

OCT 15 2004

ACTION MEMO

USD(P)
15 Oct 2004
OSD/ISA/NESA
I-04/013743-ES
ES-1027

Handwritten notes:
10/15/04
10/14

Handwritten: Korea

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

Handwritten signature: [Signature]
18 OCT 2004

SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

- You asked us to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula.
- We have already sent him a thank you note (attached).
- Next under is another note with photos attached.

Recommendation:

- Sign note to Crown Prince of Bahrain.

Handwritten: 18 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04

DU/D/ISA *[Signature]*

PDASD/ISA _____

Prepared by: CDR Peter McVety, OSD/ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Handwritten: 13 OCT 04

late
1700

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2004
ES-1027
I-04/013743

Korea

TO: Bill Luti
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

I want to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula as promised.

Please give me a draft of the note to review.

DHR:ss
101304-11

.....
Please respond by 10/19/04

→ TO Sec Met *DB 10/21*
Paul Butler
10/20

13 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04

~~FOUO~~

His Highness

Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief
Bahrain Defense Force
Kingdom of Bahrain
Manama, Bahrain

Your Highness,

It was a pleasure to see you during my visit to Bahrain. I want to again express my special appreciation for your gracious hospitality and the elegant dinner that you hosted for all the visiting Ministers of Defense.

Thank you for your continued cooperation. I look forward to returning to Bahrain in the future.

Sincerely,

Mailed out on 13 October, 2004.

11-L-0559/OSD/44868



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



OCT 21 2004

His Highness
Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief
Bahrain Defense Force
Kingdom of Bahrain
Manama, Bahrain

Korea

Your Highness:

Enclosed is the satellite photo of the Korean Peninsula that I promised you during dinner.

Again, thank you for the wonderful day in your country.

Sincerely,


21 OCT 04

13 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04



Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula
21 September 2003, 1201z



11-L-0559/OSD/44870

OSD 16625-04

720
FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
October 1, 2004
2004 OCT 21 09:12:43

TO: Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, **the** Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss
093004-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

FOUO

OSD 16657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44871



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 21 5:12:42

October 20, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

- At your direction, I have spoken with Larry DiRita on the management of the Defense Business Board (DBB) (snowflake at TAB A).
- I understand your concern about the Board's work products becoming public before they are in a final, releasable form.
- The DBB Executive Director will continue to work proactively with Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and will ensure they are involved early and are aware of the Board's activities, deliberations and draft reports.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Thomas Modly, DBB Executive Director (b)(6)

OSD 16657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44872

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
October 1, 2004
2004 OCT 21 PM 12:43

TO: Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, the Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss
093004-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44874

FOUO

SECRET

2004 OCT 02 AM 9:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please give me the ~~manning~~ tables for all the headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:sm
101304-5

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

FOUO

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44875

14-10-04 17:10 111



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

SECRET
2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14
I-04/013742
I-04/013838
DepSecDef
USD(P) *copy provided Oct 21/04*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mira Ricardel, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP)

FROM: Ian Brzezinski, DASD (European and NATO Policy)

SUBJECT: NATO Manning Tables

Jan M Fr
Jan Br
OCT 21 2004

- You asked to see the manning tables for NATO headquarters/activities. Attached is a by-nation summary of military manning in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) as of January 2004 (Tab *A*).
- Because the full manpower structure for the new NCS has not yet been finalized, NATO is still working under its pre-existing manpower authorizations.
 - o This means the attached table does not reflect the 7 new NATO members, the handful of new French positions in ACO and ACT, or the manpower savings that will result from command structure reform.
- (U) As soon as complete manning data for the new NCS is available, we will provide an updated list.
 - o We anticipate the NAC will approve the full manpower structure for the new NCS by the end of November 2004.

Prepared by Lt Col John Harris, ISP/NATO, (b)(6)



A

NATO Command Structure — Military Positions (as of Jan 2004)

	ACLANT* (becomes ACT)*	ACE* (becomes ACO)*	Totals
Belgium	15	492	507
Canada	60	256	316
Czech Republic	7	103	110
Denmark	18	388	406
France	2	0	2
Germany	68	2381	2449
Greece	10	583	593
Hungary	5	78	83
Italy	24	1505	1529
Luxembourg	1	0	1
Netherlands	50	657	707
Norway	29	263	292
Poland	14	258	272
Portugal	169	44	213
Spain	51	422	473
Turkey	7	686	693
UK	220	1216	1436
U.S.	432	2797	3229
Other*	103	337	440
Totals	1285	12466	13751

*
 ACTLANT = Allied Command Atlantic
 ACT = Allied Command Transformation
 ACE = Allied Command Europe
 ACO = Allied Command Operations

B

FOUO

OFFICE C
SECRET

ES-1062
04/013838-ES

2004 OCT 22 11:09 AM OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *ML*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-22

.....
Please respond by _____

13-12-22 14:54 111

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44880

OSD 16785-04

FOUO

SECRET

2004 OCT 22 11 09:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please *give* me the manning tables for all *the* headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101304-5

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

FOUO

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44881

14-10-04 17:10 IN

72
~~FOUO~~

SECRET

ES-1062
04/013838-ES

OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *JB*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:es
101404-22



Please respond by _____

11-10-04 16:56 18

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44882

OSD 16785-04

October 21, 2004

TO: Tom Hall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transforming the Guard and Reserve

Tom, I know your team has put in a great deal of effort over the past year working with the Hill on the important task of transforming the Guard and Reserve; and I see that the 2005 Authorization Bill supports most of our initiatives. We have a way to go, but this is an excellent start. Thanks for all your hard and effective work.

326

DHR:ss
102104-6

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 16815-04

210-544

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 issue

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Outlook\Outlook.exe

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like you to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHKS
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50

INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: C-130 Program

- Recent reports in the press concerning the Air Force's C-130 program relate to two distinct issues: 1) the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG's) audit of the Air Force's commercial procurement of C-130J aircraft; and 2) recent protests by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, challenging the Air Force's conduct of certain competitive procurements in which Darleen Druyun was involved as an employee of the Air Force.
- In its report of July 23, 2004, the OIG concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item was improper, and that the aircraft does not meet contractual requirements and cannot perform its mission.
- Senator McCain cited the OIG's report in a hearing before the SASC regarding the 9/11 Commission, and in a letter to you concerning the analysis of alternatives for the recapitalization of the tanker aircraft fleet.
- On August 18, 2004, you requested that the Deputy Secretary look into Senator McCain's concerns. In response to your request and the OIG's report, the Acting USD(AT&L) has undertaken a review of the C-130J program. That review is ongoing, and may result in a plan to address the concerns. The Acting USD(AT&L) informed Senator McCain of the review in a letter dated September 29, 2004.
- Following reports of Ms. Druyun's plea agreement, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems addressed their protests to officials in the Air Force. The protests challenge the award of contracts to Boeing under the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and in other competitive procurements in which Ms. Druyun participated. My staff is reviewing the protests in coordination with attorneys in the Air Force Office of General Counsel.

OSD 16863-04

OSD 16863-04



11-L-0559/OSD/44885

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared By: Charles Bidwell, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: C-130 issue

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There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like **you** to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44887

OSD 16863-04

A

TAB A -- COORDINATION: INFO MEMO RE C-130 PROGRAM

Mr. Krieg, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 21, 2004

Mr. Patterson, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 21, 2004

October 22, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Possible Talking Points

Attached are some thoughts on how the White House might want to talk about the Myers letter.

Again, Andy, my apologies that I did not give you a heads up this morning.

Attach.
Draft statement on NID

DHRdh
102204-10.

330.09

22 Oct 04

OSD 16866-04

DRAFT
CLOSE HOLD

October 22, 2004

General Myers has consistently provided advice to the President along the lines of his recent letter to Congressman Duncan Hunter, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. General Myers was asked by Chairman Hunter to provide his opinion on intelligence reform in writing. It has consistently been the position of the President's administration that when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is asked his opinion by Congress, that he should provide his honest advice. The President respects that.

General Myers is right in his view that nothing should intrude on the integrity of the chain of command. The President has emphasized that that is his view and that principle was reflected in the legislation sent up by the President on September 16, 2004 on page 14, section 4(k)(b)(2), which says, in part:

“The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, shall--(1) ensure that the agencies and organizations of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense adequately satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such agencies and organizations are performing Government wide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies;”

DRAFT
CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/44891

DRAFT
CLOSE HOLD

The President believes that the intelligence reform legislation now being worked on in Conference can address this issue in a constructive way. As the President has indicated, he is seeking a bill that adheres to the important principle of respecting the chain of command and also gives full budget authority to the NID. These principles touch on a variety of aspects of the relationships, including personnel, budget authority, and management accountability. The details on such matters could probably best be left to be worked out by the Executive Branch in consultation with Congress, given their importance and their complexity. The President expects that any bill that comes forward for his signature will provide the NID full budget authority, while respecting the chain of command.

General Myers supports intelligence reform, including the NID and the NCTC, and the President would not want a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who did not have views on such important matters and a willingness to express them.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/NID

DRAFT
CLOSE HOLD

SEP 27 2004

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 27 2004
10 01 01

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

10 OCT 25 AM 8:13

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 22, 2004 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- We have already achieved substantial “jointness” in MP training
- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of “places.” Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



SEP 28 2004

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 28 2004
13

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

September 15, 2003 11:45

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

857

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few idcas might include:

- Cost per soldier **per** month / year
- Total Cost **per** month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it **would** be helpful to have these in our heads as **we look** at trade-offs **with** regard to **U.S.** and local forces as well as **our** longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091501-5

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44896

OSD 16953-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2136-04
25 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 10/34*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

- **Issue.** "We need some basic 'rules of thumb' reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include: Cost per soldier per month/year, Total Cost per montldyear.. it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to US and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is \$30.5K; annual per Service member cost is \$365.9K. Total US cost per month for OIF is \$4.2B; annual total cost is \$50.5B. Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is \$53.7K, annually \$644.6K. Monthly total US costs for OEF is \$752M, annually \$9.0B. Only operational and recurring costs (TAB B) are included in these figures. Differing force packages, operational concepts, logistics networks and other cost elements for OIF and OEF result in higher costs in Afghanistan.
- **Discussion.** You must be careful when using these figures to estimate savings from future force reductions. The cost avoidance will be less than the per Service member cost. A drawdown plan is required to compute cost avoidance. The drawdown strategy would describe how much of the support structure remains in place as ground combat elements redeploy. Since the more costly support will likely drawdown more slowly than the ground combat elements, costs will not go down at the per Service member rate described above. In addition, the per Service member cost avoidance must be offset by the costs of a prolonged US sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Another rule of thumb for the security costs is the FY 2005 US costs to build the Iraqi security force and the ANA. The US cost per Iraqi security force member is \$16.7K and per ANA soldier is \$44.5K. The US costs for Iraq are lower because the Iraqi government offsets costs for Iraqi security.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44897

OSD 16953-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

1306
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 15, 2003 PM 4:15

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

857

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier per month / year
- Total Cost per month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to U.S. and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-5

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44898

OSD 16953-04

TAB B

Operational and Recurring Costs

- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are calculated by using the burn rate; that is, the average of the monthly costs per contingency operation. The burn rate costs are the recurring, operational (incremental) costs that Services and agencies report through the Defense Finance and Accounting System to Congress.
- These costs include both direct and indirect costs for OEF.
 - Direct Service costs include full pay and allowances for Guard and Reserve, incremental pay for active duty personnel (allowances such as imminent danger pay and family separation pay), personnel support, operations support, transportation and military construction.
 - Other direct costs include depot maintenance, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency operations, Defense Intelligence Agency operations, other intelligence and the Defense Health Program.
 - Indirect costs in support of OEF include costs for USCENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar, military overstrength, military construction in Southwest Asia external to Iraq and Afghanistan, the military tribunal **and** defense health care costs for military personnel in Southwest Asia, external to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since these costs are contingency related and must be reported as a contingency cost, they are shown as a cost against the first contingency in the Global War on Terrorism, OEF.
- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM reflect only direct costs incurred for Iraq.

11-L-0559/OSD/44899

Tab B

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USDC

MS. TINA JONAS

9/28/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/44900

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

720

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 OCT 26 PM 1:13

ES-1066
04/013846-ES
OCT 15 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: NATO Question on Darfur

We have to answer the Secretary General of NATO's question on Darfur.

Thanks.

DHR:as
101404-30

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16996-04
09-10-04 16:53 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/44901

10/26 0800

~~FOUO~~
FOUO

ES-1054
04/013809 (ISP)

~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

October 15, 2004

2004 OCT 26 PM 1:34
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Ian Brzezinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Surveillance System

It sounds strange that the test and analysis of the VERA-E passive surveillance system should take that long. Why don't we send some people there to test it instead of shipping it back?

Please tell the folks working on it that that doesn't sound right, and ask whether they could accelerate the effort.

I would like a report back as to what their timetable could be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101404/DH-2

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~SECRET~~ Attachment
11-L-0559/OSD/44902
~~FOUO~~
10:56 11
OSD 16998-04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000
INFO MEMO

SECRET
2004 OCT 26 PM 3:43

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

Ray DuBois 10/26/04

In my Info Memo to you, dated September 30, 2004, responding to your snowflake about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training, I reported that ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination of this issue will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) process, with the Marine Corps leading a staff working group. I wanted to update you on this process.

- The Range Sustainment WIPT met Tuesday, October 12 and the Marine Corps briefed the Undocumented Alien (UDA) issue to the other WIPT members. The Marine Corps agreed to lead a staff work group, coordinated through the IPT process, and initiate staff level coordination between DoD, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security.
- Consistent with the Commandant's recommendation to you, the Range Sustainment IPT will coordinate collaboration, both internal and external, on this subject. Initial staff contacts were begun the week of October 18 including Department of the Interior, Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM. The Marine Corps will present an update at the next WIPT meeting. An interagency staff-level meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, November 23.
- As the Range Sustainment IPT continues its efforts at a staff level, **it would be advantageous for you and General Hagee to meet with Secretary Ridge at a mutually convenient time to discuss this issue.**



OSD 17019-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44903

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The Iraqi elections in January could produce a variety of outcomes. Candidates could win who are right on the mark, somewhere in the middle, or notably unhelpful.

IRAK

The NSC needs to think through appropriate strategies and objectives now to:

- Do what we can so the outcome is favorable to the President's goals.
- Strategies to deal with all of the various possible outcomes.

Let me know what we can do to help.

DHR:ss
102504-18

26 Oct 04

October 26, 2004

TO: Richard Lawless
CC: ADM Tom Fargo
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense and Japan

My impression is that the missile defense people are dealing with the Japanese on a separate track from the overall base realignment and force posture adjustments. They seem to feel that is the right thing.

My personal view is that it is probably not the right thing, and that the people doing it don't know much about what you and Tom Fargo are doing with respect to force posture. It seems to me that all of these pieces fit together to a certain extent, and I am a little worried about their going off on their own.

Please think it through, talk to Tom Fargo and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102504-24

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

gymn

102504

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has the lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102604-6

334 NSC

26 OCT 04

OSD 17030-04

October 26, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Tom O'Connell
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

The time we spent at Fort Belvoir was excellent. The operatives are extraordinary, and we'll work on the issues that surfaced in the briefing and see what can be done about their concerns.

Thanks for suggesting and organizing the trip - it was most helpful.

DHR:ss
102604-11

.....
Please respond by _____

33350

260404

October 26, 2004

TO: COL Conrad Trautman

cc: GEN Doug Brown
Gen Dick Myers
Tom O'Connell
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

Thank you for a useful and impressive visit with your unit at Fort Belvoir. Your team is extraordinary and inspirational, and I learned a good deal during our time together.

You can be proud of the fine work you are doing for our country.

DHR:ss
102604-12

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 17032-04

333SD

26 Oct 04

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/25/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
102604-10

ATY HANUSMAN

De Odey

For Official Use Only



Afghan Security Forces Update *Executive Summary*

25 October 2004

Data as of 25 Oct 04

Version M3

11-L-0559/OSD/44910


Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– National Police	28,406
– Highway Police	
– Border Police	
– Customs Police	
– Counternarcotics Police	
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– Afghan National Army	14,225
– Afghan Air Corps	
	<hr/>
	42,631

Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44912

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Endstate	25-Oct-04	1-Nov-04	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Jul-08 ¹
National Police	47,500	55%	58%	63%				
Highway Police	2,500					50%		
Border Police	25,000						50%	
Customs Police	800						50%	
Counter-Narcotics Police	1,570							

¹Projected 100% Date is 1 Jan 07 for all forces except CN Police which is a pilot program currently under review.

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44913

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	25-Oct-04	1-Nov-04	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Apr-07
Ministry of Defense General Staff	3,000			48%				
Corps	43,000				41%	47%	51%	
Air Corps	3,000					40%	63%	
Sustaining Institutions	21,000							

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44914

Coalition Contributors



For Official Use Only

OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

Albania	22	Denmark	61	Iceland	15	Mongolia	16	Spain	1,044
Australia	5	Egypt	65	Ireland	7	Netherlands	512	Sweden	102
Austria	3	Estonia	15	Italy	1006	New Zealand	9	Switzerland	4
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	75	Jordan	174	Norway	282	Turkey	252
Belgium	653	France	1,296	Korea	205	Poland	121	UK	611
Bulgaria	42	Georgia	50	Latvia	9	Portugal	27	USA	15,903
Canada	993	Germany	2,255	Lithuania	53	Romania	570		
Croatia	51	Greece	121	Luxembourg	11	Slovakia	55		
Czech Rep	22	Hungary	156	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	22		
							Total	28,233	

Afghan Forces On Hand	67,020
National Police	48,450
Highway	891
Border Police	3,417
Customs Police	0
Counter Narcotics Police	37
Subtotal On Hand	52,795
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	590
Corps	12,860
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	775
Subtotal On Hand	14,225

Afghan Forces Trained	42,631
National Police	27,431
Highway Police	200
Border Police	750
Customs Police	0
Counter Narcotics Police	25
Subtotal Trained	28,406
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	590
Corps	12,860
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	775
Subtotal Trained	14,225



Data as of 25 Oct 04

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44916

Afghan Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

POLICE	PROPOSED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED
National Police	47,500	48,450	27,431	28,073	Jan '06
Highway Police	2,500	891	200	515	Jul '06
Border Police	25,000	3,417	750	2,200	Dec '06
Customs Police	800	0	0	0	Dec '06
Counter Narcotics Police	1570	37	25	62	Dec '07
TOTAL	77,370	52,795	28,406	30,850	Dec '07

Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

ARMY	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN 05 L/F CAPABILITY	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
Ministry of Defense General Staff	3,000	590	0	590/0	Sep 09 ⁽³⁾
Corps	43,000	12,860	0	12,860/0	Sep 09
Air Corps	3,000	0	0	0/0	Sep 09
Intermediate Commands ⁽⁴⁾	21,000	775	0	775/0	Sep 09
Totals	70,000	14,225	0	14,225/0	Sep 09

Notes:

- (1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
- (2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
- (3) Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model
- (4) Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

POLICE	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
National Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks for literate; 4 weeks for illiterate 2 weeks for existing officers Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks	1759
Highway Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)	189
Border Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 2 weeks specialized training	844
Customs Police	Program not developed	0
Counter Narcotics Police	Special Course sponsored by the DEA	25
Total		2817
ARMY	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
Enlisted Basic Training	Basic Training is 10 Weeks Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks Collective Training is 6 Weeks	2384
National Military Academy – Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05)	4 Year Course	0
Command and General Staff College	12 weeks	0
Combat Leaders Course	5 weeks	36
NCO Course	6 Weeks	420
Officers' Candidate School	8 weeks	176
Total		3,016

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44919

Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

POLICE	Mission
National Police	Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
Highway Police	Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.
Border Police	Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts.
Customs Police	To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country.
Counter Narcotics Police	Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.
ARMY	
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.
Corps	
Air Corps	
Institutional Commands	

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- ANA: Command and General Staff Course #4 graduated 59 students 20 Oct 04

Training:

- ANA: Battalions #26, #27 and #28 are in training
- ANA: Battalion #29 starts training 30 Oct 04

Equipping:

- ANA: Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating subsidizes the ammunition shortage
- ANA: Czech Republic ammunition donation has been approved by Czech Parliament

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- ANP: Construct/refurbish projects underway on 17 provincial/highway police stations
- ABP: 2 Border Police headquarters and 1 crossing site under construction

Mentoring/Employing:

- ANA: J3 recommended delaying additional Embedded Training Teams until Feb 04
- ANA: Delaying embedded trainers reduces battalion team manning from 16-12
- ANP: Police Technical Advisory Team continues sustainment training.

Funding:

- ANA: \$65m short for accelerating to 5 battalion model

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/25/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
102604-8

IMAY

260004

***Iraqi Security Forces Update
Executive Summary***

25 October 2004


Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only


<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">- Police- Civil Intervention- Emergency Response- Border Enforcement- Highway Patrol- Dignitary Protection	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 63,776
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">- Army- National Guard- Intervention Force- Special Operations- Air Force- Coastal Defense Force	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 48,742 <hr/> 112,518

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003= 0 Iraqi Security Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	25 OCT 04	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police *	135,000				47%	59%	70%
Special Police Regiments ***	1,200			50%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions ***	3,600			67%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	270		59%	84%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol	1,500			50%	61%	72%	92%
Bur. of Dignitary Protection ****	500	89%	90%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando Battalions	2,019	45%	45%	75%	85%	100%	100%
Dept of Border Enforcement **	32,000	55%	60%	62%	60%	71%	84%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- *** These units make up the Civil Intervention Force
- **** Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44927

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	25 OCT 04	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000		69%	100%	100%	75-100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584		67%	73%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904	65%	66%	74%	91%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516	58%	64%	67%	76%	95%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451		40%	40%	58%	76%	100%

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44928

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	Norway	9	Tonga	53
Australia	417	Estonia	48	Latvia	133	Poland	2,461	Ukraine	1,617
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	76	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	9,095
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	278	Macedonia	32	Romania	745	US	130,646
Bulgaria	449	Italy	3,139	Moldova	10	Singapore	33		
Czech Rep	98	Japan	812	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	427	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,497	Thailand	0	Total	156,038

IRAQI FORCES ON HAND	175,679
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	87,554
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	197
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	555
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	1,650
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	18,693
ARMY	11,776
NAT'L GUARD	43,063
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,907
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	676
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING	128,202
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	49,212
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	197
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	555
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	1,650
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	18,693
ARMY	11,776
NAT'L GUARD	43,063
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,907
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	676
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536


Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service
73,992

NATO Training Team = 15



Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44929

NATO Training in Iraq

For Official Use Only

- North Atlantic Council approved proposal for NATO Training on 22 September.
- Concept of Operations approved on 7 October.
- North Atlantic Council decision includes:
 - Dual-hatting LTG Petraeus, MNSTC-I Commander
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine and Education Center
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command
 - Focusing on training, equipping and technical assistance—not combat
 - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway
 - Providing out-of-country training
- NATO Survey Team currently in-theater to assess Training, Education, and Doctrine Command infrastructure requirements at Ar Rustimayah.
- SHAPE developing OPLAN.

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44931

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	87,554	43,627	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,196	0	3,120	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	197	100	270	FEB '05
HIGHWAY PATROL	1,500	925	555	750	TBD
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	484	446	500	DEC '04
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS*	2019	2,019	900	2,019	JAN '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	20,039	18,148	15,900	MAR '06
TOTAL	176,209	112,414	63,776	75,359	JUL '06

* New elements recently authorized, recruited, and trained by the Ministry of Interior

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44932

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS)	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	3,887	620	10,915 / 10,915	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,261	0	45,000 / 0	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	0	1,794	1,794 / 4,790	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	0	604	0 / 725	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	45,724	3,018	57,709 / 16,430	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44933

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training	5,585
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,196
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	97
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	545
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	6
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Special Forces	38
Special Police Commando Battalions	4 Weeks Basic Training 1-3 Weeks Advanced Training	750
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	7,269
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	1,802
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,113
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	127
TOTAL		22,633

Data as of

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Special Police Commando Bns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44935

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- Enrolled 2,526 new Iraqi Police Service recruits into the force for basic training course that started this week at Baghdad and Jordan Academies.
- Enrolled 956 newly-hired Department of Border Enforcement personnel into the force for eventual train-up.
- Recruited 96 new students to begin training for Emergency Response Unit.

Train:

- 5,585 Police Cadets training in basic eight-week courses in Amman, Baghdad and regional academies.
- Graduated 90 and began training of 98 new law enforcement students in three specialized policing classes at the Adnon Training Facility (Basic Criminal Investigation and two courses in Election Security).
- Graduated 27 Emergency Response Unit officers from their basic training course.
- 17th Battalion, Regular Army, completed basic training 23 October.

Equip:

- Issued 3,860 weapons, 153 vehicles, 2,612 armor vests, 500 radios, and over 3 million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior Forces.
- Issued 2890 weapons and 3.2 Million Rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Defense forces.

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- **Began construction on a Major Crimes Unit force protection enhancement project in Baghdad.**
- **Committed over \$363.7 million of the \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. Projects are out for bidding with awards expected in late October and early November, putting MNSTC-I ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter after reallocation of IRRF.**
- **Work productivity at construction sites is running at 80% of normal capacity rather than the 67% anticipated during Ramadan. Working with contractors to mitigate using double shifts and labor attendance incentives.**

Mentor/Employ:

- **Ministry of Interior's Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee has screened over 7,000 data records to date.**
- **Police Commando units executing operations with coalition forces in Samarra and Mosul.**
- **Three Intervention Force Battalions, two Regular Army battalions, the Army Commando Battalion, the Counter-Terrorist Force, a Police Commando Battalion, and Emergency Response Unit preparing for possible future offensive operations.**

~~FOUO~~

ES-1087
04/0:3935-ES

October 18, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Iraqi Army

Who disbanded the Iraqi Army – Bremer or Garner, and what date did it happen?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101804-2

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

2004 OCT 20 PM 7: 27
005-101804-2

Iraq
18 OCT 04

To SecDef
92

Paul Butler
10/21

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	1/31/10-27-04

~~FOUO~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 27, 2004

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM : CONDOLEEZZA RICE *Condi*

SUBJECT: Need for a briefing on
Salafist financial and
spiritual networks

Don,

The lead on terrorist financing is an interagency effort that Fran Townsend has led. I will arrange a briefing. The "spiritual network" has largely been treated as a disruption effort through the Agency. Elliott Abrams at the NSC has also helped to coordinate a Muslim World Outreach strategy that might be of interest. I will ask them to brief as well.

OSD 17131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44939

FOUO

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and *the* Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has *the* lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:cm
102604-4

OSD 17030-04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44940

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

14 October 2004

326

Dear Secretary:

With respect to the attached, I DON'T BELIEVE IT! With all the PR in other areas re: what is being done for families of "serving" members, this smacks of politicization.

It is quite true this area is one of heavily Democrat population. Most of the time, I find fairness a part of BEAVER County character. However, the 911th Airlift Wing at Pittsburgh International Airport has been used regularly since the first Gulf War, as have other Reservist and Guard units subject to mobilization - locally.

This attitude has been building gradually, BUT without contrary and factual info from the Services.

You may wish to give this subject a "hard go" factually to clear-the-air here.

14 OCT 04

Sincerely and Very respectfully,

N. Z. Gerhard

OSD 17135-04

October 26, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to RADM Gerhard

Please get someone to fashion the right answer to this letter from RADM Gerhard.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/14/04 Gerhard ltr to SecDef


DHR:dh
102504-21

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

CRD
CONTROL, LAUNGER
IM 10/27

Oct 10/27
Sir,
Response attached.
v/R
L+G/Lengyel
10/27

326
26 OCT 04
14 OCT 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 28 2004

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

Dear Admiral Gerhard,

Thank you for your letter and attached article from the *Beaver County Times*.

Since 9/11, Guard and Reserve units have shouldered a large burden in the Global War on Terror. Approximately 35 percent of the 911th Airlift Wing (AW) has been mobilized at one time or another since September 11, 2001. One of the 911 AW's C-130 squadrons was called up in December 2003 for 1 year, and in July 2004 they were extended to 2 years. The basic rotation schedule for the mobilized squadron is 90 days deployed, followed by 90 days home, with unit members averaging 150 days deployed this year.

I appreciate your sending along the article; we'll keep working to ensure the facts are clear to the public.

Sincerely,

OSD 17135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44943

326
28 OCT 04
14 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED
SECRET

October 7, 2004
2004 OCT 20 11:27

873

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Arabian Gulf

We recently discussed the MIO work by NAVCENT in the Arabian Gulf. I'd be interested in an update, showing the numbers of boardings conducted, where we are focusing our efforts, what we are finding, and a general assessment of the value of the operations.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100604-8

.....
Please respond by 10/16/04

801.2

7 OCT 2004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17161-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-2148-04
28 October 2004

SECRET

2004 OCT 23 10:12:42

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 10/27

SUBJECT: Non-Payment of Police Recruits in Najaf

- **Question.** "Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Najaf police recruits were not being paid due to the lag time between hiring recruits and their completing vetting and police academy training requirements. Iraqi Ministry of Interior representatives are committed to meeting the back-pay obligation.
- **Analysis.** Attached information paper (TAB B) provides additional background and actions to ensure the Najaf police recruits get paid.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44945

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17166-04

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Attachment

TAB A

October 13, 2004

CLASSIFIED BY
SECRET
2011 OCT 23 PM 12:42

875

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruits in Najaf

Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/13/04 ~~SECRET~~ Memo re: 1,000 Police Recruits Hired in An Najaf

DHR:as
101304-3

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

DSD 17166-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44946

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB B

14 October 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Non-payment of Najaf Police

1. Purpose. To provide an update on non-payment of Najaf Police
2. Key Points

- **Background.** During the fighting in Najaf, the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior authorized the Najaf police chief to fire officers who laid down arms or ran from the fight. They also authorized him to hire able and willing replacements, and told him they would be added to police rolls once Ministry of Interior approved the "by-name" list. Hundreds were fired and replacements hired.

Vetting and attending a police-training course qualifies a police candidate for pay. Many Najaf replacements, perhaps as many as a thousand, have since met these requirements and are now on the rolls.

Though they have continued to serve in various unofficial capacities, some replacements had not been identified to the Ministry of Interior by local authorities; no action had been taken to get them on the police rolls.

- **Action Taken.** We have discussed the issue with the staff of the Deputy Minister of Interior for Finance. The Ministry of Finance has committed to meeting the back-pay obligation if personnel are identified by name. If they pass the vetting process (literacy and criminal background check), these personnel can be accessed to the police rolls, though most will require training, as they have no prior military or police background.

- **Way Ahead.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has oversight on recruiting and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and will take the following actions: 1) Confirm with the Iraq Ministry of Interior, who controls the Iraqi Police Service, his intention to provide back pay and to submit names to Ministry of Interior for Finance. 2) Confirm the Minister's plans to accept applications from the unofficial police to join the police force and vet applications for permanent police status. 3) Accept a Ministry of Finance Pay LNO and establish a joint Finance Coordination Group to deal with future pay issues. 4) Assess if the problem is more widespread and initiate corrective action as appropriate.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44947

Tab B

101.5
0820

720

FOUO

October 14, 2004

FWB

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Luxembourg's MOD

2004 OCT 29 AM 10:55

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Luxembourg

Luxembourg has a new MOD who is first rate and interested in the transatlantic relationship. I sense he is pulling away from France, Germany and Belgium.

We need to find ways we can encourage that.

Thanks.

DHR:cs
101404-11

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

R&W
Paul Butler

10/28

10/15/04

→SD

Noted.
We'll keep
this in mind
and look for
opportunities

Doug Feith

14 OCT 04

FOUO

OSD 17231-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44948

FOUO

CLASSIFIED BY
STANDARD

2004 OCT 29 AM 11:08
September 28, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, who selects the commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there any role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in BRAC?

It seems to me it is time to get a briefing. Who should I be briefed by -- you or Michael Wynne?

How are we going to think about combining training activities, so they get more joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- Truck Drivers
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:m
092804-14

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

FOUO

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44949



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

SECRET

2004 OCT 25 AM 11:03

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

Ray DuBois 10/29/04

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commissioners

This memorandum answers part of your 28 September snowflake on BRAC commissioners. I will address homeland security and joint training separately.

- The President must nominate the nine BRAC commissioners for Senate confirmation no later than March 15, 2005. Two commissioners each are nominated in consultation with the Speaker and Senate majority leader and one each in consultation with the minority leaders of the House and Senate. The President nominates the remaining three, including the Chair, without consultation.
- Because the Commission reviews the *Secretary's* recommendations, your participation in the selection process is critical to support the White House selection of nominees not requiring consultation. You might also provide input for those nominations requiring consultation with the Congress.
 - Prior commissioners have been Bo Callaway, Jim Courter, Alan Dixon, Tom Eagleton, Marty Hoffmann, Graham Claytor, Gen H. T. Johnson, Gen Duane Cassidy, Bob ~~Stuart~~, Harry McPherson, Arthur Levitt, and Russ Train.
- Commissioners must be able to make this a full time effort between the time they organize and then receive your recommendations to their Sep 8th statutory deadline for reporting to the President, approximately five months. (This is no more time than provided previous commissions yet we expect a more robust recommendations set.) The statute authorizes commissioners to be paid \$137K per annum,
 - Congress appropriated \$10 million in the FY05 Washington Headquarters Services budget for the Commission's salaries and operating expenses.
- We will propose candidates to you around 22 November to support nominations in late January and confirmation in March. The Commission Chair (and the **staff** director and general counsel the Chair selects) should receive priority focus.

ATTACHMENT : As stated

cc: ✓ Dr. Wolfowitz, DepSecDef

Mr. Wynne, Acting USD(AT&L)
Jim O'Beirne, WHLO

OSD 17232-04



~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 29 11:11:00
September 28, 2004

TO: **Ray** DuBois
CC: **Gen Dick Myers**
David Chu
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, **who** selects the commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there **any** role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in BRAC?

It **seems** to me it is time to get a briefing. **Who** should I be briefed by -- **you** or Michael Wynne?

How are we going to think about combining training activities, **so** they get **more** joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- Truck Drivers
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:ww
092804-14

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44951

OCT 18 2004

?

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Letter to Maupin Family

Please check and see if I've ever written the Maupin family. If not, I should.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/6/04 Info Memo from Acting SecArmy to SecDef re: Meeting with Maupin Family

DHR:dh
101504-22

.....
Please respond by _____ 10/18

SIR —

you have not
previously
written

v/r
Jim

see
attached
draft

704
18 OCT 04
6 OCT 04

OSD 17241-04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 10/29/2004

JK 11/01/04

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT
OSD CONTROL OSD 17241-04 DOC 10/18/2004 DOR 10/29/2004 SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO SD.MA ADM STAVRIDIS, J

SUBJECT LETTER TO MAUPIN FAMILY

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN 704 SEC U OCN 101504-22

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
INFO MEMO
FRONT OFFICE DOC
FRONT OFFICE DOC

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ADC 0

Office of the Secretary of Defense

VADM S,

Sir,

*Mr. Butler asked for
your comments on the
two letters.*

*Should the Boss do it at
all? Or it differently?*

*1928 11/27
HOT! Mr Butler
NOTE TO Mr/Ms. MAUPIN
RE THEIR SON.*

*vr,
m 10/28*

Yes
*go smooth V/R
on the version 10/13
I "OK" 10/28*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Ms. Carolyn Maupin

(b)(6)

704

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will keep you informed throughout this process.

29 OCT 04

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

6 OCT 04

cc: Mr. Keith Maupin

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44954



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Mr. Keith Maupin

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time.

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Ms. Carolyn Maupin

11-L-0559/OSD/44955

OSD 17241-04

Mr. And Mrs. Keith Maupin

Address

Dear Mr. And Mrs. Maupin

I know you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army and the General Pete Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. We all want to assure you that the Department of Defense is very focused on Matt's situation and we will do everything we can to find him. ^{The Army} We will also provide frequent and immediate updates to you.

Our thoughts and prayers are with you and the Maupin family during this difficult time. ~~Please let me know personally if there is anything else we can do for you.~~

Sen Nelson
Mrs Spiker...

Mr. Keith Maupin

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time, ~~and I assure you that returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Ms. Carolyn Maupin

11-L-0559/OSD/44957

Ms. Carolyn Maupin

(b)(6)

OK

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

~~Returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~ I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will ~~provide updates to you~~ throughout this process.

Keep you informed

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. Keith Maupin



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

OCT 6 2004

DA 10/15

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Family of SPC Maupin

Exp/10/15

On 30 Sep 04, General Schoomaker and I, along with other senior Army leaders, met with the Maupin family in the Pentagon. As you may recall, SPC Keith "Matt" Maupin is our only Soldier missing in action from Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with Mrs. Carolyn Maupin, Matt's Mother; Mr. Keith Maupin, Matt's Father; (b)(6) and (b)(6) and Representative Rob Portman, Member of Congress (R-OH). The family received a detailed briefing from LTG Campbell, the Director of the Army Staff, and then met privately with General Schoomaker and myself.

704

- The intent of this meeting was to reinforce to the family the importance that the Department of Defense and the Army leadership places on resolving their son's situation. We explained what information we had and what actions we are taking to find their son. We stated that Matt is one of our Soldiers and that we will do everything possible to find him and that this is one of our warrior ethos – "never leave a fallen comrade." We also stressed that the family will receive immediate updates from the Army on any significant developments.
- We just received the completed AR 15-6 investigation report covering the event leading to Matt's capture. We assured the family that we would send someone knowledgeable from the unit's chain of command to brief them and provide them a redacted copy of the report.
- Overall, the Maupins and Representative Portman were both satisfied with and appreciative of our commitment to finding Matt. If desired, we are prepared to come brief you on the specifics of Specialist Maupin's case.

6004

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: LTG James L. Campbell (b)(6)

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44959

SEP 10 2004

September 9, 2004

2004 SEP 9 11:33

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting

As we discussed at roundtable this morning, I would be interested in an update of how we are doing in revising our readiness reporting system so that it provides sensible and accurate indications to senior decision makers. I know you've been doing some work in this area and I would like an update.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090904-7

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

OSD 17247-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44960



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 10/27/04 PM 1:33

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 29, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

David S. C. Chu

- The new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) bridges the gap between readiness status, plans, and alternate courses of action. In short, it answers “ready for what.”
- Current reporting is essentially independent of mission needs. DRRS, on the other hand, allows force managers to determine quickly:
 - What missions forces are currently prepared for, based on “output” measures for the mission essential tasks. Every tasked organization, from the ship/battalion/squadron up to the Combatant Commands, will regularly assess whether it currently can perform its assigned missions. This is essentially a “yes” or “no” question that is supported by performance measures, resource information, and commanders’ comments.
 - Which forces are currently deployed and where, and which are available to deploy.
 - What the limiting factors are (e.g., do they have enough people which individuals are not “medically prepared,” do they have their equipment and does it work). Data come automatically from authoritative sources (versus today’s manual feed).
 - What alternative courses of action could meet mission needs.
- We are partnering with the Combatant Commanders in developing and implementing DRRS.
- Initial software is in place on the SIPRNet; functionality and usability will improve over the next two years. We would be happy to provide you a demonstration at your convenience.

322

29 Oct 04

95 ep 04

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., Dir. Readiness Prog & Assessment, (b)(6)

October 29, 2004

TO: Senior Officials of the Department of Defense
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dating Documents

Please put dates on all papers you are sending.

We need to find a way to get this Department to move paper faster. If documents are not dated, there is no way for us to track the delays.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-12



Please respond by _____

312

29 OCT 04

OSD 17268-04

OCT 29 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: My Remarks to AUSA

Attached is a copy of the remarks I made to the Army Association yesterday. You might find something in there that's useful.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef Remarks to AUSA delivered 10/27/04

DHR:ss
102804-16

.....
Please respond by _____

350.001 SD

29 OCT 04

OSD 17274-04



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Speech

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>
or +1 (703) 428-0711

Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, October 27, 2004.

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. It is good to be with you for this 50th annual meeting of the Association, with so many Army leaders, soldiers and supporters -- patriots all.

General Sullivan, thank you so much for your kind words and for your leadership of this important organization. It's good to see you, and I thank you for your service.

I just left the table here with Secretary Les Brownlee and Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker. You two and your team are doing an absolutely superb job of leading the Army as it meets the tough challenges of the 21st century. We appreciate your experience, your wisdom, your energy, your toughness as you tackle your vitally important posts.

