construction during peacetime and contingencies. It establishes an environment that captures data at the source and shares it with authorized users without duplication. The Air Force has begun to implement part of its Enterprise Architecture for Procurement (EAP) through Commodity Councils, which is a complimentary strategic sourcing effort. A commodity council is a cross-functional group of contracting and product/service experts who come together to analyze the market, define the future need for a product/service and develop and implement an enterprise wide strategy to meet that need. While each commodity is different, the process used to develop and implement the enterprise strategy is the same. The EAP is directly tied to the AFMC Purchasing and Supply Chain Management (PSCM) effort and is coordinating with other AF architecture efforts.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** We will provide desktop access to negotiated/established contracting vehicles and business intelligence to almost 8,500 contracting professionals. This will move contracting personnel towards becoming strategic business advisors (versus tactical buyers). The change will require new position descriptions and training. The full extent of training and job changes needed is TBD. The full extent of the savings is TBD though the average commercial purchase cost reduction for this type of change is 12%. Interim systems capabilities are being created, including the Contracting Business Intelligence System (CBIS) and AFWay.

**POC:** Mr. Dan Bowman, SAF/AQC, (b)(6) and Ms Carolyn Lee, SAF/AQC,

(b)(6)

## **Improve Access and Utilization of Air Reserve Component**

**Processes to be addressed:** The current accession and utilization policies imposed on members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve (AFR) are complex and often misunderstood. This makes Unified Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) hesitant to rely on Air Reserve Component (ARC) capabilities, often driving COCOMs to insist on utilizing ARC members only in a mobilized status.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** Simplification of the mobilization, volunteer, and orders process so ARC members can be more readily and efficiently utilized:

- Simplify the many different duty statuses that exist for ARC members (e.g. Inactive Duty Training, Annual Training, Mobilized, Military Personnel Appropriation, Reserve Personnel Appropriation, etc.)
- Create a forum or single point of up-to-date information where COCOMs can quickly determine restrictions on the ARC and the best ways to optimally utilize ARC capability.

**POC:** Brig Gen William Rajczak, Deputy Chief of Air Force Reserve

## **Synchronize Rate Setting Process**

**Processes to be addressed:** The Department of Defense should make efforts to synchronize the Revolving Fund with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. The current rate setting by the working capital funds do not coincide with the PPBE programming cycle, and as a result customers either have too much or too little in their programs to cover Working Capital related expenses because the rates are set either after the fact or when the Services have completed their Budget Reviews.

**Changes to systems/personnel:**

Reconcile Revolving Fund rate setting with the PPBE process to prepare sound and executable budgets.

**POC:** Brig Gen William Rajczak, Deputy Chief of Air Force Reserve

## **Improve Air Reserve Component Mobilization Process**

**Processes to be addressed:** Despite the lessons learned from past mobilizations, the functionality of mobilizing and preparing reservists to deploy is not smooth. There are several areas we would suggest for improving this process to prepare ARC forces to get into the fight quicker.

### **Changes to systems/personnel:**

- Accelerate Deliberate & Crisis Action Planning & Execution Segments (DCAPES) incremental developments and upgrades. Provide new funding sources to bring DCAPES back on-line with the original development and implementation schedule.
- Integrate/Interface Aerospace Planning & Execution Network web-based tool into DCAPES to ensure the data accuracy on forces' presentation and tie personnel authorizations and mobilization requests with requirements in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data from the war plans.
- Provide DCAPES training for unit, NAF, and MAJCOM HQ personnel to ensure appropriate parties can utilize DCAPES to accomplish work required at all levels in support of planning, execution, and reconstitution of forces.
- Consolidate readiness offices at the MAJCOM headquarters into a one-stop shopping organization, e.g. DOX or a below the line A-Staff supporting Crisis Action Teams (CAT) operations at execution. This will enable more effective and efficient cross-functional planning, execution, and reconstitution of forces.

**POC:** Brig Gen William Rajczak, Deputy Chief of Air Force Reserve

## **Medical Systems Integration with AF and DoD Infostructure**

**Identified need:** Need to balance the integration and support of DoD mandated systems and the requirements of those systems to function on the service-specific infostructure. Challenges like the migrations to new operating systems driven by DoD and AF that may not be synchronized, and security issues such as access into the LAN that are often MAJCOM-constrained.

**Processes to be addressed:** AF Medical Service (AFMS) is addressing these challenges by organizational aligning with the AF Corporate structure to better understand and influence through the sharing of clearly defined requirements so that decisions made about infostructure and business processes will not affect or be affected by DoD systems. The Medical Service participates in Corporate Structure (panels), Enterprise Architecture Intergration Council, Commander IPT, CONOPS development and Capability Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) participation. The AFMS has stood up an AF mirrored Capabilities Based Planning, Programming, Budget Execution Process.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** No specific changes in systems/personnel except in the resultant changes as the AFMS moves away from maintaining infostructure and relies on AF line support.

**POC:** Lt Col Alan Bartholomew, AF/SGK

(b)(6)

## Process for Investigation Reports of Friendly Fire and Other Accidents

**Identified need:** The process for releasing reports of investigation for friendly fire and other accidents conducted at combatant commands is insufficiently formalized and may lead to OSD, JCS or the services not being adequately prepared to make appropriate congressional notifications, prepare for media queries, and otherwise react to questions regarding the incident and results of the investigation. Inadequate communications plans can lead to significant erosion of confidence in military operations.

**Processes to be addressed:** Recommend modifying DODI 6055.7, para E4.3 and/or E4.6.6 in order to formalize a notification process within DoD. Air Force Instruction 51-503, para 9.6, may provide a useful model (excerpt below).

AFI 51-503, Aircraft Accident Investigations

9.6. Distributing the AIB Report: High Interest Mishaps

9.6.1. If the AIB Report involves a high-interest mishap, certain documents must be forwarded by datafax or email to AFLSNJACT immediately following approval of the Report. In order to allow sufficient time for AF/CC, Air Staff and Secretariat review, the briefings to the NoK and seriously injured personnel, and the public release of the AIB Report will be scheduled no sooner than two duty days after the documents have been forwarded to AFLSNJACT and provided to AF/CC, the Air Staff and Secretariat. The documents that are forwarded to AFLSNJACT will be considered "close hold" until the public release date. The documents to be forwarded are:

9.6.1.1. A cover sheet that prominently displays: "CLOSE HOLD UNTIL PUBLIC RELEASE."

9.6.1.2. Convening Authority's Action.

9.6.1.3. Executive Summary.

9.6.1.4. Summary of Facts.

9.6.1.5. Statement of Opinion.

9.6.1.6. PA Release Plan, approved by the convening authority, which includes:

9.6.1.6.1. Proposed timeline for the release of the report, including NoK or seriously injured personnel briefings and public release.

9.6.1.6.2. Description of public, press, and congressional interest.

9.6.1.6.3. Proposed press release and anticipated questions and answers.

9.6.1.6.4. Do not put the names of involved personnel in the AIB press release, but refer to their position, e.g. Mishap Pilot or Mishap Pilot #1, etc.

9.6.2. In addition, prior to briefing NoK and seriously injured personnel, and prior to any public release of the report, provide the Executive Summary, Summary of Facts, and Statement of Opinion to the following offices (annotate on each copy that the report is CLOSE HOLD UNTIL PUBLIC RELEASE):

9.6.2.1. Mishap wing commander and intermediate commanders.

9.6.2.2. Other MAJCOM commanders whose assets or personnel were involved in the accident.

9.6.2.3. Foreign military commanders whose assets or personnel were involved in the accident.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** No expected change to personnel (numbers), training, supporting systems, and no dollar savings/cost avoidance anticipated. This would be a procedural change only.

**POC:** Lt Col Doug Murdock, HAF/CZ (b)(6)

## Improving Environmental Cleanup Process

**Identified need:** Environmental cleanup actions are taking too long (15-30 years) and are too costly (\$12 billion)

- Reaching a Record of Decision (ROD) for just remedy selection takes an average of seven years
- The cleanup program is focused on process rather than results
- The AF has spent \$6 billion on the 6,830 sites in the active and BRAC since 1994. Only 51% of those sites have been closed-out
- Estimated cost-to-complete is another \$6 billion
- Cleanup has been to the most stringent standards for land use, rather than acknowledging the technical infeasibility of achieving such standards, and imposing land use and use controls (LUC)
- Each cleanup site undergoes the complete process as if it were completely unique, rather than incorporating the lessons learned from 25 years of DoD and private sector cleanup experience to ensure efficient and effective cleanup on new sites

**Processes to be Addressed:** Revise the process used for the cleanup program

- Goal: Restore resources to mission ready state in most cost-effective manner
- Objective: Improve environmental protection through reduced time and cost to obtain site restoration
  - Comprehensive cleanup policy beyond ROD/LUC Policy (1 Oct 03) - develop models for performance based cleanup--Agreements and RODs
  - Create AF performance measures leveraging 25 years of cleanup experience (benchmarking)
  - Continue to revamp Annual Report to Congress
  - Energize reform of EPA risk assessment/standard setting to align risk analysis with risk management
- SAF/IEE Initiatives 2004/2005
  - Implement transformation principles (through issuance of policy, guidance and performance measures) that encourage sustainment, restoration and modernization of natural, statutory, and workforce infrastructure to ensure operational capability
    - AFPD 90-8, the directive to commanders on ESOH, in for 2-letter coord
    - IPT to work AFIs 90-801 & 802, for use by commanders, in process
  - Bring appropriate ESOH focus to AF operations through the implementation of an AF ESOH Management System constructed similar to environmental management systems (i.e. ISO 14001) with integrated safety and occupational health aspects

**Changes to systems/personnel:**

- Implement ESOH Management System to include new metrics (particularly at OSD level)
- Streamline cleanup process and make management decision based on knowledge gained from over 3,000 cleanup actions
- - Focus effects on outcomes that enhance operational capability and de-emphasize the cleanup process
- Streamlined focus is expected to require fewer people
- Invest cost savings back into cleanup process to reduce future budget requirement
- Cost-to-complete estimated savings for both active duty and BRAC installations is already \$650M

**POC:** SAF/IE

## **The Process by which DOD Recruits, Hires, and Promotes Employees**

**Identified need:** DOD must be able to compete in the marketplace to recruit and retain the best employees.

**Processes to be addressed:** The process through which we recruit and hire new employees, as well as promote existing employees is broken. Currently, it can take six months to over a year to recruit and hire a new employee. In the case of current employees, it can take months to actually process a promotion after management has made the decision to promote the person. The tyranny of arcane personnel rules and procedures must be broken so that we can recruit, hire and promote employees in a more timely fashion. Otherwise, it is going to be difficult for us to continue to recruit and retain the best and the brightest.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** The developing National Security Personnel System (NSPS) will provide a new framework for a civilian personnel system, however, it will still be broken if we do not eliminate some of the burdensome procedures and requirements that we have imposed on ourselves when hiring new employees or promoting existing employees.

**POC:** Mr. Don Fox, Deputy General Counsel (Fiscal and Administrative Law),  
SAF/GCA (b)(6)

## **The Current Workers' Compensation System for Federal Employees**

**Identified need:** The current workers compensation system is too slow and complex to the detriment of both management and the employee.

**Processes to be addressed:** Currently, DOD civilian employees are covered by a workers' compensation system established under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). The system is not controlled by DOD, but is instead administered by the Department of Labor. The current system is broken in that it takes far too long for an employee's status to be finalized. It is possible that an employee who is injured to be unable to work for over a year, but that person cannot be replaced until their status is finalized. Some positions remain vacant for over a year while employees and managers are waiting for the injured employee's workers' compensation status to be finalized.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** Unfortunately, this is not a system that is likely to be addressed by the development of the new National Security Personnel System (NSPS). The workers compensation system is managed by the Department of Labor, not DOD. DOD should, however, work with the Department of Labor in suggesting reform of the system.

**POC:** E. David Hoard, Assistant Deputy General Counsel (Installations & Environment), SAF/GCN, (b)(6)

## **Discharge Characterization of Reserve Component Members for Misconduct Occurring When They are Not on Active Status**

**Identified need:** DOD should be able to characterize the service of reserve component members discharged for off-duty misconduct in the same way that the service of active duty members is characterized when they are discharged for similar off-duty misconduct.

**Processes to be addressed:** Reserve component members may be subject to discipline for off-duty conduct, but the relevant DOD Directives, specifically, DOD Directive 1332.14, E3.A2.1.3.2.3.5, and implementing Air Force regulations limit how Reserve component commanders can characterize egregious misconduct by their members in the civilian community. A discharge under other than honorable conditions is authorized only if the misconduct "directly affects the performance of military duties." Misconduct by a reservist or National Guard member in the civilian community which has "an adverse impact" on his unit's effectiveness or morale can only result in a general discharge. Showing a "direct effect" is a very difficult requirement for the commander to satisfy. Thus, under these rules, a reservist or National Guard member who molests a child in the civilian community while not on orders only receives a general discharge because the commander can typically show only a passing impact on unit "morale" or "effectiveness."

**Changes to systems/personnel:** DOD action to amend DOD Directive 1332.14 is required to remove this limitation on all the services. Removing this restriction would permit the Air Force to revise its regulations accordingly. It would also have the effect of bringing the characterization of such misconduct by a reservist or National Guard member in line with how the active force typically characterizes this type of offense.

**POC:** Col. Felix Losco, Associate General Counsel (National Security and Military Affairs), SAF/GCM, (b)(6)

## **The Approval Process for DOD Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies**

**Identified need:** The process for approving DOD support to civilian law enforcement is outdated and confusing.

**Processes to be addressed:** The process for approving DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies is clearly broken. Guidance in DOD Directive 5525.5 and related guidance is critically outdated and difficult to understand. There is confusion both as to approval authority and to procedures for seeking approval.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** DOD Directive 5525.5 should be revised and updated. The basic interrelationships and responsibilities of the NORTHCOM, OSD and Joint Staff regarding requests for, and approval of, support to civil authorities -- particularly as they relate to Service-provided support -- need to be clearly established and communicated.

**POC:** Anthony L. Wagner, Associate General Counsel (National Security and Military Affairs), SAF/GCM, (b)(6)

## **Part 2: USAF Initiatives**

## **'One-Stop' Customer Service, Anytime, Anywhere**

**Identified Need:** The SAF/FM and AF/DP communities are collaborating to transform the personnel and pay business by providing an integrated 'one-stop shopping' service to customers while in garrison or deployed and delivering that service anytime, anywhere by leveraging technology. Central to this effort is web-based transaction processing and reachback to expert advice through a contact center on a 24/7/365 basis. It is our goal to enable customers to make well-informed decisions regarding their professional responsibilities, personal careers and the welfare of their families by giving them the tools and expert information they need. Ultimately, a by-product of this transformation will be a reduced Pers/Pay footprint, which will allow the Air Force to apply resource dividends to warfighting operations – consistent with transformation goals.

**Process to be Addressed:** Three key elements of Customer Service Delivery model are:

- Air Force Portal – A single point-of-entry for web-based customer services available 24/7/365 requiring only one user ID and password. Applicants and recruits will also have the ability to access a broad-range of information about USAF careers.
- Integrated Contact Center – A single telephone number that will provide customers with access to many of the same services available through the Air Force Portal, but via an alternate method – 24/7/365 customer contact representative availability.
- Front-line Support Cadre – A single integrated customer service center (personnel, pay, manpower and training) at base level or deployed location.
- Once fully developed and implemented, each element will provide new and/or improved capabilities to create a seamless service delivery system for all customers.

**Changes to Systems/Personnel:** We are working toward implementing the Customer Service Delivery model incrementally with spiral 1 web and contact center functionality deployed in FY06. Incremental implementation will allow us to deploy capability, measure impact and then shift resources to stressed career fields without negatively impacting Airmen. As we implement the Customer Service Delivery model, we must ensure integration with the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) currently under development. We have requested acceleration of DIMHRS for the Air Force because we believe an integrated personnel and pay system will result in fewer pay discrepancies -- a key objective in personnel and pay transformation effort.

While we are still identifying the functionality gap between the transformed AF processes versus what DIMHRS will provide at initial implementation, preliminary analysis indicates that DIMHRS will provide only 30% of our current functionality. We must ensure critical/strategic AF modules not supported by DIMHRS are identified and integrated, one such process is accounting for deployed forces in classified positions.

Our strategy is to develop short-term solutions to meet our immediate needs while providing the same requirements to DIMHRS for a long-term solution. In the example cited above, our short-term solution is to move to a single classified database (eliminating some 300 others) that ensures a single authoritative source for deploying/arriving/ departing personnel. These systems combined will support the long-term goals of our transformed Customer Service Delivery model and the SECDEF's goal of shifting resources from "tooth to tail."

**POC:** Mr. Duane Goytowski, AFPOA/DPXSD, (b)(6)

## Core Competencies / Strategic Partnering Campaign Plan

**Identified Need:** DoD's competitive sourcing strategy and policies (governed by the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 Commercial Activities Program) should be replaced by a Core Competency-based approach, a commercial best business practice. The Core Competency premise argues that the functions to be performed in-house are dictated by the relationship between our "mission" strategy (manifested through the product lines we offer to our Combatant Command customers), and our core competencies (Developing Airmen, Adapting Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations). Whether these are "commercial" activities or not is irrelevant. The main issue is whether those functions control the key attributes of product value perceived by the customer as being distinctively associated with the Military Service supplying the product. A Core Competency-based approach leads to the following policy rules: 1) the Military Services should perform "in-house" those functions and activities that contribute to customer perceptions of value—that are the means by which the Service's Core Competencies touch, shape, or create each of their core products; 2) shift non-core competencies out of the organization comprehensively, when feasible, across the entire enterprise; 3) functions requiring some skill and finesse to perform, and in which there are within the market place, important variations in quality, should be placed in the care of a Strategic Partner; 4) anything that is not a core competency, even if it is not a commercial activity, should be evaluated for outsourcing; and 5) seek competitive outsourcing environments.

The Air Force's historical decentralized approach to competitive sourcing resulted in a patchwork quilt with diverse levels of service throughout the Air Force in most activities. This patchwork quilt consists of individual activities that are contracted out; sourced by a "most efficient organization" (MEO) (as a result of a competitive sourcing study); or never competitively sourced at a particular location. The Personnel community is an example: there are 61 contracts in MPF worldwide, 18 MEOs, and nearly 2,000 residual in-house authorizations in MPFs which have never been competitively sourced.

**Process to be Addressed:** The Strategic Partnership Campaign Plan is a Headquarters Air Force initiative, identifying non-core competency activities for competitive sourcing enterprise-wide with a single strategic partner for a given activity. The endstate would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the patchwork nature of the way activities are performed across the Air Force. Step 1 would consolidate contracts across the Air Force in a particular function such as Personnel into a single contract with a strategic partner. Step 2 would competitively source residual in-house operations for possible inclusion into the contract with the strategic partner. Step 3 would competitively source existing MEOs as they expire for possible inclusion into the contract with the strategic partner.

**Changes to Systems/Personnel:** No changes to existing IT systems are required to fully implement this initiative. The changes required would be in approach: a centralized versus decentralized approach to selecting functions/locations to be competitively sourced as well as management of the existing contracts into a single agreement.

POC: Lt Col Stephanie Waldrop, AF/DPMS, (b)(6)

## Joint Competencies

**Identified Need:** There is no general understanding among the Services of the skills required for their GO/FO joint jobs. Deep expertise in one career field is no longer sufficient to ensure success as a joint senior military leader. A need exists to analytically derive joint senior leader skill requirements.

**Processes to be addressed:** The RAND Corporation studied the Air Force, Army and Navy General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) position skill requirements. This research led to a better understanding of senior leader skill requirements in the AF and has assisted in a total redesign of how the AF develops its people. In addition, AF research led to an understanding that some senior leader positions may be filled by a uniformed officer or a civilian. Advantages: GO/FO billets could be reallocated to more uniquely military duties; SES members will be given more opportunity to develop a broader base of skills; Services will fill positions with a wider base of best available senior leaders. RAND's methodology will survey all joint jobs (GO and SES) and create a catalog of jobs that contains skill requirements in generic language for use by all the Services.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** This project can be conducted at no additional cost to the Services. It supports the AF Force Development effort and will assist in further definition and refinement of the skills needed to fill GO/FO positions. Services were briefed on this study in a DCS Personnel meeting and agreed it would be a great benefit to Joint training and development. The Director, Joint Staff was also briefed. AFSLMO was asked to coordinate efforts with J7 and JFCOM in order to inform their effort to rewrite the OPMEP. AF could sponsor and manage the effort while delivering progress checks to the other Services.

**POC:** Lt Col Cassie Barlow, AFSLMO (b)(6)

## Capabilities Based Acquisition

**Identified Need:** Test and Evaluation (T&E) process must be flexible and adaptive in order to maintain continuous support to a capabilities based acquisition process that includes spiral development and rapid fielding initiatives.

**Processes to be addressed:** The Air Force requirements, acquisition, and T&E communities collaborated closely in developing a totally new and unified policy structure, a first time achievement to help ensure a greater chance of program success. Air Force T&E processes have been adapted to provide cost efficient test and evaluation programs in a continuum of integrated testing known as seamless verification. Interim guidance was issued on 8 March 2004 pending release of Air Force Instruction 99-103, *Capabilities Based Test and Evaluation*. Expected release date is June 2004. New mandatory policies address requirements for integrated test planning, early tester involvement, formation of integrated test teams, T&E for evolutionary acquisition, spiral development and incremental development, tester roles in the requirements development process, and major command tester roles and responsibilities.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** New mandatory policies and procedures are implemented for planning, conducting, and reporting capabilities-based T&E using the Seamless Verification Concept. The guidance applies to all Air Force organizations and personnel conducting T&E activities, including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command.

**POC:** Mr Jim Renshaw, AF/TER, DSN (b)(6)

## Lean Responsive Airfield Operations

**Identified need:** The Air Force is challenged to provide lean responsive expeditionary airfield operations capability. Task Force *Enduring Look* (TFEL) Quick Report Number 9, Airfield Operations (AO) and other after action reports identified deficiencies in the Air Force's ability to provide AO services. The TFEL report identified various areas of concern including confusion caused by two chains of command (AF/XO for air traffic control and airfield management personnel and AF/IL for airfield equipment and its maintainers), the age and condition of current deployable airfield equipment and lack of adequate combat skills training.

**Processes to be addressed:** An integrated process team, made up of various HAF and MAJCOM stakeholders, is reviewing AO capabilities (equipment and personnel) and optimum organizational structure required to support various AF CONOPS and Force Module requirements to quickly open, establish and operate contingency airfields.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** It is too early in the process to identify all required changes. The team will focus on organizational structure, roles and responsibilities of AF AO providers, combat skills training and determining deployable AO equipment requirements. The team anticipates requirements for additional or restructured manning and funding of new deployable equipment to fully support the combatant commanders' AO requirements.

**POC:** Maj Tony Militello, HQ AFFSA/XAR, DSN (b)(6)

## Global Situational Awareness

**Identified need:** Need a way to provide persistent, global situational awareness and tracking capability to decision makers at all levels of the military and intelligence community. Many of our current ISR systems were not designed to be able to interact with other systems to provide information and cueing to other systems to be able to provide the right information to the right people at the right time.

**Process to be addressed:** Representatives from all services, the *NRO*, NGA (formerly NIMA) and other IC agencies are working together to determine the true requirements and capabilities needed to ensure Space Based Radar (SBR) is able to work with other ISR systems. Result should be a capability to provide global and focused situational awareness to decision makers at all levels.

**Changes to system/personnel:** SBR development.

**POC:** Maj Todd Ellison, AF/XOS, (b)(6)

## Extend GIG to Airborne Domain

**Identified need:** The ability to effect joint and combined net-centric operations in the air.

**Process to be addressed:** A migration strategy for net-enabling Air Force platforms. The Air Force has initiated an effort to architect an airborne network capability and to net-enable those nodes (i.e., airborne, space-based, terrestrial) critical to providing the capabilities necessary to extend the Global Information Grid (GIG) into the airborne domain.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** Prioritize, field, and install an integrated net-enabled capability on selected nodes. Primary enablers to networking are the installation of a net-enabled radio (e.g., FAB-T, JTRS, MP-CDL) and net-enabled infrastructure as an integrated capability on affected nodes. The establishment of space (e.g., Transformational SATCOM or TSAT) and terrestrial (e.g., DoD Teleport, GIG-Bandwidth Expansion or GIG-BE) networks, and the fielding of net-centric network-level services represent critical supporting elements in this effort.

**POC:** Mr. Douglas Klimek, AF/XOSO (b)(6)

## **Create and Sustain Space Cadre**

**Identified need:** Create and sustain a cadre of Space Professionals to advance the use of space power and to transform military and intelligence operations. These professionals "will have to master highly complex technology; develop new doctrine and concepts of operations for space launch, offensive and defensive space operations, power projection in, from and through space...and operate some of the most complex systems ever built and deployed."

**Process to be addressed:** Implementing Force Development and the AF Space Professional Strategy via focused career development, education, and training, specifically:

- Instituting stronger, technically oriented space education and training programs
- Determining the unique skills that distinguish the Space Cadre from other career specialties and identify individually who is in the Space Cadre
- Identifying each Space Cadre billet and determine the education, experience, and certification requirements for every position
- Designing a certification program to measure progress throughout an individual's career
- Issuing Career Development Guidance in accordance with the Force Development construct
- Establishing a permanent Space Professional Management Function

**Changes to systems/personnel:** No systems will support these changes. It's a matter of personnel management and increased education & training opportunities

**POC:** Maj Tim Murtha, AF/XOSO, (b)(6)

## **Modify OPLANS to Include Space Capability Infrastructure Support**

**Identified Need:** Space in Annex C.

**Process to be addressed:** Point out infrastructure support and Warfighting capabilities of space capabilities in OPLANS as the military moves to the strategy of “places not bases”. As the military has both large bases in Europe and outposts in Middle East and Central Asia, space capabilities (satellite communications and intelligence) have the potential to become more important and at the same time stretched for resources.

**Changes to be addressed:** Streamline Air & Space fight in war plans. Change to OPLANS, COAs and doctrine to include space capabilities addressing communications, intelligence and space control in the joint fight.

**POC:** Maj Marc Del Rosario, AF/XOSI

## Share Weather Data in the Air Operations Center

**Identified Need:** Enable decision superiority through comprehensive integration of weather information in C2 systems at a machine-to-machine(M2M) level. Provides time- and location-specific terrestrial and space weather data necessary to calculate and visualize environmental impacts to planned and executing operations via an XML-based web service. Makes all relevant weather data and imagery available to planners/decision makers via a variety of automated tools (e.g., Common Operational Picture (COP), Master Air Attack Plan Tool Kit (MAAP-TK)).

**Processes to be addressed:** All C2 processes in an AOC are impacted by weather: Strategy; Guidance Apportionment & Targeting (GAT); Combat Plans; Combat Ops; Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Weather (ISRW); Air Mobility Division (AMD); Agile Combat Support (ACS); Time Critical Targeting (TCT).

**Changes to systems:** Interim capability merges AF Joint Wx Impact System (JWIS) and Navy Integrated Tactical Subsystem (NITES) Meteorological & Oceanographic (METOC) systems for Joint C2 Air and Space Operations. Does not require change in manning but streamlines capabilities and eliminates current shortfalls caused by stovepipe systems and ops tempo. Does not significantly add to AOC systems training, but adds 30 minutes of training during GCCS Common Operational Picture (COP) training. Subsystems within TBMCS, GCCS, GCSS, would employ XML-based Joint METOC Brokering Language (JMBL) to make requests for weather data/impacts. The Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP) would request weather data/impacts/imagery for COP visualization via GCCS (later JC2) database tied to JWIS-NITES system. Reuse of Navy capability in NITES saves the AF \$6M in development activities to provide weather on the GCCS COP.

**POC:** Maj David Bacot, XOWR, (b)(6)

## Network Protection

**Identified need:** The area of network protection continues to require the attention of the IT community and the general populace. Indeed, secure information is the necessary resource of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Now that IT is on the flightline and in the cockpit, our expeditionary forces require reliable and secure access to information.

**Processes to be addressed:** The Air Force learned that our information security incident reporting and mitigation processes required attention. Our network security processes were not as effective or efficient as they could have been. Two primary reasons were identified. First, multiple offices and agencies were involved in the reporting and mitigation process. The Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team and the Air Force Network Operations Center, two of our primary network protection organizations, needed a clear operational chain of command with a leader of sufficient rank to enforce network security directives. Second, our network protection capabilities were hindered by hundreds of redundant network servers and stove-piped systems that were wasting information security manpower.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** Two significant changes were implemented to address these issues. In the summer of 2003, the Air Force Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC) was established with the concurrence of all Air Staff agencies. The AFNOSC consolidates the information security activities of the Air Force and provides a single Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for DoD and other information security entities to coordinate with the Air Force. Further, the AFNOSC is organizationally located under the purview of the 8<sup>th</sup> AF/CC thus providing sufficient rank to enforce network security mandates. Earlier in 2003, the AF progressed with a network server consolidation initiative that reduced the number of servers requiring security by 4000. This, in turn, freed up nearly 1000 IT professionals who are now able to focus on other networking issues.

**POC:** Lt Col Dave Biros, AF-CIO/P (b)(6)

## Software Security

**Identified need:** While software manufactures strive to build secure products, often these programs are so large and complex that security vulnerabilities are difficult to identify at the time of production. Further, in an attempt to ease the workload of systems administrators, software manufactures often configure their products with minimal default security settings. This leaves programs vulnerable to hackers until secure configuration settings can be implemented.

**Processes to be addressed:** The current process of software system analysis and design is in need of attention. Software manufactures can benefit from interaction with the Air Force to learn what software configuration best suit our organization as well understand what vulnerabilities we face. The Air Force can no longer wait for software vulnerabilities to be identified after the product is released.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** The AF is taking a two-step approach to this issue. First, the AF is teaming with other organizations like NSA and with software vendors like Microsoft to improve the secure posture of software products before they are released. Currently, the AF must install patches to tens of thousands of systems in order to mitigate software vulnerabilities. This requires us to purchase patching software and employ hundreds of system security specialists to secure our networks. By assisting software companies at making their products more secure, we can significantly reduce the burden. Second, we are working with DISA and AF agencies to champion "gold disks" or special compact disks with a specified set of system configurations that systems administrators can load into new IT systems prior to attaching them to the network. This will allow systems administrators to bring new systems on line faster and reduce their cognitive task of secure system configuration.

**POC:** Lt Col Dave Biros, AF-CIO/P (b)(6)

## Information Assurance Training

**Identified need:** A recent STRATCOM report noted that 30 percent of the information security incidents were due to poor user security practices. Upon annual review of the its information assurance training requirements, it was determined that AF personnel were not getting the frequency of IA training needed to keep them vigilant with respect to information security threats. Information Security is a main ingredient to a net-centric force.

**Processes to be addressed:** A review of the process determined that instead of an annual training requirement, AF personnel were given information assurance training only when they moved into a new organization. Thus, it was possible for a person to go many years without receiving information assurance training. As a result, the AF-CIO and the IL Director of Communications Operations (AF/ILC) issued policy mandating that information assurance training be conducted on an annual basis.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** As of Fall 2003, all AF military, civilian, and contractor personnel are required to have Information Assurance training. In short, over 500,000 Air Force users will receive the needed training. This will help our users to employ sound information assurance practice and, in turn, reduce the number of incident due to poor user security practices. In the future, our user training will be upgrade to focus on new vulnerabilities. Further, we will continue to train our information system security personnel at or above the 91 percent annual training level we see today.

**POC:** Lt Col Dave Biros, AF-CIO/P (b)(6)

## **Re-Engineer Information Systems and Support Processes**

**Identified need:** At the end of CY 2000, more than 3,000 legacy information systems had been identified across the Air Force enterprise. Many of these systems exchanged data via point-to-point (PTP) interfaces and contained duplicative business logic and rules. At the time, it was estimated that approximately 30-40% of our software budget was devoted towards maintaining the PTP interfaces. The extent of duplicative logic was unknown, making it impossible to determine potential savings through cost avoidance measures. These problems are not only costly to the AF, but add unneeded complexity and time to the decision process required to support the warfighter and internal business requirements.

**Processes to be addressed:** The problems of PTP interfaces and duplicative business logic are not uncommon in large enterprises such as the Air Force. To solve these problems, the AF analyzed three areas and developed corresponding strategies. The first of these areas, business process reengineering (BPR), revealed a need to communicate across functional boundaries. This motivated exchange of information concerning data sharing and business process ownership. Next, the AF addressed software development practices and directed that all applications and systems be migrated to a common enterprise environment. Last, business owners were directed to identify authoritative data elements and make those elements available to all authorized users across the enterprise. The efforts are still underway, but great progress has been made towards resolving the problems described above.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** The AF has instituted many changes during the past four years in addressing these issues. A Chief Architect for the Air Force was appointed and work began to develop the AF Enterprise Architecture. At the same time, the AF began working to develop GCSS-AF as an enterprise environment allowing integration of systems, horizontal sharing of data, and use of common services by users and applications. GCSS-AF includes the AF Portal for user interface and presentation, a framework for integration of applications and services, and an electronic data warehouse for storage of enterprise data. We are currently integrating systems and eliminating PTP interfaces. Additionally, systems are being scrubbed prior to integration to ensure duplicative logic and processes are not perpetuated. We are also finalizing a corporate strategy to complete identification of authoritative enterprise data elements for migration to the data warehouse. In addition to GCSS-AF, we are developing a concept of operations to integrate 9 critical enterprise services ultimately resulting in a net-centric 'compliant' Air Force enterprise capability. These efforts will be accomplished in consonance with our enterprise architecture to ensure consistency and reliability across the Air Force.

**POC:** Mr Dave Keal, AF-CIO/S, (b)(6)

## Combat Support Command and Control

**Identified need:** Need better Expeditionary Combat Support information and tools to improve C2 for combat support functions.

**Processes to be addressed:** Lesson learned indicate improvements are needed in the areas of organizational structure and processes; training and education; and systems integration and decision support tools.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** Air Force clearly defined an organizational structure to augment the Joint Task Force structure along with the roles and responsibilities of each of the elements and advocates the need to grow combat support C2 professionals. We plan to do this through both education and training, aimed at all ranks, as well as experience through assignments to key joint command and control organizations. In the long term, the implementation of GCSS-AF using an enterprise approach to data management and integration into the joint GCSS system will ensure real-time information availability and provide collaborative planning and operations, resulting in the greatest leap in combat support C2 capability.

**POC:** Lt Col Kimberlee Zorich, AF/ILGX (b)(6)

## Expeditionary Site Planning

**Identified need:** OIF highlighted shortcomings in Expeditionary Site Planning survey process and tools.

**Processes to be addressed:** Areas of standardization of the site survey process, a lack of credible expeditionary operating location information, the lack of standardized tools and equipment for expeditionary site surveys, and the lack of formal training for site survey responsible units and personnel.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** To mitigate these shortcomings, the AF Logistics community began efforts to re-engineer our processes in 2001. We have since then published interim guidance to the AF major commands regarding Integrated Expeditionary Site Planning, and are on track to publish a significantly revised instruction by July of 2004. Concurrently, we have developed a fully coordinated joint Integrated Expeditionary Site Survey checklist and are working to automate data input and retrieval and store the resultant data into the joint Expeditionary Knowledge Base via Logisticians Contingency Assessment Tools (LOGCAT). We are in the midst of a consolidation of systems to include the tabular data resident in the EKB with the geospatial data provided by GeoReach to enhance the quality of site planning information we provide to deployed and deploying commanders. We are also sponsoring the Visualization of Expeditionary Sites Tool (VEST). VEST is only one of two Agile Combat Support initiatives showcased in Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2004. The lead developer for the application is the Air Force Command and Control (C2) Battle lab. Results of the effort will be the capability to visualize Graphic (geospatial) and tabular data from GeoReach and LOGCAT on the same computer screen in accordance with the AF Chief of Staffs guidance.

Further, with the advent of the Air Mobility Warfare Center's Expeditionary Site Survey Process Course at Fort Dix New Jersey, we are reaching the tactical level players who are actually going to be called on to perform site surveys with the proper training with the integrated tool sets available now, and are arming them with knowledge to the familiarity level to operate the integrated set of tools. As a testament to the validity of the course and integration efforts on data collection, a recent graduate wrote in his course critique: "STRENGTH: Hands on, practical application with the Global Positioning System, INMARSAT (*sic.* ..satellite communications), Survey Tool for Employment Planning data input/transfer, GeoReach (graphic mapping and site survey tool), etc was outstanding.. .spot on! STRENGTH: Coordination and use of Millville Airport (representative deployed airfield) and practical application of site survey was outstanding.. .spot on!"

**POC:** Maj Duane Bowen, AF/ILGD, (b)(6) and ILE

## **End-to-End Joint In-Transit Visibility**

**Identified need:** Lack of joint expeditionary in-transit visibility (ITV) coupled with some theater distribution issues led to a great deal of lost and misrouted materiel, which in turn generated duplicate shipments from the wholesale supply system.

**Processes to be addressed:** Improve end-to-end joint ITV and provide relevant information to the warfighter.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** The Air Force has long been a leader in supporting in-transit visibility (ITV). It has deployed a single automated information system providing shipping support and sending associated in-transit visibility data to the Department of Defense's In-Transit Visibility System, the Global Transportation Network. This system supports active duty and Air Reserve Component forces in the United States and around the world, and is used to support deploying forces from other services at Air Force Ports of Departure.

A stand-alone version of our system will be released in July 04. This will allow the same joint ITV capability to be made available to austere locations. By providing a way to generate shipping documents, automated identification technology enabled labels, and advanced shipping notices, this capability will greatly enhance cargo processing and visibility as cargo flows through the theater distribution process. It will also improve current system support to the Army's Theater Distribution Center in Europe.

ITV leadership is not confined to the information technology arena. In Feb 2004, the Air Force published an In-Transit Visibility regulation (Air Force Instruction 24-238). It identifies in-transit visibility roles and responsibilities, extending from Headquarters Air Force down to individual organization at the installation level. It establishes the Air Force Directorate of Logistics Readiness as the Air Force in-transit visibility OPR. It translates DoD ITV policy into Air Force process. The Air Force continuously monitors technology and processes to identify ways to enhance in-transit visibility, and we are willing to share this knowledge to further enhance ITV support to all warfighters.

**POC:** Mr James Wakelcy, AF/ILGD, (b)(6)

## **Expeditionary Combat Support Systems**

**Identified need:** For Air Force logistics to be expeditionary, the logistics processes and systems need to be network-centric. Deployed units should not have to alter their business rules or processes when they deploy. Rather, the logistics system supporting that unit should be able to sense a change in the operating conditions and reconfigure itself to be able to support the deployed unit.

**Processes to be addressed:** Our Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) will tackle the challenges that need to be overcome in developing a responsive, network-centric logistics system. Among the processes it will address and subsume are strategic, integrated, collaborative planning, supply and munitions visibility, transportation times and nodes, better retrograde maintenance planning and control, improved end-to-end supplier interfaces, total product life cycle support, and demand reduction.

**Changes to systems/personnel:** The ECSS is a COTS Enterprise Resource Planning system that will consolidate or eliminate approximately 700 IT systems used to support Air Force logistics. ECSS will run on GCSS infrastructure. Personnel will have to understand an enterprise approach to logistics vice single silos cemented with antiquated IT systems. The system implements COCOM 57 and COCOM 129, will measurably improve synchronization of ops/logistics planning and execution, improve command and control, provide near real-time worldwide asset visibility, improve mission critical weapon system availability, and provide seamless transition from in-garrison to expeditionary operations.

**POC:** AF/ILI

**TAB**

**2**

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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## **Top Six Report**

**March 04**



**U.S. AIR FORCE**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23054



# Military Personnel Data System (MilPDS)

**U.S. AIR FORCE**


**OPR: AF/DPXIF**

**Problem Statement:** Lack of engineering discipline, poorly programmed resources, and haphazard training resulted in sub-standard performance for USAF's personnel data system.

**Status Update:** Rigorous requirements management and software development increasing user confidence. Air Force Inspection Agency to visit various bases and ensure training procedures and CMS are being implemented correctly. Total pay cases are again declining. Strategies to accelerate to DIMHRS and DIMHRS+ and de-commission MilPDS are in progress.

### Assessment

- Force Development Tool Kit Proof of Concept near completion;
- MilPDS system requirements documentation 60% complete; est completion Jun 04
- 154 of 213 total force MPFs visited for MilPDS training
  - Systems performance metrics on Web
  - Moved AFPC Secure applications to Portal in Jan 04
    - 17K vMPF hits
- Rapid requirements/development process being tested
  - Part of Personnel Lab product



### The Way Ahead

- Plan for DIMHRS migration
  - Developing acquisition strategy for AF uniques (DIMHRS+)—one size may not fit all
- DIMHRS estimated to cover 35 % of current functionality
- New requirements process and management tool being implemented—FOC Jul 04

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11-L-0559/OSD/23055



# Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS)

U.S. AIR FORCE

OPR: AF/DPXS


**Problem Statement:** Some process times continue to be slow.

**Status Update:** The Program Office (PO) has partnered with AF/ILC and AF CIO to explore possible inconsistencies in local base network infrastructure and solicited the support of bases to report problems to base-level NOSCs. The PO continues to work with CPMS on improving process performance by providing monthly timings on 24 key processes, so possible deficiencies in code can be identified and corrected. A prototype automated performance measurement process is being established at 11 WG to more precisely measure DCPDS process times and facilitate development of objective performance measures.

### Assessment

- DCPDS process timings are slowly improving, but some have not yet reached satisfactory levels of performance.
- Local base network performance should be monitored until system process times are consistent from month to month across Air Force.

### Mean Times of Performance for Selected Actions



Changing metric to reflect best and worst case timings

- Previous metric on left reflected average timings

### The Way Ahead

- The PO will continue to monitor system performance.
- The PO will continue to provide monthly process timings to CPMS.
- The PO will continue to work with AF CIO and AF/ILC to address local base infrastructure configurations in an effort to optimize DCPDS performance across the WAN and LAN. The PO will provide AF/ILC the monthly timings on 24 key processes to assist in the analysis.

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11-L-0559/OSD/23056



U.S. AIR FORCE

# Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS)


OPR: DFAS-DE/PMJ

**Problem Statement:** Pay and Personnel transaction errors cause inaccurate and/or untimely pay to AF members.

**Status Update:** DFAS continues to implement DJMS software changes and execute manual workarounds. Additionally, DFAS is training the technicians both at base and center level to increase pay accuracy.

### Assessment

- DJMS will have limited upkeep until an interim pay system is in place. Scheduled implementation date of November 2005.
- Per SLA consistently meeting goal of 20 or less days to resolve problem cases
- Potential move back to watch list



GOOD ↓

### The Way Ahead

DFAS is tracking causes for transaction errors and providing training to FSOs and feedback to AFPC.

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11-L-0559/OSD/23057



# Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS)

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OPR: AEPEO/C2&CS

**Problem Statement:** CAMS is an older system that maintainers use to key in data at the end of the workday. Its non-user friendly "green screens" are the source of base-level data errors. Its 106 base-specific databases do not provide a common data repository for timely, accurate analyses in support of strategic logistics decisions. It must maintain unique interfaces with other legacy maintenance information systems.


**Status Update:** CAMSv6R2 provided a graphical user interface (GUI). Users convert to GUI as base infrastructure/workstation upgrades and operational missions allow. As of 28 Feb 04, the average AF CAMS GUI usage rate is - 85%. CAMSv7R1 consolidates 106 databases into one central database (CDB). QT&E II begins 9 Apr 04 using 15 databases. Worldwide release begins 16 Jul with FOC 17 Sep 04. The program office is analyzing a Web Service replacement for legacy interfaces.

## Assessment


- The central database is in development test, and on schedule for worldwide release
- Technical analysis of a Web Service interface was completed in Feb 04; will be demo'd in Mar
- Funding cuts delaying conversion of legacy CAMS to IMDS
- Recent delivery of LogEA products will result in reconsideration of CAMS modifications

## The Way Ahead

- Continue to transition users to GUI and emphasize GUI use in meetings/correspondence with field. Attain usage goal of 100% by Sep 04 (previously Sep 03)
- Field the single, CDB by Sep 04; Point of Maintenance (POMX) upgrade (3.0) required for CAMS central database compatibility
- Use AF's Logistics Enterprise Architecture project to frame long-term final solution. Limit CAMS modifications to those in support of LogEA efforts



**Average % GUI Usage**



**Database Reduction**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23058



# Combat Ammunition System (CAS)

U.S. AIR FORCE

ODD - AFED/IC2&CS

**Problem Statement:** In-transit visibility (ITV) of munitions is not currently visible in worldwide stockpile numbers while assets are in "shipped" status. Combat Ammunition System (CAS) requires upgrade to enhance ITV capability.

**Status Update:**

AF completed 100% fielding CAS 1.1 on 26 January 2004 - ahead of schedule (Mar 04). This converts base level systems from client server to web-based service on Global Combat Support System-AF.

In-transit visibility - Fielding of update completed 29 Jan 04.


Assessment

Program on track to mitigate issues identified in problem statement


- Inventory variance missing; JDAM tracking represents munitions issues

The Way Ahead

- CAS web-enabled through GCSS-AF CAS 1.1 -- 100% fielded on 1/26/04
- In-transit visibility: define, execute, and field. Scheduled for Jun 04; completed 1/29/04
- Established baseline numbers to track inventory variance of selected munitions (JDAM) caused by lack of ITV- Goal for metric to report <1% variance for four consecutive months.
- Use AF's Logistics Enterprise Architecture project to frame the long term final solution. Limit CAS modifications to those that support LogEA efforts



**CAS 1.1 Fielded Percentage**



Goal less than 1% variance over four month period

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11-L-0559/OSD/23059



**U.S. AIR FORCE**

# AF Portal / GCSS-AF

OPR: AF-CIO/S

**Problem Statement:** The functionality and content available via the AF Portal do not provide sufficient value to AF users.


**Status Update:** The aggressive outreach effort has resulted in a 74% increase in users. Continued emphasis placed on content owners to accelerate movement of killer applications and essential capabilities to the AF Portal.

## Assessment

Schedule is aggressive but achievable with continued oversight and executive level emphasis by content owners to make content available to AF members via the Portal. Leveraging bi-monthly CIO/XI Executive Board to manage risk.

## Registered Users

As of 03/05/04



173K user accounts; 200K weekly logins; 800K- 1,200K pages viewed daily

## FY04 Work Plan

FY04 Summary	Accomplished	Planned
Reduced Sign-On	39	50
Po		
GCSS-AF IP Upgrades	8	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>110</b>

## The Way Ahead

- Continue aggressive communications campaign
  - Articles released in AF News, AirForce Times, Aim Points, and within AFPC
- Usability issues are top priority
  - Improving user navigation & registration
- Performance improvements
  - Heavy use of Portal during worldwide rollout is intermittently slowing response time
  - Response time under 3 sec, 80% of time; continuing to monitor with new releases
- Further migration of killer applications and capabilities for worldwide rollout
  - Delivered vMPF with 13 other AFPC apps
  - AF Fitness Management System (AFFMS)
  - Desktop integration & web-based e-mail pilot
  - AF performance report workflow & myPay

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**U.S. AIR FORCE**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23061

**TAB**

**3**

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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## **Joint Senior Leader Force Planning**



**BGen Rich Hassan  
US Air Force  
Senior Leader Management Office**

**U.S. AIR FORCE**

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U.S. AIR FORCE

## ***Where did we start?***

### ***Gen Ryan (as CSAF in 1997) Concerned That GO Candidate Pool Provided Insufficient Selectivity***



#### **Conclusions:**

**Not enough selectivity for top jobs  
in the Air Force**

**Too many narrowly  
experienced specialists**

**Too few with desired  
background and experience**

**Need specific  
multifunctionality rather than  
“generalists”**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23064



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# *Developed Senior Leader Job Database*

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- Developed through
  - Interviews with selected senior leaders
  - Surveys of prior and current job holders
  - Multiple reviews (three-star or SES equivalent) and syntheses


Structure:

	Occupational competencies		Functional familiarities	Cross-functional competencies
	Primary	Secondary		
Jobs				



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# Desired Development Pattern



Fighter pilot

Pol-mil affairs

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# *Found Overlaps Between GO and SES Job Characteristics*

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		Functional expertise	
		Deep	Broad
Position continuity	Stable	I	II
	Mobile	III	IV





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# Determined Which Jobs Could be Filled by Either GO or SES

		GO	SES
Total jobs =		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Some jobs must be military	Military occupation	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Military command	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Military discipline/combat	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Military experience	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Joint military requirement	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Some jobs must be civilian	Deep	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Stable	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Ph.D.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Civilian experience	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	Joint civilian requirement	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	O-6-equivalent job	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
"Off the table" ( <u>not</u> either/or candidates)		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
"On the table" (either/or candidates)		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

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11-L-0559/OSD/23068



U.S. AIR FORCE

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## *Objective*

**To analyze senior-leader job requirements in order to help OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services develop officers and civilians to optimally fill joint senior-leader positions.**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23069



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# ***Methodology/Timeline***

- Identify the joint jobs that will be included in these analyses (Jan 04)
- Determine the structure of the requirement taxonomies (Jan 04)
- Identify military/civilian essentiality indicators--the characteristics of a position that indicate whether the position must be military, must be civilian, or may be either (Jan 04)
- Develop Survey (Feb 04)
- Using the taxonomic structures developed above, survey joint senior leaders to collect incumbents' and prior job holders' assessments of competency requirements and military/civilian essentiality indicators (Feb 04 – March 04)

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11-L-0559/OSD/23070



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## ***Methodology/Timeline (cont.)***

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- **Analyze survey results and create a database of skill requirements and military/civilian essentiality indicators for senior leader positions (Apr 04)**
- **Produce a job book (Mar 04)**
- **Explore feasibility and utility of a flow model (Apr/May 04)**
- **Explore implications for tactical, operational and strategic joint education and training (Jun/Jul 04)**

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11-L-0559/OSD/23071



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# ***Project Administration***

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- Project manager: AFSLMO
- Oversight: Senior Advisory Group (DJS, J3, J5, J8) – meet quarterly
- Coordination: Steering Committee (O5/O6 level Service, OSD and Joint Staff membership) – meet as required
- Status: Brief DCSPers meeting quarterly and at end of project
- Resources: No additional funding needed - project will be supported within the levels of effort of ongoing RAND senior leader work for the four services

Handwritten initials/signature at the top of the page.

March 18, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Joyce and Memorial Fund

Is someone getting me a piece of paper telling me what Joyce can do with respect to helping raise money for the Pentagon Memorial fund? I think you said she could serve on the board and help. However, she certainly couldn't go to defense contractors.

