

COORDINATION SHEET  
 Snowflake Response to *Washington Post* Article on C-130J

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Concur Non-Concur Concur w/edits</b>
ARA	Dr. Spruill	June 30,2006	Concur
GC	Mr. Dell'Orto	June 30,2006	Concur w/comments Comments incorporated
<b>PA</b>	Ms. Irwin	June 30,2006	Concur
PA&E	Mr. Berkson	June 30,2006	Concur w/comments Comments incorporated
Air Force	Lt Gen Hoffman	July 5,2006	Concur w/comments Comments incorporated
Comptroller	Mr. Patterson	June 30,2006	Concur
DP&AP	Mr. Nielsen	July 5,2006	Concur w/comments Comments incorporated

~~FOUO~~

May 30, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC Gen Pete Pace  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT Problem with Ministries

In view of that last NSC meeting, I would like to have you **get** the facts on how many people folks think are needed in each of the ministries, every ministry in **Iraq** and in Afghanistan. The **only** thing that will solve the problem **that** Casey is worried about is facts, and we don't have them.

Please pull together data on ministry advisors in detail. Specifically, we need to have a list that shows each ministry and the:

- target number of people believed to be needed
- the skill sets needed
- how many people are currently in place and **the** following:
  - their names
  - their grade levels
  - what departments and agencies they are from
  - whether they are contractors, or civilians, or military
  - the number of months they have committed to

We need to get it pulled together and figure out what the problem is.

According to Zal, one of the problems is security. The State Department **has** not even asked for money to hire contractors.

Let's **talk**.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58414



~~FOUO~~

Thanks.

DHR dh  
053006-22

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*Please Respond By 06/09/06*

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
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58415

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INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  JUL 10 2006

SUBJECT: Problem with Ministries in Iraq and Afghanistan (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked (attached) for detailed information on the requirements for advisors and advisor-staffing levels supporting ministries in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iraq Response (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ MNSTC-I has 119 advisors with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and 119 advisors with the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
  - Of the MoD advisors, 58 are U.S. military, 7 are non-U.S. military, 28 are civilian, 25 are contractors, and 1 is coalition. Of the MoI advisors, 50 are U.S. military, 25 are non-U.S. military, 10 are civilian, 24 are contractors, and 10 are coalition.
  - The table at Tab A provides details about these advisors.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Embassy's Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) provides 63 full-time advisors for Iraq's non-security ministries; this is 80% of IRMO's target staffing of 79 advisors. The advisors are listed by name at Tab B.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Embassy has created Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) to coordinate support to non-security ministries. MATs include full-time IRMO advisors and part-time staff. Information about these advisors is at Tab C.
  - There are 133 advisors in the MATs, 82% of the target of 162 advisors.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Embassy is reviewing the required number and mix of skills for advisors to Iraq's non-security ministries; the review is expected to call for more advisors.
  - In the next 6-12 months, Embassy Baghdad is expected to hire up to 200 additional contractors as full-time members of MATs.
  - A total of \$150 million has been requested by State in the FY06 supplemental and FY07 budget for ministerial capacity efforts.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Security challenges limit access to ministries throughout Baghdad. Last year, Embassy Baghdad's security office cancelled almost 30% of scheduled movements. Additional advisors *will* require additional security.

OSD 10900-06

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Prepared by Shannon Green, OSD-ISA-NESA, (b)(6) and Shawn Steene, OSD-ISA-NESA, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58416

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Afghanistan Response (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Department of Defense has **71** mentors to the MoD and 30 mentors with the MoI. In addition, State Department has **10** advisors with the MoI.
  - Of the MoD advisors, **45** are contractors and **26** are military. Of the MoI advisors funded by DoD, 19 are contractors and 11 are military.
  - The commitment for most of these advisory positions is one year. The MoD and MoI advisors are embedded in the ministries full-time.
  - The table at Tab D provides more detail about these advisors.
- (U) Other USG agencies have a total of **40** advisors in non-security ministries. These advisors are listed by name at Tab E.
  - USAID has 35 mentors spread throughout the ministries of Commerce, Communication, Education, Energy, Finance, Public Health, Public Works, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Women's Affairs.
  - Treasury Department has 1 advisor in the Ministry of Finance; Department of Agriculture has 1 advisor in the Ministry of Higher Education; State Department has 2 contractors in the Ministry of Justice; and Federal Aviation Administration has 1 advisor in the Department of Transport.
  - Most of these advisors are contractors with a one-year commitment. Some of them are embedded full-time in the ministries while others are not.
- (U) Unlike Iraq, the Embassy has not set targets for each Afghan ministry. The Afghan Reconstruction Group provided feedback on the **skills** needed (Tab F).
  - The GoA needs additional assistance in budgeting, accounting, long-term planning, and customs and revenue collection. We will have a more comprehensive understanding of needs when USAID completes its assessment of ministerial capacity in fall 2006.

ATTACHMENTS:

TAB A – Iraq MoD and MoI Advisor Staffing

TAB B – IRMO Staffing List, By Name

TAB C – Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) Summary

TAB D – Afghanistan MoD and MoI Advisors

TAB E – Afghanistan Advisors in Ministries

TAB F – Afghanistan Ministerial Needs Assessment

TAB G – Coordination Sheet

**FOUO**

**May 30, 2006**

TO: Eric Edelman

CC Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

**SUBJECT:** Problem with Ministries

In view of that last **NSC** meeting, I would like to have you get the facts on how many people folks ~~thi~~ **are** needed in each of the ministries, every ministry in Iraq and in **Afghanistan**. The **only** thing that will solve the problem **that** Casey is worried about is facts, and we don't have them.

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- the skill sets needed
- how many people are currently in place and the following:
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  - whether they are contractors, or civilians, or military
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We need to get it pulled together and **figure** out what **the** problem **is**.

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**Let's talk.**

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/58418

**FOUO**

Thanks.

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*Please Respond By 06/09/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/58419

# Traq MoD and MoI Advisors

As of 7 June 2006  
TAB A

Ministry	MNSTC/Advisors	Advisors						Total Partners on Hand	% Filled
		Ministry	Private Industry	Academia	Contractor	Coalition	NGO		
Ministry of Interior	112	50	25	10	24	10	0	119	106%
Ministry of Defense	103	58	7	28	25	1	0	119	115%
<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>110%</b>



# Iraq Ministerial Capacity Building

As of 7 June 2006  
TAB B

## Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Staffing

Ministry	Target Manning	On Board Staff	% Filled
Agriculture	1	1	100%
Communications	5	5	100%
Education	2	2	100%
Electricity	10	7	70%
Public Integrity	7	6	86%
Finance	7	5	71%
Health	2	2	100%
Oil	10	6	60%
Planning	1	1	100%
Private Sector Development	3	3	100%
Resolution of Real Property Disputes	2	2	100%
Trade, Industry, & Minerals	4	4	100%
Transportation	18	15	83%
Justice	2	2	100%
Water & Public Works	4	1	25%
Youth & Sports	1	1	100%
<i>Total</i>	79	63	80%



# Iraq Ministerial Capacity Building

As of 7 June 2006  
TAB B

## Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Staffing

Senior Consultant	Reed, June	1			6/30/2006	6/27/2004
Project Analyst ISX Automation	Isely, Christian	1			2/17/2006	3/21/2005
xx		1				
Senior Consultant	Warner, Elizabeth	1			indefinite	6/27/2004
Senior Consultant	Warner, Elizabeth	1			indefinite	6/27/2004
Advisor for Displacement & Migration	Under Review					
Senior Consultant	Bun, Mark	1			indefinite	12/15/2004
Trade and Privatization	VACANT					
Trade and Operations Consultant	Lyons, John	1			indefinite	6/27/2004
		1				
Senior Consultant	Fatfat, Mounzer	1			6/30/2006	6/27/2004
Senior Consultant	McHugh, Peter		1		indefinite	
Deputy Senior Consultant	Barkaway, Aladdin		1		indefinite	
Business Manager	Warner, Tim (Dual)	1			indefinite	2/12/2006
Contracts Manager	Dehlinger, James	1			indefinite	3/8/2006
Deputy Senior Consultant- Maritime Affairs	Hearn, Robert	1			indefinite	5/8/2005
Deputy Senior Consultant - Railway Affairs	Hemphill, Mark	1			indefinite	3/20/2005
Regional Consultant - North	VACANT	1				
Railway Sustainment Advisor	VACANT	1				
Transportation Development Liaison			1		indefinite	
Chief of Staff	Warner, Tim (Dual)		1		indefinite	
Regional Consultant - South	Nelson, K. Will	1			indefinite	11/20/2005
Ports Operations Mgr	Ariam, Lmad	1			indefinite	8/7/2005
Aviation Security Advisor - North	VACANT					
Aviation Security Advisor - South	VACANT					
Housing & Const - Senior Consultant	Purington, Roliff	1			6/30/2006	6/27/2004
Project Manager- Civil Engineer	Salgado, Roberto		1		6/30/2006	
Military Advisor -- Flight Safety	Cintron, Melvin		1		indefinite	
Bilingual-Dicultural Advisor	Basil Harbi				indefinite	
Senior Consultant	Ramaizet, Frank	1			indefinite	2/2/2005
xx				1		
Senior Consultant	VACANT					
Deputy Technical Consultant- River Management	Under Review				indefinite	
Deputy Senior Consultant	Allen, Linda (Act SC)	1			indefinite	8/1/2005
Public Works Advisor					indefinite	10/23/2005
Water Resources Advisor	VACANT					

11-L-0559/OSD/58422



# Iraq Ministerial Capacity Building

As of 7 June 2006  
TAB B

## Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Staffing

POSITION WORKING TITLE	NAME (Lastname, Firstname)	POSITION SOURCE					Position Duration	Post Arrival Date
		3161	Der	Com.	Mil	Coal		
Senior Consultant	Savello, Paul	1					indefinite	6/27/2004
Senior Consultant	Craft, Michael	1					indefinite	6/7/2005
Program Manager	Hakurd, Shwan	1					indefinite	
Project Manager	Baker, James	1					indefinite	9/11/2005
Chief of Staff	Agily, Shaib	1					indefinite	1/23/2005
Senior Consultant	Cross, Alan	1					indefinite	11/17/2004
Senior Consultant	Herman, Albert	1					indefinite	2/21/2006
Sr Engineer/Generation & Fuels Consultant	Dempsey, John	1					indefinite	9/18/2005
Sr Policy and Planning Consultant	Lockhard, David	1					indefinite	1/16/2006
Deputy Senior Consultant/Finance & Rates	Clemons, Carla		1				indefinite	6/27/2004
Sr Engineer/Trans & Distribution	Ensign, David	1					indefinite	7/26/2005
Security Operations Advisor	Jayohn, Curtiss	1					indefinite	10/27/2005
Log & Supply Chain Management	Under review							
Office Manager/Capacity Development	VACANT							
Senior Engineer (Distribution)	Al Hilo, Yahya	1					indefinite	8/1/2005
Sector Program Manager- Electricity	Krause, Bob	1					indefinite	1/16/2006
Sr Engineer - Elec Utility Generation/O&M/Tech Cons	VACANT							
Chief of Staff/Admin Support	New Position							
Senior Consultant CPI-Director of CPI	King, Christopher	1					indefinite	6/27/2004
CPI-CoS/Operations Manager	Morefeld, Mike	1					indefinite	1/17/2006
CPI-Operations Officer	Griffith, Catherine		1				indefinite	2/12/2006
CPI-Ass stant Legal Consultant	Griffith, Chris	1					indefinite	2/27/2006
CPI-Senior Comm Rel Consultant	Under Review							
CPI-Public Affairs Officer	Under Review							

11-L-0559/OSD/58423



# Iraq Ministerial Capacity Building

As of 7 June 2006  
TABB

## Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Staffing

CPI-Public Ethics Manager	Matchinson, John	1					indefinite	1/17/2006
CPI-Chief Auditor	Jochim, Vance	1					indefinite	6/27/2004
CPI-External Relations	Marshall, Brian						indefinite	3/11/2005
Interpreter	Falaha, Mohammad						indefinite	
Senior Advisor - Investigations	Mueller, Noel						indefinite	
Senior Consultant- Monetary Policy	Taecker, Kevin		1				indefinite	
Dep. Senior Consultant Debt Management	Gallalee, David	1					indefinite	5/31/2005
Dep. Senior Consultant for Banking	Messec, Jim	1					indefinite	2/8/2005
Budget Execution Director		1					indefinite	
Finance Consultant	<b>VACANT</b>							
Iraqi Banking Sector Advisor		1					indefinite	
Senior Consultant	Bowersox, John (COL)		1				indefinite	
Deputy Senior Consultant	Gilchrist, Tracy (LCDR)		1				indefinite	1/29/2006
Program & Project Manager	<b>Under review</b>							
Senior Consultant	<b>VACANT</b>							
Economics and Planning	Morris, Mike		1				indefinite	
Oil Analyst	Valentino, Brian		1				indefinite	
Deputy Senior Consultant	Sickman, John (Act SC)	1					indefinite	1/15/2006
Legal and Regulatory Specialist	Meguire, Robert	1					indefinite	6/27/2004
Chief of Staff/Senior Administrator	Salas, Maria	1					indefinite	
Oil/Gas Expert	Himer, Roman			1			indefinite	
Exploration Consultant - Geologist	<b>New Position</b>							
Finance Consultant	Nicolle, John						indefinite	11/20/2005
Production Consultant - Engineer	<b>VACANT</b>							
Midstream Energy Consultant - Engineer	<b>VACANT</b>							
Downstream Energy Consultant - Refineries & Export	<b>VACANT</b>							
Senior Consultant	Martin, Gailher	1					indefinite	3/23/2005
NGO Reg. & Coord.	Thomas, Herve						indefinite	3/25/2005
Charge d'Affaires to Iraq	Henderson, Stewart						indefinite	
Donor Coordination Consultant	Williams, Elizabeth						indefinite	
Donor Coordination Consultant	Tonai, Akihiro						indefinite	

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# Iraq Ministerial Capacity Building Staffing

As of 7 June 2006

TAB C

## IRMO Advisors and MAT Staffing of Key Ministries

Ministry	IRMO	Ministry Advisory Teams	
		Target Staffing	Filled
Agriculture	1	29	26
Education	2	8	7
Electricity	10	14	14
Oil	10	9	6
Finance	7	33	28
Health	2	12	10
Justice	2	12	11
Planning	1	18	10
Water Resources	4	27	21


The Ministry of Electricity is a good example of the composition of a MAT.

Ministry of Electricity	Title	Name
IRAQI Partner	Deputy Minister	Mrs. Barga Al-Juburi
IRAQI Partner	DG Planning	Momtaz Ayoub
IRAQI Partner	DG Training	Abdul Amer
IRMO Partner	Senior Consultant	Carla Clemons
IRMO Partner	Chief of Staff & Donor Advisor	Alia Kasey
IRMO Partner	Program Manager	Bob Krause
IRMO Partner	Senior Energy Consultant	David Lockhart
ECON Partner	Essential Services Liaison	Larry Kimmel
USAID Partner	Director, Infrastructure	John Pennell
USAID Partner	Senior Energy Advisor	Dick Dumford
PCO Partner	Ministry Senior Advisor	Dr. Ahmed Kaldi
(World Bank)	Senior Energy Advisor	Simon Stolp
CMO Partner	CMO Electricity Liaison	MAJ Barbara Kuhn
4th ID GST	Electricity Sector Liaison	MAJ Al Moff

# Afghanistan MoD and MoI Advisors

As of 12 June 2006  
TAB D

Ministry	Advisors			Total Partners on Hand	
	Ministry	USG Civilian	DoD Contractor		State Dept Contractor
Ministry of	11	0	19	10	40
Ministry of Defense	26	0	45	0	71
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>111</b>



# Afghanistan – Advisors in Non-Security Ministries As of 21 June 2006

TAR E

Foreign Affairs	None				
Procurement Center	None				
Higher Education	1	USDA	Kevin McNamara	Contractor	Feb 05-Aug 06
Justice	2	INL contract with PAE	Bashir Ghazialam	Contractor	May-July 2006
		INL contract with PAE	Robert Gibson	Contractor	July 06-July 08
Public Health	3 as of July	USAID	Pia Chesnias	Contractor	July 06-July 09
	1	USAID	Omid Ameli	Contractor	July 06-July 09
		USAID	Bill Newbrander	Contractor	July 06-July 09
Public Works	1	USAID	Eshaq Aman	Contractor	Apr 06-Sept or Dec 06
Rural Rehabilitation and Development	1	USAID (through UNDP)	Meral Jabucar	Contractor	Jan 06-Jan 07
Transport	1	FAA	Jim Richmond	Civilian	Depart Oct 06
Women's Affairs	1	USAID	Jane Williams Grube	Contractor	

\*These mentors are not all embedded full-time in the ministries but spend most of their time advising the ministries.



# Afghanistan - Advisors in Non-Security Ministries

As of 21 June 2006  
TAB E

Ministry	Number of Advisors	Agency	Advisors	Role	Contract Dates
Commerce	3	USAID	James Robertson	Contractor	
		USAID	Edgar Parks	Contractor	
		USAID	Cathy Silverstein	Contractor	
Communication	6	USAID	Oliver Dziggel	Contractor	
		USAID	Tony Loda	Contractor	
		USAID	Farahuddin Khuram	Contractor	
		USAID	Ahmed Royan	Contractor	
		USAID	Nick Towle	Contractor	
		USAID	Chris Kitilov	Contractor	
Education	2	USAID	Sarah Amiryar	Contractor	Both are long term contracts through at
		USAID	Craig Naumann		
Energy and Water	2	ARTF	Axel Wemer		
			Ahmad Wali Shairzay	Contractor	
Finance	20	USAID	Lisa Pinstev		Nov 05-Nov 06
		USAID	Amy	Contractor	Feb 06-Feb 07
		USAID	Rodney Mays	Contractor	
		USAID	M. Van Wichelen	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Eugene Fatakanwa	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Robert Henderson	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Janis Kainins	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Henrik Kristensen	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Vesna Stojanovic	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Abdul Latif	Contractor	Dec 05-Dec 06
		USAID	Grame Atkins	Contractor	Jun 06-Aug 08
		USAID	Naresh Guggal	Contractor	Aug 05-Aug 08
		USAID	Vishal Gandhi	contractor	May 06-May 07
		USAID	Leah April	Contractor	Aug 05-Aug 06
		USAID	Megan Gray	Contractor	Mar 06-Mar 07
USAID	Kelvin Power	Contractor	Jun 05-Jun 07		
USAID	Madhusuna Rao	Contractor	Aug 05-Sep 06		
US Treasury Department			Bob Jelnick	Civilian	To be extended
Unclear			Deanna Aubrey	Contractor	Contract ends Nov 06



# Afghanistan Ministerial Needs Assessment

As of 21 June 2006



TAB F

<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Crops, livestock, and agribusiness programs</b>
<b>Borders and Tribal Affairs</b>	<b>Customs and border control</b>
<b>Commerce</b>	<b>Census support, trade development</b>
<b>Communication</b>	
<b>Defense</b>	<b>Mentors needed for Afghan National Army - field level</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>Literacy programs, vocational training, and female education</b>
<b>Energy and Water</b>	<b>Power sector, mineral resources, and alternative energy development</b>
<b>Finance</b>	<b>Customs expertise, long-term planning</b>
<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	
<b>Procurement Center</b>	<b>Budgeting, accounting, and finance</b>
<b>Higher Education</b>	<b>Vocational training</b>
<b>Interior</b>	<b>Mentors needed for border police, civil police - field level</b>
<b>Justice</b>	<b>Legal education and training, trial law, legal aid and public information, women's and children's justice, and counter-narcotics and anti-corruption prosecution</b>
<b>Public Works</b>	<b>Housing programs, municipal services, and urban planning</b>
<b>Rural Rehabilitation and Development</b>	<b>Rural development, micro-enterprises, and agriculture</b>
<b>Transport</b>	<b>Aviation, road and rail transportation administration, and investment promotion</b>
<b>Urban Development and Housing</b>	<b>Housing programs and urban planning</b>
<b>Women's Affairs</b>	<b>Research, program development, budgeting, advocacy, and networking with other ministries</b>

\*This information is based on an informal assessment by DoD with input from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group. A more comprehensive assessment of ministerial capacity and needs will be completed by fall 2006.

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COORDINATION  
Problem with Ministries in Iraq and Afghanistan

ASD ISA	Mr. Peter Rodman	 7/9/06
PDASD ISA	Ms. Mary Beth Long	
Principal Director, NESAS	Brig Gen Paula Thornhill	 7-6-06
Director, Northern Gulf	Mr. John Trigilio	 7/7/06
Deputy Director, SA	Ms. Laura Cooper	 7/7/06
DASD(ISP)	Mr. Joe Benkert	<u>reviewed, changes incorporated</u>

~~FOUO~~

061306-19

Exec Sec

June 13, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
GEN John Abizaid

Distro To PT, NB

Date 6/15/06

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

Time 1133

**SUBJECT** Paper by Michael Vickers

Attached is a paper Michael Vickers gave the President, which I found interesting.

**Any** thoughts?

Thanks,

Attach: **6/12/06** Vickers memo to POTUS

DHR.ss  
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~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58431

OSD 10923-06



7/11/2006 1:16:08 PM

6  
June 12, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE **PRESIDENT**

FROM: Michael G. Vickers *MV*

SUBJECT: Transitioning to an Indirect Approach in Iraq

This memorandum expands upon my earlier memo regarding the transition to an indirect approach in Iraq. It builds on our May 30<sup>th</sup> discussion in the Oval Office, and seeks to address the questions you raised.

One of the many paradoxes of modern counterinsurgency is that less is often more. This paradox applies to strategy and tactics, to external powers supporting counterinsurgencies, and to internal governments fighting an insurgency. Successful counterinsurgency operations are characterized by an emphasis on intelligence, the discriminate use of force, a focus on building popular support for the government and protecting the population, and on political reconciliation, including amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents. Police are in the lead, with the military in support. Unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts are characterized by a military focus on large-scale sweep and kill-capture operations, with forces concentrated in large bases for protection. Building indigenous capacity has been a low priority in unsuccessful operations. Intervention by outside powers in insurgencies in the past half century has been far more successful when an indirect, small footprint approach is used.

Our strategic predicament in Iraq can be summarized as follows: For three years, we have pursued a direct approach to counterinsurgency that has eroded American public support for the war (our center of gravity) more than it has reduced Iraqi support for the insurgency (our enemy's center of gravity). By almost all measures, the insurgency has gotten worse. Insurgent attacks are at historically high levels (3,500 per month), with twice as many attacks occurring daily in May 2006 than in May 2004 and 2005. The security situation in Baghdad has deteriorated. Al Qaeda in Iraq forces and other Sunni insurgents are seriously contesting Ramadi. Insurgent attacks on Iraqis have increased substantially. Independent militias have grown in numbers and influence as a result of intra-Shia power struggles and Sunni-Shia sectarian violence.

Given Iraq's unsettled politics, it is highly unlikely that American forces, even with growing Iraqi security force assistance, will be able to defeat the insurgency within the next 2-3 years. The current level of insurgency, moreover, is likely to be insensitive across a wide range of force levels. The assertion by many critics that more troops in 2003 could have nipped this insurgency in the bud or fundamentally altered its course is not credible. Likewise, increasing the number of U.S. troops now is highly unlikely to be decisive. The insurgents will still control the initiative, and they can always temporarily decline to fight. Insufficient intelligence and continued strong support for the insurgency among the Sunni population will limit the strategic success of any near-term efforts. As

long as the political grievances fueling the insurgency remain, the insurgency will remain.

Because of the direct approach's inability to produce decisive near-term results and its increasing **cost**, the longer we stay with it, the more we place our long-term goals in Iraq at risk. Continuing with **this** approach, moreover, does not play to American **strengths**. The insurgents and the states supporting them (i.e., Iran and Syria) retain the strategic initiative in Iraq, while we suffer from significantly reduced strategic freedom of action.

It is imperative that we accelerate our shift to an indirect approach, with Iraqis in the lead and Americans in support. Transitioning to an indirect approach will require that we **begin** and continue the drawdown of U.S. forces while the insurgency is still raging. It will **require** additional resources for Iraqi security forces. Most importantly, we must make **our** stated "main effort" our actual main effort.

The Iraqi insurgency will not be particularly difficult to defeat over the longer **term**. It is imperative, however, that we shift the focus from why we seem unable to defeat the insurgency in the short run, to why the new Iraqi government, with our support, will prevail in the long run. The indirect approach has defeated far more formidable insurgencies (i.e., El Salvador in the **1980s**) than the one currently being waged in Iraq. The transition to an indirect approach has also been successfully accomplished in the face of much greater insurgent threats and following more dire failure of direct approaches (i.e., by the U.S. in Vietnam after **1971**, and by the Soviets in Afghanistan after 1989; the indirect approach failed **only** when the supporting government collapsed).

Insurgencies are protracted contests of wills. There are no counterinsurgency blitzkriegs. We and the Iraqi government will win in the long run simply by not losing, and by driving the insurgency to lower and lower levels until the insurgents' political will to continue has been broken. We **can** defeat the insurgency in Iraq the same way we will win the broader Global War on Terrorism by game-changing, direct operations early in the war (i.e., the overthrow of the Taliban and elimination of the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan), followed by protracted indirect and clandestine operations that leverage the capabilities of our partners. The Iraqi insurgents do not offer a viable political alternative. Unless **America** abandons Iraq, Iraqi insurgents will remain incapable of massing and conducting large-scale, decisive operations. The Iraqi insurgency will be defeated by increasing Iraqi **security** and intelligence capabilities, the Iraqi population's eventual rejection of insurgent violence, political reconciliation, and continued American political, military and economic support.

American support, however, must be sustainable **across** administrations. There is no more important task for the administration than to hand off **an** Iraq strategy that is sustainable politically by its successors. The strategic imperative is to transition before perceived failure with the direct approach forecloses otherwise viable options. (This **was**

one of the major mistakes we made in Vietnam.) **Our** objective should be to hand over primary **security** responsibility to Iraqi forces no later than summer **2008**.

Transitioning to an indirect approach in Iraq is emphatically not an exit strategy. Nor does it mean that we must adjust our goals downward as we hand off security responsibility to Iraqis. It is imperative that we and others not confuse means with ends. **Our** goals in Iraq should remain our goals. We have long recognized that our goals there cannot be achieved overnight, and that they can only be achieved if the Iraqis take ownership of them.

Zarqawi's death and the formation of the new Iraqi government provide the events on which a transition can begin. This unusual meeting at Camp David provides another potential turning point. The challenge will be to conduct the transition so as to build support among the **American** people for a sustainable strategy while assuring the new Iraqi government and signaling our enemies that decisive **American** support will continue. Iraqi security forces have been stood up to **80-85** percent of their targeted levels, and will reach 100 percent by the end of the year. We have killed or captured nearly all former regime elements, and in addition to killing Zarqawi, we have significantly degraded Al Qaeda in Iraq. The insurgency has been successfully contained to Iraq, and it is driven primarily by domestic Iraqi political disputes.

Operations in the near term should focus on eliminating the insurgent sanctuary in Ramadi and on improving the security situation in Baghdad. Substantially reducing the insurgent presence in Ramadi will likely require a combination of clandestine operations by JSOC and the CIA, coupled with direct operations similar to those conducted in Fallujah. Because of sectarian divisions and **Sunni** rejectionism, U.S. forces will have to take the lead in Ramadi, though as much of an Iraqi face as possible should be put on operations. Because it is the heartland of **Sunni** rejectionists, Al Anbar is an area ripe for an indirect and clandestine approach over the longer term. Our objective should be to peel off the reconcilable elements of the **Sunni** insurgency and assist **Sunni** irregular forces in fighting the irreconcilable elements.

Demonstrated victories are vital to the credibility of the new Iraqi government. It must take the lead in securing Baghdad. We should not, however, create unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in the near term. Security will stem in large part from political accommodation and reconciliation. We should seek to incorporate rather than disband militias wherever possible. U.S. advisers and material assistance can play an important role in this process.

More broadly, a regional, rather than country-specific approach is imperative. In Central America, we pursued an offensive indirect approach through covert action in Nicaragua – the Sandinistas were providing sanctuary to Salvadoran insurgents and other Central American Marxist groups – in conjunction with our indirect approach to counterinsurgency in the other Central **American** countries. We should do the same today with regard to Iran and **Syria**.

**Our** advisory effort must become the a d , and not just the stated main U.S. effort in Iraq. Support for Iraqi security forces, police as well as army, needs to be increased in several areas: equipment, supplies and secure facilities. They also need responsive operational support. Iraqi security forces must take the lead in planning operations, and not serve as last-minute adjuncts to U.S. operations. As T.E. Lawrence observed, "better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them." Giving the Iraqis something to defend, moreover, is essential. Economic assistance is as important as security assistance.

We need to send our best personnel as advisors, and they require proper training. We are currently not doing very well in this area. Senior advisory positions (Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel) should be command-equivalent and centrally selected. The same situation applies to personnel from other agencies and departments. Iraqi police will become the main counterinsurgency effort over time. Accordingly, we need to substantially increase our advisory presence with them. (Currently, our effort is heavily weighted toward the Iraqi army.) The overall advisory effort, currently around 5,000 personnel, needs to be doubled.

As part of the transition, we should achieve unity of command and signal our shift to an Iraqi-led approach by putting the U.S. Ambassador in charge of the U.S. effort there. A Special Operations Forces three-star should be selected to head the military assistance command. The current SOF advisory effort in Iraq, with the exception of its support for the Iraqi SOF Brigade, is being constrained by its subordination to conventional forces.

The drawdown of U.S. combat forces, it goes without saying, should occur gradually, and will almost certainly not be completed by the time the administration leaves office. It must begin, however, and it will have to occur while the insurgency is still raging. Significant reductions are feasible and essential, and over the coming two years, the role of remaining U.S. combat forces should shift from a direct combat force to a Quick Reaction Force in support of Iraqi Security Forces. Over time, command of the QRF should be reduced to a two-star position and subordinated to the military assistance effort. A continued clandestine presence (i.e., JSOC) will also be required for some time, and should directly report to the senior military commander.

U.S. combat forces that remain in Iraq after Iraqi forces assume primary security responsibility should be high-leverage, theater-ranging assets: airborne surveillance and strike and air mobility to move rapid reaction ground forces, both U.S. and Iraqi. The entire quick reaction force should not exceed 40,000 troops, about half of which would provide air support. The ground component of the QRF should not be involved in day-to-day counterinsurgency operations.

To politically facilitate the transition, Prime Minister Maliki's goal of accepting security responsibility in 18 months should be supported. A four-star-led assessment team might also be convened to provide recommendations on the transition to an indirect approach.

COALITION FOR AC  
JUN 29 2006  
CTD

~~FOUO~~

June 28, 2006

h114

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone  
LTG Michael Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Unifying DoD Representation in US Embassies

What has happened to our initiative to create a single DoD senior official in each of the US embassies? I was briefed that we would move out on a new structure with a "Senior Defense Office and Defense Attache" by this summer.

Where are we?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF062806-01

-----  
*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

28 JUN 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58436



7/12/2006 9:15:10 AM

~~FOUO~~

July 07, 2006

TO: Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne

CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

We still have a long way to go in reducing waste in this Department.

I would like each of you to provide me a short, 8-10 slide presentation that outlines what you have done thus far in your military department and what your upcoming plans are to further reduce waste financially, bureaucratically and organizationally. I am considering pulling together a Department brief for the President in August.

Please get back to me by Thursday, July 13.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
SF070706-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58437

OSD 11014-06





SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

July 13, 2006, 1430PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, *Secretary of the Air Force*

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

You requested a short 8-10 slide presentation outlining our efforts to reduce waste. The attached briefing details our efforts to reduce waste financially, bureaucratically, and organizationally.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As sated

Prepared by: LT COL DICK POORE, HAF/CX, DSN (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/58438



OSD 11014-06

711412006 12:29:59 PM

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*



## **Air Force Waste to Warfighting**



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***“What have you done thus far in your military department and what are your upcoming plans to further reduce waste financially, bureaucratically, and organizationally?”***

***-- Secretary Rumsfeld, 7 July 2006***

---

***Integrity - Service - Excellence***

11-L-0559/OSD/58440



## *Financially*

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- **Reducing force by 40,000 Full Time Equivalent Manpower Billets over the FYDP**
  - FY06: On track to reduce 7,450 active duty personnel
  - FY07: Planned to reduce 16,700 active duty personnel
- **Reducing planned Contract Service Support by an estimated \$6.2B across FYDP**
  - FY06: On track with \$200M reduced
  - FY07: \$700M
  - FY 08: ~\$999.8M
  - FY08-11: ~\$5.5B
- **Accomplished on a Mission First Basis**
  - Essentially responding to Waste to Warfighting

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

11-L-0559/OSD/58441



# Bureaucratically

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- **Combined Lean and 6-Sigma process as Air Force Smart Operations for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**
    - Identify “Waste” in the Kaizan Sense
  - **Air Force Depots won “Shingo” Prize for Public Sector Lean, 6-Sigma – “Nobel Prize for Manufacturing”**
    - Warner-Robins ALC – one “Shingo Gold” for C-5 Depot Maintenance
    - Ogden ALC – two “Shingo Silver” for F-16 Common Configuration Program and Commodities Branch Pylon Shop
    - Oklahoma ALC – one “Shingo Silver” for KC-135 depot Maintenance
  - **Leading the Business Modernization with push toward Transparent Business Process and Clean Audit**
    - Back to basics and block approach on space acquisition
    - AF Business Enterprise Transition Planning/Portfolio Management
    - Transforming data systems – traceable, auditable, authoritative, decision-quality information to comply with contractual and regulatory obligations.
- 

*Integrity · Service · Excellence*



## *Organizationally*

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### ■ **Integrated Headquarters Staff**

- Eliminated overlap between Secretarial Support and Chief Support
- Moved to A-Staff Structure (A1-A9) to reflect Joint Staff

### ■ **Moved to Component Headquarters Construct**

- Ten – headquarters-sized and tailored to COCOM mission
  - JFACC-ready, JTF/CC-capable
- Streamlined staff, pushed reach back support positions and manpower
- Eliminated – 1500 in indirect support

### ■ **Consolidating Support Functions**

- Announced consolidated Finance Center at Ellsworth AFB, SD
- Announced Legal Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
- Consolidated Personnel Service Center is next
- Acquisition under review

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

11-L-0559/OSD/58443



## ***Air Force Cost Control Themes***

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- **Reducing Personnel**
- **Control Operations and Maintenance**
- **Recapitalization for Future Fight**

***Waste to Warfighting***

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

11-L-0559/OSD/58444



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

14-07-2006 A11:13

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated July 7, 2006, subject as above (Tab A).
- The slides you requested are provided at TAB B.
- The Army approach to reducing waste is threefold. *Financially*, in the near term (2006), the Army has implemented aggressive spending controls on operations and maintenance accounts, and is intensely reviewing and re-validating service contract requirements. In the long term, the Army is in the process of rolling out the largest-ever deployment of Lean Six Sigma, which will give our managers an effective tool to reduce cost and to enhance the output quality of their business operations. *Bureaucratically*, we are changing the Army business culture to one that is continuous process improvement focused, performance based and founded in Army Values. Our Lean Six Sigma efforts will also reduce bureaucracy by decreasing the cycle time of our business processes. *Organizationally*, we are streamlining our structure by reassessing the organization and functions of Army Headquarters, beginning with my office. We also are improving our reporting capabilities with development of the General Fund Enterprise Business System and the asset visibility in supply and personnel systems.
- The Army is pursuing several other major initiatives. We have terminated or restructured dozens of weapon system programs, resulting in an overall cost reduction of \$86B between FY99 and FY 11, some of which has been reinvested for other uses. In military construction, we project that the adoption of private sector best practices will reduce construction costs by 15 percent. In the area of information management, we are aggressively closing redundant operations at our installations and aggressively focusing on portfolio management, with the goal of eliminating 80 percent of our redundant, stove-piped systems.

11-L-0559/OSD/58445



7/14/2006 12:47:03 PM

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

- Also, this spring I stood up the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation. This office is responsible for synchronizing and integrating business transformation efforts throughout the Army, providing a forum for the identification, rapid approval and implementation of a wide range of initiatives. While most of our business transformation efforts are relatively new, I project that what we are doing today will reap great savings and efficiencies in the future.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Jim Anderholm, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

July 07, 2006

TO: Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne

CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

We still have a long way to go in reducing waste in this Department.

I would like each of you to provide me a short, 8-10 slide presentation that outlines what you have done thus far in your military department and what your upcoming plans are to further reduce waste financially, bureaucratically and organizationally. I am considering pulling together a Department brief for the President in August.

Please get back to me by Thursday, July 13.

Thanks.

DHR, JI  
SF070706-06


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*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/58447



711412006 12:44:36 PM



**Relevant and Ready, Today and Tomorrow**



**A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities**

# **Army Plans to Reduce Waste**

*Financially, Bureaucratically, and Organizationally*

**14 July 2006**


**PREDECISIONAL – FOUO**



11-L-0559/OSD/58448




# Improving Capabilities While Reducing Costs



Reduced Cost with No Loss of Capabilities

Improved Capabilities @ Increased Cost





# *Where the Army Spends Money and the Potential for Waste*



Category	Percent of FY06 Budget	Potential for Waste	Focus Area
Pay	40	Low	X
- Military	32	Low	X
- Civilians	8	Moderate to High	X
Travel	2	High	
Transportation	4	Moderate	
Supplies & Equipment *	18	Moderate to High	X
Contracts	32	High	X
- Products	5	Moderate	X
- Services	27	High	X
Rents	2	Low	
Other	2	Low	

\* This category includes payroll costs for some reimbursable civilian positions.



# *Plans to Further Reduce Waste*



## **Financially**

- Cost reductions ... business transformation
- Spending restrictions for Operation and Maintenance, Army
- Cost controls
- Service contracts requirements review

## **Bureaucratically**


- Change in business culture
- Civilian Senior Leader Management Office/Review of Training, Education, and Assignments for Leaders
- Secretary of the Army contract and personnel hiring controls
- Business transformation

## **Organizationally**

- Organizational analysis and design
- Development of General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS)
- Asset visibility in supply and personnel improvement



# Business Transformation Initiatives



- LSS – Lean Six Sigma
- I3MP – Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program
- GFEBs – General Fund Enterprise Business System

- DIMHRS – Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
- RETAL – Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders



# Army Initiatives – A Summary



	Realized Cost Reductions (2001-2006)	Planned Cost Reductions (2007-2011)
Personnel initiatives	Transfers of 30,000 military manpower positions from institutional Army to operating force	
Equipping		
System Terminations and Restructurings (Gross)	\$6.1 B	\$79.8B
Logistics, Fielding and Sustainment Initiatives		\$1.8B
Stationing		
Global Defense Posture (GDP) Changes		\$0.8B
BRAC		\$1.8B
MILCON Transformation		15% reduction in cost per square foot
Business Transformation	\$1.8B	\$16.9B
2006 O&M Spending Controls	<i>\$0.56</i>	



# To Be Provided Under Separate Cover



## Bureaucratic

### Process Change

- Currently conduct **\$19.5B** in reimbursable orders
- Will change to direct funding
- Personnel savings and dollars (too many MIPRs)
- Applicable DoD-wide

## Organizational

### Process Change

- Requirement **3** concept development **3** procurement
- Higher velocity, lower cost
- Improved ratio of R&D to procurement

## Organizational

### IT System Portfolio Mat

- Currently low visibility
- Legacy systems that add no value
- "Pull the plug and funding"

## Financial

### Mgt Control Process Improvements

- Interfund billing **ently** drives high error rate
- Creates conditions in which **fun are** against pseudo accounts
- **Ccorrect ro** ...**\$1B** in **g** across FYDP



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20359-1000

July 18, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

In response to your memorandum dated July 07, 2006, the attached slides outline the Department of the Navy's current initiatives and upcoming plans to further reduce waste financially, bureaucratically and organizationally. We are dedicated to a culture of continuous process improvement, and focused on improving the effectiveness of support to our Warfighters, now, and in the future.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Winter".

Donald C. Winter

Attachment:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/58455





# Department of the Navy Reducing Waste

18 July 2006

11-L-0559/OSD/58456



# Overview

---

- Financial
  - Base Closures
  - TACAIR Integration
  - Operational Costs
  - Open Architecture
- Bureaucratic
  - Oversight Improvements
- Organizational
  - Lean Six Sigma
  - Manpower
  - Installations
  - Capabilities Boards



# Financial

---

## **FOCUSED ON EFFICIENT EXECUTION TO ENSURE TIMELY COST SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH BASE CLOSURE**

- Surface – Closing Naval Station Pascagoula and Naval Station Ingleside providing a recurring annual savings of \$123M
- Aviation – Closing Naval Air Station Atlanta, Naval Air Station Brunswick and Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove providing a recurring annual savings of \$162M
- Weapons Stations – Closing Naval Weapon Station Concord providing a recurring annual savings of \$16M
- Navy Recruiting – Closing 5 recruiting districts providing a recurring annual savings of ~~\$14M~~
- Support Activity – Closing Naval Support Activity New Orleans proving a recurring annual savings of \$36.5M
- Reserve Activities – Closing 37 reserve activities providing a net savings of \$126M over 20 years

## **EFFICIENTLY UTILIZING NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR ASSETS AND PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT EXPEDITIONARY AND CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS**

- Integrated Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air Assets
- Reduced Tactical Air inventory requirements from 1637 to 1140
- USMC committed to support 10 Carrier squadrons
- USN committed to conduct deployments in support of USMC
- Tactical Air Integration will save \$35B between 2007 and 2020



# Financial

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## **PROACTIVELY REDUCING ENERGY AND OPERATIONAL COSTS THROUGH TECHNOLOGIES AND CONSERVATION**

- New Virginia Class Submarine design avoids a mid-life nuclear refueling (\$175M/ship life cycle savings)
- CVN 21 propulsion plant manning will be 50% less than current carriers
- CVN 21 dry-docking planned incremental availabilities will be reduced from 4 to 2 and incremental availabilities from 12 to 8 for a savings of \$1.9B over the 50 year life cycle
- DON generated and purchased renewable electricity and thermal energy, equivalent to 10.6% of annual electrical consumption
- DON has produced more than \$400M in annual savings including reduction in energy consumption, including reduction in energy consumption in buildings of 29%
- Between 2004-2005 decreased fuel oil use in facilities by 1.8M gallons

## **UTILIZING OPEN ARCHITECTURE FOR FLEXIBLE DEVELOPMENT**

- Open architecture implementation across undersea systems allowing commercial off the shelf hardware to be used during submarine sonar and weapons system upgrades resulting in improved software commonality and a cost avoidance in excess of \$500M
- DDG 1000, CVN 21, and LCS are also being designed to use open architecture to avoid reliance on proprietary software and enable future spiral developments



# Bureaucratic

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## **DON OVERSIGHT IMPROVEMENTS**

- Established the Acquisition Integrity Office September 2005
  - Merged talents of Naval Audit Service, NCIS, General Counsel, Navy IG
  - Proactive & reactive fraud deterrence and detection
  
- Established oversight planning process in June 2004 to identify significant business risks & opportunities to combat fraud, waste, & abuse
  - Senior Leadership Group/Oversight Planning Board
  - Annual Risk & Opportunity Assessment & Oversight Plan
  - In 2006 over 500 significant risks and opportunities were identified in the Department of the Navy and integrated into the annual assessment plans



# Organization- Lean Six Sigma (LSS)

---

## **Objective:**

- Apply to activities engaged in the areas of service, support and transactional missions
- Four broad goals of LSS center on:
  - Reduction in overhead rates
  - Speed of decisions, paperwork and transactions
  - Decrease in the number of mishaps through standardization and cleanliness
  - Increase in quality of work life

## **History:**

- Lean Six Sigma (LSS) deployment grew from grassroots initiatives in the DON's Industrial Base over the past 10 years
- In 2004, ASN (RDA) established specific goals for the acquisition team, pushing broad adoption and application of LSS practices across acquisition, service, support and transactional processes
- On 3 May 2006, announced goal of creating more readiness and assets in the budget through employment of LSS across the Department
- On 27 June 2006, initiated a DON-wide LSS leadership Executive Deployment Session with principals. Established a common knowledge baseline, reviewed successful commercial implementations, assessed current initiatives, and agreed to a three year plan of action



# Organization- Lean Six Sigma (LSS)

---

## Status:

Projects:	Over 3300 projects and events in process or completed
Cost Savings:	\$545M to date
Return on Investment:	4:1 (average)
Trained Leaders:	3567 including 140 Flags/SES
Black Belts:	755 (53 are American Society of Quality certified)
Green Belts:	3096
-Feedback/	
Process Improvement:	Monthly SECNAV-led progress meetings



# Organization- Manpower

---

**USN “Strategy for our People”:** Improves management efficiencies and effectiveness of manpower (military, civilian and contractor) while aggressively pursuing military manpower efficiencies ashore and increasing combat capability

- Examples include: Lean Six Sigma implementation, establishment of the Chief of Naval Installations, formation of a single manpower resource sponsor, merging Manpower and Personnel with Training and Education, and military-to-civilian and military-to-contractor conversions
- Results: Active end-strength in 2003 was 383,214. Projected FY 08 active end-strength is 324,900.

## **USMC Reallocation Of Manpower Resources:**

- Realigned 2800 Marines into Irregular Warfare capabilities in 2004
- Converted 2500 military billets to civilian positions between 2004 and 2006
- Created Marine Special Operations Command within existing manpower ceiling



# Organization- Installations

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**Past:** Numerous organizational structures & financial processes constrained flexibility & efficiency

**Present:** Single, responsible installation management activity

- Standardized policies/procedures/practices
- Ensures effective funding execution and efficient service delivery across 16 regions / 98 installations
- Eliminated duplication between commands; standardizing Public Works production outputs, engineering & planning; implementing standard business processes and common shared IT systems
- Realigned within Regional Commands providing a savings of \$208M over 20 years.
- Transformation translated into real savings via Working Capital Fund rate pressurization of \$60M in POM-08

**Demonstrated Efficiencies:**

- Returned \$1.1 billion between 2004 and 2007 for investment in recapitalization
- Regionally/HQ-centered processes de-layered
- Combined bases/staffs
- Streamlined Comptroller organization



# Organization- Capability Boards

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## *Resources, Requirements Review Board (R3B) and Navy Capability Board (NCB)*

**Issue:** Unconstrained requirements growth resulted in increased platform prices and a subsequent reduction in the number of ships/aircraft that the Navy could buy

**What We Did:** Developed process for Senior Leadership to review and approve changes in cost, schedule or performance to better align resources and requirements across all Navy Sponsors

- Additionally, instituted periodic review of major acquisition program performance focusing on capabilities and requirements

**Results:** Improved Senior Leadership awareness and control of "requirements creep" resulting in improved resource allocation decisions

- **DDG 1000** lead-ship cost reductions of \$300M have been identified with saving of \$1.2B across the FYDP
- Threshold capabilities reduction is under review for CVN 79

**FOUO**

**July 07,2006**

TO: Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne

CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT: Reducing Waste

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Please get back to me by Thursday, July 13.

Thanks.

DIR.dh  
SF070706-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/58466

~~FOUO~~

JUN 14 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Critiques of DoD Appropriations Bills

After reading the attached memo from Tina Jonas regarding the FY '07 Appropriations bill, I wonder if each year, after each bill is passed, we ought to take sometime and fashion a critique as to what good we believe was generated by the bill, and what negative impacts the bill will have. I think a collection of those Critiques over a period of time would present a compelling story, and maybe change behavior on the Hill.

Thanks.

Attach: USD COMPT memo to SecDef (OSD 09346-06)

DHR:sj  
SP061206-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/14/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11024-06



7/13/2006 8:05 45 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58467

~~FOUO~~

June 12, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT: Critiques of DoD Appropriations Bills

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DHR:ss  
SF061206-08

.....  
***Please Respond By 07/14/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58468

6/9  
1600



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

*Also we cut  
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costs &  
change done*

June 9, 2006, 1:00 PM

*no  
6/12/06*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*cc →*  
Robert Rangel  
*6/9*  
*FRONTS: Tina W. Jonas*  
*J. Smith*  
*Altman*

SUBJECT: House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee (HAC-D) Markup of the FY 2007 DoD Appropriations Bill

- The HAC-D completed markup of the FY 2007 DoD Appropriations bill. Full committee **markup** is scheduled for June 13<sup>th</sup>. The Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee (SAC-D) has not announced a schedule for their markup.
- The HAC-D funded \$376.6 billion for DoD in their bill, a reduction of \$4.1 billion from the President's request of \$380.7 billion. Of this reduction, \$1.9 billion is in the operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts and \$1.2 billion is taken from military personnel (MilPers) accounts.
- The bill funds the requested 2.2 percent military pay raise.
- Significant changes to acquisition programs include:
  - **DD(X) Destroyer** - Denied the request to incrementally fund two DD(X) destroyers; fully funds one DD(X) at the requested level of \$2.6 billion.
  - **Future Combat System (FCS)** - Reduces the FCS research and development (R&D) request of \$3.3 billion by \$326 million, leaving \$2.9 billion.
  - **F-22** - Concurs with the FY 2007 House passed Authorization Bill, adding \$1.4 billion to the request of \$1.5 billion to fully fund the 20 aircraft that were incrementally funded in the request.
  - **G17** - Reduces the request of \$2.6 billion to \$2.2 billion for 12C-17s. The \$390 million reduction is the amount requested for contract termination costs. The committee also included \$789 million in the bridge fund (Title IX) for three additional C-17s.

MA SD		SMA DSD	
SA SD	<i>6/9</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>1600 WPT 6/9</i>		<i>6/12/06</i>
ESR MA	<i>20 6/9</i>	STF DIR	

OSD 08346-06

6/9/2006 3:38:14 PM

- a Joint Strike Fighter (**JSF**) - Reduces the **JSF** procurement request of \$869.7 million (five aircraft) to \$729.7 million. The \$140 million difference **reflects** a reduction of one **aircraft**. The committee **also** added **\$200** million in R&D funding to continue the **JSF** Alternate Engine.
  - Conventional Trident **Modification** Program (**CTM**) - Concurs with the FY 2007 House **passed** Authorization Bill and reduces the **\$127** million request by \$97 million to \$30 million.
- a The **committee also** approved the **\$50** billion bridge fund (Title IX) to fund contingency operations related to the war on terror. Highlights of the **HAC-D** bridge fund markup include the following:
- Transfer from Baseline - Shifts \$833 million from baseline O&M and MilPers accounts to the bridge fund.
  - Equipment Replacement - Provides **\$5.6** billion for procurement which includes Humvees, trucks, radios, Hellfire missiles and ammunition.
  - IED Defeat - Provides **\$1.5** billion to **test** and field new **jammers** in Iraq and **Afghanistan**.
  - Train and Equip - Provides authority and **funding** to spend \$1 billion to **train** and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
  - Commander's Emergency Response Program (**CERP**) - Provides authority to spend \$500 million in Iraq and **Afghanistan**.
  - **Army** National Guard - Provides \$470 million to **fund** to a level of 350,000 end strength for the **Guard**.
- We will continue to track the progress of the Defense bill and keep you informed.

COORDINATION None

Prepared by: Robert Hood, (b)(6)



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

July 12, 2006, 8:00A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Snowflake #06 1206-08 --Critiques of DoD Appropriation Bills

You asked us to whether we ought to fashion a critique of the appropriations bills and offered the view that those critiques over time would present a compelling story and change behavior on the Hill.

Tina Jonas, Dave Patterson and I have discussed this matter extensively. We'll continue this process throughout the year and provide you with regular critiques.

- This year, to date, Congress has acted on two appropriations bills and the FY '06 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations (Tab A):
  - The House has passed both the FY '07 Defense and Military Quality of Life Appropriations Bills
  - Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) is scheduled to take up both bills the week of July 18"
  - Congress will attempt to send both bills to the President before the fall recess
- Three issues of paramount concern to the Department:
  - Topline reduction of \$9 billion by SAC
  - FY 2007 war funding bridge (\$50 billion) cash flowing operations 8 vs. 6 months
  - House Appropriations Committee (HAC) reduction for:
    - Coalition Support Funding (from \$1 billion to \$0.3 billion)
    - Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funding (from \$3.2 billion to \$1 billion)
- Key issues in FY '07 HAC Bill (Tab B)
  - HAC took an approximate 1 percent allocation (\$4 billion) from Defense
    - Reduction impacts recruiting with potential reduction in force structure
    - Equal to the budget for the entire Army Reserve
  - HAC reduced or changed several major weapons systems: DDX, F-22, JSF
  - HAC cut \$9.5 billion from critical programs to fund 1,700 un-requested adds under \$50 million (would pay for the entire FY '07 ship building budget with enough left to buy 6 F-22s)

11-L-0559/OSD/58471



7/13/2006 8 08 32 AM

- Key issues in FY '07 House Military Quality of Life Appropriations (Tab C)
  - House reduced Defense request by \$0.6 billion military construction
    - \$0.3 billion from BRAC
    - \$0.8 billion from Non-BRAC
  - Added back \$0.5 billion in un-requested Non-BRAC military construction for a net reduction of \$0.3 billion in Non-BRAC military construction
  
- Department courses of action for SAC mark-up:
  - SecDef letters to Senators Stevens and Inouye
  - DepSecDef office calls with Senators Stevens and Inouye on 12 July
  - SecDef office call with Senator Inouye (scheduling in work)

Attachments:

Tab A: FY '06 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Tab B: Key issues in FY '07 HAC Bill

Tab C: Key issues in FY '07 House Military Quality of Life Appropriations

Tab D: Snowflake SF061206-08

**FY 2006 Supplemental Appropriations  
Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Hurricane Recovery  
Final Bill**

**Budget Request**

- **Budget Request:** The original request for the Department was \$69.7 billion, but the revised request was a net \$1.2 billion lower – so the Resident could transfer funding to border security initiatives.
- The final FY 2006 Supplemental provides \$68.2 billion, \$1.5 billion below the original request.

(\$ in billions)

	<u>Original Request</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>	<u>Final</u>	<u>Change to Original</u>
GWOT – DoD	65.3	63.4	63.1	- 2.2
Border Security	---	0.8	0.7	M.7
GWOT – Intelligence	2.6	2.5	2.8	+0.2
Hurricane recovery	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>-0.2</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>68.5</b>	<b>68.2</b>	<b>- 1.5</b>

***Coalition Forces***

- Iraqi and Afghan security forces. The bill provided \$4.9 billion, a reduction of \$1 billion from the request of \$5.9 billion.

**Impact:** This reduction may delay Iraqi and Afghan security forces infrastructure needs, and potentially prolong Coalition deployments.

**Note:** This delay could be mitigated by FY 2007 Bridge funding and timely passage of the DoD appropriations bill including it. However, the House bill included only \$1 billion of the \$3.2 billion needed to train and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

- Coalition support. The bill provided \$0.7 billion, \$0.8 billion below the request.

**Impact:** This reduction could jeopardize or delay international support for counter-terrorism operations.

**Note:** Again, this delay could be mitigated by FY 2007 Bridge funding and timely passage of the DoD appropriations bill. However, the House bill included only \$300 million of the \$1.0 billion needed for timely reimbursement of our coalition partners like Pakistan and Jordan.

### *Procurement*

- The bill adopted most of the Revised Request's adjustments, most of which were from Procurement accounts, but preserved major funding adds from both House and Senate bills – including adds for M1 tank improvements, Bradley Fighting Vehicle upgrades, three V-22 aircraft, two KC-130J aircraft, eight Predators and advance procurement for three C-17 aircraft.

**Impact:** These adds are needs the Department would have addressed in subsequent Supplementals, so their immediate effect is to displace more pressing requirements – such as infrastructure improvements for Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

### *General Provisions*

- Shipbuilding recovery. The final bill omitted the Senate's damaging provision that would have expanded the Navy's liability for contractor costs and business disruptions.

**Impact:** This outcome avoids the establishment of a very damaging precedent.

- 
- General Transfer Authority. The bill provides the entire \$5 billion requested, a major victory because both houses had lower amounts.

**Impact:** This full requested authority will be critical of our ability to shift funds to address the most pressing needs of our deployed forces.

B

**FY 2007 Defense Budget**  
**House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (HAC-D) Bill**  
**As Passed by the House**

**Budget Request**

- **Budget Request:** The Department requested \$489.3 billion in the President's Budget. The HAC-D has jurisdiction over \$380.7 billion. It also has jurisdiction over the \$50 billion bridge allowance to partially fund the global war on terror.
- The HAC-D bill provides \$426.6 billion (\$376.7 billion base budget and \$50 billion for the GWOT allowance), a reduction of **\$4.0 billion**.

	(\$ in billions)		
	Request	Funded	Difference
Base budget (HAC-D)	\$380.7	\$376.7	- \$4.0
GWOT Bridge (HAC-D)	<u>\$ 50.0</u>	<u>\$ 50.0</u>	<u>\$0.0</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$430.7</b>	\$426.7	- \$4.0

**Baseline Budget**

- **Reduction:** The reduction of -\$4.0 billion is taken largely from military pay and operations accounts.

**Impact:** If the reduction stands, the services will be required to slow accessions and reduce force structure.

**Weapons Programs**

- The House reduced and changed several major weapons programs.
  - **DDX.** The House rejected split funding for the two lead DD(X) ships; they provided \$2.6 billion to fully fund 1 ship.
 

**Impact:** The decision will block competition to achieve the best value, increase program costs, and hurt the shipbuilding industrial base.
  - **F-22.** The House added \$1.4 billion to fully fund the F-22 aircraft procurement.
 

**Impact:** Other military program priorities (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter) were reduced – resulting in delays or reduction in quantities).

- **Joint Strike Fighter.** The House bill rejected the proposal to eliminate the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine. The House bill also reduced Joint Strike Fighter funding by \$.4billion – resulting in initial operational capability delays of 3 months for the Air Force and 8 months for the Marine Corp.

**Impact:** These changes to the JSF will cost about \$1.8B through FY 2011 ; thus, causing the Department to reduce other procurement programs, readiness or force structure.

- **Tactical Aircraft.** The House shifted \$0.8 billion from EA—18G to F/A-18E/F.