General Sullivan mentioned my meeting here some 20 years ago. I remember it well, meeting with this Association. I also remember that the following year, the organization wisely presented the George Catlett Marshall Medal to my friend, Paul Nitze.

As many of you may know, Paul Nitze died last week.

As one of the key architects of the strategy that defended America through the long struggle against the Soviet empire, his keen intellect helped to give the hope of freedom to literally millions of people trapped behind the Iron Curtain. And through his long and distinguished public career and his dedicated service to the country, he remained a model of honor and integrity. We will certainly miss him.

General Sullivan mentioned who the recipient of the George Catlett Marshall Medal is this year -- the American soldier. That is an inspired choice. There could be no better, and I congratulate you for it. To the soldiers.

I never cease to be amazed at these young men and women -- active, Guard and Reserve alike. They're a very special group of truly selfless volunteers. Our country is so fortunate that they have stepped forward and said, "Send me." And certainly to all of the soldiers here and across the world, please know that we are deeply in your debt.

When I spoke to this organization in 1984, I did mention the growing threat of terrorism. I was concerned even two decades ago about what I had seen when I was serving as President Reagan's Middle East envoy. You'll recall 241 of our service people were killed in Beirut, Lebanon. I was afraid that the threat was underestimated, and I worried that the effect of a single attack could have a

11-L-0559/OSD/44964

serious effect on even the behavior of great nations.

Seven weeks ago, we observed the third anniversary of September 11th, the day that awakened our country to a new world. Three years into the global war on terror, some still ask, "Is our country safer today?" And it's a fair question. And the answer is yes -- we are safer today, without question.

It's been said that the global struggle against extremism will be a task for a generation, that it could go on for years, as did the Cold War; and I'm afraid that's true.

The Cold War was a great victory, a victory for freedom, but that 50-year struggle between the free world and the Soviet empire was marked by setbacks and failures all along the way, as well as some successes.

There were times when the Soviets seemed to have the upper hand. I remember when "euro-communism" was in vogue, when the West was considering withdrawing from the Cold War. I was Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970s, and I recall having to fly back to Washington in a hurry to testify before the United States Senate against an amendment that would have begun pulling U.S. forces out of Europe at the height of the Cold War. Many Americans and many of our allies were exhausted, and they favored withdrawing from the struggle.

The West's strategies varied. They varied from coexistence to containment to detente to confrontation. Our alliances wavered. In NATO, there were frequent disputes over diplomatic policy, serious disputes over weapon deployments, and arguments over military strategies.

In the 1960s, France pulled out of the military command in NATO, and they tossed NATO out of France. In America, columnists questioned U.S. policies. There were vocal showings of support for communist Soviet Union, marches against the U.S. military buildup, even instances where American citizens saw their own government unfairly challenged as warmongers.

Clearly, many did not fully comprehend the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's appetite for empire. But our nation, over a long period and with our allies, demonstrated impressive perseverance and resolve. We dared to confront what many thought might be an unbeatable foe, and eventually the Soviet regime collapsed.

It seems that that's a lesson that needs to be relearned from generation to generation -- the lesson that weakness can be provocative, that it can entice others into adventures they otherwise would have avoided, that a refusal to confront gathering dangers can increase rather than reduce future peril. And that while there are risks to acting to be sure -- and there are risks to acting -- there are also risks to failing to act, and that ultimately victory comes from those who are steadfast.

It's with those lessons in mind that the President and a truly historic coalition of more than 90 nations have sought to confront a new and perhaps even more dangerous enemy -- an enemy without a country, an enemy without a conscience -- one that seeks no armistice, no truce with us or with the civilized world. From the outset of the conflict, it was clear that our coalition had to go on the offense against the terrorists: the need to pursue terrorists and regimes that provide them comfort and aid, to establish relationships with new allies and bolster international coalitions to prosecute the war, and the need to work with moderate Muslim leadership to undermine the terrorists' ideological foundation.

Al Qaeda was a growing danger long before September 11th, 2001. Osama bin Laden was safe and sheltered in Afghanistan. His network was dispersed all across the world.

Today, a bit more than three years later, a large fraction of al Qaeda's key leaders have been detained or killed; and I suspect that Osama bin Laden spends a major portion of each of his days just avoiding being caught.

Once controlled by extremists, Afghanistan today is led by President Hamid Karzai, who's helping to lead the world in support of moderates against the extremists. Soccer stadiums in Kabul, once used for public executions under the Taliban only a few years ago, today are used for soccer.

Three years ago in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his sons brutally ruled an important nation in the heart of the Middle East. Saddam was attempting to regularly kill American and British air crews that were enforcing the southern and northern no-fly zones. He ignored more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions. He was paying \$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers.

And last December, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. Special Operations Forces and by the 4th Infantry Division. He's no longer killing tens of thousands of innocent people. He's in a cell -- a prisoner awaiting trial by the Iraqis. His sons are dead after refusing to surrender to the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne.

Some 112,000 trained and equipped Iraqis today now provide security for their fellow citizens. Under the new Iraqi leadership, Iraq is determined to fight the terrorists and to build over time a peaceful society.

Interestingly, NATO is now leading ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan. It's also helping to train Iraqi security forces near Baghdad. For NATO to be operating outside of the NATO treaty area, outside of Europe, for the first time in the history of that alliance, is a truly historic move.

Here at home, the demands of the global war on terror have given an even greater impetus to the need to transform our armed forces. The armed forces, as you know, are faced with an increasingly complex array of missions. With the leadership of Les Brownlee and Pete Schoomaker, and using the President's emergency powers, the size of the active duty Army has increased by about 30,000 troops, and is being reorganized into more agile, more lethal, and more readily deployable brigades -- brigades with the protection, firepower and logistics assets necessary to sustain them. And we're currently increasing the number of these new, more capable Army brigades from 33 to 43 or possibly 48, over the coming two-and-a-half to three or three-and-a-half years.

In addition, the Army is restructuring and retraining the active component and the reserve components to achieve a more appropriate 21st century balance to get a distribution of skill sets between the active force and the reserve components to fit this new century -- to improve total force responsiveness -- and so that Reservists and Guardsmen will be called somewhat less often, possibly for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability.

The ability of the armed services -- the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard -- to work together is increasing. It has to increase. Jointness has to become the rule and not an occasional luxury. Communications and intelligence activities have been improved, and we have significantly expanded the capabilities and the missions of the Special Operation Forces. And they are doing a truly outstanding job for our country, let there be no doubt.

Since the global war on terror began, our coalition has worked to undercut the extremists' efforts. Our world is, I suppose it's fair to say, divided between regions where freedom and democracy have been nurtured, and areas of the world where people are subjected to tyranny.

And if one were to look down from Mars on the globe, we would see that it is those countries with political and economic freedom that are providing the most for their people; and those countries that have repressive systems, centralized systems, tyrannical systems that are denying their people the opportunities available elsewhere in the world.

In Afghanistan, over 8 million people voted in this month's election. They were hoping to get 6 million people registered; 8 million voted. People dressed in their best clothes. They got up at 3:00 in the morning and they walked miles in the cold to go vote. A long line of women stayed in line, even after some explosives went off about a hundred yards from their polling place.

Iraq now has an interim constitution that includes a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. There are municipal councils in almost every major city in Iraq, most towns and most villages, and provincial councils for all of the 18 provinces. The Iraqis are now among those in the world who are allowed to say and write and watch and listen to whatever they want and whenever they want, and it's clear that governments and the people in the Middle East are taking note.

I flew over much of Iraq a week and a half ago, I guess, coming in from the south, went to the west, went in towards Baghdad, went north, and it's a different country than one sees. It is different in different parts of the country, to be sure, but it is a very different one from what the people here in the United States see. The schools are open with new books. The clinics are open. There's a stock market. The economy's strong. The oil listings are back up where they were. The electricity is at or better than where it was. It is not burning and smoking in a way that one believes it to be by watching television. I don't talk to anybody who comes out of there who isn't struck by the contrast between what they experienced on the ground and the good things being done by the young men and women in the Army and in the Air Force and in the Navy and in the Marine Corps for the people of that country.

It's also clear that the people in the Middle East are taking note of what's happening in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Now, there have been setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, to be sure. And on a bad day, Iraq is not a pretty picture. But the road from tyranny to freedom has never been peaceful, it's never been tranquil, it's never been without bumps. It's always been difficult and dangerous everywhere. It was tough for the United States. It was tough for Germany and Japan and Italy. And the idea that the path from a repressive system to a free democratic system is or could be easy is fanciful. It isn't easy. It's hard. It's tough.

But these enemies cannot defeat the coalition in a conventional battle, let alone in a war. But of course they don't seek conventional war. Their weapons are terror and chaos. They want the world to believe that the coalition cannot win; that the free Iraqi and the free Afghan governments cannot win; and that the fight is not worth it; that the effort will be too hard, that the losses will be too great, and that it's simply too ugly for an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week. They attack any sort of hope or progress in an effort to try to undermine morale -- the morale of the Afghans, the morale of the Iraqis, the morale of the coalition countries, and -- let there be no doubt -- the morale of the American people. They're convinced that if they can win the battle of perceptions -- and they are superb at managing perceptions, much better than free societies are, that's for sure. But they're convinced that if they can win that battle of perceptions, managing the media and affecting people's thinking -- that we will lose our will and toss in the towel.

Well, they're wrong. Failure in Afghanistan or in Iraq would exact a perfectly terrible toll in this world. It would embolden the extremists. It would make the world a vastly more dangerous place. It would turn it all over to those who would lead the world into a dark, dark place.

Our 26th president, the Commander-in-Chief, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote in his autobiography that, "The worst of all fears is the fear of living." He was correct, and we cannot allow the terrorists, the extremists, to win this struggle and destroy the way of life of free people.

From Baghdad to Kabul, Madrid, Bali, the Philippines, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the call has been sounded, and the outcome of this struggle will determine the nature of our world for some decades to come. These enemies will not be wished away.

Those who behead innocent people on television, those who seek to enslave others, have shown that they were perfectly willing to do literally anything to achieve their goals. The deaths of the innocent people that they kill are not incidental in this war. Indeed, innocent men, women and children are in fact the target in this war, and the extremists will willingly kill hundreds and thousands more.

The world has gasped, if you will, at the brutality of the extremists: the hundreds of children in Russia who were killed or wounded on their very first day of school; the commuters blown up in the trains in Madrid on their way to work; innocents murdered in the nightclub in Bali; the cutting off of heads on television. Should these terrorists acquire the world's most lethal weapons -- and they are seeking them, to be sure -- the lives of tens of thousands could be at stake.

There have been losses, and they have been borne heavily by the United States Army -- active, Reserve, and Guard alike.

Every loss is deeply felt.

Today, as before, the hard work of history falls to our country, to the U.S. armed forces, and certainly to the United States Army. Our people have been entrusted with the gift of freedom, and it is for each generation to safeguard and to defend that freedom. And as the brave men and women in uniform face these new challenges, they can know that the great sweep of human history is for freedom, and that that is on our side.

The Afghans are making it, thanks to the U.S. military, thanks to the coalition forces, and most of all, thanks to the Afghan people, who are reaching out for freedom courageously.

And the Iraqi people have a good crack at making it as well. And I believe they will make it, and I believe it will be because I have so much confidence in the American people winning that test of wills which we face.

So I thank you all. May God bless the men and women of the United States Army and our great country. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html>

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
2004 NOV - 01 1: 54

July 28, 2004

000.5

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Caleb Carr

Next week I would like to have Caleb Carr come in for lunch with Doug Feith, me and possibly Pete Pace to talk about the attached article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Carr, Caleb. "Wrong Definition for a War," *WashingtonPost*, July 28, 2004, p. 19.

DHR:dh
072804-11

.....
Please respond by 8/5/04

28 JUL 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44969

OSD 17300-04

Washington Post
July 28, 2004
Pg. 19

Wrong Definition For A War

By Caleb Carr

Toward the end of its widely praised report, the Sept. 11 commission offers a prescriptive chapter titled "What to Do?" There, it makes an assertion that is genuinely shocking. It says that in our current conflict, "the enemy is not just 'terrorism,' some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism [the report's emphasis] -- especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology."

At a stroke, in other words, the members of the commission have tried to rewrite the terms of the global war on terrorism and turn it into a global war on Islamist terrorism alone.

It seems almost incredible that we could have been at war this long without defining precisely who or what we are at war with. But such is the case, and it has never seemed an urgent matter to lawmakers. When I appeared before a congressional subcommittee studying strategies for the war on terrorism in 2002 and suggested that the first step should be the promulgation of just such a uniform definition, the members were momentarily dumbstruck. To their credit, they soon recovered and we began to discuss the issue, but a comprehensive definition of terrorism for the use of the American government and the education of the American people never emerged. Now, however, the president and his supporters are apparently ready to instantly approve the radical definition set forward by the commission.

Terrorism, as defined by military historians, has been a constant, ugly feature of warfare, an aberrant tactic akin to slavery, piracy and genocide. One of the reasons that some of us argued throughout the 1990s for undertaking of genuine war on terrorism (involving the military in addition to intelligence and law enforcement) was the notion that we might finally declare the tactic -- like those other aberrant belligerent methods -- to be out of bounds, for the armed forces of civilized nations and non-state organizations alike.

It's true that both slavery and piracy are still practiced, but only in remote corners of the world; certainly genocide is still with us, but its employment is now cause for immediate sanction and forceful reaction (theoretically, at any rate) by the United Nations. Banning such tactics and actively stamping out their practice has been the work of some of the great political and military minds and leaders of the past two centuries. Now it is time -- past time, really -- for terrorism to take its place as a similarly proscribed and anachronistic practice.

But first we must agree on an internationally acceptable definition. Certainly terrorism must include the deliberate victimization of civilians for political purposes as a principal feature -- anything else would be a logical absurdity. And yet there are powerful voices, in this country and elsewhere, that argue against such a definition. They don't want to lose the weapon of terror -- and they don't want to admit to having used it in the past. Should the United States assent to such a specific definition of terrorism, for example, it would have to admit that its fire-bombings of German and Japanese cities during World War II represented effective terrorism. On the other hand, few Muslim nations want to go up against the power of organized terrorist groups by declaring them de jure as well as de facto outlaws.

In the intellectual arena, meanwhile, the fatuous logic that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom

11-L-0559/OSD/44970

fighter" keeps left-leaning intellectuals away from the cause of definition. And so its promulgation continues to elude the world, even as we have embarked on a war against the phenomenon itself.

The Sept. 11 commission evidently also came to feel, during its months of sitting, that defining terrorism was too thorny a problem to be undertaken in anything but a partial and temporary manner. Fighting wars against tactics, they announced -- fighting wars over the nature of war itself -- is simply too complicated. We need to fight specific wars about people, not general wars about ideas (the American Revolution, the Civil War and two world wars notwithstanding).

By this token, any and all intellectual or moral meaning is removed from our military undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as from the global war on terrorism generally. What began as a war between modernism and medievalism, between progressive ideas of how to reform war and regressive notions of cataclysmic conflicts, will, if the commission's recommendations are fully implemented, become instead a "clash of civilizations" between extremist Western and extremist Muslim values: a simplistic, devastating confrontation. In a terribly ironic but real sense, the final hijacking of Sept. 11 will be the commandeering of the global war on terrorism itself.

What the commission fails to see is that the word "extremist" (or "Islamist") is not what will be heard on the "Arab street," or indeed much of anywhere else in the world, when the new enemy is proclaimed. George Bush initially reacted to the Sept. 11 attacks by calling for a "crusade" against terrorism, but many Muslims heard only one word, "crusade," and they heard it in its historical rather than its rhetorical sense. The West, that word implied, is coming again to take control of Muslim nations and holy places, just as it did after the turn of the last millennium. The president later apologized for his thoughtlessness, but the damage had been done.

And now, when the Sept. 11 commission says that terrorism is no longer the enemy, that Islamist extremism has assumed that role, most Muslims are going to hear the same sort of threatening, generalized message, one constantly repeated by Osama bin Laden: The Americans are not really concerned with terrorism -- in fact, they've practiced it throughout their history; what they are embarked on is a war against Islam itself.

The commission should immediately amend its report, and reassert, rather than deny, that we are indeed engaged in a global war against terrorism, whoever practices it. (They might also think to recommend that, at some point soon, the United States formally repudiate the deliberate victimization of civilians, something it has never done.) Then President Bush, Sen. John Kerry and all national leaders should support the change in message. The war on terrorism began not as a crusade about ideology but as a pragmatic war about war. It must remain such.

The writer is professor of military history at Bard College and the author, most recently, of "The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians."

11-L-0559/OSD/44971

FOUO

SECRET

July 26, 2004

2004 NOV -1 PM 1:54

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vigilante

Please take a look at this cable. I have never heard of this fellow. How do we deal with this?

Thanks.

Attach.
Reuters file

DHR:dh
072604-27

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04.

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44972

OSD 17303-

DOCUMENT_ID: OW44634135
 DOCST: ACTIVE
 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
 VENDOR: REUTERS
 PUBNAME: REUTERS LIBRARY SERVICE
 ORIGDATE: 200407210518
 PUBLISHR: REUTERS
 PUBNO: a1903
 DOR: 20040721
 TOR: 051829
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 TITLE: Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.

TOPLINES:

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was

TEXT:
 ^BC-AFGHAN-VIGILANTES (PICTURE)@

^Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.@

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was working for the U.S. government.

Jonathan "Jack" Idema said he had been in frequent contact with the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies in the course of his work tracking Islamic militants in Afghanistan, including al Qaeda members.

"We were working for the U.S. counter-terrorist group and working with the Pentagon and some other federal agencies," Idema told reporters before the opening of his trial.

"We were in contact directly by fax and email and phone with Donald Rumsfeld's office," he said, referring to the U.S. Secretary of Defence.

The U.S. military and NATO peacekeepers have said the group was not acting on behalf of, or in conjunction with, their forces.

Idema and his two American colleagues were arrested on July 5 after a brief shootout in Kabul. They and some Afghan accomplices had illegally detained and interrogated eight people they believed to be terrorists, Afghan officials said.

The three face up to 15 years in prison if found guilty of illegally detaining and torturing people.

The arrests have been a headache for foreign forces in Afghanistan, where the U.S. military has been under scrutiny for its treatment of suspected militant prisoners.

The U.S. military has been accused by U.S.-based Human Rights Watch of "systematic" abuse of detainees.

The court sat for about two hours on Wednesday with a prosecutor giving details of the charges against Idema and his two colleagues, identified as Edward Caraballo and Brent Bennett. Idema said Caraballo was a journalist.

Idema, wearing dark glasses, combat boots, khaki trousers and a shirt with a U.S. flag on the shoulder was brought into court in handcuffs. The handcuffs were removed when the trial began.

UNCLASSIFIED

Idema told reporters he had broken up an assassination plot against Afghan government ministers and captured a Taliban intelligence chief in May and passed him to U.S. military authorities.

The trial was adjourned for 15 days.
Reut05:18 07-21-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44974
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2

720
FOUO

Mr. Di Rita

FYI

July 20, 2004

No action
required

b.p.

032

file
M 1:54

TO: Paul Butler
RADM Jim Stavridis
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mary Bono

When are we having Congresswoman Bono down here?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072004-5

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

7/30
DU 8/31

~~Secret~~

Powell Moore
discussed this with
her and she said she
would enjoy coming but
simply wanted you to know
how much she supports what
you are doing. We'll
get her in sometime.

2074104

FOUO

OSD/17305-04

D. Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/44975

720

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 12, 2004
2004 JUL -1 PM 1:54

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Second Three-Star Billet for SOCOM

210 (324)

I have reviewed your memo to me on this subject and understand your suggested strategy to pay for this billet.

I am concerned that continued use of emergency powers authority may well cause us problems in the future. There are a few scenarios I can think of which might suddenly withdraw the authority from us. I am aware of three or four generals we have already appointed to positions based on this authority. More will only make the potential problem worse. Furthermore, it doesn't feel right to use this authority in the "semi-permanent" fashion that we seem to be heading toward.

At this time, I do not want to authorize the second three-star billet at SOCOM using this authority. Instead, I believe we can identify an existing three-star billet as a billpayer. It seems to me that within 60 days we should be able to identify the billpayer. If that position is encumbered and cannot be vacated in the short term, at that time I will consider using emergency powers as the authority for the SOCOM billet until the billpayer billet is unencumbered.

Thanks.

Attach.

Memos from CJCS re second three-star billet for USSOCOM: 5/27/04, 3/30/04, nom package

DHR:dh
070604-1

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

1204104

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11-L-0559/OSD/44976

OSD 173 07 -04

UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/5/27*

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Second Three-Star Billet for USSOCOM

- Recommend establishing a second three-star position in USSOCOM to perform all the operational functions under the Commander. USSOCOM is unique in having both Unified Combatant Commander/Geographical Combatant Commander in addition to service responsibilities. The current Deputy Commander would perform the duties similar to a Service Vice-Chief.
- Suggest a two-part strategy in order to quickly establish this new three-star position.
 - Initially establish the position using your authority under 10 USC § 527 to exceed active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling.
 - Establishing a temporary three-star position in USSOCOM will provide sufficient time to identify, staff, and vacate a current three-star position to downgrade or civilianize.
 - Preliminary guidance is to identify a joint three star position in either the European theater, head of DoD Agency, or President of NDU to downgrade or civilianize as appropriate. I will provide a recommendation within six months with the objective to implement by end of FY06.
- At TAB A is General Brown's detailed explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the two USSOCOM key leadership positions requiring the grade of three-star.
- For your consideration, I have also enclosed the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, US Special Operations Command and appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense exercise his authority to exceed the active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling under 10 USC § 527 and forward Major General Dailey's nomination to the President for approval.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral T. J. Keating, DJS (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/44977



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

27 May 2004
GFO 159/11-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, and DoD Instruction 1320.4, the Acting Secretary of the Army has recommended Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, and appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. The Acting Secretary also asks that this position be designated a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general.

2. This nomination requires you to exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceiling to fill this temporary position under the provision of Title 10, United States Code, section 527 and executive order 13223.

3. I have reviewed Major General Dailey's performance in three joint assignments. While serving as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, he specially organized, trained, and equipped assigned forces to conduct time sensitive, surgical special operations across the spectrum of conflict. Major General Dailey tirelessly improved inter-operability with all subordinate commands and other joint units as well as leveraged scarce resources to improve training facilities and initiate world-class information operations. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.

4. I concur with the Acting Secretary's nomination of Major General Dailey for this assignment, appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, and that this position be designated as a position of importance and responsibility. I recommend you forward it to the President for approval.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers".

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/44978



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

MAR 30 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

We recommend the President designate the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C. Section 601, and that the President nominate Major General Dell L. Dailey, age 54, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment to this position. Major General Dailey has served as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, since September 2003. His mandatory retirement date is July 1, 2009, based on time in service.

In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., and DoD Instruction 1320.4, a proposed memorandum for the President is enclosed. Major General Dailey is a graduate of the United States Army War College. He has served in three joint duty assignments, but is not a joint specialty officer.

The Director, Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, United States Special Operations Command is currently a two-star billet. The upgrade of this position to a three-star billet is temporary. We request that you exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceilings to fill the position under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., section 527; accordingly, this position will not count against the Army's general officer strength ceilings.

All systems of records, to include Equal Employment Opportunity files and the Standard Form 278 (Public Financial Disclosure Report), maintained in the Department of Defense that pertain to this officer have been examined. The files contain no adverse information about this officer since his last Senate confirmation. Further, to the best of our knowledge, there is no planned or ongoing investigation or inquiry into matters that constitute alleged adverse information on the part of this officer.

If selected for this position of importance and responsibility, we request approval to frock Major General Dailey to the grade of lieutenant general upon his confirmation by the Senate, but no earlier than 60 days prior to assuming his new duties. If the exemption is approved, this action will not cause the Department of the Army to exceed the number of officers authorized to serve in the grade of lieutenant general.

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

Major General Dailey's career resume is enclosed.



Peter J. Schoomaker
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff



R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Enclosures



United States Army

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

**Deputy Commanding General
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310
since September 2003**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
Shippensburg University - MPA - Public Administration

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) Spanish

PROMOTIONS

DATE OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	9 Jun 71
1LT	9 Oct 72
CPT	9 Jun 75
MAJ	1 Feb 83
LTC	1 Mar 89
COL	1 Apr 94
BG	1 Nov 97
MG	1 Jan 01

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FROM

TO

ASSIGNMENT

Jan 72	Feb 73	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 6th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado
Mar 73	Dec 73	Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, United States Army Primary Helicopter School, Fort Wolters, Texas
Dec 73	Sep 74	Executive Officer, 2d Aviation Battalion, later Aviation Officer, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea
Oct 74	Jul 75	Aviation Operations Officer, B Company, 2d Aviation Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

Jul 75	Mar 76	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Mar 76	Jun 76	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Jun 76	Feb 78	Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, later Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Feb 78	Apr 78	Assistant G-3 (Operations), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia
Apr 78	Apr 79	S-5 (Civil Affairs), later S-4 (Logistics), 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia
Apr 79	Aug 81	Platoon Commander, later Executive Officer, Air Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 81	Nov 81	Operations Officer S-3, Command and Control Squadron, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Nov 81	Apr 83	Commander, Combat Aviation Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Apr 83	Jun 84	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 84	May 85	Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Fort Benning, Georgia
Jun 85	Aug 87	Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Aug 87	Apr 89	Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC
Apr 89	Jul 91	Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia
Jul 91	Jun 93	Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jun 93	Jul 94	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Oct 94	Oct 96	Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Oct 96	Aug 98	Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Aug 98	Jul 00	Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
Jul 00	Sep 03	Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Commander, 160th Aviation Battalion, 3d Special Operations Command, OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia	Sep 90 – Apr 91	Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	Aug 98 – Jul 00	Brigadier General

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

Commanding General, Joint Special Operations
Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Jul 00 - Sep 03

Brigadier General/
Major General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Master Army Aviator Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 17 March 2004



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, be designated as a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 601(a). I also recommend the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and his assignment as the Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Major General Dailey, age 54, is currently serving as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This is a new, temporary position, established to augment United States Special Operations Command's mission to defeat the Global War on Terrorism.

To carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions, both in his own Service and in the joint arena. The general officer must be capable of planning and synchronizing the Department of Defense effort in the Global War on Terrorism. He must be thoroughly knowledgeable of the overall management of a unified command, extensively trained and experienced in the development and execution of global command and control of Special Operations Forces missions and for providing tailored Special Operations Forces capabilities to the designated Combatant Command. Major General Dailey meets these requirements. Major General Dailey possesses the qualifications and broad leadership experience necessary to carry out effectively the duties and responsibilities of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command.

I have exercised my authority to exceed general officer grade and strength ceilings under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 527. Accordingly, this position will not count against the number of general/flag officers authorized under law. This action is based upon the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Army and the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 164(e), the Commander, United States Special Operations Command concurs with this recommendation.

As required by Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on Major General Dailey's performance in his joint duty assignments.

Enclosure

APPROVED _____ DATE _____
President of the United States

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Lieutenant General
Major General Dell L. Dailey, 3747

GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced today that the President has nominated Maj. Gen. Dell L. Dailey, U.S. Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment as director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Dailey is currently serving as the deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, N.C.

~~-END-~~

Major General Dell L. Dailey
Major Permanent Duty Stations/Positions

<u>Duty Station/Duty Assignments</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Total Months in Position</u>
Fort Benning, Georgia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (Operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) 	Jun 84	May 85	11
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) 	Jun 85	Aug 87	26
Washington, DC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 	Aug 87	Apr 89	20
Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia 	Apr 89	Jul 91	27
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) 	Jul 91	Jun 93	23
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) • Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 	Oct 94	Aug 98	24
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command 	Aug 98	Jul 00	23

•	Fort Bragg, North Carolina	Jul 00	Present	
•	• Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command			38
	• Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg			6

As of 30 March 2004

Cathy +
Col B
for action

July 22, 2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AG Meeting

Jim Haynes is going to set up a meeting with the Attorney General and whoever else the AG wants to bring. We will go over there. The meeting should be set for Monday or Tuesday of next week if we can. I would like Haynes, Steve Cambone and probably Geren and Maples to be there.

By Friday morning Haynes is going to give Cambone, Dick Myers and me a packet of material to read. Before we have the meeting next week, we ought to have a meeting of Haynes and Myers to discuss how we are going to handle the AG meeting.

After the AG meeting we are going to think about having a meeting with Will Taft of the State Department.

Thanks.

DHR:db
072204-4

.....
Please respond by _____

337

2250104

July 21, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report

000.5

A couple of thoughts:

1. The issue of reform – set aside the Commission’s recommendations or anyone else’s recommendations for a minute – is an important one, and it is important that it be discussed thoughtfully.
2. The most important thing to do first is to identify the problems one thinks need to be corrected, before coming up with solutions to unidentified problems. To those who would tear down what is falls the responsibility for specifying why it should be changed, and then recommending something better that actually will fix the real problem as first identified.
3. One consideration has to be the new reality that a user of intelligence, whether anyone from the President down to a platoon leader, really doesn’t care where the intelligence comes from. The distinction between national intelligence and tactical military intelligence is somewhat of an anachronism in the sense that information today is coming from a variety of sources – satellites, human intelligence, etc. What is really important is how that information gets to where it is needed. So, in a sense, artificial separations between national and tactical intelligence really are a thing of the last century.

2/14/04

4. Next, there are certain activities – I would include research and development and intelligence gathering – that have historically been shown to benefit from an absence of centralization and regimentation. That is to say, competition and differing views in those areas have historically led to greater innovation and creativity in the case of research and development, and, in the case of intelligence, avoiding the kind of “group think” that can lead to intelligence disasters.

5. When there are problems, and goodness knows there have been problems with respect to intelligence, there is a tendency to rush to make corrections. We don’t want to see damage done in the name of reform. It strikes me it is important to think any reform through carefully, but first identify the problem, have an elevated discussion, and only then consider solutions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072104-13

.....
Please respond by _____

July 20, 2004

320.2

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Gen. John Jumper
 GEN. DICK MYERS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

We have talked about the fact that the Air Force is 20,000+ over authorized end strength. Some weeks ago, when it was 19,000, I asked you to start working that number down. Instead of going down, it has gone up. Why has it ballooned?

I would like to see a plan by Thursday, July 22, that explains how you plan to get it down – with a timeline – and with what adverse effects to the Service.

I also would like to know where you are getting the money out of your program to pay for it, and what it costs to have 20,000 people in the Air Force a year longer than budgeted.

Thanks.

Attach.
 7/13/04 Active & Reserve Strengths Snapshot

DHR:dh
 072004-12

.....
 Please respond by 7/22/04

2074104

Active & Reserve

Active Component

Service	FY04 Authorized End Strength(PB05)	FY04 Waiver Authority *		Current End Strength		% Difference and Authorized End Strengths
		2%	3%	As of May 31, 2004	Difference	
Army	482,400	492,048	496,872	495,763	13,363	2.8%
Navy	373,800	381,276	385,014	376,204	2,404	.6%
Marine Corps	175,000	178,500	180,250	175,048	48	0
Air Force	359,300	366,486	370,079	379,534	20,234	5.6%
Total	1,390,500	1,418,310	1,432,215	1,426,549	36,049	2.6%

Reserve Component

Service	Currently Mobilized
Army	133,200
Navy	2,772
Marine Corps	10,304
Air Force	8,068
Total	154,344

* Section 115 of Title 10 allows Service Secretaries to increase end strength by 2%.

* Section 115 of Title 10 allows SECDEF to increase end strength by an additional 1% for a total of 3%.

* Section 123 of Title 10 removes all end strength limitations during time of war or national emergency.

July 20, 2004

To See Def

~~Paul Butler~~

7/20

IRAQ

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iraqi Stock Exchange

SIR
Current stuff here.
v/r
joi

Please find out today about the Iraqi stock exchange - if one opened, what happened to the market, how many stocks, and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072004-6

.....
Please respond by 7/20/04

7/21

SIR,
Response attached.

v/r
LTC Longyel
7/20

OSD 17322-04

2007104

To: SecDef

July 20, 2004

From: Paul Butler

Cc: Larry Di Rita

Re: Iraqi Stock Exchange

Here is some data on the Iraqi Stock Exchange:

- Opened on June 24, 2004. Open for business only on Wednesdays and Sundays for two hours per day.
- Presently 27 companies are listed but Iraqis expect to list more than 100 by the end of July.
- Trading has been vigorous. An article last Sunday (attached) describes the activity: over 1.43 billion shares worth over \$10 million traded in the Sunday July 18 session (the first session open to the media).
- There is no data on the Iraqi exchange in the Wall Street Journal stock tables. I will check the Financial Times and get back to you.

Also noteworthy is the fact that on July 19 the Iraqis did their first post-Saddam bond issue raising \$103 million for 91 day government bonds at 6.8% interest. The Iraqi government hopes to raise \$1.2 billion this year in twice weekly bond auctions (second article attached).



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Business News - July 20, 2004

Volume Jumps on New Iraq Stock Exchange



July 18, 2004 04:18 PM EDT

Iraqi stock traders bid during a trading session at the well guarded stock exchange building in the center of Baghdad, Iraq. Sunday, July 18, 2004. At present, the Iraq stock exchange is open only on Wednesdays and Sundays from 10 am until midday, but plans are under way to create a six-day trading week. It only has 27 listed companies with about 100 more due to go public in the coming months. (AP Photo/Saeed Khan, Pool)

BAGHDAD, Iraq - The miniature Liberty Bell clanged. Elbows flew. Sweat poured down foreheads. Sales tickets were passed and, with a flick of the wrist, 10,000 shares of the Middle East Bank had more than doubled in value. The frantic pace Sunday of those first 10 minutes of trading typified the enthusiasm behind the Iraq

Stock Exchange - a new institution seen as a critical step in building a new Iraqi economy.

In just five sessions, trading volume has nearly quadrupled and the value of some stocks has surged more than 600 percent, gains traders say reflects the pent up frustration of 15 months of closure.

"How can I not be excited by this?" Taha Ahmed Abdul-Salam, the exchange's chief executive officer, said as he eyed the activity on the trading floor.

The ISX is temporarily housed in a converted restaurant. Looters had gutted the old exchange, so traders now jostle for position in a long room overlooking an old dining room. Where bartenders once chatted with patrons sidling up for drinks, a bank of secretaries log orders.

With space limited, investors are not allowed in the exchange, let alone the "floor." Instead, from a makeshift courtyard, they can look in through the same windows that once offered diners a garden view. Joining them are the posse of men armed with assault rifles who provide security for the exchange.

Such scenes are standard in the tumultuous Iraqi capital. But the

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11-L-0559/OSD/44996



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Market Update

DJIA	NASDAQ	S&P
9:57 AM		
	10,110	
	10,100	
	10,090	
	10,080	
	11	1 3
DJIA	10,095.11	+1.05
S&P	1,101.40	+0.59
NASDAQ	1,891.34	+7.51

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ET - NEW YORK (CBS.MW) -

Insurer Safeco said Tuesday that its careful underwriting practices and low catastrophe payouts helped it double second quarter earnings versus year-ago levels.

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presence of security does little to dampen enthusiasm at the exchange.

The unofficial figures of the day's trade tell the story. Over \$10 million in stocks changed hands, reflecting the movement of about 1.43 billion shares - though only 27 companies are listed on the exchange.

"Iraqis have always been business savvy," said Abdul-Salam, the former research head at the old exchange. "But that we have this much activity with so few companies listed shows just how much pent up frustration there was among investors under the previous regime."

For Iraqis, these days have been a long time coming. The ISX replaces the now-defunct Baghdad Stock Exchange, which was riddled with corruption. Saddam's extended family often muscled in at will by simply issuing new shares for companies they found attractive.

The new exchange has built in safeguards against manipulation. It took about a year to set up, with 12 brokerage houses and banks that own it working alongside former occupation authorities to lay the legal and regulatory framework.

"This is much better than before," said Emad Shakir al-Baghdadi, a broker with the Okaz Co. firm. The removal of a 5 percent cap on price swings has added tremendous credibility and liquidity to the market, he added.

"Look at these prices," he said, glancing at the board showing offers for one industrial company at about 25 dinars, almost two-tenths of a cent. "These shares are ridiculously undervalued. That's why prices are surging as much as 600 percent from day-to-day."

The exchange was inaugurated last month and is open two days a week for two hours a day. Sunday's session was the first open to the media.

Officials say they hope that in a month they will have all 120 companies previously listed on the old exchange on the new ISX's "big board" - actually 27 small white boards, where workers record trades with markers.

Thirty minutes after the ringing of the Liberty Bell replica - a donation from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange - Talib al-Tabatabaie, the ISX's board chairman, hollered into the phone, struggling to be heard over the din from the unairconditioned trading floor.

"Sell? Do you want me to sell them now?" he screamed at a client over the phone, his shirt coming untucked as he waved his arms. "It's up again! We should sell!"

Economists say the key to success is a strong regulatory framework, transparency and accountability. A shift to an electronic trading system is coming, officials say.

11-L-0559/OSD/44997

So are more regulations. Oversight here comes from the Iraq Securities Commission, headed by Luay al-Okali.

"Right now, we're all working together to build up the exchange. Later, when things are running smoother, then we'll give them a hard time," al-Okali said with a wink.

The added bonus will be opening the door for foreign investment. The legal framework is in place, but the details have yet to be completed.

"My hope would be that they would quickly encourage foreign investment," Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist Gary Becker told The Associated Press by telephone. "Foreign investors often want to make sure they have majority ownership."

Brokers and ISX officials predict that the tourism and hospitality sector will be the market's new blue chips.

On Sunday, Baghdad Hotel's shares did not disappoint. In a market when many shares were trading at values equal to a fraction of a penny, the 25-cent offer for the hotel's stock was snapped up.

"Don't forget that Iraq is a tourist country. There's plenty to see here," said Mohammed Ismael, a broker with Qidwa Securities.

As the sound of automatic gunfire reverberated in the distance, he shrugged.

"I guess it will take a little more time for them to come."

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INTERNATIONAL

Iraq raises \$103m in post-Saddam bond sale

July 19, 2004

London - Iraq sold its first bonds since the ouster of Saddam Hussein more than a year ago, raising \$103 million (R607.6 million) from domestic banks.

The central bank in Baghdad will today announce the yield on the 91-day 6.8 percent-interest note.

Iraq's three-week-old government is selling debt to help pay local banks \$3 billion of debt that Saddam's rule and to reduce its reliance on international loans and revenue from oil. The government will hold twice-monthly auctions to raise as much as \$1.2 billion by year-end.

"It shows the sophistication of the Iraqi banking system," said Richard Segal, research director at London brokerage for emerging market securities, including Iraqi debt.

Iraq, the world's number three holder of oil reserves, this month made its first payment on domestic bonds since 1981, paying 507 billion dinars (R2.13 billion) for three-month 6 percent-interest bills to domestic banks during the days of Saddam's leadership.

Today's sale will help it repay another 600 billion dinars of debt that comes due on October 1, said finance minister Aziz Jaafar Hassan said in a weekend interview.

The government will have to overcome investor scepticism about its ability to pay debt. The nation is subjected to frequent attacks by insurgents, about 140 000 US troops are stationed in the country and the nation still has to reach an agreement on \$120 billion of foreign debt.

Meanwhile stockbrokers have reported roaring trade, making three times their monthly salaries on shares bought just one week ago on the revamped Iraq stock exchange.

"It's simply fantastic. I sold shares worth 5 million dinars and made a profit of more than 2 million in one session. What a great day," exclaimed trader Abdul al Jabar.

The bourse, which opened on June 24, enjoyed record trading volumes on its sixth session to date, with more than 2 billion shares swapping hands.

"The volumes seen Sunday are simply historic," said Taha Ahmed Abdulsalam, the chief executive of the exchange.

"This is despite the primitive system we have. Imagine what it would be once the electronic trading system comes," he said, referring to a plan to shift from the old-fashioned paper system to a fully automated one.

Iraq's stock exchange is a product of more than a year's work by 12 brokerage firms and banks in the country. It has 27 listed companies, with about 100 more due to go public in the next six weeks.

The bourse is open only on Sundays and Wednesdays for two hours at a time. - Bloomberg and

July 26, 2004

322

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis
cc: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Event for Combatant Commanders

For the combatant commanders' dinner, we will have:

- Service Chiefs – no substitutes, not the Vice Chief if a Service Chief cannot be there
- combatant commanders
- Craddock and Keating, who are confirmed
- Martin, if he is confirmed
- Chairman and the Vice Chairman
- Admiral Stavridis
- Probably Duncan Hunter and Congressman Skelton.