Please get me something definitive I can give her, so she knows what to do and who she can call to check with if she has questions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031804-5

Please respond by

3/22

✓ 3/22

4004

18 Mar 04  
1 Mar 04

3/22  
100\*

Larry -  
She will do it -  
Do you want to  
set it up?  
3

Response attached.  
w/ CDR Nasurzo  
3/19

OSD 04002-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23073

12  
0800

March 1, 2004

0004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memorial

Please figure out what Joyce can do to help raise money for the Pentagon memorial. She would love to do it, but we don't know what is legal and proper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-2

.....  
Please respond by 3/2/04

*3/8*  
*To Ray DuBois*  
*Please let's discuss*  
*D. Di Rita*

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*3/8*

*1 Mar 04*

OSD 04002-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23074



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

SUBJECT: Fundraising by Mrs. Rumsfeld for the Pentagon Memorial

17 MAR 2004

- In the attached snowflake you asked what Mrs. Rumsfeld could do to help raise money for the Pentagon Memorial.
- After consultation with the DoD General Counsel (Standards of Conduct Office), I recommend that she offer to serve on the Executive Committee of the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.), a private non-profit foundation raising money for the Memorial. See attached listing of the current membership.
- Because Mrs. Rumsfeld is not a Federal employee she is not limited by the restrictions on fundraising and endorsement that apply to DoD personnel. Thus, she can normally participate in private fundraising activities conducted by the PMF, Inc.
- However, as the wife of the Secretary she should exercise the following cautions:
  - Do not use property, official time of DoD personnel or resources of DoD
  - Do not imply the official endorsement of DoD
  - Do not solicit from prohibited sources such as Defense contractors
  - Do not solicit from DoD employees/ subordinates of the Secretary

COORDINATION: DoD GC SOCO

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Bill Brazis, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/23075

OSD 04002-04

12  
2800

March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memorial

Please figure out what Joyce can do to help raise money for the Pentagon memorial. She would love to do it, but we don't know what is legal and proper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-2

.....  
Please respond by 3/2/04

*3/8*  
*To Ray Dubois*  
*Please let's discuss*  
*DR*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/8*

OSD 04002-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23076

## **Pentagon Memorial Fund: Executive Committee**

### General H. Hugh Shelton

General Shelton served two terms as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and counsel to the President. He was the Chairman on September 11, 2001 when the Pentagon was attacked.

General Shelton received the Congressional Gold Medal, the highest award conferred by the U.S. Congress. Among his other numerous military awards are four Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Army Distinguished Service Medals, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal for Valor and the Purple Heart. He has received decorations by fifteen foreign governments.

General Shelton has retired from military service and serves as president of international operations at MIC Industries. He resides in Virginia with his wife, Carolyn, who served on the jury that selected the Pentagon Memorial design.

### Norman R. Augustine

Chairman, Executive Committee, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Retired chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation  
Former Under Secretary of the Army

Mr. Augustine resides in Potomac, MD

### Edward A. Brennan

Executive Chairman, AMR

Member of the AMR Corporation Board of Directors since August 1987, was named Executive Chairman of AMR and American Airlines in April 2003. He is the retired Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Sears, Roebuck and Co.

Brennan was named President and Chief Operating Officer of the Sears, Roebuck corporation in 1984, with responsibility for Sears Merchandise Group, The Allstate Insurance Co., Dean Witter Reynolds and the Coldwell Banker Real Estate Group. He served as Chief Executive Officer of Sears from January 1986 to August 1995.

In addition to AMR, Brennan serves on the boards of The Allstate Corporation, 3M, Exelon Corporation and McDonald's Corporation. He is a member of The Business Council.

Mr. Brennan resides in Chicago, IL.

Kurt Campbell

Senior vice president and director of International Security, CSIS

Kurt M. Campbell is senior vice president, director of the International Security Program, and holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security at CSIS. He joined the Center from government service in 2000. In addition to his CSIS duties, he is director of the Aspen Strategy Group, a contributing writer to the New York Times, and a frequent on-air essayist for National Public Radio's All Things Considered. He has also been a consultant to ABC News. Previously, Campbell served in several capacities in government, including as deputy assistant secretary of defense at the Pentagon (1995-2000), as a director on the National Security Staff (1994), as deputy special counselor to the president for NAFTA on the White House staff, and as a White House fellow (class of 1992-1993) at the Department of the Treasury.

Campbell was also associate professor of public policy and international relations and assistant director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He was a reserve officer in the U.S. Navy serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Special Advisory Group to the chief of naval operations. He is the author or editor of several books, including *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism* (CSIS, 2001), as well as a contributor to numerous journals, magazines, and newspapers.

Mr. Campbell resides in Washington, DC.

John W. Dounlass,

President and CEO, AIA  
Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Mr. Douglass became the seventh full-time chief executive of the association in September 1998. Before that he served for nearly three years as assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition of defense systems for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.

Before being named a civilian Navy executive, Mr. Douglass was with the Senate Armed Services Committee where he was foreign policy and science and technology advisor to Senator Sam Nunn and served as lead minority staff member for defense conversion and technology reinvestment programs.

Earlier Mr. Douglass completed 28 years of U.S. Air Force service and retired as a brigadier general in 1992. His numerous Air Force assignments included service as the deputy U.S. military representative to NATO as well as director of plans and policy and

director of science and technology in the office of the secretary of the Air Force. He also served as special assistant to the under secretary of defense for acquisition.

Within the executive branch, Mr. Douglass was director of national security programs for the White House, responsible for formulation policy on a broad range of national security issues. He served as President Reagan's personal representative to the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management chaired by David Packard.

Kenneth Fisher:

Kenneth Fisher, a partner in the prestigious New York City firm, Fisher Brothers, continues a four-generation tradition in real estate. As a 24 year veteran in the real estate industry, Kenneth Fisher is responsible for the ongoing leasing and management of more than six million square feet of class A commercial space in midtown Manhattan, covering Park Avenue, Sixth and Third Avenues, as well as overseeing the daily marketing nuances of Fisher Brothers.

Ken joined the Fisher House Foundation, a not-for-profit organization that constructs comfort homes for families of hospitalized military personnel and veterans, in 1999. Begun in 1990 by his late uncle Zachary, the program currently operates 32 such houses at military bases and VA medical centers across the country, and overseas in Germany. The program aids more than 8,500 families every year, and plans to open two new Fisher Houses by the end of 2004. In May, 2003, he succeeded his father, Arnold, as Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Foundation.

Ken is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Intrepid Museum Foundation .

Paul Stern

Paul G. Stern, partner and co-founder of Arlington Capital Partners, and partner and co-founder of Thayer Capital Partners, was elected to the Dow Board of Directors in 1992. He currently serves on the Audit Committee, the Compensation Committee and the Public Interest Committee.

Paul is a partner and co-founder of Arlington Capital Partners 1999 to date and a partner and co-founder of Thayer Capital Partners 1995 to date. He serves as a special partner at Forstmann Little & Co. 1993-95. Northern Telecom Limited - Chairman of the Board 1990-93, Chief Executive Officer 1990-93, Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 1989-90, Director 1988-93. President, Unisys Corporation (formerly Burroughs Corporation) 1982-87. Director of Whirlpool Corporation. Board member of the University of Pennsylvania's School of Engineering and Applied Science and the Wharton School. Treasurer, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. Board of Trustees, Library of Congress. Board member, Business Executives for National Security.

Mr. Stern resides in Potomac, MD.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO:

Ray DuBois

Larry Di Rita

3/23

OSD 04002-04

0004

23 Mar 04

1 Mar 04

3/22

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Ray

Can you get this  
going please?

Work with GC

and Mary Clare

(Re letter, as appropriate)

OSD 04002-04

Thanks  
11-L-0559/OSD/23081

*[Signature]* 3/23  
Army Di Rita

March 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cost of the ~~War~~

Yesterday we talked to the President about the cost of the war. I need to get clarity.

Please pull together whoever you need to and get a briefing for me that you have seen and are comfortable with, so we know what our Department's position ought to be and how we ought to handle it

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-25

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

*INFO*  
**ACTION MEMO**

March 17, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Cost *of* the War

- The Secretary asked for a briefing on what the Department's position should be with regards to the FY 2005 cost of the war (TAB A).
- TAB B is a short briefing that addresses the Secretary's concerns. It includes three sections: the reasons why no funds were requested in the FY 2005 President's budget; how the Components will finance the operating costs until a Supplemental is enacted; and an explanation why Afghanistan costs remain so high.

COORDINATION: The Joint Staff and PA&E concur (TAB C).

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23083

OSD 04017-04

8 Mar 1030  
Scanned

March 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cost of the War

Yesterday we talked to the President about the cost of the war. I need to get clarity.

Please pull together whoever you need to and get a briefing for me that you have seen and are comfortable with, so we know what our Department's position ought to be and how we ought to handle it

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-25

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

11-L-0559/OSD/23084

UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# ***COST OF THE WAR***



## **Briefing To The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)**

**March 16, 2004**

~~**CLOSE HOLD PRE DECISIONAL**~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23085



~~CLOSE HOLD PREDECISIONAL FOUO~~

USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War*

## SecDef March 8 tasking

*Yesterday we talked to the President about the cost of the war. I need to get clarity.*

*Please pull together whoever you need to and get a briefing for me that you have seen and are comfortable with, so we know what our Department's position ought to be and how we ought to handle it.*

8 pm 10:30  
Scanned  
March 16 2004

TO : Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM : Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Cost of the War

Yesterday we talked to the President about the cost of the war. I need to get clarity.

Please pull together whoever you need to and get a briefing for me that you have seen and are comfortable with, so we know what our Department's position ought to be and how we ought to handle it.

Thanks

DRM:ab  
03/16/04

Please respond by 3/26/04

~~CLOSE HOLD PREDECISIONAL FOUO~~

USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War*

- 1. Reasons that no funds were requested in the FY 2005 President's budget.**
- 2. How the Components can absorb initial costs thru March/April 2005.**
- 3. Reasons that Afghanistan costs remain so high.**



USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War*~~CLOSE HOLD PREDECISIONAL FOUO~~**(1) Reasons that no funds were requested in the FY 2005 President's budget:**

- As a normal business practice, the DoD does not request funding for contingency operations in the Presidents' budget.
- Political situation is too uncertain to accurately define costs and may change the DoD mission.
  - Transition to Iraqi sovereignty.
  - Presidential election in June in Afghanistan .
- Military requirements continue to evolve.
  - Force protection needs - SAPI plates, Up-Armored HMMWV.
  - Evolving missions - training Iraqi security forces.
  - Force Package changes - Sending the Marine Expeditionary Force.
  - Future force structure and footprint are undetermined.



**USD (Comptroller)**

*Cost of the War*

~~CONFIDENTIAL/REDECISIONAL 1000~~

**(1) Reasons that no funds were requested in the FY 2005 President's budget (cont'd)**

- **Threat is decentralized.**
  - **Different types of insurgents: former regime loyalists; Al-Qaeda; Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; criminals; Taliban.**
  - **Civil tensions between different internal factions.**
  
- **Factors impacting the establishment of Iraqi Security Forces.**
  - **Quantity and capability of the new**
  - **Role of UN and depth of international**
  - **Stability of surrounding**
  - **Training and mentoring**

~~CLOSE HOLD PREDECISIONAL FOUO~~

USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War*

### Summary:

- To include the war costs in the FY 2005 budget we needed to understand the costs and be able to accurately estimate funds by appropriation.
- Without that we would have needed a large flexible transfer account (i.e., Iraq Freedom Fund) so that in execution we could move money where needed. However,
  - >Congress has been resistant to allow a large flexible fund.
  - Congress has also been uncomfortable with adding significant special transfer authority in prior supplementals.



USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War***(2) How the Components can absorb initial costs thru March/April 2005:**

- FY 2003 demonstrates that the Services can absorb and cash flow the initial cost of operations.
  - Difficult, but doable.
  - Needs to be managed closely.
- Components will defer some expenses to the end of the fiscal year.
  - Facility Sustainment, Restoration,
  - Depot
  - Base Operating
- To make sure the Components have the cash they need, a larger percentage of their annual funding would be issued at the start of the fiscal year.
- Early FY2005 approval of the supplemental will be needed.

~~CLOSE HOLD PREDECISIONAL T O O O~~

USD (Comptroller)

*Cost of the War*

(3) Reasons that Afghanistan costs remain so high:

- 46,000 personnel in the operation – approximately 13,000 in country, and 33,000 in support.
- Geography – remote and large nation (250,000 square miles).
  - High cost of transportation - lack of roads, requires helicopters transport.
  - Higher tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset requirement.
- Infrastructure (communications, electrical, water, etc.) is primitive, forcing U.S. to build or transport everything.
- Security - continued al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency.
- Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) – required for all support.

COORDINATION PAGE

PA&E

The Joint Staff (J8)

Mr. Kreig

Gen Cartwright

March 16,2004

March 16,2004

COORDINATION PAGE

Subject: Cost of the War, Briefing for the SecDef

PA&E

The Joint Staff (J8)



---

MAR 16 2004

---

COORDINATION PAGE

Subject: Cost of the War, Briefing for the SecDef

PA&E

The Joint Staff (J8)

A handwritten signature in black ink, written over two horizontal lines. The signature is stylized and appears to be a name with a long, sweeping underline.

March 17, 2004

000.M

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Op-ed

Someone suggested that you do an op-ed piece that would be in the press the day before or the day of my testimony on March 23, laying out your view of it. I think it is a good idea.

DHR:dh  
031704-12

10 MAR 24

OSD 04035-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23096

3/19  
1400

120

8 10 PM

3/20

TO: Rill Winkenwerder  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*  
DATE: ~~February 26~~ <sup>March 1</sup> 2004  
SUBJECT: **Suicide and Depression**

Please draft a **letter** from me to Senator Dominici responding to **this** question as you have indicated.

Thanks.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Laura Di Rienzo  
3/25

782

DHR/act  
022604 05

Attach: *Winkenwerder memo to SD 2/17/04 Re: Suicide*

\_\_\_\_\_

*M 3/29* → *Jack DeF...* *3/29*

Iman 04

Laura Di Rienzo  
3/29

2/18  
1200



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

February 17 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, **ASD** (HEALTH AFFAIRS)  
SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression--SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

- The Office of Legislative Affairs has made several attempts to schedule a presentation, and we are prepared to brief Senator Domenici at his convenience.
- The suicide rate in-theater is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services (TAB B). Suicide rates for the Services have remained in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year, while the civilian rate (matched by age and gender) is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year.
  - There have been 22 medical examiner confirmed suicides in the Iraqi theater ( 18 **Army**, 2 Navy and 2 Marine Corps). (Each service Criminal Investigation Division provides the final determination.)
  - The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 13.5/100,000/year, compared against an overall Service rate of 11.6/100,000/year
  - The Marine **Corps** reports an in-theater rate of 5.3/100,000/year.
  - The Navy has experienced 2 confirmed suicides; with conservative estimates of the size of the naval force in theater, the rate would be less than the overall Service rate of 11.7/100,000/year.
  - The Air Force reports no suicides in theater.
- Each Service **has** a Suicide Prevention Program; I have reviewed them all. The **Army**, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program, consisting of
  - A formal training program, Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), to educate leaders and service members.
  - Combat **Stress** Control units assigned throughout the theater
  - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R)

*Viewed by U. L. Han 17 Feb 04*

Attachments:  
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	2/26
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/18

Prepared **By**: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/23098

USD 02513-04

October 16, 2003

TO Bill Winkenwerder  
CC Powell Moore  
David Chu  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following. Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DRK:ah  
101503-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

11-L-0559/OSD/23099

*11/21/03*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 30 2004

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Pete,

I wanted to provide you some follow up to the phone conversation we had about military suicides. We have investigated this issue and found that the suicide rates for all of the Services, both total rates and rates within the theater of Operation Iraqi Freedom are generally consistent with the rates that they have experienced for the period 1990-2003. Suicide rates for the Services over that period have been in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year.

There have been 27 cases of suicide in the Iraqi theater (23 Army, 2 Navy, 2 Marine) which have been confirmed by the criminal investigation divisions of each Service. The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 17.3 per year, compared to an overall Army rate of 12.8 per 100,000. While the in-theater rate is higher than the overall rate, it is lower than 20 per 100,000 per year, the rate of a civilian population of the same age and gender.

Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program. The Army, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program consisting of formal training (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training), Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater, and the Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities prior to, during, and post-deployment. While deployed, Service members are trained to recognize sources of stress and the symptoms of depression, including thoughts of suicide, in themselves and others. In addition, there is high awareness among command leadership regarding mental health and stress issues.

Mental health care is available in-theater to handle any problems that might arise. After returning home, help for any mental health issues, including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, is available through the Military Health System for active duty and retired Service members, or through the Veterans Health Administration for non-retired veterans. Every returning Service member is carefully screened for mental health problems with the post-deployment medical assessment process using a thorough questionnaire and an interview with a medical provider.

702

30 MAR 04 1 MAR 04




11-L-0559/OSD/23100

OSD 04047-04

I hope this information is useful. Bill Winkenwerder, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, has more information if you would like to discuss it with someone.

With best wishes,

Thank for  
your call -  
D

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Winkenwerder". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET  
MAR 15 2004

HEALTH AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

MAR 15 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *W. Bill Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Domenici on Suicide and Depression

- You requested a written reply to Senator Domenici based on the previous response. (TAB B)
- The letter of response (TAB A) provides information about suicide rates that is current as of the date of this memo. The rates for the Army differ from those in the previous info memo because Army Criminal Investigations Division has determined that three previously undetermined deaths were suicides.

702

RECOMMENDATION: The Secretary of Defense sign the letter at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: COL Burke, C&PP, (b)(6) CDOCS# 61616,61480

15 Mar 04 1 Mar 04

11-L-0559/OSD/23102

OSD 04047-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici  
United States Senate  
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Domenici,

Thank you for your inquiry about suicides in the Army. We have investigated this issue and found that the suicide rates for all of the Services, both total rates and rates within the theater of Operation Iraqi Freedom are generally consistent with the rates that they have experienced for the period 1990-2003. Suicide rates for the Services over that period have been in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year.

There have been 27 cases of suicide in the Iraqi theater (23 Army, 2 Navy, 2 Marine) which have been confirmed by the criminal investigation divisions of each Service. The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 17.3 per year, compared to an overall Army rate of 12.8 per 100,000. While the in-theater rate is higher than the overall rate, it is lower than 20 per 100,000 per year, the rate of a civilian population of the same age and gender.

Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program. The Army, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program consisting of formal training (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training), Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater, and the Deployment Cycle/Support Program which includes activities prior to, during, and post-deployment. While deployed, Service members are trained to recognize sources of stress and the symptoms of depression, including thoughts of suicide, in themselves and others. In addition, there is high awareness among command leadership regarding mental health and stress issues.

Mental health care is available in-theater to handle any problems that might arise. After returning home, help for any mental health issues, including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, is available through the Military Health System for active duty and retired Service members, or through the Veterans Health Administration for non-retired veterans. Every returning Service member is carefully screened for mental health problems with the post-deployment medical assessment process using a thorough questionnaire and an interview with a medical provider.

We regard each suicide that occurs within the U.S. military as a tragic event; one is too many. I thank you for your concern for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. My Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, Dr. William Winkenwerder, is available to provide you a more detailed briefing on these issues at your convenience.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/23103

**Depression and Suicide**

**COORDINATIONS**

**CoS (HA)**

3/8/04

**PDASD (HA)**

3/15/04

**ASD (LA)**

Oliver Shan 3/11/04

**USD (P&R)**

J.S.C. Chan

12 Mar 04



0605D

8 Mar 04

11-L-0559/OSD/23105

OSD 04053-04

March 8, 2004

O  
OSD

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Action Photo

Please give me a good action photograph of me (alone), with some kind of animation. I would like to sign it and then have it sent to the (b)(6)

(b)(6). They asked for the photo.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-26

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

8 MAR 04

8 MAR 04

1 March 2005


TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Attached is a copy of a greeting card (I kept the original, needless to say!) that I think you'll find encouraging – let me put it that way.

Regards,



Attach.  
Benedetti card to SecDef

DHR:Jh  
022805-12

3355D

1 MAR 05

242204

OSD 04075-05

335 57

A \* M \* E \* R \* I \* C \* A



24 Dec 04



UNITED WE STAND!

There are no words to  
express my **CS** for you.

The garbage dumped on you  
daily by the media. This  
media that seems happy  
to exploit everything  
in the war. Especially

I'm sure the military  
is watching our backs and  
you're watching them. Though  
I'm getting up there in age,  
54. To me you and vice  
President Cheney are the  
best men in America,  
next to my husband.

## GOD BLESS AMERICA

The Soldiers,  
President Bush  
Vice President Cheney  
and you Mr. Rumsfeld

TAB A

326

December 27, 2003

TU: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not far much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoemaker talk to him and see what he has to say. He is an interesting man, very bright, He is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-27 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

27 Dec 03

OSD 04082-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23110

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1632-04  
19 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *19/03/19*

SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

- **Question.** "Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth. Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, and I are meeting with Congressman Jim Marshall regarding this matter on 23 March.
- **Analysis.** After the meeting, we will report on insights from Congressman Marshall at your earliest opportunity.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

CSA

Prepared By: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/NG; (b)(6)

OSD 04082-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23111

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas ~~about~~ using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week ~~vars~~ and not for much else. ~~Re~~ says they like to do it and do it well. ~~He~~ says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk ~~to~~ him and see what he has to say. ~~We~~ is an interesting man, very bright ~~He~~ is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-27 (to computer)

.....  
Please respond by

1/31/04

11-L-0559/OSD/23112

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Office of the Chief of Staff, COL Campbell 16 March 2004  
**US** Army



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

2-Feb-04 11:23 AM

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
 Through: LTG Craddock (has seen, show SecDef)  
 From: Cathy Mainardi  
 Subject: Christening of the USS Paul Nitze

Sir, the USS Paul Nitze will be christened on April 17th 2004 @  
 Bath Iron Works in Maine. Your schedule is currently open if you would  
 like to attend.

Accept \_\_\_\_\_ Regret  Other \_\_\_\_\_

Thank You,  
 Cathy

001150

Exec Sec 2/26  
 pls Have Carrie Sue draft  
 short note to  
 Mrs Nitze  
 J. R. L.

ESC →

To: MRS Nitze

CARRIE SUE

FORAC

THANKS

1M 2/27

2 February 26 2004

OSD 04089-04

January 26, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9

SUBJECT: Christening of USS Paul Nitze

Please get me the details on when the ship, the Paul Nitze, is going to be christened and what the plans are for it. I think it is in April.

I saw Mrs. Nitze the other day, and she asked me about it. She apparently had just been told the date.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012604-8

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

*Response attached  
1/27*  
*I should have it  
by COB today.*  
*W/ADEN*

001.1SD

26 Jan 04

OSD 04089-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23115

March 16, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paul Nitze's Widow

I had a letter in here today to Mrs. Paul Nitze, and I said get her correct name. I think her last name is (b)(6) and I think her first name is (b)(6) but we should check with Joyce and find out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031604-9



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~Sent email 3/18 to MR~~      ~~Don not know!~~

Mrs (b)(6)

(b)(6)

*See  
advis*

001.15D

160304 26 Jan 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 19 2004

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

I regret that I will not be able to attend the christening of the USS Paul Nitze on April 17<sup>th</sup>.

Please accept my best wishes to you and Paul. This is a well-deserved tribute for a very special patriot.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

001,15D

19 Mar 04 26 Jan 04

OSD 04089-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23117



E SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Name

(D)

Dear

(b)(6)

I regret that I will not be able to attend the christening of the USS Paul Nitze on April 17<sup>th</sup>.

Please accept my best wishes to you and Paul. This is a fine tribute ~~to~~ a Paul Nitze,

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Well deserved

Ask Joyce  
her name

January 13, 2004

660

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: LTG John Craddock  
VADM Staser Holcomb (Ret.)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army/Joint Positions

My impression is that when **we** are approving people for Army jobs, we are in fact approving them for joint **jobs**, but we are not taking that into account. That would **be true**, for example, with Metz. I did not take into account **his** probable role in **Iraq**.

How do we change the system so that I am properly informed **of things like that**?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011304-8

.....  
Please respond by 1/20/04

OSD 04094-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/23119



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1625-04  
19 March 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBMY 3/17*

SUBJECT: Army/Joint Positions

- **Question.** "My impression is that when we are approving people for Army jobs, we are in fact approving them for joint jobs, but we are not taking that into account. That would be true, for example, with Metz. I did not take into account his probable role in Iraq. How do we change the system so that I am properly informed of things like that?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** All Service three-star command billets are potential warfighters in the joint environment. As such, the Services will identify in all future nomination packages any known or probable joint general or flag officer duty requirements associated with three-star Service command positions.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff (b)(6)

OSD 04094-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23120

January 13, 2004

660

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
VADM Staser Holcomb (Ret.)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Army/Joint Positions

My impression is that when we are approving people for **Army** jobs, we are in fact approving them for joint jobs, but **we** are not taking that into account. That would be true, for example, with Metz. I did not take into account **his** probable role in Iraq.

How do we change the system so that I am properly informed of things like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011304-8

.....  
Please respond by 1/20/04

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

Army Chief, General Officer Management Office	COL Daniel V. Bruno	Concur 30 January 2004
Navy Flag Officer Management Office	CDR James Housinger	Concur 25 February 2004
USMC	Col Van Dyke	Concur 25 February 2004
USAF	Col Shelby Ball	Concur 24 February 2004



72  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

your committee

March 19, 2004 - 6:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *Ampl. & when 19/02/04*  
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Advisory Committee on Military Compensation  
--SNOWFLAKE

- We have contacted all the individuals whom you indicated would be good choices for the Advisory Committee (Tab A).
- Eight have indicated an interest in serving, and in almost every case, a strong interest: Denny, Van Alstyne, Anderson, Cook, Jannotta, Oi, Tracy and White. (Mr. Denny, however, will be out of the country about one third of the time this year.) These eight give us a good potential balance of political experience, bipartisanship, academic talent, business knowledge, and military service. Marty Hoffman would serve, but reluctantly, given his other activities on your behalf.
- Unfortunately, Frank Carlucci and Don Rice, your two leading choices for chairman, both declined: Mr. Carlucci for health reasons, and Dr. Rice for a variety of reasons (although he would be glad to serve on other Departmental panels).
- As you recall, we are aiming for a panel of seven, including the chair. We could choose the chair from one of the eight interested in serving, or we could ~~turn~~ to a new candidate. If the latter, one possibility might be retired Admiral Don Pilling, now the president of the Logistics Management Institute.

334

19 Mar 04

**Recommendation:** Pick a chair from a new list that includes Admiral Pilling as a candidate, and appoint balance of panel from the eight interested in serving.

Pick chair from 8?	Yes _____	No _____
If No, Approve Admiral Pilling?	Yes _____	No _____
Other chair candidates?	_____	
Preference for balance of Panel?	_____	

w/o Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23123

with TSA since 3/22/04 17:39

*Poll Dr. Chu talked to Mr. Patterson 4/29/04 & a new person will be submitted 04/29-04*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO  
ACTION

DATE: 19 MAR 2004

March 19, 2004 - 6:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *Approved by David S. C. Chu*  
*19 Mar 2004*

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Advisory Committee on Military Compensation  
--SNOWFLAKE

- We have contacted all the individuals whom you indicated would be good choices for the Advisory Committee (Tab A).
- Eight have indicated an interest in serving, and in almost every case, a strong interest: Denny, Van Alstyne, Anderson, Cook, Jannotta, Oi, Tracy and White. (Mr. Denny, however, will be out of the country about one third of the time this year.) These eight give us a good potential balance of political experience, bipartisanship, academic talent, business knowledge, and military service. Marty Hoffman would serve, but reluctantly, given his other activities on your behalf.
- Unfortunately, Frank Carlucci and Don Rice, your two leading choices for chairman, both declined: Mr. Carlucci for health reasons, and Dr. Rice for a variety of reasons (although he would be glad to serve on other Departmental panels).
- As you recall, we are aiming for a panel of seven, including the chair. We could choose the chair from one of the eight interested in serving, or we could turn to a new candidate. If the latter, one possibility might be retired Admiral Don Pilling, now the president of the Logistics Management Institute.

**Recommendation:** Pick a chair from a new list that includes Admiral Pilling as a candidate, and appoint balance of panel from the eight interested in serving.

Pick chair from 8?	Yes _____	No _____
If No, Approve Admiral Pilling?	Yes _____	No _____
Other chair candidates?	_____	
Preference for balance of Panel?	_____	

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/23124

OSD 04129:04

6:45 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: January 9, 2004  
SUBJECT:

*(Handwritten initials in a circle)*

David Chu said there is a personnel memo here. Please get another copy of it and get it to me. I can't find it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010904.03

*1/22*  
*De Chu -*  
*was in discussion*  
*when you get this.*  
*D. Ritz*  
*Mary Di Rita*  
*1/9*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*M 1/22*

*ADD*  
*Denny*

*Paper attached.*

*C 1/9*

*Add*  
*Joe Jannotta*  
*Guy from Defense*  
*Hoffman*  
*Jim Denny*  
*Tori*

- Joe Jannotta
- Guy from Defense Business Board.
- Mary Hoffman
- Jim Denny
- Tori Clarke

(b)(6)



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
703 DEC 13 AM 11:53

**ACTION MEMO**

December 17, 2003, 3:00 PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 18 Dec 03*

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Charter and Selection of FY04 Advisory Committee on Military Compensation Members

- We are proposing you appoint an Advisory Committee on Military Compensation to conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation for Active and Reserve Forces; proposed charter at Tab A.
- The list of candidates to serve as Chair includes six names (Tab Bj). Six committee members would join the Chair (total seven) in forming the Committee.
- We will coordinate with OGC and White House after you approve our concept.
- The list of potential committee members (Tab C) includes representation from the academic, business, military, and legislative communities. Each has had extensive experience in the area of compensation and an understanding of the military. We have not asked White House Liaison to screen nor have we contacted any of the nominees.
- The Advisory Committee would be established for not more than one year, conducting public meetings, and necessary fact-finding trips.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Approve the Advisory Committee on Military Compensation, select a Chair, and choose six committee members (or designate others of your choosing).

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COORDINATION:** None

Attachments :  
As stated

Prepared by: S. Pleeter, Compensation (b)(6)

U20862 / 03



## Draft Charter for an **Advisory Committee on Military Compensation**

The Advisory Committee on Military Compensation will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation from the perspective of both the Active and Reserve Forces. The Committee's goal is to identify approaches to balance military pay and benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of high-quality people, as well as a cost-effective and ready military force. The Committee will be appointed for a period not to exceed one year.


The Advisory Committee on Military Compensation will perform a comprehensive review and strategic assessment of military pay and benefits with a view towards simplifying and balancing pays to maintain our competitive edge in recruiting and retention. Upon completion of its work, the Committee will publish its conclusions and recommendations and transmit those to the Secretary of Defense.

### Issues to be addressed by the Commission

- What form of military compensation and benefits are the most effective for meeting the needs of the Nation in peace and war? Does the present pay and benefits allowance system provide a level of compensation, in both peace and war, that is appropriate? If not, what changes offer greater potential to serve the national purpose?
- What provisions are appropriate for differential compensation in terms of facing danger, risk and hardship; and, what are the appropriate criteria for using them?
- What is the appropriate balance between in-service and post-service compensation? Is the present system effective in achieving these purposes? Are current policies relating to the compensation of veterans with disabilities consistent with desired goals? What changes are appropriate?
- Is the structure and level of reserve compensation appropriate for the changed utilization of Guard/Reserve? What is an appropriate structure for reserve post-service compensation?
- Should the unique characteristics of military service be reflected in the compensation system? If so, how?
- Is the relative balance between cash and non-cash compensation appropriate?


**PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY COMPENSATION NOMINEES FOR CHAIRMAN**

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
1	Hon. Warren Rudman 	Male	White	East (New Hampshire)	Former Senator, New Hampshire  Former Member, Senate Appropriations Committee  Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  Reciuent. President's Citizen's Medal
2	Mr. Norman R. Augustine 	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Princeton, NJ)	Former Chairman & CEO, Lockheed Martin Co.  Former Chair, Defense Science Board  Former Chairman, American Red Cross  Professor, Princeton University's School of Engineering and Applied Science
3	ADM David Jeremiah 	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Washington, DC)	Retired Admiral USN  Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  Member, Defense Policy Board  Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources


4	Hon. Sam Nunn 	Male	White	South (Atlanta, GA)	Senior Partner, King & Spalding LLP  Distinguished Prof, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech  Co-chair & CEO Nuclear Threat Initiative.  Chair, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC.  Former U.S. Senator, SASC Chairman
5.	Dr. Donald B. Rice 	Male	White	West (Los Angeles, CA)	Former Secretary of the Air Force  Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource Analysis  President & CEO, UroGenesys, Inc.  Former President & CEO, RAND Corp.
6.	Hon. Frank Carlucci 	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Washington, DC)	Former Secretary of Defense  Member, President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management  Former Chair & CEO, Sears World Trade Inc.
7	Hon. Bob Kerrey 	Male	White	Mid West (Nebraska)	President New School University Former Senator of Nebraska Former Governor of Nebraska Congressional Medal of Honor



**PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY COMPENSATION NOMINEES**

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
1	Dr. Walter Oi 	Male	Asian	Mid-Atlantic (Rochester, NY)	<p><b>Academic</b> Elmer B. Milliman Prof of Economics, University of Rochester</p> <p>Fellow of the American Economic Association.</p> <p>Recipient of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding public Service</p>
2	Dr. Martin Anderson 	Male	White	West (Palo Alto, CA)	<p><b>Academic</b> Keith &amp; Jan Hurlbut Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute, Stanford University</p> <p>Member, Defense Policy Board 2001.</p> <p>Chair, Congressional Policy Advisory Board, 1998-01.</p>
3	Dr. John P. White 	Male	White	East (Boston, MA)	<p><b>Academic</b> Faculty Chair of the Middle East Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard U.</p> <p>RAND Advisory Trustee</p> <p>Former Deputy Secretary of Defense</p> <p>Director, Institute for Defense Analysis.</p>
4	Mr. J.C. Watts 	Male	Black	Mid-Atlantic (Washington, DC)	<p><b>Congressional</b> Former Representative, 4<sup>th</sup> District, Oklahoma</p> <p>Chairman J.C. Watts Company</p> <p>Senior Distinguished Fellow, Mercatus Center</p> <p>Co-chair, Coalition for Aids Relief in Africa</p> <p>Board Member. U.S. Military Academy at West Point</p>

**PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY COMPENSATION NOMINEES**

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ <b>RACE</b>	REGION	EXPERTISE
5	Ms. Tilly Fowler 	Female	White	South (Jacksonville, FL)	<b>Congressional</b> Former Member, House Committee on National Security Subcommittees on Military Facilities and Installations and Military Readiness  Former Representative, Jacksonville Florida
6	Mr. Arthur M. Blank 	Male	White	South (Atlanta, <b>GA</b> )	<b>Business</b> Former Chief Executive Officer, Home Depot Co.  CEO, AMB Group LLC  Distinguished Executive in Residence, Emory University
7	Mr. Michael L. Eskew 	Male	White	South (Atlanta, GA)	<b>Business</b> CEO, United Parcel Service  Trustee, Annie E. Casey Foundation  Member, President's Export Council  Member, Business Roundtable
3.	Ms. Carol DiBattiste	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (Washington,DC)	<b>Government</b> Chief of Staff, Transportation Security Administration  Partner, Holland & Knight LLP  Under Secretary, USAF  Deputy <b>U.S.</b> Attorney for the Southern District Florida

9	Gen Billy J. Boles	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Washington, DC)	<b>Military</b> Retired General USAF  Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel  Commander, Air Education & Training Command  Member, Defense Science Review Board
10	LtGen John A. Van Alstyne  <b>Yes</b>	Male	White	Southwest (College Station, TX)	<b>Military</b> Retired General USA  Commandant Texas A&M University Corps of Cadets Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, Military Personnel Policy
11	<b>Jim Hosek</b>	Male	White	West (California)	Academic Senior Rand <b>Military Compensation</b> Researcher
12	Chris Jehn	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Virginia)	<b>Business</b> VP <b>Gray</b> Computers Former Asst. Secretary of Defense (FM&P) <b>Bush 41</b>
13	<b>David Armor</b>	Male	White	Mid-Atlantic (Virginia)	Academic Professor, George Mason University Former Principal Deputy (FM&P) <b>Reagan</b>
14	Norb Ryan <b>NO</b>	Male	White		<b>President of Military Officers Association</b> Retired Vice Admiral Chief of Naval Personnel
15	Louis Caldera <b>NO</b>	Male	Hispanic	West (California)	Vice Chancellor California State University Board of Trustees Former Secretary of the Army



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 JAN 13 PM 12:40

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM-0023-04  
10 January 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE

Subject: Proposed Charter and Selection of FY04 Advisory Committee on  
Military Compensation Members

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the proposed charter and nominees for the Advisory Committee on Military Compensation Members.<sup>1</sup> We concur as written.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Charlene D. Jefferson, USAF; J-1; (b)(6)

T. J. KEATING  
VADM, USN  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Reference:

- 1 OSD memorandum, 23 December 2003, "Request for your Coordination of OSD Control Number U20862-03"

11-L-0559/OSD/23133

U20862 /03

TO: LTG John Craddock  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: January 9, 2004  
SUBJECT:

*Handwritten circled initials 'CU' and 'L' with other scribbles.*

David Chu said there is a personnel memo here. Please get another copy of it and get it to me. I can't find it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010904.03

*Handwritten note in a box:*  
1/22  
3-29  
David Chu -  
We can choose  
when you get this.  
D. Ritz  
Larry Di Rita  
1/9

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Handwritten:* M 1/22  
1/22

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
ADJ  
Denny  
[Signature]

*Handwritten:* Paper attached.

*Handwritten:* @119

*Handwritten list:*  
Add  
Joe Jannotta  
Guy from Defense  
Hoffman  
Jim Denny  
Tori

- Joe Jannotta
- Guy from Defense Business Board.
- MARY HOFFMAN
- Jim Denny
- Tori Clarke

(b)(6)



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 25, 2005, 12:10PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM:** Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 25 Feb 05*

**SUBJECT:** League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) Group--Snowflake

- After an October meeting with members of LULAC, you asked for proposals to increase Hispanic representation in DoD (attached).
- Over the last decade, Hispanic military representation has shown marked improvement (from 5.4% overall in FY94 to 9% in FY04); civilian representation, however, has only increased from 5.8% to 6.2% over the same time frame.
- In 2000, the Department published Hispanic Employment Initiatives to guide the Services' efforts; the document emphasized recruitment, development, and retention; we revitalized those initiatives and increased joint OSD and Service endeavors.
- Recent efforts include several major outreach events, increased collaboration with key Hispanic organizations (signed partnerships with LULAC and the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities), focused/tailored recruiting programs, and increased contracts and grants to Hispanic businesses and Hispanic Serving Institutions.
- We also asked the Defense Business Board (DBB) for advice; the Defense Human Resources Board is monitoring the Services' progress at implementing the DBB report recommendations.
- Additionally, we have funded several research projects aimed at better understanding the Hispanic market and enhancing our recruitment and retention efforts.
- Achieving a diverse and capable workforce is an expressed goal in the Department's Human Capital Strategic Plan, and we are increasing our efforts toward this end.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That we continue to implement current plans and initiatives to enhance Hispanic recruitment and retention and closely monitor these efforts for positive results, providing you a semi-annual report.

**PREPARED BY:** John M. Molino, Acting DUSD (EO) (b)(6)



OSD 04133-05

**INFO MEMO COORDINATION PAGE**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

SA 2-22-67

Acting DUSD(MPP)

Bill Carr

November 16, 2004

Subsequent coordination from Accession Policy, CAPT Arendt

January 11, 2005

Acting DUSD(CPP)

Ellen Tunstall

November 19, 2004

Subsequent coordination from Ms. Tunstall

January 11, 2005

~~FOUO~~

PD USB RTR

Al R. Molina

OCT 15 2004

No suspects -  
show for Nov 1.

TO: David Chu  
Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: LULAC Group

I was glad I met with the LULAC Group.

I think it is extremely important that the Department of Defense do a better job at recruiting Hispanics at all levels - civilian and military.

Please put together a good plan - each of you in your respective areas - and get back with me some proposals.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
101404-26

.....  
**Please respond by** \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23137

OSD 04133-05



HEALTH AFFAIRS

720  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

2004 MAR 23 12:15

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: UPDATE #2: Health Issues Related to Haiti – Response to Snowflake, dated March 1, 2004

- The attached medical status reports are provided subsequent to my info memo dated March 2, 2004, subject as above (TAB A). The Medical Officer of the Marine Corps, RADM Hufstader, is providing a weekly status on Force Health Protection activities of the deployed marines. He reports no disease outbreaks or non-battle injury trends.
- For the next weekly report, I have asked RADM Hufstader for a detailed compliance report on the percentage of the task force that has completed pre-deployment assessments, completed vaccinations required for the region, transitioned to chloroquine as a prophylaxis against malaria, and any other measurable Force Health Protection activity. The objective is to ensure there is good visibility among all the leadership on these important measures.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *William Winkenwerder, Jr.* 19 Mar 04

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs),

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23138

OSD 04147-04

**TAB**

**A**

11-L-0559/OSD/23139

**INFORMATION MEMO**

10 March 2004

**FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: Medical Status Report for Marine Deployment to Haiti**

1. There are currently 1400 Marines ashore in Haiti. Medical support is General Medicine, Aviation Medicine, Surgery and Preventive Medicine. Additional capabilities arriving this week: disease surveillance, entomology, environmental surveillance, food safety, sanitation, and water quality surveillance. Casualty evacuation: H-60 helicopters ashore, C-130 in area, and ISOS on-call. Other non-U.S. medical assets are increasing and are coordinating with U.S. Forces.

2. The following information was provided by the Combined Task Force (CTF) Surgeon regarding Force Health Protective measures:

<b>Health Threats</b>	<b>Protective Measure/Control Measure</b>	<b>Current Status</b>
Deployment	Pre-deployment Health Assessment	Pre-deployment Health Assessments are being conducted. Ongoing reviews to assure complete coverage.
Hepatitis A	Vaccination/Immune Globulin	Administered. Ongoing reviews to assure complete coverage.
Typhoid Fever	Vaccination	Administered. Ongoing reviews to assure complete coverage.
Suicide	Briefing, stress monitoring, awareness	Routine pre-deployment briefing completed. Senior enlisted and medical staff monitoring individuals for signs of stress.
Enteric disease	Briefing, hygiene surveys, surveillance	Testing of local water revealed coliform contaminants. Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) or bottled water for drinking. Senior enlisted enforcing hand-washing procedures.
Malaria	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net, prophylaxis	Marines currently using multiple agents (doxycycline, chloroquine, mefloquine). CTF Surgeon transitioning all Forces to chloroquine or doxycycline as alternative. One individual arrived without prophylaxis. Corrected.

11-L-0559/OSD/23140

		320 Marines arrived without permethrin-treated uniforms. Permethrin obtained and uniform treatment underway. Monitoring continues for protective measure use.
Dengue Fever	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net.	Leadership active in assuring compliance.
Filarisis	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net.	Leadership active in assuring compliance.
Leptospirosis	Doxycycline	Environmental risk assessment conducted. Low risk in USMC operational areas. Lab capabilities being established for diagnosis and surveillance. Widespread prophylaxis not required. Individuals operating in any high-risk areas will receive prophylaxis.
STD	Briefing, awareness, surveillance	No change from previous report.

3. Situation reports are submitted to USSOUTHCOM daily and copies are received at Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

INFORMATION MEMO

18 March 2004

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS

FROM: RDML R. D. Hufstader, Medical Officer of the Marine Corps

SUBJECT: Medical Status Report for Marine Deployment to Haiti

1. Combined Joint Task Force established. New medical assets requested and enroute include surgical company (-) and a forward-deployed preventive medicine unit (FD-PMU).
2. No disease outbreaks or non-battle injury trends. One Marine with gunshot wound to arm stabilized, surgical care in Miami, expected release from hospital today.
3. Onset of rainy season will increase mosquito prevalence. FD-PMU will provide entomology and increased vector control capabilities. No change to following table since last week.

Health Threats	Protective Measure/Control Measure	Current Status
Deployment	Pre-deployment Health Assessment	Pre-deployment Health Assessments are being conducted, with ongoing review to assure complete coverage.
Hepatitis A	Vaccination/Immune Globulin	Administered. Ongoing review to assure complete coverage.
Typhoid Fever	Vaccination	Administered. Ongoing review to assure complete coverage.
Suicide	Briefing, stress monitoring, awareness	Routine pre-deployment briefing. Ongoing monitoring by senior enlisted and medical staff.
Enteric disease	Briefing, hygiene surveys, surveillance	Local water coliform contaminated. Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) or bottled water for drinking. Handwashing emphasized.
Malaria	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net, prophylaxis	All forces transitioning to chloroquine prophylaxis with doxycycline as alternative. Ongoing compliance monitoring of protective measure use.
Dengue Fever	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net.	Ongoing compliance monitoring.
Filariasis	DEET, Permethrin-treated uniform, bed net.	Ongoing compliance monitoring.
Leptospirosis	Doxycycline	Low risk in operational areas. Total force prophylaxis not required. Individuals in high-risk areas will receive prophylaxis.
STD	Briefing, awareness, surveillance	No change from previous report.

120/04

7:35 PM

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: Pay Cap

I would like to go back **and try to** get the pay cap fixed. John Handy has been working for about 25% of his pay or something like that. Why don't we go back at it this year and try to **fix** it.

**Thanks.**

DHR/azn  
021804.15

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

3/7

OSD 04149-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23143



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

March 18, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (R&R)

*David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: Pay Caps

- In your February 20 memo, you state, "I would like to try to get the pay cap fixed. John Handy has been working for about 25% of his pay or something like that." (Tab A)
- Annual basic pay for Combatant Commanders (and Joint Chiefs) should be \$175,600, but is capped at \$145,600. All other O-10s are also capped at \$145,600.
  - o Basic pay of flag officers may not exceed Executive Level III (\$145,600).
  - o O-10 retired pay is also based on the capped pay (\$109,200 using a 75% multiple of \$145,600 which is maximum for thirty years service).
- For the FY05 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department proposes the following (included in FY04 Defense Transformation legislation, but not adopted):
  - o Calculate flag officer retired pay based on uncapped rather than capped pay, and
  - o Allow flag officers to accrue retirement multiplier beyond 75%.
- If adopted, this would provide a substantial benefit to Combatant Commanders. With 40 years, one would retire at 100% of uncapped basic pay (e.g. \$175.6K vs. \$109.2K).
- In 1999, the flag officer pay cap was raised from Executive Level V. At the time, members of the Senior Executive Service, many of whom worked for senior flag officers, had their basic pay plus locality pay capped at Executive Level III. (Tab B)
- The FY04 National Defense Authorization Act set a new cap for Senior Executive Service basic pay at Executive Level II. (Tab C)
- We are pursuing FY05 legislation to raise the cap for flag officers to Executive Level II, as well. This would raise pay for a Combatant Commander to \$158,100 vs. \$145,600.

RECOMMENDATION: N/A

COORDINATION: Tab D

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared by: S. Pleeter, Compensation (b)(6)



12/18/04

7:35 PM

TO: David **Chu**  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Pay Cap**

I would like to go back and **try** to get the **pay cap** fixed. John Handy has been working for about 25% of his pay or something like that. **Why don't** we go back at it this year and try to **fix** it.

**Thanks.**

DfFR/azn  
021804.15

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

3/7

11-L-0559/OSD/23145

**TAB**

**B**

## Information Paper

### Subject: Pay Caps

- The pay of every military officer and member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) is subject to statutory pay caps based on the Executive Schedule of pay.
  - Executive Level I is \$175,700 (SecDef)
  - Executive Level II is \$158,100 (DepSecDef / Service Secretaries, USD(AT&L))
  - Executive Level III is \$145,600 (USDs - P&R, Comptroller)
- The FY2004 NDAA established government-wide provisions for SES basic pay as well as DoD provisions under the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
  - Government-wide provisions:
    - SES basic pay is capped at Executive Level III, and aggregate compensation may not exceed Executive Level I (excess carries over to the next year), until the agency obtains certification of its performance management system.
    - SES basic pay is capped at Executive Level II, and aggregate compensation increases to the Vice President's salary (excess carries over to the next year), if the agency has a certified performance management system.
  - NSPS provisions provide the Department with the latitude to establish basic pay for SES, capped at Executive Level II; allowances and differentials may not exceed the Vice President's salary (excess carries over to the next year).
- Basic pay of General Officers may not exceed (is capped at) Executive Level III.
  - At present, only O-10s are subject to (or reach) the cap.
  - So all O-10s receive the same basic pay of \$144,600 per year.
  - Allowances, paid above the cap, and are not subject to further limitation.
- The cap for flag officers was recently increased from Level V to Level III.
  - In 1999, the flag officer pay cap was raised from Executive Level V.
  - At the time, members of the Senior Executive Service, many of whom worked for senior flag officers, had their basic pay plus locality pay capped at Executive Level III.

**TAB**

**C**

**SEC. 1125. SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AND PERFORMANCE.**

**(a) SENIOR EXECUTIVE PAY. —**

Chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 5304— ...

(2) by amending section 5382 to read as follows:

**“§ 5382. Establishment of rates of pay for the Senior Executive Service**

“(a) Subject to regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management, there shall be established a range of rates of basic pay for the Senior Executive Service, and each senior executive shall be paid at one of the rates within the range, based on individual performance, contribution to the agency’s performance, or both, as determined under a rigorous performance management system. The lowest rate of the range shall not be less than the minimum rate of basic pay payable under section 5376, and the highest rate, for any position under this system or an equivalent system as determined by the President’s Pay Agent designated under section 5304(d), shall not exceed the rate for level III of the Executive Schedule. The payment of the rates shall not be subject to the pay limitation of section 5306(e) or 5373.

“(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), the applicable maximum shall be level II of the Executive Schedule for any agency that is certified under section 5307 as having a performance appraisal system which, as designed and applied, makes meaningful distinctions based on relative performance.

“(c) No employee may suffer a reduction in pay by reason of transfer from an agency with an applicable maximum rate of pay prescribed under subsection (b) to an agency with an applicable maximum rate of pay prescribed under subsection (a).”; and

(3) in section 5383—

(A) in subsection (a) by striking “which of the rates established under section 5382 of this title” and inserting “which of the rates within a range established under section 5382”; and

(B) in subsection (c) by striking “for any pay adjustment under section 5382 of this title” and inserting “as provided in regulations prescribed by the Office under section 5385”.

**TAB**

**D**

Coordination Page

General Counsel

Daniel J. Dell'Orto

March 12, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23151

March 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Active Duty for Reserve

I was told by the personal security officer that he can only stay on active duty a maximum of two and a half years as a member of the Army Reserve.

Do you know anything about a rule like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-4

.....  
Please respond by

3/26/04  
3/19

11-L-0559/OSD/23152

OSD 04151-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Active Duty for Reserve

- You asked if I know about a rule that would limit Army Reserve personnel serving as personal security officers to a maximum of two and a half years on active duty. There is no such rule.
- For the GWOT, Department policy states that involuntary active duty service is limited to 24 cumulative months, generally in a TDY status with per diem. Active duty beyond that shall be in a voluntary status. I have not approved a department-wide policy that would limit such voluntary duty.
- Army policy (attached) states soldiers may volunteer to serve beyond 24 months in a TDY status for up to six months, with per diem. If the mission is to continue beyond six months, soldiers may be placed on extended active duty for up to three years. Such duty will involve a permanent change of station, and per diem stops.
- The Army is trying to inform all commands of this policy. As far as the Personal Security Detail is concerned, Army has communicated directly with CID. Security personnel know the policy, but are not happy with the loss of per diem.
- CID is trying to make the Personal Security Detail an Active duty mission and eliminate the need for Reserve support.