**Impact:** This change will disrupt the existing production line, delay the EA-18G fielding by one year, and increase program costs.

### **Research & Development**

- The House cut \$9.5 billion in critical programs to fund approximately 1,700 congressional un-requested projects under \$50 million.

- **Transformation.** Several transformation programs were reduced including: the Transformational Satellite; Space Radar; Future Combat Systems; Missile Defense; and, the Conventional Trident initiative.

#### **Impact:**

- TSAT-Eliminates funding needed for Congressionally mandated mission assurance activities.
- Space Radar-Delays fielding the capability.
- FCS-Increases cost and delays fielding to the new enhanced Brigade Combat Teams.
- Missile Defense-Causes a 6 month delay in the fielding of the Alternative Infrared Satellite System.
- Conventional Trident initiative-Increases our risk and prolongs the gap in prompt strike options.

## Personnel and Benefits

- **Health Care Savings.** The House Military Construction and Quality of Life subcommittee has jurisdiction on these issues.
- **Un-requested Medical Adds.** Although the HAC-D does not have jurisdiction over health care programs for the military, the committee continues to cut military programs to fund medical research.
- The bill included \$508 million in un-requested medical research adds. This compares with \$489 million in un-requested adds in FY 2006, an increase of \$19 million in medical adds.

## Global War on Terror Bridge

- **Shift of Funds.** The bill shifts \$1.6 billion in base funds to the bridge:
  - \$0.8 billion for Operation Noble Eagle
  - \$0.8 billion for three un-requested **C-17s**

**Impact:** This shift or budget gimmick:

- causes shortfalls in base operating funds
- reduces priority programs to fund **3** un-requested aircraft
- delays critical reset equipment for deployed forces

This gimmick mixes supplemental funds – intended to pay for the cost of the war – with baseline military funds. The practice has the potential *to* overstate war costs while shortchanging basic military needs.

- **Security Forces,** The House provided only \$1 billion of the **\$3.2** billion needed to train and equip Iraq and Afghan security forces.

**Impact:** Delays completion of training of critical security forces and potentially prolongs Coalition deployments.

- **Coalition Funding.** The House provided only \$300 million of *the* \$1 billion needed for timely reimbursement of our coalition partners like Pakistan and Jordan.

**Impact:** Potential to jeopardize or delay international support for counter-terrorist operations.

- **National Guard.** The House added \$470 million to finance the 350,000 Army National Guard end strength (the request funded 333,000).  
**Impact:** Displaces funding for other priority programs.
- **C-17.** An additional three C-17 aircraft are funded in the Bridge (request proposed ending production with 12 C-17 aircraft).  
**Impact:** Displaces funding for other priority programs. Delays shutdown of production as proposed in the budget.

C

**FY 2007 Defense Budget -- House Appropriations Committee  
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veteran Affairs  
House Passed Bill**

**Budget Request**

- **Budget Request:** The Department requested \$58.6 billion for programs under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
- The House bill provides \$58.0 billion, a reduction of \$0.6 billion, virtually all of it from Military Construction accounts.

	(\$ in billions)		
	<u>Request</u>	<u>Funded</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Basic Allowance for Housing	13.5	13.5	---
Defense Health Program, facilities sustainment	28.7	28.7	---
Military Construction	12.6	12.1	- 0.6
Family Housing	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>	---
<b>Total</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>- 0.6</b>

***Military Construction***

- Base realignment and closure (BRAC). The House reduced the request \$0.3 billion.

**Impact:** This would delay implementation of realignments and closures that are critical to reshaping our forces and global basing.

- Military construction projects (non-BRAC). The House bill cut \$0.8 billion from requested projects, which helped it add \$0.5 billion in unrequested projects.

**Impact:** This reduction would delay implementation of our Army Modularity initiative, construction of need operational and training facilities, and a military ocean terminal.

### *Defense Health Program (DHP)*

- The House fully funded the request and added the \$249 million in savings we assumed in our request for changes in TRICARE fees -- because neither authorization or appropriations committees are supporting our changes.

**Impact:** The House funding will enable the Department to cover the savings we cannot achieve without Congressional support of TRICARE fee changes.

~~FOUO~~

JUN 14 2006

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CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
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DHR:as  
SP061206-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/14/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11024-06



7/13/2006 8:03:57 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58482

D

~~FOUO~~

June 12, 2006

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CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
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*Please Respond By 07/14/06*

~~FOUO~~

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COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

*Also we cut  
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6/9  
change Done*

June 9, 2006, 1:00 PM

*no  
6/12/06*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*cc →  
Robert R...*

*FRON [Signature]  
Tina W. Jonas*

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MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	<i>6/9</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>6/9</i>	STP DIR	<i>6/9</i>
ESR MA	<i>6/9</i>		

OSD 09346-06

6/9/2006 3:38:14 PM

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- We will continue to **track** the progress of the Defense bill and keep **you** informed.

**COORDINATION:** None

Prepared by: Robert Hood, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

**July 07, 2006**

**TO:** Eric Edelman  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Paper on the New World Paradigm

Should we be thinking about this and proposing an adjusted foreign policy because of it?

Thanks.

Attach: CFC position paper on "The New World Paradigm: USA Must Adjust Quickly and Correctly"

DHR:sa  
3F070706-08

.....  
*Please Respond By July 25, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



11-I -0559/OSD/58486

7/13/2006 1:17:04 PM



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BELLEAIR BLUFFS, FLORIDA 33770

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CHAIRMAN AND CEO

MAILING ADDRESS  
POST OFFICE BOX 1188  
BELLEAIR BLUFFS, FLORIDA 33770  
AREA CODE 727 • 351-8702

1 July 2006

Don -

Market volatility worldwide, five recent global paradigm shifts  
adverse to USA, nuclear Iran, Ahmadinejad's China visit and  
11.2 m bbl/day USA energy deficit vulnerability.

You are precisely correct  
in what you are saying and  
doing. Bravo! UWN and Susan

CFC® Position Paper

THE NEW WORLD PARADIGM:  
USA MUST ADJUST  
QUICKLY AND CORRECTLY

Owen J. Roberts

1 July 2006

This document required hundreds of hours of vigorous intellectual inquiry.

We evaluate political, economic and financial information worldwide and present  
a crisp summary of a timely impact topic.

Your contemporaries and our friends universally indicate the Position Papers are:

- thought provoking
- providing information not usually seen
- useful in their decision making
- presented in a concise format.

We hope you find similar results to be true for you.

We have been musing on why recent, worldwide financial markets have shown considerable volatility, largely to the downside, and because financial markets are often barometers for the future, let us together see if we can discern some meaning out of this chaos.

### OUR USA IS VULNERABLE TO THESE PARADIGM SHIFTS

Over many years for many unique reasons and largely earned, America came into the 21<sup>st</sup> century with enormous accumulated assets representing global dominance and power never before acquired by one nation. On a relative and absolute basis these advantages are being eroded in major ways. It is very important for us to understand these changes and adjust quickly and correctly to them. Failure to do so places us in great, permanent peril.

### RECENT WORLDWIDE MARKET VOLATILITY

There has been much recent evidence of market volatility.

Although there has been some recovery, common stocks in USA in a recent two week period gave up almost all of their accumulated gains for this calendar year, as represented by the Dow Jones Industrial, NASDAQ, Standard & Poor's and Russell 2000 stock averages. USA stock market aggregate losses were \$1.5 trillion. To put this number in perspective, the federal government spends \$2.5 trillion a year, the USA annual Gross National Product is \$13 trillion a year and the aggregate personal net worth, including present home values of all Americans, is thought to be \$53 trillion.

Many overseas stock market percentages were hit even harder. Emerging nations' markets have enjoyed large percentage gains over the last several years, fueled by the input of American investment capital seeking higher returns than were available in USA domestic markets. In a period as short as a week, these markets lost 10% of their value and in some cases more. Saudi Arabia had a percentage loss of over 54% from its February stock market peak. Japan sustained a 4.1% one day loss in the Nikkei, the largest daily loss in the past two years, resulting in a cumulative loss of 11.8% since the beginning of the year. Also, European stock markets moved to the downside.

Commodity prices have risen substantially over the last several years. This was largely fueled by China's economic industrializing process that demanded huge amounts of imported iron ore, copper and other industrial commodities. Commodity losses in many categories have been severe. Even gold, the historical fear refuge, and often viewed as the ultimate store of value asset class, had its major increase in price over the last five years reduced. Gold's 7.6% sell-off was the biggest decline in 15 years.

What has caused these downside reversals? We are surrounded with the usual talk suggesting overaggressive central bank interest rate policies, deficits of all kinds and other seemingly madequate answers. It seems to us, and possibly to you, that more fundamental changes are taking place. Let us together pursue this line of inquiry.

### FIRST CHANGE AGENT FOR NEW WORLD PARADIGM: CHINA

The initial and perhaps major reason for this paradigm shift is the change of China from a largely agrarian state to a rapidly industrializing state.

The care function that is working to the advantage of China is its vast labor force. Tens of millions of people previously unemployed or underemployed have now acquired skills and transitioned into being productive, useful industrial workers. The advancement of skills applies also to professions, especially science, and has been implemented in both China's business and military activities.

An enormous continuing cost advantage exists for China. It is because labor rates on the **factory floor** and in the sciences are enormously below the wage rates for comparable skills in other industrialized countries throughout the world. Therefore, China has exported to the rest of the world goods and now **services**, very substantially below the **costs** of the countries to which the goods and services are sent, thus resulting in a very advantageous balance of trade. As a consequence China has accumulated \$1 trillion of liquid, foreign capital investments which are parked on the balance sheet asset side of China's central bank.

If China had not made this dramatic advancement toward a modern society, USA would have remained relatively unchallenged for its premier position in the world. But **this** is no longer true.

#### SECOND CHANGE AGENT FOR NEW WORLD PARADIGM: CRUDE OIL IMBALANCES

China, although it has substantial **internal** energy sources, is currently energy insufficient, particularly in crude oil and distillates. Therefore, China has to import large amounts of petroleum products to advance and prosper as a modern energy supported society. China continues to arrange new, worldwide additional sources of supply.

#### COUNTRIES ABLE TO EXPORT CRUDE OIL PRODUCT TO CHINA

The countries able to export crude oil to China are: Saudi Arabia 8.7 million bbl/day, Russia 6.7, Norway 2.9, Iran 2.6, Venezuela 2.4, United Arab Emirates, **UAE**, 2.3, Kuwait 2.2, Nigeria 2.2, Mexico 1.8, Iraq 1.5 and Libya **1.3**, totaling **34.6m bbl/day**. This represents over 43% of the world's daily 80 m bbl/day consumption requirement.

#### THIRD CHANGE AGENT FOR NEW WORLD PARADIGM: PRICE OF CRUDE OIL

The new demand for crude oil, combined with the relatively long discovery, development and transportation **time line** to bring new crude oil to market, has caused the supply to be largely fixed for the short term. With demand rising rapidly the price of oil has risen dramatically from **less** than \$25 bbl to \$70 bbl. The tight supply and demand circumstance is the world condition today. **This** leaves, at most, an unused worldwide capacity of **2.0 m bbl/day**, as interdictions by terrorists in various parts of the world continue to interrupt supply.

It is an astounding fact that even with the enormous increase in price per barrel to \$70 bbl there seems to be no indication of world demand decline. Similarly, the increased **price** of gasoline in USA, at times up to \$3.00 per gallon, has not decreased its use.

#### FOURTH CHANGE AGENT FOR NEW WORLD PARADIGM: NEW PRODUCER RICHES

Petroleum exports have generated very large daily amounts of cash flow: Saudi Arabia \$609,000,000 per day, Russia \$469,000,000 per day, Norway **\$203,000,000** per day, Iran **\$182,000,000** per day, Venezuela \$168,000,000 per day, UAE \$161,000,000 per day, Kuwait **\$154,000,000** per day, Nigeria \$154,000,000 per day, Mexico \$126,000,000 per day, Iraq \$105,000,000 per day and Libya \$91,000,000 per day. This amounts to \$2.4 billion per day.

These are astounding amounts of money, especially with no additional risk or investment required by the producers. In **business** terms increased gross **fell** to net, a condition that rarely exists.

If these prices hold for 12 consecutive months, the annual cash flow per year is: Saudi Arabia \$222 billion, Russia \$171 billion, Norway **\$74** billion, Iran \$66 billion, Venezuela \$61 billion, UAE \$59 billion, Kuwait \$56 billion, Nigeria **\$56** billion, Mexico \$46 billion, Iraq \$38 billion and Libya \$33 billion. This amounts to \$882 billion or almost a trillion dollars per year.

All of this increase in price is a tax extracted from petroleum import users and is paid to petroleum exporters. As such, it represents an enormous shift in world financial and geopolitical power with the importers being the losers and the exporters being the winners. Never in recorded history has the world experienced a transfer of power from one category of nations to another in such astounding magnitude.

USA now imports 11.2 m bbl/day. If we assumed we could purchase oil at \$35 a barrel but we are now paying \$70 a barrel, the increase is a \$392,000,000 tax on consumers daily. This is a \$143 billion annual tax bill for USA and its citizens.

#### FIFTH CHANGE AGENT FOR NEW WORLD PARADIGM: RICHES TO SPEND

Assuming that each of the countries doubled its expenditures internally from the \$35 increase and only exported the percentage previously available for export, the new funds flowing to the producing nation might be a strong catalyst to cause a change in behavior, sometimes to the substantial disadvantage to USA.

Saudi Arabia for many years has been a strong ally and large supplier of petroleum to USA. There have been and will continue to be policy differences between USA and Saudi Arabia. But USA is a long-term buyer of petroleum exports and a source of very needed technological advice and counsel. USA also has provided Saudi Arabia with a military shield against confiscation of its national wealth by Saddam Hussein whose armies stormed into Kuwait, with Saudi Arabia as his next target.

Times change, however, and Saudi Arabia is now a provider of petroleum to China and perhaps in the future Saudi Arabia will look to China for military protection against invaders and those who would confiscate its oil wealth. Saudi Arabia now receives \$609,000,000 a day from exports which allows \$222 billion a year to spend as it chooses.

Have the new petroleum riches to spend altered the behavior of Saudi Arabia?

#### RUSSIA NEW RICHES TO SPEND AND BEHAVIOR CHANGES

Russia exports 6.7 m bbl/day of crude and therefore receives \$469,000,000 a day, which amounts to \$171 billion a year. President Vladimir Putin was initially very helpful to USA, but recently has been much less helpful. His ambition to return Russia to its former USSR glory and superpower status is often discussed in the corridors of international power. He has looked dimly on USA efforts to assist former parts of the USSR to become democratic, independent nations. Russia participates in joint military exercises with China and plans to pipe petroleum product directly to China. Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas in the world.

Have the new petroleum riches to spend altered the behavior of Mr. Putin?

#### VENEZUELA: NEW RICHES TO SPEND AND BEHAVIOR CHANGES

Venezuela exports 2.4 m bbl/day of crude and therefore receives \$168,000,000 a day, which amounts to \$61 billion a year. Since wrenching the control of government from its previous officials, President Hugo Chavez has essentially eliminated political opposition at home, suppressed a free press, and embraced Fidel Castro and his Cuban communist philosophies. He also has encouraged Bolivia and other countries in South America to join his vision for the future, which originally was socialistic but has taken on a stronger and stronger communist patina.

The belligerence with which Chavez treats the USA in general and President Bush in particular exceeds respectful international protocol. He has threatened to cut off crude export to USA. Chavez has unilaterally altered the conditions of the contracts of international oil companies that developed

Venezuela's oil fields using their own capital. It will be surprising if much of anything is left for those companies that took the risk when Chavez's confiscations are completed.

Have the new petroleum riches to spend altered the behavior of Mr. Chavez?

### IRAN: NEW RICHES TO SPEND AND BEHAVIOR CHANGES

Iran exports 2.6 m bbl/day of crude and therefore receives \$182,000,000 a day, which amounts to \$66 billion a year.

President Ahmadinejad has embarked on a populist agenda using the recent, enormous oil revenues to subsidize many foodstuffs, subsidizing gasoline at 40 cents a gallon. He has raised tariffs on some imported products, discouraged foreign investment and vigorously embraced many tenets of centralized socialism. Ahmadinejad, with more and more government handouts, has become very popular with the working and nonworking poor.

Iran has large numbers of young people entering the workforce each year. The government states that unemployment is 10%, but it may be twice as large for this nation of 70,000,000 people. The small private sector in Iran is under stress with price controls and regulations and inflation is 15%. Ahmadinejad has the power to appoint the head of Iran's central bank.

The very substantial oil and gas business arrangements between Iran and China are significant. China will import large amounts of Iran's petroleum products and will also help fund the upgrading of Iran's domestic oil infrastructure and discovery of future properties thought to be very substantial.

As the civilized world came to understand that Iran had not been complying with international agreements executed by Iran and had been pursuing vigorously its clandestine nuclear bomb enrichment to allow the production of nuclear bombs on its soil, Ahmadinejad spoke to the world with various degrees of belligerence and denial, including the position that the Holocaust never occurred.

Have the new petroleum riches to spend altered the behavior of Ahmadinejad?

### AHMADINEJAD RECENT VISIT TO CHINA MAINLAND

Ahmadinejad has made it clear that Iran will continue its nuclear program because it has support from very strong players on the world scene. China has the veto power on the Security Council to prevent any meaningful sanctions from being imposed by the UN on Iran. Ahmadinejad said "discussions focused on avenues for consolidating bilateral ties as well as important regional and international developments." The swift change in the tone and coloration of the remarks by Ahmadinejad during and after his visit to China makes us wonder if he was offered the technological nuclear assistance and know-how he wants. This scenario also fits with Ahmadinejad's recent much softer response to the incentives package offered by the five members of the UN Security Council and Germany.

### THE CIVILIZED WORLD UNDERSTANDS THE HUGE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WMD IN IRAN

Much energy and effort has been expended by civilized nations to prevent Iran, a terrorist sponsoring nation, from obtaining the capacity to develop fully the technology to build nuclear bombs. Iran already possesses substantial short and intermediate missile capability.

Iran must not be given the opportunity to give these horrific weapons to irresponsible terrorist zealots driven by motives unacceptable to civilized nations and peoples.

FIVE CHANGE AGENTS FOR THE NEW WORLD PARADIGM

These change agents for the new world paradigm are:

- China: low cost capable labor force
- crude oil imbalances
- price of crude oil
- new producer riches
- new producer funded behavior changes

This paradigm shift impacts our USA very negatively.

We must decrease and even eliminate our dependence on foreign energy imports as rapidly as possible. They are taxing our nation very heavily and funding our adversaries hugely. They are providing our adversaries enormous means to increase their own military power and close the gap on the cutting edge military technology and capability of USA that has been and continues to be a source of power for USA to give us the chance to prevent terrorists and others resorting to barbaric tactics from irrevocably destroying all the meaningful and precious human progress made throughout the centuries.

HOW NOT TO ELIMINATE USA IMPORT ENERGY DEFICIT

Some approaches to solve our energy dependence deficit already appear to be unproductive and against an ideal, optimum standard.

Interdiction of petroleum product in pipelines is occurring throughout the world today. The pipeline from northern Iraq carrying crude oil to Turkey has been blown up several times by terrorists. Before 2003, without insurgent strikes, the pipeline was shipping 700,000 bbl/day to world markets. In Nigeria, terrorists are stopping daily flow up to 550,000 bbl/day and have threatened oil refineries, oil tankers and workers. Customer countries should prefer not to route their supply pipelines through a country that in the future might limit or eliminate supply or attempt to coerce price contract changes. Putin did this with Russian gas to the Ukraine and the delivery of major gas supplies to Europe in the dead of a bitter winter, a result not well received by EU customer citizens.

A recent Wall Street Journal article said that Sudan is about to repudiate contracts with a major company now with a contractual 90/10% split in revenues. Sudan intends to cede these resources to another company splitting 50/50%. The controversy is currently in litigation in international courts.

Recently, Bolivia sent the troops to the oil fields to enforce its confiscation decrees, as did Trotsky in Russia early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Drilling offshore in politically backward nations seems to be an invitation for the investment of billions of dollars which, if successful in finding oil, may be or even probably will be *confiscated*.

Let us not **seek** solutions that are subject to geopolitical and military risk.

We all love corn and are vigorously for a farm policy that causes USA to never be dependent on foreign food stuffs to feed our people. But, to directly subsidize with taxpayers' money the unlimited conversion of corn into ethanol as an energy source may be a losing financial equation for the nation. Tax subsidies for huge modern windmills may also not pass the very sharp pencil test applying all cost inputs, including government subsidies, compared to energy output results. Whether it is ethanol, windmills or any other program, if any particular approach requires an energy equivalent of 1.3 barrels of oil to produce the equivalent 1.0 barrels of oil, the equation works only as long as there is a government subsidy.

We need an absolutely valid, analytical assessment of all cost inputs and energy outputs of all suggestions to solve our energy deficit of 11.2 million barrels of oil a day amounting to \$784,000,000 a day or \$286 billion a year. It is unconscionable that USA is not drilling in ANWR, Arctic National Wildlife

Refuge, which could by now be reducing our daily crude deficit by 12%, pumping and distributing 1.4 m bbl/day, saving \$98,000,000 a day or \$36 billion a year.

### HOW TO ELIMINATE USA IMPORT ENERGY DEFICIT

USA must make the decision now. Our internal energy deficit problem must be approached with a precise evaluation of the type of energy sources we use now and the most probable energy sources needed in the future.

We recommend that the import oil deficit be solved by new technology, dreamed up by yet unknown, innovative and creative personalities in the American tradition of Orville and Wilbur Wright, Thomas Edison, Sam Walton and Bill Gates. This is an eclectic collection of entrepreneurial genius, but that is exactly what this problem needs.

We suggest that \$50 billion per year, starting now for a period of 5 years, be allocated to solving our critical national energy deficit problem. This represents a mere 2% of the present annual federal expenditures of \$2.5 trillion a year. This is a miniscule amount in terms of the adverse consequences to our nation if we fail to act. These sums are not to be allocated through government bureaucracies. It can be done. It does, however, need to be structured in a creative and innovative way to give incentives to those demonstrating actual, real progress to solve our energy deficit problem.

### USA PRESENT IMPORT OIL VULNERABILITY, IRAQ AND N. KOREA

The USA import oil vulnerability, Iraq outcomes and N. Korea are rarely put in the same context.

It certainly is not comforting, and should be very alarming, for the USA to know that the major present worldwide crude oil producers, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq with fellow OPEC member Chavez's Venezuela and power player Russia's Putin, can work in concert to decrease world energy production and supply, thus strangling our nation with higher and higher oil prices. These countries are a supply oligopoly long embracing highest oil prices as their core, strategic first principle.

It does not take but a small amount of time analyzing our world geopolitical status, including our oil deficit crisis, to conclude how a cut and run Iraq strategy demolishes the time required to find a sound approach for our energy deficit. The Middle East without a strong USA military presence is not a condition we should wish to create, especially with the nuclear bomb threats with intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities now already in place in N. Korea and being vigorously pursued by Iran.

Such enormous harm is being done to our nation by those who are advocating a quit strategy in Iraq at the very moment the tide is turning. The problems in Iraq are not all solved, but many of them are behind us. The cut and run advocates are producing copious amounts of propaganda fodder for Al Jazeera to discourage a people who have endured unimaginable hardship and cruelty at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime and who, if we do not quit, will impress us with their grit and steadfastness. Stay the course.

God bless our courageous men and women in uniform.

God bless our President George W. Bush.

God bless our Vice President Dick Cheney.

God bless our Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

God bless our Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

God bless the United States of America.

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO



FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

JUL 12 2006

SUBJECT: Response to Position Paper

- You asked for a response to the paper, “The New World Paradigm: USA Must Adjust Quickly and Correctly,” and an appraisal of its foreign policy implications.
- The paper makes several important points:
  - Governments of oil exporting countries are benefiting greatly from high oil prices and are attempting to translate their energy clout into geopolitical power.
  - The U.S. should be wary of how other states’ pursuit of energy security may work against U.S. goals.
    - China has used its quest to secure key energy supply nodes to strengthen its influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.
    - The enormous revenues flowing into key producer states in these regions work against some of our key strategic goals, including democratization, non-proliferation, and prevention of terrorism.
  - U.S. dependence on foreign oil imports is a vulnerability that needs to be addressed with a sustainable, broad-based diversification strategy — from the logistical to the geopolitical.
- The paper misses several key points:
  - High oil prices are caused by a combination of factors; while 20-year projections for energy consumption do cite Chinese and Indian growth as central drivers of new demand, they are not the cause of current high oil prices.
  - Pipelines are just one aspect of critical energy infrastructure. Most strikes on pipelines can be repaired in less than 30 days, while damage to refineries would have a greater impact on supply and could take significantly longer to repair.
  - Finally, the recommendation to invest \$50 billion in unspecified “technologies” to solve our oil dependence is not helpful.
- I do not think we should adjust our foreign policy based on the paper’s suggestions.

Attachments:

Tab A – Memoto USD(P)

Tab B – Paper on New World Paradigm

~~FOUO~~

Prepared by: Jennifer Sciubba, Policy Planning, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58494

OSD 11048-06



7/13/2006 1:18:19 PM

FOUO

July 07, 2006

070706-16

TO Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: \$2 Billion for Afghanistan

What was the \$2 billion dollars that, apparently, was just agreed to go to Afghanistan? I am not aware of it.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF070706-16

.....  
Please Respond By 07/10/06

Distro To PT, LC, Ateam  
Date 7/10/06  
Time 1010

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58495

OSD 11049-06



7/13/2006 1:44 05 PM

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COORDINATION  
\$2 Billion for Afghanistan

JUL 12 2006

PDASD ISA	Ms. Mary Beth Long	
Principal Director, NESAS	Brig Gen Paula Thornhill	<u>gl for PT 7-10-06</u>
Dep Dir (SA)	Ms. Laura Cooper	<u>gl for LC 7-10-06</u>
Joint Staff	Col Matt Cicchinelli	<u>07-10-06</u>
OUSDC	Ricardo Aguilera	<u>07-10-06</u>


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W 22

INFO MEMO

DSD  
USDP  JUL 12 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

 FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)  Hiller

SUBJECT: \$2 Billion for Afghanistan (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked about the \$2 billion that was recently released for Afghanistan.
  - During your meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Spanta, he expressed appreciation for U.S. support, including \$2 billion in assistance for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Minister Spanta was most likely referring to a statement by U.S. military representatives in-country that approximately \$2 billion worth of equipment was beginning to arrive for Afghan security forces.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Alternatively, he could have been referring to the almost \$2 billion in FY 06 supplemental funding for training and equipping the ANSF.
  - \$735 million will be used for the Afghan National Army, \$1.2 billion for the Afghan National Police, and \$14 million for detainee operations.

TAB A – Coordination Sheet

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Prepared by Shannon Green, OSD-ISA-NESA, (b)(6)



OSD 11049-06

11-L-0559/OSD/58497



7/13/2006 1 43:51 PM

ALISA

~~FOUO~~

JUL 11 2006

071006-14

To: Eric Edelman

CC Gen Pete Pace  
Bill Luti  
Robert Wilkie  
Dorrance Smith  
Eric Ruff  
Robert Rangel  
STEVE BUCCA

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Washington this Month

Apparently, Maliki is going to bring the Defense Minister and the Interior Minister with him when he visits Washington July 25-26.

I have to make sure I am here, and we have to figure out what we do for all of them: Who we put them with, what additional things we do with them on the Hill, who they see in the Department of Defense, etc. Let's get a major plan worked up FAST.

DMR:ms  
071006-14TK

.....  
*Please respond by July 14, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

ISA

11-L-0559/OSD/58498



7/13/2006 4:37:06 PM

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3 W 05

INFO MEMO

DSD  
RUSDP *[Signature]* JUL 19 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Maliki's Washington visit (July 24-27)

- You asked about what we should do for Iraq Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Washington, as well as for the Ministers of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI),
- We have confirmed, as of July 19<sup>th</sup>, the MoD and MoI are not coming to Washington.\*
  - o We have been coordinating with State, NSC staff and others on the visit. Tab A is a draft schedule being coordinated for Maliki, current as of 5:00 pm on July 17, 2006.
- We will continue to develop the schedules and keep you apprised.

Attachment: Tab A - Draft Itinerary for Maliki visit (State)

\* CONFIRMATION WITH JOINT STAFF AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S VISIT COORDINATORS

DIR NG H/S 18 July

PDASD/ISA *[Signature]*

ASD/ISA *[Signature]* JUL 18 2006

Prepared by: Peter McVety, ASD/ISA/NG (b)(6)



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11-L-0559/OSD/58499



7/20/2006 2:31:06 PM

ALT SA

~~FOUO~~

JUL 11 2006

071006-14

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
 Dill Luti  
 Robert Wilkie  
 Dorrance Smith  
 Eric Ruff  
 Robert Rangel  
 STEVE BUCCI

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT; Rime Minister Maliki's visit to Washington this Month

Apparently, Maliki is going to bring the Defense Minister and the Interior Minister with him when he visits Washington July 25-26.

I have to make sure I am here, and we have to figure out what we do for all of them: Who we put them with, what additional things we do with them on the Hill, who they see in the Department of Defense, etc. Let's get a major plan worked up FAST.

DHR:sk  
 071006-1415

.....

*Please respond by July 14, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11070-06



7/13/2006 4:38:51 PM

ISA

11-L-0559/OSD/58500



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Draft Itinerary as of COB, 17 July 2006  
Visit to the United Kingdom & the United States  
July 23<sup>th</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006  
ALL TIMES LOCAL

**Sunday, July 23<sup>rd</sup> – Baghdad/London**

0900 – Depart Baghdad  
1400 – Arrive London  
1430 – Arrive Hotel  
TBD – Private Meetings  
**RON** London

**Monday, July 24<sup>th</sup> – London/Washington**

TBD Meetings with PM Blair and other high level UK officials  
1900 – Depart London en route Andrews AFB  
2200 – Arrive Andrews AFB  
2230 – Arrive Blair House  
**RON** Washington, D.C.

**Tuesday, July 25<sup>th</sup> – Washington**

0700 – Meeting with CoR Member Mithal al-Alusi  
0815 – Breakfast with APNSA Hadley (TBC)  
0925 – Arrive White House  
0935 – Meeting with POTUS  
1110 – Joint Press Conference Pre-Brief  
1125 – Joint Press Conference  
1200 – Working Lunch with POTUS  
1300 – Return to Blair House  
1315 – Prayer Time  
1345 – Depart for Capitol Hill  
1400 – Senate Leadership Meeting (TBD)  
1445 – Press Stakeout (TBD)  
1500 – House Leadership Meeting (TBD)  
1600 – Press Stakeout (TBD)  
1615 – Depart for Treasury (TBD)  
1630 – Meeting with Secretary of Treasury Paulson (TBD)  
1730 – Depart for World Bank (TBD)  
1745 – Meeting with World Bank President Wolfowitz (TBD)  
1800 – Depart for Blair House – Personal Time  
1900 – Dinner at TBD (hosted by Congressional Leadership or VP Cheney?)  
2100 – Depart TBD en route Blair House  
2115 – Arrive Blair House – Personal Time & Congressional Address Preparations  
**RON** Washington, D.C.

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11-L-0559/OSD/58502

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Wednesday, July 26<sup>th</sup> – Washington

0800 – Breakfast with Vice President Cheney  
0900 – Depart Blair House for the Pentagon  
0910 – Pentagon Honor Cordon at Arrival  
0920 – Meeting with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (TBC)  
1000 – Joint Press Conference  
1020 – Depart Pentagon for Capitol Hill  
1045 – Arrival, Meet with Speaker  
1100 – Entrance into Chamber/Deliver Address to Joint Session of Congress  
1200 – Address Concludes  
1215 – Depart Capitol Hill for Blair House  
1230 – Lunch at Blair House  
1330 – Prayer Time  
1400 – Meeting with DNI Negroponte and DCI Hayden (TBC)  
1515 – Meeting with Arab Ambassadors  
1630 – Depart for LMF (TBD)  
1640 – Meeting at **IMF** (TBD)  
1730 – Depart IMF for Blair House  
1740 – Arrive Blair House  
1800 – Middle East/Iraq Policy Influentials Reception (TBC)  
1930 – Reception Concludes  
1945 – Dinner at Blair House (with Select Cabinet Members?)  
RON Washington, D.C.

Thursday, July 27<sup>th</sup> – Washington/New York

0700 – Breakfast  
0800 – Depart Blair House for Arlington National Cemetery  
0810 – Wreath-laying at Arlington National Cemetery (TBD)  
0910 – Depart Arlington National Cemetery en route Andrews AFB  
0940 – Arrive Andrews AFB  
1000 – Depart Andrews AFB en route New York  
1100 – Arrive New York City  
1130 – Arrive Waldorf-Astoria Hotel  
1230 – Meeting with UNSYG **Annan**, D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown (TBC)  
1330 – Press Conference with UNSYG Annan (TBC)  
TBD – Prayer Time  
TBD – Meeting with UNSC (TBD)  
TBD – Editorial Boards (TBC)  
1700 – Ceremony Marking the Return of Recovered Artifact (TBD)  
1845 – Depart for CFR (TBC)  
1900 – Think Tank Speech (CFR)/ Business Leaders Reception (TBC)  
2100 – Arrive Hotel, Dinner  
RON New York City

Friday, July 28<sup>th</sup> – New York/Detroit

1200 – Begin Economic Forum at the Detroit Economic Club (TBC)

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1400 – Economic Forum Concludes (TBC)  
1415 – Prayer Time  
1500 – Arab Press (TBC)  
1530 – Western Press (TBC)  
1830 – Dinner  
2000 – Iraqi Community Event (TBC)  
2200 – Personal Time at Hotel  
RON Detroit

**Saturday, July 29<sup>th</sup>**

TBD – Breakfast  
TBD – Depart Hotel for Airport  
TBD – Arrive Airport  
TBD – Depart Detroit for **Amman**  
RON aboard Aircraft

**Sunday, July 30<sup>th</sup>**

1000 – Arrive Amman  
TBD – Meetings with King Abdullah  
TBD – Depart **Amman**  
TBD – Arrive Baghdad

~~FOUO~~

JUL 13 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Central Asia

HTS: R

We are getting run out of Central Asia by the Russians. They are doing a considerably better job at bullying those countries than the U.S. is doing to counter their bullying.

The U.S. needs a balanced effort -- political, economic and military to military. It is out of balance at the present time. For example, in Tajikistan the FMF this year is \$495,000. The USAID money that is going into the NGOs for democracy is \$5.6 million. There is no accountability from the NGOs as to what they are doing. They're not coordinating with other elements of the USG in Tajikistan.

The same is true in Kazakhstan.

We need to question how the USG is going about our responsibilities. We need an Administration policy for Central Asia, and we need the NSC to see that our agreed policy -- once we have one -- remains in balance.

DHR:js  
071206-9273

13 Jul 06

OSD 11081-06



7/14/2006 1:52:33 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58505

FOUO

NESA

June 14, 2006

061406-07

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT Link to Iraq Study Group

We have to establish a direct link with the Iraq Study Group that is headed by **Jim Baker**.

Steve Cambone did it during the 9/11 Commission. We simply have to have someone who stays in close touch with them. What do **you** recommend?

Thanks.

OHR ss  
SF061406-07

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/22/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58506

OSD 11125-06



7/14/2006 3:35:29 PM

July 14, 2006

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England



Subj: Options for the Budget

Don,

- While this follow-up note is a bit late, Tina and I did meet with Rob Portman and his staff on June 30. We had a very good discussion regarding the baseline appropriations and the supplemental tradeoffs..
- Our emphasis was assuring that the reconstitution of the force has high priority. If supplementals *go* away, then we emphasized that the reconstitution cost needs to be incorporated into the base appropriated budget.
- One approach is to include the entire reconstituted amount in the base budget but separately identified from other routine procurement items. This would **assure** that there is no reconstitution tail at risk once hostilities are ended in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The downside to that approach is that a large percentage of the reconstitution costs would be estimated, but that may still be preferable vice the risk of not having tails fully funded in the out years. We also discussed other options like continuing with supplementals each year for war-related operation and maintenance costs but with reconstitution costs in the base budget.
- This was *not* a decision meeting, but, rather, to sensitize OMB on the concerns and needs of the Department, especially regarding reconstitution of the force. We will now prepare a set of options with pros and cons for your consideration as a base for the next round of discussion with OMB.

cc: Tina Jonas

OSD 11148-06



7/17/2006 10:54 14AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58507

118.01

1474106

~~FOUO~~

June 15, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT Options for the Budget

Let's talk about what we do if we are required to put the war, or a portion of the ~~war~~ in the regular budget. Let's come up with some options.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF061506-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/05/06*

11001

15 Jun 06

14 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~



7/17/2006 11:00:14 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58508

~~FOUO~~

MAY 09 2006

T O David Chu  
C C Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Service Academies*/Board of Visitor Information

Please get the precise attendance records for these Boards of Visitors, show me the proposal you have made to exempt them from FACA, come up with a way that you could get rid of tenure, and let me see any other recommendations you have. Then let's think of moving on this.

Thanks.

Attach: 2/1/06 SecDef memo to USD (P&R); 5/3/06 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR:js  
050606-20

.....  
*Please Respond By May 30, 2006*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/58509

OSD 11175-06  
  
7/17/2006 1:28:33 PM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



*IAVFO*  
~~ACTION~~ MEMO

June 26, 2006, 2:00PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 17 July 06*

SUBJECT: Service Academies/Board of Visitors (BOV) Information and Tenure of Faculty  
SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- The attendance records for the Boards of Visitors at the three Service Academies indicate generally good attendance rates over the last two years (Tab B).
- NDAA '05 changed BOV requirements for the US Air Force Academy (USAFA)
  - Of the four persons designated by the Speaker of the House, three *will be* members of congress and the fourth *will not be* a member;
  - At least *two* members designated by the President will be USAFA graduates;
  - Meetings increased from one to four per year, at least *two* held at USAFA;
  - Board members will have access to academy grounds and cadets, and have complete disclosure of information with respect to institutional problems;
  - Missing two consecutive meetings causes termination of appointment;
- We will propose legislation (for NDAA '08) to implement these changes for the US Military Academy and US Naval Academy (USNA) along with a previously submitted proposal to exempt the BOVs from the Federal Advisory Committee Act, by giving the Superintendents authority to determine if meetings should be closed or open based on the business to be considered.
- Our close review of "tenure" (employed at USNA) established it is not "tenure" in the form traditionally offered in academe. Rather, it simply provides to those who complete their probationary periods the same protections afforded any other post-probation civil servant in the "excepted service." Academy professors who achieve "tenure" have no greater or lesser institutional protection than other Federal employees.

Attachments:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/58510

OSD 11175-06



7/17/2006 1 28 39 PM

~~FOUO~~

MAY 09 2006

**TO:** David Chu  
**CC** Gordon England  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT** Service Academia /Board of Visitor Information

**Please get the precise attendance records for these Boards of Visitors, show me the proposal you have made to exempt them from FACA, come up with a way that you could get rid of tenure, and let me see any other recommendations you have. Then let's think of moving on this.**

Thanks.

**Attach:** 2/1/06 SecDef memo to USD (P&R); 5/3/06 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR:as  
050606-20

.....  
***Please Respond By May 30, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58511

<b>US Military Academy (2004 - Present)</b>	<b>Member Through</b>	<b>Attendance (4 meetings per year)</b>
Baca, BG Gilbert	Feb-05	5 of 5
Collins, Sen Susan	Current	3 of 3
Contreras, Rebecca	Current	3 of 3
DeWine, Senator Mike	Jul-04	0 of 3
Evans, Adm Marsha	Feb-06	7 of 9
Hinchey, Rep. Maurice	Current	5 of 10
Hutchison, Sen Kay Bailey	Current	2 of 2
Kelly, Rep. Sue	Current	8 of 10
Landrieu, Senator Mary	Current	5 of 10
Lessey, Hon. Samuel	Current	10 of 10
McHugh, Rep. John	Current	7 of 10
Rainey, John	Current	1 of 1
Reed, Senator Jack	Current	10 of 10
Sessions, Senator Jeff	Nov-05	5 of 8
Strong, William	Current	1 of 1
Tauscher, Rep. Ellen	Current	3 of 10
Taylor, Rep. Charles	Current	9 of 10
Watts, Mr. J.C.	Current	6 of 10
Wilkins, Mr. David	Apr-05	3 of 6
Younger, Dr. Charles	Current	10 of 10

<b>US Naval Academy (2004 - Present)</b>	<b>Member Through</b>	<b>Attendance (4 meetings per year)</b>
Mr. Brulte	2005	2 of 4
Senator Cochran	Current	5 of 10
Representative Cummings	Current	2 of 2
Representative Cunningham	2005	2 of 4
Dr. del Junco	2005	6 of 8
Mr. Duchossois	Current	1 of 2
Representative Gilchrest	2004	0 of 4
Representative Hoyer	Current	6 of 10
GEN Krulak	Current	8 of 10
Senator McCain	Current	2 of 10*
Senator McIntyre	Current	5 of 10
Mr. Meyer	2004	4 of 4
Senator Mikulski	Current	5 of 10
Ms. Newman (Chair)	Current	10 of 10
Mr. Pacheco	Current	1 of 2
Senator Sarbanes	Current	8 of 10
ADM Smith	Current	9 of 10
Lt Governor Steele	2004	4 of 4
Representative Tanner	2005	2 of 4
Representative Wicker	Current	5 of 6

<b>USAFA (2004 - Present)</b>	<b>Member Through</b>	<b>Attendance (4 meetings per year)</b>
US Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO)	Current	10 of 10
Mr Dionel Emilio Aviles	Current	7 of 10
US Senator Larry Craig (R-ID)	Current	8 of 10
Mr Robert K Dornan	Current	9 of 10
Mr Charles P Garcia	Current	2 of 4
Governor James S. Gilmore III (Chairman)	Feb-06	9 of 9
US Representative Kay Granger (R-TX)	Current	7 of 9
US Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO) (Vice- Chair)	Current	9 of 10
US Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC)	Nov-04	0 of 4
Dr. Gail Jacquish	Current	1 of 1
Gen Hansford T. Johnson (Ret)	Current	2 of 2
US Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD)	Current	1 of 2
Mr. John Kidde	Feb-05	5 of 5
US Representative Carolyn C. Kilpatrick (D-MI)	Current	5 of 10
Ms. Nancy Kudla	Current	4 of 4
US Senator Mark Pryor (D-AR)	Current	4 of 9
Dr. Candace de Russy	Feb-05	4 of 5
Dr. Susan Schwab	Oct-05	7 of 8
Mr. A. J. Scribante	Current	1 of 1
US Representative Mike Thompson (D-CA)	Nov-04	2 of 4
Mr. Winston A. Wilkinson	Feb-06	8 of 9
Senator Jackie Winters (R-OR)	Current	1 of 1

: etc

~~FOUO~~



May 15, 2006

TO: David Chu

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Security Clearances and High-Level Language Skills

I would like to better understand the tension between high-level language skills and securing security clearances.

Do our security assumptions need to be challenged in light of current global conditions?

Thanks.

DHR, dh  
OS1506-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58514

OSD 11179-06



7/17/2006 1:31:45 PM



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Security Clearances and High-Level Language Skills (TAB A) *17 Feb 06*

- United States security clearances generally require: 1) U.S. citizenship and 2) that any foreign attachments be examined and evaluated by a trained adjudicator.
- Native speakers may have relatives, friends, investments, or property in their native country or other foreign countries. These are defined as potential risk factors requiring additional time and resources in the background investigation and adjudication process. Delays may last up to 18-24 months.
- Tension also occurs when a U. S. citizen has lived abroad and acquired foreign friends and associates. This affects the timeliness of our hiring of participants in the National Security Education Program. This government program funds students to study culture and language abroad in return for a commitment to federal service.
- Possible solutions to these issues include:
  - A Limited Access Authorization process, granting access to limited operational information based on a streamlined process.
  - Processing National Security Education Program award recipients for clearance when the fellowship is awarded rather than waiting for later government appointment. Current policy is that one must have a particular position in a government organization before this process is engaged. Granting clearances before a government appointment would require a change to policy in the Executive Order.
  - I will also engage the Personnel Security and Research Center as a source of additional ideas.

COORDINATION: USD(I); Mr. Robert Andrews

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (P) all.mcginn@osd.mil (b)(6)

OSD 11179-06

11-L-0559/OSD/58515



7/17/2006 1:32:09 PM

~~FOUO~~



May 15, 2006

TO: David Chu

c c : Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Security Clearances and High-Level Language Skills

I would like to better understand the tension between high-level language skills and securing security clearances.

Do our security assumptions need to be challenged in light of current global conditions?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051506-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58516

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant**

**19 July 2006 - 0919 Hours**

MEMORANDUM FOR **ADMIRAL MULLEN / CNO**

SUBJECT: BSG-1 Pakistan Relief Efforts


Sir:

Please see the Deputy Secretary's comments to you reference para 4 on the attached:

"Mike - Great idea to maintain relations - I'll make arrangements if you'll 'tickle the date'. Gordon"

Should a reply to the Deputy be required, please ensure a copy of this memo is attached. Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
Captain, **U.S.** Navy  
Military Assistant to  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
OSD 11263-06

OSD 11263-06



7/19/2006 2:08:05 PM

NOHISTA

10 Jul 06

12 Jul 06



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000

OSD Copy  
CNI 7/18  
OKAYMENT  
IN REPLY REFER TO  
JUL 17 2006

originals to Go to SD

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: ESG-1 PAKISTAN RELIEF EFFORTS

Encl: (1) Pakistani Military Leaders Key to Relief Efforts

1. Mr. Secretary, I recently reviewed the results and lessons learned from Expeditionary Strike Group 1's deployment as Pakistan Relief CTF, which you and the Chairman viewed firsthand a few months back. I thought the Commander's observations of the Pakistani military leadership may be particularly useful to you.

*Radon Mike Lefew, USAF*

2. The senior Pakistani military leadership warmed to U.S. forces relatively quickly, particularly those Pakistanis who had studied in the United States. Junior leaders (O-1 to O-5), and those senior leaders who had no previous engagement with the U.S., were initially **skeptical** of our intentions and less reticent only after we proved our commitment. It seems evident that exchange programs affording cultural exposure to the U.S. will be invaluable to forging relationships years down the line.

3. Continued engagement will be important to developing a more uniform level of trust in our military-to-military relationship. As seen in Indonesia after Tsunami Relief efforts, I believe that persistent, but purposeful contact will be required to **nurture** the relationships built by this HA/DR event.

4. Enclosure (1) lists the Pakistani military leaders who were critical to the success of the combined forces' operations. If the opportunity exists, perhaps on the earthquake's 1-year anniversary, recommend re-engagement with these individuals and others in the Pakistani government to emphasize the importance our relationship has in the "long war."

*Mike Mullen*

M. G. MULLEN,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

copy to:  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS  
SECNAV

*Great idea to maintain relations - I'll make arrangements if you'll pick the date.*  
*Admiral*

11-40559/OSD/58518



OSD 11263-06

7/18/2006 145 37 PM

## PAKISTANI MILITARY LEADERS KEY TO RELIEF EFFORTS

MG Farooq – Head of **the** Federal Relief Commission (FRC)  
MG Nadeem – **Deputy to MG Farooq** for the FRC and later Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (ERRA)  
BG Farooq – Head planner and ground force liaison **FRC**  
AM Kawashia – Air Force liaison FRC  
MG Shiad Niaz – Head Engineer for **Pakistan** Army (CB support)  
BG Imtiaz – Head Engineer **for Jammu** Azad Kashmir (AJK) Province  
MG Usmani – Head Medical Officer for FRC (coord efforts and MASH turnover)  
MG Javed – Head of Pakistan Army Aviation (Helicopter support and coordination)  
MG **Shakil** – 11<sup>th</sup> Corp CDR for **North** West Frontier (NWFP) Province  
MG Kalid – 10<sup>th</sup> Corp CDR for Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Province  
MG Jamil- Director of Army Logistics

Supporting requirements were managed through military expertise assigned to the FRC. For Medical support, MG (DR) Usmani coordinated the location and **size** of support required and turnover of the MASH hospital. MG **Niaz** and BG Imtiaz coordinated engineering requirements, including project locations (adopt-a-village, etc). MG Javed coordinated all aviation efforts, including flight safety and ATO coordination. Corps Commanders coordinated **security for** their respective provinces.

Encl (1)

11-L-0559/OSD/58519

~~FOUO~~

July 19, 2006  
06/001334

Pakistan

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Mike Mullen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Engaging Senior Pakistani Leadership Post-Earthquake

Attached is a good idea from Mike Mullen to reach out in some way to the senior officers from Pakistan who were engaged in the successful Pakistani Earthquake relief efforts with our forces. You might want to come up with a smart way to thank them for their help coordinating the humanitarian relief efforts.

Thanks.

Attach: 7/17/06 Memo from SecNav to SecDef

DHR:ag  
SF071906-16

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

19 Jul 06  
17 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11263-06



8/22/2006 8:54:53 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58520

7/18  
1/200



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAW PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000

001  
1/19

IN REPLY REFER TO

JUL 17 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AC  
Robert Rangel  
7/18

Subj: ESG-1 PAKISTAN RELIEF EFFORTS

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*M. G. Mullen*

M. G. MULLEN  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS  
SECNAV

NA SD	3MA BSD	
EA SD	3A BSD	



7/18/2006 1:45:37 PM

**PAKISTANI MILITARY LEADERS KEY TO RELIEF EFFORTS**

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**AM Kawaslia – Air Force liaison FRC**  
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**MG Shakil – 11<sup>th</sup> Corp CDR for North West Frontier (NWFP) Province**  
**MG Kalid – 10<sup>th</sup> Corp CDR for Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Province**  
**MG Jamil - Director of Army Logistics**

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Encl (1)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

JUL 17 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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M. G. MULLEN  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

copy to:  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS  
SECNAV

11-L-0559/OSD/58523



7/18/2006 1:45:38 PM

## PAKISTANI MILITARY LEADERS KEY TO RELIEF EFFORTS

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MG Nadeem – Deputy to MG Farooq for the FRC and later Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (ERRA)  
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MG Kalid – 10<sup>th</sup> Corp CDR for Azad **Jamu Kashmir (AJK) Province**  
MG Jamil- Director of **Army** Logistics

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Encl (1)

11-L-0559/OSD/58524

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
USDP 44

AUG 21 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *8/14/06*

SUBJECT: Engaging Senior Pakistani Leadership Post-Earthquake (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for ways to reach out to the senior officers from Pakistan who were engaged in earthquake relief efforts.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ As Admiral Mullen stated in his letter, many of these officers had little previous engagement with the **U.S.** and we should look for ways to continue **our** relationship with them.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We **are** currently working with the Near East/South Asia Center, the Asia-Pacific Center, and the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs on a conference (likely with a disaster management emphasis) in Washington for these personnel.
  - This would be an ideal way to thank them, as well as expand their knowledge of the **U.S.** and continue to build **our** military-to-military relationship.
  - While in the U.S. we could also arrange meetings with their counterparts and other relevant officials.
  - Such an event would provide a forum to highlight to the officers (and the broader Pakistani public) that our strategic partnership with Pakistan encompasses cooperation in a range of areas, not solely relief efforts or the Global War on Terrorism.
  - Participation in such an event also would make these officers part of the NESACenter's enduring network, and the recipients of periodic strategic communications on a variety of security-related subjects.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We are exploring funding options for this conference and will keep you apprised.

Pakistan

17 Aug 06

17 Jul 06

Coordination: Tab A.



**COORDINATION**  
**Engaging Senior Pakistani Leadership Post-Earthquake**

<b>PDASD ISA</b>	Ms. Mary Beth Long	_____
<b>Acting PD, NESAs</b>	<b>Mr. Paul Hulley</b>	<u>PH 8/16</u>
<b>Acting Director, SA</b>	<b>Mr. John Kreul</b>	<u>JK 8/15</u>

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

May 23, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Briefing on GTMO

I think somebody ought to prepare a briefing on Guantanamo and tell the truth about it. It is such a good story, and yet those people continue to be unfairly criticized.

Thanks.

DNR.sc  
05/23/06

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 06/15/06*

~~FOUO~~



7/18/2006 5:11:08 PM

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/58527



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0388-06  
18 July 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR/X 15 JUL 06*

SUBJECT: /SF 052206-04/ Briefing On GTMO

In response to your issue (TAB A), the attached briefing (TAB B) is being used to tell the good story about GTMO.

- A version of this briefing has been in use since November 2005 by a joint OSD/Joint Staff briefing team to present the story of policy and operations at GTMO. To date over 3,000 people have received this briefing, from students at all the major war colleges to students at Stanford University Law School.
- This briefing provides background on the beginning of the effort, how the detainees are treated, who the detainees really are (to include unclassified intelligence details), and the value of GTMO.

COORDINATION: TAB C

*WE ARE WORKING WITH OSD (PA) TO  
FIND MORE WAYS TO PUBLICIZE THE  
TRUTH.*

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Gene Renuart, USAF; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

**R OF USE II**

11-L-0559/OSD/96528



OSD 11282-06

7/18/2006 5:10:59 PM



# *US Detention Facilities* *Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO)*

**Detainee Affairs Division**  
**J-5 Deputy Director for the War on Terrorism**  
**Joint Chiefs of Staff**  
**June 2006**

Tab B

1

UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO



# *THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM*

- We are at war with al Qaida and its affiliates:
  - September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks killed approximately 3,000 people from more than 90 countries.
  - In response UN Security Council recognized our inherent right to self defense and NATO, Rio and ANZUS treaty partners invoked collective self defense clauses under those treaties
  - The Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force
- The War **is** ongoing:
  - Al Qaida attacks continue (Bali, Madrid, Riyadh, London and Amman) and threatens future attacks
  - The Al Qaida network continues to commit atrocities in Iraq
- As in any war, the US is legally entitled to capture and hold enemy fighters until the end of hostilities

Tab B

2  
UNCLASSIFIED / ~~FOUO~~



## ***RAMP-UP TO GTMO OPERATIONS***

- October 2001 : Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) resulted in capture of thousands
- November 2001 to present: Detainees held due to their continuing threat and to remove them from the battlefield
- December 2001: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) designated as long-term detention location by the President
- January 2002: Joint Task Force at GTMO received first detainees assessed to be of high strategic intelligence and threat value

Tab B

3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



## ***DETENTION OPERATIONS IN CONTEXT***

- **Nearly 800 suspected al-Qaida or Taliban terrorists have been sent to JTF-GTMO**
  - Approximately 465 remain
  - First detainees departed from GTMO in 2002
  - More than 290 have been released or transferred to their country of citizenship
- **The International Committee of the Red Cross has access to every detainee at GTMO**

JTF-GTMO Operations are truly joint, with representation from all the Services, the Coast Guard, DoD civilians, and Contractors



## ***DETAINEE MYTH-BUSTING***

- **Detention #Abuse**
  - Terrorist are instructed to claim abuse and torture
    - "The Manchester Document"
  - it is not US policy to abuse detainees
    - Any instance of alleged abuse is investigated and, if substantiated, individuals are held accountable
  - Those in DOD custody are threats, hence their detention
- **Long Detention ≠No intelligence**
  - Terrorists do not readily disclose their activities and affiliations
  - Interrogation requires planning, preparation and can take time
    - It's a marathon, not a sprint
- **Interrogation ≠Torture**
  - Detainees are questioned to gather information and combat terrorism in order to prevent future attacks
  - Detainees are required to be treated humanely at all times



# COMMON MEDIA MISREPRESENTATIONS


- Solitary confinement
- Jack-booted thugs
- Freelancing
- Enteral feeding and the hunger strike
- Detention as punishment
- Guantanamo as "prison"





# CAMP X-RAY - THEN & NOW

Camp X-Ray was used  
for 4 months in 2002.. .




**2002**


...and has not been used since.