I think that is the group. Let's pull that together, check it out with Dick Myers, and then we will decide it for sure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072304-16

.....
Please respond by 8/30/04

2674104

July 22, 2004

||

Sir,

I checked with CJCS protocol, and Sunday night, September 19th works well on their schedule, for you to host an event at your residence for the Combatant Commanders. They will all be flying in that day, so it would be the welcoming event.

The President does'NOT host a dinner during this Fall conference, but the Combatant Commanders spouses WILL be accompanying their husbands to Washington.

We will also host the Commanders on Wednesday at the Pentagon, for the Strategic Planning Council and a working lunch, etc.

cc: Admiral Stavridis
Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita

(b)(6)

*Ale
C. Davis*

*- Criddle
Kestring*

Martin if confirmed

*- Savinelli
Hunt
Skelton*

*Chi
Vice
Gmr. 9.*

July 26, 2004

383.6

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Bartlett

Please get back to Roscoe Bartlett and Murtha and tell them what happened – that SGT Davis was interviewed and so forth.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/20/04 CJCS memo to SecDef, CM-1946-04 [OSD 10977-04]

DHR:dh
072604-2

.....

Please respond by 8/9/04

26 Jul 04

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information

J
7/23

What should we do about getting that person who said **he knew** information about the abuses? He is in Roscoe Bartlett's Congressional district **and briefed** Murtha and someone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-14

.....
Please respond by *5/28/04*

Det 7/24

Sir,
Response attached.

V/R
Lt Col Lengyel
7/23

Tab

OSD 10977-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1946-04
20 July 2004

04-7/26

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard D. Myers, CJCS *RDMyers 7/20*

SUBJECT: Information

- **Question.** "What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about abuses? He is in Roscoe Barlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else." "
- **Answer.** The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed SGT Davis and there is no action required.
- **Analysis**
 - SGT Davis is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, Virginia. While assigned in Iraq with 372nd MP Company, his duties included escorting detainees in and out of Abu Ghraib (Oct 2003-Nov 2003).
 - SGT Davis provided a statement to Army CID dated 27 May 04 in which he claims to have witnessed certain treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib to include: 1) Naked detainees handcuffed together and to the bars of the cell being yelled at by interrogators; 2) Naked detainees being ordered to low-crawl on the floor, and; 3) PFC England taking photos of detainees.
 - SGT Davis reported what he saw to his chain of command while in Iraq. His platoon commander gave a written reprimand to a CPL involved in the events witnessed by SGT Davis. In addition, when it was brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of Fort Lee that SGT Davis had information about possible detainee abuse, the Commanding Officer reported this to CID, resulting in CID interviewing SGT Davis. The information provided by SGT Davis is still part of a current investigation. This information was provided by CID Agent **Worth** of the Detainee Task Force and the agent that interviewed SGT Davis.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated.

Prepared By: LtCol Richard E. Grant; USMC; OCJCS/LC; (b)(6)

TSA SD	<i>X</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>mm</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 7/23</i>

OSD 10977-04

1-L-0559/OSD/45004

file

July 26, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo

IRAQ

Do you think we ought to get this memo you gave me to Casey?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/03 MFR: Impressions - Iraq - 19-23 October 2003

DHR:dh
072604-6

.....
Please respond by _____



DR 7/27

SecDef -
- Yes - though some of the issues raised in the memo may be addressed by now, cannot be sure
- I will forward to Gen Casey to ensure he has seen

7/26

~~FOUO~~

267104

SecDef -

10/30

- author is a retired Army Colonel
- he has assisted in preparing every Army unit that has served in the Balkans
- his specialty is negotiations training
- he went to Iraq to gain situational awareness in the 4 ID area (Tikrit)
- he will assist in training the Division that replaces the 4 ID.

C

29 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Impressions – IRAQ – 19-23 October 2003

This memo contains my impressions developed during a 19-23 October 2003 visit to Iraq. I am indebted to the commanders who opened their thoughts and units to me. This is not meant to be a critical piece, as I have not walked in their moccasins. I have not written letters to families as have these great leaders. This is intended to be a forward looking, not a rearward pointing, think piece.

1. An infantry battalion commander told me, "You can't assume kindness will win their hearts. You've got to get in sync with the Arab male mentality – then they will respect you – tough but fair.
2. From point 1 comes the need to balance "Dignity and Respect" with operating within the cultural norms. Do we compromise our values to operate within their value set as did Laurence of Arabia? At what point on the toughness scale does the new unit enter the fray? This is a really tough decision for the leadership of the new unit – and I do not think it should be left to subordinate leaders to make this determination.
3. Units have got to have their game face on before they leave the operating base. Standards have got to be impeccable. This means looking correct enough that no one who wants to live would dare attack you. Units that do not demonstrate this degree of professionalism will invite attacks. I went on an early morning raid with a mechanized unit. We looked as tough as tough could be. The operation went off without incident – every soldier looked ready for action all the time. As we returned, after daylight, we passed a logistics convoy. Soldiers were not postured with the same alertness as ours; some were out of uniform. Later on, we observed a lone vehicle drive by – the policy is three, two of which must have crew served weapons. Both the convoy and the lone vehicle were inviting attacks. In the train up for this mission, I would inflict kills every time on ill disciplined convoys and lone vehicles to make the "Game Face" point.
4. Before Units enter theater, everyone must understand the capabilities of CA, PSYOPS, CI, THT. I also hear this point consistently from rotations in the Balkans.
5. Units training for this mission need to practice drills from vehicles in all environments for ambushes, raids, and manning Ops.
6. Translators should be treated as a pacing item. The battalion that I joined for the raid only had three translators – one was a CAT II, the other two were hired locally by the battalion. I am told not every battalion has a CAT II. We have forgotten what we learned in the Balkans. How do we manage perceptions, win hearts and minds, or just

Civil Affairs

Counterintelligence

*Tactical
Hunter Teams*

operate safely if we cannot communicate with the population? Soldiers detain people, search homes, and order people around without being able to explain to them what is happening. This is a recipe for disaster.

7. I spoke to a CPA representative who routinely speaks with a local Imam. In a recent conversation the Imam stated that three months ago, he used to get one request a week for a Fatwa (sp) to kill an American soldier. These requests have increased to three a day. The two main reasons for the requests are:

- a. The way we treat their woman
- b. The detention of their men

Now think back to the shortage of translators – This could be a second or third order effect of poor communications – we can't reach the people.

8. There is always the feeling that "platoon headquarters" does not know what is going on. Most useful intelligence seems to be self generated by units. Scott St-Cyr has the key. Some days ago he expressed his philosophy to me. He said, "I work for the king. The king can be the squad leader who needs the information." That is really healthy – but tough.

9. Relationships are more important here than they are for units operating in the Balkans - - build them fast; but watch who you build them with. A commander can give stature to a thug just by paying attention to him in a group.

10. All operations should be preceded with a risk assessment. The next step is to rigorously seek ways to mitigate risk. Absent this, force protection can be a crap shoot.

11. Each time units mount an operation, we will, by nature, upset a portion of the population. We should use Information Ops to mitigate this much the same as we identify actions to mitigate risk after doing a risk assessment. Actions might be as simple as the production of a flyer explaining what we are doing and why; a phone number for an IRAQI OFFICE that family can contact to get information on detained family members; could be a MEDCAP etc.

12. Instincts are important. Leaders and troops must know what right looks like. Then, instinctively, they must know something is out of the ordinary.

13. We've got to get out front of the enemy's IO. I heard over and over again, "Sheiks are the internet of IRAQ" – figure out how to leverage them!

14. Don't write checks you can't cash. Don't write checks your boss can't cash. Don't promise anything till you've checked and double checked, and have the resources under your control. The first time you promise something and don't deliver, you have no credibility with an Arab.

15. As the National Governing Council and field offices mature, operations and cooperation in the field will become more difficult. The Council in Baghdad is driving to

centralization. The CPA and the Coalition is driving, bottom up, to decentralization. They are on a collision course. One of the implications is provincial governments, put in place by the Coalition, are not being paid -- by the government in Baghdad. They seem to be on a collision course.

16. Right seat left seat rides are significantly more important here than they are in the Balkans. Incoming commanders must gain a complete understanding of players and history of previous unit's operations in the AO. The implications can be tremendous.

17. Troops I interviewed from previous rotations commented about conditions changing so much that ROE change or supplemental instructions were required, but not forthcoming. It might be prudent to review ROE regularly against METT-T-C. It might also be prudent to regularly review how ROE are being operationalized by subordinate units. In the extreme, frustration can be one heck of an enemy; it got my generation My Lai.

Ed McCarthy

29 OCTOBER 2003

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

file

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 2, 2004E

2004 NOV - 1 PM 2:10
820

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Militias

IRAN

I left one thing out when we had that meeting on the Iraqi Security Forces, and that is how we handle the militias. That has to be a part of the security situation in the country, and it should have a separate section in the approach.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070204-5

.....
Please respond by 7/

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17326-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45010

11-L-0559

SJS 04-04431

-Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS

From: Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 1:30 PM
To: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD
Cc: Leonard, Kevin A, COL, JCS SJS; Koles, Robert E, Lt Col, JCS SJS
Subject: Request for closure of SF-820 Militias

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CDR Nosenzo,

At a 2 July CJCS/MNF-I/CENTCOM SVTC, Gen Casey (MNF-I) stated militias should be woven into the plan for Iraqi Security Forces and CJCS agreed. MNF-I is taking appropriate action on SecDef's memo (SF-820).

Recommend Joint Staff action be closed out.

v/r
Fran Dillard

(b)(6)



tasker_04-04431.p
df

July 26, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Good News Story

383.6

You might want to take a look at this story and see if you can move it around.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/23/04 Fax from SecState on Major Garrity

DHR:dh
072604-10

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

26074104

(b)(6)



S/ES 200417620
United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Washington, D.C. 20520-5824

July 22, 2004

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DIST
7/22
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NOTE TO ~~THE~~ SECRETARY ✕

Attached is a *summary* of a good news story about an Army Reservist who got it right in her treatment of detainees in Southern Iraq. Maj. Garrity is from Athens, PA - not far from where our farm is located in the far north of the state. Since all we hear from ICRC and the press is bad news about U.S. treatment, this is a story that ought to reach beyond Northern Pennsylvania.

I am copying this to Richard Boucher.


Gene Dewey

A GOLDEN HEART: ATHENS SOLDIER BELOVED BY IMPRISONED IRAQIS
 (summarized from *The Sunday Review*, July 4, 2004)

Pictures from Camp Bucca, a U.S.-run detention center near Umm Qasr in southern Iraq, show a very different picture of prison life than the images of Abu Ghraib that have saturated the media. Notably, the pictures show American soldiers and Iraqi prisoners smiling together. Most of the pictures include Major Stacy Garrity, an Army Reservist from Athens, Pennsylvania.

As Major Garrity used to walk through Camp Bucca, children would chant: "good, good major!" They would give her a small, braided "friendship bracelets." At least one detainee wrote to her that "when we see you, we feel hope." Iraqi generals at the camp called her "GoldenHeart." To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

Garrity served at Camp Bucca for one year, keeping life flowing for the masses of Iraqi detainees. Garrity handled processing at the prison, interacting with everyone who came in and out. She was also responsible for family visitations and interpreters, and she served as a Red Cross liaison.

Garrity took her mission to watch and care for the Iraqis very seriously. Often, she told detainees: "You will never be mistreated while you are here." It was her conviction that anybody who came through the gates at Camp Bucca would be treated with dignity as a human being. She followed the Geneva Conventions, looked out for the detainees and treated everyone with respect and dignity. Iraqis under her care lived in large tents, got water from water buffaloes, and received ice two times a day from the U.S. soldiers. The Iraqis showered twice a day, received extra clothes and blankets, and got cigarettes twice a day.

Garrity also took on projects that were not in her job description. She procured soccer balls, volleyballs, chess, checker and domino sets, and newspapers. She set up a post office system where families could leave letters for detainees. She helped a Christian orphanage nearby get money, toys, clothes and food. She helped design a family visiting system, arranging schedules and organizing bus drivers.

Her attention to prisoners' well-being earned her affection, as evidenced by the gifts and thank-you cards given to her by Iraqi prisoners. One detainee in particular didn't want to leave Camp Bucca. A young Iraqi who speaks three languages kept committing minor crimes so he could keep coming back to Camp Bucca. Each time he would be released he would say "Major Garrity, I'll see you in two days!" And in two days he would return.

When Garrity received word this spring that she was going home, the detainees were very upset by the news. Many of the detainees invited her to visit their families - they think of her as a sister. It was because she cared. And she helped. Helping was her job, Garrity insists. Most of all, it makes sense. One of the most important things, she believes, "is to win hearts and minds." If Iraqis like Americans, they won't hurt Americans.

Garrity has also served in Haiti six times for short-term missions and in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War as an administrative officer. Garrity graduated from Bloomsburg University, where she joined the ROTC, with a business administration degree.

TWELVE - A — THE SUNDAY REVIEW, JULY 4, 2004

Heroes

A golden heart

Athens soldier beloved by imprisoned Iraqis

BY NANCY COLEMAN

(570) 245-1633

The Daily/Sunday Review

Stacy Garrity used to walk through camp, under the stinging sunlight. Her boots crunched the sand.

Dark-haired kids would see her. "Good, good major!" they'd chant. Perhaps one would run up with a small, green, braided object like a rope. He'd give it to her.

It was called a "friendship bracelet."

And she was their friend.

This was Camp Bucca, a southern Iraq detainee center. Stacy, from Athens, a U.S. Army Reserve officer, served there a year, keeping life flowing for its masses of Iraqi prisoners.

"Golden Heart." That's what some Iraqi generals there called her. To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

"When we see you, we feel hope," at least one person wrote to her.

It was because she cared. And she helped.

Why?

Well, there's the Geneva Convention. And issues of dignity and respect. And good common sense.

But for this young woman with blue eyes and golden curls ... who travels the world ... who's gone to Haiti six times on short-term missions ... who wears a small cross ring ... who likes to smile — there's some-



Submitted photo

Maj. Stacy Garrity of Athens stands with some young friends during her recent year in Iraq. Garrity, a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, served at Camp Bucca detainee center in southern Iraq.

thing more. "Something that has to be inside you," she says.

"I genuinely like people," she states simply.

"It's easy for me ... it's not a burden."

Stacy graduated from Sayre High in 1982. At first interested in political science, she finally earned a business-administra-

tion degree from Bloomsburg University. Today, she's product marketing manager at Ocrant-Sylvania in North Towanda. Her father and his wife, Howard and Tammy Lynn Garrity, live in Waverly, and her mom, Beverly Arbia, and her husband, John, in Scranton. And — Stacy doesn't want to

miss anyone — she has three sisters, Maureen, Paige and Jennifer; one living grandmother, June Garrity of Sayre, and a fiancé, Dan Gizzi of Elmira.

Years ago, her parents joined the Navy Reserve. Try it!

See HEART, Page 13A



July 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Turkish MoD

3335D

Have I sent a thank you to the Turkish MoD? If not, I should. Please draft it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-3

.....
Please respond by 7/12/04

80104



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 2 2004

His Excellency Mehmet Vecdi Gonul
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Turkey

Dear Minister Gonul:

Thank you so much for your warm hospitality. **Joyce** and I thoroughly enjoyed our visit to Istanbul. We found the dinner at the Officers Club delightful and the Gala evening at the Topkapi Palace spectacular. We wish we had been able to stay longer.

Please do express my appreciation to **Mrs. Gonul**. It was a pleasure to be with her.

Turkey organized and hosted a truly memorable Summit.

With best wishes and appreciation,

Sincerely,

OSD 09956-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45018

July 13, 2004

TO: Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF
President, National Defense University

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NDU Accomplishments

Thanks so much for your memo on accomplishments over the last year. It sounds like a lot of good work is being done there.

Congratulations.

DHR:dh
071304-6

.....
Please respond by _____

1/12
8
9 Jul 04

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense (CY FOR)
Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff

FROM: President, National Defense University

Mike D.

Subject: Accomplishments Over the Last Year

Sirs, I wanted to give you some thoughts on the changes we have made during my first year at NDU.

Transformation – we have thoroughly infused the curricula in all our colleges with transformation – from transformational leadership, transformational organizations, to transformational thinking. However, we are still not satisfied. Art Cebrowski is in the process of funding us to develop curriculum for a certificate program in Transformational Leadership – which could be used in all war colleges (Army, Navy, Air, etc.),

GWOT -- Adjusted curricula to reflect the long-term nature of the conflict. Have focused on differences of views between US/allies and others. Have brought our international students forcefully into the debate. And have brought many senior policy makers to speak – in order to ensure we present the USG point of view. Have conducted workshops/roundtables for CPA, Amb Negroponte, and for Generals Casey and Sharp. Have conducted exercises for EUCOM and Government of Greece to enhance security for the 2004 Olympics and a major bioterrorism exercise for Secs Ridge, Minetta, Thompson, and other cabinet officials.

Capstone -- many changes – most significantly -- to expose our new GOs/FOs to senior leaders – including both of you, USDP, Dir CIA, and Art Cebrowski. One class even heard from VP Cheney. Secondly, have shifted overseas travel to visit our JTFs – to include GTMO, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Korea, and Horn-of-Africa. Have also visited Israeli Northern Command (watched live Hizballah infiltrations in broad daylight) – great lessons learned. Speaker Gingrich continues to support us with his time and thoughts.

Research -- have refocused our efforts to support our customers in OSD/JS – policy, AT&L, and NII. Have added OSD chairs to the university from policy and AT&L. Have met with DASDs/Directors on products/round tables frequently. Have provided numerous studies and papers: on transformation; stabilization and reconstruction ops; IT in the military; analyzed difficult Homeland security challenges, including bio-terrorism, dirty bombs, and MANPAD threat to civil aviation; studies on implementation of US CT strategy; de-Ba'thification; building new Iraqi defense forces; changing civil-mil relations in the greater Middle East; enhancing stability in Afghanistan; papers on NE Asia and Korea/PRC roles, and others. This year, Joint Force Quarterly celebrated its 10th anniversary and INSS completed its 20th year of operations. We have provided library support to both OSD/JS.

Counter Terrorism Fellow (CTF) Program – A singular success. Is supported by SOLIC – brings international officers from those countries without enough IMET or those which have significant IMET restrictions (e.g. Indonesia), and focuses them on a CT curriculum. About 70 officers per year for 8 month program. A new class enters every 4 months. We expect our first Afghani and Iraqi students this year.

Regional Centers (Africa Center, NESACenter, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies) – All have new directors. Thru Ryan Henry's leadership, are in process of using them in the "battle of ideas." We have new courses on GWOT, created alumni associations – and providing them with high quality information, provided virtual access to our library, shared best practices among the centers, and a myriad of other programs.

Congress – have continued simulated war games and attracted over 80 members and many senior officials – have added scenarios on anthrax, plague, port security and transportation system. Have also run a Korean scenario and have one on China/Taiwan planned for later this month. We have conducted Hill staffer courses – both in terrorism and in "Defense 101," and run brown-bag lunches for Hill staffers. With Ike Skelton's help, we have held Congressional breakfasts – which expose our National War College and ICAF students to members of Congress (and vice versa).

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) – we have broadened JPME: created a course for Capt/USN Lts, created a Joint Advanced Warfighting Course for joint planners, in process of creating a course (named Pinnacle) for prospective JTF Commanders. Are reviewing ideas for joint courses for NCOs, have created Advanced JPME course for Reserve Component (RC) Officers – combination in-residence/DL format, and increased the number of RC two-week courses by 50%.

Sr Leaders – we have made a concerted effort to bring the most senior policy makers to the University to address our students. DSD has visited about a dozen times, Dep Sec State, USDP, USS Political Affairs, DHS, and almost every Combatant Commander and Service Chief have addressed our students. We have gone after many notables – many of which are scheduled to talk – including former Sec Schultz. Pres Bush addressed our classes in February.

International Focus – have expanded our International Fellow (IFs) program with NWC and ICAF by 25% -- seeking to increase the number of countries represented from the arc of instability and from Africa. We are delivering more courses to more people with our regional centers – both here and abroad. We have reinvigorated our international Hall of Fame – where we recognize those IFs who succeed in their country. Working with embassies in Washington and country teams abroad, we have sought out our grads, catalogued their present positions, and sent notes to every Ambassador, DASD/ASD/DASS/ASS informing them that they had people in the AORs which have studied in the US and are likely to have a favorable impression of the US. We urged they be nurtured and included in events when key US officials visited the country. In the near future, we see NDU linked with counterpart

institutions and alumni in almost every country in the world – interacting virtually, by VTC, and in person – seeking to build consensus in support of US objectives. [Presently I correspond with the Commandants from over 50 countries on a routine basis.] We continue to volunteer to host distinguished foreign visitors here – to conduct roundtables with them and to press US views on them. Our experience is that we can say some things in an “academic setting” that can’t be said in formal meetings.

Homeland Security –Have formed a new Institute for Homeland Security Studies (IHSS) – led by Hon Steve Duncan, former ASD (RA) and DOD drug czar under SD Cheney. Purpose of IHSS is to pull together various aspects of HLS in other NDU components and to interface with DHS. We have created a Homeland Security Planner’s Course in support of NORTHCOM. We have developed a range of training and simulation programs designed to enhance interagency planning and cooperation of complex contingencies.

Information Resources Management College – continues to adjust its focus – we have new intensive courses focused on network-centric organizations, DOD enterprise architecture, and building the business case for IT. Curriculum changes were made to update CIO competencies and CIO leadership skills such as collaboration, communication, critical thinking, and leading change. Enrollment in distance learning courses grew to 25 percent of total enrollment, and the College continues to be an innovator in instructional design.

Facilities and Infrastructure. Planning is well under way for a new 240,000 SF Academic and Conference Center – we expect ground breaking Nov 04. We plan to bring numerous NDU elements housed in leased space off campus into what we are tentatively calling “Lincoln Hall.” However, we have an opportunity to build a Homeland Security College – one which serves DOD, DHS, other parts of the government, and state/local authorities. We want DHS to fund the college and help us build the curriculum. Will let you both know of any roadblocks we might face.

Board of Visitors – have reinvigorated the BOV – provided it with more expansive view of NDU activities; have included its members in almost every facet of NDU operations, including overseas travel, key conferences, and workshops. I am very happy with the independent, thoughtful advice I get from the Board.

Funding – we have adequate funding ...but, in priority order, need additional funding for: (1) NESAC center – courses for Afghanis and Iraqis, and for playing an increasingly important role in the battle of ideas in the Presidents’ Greater Middle East Initiative. (2) NCO JPME – this is long overdue, needs resources.

Bottomline: Great things are underway here. We are improving in all we do.

Very Respectfully,

CF: DSD, USDP, DJS

July 19,2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: IRR Numbers

Please have someone get me the Individual Ready Reserve numbers to add to this "Active and Selected Reserve Forces" chart, so I know the total.

Also have them put on the same page the civilian headcount.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/04 "Active and Selected Reserve Forces"

DHR:dh
071904-20

.....
Please respond by _____

Active and Selected Reserve Forces

Service	Active	Guard & Reserve
Army	495,763	555,266
Navy	376,204	83,234
Marine Corps	175,048	39,756
Air Force	379,534	180,950
Total	1,426,549	859,206

FRR

Active Duty as of May 30, 2004
Guard & Reserves as of May 30, 2004

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: RYAN HENRY
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Allegation

383.6

You ought to have someone look into this allegation by the former detainee from Jordan.

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY AMMAN Cable P 1402252JUL 04 ZDK, "Jordanian Released from GITMO Interviewed by Islamic Weekly Al-Sabil, Cites Abuse"

DHR:dh
071404-8

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

1450104

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17331-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45025

7/14

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J

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ZNR UUUU ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0046

UNCLAS AMMAN: 005893

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IZ, JO

S-----T: JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM GITMO INTERVIEWED BY ISLAMIC WEEKLY AL-SABIL, CITES ABUSE

REF: FBIS QN920040707000102

1. JORDAN ISLAMIST WEEKLY AL-SABIL PUBLISHED JULY 6 A LENGTHY INTERVIEW WITH, THEY REPORT, THE FIRST JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA. THE FORMER PRISONER DESCRIBED HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AT DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2004 AS BEING WORSE THAN THE REPORTED ABUSE AT ABU GHREIB. THE FULL TEXT OF THE ARTICLE CAN BE FOUND IN FBIS REFTEL. WE REPORT THIS IN THE INTEREST OF ANY ONGOING INVESTIGATION.

HANDED OVER IN TEHRAN TO US FORCES

2. WISAM ABD-AL-RAHMAN, KNOWN AS ABU-UBAYDAH, DESCRIBED TO AL-SABIL HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AS A PRISONER IN DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO. HE SAID IRANIAN POLICE ARRESTED HIM IN ZAHEDAN ON HIS RETURN FROM A TRIP TO PAKISTAN. HE SAID THAT AFTER HIS INTERROGATION BY IRANIAN POLICE HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED. HOWEVER, HE WAS INSTEAD TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT IN TEHRAN AND ALLEGEDLY HANDED OVER TO A U.S. PLANE WITH AFGHAN MEN ON BOARD.

DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, CUBA; RETURN TO JORDAN

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: /
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: / FILE: _____
USDP: / DIA: _____ OTHER: _____
USDI: / PER SEC: _____ COMM: _____

3. ABD-AL-RAHMAN DESCRIBED HIS REPORTED PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2003 AS MOVING FROM "ONE AMERICAN PRISON TO ANOTHER", STAYING IN COLD, DARK, AND CROWDED ROOMS. HE SAID HE STAYED, WITHOUT CHARGES OR INTERROGATION, WITH NINE OTHER PERSONS IN A 25 SQUARE FOOT ROOM WITHOUT SUNLIGHT AND FED ONLY BREAD AND RICE FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 77 DAYS. HE SAID THAT SANITARY AND HYGIENE CONDITIONS WERE TERRIBLE, AND THAT HE DID NOT RECEIVE MEDICAL CARE NOR SEE THE SUN DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ALSO REPORTED SLEEP DEPRIVATION, UNDRRESSING IN FRONT OF FEMALE SOLDIERS, DESECRATION OF THE KORAN BY A DOG, BEATINGS, AND THREATS OF HARM FROM BARKING DOGS WHILE BLINDFOLDED.

4. ABD-AL-RAHMAN SAID THAT AFTER BEING TOLD OF HIS INNOCENCE BY AN INTERROGATOR, HE WAS FLOWN TO THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA AT THE END OF APRIL 2003. MORE ALLEGED ABUSE, POOR CONDITIONS, AND SCARCE FOOD FOLLOWED. UPON HIS RELEASE IN 2004, HE WAS FLOWN BY A U.S. MILITARY PLANE INTO AMMAN AND HELD BY JORDANIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS FOR 56 DAYS, FOLLOWED BY RELEASE UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

RED CROSS FAILED TO DELIVER LETTERS

5. ACCORDING TO ABD-AL-RAHMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC) DID NOT DELIVER ANY OF THE LETTERS THAT HE WROTE TO HIS FAMILY WHILE DETAINED. HE SAID THAT AN ICRC REP CAME TO HIS HOUSE AFTER HIS RELEASE, HANDED HIM THE LETTERS, AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT DELIVERING THEM TO HIS FAMILY.

COMMENT

6. GIVEN THE REVELATIONS OF ABUSES OF PRISONERS IN ABU GHREIB PRISON, ABD-AL-RAHMAN'S ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE IN U.S. CUSTODY IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO WILL BE WIDELY BELIEVED HERE.

7. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

VISIT EMBASSY AMMAN'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT

(b)(6)

OR ACCESS THE SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S SIPRNET HOME PAGE.

HALE

POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03291
POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03175
POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03186

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 3 of 3

**** RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE ****

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*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/45028

720

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July 14, 2004

TO: RDML Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*
SUBJECT: Declassify Testimony

31314

Is there a way we can declassify Steve Cambone's testimony today to the Intel Committee and get a declassified version for broader use?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071404-13

.....
Please respond by _____

*File copy
Attachment provided
to SD Sepur*

14 Jul 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17332-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45029

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY

DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

THE CRITICAL NEED FOR INTERROGATION

IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/45030

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY
DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

INTRODUCTION

(U) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for inviting me here today. I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the interrogation guidelines, training, and resources the Department of Defense provides its military forces. My remarks will focus on Department-level intelligence guidelines and policies, since that is the area over which I have cognizance. Mr. Feith and I are accompanied by Service and Command experts who can address your more specific questions.

VITAL IMPORTANCE OF INTERKOGATIONS

(U) Interrogation is a HUMINT collection technique employed to obtain reliable, timely information to support combat operations, military campaign plans,

UNCLASSIFIED

and national strategy. Interrogations have provided highly valuable information on individual terrorists, terrorist groups or networks, and terrorist plans. They have also been essential to the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. It is a fact that interrogations can yield information on terrorists that is unavailable from any other collection discipline.

(U) Detainee debriefs have had a major impact on our understanding of the terrorist threat since 9/11. In the case of al-Qaida, interrogations have provided highly valuable insights into its structure, target selection process, operational planning cycle, degree of cooperation between various groups, and the identities of key operational and logistical personnel. For example, interrogations at Guantanamo have yielded information on :

- Individuals connected to al-Qaida's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
- Front companies and accounts supporting al-Qaida and other terrorist operations;
- Surface-to-air missiles, improvised explosive devices, and tactics and training used by these terrorist groups;
- Explosives training, assembly, and distribution networks used by al-Qaida throughout Afghanistan;

UNCLASSIFIED

- Training of young adults for suicide bombing missions;
 - Potential travel routes to be used by terrorists to reach the United States;
 - Transnational funding operations;
 - Individuals suspected of money laundering for terrorist organizations;
- and
- Non-governmental organizations providing financial and material support to terrorist organizations.

(U) The intelligence we have obtained from detainee interrogations at Guantanamo Bay has expanded our understanding of jihadist selection, motivation, and training processes. This information has helped the US Government to disrupt active threat planning through the capture of operatives and the implementation of additional security measures.

(U) In Iraq interrogation has been employed to locate and capture Saddam Hussein, roll up his support and communications network, locate and then capture or kill insurgent leaders, pinpoint munitions stockpiles, and disrupt attacks. The loss of this source of information would have a significantly negative impact on our counterterrorism efforts, including our ability to warn of impending threats.

(U) LTG Boykin, VADM Jacoby, and LTG Alexander will provide specific examples of valuable information we have obtained from the interrogation of

UNCLASSIFIED

detainees when they testify later today.

INTERROGATION POLICY AND GUIDELINES

(U) Interrogations take place, broadly speaking, in two venues – on or near the battlefield or at detention facilities.

(U) On or near the battlefield or at transfer facilities, the primary goal is to obtain time-sensitive information which is immediately useable in helping to accomplish the supported unit's mission. There is a premium on gaining this information from a detainee as rapidly as possible after capture. If the information is not gained within the first 96 hours after capture, it is usually of limited value to an ongoing operation.

(U) Interrogations at detention centers (e.g., Guantanamo, Bagram, and Baghdad International Airport) can be conducted over longer periods of time. Detainees at these centers have either been sent to the rear from the battlefield or point of capture for continued interrogation, or assigned to a center from the time of capture. The primary goal is to extract information that might affect the broader military campaign or national strategy, although information of immediate use on the battlefield might be acquired. Interrogation plans at the centers are often more elaborate than those prepared for use at the front lines because the information is

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harder to extract. The disorienting effect of capture wears off; the detainee is more comfortable with his setting; he may have the support and assistance of other detainees in resisting interrogations; and, he has time and opportunity to hone the resistance techniques he may have learned in his training.

(U) Before providing a reprise of interrogation guidelines developed for Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq, I would like to make the following points:

- In each case the interrogation guidelines received a legal review by a command Staff Judge Advocate.
 - In the case of Guantanamo, the interrogation guidelines received two additional reviews at the DoD level.
- In each case, external reviews of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for interrogators were conducted with the aim of refining those TTPs and establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs) to improve the effectiveness of interrogations.
- In each case, the baseline for interrogation guidelines and practices was the Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52. It is important to understand that FM 34-52 does not describe the full universe of permitted TTPs. The FM states, the “approaches and techniques [listed] are not new nor [are they] all the possible or acceptable techniques.” Therefore, judgment is

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required in every case to determine whether proposed TTPs comply with applicable rules, regulations, standards, policies, and domestic and international law. That is why, as one reviews the guidelines for Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, one finds a range of opinion among interrogators, SJAs, and commanders about what is permitted, and a variation in the TTPs proposed and employed in each of the three cases.

(U) Guantanamo. With respect to the Geneva Convention and detained al-Qaida and Taliban supporters, the President directed on February 7, 2002 that:

[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

(U) From Guantanamo's establishment in early 2002, interrogators employed the standard techniques found in the FM 34-52.

(U) During the summer and fall of 2002, the United States was in a high-threat environment, and intelligence continued to indicate planning by al-Qaida for attacks in the United States and elsewhere. Among the detainees at Guantanamo were individuals thought to have close connections to al-Qaida planning figures.

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These detainees of high interest also demonstrated training in al-Qaida tactics to resist interrogation.

(U) On June 17, 2002, the acting SOUTHCOM Commander, Major General Speer, requested that the Joint Staff conduct an “external review of intelligence collection operations” at Guantanamo. The resulting report was delivered in September. It called for the adoption of a “rule of thumb” or “Rules of Engagement” for interrogation.

(U) Subsequently, the new SOUTHCOM Commander, General James T. Hill, received from Joint Task Force- 170 (charged with interrogations at Guantanamo) a proposed set of interrogation techniques, divided into three categories. GEN Hill was of the view, based on a review by the SJA for JTF- 170, that the Category I and II techniques were “legal and humane.” He requested, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a review and approval of the Category III techniques. This set of techniques had been proposed by JTF-170 for use on some detainees who had, according to Hill, “tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods.” What GEN Hill sought were “counter-resistant [*sic*] techniques that we can lawfully employ.”

(U) On November 27, 2002, the DoD General Counsel, after discussing the request with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for

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Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the Secretary of Defense “authorize the Commander of USSOUTHCOM to employ, in *[sic]* his discretion, only Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III (‘Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.’).”

(U) On December 2, 2002 the Secretary of Defense concurred in this recommendation. He did not approve for use from Category III the use of:

- Scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family;
- Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring);
- Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.

(U) These guidelines remained in effect until January 12, 2003, when the Secretary verbally suspended his December 2 decision, and then formally rescinded, on January 15, 2003, all Category II techniques and the one Category III technique he had approved.

(U) On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department’s General Counsel to establish a Working Group to assess the legal,

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policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogation of detainees held by the US military in the war on terrorism.

(U) The Working Group consisted of representatives of the Military Departments, Service general counsels, the Judge Advocates General of the armed forces, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of Justice advised the Working Group in its deliberations.

(U) Based on the Working Group's report, which was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 24 techniques for use at Guantanamo on April 16, 2003. Eighteen of these 24 techniques came from FM 34-52. Four of the 24 techniques required notification to the Secretary before they could be used. Two of these were in the FM 34-52: "incentive and removal" and "pride and ego down." Two additional techniques requiring notification were recommended: "Mutt and Jeff" and "isolation." The four other techniques not in FM-34-52 were "diet manipulation," "environment manipulation," "sleep adjustment," and "false flag." Any additional techniques GEN Hill might wish to employ other than those approved by the Secretary of Defense would require the Secretary's approval.

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(U) Of the six techniques approved, but not included in FM 34-52, five were on General Hill's original list – all from Category 11.

(U) Prior to the execution of US military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, USCENTCOM issued guidance directing the humane treatment of detainees. While detainees could be categorized as Enemy Prisoners of War or unlawful combatants, the requirement for humane treatment was a constant.

(U) Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, from the war's inception through the end of 2002, all forces employed FM 34-52. On January 21, 2003, the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS), on behalf of the Working Group referenced above, requested that CENTCOM provide information on the interrogation techniques it was using and had used, highlighting those it had found to be effective and those it desired to implement, with rationale included.

(U) On January 24, 2003, CJTF-180 prepared for forwarding to the Working Group, through the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate, its response to the DJS tasking. CJTF-180 listed all techniques currently being used, including some not explicitly listed in FM 34-52. CJTF-180 was aware that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded the techniques he had authorized for use at Guantanamo from

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December 2,2002 to January 15,2003.

(U) With respect to Special Operations in Afghanistan, SOF conducted interrogations in accordance with FM 34-52 in the beginning of 2003. Convinced that its interrogations were not yielding useful results, some SOF units conducted an external review of its interrogation TTPs in the fall of 2003. As part of its review, these elements were aware of the Secretary's December 2,2002 memo, and discussed with personnel at Guantanamo when and where information most useful to SOF might be collected. Psychologists were also consulted as part of this SOF review.

(U) The SOP it published in February 2003 focused on battlefield interrogation. It closely paralleled FM 34-52.

(U) The SJA for one of the SOCOM major subordinate commands, at the time a subordinate command for CENTCOM in Afghanistan, reviewed and recommended approval of these techniques. The Task Force Commander approved the techniques.

(U) Iraq. During July and August 2003, elements of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, which had previously served in Afghanistan, were sent to the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility to run interrogation operations. The warrant officer-in-charge prepared a draft interrogation guidelines based in part on a

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February 2003 SOF SOP. It is a near copy of the SOP created by SOF in Afghanistan. The SOF SOP in Iraq was used because members of the 519th knew of its existence and were looking for a point of departure in building an SOP for Abu Ghraib. On August 25, two SJAs from CJTF-7, an American and an Australian, reviewed the draft guidelines and recommended CJTF-7 approval.

(U) On August 31, 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller arrived in Iraq from Guantanamo. MG Miller had been tasked by the Joint Staff to send a team to Iraq to conduct an external review of interrogation policies and procedures, to include detention operations. MG Miller chose to lead the team, and he discovered that there were no official interrogation guidelines yet in place, he recommended that CJTF-7 formalize the draft interrogation counter-resistance guidelines that had been reviewed on August 25. CJTF-7 prepared such draft guidelines on September 10. It was put in a format similar to the April 16, 2003 guidance relative to Guantanamo. The draft underwent a second legal review by CJTF-7 and, with some modification, was signed on September 14, 2003 by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander. When LTG Sanchez promulgated the guidelines in theater, he stipulated that the use of certain techniques would require his personal approval. He emphasized that the Geneva Conventions on humane treatment continued to be applicable.

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(U) On September 14, 2003, LTG Sanchez also sent the new CJTF-7 interrogation policy to CENTCOM for review. At CENTCOM, the Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the policy and recommended the removal of some techniques.

(U) October 12, 2003, LTG Sanchez published revised counter-resistance guidelines. He granted authority to employ only techniques outlined in FM 34-52 with the exception of two techniques. He also required that any new techniques proposed, beyond those identified in the October 12 guidelines, would require approval. This policy remained in effect until it was modified on May 13, 2004.

(U) With respect to the SOF in Iraq, the Director of the Joint Staff inquired in June 2003 whether interrogation techniques in use in Afghanistan and Iraq by SOF were compliant with FM 34-52. A SOF SJA replied through the CENTCOM SJA that “the military interrogations at both BIAP [Baghdad International Airport] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in IAW FM 34-52 and SecDef direction.”

LOOKING FORWARD

(U) As I stated before this committee on May 11th, there clearly was a breakdown in discipline by some at Abu Ghraib. However, nothing I have seen or heard thus far indicates that the source of that breakdown was the guidance on

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interrogation provided to SOUTHCOM or by CENTCOM.

(U) This is not to assert that individual interrogators may not have exceeded their authority. We await MG Fay's findings on this point. It is to say that in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, appropriate measures were taken to ensure that proper guidance, to include legal reviews, was provided to and within the chain of command. And, it is to say that nothing we have seen in the pictures from Abu Ghraib were in any way associated with a lawful interrogation.

(U) With respect to the abuses, the Department has initiated a number of efforts to determine what happened and why, and to hold those responsible accountable. These efforts include investigations concerning accountability of those within the chain of command, such as the Taguba report and the Fay, Formica, Jacoby, and Helmley investigations; investigations by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division and Inspector General; and, various unit-level investigations within the Commands to improve accountability, unit discipline, and standard operating procedures.