Attachment:  
 As stated

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD(RA), (b)(6)





# NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM

Army Operations Center (AOC) - Crisis Action Team (CAT)



PRIME

Originator: DA  
WASHINGTON  
DC/DAMO-  
AOC// DTG: 271302Z JAN 04

Show  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**

## VOLUNTARY EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (EAD) ISO CONTINGENCY

SUBJECT>SUBJECT:VOLUNTARY EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (EAD) ISO CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

1. (U) REFERENCES:

I.A. (FOUO) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS), MEMORANDUM, DECEMBER 2, 2003, SUBJECT: VOLUNTEER DUTY BEYOND 24 MONTHS FOR STABILIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS.

I.B. (FOUO) HODA MESSAGE 171635Z SEP 02, SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED PPG FOR OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE AND ENDURING FREEDOM.

I.C. (FOUO) AR 135-210, ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY AS INDIVIDUALS FOR OTHER

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THAN A PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP, PARTIAL OR FULL MOBILIZATION.

1.D. (FOUO) AR 600-8-101, PERSONNEL PROCESSING (IN- AND OUT- AND MOBILIZATION PROCESSING).

1.E. (FOUO) AR 600-8-105, MILITARY ORDERS.

1.F. (FOUO) AR 635-5, SEPARATION DOCUMENTS.

1.G. (FOUO) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, JULY 3, 2003 SUBJECT MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD BEYOND 24 MONTHS - TASK FORCE RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND GUIDANCE.

1.H. (FOUO) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, JULY 19, 2002, SUBJECT: ADDENDUM TO MOBILIZATION/DEMOBILIZATION PERSONNEL AND PAY POLICY FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON ATTACKS.

1.I. (FOUO) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001, SUBJECT: MOBILIZATION/DEMOBILIZATION PERSONNEL AND PAY POLICY FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON ATTACKS.

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2. (U) BACKGROUND.

2.A. (FOUO) MANY RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) SOLDIERS HAVE COMPLETED OR ARE NEARING TWO YEARS OF MOBILIZATION UNDER THE EXISTING PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY (10 USC 12302), FOLLOWED BY A CONTINGENCY TEMPORARY TOUR OF ACTIVE DUTY (COTTAD) OF 179 OR 270 DAYS AT THE END

11-L-0559/OSD/23154

OF THEIR TWO-YEAR MOBILIZATION.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ THE COMMANDS TO WHICH THESE SOLDIERS ARE ASSIGNED, AS WELL AS MANY OF THE SOLDIERS THEMSELVES, DESIRE TO CONTINUE OR RESUME THEIR ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE. ONE OPTION IS FOR ELIGIBLE SOLDIERS TO SERVE IN A VOLUNTARY EAD STATUS UNDER PROVISIONS (UP) REF. 1A, FOR A MINIMUM OF TWO YEARS WITH AN ARMY-INITIATED OPTION FOR A THIRD YEAR. SOLDIERS APPROVED FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY, WILL RECEIVE ACTIVE DUTY PAY AND BENEFITS.

2C. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP REF. 1A, THE ASA (M&RA), HAS GRANTED AUTHORITY TO THE DCS, G-3, TO APPROVE UP TO 2,500 RC SOLDIERS TO SERVE IN AN EAD STATUS IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. EAD UNDER THIS POLICY IS IN ADDITION TO, BUT DISTINCT FROM, OTHER EAD PROGRAMS CONDUCTED IAW AR 135-210; ACCORDINGLY, SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THIS EAD POLICY MAY NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO OTHER EAD PROGRAMS.

2.D. ~~(FOUO)~~ ONLY RC SOLDIERS CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY ISO THE

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GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT) UP TO USC 12302 (PARTIAL MOBILIZATION), OR SOLDIERS WHO HAVE BEEN REFRAID FROM SUCH CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY ARE ELIGIBLE FOR CONTINGENCY EAD UP THIS POLICY.

2E. ~~(FOUO)~~ RC OFFICERS WHO ARE ORDERED TO EAD UP OF THIS POLICY SHALL REMAIN ON THE RESERVE ACTIVE STATUS LIST (RASL) AND HAVE THEIR ORDERS STATE THE OFFICER SHALL BE RETAINED ON THE (RASL).

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ 1,000 OF THE 2,500 EAD AUTHORIZATIONS WILL BE USED FOR FILLING VALIDATED INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA) REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLED BY THE WORLDWIDE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (WIAS). THE INTENT IS TO USE THESE AUTHORIZATIONS TO REPLACE (BUY OUT) EXISTING IA REQUIREMENTS CURRENTLY MANNED BY ACTIVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS AND TO MINIMIZE GROWTH BY PROVIDING CONTINUITY AND DEDICATED SUPPORT TO THE RESPECTIVE HEADQUARTERS. HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS, ICW THE ARMY FORCE PROVIDERS, TO FIND UNIT SOURCING SOLUTIONS TO MEET FUTURE IA REQUIREMENTS.

3A. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH THE RESPECTIVE IA ACCOUNT HOLDER TO SUPPORT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE CONVERSION OF BILLETTS TO EAD SOURCING.

3B. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL CODE EACH WIAS BILLET FILLED BY A QUALIFIED EAD RC SOLDIER BASED ON THE COORDINATION

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CONDUCTED IAW PARAGRAPH 3A. OF THIS MESSAGE AS EAD.

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOLDIERS WILL ONLY BE ASSIGNED TO VALID RC BILLETTS ON AUTHORIZED TDAIMOBTDA. HQDA WILL NOT SUPPORT REQUESTS BASED ON EMERGING REQUIREMENTS.

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ SUBMITTING REQUESTS FOR EAD.

5.A. ~~(FOUO)~~ THE ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER OF THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER, SUPPORTED MACOM/FIELD COMMAND, OR DEFENSE AGENCY WILL FORWARD A REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY EAD UNDER THIS POLICY THROUGH THE SUPPORTING COMMAND/MACOM TO HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODM. NLT 120 DAYS PRIOR TO THE REQUESTED START DATE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH REQUEST:

5.B.1. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA DOC NO.

5.B.2. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA CCNUM.

5.B.3. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA EDATE.

5.B.4. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDAIMOBTDA BILLET PARALIN #.

5.B.5. ~~(FOUO)~~ DETAILED JUSTIFICATION EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR THE

11-L-0559/OSD/23155

REQUEST.

5.C. (FOUO) FOR RC SOLDIERS CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, REQUEST PACKETS MUST INCLUDE A TAG/GOVERNOR RELEASE FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS, A USAR COMMAND RELEASE FOR ARMY RESERVE (TPU) SOLDIERS, A

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COMPLETED DA FORM 160R (APPLICATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY), COPIES OF ALL PREVIOUS MOBILIZATION/TTAD/EAD ORDERS, AND ALL ASSOCIATED TEMPORARY CHANGE OF STATION (TCS) ORDERS. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT VERIFICATION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCYVIRUS (HIV) TEST, DA FORM 7349 (INITIAL MEDICAL REVIEW ANNUAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE), OR MEDICAL EXAMINATION BECAUSE THE SOLDIER IS ALREADY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND THESE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND VERIFIED DURING THE INITIAL READINESS AND DEPLOYMENT PROCESSING.

5.D. (FOUO) FOR SOLDIERS NOT CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, REQUEST PACKETS MUST INCLUDE A TAG/GOVERNOR RELEASE FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS, A USAR COMMAND RELEASE FOR ARMY RESERVE (TPU) SOLDIERS, A COMPLETED DA FORM 160R (APPLICATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY), DA FORM 2A/2-1 OR ORB/ERB, VERIFICATION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCYVIRUS (HIV) TEST, DA FORM 7349 (INITIAL MEDICAL REVIEW ANNUAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE), CURRENT PHYSICAL, NGB 23 OR ARPC 249, AND COPIES OF ALL DD 214. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE ALL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN AR 135-210 ARE MET.

UNCLAS ALARACT 010/2004 FOUO FINAL SECTION OF 2

6. (FOUO) HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL DETERMINE WHETHER TO VALIDATE THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO FILL POSITIONS UNDER THIS POLICY BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY, AND WHETHER TO APPROVE THE RC SOLDIERS REQUEST FOR EAD UP THIS POLICY. VALIDATED REQUIREMENTS AND APPROVED REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO U.S. ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND (HRC) FOR EAD PROCESSING. HRC WILL PUBLISH AN EAD ORDER, AFTER VERIFYING THE SOLDIER MEETS ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS. HRC WILL ENSURE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION OF THE EAD ORDER.

7. (FOUO) FOR SOLDIERS APPROVED FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY RESULTING IN PERIODS OF CONSECUTIVE ACTIVE DUTY:

7.A. (FOUO) THE ORDER WILL INDICATE, YOU HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 7463, DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF

PAGE 02 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

TITLE 38, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4312 (C)(4)(B), THIS PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY IS EXEMPT FROM THE FIVE-YEAR CUMULATIVE SERVICE LIMIT ON REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER TITLE 38, UNITED STATES CODE, CHAPTER 43. THE START DATE OF THE EAD WILL BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE END DATE OF THE PREVIOUS MOBILIZATION OR COTTAD ORDER FOR THOSE CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY TO ENSURE THERE IS NO BREAK IN SERVICE.

7.B. (FOUO) CURRENT PERSONNEL POLICY AND PROCEDURES WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT DURING THE VOLUNTARY EAD.

7.C. (FOUO) PREPARATION OF DD FORM 214 (CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR DISCHARGE FROM ACTIVE DUTY). TO ENSURE IDENTIFICATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR VETERANS AND OTHER BENEFITS, A DD FORM 214 WILL BE ISSUED UP AR 635-5 TO ARNGUS AND USAR SOLDIERS ON ACTIVE DUTY UNDER 10 USC SECTIONS 12302 AND/OR 12301(D) WHEN THEY ARE REFRAD. ALL PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY WILL BE ENTERED ON THE DD 214. ITEM 26 (SEPARATION CODE) FOR RC SOLDIERS SEPARATING FOR COMPLETION OF

11-L-0559/OSD/23156

REQUIRED ACTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDE: ~~LBK~~. THE DD 214 WILL BE PUBLISHED UPON FINAL RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY.

7. D. ~~(FOUO)~~ LEAVE. SOLDIERS WITH ACCRUED LEAVE SHALL BE TREATED IAW 37 USC 501. COMMANDERS SHOULD ALLOW SOLDIERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE ACCRUED LEAVE WITHIN THE CURRENT OR NEW ACTIVE DUTY PERIOD. BECAUSE

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THERE ~~IS~~ NO BREAK IN SERVICE, SOLDIERS CAN CARRY OVER LEAVE WITH NO PENALTY SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS IN 10 USC 701; HOWEVER, A STATEMENT OF ACCRUED LEAVE WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED TO HRC BEFORE IT CAN BE ENTERED INTO THE PAY SYSTEM.

8. (U) SANCTUARY/18-YEAR LOCK-IN.

8. A. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP 10 USC SECTION 12686(A), RC SOLDIERS WHO, ON THE DATE WHICH THEY WOULD OTHERWISE BE RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY (OTHER THAN FOR TRAINING), ARE WITHIN TWO YEARS OF BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY UNDER A PURELY MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, MAY NOT BE INVOLUNTARILY REFRAD BEFORE BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR THAT PAY UNLESS SUCH RELEASE IS APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (THIS AUTHORITY IS DELEGATED TO THE ASA (M&RA)).

8. B. ~~(FOUO)~~ INDIVIDUALS WHO FALL IN THIS CATEGORY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HRC, AHRC-PDZ-RC, DSN 221-5067, FOR A DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AND VERIFICATION OF ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE. CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AND, IF POSSIBLE, AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE ACTIVE DUTY PERIOD TO ENSURE THE SOLDIER HAS FOLLOW-ON ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS. SOLDIERS RETAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY UP THIS EAD POLICY AND SUBJECT TO SANCTUARY WILL BE REASSIGNED BASED ON NEEDS OF THE SERVICE UPON COMPLETION OF

PAGE 04 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

THEIR EAD, IF REQUIRED.

8.C. ~~(FOUO)~~ HODA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL EXERCISE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO SELECT OTHER QUALIFIED RC SOLDIERS FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE **ARMY** BEFORE APPROVING RC SOLDIERS WITHIN THIS CATEGORY.

8.D. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP 10 USC 12737, RC SOLDIERS MAY NOT BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUALIFYING FOR RETIREMENT.

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ THIS POLICY DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE USE ~~OF~~ COTTAD IN SUPPORT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER WHEN MISSION REQUIREMENTS DO NOT EXCEED 270 DAYS. HOWEVER, CONSECUTIVE PERIODS ~~OF~~ ACTIVE DUTY PERFORMED UNDER 12301(D) (WHICH INCLUDES ADSW, TTAD, AND EAD) MAY NOT EXCEED A THREE-YEAR PERIOD. AN RC SOLDIER WHO WILL OTHERWISE FALL WITHIN THE SANCTUARY PROVISIONS OF 10 USC 12686 MAY NOT BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR A PERIOD OF LESS THAN 180 DAYS UNLESS SUCH SOLDIER AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVES IN WRITING THE SANCTUARY PROVISIONS OF 10 USC 12686 FOR THAT PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY.

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOLDIERS VOLUNTEERING FOR EAD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGED IN CAREER PROGRESSION. THE COMMANDER AND THE ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND MUST APPROVE ATTENDANCE AT CAREER DEVELOPMENT COURSES. THERE ~~IS~~ NO GUARANTEE A

PAGE 05 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

SOLDIER WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION/TRAINING WHILE PERFORMING EAD; THEREFORE, SOLDIERS WHO

11-L-0559/OSD/23157

REQUIRE COMPLETION OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION/TRAINING TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION CONSIDERATION DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY SHOULD NOT PERFORM EAD.

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION TO POLICY FOR EARLIER REFRAID OF EAD WILL BE ADDRESSED TO HRC, AHRC-PDZ-RC, DSN 221-5067.

BT

\*DEDICATED TO\* \$\$\$"EXCELLENCE IN\*" \$\$\$"COMMUNICATIONS\*" \$\$\$  
 ARMY SECTIONAL MSG \$\$\$

\*\*\*\*\* FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY \*\*\*\*\*

01 DA WASH DC 5  
 ACTION SAMR(\*) DAAR/CHIEF OF RESERVES(\*) SAFM(\*) (U,A,6)  
 DACH(\*) DAEN-ZC(\*) RETURN TO MRO(\*) SAPA-PLAN(\*)  
 DAJA(\*) DAMH(\*) DAMO(2) DAPE-MSO(\*) DASG(\*) SASA(\*)  
 AAOC(\*) DAMO-AAOC(\*) MARV(\*) JDNI-PT(\*) CMSDA(\*)  
 CMSDA-C(\*) CMSDA-B(\*) SAAG(\*) SAIS(\*) DAIM(\*)  
 SAIE(\*) SACW(\*) SARD(\*) AOC-AHS(1) SAGC(\*)  
 DACS CABLES(\*) DALO(\*) DCSOPS SAT TERMINAL(1)  
 DAMI-ZA(\*)  
 INFO SAIG-ZA(\*) JDNI-PT-ANR(\*) DAMO-FDW(1) DALO-ZXA(\*)  
 DAMI-FL(\*)

03 COE 0  
 ACTION (A)  
 INFO CEHECIM/COE(\*)

04 DLA FT BLVR 0  
 ACTION (A)  
 INFO DLATCC(\*)

05 HONDURAS 0  
 ACTION (A)  
 INFO JTFBTCC/HONDURAS(\*)  
 TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 5  
 #5183

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Close Window

**TAB**

**B**

March 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Active Duty for Reserve

I was told by the personal security officer that he can only stay on active duty a maximum of two and a half years as a member of the Army Reserve.

Do you know anything about a rule like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-4

.....  
Please respond by

3/26/04

3/19

11-L-0559/OSD/23160



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 MAR 22 PM 1:02  
CH-1634-04  
22 March 2004

ACTION MEMO

211

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 3/20*

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)

- Question. "Have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it. What do we have to do to get it done?"
- Answer. Dr. Chu's office and my staff are sponsoring a RAND Corporation Study regarding the joint duty assignment list. RAND is conducting a billet-by-billet review of all 9000 joint billets and will submit a long-range "get well" plan in October 2004 that will recommend which positions deserve joint credit and which should be removed. Many of the changes require legislation, and I believe the best way to get this passed is to back up the proposal with the RAND Study.
- Analysis. In addition to the study, our staffs have taken several actions to address joint duty credit:
  - Developed seven FY 05 legislative proposals allowing you to award joint credit to more joint task force (JTF) and Service component positions (TABs B and C).
  - In October 2003, Mr. Abell, Principal Deputy USD(P&R) OSD approved 343 new USCENTCOM JTF positions for joint credit.
  - USJFCOM has developed a test program to exchange officers among its Service components, allowing the Department of Defense to give joint credit to an additional 28 officers.
  - USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff identified 61 additional Service component positions manned by officers who work in the JTFs who deserve joint credit. Request your approval to give these positions joint credit (TABD).

RECOMMENDATION. Approve 61 additional Service component positions for joint duty credit.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

22 MAR 04

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

←

SPL ASSISTANT, FO-RITA	
SR MA GRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI NOSENW	3/23
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/22

11-L-0559/OSD/23161

OSD 04154-04

621

December 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Joint Assignment List

J-1

I have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it.

What do we have to do to get it done?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120603-12 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/19

Not sure SecDef  
can approve this given  
current table 10.  
Pls get a GC chop  
3/23

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/  
CDR Nosenzo  
3/23

TAB B

<b>Joint Officer Management/ Joint Professional Military Education Legislative Proposals</b>		
OMNIBUS 252/MPP 50 §662/10 USC	Changes to Promotion Objectives for Joint Officers	Makes permanent the joint promotion policy objective for the “other joint” category, which includes JSOs, to greater than or equal to Service board average.
OMNIBUS 253/MPP 51 §668/10 USC	Modifications to Definition of Qualifying Joint Service to Improve Management of Officers in Joint Activities	Modifies definition of “tour of duty” Multiple consecutive joint tours to count as one continuous tour.
OMNIBUS 250/MPP 52 §619/10 USC	Modifications to Waivers and Exceptions to the Requirement for a Joint Duty Assignment before Promotion to General or Flag Grade to Reduce Waivers	Eliminates 180-day serving in waiver by removing 180-day requirement for “serving in waivers” for selection to G/FO. Officer must complete full tour of duty in the joint assignment.
OMNIBUS 249/MPP 53 §667/10 USC	Modifications to the <b>Annual Report</b> to Congress to Highlight Key Indicators of Compliance	Modifies the <b>Annual Report</b> by adding more meaningful metrics for measuring joint compliance. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of JSO by Service/Grade</li> <li>- Analysis of Service assignment to <b>JDA</b></li> <li>- GOS Waivers by Service</li> <li>- Percent of officers departed before full credit</li> <li>- NDU fill rate by course</li> <li>- JTF – Joint Duty</li> </ul>
OMNIBUS 265/MPP 54 §661/10 USC	Changes to the Joint Specialty Officer Program to Improve Utility, and Streamline Management	Eliminates fill rate requirements and mandatory number of designated critical billets. Deletes 50% fill-rate requirement; and deletes 800 critical billets.  Allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME 11 credit
OMNIBUS 264/MPP 55 §663/10 USC	Modifications to the Length of Joint Forces Staff College and allow CJCS authority to accredit Senior Service Colleges’ JPME 11 programs.	Repeal the requirement that Phase II JPME may not be less than 3 months and allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges teach and award JPME 11 credit.
OMNIBUS 262/MPP 60 §664/10 USC	Modification to the Length of Joint Duty Assignments to Restore Equity and Reduce Waivers	Modifies general rules for length of joint duty assignment and award of full joint duty credit. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mirror DOD tour lengths for full credit</li> <li>- 1 year JTF duty for full credit</li> </ul>
§663/10 USC Late Add  Transformation Initiative	Waiver of Military Education Eligibility and Post-Education Placement	Eliminates post-education placement requirements. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sci/Tech renamed “career field specialty”</li> <li>- Removes JSO outplacement requirements</li> <li>- Removes 50%+1 outplacement requirement</li> </ul>



***Joint Officer Management (JOM) and  
Joint Professional Military Education  
(JPME): Legislative Proposals***

**30 December 2003**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23164

## *Purpose*

- 
- **Provide information on Department's JOM/JPME legislative proposals**
  - **Provide strategic approach development progress**
  - **What we can change now?**

# *Changing Environment*

## What has changed since Goldwater-Nichols?

1986

- Single threat focus
- Large force structure
- Service centric warfighting
- Resistance to jointness
- Joint operations problematic



Today

- War on Terror
- 30 percent smaller force
- Joint Warfighting
  - Interdependent
  - Capabilities-based
  - Interagency/Multinational operations
- Joint Task Forces
- Joint Experience is the norm, earlier and more often
- Synergy in joint operations





## **17 Years of Experience With GNA Shows:**

- **JOM/JPME need to evolve to current realities**
- **Combatant commands, Joint Staff set requirements for Joint Staff Specialty Officers (JSOs)**
  - ➔ **Produce more JSOs, matched to requirements**
  - ➔ **JPME occur earlier and more frequently**
  - ➔ **Better recognition of joint credit**
  - ➔ **Improve utilization**
  - ➔ **Establish metrics that measure Services' compliance with GNA**

# Proposed Legislation

<b><u>180 Day Serving in Waiver: (Section 619)</u></b>
Remove requirement that officer must be in joint assignment 180 days before O-7 promotion board to qualify for "Serving in Waiver"
<b><u>Joint Specialty Officer: (Section 661)</u></b>
Remove sequence requirement for education & experience
Automatic designation of JSO status after meeting qualifications
Eliminate 50 percent rule
Eliminate Critical Billets
Allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME II credit
<b><u>Promotions: (Section 662)</u></b>
Reduce the number of promotion objectives
<b><u>Education: (Section 663)</u></b>
Eliminate requirement for all JSOs and 50 percent +1 of other NDU grads to go to JDA upon graduation
Allow CJCS to determine appropriate length of the principal course taught at JFSC
Allow CJCS authority to accredit Senior Service Colleges' JPME II programs.
<b><u>Tour Lengths &amp; Joint Credit: (Section 664)</u></b>
Full Credit for DOD tour length and full credit for 12 months cumulative time on JTF HQ
Allow some in-Service billets to be on Joint Duty Assignment List
Eliminate 36-month tour length average and establish 2-year minimum for standard joint assignments
<b><u>Report to Congress: (Sec 667)</u></b>
New measures of merit

Tab C  
5

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23168

## *Modification to O-7*

### **GNA 86**

- **Officers must serve 180 days in a JDA prior to O-7 board convening to be eligible for Serving in Waiver for O-7 promotion**

### **Proposed**

- **Officers eligible for Serving Waiver as soon as possible JDA - but must serve a months**

- **Protects officers from board schedule changes**
- **Reduces need for GOS waivers**

## *Joint Promotion Objectives*



### **GNA '86**

- **Promotion targets**

**Current: 3 tiers**

- JSO to Svc HQ for life
- Joint Staff to Svc HQ,  
Serving In & Have Served
- All others to Svc Avg,  
Serving In & Have Served

### **Modified Proposal**

- **2 tiers**

- Joint Staff to Svc HQ, Serving In &  
Have Served
- All other officers in joint to Svc  
Avg, Serving In & Have Served

**Provides a more accurate assessment of the quality of officers the  
Services assign to joint duty assignments**

Tab C

7

**GNA '86**

**Proposal**

- Credit tied to serving 36 or 24 months
  - Services required to maintain 36 month avg for JDAs
  - "Tour of Duty" definition
  - In-Service positions prohibited from JDAL
  - Improves recognition of legitimately earned credit
  - Gives joint greater flexibility in use of officers
- USNORTHCOM ↔ NORAD, USEUCOM ↔ SHAP**

## *Maximizing Pool of JSOs*



### **GNA '86**

- **JSO sequence requirement**
  - **JPME I + II + Joint Assignment + SECDEF designation**

### **Proposal**

- **Designate all qualified officers automatically after successfully completing all JSO requirements**
  - **JPME I + II + Joint Assignment = JSO**

- **Most timely path to meeting combatant command requirements**
- **Increases JSO pool without diluting qualifications**


## Requirements for JSOs

### GNA '86

- 37.5 percent of all JDAL billets must be filled by JSO or JPME II grad
  - Services determine how to fulfill requirements
- Critical Billets - must be filled by JSO or obtain waiver

### Proposal

- JSO and JPME II requirements established by combatant commands & Joint Staff



**Joint requirements drive JSO production & assignments**

# *Tour Lengths and Joi*

## **GNA '86**

- **Critical Occupational Specialty exempt from some rules & officers on 2d joint tour have special rules**
- **Many waivers to allow accommodation of Service needs**
  - **Perception of unequal treatment**
- **Cumulative and Constructive credit**

## **Proposal**

- **One set of simple, fair rule all officers serving in the community**
  - **All CONUS officers se least 24 months**
- **Joint commander and Ser agree to departures before months**
- **Credit: full or none**
  - **Eliminates confusion ; excessive administrati**

**Provides effective management of joint officers and giv commander more voice in assigned officers depart**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23174

## *Tour Lengths and Joint Credit (Continued)*

### **GNA '96 Amendment**

- Allows officers to receive full credit if they accumulate **36 months** of duty in JTF HQs approved by SecDef for joint credit
  - To date **no** officer has earned full credit under this criteria

### **Proposal**

- Allows officers to receive full credit if they accumulate **12 months** of duty in JTF HQs involved in combat or combat related operations
  - Recognizes joint competencies the officer obtains in a high intensity environment

**Provides recognition for some officers in high demand, low density specialties**

Tab C  
12

## *Joint Education*

### **GNA '86**

- JSOs at National War College (NWC) & Industrial College of armed Forces (ICAF) must go to JDA at graduation
- 50 percent+1 of all non-JSO grads at NWC & ICAF must go to JDA
- Principal course at JFSC must **be at least 3 months long**
- JPME taught only at National Defense University schools

### **Proposal**

- No restrictions on placement of NWC or ICAF grads
  - Improves utilization by increasing flexibility
  - Allows better use of ICAF for acquisition officers
- Allow CJCS to determine appropriate length of the principal course taught at the JFSC
- Allow certified Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME II credit

**Educate and train the right person for the right task at the right time**

Tab C  
13

## *Proposed Metrics: Annual Report*

### Current Report to Congress

- Promotions to 0-7
- JSOs designated by Service
- List of COS specialties
- COS officers as JSOs & JSO noms
- Where officers were assigned after being designated JSO
- Average tour length
- Tour length exclusions
- JDA distribution by Service
- Critical position summary
- Waiver usage by Service
- JPME II grads by Service
- JTF HQs credit awarded
- Promotion comparisons

### Proposed Report to Congress

- JSO Inventory by Service, Grade & Specialty
- Analysis of how well Services fill JDAs
- GOS Waivers by Service
- Percent of Officers departing JDAs early
- Percent of NDU class seats filled by course
- JTF HQs approved for JDA credit
- Simplified promotion comparisons
- JTF HQs credit awarded

## *Legislative Summary*

- **Consistent with vision of GNA**
- **Requirements driven**
- **Expands number and improve the quality of JSOs**
- **Increase and expand Joint Education opportunities**
- **More officers receive joint credit**
- **Combatant commands, Joint Staff have more control over officers assigned**
- **Improves utilization of all officers serving JDAs**
- **Gives Congress better measure of merit in annual report**

# *Joint Officer Management (JOM)*

## *Approach*

- **USD(P&R) and Joint Staff working with RAND to develop strategic approach to shape JOM to meet future joint requirements**
- **The strategic approach will:**
  - **Establish clear goals for officer development in joint matters**
  - **Determine what current and future joint missions will look like**
  - **Identify type and quantity of officers needed to perform joint missions**
  - **Identify joint organizations' requirements**
  - **Identify education, training, and experience joint officers need**
- **Following the RAND study, the Department of Defense will determine strategic vision for JOM**
  - **Strategic vision will:**
    - **Provide impetus for policy/legislative change**
    - **Base JOM system on joint requirements versus requirements of individual services**
    - **Provide mechanism to meet joint organization personnel requirements**
    - **Outline actions to prepare future senior Joint and Service Chiefs**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23179

# *Joint Duty Assignment List Review*

## *Strategic Approach Phase II*



- After completing the strategic approach, RAND will conduct a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) review
  - Review each position currently providing joint credit
  - Ensure positions on the JDAL provide officers with significant joint experience/competencies
- Strategic approach will provide the foundation for establishing the criteria to define joint duty assignment positions
  - Create objective factors to validate JDAL positions and use these factors to recommend removal of marginally joint positions
  - Criteria will also validate adding positions to JDAL

## *Near-Term Actions*

- Identify in-Service billets for joint credit
  - Service component headquarters
    - Dual hat and cross department
    - Positions placed outside officers own department
- Assess joint duty credit for Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA)
- Increase ongoing JTF positions providing joint duty credit
- Make joint duty credit recommendations to SecDef Feb 04
- Categorize JDAL to ensure right billets award joint credit
  - Critical: Occupant holds fulltime staff or command responsibility==critically related to joint matters
  - Required: Occupant participates directly in joint matters
  - Associated: Occupant participates indirectly or supports joint matters
- Revise Officer Professional Military Education Policy to reflect CJCS Education vision

Tab C  
18

TAB D

ENTCOM	CFACC		AIRSPACE PLANNER	04	TS	013M3	AF	CAOC	DEPLOYABLE TO M3/COB/LB/SB/BB. PROVIDES AUGMENTATION SUPPORT FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OPERATIONS/CHIEF AIRFIELD OPERATIONS/LIAISON FUNCTIONS AT CONTROL REPORTING CENTERS, HOST NATION/ALLIED AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS, EMBASSIES & HEADQUARTERS STAFF ELEMENTS.
ENTCOM	CFACC		ALCT DEP CHIEF	04		012A3C	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		TANKER OPERATIONS	04		011T3Y	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER (DDO)	04	TS	013B3D	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER (DDO)	05	TS	013838	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		BATTLECAB FIGHTER DUTY OFFICER	04	TS	011F3F	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		DEPUTY CHIEF, COMBAT OPS	05	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		RC-135 LNO	04	TS	011R3G	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		SENIOR OFFENSIVE DUTY OFFICER	04	TS	011F3H	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		U-2 LNO	04	TS	011R3J	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC		ATO PRODUCTION CHIEF	04	TS	012G3	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		BOMBER PLANNER	04	TS	W011B3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		CHIEF MAAP CELL	04	TS	W011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
EMCOM	CFACC		DEPUTY CHIEF MAAP CELL	04	TS	012B3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		DEPUTY CHIEF, COMBAT PLANS	04	TS	R011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		FIGHTER PLANNER (MAAP)	04	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		KVCAS OEF	04	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		SPINS OFFICER	04	TS	011F3Y		CAM	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		ACF/CHIEF	04	TS	014N3		CAOC	The Chief of the ACF team is responsible for coordinating with CPD and COD, for planning and executing airborne ISR operations, and providing combat ISR support to air and space planning, execution, and campaign and threat assessment activities.
ENTCOM	CFACC		CHIEF, COLLECTIONS	04	TS	014N3	AF	CAOC	Chief of ISR Management Team is responsible for the collaborative effort of collection managers, reconnaissance and surveillance planners, platform sensors/liaisons, and PED centers to ensure ISR operations are synchronized with joint operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC		SIDO	04	TS	014N3	AF	CAM	The SIDO is the senior intelligence officer in the COD. The SIDO organizes and directs the operations of the ISR personnel assigned to the COD, and reports to the COD. The SIDO is responsible for monitoring and dynamically adjusting ISR collections plans, monitoring current day's ATO target and recommending roles, monitoring or reporting on situational awareness and threat information.



TAB D

GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Operations Planner	05	TS/SCI	012G4	AF	ACCE	Operations Planner. Provides expertise to CJTF-HOA Joint Planning Team to synchronize joint air operations into CJTF-HOA CONOPS, OPORDs and Fragos. Ensures joint/combined air planning is appropriately integrated into all CJTF-HOA operations. Coordinates with Joint Search and Rescue Center on providing joint air support for personnel rescue. Reviews and comments on all CJTF-HOA CONOPS, OPORDs and Fragos to ensure joint air interoperability. Provides command and control expertise for joint air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations ISO CJTF-HOA collection requirements. Provides training and education to CJTF-HOA staff on the planning, executing, and assessing joint air operations to provide a common understanding and facilitate combined/joint operations.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Operations Planner	04	TS/SCI	011S3V	AF	ACCE	Plans, executes and monitors the employment of USAF/USN/USMC aircraft in support of CJTF-HOA air requirements. Provides command and control for airlift and DV travel support for CG CJTF-HOA in a multinational/joint environment. Coordinates taskings, diplomatic clearances, and support requirements for all USN, USMC, and USAF air assets operating ISO CJTF-HOA. Coordinates with USAF/USN/USMC aircrews, their respective TACON and OPCON authorities, CJTF-HOA staff, MARGENT-DJ and US diplomatic representatives to ensure CJTF-HOA air missions are successful.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Director of Operations	04	TS/SCI	012A3Y	AF	ACCE	Plans, executes and monitors the employment of USAF/USN/USMC aircraft in support of CJTF-HOA air requirements. Provides command and control for airlift and DV travel support for CG CJTF-HOA in a multinational/joint environment. Coordinates taskings, diplomatic clearances, and support requirements for all USN, USMC, and USAF air assets operating ISO CJTF-HOA. Coordinates with USAF/USN/USMC aircrews, their respective TACON and OPCON authorities, CJTF-HOA staff, MARGENT-DJ and US diplomatic representatives to ensure CJTF-HOA air missions are successful.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Deputy Director	06	TS	011F4Y	AF	ACCE	Vice Chief of Air Staff and Deputy in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Represents the number two Airman in the JTF-180. Acts as advisor in air concerns where joint forces must interact and rely upon. Represents Wing Commander at regularly scheduled meetings, VTC's, and INTEL briefs involving Army, Marines and Coalition forces located at Bagram Air Base. Participates in joint meetings of Army, Marines, and Navy forces to properly employ Air resources in support of ground campaigns. Acts as Air expert when investigating mishaps, whether Helos, ground transport, or other fixed wing aircraft. Advises CG of JTF-180 of concerns raised by CFACC or CAOC.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE E	Executive Officer	04	Secret	097E0	AF	ACCE	The Executive Officer for the 455th AEW and Air Component Coordination Element Director in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Provides guidance concerning Wing Commander policies and Air Force (AF) guidance, to Army, Marine, and Navy counterparts, especially the J1 element. Meets regularly with CJ1 to de-conflict obstacles with fulfilling Joint Manning Document billets; coordinates actions for Awards process which involves the conferring of Army awards to Air personnel and vice versa; represents AF senior leader in personnel issues involving cross-functional duties of certain Air assets.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Strike Operations Officer	05	TS	011F4Y	AF	ACCE	Strike Operations Officer for the CJTF-180 ACCE in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. Coordinates the execution of Air Tasking Orders for combined joint operations, as well as associated taskings supporting tanker operations and Intel, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance missions. Represents strategic CJTF/Air position at meetings with Embassies, Coalition Force and Joint Force meetings. Coordinates escort missions for ground forces or other air forces. Coordinates Air Support plans.
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer	05	TS	011A4Y	AF	ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer in the Air Component Coordination Element of the CJTF 180 in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Coordinates Air Tasking Orders for combined joint airlift and combat sorties. Interacting with CENTAF's Director of Mobility Forces to ensure CJTF-180 requirements are met for its ground and air forces. Directly responsible for synchronization of air movement of senior Army, Marine, and other leaders in the AOR. Provides guidance to CJTF-180 senior staff on diplomatic Country Clearance for K's ground and air forces. Directly responsible for synchronization of air movement of senior Army, Marine, and other leaders in the AOR. Provides guidance to CJTF-180 senior staff on diplomatic
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer	05	TS	011A4Y	AF	ACCE	(see above Position description LNR 005 & 006)
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Strike Operations Officer	05	Secret	011A4K	AF	ACCE	(see above description for LNR 004)
GENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	ACCE Director	06	TS/SCI	011G4	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Director is the CFA senior air component coordination officer at CJTF-7 HQ. He represents the CFACC and coordinates COM CJTF-7 interests with the CFACC. The IRAQ ACCE Director's responsibilities include the following: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COM CJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the appointment processes. The Director supervises a team of up to 6 action officers (O-3 through O-5) and 2 NCOs. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.

TAB D

ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	ACCE Deputy Director	05	TS	D12G4	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Deputy Director performs duties as assigned by the IRAQ ACCE Director. Some of the duties of the IRAQ ACCE Deputy Director include the following: Supervise the IRAQ ACCE in the absence of the Director. Primary duty will be to manage the Plans, Operations & Intelligence (POI) section of the IRAQ ACCE. Ensure unity of effort amongst the staff; Ensure POI operations are synchronized. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Mobility	04	TS	D11A3Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Mobility is the ACCE team's primary mobility/airlift subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 airlift requirements and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC mobility agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - ISR	04	TS/SCI	011G3	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - ISR is the ACCE team's primary ISR operations subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 use of ISR platforms and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC ISR operations agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Airspace	04	TS	D12B4Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Airspace is the ACCE team's primary airspace subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 use of airspace in Iraq (military and civil) and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC airspace agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Kinetic	05	TS	011F3Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Kinetic is the ACCE team's primary kinetic operations subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 kinetic requirements and operations; and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC combat operations sections. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Intel Specialist	04	TS/SCI	D14N3	AF	C	The IRAQ ACCE Intel Specialist is the ACCE team's primary intelligence expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 ISR requirements and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC ISR agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.

TAB D

CENTCOM	CFACC		INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICER	05		3384	AF	CAOC	The IMO is the chief for all information management in the CAOC/AFFOR. They serve as the focal point for CFACC information management issues with other functional component commander staffs, works closely with higher HQ IMOs, to include CENTCOM, to ensure all required reports are up-channelled consistent with the CFACC battle rhythm, coordinates with the Joint Information Management Board as well as publishing the CFACC Information Management Plan. The IMO is intimately aware of the CFACC's information manager requirements and possesses the authority to coordinate actions and processes to satisfy essential information needs. The IMO also works closely with command admin staffs and command and control elements (command posts) of all subordinate units in order to define reporting requirements for Situation Reports (SITREP) and Operational Reporting (OPREPS). also conducts oversight of messaging services for the CAOC/AFFOR Staff to include Defense Messaging System (DMS).
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N3	CFLCC LNO OIF 0401020	04-5	TS	1050	Navy	NAVY	LNO for CFLCC in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Provides operational advice and coordination between CFLCC and CFMCC. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and the CFLCC on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N3	CFLCC LNO OIF 0401026	04-5	TS	1050	Navy	NAVY	LNO for CFLCC in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Provides operational advice and coordination between CFLCC and CFMCC. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and the CFLCC on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N1	AUGMENTATION MANAGER JFMCC-353	05-6	S	1200	Navy	NAVY	Freedom. Provides coordination and advice between CENTCOM, CFMCC, CFACC, CFLCC, and theater JTF's for joint manning requirements and personnel fill issues. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational manning requirements for joint operations and plans at the theater-strategic level. Provides expert advice on Naval personnel occupational and skills specialties to assist with assignment of joint positions for maximum effectiveness. Provides liaison between Navy Service Headquarters (DPNAV) and CENTCOM translating requirements and personnel concerns. Advises CFMCC and CENTCOM planning and execution efforts, and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands manning issues. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N1	CONTINGENCY MANNING ASSISTANT OIF 0401-022			1000	Navy	NAVY	management of individual Augmentees for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides coordination and advice between CENTCOM, CFMCC, CFACC, CFLCC, and theater JTF's for joint manning requirements and personnel fill issues. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational manning requirements for joint operations and plans at the theater-strategic level. Provides expert advice on Naval personnel occupational and skills specialties to assist with assignment of joint positions for maximum effectiveness. Provides liaison between Navy Service Headquarters (DPNAV) and CENTCOM translating requirements and personnel concerns. Advises CFMCC and CENTCOM planning and execution efforts, and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands manning issues. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N5	F2C2 COORDINATOR JFMCC-013	05	TS	1110	Navy	NA W	Friendly Forces Coalition Center Coordinator in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC and Coalition assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint, and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.

TAB D

CENTCOM	NAVCENT	NS	F2C2 DIRECTOR JFMCC-016	O6	TS	1110	Navy	NAVY	<p>Friendly Forces Coalition Center Director in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with planning, coordination and execution of all inter-agency and multinational operations and plans at the operational level to CFMCC and other commands for essential maritime and nava tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning, coordination and execution of operations. Coordinates with all relevant commands, agencies and organizations as required. Includes coalition and joint military, and other agencies and organizations as required.</p>
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	NS	F2C2 COORDINATOR OIF 0401-024	O5	S	1050			<p>Provides coordination and liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with planning, coordination and execution of all joint, inter-agency and multinational operations and plans at the operational level to focus on essential maritime and nava tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning, coordination and execution of operations. Coordinates with all relevant commands, agencies and organizations as required. Includes coalition and joint military, and other agencies and organizations as required.</p>

TAB E  
COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	Colonel Levan	27 February 2004
USJFCOM	BG Warner	17 February 2004
USD(P&R)	Ms. Earle	<b>5 March 2004</b>



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

APR 2 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)

This responds to your recent question concerning the Secretary's authority to approve the Chairman's recommendation (last sub-bullet in the 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet of the attached Action Memo) to approve 61 additional positions to receive joint credit (Tab D). While that sub-bullet is not clearly worded, it appears that the Chairman is recommending that the Secretary preapprove positions for award of joint duty credit.

Under 10U.S.C. § 664(i), temporary assignments to the headquarters staff of a United States joint task force (JTF) may qualify for award of joint duty credit if officers serving in those positions meet certain requirements. Section 664(i) envisions the award of credit to individual officers upon recommendation of the Chairman and after the Secretary determines that the officer has served in a qualifying JTF, that the service of that officer is equivalent to that which would be gained by the officer in a joint duty assignment, and that the following requirements are satisfied:

- 1.) For award of full joint tour credit, the officer has served two years or three years, as appropriate;
- 2.) For the officer to receive cumulative joint tour credit, the officer must have served at least 90 consecutive days in the qualifying temporary JTF assignment;
- 3.) The service must be performed in support of a mission that is directed by the President or that is assigned by the President to United States forces in the JTF involved;
- 4.) The JTF must be constituted or designated by the Secretary or by the commander of a combatant command or of another force; and
- 5.) The JTF must conduct combat or combat-related operations in a unified action under joint or multinational command and control (or other requirements not pertinent here).

The Department has implemented section 664(i) in DoD Instruction 1300.20. As a measure of expedience, Appendix 13 of the DoDI sets out procedures to gain the preapproval of JTF positions that satisfy the requirements set out above, except for 1 and 2. After completing a temporary assignment to a tour of duty in a preapproved assignment that satisfies the time period stipulated in 1 or 2, above, an officer receives an appropriate joint credit award.

11-L-0559/OSD/23189



TAB

4:05 AM

707

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
 DATE: February 24, 2004  
 SUBJECT: Protective Forces

When the U.N. asks us to provide protection for them but not U.S. forces, we ought to use that as a lever to get other countries to send in troops, since is obviously a choice assignment. Either we could get Morocco or India to do it rather than just moving current coalition people over to do it.

UN

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 0202404.13ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

24 Feb 04

'04 FEB 25 PM 4:12

OSD 04161-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/23190



November 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: HAG Program

NOV 10 2004  
11 08 05

Please take a look at this HAG Program and tell me what you think of it -- if we ought to be doing anything with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Paper on High Accuracy Guidance Program

OSD 04210-05

DHR:ss  
110804-8

373.24

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

- Met with The proponents
- Missile Defense Agency is interested; issue is legal/contractual.
- Inventor wants an agreement to be paid for "value" after testing - raising the <sup>possibility</sup> of a different assessment by the government and law suits by the inventor.
- MDA wants to use a legal vehicle by which they "buy" the intellectual property in advance. Inventor has no residual value.

S. M. ...

11-L-0559/OSD/23191 ~~FOUO~~

I'd leave this to the missile defense agency to solve.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

06/11/8

## High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed "black box" by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG's inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- e Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Drafted by: Keith Englander (b)(6)  
11/05/04

11-L-0559/OSD/23192



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

04 3 004

The Honorable Jon Kyl  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0304


Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG source code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MDA-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,

  
HENRY A. OBERING III  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

11-L-0559/OSD/23193



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
 7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

⑦  
 Puller 1111 file  
 4/4

INFO MEMO

March 24, 2005

FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)  
 FROM: Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, Director, Missile Defense Agency  
 SUBJECT: High Accuracy Guidance Algorithm Status

37  
 24

- The High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) is a homing guidance and missile command algorithm currently under evaluation by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the Missile Defense Agency.
- Proponents claim it can improve the hit accuracy of an interceptor against a missile, especially against highly maneuvering targets within the atmosphere.
- The HAG intellectual property is believed to be owned by a U.S. citizen living in Israel. Space and Missile Defense Center has been negotiating with the owner's representative since January 2005 to evaluate the algorithm and examine the source code.
- The evaluation is to be conducted over the next year in a Patriot missile simulation environment. During the evaluation period, the owner will retain all intellectual property rights. The government will assume no obligations and will make no commitments regarding the purchase of the HAG intellectual property.
- Upon completion of the evaluation, the government will determine whether inclusion of the algorithm improves the performance of the Patriot missile.
- If the results show reason for continued government interest, then SMDC will recommend options to acquire the defense rights to the HAG intellectual property.
- The government and the owner's representative are expected to complete contract negotiations by July 2005 and the test evaluation period is from September 2005 through May 2006.

24 MAR 05

COORDINATION: None

cc: DSD

Prepared by: Keith Englander, MDA/DT (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23194

8 NOV 05

04210.05



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

HOLD

ACTION MEMO

03231-05  
03231-05

March 1, 2005

350.09

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: *Raymond F. DuBois* Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

- In your attached Snowflake, you asked about the status of a memo you sent to Steve Cambone in May in which you raised organizational placement and access issues associated with the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight(ATSD(IO)).
- In his response to you on February 15, 2005, Steve stated: "As part of the effort to review and revise oversight, I am working with DuBois to transfer this activity to OUSD(I)."
- While Steve has shared his views with me, I strongly believe that this concept is ill-advised (1) a conflict of interest would exist, since the OUSD(I) should itself be subject to the Intelligence Oversight function and (2) the dynamic state of National and Defense intelligence argues for a careful approach, for reasons of both substance and perception.
- Taking into consideration concerns regarding the number of officials who report directly to you and the Deputy Secretary, we will examine organizational options, which include: (1) realigning the function under the DA&M or (2) realigning the function under the IG, DoD.

2 MAR 05

COORDINATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: In coordination with Steve Cambone and Jim Haynes, we will forward a recommendation to you in 30 days or less.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments: As stated

cc:  
USD(I)  
GC, DoD

OSD 04230-05

Amc 03231-05

25 MAR 05

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr., O&MP/ODA&M Staff, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23195

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

Here's a memo I sent to Steve Cambone May 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:aa  
022405-1

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/05

May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052504-14

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

*As part of the effort  
to review & revise oversight,  
I am working w/ DuBois to  
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

*J 2/15/05*

11-L-0559/OSD/23197

OSD 04230-05

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

Here's a memo I sent to Steve Cambone ~~May~~ 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

Attach  
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:es  
022405-1

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/05

*350.09*

*25 Feb 05  
25 may 04*

DSD 04230-05

May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

*350.09*

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
052504-14

.....  
Please respond by

*6/4/04*

*As part of the effort  
to review & revise oversight,  
I am working w/ DuBois to  
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

*J 2/15/05*

*25 m Aug 04*

March 19, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
 CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Non-NATO Ally Status

Pakistan

I just heard that Colin has announced that Pakistan is now a non-NATO ally.

I don't recall knowing about this.

We ought to decide who should have non-NATO ally status, and on what basis we will decide it.

It ought not be like passing out eggs at Easter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031904-4

19 Mar 04

OSD 04237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23200

November 30, 2004

000.4

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I'm told a fellow named Jack Taylor is the retired chairman of Enterprise Rental Car. He's about 80 years old. He apparently gave about \$80 million to the Naval Aviation Museum Academy Program. I wonder if someone in the private fundraising business ought to include him in their solicitation of the Pentagon Memorial. He sounds like a person who could be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
1 13004-26

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

30 NOV 04

November 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assessments in Iraq and Afghanistan

IRAQ

I think it is important that we conduct honest assessments by outside reviewers of how we are doing with security force development in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand we've just completed such an assessment in Afghanistan - good. I'd like to see it as soon as it is ready.

For the assessment in Iraq, I'd like a look at a specific proposal, including details on who you suggest to conduct it, what the time table will be, and the draft charter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
113004-27

.....  
Please respond by 1/6/05

30NOV04

November 23, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
  
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Papers

Attached is a series of interesting papers on public diplomacy, which we might want to think about.

Attach.  
The Ambassadors Review, Spring 2004, Special Section on Public Diplomacy

DHR:ss  
112304-4



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000, 7

03 Nov 04

## **Special Section on Public Diplomacy**

11-L-0559/OSD/23204

## Public Diplomacy: Reaching Beyond Traditional Audiences

*Margaret D. Tutwiler*

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Chairman Wolf, Congressman Serrano and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Your interest and commitment to public diplomacy is greatly appreciated, and I look forward to working with this Subcommittee.

In less than two months that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a much better sense and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, as well as our three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy.

Over the last two years, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United States (US) government's public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by Ambassador Ed Djerejian's Advisory Group, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today—a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.

We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation and, at the same time, work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own personnel overseas. We will shortly be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive Web site.

I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. **Our**

11-L-0559/OSD/23205

senior officials, Ambassadors and Embassy staff are out there explaining US policy, goals and initiatives. However, we can all do better.

In addition, we must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. Where we have not placed enough effort and focus is with the non-elites who, today much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many US corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We must continue pursuing new initiatives and improving older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

For instance:

- ◆ The Bureau of Public Affairs worked with our Embassy in Jakarta to broadcast year's State of the Union Address live, with simultaneous interpretation in Indonesian. One national radio station carried the entire broadcast live, millions in this predominately Muslim
- ◆ In China, growing numbers of media outlets, including official government are carrying material distributed via the International Information Chinese-language Web site and Embassy information

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans and together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30,000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide.

Since 9/11, we have organized over 1,000 digital videoconferences between American officials and experts and foreign audiences. In the past year, we facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior officials from the Department of State for foreign media outlets.

As Under Secretary, I would like to see us expand our exchange programs however we can. Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, \$316,633,000 in FY 2004, which regrettably is \$28,713,000 less than the President's request including a rescission of \$3,367,000. Within this amount, we must set priorities.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asian and the Caucasus currently collaborate in online projects on current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility with US students.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students and also high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. In addition, 70 undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the US beginning next month for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

These are the kinds of initiatives I believe we should be pursuing. A new initiative which I am exploring is the idea of micro-scholarships for learning English and for attending our American Schools overseas. The US has been incredibly successful with micro-credits for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Why not take that same concept and apply it to education and English-language learning?

However we do it, we must engage, listen, and interact—especially with the young. They are the key to a future peaceful world.

Reaching out to the Arab and Muslim world is a top priority. With regard to exchanges, 25 percent of ECA's funding will go to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17 percent in FY 2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan after a 25-year hiatus. Twenty Afghan Fulbrighters will arrive next month. Just a few days ago, 25 Iraqi Fulbright students arrived here for orientation prior to beginning their regular studies.