**Today**




11-L-0559/OSD/58536



11-L-0559/OSD/58537

# CAMP 6 (ready in Aug 06)





11-L-0559/OSD/58538



## GENEVA & GTMO

- 3 square meals, clean quarters (specially prepared – Halal)
- Recreation (library, outdoor activities, board games)
- Freedom to practice religion (Koran, prayer oil, beads)
- Free **medical/** dental/ psych care
- Sufficient, weather appropriate clothing
- Suitable Work Conditions (Not required to work)
- Send and receive correspondence
- Protected from public curiosity (no pictures)
- Consult lawyer for basic legal documents (Consult with civilian lawyers – Habeas)
- Released and repatriated after fighting stops (May be released before fighting stops)





TabB 11

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



## ***CONDITIONS OF DETENTION FOOD AND SHELTER***

- **Detainee Meals: approximately \$2.6M annually**
  - **Meet cultural and dietary requirements (Halal)**
  - **Approximately 4200 calories a day**
  - **Four menus offered**
  - **Refreshments in recreation areas (Gatoradelgranola bars)**
  - **Meal times adjusted during Ramadan**
  - **Recognition with Feast of the Sacrifice**
  - **53 individually prepared special diet meals**



Tab B



## *CONDITIONS OF DETENTION OPPORTUNITY TO WORSHIP*



- Korans provided (Arabic, Dari, Pashtu, Russian, Farsi, Tajik, Uighur, Urdu, English)
- Call to prayer sounded five times daily
- Prayer beads, prayer rugs, oil provided
- Arrows signify direction of Mecca
- Uninterrupted prayer time





## ***CONDITIONS OF DETENTION MAIL AND LIBRARY***

- **Mail**
  - **Over 43,121 pieces of mail sent or received: approximately \$5.9K annually**
  - **18,580 in 2005**
  - **Regular post mail and ICRC mail**
  - **Privileged attorney/client mail**
- **Library**
  - **Books/magazines offered to all compliant detainees**
  - **Over 3500 pieces in 13 languages available**
  - **Reading *room in camp 5***



Tab B


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



## *CONDITIONS OF DETENTION*

### *RECREATION*

- **All detainees have significant opportunities for recreation. Most enjoy 2-12 hours daily**
- **Sports opportunities: soccer, volleyball, basketball, table-tennis, board games**
- **New aerobic exercise machines**
- **Arabic language TV shows and broadcast of World Cup games**



Tab B



# ***JOINT MEDICAL GROUP CAPABILITIES***

## **Detainee Hospital**


- **20 beds - Expandable to 30**
- **Operating Room (1 table – expandable to 2)**
  - **Surgeries: 142**
- **Radiology (New Digital Machine)**



- **Pharmacy**
- **Central Sterile Supply**
- **Dental (1 chair)**
  - **Procedures: 341**
- **Physical Therapy**

## **Naval Hospital**


- **General Surgery**
- **Orthopedic Surgery**
- **Colofloscopy**
- **Optometry**
- **Physical Therapy**
- **Radiology**
- **Pharmacy**
- **Laboratory**
- **Dietary**
- **Preventive Medicine**
- **Oral Surgery**





## *MEDICAL CARE*

- **Detainee in-processing**
  - **Comprehensive physical/dental examination & assessment**
  - **upon arrival**
- **Access to care**
  - **Block sick call**
  - **Clinic appointments/block visits**
  - **Detainees average approximately 300 medical evaluations a month**
  - **Medical services available 24 hours/7 day a week by a core staff of 7 physicians, 12 nurses, and 83 corpsmen**





UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO



## *MEDICAL CARE*

- **Access to care:**
  - **Dental: 322 visits since November 2005 (35 cleanings, 91 cavities, 36 root canals, 6 oral surgeries)**
  - **Full scope eye care available. Optometry ~ 45 routine exams/month. 174 pairs of glasses issued over the last year**
  - **Prosthetic devices: Issued to 22 detainees**
  - **Specialty care (Cardiology, Gastroenterology, Dermatology) offered on a recurring basis**
  - **Physical therapy: averages 7 patients per day**



Tab B 18



## *MEDICAL CARE*

- **Preventative Health Screening/Maintenance**
  - **Recommended center for disease control immunizations including: diphtheria and tetanus series, mumps, measles, and rubella (MMR), hepatitis, influenza, annual purified protein derivative (PPD) monitoring for tuberculosis. Over 5000 vaccinations given.**
  - **Monitoring medical conditions: hypertension, diabetes, special diets, latent tuberculosis**
  - **Colon cancer screening for age-appropriate detainees: 10 colonoscopies performed**





Tab B



## *BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES*

*New Mental Health Ward - October-2005*

- Mental health evaluations for benefit of detainees
- 15-18% of detainees arrive with some mental illness
- 6-8% of population are followed by the Mental Health Service
  - Allows for centralized management of acute cases into a separate psychiatric detention area
  - 16 inpatient cells
  - Cost:\$2.65M





## ***WHO DO WE HAVE AT GTMO – TERRORISTS!***

- a Terrorist trainers / financiers**
- a Bomb makers / potential suicide bombers**
- o Recruiters and facilitators**
- a What are we learning?**
  - Organizational structure of al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations**
  - Extent of terrorist presence throughout the world**
  - Al-Qaida’s pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction**
  - Methods of terrorist recruitment; location of recruitment centers**
  - Terrorist skills sets: general and specialized operative training**
  - How legitimate financial activities are used to hide terrorist operations**



## *EXAMPLES OF ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT GUANTANAMO*

- An admitted al-Qaida explosives trainer who has given us information on the September 2001 assassination of Northern Alliance leader Masood and on the al-Qaida organization's use of mines
- An individual involved in terrorist financing who has provided us detailed information on Usama bin Laden's front companies and their accounts and on international money movements for financing terror
- An individual with links to a financier of the 9/11 plots who attempted to enter the United States through Orlando, Florida in August 2001. Phone records suggest 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta was also at the Orlando airport that day. This individual was later captured in Pakistan after fleeing Tora Bora
- A Taliban fighter who spent three months fighting on the front lines in Afghanistan and is linked to al-Qaida operatives connected to the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings




## *EXAMPLES OF ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT GUANTANAMO*

- An individual who served as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden and escorted him to Tora Bora, Afghanistan following the fall of Jalalabad, Afghanistan
- An admitted al-Qaida member who served as an explosives trainer for al-Qaida and designed a prototype shoe bomb for destroying airplanes as well as a magnetic mine for attacking ships
- An individual who trained al-Qaida associates in the use of explosives and worked on a plot to use cell phones to detonate bombs
- An individual who served as an al-Qaida translator and managed operating funds for al-Qaida. An individual who helped stockpile weapons for use against U.S. forces in Afghanistan
- A member of an al-Qaida supported terrorist cell in Afghanistan that targeted civilians, especially journalists and foreign aid workers; responsible for a grenade attack on a foreign journalist's automobile



## WHAT DETAINEES TELL US




*“Victory and the good news came from Allah...We thank the creator for the fall of the infidels’ Trade Towers. Joy overwhelmed and the earth gave thanks to the Almighty, the Omnipotent...the coterie of dogs started to tumble down burning in black fire, and the smoke went up saying, victory to Islam....20 swords of Jihad stepped forward (the hijackers)....*

*[Detainee is leading the rest of Kilo Block in singing a religious song with anti-American overtones] “. . . to the American be patient, your days is coming, one day we going to slaughter you behind the tree.” **The song goes on to cheer UBL and Jihad.***



## WHAT DETAINEES TELL US




*"...If they (Americans) don't find evidence or witnesses to testify against you, they'll keep you in prison for two, three or four years, may Allah place his curse on them... But if they have confessions and evidence, they'll turn you in to the court system."*

*"Listen, even the terrorists are innocent because they are Jihadists... The Mujaheddin are innocent."*



## *WHAT DETAINEES TELL US*



*“No, no it is too early to start the strike. Our goal **is not** to make the brothers go hungry, and I know they will not last. What we mean to do is to go on food strike when the lawyers come here, and stay **on** strike till the lawyers go back. Now these dogs will start to come up with new lies and stories, and the whole things will be spoiled. When the lawyers are here they are forced to write down what is happening and will take it out to the press **and** the world. No one could stop them then.”*



## *AL BAHLUL*



Comments from open Commissions hearing,  
1 March 2006

- He had written KSM and Ramzi Binalshibh to ensure that his participation in the commissions would not hamper AQ strategy
- Claimed that he is a member of AQ in an ongoing war against America

\*Made 7 references to September 11th in his opening statement to the Presiding Officer

- Boasted 5 times that he was a member of AQ during opening remarks
- Repeatedly refused his military appointed lawyer, citing the "scar on the psyche" of the American people, caused by the Sept 11th attacks



## *AL SHARBI*



Comments from open Commissions hearing, 27 April 2006

- “I’m going to make this easy for you guys: I’m proud of what I did and there isn’t any reason of hiding.”
- “I fought against the United States. I took up arms.”
- Sharbi denounced the United States as “the infidel against God.” “May God help me fight the infidels or the unfaithful ones.”



## ***INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF DETENTION***

- Intelligence gained at **JTF-GTMO** has:
  - Identified, exploited, and disrupted terrorist operations
  - Gained intelligence on bomb making and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
  - Provided more info on recruitment and formation of terrorist cells
  - Revealed al-Qaida leadership structures, operatives, funding mechanisms, communications methods, training and selection programs, travel patterns, support infrastructures, and plans for attacking the United States and other countries
  - Continuously provided information that confirms other reporting regarding the roles and intentions of al-Qaida and other terrorist operatives
  - Been used by forces on the battlefield to identify significant military and tribal leaders engaged in or supporting attacks on U.S. and coalition forces
  - Undoubtedly prevented terrorist attacks and saved lives



## *DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT*




Mohammed claimed to be an office clerk and driver for the Taliban. He denied having any affiliation with al-Qaida. He claimed to have received no weapons or military training due to his handicap (single amputee, knee down). After 11 SEP 2001, he stated he was forcibly conscripted by the Taliban military. Said Mohammed Shah was released on 14 March 2004.



Abdullah Mehsud's group kidnapped two Chinese engineers in late 2004. One engineer was killed during a rescue attempt. In early 2005, Mehsud also claimed responsibility for an Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing and an ambush on a van of Pakistani reporters. Probably killed earlier this year.



## *DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT*



While at GTMO Yousef Muhammed Yaaqoub claimed he was in the carpet trading business and worked as a shepherd.

Released from GTMO in May 2003

Yousef Muhammed Yaaqoub, known as Mullah Shazada, returned to Afghanistan and became a prominent Taliban Commander. He was killed in fighting with US Forces in June, 2004.



## *INTERROGATION SESSION HIGHLIGHT*



This Saudi detainee

- Swore Bayat “allegiance” to UBL in AF
- Associate of Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), Abu Zubaydah, and Zaccarias Moussaoui
- Suspected 2<sup>nd</sup> in Command London AQ Cell

On July 15, 2005 detainee, a major camp leader, predicted to his interrogator:

If the Saudi and Yemeni detainees were to leave GTMO now,

- 15% would return home, and settle down
- 85% would link up with Zarqawi network to fight Americans in Iraq
  - Yemenis could easily cross into Saudi Arabia to join Saudi jihadists
  - The Saudis would acquire false passports, easy to do in Saudi Arabia
  - The group would then cross through Jordan to Syria and into Iraq



## *INVESTMENT in GUANTANAMO*

### The United States has invested significantly in GTMO

- Investments in JTF-GTMO include:
  - \$109.2M in new construction (\$42M additional underway from 2005 Supplemental):
    - Medical Facilities
    - Interrogation Facilities
    - Multi-story berthing/dining/food preparation facilities
  - \$241M in cost of operations (now roughly \$95M/year)



## *EXTERNAL ASSESSMENTS*

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said on 3 March 2006
  - "it is a model prison.. ."
  - Detainees rights to practice religion, food and medical care were better than Belgian prisons
  - Dramatic improvements over the last two years
  - No point in calling for immediate closure of the detention camp
- International Committee of the Red Cross: Quarterly
  - Meaningful
  - Useful
  - Confidential



## *CONCLUSION*

- Safe and humane care and custody
- We are saving the lives and improving health of the detainees
- It is unprecedented in modern warfare that, during an on-going conflict, we outright release enemy combatants to their home countries, that we have an on-going tribunals process to “hear their cases in a court of law,” and that we as a nation expend significant amounts of our national treasure to ensure safe, humane custody of unlawful enemy combatants under our control
- American men and women are doing a terrific job in a dangerous place. . . much to be proud of.



- **Will continue as a strategic level interrogation and detention facility**
  - We are in the midst of a “long-war” that requires human intelligence collection to combat the enemy
  - We need a secure, safe environment to hold those detainees that continue to be of a significant threat to the US and US interests
- **When appropriate, detainees will be transferred from JTF-GTMO to countries of origin that adhere to international standards of humane treatment**

*“We have no desire to be the world’s jailer”*



## *MORE INFORMATION*

For more information:

<http://www.dod.mil/news/detainees.html>

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TAB C

COORDINATION

USSOUTHCOM

Mr. Schoenbeck

23 June 2006

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/58566

Tab C

SIR, BOB E. RE 1645  
DSD ✓ 145,006  
PWS  
FYI  
1/2 RUS July 14, 2006

~~FOUO~~

TO: Gordon England

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*


SUBJECT Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

032

Do you think we ought to go up and talk to the House Appropriators and the House and Senate Authorizers on the issues that we talked to Inouye and Stevens about yesterday?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF071406-15



*Please Respond By 07/19/06*



14 JUL 06


~~FOUO~~

July 18, 2006

To: SECDEF  
Fr: Gordon England  
Subj: Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

Don,

- Tina Jonas, Robert Wilkie and I agree that we should also meet with House appropriators; specifically, Jerry Lewis and Bill Young, and, most likely, to include David Obey and John Murtha. If you agree, I will work schedules.
- The House is leaving on the 28. However, the Senate will not finish its version of the DoD Appropriations Bill until **the** first week of August. Therefore, we can schedule the meeting before the 28<sup>th</sup>, but can also delay **until** Congress reconvenes in early September.
- Yes, we also need to follow up with **the** House and Senate authorizers, but, typically, with a different set of issues.
- In my discussions with Wilkie today, LA is preparing **a** book for us to be available early next week, prior to breakfast with **the** House and Senate authorizers next Thursday.



OSD 11313-06



7/19/2006 5:04:35 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58568

July 18, 2006 - HC 1818

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

Don,

- Tina Jonas, Robert Wilkie and I agree that we should also meet with House appropriators; specifically, Jerry Lewis and Bill Young, and, most likely, to include David Obey and John Murtha. If you agree, I will work schedules.
- The House is leaving on the 28<sup>th</sup>, so we need to do this by the 27<sup>th</sup> of this month.
- Yes, we also need to follow up with the House and Senate authorizers, but, typically, with a different set of issues.
- In my discussions with Wilkie today, LA is preparing a book for us to be available early next week, prior to breakfast with the House and Senate authorizers next Thursday.

S/S

11-L-0559/OSD/58569

SIR, BOB E. RE 1645  
DSD ✓ 145406  
DGS

FOUO

FYI

1/2 RUS  
July 14, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

Do you think we ought to go up and talk to the **House** Appropriators and the House and Senate Authorizers on the issues that we talked to Inouye and Stevens about yesterday?

Thanks.

DHR:js  
SF071406-15



*Please Respond By 07/19/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58570

July 18, 2006

all  
7/20

032

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

OK

Don,

- o Tina **Jonas**, Robert Wilkie and I agree that we should also meet with **House** appropriators; specifically, Jerry Lewis and Bill Young, and, most likely, to include David Obey and **John** Murtha. ~~If you agree, I will work sche-~~ **dules.**
- The House is leaving **on** the 28<sup>th</sup>. However, the Senate will not **finish** its version of the DoD Appropriations Bill until the first week of August. Therefore, we can schedule the meeting before the 28<sup>th</sup>, but can also delay until Congress reconvenes in early September.
- o Yes, we also need **to** follow up with the House and Senate authorizers, but, typically, **with** a different set of issues.
- In my discussions with Wilkie today, LA is preparing a book for us **to** be available early next week, prior to breakfast with the House and Senate authorizers next Thursday.

OK

*Andrew*

11-L-0559/QSD/58571  
1393-08

7/19 1200  
REVISION

(1454107)

July 18, 2006 - HC 1818

032

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England

*England*

Subj: Possible Meeting with Appropriators and Authorizers

Don,

- Tina Jonas, Robert Wilkie and I agree that we should **also** meet with House appropriators; specifically, Jerry Lewis and Bill Young, **and**, most likely, to include David Obey and John **Murtha**. If you agree, I will work schedules.
- The House is leaving on the 28<sup>th</sup>, so we need to do this by the 27<sup>th</sup> of this month.
- Yes, we also need to follow up with the House and Senate authorizers, but, typically, with a different set of issues.
- In my discussions with Wilkie today, LA is preparing a book for **us** to be available early next week, prior to breakfast with the House and Senate authorizers next **Thursday**.

18 JUL 06



14 JUL 06

FOUO

July 14, 2006

D32

TO: Steve Bucci  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Warner and Levin

I think I should see Warner and Levin about the Shelby bill.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF071406-13

.....  
Please Respond By 07/21/06

July 19, 2006

19 JUL 06

Mr. Secretary,

We have scheduled time on your calendar to see Senators Warner and Levin on our legislative priorities for July 27<sup>th</sup>. We will include CRIVS legislation in your talking points.

*Robert Wilkie*

19 JUL 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58573



7/19/2006 2:17:51 PM

FOUO

July 14, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT: Iraq Handout

*ZCWD*

I looked over this Iraq handout (the one that I mentioned the print was too small) and think the items on it are terrific. I like the content. I'm just not sure how you can make it ~~more~~ user-friendly.

Attach "Iraq Two Years of Progress" brochure

DHR:ss  
SF071406-32

July 19, 2006

Mr. Secretary,

I agree, this is an excellent product. We are collaborating with CENTCOM and the Joint Staff and will incorporate much of it into our Iraq tri-fold.

We are reformatting and/or reproducing the data in a more user-friendly product.

Attached is our most recent version (July 17, 2006).

*Robert Wilkie*

*14 JUL 06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58574

OSD 11361-06




7/19/2006 2 2334 PM

**Government**  
Iraqi army has 231,000 troops, including 137,000 regular troops. The Iraqi army was reformed in October 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in the 2003 election.

**Council Seat Distribution Breakdown**

Percentage of Seats in the Council  
Iraqi Ethnic Breakdown




**Growth of Iraqi Security Forces**



About 90,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces in June 2004. More than 265,000 trained and equipped ISF in June 2006.

**Iraqi Army Lead and National Police Lead**



In June 2004, the Ministry of Defense had 137,000 troops. By June 2006, 265,000 troops were trained and equipped. This growth is a result of the coalition military force's efforts.

**Children**  
Iraqi children are being recruited into the military. The UN has reported that over 100,000 children have been recruited into the Iraqi military since 2003.

**Size of security forces**

Force	2004	2006
Iraqi Military	24,000	265,000
Iraqi Army	43,812	193,300
Support Forces	0	6,686
Special Operations	517	1,100
Air Force	116	100
Navy	282	100
Total	44,427	197,486
Iraqi Police	20,000	200,000
Police	14,213	107,300
Border Enforcement	14,213	21,686
Intelligence Police	0	22,788
Digital Protection	0	100
Total	46,525	149,288
Total	90,952	246,774

2004 unemployment rate was 11.5%.

	Crude Production
June 2004	2.295
June 2006	2.3

**GDP**

Nominal GDP (USD bill)
Percentage of which no
Real GDP Growth Rate
Per Capita GDP (USD)
Consumer Price Index
<b>Media and Communi</b>
Telephone Subscribers
Internet Subscribers
Commercial TV Stations
Commercial Radio Stati
Independent Newspape

11-L-0569/O.S.D/58375


# Before & After

# The Way Forward

### Water

In June 2004, only 5.5 million of Iraq's 25 million citizens had access to a safe and stable water supply. Iraqi cities suffered from inadequate and malfunctioning sewage systems that sometimes left streets filled with raw sewage water.

## Before



## After

Baghdad's three new sewage plants, comprising 75 percent of Iraq's total sewage treatment capacity, were not opening waste for more than six years before the conflict.

In June 2004 less than one trillion Iraqis had access to wastewater sewage treatment.

Today 5 million people benefit from improved sewer lines and water treatment plants and 9.25 million have access to clean water.

### Agriculture

- Irrigation drainage project added 74,600 acres of farmland.
- Canal projects for irrigation added 83,000 acres of farmland.
- Strategic re-flooding projects are restoring the large areas of the 8,000 square miles of marshes.
- Large-scale aerial crop spraying projects applied pesticides to 333,590 acres of date palm trees and wheat and barley fields across seven provinces.

### Education

- Primary school enrollment has increased from 4.3 million in 2004 to more than 6 million in 2006.
- More than 200 schools have been constructed, rebuilt or upgraded since 2004.
- Iraqi medical schools now graduate 2,250 doctors each year.

The vision of the Coalition and the Iraqi people is one of Unity, Security and Progress. The past few years have not been easy. Achievements have been made against the backdrop of an active and determined insurgency.

These achievements have shown that Iraqis have the ability to build a democratic society, to work together, and to embrace the alternative vision for Iraq that we share.

Now, through the leadership of the Iraqi people, we are working to build a new Iraq. We are working to build a new Iraq that is a land of opportunity, a land of hope, and a land of peace. We are working to build a new Iraq that is a land of unity, security and progress.



Our vision is a land of opportunity, a land of hope, and a land of peace. We are working to build a new Iraq that is a land of unity, security and progress.

Gen. George W. Casey, Jr.  
Commanding General  
Multi-National Force - Iraq



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Se  
Pro

Iraq's top seven posts for the national unity government:

- Prime Minister: Nuri al-Maliki.
- President: Jalal Talabani.
- Deputy President: Adil Abd al-Mahdi.
- Deputy President: Tariq al-Hashimi
- Deputy Prime Minister: Barham Salih.
- Deputy Prime Minister: Salam al-Zawba'i.
- Minister of Defense: Mohammed Jasim.
- Minister of Interior: Jawad al-Bolani.

**Key Political Events:**

- June 28, 2004: Transfer of Sovereignty; Interim Iraqi Government Established.
- March 8, 2004: Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) signed.
- Jan. 30, 2004: First Democratic Election.
- March 16, 2005: Transitional National Assembly sworn-in.
- October 2005: Constitution ratified.
- December 2005: Elected a constitutionally-based 4-year government.
- March 16: Council of Representatives sworn in.
- June 8: Full Iraqi Cabinet established.

More freedom facts... leading to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Here are some examples of projects that improve the lives of Iraqis:

- Water:**
  - In June 2004, only 5.5 million Iraqis had access to a safe and stable water supply. Today, more than 8.25 million people have access to potable water.
- Education:**
  - Primary school enrollment has increased from 4.3 million in 2004 to more than 6 million in 2006.
  - More than 800 schools have been constructed, rebuilt, or renovated since 2004.
  - Iraqi medical schools now graduate 2,250 doctors each year.

**More Freedom Facts...**

- Communications:**
  - In June 2004 only 1.2 million Iraqis had phone service. Today, nearly 7.5 million Iraqis have phone service.
  - There were virtually no cell phones in 2003.
- Electricity:**
  - Availability of electrical power varies throughout the country, with the national average at 12 hours of electricity each day.
  - The latest numbers show Baghdad averaged 8 hours of state-generated power.
- Healthcare:**
  - Six fully completed health care centers have been turned over to the Ministry of Health.
  - 98% of newborn children have been immunized.

1-800-555-0559 / OSD/58577




**IRAQ UPDATE**

**Muthanna Province Handover**

*"It's a historic day in Iraq.. It's a day in which the people of al-Samawa should be proud, and should be recorded in their history as being the first city which succeeds to achieve peace and security."*

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki

July 13, 2006



**What Does It Mean?**

The transition in Muthanna province marks the increased capability of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government not just to operate independently, but to literally replace Coalition forces.

The Governor of Muthanna assumes supervision and general direction for the province.

The provincial Iraqi Police assumes the lead for civil security in Muthanna.

National police and Iraqi Army in the province will remain under national control of the Prime Minister.

Coalition forces will move out of all urban areas in Muthanna and assume a supportive role.

July 17, 2006

“Success ultimately will be won by the Iraqi people over a period of time, and they’re invested in it, let there be no doubt.”

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
July 12, 2006

ISF Successes

Iraqi Security Forces captured kidnappers and an entire insurgent cell east of Baghdad on July 10<sup>th</sup>.

During an early morning raid on July 7<sup>th</sup>, Iraqi Security Forces nabbed an insurgent leader wanted for murdering, torturing and kidnapping civilians. He’s also accused of coordinating attacks against Coalition forces.

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 11 detainees in late June. When captured, a search of an insurgent’s car uncovered 31 attached explosive rounds which could have been detonated by a dashboard device.



**Iraqi Security Force Statistics**

Iraqi planned, Iraqi conducted, and most of all, Iraqi-led missions continue throughout Iraq.

In July 2004, there were no operational Army division or brigade headquarters.

Today, 4 divisions headquarters and 20 brigade headquarters are controlling their own area of responsibility.

In July 2004, there were no operational National Police units under the Ministry of the Interior.

Today, all 28 authorized National Police units are in the fight with 2 battalions controlling their area of responsibility.

In August 2004, there were roughly 184,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces.

Today, there are over 269,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces.

In August 2004, a handful of Iraqi Army battalions were in the fight.

Today, there are 114 Iraqi Ministry of Defense combat battalions with 73 controlling their own areas of responsibility.


Iraqis now maintain control over 42 operating bases (FOBs).

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58578

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Controlled Areas of Responsibility: 1/06



In January '06, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had 2 divisions, 10 brigades and 43 battalions that controlled areas of responsibility.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Controlled Areas of Responsibility: 7/06



Today, the ISF has 4 divisions, 20 brigades, and 75 battalions that control their own areas of responsibility.

~~FOUO~~

July 14, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT Iraq Handout

*JRW*

I looked over this Iraq handout (the one that I mentioned the print was too small) and think the items on it are terrific. I like the content. I'm just not sure how you can make it more user-friendly.

Attach: "Iraq Two Years of Progress" brochure

DHR:ss  
SF071406-32

.....

July 19, 2006

Mr. Secretary,

*19 JUL 06*

I agree, this is an excellent product. We are collaborating with CENTCOM and the Joint Staff and will incorporate much of it into our Iraq tri-fold.

We are reformatting and/or reproducing the data in a more user-friendly product.

Attached is our most recent version (July 17, 2006).

*Robert Wilkie*

*19 JUL 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58579



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~~FOUO~~

May 11, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reserve and Guard Issues

Today when I met with some folks at the DASD level, a question came up about the goal of communicating the preferred dwell time and mobilization time. To do so, it would be desirable to improve training for Guard and Reserve so that when they are activated, they would only have to be activated for 12 months instead of up to 18 months. It is a good point.

The impression I got was that the Army Reserve and National Guard are still back in the industrial age in terms of managing their forces.

The individual also raised a point about "coercive personnel methods" that are a holdover from the conscript force, as opposed to the volunteer force. He said there was an article in today's papers about disallowing voluntary resignations.

Please give me an assessment of how you think the Army is doing and what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
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.....  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

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PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

July 19, 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
*19 July 06*

SUBJECT: Coercive Personnel Methods—SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- The Army prefers a unit approach to force management, but much of your guidance focuses on individual mobilization length, frequency, and dwell time.
- The Army is succeeding in meeting your guidelines. However, some leaders would prefer to manage at the unit level and avoid management of individuals. This issue is likely to arise again when the Joint Staff offers you its presentation on sustaining deployments for the long term ("access to Reserves").
- The Services differ significantly in their Reserve management philosophies.
- Personnel management in the Army Reserve rests on "involuntary mobilization," which implies that individuals will not serve unless compelled to do so. This leads to:
  - Proposing that Army reservists who fail to show up for weekend drills be placed on active duty for up to two years.
  - Declining to accept resignations from Army Reserve officers nearing end of their service obligation if they possess certain skills or have not deployed.
  - Attempting to assign members of the Individual Ready Reserve involuntarily to units to enforce service agreements.
  - Using "stop loss" extensively.



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OSD 11398-06



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- o The Air Force in contrast, uses volunteers extensively and employ involuntary mobilization as a last resort.
- The Marines integrate active and reserve members into organizations, maximizing capabilities through task organization of small unit "building blocks."
- These alternative approaches to personnel management imply we should be:
  - Communicating expectations of service—responsibilities, duties, and opportunities that apply to both the military service and the military member. (Each Service has rolled out its expectant management plan. I will ask LTG Stultz to communicate clear expectations to Army reservists).
  - Eliminating the distinction between involuntary and voluntary mobilization in lieu of a simpler construct, "call to duty," consistent with expectations.
  - Accepting that forces will be task organized and adopting individual methods for managing people. It is especially important to embrace incentives as a way to induce desired behaviors and performance, as the Navy does aggressively with its practices.
  - An opportunity to apply these principles will occur with the inauguration of the **Army's** new force rotation model.
  - Strong leadership will be key to moving away from a system that manages by units without much regard for differences among individuals, and that relies on "sticks" over "carrots" in managing individuals.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Dr. John D. Winkler (DASD/M&P), (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

JUL 11 2005

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*  
SUBJECT: Item in the *London Sunday Times*

The attached article says the Proliferation Security Initiative was John Bolton's brainchild. I thought it was something that came out of DoD. Do you recall the origin of it?

I need to get my head straight on it because I have been saying the wrong thing, if this is true.

Attache: 7/9/06 *London Sunday Times* article

DHR:m  
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~~FOUO~~

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7/21/2006 2 04 33 PM

and offered to meet bilaterally with the North on the sidelines. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill was in Seoul to help coordinate the international response to the North's test-firing Tuesday of seven missiles.

Also in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Tanu Aso said Sunday that Japan would not be cooperative on the stem wording of a U.N. resolution that would impose sanctions on North Korea. Japan is pushing for a vote on the resolution Monday. U.S. State Department spokesman Geoff Morley said.

London Sunday Times  
July 9, 2006

### 15. West Ministers 'Secret War' To Keep Nuclear North Korea In Check

By Michael Sheridan, Rur Dan Correspondent

A programme of covert action against nuclear and missile traffic to North Korea and Iran is to be intensified after last week's missile tests by the North Korean regime.

Intelligence agencies, marines and air forces from at least 13 nations are quietly co-operating in a "secret war" against Pyongyang and Tehran.

It has on far involved interceptors of North Korean ships at sea, US agents preventing the war-trains in Taiwan, multinational naval and air surveillance missions out of Singapore, investigations pouring over the banks of Arthur basins in the former Portuguese colony of Macau and a fleet of planes and ships eavesdropping on the "secret kingdom" in the waters north of Japan.

Five details filter out from western officials about the programme, which has operated since 2003, or about the American financial structures that accompany it.

But together they have highlighted a moose around Kim Jong-il's bunkers, hungry nation.

"Diplomacy alone has not

worked, military action is not on the table and so you'll see a persistent increase in this kind of pressure," said a senior western official.

In a telling example of the programme's success, two Bush administration officials indicated last year that it had blocked North Korea from obtaining equipment used to make missiles propellant.

The Americans also persuaded China to stop the sale of chemicals for North Korea's nuclear weapons scientist. And a shipment of "precursor chemicals" for weapons was seized in Taiwan before it could reach a North Korean port.

According to John Bolton, the US ambassador to the United Nations and the man who originally devised the programme, it has made a narrow dent in North Korea's revenues from ballistic missile sales.

But the success of Bolton's hand-picked, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), whose stated aim is to stop the traffic in weapons of mass destruction, might also push North Korea into extreme reactions.

Brown is a staff member of the initiative, which was announced by President George W Bush in Kuala Lumpur, on May 31, 2003. British officials have since joined colleagues of "operational experts" in Australia, France and the US, while the Royal Navy has committed ships to PSI exercises. The participants include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Italy, Spain and Singapore, among others.

There has been almost no public debate in the countries committed to the initiative. A report for the US Congress said it had "no international secretary, no office in global agencies established to support it, no database or reports of successes and failures and no established funding."

To Bolton and senior British officials, there were

qualities make it particularly attractive.

In the past 10 months, since the collapse of six-nation talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the US and its allies have also replaced the scores on Kim's chemistries funding which generated some \$500m a year for the regime.

Robert Joseph, the US undersecretary for arms control, has disclosed that 11 North Korean "bankers" — trading companies or banks — plus six more than one from Syria were singled out for action under an executive order numbered 13382 and signed by Bush.

For the first time, the US Secret Service and the FBI released details of North Korean involvement in forging \$100 notes and in forging counterfeit Viagra, cigarettes and smartphones in collaboration with Chinese gangsters.

The investigators found in on a North Korean trading company and two banks in Moscow. The firm, which had offices set to a casino and a "sauna" was run by North Koreans with diplomats in passport, who promptly vanished.

The two banks, Song Heung bank and Hwang Deok Asia, denied any wrongdoing. But the Moscow authorities stepped in after a run on Banco Delta Asia and froze some \$50m in North Korea's accounts.

Last week the North Koreans demanded the money as a precondition for talks but the Americans boasted off their pursuit.

Kim said the failure, the Chinese president in January that his government was being strangled, diplomats in the Chinese capital said. "The loss worried the Chinese leaders his regime could collapse and he knows that is the last thing we want," said a Chinese source close to the foreign ministry.

The risk being assessed between Washington and Tokyo this weekend is how far

Kim can be pushed against the wall before he undertakes something more radical than last week's display of force.

The "Dear Leader" has turned North Korea into a military-dominated state to preserve his own inherited role at the spot of a Sino-American personality cult. Although he appears erratic, and North Korea's rhetoric is extreme, most diplomats who have met him think Kim is highly calculating.

"He is a very tough Korean nationalist and he knows exactly how to play the power game — very hard," said Professor Shi Yinhong, an expert in Beijing.

But the costly failure of Kim's intercontinental satellite, the Taepodong 2, after just 42 seconds of flight last Wednesday, was a blow to his prestige and to the face of his deterrent. Six other short and medium-range missiles splashed into the Sea of Japan without making any serious military point.

The United States and its allies are now preoccupied by what Kim might do with the trump card in his arsenal — his stockpile of plutonium for nuclear bombs.

"The real danger is that the North Koreans could sell their plutonium to another major state — read Iran — or to terrorists," said a western diplomat who has served in Pyongyang. American officials fear Iran is negotiating to buy plutonium from North Korea in a move that would confront the international effort to stop Tehran's nuclear weapons programme.

The prospect of such a sale is "the next big thing," said a western diplomat involved with the issue. The White House commissioned an intelligence study on the risk last December but drew no firm conclusion.

Plutonium was the element used in the atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945. It would give Iran a rapid route to the bomb as an alternative to

~~FOUO~~

JUL 11 2006

44

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~~FOUO~~

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and offered to meet bilaterally with the North on the situation. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill was in Seoul to help coordinate the international response to the North's test-firing Tuesday of seven missiles.

Also, in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Taro Aso said Sunday that Japan would be cooperative on the stem wording of a U.N. resolution that would impose sanctions on North Korea. Japan is pushing for a vote on the resolution Monday, despite opposition from China, Aso said.

#### London Sunday Times

July 9, 2006

### U.S. West Mounted 'Secret War' To Keep Nuclear North Korea In Check

By Michael Sheridan, Far East Correspondent

A programme of covert action against nuclear and missile traffic to North Korea and Iran is to be intensified after last week's missile tests by the North Korean regime.

Intelligence agencies, navy and air forces from at least 13 nations are quietly co-operating in a "secret war" against Pyongyang and Tehran.

It has an far involved interception of North Korean ships at sea, US agents proving the war-finks in Taiwan, multinational naval and air surveillance missions out of Singapore, investigators poring over the books of Airbus banks in the former Portuguese colony of Macau and a fleet of planes and ships over-flying on the "secret kingdom" in the waters north of Japan.

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But together they have highlighted a more secret Kim Jong-il's bankruptcy, hungry nation.

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The Bolton and senior British officials, whose views

qualifies make it potentially strategic.

In the past 10 months, since the collapse of six-week talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the US and its allies have also tightened the screws on Kim's clandestine fundraising which generated some \$500m a year for the regime.

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INFO MEMO

DSD  
FDUSD(P) *R* JUL 20 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP) *PF* JUL 18 2006

SUBJECT: Item in the *London Sunday Times* (ES-071006-27TS)

- You asked about the origin of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- PSI was a collaborative effort; the lead actors were Doug Feith and J.D. Crouch, Bob Joseph, and John Bolton.
- During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) DOD cooperated with coalition partners to conduct anti-terrorism maritime interdictions. We realized this model would be valuable for combating WMD proliferation.
- In parallel, Bob Joseph was developing the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, which directed development of more robust U.S. efforts to interdict WMD-related material.
- The DOD and Joseph efforts merged to become PSI.
- President Bush launched PSI formally in a speech in Poland in May 2003. Over the next several months, U/S Bolton led negotiation of the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" with a core group of initial partner countries.
- Agreement of the Statement of Interdiction Principles was announced September 4, 2003.
- OSD then took the lead for developing PSI concepts of operations and established the multinational Operational Experts Group (OEG).
- The 20 OEG nations have held 23 multinational exercises and table-top games to improve interdiction capabilities. They have reviewed interdiction-related national legal authorities. They have held two workshops with transportation industry leaders to solicit their cooperation on interdiction operations.

Prepared by: Jack David, DASD/C&CWMD&NP (b)(6) *JH, for 7/17*



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INFO MEMO

DSD  
FD/JSD(P) Q JUL 20 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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710

2 JUL 06

11 JUL 06

Prepared by: Jack David, DASD/CbtWMD&NP, (b)(6) CH, for 7/17



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~~FOUO~~

JUL 06 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Cathy Mainardi  
Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Congress and the Stolen Valor Act

If Congress passes the "Stolen Valor Act" and it is going to be signed by the President, I would like to attend the signing.

Please let me know what the status of the legislation is.

Thanks.

Attach: Information on Stolen Valor Act

DHR:ss  
SF070506-29

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/14/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58589

OSD 11540-06



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# Colorado Congressman John Salazar Introduces Stolen Valor Act of 2005



MDH Recipient Peter Lemon and brother veteran Colorado Congressman John Salazar.

July 22, 2005

CONGRESSMANSALAZAR: "PENALIZE PHONIES NOW"



CONGRESSMAN JOHN T. SALAZAR

Third District of Colorado

Contact: Nayyera Haq  
(202) 225-4761

### *Salazar Introduces "Stolen Valor Act" to Penalize Medal Frauds*

WASHINGTON, DC - Congressman John T. Salazar (CO-3), the only veteran from the Colorado delegation, today announced the introduction of the "Stolen Valor Act", legislation to penalize distributors of phony medals and those who fraudulently claim to be decorated veterans. Salazar's legislation would place criminal penalties on those who falsely claim to have risked their lives for our country, restoring honor to those who have truly earned it.

"Medals recognize the best American qualities - courage, honor, and sacrifice," said Salazar. "These honors are reserved for those who willingly risked their lives for our country. The Medal of Honor is our nation's highest military honor. And the Purple Heart is only awarded for genuine acts of courage. It is our job to protect the honor and integrity of our veterans, to make sure the memory of their heroism is not tarnished."

B.G. Burkett's award winning book "Stolen Valor" first exposed the problem of medals fraud. Current law only allows prosecution of imposters who wear an unearned Medal of Honor on their person. Salazar's legislation will expand the law to include those who publicly claim to be decorated veterans, allowing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to finally prosecute several high profile cases (see attached profiles.)

"Shame on those who claim credit for acts of courage they didn't commit, their lies are criminal," said Salazar. "Medal recipients are often too humble to parade their honors. By letting the phonies continue their masquerade, we diminish the honor of our true heroes. Federal law enforcement agents are willing to go after these frauds, Congress needs to provide the tools necessary to get the job done."

Salazar's legislation is the direct result of the efforts of Pam and Doug Sterne of Pueblo and Medal of Honor recipient Peter Lemon of Colorado Springs. The city of Pueblo in Salazar's congressional district was designated "America's Home of Heroes" by Congress.

because it is home to more Medal of Honor recipients than elsewhere in the country.

### FRAUDS GOING FREE

#### Judge Michael O'Brien, Illinois

Illinois District Judge Michael O'Brien displayed two Medals of Honor in a frame on the wall of his courtroom. Everyone in his city believed their judge was not only an honorable man of the judicial profession, but one of America's greatest heroes.

O'Brien's fraud was discovered when he tried to apply for Medal of Honor license plates for his vehicle. Illinois provides valid Medal of Honor recipients with distinctive license plates for their personal vehicles. When Judge O'Brien applied for his Medal of Honor plates for himself, someone at the Department of Motor Vehicles happened to contact a true recipient and learned O'Brien was a fraud.

O'Brien's lies were subsequently exposed but he avoided prosecution. While it is against the law to manufacture, wear, buy, sell, or trade the Medal of Honor, it is not a criminal offense to possess one or display it on your wall.

"We couldn't prosecute O'Brien under federal law because he wasn't actually wearing the Medal, which is illegal for an impostor to do," explains FBI agent Tom Cottone.

#### Lawrence Hammer, Florida

Lawrence Hammer claims to be a former Navy Seal who won the Medal of Honor for being shot twice in Vietnam. Not only did he use his claims and falsified records to gain employment and health care, he went on to coo \$45,000 from a widow he met at the Bay Pines VA Medical Center.

In the words of the widow:

*"I am a VA employee at Bay Pines VA Medical Center, Bay Pines. Mr. Hammer was a patient and a CWT worker at this hospital when I met him. I was widowed 3/3/01 and Mike knew about the time I spent taking care of my husband before he died... he took me for over \$45,000..."*

*"I have since had contact with a Susan in Savannah who told me he did exactly the same thing to her. He also did this to a woman in South Carolina named Krissy, who had his arrested for domestic violence, she was beaten and choked by this man... he told me and many people here at the VA that he was trained to kill in the Seals and had already killed a man who molested his daughter, but according to his father, he's never been married or had kids. This man is a predator and I want to see him exposed before any more women are taken in by him."*

Hammer falsified records claiming to be a decorated veteran and used that status to con the government and unsuspecting women - but he cannot be prosecuted because he did not display medals on his person.

#### Gilbert Velasquez (AZ)

In 2004, a small paper in Arizona ran a two-full-page story of local "hero" Gilbert Velasquez, who claimed to have participated in the "Blackhawk Down" mission and the capture of Saddam Hussein.

The article featured a front-page photo with Velasquez holding multiple awards including TWO Silver Stars, Legion of Merit, Bronze Stars, Purple Hearts. Despite holding the photo of these medals he claims or telling a reporter his DSC was buried with his godfather—and despite gut-wrenching "war stories" of combat, lost buddies, and personal heroics - this man cannot be prosecuted under current law.

### AOH RECIPIENT QUO'

From Recent News Stories on this Bill

"Somebody else wearing a medal and they didn't earn it. That's defrauding people who've earned it" said George Sakato, 84, of Denver who received the Medal of Honor for his acts of courage in World War II. For Sakato, who is Japanese-American and was originally awarded the Army Distinguished Service Cross, he said being upgraded to a Medal of Honor about fifty years later in 2000 was the most meaningful days of his life. That he said, is what makes what the posers do all that more despicable. "It's not right. It's just not right," he said. (Associated Press)

"That should be against the law," says former Navy corpsman George Wahlen of Roy, Utah's only living recipient of the Medal of Honor who also was awarded three purple hearts in World War II. "It's something that is a personal thing. It shouldn't be sold" (Salt Lake City Tribune)

Please Sign Our  
**Online Petition**

#### RECENT STREAMING MEDIA NEWS REPORTS

New • June 22	June 32	June 25	Florida DSC Case
Good Morning America	Fox & Friends	Weekend Live	NBC - 2 (Florida)
Video Archives from Last Year's Stolen Valor Stories			
CNN	Channel 13 - Pueblo	FOX NEWS - GREAT!!	FOX 31 - Talk Show

#### MORE Video Reports are available in our NEWS SECTION

Note: While journalists do not endorse legislation in order to maintain impartiality, we are pleased to share with you the following congratulatory remarks by a leader in American news broadcasting:

*"I congratulate Congressman Salazar for getting on this case and I am with him all the way."*

Bob Schieffer, CBS Evening News

## Stolen Valor Act of 2005

# H.R. 3352 & S. 1998

[Policy Analysis  
Webpage](#)

[Policy Analysis  
WORD Doc.](#)

[Policy Analysis  
WORD PDF](#)

Contact Congressman Salazar

## John T. Salazar (0-3) SPONSOR

102 Members of Congress Co-Sponsoring This Bill in the House  
(Sorted By State & District)

- [AL-5] Robert Bud Cramer
- [AR-1] Marion Berry
- [AR-4] Mike Rose
- [AZ-7] Raul Grijalva
- [CA-1] Mike Thompson
- [CA-8] Nancy Pelosi
- [CA-15] Mike Honda
- [CA-18] Dennis Cardoza
- [CA-20] Jim Costa
- [CA-28] Adam Schiff
- [CA-33] Diane Watson
- [CA-38] Grace Napolitano
- [CA-43] Joe Baca
- [CA-51] Bob Filner
- [CO-2] Mark Udall
- [FL-2] Allen Boyd
- [FL-17] Kendrick Meek
- [FL-23] Alcee Hastings
- [GA-3] Jim Marshall
- [GA-12] John Barrow
- [GU] Madeleine Bordallo
- [IL-2] Dan Rostenkowski
- [IL-3] L. Boswell
- [IL-4] I. Guriérrez
- [IL-5] Emanuel
- [IL-7] J. Carson
- [IL-11] Dennis Moore
- [KY-6] B. C. Carr
- [LA-3] Charlie Melancon
- [LA-4] J. W. J. R.
- [LA-5] J. Hoyt
- [ME-2] J. Michael
- [MI-5] Dale Kildee
- [MI-4] John D.
- [MI-7] Colin F.
- [MI-4] Gene L.
- [NC-7] Mike McIntyre
- [ND] Earl Pomeroy
- [NJ-9] Steven Rothman
- [NM-3] Tom Udall
- [NJ-13] Robert Mendez
- [NV-1] Shelly Berkley
- [NY-2] Steve Israel
- [NY-4] Carolyn McCarthy
- [NY-12] Nydia Velázquez
- [NY-16] Jose Serrano
- [OH-6] Ted Strickland
- [OH-13] Sherrrod Brown
- [OH-17] Tim Ryan
- [OK-2] Dan Eoren
- [OR-5] Darlene Hooley
- [PA-17] Tim Holder
- [SO] Stephanie Herseth
- [TN-4] Lincoln Davis
- [TN-5] Jim Cooper
- [TN-6] Bart Gordon
- [TN-8] John Tanner
- [TX-1] L. Ford
- [TX-16] J. Ruben
- [TX-10] J. Es Gc
- [TX-25] Lloyd D
- [TX-27] Sclcn or Jr
- [TX-28] Henry Cuellar
- [TX-29] G G en
- [TX-30] Ec B . \*
- [UT-3] Jim H. J.
- [VA-3] Brian Baird
- [VA-7] J. McDerm
- [VA-9] A Jim Smith
- [VA-3] N < Rahall

- [AZ-1] Rick Renzi
- [CA-41] Jerry Lewis
- [CA-44] Ken Calvert
- [CO-4] Marilyn Musgrave
- [CO-6] Tom Tancredo
- [CO-7] Bob Beauprez
- [CT-2] Rob Simmons
- [IL-18] Donald Manzullo
- [IN-5] Dan Burton
- [IN-4] Stew Buyer
- [IN-8] John Hostettler
- [KY-1] Ed Whitfield
- [KY-2] Ron Lewis
- [KY-3] Anne Northup
- [KY-4] Geoff Davis
- [KY-5] Harold Rogers

- [LA-5] Rodney Alexander
- [MI-8] Mike Rogers
- [MI-11] Thaddeus McCotter
- [MN-2] John Kline
- [NJ-8] Scott Garrett
- [NJ-7] Mike Ferguson
- [NY-13] Vito Fossella
- [NY-18] Sue Kelly
- [NY-24] Sherwood Boehlert
- [NY-28] John Randy Kuhl
- [PA-3] Phil English
- [TN-3] Zach Wamp
- [TX-2] Ted Poe
- [TX-23] Henry Bonilla
- [WI-8] Mark Green

### Kent Conrad (ND) - Sponsor 25 SENATE Co-SPONSORS S 1998 SENATE VERSION of Stolen Valor:

- [AR] Mark Pryor
- [AR] Blanche Lincoln
- [CO] Ken Salazar
- [CT] Joseph Lieberman
- [HI] Daniel Inouye
- [NE] Benjamin Nelson
- [NJ] Frank Lautenberg
- [NM] Jeff Bingaman
- [NY] Hillary Clinton
- [SD] Tim Johnson
- [WV] John Rockefeller
- [WV] Robert Byrd

- [AK] Ted Stevens
- [CO] Wayne Allard
- [GA] Johnny Isakson
- [GA] Saxby Chambliss
- [KS] Pat Roberts
- [LA] David Vitter
- [MT] Conrad Burns
- [NC] Elizabeth Dole
- [NE] Chuck Hagel
- [PA] Arlen Specter
- [PA] Rick Santorum
- [SD] John Thune
- [WY] Thomas Craig

NOTE: ALL SIX representatives, including members of BOTH parties, have signed on as co-sponsors for this bill. Way to go KENTUCKY.

- 1) Call your Congressman or Congresswoman.
- 2) Ask if they will co-sponsor the bill, and
- 3) Ask them to call you back when they have signed on.

You can find the contact information for your own Congressman or Congresswoman [HERE](#) or from the link below. A personal call, letter or fax is preferable to email when contacting Congress.

**Write to Congress**  
 Enter ZIP Code    
 Find Your Reps

### ENDORSEMENTS

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

**H. Res. 297**  
National Medal of Honor Day

**NEW G.I.**  
Bill of Rights

**H. RES. 404**  
Honoring  
Adm. Jim Stockdale

Dong or Pam Sterner may be contacted at: (719)564-1755 or by Email: [Pam Sterner - Dong Sterner](mailto:Pam.Sterner@DongSterner.com)

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_____	_____
_____	_____
<b>ARMY</b> Valor	<b>NAVY</b> Valor
<b>USMC</b> Valor	<b>AIR FORCE</b> Valor

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| [Remembering 911](#) | [Our Citizens Speak Out](#) | [The Blinch](#)  
[How to Obtain Military Records of a Family Member](#)

### INTERACTIVE FEATURES


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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

July 21, 2006, 12:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Snowflake # 070506-29 — Status of Stolen Valor Act

- You asked about the current status of the proposed “Stolen Valor Act.”
- Representative John Salazar (D-CO) introduced HR 3352 on July 19, 2005. The bill currently has 103 co-sponsors, and it was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, House Judiciary Committee. There has been no committee action.
- In the Senate, Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) has introduced S. 1998, which currently has 26 co-sponsors. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. There has been no committee action.
- Current Federal law makes it unlawful to *wear* a Medal of Honor or other high medal that one has not earned, but it is not unlawful to *claim to have received* such a medal. The Stolen Valor Act is intended to close this loophole.
- We have also checked both the House version and the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), now in conference. Neither bill has anything pertinent on this matter. It is unlikely that Congress will act on the proposed Stolen Valor Act during the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress.
- We will track the progress of this legislation and, should it clear both chambers, will work with your schedulers for the signing ceremony.

Attachment: Snowflake #070506-29

Prepared By Samuel F. Wright, Special Assistant, OSD(LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58596



7/21/2006 3 50 05 PM

~~FOUO~~

JUN 05 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Advisors for Ministries

I talked to Zal about the advisors for the ministries. He said they need more people, but the constraint is on movement and security. He said if more get sent, they will need more security. It is either going to be military or contractor, and cost is the Issue. The alternatives are to provide training for Iraqis to provide the security, or get some third countries to come in.

He says he doesn't see how it is going to get solved at an acceptable pace.

I asked if State had requested the funds to hire contractors, and he said they have not. They feel the traffic won't bear it.

Please put your head into this, and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

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060106-28 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11545-06



7/21/2006 4:06:22 PM

11 L 0559/OSD/50597

~~FOUO~~

JUL 21 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Don -*  
SUBJECT Your Speech to the NAACP

Mr. President,

I watched your presentation to the NAACP today. Congratulations. You did a terrific job in a tough circumstance. I **am** pleased you went. I **am** sure it wasn't your first choice, but it was worth doing, **and** you have a lot of friends and associates who appreciate that you did it.

Respectfully,

DHR:ss  
SF072006-15

350601WH



7/21/2006 5:28:44 PM

21 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58598

~~FOUO~~

June 28, 2006

**TO** Eric Edelman  
**CC** Gen Pete Pace  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Iraq's Ministries

If the ministerial capacity building process is not working and we are dependent upon having it work, then George Casey and you folks ought to decide which of these other ministries we need to do something about, and then we better develop a plan to do it.

My recollection is that Casey said he could not succeed unless the Public Integrity, Finance, Oil, Planning and Justice Ministries also succeed, not just the MOI and MOD.

If that is true, let's come up with a plan.

Thanks.

**Attach:** Ministerial Capacity Building slide

DHR:es  
SP062806-15

.....  
*Please Respond By July 25, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



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INFO MEMO

DSD  
ROUSDP *R* JUL 20 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PWR* JUL 20 2006

SUBJECT: Iraq's Ministries

~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for a plan on advancing ministerial capacity in the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Oil, Planning, and Justice and in the Commission on Public Integrity.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ State Department has the responsibility to build up these ministries, but slow contracting processes, the non-permissive security situation and lack of subject matter experts have resulted in limited progress in ministerial capacity building.
  - Some ministries – such as oil, health and communications – are of direct importance to DoD, since the Iraqi Security Forces rely on them.
  - DoD has validated that “embedding” advisors is the most effective way to train Iraqi security forces. Classroom instruction alone isn't sufficient – continuous contact seems to be the best way to inculcate proper processes and management systems.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The amount of time that advisors spend with their ministries must be increased. Currently, advisors are only visiting key ministries one or two times per week. The Embassy security office often cancels convoys outside of the International Zone, up to 30% of the time.
  - The use of contractors who can live and work in outside of the International Zone without security details should be evaluated. Hiring Iraqi-Americans may be particularly valuable.
  - Additional subject matter expert contractors would be used in addition to IRMO advisors, NGOs and coalition partners.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ This suggests that, with respect to selected key ministries our investment should be comparable to our investment in the ministries of defense and interior (i.e., about 100 full-time advisors per ministry).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We are exploring ways to resolve security concerns so that these advisors can work full-time at the ministries, including securing specific ministries with

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Prepared by Timothy Bennett, DRSC

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11-L-0559/OSD/58600

OSD 11549-06



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Personal Security Details, or augmenting ISF security with Coalition forces. We will have a comprehensive **plan** for your review by 30 July 2006.

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject:** Iraq's Ministries

**Control Number:** 1-062806-28

<b>Title/Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>
Director, NESANG	 John Trigilio	13 July 2006

July 23,2006

For: Secretary of Defense  
From: W. J. Haynes   
Subject: USG legal representation of current and former Federal officials  
sued in their personal capacity in civil actions for money  
damages based on their performance of official duties in the  
conduct of ~~war~~.

Attached for your information please find three items of correspondence  
on this subject.

Attachments: a/s

11-L-0559/OSD/58603



7/24/2006 9 06 26 AM



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

December 9, 2005

The Honorable Paul J. McNulty  
Acting Deputy Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General McNulty:

Consistent with the Attorney General memorandum of April 15, 2002 regarding communications with the Department of Justice, this letter recommends that the Department of Justice take action, consistent with applicable law, to provide legal representation to current and former Federal officials when civil actions for money damages are filed against them in their personal capacity based on their performance of official duties in the conduct of war.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, "there is a strong public interest in protecting public officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages actions." The Court, noting that "it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty," has recognized that the social costs of suits against Federal officials in their personal capacity for money damages "include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." The Court has also noted in this context "the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties." In short, the Court recognizes "the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority."

Civil actions for money damages against current and former Federal officials in their personal capacity, based on their performance of official duties in the conduct of war, range from *Arar v. Ashcroft* in the Eastern District of New York, to *Ali v. Rumsfeld* in the Northern District of Illinois (subsequently transferred to the District of Columbia<sup>6</sup>), to the most recent *Khaled El-Masri v. Tenet* in the Eastern District of Virginia. Without confirming or denying any allegation in any

<sup>1</sup> *Crawford-El v. Britton*, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998).

<sup>2</sup> *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 814, quoting *Gregoire v. Biddle*, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).


<sup>5</sup> *Butz v. Economou*, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).

<sup>6</sup> *In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation*, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation) (June 17, 2005).

particular complaint, which I **am** not in a position to do, I note that the complaints in these examples deal with **alleged** official activities of **the** then-Attorney **General**, the Secretary of Defense, and the then-Director of **Central** Intelligence and the organizations they supervised. Such cases directly implicate **the** abovequoted **concerns** identified by the Supreme **Court**.

I recommend that **the** Department provide, consistent with applicable law, to current and **former** Federal officials **sued** for the performance of official duties in **the** conduct of war **the** **robust** legal representation that advances "the need **to** protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and **the** related public interest **in** encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." Such robust legal representation is essential to help ensure that U.S. law enforcement, military and intelligence personnel and their leaders are able **and** **willing**, **consistent** with **the** **law**, **to** protect the American people and achieve victory in **war**.

Thank you for your Department's continuing leadership in protecting the **American** people and for your consideration of my recommendation.

Sincerely,  
  
 David S. Addington  
 Chief of Staff and Counsel

~~FOUO~~

JAN 03 2006

TO David Addington  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA*  
SUBJECT: Lawsuits

Thanks **so much for sending me a copy of your note to the Acting Deputy Attorney General on the subject of lawsuits against public officials. I appreciate your taking such prompt action!**

Regards,

DHR:dt  
122905-23 (TS).doc

~~FOUO~~



Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
Washington, D.C. 20530

March 20, 2006

The Honorable David S. Addington  
Chief of Staff  
Office of the Vice President  
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Mr. Addington:

Thank you for your letter of February 1, 2006, recommending that the Department of Justice take appropriate steps consistent with applicable law to protect intelligence sources and methods when civil actions are filed against private entities based on their alleged compliance with direction from the United States related to the conduct of the ongoing war against terrorism or arising from other alleged forms of cooperation in that war effort. Appropriate steps discussed in your letter that the Department should consider include efforts to intervene or the filing of statements of interest in litigation, and affording legal representation to intelligence sources, either directly or by private counsel at federal expense.

I agree that the United States has a compelling interest in preventing the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods needed to conduct the war and protect Americans from attack. When litigation has implicated such interests, the Department has responded aggressively and will continue to do so to the full extent of the law. The Department's commitment to the protection of sources and methods remains steadfast both in cases against the United States and its officials or agents, as well as those filed against private sector entities based on their alleged assistance to the United States in the conduct of the war against terrorism.

I also agree that the steps outlined in your letter may be appropriate options in such litigation. The specific manner in which the Department will proceed in any given case will vary of course depending on the circumstances presented. In cases in which the United States is not a party, the Department has filed statements of interest or moved to intervene to protect intelligence sources and methods. The Department has also asserted the state secrets privilege as well as other available and appropriate defenses in cases involving both private and government defendants, and will continue to do so when necessary to protect compelling national security interests. The Department may also provide legal representation to private entities under 28 U.S.C. § 517 where the interests of the United States so warrant. Where direct representation by the Department would not be appropriate, the government may consider authorization of payment for or reimbursement of the costs of legal representation by private counsel.

The Honorable David S. Addington  
Page 2

Your interest in **this** important **area** of litigation is greatly appreciated. Please contact me at your convenience should you have **questions** about Department policy or **practice** regarding suits that implicate intelligence **sources** or **methods** or the status of **particular** litigation.

Sincerely,



Paul J. McNulty  
Deputy Attorney General

~~FOUO~~

FEB 23 2006

TO: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Proposal for CFIUS Situations

I would like a complete proposal from Mike Donley as to how we rewire these CFIUS situations. Certainly, the Joint Staff ought to be involved.

Furthermore, it looks like too many people are involved in it, and nobody is responsible. I don't understand how all these people could have looked at it, and not one person had the judgment to raise the issue. It is obviously a big issue. In retrospect, one would think that one out of 17 would have seen it before the fact, rather than after.