(U) In addition, the Secretary of Defense has:

- Appointed VADM Albert Church to conduct a comprehensive Detainee Operations and Interrogation Review.
- Set up a review panel under Secretary of the Navy Gordon England to

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harder to extract. The disorienting effect of capture wears off; the detainee is more comfortable with his setting; he may have the support and assistance of other detainees in resisting interrogations; and, he has time and opportunity to hone the resistance techniques he may have learned in his training.

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will help reduce the impact of heightened OPTEMPO.

- As you know, we are engaged in remodeling Defense intelligence that encompasses a wide range of efforts to change the way we prepare for and conduct intelligence activities in the Department. As part of that effort, we intend to increase the foreign language proficiency of our HUMINT collectors, including interrogators. We have begun to do this by raising the standards of graduates from the Defense Foreign Language Institute from Level 2 proficiency to Level 3 (professional proficiency). These new standards will improve the performance of the language specialist corps throughout the force, including interrogators.
- DIA is currently coordinating its Interrogation Policy for DHS.
- Furthermore, I have engaged the Department's intelligence community on the question of a DoD-level set of guidelines for interrogation drawing on DIA's work.
- The Army proposed a joint review of doctrine regarding interrogations, prisoners of war, and security detainee operations. This will include a review of operations and oversight of confinement facilities. The goal is to clearly identify responsibilities among Military Intelligence, Military Police, and other agencies that conduct interrogations in a military theater

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of operations. The review is underway, under the lead of Major General Ronald Burgess, the Director, J-2, Joint Staff, with assistance from Joint Forces Command. The Department will act expeditiously on the recommendations that come out of this review.

- CENTCOM has taken a number of steps to streamline the chain of command at Abu Ghraib, unifying responsibility for detention operations, law enforcement, investigations, and disposition of criminal cases under MG Geoffrey Miller. It has also taken action to expedite detainee processing and upgrade detention facilities.
- CENTCOM has taken the following corrective steps in the area of intelligence and interrogation. It has:
 - Placed a General Officer on the Multi-National Force—Iraq staff to serve as Deputy Commander General—Detainee Operations. Made this officer responsible for all detention and interrogation operations;
 - Issued interrogation policies reinforcing the requirement to abide by the Geneva Conventions and required that all interrogations be conducted with command oversight;

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- o Assigned a behavioral psychologist to provide support to interrogators;
 - o Transferred responsibility for all HUMINT collection and analysis to the Multi-National Force—Iraq and increased that organization's manning level.
 - o Established a weekly Inter-Service/Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts;
 - o Established an intelligence fusion system that decreases the amount of time needed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information; and
 - o Assigned **DIA** personnel to primary theater interrogation facilities to facilitate intelligence sharing between agencies.
- In Iraq, MG Geoffrey Miller is working to accelerate the release of those detainees who no longer pose a security threat, who do not possess valuable intelligence, and who will not be subject to criminal prosecution. Based on a review of each detainee's case, we have already been able to reduce the detainee population at Abu Ghraib by 50 percent – from approximately 5,000 on April 14, 2004, to 2,500 on June 7, 2004. By mid-July, the goal is to have the total detainee population in Iraq

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reduced to between 1,500 and 2,000. A similar process is underway at Guantanamo, where Secretary of the Navy England is leading an effort to review each detainee's case annually. We have released detainees when we concluded they did not pose a significant threat, but we must continue to detain those we think would launch new attacks if released.

CONCLUSION

(U) In conclusion, I would like to underscore the absolute necessity of maintaining an inherently robust interrogation capability within the Department of Defense: it is critical to protection of our forces and critical to fighting a meaningful war against terrorism. Too much is at stake to abandon an intelligence collection technique that often gives us the only useful intelligence we have on terrorist capabilities and intentions at both the tactical and strategic level. Nothing that took place at Abu Ghraib was in the context of lawful interrogation. Nor do I ascribe to the premise that a climate was created that condoned such behavior.

(U) The Department recognizes that grievous mistakes were made in the treatment of some detainees in Iraq. The abuses are being investigated, and the Department will take appropriate action. Meanwhile, the Services, DIA, and the

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Combatant Commands are reviewing detainee and interrogation policies and procedures; these will be updated and corrected where necessary. Service training curriculum is also being carefully examined. Our intent is to learn from mistakes that were made, ensure that they are not made again, and continue forward with a strengthened interrogation capability.

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file

August 2, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet w/Army

0200ARMY

I need a meeting with the Army. Don't tell them, but I want to talk about:

- Incentives for folks.
- The possibility of having some come home just marginally earlier than they expected.
- Morale.
- Managing the force well.
- The importance of leadership on the part of commanders.

I will need this note for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073004-9

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04

~~FOUO~~

*Sir,
meeting is
set for
4 Aug at 1100.
I've included Dr.
Chu. v/r Jim*

OSD 17333-04

2 AUG 04

2 August 2004

TO: SECDEF

FROM: VADM JIM STAVRIDIS

SUBJ: MEETING WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

1. Sir, we've set up a meeting on Wednesday with SecArmy, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and Dr. Chu.
2. As per your snowflake, I have not given them advance notice of topics. Director Army Staff called and said he thought the topics were force rotation and detainees. I was non-committal.
3. In your snowflake you mentioned a few topics. Here are my thoughts on each:
 - a. **Incentives.** Should push this hard. Army needs to be creative and leaning forward. This would solve much of the non-volunteer issue, I believe.
 - b. **Bringing units home marginally early.** Huge winner. Recommend pushing hard. If they can go down from 148 K to 120 K for weeks, why not use some of that time to bring folks home early, especially with holidays coming up?
 - c. **Morale.** They need to provide you with a sense of how the troops are doing on a regular basis, drawing on a wide variety of inputs. Senior enlisted advisor could be very helpful here.

- d. **Managing the force well.** Need to get “out of the shoebox.” Too many times you get the answer, “system doesn’t give us enough granularity.”
 - e. **Importance of leadership on part of commanders.** The basis of coming through this challenging period lies in this point. Insist on a sense of how the 0-5 / 0-6 level leadership is working through the issues – that’s where the officer impact “rubber meets the road.”
4. I recommend you also discuss “the rules” for deployments with them (attached), keying on their need to manage their way through challenges and not create surprises.
5. This may be the first of several meetings. We’ll schedule appropriately after you go through these topics with them.

v/r
Jim

~~FOUO~~



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

July 30, 2004, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Force Deployment Rules for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM

The following summarizes for the deployment rules used to source active duty and reserve forces.

Active Component Forces

- Dwell Time: a minimum 1:1 ratio of deployed time (in support of any contingency operation) to home station time. Whenever possible, forces are chosen based upon longest dwell time.
- Forces assigned to other Combatant Commanders may be used if risk is acceptable.
- Units will deploy at required readiness levels.
 - Units with less than required readiness ratings may be used if required training can be accomplished, or the unit can be cross-leveled with appropriate personnel and equipment.
- Time in theater guidelines differ for each Service.
 - Army: Units (not soldiers) will serve one-year boots on the ground (BOG). BOG is defined as when the main body of the unit (not individuals) arrives in the OIF/OEF AOR (e.g., arrival in Kuwait). The Joint Staff has defined BOG as *"the window of time a unit (main body) physically arrives in theater until the window of time the unit physically departs the theater."*
 - Marine Corps: Marine units below Regimental/Group level deploy for seven months. Regimental/Group Headquarters and above deploy for twelve months. The Marines volunteer their OIF/OEF forces as a "surge" capability if the on-ground situation requires more forces.



11-L-0559/OSD/45054

~~FOUO~~

- Air Force: The Air Force rotates personnel in accordance with its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle. Beginning September 2004, the baseline deployment will be 120 days in a 20-month cycle. Each Airman deploys only once during a cycle, although some stressed specialties will deploy longer, and in greater frequency. Some deployment rules have been modified at the unit level to increase volunteerism or provide stability in key missions, (e.g. senior personnel rotations in the Combined Air Operations Center are for 1 year).
- Navy: The Fleet Response Plan (FRP), calls for surge capability to meet global requirements while moving away from traditional scheduled/longer deployments. Currently, CNO deployment goals are 6 months portal to portal with 12 months in a non-deployed status.
- Alternative sourcing is considered before re-deploying active forces in violation of above criteria or service guidelines. Options include:
 - Can COCOM handle the task with forces already in country, with a gap?
 - Can the in-country force be extended without violating “boots on ground” criteria?
 - Can host nation (Iraqi/Afghani) and coalition support be used?
 - Can the duty be outsourced and supported by a contractor?
 - Can similar specialties from other Services support the requirement?
 - Can other geographic Commanders’ forces be used without undue risk?
- Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets are closely managed under the Global Military Force Policy to preserve their capability to respond to emerging crises. Before an asset is tasked above levels sustainable without significant adverse effects, Joint Staff asks:
 - Can another asset be substituted or lower-priority/exercises joint experiments be cancelled?
 - Can a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) minimize excessive deployments, while maintaining home-station training?
 - Can the asset support one AOR, but be quickly re-rolled into another AOR during a crisis?

Reserve Component Forces

- Activate Reserve component forces only after determining that it is both prudent and judicious to do so.
 - Voluntary duty – no restrictions on tour duration.
 - Involuntary duty – ,maximum of 24 cumulative months.
- Involuntarily recalling the Individual Ready Reserve only after considering Selected Reserve members & volunteers.

- Second or subsequent involuntary recalls – previous service (length & nature) is considered and the maximum break between tours is provided (1 in 6 planning factor considered).
- Maximize Predictability – mobilization orders to be provided in a timely manner (minimum of 30 days prior to active duty report date).
- Training when mobilized – members may not be mobilized solely for the purpose of training, but training related to the mobilization mission is permitted. (Legislative relief being requested).
- Members retained on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.
- Members taking leave prior to release from active duty are voluntarily retained to use accrued leave.

General Observations

- These rules evolved in response to changing needs since September 11, 2001. They are therefore likely to evolve further. The rules recognize that this is an all-volunteer force; equitable sharing of our burden is essential to retaining today's volunteers and attracting their future replacements.
- Upon your confirmation of these rules, we will publish the associated implementing guidance.

Decision

Schedule meeting to discuss _____ Proceed without further discussion _____

Prepared By: Paul Mayberry (b)(6)

file

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 1, 2004

JUL 1 2004 - 1 00 34:02

7/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Captain Hopper

Lynne Cheney tells me that this Captain Hopper is a star. If she is going to be around here sometime probably ought to ~~see~~ ^{meet} her. You might want to think of whether there is anything you could do to acknowledge her.

Thanks.

Attach.
Mrs. Cheney photograph

DIIR dh
070104-31

Please respond by 7/16/04

— Do a letter to her

— work to bring her in for meeting.

7/22
I'd like to meet her - DR

7/14 -
SecDef -
Agree. FYI, attached is an article we did about her on the DoD "Defend America" website. We will look for other possibilities to highlight/acknowledge her.
Di Rita

Captain Hopper
Good Housekeeping Women
in Govt Award
First ~~first~~ African-American
woman to fly a fighter jet



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U.S. Air Force Capt. Christina Hopper

Pilot Wins Good Housekeeping Award

By Keith Pannell / 27th Fighter Wing Public Affairs

CANNON AIR FORCE BASE, N.M., June 30, 2004 — An unwavering faith, a good clean life and a sparkling career — not necessarily a clean house — earned a 524th Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon pilot here a Good Housekeeping award.

Capt. Christina Hopper was presented Good Housekeeping magazine's Woman in Government Award for 2003 recently and will be featured in the magazine's July edition.

The award is given to a woman who "has made a significant contribution toward the advancement of women in government."

Hopper was nominated by base officials here.

"I got a call from the editor at Good Housekeeping telling me I won the grand prize," the captain said. "I couldn't believe I had been selected. I literally trembled for about a half hour after I hung up. Then, I called my family and my squadron commander to let them know."

Hopper's husband, Capt. Aaron Hopper an F-15 pilot in the 522nd Fighter Squadron, said he is happy for his wife.

"I am extremely happy for her," he said. "It's a tremendous honor for her to have been selected out of such a qualified pool of nominees. I think the attention she has received will prove to be very beneficial for the Air Force by encouraging women and ethnic minorities to pursue their dreams in the military, especially if that includes flying fighters."

Attention is something he said his wife has not asked for, but has certainly gotten.

In the last year, she has been interviewed by reporters on international news channels and from international magazines. Hopper said she has spoken with Oprah Winfrey and has done countless local interviews.

"Christina never set out to gain recognition or special attention, but many people have been encouraged by the opportunities she has been given by both God and the Air Force," said her husband.



Air Force Capt. Hopper poses for a photo. She is a pilot and will be featured in the magazine's July edition. She is a pilot and will be featured in the magazine's July edition. She is a pilot and will be featured in the magazine's July edition.

She said the biggest stressor is the constant separation from her husband because of demands by their different squadrons.

"We are often separated by temporary duty assignments and opposite flying schedules," he said. "But our faith is a blessing and gives both of us strength to focus on our work."

The fighter pilot duo is to be separated again for an instructor pilot assignment at Luke Air Force Base.

The Good Housekeeping grand prize also came with a \$10,000 cash award.

"We plan to give a portion of the money to the squadron," she said. "We'll make a contribution to the squadron," she said. "We'll make a contribution to the squadron," she said.

Hopper was deployed with her squadron in Iraq during the war in Iraq started. She and the other squadron members were bombing targets the second day of the war.

"The desert experience was unforgettable," she said. "I look back on that experience with a deep sense of gratitude. I'm grateful to God, who gave me the opportunity to serve my country in such a life-changing and world-changing environment."

She said she also credits the men in the squadron for their support. "I know what she needed to know to stay alive in Iraq. I know what she needed to know to stay alive in Iraq. I know what she needed to know to stay alive in Iraq."

"Christina Hopper is an all-around great person. She is a Col. Jeffrey Stambaugh, the 27th Fighter Wing commander. "She performed magnificently in Iraq and is a firm in her faith, and she's a fitness role model. She is simply a wonderfully talented and hard-working woman with a great character."

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Hopper said she does not see her faith as a part of her life, rather as the central point in her life. Her call sign, "Thumper," is not a play on her last name, but a shortened form of "Bible Thumper."

 [Email A Copy](#)

"I believe every blessing, including this Good Housekeeping award, is a gift from (God)," she said. "My faith gives me the consistent ability to cope with all kinds of stressors."

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11- L-0559/OSD/45060

August 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

I am thinking of sending the Thomas Schelling foreword to the following people:

Fran Townsend, Tom Ridge, John Ashcroft, Condi Rice, Rich Armitage, Bodman,
the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Mueller, and Bellinger.

Please let me know if you think there is anyone else who should get it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cover memo, Schelling foreword

DHR:dh
073004-5

.....
Please respond by _____

461

2 Aug 04

August 2, 2004

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

DR

This is a worthwhile read on the subject we have been discussing.

Thanks.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book, *Pearl Harbor***

DHR:dh
073004-11

11-L-0559/OSD/45062

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were *so* busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it *was* an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on *war*, the attack hardly appears reckless. There *is* a tendency in *our* planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what *is* improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible *mistake—one* we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to **work**, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who **knows** he'll be chewed **out** by his superior *if* he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip **us** off to the climax.) Finally, **as** at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found **us**, it can only remind us how likely it *is* that **we** are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession **with** a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid **and** oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, **as** Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" **who** count are **also** responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
© 1962 by the Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University
Printed in the United States of America
Cloth ISBN 0-8047-0597-6
Paper ISBN 0-8047-0598-4
Original printing 1962
Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/45065

720
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OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 15, 2004

2004 2004-1 07 15 09

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Response Force in Afghanistan

We need to keep pushing in NATO on this issue of getting the NATO Response Force (NRF) to go into Afghanistan for the election. In doing so, we have to make sure we don't allow the French to paint the NRF into a corner so that the NRF could only be used in a crisis. That was never the intention.

Please get from NATO the resolution that passed NATO to create the NRF. I want to see if the word "crisis" was used.

If we cannot get the NRF into Afghanistan, then I think we ought to have a force generation in NATO. If that doesn't work, we ought to get a coalition of the willing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-17

.....
Please respond by

7/16/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45066

OSD 17338-04

Affghanistan

17

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET
July 1, 2004

ZON 107 -1 RI 3: 07

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

Attached is a memo I sent to Condi Rice. Why don't you screw your head into it and get the Deputies going.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/25/04 SD memo to Rice: "Kurds and Sunnis" [062504-2 (ts computer)]

DHR:dh
070104-16

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45067

OSD 173 40-04

FOUO

June 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

I think we need to have a briefing to the PC that tees up a proposal as to how the Iraqis are going to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Sunnis in terms of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from the Kurds, and the Kurds now want back.

It is a serious point of friction, and there are those who think it could lead to a major conflict as early as August. It merits our attention. The flash points could come soon, so I would think we would want to get a briefing in the next two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062504-2 (ts computer).doc

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45068

4

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR:dh
071904-7

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17341-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45069

file

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

825

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR:dh
071904-7

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

*2x LTG Barro SITE
on 9 5 Aug*

CHAIRMAN'S ACTION ASSIGNMENT

Reviewed by B 11/14 Date _____

Assigned Action to								
SJS/CPCB			SJS/ACB			Protocol		
LA			LC			Speechwriter		
Aides			JHO			NG/RA		
PA			Other <u>125</u>					
Action								
J	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
CJCS Reply			See CJCS Note			Info Only		
Scan & File/Note & File			Direct Reply			Appropriate Action		
Condolence			BSA/GSA			Translation		
Recommendations:								
Forward to:					Purple note:			
Amplifying Information <i>This is OBE work w/MA</i> Personal friend/salutation is: <i>to get off snowflake</i> Comments: <i>Let. S/D is well aware of the way ahead on Afghan security</i>								
Enclose w/letter								
Photo			Bio			CJCS Book		
Autographed Card			CJCS Functions Sheet					
Other								
Gifts(s) Received								
SUSPENSE:					CONTROL #			

JS Form 12, Feb 01 (EG)

11-L-0559/OSD/45071

ROUTING COVER SHEET

CASEY

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	DATE RECEIVED 08/02/2004	ACTION NUMBER 04-04044/01
---------------------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------

SUBJECT
/SF-825/ AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

CJCS REPLY

CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BRANCH FOR DISPATCH OR FILING. **THIS FORM SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM ATTACHED DOCUMENT.**

TO	NAME	INITIAL	COMMENTS
	CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS		<p>AUG 4</p> <p>CJCS HAS SEEN</p> <p>AUG 04 2004</p> <p><i>This SOB works w/ me & got off snowflake list. SD is well aware of the way ahead on Afghan security.</i></p>
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	ASSISTANT TO THE CJCS		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR NG		
	ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR RM		
	SPECIAL ASSISTANTS		
	LEGAL COUNSEL		
	LEGISLATIVE ASST		
	PROTOCOL		
	JOINT HISTORY OFFICE		
	PUBLIC AFFAIRS		
3	DIRECTOR, JT STAFF		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
2	VICE DIRECTOR, JT STAFF		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
1	SECRETARY, JT STAFF		
	CHIEF, ACTIONS DIVISION		
	RETURN TO ADM SUPPORT BR		

CLASSIFICATION **UNCLASSIFIED**

June 14, 2004

808

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

PR

7/15
J

I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan security situation.

One option should include using our clout to get the militias to turn in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military.

Here is a report on Afghan capabilities.

Thanks.
Luss

Attach.
NIC Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 2004-04HC, June 2004

(Distributed separately)

DHR:uh
061404.12

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

SIR,
Response attached.
vr / CDR Nosenro
7/15

T-8/1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1933-04

2004 JUL 15 AM 10:41 15 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RSMB 7/14*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

- **Issue.** "I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan Security Situation. One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ^{trust} ~~turn~~ in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military. ..."
- **Conclusion**
 - My staff is working closely with General Abizaid to develop a framework for Afghanistan security forces, similar to the one now being developed for Iraq. This framework will address concerns regarding the security situation and provide a way ahead for Afghanistan forces.
 - As the Iraq framework piece nears completion, work is beginning in earnest on a similar framework for Afghanistan.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

*Sir - This is the Metrics
Work / Exit Strategy briefs
from Gen Casey. Gen Borno
will be in shortly
with the Afghan
version. vlr jim*

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	N 7/15
EXEC SEC	SL 7.15.04

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OSD 10492-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45074

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

COL Doxey

18 June 2004

July 29, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Analysis of Alternatives

Please take a look at this letter from Senator McCain and come up with three or four alternatives as to what we might do about the fact that he is challenging RAND's ability to do this.

Please try to do it fast and get it to me by tomorrow.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/28/04 McCain Letter

DHR:dh
072904-3

.....

Please respond by 7/30/04

OSD 17342-04

JUL. 28. 2004

JOHN McCAIN
ARIZONA

CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

SIR,

7/29

7/29

- Latest from Sen McCain
- Concerned about AOA
- Wants independent group, not RAND/Project AF, to do it. DSD for action.

P. 2/6

1221 S. SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0303
(202) 224-2235

50 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE B-130
TEMPE, AZ 85282
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SUITE 1150
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(602) 952-2410

2 WEST PASEO REDONDO
TUCSON, AZ 85701

(520) 870-8334

PHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED
(202) 124-7132
(800) 882-0170

VIA FAC

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-3010

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am concerned about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the Tanker Lease Proposal will be conducted. In particular, I am concerned about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA, and the involvement of the Air Force's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)—RAND, which I understand is spearheading this effort.

The conduct of Air Force leadership regarding the Tanker Lease Proposal has been unacceptable. Frankly, its credibility on the recapitalization of the tanker fleet has been fundamentally called into question. Notably, many of the problems that the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD-OIG) found in the Tanker Lease Proposal are similar to those it recently found in the multibillion dollar C-130J procurement program. Bases for my concern about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA include, but are not limited to, the following.

First, the Air Force has provided Congress inaccurate information in an attempt to justify its original proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767As. For example, Air Force Secretary Jim Roche has repeatedly advised Congress that, in the existing KC-135 fleet, "corrosion is significant, pervasive, and represents an unacceptable risk." Secretary Roche has also emphasized to Congress increased operating costs in the current fleet as a basis for entering into the tanker lease. Air Force leadership has indicated that these elements create an "urgent" need to recapitalize the fleet. However, as you of course know, the DSB task force concluded that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. As such, the task force also concluded that "[t]here is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a replacement program prior to the completion of the AoA and the MCS." Thus, the task

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
July 28, 2004
Page 2 of 5

force jettisoned the "dominant reason" Secretary Roche first cited in his July 10, 2003, report to Congress as the basis for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing tankers than they would for buying them. The Air Force's representations on this issue remains a matter of continuing investigative concern.¹

In another example, to comply with the original authorizing statute, the Air Force misrepresented to Congress that its proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767 tankers was merely an operating lease. This would have obviated the requirement that the White House obtain advance budgeted authority for the whole lease proposal. But, the DoD-OIG and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), as well as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the procurement of these tankers is, in fact, a lease-purchase. In addition, facts surrounding the Original lease proposal made it clear that the transaction was a lease-purchase: under the original proposal, the Air Force conceded that the DoD is "committed to earmark[ing] an additional \$2B in FY08 and FY09 for the purchase of aircraft covered by the multi-year program under the terms of the proposed contract" to head off a funding spike over the Future-Years Defense Program.

Second, the DoD-OIG and the NDU concluded that the Air Force's commercial item procurement strategy "prevented any visibility into Boeing's costs and required the Air Force to use a fixed-price type contract ... The strategy also exempted [Boeing] from the requirement to submit cost or pricing data. The strategy places the Department at high risk for paying excessive prices and precludes good fiduciary responsibility for DoD funds." The NDU similarly concluded that "[i]n a sole source, monopoly commercial environment, the government is not served well with limited price data" and suggested that the Air Force neglected its fiduciary/stewardship responsibilities.

Notably, the DoD-OIG arrived at similar conclusions regarding the Air Force's mismanagement of the C-130J procurement program. In particular, the DoD-OIG found that, because the C-130J was improperly acquired as a commercial item, the Air Force did not have contractor-certified information on contract prices, costs, or profits, and therefore was "limited" in its ability to protect the Government against possible overpricing.

¹My concerns about whether the stated reason for the lease was pretext is in part based on an e-mail among senior Boeing executives, dated September 18, 2001. This e-mail describes a meeting between Boeing and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Marvin Sambur, during which "[Sambur] indicated that the USAF is desperately looking for the rationale for why the USAF should pursue the 767 Tanker NOW. The briefing his staff had put together on the Economic Service Life Study did not meet his needs ... Sambur is looking for the compelling reason the administration should do this now rather than push off to a future administration." E-mails of this sort underscore the Committee's need for the documents it requested from the DoD and the Air Force on July 2, and September 11, 2003.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

July 28, 2004

Page 3 of 5

Third, the DoD-OIG and the NDU also concluded that the operational requirements document (ORD) for tankers was not tailored, as it should have been, to the requirements of the warfighter, but rather to closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A. The DoD-OIG found that senior Air Force staff directed that the ORD closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A that was being developed for a foreign government, in anticipation of the authorizing legislation. This is particularly troubling where, according to an internal Boeing document regarding the ORD, Boeing planned to "[e]stablish clearly defined requirements in ORD for the USAF Tanker configuration that results in an affordable solution that meets the USAF mission needs and will prevent an AOA from being conducted." Under the current proposal, the first 100 tankers produced will not be capable of, among other things, interoperability with Navy, Marine, or coalition, assets, or simultaneously refueling more than one receiver aircraft. Rear Adm. Mark P. Fitzgerald, USN, recently suggested that in theater, such a limitation restricts the Navy's long-range striking capability and fosters a needlessly risky aerial refueling environment.

Notably, with respect to the C-130J procurement program, the DoD-OIG similarly found that, while the Air Force conditionally paid Lockheed Martin about \$2.6 billion, the C-130J is not operationally suitable or effective and cannot perform its intended mission. Furthermore, to date, 36 deficiency reports that "could cause death, severe injury or illness, major loss of equipment or systems, or that could directly restrict combat or operational readiness" have been received.

Finally, Boeing documents suggest that the Air Force allowed Boeing to modify the requirements in the ORD while it was being developed. These documents also reflect that the Air Force induced the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) into approving and validating the corrupted ORD by falsely representing that it was not tailored to a specific aircraft. This is of continuing investigative interest to the Committee.

Interestingly, as a result of the commercial specifications of the C-130J not meeting user needs, the Air Force (and Marine Corp) decided to "revise its requirements document" to reduce the initial capabilities required and to satisfy operational requirement deficiencies through block upgrade programs at the Government expense. I am very concerned about this.

I understand that RAND (the Air Force's FFRDC), and Project Air Force in particular, is spearheading the AoA. Generally, the Air Force, specifically Dr. Sambur, is "the overall sponsor" for Project Air Force activities. However, having argued against the need for an AoA as early as November 2002, according to a recently produced internal DoD e-mail, Dr. Sambur has apparently prejudged its outcome:

A formal AoA will cost money, delay the program two years, and still come up with the same answer we have today. There are only a few aircraft that can serve as tankers, they are already in production, and so analyzing their respective capabilities and costs won't take long—in fact, it's already been done and the results passed to OSD. What's left to study?

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 July 28, 2004
 Page 4 of 5

As I originally indicated in my letter of March 12, 2004, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley **similarly** touted the Air Force's proposal to lease and 'buy' Boeing 767s during recent budget hearings. In particular, General Moseley provided "opinion" testimony suggesting that the KC-767 tanker is the Air Force's only viable option. For example, in testimony before the Projection Force Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, General Moseley specifically rejected re-engining remaining KC-135Es (as the DSB task force recommended); modifying used aircraft (for example, DC-10s, also as the DSB task force suggested); using contractor support services (as the GAO recently opined), and other options that your office's AoA guidance specifically required the Air Force to examine. While General Moseley attempted to explain away his testimony as "personal opinion," at no time was he asked to provide his personal opinion and at no time during his testimony did General Moseley indicate that he was conveying a personal opinion. Considering General Moseley's role as the chairman of the Air Force Steering Group for Project Air Force and, respectfully, despite your assurances in your March 17, 2004, Letter, I remain concerned that the Air Force and RAND have effectively prejudged the outcome of the AoA regarding the Tanker Lease Proposal.

Several recently produced internal DoD e-mails call into question whether the ongoing AoA will be conducted objectively. For example, in an e-mail, dated August 15, 2003, from Secretary Roche to Dr. Sambur and Acting Undersecretary Wynne, Secretary Roche dissuaded the OSD and Air Force staff from initiating an AoA. In this e-mail, Secretary Roche said the following:

Agggggg, stop the nonsense! Don't even begin to start an unnecessary AoA at this point. All this would do is give the enemies of the lease an excuse from DoD to delay the lease, and really honk off the Appropriators. Let's see what comes out of conference, damn it! If the lease is approved then we can talk about how to decide on the recapitalization of the other 400 airplanes, but there is no rush here.

Soon thereafter, Acting Secretary Wynne responded, "I agree with Jim, [sic] What started this flurry of activity? I'd hate for our story to change." The foregoing does not inspire confidence that the current AoA will be conducted properly.

My concern that RAND, in particular, may have prejudged the outcome of the AoA is underscored by its conclusion regarding tanker recapitalization in a recent report. In a December 2003 report entitled "Investigating Optimal Replacement of Aging Air Force Systems," RAND, in particular Project Air Force, found—without the benefit of an AoA—that "it appears to be optimal to replace the KC-135 by the end of the decade." Apparently relying on Air Force data and analysis that was ultimately rejected by the DSB task force, this conclusion comes unacceptably close to prejudging the outcome of the AoA and is inconsistent with the conclusions of the Air Force's own Economic Service Life Study; the GAO; and, most recently, the DSB task force, all of which found that the current fleet is viable through 2040. In light of the relationship between the RAND and the Air Force, as described above, there can be no assurance that RAND will conduct the AoA here with the desired independence.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
July 28, 2004
Page 5 of 5

My concerns appear to be reflected in a recently released internal DoD e-mail from Eric Coulter, Deputy Director for Theater Assessments and Planning at Program, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to Nancy Spruill, co-chairperson of the Leasing Review Panel Working Group, dated August 7, 2003:

I do not support RAND as the sole source or lead to conduct the Congressionally-directed independent tanker AoA. First, its [sic] said that it takes Congress to direct the Department to do something it should do on its own. We've been trying to get the AF to conduct an AoA for several years, but could never get AT&L's support to direct one. The AF clearly wanted to postpone it for as long as possible to delay the issue of recapitalizing the fleet. Now the Department is playing catch up. That said, [the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)] has more experience to conduct this type of effort. In fact, [Air Mobility Command] relies on IDA to do a lot of its mobility analyses both for airlift and tankers. I believe the Department will get a better, more objective product than we would from RAND. I hope we're not letting IDA's cost review of the tanker lease color our opinion. Please convince me otherwise.

I am also concerned about the fact that Project Air Force may have received as much as \$50 million for FY03 and FY04 and is expected to get at least another \$25 million for FY05. This financial relationship between the Air Force and RAND renders RAND unsuitable for conducting the AoA on this multibillion dollar procurement proposal.

Given the foregoing, I respectfully suggest that the Air Force not enter into an agreement to procure aerial refueling aircraft until an entity independent of the Air Force—on the basis of a study not funded directly or indirectly by the Air Force—completes the AoA.

As always, I appreciate your consideration.

Sincerely,



John McCain
Chairman

file

SECRET
July 1, 2004
2004 NOV -1 PM 3:02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Op-ed

7/20
J

Larry Di Rita
7/20

I got a note from John Howard asking if he should submit his articles, such as the attached one, to *Stars and Stripes*. If you think so, you should tell him. If not, just forget it.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/26/04 Howard letter and op-ed piece

DHR:dh
070104-14

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

DR 7/22

Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Lengyel
7/20

08/7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita
TO: SecDef
cc: Allison Barber
DATE: July 13, 2004
SUBJECT: Op-Ed

Stars & Stripes is always looking for thoughtful and thought-provoking pieces like this. I will have Allison Barber make contact with him so that he knows how to submit his articles. We'll encourage him to do so.

July 15,2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

c c : Larry Di Rita, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Op-Ed Submission to *Stars and Stripes*

- Dr. John Howard will be submitting his articles to *Stars and Stripes*.

11-L-0559/OSD/45084

THE HOWARD CENTER
FOR FAMILY, RELIGION & SOCIETY



934 North Main Street
Rockford, Illinois 61103
phone: 815/964-5819
fax: 815/965-1826
email: hwdctr@profam.org

DR. JOHN A. HOWARD
Senior Fellow

26 June 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don:

"Democracy in Arabia" is something you will want to read if you haven't seen it.

Owen Roberts' Position Paper is a privately subscribed circulation piece, but I have his permission to send it to you. The marked Churchill quote on page 2 is powerfully à propos.

I also ~~enclose~~ enclose the just finished text of the next in our series of op/ed pieces. Is this something I should submit to Stars and Stripes? If so, how?

The warmest good wishes

John

DRAFT

Date

Editor
Address
City, State Zip

Dear Editor:

In his biography of John F. Kennedy, Ralph Martin notes that when James Reston asked the new President what vision he had for the future, Kennedy replied that he hadn't had time to think about it. The intensity of modern presidential campaigns is so great that the news media like the candidates tend to be engrossed in today's issues, seldom finding time to consider larger matters such as what personal qualities make for wise and capable leadership.

Here is an essay about presidential leadership you are welcome to publish or distribute.

Sincerely,

Lawrence D. Jacobs
Vice President

LDJ/cg

11-L-0559/OSD/45086

LEADERSHIP RECONSIDERED

by **Dr. John A. Howard**
Senior Fellow, The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society
Rockford, Illinois

Following the death of Ronald Reagan there was a spontaneous truce in the continuous media barrage of angry criticism hurled at President Bush and his Administration. For a week the news was dominated by fond memories and praise of another president. Although it was a time of mourning, the relief from the rancor of the political campaign, combined with the numerous stories of Ronald Reagan's courage, optimism, kindness and good humor made it a welcome period of national amity, and, for many, of renewed pride in their country.

There is an eternal human hunger for leaders who proclaim and champion ideals, who embody the principles undergirding those ideals, and who provide hope and inspiration to the people. During the two decades prior to the Reagan election, the sour cynicism about, and criticism of, America that prevailed in the media, academia and the entertainment industry cast a pall over patriotism and other idealistic sentiments. It became a modern **Dark** Age which James Reston in 1969, perceived as "a new pessimism," Arthur Burns as "a loss of faith in our institutions," and Archibald MacLeish, as "an anesthesia of the soul."

Suddenly America had a leader who reversed the engines. As Margaret Thatcher said: "Others prophesied the decline of the West; he inspired America and its allies with renewed faith in its mission of freedom. Others saw only limits to growth; he transformed a stagnant economy into an engine of opportunity. His politics had a

freshness and optimism that won converts from every class and nation – and ultimately from the very heart of the evil empire.”

One startling aspect of that freshness was the fact that he did not seek the presidency for fame or power or personal advancement. As he said in his speech to the nation when leaving office, “I never meant to go into politics . . . but I was raised to believe you had to pay your way for the blessings bestowed on you. I was happy with my career in the entertainment world, but I ultimately went into politics because I wanted to protect something precious.” Serving his country was a natural and genuine motive and gave him the freedom to follow whatever course he judged best for the nation. Self-seeking moneyed pressure groups had no claim on him.

The something precious he wanted to protect was, naturally, the first point he made in his Farewell Speech. He spoke of an incident involving the Midway aircraft carrier in the China Sea: They spotted a small craft filled with “Boat People,” trying to escape from Communist tyranny. As the launch from the Midway brought them back to the Carrier, a refugee shouted to a seaman way up on the deck, “Hello, American sailor. Hello, Freedom Man.” What more poignant illustration could there be to illustrate the preciousness of freedom to all human beings?

The religious up-bringing which instilled in him the duty to be of service to the community also taught him to serve and love other people. Vice President Cheney in his eulogy stated, “If Ronald Reagan ever uttered a cynical, or cruel, or selfish word, the moment went unrecorded.” President Bush said, “Ronald Reagan carried himself, even in the most powerful office, with a decency and attention to small kindnesses that

define a good life. He was a courtly, gentle and considerate man, never known to slight or embarrass others.”

Ronald Reagan reawakened in our nation an appreciation of the depth and beneficent power of the basic ideals of our free society and labored to help other nations adopt and benefit from them.

A politician he was not. A gifted and admirable leader he was.



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CHAIRMAN AND CEO

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John — 3 May 2004
Thank you for all the good
you do in this world and for
sharing your magnificent
writings with us. (with and (b)(6))

John A. Howard

CFC® Position Paper

THE LONDON BLITZ, 1940
and
WORLD TERRORISM, 2004

Owen J. Roberts

3 May 2004

July 28, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Use of Helicopters w/Detainees

383.6

Someone raised a question as to whether or not anyone who was at GTMO or anywhere else was taken up in a helicopter and threatened to be thrown out as a way to scare them.

I had never heard that before. I had heard it about Vietnam, but I had never heard it about the global war on terror. Please have someone check into that and see if anyone knows anything about it. If so, we better do whatever is appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072804-13

.....
Please respond by _____

28 Jul 04



720

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:

J00
4 Oct 04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Improvements to Jointness – Response to Singapore Snowflake

1. I have reviewed Lin Wells' summary of Singapore's military transformational efforts and appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on improving "jointness" within this context. I will specifically address the areas of Joint command and control, where I can speak from experience.
2. Singapore's emphasis on integrated command and control and warfighting experimentation are key enablers to jointness. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is working closely with the Services and Defense Agencies to develop fully integrated command and control capabilities. Further, we continue to reach out to our multinational partners to draw them into our exercise and experimentation programs. In fact, I personally extended an offer to Singapore's CNO to assign a liaison officer to JFCOM.
3. Singapore's decision to designate a "Future Systems Architect" and "fence" a portion of their budget for experimentation and future systems architecture development is noteworthy. In a similar vein, JFCOM's oversight of Joint Battle Management Command and Control is crucial to ensuring the relevance of this system-of-systems approach to our joint operational commanders. As we look to the future of Joint command and control, the key to success will depend on effective joint oversight and adequate resources. The use of the Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap, signed by myself and Mike Wynne on 26 May 2004, as a directive document to guide Service and Agency acquisition efforts is a key element of JFCOM oversight per Management Initiative Decision (MID 912), signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 7 January 2003. This roadmap is my "proposal" for Joint command and control in DoD.

VIR

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

OSD 17354-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45092

OCT 19 2004

720

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gem Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA

SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers

I'd like some hard data - within the next week - telling me precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve that have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102004-5

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

326

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 17356-04

20 Oct 04



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000
INFO MEMO**



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

November 1, 2004 – 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu INV04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers

2004 NOV 1 11 11 AM
 11-0559-05078

- You asked for hard data telling you precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve who have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.
- Our official database for the Reserve components reflects that 1,796,347 individuals were members of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) from FY99 through FY04. Average annual SelRes strength over that 6 year time frame has been about 875,000.
- Of these almost 1.8 million individuals shown to have served in the SelRes since FY99, the following is a breakdown of those who have served once or more in support of contingency operations over the last six years. This includes operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and current operations - ONE/OEF/OIF.

326

One Time	Two Times	Three Times (or more)	Total
334,078	53,478	8,822	396,378
18.60%	2.98%	0.49%	22.07%

1 Nov 04

- The percent of members who have been called-up multiple times is about 3.5% of the members who were reflected to be in the SelRes Population from FY99 – FY04.
- Looking at just the current SelRes population of 860,764, about 327,900 – or –38% – have been called-up for operations ONE/OEF/OIF over the past 3 years.

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

20 Oct 04



OSD 17356-04

OCT 19 2004

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve Call-Up Numbers

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
102004-5

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 17356-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45095

720

November 1, 2004

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads **up** on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

D11R:dh
110104-7

373 24

1 12/11/04

OSD 17361 -04

11-L-0559/OSD/45096

720



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 1, 2004 - 11:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

David S. C. Chu
(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: Guideposts For Boards — SNOWFLAKE (Attached)

- The Secretaries of the Military Departments issue guideposts to the promotion boards in the form of written instructions:
 - Army- "Give special attention to officers who can conceptualize, chart strategies, and formulate policies as opposed to merely organizing solutions to problems."
 - Navy- "The Navy needs bold officers who are willing to think creatively, take well-calculated risks, develop new ideas, and maximize capabilities through sound management practices."
 - Marine Corps- "A critical goal of the Marine Corps is to encourage -- to demand -- innovation and efficiency to ensure that we retain an adaptive, flexible, and effective naval force able to anticipate events and win across the spectrum of conflict."
 - Air Force- "To support this effort, the Air Force needs leaders who can be the intellectual compass for the institution -- leaders who don't just do, but who can conceptualize what needs to be done."
- But we can also encourage innovation and boldness through other avenues, on which I will report shortly.
- Ultimately, the issue is whether those mechanisms actually produce the results you want--a subject for further thought.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Herbert, (b)(6)

OSD 17374-04



11-L-0559/OSD/45097

Vertical text on the right margin, possibly a file number or date: 280...