Of course, the Muslim world extends beyond the Middle East and South Asia. We are mindful that programs in Africa, East Asia, and Eurasia are also priorities in this context. In addition to the Arab and Muslim world and reaching out to young audiences, some of the program priorities we hope to pursue include many recommended by Ambassador Ed Djerejian and others.

For example, we are taking steps to improve interagency coordination. The new State-US Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Policy Council and State-USAID Management Council is intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy as in other areas and help ensure the most effective use of program resources at USAID. Regrettably, all too often, our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of ensuring the US's efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country.

Another program which holds promise is American Corners. In recent years, we have had good results from our American Corners program, which, as you know, are

partnerships between our Embassies and local institutions like libraries, universities, and chambers of commerce. These corners are a source for information outreach at the grass-roots level.

The Bureau of International Information Programs is working with the Near Eastern Affairs and South Asia bureaus to establish 43 more American Corners in those regions in FY 2005. We currently have more than 100 American Corners around the world. In FY 2004, we are planning on opening 194 more in 64 countries. Of these 194, we will establish 58 in the Middle East and South Asia, including ten in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

Virtual consulates, targeted Web-based outreach to cities where we lack an actual presence, may also offer a powerful tool for reaching wide audiences with general information about the United States, as well as specific information about commercial, visa and other issues. Virtual consulates can also provide links between foreigners and counterparts in the US with whom they might want to do business.

**English Teaching:** To strengthen English teaching programs, ECA is devoting an additional \$1,573,000 to these programs, creating five new Regional English Language Officer positions in FY 2005, bringing the total to 20. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English-language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a terrific example of outreach to the successor generation in Syria.

**Book Programs:** The Department has developed "book sets" about American history, culture, and values for younger audiences around the world. Embassies donate the "book sets" to local libraries and primary/secondary schools. As of September 2003, Embassies worldwide had distributed over \$400,000 worth of book sets. We are examining our overseas book buys and journal publications as well.

**Private Sector Cooperation:** I have created a new unit in my office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance our public sector objectives. We can expand public-private partnerships, initially focusing on key industries such as technology, health care, and education. There is much more we can do in the field of sports and the arts, and I intend to pursue this.

Through ECA's new Culture Connect program, America's cultural leadership directly communicates with elite and non-elite foreign youth about our country and values. We currently have ten Culture Connect Ambassadors, and we are going to expand the program this year.

Television offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy and public affairs. We are using cooperative programming with local broadcasters and exploiting new distribution channels and technologies to create a fuller, more accurate picture of the US for general

audiences abroad. Over the past two years, we have funded several hundred journalist tours for broadcast and print media overseas, more than half of which have been in Muslim majority countries. We intend to increase these types of journalist tours.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say again that we all know that there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interests and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people.

In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, "Is the activity I am doing getting the job done?" We must listen to our field force. Today the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I maintain that every American, regardless of agency or department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much effort and time. We must move beyond the walls of our Embassies overseas and foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier, and much more accurate impression of our nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and the difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning, and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood. We will continue to make some mistakes but I truly believe we will ultimately get there. We have no choice. We must.

Thank you.\*

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\* *Editor's Note: Under Secretary of State Margaret Tutwiler delivered this testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary on February 4, 2004.*

# Overcoming our Public Diplomacy Deficit

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If we are to win the war against international terrorism, our public diplomacy will have to play a more effective role than it does at present. In the Islamic world, isolating the extremists within their own societies is a goal that can only be achieved if the majority of non-violent citizens perceive terrorism as unjustified. Unfortunately, the trend is going in the wrong direction; an increasing number of ordinary Egyptians, Turks, Pakistanis and other Muslims perceive the United States (US) as hostile to the Islamic world, determined to control Middle East oil, and hypocritical in its pro-democracy pronouncements. The terrorists draw strength from these broadly held views. Public opinion surveys in the non-Muslim world (including our traditional European allies) show that similar views are present and growing. The terrorists are strengthened by our estrangement from publics in Europe.

These are challenges that cannot be dealt with by the might and skill of our armed forces. To ultimately defeat terrorism, we must also engage the Muslim world in the realms of ideas, values, and beliefs. No previous foreign affairs crisis has been so deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding, and we must address this gulf of misunderstanding if we are to succeed.

It would be naïve indeed if we failed to acknowledge that American policy in the Middle East as perceived by the Islamic world is a persistent and pervasive source of tension and hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, policy disagreements alone cannot account for the fact that many in Islamic countries regard the United States as a source of evil. As a nation, we have not done an adequate job of explaining ourselves to the world, or of building the personal and institutional connections with these countries that support healthy bilateral relationships. As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural misunderstanding there will be no substitute for public diplomacy (PD). It must be a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism.

Since the advent of the current administration, no fewer than a dozen studies and reports have focused attention on the shortcomings of our public diplomacy. These studies differ in detail and emphasis, but for the most part they share two conclusions. We don't put enough resources into PD, and we need to make certain that the reorganization that folded the US Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department does not harm our ability to carry out PD's vital functions. I believe that four major areas of concern require urgent attention if public diplomacy is to fulfill its obligations to the American taxpayer:

(1) the need to strengthen our international exchange programs with the Islamic world; (2) the need for a rational, effective visa policy; (3) the need for improved media outreach to the Islamic world; and, (4) the need to correct anomalies in the State Department's bureaucratic structure that I believe diminish the effectiveness of our public diplomacy. Let me turn first to exchange programs.

### The Importance of Exchange Programs: Building Cultural Bridges

People-to-people ties are an essential part of our public diplomacy. As Ambassador Arthur Burns once said, "The achievement, of true understanding between any two governments depends fundamentally on the kind of relationship that exists between the peoples, rather than on the foreign ministers and ambassadors."

In the Islamic world, we clearly have not done an adequate job of fostering relationships between our peoples. A Gallup poll conducted in February 2002 reported that 61 percent of Muslims believe that Arabs did not carry out the attack on the United States. More recent surveys show that Muslims in general doubt America's sincerity in its stated aims in the war against terrorism. They believe that our actions reveal deeply-rooted antipathy toward Islam, and they point to inflammatory anti-Muslim utterances by American religious and social leaders, as well as unsympathetic portrayal of Arabs in films and television as evidence to support this view. Many doubt our commitment to democratic values and basic fairness in our dealings with the region, and they cite our uncritical support of Israel and our strong links to non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere. As we struggle to bring some kind of stability and peace to post-Saddam Iraq, the perception has arisen that our promise to promote democracy in that benighted country was insincere, particularly in view of US opposition to early direct elections for the country's leaders. The public manifestations of these views frustrate our ability to advance the nation's interests throughout the Islamic world. It is no exaggeration to say that our policies, our purposes and our fundamental values are under increasing fire in this broad swath of the globe. Our public diplomacy has—in many ways—a more difficult challenge than we faced at the height of the Cold War.

We must recognize that we are facing this challenge from a very unfavorable position. Changing minds—or merely opening them—is a long, painstaking process. There are no quick fixes. And if we are truly to win the war on terrorism, there will be no avoiding the need to build bridges between the American people and the people of the Muslim world. This effort will require us to be creative, disciplined, and patient as we try to reach audiences whose attitudes towards us range from profoundly skeptical to openly hostile. We will not succeed in opening every mind, but we do not need to do so. What we must succeed in doing is challenging and changing a climate of opinion that unjustly paints the United States as a source of evil. Improving the relationships that exist between our peoples is the best way to do that.

America's unique status in today's world as the sole superpower puts new and difficult challenges before us. These new relationships with the people of other nations don't come easy. They can be, and often are, colored by resentment, jealousy, and

suspicion. In this world there is an absolute requirement that we demonstrate a true respect for the opinions of mankind, that we listen as well as speak, and that we hear and understand those opinions and take account of them as we set our policies. Our public diplomats are trained to do exactly that, as well as to articulate clearly and persuasively the true nature of US values and goals. The exchange components of our public diplomacy must serve to deepen that understanding that we must achieve. And if we succeed, terrorists will find it much more difficult to gain support or sympathy, either from their governments or from their societies.

Recognizing the need for more funding for public diplomacy in the Islamic world, the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress acted quickly to increase the State Department's exchanges with the Islamic world. This marked the beginning of an effort to give us the means to build a range of productive, positive relationships based on shared interests. This initiative will engage the American public—in our communities, schools, and universities—in an effort to project American values. We will find no better or more convincing representatives of our way of life. And the engagement of the American public will leverage significant additional resources to support this effort.

Initial efforts were made during the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress to both authorize and fund programs on a broad range of exchange activities to build relationships with the Islamic world and enhance US national security. The Cultural Bridges Act of 2002 called for an additional \$95 million annually for exchanges with the Muslim world. In tandem with the Freedom Promotion Act introduced by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and passed by the House of Representatives, this bipartisan effort led to initial funding for these programs in the supplemental appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2002. The supplemental included \$10 million for a high school exchange program aimed at Muslim youth and an additional \$10 million for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange (ECA) at the State Department to fund more Fulbright exchanges, programs to promote religious tolerance and values, English language programs, American studies programs, media training and other key initiatives for the Islamic world.

In addition to emergency ECA funding, an independent office was created to administer a Middle East Program Initiative (MEPI). This was a welcome beginning in building new ties to the Islamic world, but only the first steps in what will need to be a major effort, necessitating our engagement in a very broad range of countries, in an arc reaching from Africa to the Middle East, stretching further eastward from Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia. Addressing so many countries and cultures will demand thoughtfully differentiated approaches to public diplomacy. In some countries, significant increases in our traditional exchanges, such as the Fulbright and International Visitor programs, will be appropriate, welcome, and effective. In other countries, such an approach may be seen as threatening. Particularly in those cases, we must be creative in finding ways of reaching more skeptical publics, such as journalists and religious communities. And everywhere, we must seek ways of reaching younger participants.

Significant new resources will be required to develop these programs. The scope of the task is too great, and its importance to our national security too critical to be able to accomplish our goals by simply shifting money from other regions of the world. The importance of maintaining a broad, worldwide coalition to combat terrorism suggests strongly that shortchanging one area of the world in order to temporarily emphasize another will be an ineffective strategy. Yet it appears that by mandating that 25 percent of ECA funding must be spent in the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) region—while keeping the budget virtually flat—Congress has unintentionally taken away resources from other critical areas, notably the New Independent States (NIS), Africa and perhaps even Islamic countries in other regions.

Reductions in public diplomacy over time have limited our reach: we have closed posts and cultural centers, reduced numbers of public diplomacy positions in our Embassies, and steeply reduced the number of exchange participants. As populations in significant Muslim countries have increased by approximately 15 percent over the past ten years, the numbers of exchange participants from key countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey have declined by approximately 25 percent.

In the face of those reductions, it is important for us to recognize the dedication, hard work, and effectiveness of the State Department's corps of public diplomacy officers. Faced with diminishing resources and a major reorganization that abolished USIA and moved their function and careers into State, these professionals have performed in their typical fashion: professionally and effectively. It must be noted, parenthetically, that the movement of the public diplomacy function into the State Department has had two important effects on PD officers, one intended, one not. On the positive side, PD officers have easier career access to the tracks that lead to ambassadorial assignments: political and economic jobs, and deputy chief of mission (DCM)-ships. On the negative side, it has been difficult to maintain the critical mass of PD officers with cumulative experience and a commitment to PD careers.

The exchanges community has told Congress that a meaningful and effective Islamic exchange initiative will require \$100 million above the current appropriation for State exchanges. In the current budget circumstances, this is a significant amount of money. Nevertheless, this funding level is necessary and appropriate given the expanse of the Muslim world and the urgency and importance of the task at hand. Redistributing money from a roughly steady appropriation will not do the job. Furthermore, this amount of money spent on promoting our ideas and values is really very small when compared to the sums we are spending on military operations, but it is no less crucial to our success.

One largely unseen area in the realm of exchange is that large group of non-government programs, officially known as the Exchange Visitor Program and often referred to as the "J-visa" programs. It is difficult to overestimate the long-term value to the United States of the thousands of youngsters who come to this country each year on summer work-travel, camp counselor, au pair, high school, and professional training-study programs that don't cost the US government one cent in funding support. On the contrary, these programs add a significant amount to the US economy, are vital sources of workers

for camps, resorts and theme parks, and provide jobs for hundreds of Americans who administer the programs. One example: some 20,000 Polish youngsters come here each summer, generally have a positive experience and return to Poland with an understanding of our country and an affection for our people. Our Embassy in Warsaw rightly regards this as among its most significant public diplomacy assets. I will discuss the visa complications for these and other potential friends of the US below, but it is worth citing these exchange programs as part of our answer to the sliding favorability numbers of the US throughout much of the world, which in turn provide aid and comfort to our enemies. Most important, these programs touch youth, a category that was historically neglected in US core exchange programs.

Today, these programs are in trouble. Visa issues are involved, but the immediate problem is regulation. J-Visa programs are regulated by the State Department. A new set of revised regulations for several program categories has been hung up in the bureaucracy for more than a year, creating uncertainty and difficulty in planning for the operators of the J-Visa programs. Moreover, the trend of regulation over the past decade has generally been to limit these exchange opportunities, rather than to expand them. The exchanges community is urging the Department to expedite the issuance of these regulations, but it is likely that for the foreseeable future, program sponsors will continue to operate in an uncertain regulatory environment.

#### Needed: A Visa Policy that Serves All Aspects of Our National Security

Since the horrific September 11 attacks on the US, the way the United States administers its visa policy has received much scrutiny, and appropriately so. Members of the exchange community, like all Americans, want a visa policy that protects us from those who would do us harm. We understand that greater scrutiny is required, and we support this. The exchanges community also campaigned vigorously to maintain the visa function within the Department of State; State's long-time involvement with the exchanges programs means that the steep learning curve that would accompany a shift of the function to another agency has been avoided.

State's effort to tighten visa adjudication, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, is necessarily a work in progress, and has led to unpredictability and confusion. The impact of this somewhat messy process is being felt in virtually all walks of American life: business, medicine, education, scientific research, travel and tourism. The simple fact is that in 2004, there is very little activity in American life that does not have an important international dimension. And by disrupting these activities through slow or inconsistent visa procedures, we pay a high price as a nation.

As spring and summer and their high volume of visa applicants approach, we urgently need to implement a balanced approach to visas, one that addresses our national security concerns and also encourages the many legitimate visitors whose presence benefits the United States. We must not view the issue as a trade-off between security and openness; continued openness contributes to our national security by building a web of positive international contacts. Our true security interest lies in finding the right balance.

As noted above, participants in long-standing summer exchange programs, such as camp counselors and summer work-travel students, are enormously valuable to American businesses and gain first-hand exposure to American life. Often these are individuals who could not afford to come to our country without a job to cover their expenses. Because these programs are of short duration and keyed specifically to the summer season, long delays in visa processing this spring could prove very disruptive both to exchange participants and to the many American businesses that depend on them.

Uncertainty over visas also is having a significant impact on American campuses. I serve on the advisory board for international programs at the University of Kansas, my *alma mater*. KU reports that the international student population for the academic year 2003-2004 is down nearly 40 percent. Universities throughout the country are reporting diminished undergraduate applications, as good students around the world increasingly look to Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand for higher education. Growing difficulty in attracting foreign faculty and researchers leads my colleagues in the heartland to the conclusion that many in the international scholarly community, both faculty and students, view the US as inhospitable to them. This perception and the behavior it impels are enormously damaging to our long-term interests, which are well-served by attracting the best and brightest to an American education. What is needed is a visa policy that supports our national security in all its aspects. The exchanges community believes that the consular function is inadequately resourced in the field, particularly given new demands for interviewing nearly every applicant.

Our security requires that we screen more carefully and effectively identify and keep out those who would harm us. Our security also demands that we welcome those with a legitimate purpose for being here, and whose presence manifestly benefits our nation.

#### The Media Challenge: Carrying Our Message More Effectively

It is vitally important that our government-sponsored media and our relationships with foreign media must be improved if we are to succeed in the competition for attention in Islamic nations. As Coalition Spokesman during the campaign to unseat the Taliban government and destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, I faced two challenges. One, facing down the disinformation from the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, was relatively easy to achieve. The second, convincing a skeptical Islamic world press that the Coalition was at war with terrorism and not with Islam, was far more difficult. In truth, we made little headway in that essential struggle. But a useful lesson was learned: the US must take foreign media more seriously. Our government understandably focuses its attention on the domestic press. It should now be clear that renewed efforts to get our message into foreign media are required. Nine out of ten Middle East adults get their news from either their national television networks or satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and others. Most of those outlets, including Al-Jazeera, are open to us, and we should use them. I believe this will not require major new funding, but a change in emphasis.

I applaud the innovative FM radio programming undertaken by the Voice of America. Radio Sawa seems to be steadily gaining listenership among Arab youth. On a

recent trip to Iraq, I heard Radio Sawa from radios from Kurdistan to Baghdad. It has been argued that its “drive time” format has limited impact on political attitudes. This may be true, but Sawa is nevertheless valuable because it reaches a broad youth audience with “light freight” and popular music, and creates a positive, non-threatening image of the US. Moreover, if they’re listening to Sawa, they’re not listening to something more negative toward us.

However, television is the key, and broadcasting on local facilities is politically tricky. Al-Hurra has now gotten off the ground. It faces numerous hurdles as it seeks to find audience share. But the experiment needs to be funded and results carefully measured. It will need to prove itself over time.

### State Department Structure Inhibiting *li Di*

I share the view of many in the public diplomacy community that the merger of USIA into State has inhibited rather than enhanced our efforts. Under the current structure, which I believe to be flawed, the primary purveyors of public diplomacy programs and resources—the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs (IIP)—have no direct connection with the public diplomacy sections in our Embassies, and no *formal* connection with the regional bureaus that supervise those posts.

This anomalous structure runs the risk of marginalizing public diplomacy within State, and already has diminished its effectiveness. Those senior officials with responsibility for public diplomacy do not control field resources; those with a direct connection to the field resources are mid-ranking office directors in the regional bureaus, and do not have the clout to take bold action. Instead of sitting in policy-making councils, these public diplomacy office directors spend their very long days responding to task assignments. The structural flaw already is manifesting itself in diminished focus, uncoordinated activities, and reduced field resources.

And then there is the matter of the State Department *culture* as a home for public diplomacy. I led the USIA team that negotiated the merger into the State Department in the summer of 1997. I came to deeply respect my State counterpart, Maura Hardy. With regard to public diplomacy, she—like so few of her State colleagues—actually got it. USIA people worried that in moving to State they would get absorbed in an alien culture in Washington, and would move down the food chain in the field. Maura argued vigorously to the contrary, especially when it came to the merger in Washington. She was convinced that an influx of USIA people would bring a refreshing creativity to the State Department. In fact, USIA’s fears have been largely realized. Public diplomacy was the *only* business of USIA; it is barely visible at State.

The fifteen or so independent reports on public diplomacy have acknowledged these problems and have recommended various prescriptions for change. Congressman Frank Wolf, who godfathered the oft-cited Djerejian report, has called for a White House public diplomacy czar who can produce high-level attention and support to the effort.

Public diplomacy veterans like former director Charles Wick want to see a USJA-like structure within State, with an Under Secretary who has most of the same authorities enjoyed by former USIA leadership. Congressman Hyde has proposed another version that would give the Under Secretary more control over resources and program.

The debate, I believe, will continue. Although various Congressional actions are moving forward, it is hard to envision bold action being taken concurrently with the distractions of a presidential election campaign. But *at a minimum* there is one thing that can go some distance toward ameliorating the damage of the structural flaw. Congress should authorize and the Department should create in each regional bureau a Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) position responsible solely for public diplomacy.

Establishing a DAS in each regional bureau would ensure that public diplomacy is actively represented in senior-level meetings and thus an integral component in our approach to every foreign policy issue. A senior officer with these responsibilities could effectively coordinate public diplomacy activities across the region, make the case for additional resources when needed, and play an active role in personnel decisions. The DAS would coordinate closely with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, creating a policy-level link between these two functions that is not constricted by the competing demands of a DAS who deals with public diplomacy as one of several responsibilities.

Creating and maintaining new DAS positions for public diplomacy would be a critical first step in changing the Department's culture, and would send an unmistakable message to those who work at State: that public diplomacy matters, and matters enough to require senior leadership.

This proposal has surfaced before. It was part of the "bracketed" language of the blue print for the reorganization presented to Secretary of State Albright in August 1997. The Department has not appeared to welcome it. There are two primary arguments against adding public diplomacy DAS positions: that State already has all the DAS positions necessary to do its job, and that there are not enough senior public diplomacy officers qualified for these positions. Neither of these objections holds water.

As to the limitation on the number of DAS positions, what we are talking about today is how to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy, a vital element of our national security strategy. Are we to ignore an opportunity to strengthen our public diplomacy in order to preserve an arbitrary ceiling on DAS positions? I believe the American public is more interested in effective action than it is in the number of senior officers required to accomplish it.

As to the availability of qualified senior officers, my own knowledge of the public diplomacy corps suggests to me that there are any number of experienced officers well suited to this type of leadership role. But State need not exclude senior officers from other career specialties when assessing candidates for these new positions. For example, one can easily imagine many political officers being particularly effective in making the connection between public diplomacy and policy.

The bureaucratic structure imposed on public diplomacy by the merger is not working. The office directors for public diplomacy in the regional bureaus are seeing their people and resources drained away. The NEA public diplomacy office has effectively been placed under the control of the MEPI office, which is headed by people with no public diplomacy experience in the field. The overall trend is to disperse public diplomacy assets, while the need is to create a critical mass. PD officers who get completely absorbed in preparing for the noon briefing or providing background papers for senior level visits *cannot* make sufficient time to coordinate with the producers of public diplomacy educational, cultural and information products the field officers need. That coordination is vital. It is the PD officer who, in an earlier life, insured the proper confluence between Washington-centric ECA and IIP products and actual field needs.

Will the establishment of DAS positions solve all these problems? Perhaps not, but it would add the bureaucratic clout that is the coin of the realm in the Department of State. Change would then be achievable.

## The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Giving World Publics a Greater Voice

*Donald Kimelman*

Director of Information Initiatives, The Pew Charitable Trusts

When the Pew Global Attitudes Project was conceived, the original plan was to measure attitudes around the world toward globalization and democratic values in a single major survey. In June 2001, The Pew Charitable Trusts committed \$3.8 million to The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, an opinion research organization we have funded since 1995, to carry out this ground-breaking work. This initiative was in keeping with the Trusts' long-standing commitment to informing the public on a range of important issues through independent, non-partisan research and polling.

When the grant was made, no one realized the full scope and impact the project would have. Well before the survey was ready to go into the field, the terrorists struck the United States on 9/11, and the war on terrorism began. Andy Kohut, who directs the Pew Research Center, responded by reordering priorities to include survey questions about the war on terrorism and America's standing in the rest of the world.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project released the results in two stages: *What the World Thinks in 2002*, issued in December 2002, and *Views of a Changing World*, released in June 2003. The surveys were based on 66,000 interviews in 49 nations and the Palestinian Authority. The reports found widespread acceptance of globalization, particularly in the developing world, and strong support across cultures for democratic values, including in the Middle East. But much of the media's attention focused on the increasing antipathy toward America's policies abroad—especially in Europe and the Muslim world. Anger about the Iraq war appeared to be the principal factor in driving up this level of opposition.

In February of this year, on the eve of the first anniversary of the start of the war, The Pew Research Center went back into the field for a follow-up survey in nine countries, including the United States. The survey set out to determine whether the passage of time since the fall of Saddam Hussein had moderated negative views about America in Europe and the Muslim world. The results, published in the Center's latest report, *A Year After the Iraq War*, were sobering, suggesting an ever-growing divide between this country and its post-war allies.

What follows is an excerpt from this study. It is the most recent set of findings from a project that has expanded its original charge to give world publics a greater voice on a host of important issues that transcend national borders. In a drastically changed world, we now view global polling as an ongoing mission.

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## A Year After the Iraq War: Excerpts

A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States (US) in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war's conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America's credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the US-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States.

In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the United States remains pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for the war on terrorism has inched up. Osama bin Laden, however, is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65 percent), Jordan (55 percent) and Morocco (45 percent). Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is highly unpopular, as many as 31 percent say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Majorities in all four Muslim nations surveyed doubt the sincerity of the war on terrorism. Instead, most say it is an effort to control Mideast oil and to dominate the world.


There has been little change in opinion about the war in Iraq—except in Great Britain, where support for the decision to go to war has plummeted from 61 percent last May to 43 percent in the current survey. In contrast, 60 percent of Americans continue to back the war. Among the coalition of the “unwilling,” large majorities in Germany, France and Russia still believe their countries made the right decision in not taking part in the war. Moreover, there is broad agreement in nearly all of the countries surveyed—the US being a notable exception—that the war in Iraq hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism.

In the four predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, opposition to the war remains nearly universal. Moreover, while large majorities in Western European countries

<b>Transatlantic Tensions Unabated</b>			
<i>Support for an Independent European Foreign Policy</i>			
	Apr 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	47	48	45
France	60	67	76
Germany	51	52	57


  

<b>U.S. Favorability Ratings</b>			
	Summer 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	75	48	70
France	63	31	43
Germany	61	25	45



opposed to the war say Saddam Hussein's ouster will improve the lot of the Iraqi people, those in Muslim countries are less confident. In Jordan, no less than 70 percent of survey respondents think the Iraqis will be *worse off* with Hussein gone.

This is the latest in a series of international surveys by the *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. It was conducted from late February to early March in the United States and eight other countries, with fieldwork under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International.<sup>1</sup> The survey finds a significant point of agreement in opinion on Iraq's future. Overwhelming majorities in all countries surveyed say it will take longer than a year to establish a stable government in Iraq.



But there are deep differences about whether the US or the United Nations should do the best job of helping Iraqis to form such a government. The UN is the clear choice of people in Western Europe and Turkey; Americans are divided over this issue. However, roughly half of Jordanians and a third of Moroccans volunteered that neither the US nor the UN could do best in this regard.

Americans have a far different view of the war's impact—on the war on terrorism and the global standing of the US—than do people in the other surveyed countries. Generally, Americans think the war helped in the fight against terrorism, illustrated the power of the US military, and revealed America to be trustworthy and supportive of democracy around the world. These notions are not shared elsewhere. Majorities in Germany, Turkey and France—and half the British and Russians—believe the conflict in Iraq undermined the war on terrorism. At least half the respondents in the eight other countries view the US as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. For the most part, even US military prowess is not seen in a better light as a result of the war in Iraq.

	April 2002 (%)	March 2004 (%)
France	30	57
Germany	33	49
Britain	20	33
Jordan	--	76
Morocco	--	72
Pakistan	--	66
Turkey	--	55
Russia	--	34
U.S.	--	13

A growing number in Western Europe also think that the United States is overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Only in Great Britain and Russia do large majorities believe that the US is right to be so concerned about terrorism. Many people in France (57 percent) and Germany (49 percent) have come to agree with the widespread view in the Muslim countries surveyed that America is exaggerating the terrorist threat.

<sup>1</sup> All surveys are nationwide representative samples except in Pakistan, which was predominantly urban, and Morocco, where the survey was conducted only in urban areas.

Nevertheless, support for the US-led war on terrorism has increased dramatically among Russians, despite their generally critical opinion of US policies. More than seven-in-ten Russians (73 percent) currently back the war on terrorism, up from 51 percent last May. Since the end of the Iraq war, there also have been gains in support for the US anti-terrorism campaign in Turkey (from 22 percent to 37 percent) and Morocco (nine percent to 28 percent). On the other hand, backing for the war against terrorism has again slipped in France and Germany; only about half of the public in each country favors the US-led effort.


**Trend: Favor US-led War on Terrorism**

	Summer 2002 %	May 2003 %	March 2004 %
U.S.	89	--	81
Britain	69	63	63
France	75	60	50
Germany	70	60	55
Russia	73	51	73
Turkey	30	22	37
Pakistan	20	16	16
Jordan	13	2	12
Morocco	--	9	28

Publics in the surveyed countries other than the United States express considerable skepticism of America's motives in its global struggle against terrorism. Solid majorities in France and Germany believe the US is conducting a war on terrorism in order to control Mideast oil and dominate the world. People in Muslim nations who doubt the sincerity of American anti-terror efforts see a wider range of ulterior motives, including helping Israel and targeting unfriendly Muslim governments and groups.

Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that America and British leaders lied when they claimed, prior to the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction. On balance, people in the United States and Great Britain disagree. Still, about three-in-ten in the US (31 percent) and four-in-ten in Great Britain (41 percent) say leaders of the two countries lied to provide a rationale for the war.

In that regard, opinions of both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are negative. Large majorities in every country, except for the US, hold an unfavorable opinion of Bush. Blair is rated favorably only by a narrow majority in Great Britain but fully three-quarters of Americans. In contrast, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is viewed positively in nearly all nine countries surveyed, with Jordan and Morocco as prominent exceptions.



The United Nations itself engenders varied reactions around the world. Just 55 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of the world body. This is the lowest rating the UN has achieved in 14 years of Pew Research Center surveys. People in Russia and the Western European countries have a considerably more favorable view of the UN. But large majorities in Jordan and Morocco hold negative views of both the UN and the man who leads it.

Majorities in the Western European countries surveyed believe their own government should obtain UN approval before dealing with an international threat. That idea is much more problematic for Americans, and on this issue Russians and people in Muslim countries are much closer to Americans than they are to Western Europeans.

Despite that small piece of common ground, however, there is still considerable hostility toward the US in the Muslim countries surveyed. Substantial numbers in each of these countries has a negative view of the US. Overwhelming majorities in Jordan and Morocco believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. As a point of comparison, slightly more people in those two countries say the same about Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis.

<b>The Gap Over Using Force</b>			
	<i>Country Needs U.N. Approval First</i>		
	<u>Yes</u> %	No, too difficult %	DK/ Ref %
U.S.	41	48	10
Britain	64	30	6
France	63	35	2
Germany	80	15	6
Russia	37	41	21
Turkey	45	44	11
Pakistan	38	34	28
Jordan	47	38	15
Morocco	42	42	16

About half of Pakistanis also say suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq—and against Israelis in the Palestinian conflict—are justifiable. Fewer respondents in Turkey agree, but slightly more Turks view suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq as justifiable as say the same about Palestinian attacks on Israelis (31 percent vs. 24 percent).

#### Other Findings

- ◆ Despite concerns about rising anti-Semitism in Europe, there are no indications that anti-semitism has increased over the past. Favorable ratings of Jews are actually now in France, Germany and Russia then were in 1991. Nonetheless, Jews are better in the US than in Germany and Russia. As is case with Americans, Europeans hold more negative views of Muslims than of
- ◆ The survey finds, however, that Christians much lower ratings in predominantly Muslim countries than do Muslims in mostly Christian countries. Majorities in Morocco (73 percent), Pakistan (62 percent) and Turkey (52 percent) express negative views of Christians.
- ◆ The adage that people in other nations may dislike America, but nonetheless want to move there is borne out in Russia, Turkey and Morocco. Roughly half of the respondents in those three countries say people who have moved to the US have a better life.

	<b>Favorability Ratings: Jews</b>		
	Very Fav %	Somewhat Fav %	Un- Fav %
U.S.	36	41	8
Britain	23	53	9
France	28	53	11
1991	14	58	14
Germany	10	53	20
1991	5	47	24
Russia	18	47	25
1991	9	49	26
Turkey	6	21	49
Pakistan	1	2	80
Morocco	1	5	92

Question not permitted in Jordan.

- ◆ But one of the largest gaps between Americans and Europeans concerns the question of whether people who move to the US have a better life. Americans overwhelmingly believe this to be the case—88 percent say people who move to the US from other countries have a better life. By contrast, just 14 percent of Germans, 24 percent of French and 41 percent of British think that people who have moved to the US from their countries have a better life.\*

<b>Favorability Ratings:</b>			
<b>Muslims</b>			
	<u>Very Fav</u>	<u>Somewhat Fav</u>	<u>Un-Fav</u>
	%	%	%
U.S.	13	35	32
Britain	18	49	18
France	16	48	29
Germany	5	36	46
Russia	15	38	38
Turkey	66	22	9
Pakistan	17	10	2
Morocco	70	20	9
<b>Christians</b>			
	<u>Very Fav</u>	<u>Somewhat Fav</u>	<u>Un-Fav</u>
	%	%	%
U.S.	55	29	6
Britain	36	48	6
France	34	50	9
Germany	15	60	16
Russia	44	49	3
Turkey	6	25	52
Pakistan	4	20	62
Morocco	2	21	73
Questions not permitted in Jordan.			

\* *Editor's Note: These excerpts and charts are taken from the March 16, 2004, report, "A Year After the Iraq War." Reprinted by permission of The Pew Global Attitudes Project, a project of The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.*

## Is American Security Being Lost In Translation?

*Rush Holt*

Member, United States House of Representatives  
Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
Member, Committee on Education and the Workforce

“The United States [US] today carries new responsibilities in many quarters of the globe, and we are at a serious disadvantage because of the difficulty of finding persons who can deal with the foreign language problem.”

– John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, 1953

What was true in the post-World War II world of 1953 is true in the post-9/11 world of 2004. Our national deficiency in the languages and cultures of critical areas around the world is compromising American security interests at home and abroad. In addition to diminishing our opportunities economically and culturally, the deficiency is making our troops overseas more vulnerable and the American people less safe than they should be. We must eliminate the severe shortage of language professionals in our diplomatic corps, our military, and our intelligence agencies. Almost three years after the events of September 11, 2001, we still fail to address one of the most serious security problems facing this nation. So far, the approach has been superficial or temporary, with Congress and senior Administration officials exhorting agencies to hire more linguists. That is not enough.

The current shortage of language professionals is well documented throughout the federal government. In January 2002, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that “diplomatic and intelligence officials have stated that lack of staff with foreign language skills has weakened the fight against international terrorism,” while at the Federal Bureau of Investigation “shortages of language-proficient staff have resulted in the accumulation of thousands of hours of audiotapes and pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated.” More recently, the 9/11 Joint Inquiry reported last July that our intelligence community is at 30 percent readiness in languages critical to national security, while a State Department commissioned report from October found that our government has only 54 genuine Arabic speakers working in the entire Foreign Service.

When I recently asked David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, how many of his 1,400 member-team spoke Arabic, he could count the number on the fingers of one hand. I posed similar questions to some members of the Special Forces who have been combing the mountains of Afghanistan looking for Osama bin Laden. I asked them how much Pashto they spoke. They responded that they had “picked up some” during the year they had been there. Although our Special Forces represent some of the best trained soldiers in the world, we’re clearly not giving them all the skills they need to be successful in their mission.

While the Defense Department, the State Department and our intelligence agencies have recently turned their attention to the language problem, their approach remains focused on immediate needs. They're stepping up recruitment efforts and expanding their respective language education programs. These are promising and necessary changes, but they only scratch the surface of what is fundamentally a national problem.

#### Federal Language Schools: A Tool, Not the Solution

The federal government long ago recognized that our public education system alone could not provide the advanced language specialists that it required. As a response, the government established language schools to train its own people in the languages of the world. I recently visited the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, where each year approximately 3,700 members of the armed forces study languages ranging from Arabic to Chinese to Spanish. DLI touts itself as the country's largest center of foreign language study.

Indeed, DLI is a remarkable educational facility. I watched students there learning in the classroom from smart boards connected to the Internet from which instructors could call up, highlight, and use text, audio and video streams, and from specially formatted MP3 players (e.g. iPods) to replay foreign news broadcasts and music directly into their headphones. DLI is certainly on the cutting edge of educational technology, but technology alone cannot surmount the challenges of learning a language. I also have visited the language schools of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department (Foreign Service Institute), and have talked with many officers with the various agencies they serve.

The problem these federal language schools have is two-fold. First, the schools react specifically to the immediate needs of the agencies they serve. If the army needs Arabic speakers, then the DLI hires Arabic teachers. The other schools operate in much the same way. They do not plan for the long term. When a language is no longer designated "high-need," teachers lose their jobs and training in that language is cut back. In short, we are not preparing to meet the potential needs of the future. There is no built-in system to adapt to future and emerging linguistic needs. Unfortunately, as any linguist will tell you, it's simply not possible to produce adequate speakers of difficult languages in a short period of time no matter how good the faculty or how advanced the technology. They take years of training and immersion to cultivate.

Second, the federal language schools alone simply cannot meet the language needs of the armed forces, the State Department, our intelligence agencies, and the larger federal government. Too often, their students have a limited foundation in foreign languages and are starting their language classes with little or no previous language training. This makes them very expensive to train and many of them finish their one-year programs with only basic language skills. As a result, they can only make a limited contribution to the agencies they serve. Ultimately, the language problem cannot be solved at the federal level because the root problem lies in public schools throughout the country.

### The Root Problem: Our Schools

If we are to address adequately the language shortage in the federal government, we have to look past the issues of immediate recruitment and federal language training. Federal language schools are building on a poor language foundation, and the federal government cannot recruit linguists from a pool that does not exist. With this approach, we will always be trying to catch up. We must design and implement a federal language strategy that begins in the earliest years of education and continues through college.

Consider the following sober facts. Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist elements operate in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a few (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together, according to figures from 2002. Last year, American universities granted only six degrees in Arabic and eight in Korean, while they granted more than 7,000 in Spanish. We need to improve the numbers in critical languages if we're going to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security and represent American interests abroad.

### National Security Language Act

In Congress, I have introduced the National Security Language Act, legislation that would expand federal investment in education in foreign languages of critical need, such as Arabic, Persian, Korean, Pashto and Chinese. It would provide federal incentives for high school students to study languages into college, give universities resources to expand language programs overseas, and identify Americans with pre-existing language abilities for recruitment. The main provisions of the bill include:

- ◆ **The International Flagship Language Initiative (IFLI):** Providing federal grants to specific American universities and colleges to establish high quality, intensive in-country language study programs in a broad range of countries around the world. Institutional grants of up to \$400,000 per language would be provided to establish new programs. The initial target will be the languages identified by the government-wide needs assessment conducted regularly by the National Security Education Program (NSEP). The NSEP, which already oversees the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI), will also administer the program.
- ◆ **Science and Technology Advanced Foreign Language Grants:** Providing federal grants to institutions of higher education to establish programs that encourage students to develop foreign language proficiency as well as science and technological knowledge. Eligible institutions will develop programs in which students take courses in science, math and technology taught in a foreign language. Funds will also support immersion programs for students to take science and math courses in a non-English speaking country.

- ◆ **Loan Forgiveness for Undergraduate Students in Foreign Languages Become Teachers or Federal Employees:** Authorizing the Secretary of to assume the obligation to repay a total of not more than \$10,000 of the and interest for a student borrower who has obtained an undergraduate degree in critical need foreign language. To qualify the recipient must be employed in agency of the United States government or in a full-time position in an or secondary school as a
- ◆ **Encouraging Early Foreign Language Studies:** Establishing grants for language partnerships between local school districts and foreign departments at institutions of higher education. Also eligible to participate in partnerships would be state education agencies, an education or teacher department of institutions of higher education, a business, a non-organization, heritage or community centers for language study, or a Resource Center. Priority would be given to partnerships that include a high-local educational agency and to partnerships that emphasize the teaching less-commonly taught
- ◆ **National Study of Foreign Language Heritage Communities and Marketing Campaign:** Commissioning a national study to identify communities with native speakers of critical foreign languages and make targets of a federal marketing campaign encouraging students to pursue degrees those languages. Members of heritage communities are a better and less educational investment than non-heritage speakers with no previous experience. Unfortunately, many heritage communities view knowledge of language other than English as a problem to be overcome. A federal campaign should educate heritage language speakers about the educational professional opportunities that their language skills may afford

### A Sputnik

A few years after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lamented America's lack foreign language abilities, the Soviet Union surprised America with the launch of the first Sputnik into space in 1957. American leaders vowed never to be second to anyone in proficiency in science and mathematics. In 1958, Congress responded to Sputnik by passing the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which created a generation of scientists, engineers, and Russian linguists who helped win the Cold War.

Immediately after September 11, 2001, Americans found themselves again facing a Sputnik moment. They realized that they were caught flat-footed, unprepared to confront al-Qaeda terrorists. We need a national commitment to languages on a scale of the NDEA commitment to science, including improved curriculum, teaching technology and methods, teacher development, and a systemic cultural commitment. I offer the National Security Language Act as the first part of a solution that will give us a generation of Americans able to confront the new threats we face today.

## America's Language Challenge: Multidimensional Responses

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United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1998-2001

Secretary Powell has called our diplomatic personnel "America's first line of offense." The overarching goal, therefore, is to get the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time to carry out America's foreign policy. One of the skills that is the hallmark of effective diplomacy is the ability to use a foreign language to carry out our responsibilities. In the wake of the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the press, the public and the United States (US) government have grown painfully aware of the phenomenon that Senator Paul Simon called (in 1980!) "The Tongue-Tied American." Repeatedly, we see compelling evidence of the critical role of high-level foreign language capabilities in our foreign policy, our international responsibilities, and our national security. It has become both obvious and urgent for the foreign affairs community to stand up and address the "language challenge."

### Some Facts: What We Have to Work with to Meet the Challenge

In an article with a stinging title, "Now That We're Comrades, We Don't Care Anymore," Washington Post, November 9, 2003, we learned that:

"The US government is spending 25 percent less today, adjusted for inflation, than it did in 1967 on high-level foreign language training. And that figure includes an additional 20 percent for Arabic and Middle Eastern studies appropriated by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A Washington-based consultant on international education [noted] that the number of fellowships in all advanced foreign language and area studies declined from 2,344 in 1967 to 1,640 in fiscal year 2003."

In addition, in the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, three key pieces of data are given as reasons to support foreign language education:

"82 percent of the US population of 255 million people speaks only English. There are very few US households where languages critical for supporting US national security are spoken. For example, only 0.23 percent, or 596,000 of the US population, speaks Arabic at home, 0.13 percent for Hindi, 0.11 percent for Urdu, 0.09 percent for Serbo-Croatian, 0.27 percent for Russian, 0.18 percent for Japanese, and 0.78 percent for Chinese.

Second, less than one percent (about 144,000 in calendar year 2000) of all US students in higher education study abroad. Study abroad program data

also show that US students historically have not studied in areas that are emerging as critical to national security. In 2000, 60 percent of US study abroad students studied in Western Europe. Less than 2.9 percent studied in the Middle East (a mere 4,100 students, with 3,900 of these studying in Israel); 2.7 percent studied in Africa (3,900 students), and six percent in Asia (8,800, with 5,600 of these in China and Japan).

Third, modern foreign language class registrations in US higher education are down from a high in 1965 of 16.5 foreign language class registrations per 100 overall class registrations to 7.9 registrations per 100 in 1998. Spanish accounts for 55 percent of foreign language registrations, while Arabic accounts for 0.5 percent (5,500 registrations), Chinese for 2.4 percent (28,000), and Russian for two percent (24,000)."<sup>1</sup>

In his "Dear Colleagues" letter in November 2003 inviting fellow House members to co-sponsor his bill, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), notes:

"I am introducing legislation, the National Security Language Act, which would significantly expand our investment in foreign language education on the primary, secondary, and post-secondary level.

Al-Qaeda operates in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a dozen (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together. We need to do more to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security. This cannot be done overnight. We are already years overdue."

One of the local Washington television garden advisors was asked by a viewer "When is the best time to plant trees?" His answer: "Twenty years ago." Given the unavailability of a reliable time-machine, everyone is now scrambling to propose their own ways to put good will and good money to work to ameliorate the fact that the American public and the educational system, and, yes, we in the government, have fallen short of anticipating and providing for foreign language capability across a broad range of our population. September 11, 2001, was our generation's Sputnik. We rose to that challenge in 1957, and slowly we are rising to this one.

While the Department as a whole is not formally considered part of the Intelligence Community (IC), we share with them the need for strong foreign language capability in order to achieve our mission goals, and Congress has shown special interest in the linguistic capabilities not only of the Department of State, but also the IC and the rest of

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<sup>1</sup> Section 333 of the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-789, H.R. 4628, which adopted section 309 of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-592.

the national security agencies and in what initiatives are being undertaken to meet current and future IC language requirements. How do they and others anticipate language demands for the future, and what is being done to meet the emerging demands?

Leadership on this issue will be required from the highest levels to encourage new programs in the elementary and secondary schools and post-secondary schools and to continue the existing ones such as the National Security Education Program in order to build a talent pool from which the government can recruit candidates. This and more creative ways to tap into America's rich diversity of "heritage" language speakers can bring more people into the applicant pool for critical roles across the government and in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) and private sectors as well.

### The State Department's Approach

That is the backdrop, and I would note that many of the concerns and challenges are shared ones on which we in the State Department have been very eagerly collaborating much more intensively since 9/11. There are growing fissures in the stovepipes and cracks in the iron rice bowls. And that is a very good thing.

Ameliorating our shared challenges required us to consider how to better exploit and channel existing language resources and how to create new ones. In other words, how do we recruit, train, assign, retain and further develop the cadres with those language capabilities that are needed in all their various guises to enable us to accomplish our mission? That covers a lot of ground, so where do we begin?

The Department of State has developed and started to implement a coherent, integrated strategic plan for meeting its language proficiency goals. This plan involves close collaboration among the Bureau of Human Resources, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the functional and regional bureaus and posts with foreign language requirements. Our approach involves targeted recruitment, credit in the hiring process for language proficiency, and incentives to acquire, maintain, and improve language skills to highly advanced levels, and to re-use over a career the critical and difficult languages that are in high demand as we build the needed language cadres. This strategic plan is reinforced by the high value that the Department's corporate culture places on language proficiency among our Foreign Service employees.

### Getting the People

Language training is time consuming, expensive, difficult, and the resulting proficiency is fragile—use it or lose it. The best language training in the world, and we believe that FSI provides that, only works when there are students who can come to training, stay in training for the required amount of time, and use, maintain, and reuse their hard-won proficiency. But the Foreign Service was "hollowed-out" by the freeze on hiring in the mid-1990s, so Secretary Powell launched a successful move to bring the number of State employees back to what is required to meet critical overseas needs, as well as create a "personnel complement." That would provide for enough staff resources to make training

and crisis response possible. Known as the “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,” it is bringing record numbers of new employees into the Department, 1,069 over three years in addition to other special hiring for security and consular affairs. This is one factor in a 150 percent rise in the amount of language training delivered in the past six years.

As I noted, one way to increase language capacity is to target the people and places where there are reservoirs of language proficiency. We look to the “heritage” community, but conducting background investigations for clearances on native speakers can be particularly difficult, because many of these individuals have lived abroad, in some cases for years. We also target those who, despite the vagaries of the American educational system, have already developed strong skills in critical languages.

There are several important reasons why we do not require language proficiency or set it as a primary criterion for selection into the Foreign Service. The fluidity of language requirements partially explains this. In other words, the Albanian speakers we would have hired three years ago would not necessarily help us meet today’s needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, the Department has identified core skills and qualities, which we call “dimensions,” that are far more indicative of a candidate’s long-term prospects for contributing successfully to the conduct of American foreign policy over a full career. These dimensions have proven essential to conducting a long career in an ever-changing environment. They represent skills that cannot be taught easily, if at all: cultural adaptability; leadership; initiative; judgment; composure; interpersonal skills, etc. A person without these skills would not make an effective diplomat even if he or she spoke Chinese just as well as a native speaker.

However, once our applicants have passed the rigorous written and oral examination process, they are placed on a selection register and then can take a speaking-only telephone test to determine whether they are at a “threshold level” at least S-2 in a hard or S-3 in a world language. If so, they are then moved higher on the selection register for possible earlier entry into the Foreign Service. A recent change in that program provides even more bonus points for certain languages and language families designated as “critical needs languages” for national security. As a result, a recent entering class of entry-level Foreign Service Officers (March 8, 2004) is comprised of a majority of candidates who have passed a preliminary screening test in designated languages and who received the extra bonus points for entry into the Foreign Service. (Reinforcing the observation about when to plant trees, it was interesting to note that most of the new officers who came into the Service with strong Japanese skills were not heritage speakers, but likely benefited from the teaching of Japanese in the public schools in the 1980s and 1990s, when the issue was global economic competitiveness.)

These pre-existing skills—in any language—will then play a major role in bids for their first assignments. In general, officers entering with language skills have more options than those who enter with none. With proven language learning ability, they generally make better candidates for more difficult languages, like Arabic or Chinese, and more often are assigned to training for positions requiring proficiency in such languages.

Once hired, and irrespective of whether they enter with language proficiency or not, new officers are acutely attuned to language training issues as part of their overall career development. Entering officers must achieve proficiency in a foreign language to gain tenure, and later in their careers, those desiring to become senior officers must have achieved a professional level of proficiency (S-3/R-3) to cross the senior threshold.

Throughout, employees' career paths are influenced in part—and in many cases, very significantly—by their language skills. When possible, the Department's goal is to assign officers who already speak languages not commonly spoken or studied in the US to a number of tours in which that language may be used. Particularly for the most difficult languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), the Department's goal is to ensure that officers with relatively rare language skills or those able to take long-term language training are given priority for assignment and re-assignment to posts where those languages are spoken.

Generous Language Incentive Pay (LIP) is available for those using designated hard languages while on assignment. Additional bonuses are paid for substantial improvement in proficiency and for repeat tours that use the same language. And I also would like to believe that the state-of-the-art language training delivered by the Foreign Service Institute is in itself an incentive to the motivated foreign affairs professional.

#### The Language Continuum: Developing the Needed Cadres

The immediate challenge of 9/11 for our diplomats abroad is to have the language skills to competently and credibly convey America's message to often skeptical and even hostile foreign audiences, to understand the positions of our interlocutors—allies and adversaries alike—and to advance US policy goals and interests. The "Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World," created at the request of Rep. Frank Wolf and the House Appropriations Committee and chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, issued a report on October 1, 2003, recommending steps to strengthen public diplomacy. A major recommendation of that group was a very substantial increase in our capability in Arabic. And it is true that after 9/11 we had to call one of our best Arabic linguists out of retirement to go on Al-Jazeera and debate and present America's story to an Arab audience. While we do have many competent Arabic speakers, we are still too thinly staffed, and there are too many critical jobs for them to fill in the Middle East and elsewhere. And to do what amounts to the equivalent of "Crossfire" or "Meet the Press" in Arabic will take more than a basic course—or even an advanced course in Arabic. It's going to take enormous commitment and effort and experimenting with new approaches.

Over the years we had already been consciously and thoroughly increasing the professional relevance of our language training, and after 9/11 those efforts were redoubled, especially in the areas of consular tradecraft language and public diplomacy practice for all students, not just those in the public diplomacy cone. The "training float" has permitted us to make intensive targeted language training become more of a reality as those outside the Department as well as visionaries within it have put greater emphasis on language proficiency. The electronic wizardry of new multimedia technology and the

Internet have allowed us to expand our reach beyond the school house and provide continuing language education—a mandate that was laid on us by Congress some years ago and remains yearly in our authorization.