Please come back with a proposal, and let's do it in ten days.

Thanks.

Attach: List of DoD Entities that Participated in the CFIUS Review

DHR:m  
022306-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 03/03/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58609





ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JUL 24 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management

*Robert S. Newton for*

SUBJECT: CFIUS Case Processing in DoD

- In the attached snowflake, you asked for a proposal for rewiring the Department's CFIUS review process. In coordination with Eric Edelman, we reviewed CFIUS case processing and have forwarded the following key recommendations to the Deputy Secretary:
  - Prepare a DoD Instruction to document the responsibilities, authorities, and process for developing and coordinating the Department's position on CFIUS cases.
    - › Assign and clearly depict responsibilities of the pertinent OSD Principal Staff Assistants, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Heads of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as appropriate.
  - Elevate the level of coordination and approval of CFIUS cases within the Department.
  - Implement a proactive approach to the assessment of risk in CFIUS cases for infrastructure critical to DoD missions.
    - › Develop a consistent methodology for conducting and documenting risk assessments.
    - › Assess baseline risk in Defense critical infrastructure sectors.
    - › Engage the Intelligence Community in risk assessments to ensure comprehensive threat information is developed and assessed.
  - In coordination with the member agencies of CFIUS, determine whether additional statutory or procedural remedies are necessary to incentivize firms to enter into agreements to mitigate DoD national security concerns with foreign acquisitions including those involving dual-use technologies.
  - In conjunction with the documentation of the Department's responsibilities and authorities for CFIUS case processing, determine the appropriate level of resources for CFIUS-related functions and make recommendations for changes where necessary.

Prepared By: Bob Menig (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58610



7/24/2006 5:58:30 PM

7/19  
1900

~~FOUO~~

33  
50

July 19, 2006

TO: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Georgia State Patrol

Please have someone *draft* a note to these folks thanking them for the coin and the patch they sent me, and send them one of my coins.

Thanks.

PLS ADDRESS NOTE TO:

Attach: Georgia State Patrol notecard

DHR:sa  
SF071906-15

**Please Respond By 07/31/06**

From: randall.elrod@us.army.mil [mailto:randall.elrod@us.army.mil]  
 Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:41 PM  
 To: (b)(6)  
 Subject: Re: Patch / Coin

SFC Lawton G. Taylor  
 Georgia State Patrol  
 (b)(6)

Thanks Randy

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6)  
 Date: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04 pm  
 Subject: Patch / Coin

- > Randy-
- >
- > I gave the **boss** the GA State police coin and patch this morning.
- > He would
- > like to write a thank you note. Can you give me a name and
- > address of whom
- > he should write the letter to. Also, received your write up ref
- > Nic...
- > Thanks. (b)(6)
- >

OSD 11653-06



7/25/2006 1:26 18 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58611


11/25/06

SIR,  
THE ATTACHED IS  
FROM THE GEORGIA  
STATE POLICE (FOLLOWING  
YOUR MAY 4 TRIP  
TO ATLANTA)

State Capitol  
Zell Miller  
Governor of Georgia



1937 - 1948



1948 - PRESENT



State Capitol  
Zell Miller  
Governor of Georgia



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 24 2006

335 50

Sergeant First Class Lawton G. Taylor  
Georgia State Patrol

(b)(6)

Dear Sergeant Taylor,

Thank you so much for the Georgia State Patrol coin and patch that you sent me. Your thoughtfulness means a great deal. I am delighted to have them both.

As a token of my appreciation, I have enclosed one of my coins for you.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,


244/104



OSD 11653-06

7/25/2006 1:26:11 PM

190006



OSD 11653-06



7/25/2006 13:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58615

FOUO

1225  
24 Jul 06  
BLS

July 24, 2006

110,01

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Army Situation

I think we need to have a meeting soon to decide how we are going to handle the **Army** situation in terms of the public affairs side of it. I notice Pete Schoomaker is testifying on the subject, which he told us he would be doing. We have to develop an approach. Let's pull that together for Tuesday morning or even today.

My guess is that it will require **us** to make some adjustments in the strategy and the so-called needs or requirements, but to do it by adjusting the timeframe in which things have to be accomplished.

Specifically, for example, B.B. Bell **is** changing the Korea war plan dramatically by reducing the requirement. After we have adjusted his war plan **and** looked at the requirements and the strategies and then fit the Army program into it, **we** then better decide if we **are** satisfied with that. If we are not satisfied, we should **go to** the President and the Congress to ask for additional funds.

We need to at least do a much better job of talking to the Congress so **they** stop cutting funds, although Duncan Hunter said that is going to happen regardless of what we do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF072406-08

24 Jul 06

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/27/06*

FOUO



7/25/2006 10:25:11 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58616

24 July 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Army Situation

Don,

- On Friday, 28 July, VADM Stan Szemborski, Brad Berkson, and I will meet with you regarding the Army Budget.
- The following Wednesday, 2 August, we will convene a meeting with the Army including Fran Harvey and Pete Schoemaker.


*Stan*

116.01

24 Jul 06

24 Jul 06

11-L-0559/OSD/58617



7/25/2006 10:25:33 AM



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

JUL 22 2006

200,4 WH

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AIDE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
HQDA DAEC-CA EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF THE  
AIR FORCE

Subject: Nominations of Military Personnel - Program Manager,  
Policy, Plans and Requirement Directorate, White House  
Military Office

Ref: WIMO ltr to OSD ES of 15 Mar 2006, #OSD 04356,-06

The attached memorandum from the White House Military Office requests the Department of Defense to submit six nominees (USN (1), USMC (1), USA (2), USAF (2)) for consideration to fill the Program Manager, Policy, Plans and Requirement Directorate, White House Military Office replacing Major Tay W. Johannes, USAF, 516-96-8455. It is essential that only candidates meeting or exceeding qualifications and criteria described in the reference be nominated for this position.

Please forward service records of nominees to my POC listed below by 15 September 2006. Completed nomination packages must include a record summary, a biography, copies of the last six evaluation reports, a current official photo and a signed SF Form 86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions).

22 Jul 06

Nominees should be available to report February 2007 contingent upon successful completion of a background investigation for Presidential Support Duty (Yankee White). Qualifications for this assignment are under the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.55 and DoD Instruction 5210.87. A billet description is provided to aid in selecting qualified candidates per the reference.

The OSD point of contact is GySgt Remayl L. Shaffer-Hardy, at (b)(6) Your response should include the name and phone number of your POC.

WILLIAM P. MARRIOTT  
Executive Secretary

15 Mar-06

Attachments  
a/s



04356-06

~~FOUO~~

May 22, 2006

200.1

TO Dorrance Smith

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PA.*

**SUBJECT** Extra Leave for Troops to *Speak Upon* Return from Iraq

At the Town Hall Pete Pace talked about getting some Public Affairs assistance by giving troops ~~returning~~ from Iraq 3 or 4 days of additional leave, and having them speak to the ~~Rotary~~ Club and various church groups.

Please come up with a proposal **as to how** that can be done.

**Thanks.**

DHR:ss  
052206-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/07/06*

22 May 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58619

OSD 11678-06  
  
7/25/2006 12:29:29 PM

7124  
1730

~~FOUO~~

July 24, 2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: General Peter Pace  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
RE: Snowflake 052206-10.

200.1

Sir,

We are developing a traveling speaker's tour titled *Why We Serve*.

I have asked the Service Secretaries to temporarily assign three members who have recently returned from serving in Iraq or Afghanistan to OASD PA for 60 days in support of this program (see attached.) We hope to begin the first tour in mid-August.

My staff is also working with General Pace's staff to draft a memo from him encouraging the Service's participation.

24 Jul 06

22 May 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58620



71251200612:50:30 PM



WBUC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

July 21, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Military Personnel Participation in National Speakers Bureau Program

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Public Affairs has developed an Armed Services speakers program titled *Why We Serve*. This program is designed to give CWOT veterans the opportunity to share their personal experiences, while conveying to the greater public the nobility of service.

The first phase of the program will begin August 14 and continue **through** early October. Speakers from each Service will receive training from public affairs staff in preparation **to** address community organizations across the United States.

No later than August 7, please nominate three service members from each Service (i.e., **Army**, Navy, Air Force and Marine **Corps**) for temporary assignment **to the program** as speakers. Nominees may range in grade from E-4 through **O-4**, and must have returned from duty in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Horn of Africa within the last **90 days**. These individuals should be selected based on communications skills, maturity, appearance, and representation of the Service's contribution to the joint **fight**. Nominations should include a brief biography and contact information for the individual's command.

Nominees selected for the program will be placed on Temporary Duty orders for a period of 60 days, beginning August 14, and assigned to OASD(PA). OASD(PA) will **fund** CONUS travel, lodging and all other costs associated with the program. The OASD(PA) point of contact is Maj. Matt Morgan, program director, [matthew.mormn@osd.mil](mailto:matthew.mormn@osd.mil), (b)(6)

  
Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

CC:  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Joint Staff  
USD(P&R)  
OGC



11-L-0559/OSD/58621

CJCS

~~FOUO~~

July 20, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani  
Robert Wilkie

451

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Armor Classification

Please get back to me as soon as possible on what we do about the meeting we had with Duncan Hunter today.

If the classification system is wrong or leading people in the wrong direction, we need to either change the classification system, so it is no longer based on where a HMMWV is hardened, or add a new classification system that reflects what we really care about -- a level of protection at 7/8ths of an inch or more.

Second, we need to get the precise dates all the experts think they will be able to assure us that every vehicle will have the appropriate armor. If we don't like the dates, tell me and we will change the dates. Then we will tell people how they can meet the earlier dates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF072006-26

.....  
Please Respond By 07/27/06

26501060

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58622

OSD 11711-06  
  
7/25/2006 2:33:18 PM

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

June 14,2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT Short Tours **of Duty** in Iraq

**Please get back to me on the issue about troops serving short tours of duty in Iraq and punching tickets, like they did in Vietnam.**

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SP061406-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/11/06*

~~FOUO~~



11-L-0559/OSD/58623



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-0400-06  
26 July 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR/P 25 Jul 06*

SUBJECT: Short Tours in Iraq (SF 061406-15)

- In response to your issue (TAB A), there is no evidence of shortened deployments to "ticket punch" a tour of duty in Iraq. The Services are rotating personnel and units based on Service rotation policies and specific mission requirements. The following highlight Service responses.
  - Current Service rotation policies are: USA - 365 days, USAF - 120 days, USN - 180 days, USMC - 210-365 days.
  - No Army units rotated for less than a 4-month period.
  - No Marine Corps units rotated for less than a 4-month period.
  - The Navy rotated 13 ships for less than 4 months due to mission needs. These ships supported the WOT surge operations and Marine Corps support and/or offloading.
  - The Air Force deploys expeditionary capability for 4-month rotations. Reserve Component personnel sometimes rotate for less than 4-month periods in support of enduring operations to encourage volunteerism and decrease mobilization.
  - No special operations forces units rotate for less than 4-month periods in support of enduring requirements. Some special operations crews and individuals rotate every 90-120 days in support of specific mission requirements.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 11752-06



7/26/2006 9:45:25 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58624

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

June 14, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Short Tours of Duty in Iraq

Please get back to me on the issue about troops serving short tours of duty in Iraq and punching tickets, like they did in Vietnam.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF061406-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/11/06*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B

### COORDINATION

USA	COL Strong	20 June 2006
USN	CAPT Wode	20 June 2006
USAF	Col Hollerbach	22 June 2006
USMC	Col Haines	20 June 2006

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/58626

~~FOUO~~

June 21, 2006

TO: Michael Wynne  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Gen Mike Moseley  
LTG Steve Blum  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Ellington Field, Texas

Please take another look at *the* plan for the transition at Ellington Field, Texas, of the current F-16 flying mission to Predator UAVs.

I am told *the* plan *calls* for the transition to take place by FY08. It is important that the F-16 to Predator transition not slip and that there is little to no gap between *the* two missions.

Let me know what you find out and how you propose to manage this.

Thanks.

DHR:dl  
SP062106-16

.....  
Please Respond By 07/27/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58627





SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

26 JUL 2006/1200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force *MW*

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to Transition Plan Inquiry for Ellington Field Air Guard Station, Texas

- This is in response to your June 21 inquiry concerning the transition plan for Ellington Field, Texas, to move from an F-16 to a Predator mission.
- The Air Force is fully committed to ensure that there will be no gap between the F-16 and Predator UAV missions for the 147<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing at Ellington Field, Texas.
- The current plan is to position a Predator Ground Control Station (GCS) at Ellington Field with an IOC of 2Q/FY08 and assign the first four MQ-1 Predator aircraft to the 147<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing in the third quarter of FY08. Four more aircraft are to arrive in FY09, and another four in FY 10. While TX ANG favors basing their aircraft at Ellington Field when not deployed, the final location will be determined based on available airspace, adhering to applicable FAA restrictions, and the ability to meet training and other requirements.
- The 147<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's 15 F-16s are currently scheduled to be retired by the end of FY08 as a result of BRAC realignment - six F-16s will be retired in the third quarter and the remaining nine in the fourth quarter of FY08.
- The NGB continues to support the current course of action: retiring Ellington's F-16s in FY08 and transitioning the 147<sup>th</sup> FW to the Predator mission. This will provide long-term sustainability, is vital to our GWOT efforts, and is in the best interest of Homeland Security and National Defense.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

Memo (21 June 06) from SECDEF to SECAF

Prepared by: FREDERICK DONOVAN, AF/A8FA, DSN: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58628

OSD 11837-06



7/27/2006 7:16:46 AM

FOUO

August 01, 2006

452 F

TO: Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
Lt Gen Gene Renuart

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Correspondence from Congress

I just saw that Warner, Levin and McCain wrote me about Dennis Blair and the F-22 multi-year procurement. I have never seen the letter.

Please be sure that I know about letters like that from Congressmen and am at least given a copy at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF080106-18

AUG 02 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*8/1/06 DR*  
*8/2/06*

*1 Aug 06*

*SecDef -*

- ATTACHED IS COPY OF WARNER, LEVIN, MCCAIN LETTER.
- ALSO ATTACHED IS PROPOSED INTERIM REPLY INFORMING THEM THAT KEN KAISER WILL RESPOND MORE FULLY ON THE ISSUE.

*26 Jul 06*

*Robert*  
Robert Rangel  
OSD 11862-06



FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58629

8/2/2006 12:53:27 PM

FOUO

August 01, 2006

452 F

TO: Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
Lt Gen Gene Renuart

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Correspondence from Congress

I just saw that Warner, Levin and McCain wrote me about Dennis Blair and the F-22 multi-year procurement. I have never seen the letter.

Please be sure that I know about letters like that from Congressmen and am at least given a copy at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF080106-18

.....  
AUG 02 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*8/1 [initials]  
8/2*

*1 Aug 06*

*SecDef -*

- ATTACHED IS COPY OF WARNER, LEVIN, MCCAIN LETTER.
- ALSO ATTACHED IS PROPOSED INTERIM REPLY INFORMING THEM THAT KEN KAISER WILL RESPOND MORE FULLY ON THE ISSUE.

*26 Jul 06*

*Robert*  
Robert Rangel  
OSD 11862-06



FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58630

8/2/2006 12:53:27 PM



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 2 2006

452 F

The Honorable John Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 205 10

Dear Mr. Chairman:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with Senators Levin and McCain regarding The Washington Post article on possible ties between Admiral Blair and EDO Corp. I have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to look into this matter. We will get back to you as soon **as** possible.

2


With best wishes,

09 06

Sincerely,

26 Jul 06

OSD 11862-06  
8/2/2006 12:28:01 PM



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 2 2006

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

Thank you for the letter you signed with Senators Warner and McCain regarding *The Washington Post* article on possible ties between Admiral Blair and EDO Corp. I have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to look into this matter. We will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,


Sincerely,

OSD 11862-06



8/2/2006 12:28:00 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58632



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 2 2006

The Honorable John McCain  
Chairman  
Airland Subcommittee  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 205 10

Dear Mr. Chairman:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with Senators Warner and Levin regarding *The Washington Post* article on possible ties between Admiral Blair and EDO *Corp.* I have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to look into this matter. We will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 11862-06



8121200612:27:57 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58633

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948, Suscense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6) Email: [suspense-desk@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:suspense-desk@osd.pentagon.mil)

Action Agency

IG

Suspense Date

7 Aug 2006

### 1. ACTION TAKEN (Check One)

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to 1 (Justify Below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify below / include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)

### 2 JUSTIFICATION

### 3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY <u>IG</u>	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)	
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER _____	Signature _____	Date Signed _____

c. TELEPHONE NO. _____	<b>5. ACTION TAKEN</b> (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
d. DATE _____	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
<b>4. CCD CONTROL #</b> <u>OSD 11862-06</u> 	b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	e. OTHER (Specify) _____		
		Signature _____	Date Signed _____

JOHN WALSH, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA  
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA  
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS  
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA  
 SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
 JOHN ENGLISH, NEVADA  
 JAMES M. TALENTY, MISSOURI  
 SANDBY CHAMBERLAIN, GEORGIA  
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
 ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA  
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
 JOHN THUNE, SOUTH DAKOTA

CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK  
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS  
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA  
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT  
 JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND  
 DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII  
 BILL NELSON, FLORIDA  
 B. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA  
 MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA  
 EYAN BAYH, INDIANA  
 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

CHARLES S. ABELL, STAFF DIRECTOR  
 RICHARD D. DEBOSS, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

**United States Senate**  
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8060

July 26, 2006

**VIA FACSIMILE ONLY**

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary  
 Department of Defense  
 The Pentagon 3E880  
 Washington, DC 20301-3010

**Re: F-22 Multiyear Procurement Proposal****Dear Mr. Secretary:**

As you may know, for some time now the congressional defense committees have been considering the Air Force's proposal to procure 60 F-22A Raptors under a 3-year multiyear contract. In fact, the matter is currently being evaluated by conferees in the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act,

Proponents of the proposal have repeatedly cited analysis conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses ("IDA") in support of the proposition that buying these aircraft under a multiyear contract will achieve "substantial savings" over doing so through a series of annual contracts as required by statute in section 2306b of title 10, United States Code. The IDA has held itself out as an independent federally funded research and development center ("FFRDC").

Against that backdrop, we were extremely disturbed and disappointed to read yesterday's edition of *The Washington Post* that reports that IDA President Admiral Dennis C. Blair has "extensive ties" to at least one of the F-22A's subcontractors. According to this article, Admiral Blair apparently sits on the board of directors of at least one subcontractor on the F-22 program, EDO Corp. The article also states that Admiral Blair holds options to buy tens of thousands of shares of EDO stock. We do not currently know the extent of Admiral Blair's involvement, if any, in the preparation of IDA's report on the F-22 program and related work.

Particularly on multibillion dollar procurement programs, we must hold not only government employees but also contractors to the highest standards of business ethics. That is why we sent a letter to the Government Accountability Office earlier this summer, requesting that GAO review the adequacy of existing procedures and safeguards to prevent individual contractor employees from having personal conflicts of interest or other ethical problems when they perform services for or on behalf of the Department of Defense (copy attached).

OSD 11862-06



11-L-0559/OSD/58635

7/27/2006 9:43:29 AM


We share the view of U.S. Comptroller General David Walker that, if the conflict of interests allegations are true, "[t]he individual involved could not be deemed to be independent, and if the individual had a substantial role with IDA I don't believe IDA can be viewed as independent." Accordingly, we request that the Department of Defense undertake a thorough independent review of these matters. This review should address, at a minimum—

- the nature and extent of Admiral Blair's interest in EDO;
- the nature and extent of EDO's interest in the F-22 multi-year contract;
- the nature and extent of Admiral Blair's role in the IDA study and related work; and
- the extent to which the Air Force relied upon the IDA study and related work in determining that the multi-year contract is in the Department's interest.


Because of the serious nature of these allegations, we ask that you hold the Department's F-22 multi-year proposal in abeyance until this investigation has been completed. Should the conflict of interest allegations prove true, we believe that the proposal should be withdrawn until a new study can be completed to replace the IDA review.

We appreciate your timely response as to how you intend to handle this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact any of us at your convenience.


Sincerely,



Carl Levin  
Ranking Member



John Warner  
Chairman



John McCain  
Chairman  
Airland Subcommittee

Enclosure

cc: Tom Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense

11-L-0559/OSD/58636

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA  
JAMES INHOFE, OKLAHOMA  
PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS  
JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA  
BRIAN IN COLLINS, MAINE  
JOHN BARRIS, NEVADA  
JAMES M. TALENT, MISSOURI  
ANDREW CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA  
LINDSEY D. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
ELIZABETH BOURN, NORTH CAROLINA  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
JOHN THUNE, SOUTH DAKOTA

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JOSEPH I. LIBERMAN, CONNECTICUT  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND  
DANIEL E. AKAKA, HAWAII  
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA  
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA  
MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA  
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA  
WILLIAM RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

CHARLES S. ABELL, STAFF DIRECTOR  
RICHARD D. DEBOUCE, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

**United States Senate**  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 8, 2006

Honorable David Walker  
Comptroller General  
Government Accountability Office  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Walker:

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense has become increasingly reliant upon contractors to support and carry out defense missions. Contractor personnel work side-by-side with Government employees (whether civilian or military), often in the Federal workplace (or on the battlefield), and sometimes on substantially the same, mission-critical tasks. For example, contractor personnel frequently participate in deliberative meetings with Government employees, provide oversight of other contractors, and make critical recommendations on decisions that bind the Government and decisions concerning the Government's disbursement of Federal funds. Section 2383 of title 10, United States Code defines such mission-critical tasks as "functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions".

To protect the integrity of Federal operations and programs, Executive Branch employees have long been subject to an extensive set of conflict of interest laws and ethics rules. These laws and rules address issues such as individual conflicts of interest, negotiating for employment, gifts, misuse of property and information, and misuse of actual or apparent authority. Contractor personnel are not generally subject to either the criminal conflict of interest laws or the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch ("Standards of Conduct"), even when they perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions. While section 2383 requires the Department of Defense to address potential organizational conflicts of interest of contractors in the performance of functions closely associated with governmental functions, it does not address the possibility of individual conflicts of interest on the part of contractor employees.

We think it is important to ensure integrity in Governmental decision-making under all circumstances. For this reason, we ask that GAO review the adequacy of existing procedures and safeguards to prevent individual contractor employees who perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions from having personal conflicts of interest or other ethical problems when they perform services for or on behalf of the Department of Defense. It would be particularly helpful if your review were to address the following questions:

- What steps, if any, has the Department taken to identify and mitigate potential ethical problems and conflicts of interest by individual contractor employees who perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions? Does the Department have any rules or contract requirements addressing these issues?
- What mechanisms, if any, have the Department's contractors used to address these issues? Are there any model codes of ethics or standards of conduct that help contractors address these issues? If so, how many of the Department's contractors actually use these standards?
- What types of conduct are prohibited for Federal employees, but not for contractor employees who perform similar functions? What vulnerabilities do these differences in permissible conduct create for the Department of Defense?
- How does the Department find out about contractor employee misconduct? Does the Department have any mechanisms that would enable it to determine whether contractor employees have engaged in conduct that would be prohibited for Federal employees?

If you have any questions about this request, please contact Scott Stucky (224-8629) or Peter Levine (224-8631) of the Committee staff. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin  
Ranking Member



John Warner  
Chairman



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

AUG 15 2006

452 F

The Honorable John Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 205 10-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of Defense has asked me to respond on his behalf to the issues raised in your joint letter of July 26, 2006, concerning allegations of a conflict of interest (COI) by Admiral Blair (USN Ret.), the President of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), with respect to the Business Case Analysis performed to support the proposed F-22 Multiyear Procurement (MYP).

I share your concern. If we are to consider work done by our Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) in decision-making, it must be free from COI and maintain a high standard of business ethics. With respect to the particular allegations at IDA, the DoD Inspector General is performing an independent review. The results of the Inspector General's review will be provided to you and other interested members of Congress separately when it is completed. In addition, I am reviewing the COI policies, processes and management controls at IDA and all of our other FFRDCs.

The Secretary of the Air Force advised that he relied on the IDA analysis in evaluation of the six criteria specified in 10 U.S.C. 2306b(a) for MYP approval. We have provided our findings associated with those six criteria. MYP is a good acquisition strategy that can save the Department money on the equipment we need. Rather than hold our proposal for F-22 MYP in abeyance, pending completion of the DoDIG review, I request your support of F-22 MYP on the condition that we find that we can save at least \$225M as compared to the cost of ~~three~~ single-year procurements. We will not execute the MYP contracts unless we can conclude from the actual contract negotiations that there will be at least \$225M in savings. If the Congress approves the MYP, this strategy will empower the Department of Defense to secure savings to the taxpayer. If savings are sufficient, we will provide the appropriate notices and multiyear certification to Congress before contract award. This gives the Congress assurance that these savings will be realized before a DoD commitment is made to the MYP. The Secretary of the Air Force has agreed to this plan, which is compliant with our certification requirements for MYP.

(26 Jul 06)



R 11862 06

Identical letters have been sent to Senator Levin and Senator McCain and copies provided to the Chairman and Ranking members of the other Defense Committees.

Sincerely,



Kenneth J. Krieg

cc:

The Honorable **Ted** Stevens,  
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Daniel Inouye,  
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable C. W. **Bill Young**,  
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable John P. Murtha,  
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Duncan Hunter,  
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee  
The Honorable Ike Skelton,  
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

30 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

AUG 15 2006

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 205 10-6050

Dear Senator Levin:

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Kenneth J. Krieg

cc:

The Honorable Ted Stevens,  
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Daniel Inouye,  
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young,  
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable John P. Murtha,  
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Duncan Hunter,  
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee  
The Honorable Ike Skelton,  
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee



**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010**

**ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS**

**AUG 15 2006**

The Honorable John McCain  
Chairman  
AirLand Subcommittee  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6052

Dear Senator McCain:

The Secretary of Defense has asked me to respond on his behalf to the issues raised in your joint letter of July 26, 2006, concerning allegations of a conflict of interest (COI) by Admiral Blair (USN Ret.), the President of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), with respect to the Business Case Analysis performed to support the proposed F-22 Multiyear Procurement (MYP).

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Identical letters have been sent to Senator Warner and Senator Levin and copies provided to the Chairman and Ranking members of the other Defense Committees.

Sincerely,



Kenneth J. Krieg

cc:

The Honorable **Ted** Stevens,  
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Daniel Inouye,  
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable **C. W.** Bill Young,  
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable John P. Murtha,  
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  
The Honorable Duncan Hunter,  
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee  
The Honorable Ike Skelton,  
Ranking Member, House **Armed** Services Committee

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

July 07, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
ADM Ed Giambastiani  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT North Korean Missile Exercise - After Action/Lessons Learned

I would like a lessons learned/after action report on the effort we have gone through over the past two weeks on the North Korean missiles. The current system is not working well enough.

I would like separate after-action reports from Admiral Fallon, General Cartwright and Admiral Keating. It seems to me that each had a somewhat different perspective.

Please do a lessons learned and let me know how we can get this fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF070506-31

.....  
*Please Respond By 01/26/06*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 11933-06



7/27/2006 3:28:33 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58645

Korea (North)

750106

~~FOUO~~

July 11, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Appointing Someone as Deputy to Jaap's Liaison to Karzai

What do you think about trying to put a U.S. person as deputy to the Dutchman who reports and deals with Karzai on Jaap's behalf?

Thanks.

DHR ks2  
SF071006-21

.....  
*Please Respond By July 31, 2006*

NATO  
230

11 JUL 06

27 JUL 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58646



7/28/2006 10:22:25 AM

FOUO

INFO MEMO

NATO 230

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

JUL 27 2006

SUBJECT: NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for our thoughts on appointing an American deputy to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan. We fully support the idea and are working to make this happen.
- (U) The SCR has three POLADs, none of whom is designated as a deputy SCR. All three of these positions are Voluntary National Contributions.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ In a 17 July 2006 meeting with General Jones, the new Dutch SCR Daan Everts agreed in principle to appointing an American as his deputy.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ SCREverts, SecGen de Hoop Scheffer, and General Jones also all agreed that the NATO SCR Office must be more robust and play a stronger role.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ To ensure we have a top-rate American in an influential position on the SCR's staff, we should consider offering one on secondment.
  - o We will work quickly within OSD and with State to see if we can offer a candidate.
  - o Once we have a person identified, we will press NATO to designate him as the deputy SCR.
- (U) We will keep you posted on further progress and issues.

OSD 11972-06



7/28/2006 10:23:15 AM

Prepared by DB Des Roches, ISP/NATO Policy (b)(6) Richard Dotson (b)(6)

FOUO



\* 0 6 / 0 0 8 8 6 7 - E S \*

11-L-0559/OSD/58647

27 JUL 06

~~FOUO~~

July 11, 2006

**TO** Eric Edelman  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**SUBJECT** Appointing ~~Someone~~ as Deputy to Jaap's Liaison to Karzai

What do you think about trying to put a U.S. person as deputy to the Dutchman who reports and deals with Karzai on Jaap's behalf?

Thanks.

DHR ks2  
SF071006-21

.....  
*Please Respond By July 31, 2006*


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58648

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: NATO SCR in Afghanistan

I-Number: 06/008867-ES

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Acting ASD, International Security Policy	Joe Benkert	 JUL 24 2006
DASD, Eur&NATO Policy	<del>Don</del> Fata	 JUL 21 2006
Director, NATO Policy	Tony Aldwell	 21
Deputy Director, ISA/NESA	Laura Cooper	21 July 2006

~~FOUO~~

July 18, 2006

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Response to Krepinevich

*Iraq*

Please think about you responding or getting someone else to respond directly to the attached article by Andy Krepinevich.

I have just been in Iraq. Our people say it is not accurate, and you ought to quickly get an article out in response to it, if you can find somebody or some way to do it.

Thanks.

Attach. Krepinevich, Andrew. "Send in the Advisers,;" July 11, 2006.

DHR:dh  
SF071806-10

.....  
***Please Respond By 07/27/06***

*18 Jul 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58650



7/28/2006 4:43:01 PM

# Send in the Advisers

- SIGN INTO E-MAIL THIS
- PRINT
- SAVE

ARTICLE TOOLS  
SPONSORED BY

AP

By ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH  
Published: July 11, 2006

Washington

## Readers' Opinions Forum: The Transition in Iraq

**THE** United States has more than 130,000 troops in Iraq, 14 combat brigades in all. But as sectarian violence rages in Baghdad, it is increasingly clear that success or failure in this war does not rest solely, or even primarily, on the efforts of American combat troops. Rather, it lies in the hands of some 4,000 soldiers — the American officers and sergeants embedded as combat advisers in the new Iraqi security forces.

These advisers are the steel rods around which the newly poured concrete of the Iraq military will harden. They will determine whether President Bush can keep his pledge to "stand up" Iraqi forces so that American forces in Iraq can "stand down." And it is the Iraqi military that will in turn play the crucial role in girding Iraq against the chaos that now threatens to engulf it.

Given the importance of the advisory effort, one might expect it to be a top priority for the Bush administration. But there are worrisome signs that this is not the case.

Despite their critical part in this war, the advisers are thinly spread. Every Iraqi battalion, made up of some 500 troops, is assigned roughly a dozen advisers, although the true requirement is closer to 30. Sadly, the

---

Army's best officers avoid serving **as** advisers if at **all** possible. The reason is simple: the Army is **far** more likely to promote officers who have served with American units than those who are familiar with a **foreign** military.

Because of the resulting shortfall, some Army units have been given the **task** of augmenting the advisory teams. Yet often these units simply send their "problem children" — their **most** marginal **officers** and sergeants — to support the advisers. This places **an** additional burden on the advisers, who must not only coach the Iraqis but **also** deal with their less-than-capable **American** colleagues.

Some American brigade commanders further compound the problem by imposing extensive **reporting** requirements on the **advisory** teams. While the **Army** has scores of "PowerPoint rangers" (the title given to officers who prepare briefings and **reports**), the Iraqis have none. And so the advisers often spend hours doing **paperwork** when they could have been working with their Iraqi counterparts instead.

The advisory **effort** is too important not **to** succeed. Advisers coach their Iraqi counterparts on how to plan, conduct and sustain counterinsurgency operations involving dozens and eventually hundreds of soldiers. **They** **also** work to identify and report the corruption in the Iraqi government that can make it difficult to get adequate supplies to Iraqi troops. Unlike the soldiers in American units, who retreat to **fortified** bases with air-conditioned **barracks** and other amenities, the advisers live, train, eat and fight with their Iraqi counterparts.

It is not surprising that many Iraqi officers come to treat their American advisers **as** "brothers," whereas they view United States units with skepticism. Revealingly, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who is in charge **of** training and equipping the Iraqi forces, reports that Iraqi troops have never betrayed their United States advisory teams to the insurgents. It is this kind of trust that will be essential to waging effectively what the Bush administration now **calls** the "long war."

---

Living and working day in, day out with the Iraqis, advisers *are* also an invaluable source of intelligence. They know which Iraqi military leaders **are** the **most** talented and worthy of promotion and which are incompetent and need to **be** relieved. They **can** help us identify which officers are loyal and which have sectarian sympathies, which are honest and which corrupt. The advisers **can** best tell us what equipment the Iraqis need to **be** most effective, rather **than** what equipment we think they should have.

With popular support for the war waning and sectarian violence in Iraq rising, the United States ambassador to Iraq, **Zalmay** Khalilzad, has declared, "The next **six** months will be critical in terms **of** reining in the danger of civil war."

The Iraqi Army's ability to stem the violence will depend, **as** much **as** anything, on how **well** its American advisers perform. It is vital that we put our best people into this effort, in sufficient numbers and with sufficient resources to **succeed**,

This means doubling or, better still, tripling the number of advisers per battalion. To attract our best soldiers to **serve as** advisers, Army promotion boards must be instructed to give preference to those officers and sergeants who serve capably in this position.

Advisers should **also** be encouraged, through promotions and bonuses, to **serve** tours longer than the standard single year. Longer service enables the advisers and the Iraqis to develop strong bonds of trust, rather **than** building a **new relationship** every 12 months.

United States Army commanders in Iraq should demonstrate their commitment to the **development** of the Iraqi **forces** by fully including Iraqi commanders in their planning **efforts**, conducting combined **missions** with Iraqi **units** **as** a matter of course, and eliminating **all** unnecessary administrative **burdens** on the advisers.

Expanding the advisory effort is a winning strategy for everyone. By making the Iraqi military more effective, advisers **can** ultimately enable

---

**us to reduce the number of American soldiers deployed in Iraq. Those who are looking for signs of how well we are doing in this war and how soon our troops can begin to come home would do well to measure the progress of this small band of American soldiers. Their success will determine whether we win this war, at what cost, and how soon.**

*Andrew F. Krepinevich, the executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, is the author of "The Army and Vietnam."*



UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

INFO MEMO

JUL 27 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Response to Krepinevich

*Iraq*

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated July 18, 2006, subject as above (Tab A).
- Army Public Affairs submitted a response to Krepinevich's commentary to the **NY** Times on 27 July (Tab B), which addressed the inaccuracies.
- Given the importance of this training mission, and the news and commentary that it will generate, Army Public Affairs continues to work with FORSCOM public affairs to promote as many of the training team stories as possible and is coordinating a live interview for the DoD press pool with the Transition Team chain of command.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
**As** stated

Prepared By: LTC Carl S. Ey, (b)(6)

*27 Jul 06*

*18 Jul 06*

27 July 2006

Recently, the New York Times published an article, "Send in the Advisors," penned by a respected retired Army officer and analyst, Andrew Krepinevich. The piece suggested the Army places less than its full attention on the military transition teams aiding the Iraqis to take over security operations for their own nation. It stated that the transition teams are severely undermanned, rife with bureaucracy, and that the Army's best officers avoid this assignment if at all possible. That is not the case.

The Army takes every mission seriously. When a theater commander – particularly one in combat – asks for a new capability or an enhanced capability, the Army applies the maximum amount of energy to move resources, adjust priorities and meet the ground force requirements of the joint team in harms way. Without question, we fully recognize the strategic significance of the military training and transition teams' mission in Iraq. The success of these teams is critical to allowing the newly elected Iraqi government establish its sovereignty and bring peace and stability to people who have endured so much.

The Army has more than **240** Transition Teams working in and among Iraqi soldiers. The size and number of those teams may vary based on the judgment of the coalition commander in Iraq. All our officers and NCOs serving in these critical and inherently dangerous jobs are just like their brothers and sisters in units on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the other 120 countries in which Soldiers are serving: the best America has to offer. To infer anything else does them a disservice.

The Army remains a learning organization. We look hard at Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom for real-time counterinsurgency insights ("lessons learned") to be applied to the current force and the implications for future force doctrine, organization, training, and materiel. As part of this, we have adapted to sustain the requirement for the Transition Teams. In a very significant move, we changed the entire focus of one of our combat divisions, the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, and diverted its two star commander, his entire staff, and two brigade combat teams' worth (several thousand) of leaders and personnel to execute all efforts to man, equip and train the Transition Teams. This is now underway at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In support of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division's efforts, the Army has also given new priorities to its Human Resources Command, the office that manages all Army assignments. To sustain the flow of outstanding personnel to these critical duty positions, we are making modifications to assignment processes to better support the Soldiers and families ordered to these duties. This is our top priority personnel requirement, clearly articulated by Army senior leadership. We are assigning officers directly from the Army's premier intermediate educational

11-L-0559/OSD/58656

institution to the Training Team mission: approximately 18% of the next class that graduates from our Command and General Staff College will go directly to Transition Team assignments. There is no question we will continue to fill Transition Teams with our best trained and led people for the duration of this mission.

We commend for reference articles and stories on the Army's support to the military training and transition teams in Iraq by the Associated Press, United Press International, Jane's Defence Weekly, Reuters, ABC News, the BBC, National Public Radio and the Stars & Stripes at a Transition Team Pentagon press pool media event in November 2005. Accurate information is out there.

We wholeheartedly support Mr. Krepinevich's advice that, "Expanding the advisory effort is a winning strategy." The U.S. Army could not agree more, and in support of the commanders in Iraq, that is exactly what we are doing.

ANTHONY A. CUCOLO III  
BRIGADIER GENERAL, US ARMY  
Chief, US Army Public Affairs

FOUO

28 July  
**BOB E.** 1340

July 28, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: ~~Tira~~ Jonas  
Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

*S.R.*  
*FYI*

110,001

SUBJECT Assuring no Veto on the DoD Budget

We have got to be sure the White House does not issue a veto message, if Congress increases DoDs budget. We need the money.

Let's be sure that does not happen, and tell me what I need to do to ensure it does not happen.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF072806-05

.....  
Please Respond By 08/02/06

*Got it! I'm working with OMB to craft a way ahead. They will prepare several options to increase #'s for our review, input and recommendation.*

*My approach is to have OMB in the boat with us!*

~~FOUO~~

28 Jul 06

OSD 12035-06



7/31/2006 9:14:29 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58838

*7/28*

<sup>28 July</sup>  
**BOB E.** 1340

~~FOUO~~

July 28, 2006

10, 01

TO: Gordon England

CC: Tina Jonas  
Robert Wilkie

**SK  
FYI**

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Assuring no Veto on the DoD Budget

We have got to be sure the White House does not issue a veto message, if Congress increases DoDs budget. We need the money.

Let's be sure that does not happen, and tell me what I need to do to ensure it does not happen.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF072806-05

.....  
Please Respond By 08/02/06

*Got it! I'm working with OMB to craft a way ahead. They will prepare several options to increase #'s for our review, input and recommendation.*

*My approach is to have OMB in the boat with us!*

~~FOUO~~



11-L-0559/OSD/58660

*John 7/28*

7/31/2006 9 14 29 AM

28 Jul 06

28 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

JUL 0 6 2006

**TO:** Gordon England  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Paper on Military Absentee Voting

Please take a look at the attached Military Absentee Voting paper, and get your head into it as soon as possible and tell me if you think we ought to implement it. It is not described, so I can't tell.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach Paper on Military Absentee Voting

DHR.ss  
SF070506-13

.....  
*Please Respond By July 18, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12045-06



7/31/2006 10:00:49 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58660

28-Jun-06

SUBJECT: ~~Military~~ Absentee Voting

- The performance of DOD in providing sufficient opportunity for deployed personnel to exercise their voting franchise fell well short of the adequate in the 2004 election cycle. This has been a consistent problem throughout this Administration.
- Early in the 2004 election cycle, a current member of the business board, Henry Dreifus, designed and proposed an effective and inexpensive approach to solving the problem of timely delivery of absentee ballots.
- His efforts, which received very strong support from White House officials, were stubbornly resisted by the staff of the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).
- However, in spite of the FVAP resistance, the Dreifus program was successfully demonstrated in the 2004 election cycle, if only on a small scale.
- Since that time, the Dreifus approach - the electronic delivery of blank ballots - has been enthusiastically taken up by members of Congress on a bipartisan basis. Congress has made approximately \$3 million dollars immediately available to implement this approach in the 2006 election cycle.
- David Chu's office opposed that funding when proposed.
- The three military departments have united behind the US Navy under Secretary Winter's leadership in a desire to implement this program immediately.
- However, time is of the essence. Several key meeting of secretaries of state and state voting officials will take place in early July.
- The FVAP office has no existing plan to implement this program. The Navy is prepared to move at once. However, the Navy must have the \$3 million in order to do so. David Chu opposes the transfer of funds.
- I have no confidence whatsoever that if implementation is left to the staff of the FVAP office in P&R that this effort will be successful. If it is not successful, there will be serious dissatisfaction at the White House about this repeated failure.

PERSONNEL RELATED - EXTREMELY SENSITIVE

- In addition, the political opposition will have another avenue of r upon the DOD immediately prior to the 2006 election.
- I recommend that the \$3 million be transferred to the Navy imme the Navy head a combined service department implementation of important military voting initiative.

orical attack

ately and that  
is very

PERSONNEL RELATED - EXTREMELY SENSITIVE

July 28, 2006

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon

Subj: Paper on Military Absentee Voting

- I have been into this issue **far** too much, including a meeting with **Conrad Burns** last night.
- Henry Dreifus is associated with a company that has software that could be usable to facilitate absentee voting via e-mail. However, sole source would likely cause protests and long delays. Accordingly, his company is not a viable option.
- DoD has a similar workable software program named Integrated Voting Alternative Site (IVAS).
- Only six states allow e-mail for voting. Nine states allow e-mailing to request a ballot and to have a ballot sent to the voter. None allow voter registration due to the potential of fraud.
- The Navy is now red-teaming P&R's electronic voting implementation plan to expand e-mail for the coming elections.
- My strong direction is that DoD will have electronic aid/voting for the November elections. I will keep you informed. This is an issue of high personal interest.

*Gordon 7/28*

11-L-0559/OSD/58663



7/31/2006 10:00:33 AM

~~FOUO~~

July 14, 2006

720

TO: Dan DellOrto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Gilead

Please see me on Gilead and an AIDs drug.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF071406-19

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/27/06*

14 JUL 06

14 JUL 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58664

OSD 12086-06



7/31/2006 2:51:08 PM



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

720

INFO MEMO

JUL 30 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Recusal from Gilead and AIDS Related Matters

- You mentioned that Gilead is producing two compounds that are included in a new, multi-drug medication for AIDS, and asked whether that affects your current recusal.
- It does not. You are currently recused from participating in particular matters involving AIDS or Gilead Sciences, Inc.
- Your current recusal is adequate and you do not need to take any further action.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

30 JUL 06

11-L-0559/OSD/58665



OSD 12086-06

7/31/2006 2:51:14 PM

**FOUO**

July 14,2006

**TO:** Dan DellOrto

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

**SUBJECT:** Gilead

Please *see* me on Gilead and an AIDS drug.

Thanks .

DHR.dh  
SF071406-19

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/27/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/58666

~~FOUO~~

AUG 01 2006

230.07

TO: Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*



SUBJECT: Background Sheet on (b)(6)

Please take a **look** at the attached letter and background sheet. Is it possible for us to use a Canadian citizen here in the Department?

Jean **Smith** is a professor of history and an author of some note. He was a classmate of mine in college. I have respect for his judgment.

Let me know what you think.

**Thanks.**

Attach 7/11/06 Jean Edward Smith letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF073106-48

1 Aug 06

*Please Respond By August 16, 2006*

OCT 11 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

11 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58667



OSD 12142-06

10113120068:47:09 AM



# THE JOHN DEEVER DRINKO ACADEMY

For American Political Institutions and Civic Culture

## BOARD OF ADVISORS

July 11, 2006

Dr. John Deaver Drinko  
Baker&Hostetler

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld '54  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dr. C. Anthony Broh  
Princeton University

Dear Don:

Dr. Norman Graebner  
University of Virginia

I don't know whether you have a **need** to replenish your **staff** from time to time, but I would **like** to recommend a former **student** of mine (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dr. Maurice Hamon  
University College Dublin

(b)(6) is a demon worker, hard-headed, extremely efficient, well-read, and blessed with a pleasing disposition. In a profession where ego is the rule, she is marvelously **unassuming**.

Dr. George McGovern  
Middle East Policy Council

(b)(6) who is politically conservative, is currently working (b)(6)

(b)(6)

specializing in

**national** security issues. She would like to **return** to **Washington** where (b)(6)

(b)(6)

She is a **Canadian** citizen, but enjoys permanent residence status in the United States.

Dr. Grinor Rojo  
University of Santiago

Dr. Jean Edward Smith  
Marshall University

I believe that if you or someone on your staff meets with her, **you** will want to find something for her immediately. She's that **good**.

Dr. Trevor Wilson  
University of Adelaide

Best **regards** to Joyce,

Jean Edward Smith '54

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Dr. Alan B. Gould  
Marshall University

OSD 12142-06



8/1/2006 10:44:10 AM

720-7

July 2006

(b)(6)  
E-mail: (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Education:

(b)(6)

Citizenship:

Permanent Resident ~~Status~~, United States  
Canadian citizen

Additional Experience:

(b)(6)

Permanent Address:

(b)(6)

Home Address:

(b)(6)

Awards:

(b)(6)

References:

Professor Richard K. **Betts**  
Columbia University  
New York, **NY** 10027  
Telephone: (212) 854-7325  
Email: rkb4@columbia.edu

Professor Robert Jervis  
Columbia University  
New York, **NY** 10027  
Telephone: (212) 854-4610  
Email: rlj1@columbia.edu

Professor Jean Edward Smith  
**Marshall** University  
**Huntington**, WV 25755-2014  
Telephone: (304) 696-4015  
Email **address** unavailable

August 16, 2006

*JS*  
10/10

230.02

*cc* ↗

TO Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: *Jim O'Beirne* *JS*  
*8/16/06*

SUBJECT: Background on (b)(6)

(b)(6) is a very attractive candidate, and I will definitely explore the possibility of bringing her into the Department. However, I should await the final opinion from DOD-GC on the issue of her legal employability. However, my own research indicates that there should not be a problem. (See attached.)

16 Aug 06

11 Jul 06


12142-06

## Interim Response

I have asked the General Counsel's Office for a review of current law regarding the employment of non-US citizens and am awaiting the results of that review. I have also conducted my own research and have discovered the following facts.

- Regulations that implement immigration laws are published in title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). According to 8 CFR 274a, U.S. employers may .... hire an individual who is:
  - lawfully admitted for permanent residence
- Current appropriations law prohibits an agency from using appropriated funds to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States whose post of duty is in the continental United States unless such person qualifies for a specific exemption in the law. One such exemption is established for:
  - nationals of those countries allied with the United States
  - According to the State Department, countries with qualifying treaties as of August 2005, include: .....Canada.....
- Some agencies may have appropriations language that specifically exempts them from the ban on paying non-citizens. For example, the Department of Defense is granted such an exception in its Appropriations Act.

It would, therefore, appear on the basis of my non-legal review that there is no legal impediment to employing (b)(6) at DOD. I will forward the General Counsel's opinion when I receive it in this office.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 12 2006

230,02

Professor Jean Edward Smith  
John Marshall Professor of Political Science  
The John Deaver Drinko Academy  
One John Marshall Drive  
Huntington, WV 25755-2014

Dear Jean,

I wanted to get back to you in connection with  
(b)(6) She clearly is a very talented person.  
However, I am told the clearance issue is one that is just too  
complicated, since she is not a U.S. citizen. It would not be a  
problem in most other Departments.

I wish there were a way we could do it and that I could  
find a different answer. I do appreciate your giving me a  
heads up on her.

Thanks so much.

Regards,

12 Oct 06


11 5106

11-L-0559/OSD/58673



OSD 12142-06

10/13/2006 8:46:51 AM



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 31 2006

235.02

Professor Jean Edward Smith  
John Marshall Professor of Political Science  
The John Deaver Drinko Academy  
One John Marshall Drive  
Huntington, WV 25755-2014

Dear Jean,

Thanks for your note about (b)(6) We will be happy to take a look at her. She sounds terrific.

My only concern is her citizenship, which could be a problem, given the clearance issues.

Thanks so much for your note. Do let us know if you are going to be in Washington. I would enjoy having a chance to catch up with you.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

31 Jul 06

11 Jul 06

OSD 12142-06



6/1/2006 04:44:12 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58674

FOUO

AUG 01 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Briefing by Dan Dell'Orto

Dan Dell'Orto, Deputy General Counsel at the Department of Defense, has been working the legal issue that you were going to put some people on. He talked with Harriet Miers, and no one in the **White** House is cleared. Dan **has** put together a small team of 3-4 people -- mostly NSA lawyers -- and they have worked it. Dan can brief you, if you are interested.

DHR:ss  
SF073106-45

OSD 12156-06



8/1/2006 12:31:02 PM

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58675

337

1 AUG 06



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 2 2006

040 VT

Michael F. Roizen, M.D.  
Chairman  
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation  
9500 Euclid Avenue/E30  
Cleveland, OH 44195

Dear Mike,

Thanks for your note. I do still play some squash,  
but not as often as I would like.

I regret to say I am going to have to pass off the  
information on your doctor associate to people here who  
can check it with the legal authorities as to what we are  
and are not able to do. We will be back in touch with you.

Best regards,

2 Aug 06

OSD 12229-06



31212006 123:34 PM

11 201 20

11-L-0559/OSD/58676

8/4/06

~~FOUO~~

August 01, 2006

TO: Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Visa Issue

DHO VA

Please check with Steve Epstein to see what I am allowed to do about the request in the attached letter from Mike Roizen. Needless to say, I do not want to do anything that would be in any way improper.

Then get back to me, and we will connect with him.

Thanks.

Attach. SD response and 7/13/06 Roizen ltr to SD

DHR.ch  
SFO80106-08

.....  
Please Respond By 08/31/06

(b)(6)

*(Handwritten signature/initials)*

1 Aug 06 13 2106

Sir

I checked with GCS Ethics folks. You should not be involved with this. Attached is a draft note back to Dr. Roizen.

OSD 12229-06



8/29/2006 2:56:53 PM

*VR*  
*Dr B.*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58677

THE CLEVELAND CLINIC  
FOUNDATION 

Anesthesiology, Critical Care Medicine  
and Comprehensive Pain Management

Michael E. Roizen, M.D.  
Chairman  
Office: 216-444-2595  
Fax: 216-444-1352  
E-mail: roizenm@ccl.org

July 13, 2006

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

As you know it is time for me to get you back on the squash court. Have you gotten soft just having to deal with generals and the press?

If so, I'll understand. If those guys don't play for blood the way I do, I'll understand. And as you know, warming up in a sauna doesn't do your muscles any good. You are going to have to do better than that to beat my bottom into a pulp.

But much as I want to play squash with you, and much as I am going to **try** to play squash with you, this letter is about helping a fellow squash player -

(b)(6)

Do you believe that name? This poor guy is an outstanding (b)(6) who completed (b)(6). The VA of course is short of (b)(6) and not many in the USA are as good as this guy. Remember he trained at the place that has been #1 for 12 years in a row. I think you like being #1, well we like #1 and this guy is an outstanding

(b)(6)

OSD 12229-06



8/2/2006 1:23:30 PM

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
July 13, 2006  
Page Two

In fact he is at least 3 logarithms better (b)(6) than he is a squash player. But I have played squash with him and you can really tell a lot about a guy on a squash court. He is about as close to a terrorist as I am to an Edsel driver. (I wouldn't be caught dead in an Edsel and he has nothing but the wish to help humanity and fellow man.) His VISA has been held up in Homeland Security for over one year. I don't know how to flush it out and I wondering if you could give me advice on how to send a Roto Router to Homeland Security as pertains to (b)(6) I have also taken the liberty of sending you another book, "You the Smart Patient," and the "RealAge Workout." These are two additional books we published after "You The Owner's Manual" became #1. We hope you are well and that Janet is thriving and learning to deal with the press as well as you do. You are a model. Remember, I am going to get you on the squash court sooner or later. With great respect and admiration.

P.S. I have enclosed the CV of this guy with the horrible name, (b)(6) (b)(6) but who is a great (b)(6) that we are trying to employ at the VA in Cleveland. Thanks for any advice you can give.

Sincerely,



Michael F. Roizen, M.D

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Personal Data:**

*Date of Birth:*

(b)(6)

*Place of Birth:*

*Sex:*

Male

*Fluent(written & spoken):*

Arabic & English

**Postgraduate Training and Appointments:**

(b)(6)

**Education:**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Certification and Licensure:**

(b)(6)

**Research and publications:**

(b)(6)

**Presentations:**

(b)(6)

**Memberships in professional and scientific organization:**

(b)(6)

**Positions held:**

(b)(6)

Name: (b)(6)  
Time Period: 7/01/2004 - 2/28/2005

Staff Name/Comments	Rotation	Cog	Tech	Comm	Prof	Know	Total	End Date
(b)(6)								

Periodic Fellow Evaluation Report

Name: (b)(6)

Time Period: 7/01/2004 - 1/31/2005

Staff Name/Comments	Rotation	Cog	Tech	Comm	Prof	Know	Total	End Date
---------------------	----------	-----	------	------	------	------	-------	----------

(b)(6)								
--------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Name: (b)(6)

Time Period: 07/01/2004 - 06/30/2005

Staff Name/Comments	Rotation	Coor	Tech	Comm	Prof	Know	Total	End Date
---------------------	----------	------	------	------	------	------	-------	----------

(b)(6)								
--------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Name: (b)(6)

Time Period: 07/01/2004 - 06/30/2005

Staff Name/Comments	Rotation	seg	Tech	Comm	Prof	Know	Total	End Date
---------------------	----------	-----	------	------	------	------	-------	----------

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

AUG 21 2006

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

O40 VA

Michael F. Roizen, M.D.  
Chairman  
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation  
9500 Euclid Avenue, E 30  
Cleveland OH 55195

Dear Dr. Roizen:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld requesting assistance for your friend, (b)(6) concerning the lengthy processing time his visa application is experiencing. Your letter has been forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and I have been asked to respond.

While you requested assistance from Secretary Rumsfeld, the individual who should be best able to assist you is a Mr. Prakash Khatri, Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS Ombudsman), Department of Homeland Security. Since the CIS Ombudsman assists individuals and employers in resolving problems and provides recommendations for resolving those problems with the United States Citizenship Services (USCIS), he is the individual you should contact on behalf of (b)(6) (b)(6)

The email address for CIS Ombudsman is [cisombudsman@dhs.gov](mailto:cisombudsman@dhs.gov) and the mailing address is as follows:

Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman  
United States Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, D.C. 20528

Again, thank you for your letter and we deeply appreciate your continued support of those who serve our great Nation.

Sincerely,

*Robert J. Dannemiller*  
Robert J. Dannemiller  
Executive Services Administrator

11-L-0559/OSD/58687

R

OSD 12229-06

(13 Jul 06)

PAIR

**SCHEDULING PROPOSAL FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**MEMORANDUM FOR** (b)(6) **THE CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT  
TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**THROUGH: PROTOCOL**

**FROM:** Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE* **AUG 01 2006**

**PURPOSE:** To schedule a meeting between the Secretary and Spanish Minister of Defense (MOD) Jose Antonio Alonso in the period of 23-25 October, 2006.

**DESCRIPTION:**

- Alonso was appointed MOD in April 2006.
- At the June 2006 NATO Informal Ministerial in Brussels, Alonso asked you if he could visit the United States in October or November. You agreed (Tab A).
- A meeting would provide the opportunity to discuss Lebanon; Afghanistan; Venezuela; the NATO Summit in Riga; and, if necessary, efforts to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding on NCIS/OSI agents activities in Spain.

1 AUG 06

**RECOMMENDATION:** SecDef meet with Minister Alonso.

**REVIEW OF EVENTS:** Honor cordon and 30 minute meeting in SecDef office or conference room.

**PARTICIPANTS:** SecDef, ASD/ISP Flory, DASD EUR NATO Fata, Dir Europe South COL Zaccor, ISP/EUR NATO Country Director Ellehuus (note taker). Spain: MOD Alonso, Defense Attaché BG Valderrabano, plus 3 aides.

**SECDEF DECISION:**

Accept: \_\_\_\_\_ Decline: \_\_\_\_\_ Defer to: \_\_\_\_\_

**RESPONSE DEADLINE:** 18 August, 2006

**RELATIONSHIP HISTORY:** You met MOD Alonso briefly on 8 Jun 06 at the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Brussels.

**ATTACHMENT:** As stated.


Prepared by: Rachel Ellehuus, ISP/EUR, (b)(6)

13 AUG 06



POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** *SecDef Schedule Proposal- MOD Alonso, Spain*  
**I-Number:** 06/009687-EP

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
ASD ISP	Peter Flory 	AUG 1 2006
DASD EUR/NATO	Daniel Fata 	

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

10  
7/5/06

~~FOUO~~

June 13, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi

U  
J  
A  
I  
I

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Spanish MOD Visit Request

The Spanish MOD asked if he could visit the U.S. in October-November. I told him that's fine.

DR:m  
SFO:306-06

.....