SEP 29 2004

September 28, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

Should there be certain precepts or guideposts for boards that select flag officers?
Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-10

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

FOUO

SEP 29 2004

September 28, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

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Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-10

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

200 (5000)

FOUO

OSD 17374-04

28 Sep 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45099

11/2
D930

~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004
11:11:11

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Dutch Issue

Colin Powell called. He said the Dutch are locking themselves into pulling their troops out in March. He said the Defense Minister Kamp apparently has the lead role in their Coalition politics on this subject.

Apparently they have 1450 people there and he has said publicly that they will not be extended past mid-March, 2005. The White House and State are trying to walk the Dutch back.

What should we be doing? Should I be calling Kamp and finding out? I had not heard this. Please get your folks to find out what's going on. We should get ahead of the curve on this stuff, as I've been asking.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-28

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 17431-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45100

FOUO
TAB A

CJCS HAS SEEN

OCT 19 2004

OCT 15 2004

2004 10 15 11 51 AM
SECRET

ITALY

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Italy's Offer

We ought to make sure we follow up with Italy on their offer to train and equip in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-37

.....
Please respond by 10/24/04

Tab A

FOUO

OSD 17555-04

ISOCIOY

11-L-0559/OSD/45101



720
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 NOV 27 09:56 AM

CH-2161-04
3 November 2004

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

- **Issue.** "Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** One C-130 load of plastic sheeting and one C-130 load of Government of Japan (GOJ)-provided relief supplies were delivered on 28 October.
- Four additional C-130 loads of GOJ-provided supplies were planned; however, the second sortie satisfied the relief requirement.
- **Discussion.** Department of State requested DOD humanitarian support to the victims of the 23 October earthquakes in the Niigata Prefecture (130 nm NNW of Tokyo). Assistance is being provided on a non-reimbursable basis.
- Japanese Foreign Ministry conveyed a request for the US Government (USG) to provide and airlift one C-130 load of plastic sheeting for use as temporary shelter for approximately 100,000 displaced citizens and support five C-130 loads of GOJ-furnished relief supplies.
- The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved this action via OSD Executive Secretary memorandum on 27 October.
- The US Embassy has worked closely with the GOJ to provide additional assistance. No other requests for assistance remain. Relief supplies available to US Forces Japan include:
 - Blankets, tents, bedding, generators, potable water and Meals Ready to Eat.
 - A standard tent camp for 1500 persons.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 17581-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45102

JPM

3 NOV 04

27 OCT 04

- A SEABEE Detachment, a Marine Engineer Battalion (on Okinawa) and Air Force Prime Beef Engineer Units.
- These additional assets can be available on short notice.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize a positive response to future GOJ requests for assistance related to the current Niigata earthquake situation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :
As stated

Reference:

- 1 OSD Executive Secretary memorandum, OSD 17017-04, 27 October 2004, "Approval of State Request for DoD Assistance to Japan Earthquake Victims"

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/45104

FOUO

TAB A

10/27

2004 NOV -3 PM 5: October 27, 2004

Hor!

J-3

N 28

TO: Gen Dick Myers
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
 10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:ss
 102704-1

.....

Please respond by 10/28/04

FOUO

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45105

OSD 17581-04

OK 10/26

From: Baker, Howard H (Tokyo)
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY** RUMSFELD
FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD **BAKER**

Importance: High

Dear Don:

I am sure that you are well aware of the earthquake that shook the Niigata area of Japan **last** Saturday and of the devastation that it caused. Several dozen **people** were killed, over 100,000 are out of their homes, roads and other infrastructure have been badly damaged. There has been a very strong aftershock just this morning, adding to the existing damage and further complicating efforts to return the affected area to normal.

We have been working here with the Japanese Government on ways in which the USG might respond to this disaster. I have turned over a check for \$50,000 as a start. State **and** DoD are now working out details of a plan to authorize providing badly needed materials such as plastic sheeting. U.S. Forces Japan is ready and willing to support this effort.

I hope that you will give this issue your personal attention. It goes without saying that this humanitarian mission must be accomplished swiftly in order to be effective and beneficial to the affected people in Niigata Prefecture. I greatly appreciate your support.

Sincerely,
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45106

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY

10/27

2004 NOV -3 10:51:25
October 27, 2004

Hor!

3-3

N 28

Japan

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

Let's see what **we** can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from **Howard** Baker and get back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:ss
102704-1

.....
Please respond by 10/28/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 17581-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45107

2506107

OK 10/26

From: Baker, Howard H(Tokyo)
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY RUMSFELD**
FROM **AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER**

Importance: High

Dear Don:

I am sure that you are well aware of the earthquake that shook the Niigata area of Japan last Saturday and of the devastation that it caused. Several dozen people were killed, over 100,000 are out of their homes, roads and other infrastructure have been badly damaged. There has been a very strong aftershock just this morning, adding to the existing damage and further complicating efforts to return the affected area to normal.

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I hope that you will give this issue your personal attention. It *goes* without saying that this humanitarian mission **must** be accomplished swiftly in order to be effective and beneficial to the affected people in Niigata Prefecture. I greatly appreciate your support.

Sincerely,
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45108

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/45109

720
TAB A
~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **Jim** Jones Organization

2004 09 29 11:54:27
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

EUCCOM

Should the **Jim Jones** organization be reorganized? **My** impression is it should be.
The **world has** changed, **NATO** has changed.

Please have some **folks look** at it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

29Sep04

11-L-0559/OSD/45110

OSD 17583-04

7201
~~FOUO~~

November 4, 2004

TO: Dina Powell
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Force Appointees

I've been informed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche, and Under Secretary Pete Teets that they, as well as the other PAS appointees in the Air Force, with the exception of Michael Dominguez, are planning to step aside sometime after the election.

DHR:ss
110104-36

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17606-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45111

020

4 NOV 04

NOV 04 2004

TO: Dina Powell
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turbulence in Key Positions

020

Attached is a memo on the subject of turbulence in key Presidential Appointment positions. As you know, DoD has had a vacancy rate of about 20-25% throughout the past four years.

- The FBI clearance process has been sluggish
- The ethics clearance process has been sluggish
- The Senate confirmation process has been damaging, with some Presidential nominees being held up without a vote for as long as a year and a half.

The attached paper addresses the facts surrounding the corruption to which Darlene Druyun has now confessed.

Quite beyond the Air Force is the fact that the Secretary of the Army position has been vacant 18 months, because of the refusal of the Senate to confirm a nominee. And, it is the Secretary of the Army that is the Executive Agent for detainees and, I should add, therefore for Abu Ghraib.

Something has to be done to fix this process. There is only a modest veneer of civilian control in the Department of Defense. With an average 20-25% vacancy rate in the 48 Presidential-appointed Senate-confirmed positions, a President's grip on the Executive Branch is even thinner. DoD is responsible for more than three million people, including the active force, the reserve components, civilians and contractors, and a budget of more than \$400 billion.

Operating at a 20-25% vacancy rate during a war is unacceptable. This process needs be fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/1/04 Druyun memo

DHR:dh
110104-30

OSD 17607-04

honor

2 November 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process. The question is: "How could such major corruption happen, over such a long period, without those serving above and around her seeing her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- Druyun served as the "civilian" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air Force for Acquisition for ten years.
- During the ten years of Druyun's service, the position of her immediate superior, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, was vacant for four of those ten years. As a result, for those four years Druyun was the senior civilian in the Air Force acquisition system and in charge of the day-to-day activities of all Air Force acquisition. In the six years that there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary, daily oversight of Druyun's activities was spotty, since there were four Assistant Secretaries who moved in and out of the post as her superior, for an average tenure of roughly 18 months.
- In addition to Druyun's post, there is also a "military" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-year tenure, there were four "military" Deputies moving in and out of office. But, these three-star general officers were not involved in contracting. It is notable that, under Title 10 U.S.C., even today only a senior civilian can make major acquisition decisions. Military officers, no matter how senior, cannot do so. Therefore, by virtue of her position as the senior Air Force acquisition civilian, all procurement information passed through and was controlled by her.
- To further add to the turbulence in Air Force acquisition, during her ten-year tenure, there were five Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of the U.S. Air Force. And, there were four different Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide oversight of Air Force acquisition organization and processes. The rapid turnover reduced continuity of adult supervision.
- However, within twelve months of the current Air Force Secretary being confirmed, and within seven months of having an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition confirmed, the Air Force acquisition organization

FOUO

and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of the organizational power Druyun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45114



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRlich, JR.
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel
Tele: (410) 974-3005
Fax: (410) 974-2077

October 26, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 33880
1300 Defense Highway
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. ~~Secretary~~ Secretary:

For openers, permit me again to reiterate the pleasure and uplifting that your fine (if brief) visit to Annapolis several months ago provided the Governor and all the rest of us. Even from a great wrestler (now more than a half-century ago), it was special. All the members of my office join me in our gratitude, prominently displaying our photo with you.

Your distinguished career of honor and persistence in devoted service to our beloved country will retain all of its outstanding character, whatever the future holds.

On an item of governmental as well as personal privilege, Clarence Watson "Watty" Wheelwright was a close, also under-age carousing friend of mine, who joined the Air Force to defend our country when the Korean War began. As gunner on a B-26 bomber, AIC Wheelwright went down with his aircraft on a bombing run over North Korea on May 31, 1952. There were no survivors. Since then his (b)(6) and (b)(6) have tirelessly worked with U.S. officials to recover his remains. The exact site has been pinpointed.

Most recently, (b)(6) was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45115

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and (b)(6) personal appreciation to them.

My file reflects that Watty Wheelwright's identifier is Tasker Number **2003015143** (AIC Clarence W. Wheelwright). As you know far better than I, the USG has been negotiating with North Korea for nine years, with North Korea approving only three areas for search. It is my impression that Watty's remains are in or within walking distance of one of those sites. It is not clear to me whether a specific request as to the precise site, or a further general request, is now appropriate. Whatever, your departmental colleagues have been processing my inquiry, and anything you can do personally to assist would also be greatly welcomed. Governor Ehrlich, Mary Beth Carozza, Tom Hance, and all the other members of this office join me in forwarding our genuine appreciation.

Finally, please give my very best to Joyce, with congratulations on all her efforts, most particularly in trying to keep you, (b)(6) and the other New Triers in line.

As ever,



JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office (for forwarding)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

630

~~FOUO~~

file

3

November 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Jervis Finney

Paul Butler

12/13

Korea (North)

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Jerve Finney. He works with Governor Bob Ehrlich. You will see Finney's name at the top, on the letterhead. He is a very close friend - please see what you can do about this and update me.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
110804-5

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

12/13/04

DR 12/14

TO SecDef
From Paul Butler

Attached is a letter from Jerry Jennings - DASD/POW-MIA to Mr. Finney responding to his letter about locating the remains of his friend Watty Wheelwright (there is a team scheduled to investigate the relevant crash site in N. Korea in July 2005)

8 Nov 04

I also spoke with Mr. Finney to make sure the letter answered his questions. He said it did and passed on his support and regards. I gave him my phone number if he needed ~~FOUO~~ any follow-up.

11-L-0559/OSD/45117

Sr:
176084374

11/2
1630

FOUO

November 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Jervis Finney

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Jerve Finney. He works with Governor Bob Ehrlich. You will see Finney's name at the top, on the letterhead. He is a very close friend - please see what you can do about this and update me.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
110804-5

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

Done
Paul Butler
1/11

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45118



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

2004 10 26 11:41

DU 11/8

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel
Tele: (410) 974-3005
Fax: (410) 974-2077

October 26, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 33880
1300 Defense Highway
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. ~~Secretary~~ Secretary:

For openers, permit me again to reiterate the pleasure and uplifting that your fine (if brief) visit to Annapolis several months ago provided the Governor and all the rest of us. Even from a great wrestler (now more than a half-century ago), it was special. All the members of my office join me in our gratitude, prominently displaying our photo with you.

Your distinguished career of honor and persistence in devoted service to our beloved country will retain all of its outstanding character, whatever the future holds.

On an item of governmental as well as personal privilege, Clarence Watson "Watty" Wheelwright was a close, also under-age carousing friend of mine, who joined the Air Force to defend our country when the Korean War began. As gunner on a B-26 bomber, AIC Wheelwright went down with his aircraft on a bombing run over North Korea on May 31, 1952. There were no survivors. Since then his (b)(6) and (b)(6) have tirelessly worked with U.S. officials to recover his remains. The exact site has been pinpointed.

Most recently, (b)(6) was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04


11-L-0559/OSD/45119

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and (b)(6) personal appreciation to them.

My file reflects that Watty Wheelwright's identifier is Tasker Number **2003015143** (AIC Clarence W. Wheelwright). As you know far better than I, the USG has been negotiating with North Korea for nine years, with North Korea approving only three areas for search. It is my impression that Watty's remains are in or within walking distance of one of those sites. It is not clear to me whether a specific request as to the precise site, or a further general request, is now appropriate. Whatever, your departmental colleagues have been processing my inquiry, and anything you can do personally to assist would also be greatly welcomed. Governor Ehrlich, Mary Beth Carozza, Tom Hance, and all the other members of this office join me in forwarding our genuine appreciation.

Finally, please give my very best to Joyce, with congratulations on all her efforts, most particularly in trying to keep you, (b)(6) and the other New Triers in line.

As ever,



JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

SIR -
This has been 11/4
tasked to Policy.

(b)(6)



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

KOJ EA (K027H)

Mr. Jervis S. Finney
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of the Governor
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mr. Finney:

This is in response to **your** inquiry to Secretary Rumsfeld concerning your friend Airman First Class Clarence Wheelwright who was lost during the Korean War. As the Department of Defense office responsible for accounting for Americans missing from **our** Nation's wars, we are pleased to provide the following information.

We are not certain that we have pinpointed the exact location of Airman Wheelwright's crash site or burial location. The Russian document that provides us with our most detailed information on the shoot down states: "A search group established that on 31 May 1952 at 2300 hours a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region on a southwesterly course and crashed near the village An-Khari 20 meters **from** the railway bed. The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following **day**."

We believe that "**An-Khari**" is probably the Russian transliteration of the present village Anha-ri by general area and presence of the **main** rail line. A possible complication is that even if the village name is correct, it is possible that the village may have moved. North Koreans often relocate villages due to construction or reclamation. Secondly, there is no mention of the crew's burial location. So while we are fortunate to have this documentation, we are far from having an exact location to excavate.

Unfortunately, the North Korean government imposes significant restrictions on **our** access to their country. Therefore, **our** ability to investigate this crash site depends on the North Korean government allowing our teams access to the area. In any case, we do wish to investigate this site, as well as other aircraft crash sites in the vicinity. The arrangement we concluded last month with the North Koreans provides for a Korean People's Army (KPA) pre-investigative period in March and a joint investigation period in July 2005. Prior to starting joint field activities in North Korea in 2005, we intend to propose that our teams investigate this crash site and others during the joint investigative period in July.

(26 007 04)



R 17608-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45121

We appreciate **your** concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey to (b)(6) that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation and making every effort possible to account for her brother and his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jerry D. Jennings". The signature is stylized with large, flowing letters and a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

Jerry D. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

Mr. Jervis S. Finney
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of the Governor
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, MD 21401

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KOREA (KIA) (H)

(26.02.04)



We appreciate your concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey to (b)(6) that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation and making every effort possible to account for her brother and his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jerry D. Jennings". The signature is stylized and cursive, with a long horizontal line extending to the left.

Jerry D. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs

November 4, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

IRAQ

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/1/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
110404-7

4 NOV 04

OSD 17639-04

Iraqi Security Forces Update

1 November 2004


Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only


• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
–Police	
–Civil Intervention Force	
–Emergency Response	
–Border Enforcement	
–Highway Patrol	
–Dignitary Protection	
	63,844
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
–Army	
–National Guard	
–Intervention Force	
–Special Operations	
–Air Force	
–Coastal Defense Force	
	<hr/> 114,785

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003 =
0 Iraqi Security
Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police ⁽¹⁾	135,000	22%	46%	59%	70%	70%
Special Police Regiments	1,200	0%	50%	86%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions	3,600	0%	67%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	270	0%	85%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol ⁽²⁾	6,300		To Be Determined	To Be Determined	To Be Determined	To Be Determined
Bur. of Dignitary Protection	500	96%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando Battalions	2,019	45%	75%	85%	100%	100%
Dept of Border Enforcement ⁽³⁾	32,000	57%	62%	60%	71%	84%

Notes

- Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
- Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45129

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000	44%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584	67%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904	66%	74%	100%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516	58%	67%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451	39%	40%	58%	76%	100%

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45130

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	74	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,803	Norway	9	Tonga	63
Australia	375	Estonia	48	Latvia	133	Poland	2,452	Ukraine	1,595
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	87	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	7,862
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	276	Macedonia	33	Romania	745	US	131,376
Bulgaria	444	Italy	3,131	Moldova	11	Singapore	0		
Czech Rep	98	Japan	792	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	426	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,473	Thailand	0	Total	155,392

IRAQI FORCES ON HAND	177,931
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	87,248
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	166
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	925
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	20,039
ARMY	12,654
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,916
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	669
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING	137,459
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	48,906
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	166
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	388
HIGHWAY PATROL	555
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	18,375
ARMY	12,654
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,916
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	669
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia, Singapore & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service
73,992

NATO Training Team = 41



Iraqi Forces On Hand MNF-I



Trained Iraqi Forces MNF-I

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45131

- NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq (NTIM-I) became NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) when the Activation Order was published.
- Prime Minister Allawi will address the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 5 November.
- NATO Force Generation Conference scheduled 8-9 November in Mons, Belgium to seek fulfillment of NTM-I force requirements.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45132

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45133

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	87,248	43,439	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,196	0	3,120	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	166	91	270	MAY '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	20,039	18,375	19,889	AUG '06
HIGHWAY PATROL*	6,300	925	555	TBD	TBD
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	484	484	500	DEC '04
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS	2,019	2,019	900	2,019	JAN '05
TOTAL	176,209	112,077	63,844	79,153	AUG '06

* On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol Authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45134

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS)	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	3,887	620	10,915 / 10,915	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	43,445	0	45,000 / 0	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	0	1,816	1794 / 4,790	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	597	0	0 / 725	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	48,505	2,436	57,709 / 16,430	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is manned, trained, and equipped to prescribed standards and has capability to plan and conduct independent operations at company level. Battalion headquarters capable of commanding and controlling battalion operations.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45135

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training	400
	8 Week Academy	5,476
	Specialized Training	170
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,196
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	75
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy	0
	Specialized Training	
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training	0
	8 Week Academy Training	NA (Prior Service IPS)
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training	
	2-3 Week Advanced Training	96
	Mentoring by US Special Forces	
Special Police Commando Battalions	4 Weeks Basic Training	750
	1-3 Weeks Advanced Training	
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks	7,367
	Basic Training: 4 Weeks	
	Collective Training: 4 Weeks	
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks	2,013
	Collective Training: 4 Weeks	
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks	
	Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks	5,287
	Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training)	
	12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	0
TOTAL		22,941

Data a

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Special Police Commando Bns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45137

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- Intimidation attacks are impacting Iraqi Security Forces' effectiveness and retention in Anbar Province and several other locations in the Sunni areas, though there remain no shortage of recruits for the military or police.

Train:

- Began training for 96 Bureau of Dignitary Protection students in VIP Personal Security and Motor Escort Operations, and graduated 38 students from a VIP Site Security course.
- Graduated 545 Department of Border Enforcement students on 28 October from four-week courses in Customs, Immigration, and Border Police Operations at the Jordan Academy.
- Graduated 282 law enforcement students from five specialized policing courses at Adnan Training Facility on 28 October (Basic Criminal Investigation, Organized Crime Investigation, Iraqi Police Service Training Staff Development, and two courses in Election Security Management).
- Began the Provincial SWAT training program at the Baghdad International Airport Training Facility with 22 students from the Baghdad Region.
- 1st Battalion and the Basic Training battalion completed basic training courses; MNC-I units provided security escort for soldiers to reduce chances of ambush as the soldiers embarked on leave.

Equip:

- Issued 100 weapons, 100 vehicles to Iraqi Police Service.
- Issued 550 AK 47s, 2445 Body Armor sets, 100k rounds of 7.62 X 39 ammunition, 10,000 desert boots, and 3,095 kevlar helmets to Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Issued 645 9mm Pistols to Iraqi National Guard.
- Received inbound air shipment of 2,529 AK47s, 50 PKMs and 264 RPKs for Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Airlifted 1,371 sets of body armor to Mosul for delivery to Iraqi Regular Army units at Al Kasik.

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- Intimidation has caused delays in construction at Al Kasik Military Base in Ninewa Province that may delay generation of the 3rd Division's final brigade; workarounds being pursued.
- Awarded contracts for Basrah Military Airfield Project and Iraqi Air Force C-130 Base at Baghdad International Airport on 29 Oct 04.
- MNSTC-I has committed over \$412 million of \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. MNSTC-I is ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter.

Mentor/Employ:

- 1st Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force; 3rd Brigade (-), Regular Army; 36th Commando Battalion; Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force; 3rd Police Commando Battalion; and the Police Emergency Response Unit are preparing for operations.
- 1st Police Commando Battalion commenced successful operation in Mosul; companies from 2nd Police Commando Battalion continue good operations in North Babil and Samarra.
- Ministry of Interior conducted a communications exercise on 25 October with the National Joint Ops Center using all available systems in rehearsal for Iraqi voter registration security requirements.
- CG CPATT met with the Ministry of Interior Deputy Minister for Iraqi Police Service on 26 October to discuss plans to expand the Special Police Commando force structure by at least three more battalions (to six) and, possibly, substantially more.

November 4, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Karzai Inauguration

Afghanistan

I think you ought to think about leading the U.S. delegation to Kabul for the December 7 Inauguration of Karzai. It is an enormous success for the region and the world. It's important for the Global War on Terror. It would really show the right level of interest.

I'd like to go and I think the President ought to think about including Tom Franks in the delegation, given all he has done with respect to Afghanistan.

DHR:ss
110404-15

4 NOV 04

OSD 17680-04

~~FOUO~~

720
FOUO

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

Please get the Department working on the task of changing this law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job and the same thing in other superintendent positions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss
100604-1

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

357 Anderson

6 Oct 04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

SECRET
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 NOV -5 AM 9:37



INFO MEMO

November 4, 2004 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. CHU, USD(P&R)

A. R. Chu 4 Nov 04

SUBJECT: Forced Retirement of Superintendents--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked that the Department get "working on the task of changing the law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job."
- Mission Accomplished. With the signing of the F'Y-05 Authorization Bill, the law has been changed. The Bill provides for a waiver to allow continued service beyond an officer's tenure as Superintendent at any of the Service Academies.
- If the Superintendent is reassigned or retires before having completed three years in that position, the Service Secretary must report to Congress.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

*552
K...
4 Nov 04
6 00 PM*



FOUO

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

Please get the Department working on the task of changing this law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job and the same thing in other superintendent positions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss
100604-1

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45143

OSD 17700-04

NOV 05 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

We've been thinking about adding Joe Califano, a former Democrat office holder, to the Defense Policy Board. Given the President's comments this morning and his desire to reach out, I wonder if it might be better to consider Tom Daschle for the position. He'd probably be a good member of the Defense Policy Board. I would be happy to make the offer, and we could do it soon if we thought it would be helpful to the effort. Probably the sooner we do it, the better. Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-12

334

5 Nov 04

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Letters

I just looked at Powell Moore's paper on what is changing in the Congress. It seems to me that I should write to some of the people who are retiring or were defeated, people like Daschle, Nethercutt, Hollings, Schrock, etc. - people I have known and maybe some others that I didn't.

Please get a list of all of the people who are retiring or were defeated, and draft up appropriate letters where it seems likely that I should do so.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/5/04 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef re: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees [OSD 17729-04]

DHR:dh
111104-17



Please respond by 11/19/04

032
11 Nov 04
5 Nov 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

006 11/11

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 NOV -5 PM 2:37

INFO MEMO

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

Paul Butler
11/8
PMB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs 697-6210

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

- The gain of four seats in the Senate and three seats in the House for the Republican majority is expected to slightly change the ratios of majority and minority members of DoD committees of jurisdiction. The Republican term limit in both houses will have a greater impact.

1. Senate Armed Services Committee: None of the 25 members retired or were defeated, but the increase in the Republican majority will probably lead to a two vote margin rather than a one vote margin. No decisions have been made in this regard, but it is likely that a couple of Armed Services committee members may leave to fill vacancies on the Senate Appropriations Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. It is our understanding, for example, that Senator Evan Bayh has had a long-standing interest in the Senate Finance Committee where Democrat vacancies are likely as a result of the departure of Senators Daschle, Graham and Breaux.

2. SASC Subcommittee Chairmen: There will be a reshuffling of subcommittee chairmen. Senator McCain will be eligible to become a subcommittee chairman. He was previously ineligible as a result of his chairmanship of the Commerce Committee because of a Republican rule that prohibits Republicans from simultaneously serving as a full committee chairman and a subcommittee chairman. He will relinquish Commerce because of a term limit rule. McCain supposedly favors the Airland Subcommittee underscoring his interest in Air Force procurement issues. The Republican rule prohibiting a Senator from simultaneously chairing a full committee and a subcommittee may require Pat Roberts to give up the SASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. This would add to the subcommittee reshuffle.

TSA SD	<i>11/8</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>11/9</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>11/8</i>

OSD 17729-04

3. House Armed Services Committee: Two members, Congressmen Schrock of Virginia and Turner of Texas, have retired and Democrats, Baron Hill of Indiana, Charlie Stenholm of Texas and Ciro Rodriguez of Texas, were defeated. None of the subcommittee chairmen and ranking members are leaving the House.

4. Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee: Senator Hollings' departure, through retirement, will be the only change on this Subcommittee. He may not be replaced as a result of the change in ratios from the addition to the Republican majority.

Senator Stevens will continue to serve as Chairman of the Subcommittee thanks to an exemption from the term limit rule for appropriations subcommittee chairmen. Stevens is starting his 25th year as either Chairman or Ranking on the Defense Subcommittee. Stevens will, however, have to move from full Appropriations Committee chairmanship to Commerce Chairman, as a result of the term limit rule. Thad Cochran will replace him as full committee chairman.

5. Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee: Chairman Jerry Lewis is required to give up his Chairmanship as a result of term limits and he is expected to be replaced by Chairman Bill Young who must relinquish the Chair of the full committee as a result of term limits. Lewis is a candidate for full committee chairman along with Ralph Regula of Ohio and Hal Rogers of Kentucky. Congressman George Nethercutt of Washington is leaving the House of Representatives having given up his seat to run unsuccessfully for the Senate.

6. In the Senate Leadership, the major change will come as a result of the departure of the Majority Leader, Tom Daschle. Harry Reid of Nevada is currently the front runner to replace him. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota and Dick Durbin of Illinois are reported to be interested in the leadership and may face each other to replace Reid as Minority Whip.

(2)



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

2004 NOV -5 PM 2:37

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

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032

5 Nov 04

OSD 17729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45148

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FOUO

SEP 28 2004

September 27, 2004 ✓

TO: David Chu
cc: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-26

.....

Please respond by 10/15/04

DR

FOUO

OSD 17732-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 17 PM 5:10

CM-2190-04

17 November 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{FOR} *VA R. B. Myers 16 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Joint Credit

- **Question.** "How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it. I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for." (TAB)
- **Answer.** In response to SecDef snowflake to USD (P&R), Joint Staff/J-1, in coordination with OSD, developed initiatives to obtain credit for deserving warfighters. The previous legal issues regarding proposed joint credit were resolved as follows: SecDef, in appropriate cases, could exercise his authority under 10 U.S.C. 664 (b) and waive the statutory 24- and 36-month tour lengths for full joint duty credit if the positions are on the Joint Duty Assignment List (**JDAL**). For US officers to be eligible for this waiver, Joint Staff/J-1 will hold a review board of those positions that warrant joint duty credit, recommend these positions be added to the **JDAL** and work with OSD to expedite a **JDAL** board. Individuals obtaining 365 days cumulative credit in an approved **JDAL** position will be recommended to SecDef for full joint duty credit.
- **Analysis.** The actions listed below are planned for completion within the next 90 days.
 - CENTCOM 61: Award cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service specific positions "below" the JTF Headquarters in the USCENTCOM AOR.
 - Full Joint Duty Credit: Award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in the USCENTCOM AOR. Following USCENTCOM's development of its key position listings, my staff will recommend their inclusion on the Joint Duty Assignment List (**JDAL**).
 - A follow-on call for positions that warrant joint duty credit, as well as a list of the officers recommended for joint duty credit, will be reviewed by a G/FO board in January 2005. The approved positions will be recommended for inclusion in the **JDAL**. Officers with 365 days of cumulative credit in those positions will be recommended for consideration for full joint duty credit.
 - In the spring of 2005, the **JDAL** will be analyzed, and positions with a modest level of jointness will be recommended for deletion. The Joint Staff will host a G/FO and SES-level board to develop recommendations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USD(P&R)

Prepared By: RDML Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

OSD 1773 2-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45151

TAB
FOUO

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to **have** to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-26

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

FOUO

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/45152

OSD 17732-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

November 5, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu
 Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Joint Credit -- SNOWFLAKE

- Together with the Joint Staff, we are executing the following action plan:
- Immediate (December 2004): Ensure deserving joint warfighters get appropriate credit now (-1000)
 - o Allow cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service-specific positions "below" the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters in CENTCOM which would not otherwise qualify (solution is to dual-hat the incumbents in a qualifying position),
 - o Ask you to exercise your waiver authority to award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Horn of Africa, if the period of service does not meet the statutory minimum. General Casey and CENTCOM are completing nominations. Positions elsewhere may also deserve credit and we will pursue.
- Near-term (Summer 2005): Broaden Joint Duty Listing
 - o Add/delete positions based on actual joint content (RAND assisting Department), as confirmed by a Validation Board.
 - o Complete strategic review of joint officer management by due date (January 2006) (FY05 Authorization Act). Results of RAND's analysis and Validation Board's conclusions should be ready for your review by summer 2005.
- Long-term (January 2007): Strategic review of total work force (FY05 Authorization Act directs follow-on strategic review of senior civilians, senior noncommissioned officers, and senior Reserve leadership).

Prepared By: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)



OSD 17732-04

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
ZENTEN - 5 09 04 10

September 27, 2004 ✓

TO: David Chu
c c : Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-26

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

MR

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17732-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45154

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

858

CC: Doug Feith
Lt. Gen Sharp
Tina Jonas
VADM Willard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Funding

Please take a close look at the costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan. Clearly, there will be increasing pressure to reduce overall costs and to control such funding through the normal budget process.

We need to be sure that:

- Any security projects we put in place (ANA, Police, infrastructure) can be sustained by the Afghans in the long run.
- We create a force, both in size and infrastructure, which is appropriate to Afghanistan, reflecting its economy and circumstances, as opposed to creating something along American lines and standards.
- The interagency must be supportive of this process, to include fully and correctly staffing the Embassy, cooperating with us on funding, and agreeing with our approach.

Please come back to me with some thoughts on this as part of a larger Afghan Security Strategy soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-6

.....
Please respond by 30 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17919-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45155

AFGHANISTAN

15 Sep 04

720
~~FOUO~~
TAB

OCT 21 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

IRAQ

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-14

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

2004 OCT 23 10 50 AM

~~FOUO~~

Tab

21 Oct 04

OSD 17924-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45156



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2172-04
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 11/7*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections... I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroponte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17924-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45157

10/22
15.30

720
FOUO

October 22, 2004

TO: Paul [redacted]
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: November 14 Invitation

I can't attend this Boy Scout event on November 14. Please have *someone* write a letter of congratulations.

Thanks.

Attach.
Boy Scout Invitation for Nov 14

DHR:ss
102204-1

.....

Please respond by _____

3555 D

2000004

15 Oct 04

OSD 17965-04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45158

Boy Scouts of America Community Troop 613
1121 University Blvd. W. #103
Silver Spring, Maryland, 20902

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-3400

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Scouts, Leaders and Members of the Committee Boy Scout Troop 613 take great pleasure in announcing that:

Having completed the requirements for, and having been examined by an Eagle Scout Board of Review

(b)(6)

Was found worthy of the rank of Eagle Scout.

In honor of this achievement, we have scheduled an Eagle Scout Court of Honor to be held at 6 o'clock PM on November **14,2004** at:

**The Kemp Mill Synagogue
11910 Kemp Mill Road
Silver Spring, Maryland.**

In the event that you are unable to attend, we would greatly appreciate a letter or certificate acknowledging his achievement. We will compile it with other acknowledgments and placed in a scrapbook commemorating this special occasion.

Thank you for taking time from your extremely busy schedule to help this community recognize the achievements and service of Eagle Scout (b)(6)

Sincerely,

The Members of Troop 613

National Capital Area Council, Rock Creek District

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45159

3355b

15 OCT 19 2004

As the Boy Scouts of America approaches its centennial, it seems appropriate that the distinction of the Eagle Scout award has been bestowed. Local Scout (b)(6) earned the Eagle Rank in June of 2004; the medal will be formally presented to him in November. Open to all boys of ages eleven to eighteen, Scouting stands for and upholds the ideals of leadership, citizenship, service, and collective skill. Boys have the opportunity to earn numerous awards and achieve specific ranks within the Scouts, of which Eagle is the highest. (b)(6) joined the organization in 2000, and since then has worked toward Eagle with unwavering dedication.

Internationally recognized for nearly one hundred years, the Eagle rank is the epitome of achievement in Scouting. Requiring excellence in Scouting's entire repertoire of skills, less than three percent of all Boy Scouts reach the rank. Because of its demanding requirements, maturity, focus, and dedication are crucial. While time added a certain challenge, (b)(6) considers that aspect of the journey a definite factor contributing to his motivation. He also is grateful for his expedience in the Cub Scouts, open to boys not yet old enough to become Boy Scouts. While a Cub Scout, he earned the Arrow of Light Award, its highest recognition.

Going beyond fulfilling basic requirements, (b)(6) made sure to exemplify excellence. At each level of advancement, he earned recognition for achievement far beyond that required for the Eagle rank.

He was the first in his area to receive the (b)(6) award for religious accomplishment, and has been recently elected to Scouting's national honor society. He has also

pushed himself to earn additional awards. Knowing that setting an example helps to inspire his troop's future success, (b)(6) sets high goals. He endeavors to pass on the ideals of Scouting to all youth.

Recently graduated, (b)(6) has pursued excellence beyond Scouting. His accomplishments include (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Fully believing in dedication, (b)(6) looks forward to applying himself in the years to come. Interested in attending MIT and the University of Maryland, his study plans include computer science, mathematics, engineering, and music. As far as continued involvement with the Boy Scouts of America, he hopes to continue as an adult leader within a local troop, considering the Scouting experience to be an essential part of life.

(b)(6)



BSA TROOP 613
AND THE FAMILY OF

(b)(6)

TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN INVITING YOU
TO THE EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR
TO BE HELD AT 6 O'CLOCK ON NOVEMBER 14, 2004
AT THE KEMP MILL SYNAGOGUE
11910 KEMP MILL ROAD
SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

UNIFORM OR SEMI-FORMAL ATTIRE REQUESTED.
RECEPTION AFTERWARDS.

RSVP: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45161

(b)(6)

c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor
Event Coordinator
1121 University Boulevard West
#103
Silver Spring, MD 20902

Dear (b)(6)

Congratulations on achieving the rank of Eagle Scout! Unfortunately, I will not be able to make it to your upcoming Court of Honor, but I do want to join your family, friends, and fellow troop members in extending best wishes on this special occasion.

This significant milestone is a result of hard work and commitment. The leadership skills you have gained will not only serve you well in the future, but also set a fine example for those who follow in your footsteps.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

SOM


Paul

Paul Butler


11/8

11-L-0559/OSD/45162

EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR
EVENT COORDINATOR
1121 UNIVERSITY BOULEVARD WEST, # 103
SILVER SPRING, MD 20902




The Hon. & Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld



(b)(6)

20008/1621



11-L-0559/OSD/45163



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 9 2004

(b)(6)

c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor
Event Coordinator
1121 University Boulevard West
#103
Silver Spring, MD 20902

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With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45164

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9 NOV 04

1520104

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~~FOUO~~

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM

2004 OCT - OCT 29 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: State and CIA Deployment Policy

Please find out if the Department of State and CIA can order their employees to go to foreign posts, or if they can only ask them to do so.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102804-15

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45165



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

2004 NOV 9 5:44

November 9, 2004, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Department of State (State) to Assign Employees to Overseas Work
Sites

- You asked whether State and CIA have the authority to “order their employees to go to foreign posts, or if they can only ask them to do so.”
- In short, both State and CIA have the authority to “order” employees to perform work overseas for an extended period of time.
- Under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, members of the State Foreign Service are “obligated to serve abroad” and are required to be “available to serve in assignments throughout the world.”
- Foreign Service members who refuse to serve at foreign assignments may be subject to adverse employment action, including termination of their employment with State.
 - It should be noted, however, that generally State civil service employees, other than Foreign Service members, may not be assigned involuntarily to serve at overseas posts.
- CIA employees, like Foreign Service members, may be directed to serve at duty stations outside the United States for an unlimited period of time.
- Under Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has extremely broad authority and discretion to terminate CIA employees who refuse to serve on assignments overseas.

Prepared by: Hilary Hageman, ODGC(P&HP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/45166

OSD 18013-04

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

2004 OCT 29 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: State and CIA Deployment Policy

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
102804-15

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45167

FOUO

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Paul, let's get thank you letters to *these two* people, **Andrew** Athens and *Andrew* Manatos, thanking them for their letter.

Larry, please do a letter to **John Curtis** thanking him for the editorial he wrote. You might want to get it in the *Early Bird* or posted someplace, move it around.

Thanks.

Attach:
11/9/04 National Coordinated Efforts of Scholars letter to SecDef
11/9/04 Curtis letter to SecDef

DHR:ah
111104-33

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45168

18018-04

000,1

11 NOV 04

11 NOV 04

1700



2011-11-17

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)**

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM,
PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER AT 202-392-7790

COMMENTS: _____

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Email: CoordinationEffort@Manatos.com



**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT
OF HELLENES (CEH)**

1100 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 930-7790, (fax) (202) 428-0223
E-mail: CoordinatedEffort@Hellenes.com

Andrew A. Athens
Chairman
National Council on the Status of Hellenes (NCSH)
National Chairman
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC)
UHAC President
UHAC Director of Hellenic Affairs (UHAD)

Philip Christopher
Vice Chairman
National Council on the Status of Hellenes (NCSH)
President
International Coordination Committee
- Status for Cyprus (IFSCC)
President
Panepistimic Association of America

Andrew E. Manatos
President
National Council on the Status of Hellenes (NCSH)
Executive Board Member
UHAC and IFSCC

Pauline Papadimitriou
Executive Director
Cyprus Association of America

Nikolaos Manoyiakis
Executive Vice President
Panepistimic Association of America

Charles Manoyiakis
President
UHAC New York
Executive Board Member
UHAC

November 9, 2004

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000
VIA FACSIMILE: (b)(6)

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make the best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,


Andrew A. Athens


Andrew E. Manatos

*Congratulations. Not
bad for a "lightweight" change.
(initials)*

2011/11



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FAX TRANSMITTAL

DATE: 11-09-07 ORIGINAL RECEIPT RECEIVED

TO: DONALD H. RUMSFELD FAX# (b)(6)

FROM: JOHN CURTIS FAX#

RE: FYI

PAGE# 2/W COVER

MESSAGE: THOUGHT YOU'D LIKE THIS COLUMN!