As a proactive step in response to the national language challenge, FSI peered ahead and saw beyond the status quo, and in January 2004, we published our *Language Continuum* that parallels FSI's other career and training-related continua. This strategic plan lays out in a coherent fashion a broad range of formal and informal language learning options that have existed as independent elements into the fabric of a Foreign Service career and assignment path. A collaborative effort with the personnel system and the operational bureaus, this *Continuum* outlines for the Department and its employees a way to meld the principles of strategic workforce planning and the "Open Assignments" system, by serving as a roadmap to weave language proficiency development and use into a successful career progression. Some of the elements are opportunities beyond FSI/Washington, such as post language programs, distance learning programs that maintain the hard-won proficiency of those serving away from the area where the language is spoken, FSI's full-time language training programs at overseas field schools, and highly-advanced training at regional universities abroad. The *Language Continuum* is designed to help Foreign Service personnel, including Foreign Service Specialists and eligible family members, plan a long-term integrated approach to language learning and use, leading the motivated and talented more often to attain the advanced language skills that are so difficult to achieve, so fragile to maintain, and so critical to the nation. This is a prudent leveraging of our investment in language training and can build the advanced language cadres that 9/11 and subsequent developments have made so critical to the well-being of the United States and its citizens.

The key to America's success in meeting the global language challenge will be, like the *Language Continuum*, a weaving together of complementary and mutually supportive dimensions of action in Congress, the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Community, the broader federal government, NGOs, and the state and local educational establishments. Only then will America cease to be tongue-tied.

## Public Diplomacy and the United States Information Agency, Yes!

*Bruce S. Gelb*

Director, United States Information Agency, 1989-1991  
United States Ambassador to Belgium, 1991-1993

In the latter part of the 1950s the phrase, "Missile Gap," initially a political war cry, ultimately became accepted truth. It helped to unseat a political party, damaged not a few foreign affairs and defense establishment professionals and opened up a virtually endless treasure-trove of biting and sarcastic political cartoons. Now we have the "public diplomacy gap" which translates for many perhaps into an over-simplified question, "Why does the world suddenly seem to hate the United States (US)?"

Public opinion polls conducted by respected organizations like Zogby and others have fine-tuned these negative attitudes. We now learn from these polls that it is not Americans who are hated, it is the policies of our government. This, of course, raises immediate questions: "Do these haters understand our policies?; Can polling data in non-democratic countries be accurate?; When one's tongue will be cut off for expressing blasphemous thoughts can people speak freely and honestly?; and finally, with all of these negatives, how can there be such a disconnect between millions of people worldwide trying desperately to enter the US, legally or illegally, and these views that the world hates the US?" Carrying this hatred to the point of absurdity, maybe they hate the US because it's the middle of our President's last name: B-US-H. Who knows?

All of us living here in the United States would prefer to go to sleep at night with the comforting thought that those billions of "foreigners" do think the USA over the long haul has been a benefactor to most countries in the world. Was it not the US with the help and cooperation of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe who, together, helped bring on the implosion of the communist Soviet dictatorship? Does no one any longer remember something about how the US and Britain led the countries of the world in defeating the evil Axis of Germany and Japan? Then there was that thing called World War I and the small but special role we played there. One fears our (Western) historical memory is getting shorter by the year; not so amongst those peoples of Islam for whom the results of these wars and conflicts present themselves in an altogether different light. It is in our interest, perhaps our very survival, to know and understand our own history. With this understanding we will be better able to present our way of life with its emphasis on personal freedom and human rights.

Once upon a time in the United States there was an organization in Washington that was charged with the task of telling the truth, the whole truth, the un-propagandized truth about the US to the rest of the world. Some un-recognized "geniuses" like Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush using the presidency and a majority in Congress provided the money to create and keep alive the UNITED STATES

INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA). The mission of the USIA was to communicate to the world's populations the true benefits of an open society and the crucial nature of freedom of speech, the rule of law, freedom of religion and the benefit of free and independent labor unions to name just a few. The message was communicated in virtually every method known at the time: the short-wave radio Voice of America, a global TV network, English-language libraries with free and open access to books, magazines and newspapers, specialized media in many different languages to reach in every way possible those billions out there "yearning to breathe free." During the Cold War, President Eisenhower said that peace was too important to be left solely in the hands of diplomats and the military—there must be "People-to-People" exchanges in addition to the more formal kinds of diplomacy. As a result, thousands of carefully selected future leaders came to this country as special guests of the US government.

In addition our ordinary tourists to foreign countries were supplemented by special experts, academics, sports heroes, jazz music greats, scientists, doctors, comedians, dancers, capitalists, clowns and college boys and girls. Way beyond the billions of dollars sent in Agency for International Development (AID) programs and by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the communication of the greatness of our country was achieved through movies of all kinds which showed not just our material wealth but the kinds of people in the US that did the everyday work, raised the families, fought the wars for freedom, followed the religions that they wished and generally despite the many differences in race, religion and ethnicity got along amazingly well.

Our major Achilles heel, the mistreatment of our African-American population began to be explored, faced up to and presented by the Hollywood of the 1950s and 1960s. For the first time, Hollywood moved away from stereotyping and faced up to the race problem in the US. However, the most important message communicated around the world was the passage of specific Civil Rights legislation by Congress and signed by the President in 1964-1965.

There was clear recognition from 1947 until 1993 that in addition to the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union we were facing an ideological war between communism and democracy. There was also clear recognition that it was a long-term effort with no deadline set for ending the program until our system of government "won," to use an oversimplified term.

Today we and the West are facing another ideological challenge worldwide in nature, that of extremist, fanatical Moslem sects sponsoring terrorists and teaching hatred of the United States and almost everything associated with Western culture.

To some degree there is a parallel with the British Empire in its prime and the way the US is viewed in the world today: with hatred, fear, respect and some grudging admiration. The United States' position of strength in the world today has created the same kinds of diverse emotions worldwide. There is, of course, one major difference and that is the British people were solidly behind their empire while in the United States there is a panoply of attitudes among our people ranging from generalized rage against just about

everything America stands for to a **self-satisfied glow about our uniqueness as a bastion of freedom.**

There is also a real question if any action that our country takes to help make the world understand what the US really stands for is worth the effort. **Can education end deep-seated hatred? Can an individual driven by a blood-feud tradition of revenge against past grievances change inside? Should we care so much about how foreign populations see this country? In the view of the most experienced practitioners in the study of foreign affairs, human psychology and public diplomacy, the answer is “yes” to all four questions.**

Perhaps the most important question is “Why is anti-Americanism so pervasive around the world and what can we do about it?”

In January of this year Dr. John Brademas, member of Congress for 22 years from Indiana, addressed the Royal Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco. His subject: “Education and Culture - Forces for Peace in a Troubled World.” As President Emeritus of New York University, which today has 4,400 students from countries around the world on its campus (in the heart of New York City), he speaks with authority on this subject. In his address he endorses the position of his colleague, Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, namely, to invest more in “soft power.” Dr. Nye’s stated position is that US military power is essential to global stability and is a critical **part** of the response to terrorism; beyond that “soft power” rises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies.

The “masters” of soft power throughout the Cold War were the men and women in the United States and in virtually every country of the world who manned the United States Information Agency. Both US citizens and the thousands of foreign nationals, who represented us locally, were the unsung heroes of the ideological victory of democracy over communism.

Since 2001 with “The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination” there has been a flood of studies and recommendations on this general subject. It includes blue ribbon organizations such as: the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy; the Council on Foreign Relations; the General Accounting Office; the Center for the Study of the Presidency; the Heritage Foundation book by Johnson and Dale; the Brookings Institution study by Graham Fuller and in October 2003 the scholarly work of Ambassador Djerejian called “Changing Minds, Winning Peace.”

**All** of the above, one way or the other, agree with Congressman Frank Wolf’s “tentative” conclusion reported in *The New York Times* of February 4, 2003: “Maybe we made a mistake in closing down the United States Information Agency.” Each of the above named reports has a new, modified, re-organized, re-jiggered approach to doing what the USIA did so well, not perfectly, not without a glitch or two along the way, but well enough to have played a crucial role in fending off or bringing down communism in the USSR, Eastern Europe and in countless countries around the world.

For much of the Cold War, the Voice of America was an important part of our public diplomacy effort. While it generally received high marks for “telling America’s story” to that part of the world under the heel of Soviet communism, from time to time it came under political attack for acts of both omission and commission. It is now a part of the overall broadcasting effort of the US and that is where it should remain. It needs more financial support and more technical upgrading to bring it into the 21<sup>st</sup> century but basically it worked well. However, the rest of what constituted the USIA (or as it was known overseas, the United States Information Service, [USIS]) should be brought back to life in tact. It should be removed from its current second-rate citizen status under the State Department. There is hardly one element of what proved so helpful for so many years that needs major overhauling. Starting with its basic organization, the Director held a Sub-Cabinet appointment and reported directly to the President and to the Secretary of State. In organization terms this means a straight line to the President and a dotted line to the Secretary of State. In our political system this kind of individual was almost always readily available.

There is no question that Peter Drucker was right when he advised senior executives to avoid splitting their responsibilities. His dictum was simply “Put half a man on a job and you’ll get half a job.” The State Department focuses on many subjects: foreign politics, foreign economics, foreign military matters to name just a few and fundamentally is charged with executing the President’s foreign policy. Nothing can stand in the way of getting that job done. When the foreign country’s media deal with State Department representatives they know they are receiving the official message from a diplomat. When the USIA was in operation, the local newspaper contacts knew that they were dealing with an information specialist from an agency that reported to the US President, not to the Secretary of State. That small but crucial difference made it possible for USIA officers to develop close personal connections with the media men and women who influence the local population. This was even more true at the academic and cultural level where we clearly have major challenges today in both the Islamic and non-Islamic world.

In the world of business and generally wherever there are many possible courses of action and methods of organizing, it has often been shown that it is prudent to test an approach before using it globally to guard against unforeseen problems. In marketing there is a whole industry devoted to what is known as “test marketing.” All of the many proposals referred to above on how to deal with our country’s image overseas involve interesting and innovative changes from the established USIA experience with barely a reference to why the change was needed. It’s almost as if they were written without full knowledge of the USIA’s history.

There currently exists a nongovernmental organization in Washington, DC called the US Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), which has as its pro-bono members a broad array of the highest performing former USIA officers and Private Sector Specialists. Making a decision and getting the job started quickly is crucial. This organization which will unquestionably have the support of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress could help to put the USIA back together quickly so that it conceivably could be

functioning powerfully by the end of this year at the latest. As of today, the Council's goals are to support awareness of public diplomacy's central importance to the nation's foreign policy and serve as an activist clearing house. By offering information to the press, the public and on the Hill and elsewhere, the PDC can play a key role in helping to rebuild the structures and skills that are so essential. The Council's Web site offers timely insights into the challenges facing our public diplomacy; and its daily electronic news file is the best source anywhere of media reporting on public diplomacy (PD) issues across the country and the world.

This is not to imply that the USIA back in action will be some kind of "quick fix." Because our relationships around the world almost always involve the local publics' attitude toward the US and just about everything encompassed by our democratic system, we must gear up for a long, sustained effort just as we did in the Cold War. The rainbow at the end of this journey is a world as diverse as New York City with its 250 languages and its mix of religious and ethnic groups that goes along and gets along every day of the week.

Let's face the issue honestly and frankly. Everyone made a mistake in closing down the USIA in 1999 and for once, let's admit that mistake, get over it and get back on track.

## Still Needed: A United States Policy for “Soft Power”

*Carl Spielvogel*

United States Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, 2000-2001  
Governor, United States Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1995-2000

“Diplomacy: The Art of Letting Someone Have it Your Way.” These words are inscribed on a paperweight that sat on my desk at the United States (US) Embassy in Bratislava, the Slovak Republic, and it was the first thing I saw when I came to work each morning.

To some, it must sound a bit like a cliché, but to me, it still served as a daily reminder of a thought that unfortunately many of our government decision makers seem to have forgotten these days.

Having spent 30 years of my working life developing commercial strategies for hundreds of multinational corporations and doing business in 54 countries as a Chief Executive Officer, I believed that although I did not speak the language of all of my 10,000 multinational employees—only 1,100 of whom were Americans—I was obliged to try to help them develop “client” strategies that might be successful.

For example, I told them that one has to first understand the “problem” in our case; we call it “US public diplomacy.” Since this is the “client” we are dealing with, our challenge is to:

1. “Explain” the US and the reasons for its actions, to the rest of the world—but most importantly to our allies.
2. Try to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic world, where we have made such a halting start.

Anyone who has tried to sell US products or anyone’s products around the world understands that one cannot sell successfully a “bad” product. Yet we, the most effective democracy in the world, know that we have a superior product—the record of this young nation—and have done such a “unilaterally” poor job of selling it.

Put simply, we need more contemporary and focused communications tools in our diplomatic tool kit, and we need to use them more effectively. We have made a serious and continuing mistake in thinking that we could use our “hard power,” to the exclusion of “soft power.”

It is worth reminding ourselves that George Kennan, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, said that to win the war against communism, the US had “to create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the

responsibilities of a world power and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.”

That cogent observation, made some 57 years ago by a brilliant diplomat-public servant has stood the test of time and should still serve as a “client” position statement on which to build an effective program for public diplomacy.

To round out this strategy and include our currently alienated democratic allies in the fight against terrorism and fundamentalism, one needs to incorporate in our “soft power” initiative such shared basic values as individual freedoms, free trade, open markets, democracy, women’s rights, the rule of law, transparency, health care, public education, etc.

The new report just issued by the non-partisan Pew Research Center, about how foreign publics view America, confirms many of our worst fears about how hardened anti-American views have become in Europe and in Muslim countries.

This alarming report, entitled, “A Year After the Iraq War,” and its predecessors, “What the World Thinks in 2002” and “Views of a Changing World,” should be read carefully by everyone concerned about the future of our great country.

It is to be hoped that Margaret D. Tutwiler, recently named Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, can start to rectify this long neglected policy area.

As a person highly regarded by the Bush administration, her words carried weight, when in testifying before the House of Representatives in February, she said in referring to public diplomacy: “Unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world.”

Space limitations in this article do not permit further discussion of the many remedies available to start to cure this problem of “lack of trust” in the US although I presented some suggested solutions in the article I wrote for this publication in the spring 2003 issue, entitled “Needed: A US Policy for ‘Soft Power.’”

From my view, the most effective analysis of what needs to be done is contained in the excellent Task Force report recently released by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). It is entitled, “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy.” If one reads this report, one will find a road map for what should be done to achieve a results-oriented program for public diplomacy.

However, whatever we do in the area of public diplomacy to attempt to restore our global status as the world’s leading democracy, which cares about all of the peoples around us, we: (a) must communicate that we realize we cannot defeat terrorism alone, and (b) make certain that all of our messages are free of political spin.

In our free democratic society, White House administrations come and go, but we must communicate that “these truths are self-evident” about our democracy and that they will go on forever. Our young democracy has stood the test of time, and we must do all we can with soft power to continue to hold it up **as** a model.

One does not need to reinvent the wheel: The CFR analysis, and others like it such as the Pew report, identify the problems and the solutions. Why don't we “just do it!”?

## America's New Diplomacy: Winning the Race for Hearts and Minds

*Nancy G. Brinker*

United States Ambassador to Hungary, 2001-2003

**I**n a country where cancer is still discussed in whispers, it was a remarkable sight—hundreds of resolute Hungarian breast cancer survivors walking across Budapest's historic Chain Bridge, illuminated in pink, the international color of breast cancer.

As the American Ambassador to Hungary at the time, I had the privilege of working with Hungarian-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporate sponsors to organize last year's "Bridge of Health"—that nation's first fundraiser for women's health.\* As one woman told us afterwards, "We were not sure such a huge event could be done in Hungary. Maybe we were not brave enough. So we thank you."

With Washington engaged in a global campaign to win hearts and minds, particularly in the Muslim world, such gratitude underscores one of America's greatest foreign policy tools for promoting America's image and interests around the world—healthcare.

Today, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is rebuilding public health systems in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush has proposed an historic 50 percent increase in foreign aid and a \$15 billion initiative to fight AIDS overseas. Secretary of State Colin Powell has elevated health care as an element of US foreign policy.

At the same time, USAID is pulling out of countries across Eastern Europe, and the European Union is doing little to assist fledgling NGOs that provide the building blocks of democracy. Who will fill the void?

It's time for a new model of diplomacy, one that communicates American values and serves US interests by harnessing the combined strength of the US government, industry, non-profits and the idealism of the American people. I have seen this model in action, and it works.

First, engage the man (and woman) on the street. Whereas traditional diplomacy concentrates on influencing foreign leaders, the new diplomacy reaches out to average citizens using nontraditional gateways of influence. Effective diplomacy need not cost billions of dollars or require another government agency.

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\* *Editor's Note: The walk across the Chain Link Bridge, illuminated in pink, was so successful that it was repeated in October 2003 under the auspices of Ambassador George Herbert Walker.*

For example, **an** essential component of any healthy society is awareness, education, prevention and healthy lifestyles. Our walk across Chain Bridge ignited a national dialogue in Hungary about women's health. By sponsoring Walks for Health through Budapest with government officials, business leaders and local celebrities, we helped empower Hungarians with the life-saving knowledge that they can take charge of their own health.

Second, grow the grassroots of democracy. Traditional diplomacy forges alliances and coalitions among nations. The new diplomacy forges civil societies within nations. In countries like Hungary, the American spirit of volunteerism is still largely a foreign concept. Only now—more than a decade after the lifting of the Iron Curtain—is something akin to an independent civil society and non-profit sector taking hold.

Americans experienced in the NGO community and coalition building can help by promoting a new culture of civic activism in developing countries. I shared with Hungarians my experience as a founder of one of America's largest breast cancer organizations. A new partnership between Hungarian and American physicians is one of dozens of **USAID** initiatives to promote community-based approaches to health. With active citizens comes more public faith in the ability of a democratic system to deliver a better future.

Finally, foster a spirit of corporate citizenship. Traditional diplomacy emphasizes government assistance. The new diplomacy recognizes that 80 percent of US humanitarian aid now comes from the generosity of the American people and the private sector.

Our effort to illuminate the Chain Bridge would have been impossible without the financial support of General Electric, one of the many ways GE is reaching out to Europe after the European Commission blocked its bid to takeover Honeywell in 2001. Yet after decades of communist domination, countries like Hungary have yet to develop their own sense of corporate philanthropy.

In Hungary, I explained how non-profits and the business community can partner to achieve common ends. Likewise, American business leaders can advise their foreign counterparts on how to embrace corporate philanthropy.

As Ambassador, I had the privilege of working in the office once used by Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who took refuge in the US Embassy in Budapest for 15 years after Moscow crushed the 1956 Hungarian uprising. "Democracy," Cardinal Mindszenty once said, "implies that every citizen and every social class is equally entitled to participate in the shaping of the common fate of all of us."

The West won the Cold War with both its "hard" military power and the "soft" power of its ideals and values. Imagine how many hearts and minds the **US** could win today by making the promise of democracy—including the common human need for healthcare—a foreign policy priority.

Reaching out to ordinary citizens around the world and communicating America's values is no longer just a job for the US government. It's a job for all Americans, including the private sector.



~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper on Abu Ghraib

383.6

Here's a Tillie Fowler piece on Abu Ghraib. I don't know if she ever got it published.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Read the Report, Know the Facts" by Tillie K. Fowler

DHR:ss  
113004-6



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

30110104

~~FOUO~~

# READ THE REPORT, KNOW THE FACTS

By Tillie K. Fowler

During the time I represented the people of northeast Florida in Congress, it was not unusual to be forced to wrangle with political distortions and misrepresentations of various issues reported in newspapers and on television. However, none ever rose to the level of what has been recently reported on the work of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, which was chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and included myself, President Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown and retired *Air Force General Charles Horner*. Together, we conducted the first independent and comprehensive investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and other Department of Defense detention facilities.

Our investigation found leadership failures up the chain of command and chronicled a series of missed opportunities for effective and aggressive leadership and proper exercise of duty. We very specifically concluded that had there been stronger leadership and more effective oversight within the chain of command, the abuses could have been prevented or discovered and halted much earlier.

Contrary to recent editorial and political characterizations, our report details these primary failures and assigns responsibility appropriately. Americans did not want a political witch hunt, they rightfully demanded objective answers to why and how the abuse happened and our report provides those answers.

We did not shy away from the facts and certainly did not shelter anyone from their failures. Our report was explicit as we found the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Central Command failed to develop a war plan to include effective alternatives to post-major combat operations. We also reported the leadership failures of senior civilian and military officials in the Pentagon who did not adequately clarify and enforce how the various categories of detainees were to be treated throughout the military detention facilities.

I am truly surprised every time I read or hear that our report failed to hold officials responsible for their failures. To those detractors, I would recommend taking the time to fully read the 125-paged report in which the largest section explicitly addresses command responsibility. In fact, we provide specific examples where four Generals and four Colonels failed to exercise the judgment, awareness and resourcefulness necessary to prevent the abuses. These commanders showed little signs of the leadership expected of them and certainly did not set a good example for their subordinates to follow.

Throughout our investigation, we were committed to providing an objective and independent examination of the issue. We presented the facts as we found them and did not create scenarios to fulfill political motivations and much to the chagrin of those looking for political opportunity, we found no explicit United States government policy calling for the torture or inhumane treatment of detainees.

When our report was released it was initially praised for being the first to find accountability for the scandal up to the highest levels in the chain of command, but somehow that fact has fallen victim to a variety of political agendas which are being furthered through imprecise and inaccurate reporting.

The Pentagon has moved quickly to reform its entire detention system to ensure abuses like those at Abu Ghraib never happen again. Now they must ensure that the military justice system proceeds without delay to punish those within the chain of command whose action or inaction allowed the abuse to happen. We owe it to the young men and women honorably serving in our Armed Forces in Iraq and elsewhere to restore the trust that has been tarnished by these horrible acts.

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*Tillie K. Fowler served on the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993-2001. She is the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and led the independent investigation into allegations of sexual abuse at the U.S. Air Force Academy last year.*

11-L-0559/OSD/23247



~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Fran Harvey  
 Gen Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Saving the All Volunteer Force

320.2

Attached is an interesting paper from an expert on the subject. Why don't you take a look at it, and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

11/04 Paper on Saving the All-Volunteer Force by Charley Moskos

DHR:ss  
112904-40

.....


Please respond by 12/21/04

3000004

~~FOUO~~

November 19,2004

For: Secretary of Defense

From: W.J. Haynes 

Subject: Email from Newt Minow concerning the All-Volunteer Force

- Newt asked me to pass along to you a note from his friend Charley Moskos.
- Newt says Moskos is the leading military sociologist in the nation. I've heard similar descriptions.
- Moskos will be meeting soon with Pete Schoomaker, and has written the attached note on "Saving the All-Volunteer Force."

Attachment: a/s

11/04

Charley Moskos

Subject: Saving the All-Volunteer Force

The desirable end-strength of our armed forces, especially that of the Army has become a subject of concern. All agree, however, that the military manpower demands are heightened owing to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and other deployments. In particular, there is apprehension that reserve components will confront severe recruitment and reenlistment problems in the near future.

The most practical way of alleviating impending shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components is to introduce a short enlistment option targeted at college attendees and college graduates. This would entail a 15-month active duty commitment. Such 15-month enlistees could well perform many of the roles now being met by reserve components as well as some number of active duty personnel.

There is a definite, albeit limited, market of college graduates who state a propensity for military service if the active-duty commitment is 15 months coupled with generous educational benefits. In the fall of 2002 enlistment propensities of undergraduates were assessed through surveys conducted at four representative universities: Northwestern University, University of Arizona, University of California-Los Angeles, University of Illinois-Chicago. A similar survey was completed in October, 2004, at Northwestern University. These were the first and only surveys on enlistment propensity ever conducted on a university campus.

Options were given with different enlistment lengths and educational benefits. The educational benefits options ranged from \$60,000 for a four-year enlistment to \$15,000 for the 15-month enlistment. Across all universities, shorter terms had a notable positive effect on enlistment propensity. Twenty-three percent indicated an enlistment propensity for the 15-month option (with 15K in educational benefits) compared to two percent for the four-year option (with 60K in educational benefits).

Very significantly, the October 2004 survey at Northwestern specifically asked how many of the students would consider serving as a prison guard in places like Abu Ghraid and Guantanamo. In return, they

11-L-0559/OSD/23250

would have their student loans forgiven and be given G.I. Bill benefits for graduate school. A remarkable 11 percent that this would be a "very likely" option and another 18 percent would "consider" such an option.

Context. Two-thirds of American high school graduates now go directly on to some form of higher education. Of these, about half will graduate with a bachelor's degree. Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor's degree. Yet military recruitment of college graduates at the enlisted level is minuscule. The average college graduate today leaves with about \$19,000 in debt.

Very significantly, among the college graduates, 40 percent intend to go on to some form of graduate work. In point of fact, a higher percentage of youth now go on to graduate school than went to undergraduate school in the post-WWII years of the original G.I. Bill. The average debt of one who attends graduate school is \$38,000!

Few of the students at the more selective universities had close relatives or friends who were serving in the military. Noteworthy, there was no correlation between military knowledge (half of the students did not know a colonel was higher than a major). There was also no correlation between political values and enlistment with liberals and conservatives having the same propensity.

Arguments Against a 15-Month Enlistment. Three major arguments are raised against the short enlistment. These are given below with rejoinders.

(1) "Short enlistments would increase demands on the training base." Let us remember that almost one-third of our service entrants now fail to complete their initial enlistments. In fact, soldiers signing up for long enlistments -- four to six years - have attrition rates one and a half times greater than those who enter on the two-year enlistment. Completion of an enlistment term is also strongly correlated with higher education. Much better to have a soldier serve 15 months honorably than be prematurely discharged. A 15-month enlistment option would both reduce personnel turnover and counter shortfalls in end strength.

(2) "Today's military requires highly technical skills that cannot be met by short-termers." Precisely. Higher compensation should be aimed at

those who skills require extended training and experience. In the draft era, the pay ratio between a senior NCO and a private was seven to one; today it is three to one. Future pay raises must be focused on the career soldier. 15-month enlistees could readily fill the multitude of jobs that require only a short formal training period or even just on-the-job training. It is well documented that higher educated recruits not only have markedly lower attrition rates, but also have the skills and motivation to quickly learn a wide variety of military jobs.

A major morale problem among reservists is pulling guard duty for various installations. This could be an appropriate task for a short-term enlistee. Item: the total length of a training for an military police officer -- from service entry to completion is 14 weeks. The short-term enlistee, moreover would be ideally suited for duties in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai (and perhaps Korea). These are the very missions the surveys show are most appealing to college students. Indeed, short enlistment soldiers are especially well suited to those MOS's now confronting recruitment shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components.

(3) "A short enlistment option would attract soldiers who otherwise would sign up for longer enlistment." Quite the contrary. A 15-month enlistment coupled with educational benefits would attract college attendees and graduates who heretofore would have never considered entering the armed forces. The short-term option recognizes that there is a dual market in recruitment. One based on salary, skill training, and career benefits; the other on those seeking a temporary break between college and graduate studies or between school and career.

Recommendations. The following is a list of preliminary recommendations in conjunction with the 15-month enlistment option.

1. Consider a cohort enlistment for certain colleges to serve in a specified peacekeeping mission.

2. Emphasize military service as a rewarding experience between undergraduate and graduate school or between school and career. Use single-term veterans as part-time recruiters.

3. Now is the time to consider linking federal aid to college students to some form of national service. Under the present system, we have created a G.I. Bill without the G.I. Through federal grants and loan subsidies we now pay students not to serve their country,

4. Establish a commission to look at military recruitment, homeland security needs, civilian national service, and federal student aid.

Conclusion. Without attracting significant numbers of college graduates, military recruitment will most likely experience: (a) a lowering of entrance standards, (b) higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses, (c) an expanded recruitment force, (d) increased contracting out of military functions, (e) more recruitment of non-American citizens.

Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if military service becomes more common among privileged youth. We will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military experience - and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.

OIF Follow Up. What follow are recommendations in areas unrelated to military recruitment. Rather, these observations can be considered a follow-up to my earlier report on OIF (14 December 2003). They are based on discussions with Arabs and Muslim knowledgeable. (1) Do not assign female guards to deal directly with Muslim male prisoners. This to avoid the cultural reality of what is considered demeaning treatment. (2) Avoid using power point presentations to Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular. Again cultural realities make such presentations seem impersonal and aloof. (3) Consider establishing something along the lines of a short-term warrant officer program to recruit native-Arab speakers for interpreters, civil affairs, and the like.

~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

400.13

Please read this material on acquisition reform and come to me with your proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/04 SecDef Memo to USD (AT&L) re: Acquisition Reform

11/23/04 USD (AT&L) Memo to SecDef re: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

DHR:ss  
112904-26

.....  
Please respond by 12/17/04

NOV 29 2004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04244-05

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz  
 Gen Pete Pace Jim Roche  
 Gordon England Les Brownlee  
 Jim Haynes Powell Moore  
 Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, we absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102004-18

*Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 ✓/n  
 Lt Col Langyel*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

NOV 24 2004



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

### ACTION MEMO

November 23, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition  
Technology and Logistics)

Subject: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

- The purpose of this memo is to give you some early returns in response to your snowflake on *Bold Ideas in Acquisition Management*. The ideas are relatively easy to implement and would better align key organizations to incentivize jointness, the first step in improving acquisition. These ideas would be steps towards a bolder concept but would be useful whether or not you, and perhaps the Congress, embrace a bolder proposal. Since jointness is a Department objective, you can also achieve a major refocus by aligning resources with a policy directive.
- For aligning resources, it will be necessary to direct Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding for joint, transformational and international programs, which AT&L will identify in each of the Services' fiscal guidance. Changes to those programs would require my approval prior to POM submission. This change would put your objectives for Joint, Transformational, and those International programs you support, at the top of the priority list. Unfortunately, as you know, joint programs are at or near the lowest priority for the Service programmers. As Secretary Roche ruefully puts it: "Joint means Navy won't pay." Transformational programs usually mean new programs and in any budget end-game, current programs beat new programs. Currently, international programs compete for the dubious distinction of being the lowest priority for the Services. Attached is a memo which gives such budgeting direction (**Tab A**) I recommend you sign it.
- Most of the objectives of Secretary Aldridge's Study regarding acquisition, and even an earlier study (1992) by Secretary Yockey, were to achieve jointness and to address capabilities, not individual systems. As I construct a bold proposal, driving jointness and avoiding duplicate systems, such as trucks, will be the overarching objectives -- saving slots should be secondary and should not therefore be the objective. In the interim, the following steps would be effective in promoting jointness and could be implemented this cycle:




11-L-0559/OSD/23256

- Realign all Service research and development (R&D) commands and laboratories under the Director Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E). Establish Centers of Excellence with the current DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) in order to concentrate Science & Technology (S&T) and R&D efforts in specific areas. Developmental priorities would be addressed without duplicative structures. If you agree, I will task D,DR&E to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they would organize these capabilities. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab B**.
- Realign all Logistics organizations and functions, currently resident within the Services, under the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness) (DUSD(L&MR)). If you agree, I will task the DUSD(L&MR) to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they might organize to accomplish this objective. This consolidated logistics focus would facilitate efficiencies, balanced workloads and make public private partnerships more productive. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab C**.

COORDINATION: **Tab D**

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Recommend you sign the memo at **Tab A**.
2. Recommend you approve development of implementation plans for realigning R&D commands and laboratories as well as Material Management and Maintenance organizations (**Tabs B and C**) – with response within **45** days.



Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

See Me: \_\_\_\_\_

CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Priority for Joint, Transformational, and International Acquisition Programs

In order to ensure appropriate emphasis is given to Joint, Transformational, and International programs, I am directing Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding, in the budgeting process, for programs in these categories. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) USD(AT&L) will identify the program funding for each of these programs in the Services' fiscal guidance.

Changes to these programs shall require USD(AT&L) approval prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission. This process is intended to ensure the integrity of these Joint, Transformational, and International programs critical to transforming the Department of Defense and meeting the capability needs of our warfighters.

11-L-0559/OSD/23258

# Proposed RDT&E Realignment

- Office of Defense Research (Science)
  - Office of Naval Research (Naval Research Lab as the Defense Research Lab)
  - Army Research Office
  - Army Research Lab
  - Air Force Office of Scientific Research
  - Air Force Research Lab
  - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Office of Technology and Engineering (Demonstrations and Prototypes)
  - R&D Components of the Naval Systems Commands and Warfare Centers (Non-ACAT I)
  - Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
  - R&D Components of Army Research, Development & Engineering (Non-ACAT I)
  - R&D Components of the Air Force Systems Program Offices(Non-ACAT I)

# Proposed Logistics Realignment

- Materiel Management
  - Army, Navy and Air Force Inventory Control Points
  - DLA Supply Centers
  - Other Materiel Mgt storage locations from the Services and Defense Agencies
  - Army Arsenals
  - Marine Corps Logistics Base
- Maintenance and Repair Facilities
  - Army and Marine Corps Maintenance Depots
  - Naval and Marine Corps Aviation Depots
  - Naval shipyards
  - Air Logistics Centers
- Distribution Centers/Depots
  - Defense Distribution Depots
  - Weapons stations and ammunitions depots
  - Operational (retail level) stock points
- Logistics Information Services

COORDINATION

General Counsel

\_\_\_\_\_

November 23, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/23261

7200  
~~FOUO~~ file

November 19, 2004  
I-04/015675  
ES-1454

JAPAN

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Japanese

Please coordinate with me on dates when we do the Japanese 2+2.

Thanks.

DHR ss  
111904-22

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

Sir,  
OH 12/10  
Response Attached  
V/R, Col B  
12/9

19 NOV 04

19-11-04 17:37 IN

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23262

OSD 04245-05

DA 12/10

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_  
USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_  
ASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_  
I-04/015675

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on U.S.-Japan 2+2 Scheduling

- This memo provides an update on efforts to coordinate dates for a 2+2 meeting with the Japanese, per your request (Tab 1).
- The Japanese Foreign and Defense Ministers want to hold a 2+2 soon to maintain momentum on alliance transformation and force posture discussions.
  - o We think this is a good idea.
- The Japanese proposed February 11 or 12, but those dates conflict with your NATO ministerial commitments.
- We have proposed a one day event during February 18-23, but have not received a reply from the Japanese.
  - o State Department officials believe the SecState designate will support an early 2+2 meeting and that these dates would work, but they cannot make commitments until she is confirmed.
- DUSD Lawless will continue to follow up with the Japanese.

Attachment as stated

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_  
DUSD/AP *[Signature]* 9.12.2004  
PDIR/AP *[Signature]* 12/1/04

Prepared by: Maj Jason Perry, Country Director for Japan, ISA/AP (b)(6)

November 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Tax Exclusions

*012*

Please look at this note from David Chu on tax exclusions for the military. We ought to think through what else we might want to propose in that area.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/3/04USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion [OSD 13958-04]

DHR:dh  
111704-20

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*17 Nov 04*

~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for *the force*.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
090204-7

Please respond by

*9/10*  
*U.S. Get Answer*

*5/17*  
*Response Attached*  
*1/10/04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23265

*1314*



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

RT

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



AW 11/17

INFO MEMO

2004 NOV 15 11:30:01

November 3, 2004, 9:11 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, OSD (P&R)

SUBJECT: History of ~~the~~ Combat Zone Tax Exclusion — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Prior to **the** Korean conflict, income **tax** benefits for members of the Armed Forces were **part** of individual revenue acts **passed** to finance war efforts, and the exclusion was not dependent on combat zone designation.
- Beginning **with** the Korean conflict, the law excluded military compensation earned in a combat zone.
  - o The Internal Revenue Code exclusion is generally triggered by the President establishing a combat zone by Executive Order, not by Congressional action.
  - o Presidents have designated five combat zones: Korea, Vietnam, Arabian Peninsula, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Korea and Vietnam have been terminated.
  - o Treasury regulations allow **the** Secretary, or his delegate, to extend combat zone **tax** benefits to members serving outside of but in "direct support" of the combat zone.
- Congress acted only twice to extend combat zone tax benefits to members by establishing in **law** Qualified Hazardous **Duty** Areas: the Former Yugoslavia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).
  - o **Both** of these bills originated in **the** House Ways and Means Committee.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA (b)(6)

TSA SD	11/6
BRMA SD	
MA SD	SBS 11/7
EXEC SEC	M 11/16



DSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23266

3143

file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Karzai

If I have not sent a letter to Karzai, congratulating him on his election, I should.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-11

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*11/5* *11/4*  
*SIR* \_\_\_\_\_  
*Already sent.*  
*v/r*  
*Jim*

Afghanistan

440404

DA 11/4

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 1 of 1

PAAUZYUW RUEWFMFU3307 2911821-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS3307 2911821  
P 171820Z OCT 04

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
ZEN/OSD SECDEF  
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI

PLEASE DELIVER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RUMSFELD

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. SO MUCH  
HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, MUCH OF IT THROUGH YOUR  
HARD WORK AND DETERMINATION. YOU HAVE LED YOUR NATION WELL THROUGH  
AN EXTRAORDINARY AND DEMANDING TIME, AND THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT. YOU  
SHOULD BE PROUD.

THE AFGHANI BALLOT YOU SIGNED IS DISPLAYED IN MY OFFICE, WHERE I WILL  
PROUDLY SHOW IT TO VISITORS. IT WILL ALWAYS BE A TREASURED  
POSSESSION, REFLECTING AN IMPORTANT EVENT INDEED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE TIME AHEAD.

DONALD RUMSFELD

ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW SEPARATELY  
BT

SECDEF V2  
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(\*) (U,6,8) 2  
INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*)  
CHAIRS2(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) USDAT:STS(\*)  
ASD:FA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) USDCOMP(\*)  
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NNNN

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\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/23268

~~FOUO~~

file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **HAG** Program

373.24

Please see if you can find anything out about a high altitude guidance program. It is called **HAG**. I think it's connected to missile defense and believe it has to do with a bullet hitting a bullet.

Let me know if you can figure out what it is and what its status is.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓/r  
LT Col Bengyel  
11/5

40004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23269

OSD 04248-05

## High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed “black box” by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S. missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG’s inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

2004

The Honorable Jon Kyl  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0304

Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG source code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MD A-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. OBERING III  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

11-L-0559/OSD/23271

NOV 04 2004

311 CCC

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Paul McHale  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SITE R and other Alternate Command Sites

I enjoyed the visit to Site R and learned a great deal. Thanks for setting it up. Please come back to me about our path ahead on all of our alternate command sites - including the NAOC.

We should also work to ensure that each of these sites are laid out in a way that correctly reflects the chain of command, e.g., the Services do not need large staff spaces because they are not in the operational chain.

Finally, we need to be cost conscious. We have many priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110304-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

4 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

*foto*

November 15, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Canal Zone Security Brief

*Panama*

The administrator of the Canal Zone offered to come up and brief whoever we want at the Pentagon on other security arrangements and other plans.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111504-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

*ISPOV04*

OSD 04250-05

11-L-0559/OSD/23273

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=NOV-18 08:47

END=NOV-18 08:47

FILE NO. =359

STN NO.	COMM.	ONE-TOUCH/ ABBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL NO.	PAGES	DURATION
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

TO:	Gen Craddock	FROM:	VADM Stavridis
OFFICE:	Southcom	OFFICE:	Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHONE:	(b)(6)	COMM:	(b)(6)
FAX:		DSN:	
		UNCLASS:	
		DSN:	
PAGES W/ COVER	3		

SUBJECT/REMARKS:

Gen Craddock,  
 Passed to you sir from VADM Stavridis.  
 V/R  
 (b)(6)

The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

Releaser's Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date/Time \_\_\_\_\_



# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**WARNING!!! DO NOT TRANSMIT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OVER UNSECURED TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS. OFFICIAL DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ARE SUBJECT TO MONITORING AND USE OF DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO MONITORING.**

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

TO:	Gen Craddock	FROM:	VADM Stavridis
OFFICE:	Southcom	OFFICE:	Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHONE:	(b)(6)	COMM:	(b)(6)
FAX:		DSN:	
		UNCLASS:	
		DSN:	
PAGES W/ COVER	3		

**SUBJECT/REMARKS:**

Gen Craddock,

Passed to you sir from VADM Stavridis.

V/R

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

Releaser's Name

Date/Time

11-L-0559/OSD/23275

November 2, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Energy Idea

463

George Shultz called on the topic of energy. He says there's an outfit that can take solar energy and ~~turn~~ it into electricity by a process that puts an ink spray on a thin foil. The panels that result from this process are cheap, about one-quarter the cost. The folks who discovered this are ready to build a factory. The military possibilities might be to use it in remote locations. You could take the ink and foil and operate a radio.

Shultz and a personal friend, Dr. Paul Berg, who is a Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, sat in on the presentation. When it was finished, Berg said the presenters (chemists) know what they are talking about. They use nanotechnology. They can make a nano-molecular membrane - designed with various orifices - and put it on a thicker membrane. The cost for desalinization is in electric power. Their membrane apparently has so little resistance that it means dramatically reduced costs. There are, undoubtedly, other applications as well.

Shultz sent the attached white paper, including points of contact. I told Shultz you would get in touch with these folks and see whether anyone in DoD is interested.

Thanks.

Attach.

November 2004 Agua Via, LLC White Paper: "Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification"

DHR:ss  
110204-8

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

2 NOV 04

# WHITE PAPER

## Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification

November 2004

**Agua Via, LLC**

agua: water  
via: way, path

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330 Beach Road  
Burlingame, California 94010

(b)(6)

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1

11-L-0559/OSD/23277

AGUA: water

VIA: way, path

Based on research work which began in 1997, a novel filtration technology has been developed by mimicking the naturally occurring filtration mechanisms in the membranes of biologic cells. Desalination and water purification based on this Smart Membrane™ technology is anticipated to deliver the purest water **possible** at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible. Energy is the largest cost component of desalination. **By** cutting over 60% of energy required by current reverse osmosis membranes – and concomitantly eliminating high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems (little **wasted** energy to **recover**), certain pretreatment systems, and other maintenance costs – Smart Membranes may provide overall cost reductions of **up to 60 or 70%**. Smart Membranes are ideally suited to **deliver pure water in settings where this has not been economically or technically possible, or to deliver pure water in a smaller, less energy intensive, less costly manner than any conventional system.**

*"Water, like energy in the late 1970s, will probably become the most critical natural resource issue facing most parts of the world by the start of this century."*

- The Financial Times of London

Originally created for use in medical devices, Smart Membranes are now being adapted for use in desalination and water purification. It is estimated that purification applications using membranes will be demonstrable in 18 months, and desalination applications ready in an additional 18 months following adequate funding.

Smart Membrane technology is configurable in both performance and **scale** to the wide range of physical circumstances under which desalination or purification must be performed: point of use solutions for individuals in the field, small group systems, mobile systems on land or sea, and municipal sized systems in industrial, recreational, commercial, medical, agricultural, military, and municipal settings. At its simplest, a filtration cartridge at the bottom of a tube with a 27" head of water is sufficient to eliminate chemical, biologic and most radioactive hazards. With an additional component in place to handle osmotic gradient, the 27" tube is **also** sufficient for desalinate brackish water and seawater. The membrane is anticipated to be packaged in a variety of reliable, low maintenance, easy to use systems **designed to produce high purity water in a full range of demanding environments.**

#### EXAMPLES OF SMART MEMBRANE IMPACTS.

Calculations indicate that these membranes could produce 205 gallons per square foot per day (gfd) operating at **<1psi**, utilizing techniques other than high pressure to accommodate the osmotic gradient during desalination. At this filtration rate, high volume, high quality water purification and desalination **could be provided** within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring 165mm (6.5 inches) per side **could produce 100,000 gallons per day at 1 psi.** The implications are:

- reduction in **filtration** plant size, energy **requirements**, and **cost** The Office of Naval Research has the goal of using cutting edge conventional technologies to get a 300,000 gallon per day filtration system onto a flatbed truck. A Smart Membrane system would deliver **the** 300,000 gallons via 3 of the 6.5 inch cubes.

- useful where **small** size and low energy requirements are critical such as in emergency and military applications, or rural use off the power **grid**,
- useful in a range **of** scales: from municipalities down to individual use
- useful as a wide spectrum water purifier in military or terrorist-impacted environments: by filtering out all contaminants and leaving only safe water, water can be provided without identifying contaminants or taking special steps to **deal** with the contaminants' concentration or nature
- **sufficiently** low cost to be useful for waste water remediation, elimination of endemic biologic threats (**e.g.**, Giardia), toxic solutes or other contaminants.

Today, desalination can cost over \$1,000US per acre-foot. Although Tampa Bay, Florida had hoped to desalinate water at a cost of only \$650US per acre-foot, much of the potential cost reduction was due to favorable financing terms and projected operating efficiencies which have fallen short of the goal by 50%.

Today, energy is a dominating cost of creating a gallon of clean water. In desalination, the most energy-intensive water treatment, annual energy costs equal or exceed total capital cost. The **final** stage of purification - separating water from salt - accounts for 99% of the energy. **Of** that energy, roughly **2/3<sup>rd</sup>** is spent overcoming 1) the length, and 2) the **tortuous** path of the pores in conventional membranes. Only **1/3<sup>rd</sup>** is due to overcoming the osmotic gradient of the **salt**.

The **Smart** Membrane's extreme thinness (1 atomic layer thick) and complete **lack** of tortuous paths eliminates **both** length and tortuosity as factors in determining flow, **and so** eliminates **2/3<sup>rd</sup>** of the energy penalty experienced by conventional membranes. This reduction in energy translates to a major reduction in overall cost **of** desalinating water from energy savings alone.

Significant as a 66% energy cost reduction is, **the** impact of moving to a low-energy/low pressure mode ripples through the overall design of any water system, accounting for an additional reduction of capital cost and labor costs. For example, eliminating the high pressure pumps and energy recovery systems of Conventional **desalination** plants translates into further reduction in capital cost, system complexity, **and** maintenance costs. With capital costs alone for desalination plants running between \$40M and \$400M, the value from a **Smart** Membrane system could be regarded as significant.

Additional examples of reduced maintenance demands may be seen in fouling reduction. Fouling is a major **cause** of reduced performance and high maintenance in conventional membranes. The **Smart** Membrane is so thin that there is no ability for substances to get trapped in its pores, as is the case with thick, tortuous polymer membranes. A second cause of membrane fouling is **biofilm** formation by bacteria. **Bacteria** begin **biofilm** formation by establishing a beachhead on a surface through dropping glycoprotein-based grappling hooks. The **Smart** Membrane's pores are too small to **admit** these grappling hooks. The area surrounding the pore has the ability to be covered with surface molecules in a precise fashion to minimize bacterial attachments. This ability to cover the membrane surface in a discrete fashion **led**, in a biomedical setting, to a **powerful** strategy for implementation of biocompatibility. In water filtration and purification, this capability allows for developing surfaces with unique anti-fouling properties.

## TECHNICAL BACKGROUND.

A Smart Membrane is the thinnest membrane physically possible (1 atomic layer thick) with the ability to have custom crafted pores which filter in or out virtually any class of substances desired. For example, by sizing down slightly from the pores suitable for filtering water, one could build membranes which act as a light weight, long-lived gas mask - filtering out nerve toxins (organic molecules) while allowing oxygen, carbon dioxide and nitrogen to pass freely. Rather than absorbing and quickly saturating in the manner of conventional carbon gas masks, the Smart Membrane would reflect undesired substances.

Smart Membranes result from the creation of a new class of extremely selective, biomimetic Smart Pores™ which assemble into thin (0.5nanometer-.22nanometer) porous nanomembranes. These porous monolayer membranes have specific structures that provide a low energy barrier to the passage of water or specific solutes, while providing a high barrier to other solutes. This technology shows highly specific molecular filtration at the atomic scale and profound transport properties such as exquisite ion selectivity characteristics.

Because these membrane structures are so thin, it is **useful** to think about them in quantum mechanical terms rather than classical fluid mechanical terms. Dr. William Dean of MIT has described these pores as "orifices" offering no impedance to flow, rather than as conventional "pores." With a low pressure drop across a nanomembrane 0.5 nanometers thick, high flux is produced at very low pressure differential.

To date, Smart Pores and Smart Membranes have been targeted on difficult and novel medical filtration applications. In the **course** of this work, filtration abilities have been developed which were unprecedented and considered major advances in filtration capability.

Certain modifications, however, are necessary to meet the demands of water purification and desalination. For example, in order to meet **the** demanding medical **criteria** of biocompatibility, cost had not been a relevant factor in materials selection. Because a water filtration membrane must be rugged, low cost and able to tolerate a range of chemical insults, modifications are needed to replace the high cost biocompatible materials selected for the medical applications with more suitable ones. After the basic modifications for desalination and purification, additional modifications are planned for dealing with extreme water feedstocks, such as the cyanide-rich water resulting from mining operations.

## APPLICABILITY.

The technology is anticipated to be applicable and superior for applications in:

- Purification applications with uses ranging from high purity drinking water through higher purity water for medical uses, such as Water for Injection.
- Desalination applications, including both seawater and brackish water.
- Remediation of both waste water and polluted ground water, producing ultra high quality water.


**APPLYING SMART MEMBRANES TO WATER PURIFICATION.**

Smart Membranes are anticipated to produce only good, potable water. Everything else is eliminated: bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebas, chemical and biologic warfare agents, poisons, toxins, most radioactive agents, spores of pathogens, nitrogenous waste from commercial fertilizer or excrement, arsenic and other heavy metals, salts, etc. This addresses the full range of health problems caused by bacteria and viruses such as dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or minerals such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene, waste water redemption and agriculture in the U.S. and overseas.

Eighty percent of all disease in developing countries is water borne, and awaits a simple, cost effective, low maintenance solution which Smart Membranes could deliver. But even within the U.S., water purity is a problem. Although involving a narrower range of biologic contaminants than tropical countries, U.S. problems range from arsenic to endemic problems with Giardia, and, recently, to contamination concerns relating to terrorist activity. According to the EPA, approximately 95% of all U.S. water municipalities are small systems serving populations of less than 5,000. These are mainly agricultural communities where bacterial contamination derives from livestock; they lack the resources to build sophisticated systems despite acute need.

Number of People at Risk From Arsenic Poisoning	
US	unknown
Mexico	400,000
Chile	437,000
Bolivia	6,000
Argentina	2,000,000
Hungary	20,000
Romania	36,000
India	1,000,000
Bangladesh	50,000,000
Thailand	7,000
Vietnam	millions
Taiwan	200,000
China	720,000
Nepal	unknown

Source-Jack Ng, University of Queensland, Australia



Source: Waxler, R.H., Winkler, S.A., Helton, D.B., and Poretsky, et al., 2000, Arsenic in ground-water resources of the United States, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 285-B, 4p.

## WHERE SMART MEMBRANES CAN BE USED FOR DESALINATION

Almost 40 per cent of the world's population (UNEP) lives within 60 kilometres of the coast, placing them within immediate reach of 97.5% of the world's available water. Inland, abundant saline aquifers often lie unused only a few feet below the surface. Because of the high energy cost of desalination, desalination is currently used only in places with abundant energy or wealth: Saudi Arabia alone has 24% of the world's desalination plants. Price elasticity effects from the introduction of the Smart Membrane's cost-reducing technology should enable desalination to flourish worldwide.

Much of world is either in or facing an imminent water crisis. General consensus among economists and scientists is that the world is coming to the end of **cheap groundwater**. Some examples:


- Wars driven by water shortages are predicted to escalate over the next decades. More than a dozen nations receive >50% of their fresh water from rivers that cross borders of hostile neighbors.
- According to the World Bank, the health and economies of more than 80 countries are threatened by current water shortages.
- With-Israel buying water via pipeline from Turkey and farm land in the Galilee turning saline, Shimon Perez has made desalination a goal of Israel's nanotechnology program.
- The aquifers underlying the western United States are fast depleting, with exhaustion predicted in 15-20 years.