JUN 30 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

13  
J  
u  
n  
e  
6

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12285-06



11-L-0559/OSD/58690

8/2/2006 11:33:44 AM

DEP SEC DEF  
HAS SEEN  
1st time  
AUG 1 4 2006

8/11

**ACTION MEMO**

USD(P) *[Signature]* AUG 09 2006  
PDUSBP *[Signature]*

000.5

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*rr* →

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) *9 Aug 06*

*Clouath*  
*9 Aug 06*

SUBJECT Attorney General Letter on Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos

- The Secretary (snowflake at Tab B) asked you to handle the Attorney General's request (Tab C) to reconsider withdrawing DoD helicopter support to the DEA-led Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).
- The Secretary's May 15, 2006 letter to the Attorney General is at Tab D.
- OPBAT background and our progress in satisfying the Secretary's intent are at Tab E.
- Pursuant to the snowflake, SO/LIC DASD(CN) will keep you informed of progress in working with other agencies and OMB on OPBAT options.

RECOMMENDATION Sign and send letter in response to the Attorney General (Tab A)

COORDINATION: Tab F.

Attachments:  
As stated

9 Aug 06

17 Jul 06

Prepared by: Mr. Fernando Mark Rondon, ODASD/CN, (b)(6)



\* 0 3 0 - 1 2 3 8 1 - 0 6 \*

MA SD		SMA DSD	<i>9/14/06</i>
PSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>11/8/06</i>		<i>1800 8/11/06</i>
ESR MA	<i>RA 8/06</i>	STF DIR	

OSD 12381-06



8/10/2006 2 11 36 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58691

**TAB  
A**



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

August 14, 2006

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
The Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Secretary Rumsfeld appreciated your July 17, 2006 letter regarding his intent to withdraw Department of Defense helicopter transportation support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).

The Department acknowledges OPBAT's undisputed success and the central role Army helicopters have played in this valuable mission. However, the Secretary has determined that competing military requirements in the Global War on Terrorism preclude further dedicated DoD aviation support and continues to believe that a suitable replacement from another agency should be found. Indeed, the Department is actively working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and others, to find the best replacement for Army aviation support to OPBAT. Currently, several agencies are developing proposals, which if approved, should result in OPBAT continuity.

Kindly appreciate that the Department needs to return the OPBAT support helicopters to military operations and will work with you to ensure OPBAT's continued success as it transitions the Army's aviation role to the appropriate agency.

OSD 12381-06



8/15/2006 1:02:01 PM

11-L-0559 OSD/58693

# TAB B

11-L-0559/OSD/58694

FOUO

*Actual 1530  
8/4/06  
DS*

August 04, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Attorney General Gonzales re: OPBAT

Please handle this matter the Attorney General has written about. It seems to me it is a DHS issue, rather than a DoD issue. I think you ought to push it with OMB to get it shifted. We are not making a judgment as to whether or not it is needed, which is what he is arguing.

Thanks.

Attach: 7/17/06 AG letter to SecDef

DHR:es  
3F080406-13

.....  
*Please Respond By August 24, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

FOUO

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY** P1  
**The Military Assistant**

4 August 2006 - 1840

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


**SUBJECT** Response to Attorney General re OPBAT

Sir,

Please prepare a draft response to *the* attached letter ~~from~~ *the* Attorney General for DSD signature.

Please provide a copy of **this memo** with your response..

Very Respectfully,



John Nagl  
LTC, USA  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment: Snowflake 080406-13  
**SUSPENSE**: 14AUG06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58696

# TAB C



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C

July 17, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

This is in response to your May 15, 2006, letter advising *that* you intend to **discontinue providing** helicopter transportation support to **Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT)** by October 1, 2007, and *seeking* my assistance in identifying an agency to substitute for the Department of Defense (DoD).

OPBAT's mission for the past 24 years has been to **detect, monitor, intercept and/or disrupt** drug traffickers in Bahamian waters in the Northern Caribbean involved in smuggling drugs into the United States. For more than 20 years, this **multilateral detection and monitoring mission has been the only operation in that area of the Caribbean that can successfully track drug traffickers moving drug loads** into the United States. The need for this mission and the **central role** that DoD has played in its success is undisputed. Accordingly, I respectfully request that you **reconsider** this planned withdrawal and **maintain DoD's current level of involvement in OPBAT.**

Although initially started in 1982, OPBAT did not become fully effective until DoD joined the effort in 1986. Since DoD became a full-time participant in OPBAT, 82,805 kilograms of cocaine and 699,552 pounds of marijuana with a United States wholesale value of approximately \$1.75 billion have been seized. DoD continues to play a central role in the success of this mission. DoD assets have participated in 65 percent of the seizures in fiscal year 2005 and 50 percent of the seizures made by OPBAT this fiscal year.

Without DoD support and assistance, OPBAT, which has served as one of the most effective counter-drug operations in our nation's history, cannot effectively function. There is no other entity possessing aviation assets, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection Service, that has the necessary resources, capabilities and dedicated counter-narcotics mission to substitute for DoD in this Caribbean operation. In addition, no other agency has the experience, logistics and maintenance infrastructure available to ensure the mission flexibility and

OSD 12381-06



8/3/2006 1:46:55 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58698

safety capabilities that this mission requires. Moreover, DoD's participation in OPBAT is funded with counter-narcotics dollars that are specifically appropriated for this purpose. For all of these reasons, combined with the multiple competing responsibilities and missions of the other agencies, it will be difficult to retain the dedicated counter-narcotics focus of OPBAT should another agency attempt to fill the void created by DoD's withdrawal.

DoD has these, too!

OPBAT was initiated because the Bahamas/Caribbean corridor was the preferred route for narcotics traffickers to smuggle drugs into the United States. At OPBAT's inception in 1982, an estimated 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States entered through the Bahamas. Today, only 10 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States enters through the Bahamas, with the 90 percent balance entering across the Southwest border. This shift away from the Bahamas is attributable to OPBAT denying drug traffickers uncontested access to the United States via the Bahamas. The withdrawal of DoD participation in OPBAT will risk reversing this progress.

but, it may not. 1 - we offset the whole money for a 10% perba?

As our Southwest border security tightens under the President's now strategy, we expect drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to pursue alternate routes. History reflects that the Caribbean will become that alternate route if OPBAT ceases to function. Eliminating OPBAT as we shore up the Southwest border is an invitation not only to DTOs, but also to other groups associated with terrorism, to once again use the Bahamas as an easily accessible means into the United States.

perhaps a reduction in ft hrs, unless "cease" or "eliminate"...

For all these reasons, I request that you reconsider withdrawing from OPBAT. In my considered judgment, there is no adequate substitute for DoD in OPBAT. This essential mission must be maintained with the DoD at its care.

Sincerely,

Alberto R. Gonzales  
Attorney General

# TAB D



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

*MBH/06*

*452H*

MAY 15 2006

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
The Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Judge Gonzales:

In response to a series of semiannual "Emergency Declarations," the Department of Defense has provided helicopter transportation support for more than 20 years to the Drug Enforcement Administration and Bahamian counterdrug forces involved in Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos. I have enclosed a copy of former Secretary of Defense Carlucci's letter of November 16, 1988 to former Attorney General Thornburgh regarding this support. This support, however, now competes for resources necessary for the War on Terrorism and other activities in support of our Nation's defense, with potential adverse effects on the military preparedness of the United States.

Therefore, I intend to discontinue this support, and I solicit your help to identify a more appropriate agency to fulfill this responsibility. I would like to complete this transition by October 1, 2007.

Sincerely,

*15 May 06*

Enclosure:  
As stated

CC:  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Homeland Security  
Director, ONDCP



OSD 76037-06

5/15/2006 4:22:35 PM

*EMay06*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

16 NOV 1988

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh  
Attorney General  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dick:

This responds to the enclosed "Emergency Declaration" to allow continuation of Army helicopter support of Drug Enforcement Administration's operation "Bahamas and Turks (OPBAT)." The enactment of the 1983 DoD Authorization Act modified 10 U.S.C. 374 simplifying the approval process for military support to law enforcement agencies outside the land area of the United States. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. 374(b) (2) (E) now requires only "joint approval" by the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. There is no statutory requirement for a semiannual "Emergency Declaration."

As you are aware, the Coast Guard was scheduled to relieve the Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter detachment at Georgetown, Great Inagua Island on October 1. However, after careful interagency examination of the OPBAT mission requirement facilitated by the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), the Department of Defense authorized the Army to continue that support through September 30, 1989. As presently planned, the Army detachment will be relieved by the Coast Guard at that time. This Army support is subject to the approval requirements of 10 U.S.C. 374(b) (2) (E).

Accordingly, with your approval and that of the Secretary of State, the Army will continue to support OPBAT through FY 1989. Concomitantly, the mission requirement validating continued Army support will be reviewed quarterly at the NNBIS/DoD scheduling conference. A similar letter is being sent to the Secretary of State. As always, the Department of Defense is committed to supporting our Nation's drug interdiction program.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:  
As Stated

# TAB E

## Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) Background and State of Play

On May 16, 2006, the Secretary of Defense notified the Attorney General of his intention to end DoD helicopter support to the Drug Enforcement Administration and Bahamian counterdrug forces involved in OPBAT. OPBAT is an agreement between the U.S., the Bahamas, and the U.K. (for Turks & Caicos Islands) focused on interdicting and disrupting drug trafficking.

Since 1983, DoD has provided helicopter support to DEA and Bahamian forces involved in OPBAT. The Army currently supports OPBAT with three UH-60s and associated crews (30 soldiers) at George Town, Great Exuma. To sustain this level of support, the Army commits a total of seven Blackhawks (four in CONUS). Although OPBAT has been very successful, the DoD helicopter support to OPBAT now competes for resources needed for the War on Terrorism and other critical defense missions.

To allow time for an orderly transfer of responsibilities and/or resources to another agency, the Secretary committed to continue support to OPBAT through October 1, 2007. The Secretary established this lengthy period to enable another agency to obtain resources to conduct the OPBAT air support mission.

*4 1/2 months*

ONDCP, the chair of the International Drug Control Policy Coordinating Committee, designated The Interdiction Committee (Chaired by the Commandant of the Coast Guard) as the interagency proponent for the OPBAT issue. DASD(CN), working on behalf of the TIC, has facilitated two interagency meetings, a trip to assess OPBAT air support requirements, and drafted baseline requirements for OPBAT support at George Town.

No other agency has volunteered to replace DoD. TIC staff expects to complete interagency coordination of the OPBAT requirements assessment in early September, in order to meet Administration budget windows.

*← but this issue is who should meet the "requirements" - not what the requirement is ....*

U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas John Rood, Members of the House and Senate, and the media have publicized the Secretary's intent to transfer OPBAT air support and have written the Department. Senator Nelson of Florida has also offered an amendment to the 2007 Defense Authorization bill requiring a report on DoD support to OPBAT.

# **TAB F**

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Reply to Attorney General on OPBAT on Operation  
Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT)**

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Joint Staff/J-5	LtCol Miguel Besosa, USAF	<i>pending</i> <i>08/09/06 10:00</i>



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

August 14, 2006

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzalez  
The Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Secretary Rumsfeld appreciated your July 17, 2006 letter regarding **his intent to** withdraw Department of Defense helicopter transportation support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).

The Department acknowledges OPBAT's undisputed success and the central role Army helicopters have played in this valuable mission. However, the Secretary has determined that competing military requirements in the Global War on Terrorism preclude further dedicated DoD aviation support and continues to believe that a suitable replacement from another agency should be found. Indeed, the Department is actively working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and others, to find the best replacement for Army aviation support to OPBAT. Currently, several agencies are developing proposals, which if approved, should result in OPBAT continuation.

*Kindly appreciate*  
Please understand that the Department needs to return the OPBAT support helicopters to military operations, and *it* will work with you to ensure OPBAT's continued success as it transitions the **Army's** aviation role to the appropriate agency.

DRAFT

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzalez  
The Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Secretary Rumsfeld appreciated your July 17, 2006 letter regarding his intent to withdraw Department of Defense helicopter transportation support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).

The Department acknowledges OPBAT's undisputed success and the central role Army helicopters have played in this valuable mission. However, the Secretary has determined that competing military requirements preclude further dedicated DoD aviation support and continues to believe that a suitable replacement from another agency should be found. Indeed, the Department is actively working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and others, to find the best replacement for Army aviation support to OPBAT. Currently, several agencies are developing proposals, which if approved, ~~will~~ <sup>should</sup> result in a ~~better~~ OPBAT. <sup>continuity.</sup>

Please understand that the Department needs to return the OPBAT support helicopters to military operations, and it will work with you to ensure OPBAT's continued success as it transitions the Army's aviation role to the appropriate agency.

11-L-0559/OSD/58708



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzalez  
The Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to reply to your July 17, 2006 letter regarding his intent to withdraw Department of Defense helicopter transportation support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).

The Department freely acknowledges the contribution Army helicopters make to OPBAT; however, does not agree no other agency has the experience or capability to support OPBAT, as the Army has done for over 20 years. Please understand the Department needs to return the OPBAT support helicopters to military operations, and will work with you to transfer the mission to the appropriate agency before October 1, 2007.



## Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D.C.

July 17, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

This is in response to your May 15, 2006, letter advising that you intend to discontinue providing helicopter transportation support to Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) by October 1, 2007, and seeking my assistance in identifying an agency to substitute for the Department of Defense (DoD).

OPBAT's mission for the past 24 years has been to detect, monitor, intercept and/or disrupt drug traffickers in Bahamian waters in the Northern Caribbean involved in smuggling drugs into the United States. For more than 20 years, this multilateral detection and monitoring mission has been the only operation in that area of the Caribbean that can successfully track drug traffickers moving drug loads into the United States. The need for this mission and the central role that DoD has played in its success is undisputed. Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider this planned withdrawal and maintain DoD's current level of involvement in OPBAT.

Although initially started in 1982, OPBAT did not become fully effective until DoD joined the effort in 1986. Since DoD became a full-time participant in OPBAT, 82,805 kilograms of cocaine and 699,552 pounds of marijuana with a United States wholesale value of approximately \$1.75 billion have been seized. DoD continues to play a central role in the success of this mission. DoD assets have participated in 65 percent of the seizures in fiscal year 2005 and 50 percent of the seizures made by OPBAT this fiscal year.

Without DoD support and assistance, OPBAT, which has served as one of the most effective counter-drug operations in our nation's history, cannot effectively function. There is no other entity possessing aviation assets, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection Service, that has the necessary resources, capabilities and dedicated counter-narcotics mission to substitute for DoD in this Caribbean operation. In addition, no other agency has the experience, logistics and maintenance infrastructure available to ensure the mission flexibility and

OSD 12381-06



8/3/2006 4:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58710


safety capabilities that this mission requires. Moreover, DoD's participation in OPBAT is funded with counter-narcotics dollars that are specifically appropriated for this purpose. For all of these reasons, combined with the multiple competing responsibilities and missions of the other agencies, it will be difficult to retain the dedicated counter-narcotics focus of OPBAT should another agency attempt to fill the void created by DoD's withdrawal.

OPBAT was initiated because the Bahamas/Caribbean corridor was the preferred route for narcotics traffickers to smuggle drugs into the United States. At OPBAT's inception in 1982, an estimated 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States entered through the Bahamas. Today, only 10 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States enters through the Bahamas, with the 90 percent balance entering across the Southwest border. This shift away from the Bahamas is attributable to OPBAT denying drug traffickers uncontested access to the United States via the Bahamas. The withdrawal of DoD participation in OPBAT will risk reversing this progress.

As our Southwest border security tightens under the President's new strategy, we expect drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to pursue alternate routes. History reflects that the Caribbean will become that alternate route if OPBAT ceases to function. Eliminating OPBAT as we shore up the Southwest border is an invitation not only to DTOs, but also to other groups associated with terrorism, to once again use the Bahamas as an easily accessible means into the United States.

For all these reasons, I request that you reconsider withdrawing from OPBAT. In my considered judgment, there is no adequate substitute for DoD in OPBAT. This essential mission must be maintained with the DoD at its core.

Sincerely,



Alberto R. Gonzales  
Attorney General



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

August 14, 2006

Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
The Attorney **General**  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Secretary Rumsfeld appreciated your July 17, 2006 letter regarding his intent to withdraw Department of Defense helicopter transportation support to the **Drug** Enforcement Administration's Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).

The Department acknowledges OPBAT's undisputed success and the central role Army helicopters have played in this valuable mission. However, the Secretary **has** determined that competing military requirements in the Global War on Terrorism preclude further dedicated DoD aviation support and continues to believe that a suitable replacement from another agency should be found. Indeed, the Department is actively working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and others, to find the best replacement for Army aviation support to OPBAT. Currently, several agencies are developing proposals, which if approved, should result in OPBAT continuity.

Kindly appreciate that the Department needs to return the OPBAT support helicopters to military operations and will work with you to ensure OPBAT's continued success **as** it transitions the Army's aviation role **to** the appropriate agency.

OSD 12381-06



8/15/2006 1:02:01 PM

000.5

14 06

17 J.1/06

8/8/06

~~FOUO~~

AUG 09 2006

TO: David Chu

c c: Robert Wilkie

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Response to Senator Santorum

200.6

Attached is a letter from Senator Rick Santorum regarding notifying Members of Congress about the achievements and accomplishments of military personnel who are their constituents. I think he is right.

I have attached a draft letter I will send him if you are comfortable with it. You may want to polish it a bit.

Thanks.

Attach. **Draft** SD ltr to Sen. Santorum; 8/1/06 Santorum ltr to SD

9  
09  
06

DHR:dh  
SF080806-14

.....

*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

1  
Aug  
06



12/6/2006 7:53:41 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58713

*DR*

DRAFT

The Honorable Rick Santorum  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Santorum,

**Thanks** for your letter of August 1. We have been working the program here. Each Service has been handling it somewhat differently, so we are in the process of developing a uniform approach.

**In** short, I agree with what you have suggested, and we will be moving in that direction.

Thanks for your note.

Regards,

11-L-0559/OSD/58714

8/2/06 AS

RICK SANTORUM  
PENNSYLVANIA

REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE  
CHAIRMAN

WASHINGTON, DC  
511 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
(202) 224-6324

# United States Senate

<http://santorum.senate.gov>

COMMITTEES:  
FINANCE

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS  
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY  
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

August 1, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I write today concerning the efforts of the United States Senate to enable the Department of Defense to share the achievements and accomplishments of America's military personnel with Members of Congress.

By way of background, I authored Senate Amendment 4210 to S. 2766, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). A copy of this amendment is enclosed with this correspondence. Senate Amendment 4210 expressed the sense of the Senate that the Department of Defense and service secretaries of military departments should notify members of the Senate and House of Representatives when a constituent has received a medal, commendation or recognition for an act of extraordinary heroism, bravery, or achievement. The amendment was adopted by the Senate by unanimous consent.

The purpose of SA 4210 is to address the wave of negative stories coming from Iraq and Afghanistan concerning our ongoing military operations. The American people seldom hear about the acts of heroism, achievement and bravery carried out by American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. This amendment was crafted to spur the Department of Defense to share with Members of Congress information on all the good things our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are doing in the fight against Islamic Fascism. This amendment seeks to change this pattern by making Americans aware of the good deeds and positive contributions our military personnel are making around the world.

The House-passed bill did not have a similar amendment so this matter must be reconciled by House and Senate conferees to the FY07 NDAA. Also by way of background, I offered the same amendment last year to the FY06 NDAA. The amendment, SA 2470, was adopted by voice vote last year. I have also enclosed a copy of last year's amendment with this correspondence. Unfortunately, last year's amendment was not retained by conferees to the bill. I am hoping that conferees will retain this position this year during conference deliberations.

OSD 12388-06



8/3/2006 2:12:02 PM

ALLENTOWN  
3802 FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING  
504 WEST HAMILTON STREET  
ALLENTOWN, PA 18105  
(610) 770-0142

ALTOONA  
REGENCY SQUARE  
SUITE 202  
ROUTE 220 NORTH  
ALTOONA, PA 16601  
(814) 946-7023

COUDERSPORT  
81 MARVIN HILL ROAD  
COUDERSPORT, PA 16915  
(814) 454-7114

EPHRATA  
1705 WEST 26TH STREET  
EPHRA, PA 16908  
(814) 454-7114

HARRISBURG  
555 WALNUT STREET  
FIRST FLOOR  
HARRISBURG, PA 17101  
(717) 657-7114

PHILADELPHIA  
WIDENER BUILDING  
ONE SOUTH PENN SQUARE  
SUITE 960  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107  
(800) 664-6900

PITTSBURGH  
100 WEST STATION SQUARE DRIVE  
LANDMARKS BUILDING  
SUITE 250  
PITTSBURGH, PA 15219  
(412) 562-0533

SCRANTON  
THE RITZ BUILDING  
222 WYOMING AVENUE  
SCRANTON, PA 18503  
(570) 344-8799

11-L-0559/OSD/587114

I ask that you do all you can to implement a system within the Department of Defense and military services to share the achievements and accomplishments of our military service members with Members of Congress. Armed with this information, Members of Congress can help share the accomplishments of our military personnel with our constituents.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

*Thanks Don!*

Sincerely,  
*Rick*

Rick Santorum  
United States Senate

Enclosures  
RJS/gb

*Rick Santorum* S.L.C.

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

Purpose: Expressing the sense of the Senate on notice to Congress of the recognition of members of the **Armed Forces** for extraordinary acts of heroism, bravery, and achievement.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 2d Seas.

S. 2766

To auth <sup>*Warner*</sup> **AMENDMENT No. 4210** ry  
 acti **by Santorum** ry  
 con **To: S. 2766** t-  
 mer \_\_\_\_\_ or  
 sucl \_\_\_\_\_ er  
 pur \_\_\_\_\_

Page(s)

OPC:2004 07-2801M001

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
 ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. SANTORUM

Viz:

I At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

1 **SEC. 587. SENSE OF SENATE ON NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF**  
2 **RECOGNITION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED**  
3 **FORCES FOR EXTRAORDINARY ACTS OF**  
4 **BRAVERY, HEROISM, AND ACHIEVEMENT.**

5 It is the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of  
6 Defense or the Secretary of the military department con-  
7 cerned should, upon awarding a medal to a member of  
8 the Armed Forces or otherwise commending or recog-  
9 nizing a member of the Armed Forces for an act of ex-  
10 traordinary heroism, bravery, achievement, or other dis-  
11 tinction, notify the Committee on Armed Services of the  
12 Senate and House of Representatives, the Senators from  
13 the State in which such member resides, and the Member  
14 of the House of Representatives from the district in which  
15 such member resides of such extraordinary award, com-  
16 mendation, or recognition.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT**

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division  
 (CCD) WHS Room 3A948, Suspense Desk (b)(6) AX Number (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Email: [suspense\\_desk@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:suspense_desk@osd.pentagon.mil)

Action Agency UPR  
 Suspense Date 14 Aug 2006

**1. ACTION TAKEN (Check One)**

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to **E** \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify below / include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)

**2 JUSTIFICATION**

Duplicate tasking, ASD LA has prepared the response to USS Santorum, OSD 12538-06, which PoR has coordinated. (see attached)

**3. REPORTING AGENCY**

a. ACTION AGENCY UPR  
 c. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) *[Signature]*  
 b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER DANNEMILLER  
 Signature *[Signature]* Date Signed 8/16/06

c. TELEPHONE NO. (b)(6)  
 d. DATE 8/16/06

5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
b. CANX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
e. OTHER (Specify) _____		
Signature <i>[Signature]</i>	Date Signed <u>8/16/06</u>	

4. CCD CONTROL #  
OSD 12388-06  


100.6

(1 Aug 06)



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

August 4, 2006 3:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting ASD/LA, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake#080206-11

- Senator Rick Santorum **asked** you to implement **a** system within DoD to share service members' achievements and accomplishments with Members of Congress.
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary Michael Dominguez has made clear to the Military Departments that they already have authorization to provide summaries or citations to Members of Congress upon their request.
- Under Secretary Dr. David Chu is in the final coordination process for a new policy **with** respect to "pushing" award information to Members of Congress. The policy will specify the information that we will "push," such as type of award, name, rank and home.
- Recommend you send the attached letter **as** your response to Senator Santorum's letter.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake#080206-11
2. SECDEF letter to Senator Santorum
3. Letter from Senator Santorum (Aug. 1, 2006)
4. *Coordination From P & R*

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXBC SEC			
ESR MA	<i>Q 8/7</i>	STT DIR	

OSD 12538-06



8/7/2006 8:58:41 AM

Prepared by Tom Jones, Special Assistant for Personnel & Readiness, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58720



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ASD (LA) Staff Package with Subject: *Response to SECDEF Snowflake #080206-11*

- Concur without comment.

OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICIAL

USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
for David S. C. Chu

AUG 14 2006

---

11-L-0559/OSD/58721

10 8/3/06

~~FOUO~~

August 01, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

cc: Eric Edelman  
Tina Jonas



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Zeroed Out on the Conventional ICBM

I just found out that we have been zeroed out on the Conventional ICBM by Stevens and Inouye. We just met with them, and I never even raised the subject. It is **so** disappointing. I don't know what we need to get our arms around this, so that I am aware, and can be sure to talk **to** them about something **so** important.

Should Pace and I **go up** and see them?

DIR.ss  
SF073106-42



*Please Respond By 08/02/06*

AUG 03 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACH

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58722



8/4/2006 10:42:54 AM



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2006, 3:30 P.M.

LEGISLATIVE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

*Robert L. Wilkie*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Zeroed Out on the Conventional ICBM, #073 106-42

This is in response to an August 1<sup>st</sup> Snowflake regarding the Senate Appropriations Committee's zeroing of funding for the Conventional Trident Missile (CTM).

- The SAC-D cut \$110M from the CTM budget lines in the FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill, \$38M from Weapons Procurement Navy, and \$72M from the RDT&E account.
- The FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill is currently on the Senate Floor. Senator Sessions will be offering an amendment to add back the funds for CTM cut during the markup.

The following is an overview of Department engagements on this issue:

- General Cartwright and Admiral Giambastiani have both made calls and visits to Members of Congress in support of adding back the \$127M for CTM. They also sent a letter of support to Senators Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye, Sessions and Nelson.
- You also sent a letter of support for the CTM program to Senator Sessions. Senator Sessions agreed to offer an amendment on the Floor to increase the funding for CTM to the level requested by the President, (\$127M).
- Secretary Edelman will be calling Senators Ben Nelson, Lieberman, and Cochran on Wednesday, August 2<sup>nd</sup>, to ask for their support of the Sessions Amendment.

RECOMMENDATION:

- You are scheduled to meet with Senator Sessions, and others, before the Ops Intel this Thursday. Before the meeting, you may want to mention to Senator Sessions your support for the CTM program.
- You may also want to mention your support for this DoD priority when you see Senators Stevens and Inouye at the Ops Intel.

Prepared by: Lisa Marie Cheney, DASD Legislative Outreach, OSD(LA)(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58723



FOUO

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

4 August 2006 - 1220


MEMORANDUM FOR OGC

SUBJECT: Military and Criminal Investigations

Please prepare a response to the attached snowflake on Military and Criminal Investigations for the Deputy Secretary. Coordinate your response with the Military Services.

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response.

Very Respectfully,



John Nagl  
LTC, USA  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

ATTACHMENT: SNOWFLAKE080206-25  
SUSPENSE: 18AUG06  
CC: SECARMY  
SECNAV  
SECAF

OSD 12493-06



8/4/2006 3:02:23 PM

000,5

4 Aug 06

2 Aug 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58724

~~FOUO~~

0615  
24-06  
12/3

August 02, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Military and Criminal Investigations

The more I watch the DoD criminal investigations and military investigations, it becomes increasingly clear that the pace of events in the 21st century is such that the leisurely speed at which these investigations proceed is leaving the world with the impression that DoD is not open, we are not transparent, and that we are not serious.

We ought to give thought to requiring that the currently sequential reviews be concurrent. We could cut months off the time it takes to bring closure to these investigations.

Please look into this and get back to me with a proposal.

DHR:ss  
SF080206-25

.....  
***Please Respond By 08/30/06***

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12493-06



11-L-0559/OSD/58725

8/4/2006 3:03:27 PM

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/

5  
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0



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

OCT 04 2006

000.5

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT Investigations Snowflakes — Interim Reply

- On August 2, you asked the Deputy **Secretary** of Defense to consider whether concurrent reviews of investigations would be preferable **to** sequential reviews. The Deputy **Secretary** asked me to prepare a response.
- I prepared a **draft** reply recommending that we retain sequential reviews but increase our emphasis on timeliness. I coordinated the reply with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- On September 25, you asked me to identify ways to bring the investigative process into **the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**, **especially** regarding the timeliness of the investigative process.
- I have combined the two snowflakes into one package and again **am** coordinating my combined reply with the Secretaries **of** the Military Departments and the Chairman.
- The combined reply proposes that you sign a memorandum emphasizing the importance of timeliness in high visibility investigations and defining timely as **completing** such **an** investigation in 120 days.
- My combined reply **also** proposes that we formally establish a group to identify impediments to timely investigations and solutions **to** those impediments. I offer two options for such a group: (1) a Blue Ribbon Panel of outside experts under the Federal Advisory Committee Act or (2) a working group from across the Department under my aegis. In my coordination package, I ask the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman which option they prefer.
- Upon completion of the coordination, I **will** forward the results to you.

4 Oct 06

2 Aug 06

cc: DEPSECDEF

11-L-0559/OSD/58726



OSD 12493-06

10/5/2006 11:21:30 AM

FOUO

September 25, 2006

TO Jim Haynes  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT. Proposal For Bringing Investigative Process into the 21st Century

I would like you and the Joint Staff legal shop to come up with a proposal as to how we *can* bring the **process** for investigations into the 21st century. One year Wore anything **specific starts**, by way of action on the **matter**, is too long.

Please **get back to me** with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/25/06 Press Release on Hamdania, Iraq Investigation

DHR.m  
SF092506-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/25/06*

Copy to: CI Reed  
P JHP  
P DGC  
→ GC

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58727

OSD 15740-06

8/21 ✓  
1300



ACQUISITION.  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

DA  
8/23

0004

ACTION MEMO

August 18, 2006 2:28 PM

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg, (USD) AT&L

SUBJECT: Sale of Civil War-era Monuments

RR →  
Robert Rangel  
8/21

- Attached you will find our proposed reply to Senator Hatch about the purported sale of Civil War era Monuments. Major General Reno, the Acting Director of the Defense Logistics Agency will sign the reply. You had asked to see a copy prior to your visit to Utah.

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve the proposed reply.

Approve AK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

see edit

AUG 23 2006  
COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

18 Aug 06

26 Jul 06

Prepared by: Steve Mackey, (b)(6)

MA SD	PK 8/22	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	AK 8/21	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	MA 8/21	1245	
ESR MA	Q 8/21	STF DIR	

11-L-0559/OSD/58728



OSD 12501-06

8/21/2006 9:23:32 AM

# TAB A

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4402

Dear Senator Hatch:

This is in response to your recent letter concerning sale of Civil War-era monuments. This inquiry was forwarded to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), an activity of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DRMS does not have any historical monuments available for sale and our records show no indication we have ever sold this type of property. The process for disposition of this type of property, however, is described in the paragraphs below.

DRMS is responsible for administering the Department of Defense (DOD) personal property utilization and disposal program worldwide in accordance with the Federal Property and Administrative Services Action of 1949, as amended. This Act requires that property excess to the needs of the Military Services be turned over to DRMS for redistribution throughout DoD or to Federal civil agencies. If the property is not needed within the Federal Government, it is offered for donation to eligible donees. At the end of this reuse cycle, any property that has not been identified as being required by an authorized recipient, and that does not present a national security concern, is sold to the general public.

In addition, Section 2572 of Title 10, United States Code, authorizes ~~the~~ Secretary of a Military Department to donate or loan certain types of surplus military equipment to recognized selected recipients for historical, ceremonial or display purposes. Although receipt of this type of property by DRMS is rare, when it does occur, prior to release of these items, specific Military Service contact points approval are required. The referenced statute also prohibits the re-sale of these types of historical items by the recipients. ?

Your constituent is welcome to contact DRMS with details on the specific items of concern and we will contact the appropriate Military Service point of contact on their behalf. DRMS points of contact are Ms. Tina Aldrich at (b)(6) or Tina.Aldrich@dla.mil.

It has been a pleasure to assist you.

Sincerely,

Loren M. Reno  
Acting Director

11-L-0559/OSD/58730

# TAB B

ORRIN G. HATCH  
UTAH

PATRICIA KNIGHT  
CHIEF OF STAFF

504 Hart Senate Office Building

Telephone: (202) 224-8231  
TDD: (202) 224-2898  
Fax: (202) 224-6331

Website: <http://www.senate.gov/~hatch>

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4402

July 26, 2006

## COMMITTEES:

FINANCE

JUDICIARY

HEALTH, EDUCATION,  
LABOR, AND PENSIONS

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT COMMITTEE  
ON TAXATION

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon, 3E-380  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have enclosed a copy of the letter I received from Mr. Tom Dial of West Valley City, Utah. As you will note, Mr. Dial is concerned about the purported sale of Civil War-era monuments and other materiel by persons unauthorized to do so.

I am requesting a review of Mr. Dial's letter and a response from your office. Please fax your reply to the attention of Travis Gibbons of my staff at (202) 224-6331.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,



Orrin G. Hatch

United States Senator

OGH:tung  
Enclosure

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

OSD 12501-06



8/4/2006 2:08:57 PM

lawmsg.txt  
capitol correspond  
Incoming Email Message

constituent ID: 493370

Mr. Tom Dial

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

Phone(s): (H) (b)(6)

Activity created: 7/4/2006  
File Location: 673054  
Interest code(s): VETERANS

Incoming Message:

Date Received: 7/4/2006 7:50:27 PM

Topic/subject Desc: Ethics

I am thoroughly disgusted with the trafficking of civil war monuments that have been erected in memory of those who valiantly served their country. It seems that war profiteering is still extant and greedy collectors are willing to buy and make a killing on cannon and other artifacts sold by corrupt city and county officials. As a direct descendant of a civil war soldier, I am most adamantly opposed to the selling of these artifacts and regard such practices as spit on the grave! of those who served and spit in the face of those of us who are their descendants. I would urge you to remind your Senate colleagues of the great sacrifices made by our deceased veterans and that they be treated with the reverence and respect they deserve. My feelings are very strong on this issue. The money grubbing politicians that want to suck up everything for their own personal gratification need to be stopped dead in their tracks.

FOUO

August 09, 2006

TO: Ken Krieg

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*



SUBJECT: Sale of Civil War-era Monuments

Please be sure I see the answer to this letter from Orrin Hatch before it goes out. I would like to see it before I go to Utah in two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
SF080906-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/23/06*

AUG 22 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*ESD  
M*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58734

~~FOUO~~

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
SF081006-18

.....

*Please Respond By 08/21/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58735

8/10/06

FOR: USD(AT&L)

FROM: Jimmy Sherrod, *J. Sherrod* Chief, SecDef Executive Support Office, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Sale of Civil War-era **Monuments** (OSD 12501-06)

Per Mr. Marriott, the DoD Executive Secretary, the SecDef would like to see your reponse to the letter from Orrin Hatch before it goes out. Please prepare in final form as a Tab to an Action Memo to the SecDef requesting his approval to send it out. SecDef would like to see it before he goes to Utah in two weeks.

OSD 12501-06



8/10/2006 10:50:43 AM

**TAB C**

**Coordination Page Purported Sale of  
Civil War-era monuments**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>
OGC	Bob Gorman	16 Aug
LA	Andrew Kavaliunas	16 Aug

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2006

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Sale of Civil War-era Monuments

*000-4*

Please be sure I see the answer to this letter from Orrin Hatch before it goes out. I would like to see it before I go to Utah in two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR,dh  
SF080906-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/23/06*

*9 AUG 06*

*26 JUL 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58739

OSD 12501-06  
  
8/21/2006 9:26:01 AM

ORRIN G. HATCH  
UTAH

PATRICIA KNIGHT  
CHIEF OF STAFF

104 Hart Senate Office Building

TELEPHONE: 12021224-5251  
TDD (202) 224-2849  
FAX: 12021224-6331

Website: <http://www.senate.gov/~hatch>

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 205104402

July 26, 2006

COMMITTEES:

FINANCE

JUDICIARY

HEALTH, EDUCATION,  
LABOR, AND PENSIONS

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT COMMITTEE  
ON TAXATION

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon, 3E-880  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have enclosed a copy of the letter I received from Mr. Tom Dial of West Valley City, Utah. As you will note, Mr. Dial is concerned about the purported sale of Civil War-era monuments and other material by persons unauthorized to do so.

I am requesting a review of Mr. Dial's letter and a response from your office. Please fax your reply to the attention of Travis Gibbons of my staff at (202) 224-6331.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter,

Sincerely,



Orrin G. Hatch  
United States Senator

OGH:tmgg  
Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/58740

OSD 12501-06



8/4/2006 2:09:57 PM

1awrmsg.txt  
Capitol correspond  
Incoming Email Message

constituent ID: 493370

Mr. Tom Dial

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

Phone(s): (H) (b)(6)

Activity created: 7/4/2006  
File Location: 673054  
Interest Code(s): VETERANS

Incoming Message:

Date Received: 7/4/2006 7:50:27 PM

Topic/Subject Desc: Ethics

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

August 9, 2006

cc: L

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-4402

Dear Senator Hatch:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, on behalf of Mr. Tom Dial, concerning the alleged sale of Civil War era monuments and artifacts.

Inquiry into this matter has been initiated. You will be further advised as soon as information becomes available. If you have any questions about this inquiry, please contact Ms. Barbara Ellis at (b)(6) and refer to the following case number: 60811514.

Sincerely,

Janet Fagan  
Chief, Congressional  
Inquiry Division

(6 Jul 06)

IR  
12501-06

11-L-0559/OSD/58742



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY  
HEADQUARTERS  
8725 JOHN J. KINGMAN ROAD  
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-6221

0004

IN REPLY, DI,  
REFER TO

AUG 30 2006

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4402

Dear Senator Hatch:

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In addition, Section 2572 of Title 10, United States Code, authorizes the Secretary of a Military Department to donate or loan certain types of surplus military equipment to recognized, selected recipients for historical, ceremonial or display purposes. Although receipt of this type of property by DRMS is rare, when it does occur, prior to release of these items, specific Military Service approval is required. The referenced statute also prohibits the re-sale of these types of historical items by the recipients.

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
It has been a pleasure to assist you.

Sincerely,

ROBERT T. DAIL  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director

(26 Jul 06)

R 12501-06



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

August 7, 2006

The Honorable Pete Sessions  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Sessions:

letter requesting Dallas Military  
official event. I have shared your letter  
the DoD General Counsel and asked that  
see what we may be able to do. He will get

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



OSD 12505-06

8/8/21/06 12:57:33 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/58744

001

7 Aug 06

3 Aug 06

8/17/06  
2:43 pm

<i>OK</i>	OK - SOM*
<del>Change</del>	<del>Change and SOM*</del>
_____	SOM* and use to close
* SOM signature as 'Donald Rumsfeld' unless otherwise indicated.	

The Honorable Pete Sessions  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative *Sessions* *RETS* *ST&T*

Thank you for your letter requesting the Dallas Military Ball be designated an official event. I have shared your letter with Mr. Jim Haynes, the DoD General Counsel, and asked that

y wi

back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD .505-06

EXECUTIVE SERVICES DIRECTORATE  
3C975 (b)(6)

FOUO

AUG 10 2006

001

TO: Jim Haynes  
 CC: Robert Wilkie  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TA.*  
 SUBJECT: Designating Dallas Military Ball as Official Event

Regarding this letter from Congressman Pete Sessions, it certainly sounds like an unnecessary expense during a war. I don't know what the pattern or the precedents are, but you ought to look into it.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/3/06 Sessions ltr to SD

DHR:ah  
 SF080906-06

.....

10 Aug 06

3 Aug 06

FOUO

OSD 12505-06



8/16/2006 12:38:02 PM

11 L 0550/OSD/58710

**PETE SESSIONS**

32ND DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEE ON RULES

COMMITTEE  
ON THE BUDGET

COMMITTEE ON  
FINANCIAL SERVICES  
(ONLEAVE)

RESULTS CAUCUS  
CHAIRMAN



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

1514 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4332  
TELEPHONE: 202.225.2231  
FAX: 202.225.5678  
DISTRICT OFFICE:  
 PARK CENTRAL VII  
12750 MERIT DRIVE  
SUITE 1434  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75251  
TELEPHONE 972.392.0505  
FAX: 972.392.0615  
e-mail: ptes@mail.house.gov  
web page: www.house.gov/sessions/

August 3, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

I am writing on behalf of a number of my constituents who organize the annual Dallas Military Ball (DMB) to ask for your consideration in helping facilitate a wider degree of participation in the ball by flag and general officers.

DMB has been an annual tradition for over forty years, and is very generous in raising funds to support military charities, donating over one and a quarter million dollars through the Combined Federal Campaign. The ball has been blessed with participation from many senior military leaders. In the past six years, General Richard Cody, Admiral Vern Clark, General John P. Jumper, General Eric Shinseki, and General Michael E. Ryan have served as the principal speaker for the ball.

In addition to the keynote speakers, each service has historically provided several senior flag or general officers to represent their respective service at the ball. In the past, the DMB has paid for the travel expenses of not only the chief of the services, but also these additional senior officers and their spouses. Approximately three years ago the DoD Ethics Office began questioning this practice as being in violation of DoD ethics since it is not an official event. As a result, last year's DMB was very lightly attended by flag and general officers because they are now required to pay their own expenses. Consequently, the decline in participation by flag and general officers adversely affects the DMB's ability to generate funds to support military charities and related support organizations.

It is the desire of the DMB to continue with its charitable activities, and I am asking for your consideration in designating the Dallas Military Ball as an official event so that the DMB may be able to reimburse the travel expenses of flag and general officers for their attendance at the event. In the absence of designating the DMB as an official event, I would appreciate any actions that your office could take to allow for greater participation by flag and general officers.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/58747

OSD 12505-06



8/4/2006 2 29 37 PM

*Thank you for your consideration of this request. Please feel free to contact me, or my Legislative Assistant, Scott Cunningham, at 202.225.2231 or [scott.cunningham@mail.house.gov](mailto:scott.cunningham@mail.house.gov) should you have any additional questions regarding this letter. I thank you for your continued service to our men and women in uniform*

Sincerely,

  
Pete Sessions  
Member of Congress

PS\sc



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

AUG 16 2006

001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Designating Dallas Military **Ball** as an Official Event

- Congressman Sessions, on behalf of the Dallas Military Ball (DMB) requested that you designate the Ball **as** an official event so that General and Flag Officers, who are not in the Dallas area, may accept travel accommodations from DMB to attend.
- DMB is a fundraiser for selected charities including, among others, those that support military personnel and those that **are** included in the CFC.
- Since the DMB is a private fundraiser, Government-wide regulations prohibit official participation except for (1) providing an official speech, and (2) merely attending the event in a manner which does not include active and visible participation.
- In the past, the Department **has** provided senior officials **to** provide **an** official speech at the event. Other officials who are invited may merely attend in their personal capacities, but may not accept **DMB's** offer to pay their travel expenses since the offers constitute a gift that was offered to them by reason of their official positions.
- In the attached letter to Rep. Sessions, I explain these restrictions and point out that we are unable to send senior officials to all of the charitable fundraisers that seek our attendance. **Unless** I hear **from** you to the contrary, I will sign and dispatch the attached letter on Monday August 21.

16 Aug 06

COORDINATION:  
ASD(L/A)

Attachment: a/s

3 Aug 06



11-L-0559/OSD/58749



OSD 12505-06

8/16/2006 12:38:47 PM



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

The Honorable Pete Sessions  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Sessions:

Secretary Rumsfeld **has** asked me to respond to your letter of August 3, 2006, in which you requested that he designate the Dallas Military Ball (DMB) **as** an official event so that the Ball Committee may be able to reimburse invited Generals and Admirals for their travel expenses to attend the event.

The major impediment **this** Department **faces** in supporting the DMB is that it is a private fundraiser for a variety of charities. Government-wide regulations found at Section 2635.808 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations limit official fundraising by the Department to a very few activities authorized by statute, Executive Order, or regulation. Accordingly, the Department may officially support the annual Combined Federal Campaign, emergency relief efforts approved by the Office of Personnel Management, and fundraising efforts of the military relief societies and organizations composed primarily of DoD personnel or their dependents when **fundraising** among their own members for the benefit of welfare funds for their **own** members or their dependents.

The DMB is one of hundreds of charitable fundraising events each year that seek support from **this** Department or attendance by **Department** personnel. Many of these organizations render assistance exclusively to the men and women of our Armed Forces and their families. We do not have the resources or manpower to satisfy all requests, and, of course, we may not give preferential treatment to some charities and deny it to other similarly worthy organizations.

Furthermore, most requests for personnel or support either directly or indirectly also involve the expenditure of taxpayer **funds** for the benefit of a private organization. For example, the DMB seeks the Department to make senior officers, who are not **in** the Dallas area, available **so** that they may travel to Dallas for the explicit purpose of merely attending the ball. (As you note in your letter, the Department traditionally sends a senior officer to be the key note **speaker**, who will deliver an official speech on behalf of the Department.) Even if the DMB reimburses the Department for the travel and accommodation expenses of these senior leaders, they will be absent from their duty



11-L-0559/OSD/58750

stations for several **days** for the sole purpose of appearing at a ball. Their function, **as** you indicate in your letter, is "to generate funds to support military charities and related support organizations." Seen in this light, I hope you understand why Federal personnel are not permitted to support officially private fundraisers for the DMB or other charitable events.

I am aware that attorneys in the DoD **Standards** of Conduct Office, which is part of my office, have been working with DMB officials for several years to accommodate the requests of the DMB Committee in ways that are both legal and appropriate. I am attaching a recent letter from my office to the President of the **Dallas** Military Ball Corporation that discusses much of this support.

If you further questions, please don't hesitate to contact Steve Epstein of my office at (b)(6) or by email at [epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil](mailto:epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil).

Sincerely,

William J. Haynes II

Attachment:  
As stated



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

December 21, 2005

LTC Grady L. Fairbairn USA (Ret)  
President  
Dallas Military Ball Corporation

(b)(6)

Dear LTC Fairbairn:

This responds to **your** request, December **14, 2005**, regarding the Department's ability to approve official participation by DoD personnel in the **2006** Dallas Military Ball to be held March **4, 2006** in Dallas. **Our** determinations are identical to those made for the **2004** and **2005** Balls and **are** provided below.

The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards), 5 C.F.R. **Part 2635**, severely limit the activities of Federal personnel, both civilian and military, in official fundraising for charitable organizations. **Section 2635.808** restricts fundraising in an official capacity to those very **few activities** that are authorized by statute, Executive Order, or regulation. Pursuant to section **3-210** of Department of **Defense** Directive **5500.7-R**, the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), Department officials may endorse the fundraising of organizations listed in that **section**. The Dallas **Military** Ball is not one of these authorized organizations. The fact that the Ball is donating, in their **entirety**, the net **proceeds** and **other** donations to various organizations listed in that section and to designated charities of the Combined **Federal** Campaign (CFC) does not **convert** the Ball into a fundraising event that Department officials may endorse. Even if Department officials could **endorse** the Ball, the amount of support or participation that the Department could officially provide the Ball would not change.

The Standards acknowledge two activities that **are** not considered fundraising. One is that DoD personnel may deliver an official speech, meaning one given in an official capacity at an appropriate forum and focused on the responsibilities, or ongoing or **announced** policy, programs, or operations of the Department. **Second**, personnel may "merely attend" the event, meaning that they play no official role, **are** not an active or visible **part** of the promotion, production, or presentation of the event, and their attendance is not used to promote the event.

**This** same section of the **Standards** and **subsection 3-300.1** of the JER generally permit Federal personnel to voluntarily participate in the Ball in their personal capacities **as long as** they act exclusively outside the **scope** of their official positions and do not personally solicit from organizations that do business with the Department, **or** from subordinate personnel. DoD employees may not permit the use of their official titles, positions, or organization names to further the fund-raising effort, but may be identified by their rank and service, *e.g.*, Colonel James Smith, **US** Army.



11-L-0559/OSD/58752

I am setting out below guidance on specific matters that have been raised in the past regarding DoD support for the Dallas Military Ball.

1. Official Speech If there is a DoD officer who attends in an official capacity and delivers an official speech, that officer may appear in uniform. Personnel who normally travel with the speaker, such as security personnel and aides, may also officially attend in uniform. This is applicable to General Richard A. Cody, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, whom you are asking to be the Kenote Speaker.
2. Certain DoD facilities and equipment may be provided, at no additional cost to DoD, as logistical support of the Ball when the factors of paragraph 3-21 1.b. of the JER are determined by the cognizant Commander.
3. Active Duty Military Members: They may "merely attend" in either an official capacity upon a determination of agency interest, or in a personal capacity. The determination of agency interest must be made at each member's organization, although it appears likely that a determination of agency interest for attendance at the Military Ball may be made for only a few people, if any, and those most probably in the Dallas area.
4. Federally-Funded Travel: Even when an agency determines that personnel may attend in an official capacity, it does not necessarily follow that appropriated funds may be expended to pay travel expenses to the Ball. That is a separate analysis that must also be conducted at the specific agency level. If members attend in their personal capacities, Federal funds may not be used.
5. Uniforms: Each Military Service establishes rules for the wearing of the uniform of that Service. In general, military personnel may not wear their uniforms to assemblies or activities that imply support of commercial or political interests or official sponsorship of an activity or interest. The regulations generally permit active duty personnel to wear uniforms at social functions and informal gatherings of a military nature, but do not specifically address such events when they are fundraisers. As stated above, if military personnel attend in their personal capacities, they must act exclusively outside the scope of their official positions. Sometimes the wearing of a military Uniform at an event is so unique that it constitutes "active and visible participation" in the event, and therefore is not permissible. Because of the overwhelmingly military nature of the Dallas Military Ball and attendance by current and former military personnel, I believe that the wearing of military uniforms at the Ball will not constitute such participation.
6. Offers of Free Attendance: Any offers of free attendance to invited DoD personnel must be analyzed according to the capacity in which these personnel are attending. Since I have determined that the Ball is a widely attended gathering, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 2635.204(g)(2), DoD personnel, in their personal capacities, may accept an unsolicited offer of free attendance (food, refreshments, and entertainment

furnished to all attendees as an integral part of the event) if the personnel's supervisor determines that there is an agency interest (furthering agency programs and operations) that the individual attend the Ball. Similar offers of free attendance to DoD personnel who are attending in their official capacities, may be accepted as gifts to the agency under 10 U.S.C. 2601.

7. **Offers of Travel Accommodations:** In an official capacity, the cognizant agency may accept an unsolicited offer of travel accommodations for DoD personnel and accompanying spouses under 31 U.S.C. 1353, or if that is not available, as a gift to the agency under 10 U.S.C. 2601. DoD personnel who attend in their personal capacities may accept such offers as long as acceptance of such gifts does not violate the prohibitions of acceptance of gifts from outside sources in 5 C.F.R. 2635, subpart B.
8. **Former Military Personnel:** Former military personnel, unless they are otherwise current Federal employees, obviously may attend only in their personal capacities and are not constrained by the Standards. Like active duty military personnel, however, their respective Military Services determine when they may appear in uniform. In general, the regulations permit the uniform at events essentially of a military character, such as military balls, parades, weddings, and memorial services, but as with active duty regulations, do not address such events when they are fundraisers.

I hope you find this information useful. As discussed last year, on the Contacts page on the website, for Charity Distribution, there is an implication that the entire CFC is supported, which is not accurate and may be misleading to donors. We recommend that you state, as in your letter, that "designated charities of the" CFC are supported. As stated above, whether the Ball were to support the entire CFC or just designated charities contained in the CFC, DoD support would remain the same. I notice that you have the seals or logos of the various military services, including the Marine Corps, on your home page. As the Marine Corps, in particular, may not give permission for such use, I would like to remind you to contact the Services for permission to use their logos in this manner and highly recommend that you remove the logos until you have received permission.

Please don't hesitate to contact me or Gail Mason if you have further questions. Gail and I may be reached by phone at (b)(6) or by email at [emteinsGkiodnc.osd.mil](mailto:emteinsGkiodnc.osd.mil) or [masong@dodge.osd.mil](mailto:masong@dodge.osd.mil).

Stephen Epstein,  
Director  
Standards of Conduct Office



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

AUG 22 2006

001

The Honorable Pete Sessions  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Sessions:

Secretary Rumsfeld **has** asked me to respond to your letter of August 3, 2006, in which you requested that he designate the Dallas Military Ball (DMB) **as** an official event so that the Ball Committee may be able to reimburse invited Generals and Admirals for their travel expenses to attend the event.

The major impediment **this** Department faces in supporting the DMB is that it is a private **fundraiser** for a variety of charities. Government-wide regulations found at Section 2635. 808 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations limit official fundraising by the Department to a very few activities authorized by statute, Executive Order, **or** regulation. Accordingly, the Department may officially support the annual Combined Federal Campaign, emergency relief efforts approved by the Office of Personnel Management, and fundraising efforts of the military relief societies and organizations composed primarily of DoD personnel or their dependents when fundraising among **their** own members for the benefit of welfare funds for their own members or their dependents.

The DMB is one of hundreds of charitable fundraising events each year that seek support from this Department or attendance by Department personnel. Many of these organizations render assistance exclusively to the men and women of our **Armed Forces** and their families. We do not have the resources or manpower to satisfy all requests, and, of course, we may not give preferential treatment to some charities and deny it to other similarly worthy organizations.

Furthermore, most requests for personnel or support either directly or indirectly also involve the expenditure of taxpayer funds for the benefit of a private organization. For example, the DMB seeks the Department to make senior officers, who are not in the Dallas area, available so that they may travel to Dallas for the explicit purpose of merely attending the ball. (**As** you note in your letter, the Department traditionally sends a senior officer to be the key note speaker, who will deliver **an** official speech on behalf of the Department.) Even if the DMB reimburses the Department for the travel and accommodation expenses of these senior leaders, they will be absent from their duty

(3 Aug 06)



11-L-0559/OSD/58755


R 12505-06

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I **am** aware that attorneys in the DoD **Standards** of Conduct Office, which is part of my office, have **been** working with DMB officials for several years to accommodate **the** requests of the **DMB** Committee in ways that **are** both legal **and** appropriate. I **am** attaching a recent letter from my office to the President of **the** Dallas Military Ball Corporation **that** discusses much of this **support**.

**If** you have further questions, please don't hesitate to contact Steve Epstein **of** my office at (b)(6) **or** by *email* at [epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil](mailto:epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil).

sincerely,



William J. Haynes II

Attachment:  
**As** stated



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

December 21, 2005

LTC Grady L. Fairbairn USA (Ret.)  
President  
Dallas Military Ball Corporation

(b)(6)

Dear LTC Fairbairn:

This responds to your request, December 14, 2005, regarding the Department's ability to approve official participation by DoD personnel in the 2006 Dallas Military Ball to be held March 4, 2006 in Dallas. Our determinations are identical to those made for the 2004 and 2005 Balls and are provided below.

The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards), 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, severely limit the activities of Federal personnel, both civilian and military, in official fundraising for charitable organizations. Section 2635.808 restricts fundraising in an official capacity to those very few activities that are authorized by statute, Executive Order, or regulation. Pursuant to section 3-210 of Department of Defense Directive 5500.7-R, the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), Department officials may endorse the fundraising of organizations listed in that section. The Dallas Military Ball is not one of these authorized organizations. The fact that the Ball is donating, in their entirety, the net proceeds and other donations to various organizations listed in that section and to designated charities of the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) does not convert the Ball into a fundraising event that Department officials may endorse. Even if Department officials could endorse the Ball, the amount of support or participation that the Department could officially provide the Ball would not change.

The Standards acknowledge two activities that are not considered fundraising. One is that DoD personnel may deliver an official speech, meaning one given in an official capacity at an appropriate forum and focused on the responsibilities, or ongoing or announced policy, programs, or operations of the Department. Second, personnel may "merely attend" the event, meaning that they play no official role, are not an active or visible part of the promotion, production, or presentation of the event, and their attendance is not used to promote the event.

This same section of the Standards and subsection 3-300.1 of the JER generally permit Federal personnel to voluntarily participate in the Ball in their personal capacities as long as they act exclusively outside the scope of their official positions and do not personally solicit from organizations that do business with the Department, or from subordinate personnel. DoD employees may not permit the use of their official titles, positions, or organization names to further the fund-raising effort, but may be identified by their rank and service, e.g., Colonel James Smith, US Army.

I am setting out below guidance on specific matters that have been raised in the past regarding DoD support for the Dallas Military Ball.

1. **Official Speech:** If there is a DoD officer who attends in an official capacity and delivers an official speech, that officer may appear in uniform. Personnel who normally travel with the speaker, such as security personnel and aides, may also officially attend in uniform. This is applicable to General/Richard A. Cody, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, whom you are asking to be the Keynote Speaker.
2. **Certain DoD facilities and equipment** may be provided, at no additional cost to DoD, as logistical support of the Ball when the factors of paragraph 3-211.b. of the JBR are determined by the cognizant Commander.
3. **Active Duty Military Members:** They may “merely attend” in either an official capacity upon a determination of agency interest, or in a personal capacity. The determination of agency interest must be made at each member’s organization, although it appears likely that a determination of agency interest for attendance at the Military Ball may be made for only a few people, if any, and those most probably in the Dallas area.
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furnished to all attendees as an integral part of the event) if the personnel's supervisor determines that there is an agency interest (furthering agency programs and operations) that the individual attend the Ball. Similar offers of free attendance to DoD personnel who are attending in their official capacities, may be accepted as gifts to the agency under 10 U.S.C. 2601.

7. **Offers of Travel Accommodations:** In an official capacity, the cognizant agency may accept an unsolicited offer of travel accommodations for DoD personnel and accompanying spouses under 31 U.S.C. 1353, or if that is not available, as a gift to the agency under 10 U.S.C. 2601. DoD personnel who attend in their personal capacities may accept such offers as long as acceptance of such gifts does not violate the prohibitions of acceptance of gifts from outside sources in 5 C.F.R. 2635, subpart B.
8. **Former Military Personnel:** Former military personnel, unless they are otherwise current Federal employees, obviously may attend only in their personal capacities and are not constrained by the Standards. Like active duty military personnel, however, their respective Military Services determine when they may appear in uniform. In general, the regulations permit the uniform at events essentially of a military character, such as military balls, parades, weddings, and memorial services, but as with active duty regulations, do not address such events when they are fundraisers.