BEST, WALTER,

 JOHN CURTIS
 EDITOR, ONLINE COLUMNIST, LLC

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RUMSFELD ON TARGET 02004 JMC/uis

1

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JOHN W. CURTIS

(310) 204-6700

Realizing that the war in Iraq will not only be won in the streets, Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld launched his own propaganda offensive hoping to convert skeptics in Iraq and elsewhere. Marching on Fallouja sends a loud message to doubters questioning U.S. resolve to root out insurgents. Election year politics aided the Pentagon's efforts to capture key battlegrounds, including Sunni-controlled strongholds of Fallouja and Ramadi. Shortly after Sen. John F. Kerry conceded, U.S. forces were given the green light to retake insurgent-infested Fallouja, the presumed base of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, though U.S. officials now believe the Jordanian-born terrorist has long-since moved on. But whether al-Zarqawi is killed or captured, U.S. control of Fallouja sends a loud message to insurgents hoping to derail plans for holding free elections in January.

Taking Fallouja has huge symbolic value to skeptics believing that insurgents had the upper hand. Watching terrorists scatter gives Iraq's Prime Minister Iyad Allawi renewed credibility that his U.S.-backed government is here to stay. Playing cat-and-mouse with insurgents sent the wrong signal that Iraq was losing its war with terrorists. "Success in Fallouja will deal a blow to terrorists in the country, and should move Iraq further away from a future of violence to one of freedom and opportunity for the Iraqi people," said Rumsfeld in a Pentagon briefing. Rumsfeld reassured not only Iraqis but also growing skepticism inside the U.S. Witnessing reelection gives the White House some breathing room for delivering President George W. Bush's promise of democracy. Gaining the upper hand in Fallouja gives new hope to administration plans for scheduled elections.

Since Baghdad fell in April 9, 2003, the U.S. has been locked in its four-year battle with insurgents, with little measurable progress. Iraqis have grown increasingly skeptical of U.S. efforts to reformer Allawi's new government. With U.S. troops routing insurgents in Fallouja, Iraq's interim government gains a distinct propaganda advantage. Without putting up resistance, terrorists, like in Afghanistan, find themselves on the run, forced to hide in remote locations. Driving terrorists out of symbolic strongholds like Fallouja and Ramadi tells the Iraqi public Allawi's new Iraqi government is beginning to take charge. Dislodging terrorists from recognized strongholds doesn't solve the dilemma of preventing jihadists from streaming across Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Bilateral agreements and special efforts must be made to seal off Iraq's porous borders.

RUMSFELD ON TARGET © 2004 J.M. Curtis

2

Credit Iraq's interim leader Allawi with recognizing that there can be no compromise with terrorists. Like Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Allawi finds himself one bullet away from anarchy. He knows that his only hope of survival is to use U.S. forces to push insurgents further from Baghdad, while, simultaneously, building up his own military. So far, Allawi's new military and security forces have proved disappointing, especially the recent massacre of 50 Iraqi troops suggesting infiltration. It's hard to know whether rank-and-file Iraqis support Allawi's new government or insurgents fighting to expel U.S. occupation. As Rumsfeld knows, any long-range strategy must include winning the heart-and-minds of Iraqi civilians. Only through an all-out media blitz can the U.S. hope to turn Iraqis against terrorists currently supported by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV.

Driving tanks into the heart of Fallouja deals a blow to insurgents telling the Iraqi people that they're winning the battle against U.S. occupation. Iraqis won't support U.S. efforts until they believe insurgents are losing power. No one wants to see Fallouja go the way of Samarra, where U.S. forces liberated the city but now falls prey to ongoing terrorist attacks. Putting off the assault on Fallouja in April only made matters worse. Terrorists were permitted to amass and dig in, causing bigger headaches for U.S. forces retaking key cities inside the Sunni Triangle. "It's like pulling your fist out of a bucket of water, and everyone soaps back in," said Andrew Kropinovich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, concerned that Fallouja won't be Rumsfeld's "tipping point." If Fallouja joins Samarra, it won't reassure too many Iraqis that the insurgency is under control.

Rumsfeld put his finger on the pulse realizing that the U.S. must do a better job of winning the hearts-and-minds of ordinary Iraqis. Rooting out insurgents and retaking Iraqi strongholds won't work unless the U.S. confronts insurgents' formidable propaganda machine, supported in large part by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV and radio. Iraqis must be convinced that there's no going back. They must repeatedly hear that insurgents are losing ground to Iraq's new government. Despite skeptics, Allawi must keep up the war-of-words against pernicious propaganda. "It may not take long to capture the city, but nothing will have been resolved. It will be a symbolic victory," said French military strategist Jean Louis Dufour, proving, if nothing else, that propaganda doesn't only stem from the Middle East. Iraq must follow Rumsfeld's lead and confront the profits of doom-and-gloom.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of *Dodging The Bullet* and *Operation Charisma*.

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT
OF HELLENES (CEH)**

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(202) 393-7790, [fax] (202) 628-0225
E-mail: CoordinatedEffort@Manatos.com

SECRET
NOV 13 11 09 00

Andrew A. Athens
Chairman
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CNE)
National Chairman
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC)
World President
World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SHE)

Philip Christopher
Vice Chairman
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)
President
International Coordination Committee—
Justice for Cyprus (PSEKA)
President
Pan-Cyprian Association of America

Andrew E. Manatos
President
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)
Executive Board Member
UHAC and PSEKA

Panicos Papanicolaou
Syndesmo President
Cypria Federation of America

Nikos Moutziaris
Executive Vice President
Pan-Cyprian Association of America

Charles Maragondakis
President
UHAC New York
Executive Board Member
PSEKA

November 9, 2004

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000
VIA FACSIMILE: (b)(6)

Dew Secretary Rumsfeld;

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make the best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,


Andrew A. Athens


Andrew E. Manatos

*Congratulations. Not
bad for a "lightweight change".
(Amthor)*

OSD 18018-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45174

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)**

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM,
PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER AT 202-393-7790

COMMENTS: _____

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 24 2004

060.1

Mr. Andrew A. Athens
Mr. Andrew E. Manatos
The National Coordinated Effort
of Hellenes (CEH)
1100 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Messrs. Athens and Manatos,

Thank you for your letter of congratulations. I do appreciate your support.

The President is indeed a superb leader, and will continue to do a wonderful job for the country.

Sincerely,

24 NOV 04

OSD 18018-04

9 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45176

**MEMO TO: Doug Feith
Pete Pace**

October 28, 2004 - HC 10/27

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

PW

SUBJECT: Post-Election Strategy for Iraq

Iraq

Doug/Pete,

I agree with John Abizaid and Steve Cambone that we should get some contingency thinking going on how we would deal with the possible outcomes of an Iraqi election.

Could the two of you get back to me and the Secretary quickly with a plan of action? I would start with a very small cell that just lays out four or five possible election outcomes and then tries to enumerate the three or four major issues that we might face in each of those possible outcomes. If you prefer to start with a smaller number of outcomes and/or issues, that would be fine.

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04

FOUO

1820
101

October 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strategy

Attached is a memo from Steve Cambone. If you agree with them, as I do, would you please act on both of these recommendations? Otherwise, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/25/04 USD (I) Memo to SecDef re: 10/23 Conversation with Gen Abizaid

DHR:ss
102704-11

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

→ SD -
I agree with Steve.
I've asked
- Ken Krieg and Jim Roche
- Faith Price
to recommend a way to lead on each
FW

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45178

OSD 18024-04
Tab A

MEMO TO: VCJCS

Secretary of the Air Force
Director, PA&E

October 28, 2004 -11C 10/29

1330

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

PW

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq

452 R

Could you please come back to me quickly with some recommendations on how we might pursue Steve Cambone's suggestion here about analyzing the use of UAVs in Iraq?

I had exactly the same reaction when we were briefed by the Air Force last week on the UAV issue. The subject needs a systems approach.

Could you get back to me quickly with some suggestions about who we might task to do this and how? Thanks.

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

G.S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE 

SUBJECT: Saturday, October 23 Conversation with General Abizaid

General Abizaid called me on Saturday seeking advice on responding to Chairman Hunter's request for comments on the Intelligence Reform Bill. I advised him against responding. General Abizaid said he would follow that advice.

General Abizaid and I then spoke about strategy in Iraq. He said he could use help in two categories:

- ✓ • development of a better approach for the employment of UAVs and other sensors, and
- ✓ • development of a post-election strategy in Iraq.

With respect to UAV employment, General Abizaid expressed the view that we are making sub-optimal use of the assets. In my view, this is a classic operations research problem. Given a competing set of objectives (escorting convoys, patrolling, lines of communication, power lines and pipelines, providing surveillance for critical infrastructure, etc., in addition to supporting tactical operations), limited resources, and an adaptable adversary, how does the Commander optimize the return on the employment

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

of those resources? **This is a task that can be assigned** to one or more of the **war colleges**, perhaps to a **Service** organization—e.g. Checkmate (USAF), the Joint Staff, PA&E or even an **FFRDC** such as RAND.

With respect to a Dost-election strategy, General Abizaid did not elaborate in any detail. He did, however, **ask a** telling question: having worked hard to ensure that **an** election in Iraq will be **a** success, what **tasks** will need to be accomplished **after** the election by **the** Coalition, and what strategy **should** be employed?

A post-election strategy will need to be **embraced by the** entire **USG**; however, it is my assumption **that** DoD will **need** to prompt discussion of the subject. Before approaching **our USG** colleagues, we might sketch a set of **two** or three scenarios that might emerge **from** the election. For example, the election might result in a **more** sectarian than secular government in which the Shia center holds sway. **Or, a more** secular than sectarian government might emerge in which **the Kurds** hold the **balance**, etc. We might then postulate what the **agenda** of these **various** governing factions **and** coalitions might be, identify what we **can** and cannot **support**, and how **we** might posture the Coalition in the **country** accordingly.

If the exercise is well constructed in the beginning, it should permit **us** to adjust **our** thinking on what we will need to do **as** events on the ground clarify themselves over coming months. The purpose is not to be predictive, but instead **to** give **us** the opportunity to think **through various** plausible

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

combinations and allow us to prepare **to** respond appropriately to the results **of** the election.

Consistent with **my** conversation **with** General Abizaid, **this** exercise should **be** done here in Washington **and** offered to General Abizaid **and** General **Casey** for comment **and** editing.

This is **an** exercise that could be led by Doug Feith and **Pete Pace**. After **the** **first** iteration, **they** could branch out bilaterally to CIA **and** the State Department. A **second** iteration could be brought before **a** Deputies' Committee just prior to **Christmas**. The object **ought** not be **an** elaborate plan, but a **set** of alternate courses **of** action based on anticipated election outcomes **and** **US** and **Coalition** objectives in **Iraq**.

CC: CJCS

TAB B

2 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq (Your Memo, 28 Oct 04)

In response to your memo, here are some recommendations that can be pursued to analyze the use of UAVs in Iraq.

Draft Terms of Reference for an Operations Research Study of the Use of UAVs and RPAs in Iraq

There currently are about 400 unmanned air vehicles of various types available in-country in Iraq or nearby on any given day. These range from the long enduring Global Hawk ISR platform, to either the ISR or Killer-Scout armed Predator remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), to the ISR I-Gnat, to the Army's ISR and armed Hunter RPAs, to the Marines' Pioneer UAVs. In addition to these systems, there are numerous small, battery-powered drones, each of which is not much bigger than a bird (Desert Hawk, Raven, BatCam, etc.). These smaller drones tend to be flown below 1000 feet and may not be a serious hazard to other aircraft. The other systems are large and could be a danger to airmen whether they are flying aircraft or helicopters. Further, the Navy is experimenting with a helo-like, small UAV, and the Coast Guard is experimenting with a small tilt-rotor drone. Even now, the skies over some of the cities in Iraq increasingly contain UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft, some with considerable weaponry on board.

The exploitation of the information obtained by the sensors on board the ISR drones can be done on the ground by tactical units (equipped with "Rover" lap tops which permit the direct transmission of video from vehicles like the Predator as well as from manned aircraft equipped with Litening II sensor pods). Also, AC-130 gunships are equipped to receive Predator video and work with the Predator crews in the prosecution of a target. And, in the case of Predator and Global Hawk, the control of the aircraft and the exploitation of information can be done by "reach back" to the United States.

While these systems started out as experiments, enough experience has accumulated so that commanders such as CENTCOM need to have the operations of these systems conducted in a coherent manner. This already has been discussed by General Abizaid and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Further, while "demand" for UAVs and RPAs is growing, there are not enough, nor will there ever be enough of these systems to serve every individual ground unit which desires "an eye in the sky." The intent of this study is to develop appropriate concepts of operations for the major systems, and to think through the number and types of drones which would optimize ground operations in Iraq. To do this, the study should address, inter alia, the following:

OSD 18024-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45183

Tab B

1. Categorize the **types of UAVs and RPAs** now flying in the **AOR**, both **ISR and armed**, **as well as those expected to see action in the near future.**

2. What is the specific mission of each of the growing variety of **UAVs and RPAs?**

3. What should be the concept of operations for each? Who should be permitted to task each? Who should control the acquisition and operation of each system?


4. How should **deconfliction** and orchestration of these assets be done? Who will retain control of airspace at various altitudes (e.g., it may be the case that the land forces should control all small drones which **fly** operationally below 1000 feet, while the **Forward Air Component Commander** should retain control of the employment of all others as he does for all aircraft in the theater)?

5. How should information **from** each category be exploited and distributed? What is the required information/data needed by various consumers of the outputs of these systems? **In** what timeline **must** information be provided? To whom? Which **Service** should take the lead on which categories of systems?

6. For those systems which are **armed**, how should they be controlled? Who **does** and who should have the authority to designate **targets** and give the order to shoot? **Who** will take the responsibility for attacks made **with** such **systems?**

7. What is the preferred distribution of various systems in support of land forces like **Army** units, **Marine** units, and Coalition units? For Special Operations units? **How many** orbits of each category per day for which missions? How best can assets be deployed so **as** to enhance serving multiple "customers?"

We **would** envision this study being conducted in **parallel** by both the Joint Staff, in conjunction with the **CENTCOM** staff, and by a think tank like **RAND** (which may be the most qualified to develop concept of operations **as well as** optimization techniques).


James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

cc: Mr **Ken** Krieg (PA&E)

November 15, 2004

TO: Marvin Sambur
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry



250

I was delighted to read this note from Joe Schmitz – not surprised, but delighted.

I know you have been through a tough time and do want you to know that I recognize that and appreciate it.

Attach.
11/9/04 IG memo to SecDef [OSD 18035-04]

DHR:dh
111504-14

.....
Please respond by _____

15 NOV 04

9 NOV 04

11/10
1002

@



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

November 9, 2004 5:45 p.m.

Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11/12
PWB

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry Involving Dr. Marvin R. Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)

- We have completed a preliminary inquiry into allegations that Dr. Sambur forwarded internal DoD email to Boeing officials in violation of Section 2635.703 of the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), "Use of nonpublic information," which prohibits a DoD employee from using or disclosing nonpublic information "to further his own private interest or that of another."
- We concluded that the email at issue did not violate the JER and we found no basis for conducting a full investigation. In that regard, we considered credible Dr. Sambur's assertion that he forwarded email to Boeing officials as a negotiating technique designed to obtain the most favorable contract terms for the Government, rather than to further Boeing's private interests. Mr. Michael Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), corroborated this explanation.
- We initiated the preliminary inquiry following a Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) review of Dr. Sambur's actions with respect to matters involving Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, his former Deputy. The DCIS review found no information regarding Dr. Sambur that would warrant referral to the Department of Justice.
- In his interview with DCIS, Dr. Sambur denied having any knowledge of improper or illegal activities on the part of Ms. Druyun while she served as his Deputy. We obtained no evidence from any other source that would contradict his testimony on that point and found no basis for additional investigate work.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations (b)(6)

TSA SD	11/12
BRMA SD	
MA SD	SPC 11/15
EXEC SEC	11/10

OSD: 18035-04
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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

November 9, 2004 5:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

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COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/45187

OSD 18035-04

FOUO

ES-1245
04/014642

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Doug Feith
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security

I want to **know** how **you fix** this system with the Homeland Security Council so I get notified at a decent time from when a meeting is going to be held and plugged in. Rachel will not be able to solve this; it will have to go to someone like Jim Stavridis and/or cables simultaneously.

We also ought to think through whose advice I would want. It would obviously be McHale, **but** also NORTHCOM, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Myers, Pete Pace, possibly Ray **DuBois**, if it involves the National Capital area and Steve Cambone, if it involves Intel.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110104-6

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

FOUO

01-11-04 16:22 0353

11-L-0559/OSD/45188

OSD 18057-04

334 HSC

NOV 04

1/12
DEUS



HOMELAND
DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 10 PM 2:56

NOV 10 2004

8 NOV 2004

USD(P) (A Pouch)
I# 04/014642
E5-1245

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

PA

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security Council

- The following corrective action has been taken regarding the attached memorandum (Notification from Homeland Security):
 - HSC Notification Process: At your direction, I contacted Ken Rapuano, Fran Townsend's deputy, immediately after the HSC. He indicated that the short notice was the result of an unanticipated POTUS decision to call an HSC PC. This decision was made during a Presidential briefing that morning (0720 - 0739). See attached Rapuano e-mail. White House notice was given to OSD Cables at 0745, six minutes after conclusion of the POTUS meeting. I emphasized to Ken that DoD must receive prompt notice, including a "warning order" if there is reason to believe that POTUS might call an HSC PC. Ken gave me a commitment that we would receive the earliest possible notice.
 - OSD Message Relay: Upon notice from the White House, it took an additional 15 minutes to relay the message to you (0745 - 0800). The time was consumed in an attempt to determine the subject matter of the PC. Such delays are unacceptable. Admiral Stavridis, whose office manages the flow of message traffic to you, has assured me that corrective action has been taken. You will now receive immediate notice from Cables.

COORDINATION: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Paul McHale, ASD(HD) (b)(6)



09-11-04 08:03 PM OSD 180 57-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45189

~~FOUO~~

ES-1245
04/014642

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Doug Feith
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
110104-6

.....
Please respond by

11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

01-17-04 16:22 0353

OSD 18057-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45190

McHale, Paul, HON, OSD-POLICY

From: Rapuano, Kenneth (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2004 1:46 PM
To: paul.mchale@osd.mil
Subject: sat

Paul - Did not mean to be abrupt on the phone Sat morning. I do want you to know that DoD was the first call the SitRoom made to inform of the PC, and that a number of other principals, including the Judge Gonzales, C. Rice, and Josh Bolten were late or missed the call. Improvements needed all around -- we all tend to overestimate our abilities to quickly notify and receive notifications. **S/F** Ken

720

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

12 November 2004 - 0930 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RICHARD LAWLESS, DASD / AP / ISA

SUBJECT: Ambassador Howard Baker Email


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary forwards the attached email with the following comments:

“Richard Lawless –
Please get back to me quickly with a list of what we
would like Ambassador Baker to do. PW’

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
12Nov04 0313 email by USAmbJapan

Suspense: Wednesday, 17 November 2004

copy to: Mr. Feith USD/P

0 SD 1 80 82 - 04



NOV 12 2004

**From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz**

Richard Lawless -

Please get back to
me quickly with a list of
what we would like
Ambassador Baker to do.

FW



Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Asian and Pacific Affairs

12 November 2004

JR/PAN

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPSECDEF

Ref: Ambassador Baker's note to SecDef on his departure from Japan

Info: USDP
ASD/ISA
PDASD/ISA


Paul,

1. Ambassador Baker's e-mail was prompted by our ongoing meetings here in the Pentagon the past three days on U.S.-Japan strategic security cooperation and **U.S.** forces realignment in Japan/Okinawa. Baker's rep in the meeting had reported back overnight that, while strategic cooperation talks were going exceptionally well (our desire to move the Japanese into a global partnership and a more direct dialog about managing China and other interests), the discussion on the posture moves of **U.S.** forces in Japan would be delayed into mid-December or beyond.

(12 NOV 04)

2. A recent SecDef snowflake anticipated Ambassador Baker's note on this same issue. Our response to that snowflake, here attached, is current as of COB today.

3. I believe that my response to the SecDef snowflake answers your question, but the short version is that Ambassador Baker is very eager to do all that he can for us before he departs Tokyo PCS on 30 January. This week's results will give him a lot to work with but he will have to wait until mid-December for the real meat- specific realignment proposals. He will then have about one month left in Tokyo to push these issues for us.

Richard Lawless  15-11-04 09:29 14

12 NOV 04

P.S. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, CURRENT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRALIA, TOM SCHIEFFER, IS THE STRONG WH FAVORITE TO TAKE THE BAKER POSITION. HE ANNOUNCED HIS DEPARTURE FROM AUS EARLIER THIS

11-L-0559/OSD/45194

R 18082-04

ell

November 12, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/8/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
111004-1


Afghanistan

1a Nov 04

OSD 18103-04

~~FOUO~~

November 10, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/8/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
111004-1

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45196

Faxed copy from plane

Only

Afghan Security Forces Update
Executive Summary

8 November 2004


Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– National Police	30,462
– Highway Police	
– Border Police	
– Customs Police	
– Counternarcotics Police	
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– Afghan National Army	15,084
– Afghan Air Corps	
	<hr/>
	45,546

Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45199

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Endstate	7-Nov-04	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Jul-08 ⁽¹⁾
National Police	47,500	61%					
Highway Police	2,500				50%		
Border (2) Police	24,000					50%	
Counter-Narcotics Police	1,570						

Notes:

1. Projected 100% Date is 1 Jan 07 for all forces except CN Police which is a pilot program currently under review.
2. Border and Customs Police are combined following a meeting last week with MOI, INL, and the Germans.
 - A. Customs Police will receive special additional training under the border police
 - B. Customs Police will be under the MOI and not the MOF
 - C. Meeting confirmed the requirement for 24,000 Border Police

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	07-Nov-04	01-Feb-05	01-May-05	01-Aug-05	01-Jan-06	01-Apr-07
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	3,000		48%				
Corps	43,000			41%	47%	51%	
Air Corps	3,000				40%	63%	
Sustaining Institutions	21,000						

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45201

Coalition Contributors



For Official Use Only

OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

Albania	22	Denmark	58	Iceland	12	Mongolia	16	Spain	1,012
Australia	4	Egypt	65	Ireland	7	Netherlands	513	Sweden	87
Austria	3	Estonia	15	Italy	976	New Zealand	8	Switzerland	4
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	80	Jordan	182	Norway	255	Turkey	246
Belgium	595	France	1,254	Korea	199	Poland	119	UK	592
Bulgaria	42	Georgia	50	Latvia	11	Portugal	27	USA	15,215
Canada	1004	Germany	2,189	Lithuania	50	Romania	561		
Croatia	51	Greece	108	Luxembourg	10	Slovakia	41		
Czech Rep	32	Hungary	109	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	22	Total	25,888

Afghan Forces On Hand	67,892
National Police	48,450
Highway	891
Border Police	3,417
Counter Narcotics Police	150
Subtotal On Hand	52,908
MOD/GS	637
Corps	13,589
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	858
Subtotal On Hand	15,084

Afghan Forces Trained	45,546
National Police	29,121
Highway Police	389
Border Police	898
Counter Narcotics Police	54
Subtotal Trained	30,462
MOD/GS	637
Corps	13,589
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	858
Subtotal Trained	15,084



Data As of: 8 Nov 04 ■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45203

Afghan Security Forces M

For Official Use Only

POLICE	PROPOSED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN 05
National Police	47,500	48,450	29,121	33,621
Highway Police	2,500	891	389	515
Border Police	24,000	3,417	898	2,200
Counternarcotics Police	1,570	150	54	84
TOTAL	75,570	52,908	30,462	36,420

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45204

Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

ARMY	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN 05 L/F CAPABILITY ⁽³⁾	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽⁴⁾
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	3,000	637	0	1440/0	Sep 09
Corps	43,000	13,589	0	15,480/0	Sep 09
Air Corps	3,000	0	0	210/0	Sep 09
Intermediate Commands ⁽⁵⁾	21,000	858	0	2,100/0	Sep 09
TOTAL	70,000	15,084	0	19,230/0	Sep 09

Notes:

- (1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
- (2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
- (3) Data interpolated from planning figures in slide 5 and may decrease due to the delay of ETTs
- (4) Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model
- (5) Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

POLICE	MISSION
National Police	Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan
Highway Police	Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.
Border Police	Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts.
Customs Police	To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country.
Counter Narcotics Police	Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.
ARMY	MISSION
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.
Corps	
Air Corps	
Institutional Commands	

Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

POLICE	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
National Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks for literate; 4 weeks for illiterate 2 weeks for existing officers Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks	1702
Highway Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)	0
Border Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 2 weeks specialized training	638
Customs Police	Program not developed	0
Counter Narcotics Police	Special Course sponsored by the DEA	30
Total		2370
ARMY	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
Enlisted Basic Training	Basic Training is 10 Weeks Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks Collective Training is 6 Weeks	2818
National Military Academy – Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05)	4 Year Course	0
Command and General Staff College	12 weeks	0
Combat Leaders Course	5 weeks	36
NCO Course	6 Weeks	268
Officers' Candidate School	8 weeks	176
Total		3,298

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45207

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- ANA: Ministry of Defense Level 3 fielding now complete; 21% (637) of the 3,000

Training:

- ANA: Cohorts #27, #28, #29 are in training; cohort #26 graduated on 7 Nov (cohort #26 data is not incorporated in these slides)
- ANA: OMC-A will start the 5 Battalion Model on 20 Nov
- ANA: Forces are rotating for leave while still supporting counter-insurgency operations

Equipping:

- ANA: The Bulgarian donation provided small arms ammunition and mortar rounds

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Building:

- ANA: Qalat Brigade garrison contract to be awarded by 15 Dec

Mentoring/Employing:

- ANA: Proposing NATO embedded training team opportunities to Coalition

Funding:

- ANA: OMC-A short \$127M funding in 1st Quarter FY 05—State working AFSA/FMF Solution
- ANA: FY-05 \$65m shortfall— Plan is to cover in supplemental
- ANA: Impact of funding shortfall: delay to initial operating capability by 4 months

NOV 04 2004

019

TO: Jim Haynes
cc: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Insurance Issue

Please take a look at the attached and tell me what you think I ought to do.

Tell me what companies I have been receiving money from that we had to have a surety bond on. It may be that there is some way to solve it. I suppose I would have to recuse myself, at a minimum.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/22/04 M. Travers letter to SecDef

DIR:ss
110304-9

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

4 NOV 04

OSD 11/3

700 Quaker Lane, PO Box 350, Warwick, RI 02887
Tel: (b)(6) Fax 401 827-2674
mtravers@metlife.com

MetLife Auto & Home

Maura C. Travers
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

October 22, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Re: Individual Risk Surety Agreement


Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please be advised that Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company has made the decision to discontinue its involvement in the surety business. Your current agreement and any and all addenda will terminate on January 20, 2005 at 12:00 p.m. unless terminated sooner than January 20, 2005. Reasons for an earlier termination date may include your leaving the appointed position. We retain the right to terminate your agreement sooner if the company holding your benefits is merged with or acquired by another entity and/or in the event their ownership or control is changed in any manner.

It has been a pleasure serving you and we wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

If you have any questions about your agreement with Met P&C, please don't hesitate to call me directly at (b)(6). You may also wish to contact Jeff Green, in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, at (b)(6) if you have any questions regarding replacement of this agreement after its termination.

Sincerely,



Maura C. Travers
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

cc: D. Colasanti
J. Green



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 AM 11:29

019

INFORMATION MEMO

November 7, 2004 (11:00 am)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Recusal

- This responds to your Snowflake dated November 4, 2004.
- With the expiration of your surety agreement with Metlife, you will be disqualified from taking action having a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Sears Roebuck and Co.; Kellogg Company; and **the** Tribune Company. The attached memorandum (Tab A) will notify your staff of these disqualifications and direct them to refer such matters to the Deputy Secretary.
- As I indicated in my memorandum dated October 19, 2004, (Tab B), we are working with the Senate Armed Services Committee to find another provider of such sureties. If that fails, we will be proposing legislation to enable a Federal agency to provide such sureties.

4 NOV 04

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Jeff Greer (b)(6)



OSD 18112-04

4 NOV 04

NOV 04 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Insurance Issue

Please take a look at the attached and tell me what you think I ought to do,

Tell me what companies I have been receiving money from that we had to have a surety bond on. It may be that there is some way to solve it. I suppose I would have to recuse myself, at a minimum.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/22/04 M. Travers letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
110304-9

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

700 Quaker Lane, PO Box 350, Warwick, RI 02887
Tel (b)(6) Fax 401 827-2674
mtravers@metlife.com

MetLife® Auto & Home

Maura C. Travers
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

October 22, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Re: Individual Risk Surety Agreement

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please be advised that Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company has made the decision to discontinue its involvement in the surety business. Your current agreement and any and all addenda will terminate on January 20, 2005 at 12:00 p.m. unless terminated sooner than January 20, 2005. Reasons for an earlier termination date may include your leaving the appointed position. We retain the right to terminate your agreement sooner if the company holding your benefits is merged with or acquired by another entity and/or in the event their ownership or control is changed in any manner.

It has been a pleasure serving you and we wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

If you have any questions about your agreement with Met P&C, please don't hesitate to call me directly at (b)(6). You may also wish to contact Jeff Green, in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, at (b)(6) if you have any questions regarding replacement of this agreement after its termination.

Sincerely,



Maura C. Travers
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

cc: D. Colasanti
J. Green

11-L-0559/OSD/45214

MetLife Auto & Home is a brand of Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and its Affiliates, Warwick, RI

A



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

MEMORANDUM FOR THE IMMEDIATE STAFF OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Potential Conflicts of Interest for Secretary Rumsfeld

Effective this date, Secretary Rumsfeld will be deemed to have a financial interest in the following companies, which are defense contractors:

Sears Roebuck and Co.
Kellogg Company
Tribune Company

Please screen correspondence, memoranda, and decision papers that may have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of these companies. Such matters should be diverted to the Deputy Secretary. Please ensure they are not forwarded to the Secretary.

If you have any questions, please contact me (b)(6) Steve Epstein, Gail Mason, or Jeff Green of my office. They may be reached at (b)(6)

William J. Haynes II

cc: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense



11-L-0559/OSD/45216

B



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFORMATION MEMO

October 19, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Surety Policies for PAS Officials

- MetLife, the only provider of sureties for retirement and deferred compensation plans for Department nominees, will terminate this product on January 20, 2005.
- To date, my standards of conduct office has not identified another issuer. MetLife was unable to find another issuer. We contacted eight companies without success, and we are currently working with Lloyds of London to identify another issuer. In conjunction with the Comptroller, my office is also working with members of the Defense Business Practice Board to identify another issuer.
- The Department may also provide a "source site" request for information on its procurement website so that any company interested in offering the surety can contact the Department.
- Because an ethics regulation prohibits solicitation of prohibited sources (i.e. an entity doing or seeking to do business with the Department), I recommend that you not contact any insurance company.
- We advised the majority and minority counsels of the SASC that the surety policy may no longer be available. The Committee agreed to permit PAS officials to disqualify themselves from participating in particular matters involving their former employers until we can secure a new surety. Current DoD PAS officials who would be disqualified are listed in Tab A.
- The SASC suggested that if we cannot find this product in the marketplace, we should propose legislation for the Government to offer the surety. My office is drafting such a proposal.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Jeff Green (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45218



<u>Name</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Disqualified Company</u>
Gordon England	Secretary of Navy	General Dynamics, Lockheed
Nelson Gibbs	Ass. Sec. of AF(Installations)	Northrop Grumman
William Haynes Thomas O'Connell	General Counsel Ass. Sec. of Defense (SOLIC)	General Dynamics Raytheon
James Roche Donald Rumsfeld	Sec. of AF Secretary	Northrop Grumman Kellogg, Sears, Tribune
Peter Teets Paul Wolfowitz Michael Wynn	Under Sec. AF (ATL) Dep. Sec. Deputy U/S (Acq)	Lockheed Johns Hopkins U. General Dynamics Lockheed
John Young	Ass. Sec of Navy (Res, Dev. & Acq.)	Sandia Corp.

720
TAB A
FOUO

OCT 29 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UAVs

Do you feel you have confidence that we're doing the right things on getting more UAVs into the CENTCOM AOR? If not, tell me what I could do to be helpful.

My impression is that CENTCOM is not even asking for them, and I believe they should be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102804-19

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

0 SD 18115-04

FOUO

Tab A


11-L-0559/OSD/45220

November 11, 2004

Southern.com

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Honorable Colin Powell
 Honorable Porter Goss
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Observations from Southern Command

Attached is the farewell assessment of General Tom Hill as he departed Southern Command.

It has a number of important observations that I thought you might be interested in reading.

Respectfully,

Attach.
 11/9/04 Commander, SOUTHCOM memo to SecDef: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

DHR:dh
 111104-11

11 NOV 04

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCCC

9 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

1. Sir, as I relinquish command of **USSOUTHCOM**, I want to thank you for your leadership, guidance and trust over the past two years and three months. Command of such an important and diverse unit has enriched my life and deepened my appreciation for the greatness of our nation. As I depart, I'd like to highlight a few opportunities and challenges that I see in the Southern Command AOR.
2. Although I do not see a current or potential conventional military threat in the AOR, Latin America has become the most violent region in the world. I see the issues of violence and poverty as two sides of the same coin: the rampant violence impedes the economic growth necessary to pull up the 43% of the population who live below the poverty line. The poverty and hopelessness foment discontent, creating ready recruits for gangs, narco-terrorists and other illegal armed groups. The issue of gangs has the potential to be, over the next five to ten years, the greatest destabilizing force in the AOR. Gangs are currently most prevalent in Central America and Brazil, but the problem will spread if we do not address the threat quickly. The size, transnational nature and financial power of the gangs has outstripped the region's police. The fact that gangs are considered a law enforcement issue prevents the military from confronting the threat in most countries. The security forces of the AOR must change in order to combat the current array of threats. We must help our partner nations find a solution that makes sense, respects human rights and recognizes the historic mistrust of uniformed military acting in a police role. In order to do so, we must transform ourselves and readdress our current restrictions against training police. This will require DoD leadership in the interagency and within the Congress.
3. Islamic Radical Group (IRG) activity in the AOR is concentrated on fundraising and logistical support for worldwide terrorism. We do not see in our AOR operational cells of IRG terrorists staging for an attack on the United States. I take no comfort in that fact, however, since what we don't know about the IRG activity in the region greatly outweighs what we do know. We are vulnerable to an airborne threat because our outdated laws on aerial interdiction limit our actions and prevent our neighbors from taking action. We now have the technology to be able to detect and monitor an airplane that takes off from Panama, flies through all the countries of Central America and Mexico and crashes into a key target in the southern extreme of the United States and we will have done nothing about it because the current policy assumes that the worst thing that plane could be carrying is drugs. September 11th showed us the fallacy of this policy and we must fix it regionally for it to be effective. The regional approach is critical in Central America

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45222

due to the short flight time required to fly from the airspace of one country into the airspace of another. Regional airbridge denial is a sensitive **and** controversial issue across the interagency, and I believe that only you will be able to take this on effectively.

4. You can be proud of what the men and women of Southern Command do to support the Government of Colombia. The armed forces of Colombia, for the first time since the 1960s, are conducting sustained offensive operations in the old "*despeje*" region, which previously gave sanctuary to narco-terrorists. Those efforts are beginning to **bear** fruit **as** we **are** seeing greater numbers of desertions and decreased activity on the part of the illegal armed groups. We must stay the course in Colombia by continuing to provide logistical, intelligence **and** planning assistance to the Colombian military while interdicting the illicit trafficking that sustains the narco-terrorist groups. We must seek to regionalize our support, **especially** to Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia, whose fragile democracies must be shored up or we **risk** pushing the problem out of Colombia and into her neighbors. Again, DoD leadership is essential, both in the interagency and on the Hill.

5. In 1978, sixteen of the countries in this hemisphere had communist or totalitarian governments. Today, all of Latin America and the Caribbean, save Cuba, have made the **shift** to democracy and the militaries in the region **are** supporting democracies. **USSOUTHCOM** has played a key role in this maturation by close, continuous, personal interaction with the armed forces of the AOR. This engagement is necessary if we are to assist in the transformation of Latin American security forces to meet 21st century threats and it is vital to our continued understanding of the realities on the ground in the AOR. I am seeing the effects of the negative impact of ASPA sanctions on our engagement, especially in terms of IMET. Several of our key partners are already looking to Europe and China to fill the gap that ASPA is creating in Professional Military Education and exchange programs. Current limits on information sharing, security clearances and access are at cross-purposes with our professed goals of regional cooperation. The **SOUTHCOM** staff is working on ways to ameliorate the impact of these limitations. We must overcome these barriers if we are to continue to be the security partner of choice for the nations in this hemisphere.


6. Disenchantment with failed institutions **and** unfulfilled economic promises in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in tremendous social upheaval in the region. One manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the existing political institutions is the fact that several presidents in the AOR find themselves in the presidency as their first elected public office. As a result of the latest referendum in Venezuela, President Chávez appears to be a fixture in the **region**. From a strictly military point of view, I am concerned that President Chávez is turning his armed forces into a highly politicized praetorian guard, which will choose loyalty to **him** over loyalty to the constitution. On a larger scale, I **am** concerned about the exportation of his "Bolivarian Revolution" to countries in the AOR where governments can ill afford added instability. I urge the pursuit of **an** interagency consensus around a policy designed to limit the detrimental impact that Chávez is likely to have on the region.

~~UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO~~

7. I have seen the ongoing suffering of **Haiti** first hand, both under the UN **mandate** back in **1994** and as commander of our more recent efforts there. Until the **Haitian** people are able to lift themselves from abject misery to at least dignified poverty and develop some semblance of working institutions, Haiti's problems will continue to haunt the United States. Short of a comprehensive long-term international effort to support **Haiti**, we will always be just one step away from the next migration crisis or political collapse. DoD has a leadership role to play in Haiti and must find a way to support Haiti's security forces.

8. The stabilization of **SOUTHCOM** Headquarters stands without resolution. As you are well aware, I remain convinced, as did my predecessors, that Miami is the right location for the headquarters from a strategic point of view. The recent proposal by the Governor of Florida presents us with an opportunity to make a sound fiscal decision as well. I strongly encourage DoD to consider the Governor's proposal as a means to resolve the command's stabilization in Miami. We should come to closure on this issue for both the strategic and fiscal reasons I mentioned as well as for the quality of life of our people.

9. I thank you again for the opportunity to have served as the Commander of United States Southern Command. I have been privileged to work shoulder to shoulder with great patriots and I have been blessed by having known some of the most brilliant leaders of this hemisphere. I thank you for your steadfast leadership in this critical phase of our country's history. I am enthusiastic and optimistic about **USSOUTHCOM**'s role in helping the people of the Americas fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic opportunity.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "J/T Hill". The initials "J/T" are written above the name "Hill".

JAMES T. HILL
General, US Army
Commander

CF:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45224

FOUO

OCT 18 2004

AFGHANISTAN

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tom O'Connell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: French MOD's Suggestions

Here's a note on my meeting with the French MOD.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how you think I ought to respond to her and what we ought to recommend. Please get back to me by Wednesday, October 20.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/15/04 MFR re: Meeting with French MOD on Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan

DHR:ss
101504-28

10/11/1
10/29

Please respond by

10/20/04

Status

DR

ad check
10/15/04

DRAFT
Letter
Attached

v/r jin

SIR,
Response attached.

v/r
Lt Col Lengyel

FOUO

OSD 18135-04

18OCT04

720
~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

SUBJECT: Meeting with the French Minister of Defense on Counter-Narcotics
in Afghanistan

The French MOD indicated she thought that ISAF should not do the counter-narcotics tasks; they are not suited to it. Nor should OEF. OEF has other work to do.

She proposed putting together a special team, possibly the U.S., France and the U.K. with the Afghans. Some Special Forces might need to be involved. She mentioned the UN, EU, World Bank, and possibly some of Afghanistan's neighbors to the north, as others that might be involved.

She thinks it is important to act soon, to avoid having a situation where drug money elects the Afghan Parliament, and the Afghan Parliament then opposes Karzai and corrupts the government.

I told her I'd get back to her.

DHR:ss
101404-41

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18136-04

Afghanistan

1566704

720
TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 8.2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reducing the Number of Exercises

Last year we cut the number of exercises and the number of people involved, because of **stress** on the force. I want to do the same thing for the period ahead.

Please get me the list of what the normal schedule would be and what you folks are proposing, so that I can make some decisions.