### Ogallala Aquifer

*Ninety-five percent of the United States' fresh water is underground. As farmers in the Texan High Plains pump groundwater faster than rain replenishes it, the water tables are dropping. North America's largest aquifer, the Ogallala, is being depleted at a rate of 72 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year. Total depletion to date amounts to some 325 bcm, a volume equal to the annual flow of 9 Colorado Rivers. The Ogallala stretches from Texas to South Dakota and waters one fifth of US irrigated land.*  
- The BBC

The U.S. Government has provided small initial funding for programs to find a breakthrough in desalination to solve the U.S.'s approaching drought.

- A program driven by New Mexico's Senator Pete Domenici, whose state is acutely affected by the Ogallala aquifer water shortage, is funded within the Office of Naval Research.
- Water 2025, a Department of the Interior program, is seeking to develop technologies to avert water disaster in the western U.S. The chart on the left maps the drought probabilities for the U.S. by the year 2025. The chart on the right indicates the abundance of saline aquifers under the continental United States. This distribution is frequently found throughout the world. Therefore, by tapping these abundant saline aquifers, low cost desalination would make **fresh** water readily available to non-coastal populations. (Charts are from a presentation by the Director of the Water 2025 program.)



**CONCLUSION**

Through decades of creativity and diligence, scientists and engineers addressing water purification and desalination have made dramatic improvements in cost, quality and ability to address a range of water feedstocks. As a result, water purification and desalination are today based on mature technologies from which it is increasingly difficult to wring efficiencies, let alone breakthroughs.

**Smart Membranes** represent a new technology based on building materials which mimic the way nature performs filtration and selection. The benefits include operating in an ultra-low energy mode, operating in a small footprint, and producing highly pure and highly specific filtration **from virtually** any feedstock water, fresh or saline. Such characteristics suit Smart Membrane filtration to highly demanding applications such as total water recycling for space missions (low weight, **small** footprint, low energy, high purity), as well as to highly demanding military applications in hostile environments (rugged, simple, low cost, high purity, scalable, without regard to contaminant type or concentration, capable of processing salt water or fresh).

Smart Membrane technology holds **the** potential to provide significant benefit to the **U.S.** military and civilian populations. For the civilian population, adequate pure water represents our ability to continue agricultural and industrial productivity. For the military, better water technology lifts a logistic burden. Used as a tool for diplomacy, the technology could prevent water wars in developing countries, and with that allow better allocation of the U.S. military's resources.

\*\*\*\*\*

November 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

320.2

What do you propose we do to get the Air Force end strength down faster?

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/8/04 USAF slide: End Strength Glideslope, *SNOWFLAKE # 100704-12*

DHR:dh  
111104-40

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

11 NOV 04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12


.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Det 10/15*  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
These are numbers  
as of 30 Sep 04.  
v/r,  
Lt Col Lengyel  
*10/15*



U.S. AIR FORCE

# End Strength Glideslope



Jan 04 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 05

**\* May 04 SecAF-to-SecDEF Memo citing lead time for Force Shaping to affect end strength**

*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

T1-L-0559/OSD/23286

8 Oct 04  
Data a/o 30 Sep 04

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

IRAQ

Let's make sure everyone in the interagency and in Iraq understands the point Dick Myers makes in this memo, namely that the UN is doing a relatively small amount of the election effort, and if they move out it does not mean that the election cannot go forward.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/9/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Iraqi Elections, *SADIA FILE # 101904-14*

DHR:dh  
111104-34

.....

Please respond by 11/26/04

11 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

OCT 21 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets akittish

Thanks.

DHR:m  
101904-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lengyel*  
*4/10*

101 OCT 23 04 5:02

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 17924-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8000

*11/11*

CM-2172-04  
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RB 11/7*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections...I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroponte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TBA SD	<i>X</i>
SRMA SD	<i>X</i>
MA SD	<i>F 11/10</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 11/7</i>

USD 17924-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23289

*11-27-3*

A-27

From: Lt Col Lengyel

To: SECDEF

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Rollout Plan for NDS and NMS

381

Here is the rollout plan for the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

I think you should take over the rollout. I am not going to inform the SecState and NSA by telephone of the imminent release. It should be done by memo. You ought to decide how it ought to be handled and execute it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated Policy paper: Rollout Plan for the 2004 NDS and NMS

DHR:dh  
111104-29

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Please respond by 11/16/04

111104-29

# ***Rollout Plan for the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS)***



Gold  
PW

*Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*

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~~(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.  
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23292



# *Interagency*

O The NDS and NMS have important USG audiences (e.g. Dept of Homeland Security, State Department, NSC)

➤ State, NSC, HLS are aware of some, but not all elements of the Defense and Military Strategies

## Approach:

- 5 Nov - Secretary informs SecState and NSA of the imminent release of the strategies during the morning phone call
- 5 Nov - Secretary calls Secretary Ridge to inform him of the release of the Strategies
- Mid-Nov - PDUSD-P/J-5 conduct appropriate staff briefings

*No Memo*



# Congress

**O**The Congress will be in session for a very narrow window during second and third weeks of November

## ➤ Background:

- *Representative Skelton asked the DepSecDef about the status of the NMS during his testimony in August*
- *Congressional Staffers have inquired regularly about the release of both strategies*

## Approach:

- *Week of 8 Nov - Briefings to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D staffs by DASD-Strategy and J-5 Staff*
- *Mid- Nov - Formal written notification to majority and minority leadership of the SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D*



# Public Affairs

- **Coordinated public affairs effort that balances Strategic level guidance of the NDS and the operational character of the NMS**

## ➤ **Approach:**

- . ***Press release and briefings to accompany rollout of the Strategies***
- . ***Targeted venues for the Secretary, DSD, CJCS, USD-P, and PDUSD-P for presentation of main strategic themes***
  - o e.g. Council on Foreign Relations (DC, NY, and National Series);
  - o Chairman at War College Foundation Events; and
  - o Radio and Print Press interviews
- . ***Articles by key foreign policy and military affairs experts***
- . ***Brief Defense Policy Board members***



# *International*

- Draw on the strategies as DoD promotes a Common Global Security Assessment with foreign allies and partners

➤ Approach :

- . *USDP-led "road show" on the Common Global Security Assessment which will cover:*
  - o United States assessment of the global and regional security environments;
  - o NDS & NMS; and
  - o Evolving Posture
- . *PDUSD-P and J-5 briefings to:*
  - o The State Department Coalition Group;
  - o The foreign press corps; and
  - o 8 Nov - Transmit Diplomatic Cables with country tailored talking points
- . *Outreach briefings in appropriate venues e.g. the Foreign Officers attending U.S. War Colleges*



# Internal DoD

□ Previously we have not done a good enough job in informing Department components of changes in defense strategy

➤ Approach:

- *Transmit a formal combined notification message for NDS & NMS release directing components to web links for the strategies, and associated briefings and talking points*
- *DASD-Strategy and J-5 staff briefings to:*
  - **Department Principals;**
  - **Combatant and Component Commands; and**
  - **Advisory groups to the Joint Staff and Services**
- *PDUSD-P/DASD-Strategy and the J-5 conduct several Town Hall presentations which can be taped and transmitted to AFRTS*
- *SD, DSD, USD-P, CJCS, and VCJCS conduct interviews with AFRTS on themes from the new strategies*

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Southern Command

Attached is Tom Hill's farewell statement on Southern Command. He has a lot of important points here that I think we need to think through and develop action plans on.

I hope you'll get your folks working it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/9/04 Commander, SOUTHCOM memo to SecDef: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

DHR:dh  
111104-12

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

*Southcom*

*11 Navy*

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE  
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCCC

9 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

1. Sir, as I relinquish command of USSOUTHCOM, I want to thank you for your leadership, guidance and trust over the past two years and three months. Command of such an important and diverse unit has enriched my life and deepened my appreciation for the greatness of our nation. As I depart, I'd like to highlight a few opportunities and challenges that I see in the Southern Command AOR.

2. Although I do not see a current or potential conventional military threat in the AOR, Latin America has become the most violent region in the world. I see the issues of violence and poverty as two sides of the same coin: the rampant violence impedes the economic growth necessary to pull up the 43% of the population who live below the poverty line. The poverty and hopelessness foment discontent, creating ready recruits for gangs, narco-terrorists and other illegal armed groups. The issue of gangs has the potential to be, over the next five to ten years, the greatest destabilizing force in the AOR. Gangs are currently most prevalent in Central America and Brazil, but the problem will spread if we do not address the threat quickly. The size, transnational nature and financial power of the gangs has outstripped the region's police. The fact that gangs are considered a law enforcement issue prevents the military from confronting the threat in most countries. The security forces of the AOR must change in order to combat the current array of threats. We must help our partner nations find a solution that makes sense, respects human rights and recognizes the historic mistrust of uniformed military acting in a police role. In order to do so, we must transform ourselves and readdress our current restrictions against training police. This will require DoD leadership in the interagency and within the Congress.

3. Islamic Radical Group (IRG) activity in the AOR is concentrated on fundraising and logistical support for worldwide terrorism. We do not see in our AOR operational cells of IRG terrorists staging for an attack on the United States. I take no comfort in that fact, however, since what we don't know about the IRG activity in the region greatly outweighs what we do know. We are vulnerable to an airborne threat because our outdated laws on aerial interdiction limit our actions and prevent our neighbors from taking action. We now have the technology to be able to detect and monitor an airplane that takes off from Panama, flies through all the countries of Central America and Mexico and crashes into a key target in the southern extreme of the United States and we will have done nothing about it because the current policy assumes that the worst thing that plane could be carrying is drugs. September 11<sup>th</sup> showed us the fallacy of this policy and we must fix it regionally for it to be effective. The regional approach is critical in Central America

SOUTHCOM

9-11-04

11 Nov 04

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23299

OSD 04255-05

due to the short flight time required to fly from the airspace of one country into the airspace of another. Regional airbridge denial is a sensitive and controversial issue across the interagency, and I believe that only you will be able to take this on effectively.

4. You can be proud of what the men and women of Southern Command do to support the Government of Colombia. The armed forces of Colombia, for the first time since the 1960s, are conducting sustained offensive operations in the old "*despeje*" region, which previously gave sanctuary to narco-terrorists. Those efforts are beginning to bear fruit as we are seeing greater numbers of desertions and decreased activity on the part of the illegal armed groups. We must stay the course in Colombia by continuing to provide logistical, intelligence and planning assistance to the Colombian military while interdicting the illicit trafficking that sustains the narco-terrorist groups. We must seek to regionalize our support, especially to Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia, whose fragile democracies must be shored up or we risk pushing the problem out of Colombia and into her neighbors. Again, DoD leadership is essential, both in the interagency and on the Hill.

5. In 1978, sixteen of the countries in this hemisphere had communist or totalitarian governments. Today, all of Latin America and the Caribbean, save Cuba, have made the shift to democracy and the militaries in the region are supporting democracies. USSOUTHCOM has played a key role in this maturation by close, continuous, personal interaction with the armed forces of the AOR. This engagement is necessary if we are to assist in the transformation of Latin American security forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and it is vital to our continued understanding of the realities on the ground in the AOR. I am seeing the effects of the negative impact of ASPA sanctions on our engagement, especially in terms of IMET. Several of our key partners are already looking to Europe and China to fill the gap that ASPA is creating in Professional Military Education and exchange programs. Current limits on information sharing, security clearances and access are at cross-purposes with our professed goals of regional cooperation. The SOUTHCOM staff is working on ways to ameliorate the impact of these limitations. We must overcome these barriers if we are to continue to be the security partner of choice for the nations in this hemisphere.


6. Disenchantment with failed institutions and unfulfilled economic promises in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in tremendous social upheaval in the region. One manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the existing political institutions is the fact that several presidents in the AOR find themselves in the presidency as their first elected public office. As a result of the latest referendum in Venezuela, President Chávez appears to be a fixture in the region. From a strictly military point of view, I am concerned that President Chávez is turning his armed forces into a highly politicized praetorian guard, which will choose loyalty to him over loyalty to the constitution. On a larger scale, I am concerned about the exportation of his "Bolivarian Revolution" to countries in the AOR where governments can ill afford added instability. I urge the pursuit of an interagency consensus around a policy designed to limit the detrimental impact that Chávez is likely to have on the region.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

7. I have seen the ongoing suffering of Haiti first hand, both under the UN mandate back in 1994 and as commander of our more recent efforts there. Until the Haitian people are able to lift themselves from abject misery to at least dignified poverty and develop some semblance of working institutions, Haiti's problems will continue to haunt the United States. Short of a comprehensive long-term international effort to support Haiti, we will always be just one step away from the next migration crisis or political collapse. DoD has a leadership role to play in Haiti and must find a way to support Haiti's security forces.

8. The stabilization of SOUTHCOM Headquarters stands without resolution. As you are well aware, I remain convinced, as did my predecessors, that Miami is the right location for the headquarters from a strategic point of view. The recent proposal by the Governor of Florida presents us with an opportunity to make a sound fiscal decision as well. I strongly encourage DoD to consider the Governor's proposal as a means to resolve the command's stabilization in Miami. We should come to closure on this issue for both the strategic and fiscal reasons I mentioned as well as for the quality of life of our people.

9. I thank you again for the opportunity to have served as the Commander of United States Southern Command. I have been privileged to work shoulder to shoulder with great patriots and I have been blessed by having known some of the most brilliant leaders of this hemisphere. I thank you for your steadfast leadership in this critical phase of our country's history. I am enthusiastic and optimistic about USSOUTHCOM's role in helping the people of the Americas fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic opportunity.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J/T Hill". The signature is stylized with a large "J" and "T" and a cursive "Hill".

JAMES T. HILL  
General, US Army  
Commander

CF:  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23301

November 8, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: VADM Stavridis  
Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting on Rotations

*DONE*

*2004*

I need to have a meeting with the Army, the Joint Staff and the Chairman to talk about this memo on rotation periods and what we are facing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/1/04 Memo to SecDef re: Army Rotation Lengths

DHR:ss  
110804-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

*8 Nov 04*

~~FOUO~~

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Schoomacher

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

At our recent discussion of deployment rules with David Chu, you said you would get back to me with a view of how we might be able to reduce Army tour lengths from 12 months down toward 9 or even 6-7 months, like the Marines.

I know these are very difficult choices in the short term, but I am very curious how that analysis is going, and I look forward to hearing from you about it fairly soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091604-15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/8  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
Yr  
Lt Col Lengyel 10/5

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23303

00344-05



FOUO

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

OCT 1 2004



24

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to **six** or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six **months** is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below **12 months** without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine **months** could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current **12-month** rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers, **This** number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 05-07.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER  
General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

FOUO

40903166



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3  
400 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400



G-35-SSW

23 SEP 2004

MEMORANDUM THRU ~~DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3~~ SAC  
~~VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ SAC  
~~CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ 2/10.04

FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

**SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths - ACTION MEMORANDUM**

1. Purpose: Reply to the September 16, 2004 **SECDEF** memo on the length of Army deployment rotations.
2. Discussion:
  - a. There is insufficient depth within CS/CSS capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12-months without significant dwell ~~time~~ and remobilization violations.
  - b. While it is possible to shorten the rotation lengths for the Active Component Maneuver Brigades and still maintain the Army's Campaign Plan, doing so would require maintaining an increased level of Reserve Component participation.
  - c. While shorter unit rotations may provide the Army with potential retention and quality of life advantages, the increased operational tempo would have a negative impact on the force. Disadvantages of 9-month rotations are:
    - An increased role of the Reserve Component
    - An increase in number of units that become dwell violators
    - An increase in number of units that become remobilization violators
    - Less time available for units to conduct professional development, training, and maintenance before redeploying
    - An increased burden upon strategic air/sea lift

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
11-L-0559/OSD/23305

**SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths**

d. These disadvantages are only exacerbated under 6-month rotations.

3. (U) Recommendation: Acting SECARMY approve information memorandum for the SECDEF.

Encl

  
KEITH W. DAYTON  
Major General, US  
Director of Strategy,  
Plans and Policy

CPT KELLY L. WEBSTER (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEC 10 2004  
2005 MAR -3 AM 9:07

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report Item

*000.5*

Do we have a piece of paper that explains who is responsible for defending us at home that is clear, succinct and bullet pointed? I notice this from the 9/11 Commission Report, which is really an amazing lack of knowledge for a commission that is being widely praised.

Shouldn't we write the members of the commission a note referencing this page in their report, and explaining the answer to the question?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/11 Commission Report (ref. page 26)

DHR:ss  
110204-6

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*12 DEC 04*

agency will **not** solve America's problems in collecting and **analyzing** intelligence within the United States. We do not **recommend** creating one.

- We propose the **establishment** of a specialized and **integrated** national security workforce at the **FBI**, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, **trained**, rewarded, and retained to **ensure** the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national **security**.

At several points we asked: Who **has** the **responsibility** for defending us at home? **Responsibility** for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must **have** a clear delineation of roles, missions, and **authority**

- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should **regularly assess** the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against **military threats** to the homeland.
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should **regularly assess** the types of **threats** the country faces; in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the **readiness** of the government to **respond** to those *threats*.

\* \* \*

We call on the American people to **remember** how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not **only** the unspeakable horror but **how** we came together as a nation—one nation. **Unity** of purpose and unity of **effort** are the way we will defeat **this** enemy and make America **safer** for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a **national** debate on the merits of what we have **recommended**, and we **will** participate vigorously in that debate.

A-4-32

*Get Rec.  
7 pages*

# THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

**Final Report of the  
National Commission on Terrorist  
Attacks Upon the United States**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**WE PRESENT THE NARRATIVE** of this report **and** the **recommendations that flow** from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people **for their** consideration. **Ten** Commissioners—five Republicans **and** five **Democrats** chosen **by** elected leaders from our nation's capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without **dissent**.

We **have** come together with a **unity of purpose** because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001, **was a day** of unprecedented **shock and** suffering in the history of the United States. The **nation** was unprepared.

### A NATION TRANSFORMED

At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a **nation** transformed.

An airliner traveling at hundreds of **miles** per hour and **carrying** some 10,000 **gallons of** jet fuel plowed into the **North Tower** of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, a second airliner hit the **South Tower**. **Fire** and smoke billowed upward. Steel, **glass**, ash, **and** **bodies** **fell** below. The Twin Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked each **day**, **both** collapsed less **than** 90 **minutes** later.

At 9:37 that same **morning**, a third airliner slammed into the western face of the **Pentagon**. At 10:03, a fourth airliner **crashed in a field in southern Pennsylvania**. It had been aimed at the United **States** Capitol or the White House, and **was** forced **down** by hemic passengers armed with **the** knowledge that America **was** under attack.

**More** than 2,600 people died at the **World Trade Center**; **125** died at the

A-4-1

Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters, and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them into deadly guided missiles.

Why did they do this? How was the attack planned and conceived? How did the U.S. government fail to anticipate and prevent it? What can we do in the future to prevent similar acts of terrorism?

### A Shock, Not a Surprise

The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.

In February 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck bomb. They killed six and wounded a thousand. Plans by Omar Abdel Rahman and others to blow up the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and other New York City landmarks were frustrated when the plotters were arrested. In October 1993, Somali tribesmen shot down U.S. helicopter, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as "Black Hawk down." Years later it would be learned that those Somali tribesmen had received help from al Qaeda.

In early 1995, police in Manila uncovered a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. In June 1996, a truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds. The attack was carried out primarily by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received help from the government of Iran.

Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American "occupa-

tion" of Islam's holy places and aggression against Muslims.

In August 1998, **Bin Ladin's** group, **al Qaeda**, carried out near-simultaneous **truck** bomb attacks on the **U.S.** embassies in **Nairobi**, Kenya, and **Dar es Salaam**, Tanzania. The attacks killed **224** people, including **12** Americans, and wounded **thousands more**.

In December 1999, Jordanian police foiled a plot to **bomb** hotels and other sites frequented by American **tourists**, and a U.S. Customs agent arrested Ahmed Ressam at the U.S. **Canadian** border as he was smuggling in explosives intended for an attack on **Los Angeles International Airport**.

In October 2000, an **al Qaeda** team in Aden, Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the **USS Cole**, almost **sinking** the vessel and **killing** 17 American **sailors**.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive **than any** of these earlier assaults. But by September 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government, the **Congress**, the **news** media, and the American public had received clear warning that Islamist terrorists meant to **kill** Americans in high numbers.

### Who Is the Enemy?

**Who** is this enemy that created an **organization** capable of **inflicting** such horrific damage on the United **States**? We now **know** that these **attacks** were **carried out** by various **groups of Islamist extremists**. The 9/11 attack **was** driven by Usama **Bin Ladin**.

In the 1980s, young Muslims from around the world went to Afghanistan to **join as** volunteers in a jihad (or holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. A wealthy Saudi, **Usama Bin Ladin**, was one of **them**. Following the defeat of the **Soviets** in the late 1980s, **Bin Ladin** and **others** formed **al Qaeda** to **mobilize** **jihads** elsewhere.

The history, culture, and **body of beliefs** from which **Bin Ladin** shapes and spreads **his** message are largely **unknown** to many Americans. Seizing on **symbols of Islam's** past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people **who** **consider** themselves the **victims of successive** foreign masters. **He uses** cultural and **religious** allusions to the holy **Qur'an** and some of its interpreters. He **appeals** to people disoriented by cyclonic change as **they** confront modernity and **globalization**. **His** rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the **region's** political and economic malaise.

**Bin Ladin** also **stresses** grievances against the United States widely shared in the **Muslim** world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. **mops** in Saudi Arabia, which is the home of Islam's **holiest** sites, and against **other U.S. policies** in the Middle **East**.

Upon this political and ideological **foundation**, Bin Ladin built over the course of a decade a dynamic and lethal **organization**. He built an **infrastructure and organization** in Afghanistan that could attract, train, and use recruits against ever **more ambitious targets**. He **rallied** new zealots and new money with each demonstration of al Qaeda's **capability**. He had **forged** a close alliance with the **Taliban**, a regime providing **sanctuary** for al Qaeda.

By September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed

- leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and **direction** of a major **operation**;
- a personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet **them**, and give them the necessary training;
- communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of **operatives and those who would be helping them**;
- an intelligence **effort** to gather required **information** and form assessments of enemy **strengths and weaknesses**;
- the ability to move people **great distances**; and
- the ability to raise and move the money necessary to finance an **attack**.

#### 1998 to September 11, 2001

The August 1998 bombings of **U.S. embassies** in Kenya and Tanzania established al Qaeda as a potent adversary of the United **States**.

After launching cruise missile strikes **against** al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in **retaliation** for the embassy bombings, the Clinton **administration** applied diplomatic pressure to **try to persuade** the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to expel Bin Ladin. The administration **also** devised **covert operations** to use CIA-paid foreign agents to capture or kill Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants. **These actions** did not stop Bin Ladin or **dislodge** al Qaeda from its sanctuary.

By late 1998 or early 1999, Bin Ladin and his advisers had agreed on an idea brought to **them** by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) called the "planes **operation**." It would eventually culminate in the 9/11 attacks. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, Mohammed Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda. Within al Qaeda, **they** relied heavily on the ideas and enterprise of **strong-willed field commanders**, such as KSM, to **carry out** worldwide terrorist **operations**.

KSM claims that his **original plot** was even grander than those carried out on 9/11—ten planes would attack **targets** on both the East and West **coasts** of the United States. This plan **was modified** by Bin Ladin, KSM said, owing to its **scale** and complexity. Bin Ladin provided KSM with four **initial operatives** for suicide plane **attacks** within the United States, and in the fall of 1999 **training**

port the Taliban's enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.

After the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order. The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States. The CIA described its findings as a "preliminary judgment"; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action. The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the *Cole* issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the *Cole*, but did not like the options available for a response.

Bin Ladin's inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the *Cole*, were risk free.

The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, "something very, very, very big." Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us, "The system was blinking red."

Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush's chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush's signature on September 11, 2001.

Though the "planes operation" was progressing, the plotters had problems of

A-4-R

gration **regulations**. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States.

These cases did not prompt urgent action. No one **working** on these late leads in the **summer** of 2001 connected them to **the high** level of threat **reporting**. In the words of one **official**, no **analytic work** foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.

As **final preparations** were under way during the summer of 2001, **dissent** emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban's chief, **Mullah Omar**, opposed attacking the United States. **Although** facing opposition from **many** of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled **their objections**, and the attacks went **forward**.

it was not communicated to the pilots. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to "ID type and tail."

Like the national defense, the emergency response on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.

In New York City, the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the building employees, and the occupants of the buildings did their best to cope with the effects of almost unimaginable events—unfolding furiously over 102 minutes. Casualties were nearly 100 percent at and above the impact zones and were very high among first responders who stayed in danger as they tried to save lives. Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve unified incident command, and inadequate communications among responding agencies, all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone escaped, often with help from the emergency responders.

At the Pentagon, while there were also problems of command and control, the emergency response was generally effective. The Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response in place in the National Capital Region, overcame the inherent complications of a response across local, state, and federal jurisdictions.

### Operational Opportunities

We write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight. We are mindful of the danger of being unjust to men and women who made choices in conditions of uncertainty and in circumstances over which they often had little control.

Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures—opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time—included

- not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States;
- not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar;
- not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States;

- not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack;
- not discovering false statements on visa applications;
- not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
- **not** expanding **no-fly lists** to include names from terrorist watchlists;
- not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system; and
- not hardening aircraft cockpit **doors** or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijacking.

## GENERAL FINDINGS

Since the plotters **were** flexible and resourceful, **w**e cannot **know** whether **any** single step or series of steps would **have** defeated them. What **w**e can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the U.S. government from 1998 to 2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot. Across the government, there were failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.

### Imagination

The most important **failure was** one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the **gravity** of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 presidential campaign.

Al Qaeda's **new** brand of terrorism presented challenges to U.S. governmental institutions that they were not **well-designed** to meet. Though top officials all told us that they understood the danger, we believe there was uncertainty among them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived with for decades, or it was indeed radically **new**, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced.

As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer long responsible for counterterrorism policy coordination, asserted that the government had not yet made up its mind how to answer the question: "Is al Qida a big deal?"

A week later came the answer.

### Policy

Terrorism was not *the* overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.

The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.

### Capabilities

Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or reform them.

The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to improve its capability to collect intelligence from human agents.

At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.

America's homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases at all. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but *only* aircraft that were coming from overseas.

The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to the FBI.

FAA capabilities were weak. Any serious examination of the possibility of a suicide hijacking could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities—expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAPPS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility than they had been trained to expect. Yet the FAA did not adjust either its *own* training or training with NORAD to take account of threats other than those experienced in the past.

### Management

The missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot were also symptoms of a broader inability to adapt the way government manages problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Action officers should have been able to

**draw** on all available knowledge about al Qaeda in the government. Management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.

There were **also** broader management issues with respect to **how** top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. **For** instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several **CIA officials** and the DDCI for **Community Management**, stating: "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community." The memorandum **had** little **overall** effect on **mobilizing** the CIA or the intelligence community. **This** episode indicates the limitations of the DCI's authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government did not find a **way** of pooling intelligence and **using** it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving **entities** as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the **military**, and the agencies involved in homeland security.

## SPECIFIC FINDINGS

### Unsuccessful Diplomacy

Beginning in February 1997, and through September 11, 2001, the U.S. government tried to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice. These efforts included warnings and sanctions, but they all failed.

The U.S. government **also** pressed two successive Pakistani governments to demand that the Taliban cease providing a sanctuary for Bin Ladin and his organization and, failing that, to cut off their support for the Taliban. Before 9/11, the United States could not find a **mix** of incentives and pressure that would persuade Pakistan to reconsider its fundamental relationship with the Taliban.

From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban's **only** travel and financial outlets to the **outside** world, to break off ties and enforce **sanctions**, especially those related to air travel to Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11.

Saudi Arabia **has** been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. Before 9/11, the Saudi and U.S. governments did not **fully** share intelligence information or develop **an adequate** joint effort to track and disrupt the finances of the al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, government officials of Saudi Arabia at the highest levels worked closely with top U.S. officials in major initiatives to **solve** the Bin Ladin problem with diplomacy.

### **Lack of Military Options**

In response to the request of policymakers, the *military* prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward. When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.

Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as *the* key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998–1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable to offset their assessment of the risks.

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action. The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.

### **Problems within the Intelligence Community**

The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.

Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Yet, while there were many reports on Bin Ladin and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.

Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.

many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.

So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

### Are We Safer?

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

### WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The

enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the mark, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

### Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

- **Root out sanctuaries.** The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.

- Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

#### Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism

In October 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U.S. government should:

- Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage—our vision can offer a better future.
- Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
- Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
- Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness.
- Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact point of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
- Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, under-

A-4-24

sion of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.

- Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
- Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness—since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

## HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT

The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team."

We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;

- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.

#### **Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center**

The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning—with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.


- In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
- Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on “lost opportunities.” Though characterized as problems of “watch-listing,” “information sharing,” or “connecting the dots,” each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
- Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1960s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
- The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism “fusion centers” within the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.

- The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
- Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security
- The NCTC should *not* be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.

#### Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director

Since long before 9/11—and continuing to this *day*—the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.

- The community's head—the Director of Central Intelligence—has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and *being* the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
- A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets—like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
- The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services—such as the CIA, DIA,



Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

23

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11-L-0559/OSD/23327

NSA, and FBI—would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.

- This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
  - For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
  - For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
  - For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
- The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
- The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
- Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.

#### Unity of Effort: Sharing Information

The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."

- The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the

major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obstacles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of government operations.

- But no agency can solve the problems on its own—to build the network requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.

### Unity of Effort: Congress

Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterrorism—is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions between administrations.

- For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on ~~Atomic Energy~~ or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
- Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent standing committee for homeland security in each chamber.
- We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.

### Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States

We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence

agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.

- We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must have a clear delineation of duties, missions, and authority

- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against military threats to the homeland.
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readiness of the government to respond to those threats.

\* \* \*

We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation—one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

SECRET  
November 2, 2004

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:30

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photo in Kazakhstan

Please have the photographers find a copy of a photograph of me taken in Kazakhstan where I have on a coat and hat like Ivanov does – preferably a photo with this same person, the Kazakh Minister of Defense. I want to send a copy of my photograph to Sergey.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Ivanov photos

DHR:dh  
110204-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

*OSD 50*

*Nov 04*

OSD 04279-05

October 18, 2004

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:48

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note from Jay Garner

*(Handwritten circled 'D')*

37324

Please take a look at this note from Jay Garner and tell me what you think I ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/04 Letter to SecDef from Jay Garner

DHR:ss  
101804-10

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

OCT 26 2004

*Gen Cartwright, et. al, are briefing you on the issues associated with missile defense engagements.*

*I believe the timelines for engagement are so short that pre-delegated authority for specified events is essential.*

*We'll all be better educated in the next few weeks.*

18 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05

VIA  
FAX

OFFICE OF THE  
November 1, 2004  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:49

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads up on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
110104-7

373.24

1 NOV 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05

11-L-0559/OSD/23333

4

October 15, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

In the next several weeks you will be asked to make decisions regarding the Ground Based Mid-Course Missile Defense System. Among them is the decision to delegate Weapons Release Authority (WRA).

In the case of launches against either Hawaii or the Aleutians, the timelines are so short (around 5 min or less) and the engageable Battlespace so small that any delays to weapons release could result in a failure to engage.

As you know this is an incredibly complex issue and my impression is that some have attempted to relate this to Noble Eagle scenarios which should not be done as they are completely different.

If we are wrong in execution of Noble Eagle there are enormous political implications. If we are wrong in our decision to launch the GMD Missile, we will expend a missile in the exoatmosphere.

For your consideration.

Thanks

Jay (Samer)

373.24

15 Oct 04

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
  
SUBJECT: Iraq Info Memo

Attached is a piece on Iraq that is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/21/04 DIA Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
110104-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Iraq*

*1 Nov 04*

OSD 04281-05



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

INFO MEMO



U-0790/DR

21 October 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *L. E. Jacoby* L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Iraqi Public Anger Toward Coalition/Interim Iraqi Government

This IM is the response to a question I asked last week of one of our senior civilians who is a retired USMC Arab FAO, about why the Iraqi public was not becoming angry at the perpetrators of the car bombings which have killed so many civilians: **"The onlookers were uniformly angry at the US, but more specifically at their government for not being able to protect them and prevent such attacks. Nobody seemed angry at the attackers. I don't know what polling shows about public disgust with these attacks, but calling upon your days as a FAO and in the IO cell, what would you suggest that we/IIG do to focus anger on the perpetrators and enlist the public to rise up against the violence? Is there anything reasonable that could be done, or is there a cultural underpinning here that I don't understand?"**

**Why do they blame us, not the terrorists?** The role of government in Islamic-- particularly Arab--society is "to promote the good and prevent the evil." This is a fundamental concept articulated by Islamic political thinkers over the centuries. Accordingly, when we went into Iraq and took on the task of governance, we also took on the responsibility of protecting the population from threats, whether it be from crime, terrorism or foreign invasion. The general perception on the street is that we have failed at this very basic duty of government. That is why we are blamed.

At the street level, criminals, terrorists and insurgents pose a threat to the public, and it is the function of government to protect the populace. To do so, Islamic political philosophers over the years have condoned authoritarian measures in order for the government to do its job. Several medieval Islamic political philosophers even went so far as to make the case that bad (Islamic) government is better than anarchy or "the imposed government of a non-Muslim invader, such as the Crusaders or the Mongols with whom the Arab world had rather distasteful experiences in medieval times."

11-L-0559/OSD/23336

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

These old established attitudes were reinforced by the experience of British and French colonialism in the 19th-20th centuries. Accordingly, one can make the case that this is why Muslims have been willing to support bad government and helps explain not only why Arabs have accepted authoritarian leaders like Saddam, Nasser, Asad, Qadhafi, Mubarak and hosts of emirs, kings and sultans over the years. Moreover, in order to rule with an effective mandate, these leaders all exaggerated the foreign threat which made their authoritarian rule more palatable.

At the cultural level, within the Arab world – where immediate and extended family, then tribe, characterizes the basic social units and identification – people see government as a distant and alien institution. There is a high degree of “anomie” within the population; governments are only embraced when they are seen as promoting one's interests. This is why the streets are so filthy and so much doesn't get done. Opposite from our sense of civic pride and duty, their refrain is: “That's the government's job.” Employment as a public servant is not held in any degree of esteem, and more particularly, police and the functions they are supposed to enforce are widely derided as unwanted and unsanctioned infringements on the personal freedoms that the Koran extols for the faithful.

Given the population's cultural predisposition, then, to see government's role as promoting the good and proscribing the evil, we have failed them. Not only are many people in the Sunni triangle unemployed and poorer since regime change, but they have to cope with violent competing centers of power (resurgent tribal rivalries, Islamic guerillas, former regime insurgents, Iraqi police and security, and Coalition forces). At the street level, this anarchical environment is frightening. Then somebody explodes a car bomb, killing dozens of relatives, friends or neighbors who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Who do the survivors and relatives blame? The faceless/nameless terrorists or the people whose job it is to protect society? Bad guys are simply doing their job; government, in not protecting the population, is failing in its duties. Finally, a veneer over all of this is the long-recognized characteristic within Arab culture of not accepting responsibility for one's actions or one's fate. It is always a case of others, whether individuals or nations, being at fault for the misfortune of those particular Arabs who feel they have been treated unjustly. This is pervasive throughout Arab society and its history.

Perhaps the case of Palestine best portrays this tendency. For nearly 60 years Palestinians and Arab loyalists have incessantly blamed Israel and the US for the Palestinian problem. One never hears any Arab spokesman or Arab admit that the Palestinians had an opportunity in 1948 to claim a substantial portion of Israel/Palestine but they refused to accept what was offered them at that time. Instead we only hear that they had it taken away illegally or their human and political rights were violated. What we are witnessing in Iraq is yet another example of Arabs refusing to admit who has been responsible for the casualties their own population have been suffering...the Iraqi

insurgents, Baathists and terrorists who live among them. It is the cultural norm to blame the outsider rather than expose oneself to shame, criticism or ridicule by admitting one's weaknesses and failures which are exposed when one admits responsibility.

**What to do about it?** This is a policy question. The best I can give are observations.

Saddam ran a police state which believed it was better to arrest nine innocent men to ensure security than to let one guilty man go free. We have the opposite approach. Also, our forces never quite understood the operational environment...language, customs and cultural do's and don'ts, power structure and brokers, etc., and when they figured it out, they PCS'd and a new group came in. The compromise move is to beef up the Iraqi security forces, which is being done already; but this will still take years to accomplish, especially if we don't want to empower a coup force for the bad guys who have been trying to infiltrate the security services and armed forces.

Aside from ensuring security, major improvements in the economy...or more accurately a jobs program that takes young men (65% of Iraq's population is under 25) off the streets would make an impact. These are the same young men who have grown up lionizing Palestinian suicide bombers and see firing AK-47s and RPGs at enemies as cool and macho. Lots of young Iraqi males have joined the resistance because they can make a few hundred bucks a month and fire weapons. If you are 18, high on testosterone, and too poor to get married, being a Mujahed isn't a bad life. Get them off the street and you will have reduced the pool of insurgents. A pre-war suggestion to create a Civilian Conservation Corps-type organization where lots of cheap labor is thrown at projects to rebuild Iraq was not pursued. Maybe it was the security situation that precluded it, but this would have had the effect of getting lots of bored young men off the streets, putting some money in their pockets, providing remittances to their families, and conducting a large-scale public works campaign--that actually might change engrained cultural attitudes about civic pride.

12  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
November 8, 2004  
2005 MAR -3 AM 10: 12

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
cc: Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lunch with John Kasich

I want to have lunch with John Kasich in early December. He'll be coming down from Ohio.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110804-13

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

000,71 SD

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M  
04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04283-05

11-L-0559/OSD/23339

March 24, 2004

Haiti

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Haiti

Tom Hill was in and had a couple of thoughts that you ought to be aware of:

1. He said that the UN representative in Haiti says he would prefer to extend by several months the period between the time we went in and the time the UN comes in. We sure want to push back on that.
2. Tom also said he hoped that the Embassy would go back in pretty soon now. He thinks it is sufficiently secure and that we ought to be able to go back to the normal security protection soon, rather than the extra security he currently has in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-14

24MAR04

OSD 04391-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23340

3-2-04



March 1, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AID Employees

040 AID

Please check and tell me if 60 percent of the Agency for International Development employees are eligible for retirement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-31

.....

Please respond by 3/19/04

1 Mar 04

25 Mar 04

04434-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

March 25, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *DC* David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) *Charles Bell 3-25-04*

SUBJECT: U.S. Agency for International Development Employees (USAID)

- You asked (Tab A) if 60 percent of USAID employees are eligible for retirement.
- USAID personnel staff indicate that between 2003 and 2008, 53 percent of its Foreign Service Officers will be eligible to retire. During that same time period, 32 percent of its civil service employees will be eligible to retire.
- By contrast, between 2003 and 2008, 57.1 percent of DoD's civilian employees will be eligible to retire.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Kay Burrus, ODUSD (CPP),

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/23342

OSD 04434-04



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

**ACTION MEMO**

COMPTROLLER

March 19, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *[Signature]*

Subject: Memorandum on Allocation of DFI Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

- Attached for your signature is a memorandum that asks Ambassador Bremer to discuss with you his philosophy for allocating the additional \$4.9 billion of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) resources that have been deposited before he approves the revised Iraqi budget for 2004. It advises him that you want to create a reserve in the \$18.4 billion Supplemental by funding critical programs such as those for Iraqi security forces with DFI resources and then using the Supplemental funds later in the year to fund the deferred projects or other emerging requirements. (Tab A).
- The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council are in the process of revising the 2004 financial plan to account for the additional DFI funding and certain additional expenses.
  - As I have reported to you, significantly more funds were deposited in the DFI than the 2003 and 2004 Iraqi budgets had planned due to an increase in Oil-for-Food refunds, the transfer of frozen Iraqi assets, and an increase in Iraqi oil revenue.
  - In January and February 2004, \$200 million in frozen Iraqi assets were deposited into the DFI. These resources are in excess of what is planned for in the revised 2004 financial plan. These resources should be used to fund immediately the highest priority requirements for Iraqi security forces.
- There is agreement among the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that unplanned DFI resources should be used to finance the cost of some reconstruction and Iraqi security projects.
- In my discussions with Ambassador Bremer, he appeared receptive to using more DFI resources for security. There are, however, competing priorities from the Ministries for additional resources. The Iraqi Governing Council, for example, is looking to make cuts in the 2004 budget in order to fund increased pension payments.

*Iraq*

*19m 04 04*

- The more DFI resources that we allocate for security forces before the transfer of authority on June 30, the more U.S. appropriated funds we will have available for security forces and other U.S. priorities after the transfer of authority.
- It is my understanding that the revised 2004 Iraqi budget presented to Ambassador Bremer for his approval includes the following increases:
  - o \$627 million for security-related initiatives (attached is a chart from CPA **(Tab B)**)
  - o \$200 million reserve for security forces. *The CPA staff did this based on discussion in my biweekly teleconferences with Dave Nash.*
  - o \$60 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP), and
  - o \$20 million for the local Governorates CERP-like program.
- We were told this morning that Ambassador Bremer is just about ready to approve revised 2004 Iraqi budget so we need to send this memorandum to him soonest.

RECOMMENDATION: SECDEF sign the attached memorandum **(Tab A)**.

COORDINATION: **Tab C**

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

*Fatal*

*I assume this is the one I should edit?*

TO: Ambassador Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Reuben Jeffery  
Dov Zakheim  
SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

*Has  
Rabin's  
Chop*

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much leverage as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

*P- I agree with your goal but think*

*"flexibility" may be a better word choice.*

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently reserved another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" within the Supplemental appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within the Supplemental.

*don't we want him to spend?*

My understanding is that the 2004 Iraqi budget of \$19.6 billion includes \$2.7 billion for capital investment and another \$4.6 billion of "one-time expenditures" identified as "nationbuilding, regional projects and transfer payments." If funds were temporarily reallocated from some of that \$7.3 billion to fund immediate investments that would otherwise be funded out of the Supplemental, this would create room in the Supplemental that could be used in any number of the following ways:

*Perhaps say "dedicated to 'dedicate'."*



*Hand*

*272*

- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFJ project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

Accordingly, I would like you to take an urgent look at what projects are within the \$7.3 billion and let me know how much of that money might be reallocated to projects within the Supplemental. I would think at least \$50 million or more should be reallocated as a reserve to cover likely additional requirements for security forces.

I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

# Security Spending (\$M)

## Security

Facility Protection Service Guard Pay	60
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Pay	33
Security Hazardous Duty Pay	150
Railroad Security	50
Iraqi Police Pay	200

## Increased Security Spending since January

ICDC	25
CPA (South) Security	6
Ministry of Defense	15
Ministry of Interior	86
Railway Security	2

---

Total	627
-------	-----



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Dick Cheney *Vice President Richard Cheney*  
Condi Rice -  
Colin Powell - *-(by hand)*  
Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Dov Zakheim  
Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DE  
Security Forces

I understand that you are close to approving a revise  
Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I  
with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as mu  
possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changi  
reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as  
after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capa  
forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as pos  
fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources t  
Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another  
funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment rec  
tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" w  
appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be  
done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within  
the Supplemental.

My understanding is that the 2004 Iraqi budget of \$19.6 billion includes  
\$2.7 billion for capital investment and another \$4.6 billion of "one-time  
expenditures" identified as "nationbuilding, regional projects and transfer  
payments." If funds were temporarily reallocated from some of that \$7.3 billion to



11-L-0559/OSD/23348

*CC: VP  
Powell  
Rice  
Dear  
Condi Rice  
Colin Powell*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Reuben Jeffery  
Dov Zakheim

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

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My understanding is that the 2004 Iraqi budget of \$19.6 billion includes \$2.7 billion for capital investment and another \$4.6 billion of "one-time expenditures" identified as "nationbuilding, regional projects and transfer payments." If funds were temporarily reallocated from some of that \$7.3 billion to fund immediate investments that would otherwise be funded out of the Supplemental, this would create room in the Supplemental that could be used in any number of the following ways:



11-L-0559/OSD/23349

- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFI project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

Accordingly, I would like you to take an urgent look at what projects are within the \$7.3 billion and let me know how much of that money might be reallocated to projects within the Supplemental. I would think at least \$500 million or more should be reallocated as a reserve to cover likely additional requirements for security forces.

I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraq

11-03-04

Attached is an interesting article that says a great deal about what we are dealing with in Iraq.

Attach.  
Leo. John. "Atrocities Trade-off."

DHR:dh  
092903-4

Sample  
titles from  
previous  
snowflakes.

275805

January 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: January 24 Event

Attached is some material my staff received from Richard Perle in response to our inquiry about the conference that was held by a consortium of Iranian-American groups last weekend at the Washington Convention Center.

*Iran*

Attach.  
1/14/04e-mail

DHR:dh  
012904-8

*27 Jan 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/23352

OSD 01313-04

## COORDINATION

Joint Staff (J-8)	Lt. Gen James Cartwright	March 19,2004
USD(P)	Ryan Henry Principal Deputy	March 10,2004
General Counsel	Dan Dell'Orto Principal Deputy	March 11, 2004\
OMB	Robin Cleveland	March 15, 2003



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 25 2004

TO: Ambassador Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Dov Zakheim  
Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" within the Supplemental appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within the Supplemental.

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11-L-0559/OSD/23354

OSD 04439-04

Iraq  
25 Mar 04 19 Mar 04

fund immediate investments that would otherwise be funded out of the Supplemental, this would create room in the Supplemental that could be used in any number of the following ways:

- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFI project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

Accordingly, I would like you to take an urgent look at what projects are within the \$7.3 billion and let me know how much of that money might be reallocated to projects within the Supplemental. I would think at least \$500 million or more should be reallocated as a reserve to cover likely additional requirements for security forces.

I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

3/25  
3/25



From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz

Doc -  
I've redone the memo  
for your signature (Tab A)  
substantially based on several  
new developments.

I think it's actually  
self-explanatory so you can  
skip Doc's cover memo if you want.

Paul W.

March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Clarke and Gorton

In case you folks missed it, here is the exchange between Richard Clarke and Senator Slade Gorton last week.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Transcript

DHR:dh  
032504-14

*000.5*

*29 Mar 04*

OSD 04509-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23357

**MR. GORTON:** Now, since my yellow light is on, at this point my final question will be this. Assuming that the recommendations that you made on January 25th of 2001... based on Blue Sky, including aid to the Northern Alliance which had been an agenda item at this point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had all been adopted, say, on January 26, year 2001, is there the remotest chance that it would have prevented 9/11?

**MR. CLARKE:** No.

**MR. GORTON:** It just would have allowed our response after 9/11 to be perhaps a little bit faster?

**MR. CLARKE:** Well, the response would have begun before 9/11.

**MR. GORTON:** But ... there was no recommendation on your part or anyone else's part that we declare war and attempt to invade Afghanistan prior to 9/11?

**MR. CLARKE:** That's right.

**MR. GORTON:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

February 8, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Thank Pete Aldridge

335SD

I don't think I have thanked Pete Aldridge for all the work he did on that organizational study.

Please get something drafted if I haven't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-80

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



7 Feb 04

OSD 04514-04

29mar04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 29 2004

3355D

The Honorable E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.

(b)(6)

Dear Pete,

I don't know if I ever thanked you personally for the fine work you did on the OSD organization study. I know it was a big project and took a great deal of time.

I do want you to know how much I appreciate it. We're working the problem, my friend.

Stay in touch.

Regards,

29 MAR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/23360

OSD 04514-04

*Via Facsimile*

TO: Secretary Colin Powell  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: March 27, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **Attached Email**

Haiti

Attached is a quick note from Gen. Hill which in view of our conversation yesterday, might be of interest to you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
032704.08

*Attach: Email from Gen. James Hill to LTG Craddock Re: Haiti Experts Conference  
3/25/04*

27 March

OSD 04579-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23361

3/26

**Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD**

---

**From:** Hill, James, GEN (H) [HillJ@hq.southcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 25, 2004 6:45 PM  
**To:** LTG Craddock (E-mail)  
**Cc:** Dick Myers (E-mail); Bill Caldwell (E-mail); Pete Pace (E-mail); Doug Feith (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Haiti Experts Conference 25 Mar 04

Sir, I just completed the Haiti expert's conference that I mentioned to you yesterday morning. I held the conference to get the views from experts on Haiti regarding our current operations and way ahead. We had a great mix from academia, media and business. Additionally, we had representatives from OSD and the Joint Staff. All have spent considerable time in Haiti and still maintain extensive contacts with significant access. Their views were insightful and useful, particularly regarding issues of law and order, the political environment and information operations.

One theme was to carefully manage the Haitian people's expectations of the role of the multinational force. The group stressed that the multinational force must be balanced in its approach to dealing with various and divergent factions in Haiti. It is important to send the signal that violence and destabilizing actions will not be tolerated from any element, regardless of affiliation. We discussed in detail the continuing disruptive role of Aristide and agreed that he needs to move on and keep quiet. However, an interesting point was that the majority of Lavalas members accept Aristide's fate and are willing to move forward, and that we and the interim government need to include, rather than exclude, this viewpoint to maintain stability. Consequently, all participants were concerned that the interim government did not include any Lavalas members. All agreed that Haiti should not reestablish the Army, but rebuild the police force into a competent and respected organization. The group confirmed that the multinational force was the proper strength providing that it does not remain static and extends its presence to critical cities and villages through temporary shows of force.

They confirmed for me and my staff that our current CONOPs is on track. Their thoughts will be useful as we continuously update our plan, particularly regarding information operations.

Very Respectfully, Tom.

11-L-0559/OSD/23362

3/25/2004

March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Jerry Bremer  
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Security in Iraq Post-June 30

Our folks in Iraq keep getting told that the Iraqis are not going to be ready to take over security of the country on June 30. The implication of that, obviously, is that they think the Coalition forces are going to leave on June 30, when sovereignty passes.

That suggests we need to do a much better job of explaining to the people in Iraq that that is not the case. I hope you would get the people who handle information helping to work on that problem.

DHR:dh  
032904-16

TRUST

20040409

OSD 04581-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23363

March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Another UN Resolution

There continues to be pressure by the Brits to have another UN resolution in Iraq.  
What is the status?

DHR:dh  
032904-14

UN

29 Mar 04

OSD 04582-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23364

3/29  
0800

720

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE <sup>29</sup> March 25, 2004

2004 MAR 30 PM 4:15

0004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Ray DuBois *RD*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I just went through these two pieces of paper on the Pentagon Memorial. It doesn't tell how someone can give money.

It ought to have on it "Send check to:" with an address, a website where they can use a credit card, whether or not it is a charitable contribution and tax deductible, who is allowed to give and who is not - anything that makes it easy to give money. It is not wise to put out brochures like this and not have that information.

I gave them to some people today from the BPOE Elks thinking it had the right info on it, and it didn't.

Please get something done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Pentagon Memorial Brochure and paper

*3/30*  
*Ray DuBois*  
*?*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/30*

DHR:dh  
032504-1

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

29 Mar 04



# Pentagon Memorial

*The Pentagon Memorial is a memorial commemorating the September 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, 184 innocent lives lost in the Pentagon and on American Airlines Flight 77.*


*For information about the Pentagon Memorial Project please visit: <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>. This web site contains the most recent information on the Memorial as well as information about making donations.*



Washington

About the designers: Julie Beckman  
Keith Kaseman  
New York, New York

Beckman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, and a bachelor's degree in growth and structure of cities from Bryn Mawr College. Kaseman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation and a bachelor's degree in architecture from Arizona State University. They have recently founded their New York City design studio, Kaseman Beckman Amsterdam Studio, in 2011.