I hope you find this information useful. As discussed last year, on the Contacts page on the website, for Charity Distribution, there is an implication that the entire CFC is supported, which is not accurate and may be misleading to donors. We recommend that you state, as in your letter, that "designated charities of the" CFC are supported. As stated above, whether the Ball were to support the entire CFC or just designated charities contained in the CFC, DoD support would remain the same. I notice that you have the seals or logos of the various military services, including the Marine Corps, on your home page. As the Marine Corps, in particular, may not give permission for such use, I would like to remind you to contact the Services for permission to use their logos in this manner and highly recommend that you remove the logos until you have received permission.

Please don't hesitate to contact me or Gail Mason if you have further questions. Gail and I may be reached by phone at (b)(6) or by email at [epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil](mailto:epsteins@dodgc.osd.mil) or [masong@dodgc.osd.mil](mailto:masong@dodgc.osd.mil).

Stephen Epstein,  
Director  
Standards of Conduct Office

~~FOUO~~

August 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT Nephew of Max Baucus

Someone **told** me Max Baucus's nephew, who is a Marine, was killed in Iraq. We need to get the information to him, see that it is handled correctly, and that a letter is drafted **from** me to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF080206-03

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/07/06*

OSD 12516-06



8/4/2006 4:30:01 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58760



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

**THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

**INFO MEMO**

August 4, 2006, 12:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake – Nephew of Max Baucus, #080206-08

- You stated, "Someone told me Max Baucus's nephew, who is a Marine, was killed in Iraq. We need to get the information to him, see that it is handled correctly, and that a letter is drafted from me to him."
- CPL Phillip E. Baucus was KIA on July 29, 2006, during operations in Rawah, Iraq. He was assigned to Delta Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Recon Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. He died of wounds sustained from an SVBIED explosion.
- The family was notified of the incident on July 30, 2006. Casualty Assistance Officers are assisting the family.
- Senator Baucus (D-MT) has been named as the Special Escort for the family and has been provided Invitational Travel Orders.
- Senator Baucus was at Dover AFB to meet the arrival of his nephew's remains on August 1, 2006. Remains are scheduled to depart from Dover AFB on August 4, 2006.
- A letter was prepared by Executive Secretary for your signature and it was delivered to his office by my staff on August 3, 2006.

Attachments:

Snowflake #080206-08 (TAB A)

OSD 12516-06



8/4/2006 29:55 PM

Prepared by: Major Derek T. Contreras, Special Assistant, OASD (LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58761



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

August 10, 2006

Cuba

The Honorable Mel Martinez  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Martinez:

Thank you for your letter regarding TV Marti. I have shared your letter with General Pete Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and asked that he look into this further. He will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

10 Aug 06

2 Aug 06

OSD 12526-06



8/11/2006 8:20:32 AM

<p><i>AK</i> OK - SOM* AUG 10 2006 ____ Change and SOM* ____ SOM* and use to close</p> <p>* SOM signature as 'Donald Rumsfeld' unless otherwise indicated.</p>
--

The Honorable Mel Martinez  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Martinez:

**Thank** you for your letter regarding TV Marti. I have shared your letter with General Pete Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and asked that he look into this further. He will get back to you **as** soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 12526-06

EXECUTIVE SERVICES DIRECTORATE  
3C975 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58763

8/29 ✓  
1000

# UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

CM-0460-06  
27 August 2006

Cuba

## ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

RR →

FROM: Admiral E. P. Giambastiani, Acting CJCS

*E. P. Giambastiani* 8/27/06

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Senator Mel Martinez Regarding Available DOD Assets to Broadcast TV Marti to Cuba (SF 080906-08) (U)

- (U) In response to your request (TAB A), a copy of the response to the letter from Senator Mel Martinez is attached (TAB B).
- (U) Senator Martinez requested information on the immediate availability of Commando Solo to support the broadcasting of TV Marti to Cuba.
- (U) The attached letter provides a response on the availability of assets and the current actions being taken by the military to support the President's directives on Cuba.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Approve the release of letter at TAB B.

Approve *ML* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 29 2006

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC; Director, 5-3; (b)(6)

27 Aug 06

2 Aug 06

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<del>TSA SD</del>	<i>11/2/06</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>11/8/06</i>	<i>0800</i>	<i>8/30/06</i>
ESR MA	<i>11/2/06</i>	STF DIR	

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/58764



OSD 12526-06

8/28/2006 5:17:01 PM



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

27 August 2006

The Honorable Mel Martinez  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-0906

Dear Senator Martinez,

**Thank** you for your recent letter on Commando Solo use to broadcast TV Marti to Cuba. The Secretary of Defense requested that I respond on his behalf.

Concerning your inquiry on the immediate availability of assets to broadcast TV Marti programming, the United States Southern Command was able to broadcast using Commando Solo on 4 August, 2 days following your letter. The goal is to continue with regularly scheduled broadcasts during this crucial period in Cuba.

Joint Staff personnel will continue to inform your office of Commando Solo broadcasts. Additionally, the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, is exploring the possibility for expanded broadcasting support until the permanent Office of Cuba Broadcasting platform is available in September.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E. P. Giambastiani".

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Acting Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/58765

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

## COORDINATION PAGE

ASD(LA)	Ms. Cheney	16 August 2006
USSOUTHCOM	GEN Craddock	14 August 2006
USSOCOM	Col Smith	15 August 2006

Tab C

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/58766

10 8/31/06

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

AUG 10 2006

To: Gen Pete Pace  
 CC: Robert Wilkie  
 ERIC EDWIN  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT Broadcast TV Marti to Cuba via Commando Solo

I would like to see the final draft of the response that goes to Mcl  
 Martinez regarding the Office of Cuba Broadcasting's request to broadcast TV  
 Marti straight to Cuba via the Commando Solo platform.

Thanks.



8/2/06 Martinez ltr to SD

DHR:db  
 SP080906-08

.....  
 Please Respond By 08/17/06

AUG 30 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/58767



8/28/2006 3:13:33 PM

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Broadcast TV Marti to Cuba via Commando Solo

I would like to see the final *draft* of the response that goes to Mel Martinez regarding the Office of Cuba Broadcasting's request to broadcast TV Marti straight to Cuba via the Commando Solo platform.

Thanks.

8/2/06 Martinez ltr to SD

DHR.jh  
SF080906-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

Cuba

9 Aug 06

2 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58768

12526-06

AUG. 3. 2006 4:15PM SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ

NO. 1398 P. 2

MEL MARTINEZ  
FLORIDA  
(202) 224-5041

~~COMMITTEE~~  
AGING  
BANKING  
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES  
FOREIGN RELATIONS

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0806

August 7 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

It is my understanding that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting has asked the Department of Defense to identify whether there are any assets immediately available in order to broadcast TV Marti to Cuba.

In light of recent developments on the island, the importance of communicating directly with the people of Cuba is critical. Should an asset be available, even if only on an interim basis, via the *Comando Solo* platform, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting would be able to immediately have programming ready for broadcasts into the island.

As I know you will agree, it is imperative that we remain on the right side of history. Failure to communicate directly with the Cuban people as the current events unfold can prove costly in the Administration's overall goal of bringing about a true democratic transition in Cuba.

Since the TV Marti permanent platform is not ready for deployment yet, a temporary platform via *Comando Solo* is the only method we have for reaching the people of Cuba and reassuring them of the role the United States Government intends to play at the time of transition.

As you know, President Bush has unequivocally pledged his support and stressed the importance of Radio & TV Marti. Therefore, I am optimistic that the Administration will be able to find a viable solution until the permanent TV Marti platform is operational.

I look forward to hearing from you on this important matter.

Sincerely,



Mel Martinez  
United States Senator

OSD 12526-06



11-L-0559/OSD/58769

8/7/2006 7:34:48 AM



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

27 August 2006

Cuba

The Honorable Mel Martinez  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-0906

Dear Senator Martinez,

Thank you for your recent letter on Commando Solo use to broadcast TV Marti to Cuba. The Secretary of Defense requested that I respond on his behalf.

Concerning your inquiry on the immediate availability of assets to broadcast TV Marti programming, the United States Southern Command was able to broadcast using Commando Solo on 4 August, 2 days following your letter. The goal is to continue with regularly scheduled broadcasts during this crucial period in Cuba.

Joint Staff personnel will continue to inform your office of Commando Solo broadcasts. Additionally, the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, is exploring the possibility for expanded broadcasting support until the permanent Office of Cuba Broadcasting platform is available in September.

Sincerely,

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Acting Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(2 Aug 06)

11-L-0559/OSD/58770

R 12526-06

~~FOUO~~

August 10, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Administration's Plan for Troops in Case of Civil War

*Iraq*

Why don't you think of having the Barbara Boxer letter referred to the NSC, since she is looking for an Administration response?

Thanks.

Attach. 8/4/06 Boxer ltr to SD

DHR:dh  
SF080906-07

.....

*10 Aug 06*

*4 Aug 06*

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~FOUO~~



12/6/2006 7:50:07 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/58771

BARBARABOXER  
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES  
COMMERCE, SCIENCE  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
ENVIRONMENT  
AND PUBLIC WORKS  
FOREIGN RELATIONS

## United States Senate

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
SUITE 112  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0505  
(202) 224-3553  
<http://boxer.senate.gov/contact>

August 4, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

Twice now I have written to you, **Mr. Secretary**, asking for the Administration's plan for our troops should the situation in Iraq deteriorate into a full-scale civil war. The responses I received from Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England stated that the only plan was to avoid civil war through the implementation of the so-called "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq"—the same strategy that the GAO has called inadequate and poorly planned.


Yesterday, General John Abizaid solemnly told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I've seen it, in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war." General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went on to acknowledge to the Committee that there is a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war and he did not anticipate this situation a year ago.

This is on top of the fact that William Patey, Britain's outgoing Ambassador to Iraq, is reported to have written in a confidential memo to British Prime Minister Tony Blair that "the prospect of a low-intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy."

Mr. Secretary, it is long past time we had a plan for our troops if a full blown civil war erupts in Iraq. This plan is even more necessary in light of the fact that you are sending more troops to Baghdad. So again, I ask, what is your plan for our troops if a full blown civil war erupts in Iraq?

I look forward to your immediate response.

Sincerely,



Barbara Boxer  
United States Senator

1700 MONTGOMERY STREET  
SUITE 200  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111  
(415) 403-0100

312 NORTH SPRING STREET  
SUITE 1745  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012  
(213) 894-5000

501 J STREET  
SUITE 7-600  
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814  
(916) 448-2767

1130 O STREET  
SUITE 2450  
FRESNO, CA 93721  
(559) 497-5109

600 B STREET  
SUITE 2240  
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101  
(619) 239-3884

201 NORTH E STREET  
SUITE 210  
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92403  
(909) 888-8525

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/58772

OSD 12529-06



8/7/2006 7:44:24 AM

F.

**Faires, Jay Mr. CIV US WHS ESD**

---

**From:** Faires, Jay Mr. CIV USWHS ESD  
**Sent:** Friday, September 22, 2006 10:22 AM  
**To:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**Subject:** RE: ~~12952-06~~ (SD 391 - Boxer Cancellation)  
12529

Jason,

Will do. But the OSD number is 125<sup>29</sup>2-06. I'll close.

Jay

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**Sent:** Friday, September 22, 2006 8:34 AM  
**To:** Faires, Jay Mr. CIV US WHS ESD  
**Cc:** Scott, Catherine, QV, OSD-POLICY  
**Subject:** ~~12952-06~~ (SD 391 - Boxer Cancellation)  
12529-06

Jay,

The front office lost the package but this 391 to cancel is approved per WPM. Please attach this email to your hold copy and close the tasking.

Thanks,  
Jason

*Jason O. Boykin - Executive Services Directorate*

(b)(6)



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

NOV 03 2006

*Iraq*

The Honorable Barbara **Boxer**  
United States Senate  
112 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 205 10-0505

Dear Senator Boxer:

Thank **you** for your August 4, 2006 letter regarding violence and our strategy for victory in **Iraq**.

As Ambassador Edelman has stated and Deputy Secretary England has restated, our military leadership continues to respond to the dynamic environment in Iraq with flexibility while ensuring the safety of our troops. We have great confidence in their abilities.

Senior military officers of this department and the intelligence community will be testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 15 on the current situation and U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I can assure you that we will continue to keep the Congress informed.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Wilkie  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Legislative Affairs)

*(4 Aug 06)*

*R 12529-06*

11-L-0559/OSD/58774

ACTION MEMO

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE – LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FROM: Kelly Bulliner, Special Assistant, OSD-LA (ISA)

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Boxer Response

- Senator Boxer wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld in August regarding the plan for U.S. forces in Iraq if a “full-blown” civil war erupts there. (Tab A)
  - o This is the Senator’s third letter to the Secretary on this topic.
    - USD Edelman responded to the first letter, and
    - DSD England Responded to the second.
- A draft response is attached next under.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached letter.

Attachment(s): As stated.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_ Approve as Edited \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Kelly Bulliner, OSD-LA (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58775

A

~~FOUO~~

August 04, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Transcript of Hillary Clinton's Statement and My Response

Please give me a written transcript of Hillary's statement at yesterday's hearing,  
and my response.

Abizaid said he thought Matt Latimer ought to use it and others ought to as well.

Thanks.

DIR.ss  
SF080406-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/08/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58776



8/7/2006 8:48:13 AM



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

August 4, 2006 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Statement

You asked for a written transcript of Senator Clinton’s statement at yesterday’s Hearing and your response.

- Attached is the excerpt from yesterday’s Hearing before the SASC reflecting yours and Sen Clinton’s comments.
- Attached at Tab C is the entire Transcript, should you desire additional information from the Hearing.

Attachments:

- Snowflake SF080406-04 (TAB A)
- Sen Clinton’s and SecDef comments (TAB B)
- Transcript of SASC Hearing of 3 Aug, 2006 (TAB C)

032

4 Aug 06

4 Aug 06

OSD 12535-06



8/7/2006 8:48:45 AM

Prepared by: MGySgt Sue Hines-Labov, Executive Assistant, OASD ((A)) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58777

MCCAIN:

Senator Clinton?

CLINTON:

**Thank you** very much, Senator McCain.

Mr. Secretary, we're glad you're here.

In your opening statement, you reference the common sense of **Ameri** think it's fair to say **that** that collective common sense overwhelmingly understand or approve of the way you and the administration **are** handling Afghanistan.

ns. Well, I s not either Iraq and

Under your leadership, there have been numerous errors in judgment to where we **are** in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have a full-fledged insurgent blown sectarian conflict in Iraq.

It have led us y and full-

Now, whether you label it a civil war or not, it certainly has created an extreme violence and the continuing loss of life **among** our troops and of

uation of the Iraqis.

You did not **go** into Iraq with **enough** troops to establish law and order

CLINTON

You disbanded the entire Iraqi army. **Now**, we're **trying** to recreate it.

You did not do **enough** planning for what is called Phase Four and **rejected all the** planning that had been done previously to maintain stability after the **regime was** overthrown.

You underestimated the nature and **strength** of the insurgency, the **sectarian violence** and the spread of Iranian influence.

Last year, Congress **passed** the United States Policy in Iraq Act, **which** I strongly supported. **This** law declares 2006 to be a year of significant **transition to full Iraqi** sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the **security of a free and** sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the **phased redeployment** of U.S. forces from **Iraq**.

However, we appear to be moving in the opposite direction, with the number of U.S. troops in Iraq scheduled to increase, not decrease. That's the only way I think you can fairly consider the decision with respect to the 172nd Stryker Brigade.

So, Mr. Secretary, as we returned to our states for the August recess, our constituents have a lot of questions and concerns about the current state of affairs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

I don't need to remind any of us that we continue to lose our young men and women: 120 from New York alone.

Beside the U.S. losses, violence does seem to be increasing. From January to June of this year, there were 14,338 Iraqi civilian casualties, at least as far as anyone can count; in May and June alone, more than 5,000 deaths and 5,700 injuries.

In a July 22 article in the New York Times, General Abizaid was quoted as saying, "Two months after the new Iraqi government took office, the security gains that we had hoped for had not been achieved."

Then there was the big, ballyhooed announcement of Forward Together and the commitment by the new Iraqi government to secure Baghdad.

#### CLINTON:

Two months into that, it's clear it's not working and we are now putting in more American troops and -- following the lead of Senator McCain's line of questioning -- removing them from other places that are hardly stable and secure.

In Afghanistan, your administration's credibility is also suspect. In December 2002, you said, "The Taliban are gone." In September 2004, President Bush said, "The Taliban no longer is in existence."

However, this February, DIA Director Lieutenant General Maples said that, in 2005, attacks by the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces were up 20 percent from 2004 levels, and these insurgents were a greater threat to the Afghan government's efforts to expand its authority than in any time since 2001.

Further, General Eikenberry made a comparable comment with respect to the dangers that are now going on in Afghanistan and the failure to be able to secure it.

Obviously, I could go on and on. A recent book, aptly titled "Fiasco," describes in some detail the decision-making apparatus that has led us to this situation.

So, Mr. Secretary, when our constituents ask for evidence that your policy in Iraq and Afghanistan will be successful, you don't leave us with much to talk about. Yes, we hear a lot of happy talk and rosy scenarios, but because of the administration's strategic blunders and, frankly, the record of incompetence in executing, you are presiding over a failed policy.

Given your track record, Secretary Rumsfeld, why should we believe your assurances now?

RUMSFELD:

My goodness.

First, I tried to make notes and to follow the prepared statement you've presented.

First of all, it's true: There is sectarian conflict in Iraq and there is a loss of life.

RUMSFELD:

And it's an unfortunate and tragic thing that that's taking place.

And it is true that there are people who are attempting to prevent that government from being successful. And they are the people who are blowing up buildings and killing innocent men, women and children, and taking off the heads of people on television. And the idea of their prevailing is unacceptable.

Second, you said the number of troops were wrong, I guess history will make a judgment on that. The number of troops that went in and the number of troops that were there every month since and the number of troops that are there today reflected the best judgment of the military commanders on the ground, their superiors, General Pace, General Abizaid, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the president of the United States.

I think it's not correct to assume that they were wrong numbers. And I don't think the evidence suggests that, and it will be interesting to see what history decides.

The balance between having too many and contributing to an insurgency by the feeling of occupation and the risk of having too few and having the security situation not be sufficient for the political progress to go forward is a complicated set of decisions. And I don't know that there's any guidebook that tells you how to do it. There's no rule book. There's no history for this.

And the judgments that have been made have been made by exceedingly well-trained people: the gentleman sitting next to me, the people on the ground in Iraq. They were studied and examined and analyzed by the civilian leadership and by the president, and they were confirmed. And so I think your assertion is, at least, debatable.

The idea that the army was disbanded, I think, is one that's, kind of, flying around. My impression is that to a great extent that army disbanded itself. **Our** forces came in so fast -- it was made up of a lot of Shia conscripts who didn't want to be in it and thousands -- or at least many, many hundreds -- of Sunni generals who weren't about to hang around after Saddam Hussein and his sons and administration were replaced.

The work to build a new army has included an awful lot of people from the prior army, and it has benefited from that.

Third, the assertion that the government rejected all the planning that had been done before is just simply false; that's not the case. The planning that had been done before was taken into account by the people who were executing the post-major combat operations activities.

The comments about Baghdad I'll possibly let General Abizaid comment on.

RUMSFELD:

The goal is not to have U.S. forces do the heavy lifting in Baghdad. There **are** many, many more Iraqi forces in Baghdad.

The role of the U.S. forces is to help them, to provide logistics, to assist them **as** needed, and to create a presence that will allow the Iraqi security forces to **succeed**, and then, **as** our forces step back, allow the Iraqi security forces to be sufficient to maintain order in the city.

I can't predict if it will work **this** time. It may or it may not.

It happens to represent the best judgment of General Casey, General Chiarelli and the military leadership. And General Abizaid and **General** Pace and I have reviewed it. And we think that **it is** a sensible approach, **as** General Abizaid testified earlier.

Afghanistan -- I don't know who said what about whether the Taliban **are** gone, but, in fact, the Taliban that were running **Afghanistan** and ruling Afghanistan were replaced. And they were replaced by an election that took place in that **country**. And in terms of a government, or governing entity, they were gone. And that's a fact.

**Are** there still Taliban around? You bet.

Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places -- correction -- in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are.

Is the violence up? Yes.

Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does. And it tends to decline during the winter period.

Does that represent failed policy? I don't know. I would say not. I think you've got an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this. And the decisions that are being made are being made with great care after a great deal of consideration.

Are there setbacks? Yes.

Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.

Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet.

Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so.

Is this problem going to get solved in the near term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I don't believe it is, I think it's going to take some time.

And I know the question was, some wars lasted three years, some wars lasted four years, some wars lasted five years. The Cold War lasted 40-plus years.

And the struggle against violent extremists who are determined to prevent free people from exercising their rights as free people is going to go on a long time, and it's going to be a tough one.

That does not mean that we have to spend the rest of our lives, as the United States armed forces, in Iraq. The Iraqis are going to have to take that over. We can't want freedom more for the Iraqi people than they want for themselves. And Senator Thune mentioned earlier about that issue.

And I would point out the number of tips that have been coming from Iraqi people have been going up steadily. They're at a very high level. And it does suggest to me that the Iraqi people do want to have a free country, as I mentioned, because of their voting pattern.

So I would disagree strongly with your statement.

CLINTON:

Well, Mr. Secretary, I know you would, and I **know** you feel **strongly** about it, but there's a track record here. This is not 2002, 2003, 2004, '5, when you appeared before this committee and made many comments and presented many assurances that have, frankly, proven to be unfulfilled. **And...**

RUMSFELD:

Senator, I don't **think** that's true. I have never painted a rosy picture. I've been very measured in my words. And you'd have a **dickens** of a **time trying** to find instances where I've been excessively optimistic. I understand this is tough **stuff**.

CLINTON

Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to submit for the record a number of the secretary's former **comments**. **And** also, may we keep the record open for additional questions?

WARNER

The record will remain open until the close of business today for all members to contribute additional questions.

CLINTON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

C

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Aug. 3, 2006

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq, Afghanistan and Counterterrorism Measures

### LIST OF SPEAKERS

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WARNER

Good morning, everyone.

The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from the distinguished secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General John Abizaid, commander, the United States Central Command, on progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism and such other aspects as relative to your area of operations.

The committee will also look in for their insights on the ongoing crisis involving Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon, to some extent Palestine.

Secretary Rumsfeld, the committee appreciates the changes you've made in your schedule you've outlined to me very carefully. And we welcome you this morning.

Last week, in a historic visit, the prime minister of Iraq met with President Bush, addressed a joint session of Congress, spoke with military personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. I was privileged to be present at all of those events. I think it was an extremely important chapter in the ongoing developments in Iraq that he took that time to come over here. It demonstrated the resolve of the Iraqi people to build a free and stable country.

During the meeting with military personnel and their families -- and I witnessed this -- he, in a very passionate and sincere way, conveyed to those military people present at Fort Belvoir, and for broadcast to military people all over the United States and the world, the gratefulness in their hearts of the Iraqi people for their sacrifices of life and limb and that of their families, in order to enable the people of Iraq to gain a measure of democracy, elect their government, share in the freedom that we all have in this country.

In meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Bush reaffirmed America's commitment to support Iraq's constitutional democracy, to help Prime Minister Maliki's government succeed.

July 25th, President Bush said, "The Iraqi people want to succeed, they want to end this violence." The president also said that "America will not abandon the Iraqi people."

I am, however, gravely concerned by the recent spike in violence and sectarian attacks, the instability in Baghdad and recent decisions to extend the deployment of 3,500 American troops in Iraq, relocated additional American forces to reinforce Baghdad. Those were important decisions made by you, Mr. Secretary, General Abizaid, of course, you, Chairman. I hope that you will share with us this morning the reasons for doing so.

WARNER

I don't question the seriousness of this situation, the need to do it, but we should have a very clear explanation. Because we had, I regret to say, expectations -- largely generated by certain reports of General Casey -- about the hope to draw down our forces in the near future.

And that's a question that I hope that we address this morning, because I do not like to see the hopes of the men and women of the armed forces raised and then have to be changed, and the impact on their families and, indeed, the **confusion** that results here at home when those decisions have to be made.

But we recognize -- the president has said, **as** the secretary said -- that ground conditions vary, and they must be the determining factor.

Additionally, I've expressed concerns about the potential impact of events in Lebanon and Israel, and their cascading effect on the wider Middle East region, and specifically on United States and coalition forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

My concern is -- and I've expressed this publicly -- that Israel was wrongfully attacked by Hezbollah, no one disputes that whatsoever. They have **an** unequivocal right to defend themselves; no one disputes that.

But **as** our nation engages in this situation -- and historically we've been an honest broker in that region -- our nation engages in that conflict to **try** and resolve it, we must do so in a way to be mindful of the implications on our commitments in the Iraq theater.

The messages we send by virtue of our support to **try** and bring about a cessation of this conflict transmitted throughout the Muslim world straight up into Iraq.

WARNER

It's my fervent hope that our men and women serving in uniform and others in Iraq not be put at greater personal risk as a consequence of the rhetoric that flows, the decisions that are made in trying to resolve that conflict.

I'll have further to say about that in the question period.

In the nearly five years since U.S. forces initiated operations to liberate Afghanistan from the brutal rule of Taliban and to eliminate Al Qaida training bases and sanctuaries, there's been remarkable progress in Afghanistan on the political, economic and security fronts.

The Afghan people have spoken in favor of freedom and democracy. And I'm pleased that NATO is taking an increasing and very important role in Afghanistan.

And you're to be commended, Mr. Secretary, for initiating that move, together with General Jones, who has been a strong advocate of trying to achieve that goal.

However, reports from Afghanistan of recent show that the violence is on the rise. We will learn from you, I hope, your concern as to that AOR, General, and what the future holds in the face of a resurgence of the Taliban forces.

While some in the West take freedom and liberty for granted, Americans everywhere should remain so proud of the contributions of our service men and women deployed in harm's way.

democracy to Iraq and  
sacrifices have enabled

is obvious

unified Iraqi

other occupied nations."

He also said that he is ready to go to Lebanon to defend it.

Now, we've all recognized that he's just a hothead and a firebrand. But he's a troublemaker.

And I hope, General Abizaid, you can give us some assessment of the courage and the will of the Iraqi people, under the leadership of the prime minister, to begin a step that must be achieved. And that's the disbanding of these private militias, notably Sadr's.

Back to Osama bin Laden, his deputy issues a worldwide call for Muslims to rise up against Israel and join the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza, raising again the specter of an Islamic caliphate that I clearly remember General Abizaid discussed in testimony before the committee last year.

We hope you'll bring us up to date on the Osama bin Laden situation and the ongoing activities of our forces, together with others, trying to bring about this man being brought to justice or otherwise taken care of.

In light of all these developments, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan is even more critical.

WARNER:

Your time with us today is critical.

General Pace and General Abizaid, I want to express our gratitude to both of you and the countless men and women that you represent for your continued service and historic efforts of our nation's military to bring freedom and liberty to Iraq, Afghanistan and to preserve it here at home.

Secretary Rumsfeld, once again the committee welcomes you.

Now, just before the committee meeting started, General Abizaid offered to meet with Senator Levin and myself for information to members of the committee. And he outlined the progress being made with the various reports examining the activities of the chain of command relative to certain incidents in Iraq.

And it's our understanding, General Abizaid, that those reports will soon be given to you. There is a convergence of the criminal investigation together with the chain of command investigation under General Chiarelli. It is now in the overall command of the Marine forces, General Sattler. And then it comes to you

and it is your hope and expectation that, working with the secretary, those reports can be made available to this committee early on in September.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing.

And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here this morning.

The American service men and women in Iraq, Afghanistan and other trouble spots around the world are performing their duties magnificently. We salute them and their families. We thank them for their unselfish service and devotion to our nation.

Despite their heroic efforts, the security situation in Iraq continues to worsen. Sectarian violence is not only on the rise, it has eclipsed the Sunni insurgency and the terrorism of Al Qaida in Iraq, in terms of the toll it has taken and the threats to Iraq's chances of stability.

LEVIN:

Our military leadership has identified Baghdad as the key, what they call the center of gravity, to success or failure in Iraq. The highly vaunted recent plan to stabilize Baghdad hasn't worked, and we're going back to the drawing board and sending more U.S. troops to the Iraqi capital. We're having difficulty finding sufficient troops for that purpose.

The fact that the Army Stryker brigade that is being sent to Iraq, being sent to Baghdad, is being extended past its 12-month rotation date by another three to four months speaks volumes about how our military is overextended, unable to find other units ready for immediate reinforcement in Iraq.

And while there appears to be an immediate necessity for additional troops in Baghdad, more troops will not be the ultimate answer. Our military leadership has repeatedly said there is no military solution, and that there must be a political solution in Iraq.

Iraqis reaching the political compromises now is more important and more critical to diffusing the violence and conflict in Iraq. And that is why we need to clearly tell the Iraqi political leaders that our commitment to Iraq is not open-ended, and we will begin the phased redeployment of our troops by the end of the

year and that they must make the political compromises necessary to avoid all-out civil war and to defeat the insurgency.

When General Casey was asked at a press conference recently whether he still believed that there would be fairly substantial troop reductions over the course of this year, he said "I think so."

**LEVIN:**

Marine General Conway testified before us last week at his hearing to be the next commandant that, quote, "I personally believe that you will have Iraqis who have started to look at us as occupiers and are resisting us in some instances, whereas they would not resist an Iraqi force doing precisely the same thing."

He also testified that, "It is critical that the Iraqis understand that our presence is not open-ended and unlimited. The president has assured the nation that as Iraqi forces stand up, we will stand down."

General Dempsey, our senior general responsible for the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces has said publicly that, quote, "The Iraqi army will be built by the end of this calendar year," and that their army would be, quote, "fully capable of recruiting, vetting, inducting, training, forming into units, putting them in barracks, sending them out the gate to perform their missions," close quote.

Congress has been told that over 70 percent of Iraqi combat battalions are capable of independent counterinsurgency operations, are capable of taking the lead in those operations.

The Iraqi security forces are standing up. And we need to begin to stand down, with a phased redeployment starting by the end of this year.

It's time for the Iraqis to take greater responsibility for the security of their own country.

It's time to do what the president repeatedly said he would do. Now that the Iraqis have done a significant amount of standing up their troops, surely by the end of this year we should begin to stand down some of our troops.

**LEVIN:**

Now, not only do the operations in the Central Command region have implications on the future of that region, they're also having a serious impact on our own military.

broad  
impact on

Our ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, are under enormous strain due to several years of large-scale redeployments and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Because a large amount of equipment has been left in Iraq and Afghanistan because the remaining equipment has been subjected to large amounts of wear and tear, there is a lack of readiness for Army and Marine Corps units redeployed to their home bases.

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Now, it's argued that our units that are more capable now because of organizational changes and the infusion of technology and better equipment. But that is only true if the units actually have the equipment on hand; and that have on hand is in a high state of maintenance so that they can train for potential contingencies.

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Hypothetically, if 50 combat units could now do what 100 units could do in the past, that would be true only if those units are ready to do so.

Over two-thirds of the Army's combat brigades are not in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the Army's own statistics show that the vast majority of those at C-1 or C-2; in other words, by the Army's own measurements, are not ready to those contingencies for which they must be prepared to do by Department of Defense war plans.

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Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for calling this hearing. And I thank our witnesses, all of them, for making the arrangements which they had to make in order to be with us this morning.

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WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin.

WARNER:

Secretary Rumsfeld?

RUMSFELD:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the invitation to testify.

thank

Senator Clinton, thank you for seconding the motion.

(LAUGHTER)

I know we all agree that the American people deserve a healthy, preferably constructive, exchange on matters that so directly affect the lives, their lives, their families' lives and their country's security.

I'm joined by General Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Abizaid, the combatant commander of the U.S. Central Command. We will be providing an update on the global struggle against violent extremists and certainly will welcome questions.

In the past few weeks, in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, in Iraq and now by Hezbollah, we've seen the face of the early part of the 21st century. In this period of asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, one side puts their men and women at risk in uniform and obeys the laws of war while the other side uses them against us; one side does all it can to avoid civilian casualties while the other side uses civilians as shields and then skillfully orchestrates a public outcry when the other side accidentally kills civilian in their midst; one side is held to exacting standards of near perfection -- the other side is held to no standards and no accountability at all.

This enemy has called Iraq the central front on the war on terrorism, while some on our side seem to argue that the outcome in Iraq is not part of that global war on terror.

Sixteen years ago this week, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, killing civilians, unleashing environmental devastation, provoking a crisis that led to Iraqi attacks on Israel and threats to Saudi Arabia and others in the region.

Last week, by contrast, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the new Iraqi prime minister, who was elected by the Iraqi people under a constitution the Iraqi people wrote and ratified, came to the United States to thank the American people for their assistance in building a new future for the people of Iraq.

RUMSFELD:

He had spent 25 years in opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime. And before a joint session of Congress, he noted that if terror were permitted to triumph in Iraq, then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere.

The enemy understands this as well. They're waging a **psychological war of attrition**, planning attacks to gain the **maximum media coverage and the maximum public outcry**.

They want us to believe that perseverance by us is **futile, rather than necessary**. They want us to focus on our casualties and losses, **not on the people causing the casualties and losses**. They want us to **think** about **what will happen if our forces stay in Iraq**, as opposed to the consequences if our **forces were to leave prematurely**. They want us to be divided, because they know that when we are united they **lose**. They want us pointing fingers at each other, rather **than pointing fingers at them**.

I know there are calls in some quarters for withdrawal or **arbitrary timelines for withdrawals**. The enemies hear those words as well.

We need to be realistic about the consequences. If we **left Iraq prematurely**, as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan **and then withdraw from the Middle East**. And if we left the **Middle East, they'd order us and all those who don't share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines**. And then we would face not only the evil ideology of these violent **extremist**, but an enemy that will have grown accustomed **to succeeding in telling free people everywhere what to do**.

We can persevere in Iraq or we **can withdraw prematurely until they force us to make a stand nearer home**. But **make no mistake, they're not going to give up whether we acquiesce in their immediate demands or not**.

Decisions about conditions for a **drawdown of our forces in Iraq are best based on the recommendations of the commanders in the field and the recommendations of the gentleman sitting beside me**.

#### **RUMSFELD:**

We should strive to think through how our words can be interpreted **by our troops, by the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, by our 42 allies in our coalition in Afghanistan, and our 34 allies in our coalition in Iraq**. And we **should consider** how our words can be used by our deadly enemy.

The war on terror is going to be a long struggle. It's not **something we asked for, but neither is it something we can avoid**. But I remain confident **in our mission, in our commanders, in our troops and in our cause**. And I remain confident in the good common sense of the American people.

Americans didn't cross oceans and settle a wilderness and build history's greatest democracy only to run away from a bunch of murderers and extremists who try to kill everyone that they cannot convert and to tear down what they could never build.

Over the past few years, I've had the honor of meeting countless young men and women in uniform, all volunteers, who have answered our country's call.

I remember a service man outside of Afghanistan who looked me in the eye and said, "I can't believe that we're being allowed to do something so important," unquote.

Our troops represent the finest and the most professional troops in history. I think of these remarkable people every day. I know that everything we do in the Department of Defense and what you do on this committee affects them and their wonderfully supportive families.

Thank you.

WARNER.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**General Pace?**

**PACE**

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it truly is an honor to be before you today, representing the incredible young men and women in your armed forces.

Since 9/11, over 1 million young men and women in uniform have served this country in the Central Command area of operations.

**PACE:**

And they've done so with incredible bravery and sacrifice and performance that **has** made us all proud.

And their families have served **this** nation **as** well as anyone who **has** worn a uniform, especially those families today in the 172nd Stryker Brigade whose loved ones are not coming home when they thought they would be coming home,

and who, once again, **are** sacrificing that we might **provide the strength needed on the battlefield.**

It's now almost five years since September 11th, **2001.** And the number of young men and women in our **armed** forces who have sacrificed their **lives that we might live in freedom,** is approaching the number of Americans **who were murdered on 9/11 in New York, in Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania.**

We've come a long way in Afghanistan. We've come a **long way in Iraq and elsewhere in the war on terrorism.** We have a long way to go. **We are a nation at war.**

Fortunately, most of our fellow **citizens are not affected by this war every day.** Some 2.4 million Americans, active, Guard and Reserve, have **the privilege of defending over 300 million of our fellow citizens and countless millions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.**

Our enemy knows they cannot defeat us in battle. **They do believe, however, that they can wear down our will as a nation. They are wrong. How do I know they're wrong?**

First, this committee and this Congress **continues to provide the resources we need to defend this nation. And I thank you for that.**

Second, our service men and women **are proud of what they are doing and they are reenlisting in record numbers to continue to have the privilege to do what we do for this nation.**

Third, as the secretary mentioned in **his comments, the American people have, in the past, are now, and will in the future, respond to attacks on our way of life. Two hundred and thirty years, we have met the challenges.**

This will not be easy, this will not be quick and this will not be **without sacrifice. But we will persist and we will prevail.**

PACE:

And I look forward to answering your questions today, **and working together with you in the future to defend this nation.**

Thank you, **Mr. Chairman.**

WARNER

Thank you, General.

General Abizaid?

ABIZAID:

Thank you, Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to testify today.

A couple of days ago I returned from the Middle East. I've rarely seen it so unsettled or volatile. There's an obvious struggle in the region between moderates and extremists that touches every aspect of life.

Such extremism, whether state-sponsored by Iran or ideologically motivated by Al Qaida and its associated movements, remains a serious danger to global peace and stability.

My duties took me to both Iraq and Afghanistan, Central Asia and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, where our troops continue to perform with great professional calm and determination under dangerous and difficult circumstances.

Of course, over the past several weeks, the media has been filled with images of war in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. Indeed, U.S. forces under CENTCOM helped evacuate nearly 15,000 Americans from Lebanon's war zone.

And while the media's eye often directs public attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, it's important to remember that U.S. and coalition forces serve throughout Central Asia, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, increasing regional states' capacity to battle extremism and keeping open the vital air and sea links of the region.

In the broader struggle against extremism, we face complex and potentially intersecting problems. Our strategic imperatives are formidable.

With the continuing help of our friends, we must focus on three strategic objectives: We must synchronize the appropriate diplomatic, economic and military means to defeat Al Qaida and its associated movements; we must deter Iranian designs for regional hegemony, to include its sponsorship of terrorist organizations and its development of nuclear weapons; finally, we must find a comprehensive solution to the corrosive Arab-Israeli conflict.

ABIZAID:

I fully recognize that each of these tasks is filled with danger and enormous difficulties. I also realize that trying to solve any of these problems will take a considerable amount of time and effort.

But failure to apply coordinated regional and international pressure against these three problems will further encourage extremism and could eventually lead to a broader, even more dangerous conflict.

The arming of independent militias and the subsequent undermining of state institutions by these militias is the curse of the region.

corroded states.

If this century is to be dominated by non-state actors with no responsibility to the international community, we are in for even greater dangers.

It should not be lost on us, for example, that Hezbollah fields greater and longer-range weapons than most regional **armed** forces. If left unchecked, it is possible to imagine chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons being transferred to militias or terrorist organizations by a state actor.

In the highly unsettled Middle East, the problem of extremist-sponsored terror ambitions so

There is no doubt that these are dangerous times for the world, but **there should** also be no doubt that with concerted international action and the **application of** our own substantial power these dangers can be overcome.

Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional problem. **Al Qaida and** Shia extremists form terrorist groups and death squads to challenge the new government and undermine confidence in a better **future**. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq, but just **as** in Lebanon, it arms, trains and equips local extremist Shia militias to do Iran's bidding.

**As** the primary security problem in Iraq has shifted from a **Sunni insurgency** to sectarian violence, **Al Qaida** terrorists, insurgents and Shia militants compete to plunge the country into civil war.

Prime Minister Maliki and **his** new government know what must be done, and in **three short months in office** **are** responsibly tackling the complex and difficult problems of security and governance. Iraqi security forces, in conjunction with

coalition forces, must bring Baghdad, the center of sectarian violence, under control. Illegal militias must be disbanded. National reconciliation must proceed. Death squad leaders must be brought to justice.

It is a decisive time in Baghdad and it requires decisive Iraqi action with our clear support.

ABIZOID:

Despite the many challenges, progress does continue to be made in Iraq, and I am confident that there are still many more people in Iraq trying to hold that country together than there are trying to tear it apart.

Our ongoing support of their efforts is essential for their success, especially as they assume more and more responsibility for their own security.

I know the committee wants to focus these hearings on Iraq. But I close with the reminder that Iraq is only one part of a broader regional struggle under way -- one which requires the wise application of all our resources.

Our own troops, along with NATO ISAF forces, continue to operate in Afghanistan. Pakistani and Saudi forces are fighting extremists daily. Insurgencies, secular violence and terror sponsored by Sunni and Shia religious extremist groups are pervasive throughout the region.

Fortunately, as in our own society, the vast majority of the people in the region do not want extremists to win. Our challenge is to help these moderate forces help themselves in the struggle.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the entire region remain dangerous and often deadly. Our continued involvement in shaping regional security forces and providing the framework for action against extremist groups is essential for our own safety and prosperity at home.

Finally, we must be ever mindful of the sacrifice of our young men and women in uniform. Out of the over 1.5 million service personnel who have rotated through the Central Command region since September 11th, 2001, over 3,000 have given their lives.

ABIZOID:

We owe them and their families an enormous debt of gratitude.

11-L-0559/OSD/58797

Today, nearly 200,000 of our troops serve in harm's way. These are dedicated and resourceful professionals. Thank you for your continued support to these great Americans who willingly fight for all of us.

Thank you,

WARNER

Thank you very much, General. That's a very incisive and important statement that you've just made.

We're going to depart from our normal rotation here. Senator Levin and I both serve on the Intelligence Committee. They are now having a meeting, and the senator from Michigan has to go to that meeting. Therefore, I'll offer you the first opportunity to initiate questions.

LEVIN:

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invariable courtesies.

General Abizaid, when General Casey was asked at a press conference recently whether he still believed what he said last year, that he predicted that there would be troop reductions over the course of this year, he said that he still believes there will be such reductions this year.

Do you personally share that view?

ABIZAID:

Senator, since the time that General Casey made that statement, it's clear that the operational and the tactical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires additional security forces, both U.S. and Iraqi.

I think the most important thing ahead of us throughout the remainder of this year is ensuring that the Baghdad security situation be brought under control.

It's possible to imagine some reductions in forces, but I think the most important thing to imagine is Baghdad coming under the control of the Iraqi government.

LEVIN:

When you say it's possible to imagine some reduction in forces, you mean this year?

**ABIZAID:**

It's possible, depending upon how things go in Baghdad and how Prime Minister Maliki and his government grab ahold of the security situation.

LEVIN:

Is it important that the Iraqis understand that our commitment is not open-ended?

**ABIZAID:**

Sir, I think they fully understand it is not open-ended.

LEVIN:

Some of their statements have not reflected that full understanding. But I'm glad -- but in any event, would you agree that it is important that they do understand our commitment is not open-ended?

**ABIZAID:**

I believe they do understand it's not open-ended. And they know our commitment and they know the necessity for, over time, to increase their capacity against the extremists.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, the president has assured the nation frequently that as Iraqi security forces stand up, we will stand down.

They have stood up. The majority now of their combat battalions are capable of either independent counterinsurgency or capable of taking the lead in those operations.

Shouldn't we, at least by the end of this year, begin to do what the president said we would do? Since security forces of Iraq have stood up in such a measure, should we not begin to stand down, as the president said we would?

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RUMSFELD:

Senator, you're correct. The Iraqi security forces are now up to 275,000. They are headed toward 325,000 by the end of the year, unless the prime minister makes an adjustment in those numbers, which, as a new government, he has every right to do in a sovereign nation.

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I guess the issue of drawdown depends on what you think your base were up at 160,000. Today we're at -- we've gotten as low as, I think, 127,000. Today we're at a 133,000.

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And certainly everyone, from the Iraqis, the troops and the president, would hope that those troops could be drawn down as conditions permit.

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The question -- the only difference between the way you phrase it and the president phrases it, as he ends by pointing out that he intends to succeed here and he believes that the determinant should be the conditions on the ground as opposed to some timetable.

I do think the point you raise, the core of what you're asking, is important, and that is the tension that exists between having too many troops and having it feed an insurgency, as you, I believe, indicated General Conway may have referred to, and having too few so that you don't have a sufficient number to allow the security situation to permit the political and the economic activities to go forward.

And that's a fair tension that exists there. And it's an art, not a science; there's no guidebook that says how to do that.

And so, clearly, we would all hope that there could be drawdowns on those forces as the conditions permit.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

The press reported that Iraqi President Talabani said yesterday that the Iraqi government is confident that Iraqi troops will take over security duties for the entire country by the end of this year. And then he also reportedly said that the recent increase in violence by insurgents is, quote, "the last arrows in their quivers," close quote.

**LEVIN:**

Now, that phrase is reminiscent of Vice President Cheney's claim a year ago that the insurgency was in its last throes.

General Abizaid, does our intelligence on the insurgency provide any basis for the assertion that the recent surge in violence represents the last arrows in the insurgents' quivers?

**ABIZAID:**

Well, Senator Levin, I think it's clear that the insurgency has a lot of resiliency, it's probably going to last for some time even after U.S. forces depart and hand over security control completely to the Iraqis.

The question is for President Talabani, as I've discussed with him before, whether or not over time the Iraqis can control it. And I believe they will be able to.

**LEVIN:**

You don't agree, then, that it's in its last throes or that they're shooting the last arrows?

**ABIZAID:**

I'm making no comment about what he said about last arrows or last throes.

**LEVIN:**

Why?

**ABIZAID:**

I don't see any reason to dispute what the president says. I know that I think it's a long-term problem for Iraq that they'll be able to work through over time.

**LEVIN:**

The British ambassador made the following assessment, according to USA Today: that the British ambassador to Iraq -- it's Mr. Patey, I believe, P-A-T-E-Y - has warned that Iraq is descending toward civil war. And he said it's likely to split along ethnic lines. And he's reported as predicting that Iraq's security situation could remain volatile for the next 10 years.

Do you agree, General, with the ambassador from Britain to Iraq that Iraq is sliding toward civil war?

ABIZAIID:

I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I've seen it in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war.

LEVIN:

Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time's up. And thank you again for allowing me to go ahead of you.

WARNER

I want to go back to, **Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld**, the observations I made in the opening statement.

On July 17th, at about 8 o'clock, I went to the floor of the Senate.

WARNER

The Senate was about to consider a resolution -- **an important resolution**, reaffirming our support for Israel. But I said the following: I said I was concerned that we should take into account America's broader interests in the region as we approach this resolution.

I said specifically America's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken the lives of more than 2,500 American service men, **over 20 some odd thousand** still severely wounded, and over **\$436 billion** of our taxpayers' money over these three years.

That's **an enormous investment** of this country. And the **credibility of our country** in many respects rests on the conclusion of that **conflict in such a way**

that the Iraqi government can exercise sovereignty and bring about a measure of freedom and democracy.

We're committed to that. And I stand strongly with our president to achieve that goal.

America's participation with other nations in achieving a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis -- I can think of no problem of greater significance than our resolve to not let Iran possess nuclear weapons.

The stability of the Lebanese government -- that must survive, that government, such that they can once again take an even stronger grip on that nation and govern it.

In our relationship with other Arab nations, a lot is at stake in a region which our distinguished witness, General Abizaid -- who spent much of your lifetime in that region -- just said, "Rarely have I seen it so volatile."

WARNER

And it is subject to the corrosive relationships coming out of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

My concern is that, as we go into this situation -- and we have an obligation to try and work as an honest broker, I hope, in resolving the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah -- as we pursue that and as our actions are interpreted by the Muslim world -- and I have read some of the statements of the clerics, of recent, in the last few days. I do not want to see our forces put at greater personal risk, subject to greater intensity brought against them by the adversaries in Iraq.

So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, as we take up our role, hopefully, as an honest broker in this, are we mindful of the broader picture and the enormity of our investment in Iraq, as we try to do what we can to bring about a cessation of the fighting in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah?

RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman, in the meetings that I've been in with the president and the secretary of state and those that are intimately involved in the situation in Lebanon and Israel with respect to the Hezbollah, there is a sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our interests or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what's taking place between Israel and Hezbollah.

I think I'd suggest that it be phrased slightly differently, because there are risks, as you point out, but it's a matter of relative risk. There are also risks, one thinks about it, that Iran is the principal sponsor of Hezbollah.

RUMSFELD:

Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, as you posed. Iran is the supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. The rockets that are heading into Israel by Hezbollah tend to be, in a number of cases, Iranian rockets.

And clearly, to the extent that Iran were to achieve weapons of mass destruction, and with a history of a willingness to work intimately with a terrorist organization like Hezbollah, there is that risk as well.

So there are a variety of risks that we face in that region. And it's a difficult and delicate situation.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, I do believe what we're seeing is really the face of the 21st century. The wars we're engaged in and we see are not wars between militaries only. They're clashes between systems: political, economic and military. And they are being fought with asymmetric and irregular warfare, which is very much to the advantage of the attackers.

WARNER.

Mr. Secretary, that situation in Iraq is fragile. We need only look at the Baghdad situation. Baghdad could literally tilt this thing if it fails to bring about a measure of security for those people -- tilt it in a way that we would slide toward a civil war that General Abizaid recalled.

General Pace, I go back to the resolution of October the 16th, 2002 which I participated in, my good friend to the left, in drawing up that resolution for the Senate.

It authorized the president of the United States to use the armed forces of the United States to: one, defend the national security of our country against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; two, enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

Many of those missions set out and envisioned by the Congress when it gave this authority, namely the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, have been achieved.

WARNER

But now, in the words of General Abizaid, we're on the brink of a civil war.

And I don't have the exact words before me, but I was struck by General Chiarelli's statement the other day that in his 35 years of military training, he really never had spent a day preparing for what faces him as our commander of forces in Iraq: sectarian violence, civil war.

What is the mission of the United States today under this resolution if that situation erupts into a civil war? What are the missions of our forces?

PACE:

Sir, I believe that we do have the possibility of that devolving to a civil war, but that does not have to be a fact.

I believe that U.S. armed forces today can continue to do what we're doing, which is to help provide enough security inside of Iraq for the Iraqi government to provide governance and economic opportunity for their citizens.

The weight of that opportunity rests with the Iraqi people. We can provide support. We can help provide security. But they must now decide about their sectarian violence.

Shia and Sunni are going to have to love their children more than they hate each other. If they do that and seize the opportunity that the international community has provided to them, then this will be what we want it to be, which is a success for ourselves and the Iraqi people.

PACE:

But the weight of that shift must be on the Iraqi people and Iraqi government.

WARNER

I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the president to do in the context of a situation if we're faced with an all-out civil war and whether we have to come back to the Congress to get further indication of support.

General Abizaid, I've had the privilege of knowing you for a long time, and I really think you speak with remarkable candor and draw on an extraordinary career professionalism. You spent one year of your career in Lebanon. Lebanon is a part of your area of responsibility as CENTCOM commander.

Do you agree with the premise that in this current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, recognizing that Hezbollah attacked Israel, recognizing that Israel has got a perfect right to defend itself, but in so executing their military campaign, it is essential, in my judgment, the Lebanese government not be toppled as a consequence of the infrastructure that's being destroyed during the course of this war.

And can they achieve in this military operation such degradation of Hezbollah, its command and control, its inventory of weapons, as to result in a situation whereby a multinational force can eventually come in, subject to some form of a cease-fire, and begin to shore up, stabilize that government and allow it to take firm control over the entirety of all aspects of sovereignty of that nation of Lebanon?

ABIZAID:

Mr. Chairman, U.N. Resolution 1559 clearly calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of Lebanese sovereignty all the way from its northern border to its southern border.

Had that resolution been implemented or started to move toward implementation, the current problem would be much less severe than it has become.

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It is absolutely essential that the Lebanese government regain its sovereignty over its own territory. It will, in my opinion, need an international force to help it do that.

There are ways that, in conjunction with the international community, Hezbollah can be disarmed over time and the Shia people that participate in the political life of Hezbollah can be readily accommodated within the Lebanese body politic.

The question as to whether or not they can -- the Israelis can degrade Hezbollah, over time degradation can take place.

And I think it's also very clear to say that over time the consensus of holding Lebanon together under external pressure starts to break down. It's very important that Lebanon stay together as a sovereign country. It is key to stability in the Middle East. And it's essential that that take place. And the international community needs to move in that direction.

WARNER:

**Thank** you very much, General.

Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY:

Thank you very much.

General, just to -- first of all, thank you, General Abizaid, General Pace. Thank you very much for your service.

Welcome Secretary Rumsfeld. I think you can understand why it's so important for your presence here, given these range of issues that **are** front and center for the American people.

Let me ask you, General Abizaid, if we have difficulty with 130,000 troops **in** Iraq trying to disarm the insurgency, how in the world do we think we're going to be able to get **an** international force that's going to disarm Hezbollah?

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I think with the weight of the international community and the right rules of engagement and the right participation of the various parties concerned that over time Hezbollah can be **disarmed**.

KENNEDY:

Just to come back to a point that the chairman had mentioned about the costs in Iraq -- the \$400 billion total, 2,579 have been killed, 19,000 wounded, **54** casualties in my own state of Massachusetts, 70 percent of these from **IEDs** --

RUMSFELD:

Senator, I think there is a demand for a combination of military, political and  
toward stability.

diplomatic and more  
that's a four-year

KENNEDY.

Mr. Secretary, just to continue, the exact words that General Chiarelli said just  
last week, quote, "Quite frankly, in 33 years in the United States Army, I've never  
trained to stop a sectarian fight. This is something new." Now we hear General  
Abizaid talk about the increase in sectarian violence.

How are our troops trained to deal with sectarianism?

We know that they weren't trained as well as they should have been. We first  
went into Iraq when they weren't trained at Abu Ghraib.

How are they trained now with this new sectarian? How are they trained not to  
take sides?

And is this new addition of troops in Baghdad the beginning; we're going to  
have to have more troops to deal with this?

And what are our troops told in Baghdad now to quell the violence in this sectarian? How are they going to not get drawn in to one side or the other with the escalation of the sectarian violence?

KENNEDY:

What is in their background, what's in their training, what's been in their leadership that would give them the ability to not be involved in this, to quell the violence, and to eventually help President Maliki disarm and dismantle the militias?

RUMSFELD:

Senator, I think your point is a valid one: that ultimately, the sectarian violence is going to be dealt with by Iraqis. And it's going to be dealt with by Iraqi security forces as a part of the solution, but it's going to be dealt with through a reconciliation process, a political process that will -- Maliki, the prime minister, and others in the country are trying to design in a way that it will pull together elements within the country and thereby reduce sectarian violence.

I'd rather have either the generals comment on the training, except to say that the situation in Iraq, with 18 provinces, is really quite different in different provinces. And we have forces in most provinces. And the training is different for the different circumstances that they face.

One of the things that the department has done is have extensive lessons learned from what's taking place in Iraq in different parts of the country brought back to the joint forces command and the national training center and the troops are being trained up, carefully, to assure that they have the best kind of training they can have for the circumstances that we believe at the time they're going to find in the areas they're going to be assigned to.

KENNEDY:

My time's just about up.

General Abizaid, could you, sort of, expand on this, about their getting in with the growth of the sectarian violence? How do our troops get in there, not get embroiled in the sectarian violence?

What is your estimate: Is this the beginning or is this the end of the increased numbers of troops that we're going to need over there?

General Pace, you said there's a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war. That correct?

PACE:

I did ~~say~~ that, yes, sir.

MCCAIN:

Did you anticipate this situation a year ago?

PACE:

No, sir.

MCCAIN:

Did you, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID:

I believe that a year ago it was clear to see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be this high, no.

MCCAIN:

~~So~~, General Abizaid, we're moving 7,500 troops into Baghdad, is that correct?

ABIZAID:

The number is closer to 3,500.

MCCAW:

Three thousand five hundred?

ABIZAID:

Plus military police that were going there for other duties that are being used in the outer cordon areas, military policemen in particular.

**MCCAIN:**

And where are these troops coming from?

**ABIZAIID:**

The troops, the Stryker brigade, is coming down from **Mosul**.

**MCCAIN:**

From **Mosul**. Is the situation under control in Ramadi?

**ABIZAIID:**

The situation in Ramadi is better than it was two months ago.

**MCCAIN:**

Is the situation under control in Ramadi?

**ABIZAIID:**

I think the situation in Ramadi is workable.

**MCCAIN:**

And the troops from Ramadi came **from** Fallujah, isn't that correct?

**ABIZAIID:**

I can't **say**, Senator. I know...

**(CROSSTALK)**

MCCAIN:

Well, that's my information.

What I worry about is we're playing a game of whack-a-mole here. It **flares** up. We move troops there. We all know that Fallujah was allow to become a base of operations and insurgency, so we had to go into Fallujah and fight one of the great battles in Marine Corps/Army history.

Then when I was back there not too long ago, they said, "We're got big problems in Ramadi. Everybody knows we've got big problems in Ramadi." And I said, "Where you going to get the troops?" "Well, we're going to have to move them from Fallujah." Now we're going to have to move troops into Baghdad from someplace else.

It's very disturbing. And if it's all up to the Iraqi military, General Abizaid, and if it's all up to them, then I wonder why we have to move troops into Baghdad to intervene in what is clearly sectarian violence.

ABIZAID:

Senator, also Iraqi troops are being moved into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area are greater than our troops. We **are** in support with them in the main operational areas, and I believe that under the current circumstances that the Iraqi forces need to benefit from our command and control capabilities and the systems of a unit such as the Stryker brigade that's been moved to the south.

MCCAIN:

I would anticipate putting American troops into this very volatile situation means that **American** casualties will probably **go** up.

ABIZAID:

I think it's possible that in the period ahead of us in Baghdad that will take increased casualties. It's possible.

MCCAIN:

The situation in southern Iraq -- I was briefed by British military and others that there is a grave concern about Iranian penetration throughout southern Iraq. Is that a serious issue?