There's no way we can have business as usual. We have to reduce stress on the force. The only way to do it when we do some additional things is to stop doing some other things. In my view exercises are important in peacetime, but in wartime our troops are getting plenty of exercise.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-22

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18166-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45227

720
~~FOUO~~

TAB A

October 18, 2004

883

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Afghan Parliamentary Elections April '05

We may need to do something extra for the Afghan Parliamentary elections next April. We ought to have that in mind, just as we put some extra forces in for the Afghan Presidential election.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101504-27

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

0 SD 18167-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45228

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 PM 6:06 November 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get an instruction out to him, so that he understands it can only be used **pursuant** to a specific deployment order or execute order.

Please think that through, **work** it out and come back to me with a piece of paper.

Thank you.

DHR:ss
110104-26

.....
Please respond by 11/26/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18169-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45229



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2184-04

12 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *ASM 11/12*

SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

- **Issue.** “You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get an instruction out to him, so that he understands it can only be used pursuant to a specific deployment order or execute order.” (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The FY 05 National Defense Authorization Act included the authority to expend up to \$25M by US Special Operations Forces in support of ongoing military operations to combat terrorism. ASD(SOLIC), the Joint Staff and USSOCOM are developing, for your approval, the implementation procedures to exercise this authority.
- **Discussion.** The legislation explicitly requires the authority be used only for SecDef-approved military operations and requires the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures and notify the congressional defense committees prior to using this authority. ASD(SOLIC) has initiated (TAB B) the development of implementation procedures through the Joint Staff (TAB C).

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

0 SD 18169-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45230

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 PM 6:06 November 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get **an** instruction out to him, so that **he** understands it can only be used pursuant to a **specific** deployment order or execute order.

Please think that through, work it out and come back to me with a piece of paper.

Thank you.

DHR:ss
110104-26

.....
Please respond by 11/26/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18169-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45231



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

1-04/013685
OCT 14 2004

TO: DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC

*Clowish
NLT 18*

SUBJECT: Section 1208, Funding Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)

As you **know**, the legislation has cleared the Congress and has **been** forwarded to the President for approval (Tab A).

The legislation **authorizes** the Secretary of Defense authority to expend **up** to **\$25 million by US** Special Operations Forces in support **of** ongoing military operations to combat terrorism.

The legislation **requires** Secretary of Defense to establish procedures and notify the congressional defense committees **prior to** using this authority.

Accordingly, I request **the** Joint Staff task **USSOCOM** to **develop, for** SecDef approval, **the implementation procedures** to exercise this **authority**. Draft **procedures should be** forwarded to my office and the Joint Staff NLT 18 November 2004 **for final staffing**.

Attachment: **As stated**

Prepared by: LTC Donald C. Bolduc, SOLICSO/CT, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45232

SEC. 1208 SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

(a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of Defense may **expend up to \$25,000,000** during any fiscal year during which this subsection is in effect to provide support to for eign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

(b) **PROCEDURES.**—The Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures for the exercise of the authority under subsection (a). The Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees of those procedures before any exercise of that authority.

(c) **NOTIFICATION.**—Upon using the authority provided in subsection (a) to make funds available for support of **an** approved military operation, the Secretary of Defense **shall** notify the congressional defense committees expeditiously, **and** in any event in not **less than 48** hours, of the use of such authority with respect to that operation. Such a notification need be provided only once with respect to any such operation. **Any** such notification shall be in writing.

(d) **LIMITATION ON DELEGATION.**—The authority of the Secretary of Defense to make funds available under subsection (a) for **support of a** military operation may not be delegated.

(e) **INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**—**This** section does not constitute authority to conduct a covert action, as such term **is** defined in section 503(e) of the National **Security** Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.413b(e)).

(f) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year during which subsection (a) is in effect, the Secretary of Defense **shall** submit to **the** congressional defense committees a **report** on support provided under that subsection during that fiscal year. Each such report **shall** describe the support provided, including a statement of the recipient **of** the support and the amount obligated to provide the support.

(g) **FISCAL YEAR 2005 LIMITATION.**—**Support** may be provided under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2005 only from funds made available for operations **and** maintenance **pursuant** to title XV of this **Act**.

(h) **PERIOD OF AUTHORITY.**—The authority under subsection (a) is in effect during each of fiscal years **2005** through 2007.

SOLIC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TO: ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
FROM: DASD Special Operations & Combating Terrorism, Mr. JQ Roberts

JQ
10.19.04

Action Officer/Office/Phone #: LTC Don Bolduc, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Section 1208, Funding **Military Operations** to Combat Terrorism (U)

BACKGROUND/SUMMARY OF MATERIAL:

(U) Discussion.

- During WOT FED meetings yesterday it became clear to me that we need to develop a plan to get SecDef approved implementation guidance for 1208. Anticipating a November or December **approval** by the POTUS I propose we send a letter from the ASD to Director, Joint Staff requesting them to task SOCOM to develop the implementation guidance for **SecDef** approval.
- **My** concern is that there are many people looking at this (OGCILC, SOCOM **leg affairs**, J3 **DDSO, SOLIC, SOCOM J3 CSO**) but **no** synchronization **of effort**. It would be unfortunate to have a POTUS approve **law** that facilitates operations **in the WOT** and no implementation guidance. We need to move forward now, so we do not get caught on our heels with concepts from the field pending guidance approval.
- **BG Phelan** was briefed on the concept and agrees with this course of action.
- *See attached coordination sheet*

ACTION REQUIRED: initial Memo to DJS

I-NUMBER:		SUSPENSE: 14 October 04		HANDLING: Urgent	
NAME	PREPARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY
	LTC Bolduc	Mr. Gerlaugh	Mr. Lellenberg	Mr. McCracken	Mr. Tim Morgan
ACTIVITY	Action Officer, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT	Director, Counterterrorism Policy, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT	Director, Policy & Strategy OASD SO/LIC SO/CT	Principal Director OASD SO/LIC SO/CT	Director, Resources, SO/LIC
INITIAL	<i>13 October 04</i> <i>[Signature]</i>	<i>13 Oct 04</i> <i>[Signature]</i>	<i>10/14/04</i> <i>[Signature]</i>	<i>13 Oct</i> <i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i> Cleared on 13 October 04

TAB C
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC



Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

25 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND

Subject: Implementation Procedures for Section 1208, Support of Military
Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)

1. ASD(SO/LIC) has asked USSOCOM to develop, for Secretary of Defense consideration, draft implementation procedures for Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism.¹ Request you forward draft procedures to the Joint Staff, J-3, Deputy Directorate for Special Operations (DDSO), NLT 16 November for final staffing.

2. The Joint Staff points of contact are Mr. Mark Dunham at (b)(6) and COL Pete Dillon at (b)(6)

Approved & Secured with Approval by ~~NOFF~~

Handwritten signature of Norton A. Schwartz in black ink.

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 ASD(SO/LIC) memorandum, I-04/0 13685, 14 October 2004, "Section 1208, Funding Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)"

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

NAME	AGENCY	DATE
Mr. O'Connell	ASD(SOLIC)	8 November 2004
VADM Olson	USSOCOM	4 November 2004

720
~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: U.S. Air Force Tanker Scandal

Attached is a memorandum that sets out my current view as to how the tanker scandal may have occurred. I am sure there are other factors of which I am not yet aware.

It appears that the principal culprit, Darlene Druyun, will be going to go to jail for a number of years, as she should. Thus far, the Inspector General has not found wrongdoing by others in the U.S. Air Force in connection with this matter

The turbulence and long vacancies in the civilian leadership of DoD are, without question, harming the country.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/2/04 Druyun memo

DHR:dh
111204-1

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18175-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45238

4527

12 Nov 04

FOUO

November 2, 2004

SUBJECT Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process. The question is: "**How** could such major corruption happen, over such a long period, without **those serving above and around her seeing** her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- **Druyun served as the "civilian" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air Force for Acquisition for ten years.**
- **During the ten years of Druyun's service, the position superior, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force vacant for four of those ten years. As a result, for those four years Druyun was the senior civilian in the Air Force acquisition system and in charge the day-to-day activities of all Air Force acquisition. In the six years that there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary, daily oversight of Druyun's activities was spotty, since there were four moved in and out of the post as her superior, for an average tenure of**
- **In addition to Druyun's post, there is also a "military" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-tenure, there were four "military" Deputies moving in and out of office. But, these three-star general officers were not involved in contracting. It notable that, under Title 10 U.S.C., even today only a _____ make major acquisition decisions. Military officers, no matter cannot do so. Therefore, by virtue of her position as the senior Air acquisition civilian, all procurement information passed through controlled by her.**
- **To further add to the turbulence in Air Force acquisition, during her ten-year tenure, there were five Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of the U.S. Air Force. And, there were four different Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide oversight of acquisition organization and processes. The rapid turnover reduced continuity**
- **However, within twelve months of the current Air Force Secretary being confirmed, and within seven months of having an Assistant**

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45239

~~FOUO~~

~~Air Force~~ for Acquisition confirmed, ~~the Air Force~~ acquisition organization and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of ~~the~~ organizational power Drayun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.

~~FOUO~~



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 10 15 11 12 28

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Update *Ray DuBois 4/12/04*

- In response to your snowflake dated 26 Oct 04, the following information provides an update on progress revising or canceling DoD Directives.
- On 16 Sep 04, you issued the following snowflake to the OSD Components: "I would like to see everyone up to 100% by the end of the year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know." Two responses were sent to you and one is in route:
 - o USD(AT&L): "...I expect to complete the review of all but one of the 111 directives originally belonging to my office. DoDD 4 100.15, "Commercial Activities Program" will not be completed because both the Senate and House versions of the FY05 Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bill prohibit the implementation of a revised OMB Circular A-76, which this directive implements for the Department. Updating it is on hold until this prohibition is resolved."
 - o USD(P): "To accelerate our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, we committed with DA&M to produce one directive per month for each of my 5 components. The process began in August and we propose to complete it in June 2005."
 - o USD(I): Memo to the SecDef being prepared that will indicate: USD (I) will have 32 of 56 directives in the final stages of revision by 31 Dec 04. The remaining 24 directives that will not be completed have encountered delays due to required changes in legislation, are linked to ongoing intelligence transformation initiatives, or are pending transfer to a more appropriate OSD Component or agency.
- Attached is the current Review of Directives Progress Report ending 5 Nov 04, with the data split out separately for directive revisions and cancellations, per your request.
- Progress has been slow but steady – up 10% since late July, and the volume of revisions/cancellations is increasing. Will continue to keep you advised of our progress.

cc: All Components Listed

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Bob Storer, (b)(6)

OSD 18207-04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
11/05/04**

COMPONENT	REVISIONS		% SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION	Signed By DepSecDef
	Reported	Submitted for Coordination		
USD (AT&L)	48	36	75	16
USD (P)	44	12	27	1
USD (P&R)	85	53	62	23
USD(C)	6	6	100	0
USD (I)	42	8	19	0
ASD (NII)	10	8	80	3
ASD (PA)	3	3	100	1
ASD (LA)	3	1	33	0
DPA&E	1	1	100	0
DOT&E	1	1	100	0
DNA	1	1	100	0
IG, DoD	7	6	86	3
GC, DoD	16	11	69	7
DA&M	46*	9	20	4
WHS	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	100	<u>5</u>
TOTALS:	320	163	51%	63

COMPONENT	CANCELLATIONS		% SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION	Signed By DepSecDef
	Reported	Submitted for Coordination		
USD (AT&L)	24	22	92	10
USD (P)	9	7	78	0
USD (P&R)	11	6	55	4
USD(C)	1	1	100	0
USD (I)	6	4	67	2
ASD (NII)	13	11	85	9
ASD (PA)	0	0	NA	0
ASD (LA)	0	0	NA	0
DPA&E	0	0	NA	0
DOT&E	0	0	NA	0
DNA	0	0	NA	0
IG, DoD	0	0	NA	0
GC, DoD	1	1	100	1
DA&M	10*	6	60	1
WHS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	NA	<u>0</u>
TOTALS:	75	58	77%	27

*Of the 56 DA&M directives identified for revision/cancellation, 49 are charter directives requiring significant input from OSD Components.

Total revisions/cancellations submitted: 56%

11-L-0559/OSD/45242

720



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 15 2004

The Honorable H. Douglas Barclay
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of El Salvador
San Salvador, El Salvador

090

Dear Ambassador Barclay:

It was a pleasure to meet you and Mrs. Barclay during our visit to El Salvador. You were most gracious hosts.

I was honored to take part in the Veterans Day Ceremony at the U.S. Embassy. It is a fine tradition that you are keeping alive.

I look forward to working with you to strengthen the defense cooperation between the U.S. and El Salvador.

I have enclosed a satellite photograph of the nighttime lights of the Korean Peninsula. If you would please give it to President Saca, I would appreciate it.


Joyce joins me in expressing our thanks.

Sincerely,

15 NOV 04

12 NOV 04

OSD 18221-04



Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula
21 September 2003, 1201Z

FOUO

November 12, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
cc: *Peter Radman*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Satellite Photo

I want to send Ambassador Barclay in El Salvador a copy of the Korean satellite photo and ask him to give a copy to the President of El Salvador when we send our thank you note.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111204-9

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

OSD 18221-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45245

November 17, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Casualty Notification and Assistance

hol

I don't need the meeting on the casualty notification. I have read the material. I want you to step out smartly and get it improved.

Thank you very much.

Attach.
11/16/04USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Casualty Notification and Assistance

DHR:dh
111704-17

16 NOV 04

.....
Please respond by _____ *—*

16 NOV 04



NOV 16 2004

From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

11/16/04

Sec Def -

*I will meet with Gen. Myers
on this when he returns and
then we'll get back to you.*

Paul W.

CORRECTED COPY

1232
11/16

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

November 16, 2004 - 12:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 16 Nov 04

SUBJECT: Casualty Notification, Casualty Assistance--Snowflake

- Notification to the families of deceased, ill, and injured Service members generally works well. A joint body reviews the process three times annually to discuss real-world experiences, and improve performance.
- Casualty assistance to the families generally receives positive feedback from the next of kin, but services provided the injured are "stovepiped", hampering coordination. The length of the adjudication process is criticized, as is treatment by VA..
- Solutions:
 - o Establish a "case management" approach to unify the stovepipes (started in Army)
 - o Unify DOD and VA processes (will broach with VA)
 - o Track severely wounded at OSD level to monitor service performance (software identified)
 - o Streamline adjudication process
- An outside group can take a fresh look at what we do and how we do it, yielding suggestions that we have not considered internally.
- Attached is a list of possible group members who might contribute effectively to such an effort.
- We will check the implications of the Federal Advisory Commission Act with General Counsel.
- As you directed, I will organize a meeting with you to discuss purpose and process that includes General Myers and Powell Moore, immediately upon General Myers return.

Attachment: As Stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFF, ODUS (MC&FP), (b)(6)



(b)(6)

18271-04

A282-3

Proposed List
Casualty Notification **Working** Group

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>What They Bring to the Table</u>
Ms. Marty Evans RADM (USN, Ret)	American Red Cross	President	Years of experience as a Navy commanding officer who had to deal regularly with casualty notification. Now, CEO of an organization with a traditional relationship with DoD and emergency notification to service members of ill/injured/deceased family members.
Jack Keane GEN (USA, Ret)	GSI, LLC	President	Former VCSA, with 37 years of Army command experience, had numerous experiences with casualty notification.
Norb Ryan VADM (USN, Ret)	Military Officers Association of America	President	With years of command experience culminating in his position as Chief of Naval Personnel, has both hands-on and policy experience with casualty notification.

A282-4

Lt Gen (USAF, Ret)		Executive Director	As former Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Personnel, has command and policy experience with casualty notification. As Executive Director of AF Aid, is involved with assisting with emergency travel for airmen who need assistance for emergency leave.
LTG Garry Parks, USMC (ret)	South Carolina Credit Union League & Affiliates	President/CEO	As Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, was responsible for Marine Corps casualty notification policy.
Salvatore Frank Gallo, RADM (USN, Ret.)	Armed Services YMCA	National Executive Director	YMCA provides educational, social and religious support to the military. He was Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel , Office of CNO.
Bob Nardelli	Home Depot	President & CEO	Broad management perspective; demonstrated concern for military and militar families .
Ms. Candace Wheeler	National Military Family Association	President	As President of the National Military Family Association and over 20 years as an Air Force spouse, she is

14282-5

			knowledgeable from both personal and professional experience of the importance of sensitive and timely casualty notification.
Mr. Art Wilson	Disabled American Veterans	National Adjutant	As head of the DAV, he represents the official voice of America's service-connected disabled veterans - 2.1 million disabled veterans, their families and survivors.
Mr. Christopher Michel	Military Advantage (formerly Military.Com)	President/Founder	Through the website he founded, his organization connects with over 4 million military members and their families.
Ms. Kathryn Turman	FBI	Program Director, Office of Victim Assistance	Working with families of victims of crime and international terrorism for many years, she has first-hand experience in notifying and assisting surviving family members.
Mr. Jeff Bezos	Amazon	CEO	Provides technical experience/expertise
Mr. Bill Plante	CBS	White House Correspondent	Media perspective with added experience of spouse whose father is unaccounted for from Southeast Asia.

A282-6

Ms. Martha Didamo	Gold Star Wives	National President	Head of t made up have lost service o
Mrs. Melissa Givens	Army spouse	OIF widow	Recent w on the H Letters H hand exp importan supportiv

A282-7

11-L-0559/OSD/45252

CORRECTED COPY



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

November 16, 2004 - 12:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 16 Nov 04

SUBJECT: Casualty Notification, Casualty Assistance--Snowflake

- Notification to the families of deceased, ill, and injured Service members generally works well. A joint body reviews the process three times annually to discuss real-world experiences, and improve performance.
- Casualty assistance to the families generally receives positive feedback from the next of kin, but services provided the injured are "stovepiped", hampering coordination. The length of the adjudication process is criticized, as is treatment by VA.
- Solutions:
 - o Establish a "case management" approach to unify the stovepipes (started in Army)
 - o Unify DOD and VA processes (will broach with VA)
 - o Track severely wounded at OSD level to monitor service performance (software identified)
 - o Streamline adjudication process
- **An** outside group can take a fresh look at what we do and how we do it, yielding suggestions that we have not considered internally.
- Attached is a list of possible group members who might contribute effectively to such an effort.
- We will check the implications of the Federal Advisory Commission Act with General Counsel.
- As you directed, I will organize a meeting with you to discuss purpose and process that includes General Myers and Powell Moore, immediately upon General Myers return.

Attachment: As Stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFP, ODU (MC&FP), (b)(6)



704

16 NOV 04

18271-04

Proposed List
Casualty Notification Working Group

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>What They Bring to the Table</u>
Ms. Marty Evans RADM (USN, Ret)	American Red Cross	President	Years of experience as a Navy commanding officer who had to deal regularly with casualty notification. Now, CEO of an organization with a traditional relationship with DoD and emergency notification to service members of ill/injured/deceased family members.
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Mike McGinty Lt Gen (USAF, Ret)	Air Force Aid Society	Executive Director	As former Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Personnel, has command and policy experience with casualty notification. As Executive Director of AF Aid, is involved with assisting with emergency travel for airmen who need assistance for emergency leave.
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Mr. Jeff Bezos	Amazon	CEO	Provides technical experience/expertise
Mr. Bill Plante	CBS	White House Correspondent	Media perspective with added experience of spouse whose father is unaccounted for from Southeast Asia.

Ms. Martha Didamo	Gold Star Wives	National President	Head of the organization made up of spouses who have lost loved ones in service of the country.
Mrs. Melissa Givens	Army spouse	OIF widow	Recent widow who appeared on the HBO special, "Last Letters Home." Brings first hand experience of the importance of sensitive and supportive notification.

720

TAB B

FOUO

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

November 5, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting

2004 NOV 16 PM 6:23

Iceland

Please ~~setup meeting~~ to discuss costs in Iceland. ~~this memo is going to do~~
~~it~~ that's not how I want to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/04 Ricardel Memo to SecDef re: Iceland

DHR:ss
110404-13

.....
Please respond by _____

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

FOUO

08-11-04 16:18 0377

OSD 18345-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45258

Snowy /

720
FOUO

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 12, 2004 -HC 12/13

CC: General Myers
General Pace
Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

Don,

The following are my proposed Top 5 QDR issues, in more or less priority order:

1. What capabilities does the Department (and the USG) need to have for counterinsurgency warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping):
 - Focus particularly on: intelligence issues and on building capacity of indigenous security forces (including funding, training and language capabilities).
2. What is the right balance of risks between capabilities needed for the Global ~~War~~ on Terrorism and capabilities needed to manage the emerging military competition in East and ~~South~~ Asia.
3. What capabilities should DoD have for homeland security, particularly to prevent or deal with a catastrophic attack:
 - Particular emphasis on biological terrorism.
4. Persistent surveillance is taking precision targeting to a new level.
 - What capabilities should we have in manned, unmanned and space systems for persistent surveillance;

OSD 18372-04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45259

WID 1

12 Dec 04
16 Nov 04

FOUO

- **What changes are needed in organization, decision processes, force capabilities, etc. to properly exploit this development.**
- 5. What is the right balance of investment in tac air relative to other DoD needs.**

FOUO

FOUO

November 16, 2004

VCJCS

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob ~~Willard~~
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DIR:db
111604-1

.....
Please respond by

11/19/04

310.1

16 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45261

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob Willard
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111604-1

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

FOUO

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45262

ALR -



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

11 NOV 2004 11:58

Reply to:
USSTRATCOM/CC
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A
OFFUTT AFB, NE 681 13-6000

19 Nov 04
SM: 124-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Issues

Ref a) SECDEF memorandum, 16 November, same subject.

As requested by reference (a), following issues are offered in consideration for the upcoming QDR.

1. Strategic Deterrence Posture: Establish policy and associated strategy to guide decision makers on an updated construct to achieve strategic deterrence in the context of 21st Century realities and as envisioned by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Specifically, bolster efforts to balance the new strategic triad capabilities of strike (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses and a responsive infrastructure. A blended QDR/NPR will drive a consistent, department level offense-defense integration plan spanning the full spectrum of military means from influence to nuclear weapons. This approach will also allow us to assess the role of the current nuclear stockpile, establish a force-sizing construct to guide decision makers on the required size and composition of the arsenal and evaluate the need for new kinetic and non-kinetic solutions.
2. Combating WMD. Pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter the ability of rogue individuals, terrorist groups or hostile nation states to threaten the United State with the weapons of mass destruction we know today and the future technologies that are still yet to be developed.
3. Space. Evaluate current and future capabilities within the related areas of integrated space situational awareness, space protection, and space control. Develop a comprehensive strategy to deliver a sustained asymmetric advantage in this enabling mission area, and investigate the potential value and achievability of more responsive, less expensive space launch.
4. Global Missile Defense. Refine and validate plans and policy for the continued expansion of global missile defense capabilities in order to focus MDA RDT&E and procurement. Efforts should include establishing the relative priority of boost-phase intercept, space based weapons, directed energy weapons, advanced sensors and cruise missile defense.

310.1

JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT
General, USMC
Commander

copy to:
Mr. Ryan Henry
CJCS

19 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45263

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob Willard
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry.

Thanks.

DR:dr
111604-1

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45264

DL3

November 18, 2004
SECRET

2004 NOV 18 PM 4:37

To: SECDEF
Fr: SECNAV
Subj: QDR Issues



310.1

Mr. Secretary,

You asked for my thoughts on the QDR. The last QDR was published 19 days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the wound to our Nation was still fresh and the strategic, enduring impact of those attacks was still to be realized. Taken in that context, I propose we address the following issues:

- Global War on Terrorism. Building on lessons learned from OEF and OIF, rethink organizational alignments, processes and investments to optimize execution of the GWOT. Fund and imbed foreign language and cultural skills, rebalance tactical strike with other needs, develop metrics for stress on equipment, shorten acquisition times, etc.
- Balancing the Force. Develop a concerted Human Capital Strategy to reduce the manpower cost of DoD. Identify options to disrupt the ever higher cost trend in moving from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force. Identify and set objectives for the implementation of NSPS and strategically manage Contractor Support Services.
- Homeland Security. Partner with Homeland Security to improve the Nation's security posture. Focus on global maritime defense awareness with the Coast Guard and international naval forces, sharing information and using common systems to develop the equivalent of a maritime NORAD.
- Future Capabilities. Move joint assessment to the front end of the process of determining what capabilities are required. Develop tools, models, and simulation that can be utilized for assessing the effectiveness of systems relative to GWOT. Establish a risk analysis approach to evaluate technology and programs in a strictly joint environment.
- Post Hostilities Operations. Assess DoD roles in supporting transition to and from hostilities including interagency relationships and identify actions required to increase effectiveness in this area.

18 NOV 04

Copy to: Ryan Henry

16 NOV 04

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45265

COMMANDER
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND



ECCC

19 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC
20301-1000

SUBJECT: Commander, US European Command Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
Issues

1. The strategic shift underway since the end of the Cold War only accelerated after 9/11. This shift provides a unique opportunity for us to look beyond the crises that currently consume most of our defense establishment to consider how best to prepare for *our* long-term security challenges. Our current national prestige and power is a unique gift of history that we can use to prevent crises and indelibly shape the future security environment. Thus, the upcoming QDR comes at an ideal time to refocus all elements of national power in support of our overarching national security interests. I would especially like to see this QDR focus on organizational, doctrinal, and training issues from a Combatant Commander standpoint.

2. In response to your specific request, I offer the following topics for consideration and study during the QDR:

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), along with rapidly expanding technologies, have potentially empowered small groups of extremists to pose direct threats to our nation. We must eliminate organizational seams between nations, government agencies, and within DoD to prevent a catastrophic WMD attack on the United States or one of our allies. In addition to enhancing our ability to interdict WMD materials, the QDR should also consider strategies to address the underlying causes of terrorism, recognizing the current fight against Al-Qaeda is not the "approved solution" for countering future terror threats. Even now Islamic extremism is evolving from an Al-Qaeda centrally-directed organization to a regional franchise structure that loosely supports centrally derived themes and goals.

b. Restructure the interagency process to facilitate development and implementation of integrated global and regional strategies that leverage our vast array of diplomatic, economic and military tools in support of our national security interests. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study provides a useful starting point for energizing the discussion.

310.

19 Nov 04

16 Nov 04

The focus should be to foster stability to ensure future security. Within EUCOM's area of responsibility, Africa, and the Caucasus region are worthy focus areas for the QDR.

- c. The challenges we face in the post 9/11 environment call for a review of the capabilities needed to ensure security. High-demand low-density ~~skill~~ sets include personnel with appropriate language skills to support intelligence and security cooperation requirements. Additionally, military involvement during post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction is occurring more frequently, requiring personnel with unique skill sets not currently within core military competencies.
- d. GWOT has placed a different set of demands on our Guard and Reserve forces than those experienced during the Cold War. I recommend the QDR review the roles and responsibilities mix between active and reserve forces.
- e. Rotational and expeditionary forces will have a greater strategic effect in developing nations of the AOR. Clearly identified levels of presence, linked to regional security objectives and using rotational and expeditionary forces, is essential. QDR analysis to "right size" our force mix to include regional security cooperation requirements would help mitigate the tension that inevitably arises between global force managers and regional planners.
- f. Establish procedures and policies to identify and resolve Unified Command Plan (UCP) seam coordination issues between both geographic and functional commands. The ability to conduct security and stability operations across UCP boundaries during preconflict phases must be established. When one considers various Global Strike options, GWOT issues like targeting, SOCOM operations, and support to OIF, there is an increase in cross boundary work done under shrinking timelines. Doctrine, operating procedures, and training need to be updated to reflect that. Additionally, we still lack an effective mechanism to integrate operations, intelligence, logistics, and command and control capabilities — any contributions the QDR can make toward common command and control standards would benefit all the Combatant Commands.
- g. Recommend QDR address the issue of the structure of Unified Command headquarters to ascertain whether they are correctly sized and functionally organized to provide timely information on Interagency issues.
- h. QDR should examine how to re-mission portions of our focus to generate more Tier 3 special operations-capable forces needed to prosecute expanded GWOT activities in additional regions.

ECCC

SUBJECT: Commander, US European Command Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
Issues

3. Thank you for the opportunity to provide inputs for consideration during the QDR. I look forward to supporting your QDR team in a healthy debate on *issues of* organization, priorities, and future challenges.


JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps

CC:
PDUSD(P)

ORIGINAL

INFO MEMO

19 November 2004

FOR: **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps



SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Request for QDR Issues

The 2005 QDR should be a tightly focused effort that will achieve an executable DOD capability within a comprehensive national security apparatus. Specific issues to consider include:

- What are the capabilities and resources necessary to deal with the irregular, catastrophic and disruptive strategic challenges? How do we optimize the individual capability portfolios of the services in order to synergistically achieve the best strategic effect?
- How do we ensure our manpower processes best support the recruiting, training and retention that are so vital in dealing with the strategic challenges of the future? How do we improve the linkage between the joint employment of our manpower with the services' development of those manpower resources?
- What is the art of the achievable in improving our interagency efforts both at home and abroad? What are the appropriate partnerships/relationships with non-DOD entities within each of the strategic challenge areas?
 - a What should be the role of DOD in providing for the internal security of the homeland?
- Given the increasing interdependencies within DOD and with non-DOD agencies and departments, what is the appropriate mechanism to ensure synergy and effectiveness of our efforts?

COORDINATION: NONE.

Attachments: None

CC: CJCS

Ryan Henry

Prepared by: MajGen E. N. Gardner (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45269

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

2004 NOV 19 11:30 AM

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

INFO MEMO

November 19, 2004, 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

A. K. Cebrowski 11/19

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

- Rebalance the focus of Capabilities Based Planning to address the more relevant national security challenges. Shift the level of effort, both intellectually and resource wise, to the irregular, and potential catastrophic and disruptive challenges.
- Develop a strategic approach to cost. At a minimum, key elements of the strategy should include; decrease operational costs, better return on investment, broaden the base, create and preserve future options, manage divestiture, and impose cost to adversary. Compete on cost and time. Increase transaction rates (reduce cycle time), increase learning rates, create overmatching complexity at scale (modular scalable force structure).
- Develop an executable S&T strategy which is comprehensive across the Department and provides total S&T visibility. Included in the strategy must be an explicit approach to developing the intellectual talent base.
- Develop a coherent deployment, employment, sustainment strategy. Incorporate in the strategy key elements of the Mobility Capabilities Study and Sense and Respond Logistics Concept and the integration of Logistics, Operations and Intelligence.
- Develop a DoD Education and Learning Strategy to create a new national security culture and relationships to address the most critical component of our security capabilities, our people and future leaders. We can create the future by creating leaders capable of doing so.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Ryan Henry

Prepared By: T. J. Pudas, (b)(6)

310.1

19 NOV 04

16 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45270

OSD 18372-0A

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

VADM (ret) Cebrowski

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob Willard
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DRH:dk
11/16/04

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

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11-L-0559/OSD/45271

OSD 18372-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Topics

- You asked me to provide you with the top three to five issues that should be considered during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Here are some ideas:
- **Defense Health Program.**
 - How and where we are spending our healthcare money;
 - The budget for the unified medical program has grown from \$15 billion in FY 1993 to over \$30 billion in FY 2005 and is forecast *to* grow to \$50 billion by FY 2011.
 - Determine reasonable cost mitigation measures.
- **Force Structure.**
 - Pay and benefit structure (both military and civilian);
 - Military-civilian personnel mix;
 - Relationship between the active and reserve military components; and
 - Balance between the Services.
- **Post-conflict stability, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.**
 - Financing the training and equipping of friendly forces; and
 - Clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Department and other federal agencies.
- **Business process.** Address business process transformation with emphasis on integrated end-to-end processes and information systems.
- **Homeland Defense.** Clarify the Department's role vis-a-vis the other federal agencies.

COORDINATION: None

Cc: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Prepared By: John P. Roth, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45272

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

Ms. Jonas

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob Willard
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111604-1

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45273

DLR



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

SECRET
NOV 19 2004

INFO MEMO

19 Nov 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM VERN CLARK, Chief of Naval Operations

Vern Clark 11/19/04

310.1

SUBJECT: QDR Issues Input

Mr. Secretary -

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input to the 2005 QDR. Concurrent with aggressively prosecuting the Global War on Terror, we must transform DoD to meet the full scope of near and long-term strategic challenges. With that in mind, I propose the QDR address the following issues:

- Enhancing Operational Availability. Develop a force-planning methodology to provide clear guidance on the capabilities, structure, and alignment needed to meet the full range of future challenges. Our focus should be on speed and agility, and we should press with this principle: if it can't get to the fight on the correct timelines for the future, we aren't buying it! Advancements in technology and operational innovation will change the way we meet COCOM requirements --- more efficiently, with greater flexibility, and more affordable.
- Balancing Our Capabilities. Focus more deeply on capabilities needed when operating in irregular, catastrophic and disruptive security environments. We must decide if the desired force is part of a "Major Combat Operations" force set or whether forces will be designed specifically for the "other" security environments. Then we create the right balance in capabilities in these areas while also maintaining superiority against traditional threats.
- Managing Risk. QDR analysis should be tasked to explicitly identify joint capability gaps and overlaps. We should specifically decide where excess capacity/overlaps are desired and required. This is hard work and the work should start in the areas where the most significant investment issues exist.
- Assuring Access. Address growing anti-access technologies and politico-military factors that will influence how quickly we can get to the fight. Future forces must reduce the footprint ashore and fully exploit international sea and air maneuver space, thereby enhancing power projection, defensive shielding, and force protection options.
- Increasing Interagency and International Efforts. Address integrating DoD into the larger inter-agency and international environments, with the goal of strengthening coordinated strategies and operations. As part of that effort, we should investigate the impact of increasing partner nation capabilities as a means to enhancing stability and counter terrorism in multiple theaters.

19 NOV 0

16 NOV 04

copy to:
SECNAV, PA&E, PDUSD Policy

ORIGINAL

NOV 23 11:36



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6

November 19, 2004

MEMORANDUM THRU HONORABLE RYAN HENRY

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

This represents the combined reply from the CSA
and SecArmy on the Top Issues for QDR 05.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert E. Durbin".

Robert E. Durbin
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Director, Army QDRO

Enclosure

ORIGINAL

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45275

~~FOUO~~

PROPOSED QDR ISSUES

1. What are the strategic requirements of the 21st Century security environment?
 - Capability, availability, and usability of forces
 - Considerations for sustained / protracted conflict (complex terrain), intervention, deterrence
 - Impact on sustaining the all-volunteer force

2. What are the strategic forces for the 21st Century – the “new Triad”?
 - Inherently joint with Army, Marine Corps and SOF in major role
 - Strategically responsive and expeditionary
 - Trained and equipped for the challenges of the Security Environment
 - Constant and protected funding stream

3. What are the characteristics of a truly joint, interdependent and net-centric force?
 - Joint Fires, Force Projection, Sustainment, Battle Command, Air & Missile Defense
 - Deconfliction / Interoperability / Interdependence
 - Synergy / Simultaneity

4. What is the DoD role for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security?
 - Roles, missions, & capabilities – is it a core mission area?
 - Interagency C2
 - **AC** / RC structure and basing distribution

~~FOUO~~



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



SECRET
201 NOV 23 11 2

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
SUBJECT: Potential QDR Topics—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

310.1

* I recommend three subjects as the focus of the coming Quadrennial Defense Review:

- o What should be the future size and shape of US military forces? Active versus Reserve content? Military versus civil roles?
- o How should the investment portfolio be adjusted to reflect these conclusions? What steps might promote innovation in design and competition in execution?
- o What is our future compensation strategy, both military and civilian? (We can help answer this question by building on the results of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, which starts this year; I will work to align the schedules if you wish.)

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

cc: Mr. Ryan Henry (PDUSDP)

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

22 NOV 04
16 NOV 04



~~FOUO~~

HOV 172004 TIA

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals
Combatant Commanders

Dr. Chu

CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
VADM Bob Willard
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111604-1

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2004
I-04/0:4394
ES-1182

TO: Richard Lawless
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Andy Hoehn
FROM:
SUBJECT: Japan

JAPAN

If Howard Baker is going to leave right after the election, I believe it would be smart for us to move fast on as many of the pieces of the Japan/Okinawa puzzle as we can, and get an agreement from the Japanese, so it is behind us. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102704-8

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

27 Oct 04

OSD 18420-04

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 01 2004 15

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Qatar

Please see if you can find out some information on the attached paper. This is the first I've heard of anything like that.

Thanks.

Attach.
TS Doc (261841Z)

DHR:as
102804-6

.....
Please respond by 10/5/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 18421-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45280

Qatar

10/5/04

720

FOUO

November 4, 2004

ES-1300
04/014929

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT Possible Ceremony

The MOD of Portugal said we are transferring a couple of frigates to them, and he wondered if we ought to have some kind of a ceremony, somewhere. I suppose we could do it here in the U.S., if he could come over. It's probably easier than having me go over there.

Portugal

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-16

.....
Please respond by 11/17/04

4 Nov 04

OSD 18425-04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45281

05-11-04 P04:46

ES-1300

I-04/014929

DepSecDef

USDP

ES-4300

NOV 16 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA RICARDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (ACTING)

NOV 15 2004

SUBJECT: Possible Ceremony

- On 28 Oct, the President signed into law legislation to transfer to Portugal two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class frigates, the ex-SIDES and the ex-GEORGE PHILLIP.
 - Congressional notification is required prior to formally offering the frigates to Portugal. This is a 60-day process.
 - Once Navy makes the formal offer, we expect Portugal will accept.
- This will be a "cold" transfer, meaning the frigates are currently deactivated, and each will require about \$50 million in refurbishments to reactivate.
 - Portugal is aware of this and plans to do the work on one frigate in 2005 and the other in 2006. The work will be done in the US.
- Any near-term ceremony would consist of transfer of certificates, since the actual ships will not be ready until reactivation is complete.
- Once Portugal has accepted the formal offer, such a transfer of certificates could be accomplished on the margins of a NATO Ministerial) or other visit.

DASD (EUR/NATO): [Signature] Dir (EPS): _____

Prepared by: COL AJ Torres, ISP/EPS (b)(6)
Prepared on: 11/15/2004 07:49

OSD 18425-04

16-11-2004 11:39

11-L-0559/OSD/45282

FOR

15/11

FOUO

November 4, 2004

ES-1300
04/014929

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT Possible Ceremony

The MOD of Portugal said we are transferring a couple of frigates to them, and he wondered if we ought to have some kind of a ceremony, somewhere. I suppose we could do it here in the U.S., if he could come over. It's probably easier than having me *go* over there.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-16

.....
Please respond by 11/17/04

OSD 18425-04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45283

05-11-04 P04:46

~~FOUO~~


November 13, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Mumby
 (b)(6)

CC: Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Gift to Nicaraguan President



Please buy the David McCullough biography of Harry S Truman. I would like to send it to the President of Nicaragua with the attached note.

Thanks.

Attach.
 Note to President Bolanos

Tell (b)(6) its business deductible -

333 SD

DHR:dh
 111304-2

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45284

OSD 18546-04

13 Nov 04

do



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 19 2004

His Excellency
Enrique Bolaños Geyer
President
Republic of Nicaragua
Managua, Nicaragua

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you again for your warm hospitality during our visit and particularly for the family dinner at your home. Joyce and I were so appreciative of your thoughtfulness, and we particularly enjoyed having an opportunity to meet Mrs. Bolaños.

I also want to thank you for the beautiful woodcarving and the fascinating book on Nicaragua. It was kind of you to remember me with such thoughtful gifts.

During dinner, we talked of Harry Truman. Because of your interest, I thought you might enjoy reading the enclosed book, which I found most interesting.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

OSD 1854 6-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45285

333 SD

19 Nov 04


13 Nov 04

do

11-L-0559/OSD/45286

TRUMAN

DAVID MCCULLOUGH



11/19

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

NOV 12 2004

DepSecDef
USDP *[Signature]* ~~PROSSER~~ NOV 12 2004
I-04/015116-STRAT

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Global Posture Open Issues Decision Briefs (~~FOUO~~)

- After the 28 October SLRG on Global Posture you asked me to come to you with decision briefs on three remaining open issues (snowflake attached) –
 - o F-15s in the UK -- final location
 - o F-16s in Germany -- final location
 - o Japan, including Okinawa
- We are seeking to arrange for Gen Jones to brief you the week of 22 November.
 - o During that discussion I recommend that the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Gen Jumper be in attendance.
- ADM Fargo is meeting with his Component Commanders to update his proposals, and he is scheduled to be in DC the week of 6 December.
 - o Due to the importance of the Japan posture proposals, and the sensitivity of negotiations with the Japanese, he likely will have a Tank session with the Chiefs prior to briefing you.
 - o During ADM Fargo's session I recommend that the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and all four of the Service Chiefs attend.