**Architectural details:**

One hundred eighty four innocent lives were lost in a single moment at the Pentagon - one hundred eighty four individuals forever tied together through the horrific events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

Collective contemplation through silence, a tactile field of sensuous experience and an intimate setting are the objectives that fostered the birth of the concept for the chosen Pentagon Memorial design. The design sets out to permanently record and express the sheer magnitude of loss through an architectural experience of a place radically different than what we encounter in our daily lives. In this light, the space itself serves as the memorial at all scales of experience and engagement - from within, driving by, and from above.

A Memorial Park is inscribed with one hundred eighty four Memorial Units. Each unit is dedicated to an individual victim - its placement and place within the collective field are a unique instance. The field is organized as a timeline of the victims' ages, spanning from Dana Falkenberg, 3 years old, to John D. Yamnicky, 71. While each memorial unit locates itself on its respective age-line, the units are then organized by birth-date along the age line. The highly specific and qualitatively objective organizational strategy yields seemingly random results. Inherent tendencies - the clustering of certain age groups, the gap between the children and adults - are clearly evident and meaningful, though infinitely interpretive.

Personal interpretation is further sparked by embedding layers of specificity into the orientation of each memorial unit within the expansive site. Fifty nine memorial units face one way, one hundred twenty five face the other - thus distinguishing victims on board American Airlines flight 77 from those who were inside the Pentagon. When visiting a memorial dedicated to a victim who was in the Pentagon, the visitor will see the engraved name and the Pentagon in the same view. Conversely, one would see the engraved name of a victim on flight 77 with the sky. Though highly

specific, this distinction is quite subtle when deployed consistently throughout the site. It is a level of difference to the visual and spatial field, thus provoking visitors' curiosity, while simultaneously telling the story of those involved in the events that took place here that day.

The memorial unit is a single, light pool, a vertical bench and a place for the permanent inscription of each victim's name. Using computer numerical control (CNC) technology common in the spirit industry, the clear-anodized aluminum memorial unit is easily mass produced and incredibly articulate. The cast aluminum prototype/detail model was fabricated in this manner. Its structural cross-section not only reflects radiant light from the glowing light pool but also allows that light to be continuous. A polyester composite, matrix-gravel mix is poured into the memorial unit, thus integrating light and floor with gravel above the light pool. This surface is polished to attain a "terrazzo" seating finish at the horizontal bench portion of the memorial unit. As the memorial unit grows out of the ground, the stabilized gravel field is interrupted only by moments of glowing light and water, and the engraved names float above these moments.

To allow visitors to hear and feel footsteps upon the stabilized gravel is a subtle detail. Disbursed throughout the entire site, the porous stabilized gravel field is contained within two perimeter benches that serve as planters for ornamental grasses. These grasses act as a soft screen demarcating the boundary of the memorial park. Further, the combined length of the perimeter benches plus the bench portion of each memorial unit provides more than 2,100 linear feet of polished "terrazzo" seating surface. Birth years, used to locate the age lines, are inlaid aluminum numbers set flush with the "terrazzo" finish of the perimeter benches. The birth years are flanked by the aluminum age lines that permeate the whole site.

The western edge of the site is defined with the AGE Wall - a wall that "grows" in height one inch per year relative to the age lines that organize the site at large. As one moves deeper into the site, the wall gets higher - it grows from 3 inches above the perimeter bench (at Dana's memorial age-line) to 71 inches above the bench (at John's). Strategically, this wall grows as a barrier is needed between the Memorial Park and the delivery lane that encroaches the site at its northwestern edge. Experientially, this wall communicates the organizational strategy to the drivers passing by the freeway, while allowing them to peer into the site from afar. From within the site it provides a shadow backdrop for the fancy ornamental grasses that are planted along its base.

A vivid canopy of color and light provides shade throughout the site, as trees are clustered in conjunction with the disbursement of memorial units. Three varieties of maple trees could serve this scheme well - the Trident Maple, Field Maple (in landscaping) and the Paper Bark Maple. All three exquisite trees are late falling, retaining their beautiful fall foliage well into the winter months - this suspension of time will contribute to the sublime beauty of this place. On an intimate level, the interplay between leaves, light, bark, gravel, grasses, water, and the senses will be greatly enhanced with any of these elegant trees.



# UNITED IN MEMORY

Pentagon Memorial Fund

We need **your** immediate help to raise in excess of a million dollars from Department of Defense personnel in the National Capital **Area**, to **construct** at the site of the attack, a Pentagon Memorial Park honoring those lost on **September 11, 2001** here at the Pentagon. We need to **reach this** fund-raising goal **by August 15, 2003**. Your donation is needed now to **finance** final design **costs** and to begin construction in September. We estimate the Memorial will be completed in **June 2005** at a **cost** of approximately **510 Million**. **Only** contributed funds will be used to **build** the Pentagon Memorial—no taxpayer funds will be used. We can lead the **way** to **ensure** our fallen comrades **and** fellow Americans and their families will **never** be forgotten. For **detailed** memorial information visit the Pentagon Memorial Website at: <https://private.ref.whs.mil/pentagonmemorial/>


Please **give generously now** to your **organizational** contact to help us **create a lasting memorial** for those lost on **September 11, 2001** or **mail** your donation to:

Washington Headquarters Services  
Directorate for Budget & Finance  
Attn: Pentagon Memorial Fund  
Room 3B269, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-2255

**Contributions are tax deductible.**

## Campaign Managers

Maj Phredd Evans	DODIG
Dan McGinty	DCMA
Thelma Jones	US Army
COL Karla Torrez	Joint Staff
Willie Wright	Navy
Sheron Richardson	Air Force
Lewis O'Bryant	DTRA
Rich Dooley	FFPA
John Guardiani	DLA
Diane Worthington	OSD(PA)
Suellen Raycraft	DSCA
Yolanda Holmes	DISA
Don Nau	DIA
Claire Gilstad	DSS
Janice Siemsen	MDA
Veronda Powell	WHS
Dwayne Lehman	USUHS
Ernie Peters	NIMA
Carla Little-Kopach	DARPA
Bethany Williams	DFAS



*Richard McGraw*  
Richard McGraw  
On behalf of the DoD Personnel  
for a Pentagon Memorial

11-L-0559/OSD/23368



**UNITED in MEMORY**  
Pentagon Memorial Fund

Washington Headquarters Services

Directorate for Budget & Finance

Attn: Pentagon Memorial Fund

Room 3B269, The Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-1155

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11-L-0559/OSD/23369



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

April 12, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Donations

- In the attached snowflake you directed that DoD Pentagon Memorial brochures and handouts be updated to provide helpful information for Pentagon visitors who express an interest in donating to the Pentagon Memorial project.
- I have attached the updated material that will provide complete information for anyone interested in making a contribution. (Tab A). As you can see, new "How to Donate" inserts have been placed in our latest Pentagon Memorial information brochures. The old "Employee fundraiser" letters that you have seen in the past are obsolete and we have pulled these from circulation.
- In summary, there are two ways to make a contribution for the Pentagon Memorial project: 1) by check directly to DoD, or 2) by check, cash or credit card to the private foundation, *Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc.* (PMF, Inc.) which in-turn donates to DoD. ANYONE can make a donation to either, or both. Contributions to either are tax deductible.
- The private foundation has much more flexibility to solicit, publicize, and utilize wide-ranging fundraising techniques and collection methods - thus is expected to be able to raise the vast majority of funds donated to DoD for this project.
- Now that PMF, Inc. has launched its aggressive campaign, led by Lynda Webster, we expect that donations will greatly increase. I will continue to monitor and update you on the status.

Attachment

COORDINATION: none

Prepared by: Bill Brazis, (b)(6)

000, 4

12 APR 04

20 48 04



# Pentagon Memorial



*The Pentagon Memorial is a memorial commemorating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the 184 innocent lives lost in the Pentagon and on American Airlines Flight 77*



Washington Headquarters Services

About the designers: **Julie Beckman**  
**Keith Kaseman**  
 New York, New York

Beckman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, and a bachelor's degree in the growth and structure of cities from Bryn Mawr College. Kaseman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation and a bachelor's degree in architecture from Arizona State University. The pair founded their New York City design studio, Kaseman Beckman Amsterdam Studio, in 2001.



Architectural details:

One hundred eighty four innocent lives were lost in a single moment at the Pentagon- one hundred eighty four individuals forever tied together through the horrific events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

Collective contemplation through silence, a tactile field of sensuous experience and an intimate setting are the objectives that fostered the birth of the chosen Pentagon Memorial design. The design sets out to permanently record and express the sheer magnitude of loss through an architectural experience of a place radically different than what we encounter in our daily lives. In this light, the space itself serves as the memorial at all scales of experience and engagement - from within, driving by, and from above.

A Memorial Park is inscribed with one hundred eighty four Memorial Units. Each unit is dedicated to an individual victim - its placement and place within the collective field are a unique instance. The field is organized as a timeline of the victims' ages, spanning from Dana Falkenberg, 3 years old, to John D. Yamnicky, 71. While each memorial unit locates itself on its respective age-line, the units are then organized by birth-date along the age line. The highly specific and qualitatively objective organizational strategy yields seemingly random results. Inherent tendencies - the clustering of certain age groups, the gap between the children and adults - are clearly evident and meaningful, though infinitely interpretive.

Personal interpretation is further sparked by embedding layers of specificity into the orientation of each memorial unit within the expansive site. Fifty nine memorial units face one way, one hundred twenty five face the other - thus distinguishing victims on board American Airlines flight 77 from those who were inside the Pentagon. When visiting a memorial dedicated to a victim who was in the Pentagon, the visitor will see the engraved name and the Pentagon in the same view. Conversely, one would see the engraved name of a victim on flight 77 with the sky. Though highly

The Department of Defense is authorized to accept donations for the establishment of the Pentagon Memorial.

Anyone wishing to make a contribution may either:

1) Donate directly to DoD by check made payable to U.S. Treasury - Pentagon Memorial Account and forward to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Attention: Pentagon Memorial, Room 3B269, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155.

or

2) Make a contribution by cash, check or credit card to the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.). PMF, Inc. is a tax exempt, non-profit corporation, organized and led by the families of those lost at the Pentagon. PMF, Inc. is dedicated to raise and donate funds to DoD for the design, construction and maintenance of the Pentagon Memorial. Those interested in making a contribution through the PMF, Inc. can send donations to Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc., 1850 K St. NW, Suite 380, Washington, DC 20006.

PMF, Inc. fundraising inquiries should be addressed to Lynda Webster of the Webster Group - [lynda@websterconsulting.com](mailto:lynda@websterconsulting.com) or by phone at (b)(6)

Donations are tax-deductible.

For more information please visit the PMF, Inc.'s web site at [www.PentagonMemorial.net](http://www.PentagonMemorial.net).



specific, this distinction is quite subtle when deployed consistently throughout the site. It adds a level of difference to the visual and spatial field, thus provoking visitors' curiosity, while simultaneously telling the story of those involved in the events that took place here that day.

Elegant in its self-supporting form, the memorial unit is at once a glowing light pool, a cantilevered bench and a place for the permanent inscription of each victim's name. Using Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) technology common to the aerospace industry, the cast, clear-anodized aluminum memorial unit is easily mass-produced and incredibly articulate. The cast aluminum prototype/detail model was fabricated in this manner. Its structural cross-section not only reflects radiant light from the glowing pool of water onto the surrounding gravel field, but also allows that field to be continuous. A polyester composite, matrix-gravel mix is poured into the memorial unit, thus acting as glue to support and float the gravel above the light pool. This surface is polished to attain a "terrazzo" seating finish at the horizontal bench portion of the memorial unit. As the memorial unit grows out of the ground, the stabilized gravel field is interrupted only by moments of glowing light and water, and the engraved names float above these moments.

Though loose enough to hear and feel footsteps upon it, stabilized gravel is a hard, ADA-compliant surface. Disbursed throughout the entire site, the porous stabilized gravel field is contained within two perimeter benches that serve as planters for ornamental grasses. These grasses act as a soft screen demarcating the boundary of the memorial park. Further, the combined length of the perimeter benches plus the bench portion of each memorial unit provides more than 2,100 linear feet of polished "terrazzo" seating surface. Birth years, used to locate the age lines, are inlaid aluminum numbers set flush with the "terrazzo" finish of the perimeter benches. The birth years are flanked by the aluminum age lines that permeate the whole site.

The western edge of the site is defined with the AGE Wall - a wall that "grows" in height one inch per year relative to the age lines that organize the site at large. As one moves deeper into the site, the wall gets higher - it grows from 3 inches above the perimeter bench (at Dana's memorial age-line) to 71 inches above the bench (at John's). Strategically, this wall grows as a barrier is needed between the memorial park and the delivery lane that encroaches the site at its northwestern edge. Experientially, this wall communicates the organizational strategy to the drivers passing by the freeway, while allowing them to peer into the site from afar. From within the site it provides a shadow backdrop for the lacy ornamental grasses that are planted along its base.

A vivid canopy of color and light provides shade throughout the site, as trees are clustered in conjunction with the disbursement of memorial units. Three varieties of maple trees could serve this scheme well - the Trident Maple, Field Maple (in renderings) and the Paper Bark Maple. All three exquisite trees are late falling, retaining their beautiful fall foliage well into the winter months - this suspension of time will contribute to the sublime beauty of this place. On an intimate level, the interplay between leaves, light, bark, gravel, grasses, water, and the senses will be greatly enhanced with any of these elegant trees.



*For information about the Pentagon Memorial  
Project please visit: <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>.  
This web site contains the most recent information  
on the Memorial as well as information about  
making donations.*

11-L-0559/OSD/23374

3/29  
0800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
March 25, 2004  
29  
2004 MAR 30 PM 4:15

7004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Ray DuBois *RD*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I just went through these two pieces of paper on the Pentagon Memorial. It doesn't tell how someone can give money.

It ought to have on it "Send check to:" with an address, a website where they can use a credit card, whether or not it is a charitable contribution and tax deductible, who is allowed to give and who is not - anything that makes it easy to give money. It is not wise to put out brochures like this and not have that information. I gave them to some people today from the BPOE Elks thinking it had the right info on it, and it didn't.

Please get something done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Pentagon Memorial Brochure and paper

5/30  
Ray DuBois  
?  
Larry Di Rita  
3/30

DHR:dh  
032504-1

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

h0j0w0e

31  
March 29, 2004

TO: Adm. Ellis  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: British Officers

*OK*

Mira Ricardel advises me we are making progress on assigning British officers to Strategic Command.

I hope it is helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/18/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef [OSD 04268-04]

DHR:dh  
032904-24

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*31 Mar 04*

OSD 04649-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23376

3/24  
0930



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 18 2004 5:07

EF 8919

IO-04/002809-OMDP  
MAR 23 2004 USDP (6) (FOUO) (P)  
OSD

INFO MEMO

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
From: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting) *MR* MAR 18 2004  
Subject: Assignment of UK Military Personnel to USSTRATCOM

- In response to your memo of February 5 (Tab 1) regarding the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) desire to assign UK officers to key billets without providing U.S. officers in exchange, my staff has been working with the General Counsel, Comptroller, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM to find an appropriate solution.
- We have developed a draft arrangement under which UK military personnel would perform tasks assigned by the USSTRATCOM chain of command, and would be permitted to share relevant information with the UK Ministry of Defence.
  - Under this arrangement, the U.S. would not be required to provide officers to the UK in exchange.
- The General Counsel has advised that we are authorized to enter into such an arrangement under Title 10 U.S.C. 2608, which states:
  - *"The Secretary of Defense may accept from...any foreign government or international organization...any contribution of services made by such foreign government or international organization for use by the Department of Defense."*
- Acceptance authority under this provision has been delegated to the Comptroller.
- My staff is working with the Comptroller's office on such an arrangement, with the objective of having this mechanism in place by late March.
- We believe that this type of arrangement could be used not only for this USSTRATCOM assignment, but also to provide for similar assignments to other combatant commands.
  - Specific approval would be required from USD(P) consistent with DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits, Assignments, and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals," each time this authority is requested.

Coordination: Tab 2

11-L-0559/OSD/23377

Prepared By: Frank Rose, ISP/FP/MDP, (b)(6)



SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SRI MA CRADDOCK	03/19
MA BUCCI <i>Nosmra</i>	3/29
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/24

190500404268-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



FEB 5 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 DEFENSE

SUBJECT: UK Officers on USSTRATCOM Staff

Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM), wants to assign UK officers to key USSTRATCOM staff billets without having to provide US officers to the UK in exchange. Current DOD policy allows exchange officers or foreign liaison officers, but not officers who function in both capacities and on a non-reciprocal basis.

Please review the officer exchange/liaison policy to determine if the policy supports this closer cooperation across all combatant commands. If it does not, please advise me as to what courses of action may be taken to meet this goal.

Please report back to me by February 20, 2004.

2	<del>GENERAL COUNSEL</del>
1	<del>DEPT. GENERAL COUNSEL</del>
3	FA

OSD 75194-04



11-L-0559/OSD/23378

March 31, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jerry Bremer

*Advance  
copy  
3/31 1100*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security

*Iraq*

You all heard the discussion on security for CODELs, the UN and the CPA. John Abizaid, I would appreciate it if you would press forward as promptly as possible on developing options for the handling of these important and increasingly urgent matters.

I talked to Colin, and he is working his side of the problem to develop options so the Department of State will be prepared to provide security for his people by the time State takes over.

Our task is to find solutions for the issues Jerry Bremer has raised and for our portion of the responsibility that continues after June 30.

John, whatever help you need is available from the Joint Staff or the Comptroller's office. However, I am going to ask that by Friday, April 2, you and the Joint Staff provide a first cut at how these issues should be handled.

*31 Mar 04*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
033004-23

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

OSD 04388-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23379

TAB A

January 27, 2004

**TO:** Gen. Dick Myers  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT** Personnel as Better Sensors

One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the CINC conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of making all US military people better sensors.

Please have some folks think about that and get back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

OSD 04699-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23380

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1659-04

31 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBM 3/30*

SUBJECT: Personnel as Better Sensors

- **Issue.** One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the CINC conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of making all US military people better "sensors." Please have some folks think about that and get back to us (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Improving the capability of US military personnel to act as "sensors" will require a concerted effort across Service, command and agency lines to define operational requirements, design appropriate training programs and develop processes and technologies to facilitate and fully exploit collected data. Additional comments are provided at TAB B.
- **Discussion.** Changes in our operating environment require additional emphasis on training all military personnel to observe and report information. Streamlined reporting and faster processing and analysis capabilities are needed to effectively capture and exploit this data. Finally, we must foster force-wide cultural changes to ensure all DOD personnel understand the relationship between intelligence and operations and their personal role in the operations-intelligence cycle. There are many Service, Joint and intelligence community efforts underway to improve the capability of military personnel to act as "sensors" as well as to use the data they collect.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA; Director, J-2; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23381

OSD 04699-04

TAB A

January 27, 2004

**TO:** Gen. **Dick** Myers  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Personnel as Better Sensors

One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the **CINC** conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of **making** all US military people better "sensors."

Please have some folks think about that and get back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

12 March 2004

TAB B

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Personnel as Better Sensors

1. Purpose. To provide SecDef comments on improving the capability of US military personnel to act as “sensors.”

2. Analysis

- The operational environment is changing. Iraq and Afghanistan are contemporary examples in which forces on the ground have access to information that cannot be collected by technical means and limited HUMINT resources. We must be able to efficiently incorporate and exploit this information.
- Services and commands currently train military personnel to report battlefield observations; however, much of this training is highly specialized for select intelligence and special operations personnel or broadly based but narrowly focused.
- Military personnel need systematic training on their role as information receptors and reporters beginning in basic military training and commissioning programs and reinforced during subsequent skills training, unit training and exercises. Training should include basic observation and reporting techniques as well as familiarization with legal and policy limitations on these activities. We need to establish clear joint operational requirements for this training and work to harmonize Service, agency and combatant commander efforts. Experimentation and Service doctrine should reflect and support these changes.
- Military personnel must also be acclimated to their specific operating environment, to include language training and area studies when possible, and be informed of priority operational and intelligence requirements. This may require increasing unit-level resources, including intelligence (often HUMINT) personnel who normally provide this type of pre-mission preparation.
- Increasing the effectiveness of personnel as “sensors” also requires end-to-end improvements in technologies and processes to avoid information

overload and turn this potential flood of raw information into actionable intelligence that can be rapidly used to direct or plan future operations.

- Smart/interactive technologies that improve battlefield reporting without unduly interfering with the primary mission are essential to improving timely reporting. Transformational communication systems and networks that support “comms on the move” are also critical. Finally, we must improve information technologies to rapidly correlate, validate and fuse inputs from multiple human and technical sources for our battlespace awareness systems and increase investment in personnel and technical resources for all-source analysis and fusion.
- There are already many initiatives underway to address these requirements. The Army’s Task Force Soldier and Task Force Actionable Intelligence are examining the issue across the board, from training to technology, including the use of Personal Data Assistants, digital imaging and “smart”/interactive systems to improve timely reporting from the field. Systems such as Land Warrior and Joint Tactical Radio System are beginning to fill the need for improved communications. More broadly, the Intelligence Community’s Horizontal Integration initiative is addressing the need to make information widely available vertically among echelons as well as horizontally across operating environments.

Prepared by: MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA, J-2, (b)(6)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

Unit	Name	Date
US Army	COL Hooker	2 March 2004
US Navy	CAPT Dossel	3 March 2004
US Air Force	Col Murphy	4 March 2004
US Marine Corps	Col Van Dyke	3 March 2004
USCENTCOM	Col Smith	2 March 2004
USEUCOM	Col Knopp	3 March 2004
USJFCOM	COL Perkins	3 March 2004
USNORTHCOM	Mr. Tavik	2 March 2004
USPACOM	CDR Metts	5 March 2004
USSOCOM	Lt Col Crawford	3 March 2004
USSOUTHCOM	LTC Fisher	8 March 2004
USSTRATCOM	Copy provided	
USTRANSCOM	CAPT Cooney	1 March 2004

~~SECRET~~  
December 15, 2004

2005 01 13 11:04:51

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outside Look at Sentencing Equity

Please come back to me with a proposal on having an outside look at sentencing equity, if in fact we *think* it might be worthwhile.

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
121504-23

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

2005 MAR 04 PM 1:54

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2005; 1:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

*DJ Dell'Orto*  
3/8/05

SUBJECT: Outside **Look** at Sentencing Equity in Courts-Martial

- In answer to your question, at Tab A, I do not recommend **an** outside look at establishing a system to enhance sentencing equity in courts-martial.
- In 1984, Congress exempted the military justice system when it established the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
  - The U. S. Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional certain mandatory provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making them advisory only, because they conflicted with a defendant's "jury trial" rights.
  - Congress is expected to direct a review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
- By contrast, Congress created the military judicial system to be separate and distinct from its civilian counterpart in order to recognize and maintain the military's specialized requirements for good order and discipline in widely varying environments and circumstances.
  - Discretion in command actions and broad sentencing considerations apply in order to tailor sentences to both the needs of the Service and the accused.

RECOMMENDATION: Stay the course.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23387



OSD 04702-05

**TAB A**

**March 7, 2004**

719

**TO:** Gen. **Dick** Myers  
Paul ~~Wolfowitz~~  
Larry Di Rita  
David **Chu**  
Powell Moore  
Les Brownlee

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Rollout on Rebalancing

326

I **talked** to the President yesterday about the plans **for rebalancing** the active and reserve components.

We certainly have to make sure that we **have** a fabulous rollout plan for **this**. We want to be sure that **the** governors get briefed and everybody gets **signed** on.

We do not **want** to have an explosion over it. It ought to be a "good news" story, and **we** have to handle it so **that** it is.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-24

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

8 Mar 04

**OSD 04758-04**

**TAB B**

**COORDINATION**

<b>US Army</b>	<b>Responded direct to OSD-RA</b>	
<b>US Navy</b>	<b>CAPT Dossel</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Air Force</b>	<b>Col Ball</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Marine Corps</b>	<b>Col Rawson</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Coast Guard</b>	<b>CAPT Quigley</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>National Guard Bureau</b>	<b>Maj Gen Sullivan</b>	<b>30 March 2004</b>

**Tab B**

**11-L-0559/OSD/23389**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1663-04  
1 APR 11 2004

✓  
42

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

SUBJECT: Rollout on Rebalancing

- **Issue.** "I talked to the President yesterday about the plans for rebalancing the active and reserve components. We certainly have to make sure that we have a fabulous rollout plan for this. We want to be sure that the governors get briefed and everybody gets signed on. We do not want to have an explosion over it. It ought to be a "good news" story, and we have to handle it so that it is."
- **Conclusion.** The next step for the Department of Defense should be the formation of a team to develop a comprehensive strategic communication plan supporting the department's rebalancing actions.
- **Discussion.** It is critical that we develop a plan that lays out a comprehensive strategy on how to implement planned and approved rebalancing actions, linked to key events and focused on stakeholders. I understand that OSD-(PA) will be leading this effort. Here are some recommendations to consider:
  - At a minimum, the effort should include the Services, key staff elements from OSD, CNGB, and elements of the Joint Staff as core members, charged with determining the critical stakeholders, timing, and the best way to get our message out.
  - This effort must map a strategy identifying key processes and events such as the Joint Planning Guidance, association meetings such as the Reserve Officers Association and the Adjutant Generals' Association of the United States, and Congressional hearings. Information must be delivered to stakeholders in a timely and appropriate manner.
  - To maximize success, all communications should be part of a carefully crafted and coordinated departmental level strategic communications plan.

326

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

copy to:  
DepSecDef

Prepared By: MG C. A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/NG; (b)(6)  
Maj Gen J. A. Bradley, USAF; ACJCS/RM; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/1
MA SGT L. J. B. B.	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/1

(8 Mar 04)

OSD 04758-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23390

TAB B

COORDINATION

US Army	Responded direct to OSD-RA	
US Navy	CAPT Dossel	22 March 2004
US Air Force	Col Ball	22 March 2004
US Marine Corps	Col Rawson	22 March 2004
US Coast Guard	CAPT Quigley	22 March 2004
National Guard Bureau	Maj Gen Sullivan	30 March 2004

379/04

720

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

326

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-20

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

8 Mar 04

OSD 04799-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23392



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 APR -2 11 04

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

April 1, 2004 - 8:00 AM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Calling Back Retired Personnel

- e You asked if we have made any attempts to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq. You also referred to the IRR.
- e Our guidance of January 15, 2002, encouraged the Military Services to use both Active and Reserve retiree volunteers to support GWOT requirements.
- e Our data indicate only about 1,300 out of 3,500 retirees may be considered useable civil affairs resources. This is due to the amount of time elapsed since leaving active status; physical and administrative issues; age restrictions; and expired/withdrawn security clearances.
- e Consistent with this overall picture, about 125 Army civil affairs retirees have volunteered for active duty, but only 3 have met the physical, skills currency, age, and security clearance requirements.
- e I believe that we need to reenergize, primarily the Army and Marine Corps, to conduct a more aggressive examination of CA retiree capability and how to better employ that capability to meet CA requirements. We will take the steps to accomplish this-and for other skills in short supply-absent contrary direction from you.

326

1 Apr 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Colonel Nesselrode, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/1
SR MA CRADDOCK	8/15
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	4/2

8 Mar 00

11-L-0559/OSD/23393

OSD 04799-04



3/7/04

March 8, 2004

**TO:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
David Chu

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-20

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 04799-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23394



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

ACTION MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

FROM: T. F. HALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RA)

*TF Hall  
3/27/04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Calling Back Retired Personnel

- SECDEF sent you a SNOWFLAKE asking if we have made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? He also referred to the Individual Ready Reserve (TAB B).
- I have emphasized the Department's policy on the use of Active and Reserve retirees, dated, January 15, 2002 (TAB C), through my memorandum of November 5, 2002 (TAB D). We have encouraged the Military Services to use retiree volunteers to fill mobilization billets, provide volunteer services, as a civilian, to a military organization, and provide volunteer services to FEMA or other organizations.
- Regarding Civil Affairs, the Army's retiree inventory, which constitutes most of the Department's retired civil affairs (CA) assets, is limited—approx. 3,500 individuals—but only 1,300 potential resources. Skill degradation, physical and administrative issues, and age restrictions impacts the useable resource. To date, only 3 of 124 volunteer Army CA retirees have served on GWOT active duty due to such criteria.

- I believe that we need to reenergize, primarily the Army and Marine Corps, to conduct a more aggressive examination of CA retiree capability and how to better employ that capability to meet CA requirements. ~~We previously reported that about 450 civil affairs resources are in the IRR. We will take the steps to accomplish this—and for other billets in that supply—outside~~ *current direction from you.*
- ~~ALTAB A is a proposed response to the SECDEF SNOWFLAKE.~~

RECOMMENDATION: USD(P&R) sign Info Memo at TAB A responding to the SECDEF SNOWFLAKE.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Nesselrode, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

3/9/04

# SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION \_\_\_\_\_

ASSIGN ACTION TO RA/P LANS

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 3/19

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

JAN 15 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (M&RA)  
DIRECTOR, RESERVE AND TRAINING, USCG

**SUBJECT:** Strategy for Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

As you know, there has been an outpouring of support for our military following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Many of those who have offered to help support the military during the current national emergency are military retirees, both Active and Reserve. They have expressed a desire to once again serve our country in some capacity. These retired service members have a variety of skills that may be used to assist in the homeland defense mission, serve overseas in our war on terrorism, or possibly backfill a position left vacant by a service member who has been deployed.

I ask that you consider, when practical, the use of retirees who have volunteered. Attached is a conceptual strategy for the use of volunteers. The strategy is based on a hierarchical approach, which suggests possible ways to take advantage of retiree-volunteers. It also requests the Services establish a systematic approach for capturing information about volunteers. Maintaining information on volunteers appears to be a logical first step that some of you have already taken.

I request that you use this strategy as a guide, and tailor it to fit the specific needs of your respective Services. We want to take advantage of the patriotism that is being demonstrated. This strategy enables us to do that. I request that you report quarterly to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on the number of military retirees who have volunteered their services; of these, the number ordered to active duty and the number supporting DoD in a volunteer civilian capacity, during the current national emergency. The first report should be provided NLT March 31, 2002. If you have any questions, please contact Dr. John Winkler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

David S. C. Chu

Attachment:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/23397

SUBJECT: Strategy for Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

BACKGROUND: Subsequent to the attack on America on September 11, thousands of retired members of the Military Services (Active and Reserve) have volunteered to be of assistance during the current national emergency. OASD/RA developed a strategy, in coordination with the Reserve components, for capitalizing on the willingness of military retirees to serve during the current national emergency.

OBJECTIVE: To establish guidelines for identifying options, opportunities, and conditions under which retirees may volunteer their services in a military or civilian capacity.

STRATEGY GUIDELINES:

Military retirees seeking to volunteer for active duty in support of the current national emergency should be encouraged to contact the personnel command within their respective Military Service that is responsible for managing military retirees. These include:

- Army Reserve Personnel Command
- Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command
- Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
- Commander, Air Reserve Personnel Center
- Coast Guard Headquarters

There are three major ways in which retiree volunteers could be utilized. The overriding priority for use will be to the operational needs of the force (i.e., mobilization billets), to military organizations providing support to military institutions and to civilian organizations in that order.

1. Fill a Mobilization billet.

It is DoD policy that military retirees shall be ordered to active duty (as needed) to fill personnel shortfalls due to mobilization or other emergencies.

The Military Services should consider using retirees to meet operational military requirements in support of Operations Noble Eagle or Enduring Freedom when they possess a critical skill that is not available in the Active component, the Selected Reserve, or the Individual Ready Reserve.

In addition, the Services should consider using military retirees to meet military requirements in support of Operations Noble Eagle or Enduring Freedom, provided the military retiree volunteers for active duty, meets a critical or essential skill requirement (e.g., linguists or translators, administrative specialists, security augmentation) that could otherwise be filled only through involuntary activation of an Individual Ready Reservist, and meets any other specified qualifications for active duty.

Military retirees may not be used to fill mobilization billets in a non-pay status, but should be ordered to active duty with full pay and allowances. **As** with any other full-time military asset, military retirees serving on active duty may be reassigned to meet the **needs** of the military service.

2. Provide volunteer services, as a civilian, to a military organization.

In accordance **with** the authority to accept certain voluntary services under section 1588 of title 10 US Code, military retirees may also volunteer their services in a civilian capacity in support of local military organizations. However, unless under contract, this is uncompensated service. This may include: DoD and Service family support and family service programs; child development and youth services programs; library and education **programs**; religious programs; housing referral programs; programs providing employment assistance to spouses of such members; and morale, welfare, and recreation programs.

Military Services should assess their needs in these and other areas and identify opportunities to use retiree volunteers in their local areas. Installation commanders and program managers should identify support requirements where retiree volunteers within reasonable commuting distance of the installation or facility could be used to provide assistance.

It would be useful to issue regulations regarding the acceptance of voluntary services. (Under 10 U.S.C. 1588(f)(4), the Secretary concerned must prescribe regulations prior to installing telecommunication equipment in **the** home of a volunteer.)

3. Provide volunteer services to **FEMA** or other civilian organizations.

Military retirees **may** also volunteer, **as** civilians, to assist civilian disaster relief organizations, many of which encourage and accept volunteerism.

**As** appropriate, the Services should communicate through newsletters, websites, articles **and** other media volunteer opportunities within the civilian sector for military retirees who want to provide their services in support **of** the current national emergency and for whom no military requirement **has** been identified.

**ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE:**

**To facilitate the acceptance of services of retiree-volunteers:** OASD/RA will encourage the Military Services to: (1) capture in **an** automated database the identity and skills, including both military and civilian-acquired skills of those military retirees who volunteer for active duty in support of the current national emergency; (2) compile a list of functions for which retirees **may** volunteer and organizations where assistance would be welcomed; **and** (3) assist retirees in identifying suitable opportunities **within their** organization or direct them to **other** organizations that might capitalize on their willingness to serve. **Retirees' interest in volunteerism should be acknowledged and receive strong support and encouragement.**



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

11 L-0559

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (M&RA)  
DIRECTOR, RESERVE AND TRAINING, USCG

SUBJECT: Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

Dr. Chu has noted on several occasions the importance of considering all available manpower resources as we continue to support the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. In this vein, the Under Secretary issued a conceptual strategy for the use of military retiree volunteers, last January. That strategy suggested a systematic approach to capturing information on retiree volunteers and identifying possible opportunities for them to serve to reduce the demands on active and reserve forces.


As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, I would like to encourage you to continue your efforts to use retiree volunteers, particularly in view of the prospect that the war on terrorism may extend for several years. We have mobilized nearly 100,000 Reserve component members from all Services since we commenced Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. While the number of reservists currently mobilized has declined, a significant number of reservists have already begun their second year of mobilization, and future planning could lead to many more being called to active duty. Employing military retiree volunteers, where practical, would help to ensure active duty members and reservists are available in sufficient numbers to meet deployment and other essential requirements.

In addition to reemphasizing Dr. Chu's guidance to keep open the option of using military retiree volunteers and identifying requirements where they might serve, I also want to call to your attention a specific request. The Director of Washington Headquarters Services, which includes the Defense Protective Service, has expressed strong interest to Under Secretary Chu concerning the potential use of recent or younger military retirees on limited civil service term appointments to help secure the 280-acre Pentagon reservation. Active and Reserve military police have been augmenting the Defense Protective Service for over a year now and it is expected that this augmentation requirement will continue for at least another two years, if not longer. Recently retired military personnel, trained as military police, masters at arms or security forces, and still physically capable of wearing a uniform, carrying a weapon and performing security functions, may be able to relieve some of our active duty or activated Reserve members from this important requirement.



11-L-0559/OSD/23400

If you have recent retirees who might meet the requirements and would be interested in such a position, please contact my Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), Dr. John Winkler. He can be reached at (b)(6)



T. F. Hall

4/2  
15-50

72



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004-03-29 09:37

INFO MEMO

CN-1664-04  
1 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 4/1*

SUBJECT: Reimbursement

- **Issue.** I would like to see what the reimbursement is on this photo-journalist and how much the paper pays for it (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Total costs incurred by DOD are approximately \$50,000; these charges have been or are in the process of being billed to Mr. Laughlin's insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (TAB B).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

Haiti

1 Apr 04

(10 Mar 04)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>4/1</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>4/1</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>4/2</i>

OSD 04801-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23402

TAB A

March 10, 2004

731

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Reimbursement

I would like to see what the reimbursement is on this photo-journalist and how much the paper pays for it.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/9/04 *Miami Sun Sentinel* Photojournalist Wounded in Haiti, 7 March 2004 (JSRC 5x8)

DHR:db  
031004-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

Tab A

OSD 04801-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23403

**Miami Sun Sentinel Photojournalist Wounded in  
Haiti, 7 March 2004 (U)**

**Purpose.** To answer Secretary of Defense questions concerning Miami Sun Sentinel photojournalist Michael Laughlin who was wounded in Haiti Sunday, 7 March 2004.

**Issue.** Secretary of Defense asked if the wounded photojournalist had life threatening wounds, if he was imbedded, and if his care and transportation were reimbursable.

Prepared by: LtCol R. S. LaS

- The CCATT is a 3-me Puerto Rico.
- Mr. Laughlin was evacuated by air ambulance back to J
- ISOS is a civilian o:

**Bottom Line**

- The wounded photojournalist, Michael Laughlin from the Sun Sentinel, arrived in Haiti Friday, 5 Mar 04 and was not imbedded with the military.
- Mr. Laughlin received two gunshot wounds on Sunday 7 March, one to the shoulder and one to the neck. The wounds are not life threatening. He was stabilized at a local hospital (Canapé Vert Hospital), transported to GTMO Naval Hospital, then evacuated to Jackson Memorial in Miami arriving 8 Mar 1615 EST.
- US Ambassador in Haiti requested Laughlin's transportation to GTMO. Commander SOUTHCOM approved the request in accordance with DoDI 6000.11.
- JS J-4 is researching if and how the reimbursement will take place for medical care and transportation from Haiti to GTMO. The Sun Sentinel paid for flight from GTMO to Miami.

*Show me reimbursement*

**Background**

- Mr. Laughlin was alert and oriented, on a cardiac monitor, had an IV and his arm in a sling when he was transported to GTMO.
- Mr. Laughlin was transported on a US C-130 from Haiti to GTMO and was accompanied by a Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT).

Date: 22 March 2004

### **Miami Sun Sentinel Photojournalist Wounded in Haiti, 7 March 2004**

**Purpose.** To answer Secretary of Defense questions concerning the reimbursement for Miami Sun Sentinel photojournalist Michael Laughlin, who was wounded in Haiti Sunday, 7 March.

**Issue.** The Secretary of Defense asked what the reimbursement is on the photojournalist and how much the paper pays for it.

#### **Bottom Line**

- The US government is seeking reimbursement for the cost of transportation from Haiti to GTMO, cost of transportation from GTMO to Miami and for medical care received at the GTMO Naval Hospital from Mr. Laughlin's health insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield.
- The cost of the C-130 flight from Haiti to GTMO was \$19,189. USTRANSCOM is preparing documents (not yet officially filed) seeking reimbursement.
- The cost of transportation from GTMO to Miami, provided by ISOS, was \$12,324. ISOS has billed the Naval Hospital. The hospital has filed a claim with Mr. Laughlin's insurance provider.
- The cost of Medical Care at GTMO Naval Hospital was \$12,741. The hospital has filed a claim with Mr. Laughlin's insurance provider.

#### **Background**

- The wounded photojournalist, Michael Laughlin from the Sun Sentinel, arrived in Haiti Friday, 5 March and was not imbedded with the military.

- Mr. Laughlin received two gunshot wounds on Sunday 7 March, one to the shoulder and one to the neck. The wounds were not life threatening. He was stabilized at a local hospital (Canapé Vert Hospital), transported to GTMO Naval Hospital and then evacuated to Jackson Memorial in Miami arriving 8 March 1615 EST.
- US Ambassador in Haiti requested Laughlin's transportation to GTMO. Commander USSOUTHCOM approved the request in accordance with DOD Instruction 6000.11.
- Evacuation was made pursuant to DOD Instruction 6000.11, para. 6.6.2.2.1, which authorizes the theater surgeon "to approve movement of US civilians (on a reimbursable basis) when it is determined that an emergency involving immediate threat to life, limb or sight exists, adequate care is locally unavailable or unsuitable, and suitable commercial transportation is neither available nor adequate."
- Mr. Laughlin was alert and oriented, on a cardiac monitor, had an IV and his arm in a sling when he was transported to GTMO.
- Mr. Laughlin was transported on a US C-130 from Haiti to GTMO and was accompanied by a Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT).
  - The CCATT is a 3-member USAF medical team from Puerto Rico.
- Mr. Laughlin was evacuated by International SOS (ISOS) air ambulance to Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. ISOS is a civilian organization routinely used by GTMO to evacuate patients to CONUS.

Prepared by: LTC Gele, J-8/PBAD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/23405

4/22  
1/30

OSD 4/28



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1870-04  
5 April 2004

ACTION MEMO

Paul Butler  
4/27

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 4/3

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

580

- **Issue.** "Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We should include... Please get back to me with a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The proposed cover memorandum (TAB B) discourages commitment of airlift during the period of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. It also forwards a list (Enclosure to TAB B) of significant non-DOD airlift requests over the last several years.
- **Recommendation.** Sign proposed memorandum at TAB B for further transmission to the White House, Executive Departments and Coalition Provisional Authority.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

4/7  
fres  
Lorry Di Rita

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/27
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/27
MA BUCCI NOSENZO	4/27
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	Cox 7/5

4/27

OSD 04867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23406

April 28, 2004

7:34 AM

LTG Craddock:

ExecSec is ready to send the attached, however we had a conversation about who in the building should also get BCC. Would appreciate your concurrence/suggestions:

DSD

AT&L

SECAF

TRANSCOM

REUBEN JEFFERY

CENTCOM

CJCS

SECNAV

SECARMY

\_\_\_\_\_

V/R

(b)(6)

P.S. I assume we can send SecState via fax?

yes

11-L-0559/OSD/23407

1:24 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 4, 2004

SUBJECT: **Worldwide Airlift Usage**

*SF-714*

Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.

We should include an attachment of all the things that we've done by way of charitable airlifts over the last three years and show all the other requests we've received and declined. We ought to fashion a cover memo from me saying here's what has been going on, and there needs to be a limit to it. Ask them to discourage embassies and CPA and others from such recommendations and putting the US. in an awkward position when it is turned down. If things are dissuaded or turned down at the earliest stage, it is better than if it comes all the way up to Washington and it looks like the President is turning it down. The bias in favor of doing something starts at the bottom. It is the taxpayer's money, but during this period it is more - it is the stress on the force.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.06

\_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/23408 **OSD 04867-04**

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM	MG Pair	12 March 2004
	Col (S)Faulise	30 March 2004
DSCA/HA	Ms. Judith McCallum	12 March 2004
CPA	Mr. Don Eberly	12 March 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

*essential to meeting*  
*critical to meeting*

As Secretary of Defense, I have the responsibility to ensure the Defense Transportation System (DTS) supports our national security objectives. Using DTS resources to support non-U.S./non-DOD charitable airlift requests competes directly with our ability to airlift critical cargo, especially during this time of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Committing or seeming to commit this type of transportation places the United States in an awkward situation when non-U.S./non-DOD airlift requests are subsequently declined because of heavy demand on the DTS. As such, we need to discourage all agencies, at the earliest stages, from recommending use of DOD airlift assets to move any cargo not in direct support of ~~national security~~. *it would be best to*

*Secretary mission*

Since October 2001, ~~airlift requirements have~~ *have* grown dramatically. Our airlift resources have operated nearly continuously at, or above, maximum sustainable levels. ~~When justified, we endeavor to support these requests, but in certain instances we must choose between declining or further stressing the force.~~ In 2003 alone, the demand on our airlift assets exceeded our 2001 baseline by over 180 percent. ~~period, the DTS supported 16,642 tons of cargo and 13,133 airlift. This equates to 607 fully loaded C-17 aircraft, enough capacity to deploy 8+ Army brigades.~~

*most non-military*

We simply cannot afford to unconditionally ~~honor these~~ transportation requests, & request your assistance in discouraging embassies, agencies, and subordinate organizations from either directly or indirectly recommending airlift that does not support national security.

Attachment:  
1. Charitable Airlift Listing



11-L-0559/OSD/23410

*even for worthy causes such as charitable lift.*  
*There are many organizations in the U.S. and around the world that probably would appreciate the opportunity to respond to charitable lift requests from charities and other worthy non-profit organizations and I ask your assistance in encouraging people to be creative in seeking out such organizations.*

TAB A

1:24 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: March 4, 2004

SUBJECT: **Worldwide Airlift Usage**

SF-714

Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.

We should include an attachment of all the things that we've done by way of charitable airlifts over the last three years and show all the other requests we've received and declined. We ought to fashion a cover memo from me saying here's what has been going on, and there needs to be a limit to it. **Ask** them to discourage embassies and CPA and others from such recommendations and putting the **U.S.** in an awkward position when it is turned down. If things are dissuaded or turned down at the earliest stage, it is better **than** if it comes all the way up to Washington and it looks like the President is turning it down. The bias in favor of doing something starts at the bottom. It is the taxpayer's money, but during this period it is more - it is the stress on the force.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.06

---

Tab A

OSD 04867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23411



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 28 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

The Defense Transportation System (DTS) is critical to meeting national security objectives. Using DTS resources to support non-U.S./non-DOD charitable airlift requests competes directly with our ability to airlift critical cargo, especially during this time of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Committing or seeming to commit this type of transportation places the United States in an awkward situation when non-U.S./non-DOD airlift requests are subsequently declined because of heavy demand on the DTS. As such, it would be best to discourage all agencies, at the earliest stages, from recommending use of DOD airlift assets to move any cargo not in direct support of military missions.

Since October 2001, the demand for airlift has grown dramatically. Our airlift resources have operated nearly continuously at, or above, maximum sustainable levels. In 2003 alone, the demand on our airlift assets exceeded our 2001 baseline by over 180 percent.

We simply cannot afford to unconditionally meet non-military transportation requests even for worthy causes such as charitable lift. There are many organizations in the United States and around the world that probably would appreciate the opportunity to respond to lift requests from charities and other worthy non-profit organizations, and I ask your assistance in encouraging people to be creative in seeking out such organizations.

Attachment:

- 1. Charitable Airlift Listing

S 80

28 APR 04

4 MAY 04



OSD 04867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23412

## ATTACHMENT

### REQUESTS FOR CHARITABLE AIRLIFT, SEPTEMBER 2001 TO PRESENT

From September 2001 to the present, the DOD has received many requests to move non-DOD / non-U.S. Government forces, equipment, personnel or supplies. Many of these requests were for a significant level of support. Overall numbers for 2003 and 2004 are as follows.