ABIZAIID:

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds force, intelligence agencies, arm and train and equip what I would call rogue Shia groups. And, yes, it is a concern.

MCCAIN:

Is Basra in control of the militias?

ABIZAIID:

I think that the militias have greater control in Basra than they need and that is why Prime Minister Maliki has appointed a military officer there to get the security situation back under control.

MCCAIN:

Do you have confidence in the Iraqi minister of interior?

ABIZAIID:

I don't know the Iraqi minister of interior the way I know the defense minister. I have no reason not to have confidence in him.

MCCAIN:

Well, all the reports we have is that day after day is that people are around in police uniforms and army uniforms and they're actually murdering and they're killing people. Story after story, they say when you see the police uniform, it's an emergency, that people are going to be killed.

Which brings us, obviously, to the state of the training not of the Iraqi military but of Iraqi police and law enforcement. Can you comment on that situation?

ABIZAIID:

During the period after the national election, when no governance formed, the Interior Ministry in particular did not develop its forces in the way that we had anticipated that they would or should.

Military forces, on the other hand, continue to develop well, they continue to perform well. But there is no doubt that police units -- especially local police units -- were infiltrated, in Basra, in particular, but elsewhere as well, by local militias. And they put their allegiance to the militias ahead of their allegiance to the state.

It's vital that we turn this around.

MCCAIN:

The cleric al-Sadr continues to be a major obstacle to progress in Iraq. And I believe there's still an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Are we going to address that issue?

ABIZAID:

The issue will be addressed by the Iraqi government.

MCCAIN:

Not by us?

ABIZAID:

Be addressed by the Iraqi government.

MCCAIN:

All of my colleagues are here, so I want to not take time. I just want to conclude.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we passed an amendment on the armed services authorization bill, which I am confident will be accepted in conference. And that requires that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, funding for it, be included in the regular budgetary process.

We're hearing story after story about mismanagement of funds, co cetera. We must have sufficient congressional oversight.

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I hope you are making plans to include the expenses involved in o Iraq and Afghanistan in the normal budgetary process and not as a, q "emergency supplemental."

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And I think you should be able, at this time, after this many years this conflict, to be able to predict what those costs might be.

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And I want to say, again, we will have a showdown, both within tl with the executive branch, unless we start going through the normal l process to fund this conflict, which I think all of us agree we'll be inv a long period of time.

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I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

I'd have you respond, Mr. Secretary.

RUMSFELD:

We're aware of the amendment. And, needless to say, we'll comply with the law.

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From our standpoint, we can do it either way. And it's been a matt worked out, generally, over the years, between the White House, the Management and Budget and the leadership in Congress.

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And the reality is that what we would have to do, as you suggestec provide the best estimates that we can, and projections, and then mak adjustments for them as time actually passed. And we'd be happy to c

would be to  
that.

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PACE:

Mr. Chairman, can I make one clarification, so that the parents watching this do not believe that, somehow, their sons and daughters are not properly trained to handle the kind of violence that the sectarian violence is creating?

What General Chiarelli said is exactly true: that we do not train to separate sectarian violence and that that is very much a responsibility of the politicians. And as we've talked about already, the Iraqi people need to do that.

With regard to Lieutenant Pace, who's on patrol in Baghdad with his platoon and the kind of violence that he's going to come across, regardless of it's Sunni, Shia or whoever, if it's an armed group, our soldiers and Marines certainly are well trained to handle that.

So there's a difference between the kind of violence they have to handle and what will prevent that violence. And preventing that violence is very much the role of the political leaders in Iraq to solve, sir.

WARNER:

Well, that's the purpose of this hearing: to allow you and other witnesses to clarify these bullet statements that come before us and the American public.

*Thank you, Chairman Pace.*

Senator Reed?

REED:

*Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.*

General Abizaid, in your opinion, is the Mahdi Army a terrorist organization with the implicit -- at least -- support from the Iranian government?

ABIZAID:

In my opinion, there are groups within the Mahdi Army that are under the pay of the Iranian government that are terrorist organizations. I'm not sure I can say that's necessarily true about the entire organization.

REED :

And, as Senator McCain pointed out, there was an outstanding warrant for Muqtada al-Sadr, who is the leader of the Mahdi Army. But also his followers are prominent members of the Iraqi government, is that correct?

ABIZAID:

That's correct.

REED:

So when you say the Iraqi government will dispose of Sadr and the Mahdi Army, he, in fact, is part of that government.

ABIZAID:

Well, I believe that the prime minister and his government will take the steps necessary to get the sectarian violence under control and do what has to be done against the death squads.

REED:

Do you have any, sort of, sense of the timing of this, particularly with respect to the Mahdi Army and to Sadr?

ABIZAID:

Again, I wouldn't characterize the target as being either Sadr or the Mahdi Army.

I would say there are elements within the Jaish al Mahdi that will be targeted because they're participating in death squad activities.

REED:

With the encouragement, the permission, the tolerance of Sadr?

ABIZAID:

I couldn't say whether there's a permission or tolerance or anything of Sadr.

I can say that the prime minister knows and has been very forceful about saying that militias must be brought under control. He has a wide range of points that go all the way from direct military confrontation to agreement with various militias.

REED:

But we will not be involved in that process? It'll be exclusively up to the prime minister and his security forces?

ABIZAID:

I wouldn't say it would be exclusively the work of Iraqis. It's very clear that our forces, in conjunction with the Iraqis, will help target known death squad organizations.

REED:

Mr. Secretary, the chief of staff of the Army testified before the House Armed Services on June 27th that \$4.9 billion in funding that the Army requested for reset, which is to repair equipment and replace equipment, was denied before the request was submitted to the Congress.

Did you deny this request? Or did the Office of Management and Budget deny the request?

RUMSFELD:

Senator, as you know, the normal process is that the department is given a budget by the Office of Management and Budget, and we take that budget and work within the department to try to fashion a budget that is balanced and makes sense.

And then, in the event that there's from time to time a need to go back to the Office of Management and Budget or the president and request additional funds, we've done that.

I don't know precisely which \$4.9 billion I think...

REED:

Mr. Secretary, did you go back to the president and ask for more funds because of the critical needs of the Army and the Marine Corps for reset?

RUMSFELD:

We have certainly gone to the president and the Office of Management and Budget and explained the need for reset and negotiated it extensively with the Office of Management and Budget.

And regrettably, there have been cuts made by Congress every year in the defense budget. There have been not only reductions in our budget, there have been things that have been added in that we did not request that required us to take money from other things.

RUMSFELD:

And, third, there have been things required of us that we were prevented from making savings.

And the net effect of it, if you look just today in the authorization and appropriation bills between the House and the Senate, it runs somewhere between \$10 billion, \$15 billion or \$20 billion, depending on how you calculate it.

FEED:

So the White House did turn down your request for additional money for reset?

RUMSFELD:

That would not...

FEED:

Yes or no.

RUMSFELD:

... be correct.

REED:

So you did not ask?

RUMSFELD:

I can't say that because we went through an extensive discussion and negotiation, and we ended up with the budget we ended up with, which was then reduced by Congress.

REED:

Last Tuesday evening, the Senate passed an appropriation for \$13 billion of additional funding for reset. Is that money appropriate, or is it in some way a waste of resources?

RUMSFELD:

It is clearly needed.

REED:

And why didn't you ask the White House before they sent the request to Congress for that clearly needed money?

RUMSFELD:

We did talk to the White House about it and that's where the number came from, was from the Department of Defense.

REED:

Mr. Secretary, what you're saying, I think, is either you asked for the money and they said no, or you accepted a limit despite the needs that you recognized for reset. It's one or the other.

RUMSFELD:

You've lost me. At first you were talking about...

REED:

I *think* you've lost everyone with this dialogue.

RUMSFELD:

First you were talking about \$4.9 billion, I thought. Now we're **talk**ing about the \$13.1 billion, I think. And we have requested that of OMB and the / have requested of Congress, and Congress has put it in the bill, **as I understand it has**.

REED:

Well, when did you request the \$13 billion, Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD:

Within the last period of months -- weeks.

REED:

Weeks?

RUMSFELD:

Yes, weeks.

REED:

Days.

Why didn't you request the \$13 billion when the budget was being prepared to be sent to the Congress?

RUMSFELD:

When the budget was being prepared to be sent to the Congress, it would have been January of last year for the budget that's being -- still has not been passed by the Congress this year.

RUMSFELD:

And for the supplemental, it would have been late last year -- not the beginning of last year, but late last year -- when those budgets are prepared.

We gain knowledge every month that goes by. And it's very clear the Army has a reset problem. And it's also clear that the \$13 billion is needed.

REED:

Mr. Secretary, it's very clear that two-thirds of the **Army** operating force, active and reserve, is now reporting as unready. There's not a single nondeployed Army brigade combat team in the United States that is ready to deploy.

The bottom line is that we have no ready strategic reserve. And this is a stunning indictment of your leadership.

RUMSFELD:

I think it's an inaccurate statement.

FEED:

How so? Have you seen the readiness reports, Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD:

I have.

REED:

And it's inaccurate to say that the readiness report for the **Army** does not indicate severe equipment shortages leaving many brigades in the United States as nondeployable?

RUMSFELD:

If you'll allow me a few minutes to respond. It's complicated, but I'll be happy to do so.

I stand with what I say. I think the characterization that you made is not accurate.

And it is complicated. If one sees a chart that shows a deterioration like this over a five-, six-, seven-, 10-year period, one has to assume that the readiness of the military, in this case the Army, has deteriorated.

Now, the fact of the matter is, if you begin with a standard, a requirement that is X, and then you show the beginning of the chart, and then at the end you have changed your requirement because you've decided you need different things, you've learned from the experiences of the last period of years, and you've increased your requirements to 5X, and then you compare yourself against 5X -- so if you've improved 300 percent -- you were at 100 percent to begin at 1X, and now you need 5X -- you've decided your requirement's different -- and you've improved 300 percent to get there, you're still short of that requirement. And that's what shows the deterioration.

The fact of the matter is, the equipment that the military has today is vastly better today than it was five years ago. The readiness of our capabilities are -- if you measure them against full spectrum, you can say they're not ready to do everything that anyone conceivably might need to do.

RUMSFELD:

On the other hand, if you ask the readiness of the forces with respect to what they're being asked to do -- ask General Abizaid, "Are the forces over there capable of doing what they're doing, equipped and trained to do what they're doing?" he will tell you, "Yes."

If you ask General Schoomaker, "Are the armed forces of the United States considerably better today, more capable, better equipped than they were five years ago?" he will say, "Yes."

And if you ask General Pace the question, "Is the United States today capable of fulfilling the requirements that the country has put on them?" the answer is, "Yes."

REED:

Well, let me take that opportunity

General Pace, have you seen the last readiness...

WARNER:

Senator, wait a minute. You're way over your time...

REED:

Excuse me.

WARNER:

Now, just a minute. We need to allow the witness to fully respond to **your** question. And I think your question's been stated. We'll have another round **and** you can pursue this at that time. But I have to accommodate other members -- quite a bit over your time.

~~Has~~ the witness had the opportunity to fully reply to the question before him?

RUMSFELD:

I have. I think it would be useful just for the context if the senator's last question could be responded to by General Pace.

REED

Listen, Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to ask my question rather than have the secretary ask my questions for me?

WARNER:

Well, now, Senator -- just two minutes.

REED:

And if I've given up my time, then my time is gone.

WARNER

We allowed you to ask your question very fully. It was stated. It is record, I think, with clarity, and the secretary was responding.

We'll have a second round, at which time you can further pursue the subject. I recognize the importance of this subject.

Now, the secretary's asked for General Pace to give his perspective to the senator's question.

PACE:

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Readiness is reflected in personnel, in training and in equipment. A unit comes back from any deployment -- when I was battalion commander -- the unit has people change out and, therefore, the personnel numbers go down. Training as a result of the unit coming back starts out anew into the next cycle. And equipment is taken from what has been used and put into depot maintenance. That's in normal peacetime.

In wartime, we are using equipment at much greater rates.

PACE:

So we have a notional unit that has 100 trucks. And they deploy and come back. And the trucks normally will be driven 1,000 miles in a year and driven 10,000 miles in combat.

You have a larger number of those vehicles that end up being put in depot maintenance, which for the unit that is home then reduces their readiness and availability of equipment.

The units that are forward have had not only the equipment that they need with but have been augmented, thanks to the Congress providing the for example, our up-armored Humvees. The requirement globally, which we started in September of '01, was about 2,000. That number, now, is up to 12,000.

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We have bought up to those 12,000 and we have used them in combat. And now a number of those 12,000 are currently in depot maintenance waiting.

So we're way over the 2,000 we started to begin with, but now, because of maintenance, usage and combat losses, we're below the 12,000 that folks are asking for today.

So it's very difficult, when you turn the kaleidoscope, to see all the pieces. And it does not allow itself to have a straight, easy answer.

Fundamentally, the United States Army is much more capable today. Fundamentally, the Army that is fighting, our war force, today deployed is in tremendous shape, personnel, training and equipment-wise.

But it is absolutely a fact that, for various budgetary reasons, some of which are result of actions taken by the Congress, that we do not have enough funding currently to provide for the repair of all of the equipment that currently sits at our depots waiting to be repaired. And I believe that's where the dialogue is, about how much money is needed.

That \$13.1 billion, as I understand it, if approved by Congress, will, in fact, allow the Marine Corps and the Army to take the equipment that is currently stacked up at their depots, hire the workforce and begin the process.

But what has happened when we've not had budgets and we've had continuing resolutions, some of the workforce has had to be let go. And we cannot have the depots not know whether or not they are going to be able to have the funding, long term, to hire people. We cannot go out and hire a mechanic Pace for six months and then to let him go and expect to hire him back again.

I would ask, as we look at this, that we look at some kind of no-year funding that is focused on the backlog of equipment repair that will allow the depots to consciously go out and hire people who can stay in the workforce long enough to get this work done.

Thank you.

## **WARNER**

The senator from Rhode Island raises a very important question. And we will further explore it in the course of this hearing.

Mr. Secretary, I'm going to seek to get documentation that I looked at where you did engage with OMB about the need for these funds. So I think that documentation will be put in this record.

WARNER:

Senator Inhofe? But before you begin, Senator, I'm advised by the cloak room that we have two back-to-back votes. It's my intention to go over quickly and vote the first vote.

And, Senator McCain, I would ask that you chair because I'm going to be absent for that vote.

And we'll keep the hearing going, colleagues, as members come and go on these votes.

Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE:

**Thank** you, Mr. Chairman.

**And** I do want to *thank* you for giving General Pace the opportunity to respond to that question. I think that was an excellent response.

Let me just make a couple of observations if I might.

I find it really interesting -- I think most of the members of this committee have been to Iraq varying numbers of times. There are some of them who have not been at all. And when you get the reaction, the response and opinions that are formulated by those who have not been there, it's totally different than those who have really been there and they understand first-hand what's going on

There's no better example of that than an article that was in the paper in USA Today, just this morning, that said the **only** -- without quoting a source -- at least I didn't see a source -- of the 18 provinces, only one was able to be secured just with the Iraqis.

On the other hand, Dr. Rubaie, who is a person I've known for quite some time, the new NSA, has said that right now, four out of 18 are under the protection and security of Iraqi security forces and there are nine more that will be in a very short period of time, which is 13 out of 18.

INHOFE:

When you hear people who have not been there and depend on press reports, there's no way that they can get the resolve that our troops have. There's no way.

I will share with you, General Pace, since this is up in the Marines' area in Fallujah, an experience up there with this **Dr. Mahdi** that you've met many times I'm sure. Dr. Mahdi or General Mahdi was actually the brigade commander for Saddam Hussein. He hated Americans, until he started embedded training with the Marines.

And he learned to love them so much that he said that, when they rotated him out, that they cried. And he then renamed the Iraqi security forces at Fallujah the Fallujah Marines.

Things like that that are going on that you can only get by being there and experiencing it.

Now I came back from my 11<sup>th</sup> trip to the CENTCOM AOR. And I timed that trip so that it was right after Zarqawi saw his demise and after the new cabinet appointments were put into place. And you hear a lot about Maliki and so forth and perhaps even Jasim.

But when you sit down and spend quality time with them, you get a different impression than you do by looking at the media here. And, certainly, Dr. Rubaie is the same way.

Jasim at that time, General Pace, said -- or maybe General Abizaid could respond to this -- he said at that time that, of the **36** brigades, **17** -- we're talking about the Iraqi brigades now -- **17** were at level **2** or, in other words, were capable of autonomous operations. And of the **112** battalions, **62** were at level **2**.

Now this was two months ago. Do you agree with his assessment at that time of those who are trained and equipped -- Iraqi security forces -- and has that changed in the last two months?

ABIZAID:

Senator Inhofe, I think the best way to characterize where the Iraqis are doing well has to do with their units that **are** in the lead -- in the lead **in** the security structure in whatever area that's been assigned to them.

In October of '05, one division, four brigades and **23** battalions of the Iraqi armed forces were in the lead in their sectors. Today, it's four divisions, **21** brigades and **77** battalions. That's a pretty impressive gain.

And I think it's really important for people to understand that while there are a lot of very important warning signals that can't be lost to us about where sectarian violence is heading in Baghdad, the most important point that we've got to keep in mind is that the army is holding together and that the government is committed to bringing the sectarian violence under control.

So the question is, am I optimistic whether or not Iraqi forces with our support, with the backing of the Iraqi government can prevent the slide to civil war? My answer is, yes, I'm optimistic that that slide can be prevented.

INHOFE:

Well, that is consistent with what we get from the other side. I like hearings here where we get it from you, but also to go over there and they have to say about it.

And I have to say this, I was incredibly impressed. I mean, we all are familiar with Maliki, but Minister Jasim and this Dr. Rubaic, someone I had known sometime before, they are very, very optimistic about their level of professionalism.

And when you talk to the troops, getting back up to Fallujah, I was during the elections, and knowing that they were actually risking their lives, they were just rejoicing at that time, asking them the question, "Do you see the future where you're going to be able to take over your own security they just very enthusiastically say it is.

There's one area...

ABIZAID:

Senator Inhofe, if I may, I just want to say the Iraqi soldiers are fighting, they're taking casualties, they are fighting for their nation, they are trying to bring sectarian violence and the insurgency under control. And they deserve enormous amount of our respect and support.

And so I think sometimes we seem to think that we're the only forces there. We're not. There's 220,000-plus Iraqis that are out there fighting and doing a pretty good job. And, yes, there are some problems within their organizations, but they are maturing and they are doing better, and they'll continue to do better.

INHOFE:

And they're committed. I happened to be in Saddam's hometown when the training area was bombed by the terrorists.

INHOFE:

And about 40 of them -- 41, I think it was -- were either killed or very seriously injured.

Those families -- those 40 families resupplied a member of their family to replace the one that was killed. I mean, this is the type of thing, the stories you don't hear.

I know my time has expired, but for the record, Senator McCain, I'd like to ask them to give us some information.

According to Chiarelli and several others, including the Iraqis, probably one of the most serious problems, even though it doesn't have a lot of sex appeal to it, is the logistics, both civilian and military, and the problem that we -- the organizational structure to distribute civil equipment and supplies isn't there.

And I'd like to get your opinions as to what we're trying to do to correct the problem of logistical problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

MCCAIN:

Senator Ben Nelson?

BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I think your testimony in response to questions has been very helpful.

In connection with the number of Iraqi troops who are combat-capable, out of the over 250,000-plus security forces that are there, is there any estimate of the number who would be combat-capable?

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, for the record, the number of trained Iraqi police, border security and Iraqi military forces -- the number is closer to 275,000.

The combat capability within the army -- I think, again, the best measure are those units that are in at the lead, which are four divisions, 21 brigades and 77 battalions. But there's a very detailed list of what unit is at what level that we can certainly provide to you.

BEN NELSON:

That would be very helpful. Then, of the...

ABIZAID:

They are much improved and they continue to improve every month.

BEN NELSON:

Which is part of the emphasis on standing their military up so that we can stand ours down. The faster and the more capable they are, hopefully then there should be some sort of connection with the reduction of our forces as a result of that.

In terms of the police -- let's say the municipal police -- do we know what percentage or what number of the total number you would look at as being not only capably trained but honest and as part of the overall government, as opposed to a militia?

ABIZAID:

It's a difficult question to answer. There are some places where the local police are exceptionally efficient and very honest, very capable.

ABIZAID:

There are other areas where we know that they've been infiltrated by various militias, such as in Basra, where the government and the British forces that are down there are doing their best to stand down those units, retrain them and bring them on-line in a credible and capable manner.

As far as the national police forces are concerned, in Baghdad it's clear that there are a number of battalions -- again, without my notes in front of me; I'd take it for the record -- but there are a number of battalions that need to be stood down and retrained. And General Casey and Dempsey are working to do that now.

BEN NELSON:

Do we know whether approximately 50 percent or 30 percent?

ABIZAID:

No, I'd say it's probably 30 percent.

BEN NELSON:

Thirty percent.

ABIZAID:

That's national police, which is separate and distinct from municipal and/or the military.

BEN NELSON:

You know, I think the debate about whether we have a date for withdrawal or there's an open-ended commitment -- hopefully the debate will continue. But I wonder about an approach that is different than setting a date for withdrawal and to close any question about whether it's an open-ended commitment would be better approached on setting conditions for staying with the prime minister, with the Iraqi government.

In other words, there's a lot of slippage on how we have standing up to stand down in terms of their military versus our military because things change on the ground.

But do we have some idea of what our conditions for staying are? Is there a tipping point in terms of their ability or inability to get to a certain level so that they can deal with sectarian violence on their own or the Sunni insurgency, to govern themselves but also to secure themselves?

I guess I would feel more comfortable if we could establish some sort of metrics to know what it takes in terms of percentage, numbers and what it would take in terms of time so that we can say that they are capable of not only governing themselves with the elected government but also in terms of securing themselves so they can govern themselves.

BEN NELSON:

I don't know who would like to take that question, but I throw it out to all three of you.

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, the government's been in existence now for three months. They've got a lot of work to do to cement their capability of governance. It's a very difficult thing to bring in a new government under these conditions of sectarian violence and insurgency.

I think it's very important for people to understand that, while there may be a military metric to units in the Iraqi army that are equipped and trained and them taking over a certain battlespace, there is also a very, very important political aspect to this reduction of sectarian violence, which is the various communities getting together and agreeing upon ways to reduce the sectarian violence themselves.

It's important that there be a national reconciliation effort. And it's important that there be agreed-upon measures to move forward with various militias that are operating outside of government control.

I think a combination of those things will lead to less violence over time. establish the role of the national government in Iraq, and allow us to bring our level of forces down as appropriate.

RUMSFELD:

Senator Nelson, I'd just add that the U.S. ambassador and General Casey have established a committee or a commission with the new Iraqi government and the national security officials in that government to address the very issues that you're raising as to what are the things that need to be done because, as General Abizaid correctly points out, they reach well beyond military capability.

BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your answers.

WARNER:

Senator Thune?

**THUNE:**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, General, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and for your responses to the questions.

THUNE:

General Abizaid just asked a question. I talked to a soldier last week who **has** had two deployments to Iraq, and raised the question about whether or not the objectives and the goals that we have in Iraq are aligned with the goals that the Iraqi people have, and that they aren't.

And one of the reasons -- it seems to me, at least, if we're going to get control of the sectarian situation there, the Iraqi people have to buy in to what's happening in Iraq. And his suggestion was that they haven't.

And I know that when we've travelled to Iraq, and I was there a couple of months back with Senator McCain's delegation, you know, we hear from, obviously, the commanders and we talked with some of our troops. In most cases, we don't have a lot of interaction with the Iraqi people.

But I just wanted you to comment about the overall -- the interaction that we have with the Iraqi people, our troops on the ground over there, the temperature, in terms of their willingness to be a part of a national **unity** government, a democratic Iraq, and that sort of thing, relative to what we're trying to accomplish there.

I mean, this was one soldier who says he visits with these folks all the time and thinks that their interest and their objectives and goals are not aligned with what ours are over there.

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ABIZAID:

Well, there's certainly people in Iraq that don't want Iraq to come to independent state. There are terrorist groups that have views that they descend into a state of anarchy and chaos so they can establish safe havens for terrorism in the region.

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But I think that, as I go around and I talk to Iraqi military officers, Iraqi government officials, and people throughout the country -- and I think Casey certainly would echo this -- the majority of the people want Iraq to come together as a free and independent nation that is capable of being a member of the community of nations in that part of the world, that's not dominated by either Iranians or dominated by Sunni extremist groups.

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ABIZAID:

And I believe that know they have to fight in order to achieve that.

RUMSFELD:

I think it ought not to be surprising, Senator, that an American soldier would visit with Iraqis and see that they do have a different perspective. The different part of the world, they have a different history, and it's fully understandable.

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On the other hand, 12 million of them went out and voted, and they went out and fashioned a constitution and then ratified it that's there for the world to see, and they have been voting in increasing numbers.

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So while you're right and General Abizaid is certainly right that the Baathists who want to take back the country, there are Shi'a who would dominate it to the detriment of the Sunnis. The fact of the matter is the 12 million Iraqis went out and voted for that constitution, and that's not nothing, it's something important.

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THUNE:

Yes. And I appreciate General Abizaid's comment, which I've heard you make previously as well, that the forces that want to hold the country together and **see** it succeed outnumber and are greater than those that want to see it fail.

But I just wanted to get your assessment of sort of on the ground, the average Iraqi on the street type view of what's happening there, because it seems to me at least that that's a key component in starting to **turn** over information on some of the bad guys who are committing the violence there and really making this thing work.

One other question has to do again with the borders and how are we doing with respect to Iran and Syria. Foreign arms serve **as** the lifeblood of the insurgent groups. Does the Iraqi government see that as a threat to their sovereignty and are they stepping up and doing some of the work to protect the borders and make sure that a lot of the arms that **are** coming in are cut off?

What's your assessment of that? I've asked a lot of questions of your colleagues who have been in front of this committee about **IEDs**, for example, and where **are** they getting the materials to make these IEDs. And seems, at least, a lot of that's coming from some of these other countries.

And I know it's important with the length of the borders and everything else to completely shut it off, but are there efforts being made to regulate and control the materials that are coming in that are being used to inflict casualties on our **troops**?

ABIZAID:

Yes, Senator, there is a lot of effort building a border force. The border force is effective in some areas, less effective in others. The Iraqi armed forces also back up the border forces.

The Syrian border remains the primary conduit for foreign fighters. I think those numbers remain less than 100 or so that are transiting back and forth.

The vast majority of the munitions that **are** used inside Iraq come from inside Iraq. There are certainly smuggling routes that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds force people are using to bring in IEDs into the south and into some of the northern portions of Iraq that have been used, and it's clear that that's taking place.

THUNE:

Were those weapons caches that were discovered this last week -- s it been determined whether those were leftovers from the previous regime at hose that have come in -- that flooded in from other countries?

ABLZAID:

Sir, I'd have to see the specific report. There are weapon caches found every day.

THUNE:

Yes, all right.

PACE:

Sir, just to help with that number, we've had 420,000 tons of ammunition captured and destroyed in some over 14,000 locations in-theater. So it's a huge cache location and we find them every day.

THUNE:

Thank you. I thank you for your outstanding service to our country.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

MCCAIN:

Senator Clinton?

CLINTON:

Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Mr. Secretary, we're glad you're here.

In your opening statement, you reference the common sense of Americans. Well, I think it's fair to say that that collective common sense overwhelmingly does not either understand or approve of the way you and the administration are handling Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under your leadership, there have been numerous errors in judgment that have led us to where we are in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have a full-fledged insurgency and full-blown sectarian conflict in Iraq.

Now, whether you label it a civil war or not, it certainly has created a situation of extreme violence and the continuing loss of life our troops and of the Iraqis.

You did not go into Iraq with enough troops to establish law and order.

CLINTON:

You disbanded the entire Iraqi army. Now, we're trying to recreate it.

You did not do enough planning for what is called Phase Four and rejected all the planning that had been done previously to maintain stability after the regime was overthrown.

You underestimated the nature and strength of the insurgency, the sectarian violence, and the spread of Iranian influence.

Last year, Congress passed the United States Policy in Iraq Act, which I strongly supported. This law declares 2006 to be a year of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.

However, we appear to be moving in the opposite direction, with the number of U.S. troops in Iraq scheduled to increase, not decrease. That's the only way I think you can fairly consider the decision with respect to the 17th Stryker Brigade.

So, Mr. Secretary, as we returned to our states for the August recess, our constituents have a lot of questions and concerns about the current state of affairs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

I don't need to remind any of us that we continue to lose our young men and women: 120 from New York alone.

Beside the U.S. losses, violence does seem to be increasing. From January to June of this year, there were 14,338 Iraqi civilian casualties, at least as far as anyone can count; in May and June alone, more than 5,000 deaths and 5,700 injuries.

My goodness

RUMSFELD

assurances now

Given your track record, Secretary Rumsfeld, why should we believe your

So, Mr. Secretary, when our constituents ask for evidence that your policy in  
Hag and Afghanistan will be successful, you don't leave us with much to talk  
about. Yes, we hear a lot of happy talk and rosy scenarios, but because of the  
administration's strategic blunders and, frankly, the record of incompetence in  
executing, you are presiding over a failed policy.

Obviously, I could go on and on. A recent book aptly titled "Fiasco" describes  
in some detail the decision-making apparatus that has led us to this situation.

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I wish, General, if Kenney made a comparable comment with respect to the  
 dangers that are now going on in Afghanistan and the failure to be able to secure

However, this February, DIA Director Lieutenant General Mapple said that in  
2005, attacks by the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces were up 20 percent  
from 2004 levels, and these insurgents were a greater threat to the Afghan  
government's efforts to expand its authority than in any time since 2001.

In Afghanistan, your administration's credibility is also suspect. In December  
2002, you said, "The Taliban are gone." In September 2004, President Bush said  
"The Taliban no longer is in existence."

Two months ago that it's clear it's not working and we are now pulling in more  
American troops and -- following the lead of Senator McCain's line of  
questioning -- removing them from other places that are hardly stable and secure.

CLAYTON

Then there was the big, ballyhooed announcement of forward together and the  
commitment by the new Iraq government to secure Baghdad.

In a July 22 article in the New York Times, General Abizaid was quoted as  
saying, "Two months after the new Iraq government took office, the security  
gains that we had hoped for had not been achieved."

First, I tried to make notes and to follow the prepared statement you've presented.

First of all, it's true: There is sectarian conflict in Iraq and there is a loss of life.

RUMSFELD:

And it's an unfortunate and tragic thing that that's taking place.

And it is true that there are people who are attempting to prevent that government from being successful. And they are the people who are blowing up buildings and killing innocent men, women and children, and inflicting the heads of people on television. And the idea of their prevailing is unacceptable.

Second, you said the number of troops were wrong. I guess history will make a judgment on that. The number of troops that went in and the number of troops that were there every month since and the number of troops that are there today of the the superiors, General Pace, General Abizaid, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the president of the United States,

I think it's not correct to assume that they were wrong numbers, and I don't think the evidence suggests that, and it will be interesting to see what history decides.

The balance between having too many and contributing to an insurgency by the feeling of occupation and the risk of having too few and having the security situation not be sufficient for the political progress to go forward is a complicated set of decisions. And I don't know that there's any guidebook that tells you how to do it. There's no rule book. There's no history for this.

And the judgments that have been made have been made by a great many well-trained people: the gentleman sitting next to me, the people on the ground in Iraq. They were studied and examined and analyzed by the civilian leadership, and by the president, and they were confirmed. And so I think your assertions, at least, debatable.

The idea that the army was disbanded, I think, is one that's kind of flying around. My impression is that to a great extent that army disbanded itself. Our forces came in so fast -- it was made up of a lot of Shia conscripts who didn't want to be in it and thousands -- or at least many, many hundreds -- of Sunni generals who weren't about to hang around after Saddam Hussein and his sons and administration were replaced.

The work to build a new army has included an awful lot of people from the prior army, and it has benefited from that.

Third, the assertion that the government rejected all the planning that had been done before is just simply false, that's not the case. The planning that had been done before was taken into account by the people who were executing the post-major combat operations activities.

The comments about Baghdad I'll possibly let General Abizaid comment on.

RUMSFELD:

The goal is not to have U.S. forces do the heavy lifting in Baghdad. There are many, many more Iraqi forces in Baghdad.

The role of the U.S. forces is to help them, to provide logistics, to assist them as needed, and to create a presence that will allow the Iraqi security forces to succeed, and then, as our forces step back, allow the Iraqi security forces to be sufficient to maintain order in the city.

I can't predict if it will work this time. It may or it may not.

It happens to represent the best judgment of General Casey, General Chiarelli and the military leadership. And General Abizaid and General Pace and I have reviewed it. And we think that it is a sensible approach, as General Abizaid testified earlier.

Afghanistan -- I don't know who said what about whether the Taliban are gone, but, in fact, the Taliban that were running Afghanistan and ruling Afghanistan were replaced. And they were replaced by an election that took place in that country. And in terms of a government, or governing entity, they were gone. And that's a fact.

Are there still Taliban around? You bet.

Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places -- correction -- in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are.

Is the violence up? Yes.

Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does. And it tends to decline during the winter period.

Does that represent failed policy? I don't know. I would say no. I think you've got an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this. And the decisions that are being made are being made with great care after a great deal of consideration.

Are there setbacks? Yes.

Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.

Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make ground requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet.

Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so.

Is this problem going to get solved in the near term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I don't believe it is. I think it's going to take some time.

And I know the question was, some wars lasted three years, some wars lasted four years, some wars lasted five years. The Cold War lasted 40-plus years.

And the struggle against violent extremists who are determined to prevent free people from exercising their rights as free people is going to go on a long time, and it's going to be a tough one.

That does not mean that we have to spend the rest of our lives, as the United States armed forces, in Iraq. The Iraqis are going to have to take that over. We can't want freedom more for the Iraqi people than they want for themselves. And Senator Thune mentioned earlier about that issue.

And I would point out the number of tips that have been coming from Iraqi people have been going up steadily. They're at a very high level. And it does suggest to me that the Iraqi people do want to have a free country, as I mentioned because of their voting pattern.

So I would disagree strongly with your statement.

**CLINTON:**

Well, Mr. Secretary, I know you would, and I know you feel strongly about it, but there's a track record here. This is not 2002, 2003, 2004, '05, when you appeared before this committee and made many comments and presented many assurances that have, frankly, proven to be unfulfilled. And

**RUMSFELD:**

Senator, I don't think that's true. I have never painted a rosy picture. I've been very measured in my words. And you'd have a dickens of a time trying to find instances where I've been excessively optimistic. I understand this is tough stuff.

CLINTON:

Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to submit for the record a number of the secretary's former comments. And also, may we keep the record open for additional questions?

WARNER

The record will remain open until the close of business today for all members to contribute additional questions.

CLINTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PACE:

Senator, may I go on record, sir?

WARNER.

Yes, of course.

PACE

Thank you, sir.

I think it's very important that I, as chairman, having been vice chairman since 1 October of 2001, having been part of the dialogue, having worked closely with General Franks, General Casey, General Abizaid, all of the Joint Chiefs, the numbers of forces that have been requested up the chain of command have been thoroughly discussed, pros and cons of the balance, what was needed, how we might provide it, the equipment, the tactics of the major operations. A lot of those things have come up through the Joint Chiefs. We have given our best military advice.

The collaborative **nature** between our leaders here in Washington and those in the field is **as** thorough and complete **as** I could imagine. I have personally been part of each of those decisions. And I want to go on record as saying that I, along with the Joint Chiefs, have **been**, continue to be part of the decision process.

And everything, to my knowledge, that we have ever asked for with regard to equipment or personnel has been provided to us.

WARNER

Thank you very much, General.

Again, I've listened to this very important colloquy, but I do believe, **Mr. Secretary**, having followed this, as is my responsibility, these many years. I think both Secretary Rumsfeld, your predecessor, General Myers, and you, General Pace, have always made statements which were in balance and **definitely** indicating the seriousness of the conflict, the fact that it's going to be a long and a drawn-out one.

And our record has many, many entries in it to the effect that the president and the secretary of defense have relied upon the advice of the senior military commanders in structuring those force levels.

And we'll be happy to include in the record some material of our own on that point.

And I think, given the number of questions coming about the record, I'll hold the record open until close of business on Friday.

Senator Dayton?

DAYTON:

*Thank* you, **Mr. Chairman**.

I want to **thank** sincerely each of you for your service to our country. I know that all of you live with enormous demands of your positions and the conditions around the world.

With respect, I say that we, and more importantly the American people, deserve to be told I think more candidly perhaps than we have **so far**, why the Iraqis remain incapable of succeeding in Iraq, and, since our success **is** predicated on their success, what we and they **are** going to do about it.

Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in your remarks that you remain confident in the good common sense of the American people. And I agree with you that that confidence is well placed. And the American people can tell the difference between succeeding and failing. They perceive, I think, correctly, that the Iraqis are failing in Iraq and that our courageous troops continue to bear the brunt of the Iraqi failures and that the realities there, overall, are getting worse, not better.

I believe that all of you are mistaken to cast the failures in Iraq as a test of our citizens' will and resolve. I think it's unfair to the American people to do so.

I respectfully disagree with your assertion, General Pace, that most Americans are not affected by this war every day. Most of them lived through 9/11, as you did and we did,

They remain profoundly affected by it. They accepted the president's assertion that the United States invasion of Iraq was essential to protect our national security, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, as the president and the vice president said immediately and urgently threatened the United States.

The American people continue to support the war even after no weapons of mass destruction or found, even when their sons and daughters and husbands and wives -- as you said, General, over a million of them -- have been sent halfway around the world, risking their lives, giving their lives to carry out the orders of their commander in chief.

## DAYTON

It isn't their will -- the will of the American people that's being tested, it's their tolerance for failure.

Over 2,600 Minnesota National Guardsmen and -women are now serving in Iraq. They're away from their families for 18 months. Some of them will never return alive. They come from 80 of Minnesota's 87 counties. They're the best and brightest in their communities. So it's not just their families but it's entire communities that are affected by their absences.

And so those families and their fellow citizens deserve to know when the Iraqis are going to be able to take over responsibility civically and militarily and security, so that they can come home with that victory that they achieved when they toppled the Saddam Hussein regime is secured.

I've attended -- as all of my colleagues have, I'm sure -- far too many funerals and wakes in Minnesota, where hundreds or even thousands of grateful and

grieving citizens attend. Every one of those funerals is a leading news story in all of the statewide media.

**So** the people of Minnesota, and in **this** country, are asking **us** -- you and we, their leaders, is to tell them what is really going on there, not with political spins from either side of the aisle, but truth, the basic facts.

What is the situation in Iraq? Why is it seemingly getting worse not better, as evidenced **as** others have said, by the need to bring more **U.S.** troops into Baghdad, the capital city? What is our strategy? What is our strategy for reversing that slide?

What is the solution to getting the inability of the Iraqis -- I remember being with General Petraeus in Iraq in December of **2004**. He talked candidly there about, he said, the most difficult situation he had ever faced in his career, trying to train these forces to stand up -- not to the American army, but to the fellow citizens to these insurgents.

Some terrorists, we're told again and again, at least in most of the briefings, **95-plus** percent of this violence is generated by indigenous Iraqis. **So** their inability to stand up to their fellow citizens has caused, according to the reports I've read, some 850,000 Iraqi citizens to flee the country because they can't even go to work every day, can't go to school without basic security.

Again, by the indicators that I can look at -- they're mixed -- but predominantly this is a failed effort by the Iraqi people and it continues to be. And when **are** we going to see some indications of their ability to succeed, and if not, what are we going to do about it?

Secretary, maybe I'll ask you and then others respond.

RUMSFELD:

Would you like to respond?

DAYTON

General?

ABIZAID:

Senator Dayton, thank you.

I disagree.

I believe the Iraqis are capable of succeeding. I believe they do want to

ABIZAIID:

These forces of extremism are strong. They are very, very ruthless. They are well connected, not only inside Iraq, but globally. And they present a formidable force that has to be dealt with.

We are not operating in the region in some sort of a battlefield where the enemy doesn't exist. The enemy exists in Iraq. It exists in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Lebanon. You name the location in the region and they exist there.

People say the war started on September 11th, 2001, but you can make a case for the war having started in October of 1983, when Hezbollah destroyed the Marine barracks and killed over 200 American Marines that were stationed there.

You could say the war played itself out to a certain extent at a lower level in Somalia, where we stayed there for a short period of time and then left.

You could say that throwing a few TLAMs at this enemy created the circumstances by which we had to end up facing this enemy with greater force and greater perseverance and greater patience and courage than we had been able to muster before then.

This is a very serious problem that requires the application of our national might and will, along with that of the international community, to face down the extremist threat, whether it's sponsored by Iran or whether it comes from Al Qaida, or we will fight one of the biggest wars we've ever fought.

Weapons of mass destruction may not have been found in Iraq, but this enemy is trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. We know that from just looking at any unclassified Web site you want to look at. They are working at it day after day and they want to use it against us. And we can simply not walk away from this enemy until the people in the region have the capacity to deal with it themselves. And they want to do that.

We have got to shape the environment that allows them to help themselves.

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And it's a slow process. When I think of how long it took us to win the Revolution, and then to solidify our own independence and freedom through the Constitution, and eventually through our own Civil War, this is not an easy task. This is a very, very difficult task.

And I think we should give the people in the region credit for wanting to live a better life and achieve greater security and stability. We have to help them if we are going to keep our own children safe from the greater dangers that lurk out there.

DAYTON:

General, I don't say this is about walking away from the enemy. I don't think the American people -- I think it's a very unfair characterization.

I can say I voted against the resolutions to set a timetable to begin (inaudible) American troops. I've got a lot of heat back home; so be it. Because I agree that the military command needs to decide what force level is necessary to carry out the mission that they're assigned by their commander in chief. And I'm not going to second-guess that.

But I expressed a concern that that force level is going to remain there indefinitely because of the incapacity of the Iraqi society. I recognize that after living 25 years under a severe dictatorship, it takes some time.

But we heard testimony last week from Iraqis that the Health Ministry is more corrupt than it was under Saddam Hussein. The amount of electricity in Baghdad, we're told, is eight hours a day. I was there with the chairman in July of 2003 -- as you well know, sir, being there, it can get 115-degree temperatures and no air conditioning and no running water and sanitation and no refrigeration. you know, you've got a crisis on your hands. And people, as I said earlier, can't go to work without fearing and they're fleeing.

So, again, you can't paint it all one way or the other. But it seems to me that the incompetence, the corruption and the incapacity of the Iraqi forces, despite our three years of the best training of forces we have capable -- when you can train Americans in eight weeks of basic training to go over and perform -- I mean, to me it's inexplicable that after three years, they can't take more responsibility than they have so far.

And, again, if you extrapolate from those three years so far to a decade, the prediction that we would have to have a sizable force level there for a decade is a moderate -- maybe even an optimistic prediction. I mean, if we're going to be there for a decade or two decades at this kind of force level in order to hold that country together.

RUMSFELD:

Certainly no one anticipates having forces in Iraq at these levels in a decade.

And the Iraqi security forces, as I say, have gone from zero; they've been trained and equipped up to 275,000; they're going to complete 325,000 by the end of this year. And I don't know what the new government will say is the appropriate number. Maybe that number, maybe something more.

But then the support systems and the strengthening of the ministry will be required as that is occurring. And I think that your characterization is going to prove to be not correct.

DAYTON:

I'm *sorry*, which characterization, sir?

RUMSFELD:

That they could be there up to a decade.

DAYTON:

I hope it's not.

RUMSFELD:

Yeah, I'm *sure* ...

DAYTON:

That's not my characterization, it's that of others.

WARNER:

Thank you very much, Senator.

DAYTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman?

WARNER

Yes.

RUMSFELD:

Something came to my attention that I'd like to just comment on. We were discussing the reset costs early on.

WARNER

And in the interim, I've got some material to put in the record, the documents. But I **think** it's important...

RUMSFELD:

Good, I'd just like to say **three** or four...

WARNER

...we, at this point, continue our colloquy on that, and that that part of your response be inserted in the record following my comments after the senator from Rhode Island's.

So, please?

RUMSFELD:

Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The reset costs have historically been in supplementals, not in the original budgets.

partly cover fiscal year '07 reset costs.

I say "partly" because we fully expect to request additional supplemental funds in the spring, as we have in prior periods.

Reset costs have always been funded in supplementals. The \$13.1 billion in the Stevens amendment, as I understand it, is an advance payment on reset costs that would be covered in the spring supplemental.

WARNER:

Thank you.

And I've done this research and will put this in the record following Rumsfeld's statement. **Secretary**

I'm going to address a document dated August 2 from the Executive Office of the President. And it reads as follows. It clearly, in my judgment, supports your statement that you have been in constant consultation with the Office of Management and Budget on this important issue.

This document reads in part -- and I'll put the whole document in the record -- "The administration welcomes the committee's strong support for our troops fighting the war on terror. The funds provided are critical to continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while keeping our military well equipped and ready to respond.

"The administration urges the Senate to fully support the procurement request and provide full funding for Afghan and Iraqi forces to enable them to assume full responsibility for their own security and fully fund our coalition support to ensure timely reimbursement of critical partners."

WARNER

Now, this is right on point. "The administration supports the Senate's acceleration of \$3.1 billion into the bridge that would have been requested next year in the spring supplemental, bringing the total level of bridge funding in this bill to \$63.1 billion.

"This action will facilitate the needed resetting of the armed forces to continue their important missions and provide needed certainty to military planners.

"This additional funding is necessary to accelerate planned efforts to repair or replace war-damaged equipment." The point that you addressed, General Pace. "In particular these funds address Army and Marine Corps depot and unit maintenance requirements, procurement needs, including Abrams, Bradley, Apache and other helicopters, tactical vehicles, trailers, generators and bridge equipment."

And this is the document that I also ~~insert~~, which states the OMB funding levels and they were followed by the Appropriations Committee in that amendment. So that will be placed in the record as I stated. And I thank the secretary for bringing that to our further attention and clarifying it.

I'll also put in a memorandum that I've had prepared, giving a chronological history of this funding.

I see that we are now joined by several colleagues.

Senator Dayton, having finished his testimony, Senator Chambliss, you are now recognized.

**CHAMBLISS:**

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you all for being here.

And as always, General Pace...

**WARNER**

Senator Chambliss, the colleague to your left has indicated to the chair that you have to depart to preside over the Senate.

**GRAHAM:**

At noon. but I can defer.

**WARNER**

Well, go ahead.

GRAHAM:

Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

(CROSSTALK)

GRAHAM:

It just speaks well of Georgia, that's all I can say.

(LAUGHTER)

CHAMBLISS:

This will cost him, Mr. Chairman.

GRAHAM:

It will. I know I'm going to pay a heavy price for this.

Well, gentlemen, thank you for coming and I think it's important to be here and publicly talk about the war and what's going right and what's going wrong.

GRAHAM:

But let's do Insurgency 101.

The political situation in Iraq, Mr. Secretary, I think, has dramatically improved. We've got a government constituted, made up of all three groups. People voted in high numbers. It's something we should be proud of.

I was with Senator Chambliss and Cantwell and Biden on December the 15th, the national voting day. It was something to behold.

So I'd like to put on the record that the Iraqi people are very brave. They went to vote that day with people shooting at them. And they voted in large numbers than our primary in South Carolina.

So the Iraqi people really have sacrificed a lot to get to where they're at now. And I'd like to see them get this process completed on their terms, not the terrorists' terms.

But when it comes to the Sunni insurgents, how many do we believe there are and who is their leader?

ABIZAIID:

I think the number of Sunni insurgents is consistent with the intelligence estimates of at the bottom side around 10,000, up to about 20,000. And there is no distinct group that's in charge of it.

GRAHAM:

What is their goal?

ABIZAIID:

Their goal is to -- it all depends on which group it is, from within the Sunni insurgency.

If it's the former Baathists, it's to come back to power. If it's Al Qaida, it's to establish chaos so that they can achieve a safe haven in the region.

And then there are other various groups within the Sunni community that keep violence on the table because they feel that it is the only thing that they have to negotiate with against the other communities' advantages that they see that have grown at their own expense.

GRAHAM:

On the Shia side, what is the goal of the Shia insurgency? And how many do we think there are?

ABIZAIID:

Well, Senator, I think it's not quite what I would call a Shia insurgency.

GRAHAM:

What would you call it?

ABIZAID:

I think there are Shia extremist groups that are trying to ensure that the Iraqi government, as voted, fails and that they become ascendant. And you see this within parts of the Jaish al-Mahdi under Muqtada al-Sadr.

GRAHAM:

How many people are in that camp?

ABIZAID:

I think that those numbers are difficult to quantify because there are parts that are in various militia groups and there are other parts that are actively working against the government. But I think the number is in the low thousands.

GRAHAM:

OK. Al Qaida: After Zarqawi's death, how would you rate their capability and their make-up in terms of numbers?

ABIZAID:

Al Qaida is significantly depleted. I *think* their numbers are less than a thousand. I think they are a tenacious and cellular group that needs continued work, but we're making good progress against them and will continue to make good progress against them.

GRAHAM:

The reason I bring this question up is when you add up all the numbers, we're talking maybe less than 30,000 people, 40,000 people? The question for our country and the world at large is how can we let 40,000 people in a nation of how many million in Iraq...

PACE:

Twenty-five, 26 million.

GRAHAM:

Twenty-five million. Well, why can't 200,000 **armed** people, **working** together, contain 30,000 or 40,000?

RUMSFELD:

Well, a couple of comments.

One, it's a country the size of California, I suppose. And it is a heck of a lot easier to go around killing innocent men, women and children and hiding, without uniforms, and not in any organized military activity which another military could go address.

GRAHAM:

And that goes to the point. It seems to me that if the 25 million were united against the 40,000, that they wouldn't put up with this. So it seems to me that the country is not united, because if you have 25 million people, minus 40,000 that were on one side of the ledger, versus the 40,000, this thing would come to an end over night.

There's something more going on in Iraq at a deeper level from a common-sense perspective for this violence to be sustained so long and grow, not lessen. What do you think that something is?

PACE:

Sir, I think you're fundamentally correct that if the Iraqi people **as** a whole, decided today that, in my words now, they love their children more than they hate their neighbor, that this could come to a quick conclusion.

Many, about 4,500 to 5,000 per month, are currently feeding tips to their government and to our **armed** forces about potential aggressive movements.

PACE

We need the Iraqi people to **seize this moment**. We provided **security for them**. Their armed forces are providing security for them and their **armed forces are dying for them**. They need to **decide that this is their moment**.

GRAHAM:

Well said.

And the question for the American people, I think, **as we go forward**: Will they ever **seize this moment** any time soon? And I would like each of you to give me an evaluation as to whether or not the 25 million, less 40,000, will **seize this moment** any time soon.

And what is the **general view of the average Iraqi on the street about our military presence and the role that we're playing in their future**? Are they **more or less supportive of us being there now than they were a year ago**?

And I would **stop there**.

PACE:

**Sir**, I think they will **seize the moment**.

I do not know how soon that will be. I think the Iraqi people need to **get to the point where the amount of pain they're inflicting on each other goes beyond their ability to endure**.

And I don't have, based on my **upbringing and understanding of how much they can endure or how their society accepts that kind of violence**. But, clearly, there's a point in time where the amount of violence that they're **inflicting on each other is going to reach the point where they are fed up with it and they stand up to be counted**.

I cannot tell you when that moment is. But I do know that Prime Minister Maliki and his team and his cabinet and those who have been elected as part of their **parliament are the leaders of that nation and are standing up to this challenge and are working with their people to get to that day**.

GRAHAM:

And has the Iraqi public turned against us or are they still with us?

PACE:

I think they would like us to leave, but not before it's time. I think that they **are** still with us, but they would like, **as** we would like, to have foreign troops off their soil.

GRAHAM:

Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD:

It's an interesting question.

I think back over the several years and the situation **has** evolved, unquestionably.

The Kurds were and remain very supportive of our presence, concerned that we would leave.

The Shia, in many instances, were pleased with the opportunity to **assert** their majority over the country that was provided by **our** presence.

The Sunni, clearly, were powerfully against our presence.

RUMSFELD:

More recently, the Sunnis see the role of the Shia, they see influence of Iran, and they are less powerfully against our presence.

The Kurds remain where they **are** and the Shia, if one talks to the elected leader of the country, who represents the Shia coalition, it is very clear in his mind that it would be very harmful to him and to his administration and to the country were we to leave precipitously.

So it is something that **has** evolved.

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I certainly agree with the way General Pace character-  
ized it. We took a society like this and we turned it like this, and now it's moving  
in this direction. And there's a tremendous amount of friction associated with those  
movements. It's a society that must either move toward equilibrium or toward break-up.

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GRAHAM:

What do you think will happen?

ABIZAID:

I think it will move toward equilibrium.

GRAHAM:

How long?

ABIZAID:

I think it will move toward this equilibrium in the next five years. I  
mean that we need to keep our force levels where they are, but I am confident that  
the Iraqi security forces, with good governance, coupled together, will bring the  
country toward equilibrium because the alternative is so stark.

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They've had the experience of Lebanon. All you gotta do is go ask  
Lebanese how long a civil war will last, and you'll know that you must  
move toward equilibrium.

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GRAHAM:

Thank you all.

WARNER

*Thank* you very much.

Senator Bill Nelson?

BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

General Abizaid, the special inspector general in Iraq, in a report last month, stated that corruption is costing is **\$4** billion per year.

**BILL NELSON:**

The U.S. controller, David Walker, testified that 10 percent of Iraq's refined fuels and 30 percent of its imported fuels were being stolen.

Can you explain, in your strategy, how it is tailored to prevent the corruption and theft of the investments and the Iraqis' own resources, as we get into the reconstruction?

**ABIZAID:**

Senator, clearly, corruption is endemic in this part of the world. It was very heavily part of Saddam's society. It continues to be part of the current Iraqi society.

But I believe that there are many forces within Iraq that recognize the problem, that the good governance that will emerge from representative government and accountability will, over time, move this is a positive direction.

I *think* that corruption in *this* part of the world is one the great corrosive influences that causes extremism flourish. And in order to be successful against the extremists, governments must be held more and more accountable. And I believe this Iraqi government will be held accountable by their people, over time.

**RUMSFELD**

I would add one other *thing*, Senator Nelson, if I might.

One of the real problems, in my view, has been the fact that, historically, the Iraqis have been paying a very small fraction for their fuel, of what the market price is.

So, as we all know -- it ought not to be a surprise.

RUMSFELD:

If you **can** buy it at that price, you can immediately take it across **the border and** sell it for a higher price. And that has been a problem because **the government is** now in the process of raising the price towards a market price; **has not gotten** there, but is in that direction. But, in the meantime, it's very **damaging and it does** lead to corruption.

BILL NELSON:

That same inspector general's report stated that the deteriorating security situation has had a particularly deleterious effect on the establishment of our U.S. provisional reconstruction teams, the PRTs, **only five of which have begun** operations in Iraq.

And they went on to tell how the concept, the PRT concept, had **worked well in** Afghanistan. And it was thought to be a key component **in the Iraq reconstruction** strategy.

So, General Abizaid, in your discussions with the Iraqi **government and our** State Department, what is your thinking **in the strategy to implement the PRT in** every province to aid in the transition?

ABIZAID:

Well, the PRTs are the strategic responsibility of the ambassador. **And I think** it's too soon to say that they haven't been successful.

I was in Mosul the other day and I talked to the **provincial reconstruction team** up there, and it was clear to me that they were making good **progress, that they** had good access to the Iraqi provincial leadership, and then **other parts of the** country, the vast majority of the country, by the way, which is fairly **secure and** fairly stable, the PRTs will, over time, gain more access and become **more** efficient.

Certainly in those areas around Baghdad where the sectarian **violence is** extreme, it's difficult for the PRTs to do the work. But I'm confident **that the** strategy that the ambassador has adopted to move the PRTs forward **will be** successful, especially provided that the **other agencies of the U.S. government --** USAID, State Department, et cetera -- provide their manning in those teams and give them the strength that they're capable of giving them.

BILL NELSON:

How committed do you **think** Maliki is to disbanding the militias?

ABIZAID:

Sir, I've **talked** to him personally about. General Casey talks to him almost every day about it. And he has conveyed time and time again that he's committed to it. I believe that to be the case.

BILL NELSON:

What are the prospects that people like Sadr and Hakim and Hashemi (ph) will disband their militias?

ABIZAID:

I **thii** that the prospects of the militias over time disbanding **are** good.

BILL NELSON:

What's that time frame?

ABIZAID:

I'm not sure I could say. I think the prime minister is in the middle of working with his cabinet -- he's only been there for three months -- to figure out how he's going to move towards militia disbandment. You know, in Afghanistan, it's taken us a long time to move in that direction. It's a long process, depending upon how dangerous the militia is to the state.

Those that **are** benign or that **are** working in conjunction with the state to provide some additional security don't need to be disbanded right away. Those that are sponsoring death squads need to be dealt with immediately.

BILL NELSON:

Is that the key, the disbanding of the militias, to the preventing of the **sectarian** violence that you testified to from going into all-out civil **war**?

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator Nelson, I said in my opening statement that militias are the curse of the region, and they are. Whenever non-state actors have the attributes of the state, yet bear no responsibility for their actions, it brings the region in very unpredictable directions, as you see Hezbollah moving with regard to Lebanon inside of

So it's very important that militias be controlled, but it's not something that can be achieved easily overnight. But it is something that has to be accomplished.

BILL NELSON:

Are they the biggest part of stirring up the sectarian violence that you testified about?

ABIZAID:

In my opinion, yes.

WARNER

Thank you, Senator.

BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

Colleagues on my side, Senator Chambliss had begun his questions when he had to be interrupted. I'd like now to recognize you for your full time.

Senator Chambliss?

CHAMBLISS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, to all three of you, thank you for your service and your great leadership. General Abizaid, General Pace, when you see your troops on the ground, just let them know how much we appreciate the great job they continue to do. I'm always very humbled to be in their presence.

Let me give you my quick assessment. It's more complex than the way I'm going to lay it out there. But here's what I **see** having happened in the three-plus years that we have been involved in **this** conflict.

We started out with a basic ground war, which would move very quickly toward Baghdad. Then, we began to face the nonconventional enemy out there and the IEDs and the VBIEDs became a major factor.