RECOMMENDATION: If you agree I will work with VADM Stavridis to finalize the schedule, and provide the read ahead.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____
NOV 19 2004

COORDINATION: Joint Staff and CoComs.

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: CAPT R. M. Hendrickson (b)(6)

320.2 STRATEGIC 12 NOV 04 2 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

OSD
Process Control

then rate to
Policy.

Mr
Lt Col Kinsell

FN

CHED THRU UNCLASS
STRATEGIC

CREATED BY: **davisr**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC R
JCS R
USP O

FOUO

October 29, 2004

I#04/014561

ES-1231

TO: Ryan Henry

CC: Gen Dick Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen Pete Pace
 Doug Feith
 Ray DuBois
 Andy Hoehn

FROM:

SUBJECT: Decisions on Global Posture

In order to synch up our decision process with the budget process, we should quickly make decisions about several of the Global Posture issues. Over the next two to three weeks, please come in with decision briefs for me on:

- 1) Japan basing, including Okinawa plan
- 2) UK Fighter squadrons - final location'
- 3) F-16 Squadrons in Germany - final location

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-20

.....
Please respond by 11/22/04

Sir, ^{Dr 11/19}
 Response attached.
 v/r
 Lt Col Kessel

320.2 STRATEGIC

29 Oct 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/45290

OSD 18555-04



720
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

203
20 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Military Contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

In response to your snowflake dated 19 November 2004, we are working closely with your staff and General Myers' to develop U.S. force contribution numbers and usability metrics that better capture the breadth of our effort, including air, land, maritime, and special operations forces and associated critical enablers (e.g., tactical and strategic airlift, aerial refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). These will be provided to you by the last week of January to help you prepare for the NATO Informal Defense Ministerials starting 8 February in Nice, France.

In support of related NATO efforts, we will also provide these metrics and a proposed force contribution assessment methodology to the appropriate NATO officials.


E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

copy to:
CJCS
USD(P)

OSD 18661-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45291

~~FOUO~~

November 19, 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giarnbastiani
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Metrics

I sure would like to see some new metrics on

- 1) Our contributions to **NATO**
- 2) The usability of our forces

I'm disturbed that we seem to be unable to lay out decent tracking metrics.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
111904-16

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45292

OSD 18661-04

November 19, 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Metrics

I sure would like to see some new metrics on

- 1) Our contributions to NATO
- 2) The usability of our forces

I'm disturbed that we seem to be unable to lay out decent tracking metrics.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
111904-16

.....
Please *respond* by 12/3/04

381

19 Nov 04

OSD 18661-04

720

2/14/05

2/14
1730



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECURITY INFORMATION

2005 FEB -7 AM 7:41

ACTION MEMO

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

February 4, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells, Acting ASD(NII)/DoD CIO

SUBJECT: CIO

DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
151 PUL
MAR 3 2005
172 1315

*Very attached
for files*

020 NII

After we spoke in December, you asked me to prepare a reply from you to the Secretary on the CIO question. Based on our conversation in the car last week, I've revised a January 7 paper that I'd sent up, and the new version is attached for your consideration (Tab 1). In addition to our two discussions, it reflects recent talks with John Kasich, Pete Geren, Ken Krieg, Steve Cambone, and others.

Per yesterday's discussion, the memo focuses only on the CIO-ASD(NII) combination vice the four organizational options I'd originally proposed.

We have looked at the concept of a Defense Information Board, which you'd raised earlier. It is feasible, but given the difficulties of establishing a new Advisory Board under FACA rules, an Information Sub-Panel of the DSB may be a much easier way to achieve the same goals.

Next under is an amplification of some of the qualifications you might want in a CIO/ASD(NII)

Will be glad to discuss at your convenience.

RECOMMENDATION: Deputy Secretary of Defense sign correspondence at Tab 1.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

4 Feb 5 05

19 Nov 04

Prepared By: LtCol Palermo (b)(6)

MA SD	(SMA DSD)	<i>M2</i>
TSA SD	SA DSD	<i>Palermo/12</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M2</i>	
ESR MA	<i>FS</i>	

11-L-0559/OSD/45294



OSD 18673-04

Qualifications for CIO/ASD(NII)

- 1) Experience in managing a very large organization (not just consultant experience)
- 2) At least some knowledge of DoD
- 3) Sufficient technical expertise to understand what is required for success in three critical areas –
 - network operations (not just the old telephone company/comms network ops),
 - network security, and
 - performance in a very large, heterogeneous environmentFailure in any one of these could undo the vision, and
- 4) An ability to implement a collaborative environment and practices (human side) across a very large constituency.

TAB A

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

I support the points Ken Krieg made to you in his memo of October 25, and have spoken with DepSecDef, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Steve Cambone, and Mike Wynne as you asked. This memo amplifies Ken's and suggests ways ahead.

How do we empower the CIO for the Department?

All principals supported the concept of a strong, information-age Chief Information Officer (CIO) for DoD, with skills and powers to help transform the Department into an information-age organization. Success will involve leadership, communications, and marketing skills. How empowered he or she will be depends on answers to the questions raised below.

A strong CIO can't succeed without the backing of the Secretary's "full faith and credit," but empowering the CIO requires leadership, not new authorities.

- Both Title 40 and Title 10 give the CIO significant powers regarding budget and program oversight. Despite perceptions that Title 10 perpetuates Service and agency stovepipes, all applicable authorities come together at your level and you can choose how to balance them. Adoption of an enterprise-wide, information-centric focus would be a major change, but wouldn't require new statutes.
- Thus, I agree with Ken that the first question for you to decide is whether or not you personally want to take this issue on. But, if you do take it on, you also have to be willing to follow through. This can't be done just with periodic expressions of support. Key net-centric programs are underway, but they were begun when budgets were growing. Historical patterns don't bode well for continued net-centric transformation in a time of constrained resources without a sustained commitment from the top. As Ken puts it: "In a competition between digits and widgets, the widgets usually win." Supporters of net-centric transformation may wince when their own china starts being broken.

The CIO must become the "enabler" of information age transformation, but not the "doer." He or she must communicate the value of a net-centric environment

and drive and enforce standards, such as configuration, security **and** data management.

To achieve this, governance is key. Trust must be built before people will be willing to take chances, and to get this trust the CIO must:

- o Establish consistent and clear policies.
- Bring Principal Staff Assistants (**PSAs**) and components along as partners, and empower them to succeed.
- Measure progress.
- Find a big stick to prod the Department along. Industry CIOs point to the leverage provided **by** clearly enunciated standards, coupled with an ability to report to their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on compliance with the standards throughout their organizations.

The qualifications for the CJO will depend on what **you** want from the position

- Given the importance of your personal backing for the CIO, if you decide you're **not** willing to engage on a sustained basis, then leave the model as is. Look primarily to hire a technically oriented ASD/NII with a secondary role as an information-oriented CIO. The NII/CIO staff will do their best to leverage existing authorities to continue promoting information age transformation.
- o Four models of a stronger CIO were proposed during the discussions with principals (no effort is made to rank them here):
 1. Emphasize the CIO role and leave it with NII, but as DoD CIO/ASD(NII).
 2. Dual-hat an Under Secretary as CIO.
 3. Establish a stand-alone CIO. This led to two variants:
 - a. **A** stand-alone CIO within OSD, which might not be Senate-confirmed.
 - b. **A** completely new model, in **which** the CIO would have an internal role and also an external one, as Chairman of a DSB-like Defense Information Board, which would serve as an Information Advisory CommitteeEach of the last **3** models may have significant legal and organizational questions to be worked out.

What is the next step for the Kasich Group?

From a long range point of view, the most important element for the Department is to put in place a process for continuous transformation, one that will be hard to roll back and will transcend the tenure of any particular leader. The Kasich Group could provide advice on such approaches.

Once the type of **CIO** is decided, the recruiting process will be a major key to success: **A** world-class search committee should be set **up** to begin the search as soon as the questions above are answered, perhaps with Kasich Group support.

The Kasich Group also could help address some serious issues, such **as**:

- The industry model doesn't work exactly here:
 - DoD is much larger and more complex than any company.
 - If a business fails, it goes out of business. **If** DoD fails, people die. There are, therefore, reasonable limits to the amount of risk DoD can accept.
 - Our need to use competition makes it hard to impose sole-source standards (industry noted their standards often were product-specific).
 - Industry's two-to-hire, one-to-fire model for component CIOs will need careful monitoring if it is to work within the government's military and civilian personnel systems.

How do we ensure that this effort to produce an Information Age **CIO** will succeed? **If** it doesn't, it will **be** years before someone tries again.

I recommend that:

- **A** small DoD-only group begin addressing the above issues and prepare a short briefing to introduce the **CIO** issue to the **SLRG**, or a subset, in December.
- **A** longer **SLRG** session be scheduled in January in which the CEOs and CIOs from, say, two or three of the companies you saw before would spend **30-45** minutes with the **SLRG** to provide private sector perspectives. The **CIO** recruiting action would stem from this second session, though candidates could begin to be evaluated earlier against the different organizational models.
- **The** Kasich Group be engaged to help with the preparations for the second session, and also to address some of the issues raised above.
- Execution of the implementation strategy Ken recommended be deferred until the new **CIO** is on board, though **NIJ** will prepare interim approaches as your direction unfolds.

Hope this helps. **Will** be glad to discuss any of these issues **further**.

October 26, 2004

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CIO

Attached is a memo I sent to Ken Krieg and his response. Lin, please consult with the folks on this list and come back to me with some proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/4/04 SecDef memo to Krieg [100404-19]
10/25/04 Krieg ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
102504-25

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

Lin Wells,

In light of the latest E.O.s & the pending civil reform legislation, not to mention TSAT, BIG, etc., the role of a strong CEO is essential.

I'll support an effort toward that end.

SC

OCT 27 2004

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg 

SUBJECT: CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

This memorandum is in response to your questions in subject snowflake. The views are mine alone. My first question – and the key insight from the roundtable discussion – is will this area be one of your key priorities in the next period of time? The clear consensus was that the effectiveness of the CIOs stemmed from the commitment of their CEOs to this area. Assuming that it will be in the top tier (a crowded level, I realize), here are some thoughts on your two questions.

How do we empower a CIO for the Department?

To be effective, the CIO must be perceived as a DoD vice OSD official. The CIOs worldview has to be broad (operational and business, now and in the future), his focus has to be on customers (joint war fighters and key decision-makers), and his style has to be balanced (integrating strategy vice advocating specific programs). There are three areas of empowerment – perceived authority, actual authority, and the individual's capability to use the authority.

- Perceived authority is derived from the Secretary by the level of the position, in part, and, more fully, by the time and attention you give to it. The CIO is now a dual-hat position with the Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration, I would respectfully argue that the role is a little lost in the noise right now.
- Actual authorities probably could be strengthened in three areas -- by practice more than by legislation:
 1. The establishment of a DoD implementation strategy led by the CIO and agreed to by the SLRG/SEC – setting out direction, standards, and responsibilities. This should be of the 500-day variety vice the “hard-to-measure” grand strategy statements.
 2. The CIO would oversee implementation of the strategy and report regularly to you (and the SLRG/SEC) on performance and accountability.
 3. To add a little pressure to the system, you should establish dual-reporting lines for the component CIOs linking them to both the Component heads (i.e., Service Secretaries, etc.) and the DoD CIO.

11-L-0559/OSD/45301

- o The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a key member of the senior leadership group.

What is the next step in the Kasich Group?

As we work through this issue, I think we can use John and his team in the following ways:

- o As a red team to bounce development ideas off of.
- o Potentially help with the personnel search.
- Use a combination of CIOs plus their chairman for a "seminar discussion" with SLRG at kick-off for a QDR topic.
- o Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,
SUBJECT: CIO

What is the next step in the Kasich Group and the CIO for the Department?

And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.

8/13/04 Ken Krieg Memo to SecDef re: Snowflake Response on CIO

DHR:ss
100404-19

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,
Response attached.
✓/r
LT Col Lengyel
10/25*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45303

October 26, 2004

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CJO

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Thanks.

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10/25/04 Krieg ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
102504-25

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RC

OCT 27 2004

020 NII

26 Oct 04

19 Nov 04

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,
SUBJECT: CIO

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And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.
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DHR:ss
100404-19

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,
Response attached.
✓
Lt Col Lengyel
10/25*

OSD 01970-05

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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OSD 01970-05

11-L-0559/OSD/45306

- The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a key member of the senior leadership group.

What is the next step in the Kasich Group?

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- Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CIO

Please read this material from Lin Wells, set an appointment, and come to me personally with your recommendation so we can discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/19/04 Lin Wells memo to SecDef re: CIO

DHR:dh
120104-10

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

020 NIT

1 Dec 04

19 Nov 04

12/1

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

2004 NOV 22 AM 8:36

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Paul Butler
fwp
11/21

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

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- Both Title 40 and Title 10 give the CIO significant powers regarding budget and program oversight. Despite perceptions that Title 10 perpetuates Service and agency stovepipes, all applicable authorities come together at your level and you can choose how to balance them. Adoption of an enterprise-wide, information-centric focus would be a major change, but wouldn't require new statutes.
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The CIO must become the "enabler" of information age transformation, but not the "doer." He or she must communicate the value of a net-centric environment

TSA SD	11/23
SRMA SD	
MA SD	11/24
EXEC SEC	M 11/22
ESR	20 11/22

and drive and enforce standards, such as configuration, security and data management.

To achieve this, governance is key. Trust must be built before people will be willing to take chances, and to get this trust the CIO must:

- Establish consistent and clear policies.
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What is the next step for the Kasich Group?

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Once the type of CIO is decided, the recruiting process will be a major key to success: A world-class search committee should be set up to begin the search as soon as the questions above are answered, perhaps with Kasich Group support.

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How do we ensure that this effort to produce an Information Age CIO will succeed? If it doesn't, it will be years before someone tries again.

I recommend that:

- A small DoD-only group begin addressing the above issues and prepare a short briefing to introduce the CIO issue to the SLRG, or a subset, in December.
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Hope this helps. Will be glad to discuss any of these issues further.

SECRET
November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

I support the points Ken Krieg made to you in his memo of October 25, and have spoken with DepSecDef, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Steve Cambone, and Mike Wynne as you asked. This memo amplifies Ken's and suggests ways ahead.

How do we empower the CIO for the Department?

All principals supported the concept of a strong, information-age Chief Information Officer (CIO) for DoD, with skills and powers to help transform the Department into an information-age organization. Success will involve leadership, communications, and marketing skills. How empowered he or she will be depends on answers to the questions raised below.

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and drive and enforce standards, such as configuration, security and data management.

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- Bring Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and components along as partners, and empower them to succeed.
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Hope this helps. Will be glad to discuss any of these issues further.

January 28, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:

Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: CIO

After we spoke in December, you asked me to prepare a reply from you to the Secretary on the CIO question. Based on our conversation in the car yesterday, I've revised a January 7 paper that I'd sent up, and the new version is attached for your consideration (Tab 1). In addition to our two discussions, it reflects recent talks with John Kasich, Pete Geren, Ken Krieg, Steve Cambone, and others.

Per yesterday's discussion, the memo focuses only on the CIO-ASD(NII) combination vice the four organizational options I'd originally proposed.

We have looked at the concept of a Defense Information Board, which you'd raised earlier. It is feasible, but given the difficulties of establishing a new Advisory Board under FACA rules, an Information Sub-Panel of the DSB may be a much easier way to achieve the same goals.

Next under is an amplification of some of the qualifications you might want in a CIO/ASD(NII)

Will be glad to discuss at your convenience. I'm leaving for PACOM tomorrow, back on February 3rd, but my staff can make any changes to the memo while I'm gone.

O 20 NII

28 ans

19 NOV 04

Qualifications for CIO/ASD(NII)

- 1) Experience in managing a very large organization (not just consultant experience)
- 2) At least some knowledge of DoD
- 3) Sufficient technical expertise to understand what is required for success in three critical areas –
 - network operations (not just the old telephone company/comms network ops),
 - network security, and
 - performance in a very large, heterogeneous environmentFailure in any one of these could undo the vision, and
- 4) An ability to implement a collaborative environment and practices (human side) across a very large constituency.

TAB

1

January 28,2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: CIO

You asked me to take a look at Lin Wells' memo (Tab **A**) on expanding the functions of the DoD CIO. I've done this, with recommendations below.

Both Lin's memo, and Ken Krieg's earlier note, said that you personally would have to devote significant management time if you wanted to empower the CJO to lead the Department's information age transformation. The issue is important, but a realistic **look** at your schedule regrettably causes me to doubt if you will be able to devote such time. That said, I think there is a lot that can and should be done—it really is important to have someone pull the Department's information pieces together, but the industry CJO model may not be entirely appropriate for DoD, given our size and intensity.

Lin's memo teed up various organizational options, but the first step is to decide what you want from the CIO. Lin, Pete Geren and Ken Krieg are working with John Kasich to refine the CIO role for the DoD environment. In the long run, a combined USD(I) and NII focused on information seems the best way to drive the Department's information transformation. However, since that reorganization isn't on the table now, the focus should be on leveraging the CIO function with ASD(NII). The CIO should have both the strategic vision and experience to help lead the transformation of the Department, and also sufficient technical management prowess to deliver an environment that assures acceptable performance for, say, time critical targets in a mobile tactical network.

One way to reduce the demand on your time is to ensure the CIO has enough clout to be able to ensure that your vision for information age transformation is carried out. Once you let the Department know what you expect of the CIO, this approach could let you focus your support for him or her on those occasions when it really would be needed.

11-L-0559/OSD/45318

TAB

A

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

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Hope this helps. Will be glad to discuss any of these issues further.

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg 

SUBJECT: CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

This memorandum is in response to your questions in subject snowflake. The views are mine alone. My first question – and the key insight from the roundtable discussion – is will this area be one of your key priorities in the next period of time? The clear consensus was that the effectiveness of the CIOs stemmed from the commitment of their CEOs to this area. Assuming that it will be in the top tier (a crowded level, I realize), here are some thoughts on your two questions.

How do we empower a CIO for the Department?

To be effective, the CIO must be perceived as a DoD vice OSD official. The CIOs worldview has to be broad (operational and business, now and in the future), his focus has to be on customers (joint war fighters and key decision-makers), and his style has to be balanced (integrating strategy vice advocating specific programs). There are three areas of empowerment – perceived authority, actual authority, and the individual's capability to use the authority.

- Perceived authority is derived from the Secretary by the level of the position, in part, and, more fully, by the time and attention you give to it. The CIO is now a dual-hat position with the Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration. I would respectfully argue that the role is a little lost in the noise right now.
- Actual authorities probably could be strengthened in three areas -- by practice more than by legislation:
 1. The establishment of a DoD implementation strategy led by the CIO and agreed to by the SLRG/SEC – setting out direction, standards, and responsibilities. This should be of the 500-day variety vice the “hard-to-measure” grand strategy statements.
 2. The CIO would oversee implementation of the strategy and report regularly to you (and the SLRG/SEC) on performance and accountability.
 3. To add a little pressure to the system, you should establish dual-reporting lines for the component CIOs linking them to both the Component heads (i.e., Service Secretaries, etc.) and the DoD CIO.

11-L-0559/OSD/45323

- o The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a **key** member of the senior leadership group.

What is the next step in the Kasich Group?

As we work through this issue, I think we can use John and his team in the following ways:

- o **As** a red team to bounce development ideas off of.
- o Potentially help with the personnel search.
- Use a combination of CIOs plus their chairman for a "seminar discussion" with SLRG at kick-off for a QDR topic.
- Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.

October 26, 2004

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CIO

Attached is a memo I sent to Ken Krieg and his response. Lin, please consult with the **folks** on this list and come back to me with some proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/4/04 SecDef memo to Krieg-[100404-19]

10/25/04 Krieg *tr* to SecDef

DHR:dh
102504-25

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

Lin Wells,

In light of the latest E.O.s & the pending intel reform legislation, not to mention TSAT, BIG, etc., the role of a strong CIO is essential.

I'll support an effort toward that end.

DR

FOUO

OCT 27 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/45325

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: CIO

What is the next step in the Kasich Group and the CIO for the Department?

And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.

8/13/04 Ken Krieg Memo to SecDef re: Snowflake Response on CIO

DHR:ss
100404-19

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,
Response attached.
✓h
LT Col Langyel
10/25*



From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

3/3/05

Sec Def -

I think this fits well
with yesterday's decision
on NII.

Paul W.

020 NSI

3 Mar 05

19 Nov 04

OSD 18673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45327



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MAR - 3 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz ^{TW}

SUBJECT: CIO

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One way to reduce the demand on your time is to ensure the CIO **has** enough clout to be able to ensure that **your** vision for information age transformation is carried out. Once you let the Department know what you expect of the CIO, this approach could let you focus your support for him or her on those occasions when it really would be needed. I can provide more routine backing.

OSD 18673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45328

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NOV 22 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/15/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
111804-1

DR

22 Nov 04

For Official Use Only

Iraqi Security Forces Update

15 November 2004

Data as of: 15 NOV 04 Version M1

11-L-0559/OSD/45331


Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only


• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
–Police	
–Civil Intervention	
–Emergency Response	64,948
–Border Enforcement	
–Highway Patrol	
–Dignitary Protection	
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
–Army	
–National Guard	
–Intervention Force	50,934
–Special Operations	
–Air Force	
–Coastal Defense Force	
	<hr/>
	115,882

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003=
0 Iraqi Security
Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

*Anticipate a drop next week. Working with Joint Headquarters to determine exact number of soldiers who have been officially dropped from the rolls as a result of recent fighting, intimidation, and due to anticipated police losses in Mosul.

Date

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	15 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06	1 MAY 06
Regular Iraqi Police ⁽¹⁾	135,000			46%	59%	70%	78%
Special Police Regiments	1,200		50%	86%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions	3,600		67%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	270		85%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol ⁽²⁾	6,300	UNDER DEVELOPMENT					
Bur. of Dignitary Protection	500	89%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando Battalions	2,019	45%	75%	85%	100%	100%	100%
Dept of Border Enforcement ⁽³⁾	29,360	57%	62%	66%	73%	84%	94%

Notes

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

Legend	
■	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
□	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
■	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	15 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000		100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584		100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904		74%	100%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516	58%	67%	82%	100%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451		40%	58%	76%	100%

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	74	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,956	Norway	9	Tonga	63
Australia	406	Estonia	48	Latvia	119	Poland	2,477	Ukraine	1,590
Armenia	0	Georgia	161	Lithuania	86	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	7,862
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	269	Macedonia	33	Romania	741	US	138,472
Bulgaria	445	Italy	3,128	Moldova	11	Singapore	0		
Czech Rep	98	Japan	792	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	383	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,364	Thailand	0	Total	162,511


IRAQI FORCES ON HAND	174,379
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	87,084
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,091
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	168
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	925
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	16,794
ARMY	12,834
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,903
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	662
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING	131,710
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	50,051
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,091
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	168
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	370
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	1,650
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	15,190
ARMY	9,526
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,903
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	662
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

Notes


• Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security

• Armenia, Singapore & Thailand pending deployment of their forces



Iraqi Forces On Hand MNF-I

Data as of: 15 NOV 04



Trained Iraqi Forces MNF-I

NATO Training Team = 41

NATO Training in Iraq

For Official Use Only

- SHAPE OPLAN passed Military Committee under silence on 10 November. Now being forwarded to the NAC.
- Force Generation Conference 9-10 November was held to fill NTM-I Combined Joint Statement of Requirements for forces.
- NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq (NTIM-I) becomes NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) when Activation Order (ACTORD) is published.
- Conducted out-of-country training as follows:
 - 21 senior IZ officials attended Key Leader Training at Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, NO (1-8 NOV).
 - Three officers attended the Combined Joint Operations Centre Course at NATO School in Oberammergau, GE (6-13 NOV).

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45338

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	87,133	47,342	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	3,720	1,091	1,091	3,120	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	168	168	270	FEB '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	29,360	16,237	14,593	16,107	AUG '06
HIGHWAY PATROL	6,300	925	370	370	TBD
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	484	484	500	DEC '04
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS	2,019	2,019	900	2,019	JAN '05
TOTAL	177,169	108,057	64,948	75,186	AUG '06

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/45339

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS)	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	3,887	620	10,915 / 10,915	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	43,445	0	45,000 / 0	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	0	1,816	1794 / 4,790	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	590	0	0 / 725	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	48,498	2,436	57,709 / 16,430	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training	1,053 2,709 213
Civil Intervention Force	5 Week Specialized Training	0
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	0
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	597
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	0 NA (Prior Service IPS)
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Contractors	0
Special Police Commando Battalions	4 Weeks Basic Training 1-3 Weeks Advanced Training	3 Police Special Force Bns
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	5,019
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	1,428
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,087
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks Specialized Training at Umm Qasr	127
TOTAL		16,344

Data

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Special Police Commando Bns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- Completed emergency recruitment of 780 new soldiers to fill losses in the Iraqi Intervention Force's First Brigade.
- Began rebuilding of Mosul Police after their collapse in the face of multiple insurgent attacks.
- 259 soldiers now part of the 1st Mechanized Battalion, with 10 MTLB armored personnel carriers.

Training:

- 2,506 Iraqi Police Service students graduated from the Basic Course
- 1,091 Public Order Battalion officers completed their 5-week training program.
- 125 Bureau of Dignitary Protection students graduated from courses in VIP Personnel Security Detail Operations, Motor Escort Operations, and VIP Site Security.
- 70 Iraqi police personnel graduated from the Emergency Readiness Unit Phase I course.

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Equipping:

- Issued 600 weapons, 10 vehicles, 212 radios, and 350 body armor vests to Ministry of Interior forces
- Issued 4,812 sets of body armor, 287 weapons, 1990 helmets, 11,000 field jackets, 9 vehicles, 5,000 pairs of running shoes and 8,000 uniforms to Ministry of Defense forces.

Building:

- Awarded a \$45M contract to construct all new facilities for one Iraqi National Guard Brigade.
- Awarded contract for water pipeline and pump station at Al Kasik.
- Completed master plan and statement of work to construct a brigade set of barracks and facilities at Rasheed/Ar Rustamiyah in Baghdad.
- Awarded four police station projects worth combined total of \$650,000.

Mentoring/Employing:

- LtGen Abdul Qader commanding Iraqi forces in Fallujah with Iraqi liaison officers providing liaison to Joint Headquarters. National Joint Operations Center and Joint Headquarters Operations Center operating and tracking Iraqi Army operations.
- 1st Brigade, 1st Division (Iraqi Intervention Force); 3rd Brigade (-), 5th Division (Regular Army); 36th Commando Battalion; two Shewani Special Forces battalions; and Police Emergency Response Unit; deployed for operations vicinity of Fallujah.
- Iraqi Air Force conducts reconnaissance missions in support of MND/SE locating downed power lines and leaking pipelines.
- 1st Police Commando Battalion returned from Mosul and operating in Baghdad. 2nd Police Commando Battalion returned to Baghdad from North Babil and continues operations in Samarra. 3rd Police Commando Battalion deployed to Mosul for operations.

720
~~FOUO~~

ES-1170

04/014316-ES

October 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers

SUBJECT: Elections in Iraq

Attached is a note I am sending Condi. It seems to me you ought to get a group together here, and we ought to start thinking about these things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102504-26

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

10-26-04 P05:48 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/45345

OSD 18718-04

IRAC

26 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The Iraqi elections in January could produce a variety of outcomes. Candidates could win who are right on the mark, somewhere in the middle, or notably unhelpful.

The NSC needs to think through appropriate strategies and objectives now to:

- Do what we can so the outcome is favorable to the President's goals.
- Strategies to deal with all of the various possible outcomes.

Let me know what we can do to help.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45346

12/9

ACTION MEMO

NOV 17 2004 USD(P) *[Signature]* NOV 17 2004

1-04/012998

Deputy
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- On October 15, 2004, you asked Policy to examine if DoD needs a policy on detainee body cavity exams,
- I have reviewed this matter and recommend that you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) that promulgates DoD-wide policy and guidelines on the use of body cavity exams on detainees in DoD control (Tab B).

COORDINATION:

OGC Mr. Dell'Orto 25 October 2004
 Joint Staff Director, Joint Staff 27 October 2004
 Health Affairs CAPT Jack Smith 2 November 2004

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Ross Hyams, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

DSD

Paul

Please see Pete Green's note at Tab C on the yellow notes

JK
Dave

2 You *1* Do you really mean to require a GQFO approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved?

2 See Pete Green's comment. *12/9*
Does my edit of bullet 3 fix the problem?
Please reclarify this.

TSA SD	11/25
SRMA SD	12/10 JCU 12/10/04
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 11/27 11/8
ESR	16V 11-23-04

FW

3836

17 NOV 04

15 OCT 04

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HEALTH AFFAIRS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this policy.

Attachment:
As stated

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45348

Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and Exams of Detainees in DoD Control.

The United States has a significant and legitimate interest in performing appropriate security searches and medical exams that address the safety, health, and security concerns of DoD personnel and detainees under DoD control. However, the use of body cavity exams and searches may conflict with the customs of some detainees. Therefore, effective immediately, the following guidelines are in effect:

- Do not perform routine detainee body cavity exams or searches (to include hernia exams).
- Body cavity exams may be performed for valid medical reasons with the verbal consent of the patient. However, these exams should not be performed as part of a routine medical intake exam.
- Body cavity searches ~~are to~~ ^{may} be conducted ~~only~~ when there is a reasonable belief that the detainee is concealing an item that presents a security risk.
- To the extent possible and consistent with military necessity, a body cavity exam or search, whether conducted for medical or security reasons, should be conducted by personnel of the same gender as that of the detainee being searched.
- All body cavity exams and searches will be conducted in a manner that respects the person.
- The first general officer in the chain of command shall be the approval authority for body cavity searches (other than those performed for valid medical reasons).
- For the purposes of this policy, a detainee is a person under the control of the Department of Defense as a result of armed conflict, including the global war on terrorism, and includes enemy combatants, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees.

FOUO

ES-1056
04/013818

October 15, 2004

879

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Checking Detainees for Health

I don't see why U.S. taxpayers have to worry about whether detainees have hernias or enlarged prostates, particularly since examinations for it lead to charges of abuse.

383.6

Please find out whether that practice is still going on or if it has been discontinued.

DHR:ss
101404-14

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

FOUO

15 Oct 04

INFO MEMO

USD(P)

*copy provided
12/31/04
1/10*

I-04/013818

ES-1056

REC 31 2004

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Ryan Henry

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- You questioned whether it is necessary to require a GO/FO approval for a detainee body cavity search and if Pete Geren's edit of bullet # 3 of the policy fixed the problem (Tab A).
- We remain convinced that such approval should be required [redacted] would not jeopardize force protection.
 - o Policy convened a group of policy, legal, corrections, operational and medical experts and assessed that this policy will not impact current operations.
 - Units in Afghanistan no longer conduct routine body cavity searches.
 - Alternative non-invasive means of checking detainees for contraband are available.
- When the Secretary asked for this policy, we understood his intent to be to minimize the use of detainee body cavity searches, except for extraordinary security circumstances.
 - o As written, this draft policy ensures that detainee body cavity searches are conducted as an exception, not the norm.
 - o Approval at the GO/FO level will emphasize to lower-level commanders that this course of action is only for use in extraordinary circumstances.
- Recommend that you sign the attached memorandum that promulgates the policy attached at Tab B.

COORDINATION:

OGC	Chuck Allen	16 December 2004
Joint Staff	Col Barry Coble	16 December 2004

D
S
R
I

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HEALTH AFFAIRS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this policy.

Attachment:
As stated

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/45352

Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and Exams of Detainees in DoD Control.

The United States has a significant and legitimate interest in performing appropriate security searches and medical exams that address the safety, health, and security concerns of DoD personnel and detainees under DoD control. However, the use of body cavity exams and searches may conflict with the customs of some detainees. Therefore, effective immediately, the following guidelines are in effect:

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- Body cavity exams may be performed for valid medical reasons with the verbal consent of the patient. However, these exams should not be performed as part of a routine medical intake exam.
- Body cavity searches are to be conducted only when there is a reasonable belief that the detainee is concealing an item that presents a security risk.
- To the extent possible and consistent with military necessity, a body cavity exam or search, whether conducted for medical or security reasons, should be conducted by personnel of the same gender as that of the detainee being searched.
- All body cavity exams and searches will be conducted in a manner that respects the person.
- The first general officer in the chain of command shall be the approval authority for body cavity searches (other than those performed for valid medical reasons).
- For the purposes of this policy, a detainee is a person under the control of the Department of Defense as a result of armed conflict, including the global war on terrorism, and includes enemy combatants, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

10 December 2004 - 1700

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

Subject: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations


Sir,

The DSD reviewed the attached document and states the following:

“Ryan 1) Do you really mean to require GO/FO approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved? 2) See Pete Geren’s comment. Does my edit of bullet #3 fix the problem? Please reclear this. PW”

Please provide a copy of this tasker with your response.

Very Respectfully



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 15 Dec 04
ATTACHMENT: As Stated

OSD 18742-04

383,6

10 Dec 04

15 Dec 04

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

NOV 17 2004 2004 NOV 22 09 30 NOV 17 2004
USD(P) *[Signature]* 1-04/012998

Deputy
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- On October 15, 2004, you asked Policy to examine if DoD needs a policy on detainee body cavity exams.
- I have reviewed this matter and recommend that you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) that promulgates DoD-wide policy and guidelines on the use of body cavity exams on detainees in DoD control (Tab B).

COORDINATION:

OGC Mr. Dell'Orto 25 October 2004
 Joint Staff Director, Joint Staff 27 October 2004
 Health Affairs CAPT Jack Smith 2 November 2004

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Ross Hyams, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

DSD

Paul

Ryan (1) Do you really mean to require a GOFD approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved?

Please see Pete Geren's note at Tab C on the yellow notes

(2) See Pete Geren's comment. Does my edit of bullet 3 fix the problem? Patterson 12/9

*JK
Dove
Please recheck this.*

T&A SD	11/25
SRMA SD	11/10 JCL 12/09
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 11/25 11/8
ESR	16V 11-23-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45355 *FU*



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JAN 12 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HEALTH AFFAIRS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

3836

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

12 JAN 05

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in
accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is
distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this
policy.

Attachment:
As stated

OSD 18742-04

15 OCT 04



Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD

From: Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 12:13 PM
To: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD
cc: Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL
Subject: RE: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

40013

Close it as far as I'm concerned. Thx

Michael L. Bruhn
Director of Operations
for the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 12:12 PM
To: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD
cc: Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL
Subject: FW: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

We have this case as closed. The attached action memo was signed by Mr. Wynne on 23 Nov 04. We have no further response from the SecDef.
<< File: osd 18755-04_Complete.pdf >>

-----Original Message-----

From: Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 9:38 AM
To: Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL; Barker, Elizabeth, CTR, OSD-ATL; Gamble, Michael, CTR, OSD-ATL
Subject: FW: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

23 NOV 05

Pls check, thx

Michael L. Bruhn
Director of Operations
for the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 9:32 AM
To: Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL
Subject: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

Mike,

21 OCT 04

I'm still carrying this as open. What do you show? It's old, can I close it?

Thanks,
JB.

Jason O. Boykin - ESD, WHS (b)(6)

ORIGINAL

HOLD
COPIES
ECCO

NOV 23 2004 5:27 PM



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

30 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

November 23, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9
AUB

From: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Technology and Logistics)

[Handwritten signature]

Subject: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

- The purpose of this memo is to give you some early returns in response to your snowflake on Bold Ideas in Acquisition Management. The ideas are relatively easy to implement and would better align key organizations to incentivize jointness, the first step in improving acquisition. These ideas would be steps towards a bolder concept but would be useful whether or not you, and perhaps the Congress, embrace a bolder proposal. Since jointness is a Department objective, you can also achieve a major refocus by aligning resources with a policy directive.
- For aligning resources, it will be necessary to direct Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding for joint, transformational and international programs, which AT&L will identify in each of the Services' fiscal guidance. Changes to those programs would require my approval prior to POM submission. This change would put your objectives for Joint, Transformational, and those International programs you support, at the top of the priority list. Unfortunately, as you know, joint programs are at or near the lowest priority for the Service programmers. As Secretary Roche ruefully puts it: "Joint means Navy won't pay." Transformational programs usually mean new programs and in any budget end-game, current programs beat new programs. Currently, international programs compete for the dubious distinction of being the lowest priority for the Services. Attached is a memo which gives such budgeting direction (Tab A) I recommend you sign it.
- Most of the objectives of Secretary Aldridge's Study regarding acquisition, and even an earlier study (1992) by Secretary Yockey, were to achieve jointness and to address capabilities, not individual systems. As I construct a bold proposal, driving jointness and avoiding duplicate systems, such as trucks, will be the overarching objectives. Saving slots should be secondary and should not therefore be the objective. In the interim, the following steps would be effective in promoting jointness and could be implemented this cycle:



11-L-0559/OSD/45359

ORIGINAL

OSD 18755-04

[Handwritten notes at bottom of page]

- Realign all Service research **and** development (R&D) commands and laboratories under the Director Defense Research **and** Engineering (D,DR&E). Establish Centers of Excellence with the **current** DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) in order **to** concentrate Science & Technology (S&T) and R&D efforts in **specific** areas. Developmental priorities would be addressed without duplicative structures. if you agree, I will **task** D,DR&E to come back to me in forty five days with a **recommendation on how they would organize these capabilities**. Examples of **organizations** that will be realigned **can** be found at **Tab B**.
- Realign all Logistics organizations **and** functions, currently resident within the Services, under the **Deputy Under** Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness)(DUSD(L&MR)). If you agree, I will **task** the DUSD(L&MR) to come back to me in forty five **days** with a recommendation on how they might organize to accomplish this objective. This consolidated logistics focus would **facilitate** efficiencies, balanced workloads and **make** public private partnerships **more** productive. Examples **of** organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab C**.

COORDINATION: Tab D

RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Recommend you sign the memo at **Tab A**.
2. Recommend you approve development of implementation plans for realigning R&D commands and laboratories as well as Material Management and Maintenance organizations (Tabs **B** and **C**)– with response within **45 days**.

Approve _____

Disapprove: _____

See **Me**: _____

CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Priority for Joint, Transformational, and International Acquisition Programs

In order to ensure appropriate emphasis is given to Joint, Transformational, and International programs, I am directing Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding, in the budgeting process, for programs in these categories. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) USD(AT&L) will identify the program funding for each of these programs in the Services' fiscal guidance.

Changes to these programs shall require USD(AT&L) approval prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission. The process is intended to ensure the integrity of these Joint, Transformational, and International programs critical to transforming the Department of Defense and meeting the capability needs of our warfighters.



11-L-0559/OSD/45361

Proposed RDT&E Realignment

- Office of Defense Research (Science)
 - Office of **Naval Research** (Naval Research Lab as the **Defense Research Lab**)
 - **Army Research Office**
 - **Army Research Lab**
 - **Air Force Office of Scientific Research**
 - **Air Force Research Lab**
 - **Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency**
- Office of **Technology** and Engineering (**Demonstrations** and **Prototypes**)
 - **R&D Components of the Naval Systems Commands and Warfare Centers (Non-ACAT I)**
 - **Marine Corps Warfighting Lab**
 - **R&D Components of Army Research, Development & Engineering (Non-ACAT I)**
 - **R&D Components of the Air Force Systems Program Offices (Non-ACAT I)**

Proposed Logistics Realignment

- **Materiel Management**
 - **Army, Navy and Air Force Inventory Control Points**
 - **DLA Supply Centers**
 - **Other Materiel Mgt storage locations from the Services and Defense Agencies**
 - **Army Arsenals**
 - **Marine Corps Logistics Base**
- **Maintenance and Repair Facilities**
 - **Army and Marine Corps Maintenance Depots**
 - **Naval and Marine Corps Aviation Depots**
 - **Naval shipyards**
 - **Air Logistics Centers**
- **Distribution Centers/Depots**
 - **Defense Distribution Depots**
 - **Weapons stations and ammunitions depots**
 - **Operational (retail level) stock points**
- **Logistics Information Services**

COORDINATION

General Counsel



November 23, 2004

TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen Pete Pace Jim Roche
 Gordon England Les Brownlee
 Jim Haynes Powell Moore
 Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RL*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

413.51

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21st Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, **we** absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

21 OCT 04

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 102004-18

.....
 Please respond by _____

OSD 18755-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/45365