1. Requests to provide support to coalition partners:
  - a. Completed: 7,048 passengers and 12,709 short tons of cargo (2003).  
10,165 passengers and 1,880 short tons of cargo (2004 to date).
  - b. Pending: 786 passengers and 1,251 short tons of cargo.
  - c. Denied: No data available.
2. Requests to provide support for non-DOD U.S. Government:
  - a. Completed: 6,085 passengers and 3,933.2 short tons of cargo (2003).  
2,324 passengers and 892 short tons of cargo (2004 to date).
  - b. Pending: On the Morning Show, actor Gary Sinise announced plans for troops to collect school supplies for U.S. troops to donate to local Iraqi schools.
  - c. Denied: No data available.
3. Total for coalition and non-DOD USG for 2003: 13,133 passengers and 16,642.1 short tons of cargo, equating to 607 x C-17s - enough to lift 8+ Army brigades.
4. Total for coalition and non-DOD USG to date for 2004: 12,489 passengers and 2,771.5 short tons of cargo equating to 204 x C-17s - enough to lift 3 Army brigades.
5. Requests to provide support for charitable donations to troops in Iraq:
  - a. Completed  
Containers in support of Operation Salute - Anheuser-Bush (1,920 short tons).  
Red Cross quality of life items (937.5 short tons)  
Donuts (including vehicles and trailers) - Krispy Kreme (81 short tons)  
Miscellaneous personal items from the VFW (65 short tons)

Restaurant food/equipment - Outback/Gough Restaurants (70 short tons)  
Magazines - Senator Saxton request (20 short tons)  
Air conditioners - Senator Biden request (15.6 short tons)  
USO care packages (12.5 short tons)  
NASCAR promotional cars and drivers for MWR visit (7.5 short tons)  
WWE equipment and wrestlers for MWR visit (5 short tons)  
Telephone calling cards (2.5 short tons)  
Cookies for shipboard Sailors (2.5 short tons)  
Clothing for wounded troops in German hospital (0.5 short tons)  
Snacks - Slim-Jim (0.5 short tons)  
Clothing for wounded troops in Landstuhl, Germany (0.4 short tons)  
Baseball equipment - Congressman Tiahrt (0.4 short tons)  
Chapel supplies (0.02 short tons)

b. Pending:

Air conditioners for troops in Iraq (22.5 short tons)  
25-inch televisions (4.5 short tons)  
Miscellaneous goods for deployed troops (2.5 Short tons)

c. Denied:

Restaurant food/equipment for Operation Feed the Troops (35 short tons)  
BBQ restaurant food, grills, and cooks for deployed troops (35 short tons)  
Magazines for deployed troops (19 short tons)  
Freezer pops for deployed troops (2.5 short tons)  
Snow Cone machine for deployed troops (0.05 short tons)

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Dear (b)(6)

They tell me you are under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR:dh  
040204-4

335 SD

2 APR 04

OSD 04095-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23415

\* \* \* COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT ( APR. 2. 2004 10:50AM ) \* \* \*

FAX HEADER:

TRANSMITTED/STORED : APR. 2. 2004 10:49AM  
FILE MODE OPTION

ADDRESS

RESULT

PAGE

247 MEMORY TX

(b)(6)

OK  
OK

1/1  
1/1

REASON FOR ERROR  
L-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL  
E-3) NO ANSWER

E-2) BUSY  
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld



Dear

(b)(6)

They tell me you *are* under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR:dh  
040204-4

91  
1330

720

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

*4/2*  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

15 Mar 04

Sir,  
Sec Army Response attached.  
vt/CDR Nosenzo

*4/2*

4/1  
OSD 04918-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23417



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2004, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your query of March 15, 2003, I fully agree that we need to ensure our Soldiers receive the best possible support, especially with respect to their pay. We have been working to resolve the systemic causes of the problems even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We have since intensified our efforts.
- In the near term, the Forward Compatible Pay System (FCPS) will provide a commercial, off the shelf, interim solution, beginning in March 2005. Current development cost estimates for FCPS total \$17.3 million. The ultimate solution is the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), which is being developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The deployment of the system will not begin until January 2006. The Army Budget Office is working with the Joint Requirements Integration Office to validate the full DIHMRS development costs.
- Until FCPS is fielded, the Army is providing training teams to finance battalions, mobilization/demobilization sites, and units in Kuwait, as well as establishing workarounds for current pay systems to correct specific, problematic input. Additionally, an information campaign to inform Soldiers and family members of the Guard and Reserve Pay Task Force (telephonic and e-mail hot line) is already proving beneficial in resolving pay issues.
- We continue to monitor progress in resolving this issue as outlined in the attached Pay Improvement Plan (Tab A).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Susan Beausoleil, (b)(6)

OSD 04918-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23418

326

31 Mar 04

15 Mar 04

*Brownlee*



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Completed Actions</u>						
2	Training team to Kuwait	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	10	1a(2)
3	35 specific training events for finance battalions and mobilization/demobilization site personnel	USARC		completed	10	1a(3)
7	US Army Reserve help lines for individuals and finance units	USARC		completed	N/A	1a(7)
8	Deploy integrated Active Component/Reserve Component input system (DMO) to all Army	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(1)
9	Retroactive entitlement input	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(2)
10	Leave Accrual	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(3)
11	Revise Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) Military pay message from 19 Dec 02	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	1, 3, 18	1c(1)
12	Publish matrix of responsibilities by action	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	1, 3	1c(2)
13	Publish standardized entitlement explanation flyer for distribution at mobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	13	1c(3)
15	Add warning screens on input system (DMO and JUSTIS) for tour cancellations	DFAS, ARNG		completed	4, 21	1e
18	Published guidance on processing orders for medical extensions	Army GI		completed	4	1g
20	Review grades of US Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) military pay technicians	ARNG		completed	9	1i
25	Produce exportable DJMS-RC training package	Finance School	Mar-04	completed	10	2c
43	Joint Uniform Standard Terminal Input System (JUSTIS - ARNG input system) change to require remark on miscellaneous credit input	ARNG	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
44	DMO change to require remark on misc. credit input	DFAS	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
50	Establish policy for supervisory control/review of tour cancellations	DFAS/ARNG	Apr-04	completed	N/A	N/A
<u>Ongoing Actions</u>						
1	Training at US Army Reserve Pay Operations Center	USARC		ongoing	10	1a(1)
4	National Guard mobilization finance classes	ARNG		ongoing	10	1a(4)
5	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of pending mobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(5)
6	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of recent demobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(6)
14	Initiate compliance reviews of mobilization/demobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	1	1d
16	Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC) automated reconciliation to in-theater database for monitoring stops/starts of theater entitlements	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(1)
17	DJMS-RC automated reconciliation to demobilization site records for stopping all pay/curtailing tours	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(2)
19	Publish memorandum to reserve commands on importance of using pay management report	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	5	1h
21	Ensure pay issues for units identified by General Accounting Office are all resolved	ARNG	Oct-03	ongoing	15	1j
40	Continue to add functionality to myPay for discretionary actions	DFAS		ongoing	14	N/A
42	Add JUSTIS table of mobilized soldiers' accounts with recurring input required	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	19	N/A
45	Provide Defense Military Pay Offices (DMPO) and Finance Battalions (FB) with NG newsletter	DFAS		ongoing	20	N/A
51	Establish ombudsmen program for National Guard Soldiers	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	N/A	N/A

11-L-0559/OSD/23419



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Near Term Actions (3 to 6 months)</u>						
22	Automate Hardship Duty Pay - Location (HDP-L)	DFAS	Apr-04	open	17	2a(1)
23	Develop/publish revised comprehensive procedures	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	1	2b(1)
24	Clarify who does what how & develop metrics/standards tailored to mobilization/demobilization	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	2	2b(2)
38	Evaluate support for surge staffing of USPFOs	ARNG	Apr-04	open	7,8	N/A
41	Evaluate Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - National Guard (SIDPERS-NG) - JUSTIS interface for mobilization	ARNG	Mar-04	open	16	NIA
46	Evaluate potential DJMS-RC systems change for debt threshold	DFAS	Apr-04	open	21	N/A
<u>Mid-Term Actions (6 to 36 months)</u>						
26	Internet soldiers' pay account access (myPay) for dependents (view-only)	DFAS	Aug-04	open	14	3a
27	Forward Compatible Pay system (FCP) approval from DoD/ Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)	DFAS	Sep-04	open	17,18,20	3b(3)
28	Complete FCP Development-Dec 04	DFAS	Dec-04	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(a)
29	Start FCP deployment to the Army RC- Mar-05	DFAS	Mar-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(b)
30	Start FCP deployment to the Army AC-Jul 05	DFAS	Jul-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(c)
31	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes- DoDFMR	DFAS	Sep-04	open	6	3c
32	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - AR 37-104-4	USAFINCOM	Sep-04	open	6	3c
33	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - NGR 130-6	ARNG	Sep-04	open	6	3c
34	Evaluate placement and monitoring mechanisms for FCP/reserve pay training	Finance School	Sep-04	open	10,12	3d
39	Add pay support doc review & monthly reconciliations to precommand course	ARNG	Sep-04	open	11	N/A
49	Automate Continental US Cost of Living Allowance (CONUS COLA)	DFAS	Mar-05	open	NIA	N/A
52	Procedures for reviewing high dollar payments	DFAS	Sep-04	open	24	N/A
<u>Long Term Actions (36+ months)</u>						
35	Initial Army operational capability DIMHRS-Sep 05	OSD	Sep-05	open	22, 23	4a(4)(a)
36	Start deployment of DIMHRS to the Army-Jan 06	OSD	Jan-06	open	22, 23	4a(4)(b)
37	Complete DIMHRS implementation-Sep 07	OSD	Sep-07	open	22, 23	4a(4)(c)
47	Incorporate Army Guard pay problems in Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) development	OSD	Sep-05	open	22	N/A
48	Include full reengineering in DIMHRS	OSD	Sep-05	open	23	N/A

11-L-0559/OSD/23420



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer *12/6/04*

SUBJECT: Iranian Charge

We will remove the Iranian Charge. The Iraqi Foreign Minister agrees with our moving against him. However, he insisted that the MFA be given a chance to ask the Iranians to remove the charge on their own decision. He put this question to the Iranians. In fact, the Iranian Charge is out of the country at this time but it is not yet clear whether that is a quiet removal or only for consultations.

With the business in the south, thousands of Iranian pilgrims coming in the next few days for the Shia festival of Arba'een, and the British pressing to hold back until the end of the festival, we delayed implementing the order until the festival is over. I have directed my staff to have the Foreign Ministry implement the formal order to expel the Charge on April 12, the day after Arba'een.

OSD 04927-04

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
CLASS	GROUP	EXEMPT	CONTROL	EXEMPT	CONTROL
SECRET					
TOP SECRET					
CONFIDENTIAL					
SECRET					

*12/6/04*

*6 APR 04*

*5 APR 04*



**Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD**

---

**From:** Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:42 PM  
**To:** Norwood, Scott, Col; ExecSec; McCormack, Brian; Mike Adler  
**Cc:** SecDef Cables ESO  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR

You have an Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR.

V/R  
Capt Lavoie

11-L-0559/OSD/23423

---

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** Administrator (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:39 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** Delivery Status Notification (Success)



ATT228386.TXT



Iranian Charge  
Snowflake

Your message

**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake  
**Sent:** Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:44:33 +0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>  
CPA Executive Secretary on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>  
Adler, Michael J. (FS-02) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>  
Norwood, Scott on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** CPA Executive Secretary [execsec@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:46 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** RE: Iranian Charge Snowflake  
**Importance:** High

Confirming Receipt - many thanks.

Sincerely,  
S. Sita Sonty  
Exec Sec

-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 8:45 PM  
**To:** McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); CPA Executive Secretary; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake

**Classification: UNCLASSIFIED**

Please pass to Amb Bremer and confirm receipt.  
V/R  
Capt Lavoie

11-L-0559/OSD/23425

4/5/2004

3/16/04

120

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
 Dov Zakheim  
 Les Brownlee  
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

Please respond by

~~4/2/04~~  
 31 MAR

15 Mar 04

OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23426



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

252117  
2004 APR 07 11:50  
April 6, 2004, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu to General Staff*

SUBJECT: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve -- SNOWFLAKE

- Pay for active, reserve, and Guard personnel is one of the many problems caused by our ineffective legacy military personnel systems.
- The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing an interim pay system (Forward Compatible Pay) that will address some of the pay problems. The Services are also putting in place manual workarounds. However, many of the pay problems are caused by the personnel systems and the lack of integration between personnel and pay.
- My office, working with the Services and other DoD offices, designed the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) that will address the problems with our current legacy military personnel and pay systems. It is a fully integrated, all-Service, all-Component personnel and pay system built on a commercial off-the-shelf base (PeopleSoft) and designed to streamline business processes and incorporate best practices. We recently developed an accelerated schedule for implementation that will bring the Army **up** beginning in September 2005 with full implementation in all Services by October of 2006.
- The accelerated program requires some additional near-term funding, which I will work with the Comptroller to secure.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)



OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23427

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

.....  
Please respond by

~~4/2/04~~  
31 MAR

11-L-0559/OSD/23428

OSD 049<sup>0</sup>

7209



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO  
ACTION

USDP *[Signature]* MAR 29 2004  
DSD  
I-04/002780  
EF-8646

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs *[Signature]* 25 MAR 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) )

SUBJECT: Metrics

- You asked us to incorporate Andrew Krepinevich's suggestions about metrics into our process of measuring progress in the war in Iraq.
- We have forwarded these suggestions to the appropriate offices within OSD Policy, and will use them as part of our reevaluation of the metrics process.
- **Recommend you sign attached letter to Dr. Krepinevich thanking him for his suggestions.**

Attachments: As stated

DUSD (NESA) *[Signature]*

PDASD/ISA *[Signature]* MAR 25 2004

Iraq

25 Mar 04

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04



EF-8646

March 1, 2004

I-04/002780

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Suggestions from Krepinevich

Attached is a letter from Andrew Krepinevich, which has some useful suggestions.  
You might want to feed that into the process on metrics.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/17/04 Krepinevich memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030104-47

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04.

*(Handwritten signature) Letter attached*

*Larry Di Rita  
4/1*

*I*

*9*

*1 Mar 04*

*17 Feb 04*

OSD 05027-04

02-03-04 08:09 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/23430

MEMO

---

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Andrew Krepinevich  
DATE: February 17, 2004  
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq

---

cc: D. Rita  
LTG Craddock

Iraq

Thank you for inviting me to meet with you last week. During our session, I asked you what metrics you were employing to gauge progress in Iraq. You said my question was "mean" and did not offer any metrics, even though you are a strong believer in their importance, as am I.

Let me suggest two metrics that might be of use to you:

1. *The Percentage of Incidents Initiated by Coalition Forces.* This ~~war~~ is dominated by intelligence. If we **know** who the enemy is, and where he is, we will win, as the enemy cannot hope to match our military capabilities. **Thus** it is not the overall number of incidents between enemy and coalition forces that matters, but rather our *ability* to *initiate such engagements.*
2. *The Number of Enemy Defectors that Offer Useful Intelligence.* Again, **this** pertains to winning the intelligence war, but it also speaks to an erosion in the enemy's ability to win the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people. People defect when they believe their side will not win, ~~or~~ when they lose faith in the cause for which they are fighting.

17 Feb 04

As you know, in this kind of war it is important to establish metrics at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, **and** across its military, political, social and economic dimensions. There are lots of metrics. Which ones do we put our stock in? Which take priority? The choice ought to be informed by our goals and our strategy. On the other hand, if we don't have a coherent strategy, **any** metrics will do.

In a protracted competition such as this, the public will want to know that we are making progress in Iraq (and Afghanistan, and in **GWOT**) . Persuasive metrics are needed for this purpose **as** well.

Hope **this** is useful. It was good to see you. I am personally grateful for your efforts on behalf of our nation, and wish you every success.

OSD 05027-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23431



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 7 2004

Mr. Andrew Krepinevich  
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  
Suite 912  
Washington, DC 20036

IM  
a9

Dear Andy:

Thank you for your insightful memo. I forwarded it to Doug Feith for inclusion in our review of the metrics process. Please feel free to pass along any other suggestions you may have regarding the measurement of progress in Iraq.

7 Apr 04

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23432

2/24/04

72

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
254 APP - 3 0111: 22

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and get me the precise details?

701

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804 09

2/27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

18 Feb 04

OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23433



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
2004 APR -6 11:21

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

April 6, 2004 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
*Fagnola*

SUBJECT: Representative TIART - SNOWFLAKE

- e You asked for the precise details on a constituent of Representative Tiart who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare (attached).
- e Representative Tiart's Office was contacted and provided the name of the constituent, (b)(6) but was unable to provide additional details.
- e We have made numerous attempts to contact (b)(6) and have been unsuccessful to date. We will continue our efforts to contact the (b)(6) and will provide additional information after we have discussed the situation with them.
- e Our policies are structured to try to preclude any such loss for a reservist called to active duty, so we are eager to learn more to understand if there is a situation we need to correct.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment

Prepared By: Colonel Kathleen Woody, OASD/RA(M&P)



OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23434

2/20/04

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
20040218-0 11:22

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

- Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and **get me** the precise details?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.09

a/27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23435

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We **need** to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have **a** sense of how closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-32(to computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

April 7, 2004; 10:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu*  
8 Apr 04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Recruiting that Accurately Reflects Deployment

- You recently asked (Tab A) for a sense of how well the Services' recruiting efforts reflect the likelihood of deployments. This responds.
- The topic of deployments is a standard part of training and information provided to recruits during discussions with the recruiter and through Delayed Entry Program activities.
- The Air Force is the most explicit. All Air Force recruits are required to review the Air Force Expeditionary Force Policy prior to accession. Each applicant must indicate with initials or signature that he or she received information on the policy, which clearly states that, although most Air Force personnel are away from their home stations less than 120 days per year, some may be required to exceed this level. Air Force advertising and marketing also depict Airmen in deployed environments.
- Similarly, Navy advertising and marketing prominently feature sailors on sea duty or in a warrior context.
- Army recently shifted its communications strategy away from a focus on tangible benefits, such as money for college and bonuses, to a more balanced approach. Army advertising and marketing reflect all aspects of Army training, including the combat arms, and portray the full rigor of Army service, including mobilizations and deployments.
- We will use our next survey of active personnel to ensure recruits understand these messages accurately.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Capt Angela Giddings, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)  
Maj Heidi Schwenn, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/23437

OSD 05055-04

**TAB**

**A**

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the **kinds** of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-32 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

EF-8783  
04/003223

March 5, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

334

Here is a draft memorandum on the Defense Policy Board.

I wonder if we ought to do an update on it and then work it with Tillie Fowler.  
Once we have a good piece of paper, we can circulate to people who might focus  
it better.

Thanks.

Attach.  
March 2001 Draft Memorandum Concerning the Defense Policy Board

DHR:dh  
030504-29

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04 4/9

SM on 04

Ryan - It maybe  
better if you could  
pull it all together  
for SecDef with a single  
piece of paper and action  
recommendations as appropriate.  
+1/8 Lene ERIC D. L.H.

11-L-0559/OSD/23440

OSD 05109-04

INFO MEMO

MAR 29 2004

EF-8783

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *[Signature]* APR 7 2004

I-04/ 003223

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Proposed Revisions to Defense Policy Board Charter

- You asked us to consider updating the March 2001 Draft Defense Policy Board memorandum (Tab A).
- Besides the memo you provided us, the DPB is also governed by a charter which is updated every two years and signed by the USD(P). The latest charter, filed August 3, 2003, is attached (Tab B).
- Since both the memorandum and charter are similar in nature, I recommend doing away with the memorandum as a document.
- I have provided three additional ideas to utilize the DPB in other ways (Tab C).
- I have also spoken with Tillie Fowler and Walt Slocombe and have attached their inputs (Tab D). Tillie recommends merging the ideas in the attached memorandum and those in Tab C into the DPB charter when it is updated next summer.

COORDINATION: Defense Policy Board (Tillie Fowler)

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Mark Ellis, Special Assistant, OUSD(P) (b)(6)

OSD 05109-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23441

30-07-04 11:15 11

334  
29 Mar 04  
5 Mar 04

**DRAFT MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE DEFENSE POLICY BOARD**

The Defense Policy Board **was** founded during the Reagan administration: (1) to bring new **thinking** to the Department of Defense; (2) to **analyze** and assess policies and programs with the detachment **that** distance from day-to-operations allows; (3) to provide the Secretary with early warning of potential **problems** **and** early advice concerning emerging opportunities; and (4) to **help** develop support for **the** Secretary **and** his program among members of Congress, other executive branch officials, the press **and** intellectual communities.

The Board's products are ideas, assessments **and** advice. These can only be produced by a group of intelligent, experienced and innovative individuals brought together with a sense of purpose **and** a close relationship to the Secretary of Defense. **If** the Secretary takes the Board seriously, so will the officials who come before it to discuss their policies **and** **programs**. **If** it is known that the Secretary counts on the Board to keep him informed, to develop ideas, to evaluate current programs **and** propose **new** ones, the Board will be able to recruit talented members **and** enlist the help of a wider community.

To **make** the Board effective, I believe that: (1) you should be available to meet with *the* Board at least quarterly for 1-2 hours; **and** (2) the Board should be described as reporting to you (even **though**, for administrative purposes, it should continue to be managed by the Under Secretary for Policy.)

I would **like** to reinvigorate the Board by a combination of new members, the establishment of working groups assembled as necessary to look at **and** report on specific matters of interest to you, **and** by allocating a small budget for outside consulting/research services. (Board members serve without compensation.)

The priorities of the Board will, of course, be your **priorities**. I would imagine that you would want us to work on missile defense, on a strategy for **Iraq**, on the transformation of our current force posture to one less oriented to cold war contingencies, on the realignment of NATO/EU "arrangements," and the like. We should be broad and deep enough to take on any assignment you choose to give us **and** you may well have others in mind.

**As** I see the Board it is not a substitute for the **staff work** that will be coming to you from a vast department. **But** as you know it is often difficult

4

to look much beyond the next inter-agency meeting, the next Presidential speech, the next NATO ministerial meeting, the next budget decision. The Board can make its most important contribution, not by looking into the distant future or at today's immediate concerns, but at new policies that can be initiated during your tenure as Secretary.

In a separate memo I have indicated the current membership **and some** preliminary ideas about new members. If we were to go forward I would propose to conduct an immediate review of the current membership with a view to recommending a reconstituted Board.

Aug 3, 2002  
DoD Charter

CHARTER  
DEFENSE POLICY BOARD ADVISORY COMMITTEE

**A. Official Designation:** This committee will be officially designated the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (referred to as the Defense Policy Board, abbreviated DPB).

**B. Objectives and Scope of Activities:**

1. The Defense Policy Board will provide the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy. It will focus on issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense and will be responsible for research and analysis of topics raised by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. Individual Defense Policy Board members will be selected by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Members will be appointed to serve for a term of two years. Membership will consist primarily of private sector individuals with distinguished backgrounds in national security affairs, but may include no more than four (4) government officials. Board membership will be approximately twenty-six (26).

3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy may appoint consultants to support the Board and Board task forces.

4. The Defense Policy Board's sole function will be advisory and it will operate under the provisions of Public Law 92-463.

**C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purpose:** Indefinite.

**D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports:** The Defense Policy Board reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**E. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support:** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will provide personnel, facilities and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Defense Policy Board's functions. Information and assistance as required may be obtained from the Military Departments and other agencies of the Department of Defense.

**F. Duties:** The Defense Policy Board will perform the following functions:

1. Review the long-term policy implications of (a) U.S. force structure and force modernization and transformation on the ability of the Department of Defense to execute the U.S. defense strategy; (b) U.S. regional defense policies; and (c) any other issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. When required, the Chairman may establish task forces comprising members of the Board to analyze specific short-term policy issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

3. Serve as individual advisors to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as required.

**G. Annual Operating Costs and Man-Years:** Members will serve without compensation but will be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses of Defense Policy Board business as approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Defense Policy Board's annual support costs are estimated to be \$710,000 to include salaries for 2 full-time professional staff, 1 full-time administrative assistant, consultants as required, travel expenses, and miscellaneous fees and administrative costs.

**H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings:** The Defense Policy Board will meet quarterly or as required by the Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Task forces established by the Chairman may meet at other times as determined by the Chairman. Necessary notices will be filed at least 15 days prior to each meeting with the Federal Register and all procedures required for closed meetings will be followed.

**I. Termination Date:** The Defense Policy Board will terminate two years from the chartering date, unless, before that period's expiration, its charter is renewed.

**J. Filing Date:** August 3, 2003

## **Tab C: Other ways to utilize the DPB**

1. Integrated Policy Teams (IPT): To help advise the Secretary on multi-disciplinary queries, joint-board task forces could be assembled drawing on membership from the DPB, DSB, DBB, Highlands Forum, and other equivalent and relevant DoD-related boards.

2. War Games: DPB members could inform NDU and other relevant entities about the nature of senior government advisory positions based on their own experiences so as to help make war game exercises more realistic. Specific members may also participate in war game exercises if need be.

3. Team B view-point: The Secretary can direct DPB task forces to develop contrarian positions on policies under review within DoD to provide the Secretary with further option(s) in addition to OUSD(P)'s policy guidance.



DEFENSE POLICY  
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



March 26, 2004

FOR RYAN HENRY

FROM: Tillie Fowler, Chairman

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

This is in response to the Secretary's note regarding the Defense Policy Board. I understand that in the previous administration the Board was little utilized and, therefore, Richard's memo in March 2001 was appropriate at the time. During his tenure, he brought the Defense Policy Board into the forefront.

What the Secretary may not be aware of is that our charter is required to be reviewed every two years. The Defense Policy Board charter was last updated in August 2003 (Tab A). This was shortly after I took over as chair (May 2003) and provided the perfect opportunity to modify and focus the Board's future. I was thoroughly engaged in the effort and the charter was rewritten after consultations with Doug Feith. In rewriting the Charter, we made several positive changes to the Board:

- We reduced the number of Members. 26, vice 30, is a more manageable number and has allowed our discussions to be more thorough.
- We modified the composition of the Board. We removed non-participants and have added expertise where we needed it.
- We established Task Forces. The first involving the Proliferation Security Initiative, as you know, recently concluded, and we have begun the Irregular Warfare/USSOCOM task force. Additionally, I will be speaking with the Secretary on April 26<sup>th</sup> to determine the next one.
- I meet regularly with the Secretary regarding the Board's meetings and seek his input as to the topics to be discussed at each meeting.

We continue to look for ways to be more responsive to the Secretary and welcome ideas on how to do that. As to your suggestions regarding IPTs, or Joint Task Forces between the DPB, DSB, DBB, RFPB etc., I welcome this if there is a topic that crosses our boundaries. Additionally, cross flow communication between these boards is useful. Denis Bovin and Bill Schneider, both of the DSB, regularly attend our quarterly meetings, Kiron Skinner, now attends the DBB quarterly meetings and several of our

11-L-0559/OSD/23447

members (i.e. Fred Ikle, Chris Williams, Barry Blechman) have participated in DSB task forces and summer studies.

Regarding participation of our members in war games with NDU and other relevant entities, I am sure the members would be interested in participating depending upon their schedules.

Finally, with the balance of opinions on the board today, the Secretary already receives both pro and contrarian views regarding the subjects that are before us at our quarterly meetings. Developing contrarian viewpoints regarding policy guidance could certainly be a subset of our task forces for a certain policy issue.

The priority of the Defense Policy Board is to be responsive to the Secretary by providing him with independent, outside advice, assessments and ideas.

Attachments:

As stated

Annex:

Here are my quick comments on how to respond to SecDef's request for suggestions on how to make the DPB serve him and DOD better. They are not particularly geared to the 3/01 paper attached, which is more in the nature of telling him what the DPB does and how to restructure its membership. (The list of topics to address, for example, is clearly the product of 2001 not 2004.)

Based on my still relatively brief service - and 8 years of working with the DPB as a DOD official - I have these suggestions:

- The Board cannot practically meet as a corporate body more than about quarterly, especially if the Secretary is to meet with them for a serious discussion. However, it would be useful if there was more opportunity for members both to learn about what is going on in DOD and to work on specific projects between meetings. The task forces are a *good* initial step in that direction, but I should think more could be done to ask members to contribute in between meetings. It would be a mistake to over-organize, but it might make sense to have several sub groups working most of the time, on topics the Board had earlier identified. (I realize this process has already started.)
- The agenda should reflect first of all the Secretary's preferences/concerns, and those should take absolute priority. However, it would also be useful if there were a more systematic way for members to suggest items which the Board should address. Would it, for example, be possible to canvass the board a month or so before each meeting for suggestions for topics?
- It is useful for Board members to know what are the Secretary's and the Department's long-term policy concerns even if they are not (at least initially) on the DPB's agenda for any meeting. It might, for example, be useful for USDP to appear briefly at alternate meetings to give an overview of "strategic business," not yesterday's cable clearing crisis, but long-term projects on his agenda - both to sensitize the board to what's on his (and, by hypothesis, SecDef's) mind, but also to get suggestions at a relatively early stage from the board both as to considerations for what he is working on and also what is conspicuous by absence.
- The Board should focus on long-term issues, not current affairs. The focus at the last meeting on China is an example of doing just this. It would be useful to bring in experts from both inside government and outside to address - sometimes with a different perspective - these longer term issues. (An example is the presentation by Lord Guthrie on Pakistan - and, in fact, the controversial briefing on Saudi Arabia.)
- The main utility of the Board, as I see it, is to give the Secretary *outside* advice. He has a couple of a million direct employees to tell him how to manage details and implement the policies that he has established (or that they think he should) and to congratulate him and his staff on how well they are doing. The Board should not be a debating society and it may not need to include bitter partisan enemies (though Richard

Perle served usefully and with integrity throughout the Clinton years, and it did us no harm to be informed as to our manifest failings on a regular basis) but it should include some but who don't, in general, agree with the Administration of the day

- In order to fulfill its potential, the Board should be understood as strictly advisory and deliberately somewhat contrarian — for the sake both of the Secretary and for the integrity of its advice. Its members are not government officials, they are not even, at least not by reason of their membership, confidants of the DOD leadership who for one reason or another don't want to work in the government, but whom the Secretary wants to be able to call on for counsel. They are independent sources of comment and suggestions, without authority or official status. In today's Washington, that may be hard to convince anyone of, but it should still be the message.

Wall Street

215070/27 Mar 04

MARK J. ...  
*[Handwritten signature]*

**ACTION MEMO**

I-04/003253-ES  
DepSecDef  
USDPCopy provided  
*[Handwritten: L. Sanchez]*

*Haiti*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

*[Handwritten signature of Peter W. Rodman]*

11 MAR 2004

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters to the Chilean and Canadian Ministers of Defense.

- You asked us to prepare letters from you to your Chilean and Canadian counterparts thanking them for their prompt deployment of troops to Haiti (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION: That Secretary of Defense sign the attached letters and release the transmittal cables at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Luis Sanchez, ISA/WHA, (b)(6)

*11 MAR 04*

*9 APR 04*

2/15 0800

4/1030

EF-8801  
04/003253-ES  
March 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Chile and Canada in Haiti

Please draft a letter for me to send to the MoD of Chile and the MoD of Canada thanking them for sending troops to Haiti so promptly - I appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-98

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

*Handwritten:* Larry E. Rios  
*Handwritten:* for Sam 4/8

*Handwritten:* (152P)  
He said Chile we got France?  
Exec Sec - 3/29  
This is UNSAT. Please pay attention I did not ask for a letter to France  
D. Wolfowitz

????????

11-L-0559/OSD/23452

EX 100-03-04 10:24

4/2

11/17/1



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

Haiti

Her Excellency  
Michelle Bachelet  
Minister of National Defense  
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,

Santiago



11-L-0559/OSD/23453

OSD 05114-04

9 April 04



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Her Excellency  
Michelle Bachelet  
Minister of National Defense  
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to ~~democracy~~ *democracy, stability and security*.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/23454



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

His Excellency  
David Platt  
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti in such an expeditious manner. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/23455

OSD 05114-04

11/17/04

8-11-04



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**

His Excellency  
David Platt  
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the  
Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important  
contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to

*stability and security*

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/23456

\_\_\_\_\_

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh  
040504-10

*335 SD*

*7 Apr 04*

OSD 05131-04



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
204 162 -2 AM 12: 04

APR 07 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani

c c : Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Visit

Thanks so much for your hospitality. It was a good visit, and I am delighted you are enjoying what you are doing so much. Stay in touch.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
040604-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

33350

7 APR 04

OSD 05135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23458



April 8, 2004

TO: Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jan Boyer

Here is the background sheet of someone who wants to work on the Millennium Challenge Account. He is bright and capable.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jan Boyer's background sheet

DHR:dh  
040804-15

*230 02*

*8 Apr 04*

OSD 05147-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23459

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I trust you are well. I moved from Argentina to come to DC about a year ago to take up a post as Senior Advisor to Peter Watson, the President of OPIC.

I remain appreciative for your time and counsel after the Dole campaign and up to the time you moved back to Washington. I haven't wanted to burden you since my arrival since I can only imagine how busy you must be. Frank Carlucci suggested I ask for your counsel and support in my next step in public service.

I have an interest in serving on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the President's new foreign aid initiative. This new organization will be headed by Paul Applegarth, whose name has been submitted to the Senate for confirmation. I have been told that the WH is making personnel decisions regarding the next tier of leadership of the organization and that my name is "in the mix". The decisions are being made in the next few days and, not surprisingly, it is a very competitive process.

I would very much appreciate your help in the form of a call to share your opinion on my qualifications. I would understand if, for whatever reason, you were unable or unwilling to do so.

In the event you decide to support my interest, I thought you might find useful some relevant background :

1. Position sought: "VP Country Relations", reporting to the CEO. As I understand it, this position has operational responsibility for negotiating the agreements with foreign aid recipient governments.
2. The key challenge for MCA is implementation. I have a proven track record of negotiating agreements and deploying capital in the developing world. In addition, my time at OPIC has taught me about launching initiatives inside the USG.
3. Of the 18 countries initially eligible for MCA aid, I speak fluently one of the official languages of 14 of these countries and have traveled or done business in several.

I am attaching my CV. I am available to talk to you and would welcome your counsel. Many thanks and sorry for the bother.

Best regards,

Jan Boyer

11-L-0559/OSD/23460

# JAN BOYER

(b)(6)

## EXPERIENCE

*2003-present*

**OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC)**, Washington, D.C.

Senior Advisor to the President.

- Involved in strategic projects for the private equity, structured finance and insurance activities.

*1994-2002*

**VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTOR** (in US and Emerging Markets)

Have launched and led three successful private investment initiatives in emerging markets. Responsible for strategy, implementation, budget, oversight, personnel and media relations. Reviewed more than 1,200 investment proposals from over 30 countries. Negotiated agreements with more than 150 companies, organizations and NGOs.

### Positions:

Managing General Partner and Founder, Softbank Latin America Ventures, L.P. (2000-2002)

- Chief executive of investment activities of **Softbank Corp.** (a Tokyo Stock Exchange listed company) in Latin America and the US Hispanic market.
- Responsible for investment funds of \$155 million; annual budget of \$7 million; oversight of companies with over 400 employees, more than \$100 million of invested capital and offices in 7 countries.
- Served on Board of Directors of Connectmed, Spring Wireless, Dineronet, BitTime, Tiixa, LearningSoft, iCaramba and others.

President, BancBoston Capital Southern Cone; Partner and Director, BancBoston Capital, Inc. (1997-2000)

- Private equity business of **FleetBoston Financial Corporation** (a NYSE listed company) with investments of \$1.4 billion in over 350 companies.
- Established franchise in region and partnerships in four countries. Responsible for all operations and deal flow.

Director, Member of the Board, MBA Holdings, S.A. (1994-1996)

- Private equity business of Merchant Bankers Asociados, Argentine affiliate of **Salomon Smith Barney**.
- Managed investments of \$60 million fund.

*1984-1993*

**INVESTMENT BANKER** (in US, Europe and Emerging Markets)

### Positions:

**Lehman Brothers Inc.**

Director, based in London (1989-1993)

Vice President, Associate, Analyst, based in New York (1984-1989)

Mergers, Acquisitions, Principal Investments and Corporate Finance.

- Completed international and domestic strategic transactions for US, European and South American companies.
- Negotiated acquisitions, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, strategic alliances, cross-border joint ventures and recapitalizations.
- Raised financing (debt and equity) in the public and private markets.

Government Financial Advisory.

- Provided economic policy advice to the Governments of Nigeria, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and others. Negotiations with multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank).
- Undertook financial restructuring, privatization and recapitalization work for state-owned entities.
- Negotiated debt-rescheduling agreements with commercial bank and government creditors.

## EDUCATION

*1993-1994*

**HARVARD UNIVERSITY**, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Master in Public Administration Degree (MPA). Course work at Harvard Business School and Law School. Co-taught graduate level course: "Financial Aspects of Privatization".

*1980-1984*

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY**

B.A. Degree in Economics and International Relations (Honors). Awarded competitive scholarships to conduct thesis research in Tanzania (summer 1983). Rowed Varsity Crew; Captain (1981).

11-L-0559/OSD/23461

**LANGUAGES** English and Spanish mother-tongues. Fluency in Italian, French and Portuguese.

#### **POLITICAL ACTIVITIES**

- Full-time staff member, Dole Presidential Campaign, Washington, D.C. (1996).
- Financial advisor to Cabinet Ministers and Heads of Central Bank in Latin America and Africa.
- Legislative intern, Senator Hayakawa (R-CA), US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (summer 1982).
- Elected representative, Kennedy School Student Government at Harvard. Only Republican member (1993-1994).

#### **PUBLIC SERVICE**

- **Endeavor.** US non-profit organization pioneering economic development in emerging markets through entrepreneurship. Member of the Global Advisory Board (1999-present).
- **World Economic Forum.** Served on the Global Digital Divide Initiative Task Force and the Steering Committee on Entrepreneurship (2001).
- **Hispanic-Net.** Non-profit organization dedicated to fostering Hispanic entrepreneurship in the high technology sector. Member of the Advisory Board (2001-present).
- **Catholic Big Brothers,** New York City (1987-1989). Served as mentor to Hispanic youth. Chosen Big Brother of the Year Speaker.
- **Heritage Fund,** Chairman. Selected to direct fund-raising organization with 50 volunteers at Stanford University (1981-1984).

#### **MEDIA/PUBLIC SPEAKING**

Interviewed in several languages by CNN, The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Time, ABC, CBS, NBC, Institutional Investor, Latin Finance, Latin CEO and by more than a hundred other US and international television, radio, print and on-line media.

- Featured speaker and participant at over **fifty** conferences and seminars organized by the World Economic Forum, the Aspen Institute, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Harvard and other similar institutions. Topics include: international finance and investments, entrepreneurship, foreign policy, minority investing, private equity and technology.

Editorial columnist: Diario El Financiero, Chile (1997-1999); Stanford Daily (1982-1983).

#### **PERSONAL**

- Born in (b)(6) Married to (b)(6)
- Multicultural upbringing, education, and professional experience having lived outside the US for more than 20 years. Traveled and worked extensively in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe and the Americas.
- Enjoy high altitude mountain climbing, parachuting, motorcycling and flying.



~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 17 PM 3:07

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach  
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss  
112204-5

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/10/04

03-11-04 11:43 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23463

OSD 05203-05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*

11-L-0559/OSD/23464

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile: unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.**

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE:** Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

11-L-0559/OSD/23466

or statement will **have** on foreign **public** opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the **U.S. government's** foreign public opinion **programs** together with the Under **Secretary** of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under **Secretary** of Defense for Policy, **representatives** of **USAID**, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an **ad hoc** basis.

A dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world must be seen **as** a long-term commitment central to **America's** vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, **performing** government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the **impact** of **American** policy on foreign public opinion would **give** the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest** of the world. Further, **bringing** public **diplomacy** to the highest level of **NSC** deliberation will ensure that we communicate **our** message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Osama Bin Laden's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

## I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the **press**.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5 million** annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does **fails** to address important **questions**. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of **Radio Sawa**, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while **Radio Sawa** has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether **Radio Sawa** was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain **Radio Sawa's** impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the **Arab world**," the draft report said.<sup>5</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>6</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions"

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes most to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. **This** investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allow for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

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of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said “I never know what I say until I hear the response.” This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts, “State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs.” America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America’s standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy,” September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we have **at** our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how **and** when these **tools** should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law for, at the **very least**, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world **that we** are trying to persuade. **That is**, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort **is less likely** to be successful **than** one that recognizes **that** the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might **be different** from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, **we** might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country **than** we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message **than** their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should **be** delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America **should** simply recognize that our **message** should be delivered **differently** to different groups.

To spread our message, the **U.S** government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. **This** would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, **and** other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as **Americans** in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences **and** their reactions to the United States. **As** an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

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The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

##### *The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the **War on Terrorism** will require **unprecedented use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the **teamwork** of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. **To** this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution **similar to RAND** charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S. government** to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the **War on Terror**.

**The** mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully engage** in a long-term market **research effort** aimed at **better** understanding foreign public opinion. It **would** be tasked **with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, **ask** question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner **that** is **simply** not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to **issues** of anti-American sentiment **and** this institution would be **tasked** with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this **corporation**. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights **over** what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls **the focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across **many areas** of government - from the Broadcasting **Board** of Governors to **the National Security Advisor** - and keeping it **independent** would **allow** its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with **the rest of the world** while **still** maintaining crucial separation between various entities. **That is**, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, **creating** an independent corporation would **allow** each to continue to work completely **in** its own sphere while still having access to research when **necessary**.

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<sup>41</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### *Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFO.4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.**<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep all pans of the government bureaucracy moving towards the **same** goal, a senior interagency **group (SIG)** should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the **U.S.** government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of **USAID**, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. **Acting** on the information provided by **CFOA**, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member **would also** be responsible for ensuring that **all U.S.** government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is *vital* that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the **U.S.** public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 20M Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United **States** military, he must similarly view himself **as** the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This **commitment** must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority **commitment** that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

### Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of **many** in Washington - including **many** who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is for more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen **as** a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would **give** the **U.S. government** the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest of** the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a **small, extremist segment of** the world *population values like* freedom **and** prosperity **are** meaningless. Yet **the** vast majority of people around **the** globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than **war** and destruction. **America has** a peaceful message and **strives** to be a force for freedom and prosperity around **the world. Yet we** are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. **As** the 9/11 commission stated "If the United States does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a *man in a cave* out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security **requires** that **we harness** the wealth of **resources we** have available to communicate **with** the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do **so, we** will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pp. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

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INFO MEMO

MAR 16 2005

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POUSDF  
I-04/015791-ES  
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

02 MAR 2005

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
  - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved
  - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
  - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
  - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
  - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

**Bottom Line:** The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

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~~FOUO~~

Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)\_\_\_\_\_

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~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:10

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

**TO:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

**FROM:**

**SUBJECT:** Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss  
112204-5

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

20-11-04 1:03:00T

20-11-04 05D 05203-05

~~FOUO~~

11- L-0559/OSD/23483

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*

11-L-0559/OSD/23484

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States **must** capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our **extremist allies** can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that **we** convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. **As** such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central **component** of the **War** on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does **not** seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we **present** two substantial **and** vital **recommendations**, which will allow America to bring to bear the full **Force of the greatest** communications **society** in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping **hearts** and minds and changing **viewpoints** in the **War** on Terror.

it **is** important to note from the **start**, however, **that any** attempt at changing the **attitudes** and behaviors of **foreign** publics **towards the** United States **is** futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just **as** the President **serves** as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must **similarly view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. **This** role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is **an** integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the **United** States government should

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE:** Listen, **ask** questions, and **analyze** foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor **how** the opinions of **various** demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and to an

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appropriate 'degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the **War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To **this** end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with **gathering** the information required by the **USG** to advance America's position in the communications **aspect** of the **War on Terror**.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for **Foreign** Opinion Analysis" (**CFOA**) will be to use the **resources** and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a **long-term** market research effort aimed **at** better understanding foreign public opinion. It **will be tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, **and** analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that **is** not being done **today**, as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG messages**. **Crucially**, **CFOA would** only **provide** the research product - **coordination of message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the **Departments** of **State** and **Defense**, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE** : Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

*Because* the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the **same** sheet is especially important. **CFO.4** will provide the **data** that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and **constantly** reevaluate and refine the **U.S. government's** message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it **can utilize this** information effectively.

As **such**, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S. government's overall** communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA data** so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

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or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC & liberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the **American** Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it: about a third had **opposed it**; and about a third was waiting to **see who won**. In many ways, this is the **situation America is** faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War on Terror**, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the **War on Terror** is to capture, kill, or **deter** more terrorists **than** our extremist adversaries can **win over** to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a viral and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Laden's version of Islam are **impervious to persuasion**."<sup>1</sup> To win the **War on Terror**, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the **ranks of** our supporters, decreasing the **small** percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion" and impacting those who, **while** not actively **supportive of** extremists, have sat on the sidelines **due to resentment of** America. Put bluntly, **America needs** to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations **around the world**.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the **problem** of public diplomacy. All have **acknowledged** a **problem exists** and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the **War on Terror** has required a **rethinking of many aspects** of American **foreign** policy, it similarly justifies a **strategic** reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or **reshuffling** bureaucratic **boxes**. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider **all** available tools of public diplomacy - **old and new** - and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

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<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including **Heritage Backgrounder 1645** as well as a section in the **2005 Mandate for Leadership**), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the **same** conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

**This project must** be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the **American** media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies **at the very** core of **America's own vital national interest.**

## **I. How America Is Viewed Abroad**

America's standing in the rest of the world **has taken a beating in recent years.** In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 **have a negative view** of the United States. **This negative view** of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents **over 50** had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 **view America unfavorably.**<sup>3</sup> This **stark contrast suggests** that older **Koreans are perhaps** more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, **look** more favorably on the security provided by the United States – **than the younger generation,** and that older **Koreans** remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly **negative** in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 **finds** only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are **particularly shocking** in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong **similarities between the citizens** of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family?" and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," **seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many** Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs **share core** political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question — some of which might even prove accurate — the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.<sup>5</sup> Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, The Washington Post has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said."

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the Jay” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

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of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."<sup>13</sup> America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world, American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we **have** at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how and **when these** tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of **law** (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), **we** must **begin** by **identifying** the different segments that **exist** around the world that **we** are trying to persuade. That is, **a one-size-fits-all** public diplomacy effort **is** less likely to be successful than one **that recognizes that the** arguments that **are successful** in the Muslim world might be **different** from **the** persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to **one religious** or ethnic group within a country than we **would** another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older **Koreans** who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of **the war** from distorted history **books** accounts.

Crucially, **this** does not mean America **should** be delivering **contradictory** messages to **different groups**. Not only does delivering false messages or **propaganda** go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to **different groups**.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ **all** available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing **the** President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials **as well as** Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. **These** "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the **research** necessary to effectively **pair** a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should **also** not be hesitant to use **the** private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States; **As an** Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

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The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public **diplomacy**: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications." Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools **will** remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on **Terror** is making sure that American policy makers and *advocates have* the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them **at all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration **that will allow** the U.S. government to bring the best **work** of the American public and private sectors to bear in the right to **shape** the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

*The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, **Hap Arnold**, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the *United States of America*."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done Today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-~~array~~ of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### ***Create a mechanism for using CFOA***

Because the U.S. government has **so** many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the **same sheet** is **especially important**. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the **data that** allows America to both formulate a **comprehensive** communications strategy **and** constantly reevaluate and revise **that** strategy into the future. The **U.S.** government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A **vital first step** is to make sure that someone is empowered **with** coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages **so** that they are aligned with the **US.** government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not **this** empowered individual **as** he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also **vital** that this individual have the **ability** to easily **get** information to the highest levels of government.

**As** such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be **created** and charged with coordinating the **U.S.** government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they **are** aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. **As** the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory **Commission** on Public Diplomacy states, "Along **with** the White House and the Department of **State**, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and **abolished** the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, coordinating authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While a few structures link** federal officials, coordination **often** does not extend to embassy practitioners.<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep **all parts** of the government bureaucracy **moving towards** the same goal, **a senior** interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together **with the** Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on **an ad hoc basis**. This **formal** consulting mechanism would **encourage** closer cooperation **among** the **various** parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would **allow** the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Korea, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the rest of **the world** – and the **responsive framework** established that incorporates government **and the private sector** – is seen **as a** long-term commitment. **The creation of a private** institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion **would** give the **U.S.** government **the real-time information necessary** for effective communication with **the** rest of the world.

**As John Adams** famously observed, **"The Revolution** was in the **minds and hearts** of the people." **For a** small, extremist **segment** of the world population values like **freedom** and prosperity are meaningless. Yet **the vast** majority of people around the **globe** is more interested in **security** for themselves and their families than **war** and **destruction**. **America** has a peaceful **message** and strives to **be a** force for **freedom** and **prosperity** around **the** world. **Yet we are** doing incredible **harm** to **ourselves** by not advocating for ourselves effectively. **As the 9/11 commission stated:** "If **the United States** does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the **extremists** will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard **Holbrooke** put it best, "How can a **man** in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications **society**?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires **that** we **harness the** wealth of resources **we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If **we** do so, **we** will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report." pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out." *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

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INFO MEMO OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 16 2005

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:24 241-04/015791-ES ES-1478

POUSDP *ibm*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) )

*mm* 02 MAR 2005

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SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
  - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved:
  - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
  - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
  - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
  - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

**Bottom Line:** The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

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~~FOUO~~

**Attachments:** As stated

**Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)**\_\_\_\_\_

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 MAR 17 PM 3:09

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:as  
112204-5

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

23-11-04 10:35 OUT

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/23501

OSD 05203 -05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
**Joseph Duffey**  
**Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.**  
**Lewis Manilow.**

*November 2004*

11-L-0559/OSD/23502

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE:** Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - to an

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appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.**

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

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or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion."<sup>1</sup> To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

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<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounders 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

- This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in *the* American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

## I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view *America* unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.' The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question - some of which might even prove accurate - the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.<sup>4</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered — if not always agreed with — in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal — from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth — information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

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(b)(6)

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

**III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror**

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said “I never know what I say until I hear the response.” This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts, “State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs.”<sup>8</sup> America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation **must** be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America’s standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences **must** believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy,” September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences **we are trying to persuade** and **what tools we have at our disposal** to attempt to influence **these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.**

In order to convince foreign audiences to support **America's** vision of **freedom** and prosperity under the **rule** of law (or, **at the very least**, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), **we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade.** That is, **a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia.** Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group **within a country than we would another group.** The **same** could be true for different **age groups** - **older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.**

Crucially, this **does not mean** America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. **Not only does** delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the **basic principles our country stands for, but also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly **catch on to any** contradictions. Rather, **America** should simply recognize that **our message should be delivered differently to different groups.**

To spread our message, **the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy.** This would include utilizing **the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth.** These "public diplomacy **ambassadors**" can speak to foreign audiences **using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges.** The **key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.**

The **U.S. government** should also **not** be hesitant to **use the private sector in** doing research into foreign audiences **and their reactions to the United States.** As an **Independent Taskforce** sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

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The "U.S. private sector leads the world in **most** of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: **technology**, film and broadcast, **marketing** research, and **communications**."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, **effective** communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run **public** diplomacy (though these tools will **remain** vital), but also **the** resources and **expertise** of **the** American private sector

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging **the** public opinion **aspect** of the War on Terror is making sure that American **policy makers** and advocates have the **most** accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences **available** to **them** at all times. **Doing** so requires **two** important **actions** **from** the Administration that will allow **the** U.S. government to bring the best **work** of the American public and private **sectors** to **bear** in the fight to **shape** the attitudes and **behavior** of foreign publics.

*The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World ~~War~~ II, the **Commanding** General of the **Army** Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to **Secretary** of ~~War~~ Henry Stimson:

"During this war the **Army**, **Army Air Forces**, and the **Navy** have made unprecedented **use** of scientific and **industrial** resources. **The** conclusion is inescapable that **we** have not **yet** established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of **teamwork** among the **military**, other **government agencies**, **industry**, and the **universities**. **Scientific** planning must be years in advance of the **actual** research and development **work**."<sup>10</sup>

Out of **this** understanding of the importance of **technology** research and development for **success** on the battlefield, **representatives** of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and **private** industry established Project **RAND**, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. **The** Articles of Incorporation bluntly **set forth** **RAND's** purpose: "To further and promote **scientific**, educational, and charitable **purposes**- all for the public welfare and security of the United **States** of **America**."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, **winning the War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use of America's** technology, broadcast, market research, and communications **resources**. In order to **best utilize those resources it is vital** to insure the teamwork of the **State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies**, universities, and the **private sector**. To this end, the Administration **should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND** charged **with gathering the information** required by the **U.S. government** to advance **America's** position in the ideological aspect of the **War on Terror**.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully **engage** in a long-term **market research** effort aimed at better understanding **foreign** public opinion. It would be **tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and **analyze** foreign public opinion in a manner **that is** simply not done **Today**. **There are** knowledge gaps with regard to issues of **anti-American** sentiment and this institution would be **tasked with reviewing** all existing **data** plus contracting for any original research **needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."**

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what **budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from**, who **controls the focus** of the research, and so forth. **Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests**. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different **aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities**. That **is**, given **how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary**.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### *Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.”

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessmen, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as

<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

### Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communication effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 FEB 12 AM 8:18

EF-8772

March 8, 2004

I-04/003198

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Liberia and Haiti *DN*

Let's get the Department of State to put pressure on Taylor to start behaving and stop making trouble in Liberia, and pressure on Aristide to start behaving and stop making trouble in Haiti.

092

Thanks.

DHR:db  
030804-21

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Please respond by 3/12/04

3/11/04

→ SD

At the March 10 DC meeting on Haiti, Hadley and I asked State to develop and implement a "Plan Aristide" to do what you suggest.

8 Mar 04

Part of plan is to gather what we know of his corruption and human rights abuses and get US and foreign spokesmen to publicize this to counter Aristide's possible efforts to return as President.

09-03-04 12:13 IN

We had a similar discussion about Taylor at a Liberia DC meeting some time ago. I'll push on implementation.

Doug Feith

OSD 05207-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23518

February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Trip Coordinators  
(b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: April Function

ASD(ISP) —  
Need to sort out  
quickly (per our  
conversation yesterday)

ROMANIA

C 3/4

Nick Burns says there is some sort of function in early April. I don't know what it is. I think it is maybe near Romania. Please see what that is and tell me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020704-1 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

— FOREIGN MINISTERIAL IN BRUSSELS 2 APR  
7 INVITEES BECOME FORMAL MEMBERS  
FOR JUNE SUMMIT.  
Accessions Ceremony held  
to the Foreign Ministers  
(FRIDAY)

— ROMANIA IS 12-13 OCT (MAYBE)  
Schedler may want Def  
Minister a day early  
9 FEB 04

OSD 05216-04

April 8, 2004

TO: Steve Hadley

c c : Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Requests of Joint Staff

If you have requests of the Joint Staff or the Vice Chairman, you should run them through John Craddock's office. Then we will know what is going on and be able to make sure that appropriate information required by the National Security Council staff gets to you.

I have asked the folks in the Joint Staff to refer such requests to my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040804-4

OSD 05217-04

11-L-0559/OSD/23520

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh  
040504-10

*335 SD*

*7 Apr 04*

OSD 05234-04

March 29, 2004

Afghanistan

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: *The Hunt for Bin Laden*

Would you please do me a favor and read the book, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* by Robin Moore, and tell me what you think of it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-15

24 March

.....  
Please respond by 4/30/04

Ad 4/14

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/ CDR Nasenzo  
4/12

12 APR 04

'04 MAR 29 PM 1:59

OSD 05246-04