They're still a major factor, but the fact is that we're not seeing that type of conflict directed toward the American soldier now **as much as** we have been in the past.

CHAMBLISS:

So it's pretty obvious we've done something right, both in the original ground war, **as well as** our defense against the enemy from an IED standpoint.

And I don't think we talk about that enough. And I want you to comment on that. But now, we're in, kind of, another phase, where the violence is primarily being directed toward the Iraqi people -- a lot of intimidation, a lot of threats. *And* they aren't just idle **threats**. They're being carried out.

We're seeing gangland-style executions. We're seeing, literally, gangs of individuals, numbering from 12 to 25, coming in and, for example, going into the Olympic committee meeting and taking hostages. It's **an** entirely different type of reaction.

And when Senator Levin said that Mr. Talabani said that this is their last quiver -- I'm not sure whether it's their last quiver or not, but it's pretty obvious that we've done some things right. And we forced them to change their tactics.

Now, obviously, we can't talk in an open hearing about what we **are** doing relative to **this** new type of tactic. But can you comment on that **type** of assessment?

And can you talk about some of the things that we have done right relative to the IEDs?

And what are we doing relative to this new type of offensive that's coming from the insurgents?

ABIZAID:

Senator, I think it's very clear to us that, if you look at the recent experience that the Israelis are having as they operate in Lebanon and you look at how other armed forces -- say Pakistani armed forces -- operate in their northern territories, that asymmetric warfare is here and with this.

And it's the warfare of the 21st century, where the enemy seeks to attack the weaknesses of their opponent, and where they will attempt to win media victories as opposed to military victories.

It should go without saying that, in five years of war, we have never lost a major engagement to the enemy anywhere in the region, yet there is considerable loss of confidence because the enemy is so agile and capable in purveying the notion that the situation is not winnable.

Certainly, the IED fight has been a difficult fight. And it is a fight that we see not only in Iraq, but we see it in Afghanistan and Pakistan. You see it in southern Lebanon. You see it in other places, such as in Egypt, where they're using IEDs, occasionally, there, as well.

Their tactics, techniques, and procedures are shared. We're learning a lot about it. We've gotten pretty good about it. And, I think, in the closed session, we could talk to you about some of the great successes we've had.

With regard to other situations with tactics, techniques, and procedures that the enemy have applied across the battle space, I think we'll continue to adjust. And again, I'm very, very confident that our forces are not only capable but very, very effective against what the enemy has put against us.

CHAMBLISS:

Senator Graham was talking about the fact that it's difficult for the American people to understand why 40,000 military insurgents can't be controlled by 127,000, or whatever, Mr. Secretary, you said we had over there now, plus the Iraqi army.

Well, I think the numbers in Lebanon, of Hezbollah insurgents, is probably very insignificant, particularly when compared to the force, as long as they're moving and hostile and agile, as you referred to them, General Abizaid.

It's pretty obvious that that does present significant problems.

CHAMBLISS:

Lastly, let me just say that Senator Graham referred to our trip over there in December. We met with eight members of the Iraqi election commission, all of whom happened to be Sunnis. And every one of them made the comment -- unsolicited on our part -- about the presence of the American soldier.

And the comment was: Do we want to see the American soldier leave? And if you ask the Iraqi people that today, they'd say: Sure. But if you ask, "Do you want the American soldier to leave today?", the answer is overwhelmingly no.

And I think that's borne out in a newspaper story today where there's a number of quotes here in the Washington Times from Iraqi citizens with regard to the troops, General Abizaid, that you put into Baghdad to run the militia out of the various neighborhoods.

And the fact now that these Iraqi citizens are quoted as saying that for the first time in months that they are able to come out of their homes now, to reopen their shops and for commerce to once again be present within the city of Baghdad speaks volumes about the American soldier. And there's nothing but compliments about the job that the American soldiers are doing.

And it still goes back to the fact that they do want us to leave. But they don't want us to leave until the job is done.

So I hope that the Iraqi leadership is right by the end of the year, that they are able to take over control of the entire country. But in the meantime, it's pretty obvious that our troops are doing the right things over there today under your leadership.

So with that, thank you and appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman?

WARNER

Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Bayh?

BAYH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today.

General Abizaid, I would be interested in your opinion. Some observers have commented that there remain unresolved political questions for the Iraqis involving their constitution-- division of oil revenues, that sort of thing -- and that this is in significant part fueling the insurgencies and the continuing conflict.

BAYH:

I'd be interested in your opinion about whether you think that's true and, if so, what you think we can do to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to resolve their remaining political disputes.

ABIZAID:

Senator, as General Casey has said to me on numerous occasions, this conflict has gone from essentially insurgency to a discussion within the internal Iraqi groupings about the distribution of power, resources and future control.

And you can approach it one or two ways. One way is by violence; the other way is by compromise.

It's my opinion that the forces of compromise will eventually understand that violence gets them nothing, and that the compromise is absolutely essential; just like we had to determine that in our own constitutional mechanisms after our own independence.

And so do I think that they can compromise? I think there'll be a period of violence. I think that people are looking at very severe violence in Baghdad now that can be brought under control; and that the constitutional discussion they know has to be one of compromise, national reconciliation and sharing of resources.

If you look at their neighborhood, I think they have all come to the conclusion that an Iraq that is not united and independent will be one that will be dominated by unfriendly neighbors in a way that will be very bad for the Iraqi people.

And I believe they're determined to hold the country together, to stabilize the country, to compromise their way through it. But I think it'll be a violent period and one that will ultimately lead to stability.

BAYH:

So your opinion is that these unresolved political disputes are contributing in a material way to the ongoing...

ABIZAID:

Certainly. They do contribute. But I believe that this is part of the resolution process.

BAYH:

Well, perhaps I can ask both you and the secretary if he thinks it's appropriate. Maybe this is going on behind the scenes, but what is keeping them from getting on with this business of revisiting the constitutional disputes that basically were put off until after the last election?

That would be number one.

And number two -- Mr. Secretary, perhaps this is appropriate for you -- some other commentators have opined that perhaps something similar to what happened in Dayton to help resolve the Balkans conflict would be appropriate to try and bring this to some political closure so that we *can* deal with this and move on about that.

RUMSFELD:

Senator, it's a fair question -- what's keeping them. They've gone from an election in January of last year to the drafting of a constitution to a referendum on the constitution in October of last year to an election December 15th of last year, electing these people under the new constitution, to a relatively long period of some months -- longer than have with an election in early November and then finally getting our Cabinet put in place sometime in February or March here -- they're doing it for the first time.

And it's a permanent government, and the issues are tough.

And some of them were reasonably intractable. For example, we urged them to not put sectarian, unskillful ministers in Defense and Ministry of Interior. And the prime minister designate fought it and fought it and fought it, received a lot of pressure from people to put political people in there in a way that didn't have the confidence and might have been sectarian.

And he prevailed. He ended up getting people that he accepted as being nonsectarian and competent. Time will tell. But it showed a lot of courage, but it took time.

The issues you raised about the constitution were set aside. They kicked the can down the road just like we did. I mean, we still didn't have women voting or we still had slavery with our original constitution.

RUMSFELD:

So it's not as though -- cause those things come out perfectly formed in the first five minutes. It takes some time. And they're going to have to work on them.

The Dayton process idea, I don't know the answer. All I know is that Zal, our ambassador, Khalilzad, is, in fact, trying to serve, along with the British officials, a facilitating role in encouraging things to move faster because time hurts. People have been killed while that time is being taken. And there is no question about that.

But my impression is that our ambassador is doing a very skillful job, with the assistance of coalition countries, and General Casey is, trying to facilitate the different groups working out some dam tough issues.

BAYH:

It's understandable why they wouldn't get all these things resolved in the first effort and some were postponed, but if -- I think we all agree that this is fueling the insurgency.

I guess what we're looking for, Mr. Secretary, we have a greater sense of urgency and perhaps something of a higher-profile nature like a Dayton-like process would assist the ambassador with his efforts to really focus the minds of the participants, as well as the world, "Now look, we need to get this done, and the sooner the better, because some of the trend lines here, frankly, are not positive."

RUMSFELD:

Well, certainly the president and the secretary of state and the U.S. ambassador, chief of mission, who worry ~~through~~ those issues are aware of that possibility. And I'm sure they're considering it.

BAYH:

General, back to you for one moment.

You mentioned that -- and several others have mentioned that -- we can argue about the semantics and what constitutes a civil war, but that it is a real possibility if things don't go as we hope. If it does come to that, which side are we on?

ABIZAID:

I don't think it's a civil war because the institutions of the center ~~are~~ holding. And I believe that before we start talking about what we're going to do if there is civil war, that we do everything in our power to prevent it from moving that way.

I don't believe that Iraq will move toward civil war ~~as~~ long as we apply the necessary military, diplomatic and political actions necessary to bring the Baghdad situation under control in the short term.

PACE

Senator, if I may, both General Abizaid and I have been asked if it was possible that this could lead to civil war. And the answer is, "Yes, it is possible."

Speaking for myself, I do not believe it is probable. And I do not believe it is probable for the exact same reason that General Abizaid just stipulated, which is that the government is holding, the army is holding solid and is loyal, when they had the Golden Mosque bombing, it was the Iraqi army that went into the streets and helped keep calm. So I don't expect this to dissolve into civil war.

BAYH:

Well, we all hope that's right, General. But if it takes a course that is not ~~as~~ optimistic ~~as~~ we would all like to see here, and it does come to civil -- the reason for my question is essentially, if it does come to that, then what is our role in the country?

Many people would say we would not have a -- that's why I asked side would be on? We'd be put in a very difficult situation where we want to take sides, but the Iraqis themselves would have chosen up s that point, the mission would become much different.

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Mr. Secretary, my last question, back to you again. *On* the Dayton

WARNER

Just a minute, Senator, I *think* you have posed a question in your p comments. Is it? Or do you wish to go to your last question?

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BAYH:

My last question, assuming L..

(CROSSTALK)

BAYH:

I have a couple blue cards here; I hope I haven't ...

WARNER

No, but I want to make sure the panel had adequate opportunity to

swer.

BAYH:

Well, let me pose it **as** a question, then.

If it does come to that, do we have a continuing mission in Iraq? If themselves have not been able to hold the center, and they have chos along sectarian lines, at that point, do we have a continuing mission) not?

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WARNER

And that will be your last question? But let's get the panel.

It's directed to whom? All three or the...

RUMSFELD:

**I'm** reluctant to speculate about that. It could lead to a discussion that suggests that we presume that's going to happen, And both General Abizaid and General Pace have offered their comments on that.

**Our** role is to support the government. The government is holding together. The armed forces **are** holding together. And we are functioning in a very close relationship with that government in providing them assistance in achieving their goals.

We've seen what happens when governments pull apart, militaries pull apart. We saw it in Lebanon, and it's not a pretty picture.

And obviously, that would be a set of decisions that the president and the Congress and the country would address. But I think that beyond that, it would be not my place to be discussing it.

WARNER:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I think that disposes of the question, unless either of the other witnesses want to add any views.

If not, Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One discussion that we've had here, and had some votes -- I think the last vote we had was on a question of whether we should set a **firm** date for pulling out regardless of the situation in Iraq. It was voted down to 83 to **16** or something to that effect.

SESSIONS:

Senator Warner made the reference, General Abizaid, to the fact that the emotional reactions to the Lebanon situation could make the situation more

difficult, perhaps, for our soldiers in Iraq. I'd like to ask a little bit different question.

It would be: What kind of reaction, what kind of impact would there be with regard to the Islamic extremists in the Middle East -- and you're a student of that region, you've spent time in that region as a young person, you speak Arabic and you've been with us conducting this Iraq war from the beginning -- what kind of impact would result if we were to precipitously withdraw?

Would mollify the extremists? Would it make them say, "Well, the United States is a nicer place and we don't have to be so aggressive now"? Or would they likely be emboldened and empowered and more aggressive?

ABIZAID:

Embaldened, empowered and more aggressive.

SESSIONS:

And, in your opinion, would a failure in Iraq embolden and empower these radical extremists?

ABIZAID:

Yes, it would.

SESSIONS:

And, in your opinion, would setting a fixed date, regardless of the situation, in Iraq for a withdrawal embolden or empower the extremist forces?

ABIZAID:

Embalden.

SESSIONS:

General Pace, this is a matter we've discussed. Fortunately, it's had very little support in the Senate. But there's a political election coming up, and people float this idea that we should just pull out.

You've heard General Abizaid's comments. He's been in the region for years and been leading this effort. Would you agree with his comments?

PACE:

Sir, I agree with each of General Abizaid's responses to each of your questions.

SESSIONS:

And as Senator Warner has said for some time, we have asked much of our nation. We have asked much of our soldiers. They have gone willingly with the most -- almost without any single objection, they've gone and served in harm's way to carry out a policy that this Senate and this Congress has voted for, the American people ratified with the re-election of President Bush. It was an issue in that election.

And don't you think we owe it to them to continue to work in every way possible to make the sacrifice of those who've gone before be successful, General Pace?

PACE:

Sir, I was in Afghanistan last Thursday and Friday. Our troops are so proud of what they are doing. We do owe them and their families the continued support of this nation and especially those who have sacrificed their lives that we might live free.

SESSIONS:

Well, I just hope that we put an end in this political season to any suggestion that we may just precipitously withdraw without regard to the circumstances there.

ABIZAID:

Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS:

General Abizaid?

**ABIZAID:**

Sir, what I'd like to say is **the** troops that serve in the region **are not afraid** of what's happening there. They would be afraid of what would happen if **precipitously** left there.

**SESSIONS:**

I have heard that repeatedly. On the anniversary of the Army, I was Army to celebrate that day recently, and this young guy told me, "Sen want to win. We want to be successful."

General Pace, you made reference to **the re-enlistment rate**. I'm told enlistment rates of National Guard units that deploy to Afghanistan or return exceed that of units who haven't gone.

Do you think that bespeaks of the **military's belief** that they're doing that's worthwhile and meaningful?

**PACE:**

Sir, I think it does. **I thi** that our troops know what they're doing. They're proud of what they're doing.

And as General said, the main question they ask is, "Do the American support what we're doing?" And when we point to the numerous ways the American people support it, including what this Congress does to resources, it reinforces with them the **goodness** of what they've dedicated lives to do.

**SESSIONS:**

Well, we have people say, "Well, we're spending too much **on this** then they come forward and say, "Well, you didn't spend enough. You enough equipment."

Let's talk about that a little bit, General Pace. I'm familiar with **just** Anniston Army Depot. I know that they're vigorously and aggressively people to **reset the equipment**.

SESSIONS:

I was also aware that we didn't have enough money, apparently, in this budget to meet high challenges that we were facing with the reset.

The Defense Department blessed the Army's concern in that. It was made known to the Congress. We just added another \$13 billion in another amendment by Senator Dodd that would allow another \$6 billion and allow another \$6 billion to meet that challenge.

First, I will ask you -- let me just ask you: Do you **think** we **are** going to, with those **funds**, be able to meet that reset problem?

PACE:

**Sir**, the money that was just -- the \$13.1 billion will meet the current Marine Corps and Navy -- I'm sorry -- Marine Corps and Army backlogs at the depots. It will allow for hiring of the additional shifts of skilled workers to get the job done.

And that is why I mentioned before that as best that Congress can provide a no-year funding stream that the depots can depend on so they can go out and hire workers who know they will have a job for the foreseeable **future**, we can start working off this backlog, sir.

SESSIONS:

I think you're exactly right. And I'm glad we've taken steps on that. And if we need to do more, I believe **this** Congress will meet your demand.

One more thing. With regard to readiness, I was in **an** Army Reserve unit, and they raised us whether we were ready or not in the '70s and '80s. And if you don't have all your vehicles, you're not rated ready. **And** when a unit comes off any major deployment, particularly coming off a combat deployment, isn't it inevitable -- I think you indicated -- that you will not be rated ready?

SESSIONS:

And one of the complicating factors for an effort like we're undergoing in Iraq, it seems to me, is units take their equipment with them, and it's cheaper and smarter to leave that equipment over there for the next unit that replaces them.

Therefore, when they get back, they may not have the full complement of equipment they need to be rated in your strict standards of readiness ready.

PACE:

Sir, you're exactly right. And the reset money has been in the supplements. The money for the Reserve and Guard to build the 28 fully manned, trained, equipped brigades that the Army has stipulated they need is in the baseline budget to the tune of \$21 billion over the next five years.

SESSIONS:

Well, General Pace, you've been at this quite a number of years.

Would you say that we are moving to have the best equipped, most ready military the world has ever seen at least this Army, in peacetime, before this war started?

And as we go forward, aren't we better equipped and moving to a way to have our Guard and Reserve have the kind of equipment they've never had before?

PACE:

Sir, we are today the best equipped, manned, trained, battle-hardened that we've ever been. And, with your continued support in the Congress, we'll be able to maintain the equipment and replace the combat equipment that's been lost.

It takes of upwards of 36 months from the time you lose a helicopter in combat till the time the replacement helicopter comes on line. That does not mean that people are not trying to do the right thing or that the system isn't working; it just takes that amount of time for that kind of equipment to be identified as lost, put into the budget process, funded, contracted and built.

SESSIONS:

*Thank* you very much.

RUMSFELD:

It argues, Senator Sessions, for the possibility of the Congress looking at the idea of a reset fund.

That is to say, if you want to shorten that period of time, the time it takes for the analysis as to what's been lost or degraded, the time the Congress takes to consider it and weigh it, the time it takes to place the orders and have the contract validated, and then the time it takes to produce it, which is, as General Pace said, it can be up to three years -- if you had a reset fund that the Congress approved and it ~~was~~ only for those purposes, the funds could then be drawn down in a much shorter period of time. Depots could plan their hiring earlier. And you would have the ability to shorten that.

And I don't know, I guess I haven't talked to the ~~Office~~ of Management and Budget about this, but inside the Department of Defense we've been talking that there ~~has~~ to be a way to shorten that time period.

And one of the ways would be for Congress to act more rapidly on budgets than happens each year. Another way would be for the Congress to approve a reset. And another way would be for us in the department to find a way to try to cut in half the period of time it takes to actually let a contract and go through that whole procedure.

RUMSFELD:

And if the three of us did those things, it's conceivable we could abbreviate that period and solve some of the problem General Pace is talking about.

SESSIONS:

General Pace, ~~just~~ briefly, the idea that was stated earlier about a number of our brigades not being ready, in your opinion, does that misrepresent the status of our capability at this time? Would it cause someone to have a higher degree of concern than is warranted?

I know we want to do better. We want every unit to be ready. But isn't it inevitable that as units transition off combat that there will be a period when they don't meet your high standards of readiness?

PACE:

Sir, there will be a period like that. *Our* readiness reporting system ~~has~~ been accurately reported to the Congress as is required every quarter. We've been talking about the need to repair equipment now for about the last year to 18 months.

So it's not wrong to say that we have equipment deficiencies and that we need to spend the money to do that. That's an accurate use of the data that's available.

But if you say to me, would I rather have 100 percent of the 2,000 1-armored Humvees that I thought I needed in 2001 or 50 of the 12,000 up-armored Humvees that I say I need today and which army is better, I would tell you that though my reporting system would tell you I'm now at 50 percent and therefore I, that the army I have built is three times better with regard to Humvees. And you can multiply that toward the hundreds of thousands of end items.

And that's why it's really a kaleidoscope. And to try to have a discussion that just lays out exactly precisely what the readiness ratings are lends itself to misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

SESSIONS:

Well said.

Thank you.

WARNER

Thank you, Senator.

Senator Collins?

COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RUMSFELD:

Could I say...

WARNER

Oh, yes...

RUMSFELD

I'm **sorry**. I apologize

WARNER

No, that's all right. We...

RUMSFELD:

I think it is important that we be careful how we describe the capabilities and the readiness of the **U.S.** armed forces. We have multiple audiences and Iran listens and North Korea listens and other countries listen. And it's important to be precise, it's important to be accurate, and it's important to not leave an impression that might entice someone into doing something that would be a **mistake** on their part, because we have an enormously capable armed force.

WARNER:

Mr. Secretary, I associate myself with your remarks. **You** are absolutely right.

Unfortunately, some of the remarks have come from your department from very high-ranking officials in connection with this budget process. So we're trying to do our very best with that.

Senator Collins?

COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, Senator Sessions has done an excellent job of pointing out the pitfalls of an abrupt withdrawal on a set timeline from Iraq.

COLLINS:

But I want to talk to you about my concerns about what our exit strategy does seem to be. It is premised on the ability of Iraqi troops to assume full responsibility for the security of their country.

Over and over again, we've heard the phrase that, **as** Iraqi forces stand up, our troops will stand down. We've heard that time and again.

Our troops **are** the best equipped, the best trained, the best led in **the world**. And I am enormously proud of them. And I have the utmost confidence in **their ability** to handle any mission.

~~Yet~~ sectarian violence is worse than ever, in Baghdad, in particular. And I wonder about the validity of a strategy that says that less capable **troops that are not as** well equipped, trained, and led as the best trained in the world can handle the security of **this** country.

If the upswing in violence **has** occurred despite the presence of the best troops in the world, it doesn't give me a lot of confidence in our **underlying strategy**. And it suggests to me that what we need is a political rather than a **military solution**.

ABIZAID:

**Thanks**, Senator Collins. I believe you have to have a combination of political action and military action that moves toward a lessening of the **sectarian tensions**.

But I would try to make people that are listening to this **understand that there's** no better troops to deal with the sectarian problem than **well-led Iraqi troops that** are loyal to the government.

ABIZAID:

**They** don't want their nation to fall apart. They have a much better **intrinsic** view of what's happening. **They** have instincts about what goes on within their own culture that, **as** well trained and **as** well equipped as we might be, **we don't** have.

And so I would never sell the Iraqi armed forces short on their **ability to make a** difference. But the Iraqi armed forces **must** be well led by their **military leaders**. The military leaders must be well connected with the political leadership, and they must share a common vision of where Iraq is headed.

Again, I emphasize that Prime Minister Maliki and his **current government's** only three months old. I believe they very much share a **vision of a unified Iraq** where the armed forces will **impose** its will upon the **people of Iraq and defeat the** insurgency and the groups that are sponsoring **sectarian violence, especially the** terrorists.

I think that what General Casey has **embarked upon, which is a very artful form** of **trying** to gauge the capabilities of the **Iraqi armed forces and at the same time** bring down our forces so that the **Iraqis will do more to defend their own turf, is**

one of the most difficult strategies that any wartime commander **has** ever had to execute. And I think he is doing it enormously well.

And there will come times in the campaign, such **as** the current period, where the sectarian violence is showing us a level of concern which means that we've got to take time to apply the military pressure necessary and that Zal Khalilzad will help apply the political pressure necessary to get it back on the right path.

Again, don't want to be mischaracterized by what I've said here today. I'm very confident that that can be done.

**COLLINS:**

The prime minister, one of his very first initiatives, **was** a new national security plan. I realize it's only **been** three months since he's been in office, but that plan does not seem to have been effective in quelling the upsurge in sectarian violence.

**COLLINS:**

Do you think that it's too soon to judge that plan, or has it failed?

**ABIZAD:**

Senator, it's a great question. I don't **think** that the plan **has** failed. I **think** what you're seeing is an adjustment to a plan that wasn't working with the speed that we had hoped.

And **so** General Casey and his commanders are adjusting the plan. And they **are** doing it in conjunction with the Iraqi commanders. And, of course, the enemy is attempting to really make the sectarian divide become the decisive point **at** a point in time where the Iraqi government hasn't quite gotten itself together yet.

And I'm very confident that, over time, you'll see the Iraqi forces, in conjunction with our forces, primarily with Iraqis at the lead, will bring the sectarian problems under control.

And you know, Senator, nothing in the Middle East moves in a straight line. Things get worse; they get better. The question is whether or not the trend line is a trend line that can lead to success.

And my belief is, so far, the answer is yes. And it will continue that way.

COLLINS:

Thank you.

WARNER:

Go ahead, Senator. Go ahead.

COLLINS:

Mr. Secretary, yesterday, I chaired a hearing at which the special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction testified.

He described massive cost over-runs, schedule delays, half-completed projects for which the money had run out. It was not a pretty picture. It seems that everything in Iraq is costing more than was anticipated, by a considerable amount.

COLLINS:

And, as many of us have discussed, earlier this week the Senate added \$13.1 billion in emergency spending to replace the worn-out equipment that we've discussed this morning. The chairman mentioned that we've spent some \$437 billion, I believe, over the last three years. I think the current spending rate is \$2 billion a week.

There has been an enormous cost to this war and an enormous impact on the federal budget.

Looking ahead to next year, what are your projections for the spending on the war?

RUMSFELD:

The Iraqi reconstruction is something that the Department of State works on and requests funds for. And you're quite right, there have been a number of inspector general reports about open investigations into fraud and corruption and the like. And there also are a number of projects that, because of security problems, have cost a great deal more than had been anticipated.

And, as we know, a number of them are instances where the insurgents have actually gone in and blown up something that had been halfway built. And we've seen that happen.

I don't have a number that I can give you. I know the Office of Management and Budget **can. Bt...**

COLLINS:

I'm not talking about the reconstruction projects which, I realize, **are** under the State Department largely, and USAID. I'm saying, for the Defense Department, **as** you look ahead to the next year -- as you know, many of us believe that the spending for the war needs to be part of the regular budget and not just dealt with in emergency supplementals.

So I'm asking you to look ahead because we, **as** a Congress, need to budget more accurately for the cost of the war. And we can **only** do that based on your projections.

RUMSFELD:

I understand.

We do not know yet what we will get for this year's budget. And we do not know what the supplemental will be.

We do know that we're in the process of preparing the budget for next fiscal year, and that that will be presented by the president in February.

But I can **try** to get back to you for the record to give you something that the Comptroller's Office in the Pentagon would take out **as** a discrete piece for the Department of Defense's portion, if that would be helpful.

COLLINS:

That would be. I'm just trying to get a sense, Mr. Chairman, of whether we can expect indefinitely approximately \$2 billion a week from our budget to be spent on this war.

WARNER

Well, Senator, that's a question that's constantly in the minds of the people. And it's an important one. And, as you well point out, the success ability to bring about a democracy in this country requires a certain amount of infrastructure rebuilding. And that has to be done at a constant level at some progress.

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But, as the secretary said, we take two steps forward and all of a sudden we look around and have to take a step backward because of the internal

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ruption.

I'd like to...

**COLLINS:**

Thank you.

**WARNER**

Thank you, Senator.

I'd like to, before calling on Senator Talent and then the senator from Rhode Island has an opportunity to speak, but our panel of witnesses must appear before the whole Senate at 2:00 o'clock sharp. And, consequently, within the period of roughly 1:00 o'clock and 2:00 o'clock, they have other obligations to perform.

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**WARNER**

So it is my hope to conclude this session here in a matter of 10 minutes or so.

es or so.

Senator Talent, your time is now recognized.

**TALENT:**

Thank you, Mr. chairman.

I want to thank all three of you for your service. I was going to say

**PACE:**

He'll be right back, sir.

TALENT:

In absentia, General Abizaid, in particular, for being in that crucible...

WARNER:

He go a telephone call and...

TALENT:

I understand entirely. And I'll direct my questions at the secretary anyway.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with an awful lot of what you said in your opening statement. And I think it's important to remind people about what this is about.

I agree this is an existential struggle, and that's how they view it -- a struggle for existence. I agree that there are no conceivable accommodation with them that would cause them to stop attacking us. We do not have the choice of them not attacking us. They're going to attack us. We, therefore, have to fight the war.

I also agree that the war in Iraq, the mission in Iraq was a good strategic option and maybe the only strategic option. I've always said that mission was to remove Saddam, who was an organic threat, and replace him with a multiethnic democracy that would be an ally in the war on terror. I also believe that we are making progress toward that end.

And, you know, if we're talking about whether the circumstances are such that we can withdraw, we're talking about whether the mission's been completed.

I mean, I think we need to understand that as long as the terrorists are prepared to concentrate to the extent they are in Iraq, we can't guarantee that it's going to be a pacified country. But we're getting closer to the point where the Iraqi government can sustain itself with less American help.

And so I do think there's been progress, and I'm pleased about all that.

What I want to ask you about, Mr. Secretary, is this: Given that we are involved in this war and in this existential struggle, how can we be in a situation where we are allowing the budgets that you think you need to be reduced by the Office of Management and Budget year after year?

And I refer to the budget reduction in the fall of '04 -- \$30 billion over the FYDP; in the fall of '05, \$32 billion over the FYDP; April of this year, indications there'll be another 2 percent cut.

I'm concerned that we may see a cut in the fall of this year. And these cuts are coming from the Office of Management and Budget.

TALENT:

Now, we're in an existential struggle. I just don't think -- you've referred appropriately, I think, that we have to be concerned about the message we're sending. And I'm concerned that these budget cuts, coming from people who are not warfighters, are sending the message that we're weakening, that we're not prepared to bear the cost of this.

Before you answer, I'll just make one other point, with reference to something Senator Collins said.

Yes, this is a difficult struggle. We've spent over \$400 billion in three years. Our gross domestic product in that period of time has been \$36 trillion. So we're spending about -- what -- 1.2 percent of our gross domestic product on this?

Given the importance of this struggle to the country, we're fighting, it seems to me, at a cost that this economy can afford. We are so strong. And I think sometimes that we forget that.

So if you would address that, I'd appreciate it. This is what is frustrating me. We need to give you what you think you need, not what the bean counters at OMB think you need.

RUMSFELD:

Senator, you're experienced, you know how this town works. And let me say that I agree with you that the United States of America spending 3.8 percent of gross domestic product on our entire national security is a relatively small percentage of the GDP.

When I came to Washington in the Kennedy and Eisenhower era, we were spending 10 percent of GDP. Thirty years ago, when I was secretary of defense for President Ford, we were spending, I think, 5 percent of GDP. Today we're down to 3.8 percent of GDP.

This country can afford to spend what is necessary.

You've mentioned the Office of Management and Budget. **Let** me talk about the Congress for a minute. This year, if you take the House and the Senate, the authorization and the appropriation committees, and drop a plumb line through all of it, we're looking at somewhere between \$15 billion to \$20 billion that we will not have to spend on the things we need to spend it on.

If you look at the time it takes to pass an authorization, to pass an appropriation, the delays that **are** incurred, and the gyrations that the **services** have to go through to try to cash drawer what they're doing, take money from this and spend it on that, the inefficiencies, the inability to plan ahead, the inability to get the depots to hire the people they need in advance because we don't have **this** depot -- correction: the reset fund that I mentioned might be a way to help solve this problem.

It's a combination of cuts. I guess the Senate Appropriations Committee wanted to cut something like \$9 billion this year. Then, it's the member adds, all the things that have been added on top that we, without money, simply things that we need to spend on that we don't want.

Then a series of things that we have offered to not do -- a second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, a 12th carrier that we don't believe we need because it cost too much to repair it -- and we're being forced to do those things.

RUMSFELD:

And then we came in and said we can save money doing a series of things with respect to health care and a variety of things that we were told you may not do that. The combination of all of that is big dollars. And it hurts.

TALENT:

And, Mr. Secretary, you **are** looking here at two committee members who offered and got passed an amendment raising the top line for the Defense. And that was reallocated away.

So I could not agree with you more about it. I just think -- all of who understand, who have sat on these committees or been in your chair **or** the chair of the generals there and know what we need have to find a way to insist on getting what we need.

And I would encourage you very, very **strongly** because **you** mentioned the Congress. And I'm not trying to -- I'm just saying it's harder for **those** of us here

who understand this to hold this if we're getting cuts from the **administration that** the economic and the budget people are recommending.

I mean, I don't think there is any way we can lose this war **unless "we" lose it.** And I think you're saying the same thing in general terms. **And I agree with you** completely. Let's **just** agree not to let this happen. And I **certainly will do my part.** The chairman certainly has done his **part.** And I know **Senator Reed has, as well.**

So I wanted to make that point.

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, too. And I know we **have time constraints.**

WARNER

Thank you very much.

Senator Reed, I had indicated that you would have opportunity for a **follow-up** question.

**REED:**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Pace, you are familiar with the current readiness reporting of the Army and Marine Corps, but particularly the Army?

PACE:

Yes, sir, I **am.**

**REED:**

Would you dispute the conclusion of former Secretary of Defense **Bill Perry** that two-thirds of the Army's operating force, active and **reserve,** is **now reporting as unready?**

And the conclusion of General Schoomaker in response to this **question from** Mr. Skelton, "Are you comfortable with the readiness level for **the non-deployed** units that **are** in the continental United States?" -- General **Schoomaker's reply:** No, he's not comfortable.

PACE:

I think that the readiness reporting system, **as** it is constructed **has** been accurately described, that the number of brigades in the United **States** Army whose equipment requirements have changed dramatically over the last five years **are being** accurately described.

I absolutely agree with General Schoomaker in his comments about additional funding needed to buy back combat losses, to buy back the reset.

PACE:

All those things are absolutely accurate, Senator. All I want to make **sure** we understand is that the system itself is reporting pure math. **But, as** one example again, the pure math is based on, in 2001, needing 2,000 up-armored Humvees, in 2006 needing 12,000; and, therefore, the capacity of the Army to wage war is significantly greater than it was, even though the reporting system properly utilized is highlighting places where we need to put more money.

TALENT:

Well, General, I can recall when General Abizaid and I were lieutenants together in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment -- I'll **just** speak for myself-- we took this reporting system very seriously because we understood, and I **think** you do, that soldiers and Marines, **as good as** they are, need equipment to **fight**

And we presumed that the leadership -- both uniformed and civilian -- of the Department of Defense took those reports seriously also, and that they would not require us to report on equipment which were really tangential to the needs of the unit.

In fact, we all recalled where individuals were relieved because they could not maintain adequate levels of readiness under the current reporting system at the battalion level, but it does not appear that takes the place at the **national** level, because you have a readiness crisis.

REED:

We've tried to address it with \$13 billion last Tuesday, noting that **this** document was submitted Wednesday, a day late, and \$13 billion short...

WARNER

REED:

So I think the signal that you're sending to those lieutenants, sergeants, captains is that, you know, this reporting system is either illogical and nonsensical or it's being disregarded at the highest levels, because it was not the Department of Defense that was asking for this money to the president -- forget OMB, to the president. Turned out that, I think, within the Army there was such concern about their troops that they went around you all and approached the Congress.

I think that's a sad commentary on the leadership of Department of Defense. And this might not be a question, but a comment, but I am particularly incensed with some of the suggestions that this is all just kind of some subjective evaluation we do, and the readiness reporting has no real impact in the world. And also the suggestion that if we talk about readiness, particularly when it's in a crisis like this, we're somehow giving unfair advantage to our adversaries.

But I recall in 2000, when then Governor Bush stood up and said: The president of the United States, if he called on his Department of Defense, they'd have to report two divisions not ready for duty, based upon the reporting system.

How many divisions will we have to report that way to that question today based on the reporting system, General Pace?

PACE:

First of all, sir, we're not doing divisions anymore, we're doing brigades, as you have already pointed out.

REED:

I know that.

PACE:

About **two** thirds of the brigades, **as** you have pointed out, would report C-3 or c-4.

REED:

Not ready for duty.

PACE:

I will stand by my comments first and foremost.

REED:

Thank you, General.

PACE:

Sir, may I finish?

REED:

Yes, sir.

PACE:

Thank **you**.

WARNER

Thank you very much.

PACE:

We do take, with great integrity and responsibility, the Readiness Reporting System. That is exactly why, for every quarter **as** required, we report to the Congress the exact accurate reporting for readiness.

I **am** saying that we do need more money. I am not disputing that at all, sir. We do need more money for all the reasons I have articulated.

**have, the  
trying to make sure  
how you can go from  
vehicles, and not have all 12,000  
capacity to get the job done.**

WARNER

Thank you very much, General.

PACE:

Thank you.

WARNER

May I say to my colleague from Rhode Island, General Schoomake is visiting

WARNER

I would be pleased to have you join us. I've invited Senator Levin. He's likewise going to join us. And it may well be that he will wish to put his comments in the record of these proceedings today a section relating to your questions.

**REED:**

11-L-0559/OSD/58893

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

Thank you very much.

One last question, and then we will conclude this, I **think**, an excellent hearing.

Last week, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair agreed to seek a U.N. resolution calling for the creation of a multinational force to help the Lebanese government extend control in southern Lebanon.

I strongly support those initiatives by our president. And given that that country, Lebanon, is in your area of operations, and given your long experience, first I'd like to have your assessment of: What is the capability of the Lebanese Army today, and what training and equipment would they require for the mission of their government to go out and begin to maintain control, **give the assumption that there will be a multinational force eventually put together?**

So if you could include your assessment of the size and the capability of such force that would **be needed to fulfill the commitments that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made to our respective nations and the world.**

ABIZAIID:

Senator, certainly I don't want to **let any of my comments get in the way of the diplomacy that's going on right now.** It's very important ~~that~~ the diplomats do their work.

The Lebanese armed forces is a professional **armed** force. It has one of the most educated officer corps in the Middle East. It is a small force for Middle Eastern standards, about 50,000 **or so.** And it needs significant upgrade **of** equipment and training capability that I believe the Western nations, in particular the United States, can assist with.

We recently, before the current difficulties started, visited the Lebanese **armed** forces, did an assessment of where they happen to be in readiness. We **saw that** they needed some significant spare parts. I think we've made our desires known through the department as to how **we** could help *them* immediately.

ABIZAIID:

capable of really enforcing peace and security in the region.

So whatever force goes in has to have robust rules of engagement.

WARNER

Robust rules?

ABIZAID:

and clear

WARNER

Could you further define your professional definition of "robust rules of engagement"? That was the second ~~part~~ of my question.

ABIZAID:

"Robust rules of engagement" means that the commander has the ability to effect the mandate that's been given to him by the international community to include the use of all available means at his forces' disposal.

And I think, in the case of southern Lebanon, it'll have to have capabilities that are just not minor, small arms, but would include all arms.

WARNER

Thank you.

My distinguished colleague from Minnesota indicated the hopes to have a second round. We have had some. But the intervention of two votes precludes a further second round of questions by members. But I invite you to provide for the record your question. It will be open until tomorrow close of business.

And I'd like to say in conclusion, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, General Abizaid, this has been a very thorough and constructive hearing. And I thank each of you for your participation and forthrightness in the responses.

The hearing is now recessed.

CQ Transcriptions, Aug. 3, 2006

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C

~~FOUO~~

August 04, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Redo Congressional Contacts Memo

Please redo this memo without the letterhead **and** not in memo format, but simply in bullet points, so it is usable.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/3/06 ASD LA memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF080406-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/09/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58897

OSD 12537-06



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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

August 4, 2006, 5:00 P.M.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake#SF080406-17

- You requested a redo of your Congressional Contacts for Calendar Year 2006.
- The attached bullet points have been revised to include your contacts with Members of Congress to date. (Tab A)
- **An** updated Congressional Contacts spreadsheet is included at Tab B.

Attachments:

Revised bullet points (Tab A)

Updated spreadsheet (Tab B)

Snowflake#SF080406-17 (Tab C)

OSD 12537-06



8/7/2006 8:53:28 AM

Prepared by: MGySgt Sue Ann Hines-Lahoy, Executive Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/58898

**Congressional Contacts for Calendar Year 2006 by the Secretary of Defense**

- The Senate was in session for approximately 58 days while the House was in session for 56 days during this calendar year.
- Participated in 53 events with Members of Congress.
- Met with 72 of the 148 Members assigned to leadership, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Senate and House Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
- Met personally with 139 Members of Congress, and appeared before a total of 344 Members.
- Conducted seven Ops Intel briefings; three all House and four all Senate.
- Hosted five breakfasts with a total of 26 Senators and five Representatives.
- Hosted one lunch at the Pentagon with three Senators and two Representatives, and attended one lunch on Capitol Hill with 48 Senators.
- Met with Chairman Warner thirteen times and Chairman Hunter six times.
- Testified six times:
  - ~ Twice before the Senate Armed Services Committee
  - ~ Once before the House Armed Services Committee
  - ~ Once before the Senate Appropriations Committee
  - Once before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
  - Once before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

Date	Event	Location	Members	Other DoD Attendees	Time
19-Jan	Breakfast - QDR	Pentagon	Sens: Alexander, Burns, Coleman, Domenici, Warner Reps: S. Davis, Marshall, Skelton, Tanscher	DepSec, CJCS, Cambone, Henry, Wilkie, Rangel	1 hr
25-Jan	Meeting	White House	Sens: Bayh, DeMint, Ensign, Johnson, Lincoln, Lott, Murkowski, B. Nelson, Obama		1 hr
26-Jan	Breakfast - QDR	C-6 Capitol	Sens: Allard, Coburn, Comyn, Ensign, Martinez, Ben Nelson, Sessions, Talent	mas, Henry, Schoomaker, Wilkie	¼ hr
26-Jan	Meeting - QDR	-128 Capitol	Sens: Cochran	mas, Henry, Schoomaker, Wilkie	10 mins
26-Jan	Senate Republican Conference	Library of Congress	Senators: Alexander, Allen, Bond, Bunning, Chambliss, Collins, DeMint, Dole, Ensign, Frist, Grassley, Hutchinson, Isakson, Lott, Martinez, McConnell, Roberts, Sessions, G. Smith, Thomas, Warner, Allard, Bennett, Burns, Coburn, Coleman, Comyn, DeWine, Erni, Graham, Gregg, Hatch, Inhofe, Kyl, Murkowski, Santorum, Shelby, Stevens, Talent, Voinovich	Wilkie	1 hr
31-Jan	Conservative Members Retreat - QDR	Larkspur Court Hotel, Baltimore	Reps: Aderholt, Akin, Bachus, Barrett, Bartlett, Bishop Jr., Blackburn, Boozman, Brady, H. Brown, Burgess, Campbell, Cantor, Carter, Chahot, Chocola, Cole, Conaway, Cubin, Culberson, Doolittle, Feeney, Flake, Fortuno, Foxx, Franks, Garrett, Gingrey, Hart, Gohmert, Gutknecht, Hensarling, Herger, Issa, S. Johnson, S. King, Kline, Lungren, McHenry, McKeon, McMorris, Musgrave, Neugebauer, Pearce, Pence, Pitts, T. Price, Reynolds, Royce, P. Ryan, Sodrel, Tiahrt, Turner, Wamp, D. Weldon, Wicker, Westmoreland, J. Wilson	Wilkie, Rangel, DiRita	½ hrs

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

31-Jan	State of the Union	US Capitol	Sen: Warner Rep: Jackson-Lee		1 ½ hr
-3 Feb	42nd Munich Conference - Security Policy	Germany	Sens: McCain, Lieberman, Bailey-Hitchison, Graham. Reps: Harman, Tauscher, Schwarz, M. Udall		
6-Feb	Lunch - FY 2007 Defense Budget and 2006 QDR	Pentagon	Sens: Warner, Stevens, Inouye Reps: Hunter, Skelton	epSec, Harvey, Winter, Wynne, JCS, Krieg, Jonas, Chu, Cambone, iamhastiani, Schoomaker, Mullen, foseley, Hagee, Henry, /inkerwerder, <b>Smith</b> , Wilkie, angel.DiRita	1 ¼ hr
7-Feb	Hearing - Posture Statement	S-Dirksen	SASC/Sens: Warner, Levin, McCain, Inhofe, Akaka, B. Nelson, Byrd, Talent, B. Nelson, Reed, Dole, Lieberman, Dayton, Thune, <b>Graham</b> , Cornyn, Ensign, Collins, Sessions	JCS, Schoomaker, Wilkie, Broome	30 mins
8-Feb	Meeting - IEDs	RHOB 2117A	Reps: Hunter, Skelton	JCS, Rangel, Wilkie, Gen Miags	30 mins
8-Feb	Hearing - Posture Statement	RHOB 2117	HASC/Reps: Abercrombie, Andrews, Bordallo Butterfield, Hunter, S. Davis, Franks, Hayes, W. Jones, Larsen, Marshall, McHugh, Meek, Ortiz, Saxton, Shuster, Skelton, Snyder, G. Taylor, J. Wilson, C. Weldon	JCS, Schoomaker, Wilkie	1 ¼ hr
16-Feb	Meeting - Courtesy Call	LHOB 1011	Rep: Boehmer	JCS, Wilkie	15 mins
16-Feb	Meeting - FY07 Budget, QDR	RHOB 2407	Reps: B. Young, Murtha	JCS, Wilkie	30 mins
16-Feb	Hearing - FY07 Budget	RHOB 2359	HAC-D Young, Murtha, Tiahrt, Frelinghuysen, Dicks, Hobson, Olav Saho, LaHood, Viselovsky, Granger, Moran, Kingston Kaptur, Wicker	JCS, Jonas, Schoomaker, Wilkie	1 hr
21-Feb	SecNav Swearing in Ceremony	Pentagon	Sen Warner	epSec, Winter et al	1 hr
9-Mar	Meeting	Pentagon	Sen Ted Stevens	JCS, Abizaid, Edelman, Wilkie	20 mins
9-Mar	Meeting	SD-119	Sen Ted Stevens	JCS, Wilkie	15 mins

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

9-Mar	Hearing - FY07 Budget	SD-106	SAC-Sens: Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Bennett, Brownback, Allard, Byrd, Leahy, Mikuski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Durbin	SECSTATE, CJCS, Abizaid, W
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**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

9-Mar	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	HOB 2118	Reps: <b>Akin</b> , Bartlett, Beauprez, Bilirakis, Blackburn, Boozman, Boustany Jr., Burgess, Capito, Castle, Chabot, Chocoma, Conaway, Dent, <b>L. Diaz-Balart</b> , Drake, Duncan, Feeuey, Flake, Gohmert, Hefley, N. Johnson, Jones Jr., Kline, Kuhl, R. Lewis, Lungren, Marchant, McCaul, McCrery, McKeon, Pearce, Pence, Platts, T. Price, Ramstad, M. Rogers (AL), Ros Lehtinen, Schmidt, Simmons, Steams, Thornbeny, Upton, Wamp, D. Weldon, H. Wilson, J. Wilson; Ackerman, Bishop Jr., Blumenauer, Cardoza, S. Davis, Dicks, Etheridge, Herseth, Kind, Langevin, Levin, Lofgren, Maloney, McCollum, Meehan, Moran Neal, Pomeroy, Sherman, Skelton, A. Smith, G Taylor, M. Udall, T. Udall, Waters	JCS, Gen Abizaid, Wilkie	¼ hr
9-Mar	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	-407 Capitol	Sens: Bingaman, Cantwell, Reed, Sununu, Sessions, McConnell, Chambliss, Lott, Bennett Warner, Nelson(NE), Lautenberg, Martinez, Salazar, Kyl, Dayton, Chafee, Craig, Lugar, Cornyn, Alexander, Lincoln, McCain, Biden, Thune, Murkowski, Collins, Feingold, Voinovich, Sarbanes, Obama, Durbin	JCS, Gen Abizaid, Wilkie	hr
16-Mar	Meeting - House Theme Team	I-236 Capitol	Reps: Kingston, Putnam, J. Wilson, Pitts, Burgess, T. Price, Wamp, Wicker, Calvert, <b>Foxx</b> , M. Kennedy, S. Johnson, Drake, Ehlers, Gohmert, Keller, <del>Akin</del> , Conaway, S. Kelly, Gingrey, Aderholt, T. Murphy, Boustany, H. Brown, Foley, Gerlach, Tiberi, Tancredo, Osbourne, Tiahrt	Wilkie	¼ hr

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

28-Mar	Visit to Memorial	Hanksville, PA	Sen: Shuster	Wilkie, Smith, MG Huntoon	1 hr
30-Mar	Breakfast	230 Capitol	Sen: Frist	JCS	5 mins
30-Mar	Meeting - Outreach	326 Capitol	Reps: Blunt, Dent, McCaul, Lucas, Brown-Waite, T. Bishop, Campbell, Reichert, Sodrel, Westmoreland	angel, Ruff, Broome	1 hr
7-Apr	Joint Flight - Award Ceremony	New York	Sen Leahy		
25-Apr	Meeting	R-333	Sens. Sessions, Kyl & Comyn	angel	10 mins
25-Apr	Breakfast	R-188	Sens: Frist, McConnell, Roberts, Santorum, Sessions, Domenici, Comyn, Bunning, Thune, Hatch, Chambliss, Hutchison, Inhofe, Bennett Allard, Ensign, Thomas	Wilkie, Rangel	1 hr
3-May	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	C-5 Capitol	Reps: Bachus, Bass, Blunt, Bono, Boustany, K. Brady, Burton, Buyer, Cantor, Case, Chocola, Clay Jr., Coble, Cole, Costello, Cramer, G. Davis, Deal, Ehlers, Eshoo, Farr, Gilchrest, Gohmert, Hart, A. Hastings, Hensarling, Higgins, Jackson-Lee, E. Johnson, Keller, P. Kennedy, Kucinich, Lantos, Larson, Lipinski, McCarthy, McKeon, Millender-McDonald, J. Miller, Norwood, Pitts, T. Price, M. Rogers, M. Rogers, Rohrabacher, Ros-Lehtinen, Rush, Saxton, Schakowsky, Schiff, Schmidt, D. Scott, Sherman, A. Smith, Steams, G. Taylor, Tiahrt, Tiberi, Van Hollen, Visclosky, Walsh, D. Weldon, Wicker, H. Wilson, J. Wilson	McC Rice, Wilkie	1/4 hr
3-May	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	407 Capitol	Sens: Frist, Snowe, Lott, Carper, McConnell, Ensign, Stevens, Durbin, Wamer, Graham, Comyn, Kerry, Stabenow, Kyl, Smith, Martinez, Allen, Gregg, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Reid, Brownback, Lugar, Byrd, Dodd, Bailey-Hutchison, McCain, Inhofe, Boxer, Feinstein, Bennett, Kohl, Feingold, Salazar, Sarbanes	McC Rice, Wilkie	1 hr

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

4-May	Meeting	2217 RHOB	Reps: Blunt, T. Davis, Granger, Blackburn, J. Wilson, McCaul, Kingston, Hayes, Shuster, Pryce, T. Price	Wilkie	0 mins
11-May	Meeting- Iraq	H-232 Capitol	Speaker Hastert	Wilkie, Rangel	5 mins
17-May	Hearing - SAC-D	S-Dirksen 192	Sens: Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Bailey-Hutchison, Bums, Inouye, Byrd, Leahy, Harkin, Dorgan, Durbin, Reid, Feinstein, Mikulski	JCS, Jonas, Wilkie, Blum, Broome, Cheney	½ hrs
18-May	Meeting - Supplemental	S-230 Capitol	Sens: Frist	JCS, Jonas, Wilkie, Blum, Cheney	0 mins
18-May	Meeting - Supplemental	H-208 Capitol	Rep: Saxton	JCS, Jonas, Wilkie, Blum, Cheney	0 mins
13-Jun	Ops Intel - Global Posture	S-407 Capitol	Sens: Akaka, Alexander, Allard, Allen, Baucus, Bennett, Biden, Bond, Boxer, Bronback, Bunning, Byrd, Cantwell, Carper, Chafee, Clinton, Cochran, Coleman, Collins, Comyn, Craig, Crapo, DeWine, Dodd, Domenici, Durbin, Feingold, Feinstein, Frist, Kennedy, Graham, Gregg, Hutchison, Inhofe, Isakson, Kerry, Kyl, Lautenberg, Levin, Liebman, Lincoln, Lott, Lugar, Martinez, McCain, McConnell, Menendez, Murkowski, Murray, Nelson E., Obama, Reed, Reid, Roberts, Salazar, Santorum, Sessions, Smith, Stevens, Sununu, Thomas, Thune, Bitter, Voinovich, Warner	IECSTATE, CJCS, Abizaid, Wilkie	¼ hr

13-Jun	Ops Intel - Global Posture	Cannon Caucus	Reps: Aderholt, Alexander, Baca, Barrett, Bartlett, Beauprez, Berman, Bilirakis,	SECSTATE, CJCS, Negroponte, Wilkie	¼ hr
13-Jun	Press Availability	Cannon	Reps: Young, Hunter, Hoekstra, Hyde	Wilkie, Ruff	5 min

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY2006)**

15-Jun	Congressional Outreach	I-326 Capitol	Reps: Akin, Blackburn, Brown, Burgess, Carter, Chabot, Coble, Conaway, Foxx, Garrett, Gutknecht, S. Johnson, Kelly, Kennedy, Lewis, Murphy, Pitts, Price, J. Wilson, T. Davis, Granger, G. Davis, Shuster, Kingston, Hayes, Reichert, Fitzpatrick, Dent, Fortuno, McCaul, Sodrel, Westmoreland, Campbell, Renzi, Shaw, Alexander, R. Bishop, Brown-Waite, Lucas, Musgrave	Wilkie, Cheney	5 mins
15-Jun	Pentagon Memorial - Groundbreaking Ceremony	Pentagon	Sens: Allen, Inouye, Levin, Reid, Stevens, Wamer Reps: Blackburn, Davis, Granger, Kirk, Mica, Moran, Obey, Pelosi, Young Delegate: Holmes-Norton	SECSTATE and DoD "A" List	1 hr
15-Jun	Meeting - Update on Iraq with Bicameral and Bipartisan Congressional Leaders	White House	Sens: Stevens, Frist, Reid, McConnell, Durbin, Santorum, Stabenow, Kyl Reps: Hastert, Boehner, Pelosi, Blunt, Hoyer, Pryce, Clyburn	/P, SECSTATE	45 mins
22-Jun	Leadership Meeting - War in Iraq	H-326	Reps: Blunt, Harman, Hoyer, Cmn Hunter, Hoekstra, Hyde, Lantos, Obey, Skelton, Young	CJCS, Casey, Wilkie, Cheney	1 hr
22-Jun	Leadership Meeting	S-208	Sens: McConnell, Wamer, Durbin, Roberts, Levin	CJCS, Casey, Wilkie, Cheney	45 mins
13-Jul	Meeting - Mark-up	SH-522	Sens: Stevens, Inouye	DepSec, VCJCS, Rangel	45 mins
13-Jul	Meeting - CFIUS	Capitol- VP's	Sen: Shelby	DepSec, Broome	30 mins
20-Jul	Breakfast - IEDs	Pentagon	Chairman Hunter	DepSec, VCJCS, Wilkie, Miags, Rangel	45 mins
27-Jul	Breakfast	Pentagon	Sens: Wamer, Levin Reps: Hunter, Skelton	DepSec, VCJCS, Edelman, Jonas, Dominguez, Finley, Wilkie, Geren, Broome, Cheney, Johnson	45 mins
28-Jul	Meeting	H-144 Capitol	Chairman Young, Lewis		45 mins

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

1-Aug	Lunch - Senate Policy Cmte	Capitol	Sens: Alexander, Allard, Allen, Bennett, Bond, Burns, Burr, Chafee, Chambliss, Coburn, Cochran, Collins, Cornyn, Craig, Crapo, DeMint, DeWine, Dole, Domenici, Ensign, Enzi, Frist, Graham, Grassley, Gregg, Hatch, Hutchison, Inhofe, Isakson, Kyl, Lott, Lugar, Martinez, McConnell, Murkowski, Santorum, Sessions, Shelby, Smith, Snowe, Specter, Stevens, Sununu, Thomas, Thune, Vitter, Voinovich, Warner		5 mins
3-Aug	Hearing - Iraq & Afghanistan	-216	SASC: Bayh, Byrd, Chambliss, Clinton, Collins, Dayton, <del>Graham</del> , Inhofe, Kennedy, Levin, McCain, Ben Nelson, Bill Nelson, Reed, Sessions, Talent, Thune, Warner	CJCS, Abizaid, Wilkie, Rangel, Miags Cheney, Broome	hrs
3-Aug	Meeting -	S-407 Capitol	Sen: Coburn	Wilkie	0 mins
3-Aug	Meeting -	S-407 Capitol	Sens: Inhofe, Sessions, Comyn, Thune, Roberts, Chambliss	Wilkie, Rangel	0 mins
3-Aug	Ops Intel Briefing-	S-407 Capitol	Sens: Allard, Allen, Bennett, Bingaman, Boxer, Brownback, Clinton, Coleman, Collins,	CJCS, Abizaid, Wilkie, Rangel, Cheney, Broome	¼ hr

Total: 53

Briefings: 7  
Breakfasts: 6

Hearings: 6  
Lunches: 2

Meetings: 22  
Others: 10

FOUO

August 04, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Redo Congressional Contacts Memo

Please redo this memo without the letterhead and not in memo format, but simply in bullet points. *so* it is usable.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/3/06 ASD LA memo to SecDef

DHR ss  
SF030406-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/09/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/58909

210 ✓  
1740

ORIGINAL



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON OC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

August 4, 2006 3:00 p.m.

200.6

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting ASDLA, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake#080206-11

- Senator Rick Santorum asked you to implement a system within DoD to share service members' achievements and accomplishments with Members of Congress.
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary Michael Dominguez has made clear to the Military Departments that they already have authorization to provide summaries or citations to Members of Congress upon their request.
- Under Secretary **Dr.** David Chu is in the final coordination process for a new policy with respect to "pushing" award information to Members of Congress. The policy will specify the information that we will "push," such as type of award, name, **rank** and home.
- Recommend you send the attached letter as your response to Senator Santorum's letter.

4 Aug 06

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #080206-11
2. SECDEF letter to Senator Santorum
3. Letter from Senator Santorum (Aug. 1, 2006)
4. *Coordination from (P&R)*

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<u>TSA SD</u>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>ME/IG</i>	1730	
ESR MA	<i>Q 8/16</i>	STF DIR	

2 Aug 06

OSD 12538-06



8/7/2006 8:58:41 AM

Prepared by **Tom Jones**, Special Assistant for Personnel & Readiness (b)(6)

11-01b559/OSD/58910

# TAB 1

~~FOUO~~

1

August 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: **Response to Senator Santorum's Letter**

*Attached* is a letter I received from Rick Santorum. I have not read it.

Please look into it and get back to me within two days as to how we should answer

Thanks.

**Attach: 8/1/06 Letter from Senator Santorum to SecDef**

DHR.as  
SP060206-11

.....  
***Please Respond By 08/04/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58912